

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

ACC

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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SE/30

Commando Supremo

Mar. - Oct. 1944

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

QUESTIONS

MAJORAL
 General de Cav.
 General de Brigada
 Coronel
 Lt. Colonel
 Capitan (Colonel)
 Capitan (Lieut.)
 Mayor
 Alferes
 Alferes
 Alferes
 Major
 Alferes
 Alferes
 Major
 Major
 Capitan
 Capitan
 Capitan
 Capitan
 1st Lt.
 Lieut.
 Lieut.
 Lieut.
 Lieut.
 2nd Lt.
 2nd Lt.
 3rd Lt.
 3rd Lt.

[illegible]

U.C. 025

0143-9862/98/0005-0000\$10.00/0

64. Oil.

528

12.3

785020

301

1228

0.20
0.50
0.70

2.3.28

4.05

NOTED: Personnel already in work

CH₃COCH₃
N₂O₂CO₂
C₂H₅CO₂

20. $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3}$

* = 16. Col. UNIVERSITY and 16th COL. UNIVERSITY

TRANSLATION

FROM : M. of W.
TO : M.M.I.A.
SUBJECT: Situation of personnel of the Stato Maggiore Generale.

Ref: SG2908/G.A.
Date: Oct 18th 1944.

Reg
18
To

In reply to your G/11/1 dated 5th inst inclosed please find schedule showing total strength employed at S.M.G. after some reductions have been made and the strength allowed - 18 - for the Secretarial office of H. E. Badoglio and the High Commissioner for P.O.W. (6 and 12 respectively) have been included.

The total strength of the General Chief of Staff is of 194.

Bearing in mind, however, that the 18 univ, mentioned above and those under (3) and (4) of the schedule are not really employed by the General Chief of Staff the actual strength employed thereat is 167.

S.M.G.

The Minister
(Sgd) A. CASATI

Seen G.I.

785020

Appx "A"
to H of War
302908/c.s of 18/10

Strength Return - S.M.G.

Unit	Personnel		Notes
	Offr	SenHQ CR's	
Generals	3(1)		(1) Marshall Messe.
Off at disposal of H.E.			1 C.C. unit: Gen
The Gen. C. of Staff.	1		Maucinelli - 1
			Exile Commissioner
Secretarial Office of H.E.	2		General Chatrias
Returns Branch	6		(2) Including correspondence
Personnel Records	2		Office and Palazzo
Printing Branch	2		Baracchini maintenance
Electricity Branch	2		Staff.
Signals Branch	2		(3) Maj. Majano P.W.B.
Various Branch (2)	5		for broadcasts "Italy
Admin. Branch	1		Fights" Lt Col. Boila
C.H.Q.	2		& Maj. Tersitore of
M.I. Unit	1		the Political
Off & Sits Messes	1		Exiting Branch
M.I. Room	1		-3 mil for APC 151
Personnel on strengths			(4) Col Bruno at
but employed elsewhere			G.B.S. for Lt. P.O.W.
(fed) (3)			in North Africa.
Personnel on Strength	5		Lt. Scottanelli and
but employed elsewhere			2d Lt Zampaglione
(not fed) (4)	3		att to ACC
Secretarial office			
of H.E. Badoglio			
High Commissioner			
for P.O.W.			
TOTAL	39	35	102 194

Personnel on strengths
but employed elsewhere
(fed) (3)
Personnel on Strength
but employed elsewhere
(not fed) (4)
Secretarial office
of H.E. Badoglio
High Commissioner
for P.C.W.

5 1 - 6
3 - - 3
6
12

TOTAL

39 35 102 194


(XX) Col Bruno at
C.B.S. for Lt. P.C.W.
in North Africa.
Lt. Scottanelli and
2d Lt Zampaglione
att to ACC

1210

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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MI/ps



Ministero della Guerra

GABINETTO

n. 42928/C.A.

P.M. 151, 18 ottobre 1944

OGGETTO: situazione personale dello Stato Maggiore Generale
all.: 1 specchio

ALLA M.M.I.A.

ROMA

In relazione al foglio G/11/1 del 5 c.m., trasmetto unito alla presente, specchio dal quale si rileva il totale della forza impiegata dallo Stato Maggiore Generale dopo apportate alcune riduzioni ed avere incluso nella forza stessa anche le 18 unità previste per la segreteria di S.E. Badoglio e per l'alto commissario per i prigionieri di guerra (rispettivamente 6 e 12 unità).

In totale lo Stato Maggiore Generale ha in forza 194 unità.

Tenuto però conto che i 18 elementi sopradetti e le unità di cui alle note (3) e (4) dello specchio non prestano in realtà servi-

ALLA M.M.I.A.

ROMA

In relazione al foglio G/11/1 del 5 c.m., trasmetto unito alla presente, specchio dal quale si rileva il totale della forza impiegata dallo Stato Maggiore Generale dopo apportate alcune riduzioni ed avere incluso nella forza stessa anche le 18 unità previste per la segreteria di S.E. Badoglio e per l'alto commissario per i prigionieri di guerra (rispettivamente 6 e 12 unità).

In totale lo Stato Maggiore Generale ha in forza 194 unità.

Tenuto però conto che i 18 elementi sopradetti e le unità di cui alle note (3) e (4) dello specchio non prestano in realtà servizio presso lo Stato Maggiore Generale, la forza che in effetti è impiegata presso tale ente è di 167 elementi.

IL MINISTRO

1240



785020

BU/ps

allegato n.1 al foglio

202908/ps 18.10.44.

SITUATIONE FORZA DELLO STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE

UFFICI E REPARTI	Personale		Totale	Note
	Uff.	Sottuff.	Trup.	
Ufficiali generali.....	34	-	-	(1) Maresciallo
Ufficiali a disposizione di S.M.	1	-	-	Messa-1 genera-
il Capo di S.M. Generale.....	2	1	2	le capo reparto
Segreteria particolare di S.M.	6	6	2	generale: Mancini
il Capo di S.M. Generale.....	2	2	2	nelli-1 generale
Ufficio situazioni.....	2	2	2	Commiss. confini:
Ufficio accertamenti.....	2	2	2	Generale Chatian
Ufficio stampa.....	2	2	2	(2) Compreso uffi-
Ufficio patriotti.....	2	2	2	cio corrisponden-
Ufficio telecomunicazioni.....	2	2	2	za e manutenzione
Ufficio affari vari. (2).....	5	5	5	Palazzo Maracchini
Ufficio amministrazioni.....	1	1	1	(3) Maggiore Maje-
Quartier Generale.....	2	2	2	no P.M.E. per le-
Autodirigibile.....	1	1	1	trasmissione "I-I-
Messa ufficiali e mensa sot-	1	1	1	talia combattente"
tufficiari.....	1	1	1	Ten. Col. Borla e
Infermeria.....	1	1	1	Messa. Tessitore al
				l'Ufficio Confini
				-3 militari per
				ufficio P.M. 151
				(4) Colonnello Bru

