

11 37 0

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ACC

10000/120/1116

56/29/32

opened

Dec 19

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

10000/120/1116

SG/29/32/1

Progress Strength Returns FRIOLY

opened Dec. 10, 1944. Closed Jan. 30, 1945

Dec. 1944 - JAN. 1945

1372

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Strength Return - FRIULI Group.

SECRET
&
SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(F.V.I.A.)

S/G/29/32.1
30 Jan 45.

To : MMIA LO R.T.C., I.C.F.

Herewith latest strength return from FRIULI Combat Group
as at 1800 hrs 27 Jan 45: -

FIGHTING STRENGTH		8283
POSTED STRENGTH		8506

Taken on strength during 24 hrs ending 1800 hrs	- 27.
Deficiencies in specialists	- 947.

Deficiencies in Specialists (Detail)

Drivers		21
Smiths		4
Motor Mechanics		54
Electricians		3
Boilermen		1
Plumbers		1
Driver Mechanics		4
Boatmen		2
Motorcyclists		42
W/T Operators		130
Exchange Operators		12
Director Operators		24
Armourers		73
Carpenters		7
Mechanics (Fitters)		3
General Duties		586

Int: CINC
B/E.

R.G.A. Grah.
for Major General.
F.V.I.A.

48

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CIPHER SECRET
RAAC MESSAGE FORM

23/30
183

CALL	CIRCUIT No. NR	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS	
SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY				
FROM (A)	50 B L U		DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN 28 1900 A	
TO (FOR ACTION)	M M I A		MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR	
TO (FOR INFORMATION)				
(REF. No.)	A G 722		(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET	

Personnel bit as at 27 1800 A O
V 8283 W-8506 X-27 Z-947 O
1-21 2-4 5-34 6-3 9-1 10-1 11-4
12-2 13-42 17-130 19-12 21st 24 24th 73
26th 7 (27th) 3 32-586

. 47

Secur. Ref., M M I A 20 informed.
RTC

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	PRECEDENCE:	THI OR TOR	Off.
	ORIGINATING SECTION:		
	A. G. AUTHENTICATION:		
	ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION:	TIME CLEARED 30 th	

11374

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject :- Reinforcement Demand

To :-
A 1 Rear Cdn Corps
HQ MMIA

51 British Liaison Unit

A 16

- 1 Herewith CREMONA GRUPPO rft demand as at 15 Jan. A copy has been sent direct to the Combat Gp Rft Camp.
- 2 The rfts now demanded do NOT allow for those rfts at present expected, but covers the numbers asked for incl those required to bring figures up to WE plus 5% authorized by MMIA.

Field
19 Jan 45
RVAH/RGT

Major
DAA & QM

40

Thas looks
in
He are then
forwarding the demands
requesting 5 new files
as the main Rft file covers all rft matters.
Pls
Initial
new

1375

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY

(including authorizations of 5% after surplus)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
	Infantry	Artillery	Engineers	Medical Corps	Signal Corps	Transportation	Aviation	Construction	General Services	Medical Services	Medical Administration	Medical Supply	Medical Sanitation	Medical Education	Medical Research	Medical Development	Medical Administration	Medical Supply	Medical Sanitation	Medical Education	Medical Research	Medical Development
Infantry																						
Artillery																						
Engineers																						
Medical Corps																						
Signal Corps																						
Transportation																						
Aviation																						
Construction																						
General Services																						
Medical Services																						
Medical Administration																						
Medical Supply																						
Medical Sanitation																						
Medical Education																						
Medical Research																						
Medical Development																						
TOTAL																						

1. To include 1 L/Sgt
2. " " 3 L/Sgts
3. " " 1 NCO
4. " " 3 NCOs
5. Electrical & Mechanical

6. To include 1 Spt
7. To include 1 Spt Mech for radio rep
8. Includes 1 Spt on way.

43

11376

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8 (including authorized holding of 5% after surplus to NE) 255

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
Operations	Tel. Operations	Allocations	Postal Services	Stores	Communications	Trucks	Operations and Maintenance	Fin. and Inv.	Communications	Supply Operations	Signal Ops	Postnet	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations	Operations
12	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
13	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
14	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
15	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
16	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
17	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
18	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
19	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
20	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
21	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
22	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
23	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
24	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
25	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
26	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
27	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
28	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
29	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
30	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
31	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
32	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
33	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
34	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
35	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
36	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
37	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
38	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
39	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
40	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

- 6. To include 1 Opl
- 7. To include 1 Opl each for radio repairs
- 8. Estimate lefts on way.

9454
 2032
 7418

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BEST COPY POSSIBLE

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Army Form C 2128		MESSAGE FORM.		Serial No.	
CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	CIPHER SECRET	No. of Groups G.R.	Office Dist.	
	OUT				
(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)					
TO <u>MMIA</u>		Originator's Number <u>AG 702</u>		Date <u>22</u>	
FROM <u>50 BLU</u>		In Reply to Number <u>5521 22</u>			
SECRET	SCALE	as at	211800 AC		
V7862	W 8118	X 116	Y 4	Z 1335	
1st 97	2nd 6	5th 42	6th 9	8th 2	9th 1
10th 1	11th 4	2th 2	13th 57	17th 144	19th 20
21st 24	24th 73	26th 7	27th 5	32nd 841	
This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.		If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER.		Originator's Instructions Degree of priority	
Signed		Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)		Type of origin. <u>1400</u>	
System In	Time In	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out
T.H.I. 22-1045A					
T.O.R.					

1377/PMEU/1-10/41

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

8
S E C R E T

Subject:- Italian Combat Groups.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.).

S/G/29/32/1.
/5 Jan., 45.

To:- H.Q. No. 1 District.

Receipt of your 1D/1546/2/G(3D) of 3 Jan with copies of attached reports on the FRIULI Combat Group, is acknowledged.

I am grateful for your views on this formation particularly as most of your points confirm my previous information, and will strengthen my hand in convincing the Ministry of War of the need for certain reforms.

Although I consider most of the faults are inherent in the Italian make-up, it is only fair to note that the FRIULI has had greater difficulties to overcome than the other Groups and is consequently not so far advanced as (for instance) CRIMONA.

213
Major General.
M.M.I.A. 40

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CIPHER SECRET 8

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE 29/32/1

MSG Center No

Classification

Precedence

From

To

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

50 BLIL

MMIA (ROME)

Date Time Rec'd

Date Time Sent

Reference NR

Cite

150245H

AC/2452

Ref your SS 501 of 27th Dec 1945

Efficient Dir.

V - 7596 W - 8455, X - 2, Y - 38, Z - 998
1 - 106, 2 - 4, 3 - 2, 5 - 46, 6 - 12
9 - 1, 10 - 1, 11 - 4, 12 - 1, 13 - 35, 17 - 127,
19 - 20, 21 - 26, 24 - 70, 26 - 9, 27 - 7,
(32) - 526. Based on striking off
absentees after 30 days NOT rpt NOT
15 days.

9010
8455
- 555

Maj. Belandier.

Check with Comd R.T.C.

a base rpt on this latent inf.

File WP

SP

15 June

TH 14/505A

As Cpl

9010
7596
- 1414

9010
8455
- 555

9010
8455
- 555

41

SECRET

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(U.S.I.A.)

3/7/29/32/1
15 January 45

My dear

Re: your CS/23 of 4 Jan 45

1. (a) I have already on more than one occasion categorically informed the Minister of War that no higher formations than the Combat Group will be permitted. I will again inform the Minister of War accordingly and tell him to inform all concerned on his side.
- (b) As regards Italian participation with larger forces in the liberation of Italy, I attach a memorandum which I have made out for Mr. MACMILLAN at his request.
2. As regards Gen. HEYDENSEN's comments on FRUIT, I will set take up your time by an analysis in detail, but will say the following:-

(a) GENERAL

I was interested to get an independent view and agree generally with the criticism of Italian Staff methods etc. as judged by our standards. But I do not agree with the remarks re employment of groups or status of S.I.U. Actually, there is nothing in HEYDENSEN's report that we did not know before and have done our best to compete with. The TIME factor has perhaps been the greatest difficulty throughout and of course we are dealing with a people who measure for short of our standards and are necessary and defeated.

