

0355

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ACC

10000 | 120 | 1045

561

Cpe

A

0356

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

10000 | 120 | 1045

56(1/2) Reports on Political + General - Italian Situation

Opened Ap. 27, 1944 - Closed Sept. 13, 1944

- Ap. - Spt. 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

2

Subject:- ANDREUCCI Ernesto (CC.RR)

Main HQ,
Eighth Army, CMF.
M 349 I(b)

106

13 Sep 44

HQ - MMIA, ROME.
Rear HQ Eighth Army

1. Herewith personal file in respect of the a/n man (ref 316/44) for information and retention.
2. It is thought that the information contained therein may be of some interest.

Forwarded for interest.

SEARCHED	I
INDEXED	
Date Recd	18 9 44 ^D

Field
DL/DB

14 Sep 44

File
72
for S.S.I.
Capt

10358

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: ANDREUCCI Ernesto.

SECRET.
G.S.I. (B) Rear 2 Polish Corps.
N° 497 / INT. B. 2 / 44.
15 APRIL 44.

9A

To: G.S.I. (B) MAIN H.Q. HIGHWAY ARMY.

8A

SEEN BY	
G.I.	
G.I.	
I.O.C.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.I.	<i>[Signature]</i>
I.O.C.	

Following your 315/44 I(b) dated 13 Apr. 44:

- 1) ANDREUCCI Ernesto was released on the 14 Apr. 44.
- 2) ANDREUCCI was furnished with a movement order enabling him to return as soon as possible to his H.Q. BARE.
- 3) Arrest Report Cat. "C" N° 307/INT. B/44 dated 19 Mar 44 is therefore cancelled.

[Signature]
G.S.I. (B).

Good!

15 APR 1944
316/44

76

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

8A

Subject:- ANDREUCCI Ernesto

Main H.Q.,
Eighth Army, C.M.F.
M 316/44 I(b)

GSI(b),
Rear HQ 2 Polish Corps.

17 Apr 44

6A

Reference M 316/44 I(b) dated 3 Apr 44.

1. It is considered that ANDREUCCI may be ordered to return to his HQ in BARI in uniform, without any further disciplinary action.
2. Please furnish him with a written movement order to that effect and send him off as soon as possible.

Field.
EWI/DB.

[Signature]
Lt. Col.
G.S.I.

Copy to: HQ 26 SLV att. 2 Polish Corps.

file

0369

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

Main H.Q.,
Eighth Army, C.M.F.
M 316/44 I(b)

Mar 44

Subject:- ANDREUCCI Ernesto

GSI(b),
HQ AAI.

1. The above-named has been arrested (Category "C") by 3 Carpathian Div F.S. Section, and the following particulars of him have been received here :-
 - (a) He is a Caporale-maggiore CC.RR of 139 Sezione CC.RR stationed at BARI, attached 9 Italian Corps.
 - (b) He was apprehended in CASTEL DI SANGRO (Prov AQUILA) on 9 Mar 44 and was found to be carrying a number of notes which he stated were destined for persons living in enemy occupied territory (attached).
2. He has now been interrogated more fully and the following points have been brought out :-
 - (a) He states that the following are the names of the persons who sent him :-
 - (i) Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto, Commanding 9 Corpo d'Armata. (BARI).
 - (ii) Generale UTILLI, Commanding the Italian First Motorised Group. (SCAPOLI H.0434).
 - (iii) Tenente Colonello LOMBARDI, Capo di Stato Maggiore of IGGNANO Division (SCAPOLI).
 - (iv) Colonello VALFRE, Commanding 11° Raggruppamento di Artiglieria (SCAPOLI).
 - (v) Generale GAZERA, (newly arrived from America) (BARI).
 - (vi) Generale GUASCO (BARI).
 - (vii) Director of S.E. Railway CALLEGARI (BARI).
 SCAPOLI is a "frazione" of COLLI A VOLTURNO, Prov CAMPOBASSO.
 - (b) That his orders to move were given to him by Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto.
 - (c) That he was bound for :-

DRONERO (Prov CUNEO)
CIRIE (Prov TORINO)
GENOVA
PISA (if possible).
 - (d) That the purpose of his journey was to obtain family

in enemy occupied territory (attached).

2. He has now been interrogated more fully and the following points have been brought out :- He states

- (a) That the following are the names of the persons who sent him :-
- (i) Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto, Commanding 9 Corpo d'Armata. (BARI).
 - (ii) Generale UTILI, Commanding the Italian First Motorised Group. (SCAPOLI H.0434).
 - (iii) Tenente Colonello LOWBARDI, Capo di Stato Maggiore of LEGNANO Division (SCAPOLI).
 - (iv) Colonello VALFRE, Commanding 11° Raggruppamento di Artiglieria (SCAPOLI).
 - (v) Generale GAZERA, (newly arrived from America) (BARI).
 - (vi) Generale GUASCO (BARI).
 - (vii) Director of S.E. Railway CALLEGARI (BARI).
- SCAPOLI is a "frazione" of COLLI A VOLTURNO, Prov CAMPOBASSO.
- (b) That his orders to move were given to him by Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto.
- (c) That he was bound for :-
 DRONERO (Prov CUNEO)
 CIRIE (Prov TORINO)
 GENOVA
 PISA (if possible).
- (d) That the purpose of his journey was to obtain family news, to contact officers and suggest to them that they should escape into the mountains, to find out information on the collaboration of CC.RR, and information on enemy positions, arms etc.
- (e) That he left BARI on 1 Mar 44 in an Italian Military lorry and his route was BARI - CORATO - COLLI - SCAPOLI.
- (f) That he was instructed to contact (viii) Tenente Colonello BOSCARINI, C.O. Battaglione di ARDITI at SCAPOLI, and that this officer ordered a patrol from his Bn to help ANDREUCCI to cross the lines. The patrol left him alone in PISTEL S. Vincenzo (Prov CAMPOBASSO).
- (g) That Ten. Generale LERICI Roberto entrusted him with a special mission to pick up information about the enemy, positions of troops, arms etc.