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Segreteria particolare di S.M. il Capo di S.M. Generale.....	2	1	2	3	Uffici-I generale Comiss. Confini: Generale Cretarian
Ufficio soluzioni.....	6	6	2	14	
Ufficio esecutenti.....	2	3	2	6	(2)Campese affi- cio corrisponden- za e manutenzione fulcro Bareccchini
Ufficio stampa.....	2	1	2	5	
Ufficio patrioti.....	2	2	2	6	(2)Maggiore Raja- no P.M.B. per le trasmissione "I'I- talia contatta"- Ten. Col. Borla e Messa. Tessitore al Ufficio Confini
Ufficio telecomunicazioni.....	3	6	3	16	-3 militari per ufficio P.A. 151
Ufficio affari veri. (2).....	1	1	1	3	(4)Colonnello Bru- no al C.B.S. per inseguimento pri- gionieri italiani in A.S.-Ten. Grot- telli e S.T. Zan- paglione adetti all'A.C.C.
Ufficio amministrazioni.....	2	5	44	51	
Quartier Generale.....	1	6	27	34	
Autodirappello.....	1	2	12	15	
Mense ufficiali e mense sot- tufficiali.....	1	2	2	3	
Infermeria.....	1	1	2	3	
Personale in forze allo S.M. Generale ed in servizio al- trove (vetovaghiato) (3)	5	1	-	6	
Personale in forze allo S.M. Generale ed in servizio al- trove (con vetova. (fiato) (4)	5	-	-	3	
Segreteria S.E. Badoglio				6	
Alto Commissariato per i pri- gionieri di guerra.....				12	
Totale generali.....	39	50	102	154	12 3/4

SUBJECT:- Strengths - Italian Army

MILITARY MISSION ITALIAN ARMY

R O M E

G/11/1

5 Oct 44

Ministry of War

1. I notice from your Strength return that Stato Maggiore Generale has a strength of 41 offrs and 151 OR's, compared with the Ministry of War 443 offrs and 669 OR's.
2. The S.M.G. Strength appears to me to be out of all proportion to the Ministry of War, considering that the former is merely advisory, while Ministry of War have to do the Executive work for the whole Army.
3. We are very short of Italian personnel, particularly with the reduced ceiling and can NOT afford luxurious establishments.
4. Please obtain for me forthwith from S.M.G. a detailed statement showing how the personnel of S.M.G. are distributed and used.

signed

L. BROWNING
MAJ GEN
M M I A

Original on G/11/1

1243

(40)
CONFIDENTIAL

Army Sub Commission, MILA.
H.Q., A.C.C.

ROME.

9/50
22 Aug 44.

Dear

I have your letter of 21 Aug and your apology for any unintentional rudeness in your letter, 5982/Mob of 2 Aug.

I must say that I did take your letter as an affront to the position I held as the representative and executive of the Allies in all matters to do with the Italian Army.

I may also say that I was surprised, in view of the cordial relations and cooperation that have existed between us.

However, I am quite prepared to take your word that no rudeness was meant and to consider the matter closed. Our object is to cooperate to defeat the Germans and liberate Italy and I am sure that in the future, as in the past, nothing will be allowed to stand in the way of that object.

Yours

R.B.

1242

cordial relations and cooperation that have existed between us.

However, I am quite prepared to take your word that no ruinous war meant and to consider the matter closed. Our object is to cooperate to defeat the Germans and liberate Italy and I am sure that in the future, as in the past, nothing will be allowed to stand in the way of that object.

1242

Yours

L.B.

E.E. Gen HERBERT.
S.M.P.E.

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IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

P.M. 151, 21 agosto 1944

Al Maggior Generale L. BROWNING

1. Con la vostra lettera G/30 del 20 agosto oggi per venutami, Voi mi rivolgete in forma insolita l'ap-
punto di avere usato verso di Voi un tono di imper-
tinenza nel rispondere ad un vostro invito di pren-
dere provvedimenti relativi ad una formazione Gari-
baldi nell'Africa settentrionale.

Con vivo rincrescimento apprendo il signi-
ficato che Voi avete creduto di attribuire alle
mie parole, poichè io non ho mai inteso di usare
verso di Voi un tono meno che riguardoso.

Credo che si tratti di un grosso malinteso
che desidero vivamente di chiarire.

2. L'interpretazione da me data alla vostra lettera
G/30 del 2 agosto nella traduzione che mi fù pre-
sentata era di immediati provvedimenti da parte
mia contro la costituzione di una Legione Garibal-
di alla quale io non mi sarei opposto.

Così stando le cose, io avrei gravemente
mancato di lealtà verso codesta Commissione di con-
trollo nei cui riguardi la mia qualità di Capo di
S.M. dell'Esercito Italiano mi attribuisce precisi

. / .

obblighi, all'infuori degli obblighi da soldato a soldato nei riguardi della Vostra persona.

La mia lettera 5892 del 15 agosto a Voi ri volta voleva chiarire senza equivoci questi miei doveri e la correttezza del mio operato.

3. Darò corso alla pratica nel senso da Voi desiderato e Vi sarò grato se mi vorrete dare comunicazione che con la presente ho ottenuto di dissipare qualsiasi malinteso che abbia potuto sorgere nei miei rapporti con Voi.

*Vogliate gradire i miei cordiali
saluti.*

Gen. G. B. Bernardi

785020

(38)

1. In your letter 8/30 of 20 August which reached me today, you criticize me in unusual form of having used towards you a tone of ungentleness in replying to a request of yours to take action in connection with a Garibaldi unit in North Africa. With great regret I learn the significance which you have attributed to my words, since it was never my intention to use towards you a tone which was anything but respectful. I believe it is a case of a serious misunderstanding, which I am most anxious to clarify.

785020

attributed to my words, service
it was never my intention to
use towards you a tone which
was anything but respectful.
I believe it is a case of a serious
misunderstanding, which I am
most anxious to clarify.

2. The interpretation given by me
to your letter G/30 of 2 Aug 1920
according to the translation, admitted
witted to me was that immediate
steps were required on my part
against the form of a faithful
Legion, to which I should have
had no objection.
In these circumstances, I should
have been seriously lacking
in loyalty towards your Central

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Commission, in my dealings with which my post as chief of staff of the Indian Army gives me definite responsibilities, apart from my obligations as soldier to soldier towards your person.

My letter 5892 of 15 Aug to you was intended to clarify without misunderstanding these responsibilities of mine and the correctness of my action.

3. I will deal with the matter in the way you wish and I shall be grateful if you will let me know if with this letter I have succeeded

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responsibilities of mine and the
conclusiveness of my action.

3. I will deal with the matter
in the way you wish and
I shall be grateful if you
will let me know if with
this letter I have succeeded
in clearing up any ^{misunder-}
standing which way ^{12:00} have
arisen in my relations
with you.

Please accept etc etc.

(Sd) Berardi

SUBJECT: GAMBALDI Legion.

H.E.
General BERARDI.
S.M.P.E.

File
Army Sub Commission, MMIA.
H.C., A.C.C.

ROME.

G/30 ✓
20 Aug 44.

Ref your 5982/lob dated 2 Aug.

1. Your letter is completely off the point.
2. I fully understand your position in this matter and I know you had nothing to do with this GAMBALDI Legion, but the fact remains that: -
 - (a) I do NOT deal with Comando Supremo. I deal with you or the Ministry of War.
 - (b) I therefore gave you orders to be passed on to such authorities as you considered necessary, while informing you of the situation. I presumed (as I said in the last line of my G/30 of 2 Aug) that you would "know how to act."
 - (c) I am not interested in the back history of this case, but only with the abolition of this "private army."
 - (d) You very definitely are or should be "interested" in a private army which may be "clothed, armed, trained and formed into units" contrary to Allied policy and not under the direction of the Regular Italian Army.
3. Lastly, I strongly resent the whole tone of your letter which savours of impertinence. I expect never to receive such a communication again.