(b) ISCENTRALIZATION

Rooted in from the start. Inherent in Italian Fascist system over long years. He cannot force the pace or we will make things worse. Again the time factor. He cannot make major changes if we want these groups soon. In fact, we have to accept and do the best with these groups as they are, rather than attempt the impossible task of raising them fully to our standards 6 months hence. Improvement

2. As regards Gen. HENDERMAN's comments on PHILLIPS, I will not take up your time by an analysis in detail, but will say the following:-

(a) GENERAL

I was interested to get an independent view and agree generally with the criticism of Italian Staff methods etc. as judged by our standards. But I do not agree with the remarks re employment of groups or status of R.I.U. Actually, there is nothing in HENDERMAN's report that we did not know before and have done our best to cope with. The time factor has perhaps been the greatest difficulty throughout and of course we are dealing with a people who measure far short of our standards and are war-weary and defeated.

(b) RECENTRALIZATION

Butted in from the start. Inherent in Italian Fascist system over long years. We cannot force the pace or we will make things worse. Again the time factor. We cannot make major changes if we want these groups soon. In fact, we have to accept and do the best with these groups as they are, rather than attempt the impossible task of raising them fully to our standards 6 months hence. Improvement is continuing all the time.

(c) OFFICERS

We have always known and told the Italians that these are the weak link. They admit this. The problem is being tackled continuously from all angles. The whole level is far lower than ours. Many of the best officers are R.W. or in the North.

(d) R.I.U. STATUS

Functions and status considered fully by AFHQ and AAI and a directive issued. R.I.U. officers are excellent and pull their weight by their personality and efficiency, and not their rank. Exactly the same state of affairs applies as regards officers in MIA.

- 2 -

2. (Contd)

(e) EMPLOYMENT OF GROUPS

These Groups are NOT similar to an Infantry Brigade. They are small Divisions, organised as such and designed to operate directly under and be administered by a British Corps HQ. Apart from the psychological effect on the groups of being put under a British Division, it would not work from the "C" point of view.

(f) STRENGTH

We are having difficulty with reinforcements for a variety of reasons - see my TS/6/4 of 1 Jan. We badly want back the 3,000 PICHINO personnel lent to CC.MR., who are now over their 55,000 ceiling and have NO case for retaining the 3,000. I ask your aid in a quick decision. As in any army, the fighting strength is always lower than the posted strength, as the latter includes sick, leave, A.S.O.L., etc. The difference between the two strengths is greater in the Italian Army than ours owing to worse Italian discipline and circumstances generally - particularly at Xmas. The Italians are always "bleating" about being below strength, meaning fighting strength as opposed to posted strength. Actually the latest (14 Jan) figures we have as regards posted strength are :-

(N.B. of a Group is 6010)

	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>CHINA</u>
Posted strength	8100	8700
Reinforcements en route	200	140
" " being sent		
week beginning 20 Jan	200	200
Reinforcements being sent		
week beginning 27 Jan	300	300

(g) MORALE

We realise all the points made - and many others not mentioned e.g. family anxiety, rates of pay, war weariness etc. The best remedy will be when they go into the line and achieve something worthy of praise.

Yours

3,000. I ask your aid as a quick decision. As in any army, the fighting strength is always lower than the posted strength, as the latter includes sick, leave, A.M.U.L., etc. The difference between the two strengths is greater in the Italian Army than ours owing to worse Italian discipline and circumstances generally - particularly at Xmas. The Italians are always "bleating" about being below strength, meaning fighting strength as opposed to posted strength. Actually the latest (14 Jan) figures we have as regards posted strength are :-

(N.E. of a Group 16 0010)

	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>GERMANY</u>	
Posted strength	8100	8700	78
Reinforcements en route	200	160	29
" being sent			
week beginning 20 Jan	200	200	
Reinforcements being sent			
week beginning 27 Jan	800	800	

(g) MOBILE

We realize all the points made - and many others not mentioned e.g. family anxiety, rates of pay, war weariness etc. The best remedy will be when they go into the line and achieve something worthy of praise.

Yours

L.B.

Lt Gen Sir John HARDING K.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., V.C.,
C.G.S.,
A.F.H.Q.

From:

Lieut-General Sir John Cording,
KCB, CBE, DSO, MC

SECRET

CS/33

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

14th January, 1945.

Dear Browning

1. I am enclosing a copy of a note I have had from the Resident Minister's office, and two reports from Commander No.1 District for your information.

2. I imagine that the former is another attempt by the Italians to get our agreement to their having higher formations than the Combat Group which is obviously out of the question for some time to come. They will fight in homogeneous units when they are fit to go into the line, and if the Italian authorities would concentrate their efforts on trying to help us get them fit instead of wanting to run before they can walk they would make much more rapid progress towards the end they wish to achieve. You might use the substance of Heydeman's reports to rub this into the Italian War Office and S.M.R.E.

Been doing this for three months

3. Please let me have your comments, and come and give me a verbal account of your situation at the first convenient opportunity.

Yours very truly

38

John Cording

Major-General L. Browning, CB, OBE, MC
Head of Military Mission to the Italian Army.
C.M.F.

Please excuse pencil - am in bed with a throat but have to be in K. woods.

From:

Lieut-General Sir John Cording,
KCB, CBE, DSO, MC

SECRET

CS/33

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

4th January, 1945.

Dear Browning

1. I am enclosing a copy of a note I have had from the Resident Minister's office, and two reports from Commander No.1 District for your information.
2. I imagine that the former is another attempt by the Italians to get our agreement to their having higher formations than the Combat Group which is obviously out of the question for some time to come. They will fight in homogeneous units when they are fit to go into the line, and if the Italian authorities would concentrate their efforts on trying to help us get them fit instead of wanting to run before they can walk they would make much more rapid progress towards the end they wish to achieve. You might use the substance of Heydeman's reports to rub this into the Italian War Office and S.M.R.E.
3. Please let me have your comments, and come and give me a verbal account of your situation at the first convenient opportunity.

*Been doing
this for
three weeks*

Wendell

28

John Hanning

Major-General L. Browning, CB, OBE, MC
Head of Military Mission to the Italian Army,
C.M.F.

*Please excuse pencil - am in bed
with a throat but have to be up
K. unwell.*

C O P Y

150/0/0

To: Chief of Staff.

From: Resident Minister's Office.

Following for your information is the text of a telegram to the Foreign Office from H.M. Ambassador, Rome dated December 29th. Begins.

"In the course of a Press Conference, the Head of the Press Office at the Presidency of the Council affirmed that the Government's main concern was the intensification of Italy's contribution to the war of liberation. 'The Italian Government would be very glad if the Italian Army were allowed to participate with larger forces in the liberation of the national territory. From a moral point of view, it is to be hoped that Italian troops may fight in homogeneous units in considerable strength, and it would be better still if they were entrusted with a sector of the front, so that Italy, who is making so many sacrifices for the war, may have a war bulletin of her own. It would be desirable that the volunteers might be grouped in special formations, even if small, rather than be included individually in the various units. This would help to give them an esprit de corps which would bring back the new units to the glorious Garibaldian divisions.'"

Ends.

Philip Broad.

1st January, 1945.

Copy to: U.S. Polad.

SUBJECT Italian Combat Groups.

SECRET

1D/1546/2/G(SD)

8 Jan 45

~~Col. F. FIDONE, DSO, MC,~~
Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC,
(MMIA).

I forward herewith, as requested, copies of two reports submitted in respect of the FRIULI Combat Group, under the following references :-

- (a) G. SD/100 dated 28 Dec 44, addressed to HQ 15 Army Gp.
- (b) 1D/1546/2/G(SD) dated 31 Dec 44, addressed to HQ 15 Army Gp, copies to OGS AFHQ and 50 BLU.

CMF
BLT/BAR.

C. A. Haydey an
Major-General,
Cmd,
No. 1 District.

COPY

SECRET
SUBJECT: Memorandum on the Efficiency of Italian Combat Groups and on the Functions of British Liaison Units attached.

HQ 15 Army Group

G- SD/100

28 Dec 44

1. After good early progress in the tactical training of FRIULI C.G., since trg passed above the Coy level improvement has been most disappointing.
2. This was at first attributed by the BLU to lack of efficiency or lack of industry among the Italian Staff Officers and Regimental Officers concerned.
3. Most careful notice has however been taken and most detailed investigation has been carried out over a period of three months with the result that I am now absolutely convinced that much of the past ineffectiveness of the Italian Army and the recent lack of progress of this Group are directly attributable to their really bad Staff system which is incapable of good results.

Its chief failings are :-

- A. Failure to delegate responsibility.
 - B. Excessive centralisation.
 - C. Bad distribution of staff duties.
4. Detailed instances of these are shown at Appx A, B & C, attached.
 5. Reluctance of higher Authority to interfere with or alter established Italian methods is fully appreciated, but it is felt that Allied Formations in the field can be asked to accept only a reasonable amount of inefficiency from Italian Divisions placed under their cmd. This is particularly so, when no impossible changes are thought necessary to turn this Combat Gp into a efficient fighting formation.
 6. Recommendations - Italian.