(h) /

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- 2 -

- (h) That he proceeded to SCAPOLI in his Carabinieri uniform, and there changed into civilian clothes; grey trousers, blue jacket, black greatcoat, grey hat and Italian military boots.
- (i) That no arrangements had been made for his return.
3. 2 Polish Corps have been requested to draw the attention of Gen. UTILI to the fact that despatch of persons or messages into enemy territory is strictly forbidden without the specific authority of this HQ, and that if a breach of this regulation is again encountered disciplinary action will be taken.
You will no doubt be taking appropriate action in the case of the other officers.
4. ANDREUCCI Ernesto is being kept in detention at CARPINONE Carabinieri barracks for the time being, but will be sent back to BARI Carabinieri unless he is required for further interrogation.

Field.
EWL/DB.*file*

73

Lt. Col.
G.S.I.

10 3 6 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject:- ANDREUCCI Ernesto

SECRET ^{b²}

Main H.Q.,
Eighth Army, C.M.F.

M 316/44 I(b)


5A
GSI(b),
Rear HQ 2 Polish Corps.

3 Apr 44

Reference 360/INF.B.Tj./44 dated 26 Mar 44.

1. HQ AAI have been informed of the circumstances of the case, and have been asked to inform this HQ if ANDREUCCI is required for further interrogation. In the meantime he should be kept in gaol.
2. It will be noted that several officers, including Gen. UTILI, of the 1st Italian Motorised Bde, were attempting to forward letters into enemy territory via ANDREUCCI.
3. Although the contents of the letters appear to be innocuous it must be pointed out to Gen. UTILI that the despatch of messages or persons into enemy occupied territory under any circumstances, without the specific authority of this HQ, is strictly forbidden, and that in future disciplinary action will be taken against any officer or man despatching or assisting the despatch of messages into enemy territory.

Field.
GDF/DB.

 Lt. Col.
G.S.I.

Copy to: HQ 26 BLU att. 2 Polish Corps.

file

72

10364

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

Subject: ANDREUCCI Ernesto.

G.S.I. (L) Rear 2 Polcorps.
No 360 INF. I. T.J. 44/44
26 Mar 44. SEP

To : G.S.I. (b) MAJ H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY.

1. Reference M 316/44 I (b) dated 23 Mar 44.
2. Hereunder results of interrogation of ANDREUCCI Ernesto as requested:
 - a) 1. Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto at BARI, Commandante 9° Corpo d'Armata.
 2. Generale BRILLI at SCAPOLI
 3. Tenente Colonnello LOMBARDI at SCAPOLI
 4. Colonnello VALFRE at SCAPOLI
 5. Generale GAZERA at BARI (new arrived from America) Special mission
 6. Generale GUASCO at BARI, GAZERA's Adjutant.
 7. Director of S.E. Railway CALLIGARI at BARI.
- b) Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto
- c) 1. BIGNERO province CUNEO
2. CIRIÀ province TORINO
3. SMOVA
4. PISA if possible.

- d) 1. News from family
2. Contact officers and suggest them to escape in the mountains.
3. Information about collaboration of CC.RR.
4. Information about enemy positions, arms etc.

He left BARI on 1 Mar 44 in an Italian military lorry (from the Badoglio Army).
The route was BARI-CORATO-COLLI-SCAPOLI.
To contact Lieut. Colonel BOSCARINI, C.O. Reggimento di ARDITI at SCAPOLI. The Lt/Col. ordered a patrol from his Bn. to help ANDREUCCI to cross the lines.
The patrol left him alone in CASTEL S. VINCENZO.
Tenente Generale LERICI Roberto.

Ernesto (no last)
Calligari (no last)
Calligari
Ernesto
f. Ernest

G.2
O.3 (A)
L.O. (I)
G.3 (C)
L.O. (C)

PA 27/3

- 3. Tenente Colonnello LOMBARDI at SCAROLI
Comandante Regimento della Divisione LEGNANO
- 4. Colonnello VALFRE at SCAROLI
Capo di Stato Maggiore della Div. LEGNANO
- 5. Generale GAZERA at BARI (new arrived from America)
Commandante di 11° Reggimento di Artilleria.
Special mission
- 6. Generale GUASCO at BARI, GAZERA's Adjutant.
- 7. Director of S.E. Railway CALLEGARI at BARI.

b) Tenente Generale IERICI Roberto

- c) 1. DROMERO province CUNEO
- 2. CINESE province TORINO
- 3. GENOVA
- 4. PISA if possible.

- d) 1. News from families
- 2. Contact officers and suggest them to escape in the mountains.
- 3. Information about collaboration of CC.NR.
- 4. Information about enemy positions, arms etc.

