

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

ACC

10000/120/1139

SG/29/5

Feb -

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

10000/120/1139

SG/29/50

Reece Companies

Feb - Mar. 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(N.H.I.A.)

8/6/29/50
17. March 45

SUBJECT: Patriots.
- - - - -

TO : O.C. "E" ELU, RHC ICF.
- - - - -

Reference your interesting confidential report of 8 March on the subject of Patriots.

1. No more patriots, either as bands or as individuals, will be sent to GRSANO, at any rate for the present.

2. The following lines should be followed for patriots now at K.T.C. :-

(a) While at the RTC they should be mixed as much as possible among themselves and with the other reinforcements.

(b) As many as possible should be sent away as soon as there specialist reinforcements are required by Groups. Batches of 50 or 60, on to each Group, are suggested.

(c) The remaining 381 plus 100 ((a) and (c) of para 2 Appendix 1A of your letter) should be sent to MARTOVA as a Recce Bn as soon as approval for this is received from AFHQ.

3. Your para 13 (c) is entirely agreed. No separate camp must be established for patriots.

2. The following lines should be followed for patriots now at R.T.C. :-

- (a) While at the RTC they should be mixed as much as possible among themselves and with the other reinforcements.
 - (b) As many as possible should be sent away as soon as core specialist reinforcements are required by Groups. Batches of 50 or 60, on to each Group, are suggested.
 - (c) The remaining 381 plus 100 ((a) and (c) of para 2 Appendix 'A' of your letter) should be sent to MANOVA as a Rasce Pn as soon as approval for this is received from AFHQ.
3. Your para 13 (c) is entirely agreed. No separate camp must be established for patriots.
4. Our efforts to get better officers for the R.T.C. will help.

W. P. D. *W. P. D.*
Major General
M. H. I. A.

ex

SECRET

6

AG 091.711/083 OCT-C

SUBJECT: Italian Patriots

TO: President, Allied Commission
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission, NMIA

29/50

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
AUTH: SAC, NMIA
Initials: R. J. P.
22 February 1945

22 February 1945

1. Reference is made to recent correspondence between Allied Commission, 15th Army Group, yourselves, and this headquarters on the subject of the disposal of the increasing numbers of Italian Patriots at present being encountered in the Army area.

2. A general policy is hereby established for the induction of Italian Patriots into the Italian Army as individuals to fill the 45,000 deficiency under the present ceiling.

3. In order, however, to make the most advantageous use of the fighting capabilities of the Patriots and with the object of preserving to the greatest possible extent the esprit-de-corps which is so outstanding a feature of the Patriot bands, the present organization of the Italian Army will be adjusted to permit the formation of further combat forces in the form of Reconnaissance Companies to operate, one, with each of the five Italian Gruppi. It is suggested that these Reconnaissance Companies should have an approximate strength of 300 and should be formed of Patriots comprising their own bands under their own officers.

4. If, after operational experience of the Reconnaissance Companies formed under paragraph 3 above has been gained, it is considered desirable to form further units of a similar nature to operate with other Allied formations, the necessity for an increase in ceiling to cover the estimated future intake of Patriots will be reviewed.

5. The present Patriot bands fighting with the armies will not be disbanded but will continue to operate with their present formations.

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15th Army Group, yourselves, and this headquarters on the subject of the disposal of the increasing numbers of Italian Patriots at present being encountered in the Army area.

2. A general policy is hereby established for the induction of Italian Patriots into the Italian Army as individuals to fill the 48,000 deficiency under the present ceiling.

3. In order, however, to make the most advantageous use of the fighting capabilities of the Patriots and with the object of preserving to the greatest possible extent the esprit - de - corps which is so outstanding a feature of the Patriot bands, the present organization of the Italian Army will be adjusted to permit the formation of further combat forces in the form of Reconnaissance Companies to operate, one, with each of the five Italian Gruppi. It is suggested that these Reconnaissance Companies should have an approximate strength of 300 and should be formed of Patriots comprising their own bands under their own officers.

4. If, after operational experience of the Reconnaissance Companies formed under paragraph 3 above has been gained, it is considered desirable to form further units of a similar nature to operate with other Allied formations, the necessity for an increase in ceiling to cover the estimated future intake of Patriots will be reviewed.