That SMRE be requested to issue instructions on the following lines, that Cmds of Italian Gps be :-

- (a) Authorised to convene FagCM or their equivalents for the immediate disposal of disciplinary cases.
It is understood that this is in fact already possible under present Italian regulations, in certain cases without fresh legislation.
- (b) Be ordered to decentralise responsibility to the extent that heads of branches of staffs at all levels Cpt, Regt and Bn or equivalent be allowed to sign routine letters and orders "for" their cmds.
- (c) Informed that they may

C. Bad distribution of staff duties.

4. Detailed instances of these are shown at Appx A, B & C, attached.
5. Reluctance of higher Authority to interfere with or alter established Italian methods is fully appreciated, but it is felt that Allied Formations in the field can be asked to accept only a reasonable amount of inefficiency from Italian Divisions placed under their cmd. This is particularly so, when no impossible changes are thought necessary to turn this Combat Gp into a efficient fighting formation.

6. Recommendations - Italian.

That SMEE be requested to issue instructions on the following lines, that Comds of Italian Gps be :-

- (a) Authorised to converse PsGCM or their equivalents for the immediate disposal of disciplinary cases.
It is understood that this is in fact already possible under present Italian regulations, in certain cases without fresh legislation.
- (b) Be ordered to decentralise responsibility to the extent that heads of branches of staffs at all levels Gp, Regt and Bn or equivalent be allowed to sign routine letters and orders "for" their comds.
- (c) Informed that they may delegate responsibility at their discretion, and that they themselves will be backed in any circumstances arising out of such delegation.
- (d) Be ordered to back their subordinates in any bona fide cases of assumption of authority or initiative by such subordinates.
- (e) Be ordered to instruct their staffs and subordinate comds to overhaul their staff machinery, with particular attention to an equal and logical division of work among staff officers, to a logical distribution of clerks, and to the keeping of concise up to date "states" on all 'A' and 'Q' matters within the formation or unit.

...../2

- 2 -

7. Recommendations - British.

- (a) I consider that the anomalous position of the BLU would be thereby greatly eased. The BLU are technically without executive authority but in fact are compelled to insist with advice or requests to the point at which these reach the proportion of orders.
- (b) An increase of efficiency and speed on the part of the Italian Staff would obviate the necessity for incessant reminders and chasers from the BLU. These reminders are called forth by the dilatoriness of the present system and must admittedly in the circumstances often be infuriating to the Italians.
- (c) British Officers cannot however be expected to see Tommy Guns driven into the ground as tent pegs or fire extinguishers filled with petrol both of which have happened in this Gp, without taking drastic and insistent action.
- (d) Executive authority to forbid such or similar practices and abuses must in fairness be accorded to British Officers.
- (e) The exaggerated attention to rank paid by the Italians and their blank refusal on the grounds of loss of face to listen to fully qualified junior officers, suggests that it would assist the BLU and Trg Teams, as well as temper the wind to the Italians, if local rank could be accorded to certain officers of the BLU and Trg Team. The intention would be to make the British equal or one grade superior to those with whom they most normally deal. Officers concerned would be G 1, G II Trg and possibly DAA & QMG.
- (f) The Italians themselves have indicated that such an arrangement would be acceptable and would smooth over many small difficulties.

8. Conclusions.

- (a) I feel most strongly that these matters really do touch the root of the many difficulties experienced by this formation.
- (b) That the application of them is universal to the Italian Army and to all Italian Combat Gps.
- (c) That benefit to efficiency would accrue out of all proportion to immediate difficulties of execution.
- (d) That given the necessary instructions from SMRE the required modification to present methods could be carried out so imperceptibly as to have no adverse effect on the efficiency of staffs during the period of transformation.

- 9. (a) It is my conviction that GENERAL SCATTINI the comd of FRIULI Combat Gp

must in fairness be accorded to British Officers.

- (e) The exaggerated attention to rank paid by the Italians and their blank refusal on the grounds of loss of face to listen to fully qualified junior officers, suggests that it would assist the BIJ and Trg Teams, as well as temper the wind to the Italians, if local rank could be accorded to certain officers of the BIJ and Trg Team. The intention would be to make the British equal or one grade superior to those with whom they most normally deal. Officers concerned would be G 1, G II Trg and possibly DAA & QMG.
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(d) That given the necessary instructions from SMRE the required modification to present methods could be carried out so imperceptibly as to have no adverse effect on the efficiency of staffs during the period of transformation.

- 9. (a) It is my conviction that GENERAL SCATTINI the cmd of FRIULI Combat Gp would welcome the authority and the opportunity to improve the machinery of command within his Gp.
- (b) He will NOT however take any action, nor within the present customs of the Italian Army can he be expected to do so, unless he receives instructions from SMRE.

10. If action is contemplated on any such lines, the sooner a directive is forthcoming the quicker will the Italian Combat Gps become really effective part of the Allied effort.

- 11. I should like to add that the FRIULI Gp are at present 1400 men short a figure I can vouch for.

(Signed) C.A. HEYDEMAN,
Major-General,
Commander,
No. 1 District.

C.M.F.
CAH/awb
/JAE

Examples of Failure to Delegate Responsibility.

1. Maximum powers of summary punishment by Gp Comd are fifteen days field punishment or detention, plus thirty days confined to barracks.
2. The Gp Comd has no power to convene a FOGM, and weeks or months consequently elapse before serious cases can be disposed of.
3. (a) The Gp Comd has no power of promoting officers within W.E.
(b) Many weeks elapse before unsatisfactory officers can be got rid of.
(c) Replacements provided by SMRE are frequently no better.
(d) There is no incentive for subordinate officers to try to earn promotion.
4. (a) No comd from pl comd upwards will initiate any action without orders or permission from his next superior, nor will the Gp Comd without orders or permission from SMRE.
(b) This derives mainly from the Fascist system where all was originated from above. Officers at all levels are permanently afraid to DO anything lest their action should be deemed wrong by their superiors.
(c) The shadow of the bowler hat influences all action and inaction.
(d) No subordinate trusts his superior to back him up if the subordinate has acted in good faith.

APPENDIX B" to 1 DIST
letter G. SD/100 dated 28 Dec 44.

Excess of Centralisation.

1. Every single letter emanating from every single branch of Gp HQ requires the signature of the Chief of Staff in person.

2. Similarly every single letter emanating from every branch Regtl HQ requires the signature of the Regt Comd in person : and so on.

3. Corollaries.

(a) Every letter received by a HQ tends to wait for the attention of the comd in person before any of the staff even prepare a draft reply.

(b) The settling of the simplest matter by telephone is gravely discouraged, since no officer likes to give a direct answer in the absence of his comd.

(c) Senior staff officers at Gp HQ flatly refuse to answer telephone queries from Regts since it is not the place of the Regts to worry a Gp HQ : a letter will do.

4. Any simple correspondence Gp - Regt - Bn takes rather over twice as long as it would in the equivalent British case, i.e. four days instead of two Gp - Regt and reply, eight days Gp - Regt - Bn and reply instead of four.

BUT, in addition, the urgent matter of detail settled by us by telephone Gp - Regt - Bn in two hrs still takes EIGHT DAYS. Consequently returns etc are hopelessly out of date and inaccurate by the time they are received.

5. A Regtl comd has estimated that it takes twelve days for GSO I of the BLU to get a reply to an urgent disciplinary enquiry involving a junior officer in a Bn. This agrees with my own impressions.

COPY

SECRET

SUBJECT:- Report on the state of Readiness for War of the FRIULI Group.

1D/1346/2/3(SD)

21 Dec 44.

HQ 15 Army Group.

1. I propose to sub-divide this report into three headings :-

(a) Morale

(b) Material and Man-Power

(c) Training

2. MORALE

(a) Officers

The morale of the officers is far from good. Two-thirds of them are not imbued with real patriotism or keenness for their profession. There is very little incentive for them to work hard or improve their military knowledge, as there appears to be no reward for any special effort or efficiency. There are few chances for promotion, as I understand that there are about 3,000 officers in the Italian Army out of employment. All initiative is absolutely crushed by over centralisation. Superiors do not trust their juniors and therefore no junior cares to take any action unless he receives a definite order from his immediate superior. A high proportion of officers are far too old to do their jobs efficiently. There are a number of non-cooperators who stick to the old Italian methods and absolutely refuse to adopt British or up to date ideas. These should be ruthlessly wiped out. The Divisional Commander informs me that if he dismisses an officer he is only replaced by an equally inefficient one, from the Pool of Officers, who usually have had no training in British methods. If the officer situation is to be improved it will be absolutely necessary to replace inefficient officers, by selecting better ones from those who volunteer in PW Camps in England or other places. To obtain permission to do this is of paramount and urgent importance. The Italian Officer's knowledge of, and will to learn, man-management is non-existent.