We left BARI on 1 Mar 44 in an Italian military lorry (from the Desaglio Army).

The route was BARI-CORATO-COLMI-SCAROLI.

To contact Lieut. Colonel BOSCARINI, C.O. Battaglione di ARDITI at SCAROLI. The Lt/Col. ordered a patrol from his Bn. to help AVRE-UCCI to cross the lines.

The patrol left him alone in CASTEL S. VINCENZO.

Tenente Generale IERICI Roberto.
see para "d" subpara 4.

h) NIL

- i) In his CC.NR uniform as far as SCAROLI, where he changed into civilian clothes: gray trousers, blue jacket, black greatcoat, gray hat and Italian military boots.

7 MAR 1944
216/44

[Handwritten signature]
Captain
G.S.I. (b).

[Handwritten notes:]
Corato (Bn. 2nd)
Colmi (Bn. 1st)
Valfre
Bari
1 Colmi

[Handwritten notes:]
BARI - Corato - Colmi - Scaroli
Colmi - Bari

10 3 6 6

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4A

SECRET

Subject: ANDREUCCI Ernesto

Main H.Q.,
Eighth Army, C.M.F.

OSI(b),
Rear Hq 2 Polish Corps.

M 316/44 I(b)

23 Mar 44

1. Reference 307/INF.B.TJ./44 dated 19 Mar 44.
2. It is considered that ANDREUCCI should be detained (still as Category "C") in the CASERMA CC.RR at CARPINONE, while investigations are being carried out.
3. Please arrange to have ANDREUCCI questioned on the following points :
 - (a) What are the names of the people who sent him?
 - (b) Who gave him the orders?
 - (c) To what towns was he bound?
 - (d) What was the purpose of his journey?
 - (e) When did he set out from BARI? What was his route?
 - (f) How was he to contact the Italian patrol which was to help him to cross our lines? Which patrol was it?
 - (g) Who entrusted him with the special mission for the Italian Army to pick up information about the enemy? What kind of information was desired?
 - (h) Were any arrangements made for his return?
 - (i) How was he dressed?

Field.
EWL/DB.

Dwight Cooper
Lt.Col.
G.S.I.

Copy to: H. 26 BLU att 2 Polish Corps.
F80, 263 F.S. Section (for info).

70

file

0367

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

9/1

SECRET. 3^A

SEEK BY

G. 2 G.S.I.(b) Rear 2 Polcorps.

G. 3 (M) No 307/ INF.D.Tj./44.

L.O. (M) 15 March 44.

G. 3 (C) *see #4^A, #5^A 2^A, 1^A*

L.O. (C)

Subject : ANDREUCCI Erneste.

To : G.S.I.(b) MAIN H.Q.

Herewith arrest report for ANDREUCCI Erneste fu
 Angelo, Category "C" with mail as requested.
 Please inform us of any further disposal instruc-
 tions.

21 MAR 1944
 301

[Signature]
 Captain
 G.S.I.(b).
 69

ARRREST REPORT

RAPORT O ARESZTOWANIU

Nr. 317/44

All entries in block capitals. All spaces to be filled in. If information not known State "Not known".
 Pisać literami drukowanymi albo na maszynie. Wszystkie rubryki mają być wypełnione. O ile brak danych do wypełnienia pisać: "Nie ustalono".

Name Nazwisko	A N D R E U C C I	Christian Name Imię	Ernesto
Father's Christian Name Imię ojca	Fu Angelo	Date of Birth Data urodzenia	22 Dec. 1908
Identity Card No. Nr. dowodu osobistego	Not known	Address Adres	139 Sabotz Section of C. C. R. R.
Town Miasto	BARI	Province Prowincja	Bari
Occupation (in Italian) Zawod (pisać w języku włoskim)	Caporale majore C. C. R. R.	Date of Arrest Data aresztowania	9. March 1944
Unit Effecting Arrest Przez jaką Sekcje Bezp. Areszt.	F. S. S. 3rd Polish Carpht. Inf. Div.	Arrested at (incl. prov.) Gdzie aresztowany (i prow.)	Castel di Sangre Prov. Campobasso
Category Kategoria areszt.	C		
Designation of Cage or Prison Nazwa obozu lub więzienia, w którym osadzono aresztowanego	Not listed		
Eighth Army Black List No. Nr. czarnej listy 8 Armii	Not listed		
Reason for Arrest Powód aresztowania:	Crossed the lines as a messenger of the Italian Military Authorities in order to obtain informations and with letters to the enemy territory.		

Przechedził kłkretnie linij frontu jako wysłannik władz wojskowych Badeglie, w celach wywiadowczych, i przenesił listy na stronę okupowaną przez wpla.

10369

Occupation (in Italian) Caporale maggiore G.C.R.R.
Zawod (pisac w jezyku wloskim)

Date of Arrest 9. March 1944
Data areztowania

Unit Effecting Arrest P.S.S. 3rd Polish Carpath. Inf. Div.
Przez jaka Sekcje Bezp. Arezt.

