

1829

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ACC

10000 | 120 | 1055

SC
CP
SA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

10000 | 120 | 1055

SG/29/A

J. C. F. R.

Opened Sept. 18, 1944. Closed March 12, 1945


Sept. 1944. March 1945

1831

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SG/29/45 F

SG/29/7



J.V.F.R.

Secret

10000 120/1055

↓
J.C.F.R. Secret

10000

120

1055

THIS FOLDER

CONTAINS PAPERS

FROM

SEPT. 1944

TO

MAR. 1945

CATALOGUE.

OPENED 18 Sept 44

CLOSED 12 March 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

11832

Lt. Col. J. J. General

Subject: Territorial Organisations

ALMIA-G

FILE: S/G/29

DATE: 19/11/45

AFHQ G-3 Org. (M.M.I.A.) (3 copies)
War Ministry

CONFIDENTIAL

Land Forces Sub Commission AC.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No SD/94

12 March 45

Reference AFHQ G-3 Org. TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44 and para 15
of SD/94 of 7 Feb 45.

1.

A complete list of the units composing the Territorial Organisations of the Italian Army, showing War Establishment strength, is attached as follows :-

Appendix	Category	Unit	Establishments Strengths
A	1(B)	Hqs and Districts (Class I & IV)	1288
B	5(H)(A)	Districts (Class II & III)	307
C	6(C)(C)	Territorial Depots	430
Total			2025

2.

These units belong to Part III(a) (Administrative Units) according to the classification in AFHQ letter 922.5 of 14 Nov 44.

DISTRIBUTION

2 District+
Penthouse
Pensouth
USMAF SC/MO
AC Executive Commissioner (3)
MMA IO SARDINIA

INTERNAL
MA to GOC
2nd i/c
G(Int)

L. M. Ingledew
for Major General
M.M.I.A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

A complete list of units composing the Territorial Organisations of the Italian Army, showing War Establishment strength, is attached as follows :-

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Establishments Strengths</u>
A	1(B)	HQs and Districts (Class I & IV)	1288
B	5(H)(A)	Districts (Class II & III)	307
C	6(C)(A)	Territorial Depots	430
Total			2025

2. These units belong to Part III(a) (Administrative Units) according to the classification in AFHQ letter 922.5 of 14 Nov 44.

L.M. Ingledene
for Major General
M.M. I.A.

DISTRIBUTION

2 District
Penbase
Pensouth
USAAF SC/ATO
AC Executive Commissioner (3)
MATA LO SARDINIA
" " SICILY
" " NAPLES
" " Rear Eighth Army
" " Fifth Army
" " Fifth Army (Br Iner)
" AFHQ
" 1 District
" 3 District
" 52 Area
" 54 Area

INTERNAL

MA to GOC
2nd i/o
G(Int)
RE
Signals
A {2}
Q/G4 {2}
Q(AB) {2}
Q1
Q2
Q/CS
Q(Movements)
ST
Med
Ord
RME
Labour
Welfare

969
from Spain

CATEGORY 1(B)

Territorial Organizations Districts (Class I & IV)

Appendix "A" to NMIA
letter SD/94 dated
12 March 1945.

Ser No.	Designation of Unit Title	No.	Location or intended location (d)	W.E. No.	W.E. Strength		Remarks
					Offs	Orgs	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1.	Territorial HQ (Type A)	1	(TURIN)	11/SMRE/1	44	76	120
2.	District (Class I)	41	"	15/SMRE/1	12	-	12
3.	" (Class IV)	98	{CHIVASSO}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
4.	" (Class IV)	70	{PINEROLO}	"	4	-	4
5.	" (Class IV)	67	{IVREA}	"	4	-	4
6.	Territorial HQ (Type C)	2	{GENOVA}	13/SMRE/1	31	49	80
7.	District (Class IV)	79	{MONDOVI}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
8.	Territorial HQ	3	{MILAN}	13/SMRE/1	31	49	80
9.	District (Class I)	23	"	15/SMRE/1	12	-	12
10.	" (Class IV)	65	{LODI}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
11.	" (Class IV)	89	{SONDRIO}	"	4	-	4
12.	" (Class IV)	90	{TREVIGLIO}	"	4	-	4
13.	" (Class IV)	61	{MANTUA}	"	4	-	4
14.	Territorial HQ	4	{BOZZANO}	11/SMRE/1	44	76	120
15.	District (Class IV)	93	"	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
16.	" (Class IV)	77	{BELLUNO}	"	4	-	4
17.	Territorial HQ	5	{UDINE}	12/SMRE/1	38	62	100
18.	District (Class IV)	97	{POLLA}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
19.	" (Class IV)	95	{GORIZIA}	"	4	-	4
20.	" (Class IV)	30	{SACILE}	"	4	-	4
21.	" (Class IV)	63	{ROVIGO}	"	4	-	4
22.	Territorial HQ	6	{BOLOGNA}	12/SMRE/1	38	62	100
23.	District (Class IV)	2	{PIACENZA}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
24.	" (Class IV)	8	{RAVENNA}	"	4	-	4
25.	" (Class IV)	53	{FERRARA}	"	4	-	4
26.	Territorial HQ	7	{FLORENCE}	13/SMRE/1	31	49	80
27.	District (Class IV)	84	{PISTOIA}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
28.	" (Class IV)	101	{GROSSETO}	"	4	-	4
29.	" (Class IV)	12	{SIENA}	"	4	-	4
30.	" (Class IV)	49	{AREZZO}	"	4	-	4
31.	Territorial HQ	8	{ROME}	11/SMRE/1	44	76	120
32.	District (Class I)	36	"	15/SMRE/1	12	-	12
33.	" (Class IV)	35	{PERUGIA}	18/SMRE/1	4	-	4
34.	" (Class IV)	72	{SPOLETO}	"	4	-	4
35.	" (Class IV)	69	{ORVIEO}	"	4	-	4
36.	" (Class IV)	52	{ALCANTARA}	"	4	-	4
37.	" (Class IV)	58	{ASCOLI PICENO}	"	4	-	4

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

100 60 20

[illegible]

Appendix "B" to MATL
letter SD/94 dated
12 March 45

TERRITORIAL ORGANISATIONS
DISTRICTS (Class II & III)

CATEGORY 5(H)
Section (1)

Ser No	Designation of Unit Title	No	Location or intended location (a)	W.E. No. (o)	Offrs	Strength ORs	Total	Remarks (1)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1.	District (Class III)	75	VERCELLI	16/SITE/1	5	-	5	TURIN
2.	"	24	(NOVARA)	"	5	-	5	"
3.	"	86	CALATE MONFERRATO	"	5	-	5	"
4.	"	1	ALESSANDRIA	"	5	-	5	"
5.	"	74	TORTONA	"	5	-	5	"
6.	(Class II)	16	GENOVA	17/SITE/1	6	-	6	GENOVA
7.	(Class III)	71	SAVONA	16/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
8.	"	40	CUNEO	"	5	-	5	"
9.	"	54	PAVIA	"	5	-	5	MILAN
10.	"	73	VALENTE	"	5	-	5	"
11.	"	76	MONZA	"	5	-	5	"
12.	"	22	COMO	"	5	-	5	"
13.	"	42	BERGAMO	"	5	-	5	"
14.	"	44	CREMONA	"	5	-	5	"
15.	(Class II)	43	BIOSCELLI	17/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
16.	(Class III)	92	TRENTO	16/SITE/1	6	-	6	BOLZANO
17.	(Class II)	62	VICENZA	17/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
18.	"	45	VERONA	"	6	-	6	"
19.	"	96	UDINE	"	6	-	6	Udine
20.	"	94	TRIESTE	"	6	-	6	"
21.	"	28	TREVISO	"	6	-	6	"
22.	(Class III)	51	VENICE	16/SITE/1	6	-	6	"
23.	(Class II)	29	PADUA	17/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
24.	"	6	BOLOGNA	"	6	-	6	BOLOGNA
25.	(Class II)	7	PARMA	16/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
26.	"	57	REGGIO EMILIA	"	5	-	5	"
27.	"	47	MODENA	"	5	-	5	"
28.	"	55	PARMA	"	5	-	5	"
29.	"	56	FORLI	"	5	-	5	"
30.	"	34	ANCONA	"	5	-	5	"
31.	(Class II)	11	FLORENCE	17/SITE/1	5	-	5	FLORENCE
32.	(Class III)	63	(APUANIA)	16/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
33.	"	14	LUGO	"	5	-	5	"
34.	"	102	PISA	"	5	-	5	"
35.	"	10	TERAMO	"	5	-	5	"
36.	"	85	TRIESTE	"	5	-	5	"
37.	"	106	ORISTANO	"	5	-	5	"
38.	(Class II)	15	CAGLIARI	17/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
39.	"	3	BARI	"	6	-	6	BARI
40.	(Class III)	66	BARIETTA	16/SITE/1	5	-	5	"
41.	"	78	Taranto	"	5	-	5	"
42.	"	5	DECE	"	5	-	5	"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1839

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Appendix "C" to MATIA
letter SD/94 dated
12 March 45.

TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS
TERRITORIAL DEPOSITS

CATEGORY 6(C)
Section (1)

Serial	Designation of Unit Title	No	Location or intended location (d)	W.E. No. (e)	W.E. Strength		Remarks
					Offrs (f)	Org (g)	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h) Total
1.	Territorial Depot	77	(ALESSANDRIA) 19/SARE/1	"	5	-	TURIN
2.	"	78	(TURIN)	"	5	-	"
3.	"	79	(PINEROLO)	"	5	-	"
4.	"	80	(VOGHERA)	"	5	-	"
5.	"	81	(VERGARA AULIE)	"	5	-	"
6.	"	82	(TURIN)	"	5	-	"
7.	"	83	(CASALE MONFERRATO)	"	5	-	"
8.	"	84	(TURIN)	"	5	-	"
9.	"	85	(TURIN)	"	5	-	"
10.	"	86	(TURIN)	"	5	-	"
11.	"	73	(GENOVA)	"	5	-	GENOVA
12.	"	74	(ALBA)	"	5	-	"
13.	"	75	(ALBENGA)	"	5	-	"
14.	"	76	(CUNEO)	"	5	-	"
15.	"	68	(MILAN)	"	5	-	MILAN
16.	"	69	(COMO)	"	5	-	"
17.	"	70	(LODI)	"	5	-	"
18.	"	71	(MILAN)	"	5	-	"
19.	"	-	(MILAN)	"	5	-	"
20.	"	72	(MILAN)	"	5	-	"
21.	"	62	(TRENTO)	"	5	-	"
22.	"	63	(VERONA)	"	5	-	BOLZANO
23.	"	64	(BELLUNO)	"	5	-	"
24.	"	65	(VERONA)	"	5	-	"
25.	"	66	(TRENTO)	"	5	-	"
26.	"	67	(BOLZANO)	"	5	-	"
27.	"	58	(UDINE)	"	5	-	UDINE
28.	"	59	(TREVISO)	"	5	-	"
29.	"	60	(PADOVA)	"	5	-	"
30.	"	61	(UDINE)	"	5	-	"
31.	"	49	(FORLI)	"	5	-	BOLOGNA
32.	"	50	(BOLOGNA)	"	5	-	"
33.	"	51	"	"	5	-	"
34.	"	52	"	"	5	-	"
35.	"	53	"	"	5	-	"
36.	"	54	"	"	5	-	"
37.	"	55	(PLACENZA)	"	5	-	"
38.	"	56	(MODENA)	"	5	-	"
39.	"	57	(PLACENZA)	"	5	-	"
40.	"	45	(PISA)	"	5	-	FLORENCE
41.	"	46	(FLORENCE)	"	5	-	"
42.	"	47	(PISA)	"	5	-	"
43.	"	48	(FLORENCE)	"	5	-	"

184

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

-2-

Serial (a)	Designation of Unit Title (b)	No (c)	Location or intended location (d)	W.E. NO (e)	W.E. Strength		Remarks
					Offrs (f)	Ors (g)	
55.	Territorial Depot	44	ROME	19/SMEE/1	5	-	ROME
56.	"	1	IGLESIAS	"	5	-	"
57.	"	2	CAGLIARI	"	5	-	"
58.	"	3	TEMPIO PAUSANIA	"	5	-	"
59.	"	5	SASSARI	"	5	-	"
60.	"	6	CAGLIARI	"	5	-	"
61.	"	7	SASSARI	"	5	-	"
62.	"	-	MACOMER	"	5	-	"
63.	"	24	ROME	"	5	-	"
64.	"	25	LECCE	"	5	-	"
65.	"	26	CASTELLANA	"	5	-	BARI
66.	"	27	CONVERSANO	"	5	-	"
67.	"	28	LECCE	"	5	-	"
68.	"	29	MONOPOLI	"	5	-	"
69.	"	30	ODATO	"	5	-	"
70.	"	31	CONVERTINO	"	5	-	"
71.	"	32	RODI GARGANICO	"	5	-	"
72.	"	-	TRANI	"	5	-	"
73.	"	11	BARI	"	5	-	"
74.	"	12	SALERNO	"	5	-	NAPLES
75.	"	13	COSENZA	"	5	-	"
76.	"	14	NICASTRO	"	5	-	"
77.	"	15	VIBO VALENTI	"	5	-	"
78.	"	16	NAPLES	"	5	-	"
79.	"	17	CASERTA	"	5	-	"
80.	"	18	CATANZARO	"	5	-	"
81.	"	19	REGGIO CALABRIA	"	5	-	"
82.	"	20	CATANZARO	"	5	-	"
83.	"	21	VIBO VALENTI	"	5	-	"
84.	"	22	NAPLES	"	5	-	"
85.	"	23	SANTA MARIA	"	5	-	"
86.	"	-	CALTA VETERE	"	5	-	"
87.	"	8	NAPLES	"	5	-	"
88.	"	9	NAPLES	"	5	-	"
89.	"	10	CATANIA	"	5	-	"
90.	"	-	PALERMO	"	5	-	PALERMO
91.	TOTAL				430	-	955

11842

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Reinforcement Procedure - ER-ITN Service Units

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. SD/42
9-2 Feb 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref this HQ SD/42 dated 14 Feb 45, para 8.

1. Delete all reference to priorities within an Army.

2. Insert:-

"Priorities within an Army will be obtained by application by the C.O. Br Cadre on behalf of the BRD Commander concerned to the MIA Liaison Officer at Army HQ."

plm
Major General
M. M. I. A.

DISTRIBUTION:

ADHQ for G-1 (Br), G-3 Org, Mov
HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

HQ FIFTH ARMY FOR ER INCR
FOR MIA LG

REAR HQ EIGHTH ARMY

" " " FOR MIA LG

1 DISTRICT

" " FOR MIA LG

" " FOR CC BR CADRE

CHVETO

3 DISTRICT

" " FOR MIA LG

" " FOR CC BR CADRE

(3)
(5)
(2)
(5)
(2)
(5)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(5)
(2)

964

2.

Insert:-

"Priorities within an army will be obtained by application by the C.O. or Cadre on behalf of the BRD Commander concerned to the AREA Liaison Officer at Army HQ."

W. H. I. A.
Major General
W. H. I. A.

DISTRIBUTION:

AFHQ for G-1 (Br), G-3 Org, Mov
HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

(3)

HQ FIFTH ARMY FOR HR INCR
FOR AREA LO

(5)

REAR HQ EIGHTH ARMY

(2)

" " " FOR AREA LO

(5)

1 DISTRICT

(2)

" " "

(5)

FOR AREA LO

(2)

FOR OC HR CADRE

(2)

ORVIETO

(2)

3 DISTRICT

(5)

" " "

(2)

FOR AREA LO

(2)

FOR OC HR CADRE

(2)

AFRAGOLA

(2)

FOR OC HR CADRE

(2)

TRANI

(2)

2 DISTRICT

(2)

HQ R.A.A.C.

(5)

ALLIED COMMISSION FOR G-1 (Br)

(5)

AREA LO NAFIES

(2)

AREA LO 54 AREA

(2)

AREA LO 52 AREA

(1)

INTERNAL:

AQ

(4)

A

(2)

NO7

(4)

File SD/42

(4)

WAR DIARY

(2)

962

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1843

SUBJECT: Reinforcement Procedure
BR-ITI Service Units.

RESTRICTED.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

SD/42

12 Feb 45.

TO : Ministry of War.

1. RESPONSIBILITY.

The provision, training and allocation of reinforcements for BR-ITI Service Units is the responsibility of the Ministry of War (S.M.E.) within the terms of these instructions and with such help from M.M.I.A. as is required.

2. OBJECT

The object is to keep all units up to their approved War Establishment strength with men of the required types and trades without waste of manpower.

3. BASE REINFORCEMENT DEPOTS

Reinforcements for BR-ITI Service Units will be supplied through Base Reinforcement Depots (B.R.Ds) which have been established at AFRAGOLA, TRANI and ORVITO and which are administered through local Adm Div HQs and through the Br Cadre attached to same. These are under Disps.

4. REFRESHMENT OF B.R.Ds.

Refreshment of B.R.Ds is the responsibility of the Ministry of War after such consultations with M.M.I.A. regarding calling up of men into the Army and other methods of raising manpower as are required to maintain the necessary holding of reinforcements. In planning for this consideration will be given to the anticipated wastage due to all causes, to returns from hospital or other absence, and to the likely yield of calls and recalls in various regions of ITALY so that strength may be maintained in all arms and units.

5. FUNCTIONS OF A B.R.D.

Each B.R.D. will be responsible for: -

- (a) - Testing, selection and allocation of suitable personnel to appropriate units within the Depot according to their qualifications for the various arms of the service and to the various units.

2. OBJECT

The object is to keep all units up to their approved War establishment strength with men of the required types and trades without waste of manpower.

3. BASE REINFORCEMENT DEPOTS

Reinforcements for BR-ITM Service Units will be supplied through Base Reinforcement Depots (B.R.Ds) which have been established at AFRAGOLA, TRANI and ORVIETO and which are administered through local Adm Div HQs and through the Br Cadre attached to same. These are under Dists.

4. REFRESHMENT OF B.R.Ds.

Refreshment of B.R.Ds is the responsibility of the Ministry of War after such consultations with M.M.I.A. regarding calling up of men into the Army and other methods of raising manpower as are required to maintain the necessary holding of reinforcements. In planning for this consideration will be given to the anticipated wastage due to all causes, to returns from hospital or other absence, and to the likely yield of calls and recalls in various regions of ITALY so that strength may be maintained in all arms and units.

5. FUNCTIONS OF A B.R.D.

Each B.R.D. will be responsible for:-

- (a) Testing, selection and allocation of suitable personnel to appropriate units within the Depot according to their qualifications for the various arms of the service and in suitable proportions to meet expected requirements.
- (b) Documentation and administration in accordance with Italian Army regulations.
- (c) Equipment and clothing in accordance with approved scales.
- (d) Basic training in accordance with standards agreed between Allied Command and the War Ministry.
- (e) Allocation to Adm Divs and units in accordance with deficiencies reported.

6. UNIT DEMANDS (FORTNIGHTLY)

Unit commanders of BR-ITM Service Units will demand replacements for all personnel struck off the strength of the Unit and to bring units up to authorised W.E. strength as follows:

contd sheet 2/.

Sheet 2.

6. UNIT DEMANDS (FORTNIGHTLY) (CONT'D)

- (a) Personnel who are wounded, sick, missing or absent will not be struck off the strength until, in the case of wounded or sick, 30 days after evacuation from the Unit, or in the case of missing or absent, 30 days after being reported missing or absent.
- (b) Reinforcement demands giving the info indicated at Appx "A" will be submitted fortnightly on Wednesdays by commanders of BR-ITF Service Units direct to HQ Adm Div concerned on the prescribed speechio. The first demand will be made on 7 March 1945. War Min will forward copy of "speechio" as soon as possible.

7. CONSOLIDATED DEMANDS (FORTNIGHTLY) BY ADM DIV HQ.

- (a) H.Qs Adm Divs will submit consolidated reinforcement demands fortnightly on Saturdays giving the information indicated at Appx "B" on the prescribed speechio by quickest means to the appropriate Base Reinforcement Depot with copies to Italian Ministry of War. The Territorial HQ concerned, HQ MIA and local MIA LO (See Sub para b col 111). The first consolidated demand will be made on 10 March 1945.

- (b) Appropriation of Base Reinforcement Depots is as follows: -

(1) Adm Div	(11) Under Comd	(111) Local HQ	(iv) Base Rft Depot	(v) Under Comd.
228 Div	Eighth Army	Senior MIA LO Rear Eighth Army	ORMETO (accn ceiling 4500 (to be raised to 6000. Now under consideration.)	1 DISTRICT.
231 Div	Fifth Army	MIA LO Br Incr Fifth Army.		
209 Div	1 District	MIA LO 1 Dist	AVRAGLIA (accn ceiling 6000	3 DISTRICT
227 Div	3 District	MIA LO 3 Dist		
230 Div	3 District	MIA LO 5/4 Area	TRANI (accn ceiling	3 DISTRICT Eastern Det.

7. CONSOLIDATED DEMANDS (FORNIGHTLY) BY ADM DIV HQ.

(a) H.Qs Adm Divs will submit consolidated reinforcement demands fortnightly on Saturdays giving the information indicated at Appx "D" on the prescribed speechio by quickest means to the appropriate Base Reinforcement Depot with copies to Italian Ministry of War. The Territorial HQ concerned, HQ MMIA and local MMIA LO (See Sub para b col iii). The first consolidated demand will be made on 10 March 1945.

(b) Appropriation of Base Reinforcement Depots is as follows: -

(i) Adm Div	(ii) Under Comd	(iii) Local HQ	(iv) Base Rft Depot	(v) Under Comd.
228 Div	Eighth Army	Senior MMIA LO Rear Eighth Army	ORVIETO accn ceiling 2500 (to be raised to 6000. Now under consideration.)	1 DISTRICT.
231 Div	Fifth Army	MMIA LO Br Iner Fifth Army.		
209 Div	1 District	MMIA LO 1 Dist	ATRACLA accn ceiling 6000	3 DISTRICT
227 Div	3 District	MMIA LO 3 Dist		
230 Div	3 District	MMIA LO 5/4 Area	TRAMI accn ceiling 6000	3 DISTRICT Eastern Det.

8. ALLOCATION OF REVS.

The E.R.D. Commander will normally arrange drafts of reinforcements according to demands without further authority as far as he is able. If there are not sufficient reinforcements available he will apply through the C.C. Br Cadre to MMIA for a decision on priorities. Priorities within an Army or District will be obtained by application by the C.C. Br Cadre on behalf of the E.R.D. Commander concerned direct to HQ of the British Army or District under command of which the units are serving.

9. MOVEMENT OF DRAFTS

(a) Movement of reinforcements from B.R.D. to comply with demands of HQs, Adm Divs will usually be made in bulk drafts to reinforcement transit camps established by Adm Divs. Movement will be arranged by the Depot Commander through the C.C. Br Cadre.

Sheet 3

9. (b) O.C. Br Cadre will demand weekly on Wednesdays by telephone confirmed by immediate signal to MMIA for movement of reinforcements required to destinations outside the boundaries of his District. This demand will be in the form shown at Appendix "C" and will be in respect of movements in the week commencing Monday twelve days later.
- (c) Movement of drafts within District area will be arranged by O.C. Br Cadre through District HQ with local movements.
- (d) Receiving formations will arrange MCV from railhead or transit camps to unit.