(b) Other Ranks

There is much good material amongst the other ranks. They

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of them are not imbued with real patriotism or keenness for their profession. There is very little incentive for them to work hard or improve their military knowledge, as there appears to be no reward for any special effort or efficiency. There are few chances for promotion, as I understand that there are about 3,000 officers in the Italian Army out of employment. All initiative is absolutely crushed by over centralisation. Superiors do not trust their juniors and therefore no junior cares to take any action unless he receives a definite order from his immediate superior. A high proportion of officers are far too old to do their jobs efficiently. There are a number of non-cooperators who stick to the old Italian methods and absolutely refuse to adopt British or up to date ideas. These should be ruthlessly wiped out. The Divisional Commander informs me that if he dismisses an officer he is only replaced by an equally inefficient one, from the Pool of Officers, who usually have had no training in British methods. If the officer situation is to be improved it will be absolutely necessary to replace inefficient officers, by selecting better ones from those who volunteer in PW Camps in England or other places. To obtain permission to do this is of paramount and urgent importance. The Italian Officer's knowledge of, and will to learn, man-management is non-existent.

(b) Other Ranks

There is much good material amongst the other ranks. They are tough and can live under hard conditions with less rations and comfort than do British troops. Their morale is at present low. They have lived in want, without equipment, leave or news from home for a long time. I am doing all I can to improve the morale by better cooking, quarters, hygiene, leave and amusements and I am also insisting on officers paying special attention to man-management. I feel that these measures are certain to raise the men's morale in the near future. Their present morale is, however, best summed up by the words of the Pass Censor in his latest report - "the correspondence examined revealed no eagerness for action; indeed a number of men of this Group seem to be much more concerned with obtaining either leave or their discharge." The NCO's are on the whole fair.

-2-

3. (a) MAN-POWER

Realities must be faced and it is useless to accept figures produced by the Italian authorities. Man-power is perpetually dwindling through desertion, and the troops are perpetually subject to propaganda through Italian civilian sources. The men know that if they desert they will probably escape punishment altogether, and that even if they are eventually found and punished they will be released immediately the war is finished. I consider it essential that as soon as a man has gone absent for a week his name and address should be reported direct to the SERE who should not only order the Carabinieri to search for such deserters in their homes, but to arrest them immediately and conscientiously carry out their duties, which there is no doubt they are not doing at present. As the Italian Military Command insists on showing in their fighting strength the men in hospital and those who are absentees or deserters who have been away for less than thirty days, it is not easy to get a true picture of the fighting strength of a formation without a certain amount of recalculation. I could, however, certify that if the FULVI Group were ordered into the line to-day there would be a deficiency of nearly 2,000 men, which is about twenty per-cent of their total establishment. Out of the last party of 600, that went on leave within a radius of 50 miles of the Group's present location, between forty and fifty per-cent have failed to return. I allowed these men who live in the locality to proceed on short leave, at the suggestion of the Divisional Commander, and as I myself felt it would raise the morale of at least a portion of the Group.

(b) MATERIAL

As far as equipment is concerned there is no real reason why this group shall not go into the line immediately. There are certain minor deficiencies but none of any great importance. The worst aspect is that twenty per-cent of their vehicles are off the road at present, but this is mostly owing to lack of spare parts which, if made available, would soon remedy this shortage, as the workshops are good and working well. There is, however, a serious aspect to be considered, that is, the lack of care in the maintenance of clothing, arms and equipment. Orders have been given repeatedly that all boots shall be lubbed and that when they are showing signs of wear they shall be either renailed or mended. As far as I can see this is seldom done and I foresee that shortly many of the men's boots will be past repair. The officers who fail to carry out these orders should be dismissed. No equipment repairers are carried on the establishment of infantry battalions and this should be remedied at once. If this group is to operate in the hills under severe climatic conditions, the fact will have to be faced

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TRAINING(a) Staff Duties

(i) As pointed out in my G(3D) 100 dated 28 Dec 44 unless there is an immediate decentralisation and devolution of responsibility, also a redistribution of Staff duties, the present Italian Staff system cannot function in battle. This has been conclusively proved in my last exercise. As examples, a Regimental Commander proposed that his Adjutants Maggiore (Pde Major) should command 'B' Echelon. The same Commander when told to order up his 'A' Echelon, told his Divisional Commander "I cannot trust any of my officers to do this, I'll have to go and do it myself". The Regimental Commander is in fact attempting to do everything, command his Regiment and all the other Arms and carry out all the Staff duties himself. He has a very ample staff if duties were redistributed and officers allowed to sign on his behalf.

(ii) Under the present system no proper States are kept and it is quite impossible to obtain any accurate Return under a week or ten days.

(iii) This hopeless Staff system not only throttles the whole machinery of command but has lamentable repercussions on the Private soldier on whom most of the evil results fall.

(iv) Commanders will not consult their Artillery, Engineer or Services representatives on technical matters and these are not allowed to raise objections on technical grounds; as a result they are constantly being ordered to do impossible tasks.

(b) Tactical

Tactical training showed a great improvement up to Company level since ECU and the Training Increments were senior enough to assert their views with junior commanders and the senior commanders were only too pleased to have someone to shoulder the onus of training their sub units for war.

Battalion and higher training has shown disappointing results, owing to the refusal by some of the commanders to accept the advice of the ECU and the Training Increment. No senior Italian officer will, under any circumstances, accept the advice of a British officer of junior rank to himself. The tactical knowledge of most senior officers, their powers of command and co-ordination are very low, but those who are willing to learn are improving very rapidly.

CONCLUSION

On 28 and 29 Dec 44 I met General BERARDI, Chief of Italian General

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5. CONCLUSION

On 26 and 29 Dec 44 I met General BERARDI, Chief of Italian General Staff, who was attending a Regimental Group exercise. He was most co-operative and appeared to be in full agreement with the points mentioned above and with those in my G(ED) 100 dated 28 Dec 44. It must, however, be added that he discussed with me the functions of the BLUs. He is most insistent that BLU should only offer advice and not order, and that it is up to Italian Commanders to take or leave any advice offered. I gather from him that there is a certain amount of resentment amongst Italian formations at the manner in which the BLUs have offered their advice. I am of the opinion that what actually happens is that after the BLU has made repeated requests and suggestions, which are not complied with, the final request naturally becomes more insistent and practically takes the form of an order. As the Italian Army returns rendered are never up to date and equipment is neither marked nor looked after requests regarding these matters must eventually take the form of an order. Principles laid down in Training Directives such as the preparation of fire plans, etc., are not put into practice so I cannot see what the BLUs can do if they wish to obtain any degree of efficiency in the formation to which they are attached. I think improvement in this respect can be effected if some of the senior officers in the BLUs were given local rank. For example, if the senior officer in the BLU were a local Brigadier or Colonel, senior officers might pay some attention to his advice.

6.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

(a) Before this group can be employed in the field it is, in my opinion, absolutely essential that SMRE should immediately order a change in the staff procedure so as to enable the group to function. If this were done at once, I consider that this formation, after having practised it for two or three weeks, might go into the line in a quiet sector. It would however, require at least another four months further training before being able to take part in any sort of offensive action, except patrolling or a very limited Company counter-attack.

(b) I feel that provided (a) is done immediately and that this group were placed directly under command of an Allied Division, they might relieve an Allied Bde in a quiet defensive position, with one Regimental Group in the line and the other in reserve or support. They should then gradually become battle worthy and take over a sector in a Corps. I should like to lay great stress on the fact that the Group should be placed under an Allied Divisional Commander in order that the Commander could exercise precisely the same control over the group as he would over one of his Bdes, which in fact the group would actually be. This would save face for the Italian Command. Whereas if they were placed in a sector under Corps control this control would be far too remote to be really effective. A RUU would become a proportion of the Divisional Commander's Staff and would be able to act as his staff officers and interpret his orders to the group. The Divisional Commander would have personal contact with the senior Italian Officers and could then relieve of their command, all those whom he considered inefficient or non-co-operative.