Arrested at (incl. prov.) Castel di Sangre
Gdzie areztowany (i prow.) Prev. Campelasso

Category Knobor C
Kategoria arezt. Knobor C

"C"

Designation of Cage or Prison to which sent C.C.R.R. Carpinone.
Nazwa obozu lub wiezienia, w ktorym osadzono areztowanego

Eighth Army Black List No. Not Listed
Nr. czarnej listy 8 Armii

Reason for Arrest: Crossed the lines as a messenger of the Italian Military Authorities in order to obtain informations and with letters to the enemy territory.
Powod areztowania:

Przechodzila kilkakrotnie linie frontu jako wyslannik wladz wojskowych Badeglie, w celach wywiadowczych, i przenesila listy na strome ekupowana przez mpla.

Recommendation of F. S. O. for length of interment: Not applicable
Opinia Oficera Sekcji Bezp. co do czasu zatrzymania: Do czasu przeprocawania.

Signed G. Measolanti
Podpis Oficera S. B.

DISTRIBUTION:

- G. S. I. (b) Army
- G. S. I. (b) Corps
- With prisoner to Cage or Prison
- Local C. A. O.

ROZDZIELNIK:

- Officer Bezp. 8 Armii
- Officer Bezp. Pol. Korp.
- Z zatrzymanym
- Miejscowy oddzial A. M. G.

Underline addressee concerned. Copy to each.
W tekscie rozdzielnika podkreslic adres, pod ktory wysyla sie dana kopie.

302

10 3 7 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

S E C R E T .

Subject : ANDREUCCI Ernesto.

G.S.I.(b) Rear 2 Polcorps
No 161/INF.E.TS/44.
16 March 1944.

To : G.S.I.(b) MAIN ARMY.

Following our 262/INF.E./44 dated 15 March 44, hereunder information about ANDREUCCI Ernesto fu Angelo, born 22 December 1908 in NERVIA prov. GENOVA.

1. ANDREUCCI Ernesto was apprehended in CASTEL DI SANGRE map ref.153/088539 on the 9 March 44. He was handed over to the PSE 3 Corp. Div. CAMPIONE map ref.161/2732. There he stated that he is a member of the 139 CC.RR Section DANI attached to the 9 Italian Corps. He was sent by the Italian Lieut. General LERICI and other high Italian Officers with letters to their families living territory occupied by the enemy. An Italian patrol was to help him to cross our lines.
2. ANDREUCCI is in possession of 15 letters.
3. He stated also, that he received a special mission for the Italian Army, to pick up news from the enemy and bring them back to his superiors. It is not his first journey.
4. In view of the fact that these letters are from such high Italian officials and inept investigation cannot exclude the possibility of communication with the enemy, please inform this HQ if S.I.(b) investigation is advised instead of treating the case as a Category "A" arrest.


Captain
G.S.I.(b).

0371

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOP SECRET

MN/478

No. 1 Special Force,

C.M.F.

30th April, 1944.

Dear *General*

Herewith the report about which we spoke.

It was made by one of my Officers who really does know his Italian politics. If it proves of interest to you and you would like any subsequent ones he may be making please do not hesitate to let me know.

Yours *very sincerely*

General Holdsworth

Major General Browning,
M.M.I.A.,
c/o E.L.O.
ARI

*Circulate round G +
Lt. Col's A/Q + Colours.
Then let me see.
Circulate quickly
h-5-1466.*

TOP SECRET

No. 1 Special Force,
C.M.F.

27th April, 1944.

Copy No. 4

To: Commander

From: Captain H. Sylvester

Subject: REPORT ON TRIP TO THE WEST COAST

7th April - 21st April 1944

1. Returning to Naples after an absence of several weeks, I found that changes had taken place in the Italian Political field.
2. The Bari Convention, at the end of January, of the National Front of Liberation in Allied-occupied Italy had decided that the presence of the King made impossible a participation of the Front in the Government. Shortly after the convention, Senator Croce, Senator Forza and Senator De Nicola had decided to approach the King in order to convince him to surrender his functions to a Lieutenant-General until the time when a Constituent Assembly could be elected and could decide Italy's political regime. De Nicola expressed the views of the three leaders to the King who made, towards the middle of March, a declaration to his Cabinet concerning his desire to surrender the functions of the Crown to the Prince as Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom.
3. The Soviet Government had appeared to take a direct interest in Italian affairs and to follow a policy which was independent from that of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. Ambassadors were exchanged, the Soviet Press mentioned the necessity of forming a strong War Cabinet Soviet Press mentioned the necessity of forming a strong War Cabinet in Italy and permission was obtained for P. Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party, to go from Moscow to Italy.

10 3 7 3

7th April - 21st April 1945

1. Returning to Naples after an absence of several weeks, I found that changes had taken place in the Italian Political field.
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3. The Soviet Government had appeared to take a direct interest in Italian affairs and to follow a policy which was independent from that of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. Ambassadors were exchanged, the Soviet Press mentioned the necessity of forming a strong War Cabinet Soviet Press mentioned the necessity of forming a strong War Cabinet in Italy and permission was obtained for P. Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist party, to go from Moscow to Italy.
4. British and American authorities had come to the conclusion that it was advisable to have a new Government in Italy.
5. The position of several important political circles in liberated territory, on April 7th, can be summarised as follows:
 - (a) Members of the House of Savor and their supporters were mostly convinced that it was necessary for the crown to accept a temporary eclipse and to wait for a revival of popular support, leaving in the meantime to others the responsibility of directing National policies.