5. The present Patriot bands fighting with the armies will not be disbanded but will continue to operate with their present formations, i.e. 'F' Force Squadron with Fifth Army and BANDA PATRICIA VALELLA with Eighth Army.

6. In order to implement the policy outlined in paragraph 3, it is desired that your recommendations on the following points be submitted to this headquarters for consideration at the earliest possible date:-

a. Proposed organization, agreed by the Italian Ministry of War, into which the Reconnaissance Companies should be formed to operate most efficiently.

b. A proposed WF for the Reconnaissance Companies and a suggested

*Indicative
satisfying
Spec. ←*

180

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Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 091.711/083 GCT-O,
dated 22 February 1945. (cont'd)

scale of equipment, having regard at the same time to existing shortages of
British equipment.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSEAL ALEXANDER:

R. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Addressee
- 1 - Allied Commission
- 1 - 15th Army Group
- 1 - Fifth Army
- 1 - Eighth Army
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- 1 - US POLAD
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 1 - G-3 (Org-Br)
- 2 - G-3 (Org-P)
- 1 - G-3 (Plans)
- 1 - G-3 (Ops)
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - Q. (AE)
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2 - G-3 (Org-F)
1 - G-3 (Plans)
1 - G-3 (Ops)
1 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - G-5
1 - Q (AE)
1 - Q (Maint)
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M & D

SECRET

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SUBJECT: PATRIOTI.

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. If, as is obviously intended, the re-organized Italian Army is to be an efficient fighting instrument with a common standard of discipline and efficiency, and which may be called upon to maintain law and order in Italy, very serious consideration must be given to the problem of the 'patrioti'.
2. To enable the difficulties to be fully appreciated, some reference must be made to the origin of the 'partisan' movement.
3. During the advance into the Appennines, North of FLORENCE and PISA, the Germans carried out a systematic policy of pillage and murder in many of the mountain villages. In order to protect their women and children, to safeguard their property and to prevent themselves being carried away into labour camps, a number of the able bodied men of the villages formed themselves into small bands, which, living in the mountains and woods near the villages, harassed the Germans whenever they had the chance. A considerable number of Germans died from these partisan attacks and the most ferocious reprisals were inflicted on some of the villages -- for example, S. ANNA, a village some four miles East of FIEPPARANTA, where 136 villagers were burnt in the village square with the aid of the pews from the village church, and every house in the village was burnt.

4. As a result of incidents of this nature, the partisans developed an intense hatred of the Germans and this, coupled with their local knowledge of the countryside, proved of value to the Allies as the advance slowly penetrated into the Mountains. As the advance proceeded and more villages were liberated, the size of the bands increased as two or more village groups joined together under the leadership of some outstanding personality. Examples of these were Pingo at BARRA and Fosco in the SAN MARCELLO-CUTILLANO area.

5. When, at the end of the autumn, the advance virtually stopped, there were two distinct types of partisans. The first comprised those coming from villages already liberated who (in the 5th Army area) were fed, clothed and organized by Italian speaking personnel of the American C.I.C. The second were those who were still maintaining partisan activities on the German side of the line and who were supplied to some extent by food and ammunition which was dropped to them from the air. With the coming of winter, this method of supply became precarious and large numbers of the second type of partisan groups came through our lines, where they were collected in camps awaiting disposal.

6. Up to this stage, it may be said broadly that all partisans, with very few exceptions, were inspired by an intense hatred of the Germans and were interested in very little else but killing them and committing acts of sabotage. Politics, if considered at all, were a comparatively secondary matter.

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6. Up to this stage, it may be said broadly that all partisans, with very few exceptions, were inspired by an intense hatred of the Germans and were interested in very little else but killing them and committing acts of sabotage. Politics, if considered at all, were a comparatively secondary matter.

7. Owing, however, to the limited facilities for maintaining these partisan groups available to the 5th Army (no doubt a similar position existed in the 6th Army, but of this I have no personal knowledge), only a proportion of the total number of partisans available could be utilised in the forward area, and the remainder either went home or to centres in the rear areas.