10. B.R.D. STRENGTH RETURN.

The number of reinforcements by ranks and trades held in each B.R.D. will be reported weekly as at 1800 hrs on Sundays as in Appx "D" att'd on the prescribed specimen.

(Signed) S.M. Ingledew, Lt Col.
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

DISTRIBUTION:-

APHQ for GI (Br), G-3 Org, Mov.	(3)
HQ 15 Army Group	(5)
HQ Fifth Army for Br Iner	(2)
for MMIA LO	(5)
Rear HQ Eighth Army	(2)
for MMIA LO	(5)
1 District	(2)
"	(5)
"	(2)
for MMIA LO	(2)
for GC Br Cadre	(2)
ORVIERO	(2)
3 District	(3)
"	(2)
"	(2)
for MMIA LO	(2)
for GC Br Cadre	(2)

movements.

(d) Receiving formations will arrange MOV from railroad or transit camps to unit.

10. B.R.D. STRENGTH REVIEW.

The number of reinforcements by ranks and trades held in each B.R.D. will be reported weekly as at 1800 hrs on Sundays as in Appx "D" attd on the prescribed specimen.

(Signed) S.M. Ingledew, Lt Col.

for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

DISTRIBUTION:- A/HQ for GI(Br), G-3 Org, Mov.

HQ 15 Army Group (3)

HQ Fifth Army for Br Incr (5)

for MMIA LO (2)

Rear HQ Eighth Army (5)

for MMIA LO (2)

1 District (5)

" (2)

for MMIA LO (2)

for OC Br Cadre (2)

ORVETO (2)

3 District (3)

" (2)

for MMIA LO (2)

for OC Br Cadre (2)

APRAGOLA (2)

" " Br Cadre (2)

TRANI (2)

2 District (5)

HQ RAAC (5)

Allied Commission for G-1 (Br) (5)

MMIA LO NAPLES (2)

MMIA LO S4 Area (2)

MMIA LO S2 Area (1)

INTERAL:

AQ (4)

A (2)

MOV (2)

FILE (2)

WAR DIARY (2)

Spec Sec.

DAPCS

Q(GB)

Q(AE)

tv9.

962

11849

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

11 8 5 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

196

RESTRICTED

Appendix "A" to NMTA 30/42
dated 14 February 1945

Reinforcement Demand.

Appropriate Adm Div HQ by all unit commanders.

as at 1800 hrs Wednesday 8 March 45 and subsequently fortnightly.

days.

DATE _____ and TIME _____

W.E. (e.g. NA/500/6)

LOCATION

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)**

(h)

Rfts received
since last return

Struck off
strength since
last demand
giving reasons

Deficiencies
requested last
demand NOT yet
filled.
By ranks and
trades

Deficiencies
now demanded
by ranks and
trades.

REMARKS

Number

Date

Offrs

ORs

tal, on leave, missing or absent for period under 30 days.

1852

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

036

Adm Div HQ Consolidated Fortnightly Reinforcement Demand.

1. Adm Div HQ will consolidate the information received from their units and will render it to Reinforcement Depot with copies (vide para 7(a) covering letter) fortnightly on Saturdays.

To: B.R.D.

CONSOLIDATED RFT DEMAND

DATED _____

(a) /	(b)**	(c)		(d)		(e)	(f)xx	(g)
Total WE Strength	Effective Strength	Present Ration Strength		Struck off strength since last return giving reasons.		Deficiencies requested in last demand NOT yet filled. By Ranks & Trades.	Deficiencies now demanded by Ranks & Trades	Destination (rail). will not be Adm Transit.
Offrs ORs	Offrs ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs			

** This will include personnel in hospital, on leave, missing or absent from periods under 30 days.

xx This should equal the total of cols (d) & (e)

/ By arms of the service.

WS

1853

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

966

RESTRICTED

Appendix "B" to MIA letter
SD/42 dated 14 February 1945

Div HQ Consolidated Fortnightly Reinforcement Demand.

information received from their units and will render it to the appropriate Base
(vide para 7(a) covering letter) fortnightly on Saturdays.

CONSOLIDATED RFT DEMAND

DATED _____

(d)		(e)	(f)xx	(g)	(h)
Struck off strength since last return giving reasons.		Deficiencies requested in last demand NOT yet filled. By Ranks & Trades.	Deficiencies now demanded by Ranks & Trades	Destination (rail). This will normally be Adm Div Transit Camp.	REMARKS
Offrs	CRs				

hospital, on leave, missing or absent from periods under 30 days.

(d) & (e)

11854

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

959

Movement Bid by OC Br Cadre R.R.D.

1. By immediate signal, addressed MHA copy to MHA 10 at receiving fm.
2. Despatched to HQ MHA on Wednesday weekly by 1800 hrs confirming telephone
3. Giving the following information reading in columns:
 - (a) Priority serial and camp prefix letter. The latter will be
 - (b) Strength of draft
 - (c) Destination (rail)
 - (d) Receiving formation.
 - (e) Receiving unit where applicable.
 - (f) Date required.
 - (g) Remarks.

APP
CHU
TR

11855

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

959

Appendix "C" to MMIA SD/12
dated 14 February 1945

by OC Br Cadre E.R.D.

ate signal, addressed MMIA copy to MMIA IO at receiving fm.

to HQ MMIA on Wednesday weekly by 1800 hrs confirming telephone bid.

the following information reading in columns:

riority serial and camp prefix letter. The latter will be

AFRAGOLA	-	A
ORVIETO	-	O
TRANI	-	T

length of draft

estination (rail)

ceiving formation.

ceiving unit where applicable.

ata required.

marks.

1856

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TS/6/29
SECRET

Subject: Further Italian participation in combat.

Land Forces Sub-Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

G/6

14 Jan 45.

Chief of Staff, A.C.

As requested verbally by you to my 2nd i/c while I was on tour, herewith a short memorandum stating the salient points affecting the Italian demand for a larger Italian Combat Force to fight the Germans and liberate Italy.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Recd in S.S. by me 20. Feb.
WP

958

SECRET

GERMAN ITALIAN PARTICIPATION IN COMBAT

1. THE SUPPLY ARMS

- (a) (i) Six Italian Combat Groups, strength approximately 9000 each, with auxiliary service units were authorized last July - the clothing and equipment of all natures (roughly the equivalent of 5 British Divisions) to be furnished by the British. Owing to lack of clothing and equipment, only five combat groups are being organized and trained. Two Groups are ready for battle, two are approaching completion and the fifth is now in process of formation.
- (ii) A small part of the Italian Army (about 9%) is used purely for Italian internal administration and for the operation of hospitals, supply installations, recovery and utilization of Italian Army property, and for the repair and renovation of Allied clothing and materials used to clothe and equip the entire Army, less the Combat Groups.
- (iii) The balance of the Italian Army (about 73%) is used for pioneer, engineer, railway, signal, mail post, guard, port and internal security duty.
- (b) Between Dec 1943 and July 1944, a Combat Force

857

Two Groups are ready for battle, two are approaching completion and the fifth is now in process of formation.

(ii) A small part of the Italian Army (about 9%) is used purely for Italian internal administration and for the operation of hospitals, supply installations, recovery and utilization of Italian Army property, and for the repair and renovation of Allied clothing and materials used to clothe and equip the entire Army, less the Combat Groups.

337

(iii) The balance of the Italian Army (about 73%) is used for pioneer, engineer, railway, signal, mail pack, guard, port and internal security duty.

(b) Between Dec 1943 and July 1944, a Combat Force of Italian troops (C.I.L.), approximately 90,000, was in action with the 5th and 8th Armies. This was equipped with Italian arms, clothing and equipment, but it was necessary for the Allies to assist with motor vehicles. The short supply of Italian arms and ammunition and the lack of organization did not permit this force to remain longer in combat.

Sheet 2/.....

- 2-
- (c) (1) Certain Italian small arms and ammunition have to be put in reserve, as all Italian troops, except the Combat Groups, are armed with Italian small arms. This includes the C.I.B. and Internal Security divisions on the islands. Above this requirement, there is no surplus for any additional Combat Force, nor are there any working factories or facilities to manufacture replacements for the Italian arms and ammunition which are used up through normal attrition. To restart factories would be a long process, even assuming that the necessary raw material could be imported, factories reconditioned, trained operatives made available and Allied policy as regards disarmament permitted. In any event, these factories could not turn out the vast range of complicated arms and equipment (particularly of the heavier nature) required in modern war against the Germans.
 - (11) The Italian Army motor vehicles which were available at the time of the armistice were in poor condition. Even at best, these vehicles are not equal to the demands of modern warfare. After months of repair operations (principally cannibalisation because of lack of spare parts) it has not even been possible to keep in operation sufficient vehicles to service the existing Italian

a long process, even assuming that the necessary raw material could be imported, factories reconditioned, trained operatives made available and Allied policy as regards rearmament permitted. In any event, these factories could not turn out the vast range of complicated arms and equipment (particularly of the heavier natures) required in modern war against the Germans.

(ii) The Italian Army motor vehicles which were available at the time of the armistice were in poor condition. Even at best, these vehicles are not equal to the demands of modern warfare.

After months of repair operations (principally cannibalisation because of lack of spare parts) it has not even been possible to keep in operation sufficient vehicles to service the existing Italian Army, and the continued operation of these vehicles is limited due to lack of tyres. So, even to service the normal needs of the Italian Army, the Allies have had to lend motor vehicles.

(iii) Except for Combat Groups, the Italian Army exists on worn Allied and Italian clothing and boots which are repaired, cannibalised, dyed etc before issue. The greatest difficulty has been experienced in maintaining even the existing Italian Army under these circumstances.

Sheet 3/.....

1. (a) (iv) Thus, any increase in the combat element of the Italian Army would require the provision of clothing, arms and equipment of all natures from Allied sources at a time when such provision is not available even for the Sixth Combat Group.

2. THE ASPECT OF ORGANISATION AND TRAINING

Even if the necessary equipment could be provided from Allied sources, additional Italian Combat Forces would have to be organised, at least partially, on Allied lines. Training by the Allies in the handling of technical equipment (particularly on a higher and more powerful scale than the Italian Army has been accustomed to) is essential. This, with the addition of the language difficulty, is a slow process and requires a high percentage of specialists. After concentration of personnel, experience has shown that a minimum of 4 months is required till troops are ready for combat - always assuming that adequate equipment is available at the time required.

3. THE PERSONNEL ASPECT

- (a) Generally speaking, the Italian rank and file are good material as soldiers, BUT the officers are the weak link. The latter lack the capacity for leadership and any conception of man-management. This is particularly so at present, as the best troops are either P of W or in the more virile population of NORTH ITALY. Even so, no great improvement will be possible without a radical change in the system of selection and training of officers

accustomed to) is essential. This, with the addition of the language difficulty, is a slow process and requires a high percentage of specialists. After concentration of personnel, experience has shown that a minimum of 4 months is required till troops are ready for combat - always assuming that adequate equipment is available at the time required.

3. THE PERSONNEL ASPECT

(a) Generally speaking, the Italian rank and file are good material as soldiers, BUT the officers are the weak link. The latter lack the capacity for leadership and any conception of man-management. This is particularly so at present, as the best troops are either POW or in the more virile population of NORTH ITALY. Even so, no great improvement will be possible without a radical change in the system of selection and training of officers extending over many years.

(b) Despite the demands by political parties for a larger Italian Army, the fact remains that the Italian male answers the call-up most unwillingly. Recent call-ups have produced only 25% of expectations.

Evadee and desertion are rife (Ministry of War have 70,000 cases outstanding), particularly in those units employed in forward areas. The reasons for this and the steps being taken to mitigate it are given in MAIA letter

TS/C/4 of 1 Jan attached.

Sheet 4/...

3. (b)(Contd). The conclusion would appear to be that the Italian males of military age do not share the views of their so-called political leaders.

(c) Apart from the matter of formation of new units, the replacement of wastage at the accepted rate of 4% per month (probably higher in the case of Italians) must be catered for.

4. TO SUM UP

(a) There is no Italian equipment suitable for Combat troops, nor can any be manufactured. Equipment available from Allied sources is only sufficient to equip and maintain 5 Combat Groups out of the 6 originally planned.

(b) Assuming the availability of further Allied equipment, a period of at least 6 months (including concentration of personnel, organisation and training) would elapse before the first new Combat formations could start becoming available for battle.

(c) It is, to say the least, very doubtful whether sufficient officers and men of the requisite calibre would in fact be forthcoming to form and maintain any more units than those we already have.

952

L. B. ...

Major General,
M.H.I.A.

from Allied sources is only sufficient to equip and maintain 5 Combat Groups out of the 6 originally planned.

(b) Assuming the availability of further Allied equipment, a period of at least 6 months (including concentration of personnel, organisation and training) would elapse before the first new Combat Formations could start becoming available for battle.

(c) It is, to say the least, very doubtful whether sufficient officers and men of the requisite calibre would in fact be forthcoming to form and maintain any more units than those we already have.

954

L. B. ...

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

11865

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHOBI 06155A
TO MMIA

P 21303

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF MAJOR ANGEL SCANDELLA SPANISH MILITARY ATTACHE
MENTIONED IN YOUR O-685 OF 4 FEB. 1945 TO ITALIAN COMBAT
GROUPS NOT APPROVED

71

egl /

DISTRIBUTION

Spec Sec
File G/2

SP

953

1866

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

LRME V LAEE NR22

FROM AFHQ FUGBI 061555A

TO NMIA

GR40 BT

63/06

D/817 72

N79/6

CONFIDENTIAL. F21823

Behan - Spec Sec 7 4
Free 9/2 copies G

7/2

CONFIDENTIAL PD VISIT OF MAJOR ANGEL SCANDILLA SPANISH
MILITARY ATTACHE (PAREN SIGNED SACRED CITE FUGBI PAREN)
MENTIONED IN YOUR OBOE WYPHEN SIX EIGHT FIVE OF FOUR
FEBRUARY CMA ONE NINE FOUR FIVE TO ITALIAN COMBAT
GROUPS NOT APPROVED

952

BT 061555A

SENT NR225 061752A JLP BB K

RECD NR 225 061752 A AAA AR K

ACT - Landforces 8/0

061900

11867

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TS/6/29

71

MMIA

04/700A

AFHQ

W.P.

C 685

CONFIDENTIAL

MAJOR ANGEL S G A N D E L L A SPANISH MIL ATTACHE IN R O M E
DESIRES VISIT ITALIAN COMBAT OPS AND OTHER ITALIAN MILITARY UNITS (.)
M M I A DOES NOT RECOMMEND BUT REQUEST YOU GIVE DECISION

PRECEDENCE _____

Internal: S/Sec

AUTHENTICATED _____

File: 0/2

WS

951

1868

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

70

MMIA

16 1820 A

50, 51, 52, 53, 56 BLUS.

SS 565

Restricted

WP

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

ATTENTION ALL BLUS DRAWN TO OUR TS/G/29 OF 23 DEC ENCLOSING AFHQ AG 091.112/119
OCTMO OF 20 DEC PARTICULARLY PARA 3 (.) 51 BLU (.) YOUR A 2/2 OF 14 JAN REFERS

349

IMPORTANT

TS/G/29

W.R. Healy in W.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

B-1711

RHF/at

TOP SECRET
Auth: SAC MT
Initials: *RHF*
19 December 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 354.1/145 GCT-0

19 December 1944

SUBJECT: Training Area, LAKE BRACCOLINO

TO : Commanding General, Rome Area Allied Command, APO 794

1. Reference is made to your letter, file TKB/LL/urv, dated 14 December 1944, and to letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 9 December 1944.

2. Confirmation is made that the responsibilities of the 52d British Lirison Unit do not extend to duties of an FSP nature, but are confined to insuring that the security of the area in question is observed by the troops of the Legnano Division only.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

R. H. Freese
R. H. FREESE,
Captain, IGD,
Asst. Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

Addressed	Copy No
15th Army Group	1
Land Forces Sub Commission, AC (MIA)	2
52 BLU	3
DNT	4
G-2	5
C(Maint)	6
R.C.	7
G-3 (Org) Foreign	8
AG Records	9
	10
	11 & 12

Noted WP

Ackd 2/12

Land Forces

950

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1 8 7 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

68

SECRET

Subject :- Responsibilities of Land Forces
Sub-Commission (MMIA) to Italian
Gruppi.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

TS/G/29.
23. Dec., 44.

To :- 50, 51, 52, 53, 56 BLUs.
All MMIA LO's
LO RTC ICF.

67

Attached for information is AFHQ letter AG 491.112/119 GCT-0
dated 20th December, 1944.

W. Pidsley: Colonel
f. Major General.
M.M.I.A.

948

LAO FORCES S/C (2) 6214
JC/eth

12

Spec.

AP
: : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: SAC :
: Initials: RMf :
: 20 December 1944 :
: : : : :

$\pi/6/29$

20 December 1944

$$\sqrt{(2)(12+3)}$$
$$\sqrt{(2)(12+3)}$$

- a. All matters of purely Italian administration.
- b. Strengths and reinforcements.
- c. Discipline.
- d. Conditions of service, welfare, etc.

3. All operational, executive and policy matters, also proposals by BLUs or Combat Groups for changes in organization will be made through normal staff channels to the Allied Headquarters concerned for decisions or recommendation to JCEA.

R.H. Frost 9:7

see 64

c.c/ Unless G.(SD) Have
acted a ltr.

- and copy to encl BLD & RIC & AMNH Loo.
a circulate in MMIA &

- 1 -

SECRET

SECRET

11872

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

66

SECRET: Employment of Italian Combat Groups

Adv Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy.

8653/EGS

23 Nov 44.

S/Sec

26/11

FIFTH ARMY
EIGHTH ARMY

When employing the Italian Combat Groups in the front line, the Commander-in-Chief is most anxious to avoid the chances of fratricide and sowing the seeds of civil wars in the future and vendettas between sections of Italian opinion. In consequence he wishes arrangements to be made, whenever practicable, to prevent the Italian Combat Groups being placed in the line opposite Italian Fascist troops. There is, however, no objection to their being put in a sector opposite Germans but adjacent to one held by the Fascists, so that the latter would have sympathetic troops near them to whom they can desert.

NA

2A

John Harding

Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

PIM/VER.

Copy to: NSIA ✓
GSI
A.

11 8 7 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

65

TK/6/4

ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS

OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS OF POLICY (17 Nov 44)

1. NUMBER OF GROUPS

The Sixth Group (PICENO) is now forming and must go either forward or backward. Is it to be equipped as a combat group, if not what will be its function?

2. NUMBER OF REINFORCEMENTS

The 10% allowed on paper within the ceiling will not in practice be enough. 15% (i.e. 8,550) which is practically the strength of one group is considered necessary. Can this be considered?

3. TRAINING FACILITIES

Recommendations for training replacements and specialists are being made to AFHQ today. They involve commitments of some magnitude. May they be given very careful consideration and an early reply?

4. TRAINING EQUIPMENT

Scales of unserviceable equipment have proved unsatisfactory. Can each group receive a modicum of its W.E. (to count against full issues) and Reinforcement Depot and Schools being given an adequate allotment?

5. LEAVE

We must view this question in the light of local conditions and needs, if we are to avoid discontent and desertion. Immediate needs are controlled leave in small numbers to Forward area, SICILY and SARDINIA. Will AFHQ reconsider this?

6. PUBLICITY

Reasonable controlled publicity will pay a good dividend. A representative march through ROME during move Northward (24 Nov) is recommended. AAI, War Ministry and P.R. (A.C.) recommend this. Is there any AFHQ objection?

granted
for MANT
OVB

945

May Dotolo
Head.

} This was given to S.A.C. and Li Brig Anderson on 17 Nov as an aide memoire - for run in.

WD

874

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

64

SUBJECT: MMIA Responsibilities to Combat Groups.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

TS/C/29

24

Nov 44

TO : A.F.H.Q.

Copy to: A.A.I.

1. A definition is requested of the extent of the responsibilities which MMIA retains towards the Combat Groups as they move from under command of S.M.R.E. to that of Allied formations, and whether MMIA is empowered to communicate with ELU's direct. I have in mind organizational questions effecting strength, duties, provision and training of Italian personnel.

2. It seems apparent that these questions must ultimately affect the Ministry of War, and must therefore be considered at some stage by MMIA; also, if uniformity is to be maintained in all Groups, some of whom are under A.A.I. and some in back areas (including reinforcement organisations) that MMIA should coordinate such proceedings at an early stage.

3. It is recommended that questions affecting organisation within Combat Group units already authorised should be referred in the first instance to MMIA. It would be MMIA's duty to coordinate with other similar units, to obtain the Italian reaction and viewpoint, and to make such recommendations to A.F.H.Q. and/or A.A.I. as are considered necessary.

W.P. Duley
Major General
M.M.I.A.

944

see 67.

63
SUBJECT: Reorganization Italian Combat Force.

SECRET

MILITARY MISSION
ITALIAN ARMY
ROME

20/10/29
21 Oct 44

DP

TO : R.E. General LAMIA - Under Secretary of State for War.
R.E. General BERARDI - Chief of General Staff - Italian Army.

Further to my 12/10/29 of 28 Aug 44 on the above subject.

1. I am to instruct your Excellencies that recent decisions of AFHQ necessitate a revision of the disposal of certain units of the Italian Army, as follows.

2. Italian Mountain Combat Group.

It has been decided NOT to proceed with the proposal to form a Mountain Combat Group.

3. Formation and Equipment of Combat Groups.

(a) The present plan for the formation and equipment of the PALEI, CROAZIA, LIGURIA and PUGLIA Combat Groups will proceed as already planned i.e. PALEI and CROAZIA Groups and first third of the "tail" auxiliary units by end of October.

LIGURIA and PUGLIA Groups and second third of the "tail" auxiliary units by end of November.

(b) DAINTIA and PUGLIA Divisions.

The date by which the 5th (DAINTIA), and the 6th (PUGLIA) Combat Groups can become effective is dependent on a number of factors. It has therefore been decided to use these divisions as sources for the provision of drivers and specialists for the first two combat groups. It has further been decided to use PUGLIA Division for providing certain essential Internal Security troops, 9/2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Further to my 75/6/29 of 26 Aug 44, on the above subject.

1. I am to instruct your Excellencies that recent decisions of AFHQ necessitate a revision of the disposal of certain units of the Italian army, as follows.

2. Italian Mountain Combat Group.

It has been decided NOT to proceed with the proposal to form a Mountain Combat Group.

3. Formation and Equipment of Combat Groups.

(a) The present plan for the formation and equipment of the FRATELLI, CRUSCELLI, LACOMARE and PIGNONE Combat Groups will proceed at already planned i.e. FRATELLI and CRUSCELLI Groups and first third of the "tail" auxiliary units by end of October.

LACOMARE and PIGNONE Groups and second third of the "tail" auxiliary units by end of November.

(b) MASTROVA and PIGNONE Divisions.

The date by which the 5th (MASTROVA), and the 6th (PIGONE) Combat Groups can become effective is dependent on a number of factors. It has therefore been decided to use these divisions as sources for the provision of drivers and specialists for the first two combat groups. It has further been decided to use PIGNONE Division for providing certain essential internal security troops, 923 on which instructions will be issued separately. Meanwhile 5th (MASTROVA) will continue training on limited equipment, and will be moved to S. GIUSEPPE area when this is vacated by FRATELLI Group.