In this way with one Regimental Group at a time relieving an Allied Bde it would be encadre between troops with battle experience on a comparatively narrow front, and a disaster would be less likely and more easily rectified. I fully realise that having to deal with the Regiment in the line through the Italian Group Commander would mean an extra link in the chain of command, nevertheless I think the benefits to be derived would outweigh this disadvantage. The Allied Divisional Staff and Services would "mother" their Italian counterparts. I am convinced that this group will never, even in the distant future, be able to operate in an active role without the Italian Services having a small British increment of SF, Ordnance and RASC.

7. In conclusion I should like to add that General Scattini, the Friuli Group Commander, has been 100% co-operative throughout, he is a good soldier and quite outstanding amongst all the officers in his Group. In addition I consider that 50 RHU have done an extraordinarily good job of work under

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7. In conclusion I should like to add that General Scattini, the Priuli Group Commander, has been 100% co-operative throughout, he is a good soldier and quite outstanding amongst all the officers in his group. In addition I consider that 50 BLU have done an extraordinarily good job of work under most difficult circumstances.

C.M.F.

Copy to:- CCS ARHQ (personal for)
50 BLU.

(SND) C.A. HAYDEMAN.
Major-General,
Commanding,
No.1 District.

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1403

From 52/29/32/10. APPENDIX "C" to 1 DIST
Letter G. SD/100 dated 28 Dec 44

Bed Distribution of Staff Duties.

1. Following table shows comparative detail.

WE of Italian Regt HQ	Tasks	Equivalent offr in Brit Inf Bde HQ
Comd and 2 IC	Plans	EM
Comd and 2 IC	Preparation and drafting of OPs Orders	EM
Comd	Reports on officers	EM
Comd	Honours and awards	EM
Lt col General Duties	Unspecified but in fact does nothing	
Lt col Legal Duties	Breaches of Mil Law Summaries of evidence	Staff Capt
Signal Officer	Liaison	IOs
Adj Maggiore (EM)	Signals	Sigs Offr
" (EM)	Detail of all work prepared by Comd and 2IC	
" (EM)	Personnel	Staff Capt
" (EM)	Spiritual Welfare	" "
" (EM)	Discipline	" "
" (EM)	PF	" "
" (EM)	Billets	" "
IO	Int	Bde IO
"Quartermaster"	Sups : food, fuel, ann.	Staff Capt, BRASCO, BOWO.
Tpt Offr	Tpt	HTO
Adm Offr	Pay, local purchase of rations, claims for damage.	En QMs

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does nothing

Lt col Legal Duties	Breaches of Mil Law Summaries of evidence	Staff Capt
	Liaison	IOs
Signal Officer	Signals	Sigs Offr
Adj Maggiore (RM)	Detail of all work prepared by Comd and 2IC	
" " (RM)	Personnel	Staff Capt
" " (RM)	Spiritual Welfare	" "
" " (RM)	Discipline	" "
" " (RM)	FW	" "
" " (RM)	Billets	" "
IO	Int	Bde IO
"Quartermaster"	Sups : food, fuel, amm.	Staff Capt, BRASCO, BOWO.
Tpt Offr	Tpt	ETO
Adm Offr	Pay, local purchase of rations, claims for damage.	Bn QMs
MO	Med	
<u>SURPLUS TO WE</u>	(Borrowed from Regt HQ Coy)	
Coy Comd Regt HQ Coy	Distribution of all stores equipment arms and material throughout the regt. All indents for whole regt incl bns. Drawing of all stores above.	Staff Capt, BOWO and Bn QMs.
OC HQ Pl of Regt HQ Coys Welfare, NAAFI		ETO or IO with Bn PRIs.

Sheet Two to Appx "C"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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- (a) It is apparent that the whole Italian system is made top-heavy by the presence of a Second in Command and two other Lt Cols for gen and legal duties respectively (the adj Magg can also be a Lt Col).
- (b) These three offrs between them do a small part of the work done by a British Bde Maj and Staff Capt, and of this small amount most is duplicated by the Adj Magg and the whole finally signed by the Comd.
- (c) As a result both Comd and Adj Magg., are hopelessly overworked whereas the three Lt Cols are grossly under-worked.
- (d) The substitution of two more junior officers Cpts or Majors, for two Lt Cols would undoubtedly get more work done, but if this is not practicable a definite delegation of say all plans, orders, ops and trg to the Lt Col Gen Duties and of all reports on offrs and honours and awards to the Lt Col Legal Duties would appear to solve the problem. If junior officers were substituted the principle would remain but the Adj Magg would take G from Lt Col Gen Duties. The Adj Magg would then have time to cope properly with the remainder of his present work, the comd would have time to comd, and the 2 IC would still be spare.
- (e) The remaining complicated diversion of duties among offrs is necessitated by Italian methods of adm and supply and cannot readily be altered.
- (f) No sub-allotment of clerks to branches or to senior offrs is practised either in Gp or Regt Hqs. None are detailed to any Special branch. One regt at least is delighted with the idea.
- (g) No "states" are compiled although voluminous if frequently obsolete returns are made. No "form at a glance" is therefore ever available on any subject whatever at any Hq. The introduction of such a system is considered absolutely indispensable to efficiency and speed.

NOTE : The information contained in Appendices "A" to "C" is based on detailed discussion with an Italian Regt Comd, his Staff, his clerks and his offrs, and is believed to be accurate. The source should if possible be suppressed, lest the Comd concerned be penalised.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT : Strength Returns

50 Brit Liaison Unit

HQ MMIA

A/1/26

2 Jan 45

Attached herewith, Strength Return, and Deficiencies in Specialists for week ending 31 Dec 44.

✓
CMF
FGRV/SYB

Lt col
GS

24

Deficiencies in Specialists 31 December..... 44

Group	57 Inf	88 Inf	35 Arty	Engr	Sigs	Mod	SAT	OPD	Mod	CO	RR	TOTALS
HQ	Regt	Regt	Regt	En	Coy	Scos	Coy		Engrs			
1	-	23	31	-	15	5	-	13	-	-	1	88
2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5	-	1	1	17	2	-	6	-	15	-	-	42
6	-	1	2	-	1	-	1	-	7	3	-	13
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
11	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
12	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
13	-	16	10	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	40	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	-	16	12	83	-	-	-	-	-	23	-	111
18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	-	9	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	-	4	3	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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5	-	1	1	1	1	2	-	6	-	15	-	42
6	-	1	2	-	1	-	-	1	-	7	4	13
7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
11	-	-	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
12	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
13	-	16	10	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	40
14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	-
17	-	16	12	83	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	111
18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	-	9	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	-	4	3	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	-	35	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	77
25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	-	4	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
27	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-
28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32	-	370	269	81	60	47	33	-	-	-	-	860

d'ordine
 IL TEN. COL. CAPO DI S. M. R. M.
 (Guido Vedovato)

Capitullavara

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Week Ending 31 dicembre 1944...

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - FRIULI DIV

	Group HQ		87 Inf Regt		88 Inf Regt		35 Arty Regt		Engr Bn		Sigs Coy		Med Secs		S & T Coy		ORD	
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
W	37	199	95	1964	99	2040	99	1249	16	396	5	240	26	261	14	243	3	6
X	-	-	14	302	14	362	1	48	2	48	-	58	-	36	2	34	1	
Y	-	3	-	164	-	233	-	103	-	-	-	6	1	16	-	1	-	
V	37	196	109	2102	113	2269	100	1194	18	444	5	292	25	281	16	276	4	6

d'or
IL TEN. COL. C.
(Guido Ved)

Capd'up

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - FRIULI DIV

Ingr		Sigs Coy		Med Secs		S & T Coy		ORD		Mech Eng		CC RH		TOTALS	
Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
16	396	5	240	26	261	14	243	3	61	9	238	2	84	405	6975
2	48	-	58	-	36	2	34	1	7	-	-	-	-	34	895
-	-	-	6	1	16	-	1	-	1	-	2	-	8	1	437
18	444	5	292	25	281	16	276	4	67	9	236	2	76	438	7433

d'ordine
IL TEN. COL. CAPO DI S. M. *aps*
(Guido Vedovato)

Capo Lupatini

6975
405
7380

7433
438
7871

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM

48/30
IMMEDIATE

CALL	CIRCUIT No. NR 1098	PRIORITY IMMEDIATE	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY			DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN 322 301000A
FROM (A) 50 BLU			
TO (FOR ACTION) LMIA			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR
TO (FOR INFORMATION)			
(REF. No.) AG585		(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET	

R E with sent ref. 152
Ref your SS501 of 27.