- (b) The "Masonic" Group in the Government accepted the necessity of a change in the composition of the Cabinet. It included most of the "political" members of the latter Cabinet. They wanted, of course, to retain part at least of their influence. They had been playing the U.S.S.R. against the U.K. and the U.S.A. and they were hoping to use the Communists to break the National Front of Liberation.
- (c) The Communist Party, numerically weak in Southern Italy, but conscious of its strength in German-occupied Italy and of Russian support, was decided to play, if necessary, a lone hand provided it could get into the Government. The Communist leaders were confident that the Socialists would follow them. They were asking for five portfolios to be divided amongst themselves and the Socialists, in a re-shuffled Badoglio Cabinet.
- (d) The Christian Democrats were willing to join the Badoglio government, even accepting the King, but were unwilling to break the National Front of Liberation and were adopting, therefore, a conciliatory attitude.
- (e) The Liberals and the Democrats (Action Party and Labour Party) were willing to join the Government provided the King went. They were definitely worried by the possibility of Phillips' "Masonic" Group and the Communists joining hands to their detriment.
- (f) From conversations, I could gather that British and American representatives were willing to see the King go and the six Parties of the National Front of Liberation join a Cabinet led by Badoglio.
- g. It is not important in Liberated Italy if the National Front of Liberation survives or not, but it is important that it should survive in German-occupied Italy in view of its action in organising resistance. A split in the National Front of Liberation is important.

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- (f) From conversations, I could gather that British and American representatives were willing to see the King go and the six Parties of the National Front of Liberation join a Cabinet led by Badoglio.

6. It is not important in liberated Italy if the National Front of Liberation survives or not, but it is important that it should survive in German-occupied Italy in view of its action in organising resistance. A split in the National Front of Liberation in liberated Italy would have probably weakened the resistance movement further North.

7. Although not mentioned often, the situation in German-occupied Italy was in the minds of many political leaders. It was mostly of course in the minds of the leaders of the three political organisations which claim to have direct contact with their own groups on the other side: the Communists, the Action Party and the Socialists.

8. Among the people whom I contacted during the two weeks I stayed on the West Coast are:

JUNG, Minister of Finance in the latter Badoglio Cabinet.
CUOMO, Minister of Education in the latter Badoglio Cabinet.
PRUNAS, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Badoglio Cabinet.

0376

PHILIPSON, Under-Secretary at the Presidency in the latter Badoglio Cabinet.

MARSHAL BADOGGIO, Head of the Information Department, attached to the Presidency of the Cabinet.

CAPTAIN FORNALI, Philipson's Secretary.

SENATOR GROCE, now Minister without Portfolio.

MORILLI, Under-Secretary at the Presidency in the new Cabinet.

CALVI, representative in Naples for the executive committee of the Liberal party in German-occupied Italy.

SENATOR SFORZA, now Minister without Portfolio.

TARCHIANI, now Minister for Public works.

CIANCA, leader of the anti-collaborationist tendency in the Action Party.

CARACCILO, now Under-Secretary for the Interior.

CRIVELLI, head of O.P.I. (Organizzazione Resistenza Italiana)

LONGOBARDI, representative in Naples for the executive committee of the Socialist Party in German-occupied Italy.

PALEPPO, now Under-Secretary for War.

PIERILONI, WODZKA, CENTILI, Labour Organizers.

9. During the two weeks I spent on the West Coast, the trend of my activities was determined by the quality of the people whom I could contact:

(a) I kept in touch with the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission. They were informed of whatever new developments came to my knowledge.

(b) The car I am using has been at the disposal of Liberal and Action Party leaders and of prominent non-party personalities who wanted to go to Salerno to see Senator Groce. I visited as much as possible with Senator Groce who has been the key-man in the rapprochement between Marshal Badoglio and the National Front of Liberation.

(c) Transport was also made available for Liberal and Action party leaders who needed to go to see Marshal Badoglio in Salerno.

SENATOR FORZA, now Minister for Public Works.
TARCHIANI, now leader of the anti-collaborationist tendency in the Action Party.
CARACCILO, now Under-Secretary for the Interior.
CRAVERI, head of C.P.I. (Organizzazione Resistenza Italiana)
LONGOBARDI, representative in Naples for the executive committee of the Socialist Party in German-occupied Italy.

PALERMO, now Under-Secretary for War.
PIETRELLI, MODIZIA, GENTILI, Labour Organisations.

9. During the two weeks I spent on the West Coast, the trend of my activities was determined by the quality of the people whom I could contact:

- (a) I kept in touch with the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission. They were informed of whatever new developments came to my knowledge.
- (b) The car I am using has been at the disposal of Liberal and Action Party leaders and of prominent non-party personalities who wanted to go to Sorrento to see Senator Croce. I talked as much as possible with Senator Croce who has been the key-man in the rapprochement between Marshal Badoglio and the National Front of Liberation.
- (c) Transport was also made available for Liberal and Action Party leaders who needed to go to see Marshal Badoglio in Salerno.
- (d) Pressure was exercised, directly and indirectly, over Marshal Badoglio in order to induce him to meet the six anti-fascist parties in a way that would enable them to join the Cabinet as a group and prevent a split in the National Front of Liberation.
- (e) The activities of the "Masonic" Group in the latter Badoglio Cabinet, were watched in order to prevent them from creating too many obstacles.
- (f) Pressure was exercised, directly and indirectly, over the Action Party in order to convince its leaders to join a new Badoglio Cabinet.
- (g) The idea was put forward that a man, trusted by the leaders of the resistance in German-occupied territory, should be put in charge of a **83** under-

secretaryship which should coordinate the efforts made by Italian and Allied agencies to help the resistance movement.