At this present time the target date for completion of MASTROVA Group is 1 Feb 45.

L. Brown

Major General
S. S. A.

11877

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

832

73/8/29
GC/1ja

62a

.....
: **SECRET** :
: Auth: SACMT :
: Initials: :
: Date: 25 October 44: :
: :
25 October 1944

AG 091.711/037 OCT-0

SUBJECT: Disposal of Italian Army Units.

TO : All Concerned.

1. Decisions recently taken in this headquarters have necessitated a revision of the disposal of certain units of the Italian Army.

2. Italian Mountain Combat Group

It was decided not to proceed with the proposal to form a Mountain Combat Group.

3. Formation and Equipment of Combat Groups

a. The present plan for the formation and equipment of the Italian FRIULI, CREMONA, LEGNANO and FOIGORE Divisions into Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 Italian Combat Groups will proceed as already planned i.e.,

- (1) Nos. 1 and 2 Groups and 1/3 "tail" units by end of October. ✓
- (2) Nos. 3 and 4 Groups and 1/3 "tail" units by end of December. ✓

b. MANTOVA and PICENO Divisions.

The date by which the 5th (MANTOVA), and the 6th (PICENO) Combat Groups can become effective is dependent on a number of factors, including equipment. It has therefore been decided to use these divisions as sources for the provision of drivers and specialists for the first two combat groups. It has further been decided to use PICENO Division for providing certain essential Internal Security troops, on which instructions will be issued separately. Meanwhile 5th (MANTOVA) will continue training on limited equipment.

4. Training of Combat Groups.

The supervision of the training of the Italian Combat Groups will be the responsibility of Allied Force Headquarters.

By command of General WILSON:

and Ed Jack

Since
Cancelled
10 Nov.
WP

live copy.

6-2-49
CO

HEADQUARTERS
26011 1944
A. C. C.

942
Jack Carter.
JACK CARTER,
Captain, AGD,
Asst Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

See reverse side.

SECRET

SECRET


SECRET

Ltr Hq NATOUSA, file AG 091.711/037 GCT-O,
dtd 25 October 1944 (Cont'd).

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Hq. AAI
- 2 - Allied Control Commission ✓ 6-7
- 2 - Land Forces Sub-Commission (MILA)
- 2 - Rome Allied Area Command
- 2 - P.B.S.
- 2 - COMZONE NATOUSA
- 2 - Hq. 3 District
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 10 - G-3
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - CAO
- 1 - Q (Maint)
- 1 - Q (E)
- 1 - G-5
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - M & D

SECRET



Tepe.

Inv. d. c. p. S. S. S.
Spec. R. S. S.

URGENTE

SEGRETO

Ministero della Sanità

CABINETTO

N. 303284/C.A.

317-III-40

P.M. 151, 27 ottobre 1944

OGGETTO: Forze di combattimento italiane -

ALLA M.M.I.A.

ROMA

37

M.M.I.A.	9/5/44
FILE REF	78/6/89
Date	27/10/44

Riferimento 73/3/29 del 4 corrente.

1) Lo S.M. ha già disposto in merito ai movimenti di militari di cui al n.2 della lettera in riferimento.

- quelli del gruppo comb. "Cremona" sono già stati avviati ad Afragola;
- quelli del gruppo comb. "Prilli" sono in corso di trasferimento;
- i rimanenti (dei gruppi di comb. Volgore, Legnano e Mantova) saranno trasferiti nei prossimi giorni.

2) Sono state impartite disposizioni per l'invio in congedo o in licenza illimitata del personale della categoria D: verranno forniti dati e operazione ultimata.

3) Per quanto riguarda le varie fonti da cui trarre i 15.000 no. occorrenti al fabbisogno sicuro per forze di combattimento sino alla fine del 1944:

- a)- si confermano quelle indicate al n.5 del foglio a riferimento con le varianti che:
- dal Foggiano e Campania saranno tratti 3.000 no. anziché 1.000
 - dal distretto di Frosinone sino ad ieri si sono incorporati 1320 richiamati (il 25% dei presentati) e perciò sarà difficile raggiungere, anche con il rastrellamento già disposto, i 3.000 no. previsti.

b)- Occorrerà quindi prevedere un ulteriore gettito di 5-6.000 no. che potrebbero essere richiamati negli Abruzzi. Al riguardo, ove co-

ALLA M.M.I.A.

ROMA

MAJATA	15/16/1947
FILE REP	
Date	

Riferimento TS/3/29 del 4 corrente.

- 1) Lo S.M. ha già disposto in merito ai movimenti di militari di cui al n.2 della lettera in riferimento.
 - quelli del gruppo comb. "Cremona" sono già stati avviati ad Afragola;
 - quelli del gruppo comb. "Priuli" sono in corso di trasferimento;
 - i rimanenti (dei gruppi di comb. Folgore, Legnano e Mantova) saranno trasferiti nei prossimi giorni.
- 2) Sono state impartite disposizioni per l'invio in congedo o in licenza illimitata del personale della categoria D: verranno forniti dati e operazione ultimata.
- 3) Per quanto riguarda le varie fonti da cui trarre i 15.000 uo. occorrenti al fabbisogno sicuro per forze di combattimento sino alla fine del 1944:
 - a)- si confermano quelle indicate al n.5 del foglio a riferimento con le varianti che:
 - dal Foggiano e Campania saranno tratti 3.000 uo. anziché 1.000
 - dal distretto di Prosinone sino ad ieri si sono incorporati 1320 richiamati (il 25% dei presentati) e perciò sarà difficile raggiungere, anche con il rastrellamento già disposto, i 3.000 uo. previsti.
 - b)- Occorrerà quindi prevedere un ulteriore gettito di 5-6-6.000 uo. che potrebbero essere richiamati negli Abruzzi. Al riguardo, ove costa M.M.I.A. decida in tal senso, sarà grato di un preavviso con conveniente anticipo per riordinare e rinforzare i distretti della regione o per affiggere preventivamente i manifesti.
 - 4) Per il mantenimento della forza di combattimento durante il 1945, come precisato con lettera 303055/C.A. del 20 corr. il fabbisogno è di circa 19.000 uo. (1)

Le fonti di reclutamento potranno essere quelle indicate nella lettera suddetta.

(1) Il calcolo fatto a pag.2 del citato documento, prevede 9.450 uo. per un semestre.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Nei riguardi della chiamata alle armi dei non istruiti
del 1924 e del 1925 mi riservo di trasmettere uno studio parti-
colareggiato per l'approvazione.

IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO ALLA GUERRA
(Gen. C. B. Oxilia)

Y. Oxilia

1882

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

MESSAGE FORM

From : MMIA
To (For action) : FREEDOM
To (For info) : AAI

Date - Time

24 1630 A

SS 220

RESTRICTED

My SS 206 of 21 Oct should have cited your FX 40003 of 17 Oct reference formation of BLUE and not AAI'S SS 1185 reference combat group tail (.) Paren ROME Area

_____ Paren

Precedence ROUTINE

Authenticating
Officer

[Signature]

may

340

SUBJECT: Visit by D.M.T. to ITALIAN Gruppi

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CMF

Tel: 16950

DME/55/AM-1

14 Oct 44

Major-General L. A. BROWNING,
MILA, CMF

Copy to: CGS, AFHQ.

G-3 (ORG) AFHQ.

G-3 TRG (Br) AFHQ

G(TRG) HQ AAI

1. On 12 Oct 44 I visited the ELUs at HQs of the FRIULI and CREMONA Divisions, taking with me Brigadier NAPIER, G-3 (ORG) AFHQ, and Brigadier COWLEY, Q(AE) AFHQ. The following points were noted :-

(a) FRIULI Division

OC ELU, Lt-Col SOUTHEY, is very hard at work with his unit, seems to have the confidence of the Divisional Commander, and is taking a strong hand to get training and equipment going properly. He has several difficulties:

(1) Drivers.

The General, General PEDROTTI, produced a daily state on paper showing considerable shortages of specialists, and a total of 1,400 vehicle drivers as against some 2,500. ELU tells me that of these, probably much less than 50% are fit to drive a vehicle; many of them have never had any training at all. In consequence, they are drawing lorries very slowly, and are writing off two a day through sheer ignorance. Maintenance training with the training vehicles was almost impossible through an almost entire lack of tools. Training teams which were to have been arranged by the DSF have not fetched up. Mechanics' School have loaned a team to assist, the REME Workshops Detachment with the ELU is training drivers, and even officers are helping because the inability to move about has hindered field firing and all forms of training. As an emergency measure, I am raising scratch teams of drivers from RACTD and RASCTD to go at once to assist. Brigadier NAPIER is examining the possibility of taking a number of trained Italian drivers (soldiers) who are now held against a possible GT Coy, and offering them to you for transfer to the Gruppo. I understand

divisions, talking with me Brigadier Napier, G-3 (Org) AFHQ, and Brigadier COWLEY, Q(AE) AFHQ. The following points were noted :-

(a) FRIULI Division

OC ELU, Lt-Col SOUTHEY, is very hard at work with his unit, seems to have the confidence of the Divisional Commander, and is taking a strong hand to get training and equipment going properly. He has several difficulties:

(i) Drivers.

The General, General PEDROTTI, produced a daily state on paper showing considerable shortages of specialists, and a total of 1,400 vehicle drivers as against some 2,500. ELU tells me that of these, probably much less than 50% are fit to drive a vehicle; many of them have never had any training at all. In consequence, they are drawing lorries very slowly, and are writing off two a day through sheer ignorance. Maintenance training with the training vehicles was almost impossible through an almost entire lack of tools. Training teams which were to have been arranged by the DST have not fetched up. Mechanics' School have loaned a team to assist, the REME Workshops Detachment with the ELU is training drivers, and even officers are helping because the inability to move about has hindered field firing and all forms of training. As an emergency measure, I am raising scratch teams of drivers from RACTD and RASCTD to go at once to assist. Brigadier NAPIER is examining the possibility of taking a number of trained Italian drivers (soldiers) who are now held against a possible GT Coy, and offering them to you for transfer to the Gruppo. I understand that when FRIULI and CREMONA were choosing men in SARDINIA, FRIULI chose Grenatieri, big, fit men, while CREMONA went all out for lorry drivers. REME specialists are badly wanted.

(ii) Equipment.

We went into the list of holdings, releases and deficiencies, with Q(AE) and the unit. Equipment is nearly complete, the only deficiencies holding up training being: only four artillery directors held, (tripods just received for them); Q(AE) are making up within the next few days to eight, which still leaves eight to come in due course. The training of both signallers and artillery is being held up for signal equipment. While controlled signal stores have been received and are in use for training, no wire and no pliers are available, and this should be put right as quickly as possible. It is under control of Director of Signals. None of the artillery has complete sights - Field Artillery Branch has lent some. Q(AE) are looking into this.

(411) State of training

Col. SOUTHEY says that the HJ has to supply most of the drive. The General, in his opinion, does not always get his orders obeyed. I have not the intimate knowledge to back this up, and I presume SOUTHEY will be writing to you about it. Satisfactory progress has been made in many ways, from reports from the members of the HJ. Weapon training has progressed to the field firing stage for the infantry, (except for anti-tank guns), and the artillery are ready to start firing at once. Engineers are reported on as on the average 40% completely trained. There has been some divergence of opinion between the GSO.II Artillery of the Mission and the GOC (who is an artilleryman), as to how far British methods of control and co-ordination should replace Italian. The Inspector of Artillery was sent down by the Italian War Office, and ruled that General PEDROTTI's wish to continue Italian methods in more advanced matters of artillery training and control should prevail. They are doing British gun drill, British battery control methods, and Italian survey. You will be more competent than I to judge whether this is satisfactory.

A big point at issue is ^{where} ~~whether~~ artillery shall practice in the vicinity, as GSO.II Artillery says that one of the General's selected ranges makes shot fall in a valley, where proper OP will be difficult. OC HJ says that three other target areas indicated by the General will mean driving the infantry off their training areas while the range is in use. OC HJ has found, in their opinion, a better site for battery practice 25 kilometres away. ~~General~~ General PEDROTTI agreed to use this for battery shooting later.

I have offered facilities for troop shooting in the CATC training area, on days when it can be made available. I hope that this will help.

No snipers' rifles have been issued to either FRIULI or CREMONA. They were apparently overlooked when the G.1098 was drawn up. In my opinion they are essential to any battalion on this front. I know they are available, and spoke to GCS yesterday morning - he agrees they should be issued so that training can start now. FRIULI's progress is being held up only by deplorable lack of competent drivers or potential drivers, lack of the small items of equipment mentioned above, and, I think, less central co-ordination and drive than is evident with CREMONA.

(b) CREMONA Division

The same deficiencies of equipment as above were put forward both by the HJ and by the General. Q(AS) are acting as and when possible. The General said he would like to treble his holding of Brens, so as to go on with tactical training, with field firing, even while basic training in the Bren was continuing. As the only

6

A big point at issue is ^{where} ~~whether~~ artillery shall practice in the vicinity, as GSO.II Artillery says that one of the General's selected ranges makes shot fall in a valley, where proper OP will be difficult. OC HUJ says that three other target areas indicated by the General will mean driving the infantry off their training areas while the range is in use. OC HUJ has found, in their opinion, a better site for battery practice 25 kilometres away. ~~General~~ General PEDROTTI agreed to use this for battery shooting later.

I have offered facilities for troop shooting in the CMTC training area, on days when it can be made available. I hope that this will help.

No snipers' rifles have been issued to either PRIULI or CREMONA. They were apparently overlooked when the G.1098 was drawn up. In my opinion they are essential to any battalion on this front. I know they are available, and spoke to GCS yesterday morning - he agrees they should be issued so that training can start now. PRIULI's progress is being held up only by deplorable lack of competent drivers or potential drivers, lack of the small items of equipment mentioned above, and, I think, less central co-ordination and drive than is evident with CREMONA.

(b) CREMONA Division

The same deficiencies of equipment as above were put forward both by the HUJ and by the General. Q(AE) are acting as and when possible. The General said he would like to treble his holding of Brens, so as to go on with tactical training, with field firing, even while basic training in the Bren was going on. As the full G.1098 issue was due yesterday, this will be all right. He was emphatic about the bad effect of having guns without sights, as he was still having to flog away just at gun control and theory.

7

He is better off for drivers than PRIULI, although still short of a considerable number. His Gruppo, however, is also writing off lorries at the rate of two a day, and he agreed with HUJ's statement that this appeared due to reckless speeds and over-crowding in the front seat. He is taking energetic steps to stop this, and has erected control blocks all along the narrow, dangerous roads which are the only ones in ALTAVILLA area, where he is located.

6

A big point at issue is ^{where} ~~whether~~ artillery shall practice in the vicinity, as GSO.II Artillery says that one of the General's selected ranges makes shot fall in a valley, where proper OP will be difficult. OC HJ says that three other target areas indicated by the General will mean driving the infantry off their training areas while the range is in use. OC HJ has found, in their opinion, a better site for battery practice 25 kilometres away. ~~Metaphor~~ General PEDROTTI agreed to use this for battery shooting later.

I have offered facilities for troop shooting in the CATC training area, on days when it can be made available. I hope that this will help.

No snipers' rifles have been issued to either FRIULI or CREMONA. They were apparently overlooked when the G.1098 was drawn up. In my opinion they are essential to any battalion on this front. I know they are available, and spoke to GCS yesterday morning - he agrees they should be issued so that training can start now. FRIULI's progress is being held up only by deplorable lack of competent drivers or potential drivers, lack of the small items of equipment mentioned above, and, I think, less central co-ordination and drive than is evident with CREMONA.

(b) CREMONA Division

The same deficiencies of equipment as above were put forward both by the HJ and by the General. Q(AE) are acting as and when possible. The General said he would like to treble his holding of Brens, so as to go on with tactical training, with field firing, even while basic training in the Bren was going on. As the full G.1098 issue was due yesterday, this will be all right. He was emphatic about the bad effect of having guns without sights, as he was still having to flog away just at gun control and theory.

7

He is better off for drivers than FRIULI, although still short of a considerable number. His Gruppo, however, is also writing off lorries at the rate of two a day, and he agreed with HJ's statement that this appeared due to reckless speeds and overcrowding in the front seat. He is taking energetic steps to stop this, and has erected control blocks all along the narrow, dangerous roads which are the only ones in ALTAVILLA area, where he is located.

8

I understood that this Gruppo was to be located in the more open country northwest of HENEVENTO, and feel bound to say that to place them in this very wild, hilly area with no detent roads is impeding their training now and will delay it much more when the rain and snow come in about a month's time. I knew this area last winter, and consider a division cannot train there adequately. The General was not bitter about this, but did say he would like to have, somewhere in his divisional area, one or two places where he could at least get a company on parade to look at, and a little open space to do tactical training. As far as I know, the area northwest of HENEVENTO is still available.

12

General PRIMAVERO strikes me as a real live commander, and he and Col. WEBB-CARTER are each enthusiastic about the work of the other. I think it is a successful combination. The General and his Chief of Staff both knew all that was going on, and had a training plan and were seeing that it happened. Signal equipment, drawn only a day before, was in use by both officer and other rank instructional cadres the day we arrived. The General tells me he is a mountain gunner, and volunteered the information, (which I later confirmed at CMTC), that a considerable proportion of the infantry of the LEGNANO Division are ALPINI and ARDITI, with a good deal of experience of mountain training - natural mountaineers, and with recent battle experience. He says they have their mountain artillery, and know how to use it, and volunteered the information that they still have some of their transport.

9

2. I visited the instructional cadres of LEGNANO and ~~MONFALCONE~~ ^{FOLCONE} under instruction at CMTC. The instructors there, who had reported favourably on the standard of the cadres of the first two Gruppi, consider that those of the second pair are even better. Your liaison officer at CMTC urges that action be taken to get them even simple weapons with which to start instruction, pending the receipt of the training scale. Brigadier NAPIER says he will do what he can about this, but I suggest your SD Branch follows it up. The plan for passing on the training scale of equipment from the early Gruppi to the later ones will not quite work in the following respects:

10

(a) The rather decrepit vehicles issued have suffered a fair number of casualties at the hands of FRIULI and CARMONA.

(b) The weapons issued as training scale to the FRIULI and CARMONA have merely been augmented to make up the G.1098, so that there should be available a training scale for the next pair of Gruppi from stuff not issued to complete the G.1098 of the first pair.

3. I should be grateful for frequent visits from your SD and S. T.

538

plan and were seeing that it happened. Signal equipment, drawn only a day before, was in use by both officer and other rank instructional cadres the day we arrived. The General tells me he is a mountain gunner, and volunteered the information, (which I later confirmed at CMTC), that a considerable proportion of the infantry of the LEGNANO Division are ALPINI and ARDITI, with a good deal of experience of mountain training - natural mountaineers, and with recent battle experience. He says they have their mountain artillery, and know how to use it, and volunteered the information that they still have some of their transport.

2. I visited the instructional cadres of LEGNANO and ~~CREMONA~~, under instruction at CMTC. The instructors there, who had reported favourably on the standard of the cadres of the first two Gruppi, consider that those of the second pair are even better. Your liaison officer at CMTC urges that action be taken to get them even simple weapons with which to start instruction, pending the receipt of the training scale. Brigadier NAPLES says he will do what he can about this, but I suggest your SD Branch follows it up. The plan for passing on the training scale of equipment from the early Gruppi to the later ones will not quite work in the following respects:

(a) The rather decrepit vehicles issued have suffered a fair number of casualties at the hands of FRIULI and CREMONA.

(b) The weapons issued as training scale to the FRIULI and CREMONA have merely been augmented to make up the G.1098, so that there should be available a training scale for the next pair of Gruppi from stuff not issued to complete the G.1098 of the first pair.

3. I should be grateful for frequent visits from your SD and S & T Branches while equipping is going on, so that training may not be delayed through any unnecessary delay in getting equipment made available. In view of the information given by General PRIMAVERO concerning mountain personnel in the LEGNANO Division with the parachutists, it seems desirable to examine the possibility of equipping this Gruppo as a Mountain Group if that fits the policy of AAL.

ACK/ao

Brig.,
D.M.T.

A.G. Kennington

SUBJECT: Italian Cavalry.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

TS/G/29
15 Oct 44.

D.M.T.

copy to: CGS. AMHQ.

G-3 (ORG) AMHQ.

G-3 Trg (Br.) AMHQ.

G-3 Trg H.Q. AAI.

1. Thanks for your valuable letter, IMT/55/MT 1 dated 14 Oct.
I would like to make the following remarks for your information.

2. Your para 1(a)

Yes - Lt. Col. SOUTHEY is excellent and doing a very good
job under difficulties.

3. Your para 1 (a)(i)

(a) The specialist question, particularly drivers, has
been the main "headache" with BRILLI and will be so (in
lessor degree, I think) with CHIMENNA, LEGUANO and FOLGONE.

(b) The reasons for this are that: -

(i) the number of specialists required for a Group
on Dr. W.E. is higher than was the scale on It. A.E.

(ii) the very short time and haste with which BRILLI
has to be organised and trained. BRILLI was harves-
ting in FOGGIA previously (after coming from SARDINIA)
had many of the older classes and was concentrated
more as a collection of bodies rather than a fully
organised Division.

(c) On the other hand, BRILLI was indicated as the 1st
Group because it was the most readily available. CHIMENNA
was in SARDINIA, and LEGUANO and FOLGONE (ex-C.I.L.) in the
line.

(d) We have done our best to collect and train drivers.
But instructors were short and the training scale of MT
issued was insufficient, as a large % of MT was U/S and even
had to be towed to BRILLI area. Col. PIRLEY is now at AMHQ
trying to get more instructors, including some from Italy.

937

1 Yes - Lt. Col. SOUTHEY is excellent and doing a very good job under difficulties.

2 3. Your para 1 (a)(i)

(a) The specialist question, particularly drivers, has been the main "headache" with PRIULI and will be so (in lesser degree, I think) with CHENNA, LEGUANO and FOLGORE.

(b) The reasons for this are that: -

(i) the number of specialists required for a Group on Br. W.E. is higher than was the scale on It. W.E.

(ii) the very short time and haste with which PRIULI has to be organised and trained. PRIULI was harvesting in FOGGIA previously (after coming from SARDINIA) had many of the older classes and was concentrated more as a collection of bodies rather than a fully organised Division.

(c) On the other hand, PRIULI was indicated as the 1st Group because it was the most readily available. CHENNA was in SARDINIA, and LEGUANO and FOLGORE (ex-C.I.L.) in the line.

(d) We have done our best to collect and train drivers. But instructors were short and the training scale of M issued was insufficient, as a large % of M was U/S and even had to be towed to PRIULI area. Col. FIDELITY is now at ALHQ trying to get more instructors, including some on loan from R.A. Regts resting out of the line.

(e) The M.T. discipline of the Italians is inherently poor. We have issued strict orders, but rapid driving and lack of maintenance continues. I particularly stressed this to Div Comdr. of PRIULI and CHENNA on my recent visit. SOUTHEY has issued further instructions and I told Gen. ORSINI personally of this matter on 12 Oct. We also issued a storm Ministry of War order.