V 7567 W8149 X3. Y10 Z1304

SECOND. 1-87. 2-4. 3-3. 5-42. 6-13. 9-1. 10-1. 11-6. 12-1. 13-35.
17-111. 19-18. 21-28. 24-77. 26-10. 27-3. 32-860

Deciphered 301425A-TSW

9010
8149
432
1311

9010
7567
443

9010
8149
861

SECRET
This Message will NOT be distributed outside the Department or Headquarters, even in Cipher form. (Messages need not be paraphrased).

CIPHER

21

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE	THI OR TOR	OW.
	ORIGINATING SECTION:		
	A. G. AUTHENTICATION:		
	ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION:	TIME CLEARED	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT : Strength Returns

29/32/11

8/Sec

SECRET

50 Brit Liaison Unit

HQ MLIA

29/1 ✓

N/1/26

27 Dec 44

Attached herewith, strength return for week ending 24 Dec 44.

GP
PGRV/SYB

Shadman Nari
Lt col
h GS 20

24. 12. 1994

[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

5	Electron	-	3	-	-	14	5	-	6	-	-	15	-	45
6	Pump System	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	1	-	18
7	Support	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8	Control	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	Monitor	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10	Emergency	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
11	Reactor	-	-	-	-	4	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
12	Radio Control	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
13	Telephone	-	12	10	-	4	6	-	-	-	-	-	5	22
14	Radio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	Lincoln	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
16	Officer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	Telegraph	-	16	18	23	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	18
18	Radio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19	Engine	-	9	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
20	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21	Engine	-	2	1	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24
22	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
24	Engine	-	20	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	68
25	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26	Engine	-	2	2	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
27	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
28	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31	Engine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32	Engine	-	2/3	220	23	20	22	15	22	-	-	-	-	622

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Week Ending 24-12-1944

TOTAL W. 8173
V. 7380

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - FRIULI DIV

Group	87 Inf		88 Inf		35 Arty		Engr		Sigs		Med		S & T		ORD	
HQ	Regt		Regt		Regt		Bn		Coy		Secs		Coy			
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
W	40	226	116	2249	113	2285	93	1227	18	440	7	294	26	308	15	289
X	-	22	-	23	-	22	6	58	-	11	-	2	-	14	-	2
Y	3	49	21	368	14	297	-	46	2	55	2	56	-	55	1	48
V	27	199	95	1964	99	2040	99	1249	16	396	5	240	26	261	14	243
W.E.	29	119	123	2713	123	2713	98	1503	18	517	7	343	27	341	14	309
(15% reinforcements)																
Engns 10%																
Total deficiencies	7	464	16	428	5	266	0	77	0	49	1	39	1	20	1	3
W strength	113	1	335	4	299	-	197	12	30	-	33	-	23	2	5	1
W.E.	28	113	117	2584	117	2584	93	1433	16	470	7	327	26	325	13	294

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TOTAL W. 8173
V. 7380

SECRET

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - PRIULI DIV

Party	Engr Bn		Sigs Coy		Med Secs		S.A.T Coy		ORD		Mech Eng		CC RR		TOTALS	
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
1237	18	440	7	294	26	302	15	289	3	69	9	255	1	86	441	772
58	-	11	-	2	-	14	-	2	-	1	-	1	1	2	7	248
46	2	55	2	56	-	55	1	48	-	9	-	18	-	4	43	1005
1249	16	396	5	240	26	261	14	243	3	61	9	238	2	84	405	695
1503	18	517	7	343	27	341	14	309	4	72	8	293	2	107	452	8907
266	0	77	0	49	1	39	1	20	1	3	1	38	1	21	11	1175
197	12	30	-	33	-	23	2	5	1	-	12	24	-	16	11	327
1483	16	470	7	327	26	325	13	294	4	69	7	279	2	102	430	8580

Deficiency
against V.E.

Deficiency
against V.E.

SUBJECT: Rft Demand for week ending 23 Dec 44 50 Brit Liaison Unit

HQ MMTA

4/1/27

23 Dec 44

Below please find lists of deficiencies required to bring Op up to WE plus 5%.

List "A" gives deficiencies by units, List "B" by trades.

CAF
MF/SVB

Lt Col
GS

Copy to: Ministry of War
Rft Trg Centre Italian Combat Forces

LIST "A"

87 Inf Regt 323
88 Inf Regt 353
35 Arty Regt 168
Eng Bn 126
Med Sec 29
S&T Coy 13
Mech Eng Wksp 35
TOTAL 1047

LIST "B"

Drivers 70
Smiths 4
Bricklayers 3
Dvr/Mechs 46
Electricians 12
Fitters 4
Plumbers 1
Mechanics 10
Boatmen 1
Motor Cyclists 32
W/T Ops 119
Exchange Ops 18
Director Ops 24
Carpenters 14
Armourers 62
Tractor Mechs 1
Welders 2
Plate Workers 1

TROOPS
Inf

2 further copies given
to Maj. Gelande

Copy to: Ministry of War
Rpt Trg Centre Italian Combat Forces

LIST "A"

87 Inf Regt	323
98 Inf Regt	353
35 Arty Regt	168
Eng Bn	126
Med Sec	29
S&T Coy	13
Mech Eng Wksp	35
TOTAL	1047

LIST "B"

Drivers	70
Smiths	4
Bricklayers	3
Dvr/Mechs	46
Electricians	12
Fitters	4
Plumbers	1
Mechanics	10
Boatmen	1
Motor Cyclists	32
W/T Ops	119
Exchange Ops	18
Director Ops	24
Carpenters	14
Armourers	62
Tractor Mechs	1
Welders	2
Plate Workers	1

TROOPS

Inf	483
Arty	33
Eng	85
Med	22
TOTAL	1047

2 further copies given
to Mr. G. G. G. G.
on 12/12/47

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: THE EXERCISE AND FINANCIAL REPORTS.

British Liaison Unit.

3

15 Army Group.
FIFTH Army.
VIII Corps.
1 Dist.
M.A.S.A.

Ref 4/6/16.

22 Dec. 44.

29/32/1

Herewith the programme for week ending 30 Dec.

23, 24 Dec. Rest.

27 - 30 Dec. Exercise for Dept Op of all arms.
Detail in accompanying separate letter.
This exercise will be run as a test and will involve half of every part of the Op.

8/Sec
24/12

It is suggested that it will provide a first rate opportunity to judge the fitness for war of the Op.

Accommodation can be found for any small numbers of interested spectators.
Bedding and eating utensils should be brought.

The other half of the Op will carry out revision of op and equivalent trg at discretion of its comds.

~~Exercise should be carried out by all units concerned with the exercise and should be completed by 31 Dec.~~

W. J. G. G. G.

G.H.F.
A.S.C./A.S.B.

At Col.

G.O.C.

you will like to note this
FRUIT Exercise. 28/30 Dec.

WTD
15 Dec

Yes - I'll be glad
to know how
they complete
16
15 Dec

✓

SECRET

50 Brit Liaison Unit

G/6/20

22 Dec 44

SUBJECT : Fmn Exercises - FRIULI ICG

HQ 15 Army G2

HQ Fifth Army (Br Increment)

HQ XIII Corps

HQ 1 District

HQ 55 Area

HQ FRIULI ICG

24 Trg Increment

Herewith copies of Instructions for Exercises

PROGRESS 1 and 2.

Please ACK on form below.

CLT

WHP/SIB

Copy to :

G I

G II

SCRA

SCORE

SO Sigs

DAMONG

DADST

DADOS

SC REE

War Diary (2)

FILE

Lt col
GS

HQ 50 Brit Liaison Unit

Received :-

..... copies 50 BLU letter G/6/20 dated 22 Dec 44

..... copies Appx "A" to above mentioned letter **10**

..... copies Appx "B"

CIT
TYPE/SUB

Copy to : C I
C II
SCRA
SCRE
SO Sigs

DAMQMG
DAEST
DADOS
SO RELE
War Diary (2)
FILE

Lt Col
CS

EQ 50 Brit Liaison Unit

Received :-

..... copies 50 ELI letter G/5/20 dated 22 Dec 44
..... copies Appx "A" to above mentioned letter **10**
..... copies Appx "B"
..... copies Appx "C"
..... copies Appx "C" Annexure 1
..... copies Appx "C" Annexure 2

DATE . 28. Dec. 44

Signature

P. D. Singh

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

785020

6/6/20

21 Dec 44.

55-1-2

1/25000 sheet 115 - II 三.

037 02.

No one else on staff is and I hope you

- (1) In a move of Regt (2) in H.I. to a cone area.
- (2) In an approach march from cone area to find assembly area.
- (3) In a night advance from the assembly area and a dawn attack.
- (4) In consolidation and establishment of defensive posts following dawn attack.
- (5) In any arrangements necessitated by PARAGRAPH (1) - (4).