8. It is natural that the forward leaders selected the best possible types for incorporation in their forward fighting bands, while those who were less staunch or who had joined the movement for what they could get out of it, were relegated to the rear. It is believed that the selected bands are still doing first-class service as guerrillas in the forward area, but their discipline and fighting quality is bound to vary considerably according to the individual, their locality and their leader.

9. The Centres have provided food and shelter, and although the machinery available at Cesano does not permit of adequate checking, it appears likely that a number of undesirables, attracted by the thought of free living, managed to get themselves incorporated into the ranks of the surplus partisans, although the majority of these had neither engaged in any fighting nor had any intention of doing so. It was at this stage that the political factor became predominant and the Communist element developed an ascendancy. It is these politically minded groups who are now being drafted into CESANO under the generic title of Patrioti. In the interests both of (a) the Italian

- 2 -

Army and (b) the good name of genuine Patrioti, some medium must be established to make the real Patrioti to be distinguished from the bogus. The policy for dealing with the latter has yet to be determined. Can recruiting agencies refuse frauds?

10. It is in no sense the duty of a B.L.U. to interfere in internal politics, but where political factors interfere with the smooth running of the military training, it is no longer possible to ignore the subject.

11. Hence it may be permissible to make a few comments on the political aspect of the present situation in CESANO. There are, in fact, three separate classes of individuals :-

(a) The true Communist who is conscientiously convinced that in the Communist doctrine lies the salvation of Italy. Such men include the Under-Secretary of State for War, Avv. PALLERNO, and within the camp there are a number of Commissars with strong political convictions who wield considerable power. This power is not necessarily directed against the Army, but there is unfortunately a strong animus against the Royal House and all those who have sworn allegiance to it. The latter include all the Officers and the Carabinieri.

(b) The second class compose those labelled 'Patrioti', of whom, unfortunately, by no means all are derived from the original staunch partisans. The remainder tend to be solely interested in what they can get out of it.

(c) Finally there are the 'call-ups', many of them children, few of them educated. They are easily attracted by a political parrot cry and are easy game for the experienced political orators. Their final allegiance is secured by the present of a beautiful red scarf, which, until it was forbidden, was worn across the shoulders in uniform. (In parenthesis, the fact that the wearing of this red scarf has been practically stamped out testifies to some measure of discipline being acceptable).

12. Hence, among the odd 12,000 in CESANO, we have a conscientious few who are earnestly endeavouring to build up an Army; a strong political element opposed to the Royal House and a very large number of rabble who will follow the strongest leader. It is unfortunate that the strongest influence in the Centre is not that of the Officers and N.C.Os. (with few exceptions) but of the Communist Commissars.

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13. In that the problem is primarily political and not military, its solution is, to a large extent, outside the scope of the B.L.U. authority. However, certain recommendations may be made and alternative solutions discussed.

(a) The R.T.C. (like the League of Nations) has no physical force to ensure its orders being obeyed. The full execution of orders depends entirely on the personality of those entrusted with their enforcement. Hence a very great improvement in the standard of Italian Officers throughout the Centre is essential. It is understood that S.M.1.8. appreciate the necessity but whether sufficient first-class officers are available remains to be seen.

(b) Dissident elements must be dispersed; the best answer for the purely political leaders is to harness them until some suitable means can be devised. Dispersal is not possible within the Centre as, in spite of its size, it is really only a large camp and no amount of dispersal will prevent the holding of central political meetings during off-duty hours. Hence dispersal must be on a country wide scale.

The problem of the political leaders is exceedingly delicate and it is felt that the assistance of A.V.V. PIAZZA should be enlisted to find a solution.

(c) An alternative suggestion has been made that all 'patrioti' should be concentrated in a single camp (other than CESANO) and there given special treatment. In the writer's opinion such a course would be

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highly dangerous as it would tend to produce two entirely separate armies with different standards of discipline, training and loyalty.