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W.S.L.R.
2.c.

L.R.

Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

1228



STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

UFFICIO DEL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE

N. 5982/144. prot.

P.M. 151, li 15 agosto 1944

Risposta al foglio N. G/30

del 2-3-1944

OGGETTO: Legione Garibaldi - Africa Settentrionale.

MIN. A.	Gr
FILE	30
Date Recd	16/8/44

Alla Sottocommissione per l'Esercito dell' A. C. C.

1°). Come vi è noto lo S.M.R.E. italiano non ha alcuna ingerenza nelle questioni riguardanti il reclutamento del personale. Ciò riguarda il Governo. Quando il personale reclutato deve essere vestito, alloggiato, armato, istruito, inquadrato, allora - e solo allora - entra in gioco lo S.M.R.E.

2°). Per conseguenza conosco la questione, per sentito dire, nei seguenti termini:

Il Col. Panella era in Algeria da qualche anno e lasciò l'Algeria verso la fine dell'inverno 1944. Penso che non avrebbe potuto trasferirsi dalla Algeria all'Italia senza la autorizzazione degli Alleati.

Quale capo della tradizione garibaldina egli sperava di potere costituire una legione garibaldina non con prigionieri italiani ma con italiani residenti da anni in Algeria ed aspiranti a prendere parte alla guerra di liberazione e che la legione stessa potesse essere incorporata nel regolare esercito italiano.

3°). Tutto questo rimase allo stato di speranza del Col. Panella.

0758

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- 1°). Come vi è noto lo S.M.R.E. italiano non ha alcuna ingerenza nelle questioni riguardanti il reclutamento del personale. Ciò riguarda il Governo. Quando il personale reclutato deve essere vestito, alloggiato, armato, istruito, inquadrato, allora - e solo allora - entra in gioco lo S.M.R.E.
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- 3°). Tutto questo rimase allo stato di speranza del Col. Panella. Nessuna autorità a me superiore mi incaricò mai di studi o di predisposizioni riguardanti una qualsiasi pratica attuazione di tale speranza.
- 4°). Così stando le cose, non ho da prendere per conto mio alcun provvedimento perché nulla sono stato incaricato di fare.
Ho invece trasmesso alle autorità a me superiori copia del vostro foglio al quale rispondo.

IL CAPO DI S.M. DELL'ESERCITO

Col. Panella

Translation on reverse
File 4
in file

translation on reverse

0757

785020

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

TRANSLATION

From: SMCB
To: HMA
Ref: 3982/mob
Date: 2 Aug 44

SUBJECT: CARLEVALI Legion - North Africa

1. It is pointed out that SMCB has nothing to do in the question regarding personnel recruited. It is the Government's job. When recruited, personnel is clothed, accommodated, armed, trained, turned into units, then SMCB becomes interested.

2. For information this is what I overheard:

Col. PAVELLA was in ALGERIA for a few years and left by the end of the winter of 1943. In my opinion his transfer from ALGERIA to ITALY could not have taken place without authority of the Allies.

As Chief of the CARLEVALI traditions, he hoped to form a Legion, not from Italian P.O.W.s, but from Italians residing in ALGERIA for a number of years and willing to take part in the war of liberation and that the said Legion would have been incorporated in the Italian Army.

3. All this remained only a hope for Col. PAVELLA. No superior authority to me has ever put me in charge of such schemes and in respect of actions to be taken.

4. Since matters stand thus, I do not, on my account, have to take any action, because I have never been instructed to do so.

I have forwarded copy of your letter to my superior authorities.

sgd BERARDI

35
12/15/44

9
6 Bo
12-8 47

12 August 1944

A/CC 091.711

Dear Marshal Messe:

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated August 9th advising that, according to orders by H.S. the President of the Council of Ministers and by agreement with the Allied Control Commission, the name of the Comando Supremo has been changed to that of Stato Maggiore Generale (Italian General Staff), effective August 10th, 1944.

This will confirm our further understanding that the Stato Maggiore Generale will relinquish its functions of operation to the Ministries of Navy, War, and Aeronautics.

This will also confirm our understanding that the Stato Maggiore Generale will exercise no command or operational functions with respect to the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Forces.

Very truly yours,

HENRY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Marshal Messe
Chief of Italian General Staff
Stato Maggiore Generale

cc: Army S/C
Naval S/C
Air S/C

cc: ACC Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
Date-Time 12 Aug 1630
Via 1149 msg
File VRR.

1236

Read out by B.E. at 1630
F. M. 17/8

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

LWS/dfe

A/CC 091.711

4 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: General Browning

1. There is attached for your files a copy of the memorandum on the Comando Supremo, which General Alexander approved on August 1st.
2. I had a conference with Marshal Messe yesterday, and he clearly understands that he is not to interfere in any way on matters coming under the jurisdiction of your Sub-Commission.

W. L. Stone

WILLIAM N. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl. ref para 1 above

cc: Sir Noel Charles

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2. I had a conference with Marshal Messe yesterday, and he clearly understands that he is not to interfere in any way on matters coming under the jurisdiction of your Sub-Commission.

W. H. Stone

WILLIAM W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Encl. ref para 1 above

cc: Sir Noel Charles

✓ 12B
Aug

1235

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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O.K.

/s/ H.R.A.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/dfe

MEMORANDUM:

29 July 1944

COMANDO SUPREMO

The Italian Comando Supremo is the organ through which certain functions of the three Armed Forces, Army, Navy and Air, are coordinated.

The Comando Supremo today has four main functions: 1. SIM (Military Intelligence Service); 2. Military Law and Justice; 3. General Administration; 4. Epuration.

The operations undertaken by SIM, (Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence, Security, Sabotage) which is directly under the command of the Comando Supremo, are so well known to Allied Military Intelligence and Security Authorities that no purpose is served here in discussing this service in detail. It does not seem desirable to separate SIM into three separate intelligence services--Army, Navy and Air. It should remain under coordinated direction, but there may be grave repercussions if this organization were to come under political direction of any Ministry, through the abolition of the Comando Supremo, rather than under its present military direction.

Recognizing this same principle, ACC with AAI concurrence, recently transferred Italian civil censorship (mails, telegraph and telephone) from the political control of the Minister of Interior to the Comando Supremo, where it had been before Mussolini transferred it to the Ministry of Interior for political intelligence purposes. Public reaction was excellent. It is believed that if the Comando Supremo were abolished and civil censorship were restored to the Minister of Interior or to the Army, the public reaction would not be good.

Military Law and Justice. The Comando Supremo exercises control of wartime military penal justice. The institution, modification, the suppression of wartime military courts and the designation of the highest officials of such bodies is a function of the Comando Supremo. The Comando Supremo also issues, through proclamations, regulations having the force of law on matters concerning laws and penal procedure in wartime as well as judicial military organization.