General. Idem.

1. The German withdrawal since the break of the GUMNY and MYTER lines has been rapid and apart from obstructions, demolitions and mines have been the principal means of delaying our adv. The next stop line is expected to be the line of the INVO and to give him time to prepare this point his vanguards have lately been offering more resistance.
2. On this part of the front the Ger. 999 Inf DIV covered by 999 Recon Co. has been withdrawing along the axis of Route 2 with its INF. column moving along route MYTER - GUMNY - GUMNY - GUMNY 0367 and on 26 Dec the enemy temporarily halted our adv along the line MYTER - GUMNY - GUMNY - GUMNY. Attempts to push on have been met by considerable arty and A. Fl fire. Small groups of tanks and A.P. guns have been seen.
3. The INVO by having completed its try, has been warned that it will probably move by itself to a final zone area, NORTH of MYTER.

3. Special Ideas

1. Enemy

(a) The enemy coin which has been moving along the rd SERRA - GASTRINIA - GREVE is believed to be not more than one bn strong with possibly a squadron of the Div Rosso Bn, one or two tps of tks, some SP guns and one or two bty of the Div Arty at call.

(b) Latest known dispositions are shown at Trace "P" att. Pt 245 1041 is obviously being used as an HQ.

2. Can Tps

(a) Let tps hold the general line all incl RADDA - L ROTONDO 8540 with one coy each in RADDA area, along line of T PESA NW from RADDA, and on L ROTONDO with bn in res area. SCUM rd June 19 499. See trace "P" att.

(b) The FRESE Co has been at 3 hrs notice to move, by road goes to a conc area. 81 Regt Co is at 2 hrs notice to move. Warning has been given that each Regt Co will probably need to construct a BRESE br in the early stages of its first op.

(c) Composition of Regt Cos will be as follows :-

one Inf Regt
two bty 25 pr and 120
one tp 17 pr
one fd coy engine
br pl 2d k coy
sig sec with appropriate units
mod sec
regt sec HQ
one 10 sec 00 BR
pl 800 Coy (disregard for this exercise as will be used for tp engineering).
Tp co flying vehs (75 x 3 ton)

(d) Extracts from Corps Orders are shown at Appx "A" att.

(e) Exercise instrs are given in Appx "B", for issue 22 Dec.

(f) At Appx "C" are D.S. Notes, Fire Table and school coin - for issue to D.S. only.

Appx "A" to 50 HU letter C/6/20 dated 21 Dec 44

Copy No. 24...

EMPLOYERS TRAC. MAIL CORPS. ORDER. ORDER
No 99 dated 25 Dec 14

- | | | | |
|----|--------|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. | Draw | { | See General and Special
Idea |
| 2. | On Top | | |
| 3. | Air | | |
- 5 Army plan is to secure the line
of the ARMO by 1 Jan.

DIFFERENTIAL

VIET CONGRS will attack and capture the line all incl MONTEV. ROCHI
- RADD - POGGIBONSI and exploit through and will secure line all
incl FIRENZE - S. POLI by 1 Jan.

010-7777-1111

The oo will be carried out in three phases.

- (a) PHASE 1. One Regt C₂ of FRIULI ICG will capture N QUEROQUENIA 8841 area in order to secure the RADDA lateral. This will be completed by last night 29 Dec. X Brit Div will capture MONTIVANCHI and L French Div will capture POGGIORESI on 30 Dec.
- (b) PHASE 2. L and X Arm Divs will pass through to capture TIRINZE and ZIPOI respectively.
- (c) PHASE 3.

6. Phase 1. TRUTH ICE-

- (a) 27 Regt G will conc in area rd junc 800357 - rd junc 845317 - rd junc 796322.
(b) Route 0.3MILLINA 8034 - POCOROBONGI - rd junc 845205 - conc area.
(c) Speed 25nd2h.
Density 20vtr
Holds None
(d) Rd 10T to move on to Route 2 at rd junc 892365 before 0945 hrs 28 Dec. Tail clear this rd junc 4435 hrs. Tail to be clear ROUTE 2 at rd junc 845205 by 1300 hrs 28 Dec. No move except adv pties on to rd 1.0MILLINA 8034 - RALDA - 0.3MILLINA before 0700 hrs, 28 Dec.
Adv pties no move before 0600 hrs 28 Dec.
(e) 27 Regt G will construct 0140 br at 872375 by first light 29 Dec.

7. Phaso 2.

6. Page 5. 14.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

No. 785020

(b) PHASE 2. K Brit Div will capture MOHAMEDALI and L French Div will capture FOCCIBQSI on 30 Dec.

(c) PHASE 3. I and V Armd Bdes will pass through to capture WINEZES and ZPOVI respectively.

6. Photo 1. FRUIT ICE

(a) 27 Regt Co will come in area rd June 800357 - rd June 845317 - rd June 796322.
(b) Route C.S.TELLING 8034 - POSSIBONCE - rd June 845205 - conc area.
(c) Speed 25mi/h.
Density 20vts
Halts None
(d) MA NOT to move on to Route 2 at rd June 692365 before 0945 hrs 23 Dec. Tail clear this rd June 4435 hrs. Tail to be clear ROUTE 2 at rd June 845203 by 1300 hrs 23 Dec. No move except adv pties on to rd 1.01TEV.ROMI - R.1DDA - C.S.TELLING before 0700 hrs, 23 Dec.
Adv pties no move before 0600 hrs 23 Dec.
(e) 27 Regt Co will construct Cl 40 br at 872573 by first light 29 Dec.

7. Phase 2: 7.66

C. Chase J. N.A.

四

9.	<u>Sup.</u>	4 days will be carried by each firm
10.	<u>Am.</u>	1st and 2nd lines to be carried.
11.	<u>Pot.</u>	1st line + 50 miles will be carried within each firm.
12.	<u>Pot.</u>	By carrying tot will be found within each firm, but PRIME may be provided with additional 20 x 3 ton.
13.	<u>RED.</u>	24 CGI at STILL
14.	<u>PO.</u>	To Corpora cage at STILL
14A.	<u>PRO.</u>	111 PRO COX will arrange traffic control.

INTERCOM:

15. Corps HQ at moved at.....
Axis of adv Route 2.
16. Flanking fans will maintain liaison with FRIULI for Phase 1.
17. Wireless frequencies and code signs.
See separate sig instr.

ACK.

Method of issue *SAR*

Time of signature *1100 hrs*

Time issued to SIGs

Frank R. Smith
Brig
BCS XXX Corps

DISTRIBUTION :-

K Brit Inf Div	1-5
L Fr Inf Div	4-6
FRIULI ICG	7-9
etc	
etc	
etc	
etc	

Apex "3" to 50 MM Letter G/6/20 dated 2 Dec 44

EXERCISES 1 and 2

EXERCISE 1

1. The Group would in fact be SOUTH of SIEP and it should be explained to all that the route taken to the conc area is entirely for their own convenience.

2. For EXERCISE 2 the variations are -

(a) 88 Regt Gp made up of 88 Inf plus the other 'halves' of 88 arms will do this exercise.

(b) Comparative dates are -

87 Regt Gp	read	88 Regt Gp
26 Dec		30 Dec
27 Dec		31 Dec
28 Dec		1 Jan
29 Dec		2 Jan
30 Dec		3 Jan

(c) Certain units or sub-units will have to be used on each exercise e.g. br pl: 84T Coy.

(d) 88 Regt Gp will NOT move on : ONTARIO - TOGGIOTTI rd before 08.0 hrs 1 Jan.
All other things are identical.

3. In the exercise should one or more Divs not be actively employed by the regt and the ground is such that further situation can be given by the div could to ensure that all are exercised.

4. The new bridge just completed at 872373 should be policed and signed to prevent any but directing staffs from using it.

5. All vehicles of the directing staffs and umpires should be marked with white crosses on the windscreen, and will carry blue and white sign flags - 80 Signs to a range and for white arm bands.

6. It must be ensured that the 1st is not formed up on the rd by regt the Night

(b) Comparative notes are

67 Regt Gp	68 Regt Gp
26 Dec	30 Dec
27 Dec	31 Dec
28 Dec	1 Jan
29 Dec	2 Jan
30 Dec	3 Jan

read

(c) Certain units or sub-units will have to be used on each exercise e.g. br pl: 847 Coy.

(d) 8 Regt Gp will NOT move on MONTEVARCHI - POGGIORECHI rd before 00.0 hrs 1 Jan.
All other timings are identical.