14. In conclusion, the following points should be borne in mind when considering the whole position :

- (a) Whereas young recruits are properly called up and enlisted, many of the 'patrioti' have only drifted into the Army, either because they want to kill Germans; their homes are still in enemy occupation and the Army provides the necessary living facilities, or because they are of the gangster type and anticipate some personal profit. At the conclusion of hostilities very large numbers of these will desert as the incentive to stay in the Army will no longer exist. Although we cannot expect a 100% success, there is none the less a strong argument in favour of trying to convert as many as possible into soldiers. (Incidentally this reinforces the plea for good Italian officers as the key to the problem).
- (b) In spite of the exhortations of General Browning and Avv. Palermo, there are still a considerable number of private arms which have not been surrendered. They are well hidden and it is not anticipated that with the resources available, any steps can be taken by the Italian authorities to ensure they are handed in.
- (c) Acts of indiscipline, such as assaults on the Carabinieri still persist, but these are not regarded so seriously (the C.M.F. occasionally get knocked about), as the more general question which is the prime object of this report. What steps can be taken to assimilate the 'patrioti' into the Army and to diminish the present political activity which militates against discipline and efficiency.

15. Attached, at Appendix 'A', is the position of patriots at CESANO as on 7th March 1945.

LMA/eh.

H. H. Machin
Lieut-Col. R.A.

8 March 45.

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15. Attached, at Appendix 'A', is the position of patriots at CFSANO as on 7th March 1945.

LHM/ah.

8 March 45.

L.H. Machin
Lieut-Col. R.A.

*The answer is better (the other)
(The answer) It is difficult to
eliminate the patriots from
Service. When the present 1182
of the patriots are posted away
they should be separated*

*d 13
12 lines*

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APPENDIX 'A'.Position with regard to Patriots in CESANO on 7 March 1945.

(1) Approximate totals:			
No. 1 Regiment	-	97	
No. 2 "	-	780	
		<u>877.</u>	
(2) Number of separate Bands.			
	-	6	
		<u>=====</u>	
(a) Banda "BOZZI" - PISTOIA area. Commander Borghese Fernando.	-	100	<i>Mountain 28</i>
(b) Banda "GAROSI" - ALPI APUANE. Commander Cingilli Nestore.	-	50	
(c) Banda "BIOMCONCINI" - BOLOGNA. Commander Zinuti Luigi.	-	384	<i>Troops</i>
(d) Banda "TOSCANA" - FIRENZE Commander S.Ten. Mezzi.	-	53	
(e) Banda "FILOLIFERO" - MASSA APUANA Commander Cap. MASZ. Buffoni.)	-	55	
(f) Banda (no name) - PISTOIA. Commander Parma Leo.	-	54	
		<u>693</u>	

All the above are in the 2nd Regiment.

The remaining patriots are not incorporated in any particular Band.

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(b) Banda "CAROST" - ALPI APUANE. Commander Cingilli Nestore.	-	50	<i>To Borgo</i>
(c) Banda "BIOMCONCINI" - BOLOGNA. Commander Ziuti Luigi.	-	581	
(d) Banda "TOSCANA" - FIRENZE Commander S.Ten. Mezzi.	-	53	
(e) Banda "FILOLIFERO" - MASSA APUANA Commander Cap. Mass. Buffoni)	-	55	
(f) Banda (no name) - PISTOLA. Commander Farina Leo.	-	54	

693

All the above are in the 2nd Regiment.

The remaining patriots are not incorporated in any particular Band.

134

877

118

HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL.

Translation of a confidential report on measures to be taken to meet the present lack of discipline.

My personal opinion about the improvement in the discipline situation is as follows :-

- (I) Many, or nearly all, volunteers belong to the communist organisation.
- (II) They have come here on the orders of their leaders and they carry out their orders.
- (III) It is therefore essential that the movement should be controlled at its origin (Rome), and not here.

What we are able to do is as follows :-

- (1) To have some officers and N.C.O.s. of high quality who can establish a personal ascendancy over these men.
- (2) To assure good living conditions to avoid any complaint or ill feeling, thereby defeating the "agents provocateurs".
- (3) To reinforce our strength without, by so doing, awakening alarm. The Police School at Cesano to be amplified by additional instructor personnel and material. It is not necessary that the pupils should be carabinieri, but they should be regarded as an auxiliary force of legal troops.
- (4) To keep on one side, under good control, the troops of the Combatant Groups, watching carefully to ensure that they do not link up with the disaffected elements.
- (5) Bit by bit, as new zones are liberated, to attract officers of higher rank who have been in command of Partisan bands. (There are several of these in Emilia, Liguria and Piemonte now).
- (6) Popularise the newspaper 'Patria' after furnishing it with specific propaganda.
- (7) Prepare ourselves, if it is not possible to find a peaceful