General Administration. The Comando Supremo coordinates policy as to disciplinary measures, general personnel rules, promotions, and, in particular, the nomination of general and flag officers. At the moment the Comando Supremo has adopted a policy of opposing the creation of additional admirals and generals, notwithstanding, apparently, the strong desire on the part of the Navy to create new admirals. It is believed that if the Comando Supremo were abolished, there would be considerable pressure on the government by the services, and by members of the govern-

ment itself, to create a number of unnecessary general and flag officers.

Epuraton and Defascistization of Officers. This is a new function recently delegated by the Government to the Comando Supremo, and it seems obvious that something of the kind is desirable to insure that epuration is carried on in an identical manner in all three Armed Forces, free of political favoritism. If the Comando Supremo were abolished under Allied pressure, the public and press might feel that we desired to hinder the work of epuration. This function, however, could quite properly be assigned to each of the services - the Comando Supremo relinquishing entirely its work in this field.

Elimination of the Comando Supremo, in my judgment, would therefore have three unfortunate results:

a. It would tend to make the administration of the Army, Navy, and Air political rather than military.

b. It would make the Italian services more acutely a political problem than they are today with damage to the war effort.

c. At a time when the Italian public is clamoring for greater military effort by Italy, the announcement of the abolition of the Comando Supremo would have a disquieting effect in all moderate circles.

In present circumstances, however, there is no doubt that General Browning is correct in contending that, as a matter of logic, the Comando Supremo is a "fifth wheel" so far as operational functions are concerned. It is therefore recommended that:

(1) The name of the Comando Supremo be changed to "Stato Maggiore Generale", its pre-war designation.

(2) It relinquish its functions of epuration to the three service Ministries.

(3) It be issued a clear directive that it is to exercise no command or operational functions with respect to the Italian Armed Forces.

Based on informal discussions with the Prime Minister, I am certain that the foregoing recommendations would be acceptable to the Italian Government without undue Allied pressure.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

1220

SUBJECT: GARIBOLDI Legion - North Africa.

S E C R E T

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C. 372
Main HQ MIA.

ROME.

6/30 ✓
2 Aug 44.

His Excellency,
General BERRARDI
S.W.R.E.

copy to: Political Section, A.C.C.

Political Section, A.C.C. has recently handed me over certain papers in connection with the above, saying, rightly, that it is no concern of theirs.

Apparently since early in March discussions have been proceeding with a view to Col. PAMILLA going to ALGIERS to organise a GARIBOLDI Legion there out of Prisoners of War. The idea apparently was that this Legion should be organised in NORTH AFRICA and brought over to Italy to be incorporated in the official Italian Army.

It appears also that Comando Supremo were concerned in this though I gather from you that you had nothing to do with it.

Apart from the fact that this personnel in NORTH AFRICA is P.O.W., the whole business is highly irregular. No "private armies" are permitted under any circumstances.

The only Italian Army recognised by the Allies in Italy is the official new Italian Army.

Please therefore take steps forthwith to ensure that no further action is taken as regards this GARIBOLDI Legion which, if in process of formation, will be dissolved forthwith.

The Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which was also mixed up in this business, is telling Col. PAMILLA to explain the whole situation to you and you will now know how to act.

0 7 6 4

It is my belief that this Legion should be organized in NORTH AFRICA and brought over to Italy to be incorporated in the official Italian Army.

It appears also that Comando Supremo were concerned in this though I gather from you that you had nothing to do with it.

Apart from the fact that this personnel in NORTH AFRICA is P.O.W., the whole business is highly irregular. No "private armies" are permitted under any circumstances.

The only Italian Army recognised by the Allies in Italy is the official new Italian Army.

Please therefore take steps forthwith to ensure that no further action is taken as regards this GARIBOLDI Legion which, if in process of formation, will be dissolved forthwith.

The Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which was also mixed up in this business, is telling Col. PANELLA to explain the whole situation to you and you will now know how to act.

tva.LB.
4-4.C.

d. Brown
Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

1232

SUBJECT: Comando Supremo

SECRET

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ MILA

ROME.

6/30 ✓
29 July 44.

Acting Chief Commissioner, A.C.C.

1. Some weeks ago I recommended to Gen. MACFARLANE the abolition of Comando Supremo. He agreed on the advisability but did not wish to act while a brother Marshal, RADOGLIO, was Prime Minister. This situation exists no longer. I therefore request that a decision be given at the earliest moment in this matter.

2. My reasons are: -

(a) All Italian military forces in ITALY are under the command of General ALEXANDER under whose orders Army Sub Commission acts in executive control of the Italian Army.

(b) Early this year Army Sub Commission was ordered to deal direct with Ministry of War and S.M.R.E on all matters. This has been done and no reference to Comando Supremo has been necessary.

(c) Comando Supremo is thus the "fifth wheel of the coach", outside the direct channel of control but with ability to interfere or hinder. The situation is similar to that in ENGLAND in the last century where a C.-in.-C. Horse Guards and a War Office existed so unsatisfactorily side by side.

(d) It seems to me impossible for a Marshal of ITALY to exist at all in any official position without having considerable unofficial control behind the scenes. For example, looking

of General ALEXANDER under whose orders Army Sub Commission acts in executive control of the Italian Army.

(b) Early this year Army Sub Commission was ordered to deal direct with Ministry of War and S.M.R.E on all matters. This has been done and no reference to Comando Supremo has been necessary.

(c) Comando Supremo is thus the "fifth wheel of the coach", outside the direct channel of control but with ability to interfere or hinder. The situation is similar to that in ENGLAND in the last century where a C.-in.-C. Horse Guards and a War Office existed so unsatisfactorily side by side.

(d) It seems to me impossible for a Marshal of ITALY to exist at all in any official position without having considerable unofficial control behind the scenes. For example, looking not alone to the present but to post-war, Italian officers must be apprehensive as to their future unless they obey the wishes of Comando Supremo, which may be contrary to Allied policy and of which, if given verbally, there is no trace or indication to Army Sub Commission.

It will be difficult to devise a formula or Charter to obviate this control behind the scenes, which tends to militate against executive control by Army Sub Commission.

(e) Moreover, my Staff and I have long suspected this "hidden hand", and I could mention 3 specific instances where Marshal MESSE has interfered in military matters without any reference to or consultation with Army Sub Commission, who were directly interested and responsible. In each case I had to take action to remove the interference.

(f) The crux of the matter is in fact, the existence of a Supreme Italian Commander with the Allies exercising executive control of his forces.

3. I understand that the functions of Comando Supremo are fourfold:

- (a) SIM (Military Intelligence Service)
- (b) Military Law and Justice.

contd sheet /2/..

-sheet 2-

3 - Contd.

(c) General Administration.

(d) Reputation and defascistization of officers.

Details and your views thereon are at App "A".

4. I would like to make the following observations on these functions:

(a) SIM and CIVIL CENSORSHIP.

SIM is a purely military organisation placed at the disposal of the Allies. Comando Supremo merely administers SIM and has nothing to do with its main operational activities, which are directly under British officers in I.S.L.D., and No. 1 S.C.I. Unit. There is no political direction and consequently there would be no political effect in transferring SIM en bloc from Comando Supremo to the Ministry of War, with detachments to the other two Services.

AAI in their 1605/50/52/6/(S.D.L.) dated 21 Jul have ordered Army Sub Commission to detach the above two operational sections from SIM and that these "will not be considered part of the Comando Supremo" in future.