10. I always acted in a purely personal capacity taking advantage of the fact that I have been acquainted for many years with some of the people whom I contacted. For instance I have known Crocu, Tarchiani, Jung and Palermo for nearly fifteen years.
11. I started my trip on April 6th by setting in touch with acquaintances in Bari and in Cosenza in order to have an idea of the state of public opinion in the provinces before visiting Salerno and Naples.
12. On the 7th I reached Salerno where I lunched with three members of the Badoglio Cabinet. Later in the day I saw liberal and Action Party leaders in Naples.
13. The situation appeared to be rather satisfactory. In order to prevent an excessive increase of Communist influence, Christian Democrats, Liberals and Democrats (Labour party and Action party) were all willing to join the Cabinet, of course under certain conditions.
14. A few hints about the Communist threat were enough to convince even the most reluctant anti-collaborationist leaders of the opportunity of joining the Government. The Communists appeared to be rather annoyed as they would have preferred to run the Government without the other parties of the National Front of Liberation. They knew however that whatever happened they would make it a success for their Party.

One difficulty for a speedy solution was represented by the King who had not yet said anything in public about his intentions although it was known that three weeks before he had made a clear statement to his Cabinet on the subject of appointing a Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom.

Another difficulty was represented by the unwillingness of Senator Sforza, the Socialists and the Action Party to serve under Badoglio. They felt, however, that the Allies would not accept another Prime Minister but the Marshal and were willing to meet the Allied wishes.

A third difficulty was represented by the intrigues of Philipson's "Masonic" Group. The "Masonic" group wanted to be represented in the new Cabinet. The six Parties held the opinion that only political organisations existing on both

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A third difficulty was represented by the intrigues of Philipson's "Masonic" group. The "Masonic" group wanted to be represented in the new cabinet. The six Parties held the opinion that only political organizations existing on both sides of the front lines could be entitled to form a national government.

15. From the 9th to the 14th I spent most of the time in Sorrento, near Senator Croce. Senator Croce was the fruit d'union between Marshall Badoglio and four at least (five including the Socialists) of the Parties in the National Front of Liberation. He was meeting continually his friends of the liberal party, Rodino, leader of the Christian Democrats, Senator Sforza, etc. Senator Sforza was in constant touch with Senator Di Nicola, the one who had been chosen to express

to the King the views of the moderate anti-fascist leaders.

16. I went twice to Palermo, on the 13th and on the 13th, where I gained the impression that Phillipsen's "Masonic" Group would not be able to create much trouble as long as the National Front of Liberation remained united.

17. During that period I also went to see M. Palermo, a prominent Neapolitan lawyer, member of the Communist Party and now Under-Secretary for War. Palermo is a sincere Communist who does not always agree with the directives of the Communist Party.

His first meeting with Fogliatti was rather cold. It would have been useful to know if eventually Palermo could decide to make a split in the Communist Party.

18. After a meeting with Iadino, de Nicola and Sforza, Croce announced that he would receive Marshal Badoglio. The appointment was fixed for April 14th. The conversations were now taking a concrete turn and a considerable step forward was made when the King, after having received the British and American representatives, announced that he would surrender his powers to a Lieutenant-General as soon as allied troops entered Rome.

19. The meeting between Senator Croce and Marshal Badoglio was a friendly one and it became evident that, in spite of the promises he had made to his under-secretary at the Presidency, Marshal Badoglio was willing to throw overboard all the Phillipsen Group.

It was agreed between the Senator and the Marshal that only political parties possessing nation-wide organization would be represented in the Cabinet; that the Marshal would choose the holders of five portfolios (War, Navy, Air, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture) while the six parties would have the other eight portfolios. Civilian Under-Secretaries would be appointed for the three Military Ministries. Senator Croce asked that a new Under-Secretaryship should be created to coordinate the efforts being made by Italian and allied organizations to support the resistance groups in German-occupied Italy. The name of Sig. Tarchiani, as mentioned as future holder of the post. The Marshal agreed to this idea.

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While the conversation was going on between the Marshal and the Senator, the Marshal's secretary explained that the moment was near when a formal alliance would be established between Italy and U.S.S.R. In his opinion this would put in a difficult position the Anglo-Saxon Powers.

20. The position of the six anti-fascist Parties had been clarified. Meetings had already taken place or were going to take place in a day or two of the leaders of the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the Democrats (Action and Labour Parties), the Socialists, the Communists. On Friday 11th it appeared that their resolutions were going to be a foregone conclusion and that all would accept to enter a new *Badoglio* Cabinet. The main difficulty appeared to be the choice of the new Minister of Interior. The King's statement had satisfied the Parties. The attitude of the Allied Control Commission was generally praised.

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It was decided in Sorrento that a new meeting would take place between Senator Croce and the Marshal on Tuesday 18th. In the meantime Senator Croce would have contacted the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, the Labour Party and the independent leaders (De Nicola, Sforza, Tarchilini, who had not yet joined the action party). The Marshal was going to interview the leaders of the action party, of the Socialists and of the Communists.