- (2) To assure good living conditions to avoid any complaint or ill feeling, thereby defeating the "agents provocateurs".
- (3) To reinforce our strength without, by so doing, weakening alarm. The Police School at Cesano to be amplified by additional instructor personnel and material. It is not necessary that the pupils should be criminalized, but they should be regarded as an auxiliary force of legal troops.
- (4) To keep on one side, under good control, the troops of the Combatant Groups, watching carefully to ensure that they do not link up with the disaffected elements.
- (5) Hit by hit, as new zones are liberated, to attract officers of higher rank who have been in command of Partisan bands. (There are several of these in Emilia, Liguria and Piemonte now).
- (6) Popularize the newspaper 'Patris' after furnishing it with specific propaganda.
- (7) Prepare ourselves, if it is not possible to find a peaceful solution, to face the situation with force and thereby inflict a salutary example.
- (8) Introduce elements of the S.I. into the ranks to detect false partisans, and to unmask them.
- (9) To announce publicly to the people concerned that if the lack of discipline persists, those responsible will be prosecuted.

8 March 45.

(Signed) T.C. SIVC.
T.Col.

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Subject: Italian Patriots

SECRETLand Forces Sub Com AC
(M.M.I.A.).

File No SE/26

1 March 45

A.F.H.C.

(3)

Copy to: G-3(ORG) 15 Army Group.

Reference para 6 of your AG 091, 111/083 OCT-0 of 22 February 45.

1.

Attached at Appendix "A" is copy of minutes of meeting held at HQ MIAA on 26 Feb with War Ministry representatives to discuss the implementation of your proposal to incorporate five Patriot Recce Bns into the ceiling of the Italian Army.

2.

Attached at Appendix "B" is formal proposal for VE of units in suitable form for consideration of your War Establishment Committee should you desire. Each unit is organized into Bn HQ, a small HQ Coy which includes a signal detachment, and four rifle Coys, each of three platoons. The three points of interest in the War Establishment are as follows :-

- (a) simplicity
- (b) that has been kept to a minimum
- (c) No weapons heavier than personal weapons have been included.
- (d) War Ministry desire that unit 2nd i/c shall be a "regular" soldier. This is thoroughly supported.
- (e) VI sets have NOT been included owing to difficulty of :-

- (i) replacements including replacement of batteries and other spare parts.

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S/Sec

WP

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1.

Attached at Appendix "A" is copy of minutes held at HQ MHA on 26 Feb with War Ministry representatives to discuss the implementation of your proposal to incorporate five Patriot Reece Bns into the ceiling of the Italian Army.

2.

Attached at Appendix "B" is formal proposal for WE of units in suitable form for consideration of your War Establishment Committee should you desire. Each unit is organised into Bn HQ, a small HQ Coy which includes a signal detachment, and four rifle Coys, each of three platoons. The chief points of interest in the War Establishment are as follows :-

- (a) simplicity
- (b) Tpt has been kept to a minimum
- (c) No weapons heavier than personal weapons have been included.
- (d) War Ministry desire that unit 2nd i/c shall be a "regular" soldier. This is thoroughly supported.
- (e) WT sets have NOT been included owing to difficulty of :-
 - (i) replacements including replacement of batteries and other spare parts.
 - (ii) difficulty of training specialist operators etc. It is considered that communication between Combat Group and Reece Bn would be by WT provided by Combat Group, but communication between Reece Bn HQ and forward coys would be by :-
 - Flag
 - Radio
 - IR and/or runner.
- (f) No bicycles have been included as these are not normally included on a WE. Possibly 2 per coy may be necessary, but this will be examined in conjunction with other G.1098 proposals
- (g) No mules have been included as these are not included on a WE. It is felt however that four mules per Coy (total sixteen per unit) might very profitably be allotted from forward holdings.

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Cont'd sheet 2/.....