3. In the exercise should one or more Divs not be actively employed by the regt and the ground is such that further situation can be given by the div ord to ensure that all Divs are exercised.

4. The new bridge just completed at C72373 should be policed and signed to prevent any but directing staff from using it.

5. All vans of the directing staff and umpires should be marked with white cross on the windscreen, and will carry blue and white sign flags - 80 Signs to a range and for white arm bands.

6. It must be assured that the regt is not formed up on the rd by regt the Night prior to the move.

7. Twelve men should be provided to act as enemy who will be controlled by the trg team. C II(Trg) will arrange with T/Ool LILLY.

8. Blank should be provided for the enemy who must NOT carry live am.

9. Full scale am should be carried during the exercise but small arms must not be loaded. Units have NOT got their first line but they should use empty am boxes where possible.

10. The evacuation of casualties will be practical; casualties will be carried by the trg team. They will NOT be evacuated beyond Pd Hosp unless they are real.

11. Spec in HQ Mess at Appon will be set aside for DS and Umpires.

EX. PROGRESS 1 and 2.

Appx "C" to 50 D.L.U. letter
G/S/20 dated 21 Dec. 44.

D.S. Notes..... Timetable, School soln.

- 22 Dec. (Issue Objects of Exercise and General Idea and Exercise Instrs.
(PRIOLI GRUPPO at 24 hrs notice to move.
- 26 Dec. 0900 (87 Regt Gp at 12 hrs notice to move.
0830 Conference RADDA
- 27 Dec. 0900 Issue Special Idea.
1100 87 Regt Gp at 6 hrs notice.
1200 Warning Order.
1400 Issue Extracts from Corps Orders (Appx "A").
1630 Written Orders should leave Gruppo HQ for Regts.
1830 Written orders should leave Regt HQ.
- 28 Dec. Move to conc area.
Recess.
Move from conc area to fwd assembly area
Establishment of A and B and Echo.
(See Annexure 1 for detailed programme.)
- Night
28-29 Dec. Night adv.
- 29 Dec. Dawn Attack.
Securing of area laid down in Corps Orders.
- Day 2. Night.
29-30 Dec. Consolidation of posn gained by
Further exercising of Regt Gp by Gruppo Comd.
- Dec 31. End of exercise.

ANNEXURE 2 to Appx 'C'
to 50 B L U letter G/6/20
dated 21 Dec 44

UMPIRES (and D.S.)

Chief Umpire
Asst Chief Umpire
D S Map
Enemy
Div HQ

Regt HQ

1/87

2/87

3/87

Arty

Engineers

LAD and Recovery

Medical

Pro

S & T

OC Trg Team
G 2 Trg
1 Cpl from Trg Team
one from Trg Team
G 2

HUGHES SO Sigs

Three Brit Trg Offrs

Three " " "

Three " " "

G II RA

SO RE

SO RELE

Capt MALING

Major SUDDAREY

DADST

Spectators and Umpires.

White arm bands on BOTH arms.

White flags or signal flags on vehicles.

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EXERCISE "PROGRESS" 1 & 2.

DISTRIBUTION - Number of Copies.

	Object & Gen Idea	Special Idea.	Appx "A" Corps Orders	Appx "B" Ex Instrs	Appx "C" DS Notes Broad Time Table
FETTER I.C.G.	3	3 (b)	3 (b)	3	-
DISTONE	1	1	1	1	1
GOC DISTONE	1 (a)	1 (a)	1 (a)	1 (a)	1 (a)
15 Army Group	3	3	3	3	3
5 Army (Pr Incr)	2	2	2	2	2
XIII Corps	2	2	2	2	2
55 Area	1	1	1	1	1
G 1	1	1	1	1	1
G II	1	1	1	1	1
SO RA	1	1	1	1	1
SOIE	1	1	1	1	1
SO Sigs	1	1	1	1	1
DA & MG	1	1	1	1	1
DADST	1	1	1	1	1
DADOS	1	1	1	1	1
SC RELIE	1	1	1	1	1
Lt Col GUTTON SALMOND	1	1	1	1	1
G II Trg	1	1	1	1	1
Major SMITH	3	3	3	3	3
Major BRENT	3	3	3	3	3
War Diary	2	2	2	2	2
File	1	1	1	1	1
Sparo	4	4	4	4	4

NOTES:-

(a) All copies issued 22 Dec except

(b) which will be issued 27 Dec (c) being issued by hand 22

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DISTRIBUTION - Number of Copies.

Special Idea.	Appx "A" Corps Orders	Appx "B" Ex Instrs	Appx "C" DS Rota Broad Time Table	Annex 1. (d) Detailed Timetable	Annex 2 DS & Umpires	Trace "P" (e)
3 (b)	3 (b)	3	-	-	-	3
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1 (a)	1 (a)	1 (a)	1 (a)	1	1 (a)	1
3	3	3	3	3	3	3
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
3	3	3	3	3	3	3
3	3	3	3	3	3	3
2	2	2	2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4	4	4	4	4	4	4

All copies issued 22 Dec except

which will be issued 27 Dec (c) being issued by hand 22 Dec and (d) Annexure 1 to Appx "C" which will be issued later.

(e) Trace "P" will be issued later

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24/21
SECRET *2*

OR
SUBJECT : Strength Returns

8/Sec
50 Brit Liaison Unit

28/12
A/1/26

HQ MIA

18 Dec 44

Attached herewith, Strength Return for week ending 17 Dec 44.

✓
CMF
FCRV/SYB

Quadrone
Lt col
GS *6*



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Week Ending 14-12-1944

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - PRIULI DIV

Group HQ	87 Inf Regt				88 Inf Regt				35 Arty Regt				Engr Bn				Sigs Coy				Med Secs				S & T Coy				ORD			
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
W	41	304	111	2292	114	2481	86	1244	16	1150	4	290	24	291	15	250	3	43														
X	-	24	5	15	-	14	4	10	2	10	-	4	2	11	-	39	-	-														
Y	1	2	-	58	1	210	-	34	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-														
V	40	226	116	2249	113	2285	93	1234	18	1440	4	294	26	302	15	289	3	69														

428 441
7938 7732
8366 8173



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WEIGHT STRENGTH RETURN - PRIULI DIV

ty	Engr Bn		Sigs Coy		Med Secs		S & T Coy		QED		Mech Eng		OC BR		TOTALS	
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
244	16	1150	4	290	24	291	15	250	3	43	9	258	2	85	428	7938
10	2	10	-	4	2	11	-	39	-	-	-	-	-	1	16	128
24	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	3	1	-	3	334
234	18	1440	4	294	26	302	15	289	3	69	9	255	1	86	441	7732

428 441
7938 7732
8366 8173



1438

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SUBJECT: Strength Returns

50 Brit Liaison Unit

A/1/26

10 Dec 44

HC 1/26

Attached herewith, Weekly Strength Return, and Deficiencies in Specialists for week ending 10 Dec 44.

It will be noted that the Strength Return, in this instance, covers the period 18 Nov - 10 Dec,

The delay in submitting is regretted.

✓
CAF
SYB/SYB

Stadman
Lt col
GS

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6	2	3	1	8	12
7					
8					
9		1			1
10		4			4
11		7			7
12		2			2
13		12			2
14			2		2
15			3		3
16					
17	3	76	4		83
18					
19	2				2
20					
21					
22					
23					
24	14	20		6	40
25					
26	4	2			16
27				6	6
28					
29					
30					
31	110	170	40	29	349
32					

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No. 785020

[illegible]

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Week Ending 10 Dec 44

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - FRIULI DIV

	Group HQ		87 Inf Regt		38 Inf Regt		35 Arty Regt		Engr Bn		Sigs Coy		Med Secs		S & T Coy		OPT
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	
W	52	372	108	2216	119	2373	105	1253	18	443	7	370	29	275	18	315	4
X		6	8	115		176		100		11				24		26	1
Y	11	174	5	39	5	68	19	89	2	4		80	5	8	3	91	2
V	41	204	111	2292	114	2481	86	1264	16	450	7	290	24	291	15	250	3

7940
469
8409

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SECRET

WEEKLY STRENGTH RETURN - FRIULI DIV

Arty	Engr Bn		Sigs Coy		Med Secs		S & T Coy		ORD		Mech Eng		CC RR		TOTALS	
	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs	Ofs	ORs
1253	18	443	7	370	29	275	18	315	4	78	7	165	2	80	469	7940
100		11				24		26	1		2	93		5	11	556
89	2	4		80	5	8	3	91	2	5					52	458
1264	16	450	7	290	24	291	15	250	3	73	9	258	2	85	428	7938

7940
469
8409

1444