(f) As regards the last 2 lines of your 1 (a) (i), this is not quite correct. The GRANTIERI bus. in SARDINIA were included in PRIULI as units, not chosen as individuals. CHENNA,

(f) while in SARDINIA, was ordered to organize, get rid of unfit and over-age etc. They had a little time to do this, but the final W.E. of a group was not settled until just before CREMONA's departure from SARDINIA. They were still short of specialists when they reached the MAINLAND. So I sent the AGUA CREMONA L.O. back to SARDINIA to ~~event~~ it for specialists. The ~~thus~~ are better off than ~~IRULLI~~. ~~comg~~

Your para 1 (a) (iii)

(e) We have been doubtful of PEDROTTI, but he had a difficult task and we were not sure that it was entirely his fault. No ~~SAUBER~~ and I agree that he is not "the form", so PEDROTTI is being replaced forthwith by another G.O.C. I have spoken to Gen. OXILLA and specified the qualities necessary in his successor, but the market is not high.

(b) As regards advanced artillery methods, I have instructed Col. PISANEL (who is visiting the Gruppo now) to discuss this matter with Lt. Col. DIEN of the artillery training school there, who is in the best position to give an opinion. The decision rests on whether the Italian can adopt new methods in the time available. I will look into this matter myself.

(a) The matter of ranges - I agree with G.O. BLU and on 12 October ordered that his ideas are to be put into force. This was one of the reasons that confirmed me in the opinion that PEDROTTI should go.

Your para 1 (b)

As regards M.C., see my remarks in para 3 above.

Col. PISANEL is now on a visit to the Gruppo, with the specific task of examining (among other things) this matter of concentration and training area.

I agree to Gen. PRINZELI (not PRINZANO). I think he is good. Also WEBB-CAPTER, who is excellent.

Your para 2.

Your remarks on training scale of equipment notes, thank - we will follow up.

Your para 3.

I visited the Gruppo recently - also Col. PISANEL (i/c the project) who is down there again now. All G.O. BLU were up in PGM 2 for a general conference the other day and ~~SOFTEN~~

who is in the best position to give an opinion. The decision rests on whether the Italian can adopt new methods in the time available. I will look into this matter myself.

(a) The matter of ranges - I agree with O.C. BLU and on 12 October ordered that his ideas are to be put into force. This was one of the reasons that confirmed me in the opinion that PEDROTTI should go.

5. Your para 1 (b)

As regards M.T., see my remarks in para 3 above.

Ool. PISANI is now on a visit to the Gruppi, with the specific task of examining (among other things) the matter of counter-attack and training areas.

I agree re Gen. PRINCHI (not FALDAVINO). I think he is good. Also WERN-CARTER, who is excellent.

6. Your para 2.

Your remarks on training scale of equipment noted, therein we will follow up.

7. Your para 3.

I visited the Gruppi recently - also Col. PISANI (i/c the project) who is down there again now. All O.C. BLUs were up in ROM E for a general conference the other day and SOLIERI again on 12 Oct. You and Gen. WALTER saw me in ROM E recently. My C.O. I has gone to the Gruppi today, if S & T officer will be going early this week and I myself again after him. We are fully in the picture all the time. I do not want to overdo the visiting, particularly as many other officers from ALHQ and AAI are constantly there, but I agree that frequent visits by my Staff are desirable and will continue.

There are disadvantages in forsaking the W.E. of a "stand-by" Combat Group in order to create a "Mountain Group." I have written to AAI about this (see my IS/G/29 dated 9 Oct) and Col. PISANI also discussed this at his recent to AAI. The matter is still under discussion.

8. Again, many thanks for your valuable letter. I know you realize as in fact everyone does, that we are up against a difficult proposition, particularly as regards PISANI. We are trying in a matter of weeks to train, convert and raise to British standards Italian formations of an arm which has always been weak in officers and discipline, with the matter of special-

8. (Contd.)

-lets superimposed as perhaps the greatest "headache" in the whole business. However, as I say, succeeding groups 2, 3 and 4 should be easier, and I think we will be able to produce reasonable fighting formations, which will shake down better and better as they continue to function as a complete organization, having overcome their birth-pangs.

J. Browning

Major General.
U.S. I. A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

S-8

SUBJECT: Italian Group.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

TS/G/29
15 Oct 44.

D.M.P.

ccy to: OGS. AFHQ.
G-3 (Org) AFHQ.
G-3 Trg (Br.) AFHQ.
G-3 Trg H.Q. AAI.

1. Thanks for your valuable letter, DMT/55/MT 1 dated 14 Oct.
I would like to make the following remarks for your information.

2. Your para 1(a)

Yes - Lt.Col. SOUTHERY is excellent and doing a very good
job under difficulties.

3. Your para 1 (a)(i)

(a) The specialist question, particularly drivers, has
been the main "headache" with FRIVOLI and will be so (in
lesser degree, I think) with CEMONA, LEGGANO and FOLGORE.

(b) The reasons for this are that: -

(i) the number of specialists required for a Group
on Br. W.E. is higher than was the scale on It. V.E.

(ii) the very short time and haste with which FRIVOLI
has to be organised and trained. FRIVOLI was harves-
ting in FOGGIA previously (after coming from SARDINIA)
had many of the older classes and was concentrated
more as a collection of bodies rather than a fully
organised Division.

(c) On the other hand, FRIVOLI was indicated as the 1st
Group because it was the most readily available. CEMONA
was in SARDINIA, and LEGGANO and FOLGORE (ex-C.L.L.) in the
line.

(d) We have done our best to collect and train drivers.
But instructors were short and the training scale of MT
issued was insufficient, as a large % of MT was U/S and even
had to be towed to FRIVOLI area. Col. PUSLEY is now at AFHQ

932

I would like to make the following remarks for your information.

2. Your para 1(a)

Yes - Lt.Col. SOUTBY is excellent and doing a very good job under difficulties.

3. Your para 1 (a)(i)

(a) The specialist question, particularly drivers, has been the main "headache" with FRULLI and will be so (in lesser degree, I think) with CREMONA, LEGGIERO and FOLGORE.

(b) The reasons for this are that:-

- (i) the number of specialists required for a Group on Br. W.E. is higher than was the scale on It. W.E.
- (ii) the very short time and haste with which FRULLI has to be organised and trained. FRULLI was harvesting in ROCCIA previously (after coming from SARDINIA) had many of the older classes and was concentrated more as a collection of bodies rather than a fully organised Division.

(c) On the other hand, FRULLI was indicated as the 1st Group because it was the most readily available. CREMONA was in SARDINIA, and LEGGIERO and FOLGORE (ex-C.I.L.) in the line.

(d) We have done our best to collect and train drivers. But instructors were short and the training scale of MI issued was insufficient, as a large % of MT was U/S and even had to be towed to FRULLI area. Col. PIESLEY is now at AFHQ trying to get more instructors, including some on loan from R.A. Regts seeing out of the line.

(e) The M.T. discipline of the Italians is inherently poor. We have issued strict orders, but rapid driving and lack of maintenance continue. I particularly stressed this to Div Comds. of FRULLI and CREMONA on my recent visit. SOUTBY has issued further instructions and I told Gen. GILIA personally of this matter on 12 Oct. He also is issuing a storm Ministry of War order.

(f) As regards the last 3 lines of your 1 (a) (i), this is not quite correct. The GRANATIERI bns. in SARDINIA were included in FRULLI as units, not chosen as individuals. CREMONA,

- 2 -

(f) while in SARDINIA, was ordered to organize, get rid of uniforms and over-age etc. They had a little time to do this, but the final W.E. of a group was not settled until just before CEMINA's departure from SARDINIA. They were still short of specialists when they reached the MAINLAND. So I sent the MMIA CEMINA I.O. back to SARDINIA to ~~convince~~ ^{convince} it for specialists. They thus are better off than RIJULI.

Your para 1 (a) (iii)

(a) We have been doubtful of PERROTTI, but he had a difficult task and we were not sure that it was entirely his fault. Now SOUTHERN and I agree that he is not "the form", so PERROTTI is being replaced forthwith by another G.O.C. I have spoken to Gen. OXILIA and specified the qualification necessary in his successor, but the market is not high.

(b) As regards advanced artillery methods, I have instructed Col. PIESLEY (who is visiting the Gruppi now) to discuss this matter with Lt. Col. LUNN of the artillery training school there, who is in the best position to give an opinion. The decision rests on whether the Italians can adopt new methods in the time available. I will look into this matter myself.

(c) The matter of ranges - I agree with O.C. BLU and on 12 October ordered that his ideas are to be put into force. This was one of the reasons that confirmed me in the opinion that PERROTTI should go.

Your para 1 (b)

As regards M.T., see my remarks in para 3 above.

Col. PIESLEY is now on a visit to the Gruppi, with the specific task of examining (among other things) this matter of concentration and training areas.

I agree re Gen. PRIMESE (not PRIMAVERO). I think he is good. Also WUBB-CARTER, who is excellent.

Your para 2.

Your remarks on training scale of equipment noted, thanks - we will follow up.

Your para 3.

I visited the Gruppi recently - also Col. PRIMESE (i/c the project) who is down there again now. All O.C. MMIA were up in ROM E for a general conference the other day and SOUTHERN

933

(b) As regards advanced artillery methods, I have instructed Col. PISLEY (who is visiting the Gruppi now) to discuss this matter with Lt. Col. IEN of the artillery training school there, who is in the best position to give an opinion. The decision rests on whether the Italian can adopt new methods in the time available. I will look into this matter myself.

(c) The matter of ranges - I agree with O.C. BLU and on 12 October ordered that his ideas are to be put into force. This was one of the reasons that confirmed me in the opinion that PEROTTI should go.

Your para 1 (b)

As regards M.T., see my remarks in para 3 above.

Col. PISLEY is now on a visit to the Gruppi, with the special task of examining (among other things) this matter of concentration and training areas.

I agree re Gen. BRITTI (not PRIMEVERO). I think he is good. Also WEBB-CARTER, who is excellent.

Your para 2.

Your remarks on training scale of equipment noted, thanks - we will follow up.

Your para 3.

I visited the Gruppi recently - also Col. PISLEY (i.e. the project) who is down there again now. All O.C. BLU were up in POMI for a general conference the other day and SOUVER again on 12 Oct. You and Gen. MILLER saw me in ROMA recently. My GSO-1 has gone to the Gruppi today, my S & T officer will be going early this week and I myself again after him. We are fully in the picture all the time. I do not want to overdo the visiting, particularly as many other officers from AMHQ and AMI are constantly there, but I agree that frequent visits by my Staff are desirable and will continue.

There are disadvantages in forgoing the W.M. of a "standard" Combat Group in order to create a "Mountain Group." I have written to AMI about this (see my SS/G/29 dated 5 Oct) and Col. PISLEY also discussed this at his recent to AMI. The matter is still under discussion.

Again, many thanks for your valuable letter. I know you realize as in fact everyone does, that we are up against a difficult proposition, particularly as regards PISLEY. We are trying in a matter of weeks to train, convert and raise to British standards Italian formations of an army which has always been weak in officers and discipline, with the matter of special-

-3-
3. (Contd.)

-ists superimposed as perhaps the greatest "headache" in the whole business. However, as I say, succeeding Groups 2, 3 and 4 should be easier, and I think we will be able to produce reasonable fighting formations, which will shake down better and better as they continue to function as a complete organisation, having overcome their birth-pangs.

A. Browning

Major General.
H.M. I.A.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

932

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM: MIA

TO : FREEDOM

Info: AAI

SS 206

21 1140 A

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CITE FEGOT your SD 1185 of 17 OCT (.) PAREN ROME AREA

PAREN (.) My instructions in your AG 091.711/707/GOT/O of 21

Sep are to form six Italian Combat Groups (.) No's 5 and 6

began forming 15 Oct so as to be ready by target dates (.)

Progress of first four groups was hampered by incompleteness

of HLUS (.) Require 5 and 6 have a fair start (.) Realize

matter is being discussed but request either 5 and 6 HLUS

~~form~~ at once or my instructions amended

PRIORITY

AUTHENTICATED

Important.

W. P. Kelly
attn.

931

11901

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM WMA
 TO AFHQ
SS 212

21 1648A

SECRET

TS/9/29

S-6

For Brig NAPIER reference conversation Col FIDELITY (.) PAREN KME
 AREA _____ PAREN (.) General BREWSTER'S views sent to AAI are
 as follows (.) REGINS (.) If C. in C. has irrevocably decided to
 convert one Standard Combat Group to a mountain Warfare role your
 proposed organization is sound as a basis for discussion but modifications
 based on Italian experience and availabilities are essential (.) As
 advised in my TS/9/29 dated 3 Oct I still believe that the sacrifice of
 a Standard Combat Group and the reservation of 12,000 men and 3,600
 animals with relatively so little fighting potential and such a limited
 role are not really worth while as a proposition of war, particularly
 as only one on a long front can have little effect (.) Still feel that
 a mountain increment of Arty Tpt and Sigs which can be given to any
 standard Groups is better. If any group is to be converted it ought
 to be LEGEND (.) ENDS

PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE

AUTHENTICATED

[Signature]
Colonel

939

11902

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Col. Pidsley:

McQueen agrees to postponement of meeting on Depots etc to Mon 1430 hrs. He would however like to have NMIA's comments on Pack Tpt Gruppo basis this afternoon or tomorrow morning at latest by phone.

19 October

/S/ Stuart

REPLY

/// If C. in C. has irrevocably decided to ^{convert.} connect one Standard Combat Group to a mountain warfare role your proposed organisation is sound as a basis for discussion but modifications based on Italian experience and availabilities are essential. ^{As advised in ref} Reference ~~our~~ TS/C/29 dated 3 Oct. Still believe that the sacrifice of a Standard Combat Group and the reservation of 12,000 men and 3600 animals with relatively so little fighting potential and such a ^{limited} ~~united~~ role are not really worth while as a proposition of war, particularly as only one on a long front can have little effect. Still feel that a mountain increment of Arty Tpt and Sigs is ^{which can be given to any standard group} better. Gen Browning strongly supports above views. If any group is to be converted it ought to be LEGNANO.

///

W.P.

1903

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

SUBJECT: Training of Italian Combat Groups

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel: FILPOT 23

1605/50/57/0 (SM.)

19 Oct 44

AFHQ

Copy to: MIA

MEMO	TS/6/29/10
FILE REF	8/500
Date Recd	21/10/

Ref HSD/424 of 14 Oct 44.

1. Your proposal that AFHQ should supervise the training of the Italian Groups is accepted.

2. Dates of readiness

Formations are required for operations as soon as they can be equipped and trained. The first and second Groups should be ready for operations by 11 Oct and 15 Nov respectively.

3. Training scales of equipment should be issued to later groups as soon as concentration is approaching completion. Third and fourth groups are now reorganised. The organisation of the fifth and sixth groups is dependent on whether it is decided to adapt them for mountain warfare.

4. Operational role

Groups will be required to take over a defensive sector and to carry out an active defence. After practical experience in that role and further training they will be required to participate with Allied troops in offensive operations.

5. Special points for training

Special points for training have already been fully discussed with HET who has issued a training memorandum to HET's on this subject.

G.O.C. Seen

Formations are required for operations as soon as they can be equipped and trained. The first and second Groups should be ready for operations by 11 Oct and 15 Nov respectively.

3. Training scales of equipment should be issued to later groups as soon as concentration is approaching completion. Third and fourth groups are now reorganised. The organisation of the fifth and sixth groups is dependent on whether it is decided to adapt them for mountain warfare.

4. Operational role.

Groups will be required to take over a defensive sector and to carry out an active defence. After practical experience in that role and further training they will be required to participate with Allied troops in offensive operations.

5. Special points for training

Special points for training have already been fully discussed with DWT who has issued a training memorandum to HJ's on this subject.

G.O.C. Seen

G.S.O. I

A/Q.

Paras 2 & 3 are in danger of being out of date whether

W.P.

21/10.

928

H.R. Alexander

General,
Commander in Chief.

COPY

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the
Chief of Staff.

14 October 44.

FILE NO. HSD/424

SUBJECT: Responsibility for training of ITALIAN GRUPPIS.

TO : HQ. A.A.I.

Ref 1605/50/57/G(SM) dated 2 October 1944.

1. The recommendations in paras 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are agreed.

2. Para 3.

The distances involved make it difficult for HQ A.A.I. to supervise the training of these formations. Moreover in view of the responsibility of this H.Q. as regards equipment, which is closely bound up with training facilities it is considered that the training of these formations should be the responsibility of this Headquarters, which is close to the formations and in close touch with the Military Training Directorate.

It is requested therefore that you forward:-

- (a) The dates by which you require these formations for operations
- (b) The type of operations anticipated.
- (c) Any special points which you wish included in their training programme.

3. This Headquarters will welcome the visits of the C-in-C A.A.I. or any officers whom he may delegate to examine the state of training of these formations. It would be appreciated, however, if notice of such visits could be communicated to this Headquarters so that a representative may be present.

4. It is considered that this procedure will do away with divided responsibility and lead to quicker and better results.

By command of General WILSON.

(Sgd) J.A.H. GABELL
Lieutenant-General
Chief of Staff

WFO

11906
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

1907

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

STAFF: Training Division

TOP SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CEF

REF: 11667

52

REF: 11667

13 Oct 44

1510

- *A* WH, CEF
- *B* WH, CEF
- *C* WH, CEF
- *D* WH, CEF

Copy to: H, WHA CEF
 G-3 Trg (EF) AFHQ
 G (Trg) H, AAF

1. In continuation of this Directorate's letter of even number dated 27 Sep 44, the following points should be borne in mind in designing the training programme.

- (a) It is possible that the German Army in ITALY may disintegrate and begin fighting as guerrillas.
- (b) If such a thing were to happen the Italian Divisions at present being trained might be called upon to take part in mopping up operations against isolated pockets of resistance in the APENNINE Plain and the foothills of the Alps.

2. The operations outlined above would probably be carried out in conjunction with Allied Forces.

3. The information above should not be passed to more persons than is absolutely necessary.

BSF/na

213
Paepa
Thickness
 Col
 15/10

926

TS 5/29-
 WP

500

AFHQ Plans

23. Representatives of G-3 AFHQ should be attached to HQ AII as soon as possible.

Conclusion

24. It is recommended that:-

- (a) the current policy described at Part I should continue until the reorganization of the Italian Army is completed
- (b) during the interim period before AFHQ assume complete control, the procedure at paras 15 - 23 should be adopted.

W. H. C. C. C.
not for

Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:- G-3 (Org) AFHQ (10 copies)
DC40
D4G
DQ/G

or

- (b) AAI continue to provide the mechanism of staff control under the general direction of AFHQ until the appropriate staff section of AFHQ is fully informed as to the complex background of the present state of the Italian Army.

13. Immediate assumption of complete control by AFHQ would require from AFHQ decisions on questions of detail without knowledge of past history.

14. If it is decided that the mechanism of staff control is to remain temporarily with AAI, then it is recommended that the following procedure should be adopted during the interim period.

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

903

15. On all questions of manpower and organization AFHQ should deal with AAI through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportions allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG JFOUSA.

Shipments from S. Italy

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) AAI would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on info supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

1910

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the representative allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG I. FOUHA.

Shipments from S. F. U. H. A.

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) MIA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on India supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the I of C Area.

Organisation of units under British command

20. ME's would be approved by WEC AAI.

Kits for British units

21. Would be distributed by AAI between units in accordance with priorities decided by CI AFHQ in consultation with 'A' Branch AAI.

Ceiling

22. The distribution of personnel to categories would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

...../Sheet 4.

AFHQ Memo

23. Representatives of G-3 AFHQ should be attached to HQ AAI as soon as possible.

Conclusion

24. It is recommended that:-

- (a) the current policy described at Part I should continue until the reorganisation of the Italian Army is completed
- (b) during the interim period before AFHQ assume complete control, the procedure at paras 15 - 23 should be adopted.

*Ken. N. G. L. Allen
Plot for*

DISTRIBUTION:- G-3 (Org) AFHQ (10 copies)
DCAG
DAG
DQMG

Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

11912

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

LRUF V LRAR NR 3290

QVR 1

FROM MAIN AAL 171515A

TO MMIA

INFO AFHQ

QQY GR - BT

SD 1135

CONFIDENTIAL . REF YOUR TS/G/29 OF 23 SEP AND MY SD 1008 OF 4 OCT .
REQUEST CONFIRMATION THAT TAIL FOR FRIULI AND CREMONA WILL BE
COMPLETELY EQUIPPED AND TRAINED BY MID NOV ALS DETAILS OF UNITS
EXPECTED READIQUSE D TMT LM WOULD APPRECIATE ORBAT SOONEST
BT

SENT NR 3290 1605 KW AR TNX

RECB NR3290 1605 WH AR

*will speak when I
visit them 22 Oct
WP 925*

SUBJECT: Italian Group

D.M.T.

ccy to: CGS, AMHQ.
G-3 (ORG) AMHQ.
G-3 TRG (Br.) AMHQ.
G-3 TRG H.Q. AAI.

1. Thanks for your valuable letter, IMT/55/MS 1 dated 14 Oct. I would like to make the following remarks for your information.

2. Your para 1(a)

Yes - Lt.Col. SOUTBY is excellent and doing a very good job under difficulties.

3. Your para 1 (a)(i)

(a) The specialist question, particularly drivers, has been the main "headache" with IPULI and will be so (in lesser degree, I think) with CREMONA, LEGUANO and POLCORE.

(b) The reasons for this are that:-

(i) the number of specialists required for a Group on Br. W.E. is higher than was the scale on It. W.E.

(ii) the very short time and haste with which IPULI has to be organized and trained. IPULI was harvesting in BOGLIA previously (after coming from ARDILLA) had many of the older classes and was concentrated more as a collection of bodies rather than a fully organized Division.

(c) On the other hand, IPULI was indicated as the 1st Group because it was the most readily available. CREMONA was in SAUDINIA, and LEGUANO and POLCORE (ex-S.I.L.) in the line.

(d) We have done our best to collect and train drivers. But instructors were short and the training scale of men involved was insufficient, as a large % of them were U/S and even had to be loaned to ARDILLA. Col. PUSKAS is now at ARDILLA.

924

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

2. Your para 1 (a)

Yes - Lt. Col. SOUTHWY is excellent and doing a very good job under difficulties.

3. Your para 1 (a) (i)

(a) The specialist question, particularly drivers, has been the main "headache" with TRIULI and will be so (in lesser degree, I think) with CREMONA, LUGANO and FOLGORE.

(b) The reasons for this are that: -

- (i) the number of specialists required for a Group on Br. W.E. is higher than was the case on It. W.E.
- (ii) the very short time and haste with which TRIULI has to be organized and trained. TRIULI was harvesting in PUGLIA previously (after coming from SARDINIA) had many of the older classes and was concentrated more as a collection of bodies rather than a fully-organized Division.

(c) On the other hand, TRIULI was indicated as the 1st Group because it was the most readily available. CREMONA was in SARDINIA, and LUGANO and FOLGORE (ex-C.L.L.) in the line.

(d) We have done our best to collect and train drivers. But instructors were short and the training scale of MT has been insufficient, as a large % of MT was W/S and even had to be taken to TRIULI area. Col. PERSKY is now at TRIULI trying to get more instructors, including some on loan from R.A. Regts resting out of the line.