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3. Reference para 4(k) attached minutes, it is recommended that no reinforcement holdings are allowed surplus to WE. If a unit falls below strength it may or may not pick up reinforcements locally; but if an authorized holding unit of say 10% had to be maintained in rear of Combat Group Areas it would mean that ardent recruiting from patriots already sent home would take place. These latter will have been, so to speak, disposed of. We do not want to have them back. We want to fill wastage in WE with those who are at large with arms in their hands thus bringing them under control, reducing their potential menace and "taking the heat out of the patriot problem."

4. Will 15 Army Group please comment to AFHQ on this matter.

L. B. Browning
Major General
M.A. L.A.

DISTRIBUTION.

Patriot Branch AC }

A. }

Q }

Spec Sec }

S & T }

less Appendix "A"

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

Appendix "B" to MIA letter
SD/26 dated 1 March 45

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: WE - Italian Recce Bn

Land Forces Sub Com 13
(M.M.I.A.).

FILE No SD/26(a)

1 March 45

ATHQ G-3 Ops (For) (7 copies)

1. THE PROPOSAL

- (a) Italian Recce Battalion
- (b) New WE draft of which is attached
- (c) Nil

2. EFFECT OF PROPOSAL

- (a) Overall increase of 30 Italian Officers
470 Italian ORs
12 Vehicles (Br)
17 H/Cs (Br)

- (b) Not applicable
- (c) It is proposed to form five such units initially
- (d) Overall increase
- (e) Nil
- (f) All Category A
- (g) Yes, see para 3(a) below

(b) New IE draft of which is attached

(c) Nil

2.

EFFECT OF PROPOSAL

(a) Overall increase of 30 Italian Officers
470 Italian GPs
12 Vehicles (Br)
17 M/Cs (Br)

(b) Not applicable

(c) It is proposed to form five such units initially

(d) Overall increase

(e) Nil

(f) All Category A

(g) Yes, see para 3(a) below

REASONS FOR PROPOSAL

3.

(a) In order to implement AMHQ's proposal to incorporate Patriot Bands as Recce Bns into the Italian Army vide para 6 of AMHQ letter AG C91.741/003 GCE-O of 22 Feb

(b) See also AMHQ covering letter forwarding this proposal reference SD/26 of 1 March 45.

1178

[Signature]

Major General
H.M. I.A.

Copy to: AMHQ G-3 (Org) 2 (Manpower)
AMHQ G-3 (Org) 4

Offrs (Uff)	30
OPRs (Sottuff e Truppa)	470
<u>Total (Totale)</u>	<u>500</u>
M.C. (Motocicli)	17
Wags (Vericoli)	12

A REECE BN
(Un Battaglione Esplorante)
(Italian Personnel)

(PROPOSED) W.E. (Organico di Guerra)

DETAIL
(Description)

[illegible]

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Ser. No. (Number)	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
1	PERSONNEL (Personale)													
1	O.C. (Lt Col or Maj)	1												1
	(Commandante (Ten Col or Magg.))													
2	2 i/c (Maj or Capt)	1												1
	(Vice Commandante (Magg or Cap))													
3	Adj't (Capt or Subaltern)	1												1
	(Aiutante maggiore (Cap o subaltern))													
4	I.O. (Subaltern)	1												1
	(Ufficiale informatore (Subaltern))													
5	Quartermaster (Subaltern)													
	(Ufficiale addetto ai materiali o rifornimenti (Subaltern))	1												1
6	Interpreter (Subaltern)	1												1
	(Interprete (Subaltern))													
7	M.O. (Subaltern)	1												1
	(Ufficiale medico (Subaltern))													
8	Captains		1											5
	(Capitani)													
9	Subalterns													18
	(Subalterni)													
10	Warrant Officer													1
	(Maresciallo)													
11	NCOs (Sottufficiale)													57
12	ORs (Truppa)													412
13	Total All Ranks (Totale personale)	7	1											500

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A RECCE BN (Cont'd.)