As regards CIVIL CENSORSHIP - the Italian Cabinet paper authorising this states: "The fallen fascist regime had taken away war censorship from the control of the military authorities in order to turn it into a political instrument agreements have been reached between the interested Ministries and the Supreme Command to return such Services to the military authorities." Naturally the Government dealt with Comando Supremo as the senior military authority in this matter. But I can see no reason why the arrangement is invalidated if Comando Supremo is abolished. The Minister of War as head of the "Military Authorities" (through whom he must act) can equally well undertake this duty. If necessary, the task could be delegated to Generals CAJIA or BERARDI under the general direction of Count CASATI. There is an "Inspectorate of the Offices of military censorship" and the "Allied authorities have reserved the right of making inspections of the censorship work." Surely there are enough safeguards here against Civil Censorship becoming a political instrument if Comando Supremo is dissolved.

785020

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

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(b) Military Law and Justice.

Internally this could perfectly simply be made the responsibility of the respective Ministries in their own spheres, coordination where necessary being achieved by discussion between the Service Ministers or by decision of the Cabinet as a whole.

Externally, in-so-far as this affects the Allies, this is a matter for AAI/ACC.

(c) General Administration.

This could equally well be left to the Service Ministries with control by the ACC Service Sub Commissions, under orders of their respective Service Commanders. This in fact is the case now. Power of nomination or promotion of senior officers, as I have said above, gives Marshal MESS the power to influence all policy.

contd sheet 13/...

sheet 3-

4. (Contd.)

(d) Examination and defascistisation of officers.

The test of this is whether an officer was or is a Fascist, or not. Presumably all Ministers are anti-Fascist. If they are not, they should not be Ministers.

It follows, therefore, that Ministries could run their own committees in this connection.

5.

(a) I have written the above from my military angle. I fully realise that political factors such as stability in a shifting Italian political world may have much weight; and that political and military factors must be weighed together in the final decision by higher authority.

(b) I consider that the views of the other two Services Sub Commissions should be obtained before a decision is arrived at, as they are also intimately concerned.

(c) In any event, I request that my views as above be represented and a decision be given at an early date.

twa, LB.

N.B.
Major General.,
Director Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

copy to: Naval Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Air Force Sub Commission, A.C.C.

0779

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(c) In any event, I request that my views as above be represented and a decision be given at an early date.

R.B.

Major General.,
Director, Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

tvs.13.

copy to: Naval Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Air Force Sub Commission, A.C.C.

1223

COL. IDENTIAL

From : AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C.C. ROME
To : MAJOR BAUMANN ARMY SUB COMMISSION 7th Floor R. 56
A.C.C. ROME
Date : 28th JULY 1944
Ref. : AFSC/INT/Z3
Subject : COL. PEZZANI AND S.I.M.

Following our conversation of this morning.

- 1) Herewith translation of text of telegram sent by Pezzani to Col. Schwenke of the German Army on the 4th May 1944, also translation of letter addressed by Air Section of SIM to Sgt. Stevens of 276 Field Security Section.
- 2) It would appear from the telegram to Col. Schwenke that Pezzani subsequent to Armistice collaborated with the Germans. The telegram is actually dated 4th May 1944 one month prior to the Allies entry in Rome.
- 3) In SIM's letter to Sgt. Stevens
 - a) he is stated not to have collaborated with the Nazi-Fascists;
 - b) resentment is expressed at the manner in which his plans were taken from him and it is hinted that such plans should have been placed at the disposal of the Allies either through the Italian Air Force or with the Italian authorities' consent;
 - c) Pezzani is described as a serious person, worthy of esteem and consideration, studious, apolitical and an inventive genius.
 - d) A copy of the letter to Sgt. Stevens was handed personally to the undersigned by Major Sandon of the SIM Air Section.

*Italian Air Ministry
has described
him as de Haan
as an "adventurer"*

28744

P. de Haan 1225
(P. de Haan)

Squadron Leader
Deputy Director A.F.S.C.

785020

LUOGO Rome
n° di prot 243R I S E R V A T A
UFFICIO DI CENSURA

MITT.

Ing. Carlo PEZZANI
Viale Giappone 102
ROMA

DEST.

Comando Ruck for Col. SCHWENKE
COMO

Data di comunicazione o del timbro postale se la lettera è senza data	Tipo di posta	n° della raccoman data	lingua pervenuta censurata da	allegato
4 May 1944	Telegram		Italian	0
Annotazioni precedenti	Signal. locali	Signal del CCS	Provvedimento addottato	
			Trattenuta Recisa Fotografata Inviata con commenti a	Inoltrata Tolta dal corso Al Mittent
Origine Censura Italiana Censura Alleata x	G - 2 RAC			

OSSERVAZIONI

SELFBRAKED ROCKET AEROGUN SUBMITTED TO GERMAN HQ.

Text of telegram states :

BLUE-PRINTS AND CALCULATION REGARDING THE SELFBRAKED ROCKET AEROGUN ARE READY TO BE EXAMINED AS PROMISED YOU DURING MY VISIT THERE AT THE BEGINNING OF MARCH. STOP. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN THEM TO YOU PERSONALLY. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR AN EARLIER APPOINTMENT SENDING TELEGRAM STATING DATE ETC. SO THAT FORMALITIES OF MY TRIP TO COMO CAN BE SETTLED IMMEDIATELY.
ADDRESS: ING. CARLO PEZZANI = VIALE GIAPPONE 102 ROMA

Exaliner's note : Original version of type of gun is "AEROCANNONE AUTOFRENATO A REAZIONE" and the translation is believed to be correct.

1227

AIR FORCES SECTION

Rome 135 21st July 1944

Note for Sgt. STIVENS

276 - F.S.S.

Via Sicilia, 59

R O M E

The information given us indicates that there is nothing to be charged against Col. G.A.r.i. PEZZANI. Said Officer had contacts with the German Authorities in the period from Feb. to March 1943 on matters regarding his patent. Probably the Germans have made use of the principle of the cannon invented by PEZZANI, but even the inventor cannot say up to what point.

From Sept. 8th up to June 4th he remained in Rome in consideration of his position of special leave - he did not collaborate with the nazi-fascists nor did he appear to sympathize with them.

He had been waiting for the Allies' arrival to present to them - either through the Italian Air Force or as an inventor (with the Italian Authorities' leave) - his patent. He was rather surprised and perhaps disappointed at the not very orthodox proceeding by which his plans were requisitioned.

PEZZANI is a serious person - worthy of esteem and consideration - studious - apolitical, and an inventive genius.

THE HEAD OF THE AIR FORCES SECTION

Signed / Magg. P11. Carlo SANDON 1223

General Browning.

I explained matters on the lines of your note to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning, speaking personally with Del Balzo, who initialled the Ministry's latest memorandum of the 27th July. He said that he fully understood the position and had only one comment to make, namely, that Col. Panella had been summoned to Salerno at Marshal Badoglio's wish in February and that he did not know since then what Italian military authorities the Colonel had been in touch with.

In any case he would tell the Colonel to explain the position to the Italian Ministry of War and to ask them, if they thought fit, to discuss the matter further with the Army Sub Commission. I think that Del Balzo was in no doubt that this was the only channel for questions of this kind, i.e., Italian Ministry of War to Army Sub Commission.

Perhaps you would like to keep the whole of this file.

LA Caccia

Political Section,
1.8.44.