It was hoped that the formation of the new Cabinet could be announced on Tuesday evening or at the latest on Wednesday morning.

21. The criticism against the Badoglio administration made at a meeting of the Allied Advisory Council delayed for three days the solution of the crisis. The anti-collaborationist leaders of the action party had previously stated that they were going to accept Badoglio because it appeared that the wish of the Allies that he should remain Prime Minister. Now that it had become evident that the Allies were not particularly keen on the Marshal there was no reason - they stated - to accept him. The Socialists let it be known that if one of the six parties was going to stay out of the Cabinet they would adopt the same attitude.

22. Following the meeting of the Allied Advisory Council, the "Masonic" group in the latter Badoglio Cabinet found that the situation was developing to its advantage. They were able to convince the Marshal that what the Allies wanted was the participation of six parties in the Cabinet; therefore if two of the six nation-wide parties of the National Front of Liberation refused to join the Cabinet, the Allies would have been satisfied if two other parties were represented, even if they were only local organisations in liberated Italy.

The Marshal promised he would put in the Cabinet representatives of the Democrazia Liberale and of a new Republican Party which appears to have been organised recently.

23. On Sunday 16th at Sorrento there was a meeting between Senator Croce, Liberal leader, Senator Sforza (non-party but close to the action party), Marquis Rodolfo, leader of the Christian Democrats, and Signor Caraceni, leader of the Labour party.

The four leaders prepared a Cabinet list which gave a relative majority to the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. It was settled that a Catholic would be in the Ministry of Interior.

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23. On Sunday 10th at Sorrento there was a meeting between Senator Croce, Liberal leader, Senator Sforza (non-party but close to the action party), Marquis Rodino, leader of the Christian Democrats, and Signor Ceracchi, leader of the Labour party.

The four leaders prepared a Cabinet list which gave a relative majority to the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. It was settled that a Catholic would go to the Ministry of Interior, as for the Under-secretaryship for German-occupied Italy, Marquis Rodino stated that it could not be created. It appears that Marquis Rodino had received a message from a high-ranking Italian military authority stating that military leaders were against the idea of putting a civilian in charge of the resistance movement in German-occupied territory.

24. Marshal Badoglio received the Communist leaders. It appears that Fogliatti told him he had received instructions to obtain for the Communist Party one of the three important portfolios: either External Affairs or Interior or War. The Marshal made it clear that the Communists would join all the same the Cabinet, but his enthusiasm for the Marshal as Prime Minister was considerably damped.

25. The Socialist representatives told the Marshal that, in view of the criticism of the Allied Control Commission, their Party was doubtful on the subject of joining the Cabinet.

26. The Action Party representatives told the Marshal that their Party was unwilling to join a Badoglio Cabinet. However they left the door open for further conversations.

27. When Marshal Badoglio went to see Senator Croce on the 18th, the situation was not sufficiently clear to announce immediately the formation of a new Cabinet. But the Marshal and the Senator prepared a tentative list of Cabinet Ministers. In view of the fact that considerable time was wasted in travelling between Naples, Sorrento and Salerno, that more time was wasted in meeting separately the representatives of the various parties; in order to achieve a speedy solution of the crisis it was decided that both the Marshal and the Senator should go to Naples and meet there, first separately, then all together, the representatives of the six Parties.

28. I spent most of Wednesday in Salerno, where I had a long talk with Jung, the Minister of Finance. He asked me to go to see the Marshal and while waiting to do so I also met Col. Di Carlo (whose attitude produced in me a rather painful impression) and Phillips.

The Marshal was in a rather violent mood, but it was evident he only wanted to impress as listener and that he was going to act differently from what he was saying.

29. Returning to Naples I found the following situations:

- (a) The Communists were trying to convince Senator De Nicola to become Prime Minister, possibly with the hope of obtaining from him one of the three portfolios which the Marshal was refusing to give them.

Tagliatti was also less keen than he had been two weeks before at causing a split in the National Front of Liberation and hoped that a De Nicola Government would make it easier for the Action Party and for the Socialists to join the Government.

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(b) The Socialists leaders had been asked to go to see Bogdanoff, the Soviet representative, who convinced them to follow the same line which the Communist Party would take.

(c) A veto put by the Communists against Morelli, a close friend of Senator Croce, had put even the liberals in a rebellious mood and they were playing with the idea of not joining the Cabinet. They decided to make their cooperation dependent on the acceptance of certain points, some of which aimed at checking the influence of the Communists in the new Government.

(d) The leaders of the Action Party (including now also representatives from Puglia, Calabria and

Sicily) were more than ever decided to stay out.

30. On April 20th the situation began to clear up again. Even the most anti-coalitionist leaders in the six parties felt that there was no other alternative to a Prime Minister than Marshal Badoglio.

Both Senator Croce and Senator de Nicola refused to accept the nomination for the Premiership. A rumour had been spread by the "Masonic" group of the former Cabinet that the Allies did not want to have Sforza as Prime Minister; this was based on a phrase attributed to Sir Harold MacMillan. The name of Rodino was mentioned two or three times as a possible Prime Minister, but not very seriously. The rumour also spread that in case a speedy solution of the crisis could not be found, the Allied Central Commission would re-establish A.M.G. all over liberated Italy.