(e) The M.T. discipline of the Italians is inherently poor. We have issued strict orders, but rapid driving and lack of maintenance continue. I particularly stressed this to Div Comds. of TRIULI and CREMONA on my recent visit. SOUTHWY has issued further instructions and I told Gen. CREMONA personally of this matter on 12 Oct. He also is issuing a stern Ministry of War order.

(f) As regards the last 7 lines of your 1 (a) (i), this is not quite correct. The GRANATIERI bat. in SARDINIA were included in TRIULI as units, not chosen as individuals. CREMONA,

(f) while in SARDINIA, was ordered to organize, get rid of units and over-age etc. They had a little time to do this, but the final W.E. of a group was not settled until just before CARMONA's departure from SARDINIA. They were still short of specialists when they reached the MAINLAND. So I sent the MARCA CARMONA L.O. back to SARDINIA to ~~send~~ it for specialists. They thus are better off than FRULL, come.

Your para 1 (a) (iii)

(a) We have been doubtful of PEDROTTI, but he had a sufficient tank and we were not sure that it was entirely his fault. Now SOUTHER and I agree that he is not "the form", so PEDROTTI is being replaced forthwith by another G.O.C. I have spoken to Gen. OLLIVA and specified the qualities necessary in his successor, but the market is not high.

(b) As regards advanced artillery methods, I have instructed Col. PISANEL (who is visiting the Gruppo now) to discuss this matter with Lt. Col. RINI of the artillery training school there, who is in the best position to give an opinion. The decision rests on whether the Italians can adopt new methods in the time available. I will look into this matter myself. Done.

(c) The matter of ranges - I agree with G.O.C. RUI and on 12 October ordered that his ideas are to be put into force. This was one of the reasons that confirmed me in the opinion that PEDROTTI should go.

Your para 1 (b)

As regards M.T., see my remarks in para 3 above.

Col. PISANEL is now on a visit to the Gruppo, with the specific task of examining (among other things) this matter of concentration and training areas.

I agree re Gen. PISANEL (not PISANEL). I think he is good. Also WOOD-CARTER, who is excellent.

Your para 2.

Your remarks on training scale of equipment noted, thanks - we will follow up. 923

Your para 3.

I visited the Gruppo recently - also Col. PISANEL (i/o the prefect) who is down there again now. All G.O.C. units were up in ROM 2 for a General conference the other day and SOUTHER

Col. PIERRE (who is visiting the Group now) to discuss this matter with Lt. Col. DUNN of the artillery training school there, who is in the best position to give an opinion. The decision rests on whether the Italian can adopt new methods in the time available. I will look into this matter myself. Done.

(a) The matter of ranges - I agree with O.C. BLU and on 12 October ordered that his ideas are to be put into force. This was one of the reasons that confirmed me in the opinion that PARROTTI should go.

5. Your para 1 (b)

As regards M.T., see my remarks in para 3 above.

Col. PIERRE is now on a visit to the Gruppi, with the specific task of examining (among other things) this matter of concentration and training areas.

I agree re Gen. PRINZARI (not PRIMAVERO). I think he is good. Also WENZ-CHARTER, who is excellent.

6. Your para 2.

Your remarks on training scale of equipment noted, thanks - we will follow up.

7. Your para 3.

I visited the Gruppi recently - also Col. PIERRE (i/c the project) who is down there again now. All O.C. BLUs were up in ROM 2 for a general conference the other day and SOULIER again on 12 Oct. You and Gen. NALLER saw me in ROM recently. My GSO 1 has gone to the Gruppi today, my S & T officer will be going early this week and I myself again after him. We are fully in the picture all the time. I do not want to overdo the visiting, particularly as many other officers from AFHQ and AAI are constantly there, but I agree that frequent visits by my Staff are desirable and will continue.

There are disadvantages in forming the 4th. of a "standard" Combat Group in order to create a "Mountain Group." I have written to AAI about this (see my TS/G/29 dated 5 Oct) and Col. PIERRE also discussed this at his recent to AAI. The matter is still under discussion.

8. Again, many thanks for your valuable letter. I know you realize as in fact everyone does, that we are up against a difficult proposition, particularly as regards PIERRE. We are trying in a matter of weeks to train, convert and raise to British standards Italian formations of an army which has always been weak in officers and discipline, with the matter of special-

923
Done

(Contd.)

-lets superimposed as perhaps the greatest "challenge" in the whole business. However, as I say, succeeding groups 2, 3 and 4 should be easier, and I think we will be able to produce reasonable fighting formations, which will shake down better and better as they continue to function as a complete organization, having overcome their birth-pangs.

A. Browning

Major General.
R.M.I.A.

SUBJECT: Visit by D.M.T. to ITALIAN GROUP 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CWP

Tel: 16950

DMT/55/MT1

14 Oct 44

Major-General L. A. BROWNING,
MIA, CWP

Copy to: GDS, AFHQ.
C-3 (ORG) AFHQ.
C-3 TRG (Br) AFHQ
G(TRG) HQ MAI

1. On 12 Oct 44 I visited the BLUs at HQs of the PRIULI and ORSINA Divisions, taking with me Brigadier NAPIER, C-3 (ORG) AFHQ, and Brigadier COMLEY, G(AE) AFHQ. The following points were noted:-

(a) PRIULI Division

OC BLU, Lt-Col SOUTHBY, is very hard at work with his unit, seems to have the confidence of the Divisional Commander, and is taking a strong hand to get training and equipment going properly. He has several difficulties:

(1) Drivers.

The General, General PEDRUCCI, produced a daily state on paper showing considerable shortages of specialists, and a total of 1,400 vehicle drivers as against some 2,500. BLU tells me that of these, probably more than 50% are fit to drive a vehicle; many of them have never had any training at all. In consequence, they are arming lorries very slowly, and are writing off two a day through sheer ignorance. Maintenance training with the training vehicles was almost impossible through an almost entire lack of tools. Training teams which were to have been arranged by the DMT have not fetched up. Mechanics' School have loaned a team to assist, the REME Workshops Detachment with the BLU is training drivers, and even officers are helping because the inability to move about has hindered field firing and all forms of training. As an emergency measure, I am raising scratch teams of drivers from RACD and RACD to go at once to assist. Brigadier NAPIER is examining the possibility of taking a number of trained Italian drivers (soldiers) who are now held against a possible 5th Coy, and offering them to you for transfer to the BLU. I understand

1. On 12 Oct 44, I visited the BLUs at HQs of the PRIULI and CREMAHA Divisions, taking with me Brigadier NAPPER, G-3 (ORG) AFHQ, and Brigadier COMLEY, Q(AE) AFHQ. The following points were noted :-

(a) PRIULI Division

OC BLU, Lt-Col SOUTHEY, is very hard at work with his unit, seems to have the confidence of the Divisional Commander, and is taking a strong hand to get training and equipment going properly. He has several difficulties:

(1) Drivers.

The General, General PEDROTTI, produced a daily state on paper showing considerable shortages of specialists, and a total of 1,400 vehicle drivers as against some 2,500. BLU tells me that of these, probably much less than 50% are fit to drive a vehicle; many of them have never had any training at all. In consequence, they are drawing lorries very slowly, and are writing off two a day through sheer ignorance. Maintenance training with the training vehicles was almost impossible through an almost entire lack of tools. Training teams which were to have been arranged by the DST have not fetched up. Mechanics' School have loaned a team to assist, the REME Workshops Detachment with the BLU is training drivers, and even officers are helping because the inability to move about has hindered field firing and all forms of training. As an emergency measure, I am raising scratch teams of drivers from RACFD and RASCOD to go at once to assist. Brigadier NAPPER is examining the possibility of taking a number of trained Italian drivers (soldiers) who are now held against a possible CT Coy, and offering them to you for transfer to the Gruppe. I understand that when PRIULI and CREMAHA were choosing men in SARDINIA, PRIULI chose Grenadiers, big, fit men, while CREMAHA went all out for lorry drivers. REME specialists are badly wanted.

(11) Equipment.

We went into the list of holdings, releases and deficiencies, with Q(AE) and the unit. Equipment is nearly complete, the only deficiencies holding up training being: only four artillery directors held, (tripods just received for them); Q(AE) are waiting up within the next few days to eight, which still leaves eight to come in due course. The training of both signallers and artillery is being held up for signal equipment. While controlled signal stores have been received and are in use for training, no wire and no pliers are available, and this should be put right as quickly as possible. It is under control of Director of Signals. None of the artillery has complete sights - Field Artillery Branch has lent some. Q(AE) are looking into this.

(141) State of training

Col. SOUTHEY says that the HJ has to supply most of the drive. The General, in his opinion, does not always get his orders obeyed. I have not the intimate knowledge to back this up, and I presume SOUTHEY will be writing to you about it. Satisfactory progress has been made in many ways, from reports from the members of the HJ. Upon training has progressed to the field firing stage for the infantry, (except for anti-tank guns), and the artillery are ready to start firing at once. Engineers are reported on as on the average 40% completely trained. There has been some divergence of opinion between the GSO.II Artillery of the Division and the GOC (who is an artilleryman), as to how far British methods of control and co-ordination should replace Italian. The Inspector of Artillery was sent down by the Italian War Office, and ruled that General PRIMO's wish to continue Italian methods in more advanced matters of artillery training and control should prevail. They are doing British gun drill, British battery control methods, and Italian survey. You will be more competent than I to judge whether this is satisfactory.

A big point at issue is ^{where} artillery shell practice in the vicinity, as GSO.II Artillery says that one of the General's selected ranges was shot full in a valley, where proper OP will be difficult. OC HJ says that three other target areas indicated by the General will mean driving the infantry off their training areas while the range is in use. OC HJ has found, in their opinion, a better site for battery practice 25 kilometres away. ~~WAVEL~~ General PRIMO agreed to use this for battery shooting later.

I have offered facilities for troop shooting in the GATO training area, on days when it can be made available. I hope that this will help.

No snipers' rifles have been issued to either PRIMO or CANTERA. They were apparently overlooked when the G.1054 was drawn up. In my opinion they are essential to any battalion on this front. I know they are available, and spoke to GCS yesterday morning - he agrees they should be issued so that training can start now. PRIMO's progress is being held up only by deplorable lack of competent drivers of potential drivers, lack of the small items of equipment mentioned above, and, I think, less control co-ordination and drive than is evident with CANTERA.

(b) CANTERA Division

The same deficiencies of equipment as above were put forward both by the HJ and by the General. CANTERA are acting as and when possible. The General said he would like to treble his holding of Brens, so as to go on with tactical training, with field firing, even while basic training in the Bren was going on. As the full

A big point at issue is where artillery shall practice in the vicinity, as GBO. II Artillery says that one of the General's selected ranges must not fall in a valley, where proper OP will be difficult. OC MJJ says that three other target areas indicated by the General will soon driving the Infantry off their training areas while the range is in use. OC MJJ has found, in their opinion, a better site for battery practice 25 kilometres away. General FRANZINI agreed to use this for battery shooting later.

I have offered facilities for troop shooting in the CMC training area, on days when it can be made available. I hope that this will help.

No snipers' rifles have been issued to either FRANZINI or CHAMBERLAIN. They were apparently overlooked when the G. 1098 was drawn up. In my opinion they are essential to any battalion on this front. I know they are available, and spoke to CMC yesterday morning - he agrees they should be issued so that training can start now. FRANZINI's progress is being held up only by deplorable lack of competent drivers or potential drivers, lack of the small items of equipment mentioned above, and, I think, less central co-ordination and drive than is evident with CHAMBERLAIN.

(b) CHAMBERLAIN Division

The same deficiencies of equipment as above were put forward both by the MJJ and by the General. Q(AE) are acting as and when possible. The General said he would like to treble his holding of Brens, so as to go on with tactical training, with field firing, even while basic training in the Bren was going on. As the full G. 1098 issue was due yesterday, this will be all right. He was emphatic about the bad effect of having guns without sights, as he was still having to flog army just at gun control and theory.

He is better off for drivers than FRANZINI, although still short of a considerable number. His Gruppe, however, is also writing off lorries at the rate of two a day, and he agreed with MJJ's statement that this appeared due to reckless speeds and overcrowding in the front seat. He is taking energetic steps to stop this, and has erected control blocks all along the narrow, dangerous roads which are the only ones in ALTAVALIA area, where he is located.

I understood that this Gruppo was to be located in the more open country northwest of ~~RENEVATO~~, and feel bound to say that to place trees in this very wild, hilly area with no decent roads is impeding their training now and will delay it much more when the rain and snow come in about a month's time. I know this area last winter, and consider a division cannot train there adequately. The General was not bitter about this, but did say he would like to have, somewhere in his divisional area, one or two places where he could at least get a company on parade to look at, and a little open space to do tactical training. As far as I know, the area northwest of ~~RENEVATO~~ is still available.

General ~~PRIVATO~~ strikes me as a real live commander, and he and Col. ~~WARR-CARTER~~ are each enthusiastic about the work of the other. I think it is a successful combination. The General and his Chief of Staff both know all that was going on, and had a training plan and were seeing that it happened. Signal equipment, drawn only a day before, was in use by both officer and other rank instructional cadres the day we arrived. The General tells me he is a mountain gunner, and volunteered the information, (which I later confirmed at ~~CMC~~), that a considerable proportion of the infantry of the ~~LEMANO~~ Division are ~~ALPINE~~ and ~~ARDELL~~, with a good deal of experience of mountain training - natural mountaineers, and with recent battle experience. He says they have their mountain artillery, and know how to use it, and volunteered the information that they still have some of their transport.

2. I visited the instructional cadres of ~~LEMANO~~ and ~~PRIVATO~~, under instruction at ~~CMC~~. The instructors there, who had reported favourably on the standard of the cadres of the first two Gruppi, consider that those of the second pair are even better. Your liaison officer at ~~CMC~~ urges that action be taken to get them even ~~simple~~ weapons with which to start instruction, pending the receipt of the training scale. Brigadier ~~MAFIER~~ says he will do what he can about this, but I suggest your ~~SD~~ Branch follows it up. The plan for passing on the training scale of equipment from the early Gruppi to the later ones will not quite work in the following respects:

(a) The rather decrepit vehicles issued have suffered a fair number of casualties at the hands of ~~PRIVATO~~ and ~~GENERAL~~.

(b) The weapons issued as training scale to the ~~PRIVATO~~ and ~~GENERAL~~ have merely been augmented to make up the G.1098, so that there should be available a training scale for the next pair of Gruppi from stuff not issued to complete the G.1098 of the first pair.

3. I should be grateful for frequent visits from your ~~SD~~ and ~~S & T~~ branches, and I am sure that that training will be

gunner, and volunteered the 100mm mortar (GATC), that a considerable proportion of the infantry of his LEGHANO Division are ALPINI and ARDITI, with a good deal of experience of mountain training - natural mountaineers, and with recent battle experience. He says they have their mountain artillery, and know how to use it, and volunteered the information that they still have some of their transport.

2. I visited the instructional cadres of LEGHANO and ^{FOUGORE} ~~ARDITI~~, under instruction at GATC. The instructors there, who had reported favourably on the standard of the cadres of the first two Gruppi, consider that those of the second pair are even better. Your liaison officer at GATC urges that action be taken to get them even sample weapons with which to start instruction, pending the receipt of the training scale. Brigadier MARTEL says he will do what he can about this, but I suggest your SD Branch follows it up. The plan for passing on the training scale of equipment from the early Gruppi to the later ones will not quite work in the following respects:

(a) The rather decrepit vehicles issued have suffered a fair number of casualties at the hands of PRULI and OGNENA.

(b) The weapons issued as training scale to the PRULI and OGNENA have merely been augmented to make up the G.1098, so that there should be available a training scale for the next pair of Gruppi from stuff not issued to complete the G.1098 of the first pair.

3. I should be grateful for frequent visits from your SD and S & T Branches while equipping is going on, so that training may not be delayed through any unnecessary delay in getting equipment made available. In view of the information given by General PRISAVANO concerning mountain personnel in the LEGHANO Division with the parachutists, it seems desirable to examine the possibility of equipping this Gruppo as a Mountain Group if that fits the policy of AAL.

A. H. H. H. H.

Brig.
D. H. T.

100/40

11924

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

48 17/5

R786

8/22
15/9/29
15/10

LRGT V MEDY NR---

FROM DMT ADMAP 141723A

TO MMIA CMF

DMT/736

RESTRICTED . MAY A REPLY BE GIVEN TO DMT/573 DATED 3 OCT . MATTER NOW
VERY URGENT

BT

SENT ORI NO DMT/736 NO NR NO. LYS B OP X K

RD NR 736 141950 F A KKKK

Value 40

done

918

see 15/9/29 data 7/10

1925

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FROM: DIA

TO: DISTRICTS

INFO:

EASTERN det DISTRICTS

DIA LO 54 AREA

AAI

DIA LO 5 ARMY

DIA LO 50 BLU

WAR MINISTRY

12 Dec 4

SD 1585

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject is forthcoming move to preliminary concentration area near

S. GIORGIO N 77 of 1 coy 152 HQ Bn and three loaned G6 bns of MANTOVA

and FICIANO N 153 (.) EARLY NAME AREA. EARLY (.) Request you

instruct has shown below to send adv parties 1 offr and 3 ORs each to

report forthwith to Maj FIDELMAN DIA LO 50 BLU at SAN GIORGIO N 77 (.)

120 INZ Bn cma 2 Bn 336 Regt cma 2 Bn 119 Regt (.) 2 Bn 336 Regt adv

party will act for 1 Coy 152 HQ Bn (.) For 50 BLU your F 22 of 11 Oct

refers (.) For War Ministry request you alert above units for movement

PREPARED

AUTHENTICATED

Internal: Q

Spec Sec

1925

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SD 1525

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject is forthcoming move to preliminary concentration area near S. GIORGIO N 77 of 1 Coy 152 MG Bn and three loaned ad bns of MANTOVA and PLOMO DEVS (.) PAR N ROHS AREA. PARIN (.) Request you instruct bns shown below to send adv notices 1 offr and 3 ORs each to report forthwith to Maj FILLMAN META LO 50 BLU at SAN GIORGIO N 77 (.) 120 Inf Bn cma 2 Bn 336 Regt cma 2 Bn 119 Regt (.) 2 Bn 336 Regt adv party will act for 1 Coy 152 MG Bn (.) For 50 BLU your F 22 of 11 Oct refers (.) For War Ministry request you alert above units for movement

13/10

PROCEEDURE Completed

AUTHENTICATED [Signature]

Internal : 0
Spec Sec
Mov

SP 917

11927

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: LEAVE TO SARDINIA.

46
MILITARY MISSION
ITALIAN ARMY
ROME
TS/G/29 ✓
/O Oct 44

TO : S.M.R.E.

Ref your 12093/1 dated 7 October 44.

1. Careful consideration has been given to the request put forward by Genl ULLI that certain members of his group should be allowed to visit their families in Sardinia.
2. Whilst fully appreciating his point of view, it is regretted that it is impossible to accede to his request.
3. It is felt that this would create a precedent for which there would be no ending, for as I am sure you will agree, all soldiers whose homes are in Sardinia or Sicily, would wish to claim equal right of visiting their families in the Islands.

Stefano
Major General
M M I A

WP. 916

11928

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Italian Combat Force.

SECRET

MILITARY MISSION
ITALIAN ARMY
ROME
TS/G/29
9 Oct 44


TO : H.Q. 3 DISTRICT.

As requested in your 385/Q of 2 October, I
enclose 4 copies of my TS/G/29 of 26 Sep 44.

Would you please pass one copy to "E" Branch.

[Signature]
MAJOR GENERAL
MIA

WP 915



STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

UFFICIO SEGRETERIA E PERSONALE

N° 12093 SP. 1 di prot.

P. M. 151. R. 9 ottobre 1944

OGGETTO: licenze per la Sardegna.-

Scarsa fu Pandura

ALLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE PER L'ESERCITO DELLA A.C.C.-ROMA
e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA - Gabinetto -
- Segreteria di S.E. il Sottosegretario
di Stato, Generale Oxilia -

= S E D E

Il generale UTILI, già comandante del Corpo italiano di liberazione, ed ora comandante del gruppo di combattimento "Legnano", ha ritenuto doveroso rappresentarmi lo stato di depressione morale di alcuni suoi dipendenti - circa un centinaio - che, per effetto delle disposizioni emanate da codesta Sottocommissione, vedono preclusa la possibilità di recarsi in licenza in Sardegna, ove hanno la loro residenza.

Essi molto speravano - prima di ritornare a combattere - di poter soddisfare l'assai vivo e comprensibile desiderio di rivedere le loro famiglie.

A me pare che un provvedimento d'eccezione potrebbe essere giusto premio a questi militari che hanno ben meritato e prego codesta Sottocommissione di compiacersi portare sulla questione la sua benevola attenzione.-

ALLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE PER L'ESERCITO DELLA A.C.C.-ROMA

e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA - Gabinetto -
- Segreteria di S.E. il Sottosegretario
di Stato, Generale Oxilia -

= S E D E

.....

Il generale UTILI, già comandante del Corpo italiano di liberazione, ed ora comandante del gruppo di combattimento "Legnano", ha ritenuto doveroso rappresentare lo stato di depressione morale di alcuni suoi dipendenti - circa un centinaio - che, per effetto delle disposizioni emanate da codesta Sottocommissione, vedono preclusa la possibilità di recarsi in licenza in Sardegna, ove hanno la loro residenza.

Essi molto speravano - prima di ritornare a combattere - di poter soddisfare l'assai vivo e comprensibile desiderio di rivedere le loro famiglie.

A me pare che un provvedimento d'eccezione potrebbe essere giusto premio a questi militari che hanno ben meritato e prego codesta Sottocommissione di compiacersi portare sulla questione la sua benevola attenzione.-

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
- P. Berardi -

P. Berardi

912

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT:- Italian Combat Force

MMIA

3 District
Ext 113
385 Q

2 Oct 44

Ref TS/G/29 of 26 Sep 44.

1. May a further 3 copies be forwarded.
2. Ref Appx G. Tentage is a controlled store and will presumably be released by Q(AE). The channels through which requests for release should be made are not laid down. A scale of entitlement of tentage and accn stores is also required.

EAHG/bt

E. A. H. Goodwin
9 Col
DA & QMG
(E. A. H. GOODWIN)

913

1932

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Italian Combat Force

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY
R O M E
File No. TS/G/29
6 Oct 44

TO : IMT AFHQ

1. Reference your LMT/573 dated 4th October and para 7 of your LMT/55/MTI dated 3rd October, enclosed please find copy of our TS/G/29 dated ~~2nd~~ September 1944.

2. Copies of any relevant letters will be sent you in future.

W. H. G. S.
W. H. G. S.
Maj Gen
M M I A

1912

1933

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET
ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND

14/29

OUTGOING MESSAGE

4859

QVR -2

29/26

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: **MAIN AAI**

DATE TIME ORIGIN: **29**

AUTHENTICATED BY:

PRIORITY: **ROUTINE**

TO: **AFHQ**

ACTION:

INFO: **MMIA**

	TOP SECRET
X	SECRET
	CONFIDENTIAL
	RESTRICTED

TWO SECRET MESSAGES.