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
	(ii) Weapons (Armi)											
14	Revolvers (Pistole)	7	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	5	30	
15	Rifles (Fucili)			33	22	55		11		11	99	
16	SMGs (Moschetti an- Automatici)			12	7	19		7	27	88	371	
17	Pistols, Signal (Pistole da Segnalaza)				9	9					9	
	(iii) TRANSPORT (Mezzi di trasporto)											
18	Motor cycles (Motocicli)			2	7	9		2		2	17	
19	Car 5 cwt 4 x 4 (Autovettura da esplorazione)			1		1					1	
20	Truck 8 cwt and 15 cwt (Autocarri leggeri)							1		1	4	
21	Truck 15 cwt Water (Autobotti)			1		1					1	
22	Lorry 30 cwt or 9 ton (Autocarri pesanti)			2		2		1		1	6	
	Total Voks excl MCs (Totale veicoli escl. motocicli)			4		4		2		2	12	

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SECRET

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (LMIA)

SD / 26

28 Feb 45

MINUTES OF MEETING TO DISCUSS PROPOSED
ORGANISATION ETC OF PATRIOT RESERVE UNITS
HELD AT HQ M.N.I.A. ON 26 FEB 45

1. PRESENT

Lt-Col Ingledew	LMIA Chairman
Col Kerr	LMIA
Col Pidsley	LMIA
Col Noakes	LMIA
Major Baumann	LMIA
Capt Selby	LMIA
Major Calabrin	LMIA
Lt-Col Craig	Patriot Branch, A.C.
Lt-Col Scarpo	S.M.R.E.
Lt-Col Grati	S.M.R.E.
Lt-Col T.M. Gata	S.M.R.E.
Major Holt	LMIA Secretary

2. OBJECT

It was explained that the object of the meeting was to discuss the method of implementation of AFHQs proposal to incorporate five Patriot bands approx 500 all ranks into the Italian Army as Reserve Units on the basis initially of one per Combat Group.

3. ROLE

It was stated that the role of these units would be:

- (a) close reconnaissance
- (b) light patrol work

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Col Noakes
Major Baumann
Capt Selby
Major Calabrin
Lt-Col Craig
Lt-Col Scump
Lt-Col Grati
Lt-Col T. G. G. G.
Major Holt

Patriot Branch, A.C.

B.M.R.E.

S.M.R.E.

S.M.R.E.

IMIA Secretary

2. OBJECT

It was explained that the object of the meeting was to discuss the method of implementation of ARCA proposal to incorporate five Patriot bands approx 500 all ranks into the Italian Army as Recon Units on the basis initially of one per Combat Group.

3. ROLE

It was stated that the role of these units would be:

- (a) close reconnaissance
- (b) light patrol work
- (c) liaison with partisan/civilian
- (d) occupation of positions abandoned by enemy, etc.
- (e) guides
- (f) minor demolitions

4. AGREED ACTION

The following action was agreed:-

- (a) SAC would submit detailed list of unit (to be called Recon) based on:
 - (i) Approx four inf cos, second in HQ and small air det
 - (ii) personnel arms and equipment only (no mortars or LMGs)
 - (iii) one or two vans per cos only, but proportion of motor and bicycles to be incl
- (b) No training would be given other than by Combat Ops themselves.
- (c) Personnel would be enrolled into the Italian Army on the same basis as any other member of the Army, i.e. liable to Army discipline and liable to be sent where required.

S.M.R.E.

S.M.R.E.

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	<u>Action</u>
(d) To accept S.M.R.Es plan for temporary commissioning of officers and temporary promotion of name.	M.M.I.A.
(e) IMIA would signal 15 Army Group asking for nomination of five existing patriot bands (incl names of leaders and locations of units) suitable for incorporation into Army.	S.M.R.E.
(f) S.M.R.E. would withdraw five screening agencies from ceiling authorized which, when briefed by Ministry of War, would be sent to screen and organize the selected bands. Dul T (TROMBEE) would handle the detailed enrollment on behalf of Ministry of War.	S.M.R.E.
(g) Rocce has would be numbered and would NOT be known after their leaders who were liable to change or be killed. S.M.R.E. to submit.	M.M.I.A.
(h) Equipment and clothing would be sent to Combat Groups.	S.M.R.E.
(i) Baggage / or headgear. S.M.R.E. would submit recommendations.	S.M.R.E.
(j) Pay would be as for Combat Groups.	M.M.I.A.
(k) Rfts would NOT be forwarded from CESAMO. The method of recruiting locally was discussed but IMIA would consult with Allied authority and advise Ministry of War.	