31. Having failed in convincing Senator De Nicola, the Communists decided to join a Badoglio Cabinet. The Socialists had already lost what little initiative they had had when they attempted to follow their own policy independently from the Communists. The Liberals were making their cooperation dependent on the acceptance of conditions which were likely to be accepted by Marshal Badoglio and by the other parties. The main difficulty was represented by the Action Party.

I asked Senator Sforza to write them a letter, and interviewed separately some of their leaders Caracciolo, Cianca, Tarchiani (who had stated that he would join the party) and Craveri.

32. On April 21st, the party leaders met Marshal Badoglio in Naples and the new Cabinet was formed. It is rather unwieldy: there are twelve Ministers with portfolio, five Ministers without portfolio and fourteen Under-Secretaries. The Marshal has chosen seven of his collaborators (four Ministers and three Under-Secretaries). Seven Ministers with portfolio have been chosen by the parties, one for each Party with the exception of the Action Party which has two portfolios.

33. My estimate of the people whom I know personally and who are in the new Cabinet, is the following:

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33. My estimate of the people whom I know personally and who are in the new Cabinet, is the following:

Senator CROCE will probably be a good Chairman at Cabinet meetings. His will chiefly be the role of pacifier. 58

Senator SFORZA is politically honest, has a few good ideas which he will try to apply to realities; unfortunately he is not a politician and his tactical sense will not help him.

Marshal BADOGLIO is a shrewd man who does not often say what he thinks.

TARCHIANI is an honest and reliable man, sometimes difficult to deal with, has a better understanding of the complexity of the Italian internal and external situation than probably most of his colleagues.

CARACCIOLO is honest, well-meaning, but lacks a strong personality.

MORELLI is an intriguer, probably not much better than Philipson whom he succeeds; he exercises a good deal of influence over Senator Croce.

PALERMO, the Communist Under-Secretary for War, has little or no qualifications for his post. He is a brilliant lawyer who deals better with ideas than with men. It is likely that the Communist Party will put next to him a trustworthy and energetic party "official" who will be the real power behind Palermo.

34. It is regrettable that emphasis should have been put on the Communist intervention in the present crisis. The Communists are already in a strong position. In liberated Italy they are not numerous but they are well organized, active, and have a better party discipline than the other political organizations. There is towards the Italian Communist party and towards the U.S.S.R. an instinctive confidence on the part of public opinion which makes it possible for them to adopt, without losing any popularity, attitudes which would be severely criticized if they were adopted by other parties or by British or American representatives. Official British and American statements have praised Togliatti, while it would have been preferable to emphasize the part played by Senator Croce and Senator De Nicola in solving the deadlock between the King and Badoglio regime and the National Front of Liberation.

35. The result achieved on April 21st can be considered fairly satisfactory. All important political tendencies in Italy - minus the Fascists - are represented in the Government. Those Conservatives who turned against the Fascist regime and caused its down-fall are represented by Marshal Badoglio and by Signor Quintieri. The Moderates, of both the "clerical" tendency (Christian Democrats) and the "anti-clerical" tendency (Liberals) are in. The Leftists, of both the collectivist type (Socialists and Communists) and the anti-collectivist type (Action Party) are also in.

It would have been detrimental to the resistance movement in German-occupied Italy if the National Front of Liberation had been split. This did not happen.

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The presence of a Socialist and of a Catholic in the Ministry of Labour, Trade and Industry, may make it difficult - it is to be hoped - for the Communists to gain control over the working masses in liberated Italy. 51

The presence of a Communist at the Ministry of War may facilitate whatever cooperation the allies wish to receive from the Italian army.

There is a good administration at the Ministry of Finance. It is reported that his Under-Secretary is not a fanatic Communist and it is possible that a direct experience of financial administration will influence his political outlook. It is to be hoped that Jung will be asked to act as an adviser and that he will accept.

36. It is unlikely that the new Government will be a "strong" one. Conditions are too difficult and there is too

much confusion to make possible, even with the best team of Ministers, to achieve rapidly concrete results either in the field of economic and political reconstruction or in the field of military preparation. The worth of the Government will depend largely on the support which it will receive from the Allies.

Public opinion in Southern Italy is more interested in the solution of a few immediate economic and administrative problems than in either the War or in high-level politics. If bread becomes available, public opinion will praise the Government. If bread remains scarce, the new Government will probably be nearly as much isolated from the people as the previous one.

Deep differences exist within the Cabinet. The Marshal has little sympathy for the "politicians". The three parties of the Left do not trust the Marshal. In problems of internal administration there will probably be clashes between the various tendencies. Greater unity may prevail in relation to external problems. Much will depend on the attitude of the five Ministers without portfolios and on their ability to work together.

an opposition will exist and it can reasonably be expected that sometimes it will be fairly vocal. Besides the disgruntled but unorganised masses, the opposition will be made up of such different elements as the ex-Fascists, the Moderates of the Liberal-Democratic Party, the anti-collaborationist wing of the Action Party, dissident Socialists groups, regional groups in Sicily and in Sardinia.

It can be expected that the Communists will pay lip-service to unity in the Cabinet and that outside they will try to undermine the position of the other political tendencies. The Communists may try to spread their influence chiefly over the labour unions and in the armed forces. In the labour field they will be opposed by the Christian Democrats among the rural masses and by the Action Party among the urban masses. Owing to the lack of prestige of the conservative elements, it will probably be harder to check Communist influence among the armed forces.

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