FIRST.SD 1347 281610A.

C IN C PROPOSES VISITING ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS 1 NOV.DETAILED
ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE BY MMIA.

SECOND.SD 1350. 281615A.

REF MMIA S/G/29/26 OF 25 OCT.

FIRST.REQUEST YOU ENSURE UNITS LISTED ARE EQUIPPED BY MID
NOVEMBER AS ANTICIPATED FIRST TWO COMBAT GROUPS WILL BE READY
MOVE FWD THEN.

SECOND.FOR MMIA.REQUEST YOU ADD TO APPX A 181 TECH.MAINT SECTION
LOCATION SAN GIORGIO.

THIRD.REF MY SD 1008 OF 4 OCT PARA FIRST. REQUEST NOMINATE ONE
GEN TPT COY.

FOURTH.ORG MOB LAUNDRY COY AND MOB BATH UNIT STILL UNDER
DISCUSSION

DECIPHERED 200045A EFS

REF. NO.

DTG.

SECRET
CIPHER
911

1934

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

100-100000

Transmission of Combat Groups on a Mountain Surface

ALLIED ARMY
H.D.M.
File No. 75/12/10
Oct 44

REPLY

Copy to: ALLIED ARMY H.D.M. File No. 75/12/10

In reply to your 20 1945 of 20 Sep: -

1.

TYPE AND NUMBER

TYPE QUANTITY

75/12 mm gun

24

LOCATION

Elements with Japanese/Chinese Group

61 mm mortar

51

Elements with Japanese/Chinese Group

61 mm mortar

26

61 mm mortar with Night Army

TYPE AND NUMBER

(a) There is sufficient military as - 0.1.1. at Pischin for the above 24 x 75/12 mm gun, 51; so reserves are held.

(b) 6,000 extra soldiers were issued on loan to 24 in 200 12 but requests for the return of portion of this equipment for the Italian Army has allocated the replies that the equipment is in operational use and can not be released.

2.

QUANTITY

(a) TYPE

75/12

7,558

LOCATION

C. 100

75/12

998

1000

75/12

18,000

10000

75/12

7,650

10000

75/12

47,276

10000

TOTAL 81,568

TOTAL

(b) 12 50

1936

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(d) On the basis of the guns, the 72/15 mm was said to be of 170 days at the rate which is under 6 months.

4. (a) From the aspect of equipment alone, it appears impracticable to convert one of the 3 combat groups on to a mountain warfare basis.

(b) In addition, the following militate against such a project:-

(i) We have already progressed far with the scheme to constitute 6 "Standard" combat groups. In upst this program at this stage would be harmful to the whole project.

(ii) Mountain artillery personnel have been distributed over the groups. To withdraw these now would upset the cohesion of all units, which is gradually taking place. To extract from all groups and place personnel suitable for mountain warfare in one group would further wreck the whole existing scheme and present a very difficult and lengthy personnel problem - already complicated owing to shortage of specialists.

(iii) The only 2 anti-aircraft units are in mountain group and reinforcements are difficult.

(iv) To convert a "Standard" group into a mountain warfare group would mean a complete reworking of the S.O. of all units with all the delay that that involves.

(v) The existing Italian organization and efficiency is already fully stretched over the existing project.

CONCLUSION

(a) I submit that even if the equipment position permitted, an attempt at this stage to convert one of the 3 groups into an effective mountain group, with the right sort of personnel, would cause considerable confusion, could be detrimental to morale and would not, on the whole, be worth while.

(b) I earnestly and most strongly recommend, with the greatest regret, that the already difficult matter of constituting these 6 "Standard" groups should not be further complicated by changes in plans and instructions already given to the War Ministry, unless this is absolutely necessary, for operational reasons.

RECOMMENDATION

As an alternative, if mountain artillery is essential, I suggest that an independent mountain artillery "Independent" might be formed and be available for use with any group as required S.O. one battalion of 15 guns. The personnel could be found by redeploying the reinforcement holding from 100 to 250 and the artillery from 250 to 400. stock. This would allow for resources and could be organized far more quickly.

(v) The breaking Italian organization and efficiency is already fully stratified over the existing project.

6. CONCLUSIONS

(a) I submit that even if the equipment position permitted, an attempt at this stage to convert one of the 6 groups into an effective Mountain Group, with the right sort of personnel, would cause considerable confusion, would be detrimental to morale and would not, on the whole, be worth while.

(b) I earnestly and most strongly recommend, with the greatest respect, that the already difficult matter of constituting these 6 "standard" groups should not be further complicated by changes in plans and instructions already given to the War Ministry, unless this is absolutely necessary, for operational reasons.

6. ALTERNATIVE

As an alternative, if Mountain artillery is essential, I suggest that an independent Mountain artillery "incumbent" might be formed and be available for use with any group as required e.g. new battalion or 18 guns. The personnel could be found by reducing the reinforcements holding from 100 to 90 and the artillery from 12 - 13.5, stock. This would allow for reserves and could be organized far more easily.

Sd. L. BROWNING 909

Ref Gen
S. 11 A

11938

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

RRB V MEDY NR 66 "P"
FROM DMT ADNAP 041200A
TO NMIA CMF
QQX CR 12

BT

DMT/573

RESTRICTED (.) ~~RECEIVED~~ PLEASE FWD URGENTLY COPY OF TS/G/29 DATED
26 SEP 44

BT

1310

SENT NR 616 IMI 616 04/2010A DM BB GA

RECD NR 616

04/2010 A AAA B1 KKKK

907

042100

11939

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
Tel: FILPOT 23
1605/50/46/G(SD1)

3 Oct 44

MMIA

Attached for infm are five copies of
1605/50/57/G(SD1) and 1605/50/46/G(SD1) of 2 Oct.

ASec.

5 10

Distribution of each pc

Wm McChesney
5/10
Lieutenant-General
Chief of General Staff.

WP

1940

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

SUBJECT: Formation of COMBAT GROUPS

File in T/SC/29. (file 404) HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Q Circulate. 22.

GSOI.

AA-2MC.

already taken care of. P.V. WP

G.O.K.

Tel:- FILPOT 23

1605/59/57/G(SDI)

2 Oct 44

AFHQ (20)

Copy to:-

MAIA (5)

MS

MA to CGS

MA to CA

DCGS

G(Ops)

GSI(a)

GSI(b)

G(Trg)

A

Q

Q(AS)

Q(Mov)

In

G-4

RA

AS

X

SVY

Postal

ST

Catering

Prints

Med

Cmd

REMB

SVY

7 R

Lab

Pro

Welfare

AGS Liaison

HQ PAC

SVY

DMT (3)

1. Six Italian Combat Groups are forming or will shortly commence formation in the area PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE - SAN GIORGIO. It is desirable that the responsibilities of AFHQ, AAI, MAIA and the Italian General Staff in relation to these Groups should be defined. The recommendations of AAI are as follows.

2. Command

(a) The Groups should continue to be under command of the Italian General Staff, subject to the supervision of the MAIA, under the general direction of AAI. On completion of training, Groups should pass to under command AAI.

3. Training

Policy should be decided by AAI and implemented by DMT in his capacity as adviser to AAI.

4. The present system is as follows:-

(a) Cadres of personnel or specialist arms are allotted courses by DMT at various Schools and Trg Esqs. These cadres return to the Groups.

906

G(Ops)	X	Pro
GSI(a)	SVY	Welfare
GSI(b)	Postal	ACU Liaison
G(Trg)	ST	EQ RAC
A	Catering	PA Inv
Q	Prints	DAC (3)
Q(AR)	Med	

1. Six Italian Combat Groups are forming or will shortly commence formation in the area PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE - SAN GIORGIO. It is desirable that the responsibilities of AFHQ, AII, MIIA and the Italian General Staff in relation to these Groups should be defined. The recommendations of AII are as follows.

2. Cmd

(a) The Groups should continue to be under cmd of the Italian General Staff, subject to the supervision of the MIIA, under the general direction of AII. On completion of training, Groups should pass to under cmd AII.

3. Training

Policy should be decided by AII and implemented by DMT in his capacity as adviser to AII.

4.

The present system is as follows:

906

(a) Cadres of personnel or specialist arms are allotted courses by DMT at various schools and Trg Bats. These cadres return to the Groups to train their units.

by MMIA.

(b) Under direction of DMT, HUs and Trg Increments to HUs are responsible for supervision of trg within the Groups.

5. Organization

submitted by MMIA.

Proposals for WEs should be approved by WEO at AII and then forwarded to AFHQ. WEs of Groups have been passed by WEO AII and forwarded to AFHQ under 1781/23/48/G(3D2) of 23 Aug. WEs of auxiliary units are in course of preparation.

6. Designation of Units

Titles of units should be in English. Orders of battle of the Groups will be published later.

7. Formation and Provision of Manpower

The main sources of manpower for each Group are certain Italian Divisions. These formations will provide a fair proportion of the manpower. The balance will be obtained by call up and movement of personnel from SARDINIA. It is not expected that in practice the requirements for Service units and the Groups will conflict. MILA is responsible for deciding source of personnel and for informing AAI of specific instances when the question of priority arises between Service units and the Groups. Major issues will be referred to AFHQ. Formal orders for the formation of units for Groups and the ancillary units should be issued by AFHQ. Formation should be supervised by MILA.

8. Location and Local Admin

Arrangements have been made for Groups to form in the area SAN GIORGIO - FIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE. While, in principle, the Italian General Staff is responsible for the administration of the Groups, 3 District should co-operate with MILA in rendering assistance in matters which are beyond the resources of the Italian General Staff.

9. Equipment

The procedure for equipping Groups is laid down in AFHQ (45) Adm Instr No 3 of 27 Sep.

10. Where other requirements of AAI conflict with the needs of the Groups, AAI should be informed by AFHQ in order that AAI may decide priorities.

11. Maintenance

Although Groups are initially under command Italian General Staff, personnel should be a British responsibility for maintenance under the terms of AFHQ letter AC 400/105 D-0 dated 22 Sep 44.

12. Conclusion

It is requested that early approval may be given to the recommendations above.

W M Cullen

W M Cullen

1943

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

General Staff is responsible for the administration of the Groups, 3 District should co-operate with AAI in rendering assistance in matters which are beyond the resources of the Italian General Staff.

9. Equipment

The procedure for equipping Groups is laid down in JFHQ Q(45) Adm Instr No 3 of 17 Sep.

10. Where other requirements of AAI conflict with the needs of the Groups, AAI should be informed by JFHQ in order that AAI may decide priorities.

11. Maintenance

Although Groups are initially under command Italian General Staff, personnel should be a British responsibility for maintenance under the terms of JFHQ letter AC 400/103 D-0 dated 22 Sep 44.

12. Conclusion

It is requested that early approval may be given to the recommendations above.

W M Cullen
Hod Jr

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

SUBJECT: - The Responsibilities of AAI for the
organisation of the Italian Army.

75/6/29 SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

TEL: FILPOT 23

1605/30/46/G(SD1)

2 Oct 44

General organisation of the Italian Army

1. The attached Memorandum (1605/30/46/G(SD1) of 19 Sep 44) was submitted to AFHQ in order to clarify the relative responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI w.r.t. 10 Sep for organisation and control of Italian Army manpower. The recommendations at para 24 have been accepted by AFHQ.

2. While the mechanism of staff control of Italian Army manpower remains with AAI, it will be necessary for AFHQ to take executive action on arrangements which must be made in the L of C Area. Service units on British account, on completion of formation, are at the disposal of AFHQ. AAI, nevertheless, has an interest in these units since they may be allotted to the Operational Zone or relieve units in the L of C Area. Branches and Services therefore are requested to continue their interest in the Service unit programme and to keep their opposite numbers at AFHQ and the MILA fully informed of previous plans and proposed changes as a result of unforeseen developments in the operational situation.

The Combat Groups

3. Attached are the recommendations of AAI to AFHQ on the status of and responsibilities for the Groups (1605/30/57/3(SD1) of 2 Oct).

4. It is considered that the Groups are potentially of considerable operational importance. Every effort will be made to ensure that the Groups are completed according to Schedule.

5. Branches and Services will keep in close touch with the progress of training and organisation of the units of the Groups through the appropriate branches and Services of AAI and the relevant trg organisations of the DMI.

6. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to MILA.

KW McLaughlin
for
Brigadier

11945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

theless, has an interest in these units since they may be allotted to the Operational Zone or relieve units in the L of C area. Branches and Services therefore are requested to continue their interest in the Service unit programme and to keep their exposito numbers at AFHQ and the MIA fully informed of previous plans and proposed changes as a result of unforeseen developments in the operational situation.

The Combat Groups

3. Attached are the recommendations of AAI to AFHQ on the status of and responsibilities for the Groups (1605/50/57/G(SD1) of 2 Oct).
4. C in G considers that the Groups are potentially of considerable operational importance. Every effort will be made to ensure that the Groups are completed according to Schedule.
5. Branches and Services will keep in close touch with the progress of training and organization of the units of the Groups through the appropriate branches and Services of MIA and the relevant trg organizations of the DMT.
6. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to MIA.

Kw McArthur
for
Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:-

MS
G(Cps)
GSI(a)
GSI(b)
G(Trg)
A
Q
Q(AB)
Q(Mov)
Tn
G-4
RA
RE
X
SVY

Postal
ST
Catering
Prints
Med
Ord
RMS
Labour
Pay
V & R
Pro
Welfare
HQ PAC
HQ Inf
DMT (3)

Information
ML to OCS
DMS
MA to GAO
ACC Liaison

905

SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY

Tel: FILFOT 23

1605/50/46/3(SMI)

19 Sep 44

Memorandum on the transfer from ALI to AFHQ of responsibility for control of Italian Army Movement and Organization.

Object of this Memorandum

Policy for the transfer of responsibility for organization and management of the Italian Army is stated in AFHQ letter 46 091.112/079 GGT-0 9U4 of 10 Sep. The object of this Memorandum is to recapitulate the current policy and procedure followed by ALI and to make recommendations on the passing of responsibility to AFHQ.

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to East US, British, Combat and International requirements.

1. ALI policy is that :-

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	1/3
Combat Gps	1/3	2/3

Mechanism for implementation of procedure

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by ALI in the proportions at para 1(b) above.

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by ALI to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List S).

(c) ALI are responsible for :-

(i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British

1947

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to meet US, British, Combat and International requirements.

1. A.I.I policy is that :-

- (a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.
- (b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	
Combat Gps	1/3	2/3

Mechanism for implementation of programme

- 2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MILA in the proportions at para 1(b) above.
- (b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MILA to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List 8).
- (c) MILA are responsible for :-

- (i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British are met.
- (ii) informing A.I.I of the priority in which personnel are to be shipped from S.J.O.N.I.I.
- (iii) assessing the effective strengths of units.

Organisation of British Combat and Service units

- 3. The state of British Service units and the programme for the completion of the British ceiling are shown in the following documents (attached to this Memo).

Minutes of a Meeting - 1605/50/46/G(SM) of 5 Sep.
 Revised Agenda of a Meeting - 1605/50/65/G(SM) of 3 Sep.
 with
 Appx 'A' - Revised State of Italian Army Service units under British Card
 Appx 'B' - Programme for provision of personnel to meet deficiencies.

4. The programme is of considerable complexity. Radical changes at short notice can only lead to delay, confusion and dislocation of the Italian administrative machinery.

WE's of units under British command

5. All Italian Army service and combat units under British command will be organized on WE's approved by WEC AAI.

Formation orders for units under British command

6. Formation orders are issued by 'AI' Branch AAI. The procedure is governed by the following principles:-

(a) where the source of manpower is under command a District or Army, the District or Army is responsible for supervision of formation in conjunction with Italian Army HQ allotted to the District or Army.

(b) In other cases, AAI is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. AAI distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'AI' Branch AAI.

8. No organized system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft administrative instructions attached to 1605/50/19/G(SDI) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Appx 'AI' to 1605/50/63/G(SDI) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.

10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that

(b) In other cases, MMLA is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. MMLA distributes rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.
8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft admin instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SDI) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Annex 'A' to 1605/50/63/G(SDI) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.
10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that during an interim period responsibility for Italian Army organisation and manpower will be divided between AFHQ and AAI as follows :-

- (a) AFHQ to be responsible for
 - (i) all questions of organisation of service units
 - (ii) establishing priorities between combat and service units.
- (b) AAI to be responsible for organisation of combat units.

In view of the complexities of the Italian Army manpower situation such a division of responsibility is not practicable.

12. It is recommended that either

- (a) AFHQ take over complete control of Italian Army manpower and organisation as soon as possible.

...../Sheet 3.

or

- (b) AAI continue to provide the mechanism of staff control under the general direction of AFHQ until the appropriate staff section of AFHQ is fully informed as to the complex background of the present state of the Italian Army.

13. Immediate assumption of complete control by AFHQ would require from AFHQ decisions on questions of detail without knowledge of past history.

14. If it is decided that the mechanism of staff control is to remain temporarily with AAI, then it is recommended that the following procedure should be adopted during this interim period.

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

903

15. On all questions of manpower and organization AFHQ should deal with NIIA through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportionate allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG IAFHQ.

Shipments from Sardinia

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) NIIA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on forms supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

1971A through 1971I.

allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the present NATO allotment between US and British would be decided by APNG in consultation with JLI.

~~Disposal of personnel - 10 dotted - 103~~

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CGA, TROUS.

Shipments from 3, JOINT.

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by JLI.

Disposal of personnel allotted by British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units will be decided by AFI.

(b) MIA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(4) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on items supplied by L.I.

(ii) Combat units could be issued by AAI.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the I of C Area.

Organization of writers under British and

20. The's would be approved by WEC III.

Units for British units

21. Would be distributed by AIAA between units in accordance with priorities decided by CL AFEA in consultation with 'A' Branch AAI.

Call time

22. The distribution of personnel to categories would be decided by LMA in consultation with AJI.

/Start 6.

1952

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

AFHQ News

23. Representatives of G-3 AFHQ should be attached to HQ AAI as soon as possible.

Conclusion

24. It is recommended that:-

- (a) the current policy described at Part I should continue until the reorganization of the Italian Army is completed
- (b) during the interim period before AFHQ assumes complete control, the procedure at paras 15 - 23 should be adopted.

*W. M. C. Butler
J. C. J. J.*

Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:- G-3 (Org) AFHQ (10 C-pies)
DCAC
DAC
DQAC

1953

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

LR0F V LRAR 4218 IMMEDIATE

FROM MAIN AAI 301615A

TO ACTION MMIA

QQX

SD1948

RESTRICTED.

FIRST . OWING TO DIFFICULTIES PROVISION

TPT AND CERTAIN ITEMS EQPT

POSSIBILITY ORGANISIM ONE OR MORE COMBAT

GPS ON MTN WARFARE F IS UNDER EXAMINATION .

IMPROBABLE ANY ALLIED PACK ARTY

Q/ EQPT OR MORTARS AVAILABLE .

SECOND . REQUEST YOU REPORT URGENTLY

(A) NUMBERS BY TYPES ITALIAN PACK ARTY EQPTS AND MORTARS
IN REASONABLE CONDITION AVAILABLE

(B) QTYS AMN BY TYPES FOR WEAPONS AT (A) AVAILABLE

(C) RTY SPECIAL PACK ARTY SADDLERY AVAILABLE

EXPRESSED IN SETS

PER GUN INCL THREE MONTHS VASTACE .

THIRD . STATE LOCATIONS WHERE ITEMS AT (A) AND (C) MAY
BE INSPECTED .

FOURTH . SUSPEND IMMEDIATELY ANY FURTHER
DISPERSON PACK UNIT AND EQPT .

THI 1615

BT

SENT 2112 EC B KKKK

T/41 RD 30/2112A CP B

MM A
FILE REF 75/9/29
Date 11/10/84

902

1954

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

37

SECRET

ATTENTION: Italian Double Agents (continued)

SECRET
23 04 ✓
File No. 10/10
201 42

Ministry of War

Ref: Italian letter 20/10/54 of 5 Sep.
Your reply 7298/ord - on 28 Sep.

36

907

1. Your strength return of the six combat groups by categories A, B, C, D is noted and agreed. Your proposals for the disposal of categories E and F are generally approved.

2. Personnel (approx. 3,000) in category D are to be sent to Albania only for replacement by the main army there before transfer to service units working with the Italian army. Those from 21111 and 21112 group will be sent at once, the remainder after 13 September under arrangements to be made by you and notified to us. Auxiliary units for the "ball" may have to come from this source.

3. Personnel (approx. 2,000) in category E are to be obtained as quickly as possible, and this is informed when this has been done.

4. Further requirements of to and of 1141 for the combat force are indicated as follows:

- (a) To complete combat groups after detached units and troops have been requested and after personnel in paras 2 & 3 have been disposed of - 4,000
- (b) To complete auxiliary units - 5,000
- (c) To complete 10th reinforcement pool - 5,000
- (d) To replace lost strength - 1,000
- 24,000

5. Sources of equipment available may yield the following material:

- (a) From service units working with Italian army; to be used to form the auxiliary units. - 2,000
- (b) From Albanian army - 1,000
- (c) From various volunteers - 1,000
- (d) From other sources - 1,000

2. Personnel (approx. 3,000) in each group are to be sent to Manila Camp for screening by the main group there before transfer to service units working with the British Army. Those from Manila and Okinawa Army will be sent to Oahu, the remainder after 15 October under arrangements to be made by you and notified to us. Auxiliary units for the "tail" may have to come from this source.
3. Personnel (approx. 1,000) in category 1 are to be assembled as quickly as possible, and this is informed when this has been done.
4. Future requirements up to end of 1964 for the combat force are estimated as follows: -
- | | |
|---|---------------|
| (a) To complete combat force after detached units and troops have been received and after personnel in para 8 & 9 have been deployed of | 4,000 |
| (b) To complete auxiliary units | 2,000 |
| (c) To complete log reinforcement pool | 8,000 |
| (d) To replace lost strength | 1,000 |
| | <u>15,000</u> |
5. Sources of manpower available may yield the following numbers: -
- | | |
|---|---------------|
| (a) From service units working with British Army; to be used to form the auxiliary units. | 3,000 |
| (b) From advanced areas | 1,000 |
| (c) From Pacific volunteers | 1,000 |
| (d) From call up programme areas | 1,000 |
| (e) From proposed call up for 16 area | 1,000 |
| | <u>7,000</u> |
| To be called up from other sources to be decided | 8,000 |
| | <u>15,000</u> |
6. The maintenance of the combat force during 1965 calls for early consideration. Assuming a 100 strength of 16 per month, 2,000 men will be needed in addition to any adjustments made between the 1965 and 1968 age groups.
7. Four reserves and proposals in connection with para 8 & 9 are invited.

E. BROWNING. *P*
 Maj. Gen.
 M M I A

Copies to: 1-1
 1-2
 1-3

36
SEGRETO

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO E MOBILITAZIONE
- Sezione Ordinamento -

N° 7298 /Ord. di prot.

P.M. 151, li 29 sett. 1944

OCCORRENZA: Organizzazione gruppi di combattimento.
de generation of the combat groups

TS/3/29

ALLA SOTTOCOMMISSIONE DI CONTROLLO PER L'ESERCITO
(M.M.I.A.A.)