W. P. H. Vign

- (i) Badges etc./or headgear. S.M.R.F. would submit recommendations. S.M.R.F.E.
- (j) Pay would be as for Combat or ups. S.M.R.E.
- (k) Rats would NOT be forwarded from CIBANO. The method of recruiting locally was discussed but S.M.A. would consult with Allied authority and advise Ministry of War. M.M.I.A.

by Peter K. M. J. J.

1170

DISTRIBUTION:

0-5 (Org) A.F.H.Q.
 0-5 (Org) HQ 15 Army Group
 Executive Commissioner A.C.
 Patriot Branch, A.C.
 M.A. to G.C.C.
 2 i/c
 A Q
 Spec Sec

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3

MESSAGE FORM.

DATE TIME OF ORIGIN.

27 1500 A

FROM : MMIA
TO : 15 ARMY GROUP
INFO : G-3 Org AFHQ
REF NO : SD 2357

SECRET

REF AFHQ LETTER AG 091.711/083 GCT-O DATED 22 FEBRUARY 45 (*)
REQUEST YOU NOMINATE FIVE PATRIOT BANDS SUITABLE FOR INCORPORATION
INTO ITALIAN ARMY AS REGGE BNS FOR COMBAT GPS (*) PLEASE GIVE PRESENT
LOCATIONS AND NAMES OF LEADERS (*) NO ACTION TO ENROL WILL BE TAKEN
UNTIL AFHQ APPROVES ORC AND WE BEING FORWARDED 28 FEB (*) MMIA
WOULD PARTICULARLY LIKE TO NOMINATE A SUITABLE PATRIOT BAND NOW AT
CESANO FOR MANTOVA GP TO BE INCLUDED IN ABOVE

Precedence

Authenticated

A. M. England

JK-cl.

INTERNAL:

A.

Q.

Spec Sec

SD/26

Svs.

1172

SECRETSUBJECT: Italian Patriot UnitsLand Forces Sub Com. A.C.
(M.F.I.A.)

SD/28

25 Feb 45

TO : Ministry of War

1. A.F.H.Q. has proposed that five "patriot" volunteer Reconnaissance Companies, each approx 500 all ranks, be accepted into the Italian Army and allotted on the basis of one per Combat Group. These units will therefore be a R.I.T. commitment. Units will be recruited in bands under their own officers when suitable but personnel will be subject to Italian Army regulations in the same way as all other members of the Italian Army, i.e. personnel will elect to enrol for service wherever required by the army.

2. If, after operational experience, these units prove successful A.F.H.Q. will consider recommending to higher authority an increase in ceiling in order to take in similar Recon Coys for Allied Divs.

3. "The Recon Sen and Banda Maialla will remain att to present plans and are not considered as within the present plan.

4. Before implementation is authorized of paras 1 to 3 above, will you please submit to this H.Q. at the earliest possible date

(a) proposed organization into which Recon Coys should be formed to operate most efficiently.

(b) a proposed VE for the Recon Coys and a suggested scale of equipment, bearing in mind the limitation of British equipment owing to other demands.

5. Will you please be represented at a meeting at MIA HQ Con-

2. If, after operational experience, these units prove successful A.F.H.Q. will consider recommending to higher authority an increase in ceiling in order to take in similar Recce Coys for Allied Divs.

3. "F" Recce Sqn and Banda Madiolla will remain att to present plans and are not considered as within the present plan.

4. Before implementation is authorized of paras 1 to 3 above, will you please submit to this H.Q. at the earliest possible date

(a) proposed organization into which Recce Coys should be formed to operate most efficiently.

(b) a proposed VE for the Recce Coys and a suggested scale of equipment, bearing in mind the limitation of British equipment owing to other demands.

5. Will you please be represented at a meeting at MIA HQ Conference Room at 1500 hrs 26 Feb to discuss as much of para 4 (a) and (b) as possible and to discuss other details viz

(a) Method of commissioning officers

(b) Method of screening personnel

(c) Present locn of bands and to which gps it is recommended they should be sent after enrolment.

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[Signature]
Major General
M.A.I.A.

Copy to: Patriots Branch A.C.) Will you please be
A/Q) represented at meeting
Spec Sec) vide para 5.

Attended W.P.

0702