SUBJECT: Comando Supremo.

SECRET

Army Sub Commission, A.C.C.
Main HQ MIA

ROME.

G/30

28 July 44.

Political Section, A.C.C.

1. These documents are illuminating. They show that Comando Supremo have been working to produce a "private army" (GARIBALDI Legion) out of P. of W. in N. AFHICA with a view to this being absorbed into the existing official Italian Army.
2. Gen. BERARDI (SMRE) tells me he has had nothing to do with this, though he has had vague reports on Col. PANELLA's activities.
3. I have not been consulted at any time during the proceedings which apparently started on March 1st, despite the fact that Mr. CACCIA perfectly correctly stated on 25 May that "the Political Section refuse repeat refuse to touch this purely military affair."
4. Some blame attaches to Lt.Col. QUINSMITH (ACC LO with Comando Supremo) who told me nothing of this matter. This however does not absolve Comando Supremo from the completely incorrect procedure they have adopted.
5. The policy is to have NO private Italian Armies, certainly not one composed of P.of.W. We must stick to the bedrock factor that there is only one military (Army) organisation in ITALY authorised viz. the existing official Italian Army under the Allies. We have throughout maintained that policy e.g. re Patriots, where bands are dissolved in all areas we occupy.
6. All this is well known to Comando Supremo, yet they have acted contrary to Allied policy in the case of this GARIBALDI Legion behind my and SMRE's back. It is exactly this sort of thing which makes me press for the abolition of Comando Supremo.

3. I have not been consulted at any time during the proceedings which apparently started on March 1st, despite the fact that Mr. CACCIA perfectly correctly stated on 25 May that "the Political Section refuse repeat refuse to touch this purely military affair."

4. Some blame attaches to Lt.Col. QUINSMITH (ACC IO with Comando Supremo) who told me nothing of this matter. This however does not absolve Comando Supremo from the completely incorrect procedure they have adopted.

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6. All this is well known to Comando Supremo, yet they have acted contrary to Allied policy in the case of this GARIBOLDI Legion behind my and SMRE's back. It is exactly this sort of thing which makes me press for the abolition of Comando Supremo.

7. (a) Meanwhile, I must insist that Comando Supremo be informed forthwith of the above and that the project must be completely stopped immediately

(b) Will you please take the necessary action, informing me what steps have been taken.

1223

tvs.LB.
encls.

J. B. Brown
Major General.
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

Nr. 6/53/22

(28)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

POLITICAL SECTION.

Pursuant to Memoranda n.2779 and n.2976, respectively dated 9th and 15th May ult. (copies are herewith enclosed), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be grateful if the Allied Control Commission would kindly inform of the approximate date when Col.Panella, charged with the re-organization of the "Caribellai" Legion, in North Africa, will be able to return to Algiers.

encls.

As the Political Section of the A.C.C. is aware, Col.Panella arrived in Salerno on April 25th ult., and after having had useful contacts with the Italian military authorities has been waiting, since the beginning of May, for the necessary arrangements to be made for his return to Algiers where he should take the matter up with Allied Headquarters.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will much

785020

785020

Further to Memoranda n. 2779 and n. 2978, respectively dated 9th and 15th May ult. (copies are herewith enclosed), the R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be grateful if the Allied Control Commission would kindly inform of the approximate date when Col. Penella, charged with the re-organization of the "Carabinieri" Legion, in North Africa, will be able to return to Algiers.

Encls.

As the Political Section of the A.C.C. is aware, Col. Penella arrived in Salerno on April 25th ult., and after having had useful contacts with the Italian military authorities has been waiting, since the beginning of May, for the necessary arrangements to be made for his return to Algiers where he should take the matter up with Allied Headquarters.

The R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs will much appreciate a favourable reply with the least possible delay. *Colb.*

ROME, July 27th, 1944

1222

TRANSLATION

Letter from Royal Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

TELESPRESSO No. 3505

TO: (1) Royal Italian Military Mission
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters
Algiers

(2) Comando Supremo
Operations Office
D.M. 135/A

Royal Ministry of War
Cabinet
D.M. 107

Posizione: Franci Libera A.P.
Subject : Garibaldi Legion
Reference: Letter of 7 Feb, No. 135
Telepresso of 15 May, No. 3006

Salerno, 29 May 1944

Lt. Colonel Virgilio Panella, subject of the communications under reference, has concluded satisfactorily conversations with the Italian Military Authorities regarding the employment of the Garibaldi Legion on our front.

He now should urgently return to Algiers to obtain from the Allied High Command the assistance and the means for carrying out this project, which, more than any other, has an importance of political character of which you are well aware.

Therefore, while it would be appreciated if you would in due course support the action of Colonel Panella to the Allied High Command, I should like to ask your Military Mission, at the suggestion of the Political Section of ACC, to take steps toward obtaining permission for Colonel Panella to return without delay, by air.

/s/ Franas

22
MINISTERO

DEGLI

AFFARI ESTERI

102948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSIONPOLITICAL SECTION.

Following Memorandum n.2779 of May 9th, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs ventures to repeat that it would be very grateful if it could be possible for Colonel Panella to leave for Algiers without undue delay. His journey is rendered all the more necessary and urgent as, having satisfactorily concluded his talks with the Italian military authorities on the Garibaldi Legion's participation in the war, he will now have to approach on the same matter Allied Headquarters Mediterranean. Colonel Panella will have in fact have to enlist the support and cooperation of Allied Headquarters in order to solve, amongst other technical details, the following important questions :

- I) the rearmament of the Legionnaires ;
- 2) the establishment of the units with Italian Officers and N.C.O. drawn from amongst the most suitable elements at present P.O.W. in North Africa ;
- 3) the necessary arrangements for the transportation to Italy of the Legion, about 2000 strong.

With Memorandum n. 899 of March 1st ult. the Ministry for

all the more necessary and urgent as, having satisfactorily concluded his talks with the Italian military authorities on the Garibaldi Legion's participation in the war, he will now have to approach on the same matter Allied Headquarters Mediterranean. Colonel Panella will ~~have~~ in fact have to enlist the support and cooperation of Allied Headquarters in order to solve, amongst other technical details, the following important questions :

- 1) the rearmament of the Legionnaires ;
- 2) the establishment of the units with Italian Officers and N.C.O. drawn from amongst the most suitable elements at present P.O.W. in North Africa ;
- 3) the necessary arrangements for the transportation to Italy of the Legion, about 2000 strong.

With Memorandum n. 899 of March 1st ult. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs emphasized the far-reaching political importance of ensuring a speedy entry of the Garibaldi Legion in the common fight on the Italian front, in view also of the fact that the Red-shirted volunteers are the depositors of the finest ¹²⁰⁰ traditions of the Risorgimento and constitute the best tangible link between the past wars for Italy's liberation and the present one.

This political aspect of the matter, which cannot be overlooked, induces this Ministry to hope that the Political Section of the A.C.C. will warmly support, in the most suitable and effective manner, the requirements Colonel Panella will submit to the Allied Command so that they should be taken into the most favourable and urgent consideration. *R.F.*

SALERNO, 15 MAR 1944

X

Ref 2779 sent to Naples
on 4 May 44.
Ref 309 sent to Naples
on 1 May 44.