ROMA

Risposta al foglio ST/G/29 del 7 corr.

1. - Si trasmette l'annessa situazione di forze dei gruppi di combattimento, suddivisa in categorie (A-B-C e D), secondo quanto stabilito da codesta Sottocommissione.
2. - Le proposte per il trasferimento del personale della categoria B ed altri gruppi di combattimento, risultano dalle note riportate nella situazione stessa.
3. - Per quanto riguarda i battaglioni delle divisioni "Mantova" e "Piacenza", attualmente a disposizione degli A.A., è stata già prospettata la necessità del loro urgente rientro alle rispettive divisioni (foglio n° 301228/C.A., in data 19 corr., del Ministero Guerra - Gabinetto).



ROMA

Risposta al foglio ST/C/29 del 7 corr.-

1. - Si trasmette l'annessa situazione di forze dei gruppi di combattimento, suddivisa in categorie (A-B-C e D), secondo quanto stabilito da codesta Sottocommissione.
2. - Le proposte per il trasferimento del personale della categoria B ad altri gruppi di combattimento, risultano dalle note riportate nella situazione stessa.
3. - Per quanto riguarda i battaglioni delle divisioni "Monte" e "Piceno", attualmente a disposizione degli A.A., è stata già prospettata la necessità del loro urgente rientro alle rispettive divisioni (foglio n° 301226/C.A., in data 19 corr., del Ministero Guerra - Gabinetto).--



IL GENERALE ADDETTO
(Alessandro Senti)

909

1958

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject :- Italian Combat Force.

Military Mission Italian Army,
R O M E.

T.S./G/29. ✓

3 Oct Sept., 44.

To :- A.F.H.Q.
copy to A.A.I.

Ref your A.G.O.R. 711/107 GOT-0 of 21st. Sept., para 3.

I have to report that the second Italian Combat Group (CRSOMA) has completed reorganization in accordance with the attached order of battle.

The Group is ^{ready for} ~~in process of~~ receiving its equipment and ^{is} ~~retrain-~~ing its personnel.

It is planned to complete re-equipping and retraining by 15th. Nov., 1944.

W. Pidsley
Colonel
Major General.
M.M.I.A.

11959

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ITALIAN COMBAT GROUP.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

CREMONA COMBAT GROUP under command of Gen. PRIMERI.

Carabinieri	No. 94 Section.
21st. Inf. Regt.	1st. Bn. 2nd. Bn. 3rd. Bn.
22nd. Inf. Regt.	1st. Bn. 2nd. Bn. 3rd. Bn.
7th. Arty Regt.	1 - 4 groups 25-pdr. 5th. group 17-pdr. 6th. group 40 mm.
Engineers.	77th. and 29th. Artillery Coys.
Sigs.	44th. Signal Coy.

SERVICES.

Medical	54th. and 333rd. Field Hospitals.
Supplies	44th. Transport Coy.
Ordnance	CREMONA Ord Coy.
Mech. Engineers	CREMONA Mechanical Coy.

Location	ALTAVILLA (B6669).
----------	--------------------

11960

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

MESSAGE FORM

From : MBIA
To : AAI

Date 11/5 Time 1134
1 A

SS 117

Restricted

Your instructions on my TB/G/29 of 23 Sep with reference to adm Tps for
Italian Combat Groups awaited (.) Paren ROME Area _____ Paren

Precedence IMPORTANT

Authenticating
Officer _____
LLH/nylon

11 9 6 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: Italian Combat Force.

SECRET.

33

Military Mission Italian Army.
R O M E.

T.S./G/29.
Sept., 44.

27

To: A.F.H.Q.
copy to A.A.I.

para 3. Ref. your AG 091. 711/107 GGT - 0 of 21st. Sept.

I have to report that the first Italian Combat Group (FRIULI) has completed reorganisation in accordance with the attached order of battle.

The Group is in process of receiving it's equipment and retraining it's personnel.

It is planned to complete re-equipping and retraining by 31st. October, 1944.

gb.MG.

W.P.asley.

A

Cedant
Major General.
M.M.I.A.

897

ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

FRIULI COMBAT GROUP. Under command of Gen. PEDROTTI.

Carabinieri	No. 95 Section.
87th. Inf. Regt.	1st. Bn. 2nd. Bn. 3rd. GRANITIERI.
88th. Inf. Regt.	1st. Bn. 2nd. Bn. 3rd. GRANITIERI.
35th. Arty. Regt.	1-4 Groups (25-pdr. 5th. Group 17-pdr. 6th. Group 40 mm).
Engineers.	5th. and 52nd. Artieri Coys.
Sigs.	20th. Signal Coy.

SERVICES.

Medical.	82nd. and 960th. Field Hospitals.
Supplies.	20th. Transport Coy.
Ordnance.	FRIULI Ord. Coy.
Mech. Engineers.	FRIULI Mechanical Coy.

Location.	S. GIORGIO del SANNIO. (N 7274).
-----------	----------------------------------

1963

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

02

Military Mission Italian Army,
R. O. M. E.,
10/20

26 Sep 14

Dear

I am sending you copies of the Outline Plan
for the formation of the Italian Coastal Force.

This has been sent to R.L. U's and M.L. I.A.
Madden Officers to put them in the picture. I think you
may like to distribute copies to heads of branches and
servants for their general information.

Progress is as far being maintained in accordance
with this plan, I hope it will continue.

Yours
L.B.

Distribution:

Brig WATIER AFHQ	12.
Brig KC COOPER, AAI	12
Maj Gen HEYDENMAN	3
Maj Gen NARES	3
Maj Gen COLLIER	3

1964

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Progress is so far being maintained in accordance
with this plan, I hope it will continue.

1000

213

Distribution:

Brig MAJIER AFHQ	12.
Brig KC COOPER, AAI	12
Maj Gen HEYDEMAN	3
Maj Gen MARES	3
Maj Gen COLLIER	3

895

SUBJECT: Italian Combat Force.

SECRET

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

T.S./G/29
26 Sept. 44.

To: Heads of Branches and Services, HQ MMIA.
All Liaison Officers, MMIA.
Os i/c all ELUs.

1. The Outline Plan for the reorganisation, training and equipping of the Italian Combat Force is circulated for information in the following attached papers:

Appx. A - Summary of Organisation of a Combat Group.
Appx. B - " " of Auxiliary Units (Adm Tail)
Appx. C - Order of Battle of Six Combat Groups (as far as decided.)
Appx. D - Time schedule for formation of Combat Force.
Appx. E - Training Plan.
Appx. F - Adm Plan.
Appx. G - Equipment Procedure.
Appx. H - Instructions issued to officers of ELUs.

2. This information is circulated so the MMIA liaison officers and officers of the various services can get a general idea of the scheme and so contribute more effectively to its realisation.

3. General questions on this subject should be referred to MMIA (Special Section) telephone ROME 478423.

trs. WP.
sten.

Colonel.
M.M.I.A.

W.P. Fisher

1965

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- Appx. A - Summary of Organisation of a Combat Group.
- Appx. B - " " of Auxiliary Units (Adm Tail)
- Appx. C - Order of Battle of Six Combat Groups (as far as decided.)
- Appx. D - Time schedule for formation of Combat Force.
- Appx. E - Training Plan.
- Appx. F - Adm Plan.
- Appx. G - Equipment Procedure.
- Appx. H - Instructions issued to officers of ELUs.

2. This information is circulated so the MMIA liaison officers and officers of the various services can get a general idea of the scheme and so contribute more effectively to its realisation.

3. General questions on this subject should be referred to MMIA (Special Section) telephone LONE 478428.

W. Piddery

tps. WP.
ston.

Colonel.
H.M.I.A.



897

21 9 8 7

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



1 9 6 8
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

1989

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020**'SECRET EQUALS US SECRET'**

S U M M A R Y
PERSONNEL, ARMS and MOTOR TRANSPORT
of
AN ITALIAN COMBAT GROUP

	Officers.	O. Re.	25-pdr.	17-pdr.	40 mm.	6-pdr.	3" mortar.	2" mortar.	L.M.G.	PIAT.	M/Cyclas.	Cars.	Ambulances.	Trucks G.S. 15-cwt.	" Specialist 15-cwt.	" Water 15-cwt.
GROUP H.Q.	23	113									10	7		4	3	
ARTY REGT. H.Q.	11	74														
25 pdr B.H.Q.	7	71												6	3	
2 troops (Each)	4	24	4						2	2	5	4		1	2	
4 batteries (Each)	15	239	8						2	2	1	1		2	2	
TOTAL PLD Artillery	60	956	32						6	6	7	5		5	6	
17 pdr B.H.Q.	5	44							24	24	28	20		20	24	
2 troops (Each)	2	64		4					2	4	4	4		3		
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 17 pdr.	9	172		8					2	4	4	1		2		
40 mm B.H.Q.	5	44							6	4	4	6		7		
2 Troops (Each)	4	95			6				2	4	5	2		2	1	
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 40 mm	13	231			12				6	4	15	6		4	1	
TOTAL 1 ARTILLERY REGT	93	1433	32	8	12				36	36	52	36		37	28	
H.Q. Infantry Regt.	15	101														
TOTAL MORTAR COY	3	95														
TOTAL A.T.K. GUN COY	6	162				12	8		6	1	3	1		4		
Inf Bn H.Q.	10	115							2	2	6	1		10		
									6	2	9	2		6		
TOTAL support Coy.	6	162				2	4	14	16	6	6	1		8		

'SECRET EQUALS' US SECRET

PERSONNEL, ARMS and MOTOR TRANSPORT.

AN ITALIAN COMBAT GROUP

Officers.	O.Rs.	25-pdr.	17-pdr.	40 mm.	6-pdr.	3" mortar.	2" mortar.	L.V.C.	PLAT.	M/Cycles.	Cars.	Ambulances.	Trucks G.S. 15-cwt.	" Specialist 15-cwt.	" Water 15-cwt.	Lorries 3-ton G.S.	Lorries spec. heavy.	Trailers.	Trailers, water.	Tractors.	Carriers.	Rocco Vehicles.
23	113									10	7		4	3	1	3						1
11	74								4	5	4		6	3	1	5						
7	71							2	2	5	3		1	2	1	7						
4	84	4						2	2	1	1		2	2								
15	239	8						6	6	7	5		5	6	1	7		8		6		
60	956	32						24	24	28	20		20	24	4	20		16		12		
5	124							2	4	4	4		3		1	2		1		1		
2	64		4					2			1		2		1	2				4	1	
9	172		8					6	4	4	6		7		1	6		1		9	3	
5	14							2	4	5	2		2	1	1	3				6		
4	95				6			2		5	2		1		1	3				12		
13	231				12			6	4	15	6		4	1	2	9				69		
93	1433	32	8	12	12			36	36	52	36		37	28	8	48		65	1	69	3	12
15	101								2	10	4		11	1	1	12		2				
3	95							6		3	1		4									
6	162				12			2	1	6	1		10								9	
10	115							6	2	9	2		6			8			1	26		3
6	162				2	4	14	16	6	6	1		8			3					22	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

40 mm B.H.Q.	5	41								2	4	5	2	2	1	1
2 Troops (Each)	4	95			6					2		5	2		1	
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 40 mm	13	231			12					6	4	15	6		1	1
TOTAL 1 ARTILLERY REGT	23	433	32	8	12					36	36	52	36		37	28
H.Q. Infantry Regt.	15	101														
TOTAL MORTAR COY	3	95						8		6		2	10	4	11	1
TOTAL A. TK. GUN COY	6	162				12				2	1	6	1		4	
Inf Bn H.Q.	10	115								6	2	9	2		10	6
TOTAL support Coy.	6	162				2	4	14	16	6	6	1			8	
3 Rifle Coys (Each)	5	155						3	14	4	2				3	
TOTAL Inf Battalion (3)	31	742				2	4	23	64	20	21	3			23	
TOTAL INF REGT	117	254				18	20	69	200	63	82	15			94	1
TOTAL 2 INF REGTS	234	508				36	40	138	400	126	164	30			188	2
H.Q. Engineer Bn.	6	16							2	3	1	1			2	
2 Field Companies (Each)	5	227							12	5	12	2			5	7
Signals Coy.	7	327						2	8	5	35				16	24
TOTAL ENGINEER Bn	23	777						2	34	18	60	5			28	38
TOTAL SUPPLY COY	13	294							20	20	26	12			5	
Medical Section.	14	237									5	6	18			
2 Field Hospitals (Each)	6	44										1				
TOTAL MEDICAL SERVICES.	26	325									5	8	18			
ORDNANCE FIELD PARK.	4	69							4		5	4			4	
Mechanical Engineers Workshop	6	68							4		5	3			11	2
6 T.A.Ds (Each)		12									2				1	
Mechanical Engineers Pl. (For Supply Coy)	1	39							2	1	2	1			2	
TOTAL M.E. SERVICES	7	279							6	1	19	4			19	2
TOTAL 1 COMBAT GROUP (Less GC.RR)	428	878	32	8	12	36	40	140	500	201	341	104	18		285	73
2 Provost Sections (GC.RR)		4								2		28	2			6

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET EQUALS US SECRET.

S U M M A R Y

of

PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MOTOR TRANSPORT
FOR AUXILIARY UNITS OF ITALIAN COM-
BAT GROUPS.

Appx "B" to
dated

[illegible]

[illegible]

1974

1 Medical Platoon.

TOTAL SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT.

12 Field Hospitals (each)
4 Field Surgical Units (each)
2 Mobile X-Ray Units (each)
2 Mobile Dental Units (each)
2 Adv Depot Med Stores (each)

TOTAL MEDICAL SERVICES

1 Mobile Laundry Coy
4 Mobile Bath Units (each)
1 Transit Camp.

H.Q. Reinforcement Trg Depot
2 H.Qs Infantry Bn RTD (each)
1 H.Q. Mixed Bn RTD

TOTAL R. T. D.

TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS.

TOTAL	AUXILIARY UNITS.
1	1
2	2
3	3
4	4
5	5
6	6
7	7
8	8
9	9
10	10
11	11
12	12
13	13
14	14
15	15
16	16
17	17
18	18
19	19
20	20
21	21
22	22
23	23
24	24
25	25
26	26
27	27
28	28
29	29
30	30
31	31
32	32
33	33
34	34
35	35
36	36
37	37
38	38
39	39
40	40
41	41
42	42
43	43
44	44
45	45
46	46
47	47
48	48
49	49
50	50
51	51
52	52
53	53
54	54
55	55
56	56
57	57
58	58
59	59
60	60
61	61
62	62
63	63
64	64
65	65
66	66
67	67
68	68
69	69
70	70
71	71
72	72
73	73
74	74
75	75
76	76
77	77
78	78
79	79
80	80
81	81
82	82
83	83
84	84
85	85
86	86
87	87
88	88
89	89
90	90
91	91
92	92
93	93
94	94
95	95
96	96
97	97
98	98
99	99
100	100

3 Sections CC.RR (TOTAL)

$$\begin{array}{r} 22 \\ 138 \\ 58 \\ 57 \\ \hline 257 \end{array}$$

1975

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

FOR AMBULANCE	7	19	3	1	14	1	6	6	10	4	75	5						
COLUMN.	40	163	37	82	80	4	27	30	112	16	75	29						
FLY AND																		
TRANSPORT.																		
each)	7	56		2				1	1									
ts (each)	3	23				1						2						
(each)	1	6										2						
s (each)	1	3								1								
ss (each)	1	8							2									
CALL																		
TICES.	102	122		24		4		12	16	2		12						
(each)	5	120			6		1		16			16						
	1	18					1	1	1									
	6	105			4		4	3	4									
Depot	4	42			2	1		2	5									
ED (each)	2	21			2			1	1									
	4	21			2		1		1									
D.	12	165			8	1	3	2	8									
CELLANEOUS.	27	402			18	1	12	9	32			16						
MILITARY	124	168	100	91	27	134	15	25	66	19	508	27	75	9	9	16	32	12
TS.																		
TAL)	6	150	3		42		3	9			3							

Appx C to MMIA
letter, TS/C/29
dated 26 Sept 14.

ORDER OF BATTLE

ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE.

UNIT	FRIULI A Bn.	CREMONA B Bn.	LEGNAVO C Bn.	FOLGORE D Bn.	MANTOVA E Bn.	PICENO F Bn.
GROUP HQ.	FRIULI	CREMONA	LEGNAVO	FOLGORE	MANTOVA	
INF REGT HQ.	87	21	68	NEMO	76	
1 Bn	1 Inf	1 Inf	1 Inf	1 Bn	1 Bn	
2 Bn	2 Inf	2 Inf	2 Inf	2 Bn	2 Bn	
3 Bn	3 Gren.	3 Inf	3 Inf	3 Bn	3 Bn	
INF REGT HQ	88	22	69	S. MARCO	114	
1 Bn	1 Inf	1 Inf	1 Bers	1 (RAFFI)	1 Bn.	
2 Bn	2 Inf	2 Inf	2 Alpine	2 (GRADO)	2 Bn.	
3 Bn	3 Gren	3 Inf	3 Alpine	3 (MANTOVA)	3 Bn.	
ARTY REGT HQ	35	7	11	184	155	
1 Group	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	
2 Group	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	
3 Group	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	
4 Group	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	25 pdr	
5 Group	17 pdr	17 pdr	17 pdr	17 pdr	17 pdr	
6 Group	40 mm	40 mm	40 mm	40 mm	40 mm	
ENGINEER EN HQ.	120	144	51	184	104	
Engineers	5 & 52	13 & 29	3 & 51	184 & 10	4 & 79	
Signs	20	44	51	184	107	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

INF REGT HQ 88 22 69 S. MARCO 114
 1 Bn 1 Inf 1 Inf 1 Bers 1 (BATTLE) 1 Bn.
 2 Bn 2 Inf 2 Inf 2 Alpine 2 (GRADO) 2 Bn.
 3 Bn 3 Gren 3 Inf 3 Alpine 3 (MARUMI) 3 Bn.

ARTY REGT HQ 35 7 11 184 155
 1 Group 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr
 2 Group 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr
 3 Group 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr
 4 Group 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr 25 pdr
 5 Group 17 pdr 17 pdr 17 pdr 17 pdr 17 pdr
 6 Group 40 mm 40 mm 40 mm 40 mm 40 mm

ENGINEER BN HQ 120 144 51 184 104
 Engineers 5 & 52 13 & 29 3 & 51 184 & 16 4 & 79
 SIG 20 44 51 184 107


MED SEC HQ
 Fd Hosp 82 84 244 516 248
 Fd Hosp. 960 333 332 517 501

TRANSPORT COY 20 44 51 184
 ORDNANCE COY FRIULI CEMONA LEGNANO FOLGORE MANTOVA. 891
 MECHANICAL COY FRIULI CEMONA LEGNANO FOLGORE MANTOVA
 CARGHIERI 95 94 99 & 151
 98 739
 POSTAL 79 64


UNITS FOR ACCOUNTING FOR EQUIPMENT ARE UNDERLINED.

1979

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020



LEGEND



- Reorganization.
- training Instructors.
- Issue of Equipment.
- Training.
- Move to Line.

890

Appx E to MMIA letter,
T.S./C/29 dated 26
Sept. 44.

SECRET

ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE.

TRAINING PLAN.

1. The Training Plan is based on the understanding that the officers and men are mostly trained soldiers whose main requirement is re-training in the technical handling and maintenance of new arms, vehicles and equipment, combined with administrative training of service units and adm officers in British maintenance and supply work.
The tactical training of cords and troops will depend on time available and may have to consist only of such modifications to Italian principles as are necessary to secure effective cooperation and control.
2. Training Policy and direction is in the hands of the D.M.T. who has issued the necessary instructions to B.L.U.s. He provides a British Training Team of officers and NCOs with the necessary equipment to supervise and assist the training programme.

3. Training is divided into five phases: -

- | | | |
|----|---|-------------|
| a. | Training of Regimental Instructors at British schools | (2-3 weeks) |
| b. | Training of Cadres in Combat Groups | (1-2 ") |
| c. | Technical and Individual Tng within units | (4-5 ") |
| d. | Tactical and Adm Tng of Cords and Staff | (1-2 ") |
| e. | Collective and Tactical Training | (1-2 ") |

4. M.M.I.A. is responsible for general coordination and for making all arrangements with War Ministry and schools concerned for courses and attachments outside combat groups.
5. B.L.U.s will issue instructions and supervise training within groups in conjunction with the D.M.Ts officer in charge of the Training Team.
6. Training Scales of arms and equipment are used until full scales are available when they are passed on to the next Group. (See Appx A for vehicles.)
7. Translation of handbooks and provision of interpreters is done by MMIA.
8. Reinforcements up to 5% of the strength of a group are attached to it during the training period and return to the depot as each group goes into the line.

2. Training Policy and direction is in the hands of the D.M.I. who has issued the necessary instructions to B.L.U.s. He provides a British Training Team of officers and WOS with the necessary equipment to supervise and assist the training programme.

3. Training is divided into five phases: -

- | | | | |
|----|---|-------------|----------|
| a. | Training of Regimental Instructors at British schools | (2-3 weeks) | |
| b. | Training of Cadres in Combat Groups | (1-2 ") | |
| c. | Technical and Individual Tng within units | } --- | |
| d. | Tactical and Adm Tng of Corps and Staff | | (4-5 ") |
| e. | Collective and Tactical Training | | (1-2 ") |

4. M.M.L.A. is responsible for general coordination and for making all arrangements with War Ministry and schools concerned for courses and attachments outside combat groups.

5. B.L.U.s will issue instructions and supervise training within groups in conjunction with the D.M.I.s officer in charge of the Training Team.

6. Training Scales, of arms and equipment are used until full scales are available when they are passed on to the next Group. (See Appx A for vehicles.)

7. Translation of handbooks and provision of interpreters is done by M.M.L.A.

8. Reinforcements up to 5% of the strength of a group are attached to it during the training period and return to the depot as each group goes into the line; the better ones are then used to instruct other reinforcements.

889

ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE

S E C R E T

ADMINISTRATIVE
PLAN

App F to MWIA letter
T.S./G/29 dated 26 Sept 44.

1. Combat Groups (and auxiliary troops) are called forward by MWIA and reorganized to comply with the approved War Establishment and in accordance with the time schedule at APP D.
In the training area they are under the District Hq concerned for local administration. In forward areas they will come under command of a British Hq and be administered in the same way as a British or Allied Division using British equipment.
2. A British Liaison Unit is sent to each Group Hq on formation, its strength and responsibilities being as in App E.
3. The War Ministry is primarily responsible for the provision of suitable man-power for the Force and its 10% reinforcements. Failure or difficulty (which generally occurs) is referred to MWIA for solution.
4. Equipment, including clothing, remains an Italian responsibility until British is available and the Group is considered by MWIA, fit to receive it. Thereafter it is issued through Italian Ord Field Park (Deposito Mobila) and/or DADOS Purp of each Group as in App G.
5. Supplies, hospital treatment and postal arrangements in the training area are an Italian responsibility. In forward areas Groups will be supplied and maintained through normal British channels which will be augmented as required by auxiliary troops of the Combat Force placed under command of Corps, Army or I of C HQ concerned.
6. Recovery - repair of vehicles will be in accordance with British practice.
7. Movements and traffic control as for British Troops.
8. Discipline, Legal, Pay, Leave, Welfare and other personal services matters will be as for other units of the Italian Army. An up-to-date instruction on these matters is about to be issued by A.F.H.Q.