2779
16 May 44



785020

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

102449
A 2479

Call Maria Luisa - part
HMC 1015-

(21)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

POLITICAL SECTION.

With reference to Memorandum N. 1574 of March 27th ult. and while thanking the Political Section of the A.C.C. for its kind intervention in order to expedite Colonel Panella's visit to Italy, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs now informs that he arrived in Salerno on April 25th ult.

Having had a very useful exchange of views with the Italian military authorities with the aim of organizing the transfer of the Garibaldi Legion on the Italian front, Colonel Panella is now ready to leave for Algiers to take the matter up with Allied Headquarters.

This Ministry would be very glad if the Political Section could arrange for the return trip of Colonel Panella which should take place without undue delay and thanks in advance for its kind interest in the matter.

Salerno, May 8th 1944.
P.F. X

with reference to Memorandum N. 1574 of March 27/58
lit. and while thanking the Political Section of the A.C.C.
for its kind intervention in order to expedite Colonel
Panella's visit to Italy, the Royal Ministry for Foreign
Affairs now informs that he arrived in Palermo on April
25th ult.

Having had a very useful exchange of views with the Italian military authorities with the aim of organizing the transfer of the Garibaldi Legion on the Italian front, Colonel Panella is now ready to leave for Algiers to take the matter up with Allied Headquarters.

This Ministry would be very glad if the Political Section could arrange for the return trip of Colonel Panella which should take place without undue delay and thanks in advance for its kind interest in the matter.

SALEMAN, May 9th 1944.

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Only Digestion Phase I

~~Mr. Carson~~ ~~Cap~~

$$Q = 4.45 \times 10^4$$

1213

[illegible]

Capt. Pearson.

From Col. Quin Smith's minute I gather that he does not think that any useful purpose would be served by Panella going to Algiers.

In our opinion this question should be treated on its merits from a purely military point of view, so would it not be more proper for the Italian military authorities to take this up either with General Langley Browning or Col. Quin Smith? I do not think the Political Section nor their Staff section of A.F.H.Q.I.E., the British Resident Minister's office or the American Political Adviser, are concerned.

We should, however, be ready to take this case up with Mr. MacMillan or Mr. Murphy if Col. Quin Smith can show us any reason why they should interest themselves in it. If not, would he please take it over.

Political Section
16.5.44.

Army Section / In view of above, will you take up this matter through military channels first please?
17-5-44 / H. Pearson / Capt

Commando Submarine have as 4218
that he should return. Campbell.
Gen Inbenti spoke. P.A.C. 24/5/44

785020

(19)

Memorandum to: Office of the British Resident Minister
at Allied Force Headquarters,
ALGIERS.

From: Political Section,
Headquarters Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

No. 58.

31st March, 1944.

With reference to this Section's memorandum No. 28 of the 7th March, enclosing copy of a note from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Garibaldi Legion, the Ministry now enquire whether the Allied Authorities are willing to authorise Colonel Tanella's journey.

2. In the opinion of the Italian Government it would assist the common war effort if, in the near future, the Garibaldi Legion ^{were} able to take its place beside its Italian comrades in the line of battle, and to this end an exchange of views with Col. Tanella is considered necessary.

3. An extra copy of this memorandum is attached for Civil Affairs Section.

WHD

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

Nº 1574

7. remessa to R.R. W's office

Respon
Am
30/3

18

MEMORANDUM

for the

POLITICAL SECTION (A.J.C.)

With reference to Memorandum of March 1st n. 899 concerning the participation of the Garibaldi Legion in the war on the Italian front, it would be much appreciated if it would be possible to learn the decision of the Allied Authorities as to the voyage of Col. Panella, Chief of Staff of the Legion.

In this Ministry's opinion it would be useful to the common war effort if, in the near future, the Legion were enabled to take its place alongside its Italian comrades of the regular Army on the line of battle. For this reason an exchange of views with Col. Panella would be necessary.

SALERNO, March 27, 1944.

R.P.

Prod. 1/10/44
to Assec. Hopsler
G.M.B.

*Added 1st March
to Mr. Sec. Naples
JMK*

With reference to Memorandum of March 1st n. 809 concerning the participation of the Garibaldi Legion in the war on the Italian front, it would be much appreciated if it would be possible to learn the decision of the Allied Authorities as to the voyage of Col. Panella, Chief of Staff of the Legion.

In this Ministry's opinion it would be useful to the common war effort if, in the near future, the Legion were enabled to take its place alongside its Italian comrades of the regular army on the line of battle. For this reason an exchange of views with Col. Panella would be necessary.

R.P.

SAIERNO, March 27, 1941.

121b

*Added 1st March
to Mr. Sec. Naples
JMK*

785020

(17)

Memorandum to: British Resident Minister's Office
at Allied Force Headquarters,
5, Rue Professeur Curtillet,
ALGIER.

From: Political Section,
Headquarters Allied Control Commission,
APO 394.

No. 28.

7th March, 1944.

Attached are copies of memorandum No. 899 from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the foundation and history of the Garibaldi Legion, and requesting that Col. Panella, one of the legionnaires, may be allowed to come to Salerno to discuss the future of the Legion. It will be noted that a suggestion to this effect has already been cabled to Col. Panella through General Castellano in Algiers.

2. May the Political Section be advised in due course what reply should be given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

3. A copy of this memorandum and the enclosure are attached for the Civil Affairs Section.

WLB

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE

POLITICAL SECTION (A. C.C.)

In September 1939 General Sante Garibaldi founded in Paris a Garibaldi's Legion: its strength about 43,000 members; its object anti-fascist and anti-german. When the second world war broke out the Legion was partially mobilized and about 1500 Garibaldinians fought the Germans at Tours.

Following the Italo-French armistice of June 1940 and the total occupation of metropolitan France in 1943, the Legionnaires scattered and many of them managed to reach North Africa: amongst the latter there was Colonel Panella, Chief of Staff of the Legion. Lately the French Committee of National Liberation invited Col. Panella to reorganize the Legion as a Unit of the Free French Army in order to take part in the common struggle.

The Legionnaires, however, now that Italy is a co-belligerent of the United Nations would naturally prefer to fight on Italy's soil alongside the Italian Army.

Col. Panella

16
is there any objection
to this forwarding
the 200 and 1000
10/10/43

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The Legionnaires, however, now that Italy is a co-belligerent of the United Nations would naturally prefer to fight on Italy's soil alongside the Italian Army.

In the Garibaldinians request there is a moral and historical angle that can not be overlooked: their fighting here would constitute a link between the past and the present, between the wars of Risorgimento and the present struggle against Italy's traditional enemy.

It is therefore proposed that Col. Panella

./.

R. MINISTERO
DEGLI
AFFARI ESTERI

-2-

should come to Salerno to discuss the technical aspect and necessary details of the Legion's participation in the war: a suggestion to this effect has already been cabled to him through General Castellano in Algiers.

This Ministry would, however, be very grateful if the Political Section (A.C.C.) could expedite Colonel Panella's transportation from Algiers to Salerno.

Salerno, March 1st, 1944



1. There are two outgoing factors as follows:-
1. The Italian Armed Forces are subject to

war. a suggestion to this effect has already been called to him through General Castellano in Algiers.

This Ministry would, however, be very grateful if the Political Section (A.C.C.) could expedite Colonel Panella's transportation from Algiers to Salerno.