1 2 3 3

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

3. The War Ministry is primarily responsible for the provision of suitable man-power for the Force and its 10% reinforcements. Failure or difficulty (which generally occurs) is referred to MWIA for solution.
4. Equipment, including clothing, remains an Italian responsibility until British is available and the Group is considered, by MWIA, fit to receive it. Thereafter it is issued through Italian Ord Field Park (Deposito Mobile) and/or DADOS Dup of each Group as in Appx G.
5. Supplies, hospital treatment and postal arrangements in the training area are an Italian responsibility. In forward areas, Groups will be supplied and maintained through normal British channels which will be augmented as required by auxiliary troops of the Combat Force placed under command of Corps, Army or L of C HQ concerned.
6. Recovery - repair of vehicles will be in accordance with British practice.
7. Movements and traffic control as for British Troops.
8. Discipline, Legal, Pay, Leave, Welfare and other personal services matters will be as for other units of the Italian Army. An up-to-date instruction on these matters is about to be issued by A.F.H.Q.

288

Appendix 'C' to MMIA letter
T.S./G/29 dated 26 Sept 44.

ORDNANCE PROCEDURE.

1. INITIAL UNIT EQUIPMENT.

(a) VEHICLES. Vehicles will be released by A.P.H.Q. to the District in which the Group is forming. A copy of release notes will be sent to H.Q., M.H.I.A. and the B.L.U. concerned. Arrangements for collection will be made between District and B.L.U. Compilation of Census Returns will be a B.L.U. responsibility, and copies of D.O.S. Circular No. 68 have already been distributed to B.L.U's.

(b) CONTROLLED STORES (OTHER THAN VEHICLES) will be released by Q(AE) A.P.H.Q. who will send copies of release notes to District concerned, H.Q., M.H.I.A. and appropriate B.L.U.

Ordinance A.P.H.Q. will signal Ordnance Depot from which stores are to be drawn. Copy will be sent to B.L.U. who will arrange collection.

(c) CLOTHING AND GLOUSE EQUIPMENT.

Authority for issue will be given by Q (AE) A.P.H.Q. to District concerned, who will arrange with B.L.U. for indents to be submitted to 557 R.O.D. Clothing will be in accordance with following scale.

Blouses B.D. (Maid)	1 each
Trousers B.D. (Maid)	1 pair each
Shirts Angola Drab or A/L	2 each
Web Equipment c/w valise and Pack	1 each
Dressers Hoollen	2 pairs each
Pullever	1 each
Towel	1 each
Greatcoat	1 each
Boots c/w laces	1 each
Socks	2 pairs each
Anklets	3 pairs each
Housenife	1 pair each
Blankets (or 1 Comforter)	1 each
Mess Tin set	2 each
Knife	1 each
Fork	1 each
Spoon	1 each
Brass	1 each
Map	1 each
Water Bottle	1 each

It is proposed to supply Toilet and Shaving Kit through E.P.L. channels.

x These items are not additional to those in Table 1 of the Normal Equipment List.

2. TRAINING STORES

1985

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(c) CLOTHING AND GLOSS EQUIPMENT. Authority for issue will be given by Q (AE) A.P.H.Q. to District concerned, who will arrange with E.L.D. for indents to be submitted to 557 B.O.D. Clothing will be in accordance with following scale.

Blouses B.D. (Khaki)	1 each
Trousers B.D. (Khaki)	1 pair each
Shirts Angora Drab or A/L	2 each
Web Equipment c/w valise and Pack	1 each
Drivers Woolen	2 pairs each
Pullover	1 each
Towel	1 each
Grantecoat	1 each
Boots c/w laces	1 each
Socks	2 pairs each
Anklets	3 pairs each
Houswife	1 pair each
Blankets (or 1 Comforter)	1 each
X Mass Tin set	2 each
X Knife } Set	1 each
Fork } Set	
Spoon } Set	
Braces	1 each
X Mug	1 each
X Water Bottle	1 each

It is proposed to supply Toilet and Shaving Kit through E.P.L. channels.

X These items are not additional to those in Table 1 of the Normal Equipment List.

2. TRAINING SCALES.

(a) VEHICLES issued for training will be issued against unit entitlement (M.A. This does not apply to Friuli and Cremona Groups, where a separate training scale has been issued).

(b) CONTROLLED STORES (OTHER THAN VEHICLES) will be released to R.M.A. for sub-allotment to Groups. It is the intention that Controlled Stores will pass from one Combat Group to another as each Group completes training. Where this is not possible (as in the case of certain Engineer stores) application will be made to A.P.H.Q. for a duplicate issue of Controlled Stores required for training.

3. GENERAL.

(a) Units entitlements are shown in "Normal Equipment Lists" which cover all Personal and Common Unit Equipment. Where "cases", "boxes" etc are held as such, details of their contents will be found in "Normal Equipment List Schedules".

Continued Sheet 2

Sheet 2.

3. GENERAL (a) Continued.

Entitlement to Technical or Special equipment peculiar to any one unit is shown in "Special Equipment Lists".

These Normal and Special Equipment Lists take the place of G1093's.

(b) Each B.L.U. will maintain records of receipts of all Ordnance Stores issued to the Group for which it is responsible.

(c) Units will use alternate lines on Indent Forms in order that BLUs may, if necessary, insert British nomenclature immediately beneath Italian. Part numbers should be quoted wherever possible and in cases of doubt will serve as deciding factor in identification.

SECRET

ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS

Instructions to British Officers selected for Liaison and Training Duties.

Appendix 'H' to MTA letter
T.S./G/29 of 26 Sept 44.

Army Sub Commission, MTA.
H.Q., A.C.C.

ROME.

T.S./G/29
Sep 44.

OBJECT. These instructions are issued for the information and general guidance of British officers attached to fighting units of the Italian Army. They do not attempt to specify duties in detail and must not be allowed to hamper zeal and initiative of individual officers. They may be quoted to Italian Commanders or staff officers as required.

1. INFORMATION.

- (a) British weapons, transport and equipment are being provided for certain units of the Italian Army which are being organised as self-contained Combat Groups (GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO) of about 9,000 men each.
- (b) The number of groups will depend on the quality of Italian manpower and the quantity of British equipment available in the time at our disposal.
- (c) Certain Italian divisions have been selected each to form the basis of one of these Groups; the concentration, reorganisation and re-training of the first two divisions is now taking place.
- (d) British officers are being appointed to each Group for liaison, training and supervisory duties as described in para 4.
- (e) An administrative "tail" to augment Allied L.C.C. and forward maintenance units is being organised separately.

2. INTENTION.

1. INFORMATION.

- (a) British weapons, transport and equipment are being provided for certain units of the Italian Army which are being organized as self-contained Combat Groups (GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO) of about 9,000 men each.
- (b) The number of Groups will depend on the quality of Italian man-power and the quantity of British equipment available in the time at our disposal.
- (c) Certain Italian divisions have been selected each to form the basis of one of these Groups; the concentration, reorganization and re-training of the first two divisions is now taking place.
- (d) British officers are being appointed to each Group for liaison, training and supervisory duties as described in para 4.
- (e) An administrative "tail" to augment Allied L of C and forward maintenance units is being organized separately.

2. INTENTION.

- (a) It is intended to employ these Groups in action (either separately or together) under Allied Formation Commanders at the earliest possible moment.
- (b) They are to be lightly equipped, without armour, and will be motor borne except for the Infantry rifle coys. They are not intended to undertake major offensive operations unaided.
- (c) Sufficient Italian supporting troops and administrative services are being made available to Allied commanders concerned.

contd sheet 2/..

Sheet 2.

- (d) The Italian commanders and staffs are to be responsible for their own internal administration and the tactical handling of units of their groups to the fullest possible extent.
- (e) The internal organisation of groups is to be uniform and as simple and so effective as is commensurate with the above conditions.

3. METHOD.

- (a) The standard organisation of a Gruppo di Combattimento is given in Appx. "A" and will NOT be altered without A.F.H.Q. approval. The Italian system of command has been retained as far as possible to avoid confusion in technical training. The number of different types of weapons and vehicles has been kept to a minimum to save time in technical training.
- (b) The directive issued to the Italian General Staff (S.M.R.E.) is given in Appx. "B"
Copies of further directives will be issued to B.L.U.s.
- (c) British liaison and training staffs will be as given in Appx. "C"; they will carry out their various duties in accordance with standard British procedure and the following general instructions: -
 - (d) Separate instructions will be issued regarding:
 - i. Operational channels of communication.
 - ii. Training programmes.
 - iii. Reinforcement and other personnel questions.
 - iv. Maintenance.

4. LIAISON.

- (a) A British Liaison Unit (B.L.U.) will be attached to each Independent Group H.Q. It will be self-contained administratively but will be located at or very close to the Italian H.Q. The C. i/c will, through his officers of the various arms and services, be responsible that:
 - i. Orders received are properly understood and obeyed.
 - ii. Information required by higher authority is properly and accurately supplied, translated and transmitted.
 - iii. Training is maintained and improved whenever and

1990

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

is given in Appx. "B".

Copies of further directives will be issued to B.L.U.s.

(c) British liaison and training staffs will be as given in Appx. "C"; they will carry out their various duties in accordance with standard British procedure and the following general instructions: -

(d) Separate instructions will be issued regarding:

- i. Operational channels of communication.
- ii. Training programmes.
- iii. Reinforcement and other personnel questions.
- iv. Maintenance.

L. LIAISON.

(a) A British Liaison Unit (B.L.U.) will be attached to each independent Group H.Q. It will be self-contained administratively but will be located at or very close to the Italian H.Q. The C. i/c will, through his officers of the various arms and services, be responsible that: -

- i. Orders received are properly understood and obeyed.
- ii. Information required by higher authority is properly and accurately supplied, translated and transmitted.
- iii. Training is maintained and improved whenever and wherever possible.
- iv. Administrative services and maintenance duties are efficiently and economically performed.
- v. Circumstances likely to affect detrimentally the fighting or administrative efficiency of the formation, or the morale of the troops, are promptly prevented, rectified and/or reported to the proper authority.
- vi. In battle, communication with flank and rear formations is maintained.

The B.L.U. will in addition be the primary channel of communication between the Italian H.Q. and superior and flank formations on all questions affecting Italian units in their role as a component part of the Allied Forces.

Contd. sheet 3/...

Sheet 3.

(b) The Military Mission to the Italian Army (M.M.I.A.) is the sole channel of communication between Allied commanders and the Ministry of War and General Staff (S.M.R.E.). The M.M.I.A. representative (L.O.) at each Group HQ will therefore deal (normally through M.M.I.A.) with all questions affecting Italian personnel in their role as an integral part of the Italian Army. He will maintain the closest possible touch with the officers of the B.L.U. to assure that all essential matters are adequately and properly handled without overlapping or waste of time and effort.

(c) A training staff is provided by the D.M.T. (in addition to B.L.U.s) during initial reorganisation and training phases to supplement the training given to Italian instructors in British schools and to supervise and report on the standard of training reached. They will be withdrawn as each Group reaches the stage when it can carry on under B.L.U. supervision.

5. TRANSLATION.

- (a) Orders and memoranda are issued in the language of the nation of origin.
- (b) Translation into Italian is the responsibility of the Italian recipient.
- (c) Translation into English of documents and conversation from Italian Groups to English addresses will be the responsibility of the B.L.U. to whom sufficient interpreters are allotted for the purpose.

6. ADMINISTRATION.

- (a) All British personnel attached to Italian Combat Groups will be under command of the O i/c B.L.U. and will carry out their technical duties according to normal British procedure.
- (b) O i/c B.L.U. (and MMA L.G.) will submit such routine reports etc as are required from time to time by the authorities mentioned in para 4.
- (c) War Diaries will be kept by each B.L.U. and sent monthly to the HQ of the superior formation to which they are allotted.
- (d) Supplies for British personnel will be drawn on British scales in the normal way from nearest British Depots and will not be a charge on the Italian Army.

11992

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

5. TRANSLATION.

- (a) Orders and memoranda are issued in the language of the nation of origin.
- (b) Translation into Italian is the responsibility of the Italian recipient.
- (c) Translation into English of documents and conversation from Italian Groups to English addresses will be the responsibility of the E.L.U. to whom sufficient interpreters are allotted for the purpose.

6. ADMINISTRATION.

- (a) All British personnel attached to Italian Combat Groups will be under command of the O i/c E.L.U. and will carry out their technical duties according to normal British procedure.
- (b) O i/c E.L.U. (and MMIA L.O.) will submit such routine reports etc as are required from time to time by the authorities mentioned in para 4.
- (c) War Diaries will be kept by each E.L.U. and sent monthly to the HQ of the superior formation to which they are allotted.
- (d) Supplies for British personnel will be drawn on British scales in the normal way from nearest British Depots and will not be a charge on the Italian Army.

7. CONCLUSION.

285

This undertaking may have far reaching effects on our relations with ITALY as well as on the course of the War. Its success depends on the zeal efficiency and tact of Allied officers concerned and on the resulting ability and readiness of the Italian troops to co-operate. It must and will succeed.

tvs.WF.
ston.40.c.

W. Pidsley

for Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.S.C.

ALLIED FORTE HEADQUARTERS

SECRET

G - 3 SECTION

FILE NO : ESD/81/3

22 Sep 44

MEMO TO : Engrs
Signals.
Medical (through G-1(B)).

SUBJECT : Equipment for ITALIAN Gruppi.

1. It is intended to issue equipment for three ITALIAN Combat Groups in accordance with the following programme :-
 - (a) By end Sep - First Gruppo
 - (b) By end Oct - Second and Third Gruppi
2. Authority has been given to Q(AE) for the issue of the necessary stores and equipment on the agreed scale.
3. Copies of the Equipment Lists laying down the scale of equipment agreed on by H.Q., A.A.I. are being issued to all concerned by Q(AE), A.F.H.Q.
4. A copy of Q(AE) Adm Instrn No. 3 laying down the method to be adopted in the issue of equipment to the Gruppi is attached. This method applies in the case of all items controlled by Q(AE) and it is requested that other sections adopt the same method in the issue of their own items.
5. It is essential that MMIA and the RIUs concerned be kept fully informed of the programme for the issue of equipment.

JTW/jcc

DANIEL NOCE,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Copy to : MMIA
G-1(B)
Q(AE)
Q(Maint)
G-3 (Orig F)
Fd Arty Sec (with copy of Q(AE) Adm Instrn No. 3).

File main file
DP

557.

map Head Room 26/9

881

SECRET

Subject: Administrative Troops Italian Combat Groups

Military Mission
Italian Army
Rome

TS/G/29

13 September 1944

To : Hq. AAI Copy to A.F.H.Q.

1. Ref my TS/G/29 of 18 Sep.

Assuming that you will need a proportion of the Italian Administrative troops when the first two Gruppi are ready to go into the line during November, the following tentative instructions have been given to the Ministry of War:

a) Engineers One Field Park Coy to be formed by 7th October from the mechans of 13th Artieri Coy at present in the S. GIORGIO Area. This Field Park Coy to train with the PRIVI Group.

b) Transport As there are no spare drivers (we are still short in the PRIVI Group) the question of the provision of a complete general transport coy is referred to you. It is recommended that if one is required, it can only be obtained from those already allotted to the Allies (i.e. 1001, 1002, etc.)

c) Supplies Personnel for two field bakeries are to be provided and stationed in the concentration area to await the provision of mobile equipment, using static equipment meanwhile.

d) Ambulance Coys Again this question must be referred to you. The simplest solution seems to be to bring No. 84 Ambulance Car Section from SARDINIA, Serial No. 65 (with Italian ambulances) and to send it to APULIA on arrival, to relieve No. 1200 Italian Ambulance Car Coy (with British Ambulances).

On relief No. 1200 Ambulance Car Coy to proceed to Piedimonte D'Alife Area to form part of the administrative cell.

e) Hospitals The following to be formed and equipped with Italian personnel (and equipment).

into the line during November, the following tentative instructions have been given to the Ministry of War:

a) Engineers One Field Park Coy to be formed by 7th October from the nucleus of 13th Antier Coy at present in the S. GIORGIO Area. This Field Park Coy at present with the FRIULI Group.

b) Transport As there are no spare drivers (we are still short in the FRIULI Group) the question of the provision of a complete general transport coy is referred to you. It is recommended that if one is required, it can only be obtained from those already allotted to the Allies (i.e. 1001, 1002, 1003 etc.)

c) Supplies Personnel for two field bakeries are to be provided and stationed in the concentration area to await the provision of mobile equipment, using static equipment meanwhile.

d) Ambulance Coys Again this question must be referred to you. The simplest solution seems to be to bring No. 84 Ambulance Car Section from SARDINIA, Serial No. 85 (with Italian ambulances) and to send it to APULIA on arrival, to relieve No. 1200 Italian Ambulance Car Coy (with British Ambulances).

On relief No. 1200 Ambulance Car Coy to proceed to Piedimonte D'Alife Area to form part of the administrative tail.

e) Hospitals The following to be formed and equipped with Italian personnel (and equipment).

Field Hospitals 230) To be brought from SARDINIA
232) Serial Nos. 57 and 58

424 ~~230~~) Now in ANCONA Area 883
519 ~~232~~) under 208th Division

Field Surgical Units 34)
131) - Now under Command C.I.L.

Mobile X-Ray Unit 29 now under Command C.I.L.

Mobile Dental Unit No. 113 to be brought from SARDINIA, Serial No. 90

SECRET

Advance Depot Medical Stores. There is one at GIMO. This will be known as "S" Depot and will remain present location.

f) A reinforcement depot to be opened in the Piedmonte D'Alife Area at once - no difficulties.

Please confirm the above and give a ruling on points raised at (b) and (d).

2. No instructions have been received regarding the scales provision or issue of arms, vehicles and equipment to auxiliary units. These are awaited.

3. It is assumed that no British Liaison Units will be needed, but it may be that some Officers of Corps Headquarters concerned (e.g. the PADOS of Corps Troops) may need some assistance in administering their units; in the meantime it is recommended that they should be the responsibility of the District concerned, each of which has a M.M.I.A. L.O. to assist.

W.D. - 12.1.61
Major General
M.M.I.A.

copies to: DATA 10 1 District.
" " 3 District.
" " PBS.
Col. FIDSLEY.
G.I.
File.
G Circ.
SPARE 10.

concerned (e.g. the DADOS of Corps Troops) may need some assistance in administering their units; in the meantime it is recommended that they should be the responsibility of the District concerned, each of which has a M.W.I.A. L.O. to assist.

ME

W.D. + L.O.
Major General
M.W.I.A.

copies to:

M.W.I.A. 10 1 District.
" " 3 District.
" " FES.
Col. FIDSLY.
G.I.
File.
G Circ.
SPARE 10.

JC/BWT

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
By Authority of
SAC

Initials *RAB*
Date 21 September 1944

AG 091.711/107 GCT-0

SUBJECT: Italian Gruppi.

TO : Commander, Headquarters Military Mission Italian Army.
FOR: Army Sub Commission.

1. Instructions received in this headquarters from the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorize the formation of six Italian Gruppi to be composed of Italian Army personnel equipped from British sources.
2. The War Establishments on which these Gruppi are to be organized have now been approved and you are requested to proceed with the formation of the six Gruppi as under:
 - a. Headquarters an Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/523/1 - Officers - 28, Other Ranks - 113 and transport.
 - b. A Provost Section (CCPR) for an Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/524/1 - Officers - 2, Other Ranks 50 and transport.
 - c. An Artillery Regiment for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/525/1 - Officers - 93, Other Ranks - 1433 and transport.
 - d. An Infantry Regiment for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/526/1 - Officers - 24, Other Ranks - 358 and transport.
 - e. An Infantry Battalion for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/527/1 - Officers - 31, Other Ranks - 742 and transport.
 - f. Headquarters Engineer Battalion for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/528/1 - Officers - 6, Other Ranks - 16 and transport.
 - g. Field Company Engineer Battalion for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/529/1 - Officers - 5, Other Ranks - 227 and transport.
 - h. Signals Company Engineer Battalion for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/530/1 - Officers - 7, Other Ranks - 327 and transport.
 - i. Headquarters Supply and Transport Company for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/531/1 - Officers - 4, Other Ranks - 36 and transport.
 - j. Relief Driver Increment, Supply and Transport Company for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/532/1 - Officers - NIL, Other Ranks - 13 and transport.

882

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711/107 GCT-0
Dated 21 September 1944 (Cont'd)

k. Transport Platoon, Supply and Transport Company for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/533/1 - Officers - 1, Other Ranks - 49 and transport.

l. Composite Platoon, Supply and Transport Company for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/534/1 - Officers - 3, Other Ranks - 36 and transport.

m. Medical Section for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/535/1 - Officers - 14, Other Ranks - 237 and transport.

n. Field Hospital for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/536/1 - Officers - 6, Other Ranks - 44 and transport.

o. Ordnance Field Park for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/537/1 - Officers - 4, Other Ranks - 69 and transport.

p. Mechanical Engineers Workshop for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/538/1 - Officers - 6, Other Ranks - 168 and transport.

q. Mechanical Engineers Platoon for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/539/1 - Officers - 1, Other Ranks - 39 and transport.

r. Light Aid Detachment for Italian Combat Group - Establishment NA/540/1 - Officers - NIL, Other Ranks - 12 and transport.

3. It is requested that as the Gruppi are formed a complete Order of Battle for each unit is forwarded to this headquarters giving designation of each unit within the Gruppi.

4. Arrangements concerning the provision of the necessary personnel and training dates should be made direct to Headquarters, Allied Armies in Italy, and the receipt of combat equipment direct with this headquarters.

By command of General WILSON:

R. H. Furse

R. H. FURSE,
Captain, AGI,
Asst Adjutant General.

Copy to:
Hq AAI

881

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Combat Force - Reorganization.

File
SECRET 27
Military Mission Italian Army.
RMC.

7.8.49/29 ✓
18 Sept 44.

To: Ministry of War attn S.S.I.E.

copies to: RAF for 03 Org. - A F H G.
RAF for 03 (SU)

1. The administrative troops required to maintain the Italian Combat Force, complete details of which have been worked out with your staff, will be required to be organized in stages, approximately one third of each one of the service at a time.
The first third to be organized by the first week in October, the second by the first week in November and the third by the first week in December.

2. The units required to be organized by the first week in October are as follows:-

ENGINEERS - 1 Field Park Coy.

TRANSPORT - 1 General Transport Coy.

SUPPLIES - 2 Field Bakeries.

AMBUULANCE COY R.A. and one Transport Platoon with a proportion of relief driver increment, mechanical engineers and medical personnel, to be notified later.

HOSPITALS.
4 Field Hospitals.
2 Field Surgical Units.
1 Mobile X-ray Unit.
1 Mobile Dental Unit.
1 Advance Depot Medical Stores.

TRAINING DEPT. 1 Reinforced Training Dept., complete.

PERSONNEL 1 Section G.S. HQ

389

3. Please prepare your proposals for the formation, size and concentration of these units in accordance with the organization already approved. These proposals will be discussed at a meeting with your representatives concerned, to be held at R.A. HQ at 1000 hrs on Friday 22 Sept.

12002