Salerno, March 1st, 1944



1. There are two ruling factors as follows:-
(a) Italian Armed Forces are subject to a certain ceiling. How many if 1212

troops?

(b) Italian Combat Troops are limited to 12,000; and Italian Security Troops are 14,000 (max) to 20,000

2 Carabinieri would have to come within the above provisions.

15 ✓
R. MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

P

COLL

TR.

SP.5

1

Nº. coll: 184

Telegramma in PARTENZA

Oggetto: Richiamo temperance Col. Pannella

Data: February 29, 1944

Tramite: C.A.C.

Diretto a: Generale Castellano, Italian Military Mission, ALGIERS

Testo: (originale)

Nº. 3- February 29(.) Please ask Col. Pannella to proceed to Salerno to report(.) Have approached Allied Control Commission with a view granting necessary facilities(.) Please confirm(.)

Prunas

505 - Pannella, Col.



Testo : (originale)

Nº 3- February 29(.) Please ask Col. Pannella to proceed
to Salerno to report(.) Have approached Allied Control Commission
with a view granting necessary facilities(.) Please confirm(.)

Prunas



505 - Pannella, Col.

1211

Consegnato a: C.A.C.

il: 1-1-44
f.a.

1 MAR 1944
Anno XXII

VIA AEREA

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No.

785020

785020

General Browning.

I explained matters on the lines of your note to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning, speaking personally with Del Balzo, who initialled the Ministry's latest memorandum of the 27th July. He said that he fully understood the position and had only one comment to make, namely, that Col. Penella had been summoned to Salerno at Marshal Badoglio's wish in February and that he did not know since then what Italian military authorities the Colonel had been in touch with.

In any case he would tell the Colonel to explain the position to the Italian Ministry of War and to ask them, if they thought fit, to discuss the matter further with the Army Sub Commission. I think that Del Balzo was in no doubt that this was the only channel for questions of this kind, i.e., Italian Ministry of War to Army Sub Commission.

Perhaps you would like to keep the whole of this file.

Political Section,
1.8.44.

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Perhaps you would like to keep the whole of this file.

Political Section,
L.S.M.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

1240

TRANSLATION NO. 50, - BONANNI

SUPREME COMMAND * MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR * MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS

OFFICE I

CABINET

CABINET

TO : THE MINISTRY OF WAR
THE MINISTRY OF THE NAVY
THE MINISTRY OF THE AIR FORCE
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ROYAL ARMY
THE HIGH COMMISSIONERS OF SICILY AND SARDINIA
THE PREFECTS OF LIBERATED ITALY

CABINET
CABINET
CABINET
P.M. 151

and for information,

TO : PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
UNDERSECRETARIAT OF POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMAND OF THE ROYAL CARABINIERI OF LIBERATED ITALY

CABINET
CABINET

SUBJECT : War Censorship -

As already known, the fallen fascist regime had taken away war censorship from the control of the Military Authorities in order to turn it into a political instrument.

With the change in the political situation it has been considered that for the duration of the war the censorship services are of a special military importance. Therefore, agreements have been reached between the interested Ministries and the Supreme Command to return such services to the Military Authorities.

In regard to the above, the following has been established:

- 1) The Provincial Commissions of Censorship are suppressed beginning June 15, 1944. From that date a Military Office of War Censorship will be formed in every chief city of province.
- 2) The Inspectorate of the Offices of Military Censorship is formed once again on the basis of article 1 of the "Regulations for the Operation of the Provincial offices of Postal Censorship", published by the War Ministry S.I.M. on October 1, 1935, and with subsequent changes.
- 3) The Military Offices of Censorship will report :

785020

- 2 -

- To the Supreme Command - Office I - Inspectorate of the Offices of Military Censorship - for matters established by the Supreme Command in agreement with the Allied Authorities.

Executive provisions will be issued in detail subsequently by the Supreme Command in accord with the Allied Authorities.

4) The Military Offices of War Censorship will be composed of :

Military personnel picked by the War Ministry.

Civilian personnel already employed by the Allies and attached at present to the Commissions, and recognised as being capable.

From one to three militarized employees appointed by each Provincial Office, of Post and Telegraphs, for the functioning of the Office, and not employed in censoring.

5) The highest ranking officer, or the senior officer (normally a Colonel or a Lieutenant Colonel) will be the Chief of the Office.

6) The Military Offices will depend upon:

a) The Supreme Command - Information Office - Inspectorate of the Offices of Military Censorship for technical employment.

b) The Command of the Territorial Army corps that has jurisdiction in the chief city of the province where the Office has its seat, for matters concerning discipline.

c) The local or the nearest Military District (which provides for the reimbursement of the expenses for the operation of the office), for administrative matters.

7) The staff of the military personnel of each office will be established by the Supreme Command, with the understanding that the Office Chiefs will have the power to suggest to the Supreme Command, through the respective Command of the Army Corps, any changes in the staff that may be required by the needs of the service.

1208

- 3 -

8) The Provincial Offices of Posts and Telegraphs will furnish as much as possible the premises and equipment necessary for the operation of the Military Offices of Censorship in their seats or nearby, so that the operation can be carried out in connection with the postal and telegraph service.

The office equipment at present in the possession of the Provincial Commissions of Censorship will be handed over to the Military Offices of Censorship which is being formed.

9) The civilian personnel (including the revisori at present employed in the Allied Offices) now attached to the Provincial Censorship Commission will continue to serve.

It can be discharged only for the following reasons:

-Poor service

-Lack of discipline

-If the personnel is found to be over-strength

10) The Prefects will order their permanent personnel to cease additional duties with censorship.

Transitory provisions:

The civilian personnel (same as the above) will be absorbed by the War Ministry and will receive the same wages that they are receiving at present.

The Ministry of War may later on suggest to the Ministry of Finance, in accord with the ACC, a uniform wage-scale for the Civil Censors.

11) Simultaneously with the above the Allied Authorities have ordered the following:

-while the higher control of all civil censorship will always remain in the hands of the Allied Authorities, the actual control on domestic mail and

1207

- 4 -

on telegrams will be handed over to the Italian Government in the territory under its jurisdiction; and from this territory the Allied censors will be withdrawn.

The following exceptions will be made to the above:

a) The border offices of Bari, Taranto, Palermo and Cagliari where the executive control of certain phases of censorship of letters addressed to foreign countries must remain in the hands of the Allies, and where therefore the complete executive control will be left to Allied Censors.

b) The Allied Authorities have reserved the right of making inspections of the Censorship work.

The censorship of all communications with foreign countries and of telephone calls will remain with the Allies.

THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF
/S/G.Messe

THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
/S/E.Aldisio

THE MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS
/S/F.Cerabona

Salerno, 19 May 1944

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
/S/ Fano

1200

EXTRACT FROM THE ITALIAN PRESS 'ITALIA NUOVA'
DATED 25 July 1944 regarding Marshal Messe.

It may happen that a General commanding an Italian Army in Russia be nominated after a big defeat Maresciallo. This adventure happened in reality to Von Paulus and Messe. It may also happen that the Maresciallo, back from prison, (POW), insist (for old habit) to call comrades the soldiers of the United Nations.

And it seems too that the comrade Maresciallo in his quality of President of the Commission of the purge of the Army had given orders that all the provisions regarding the future of all officers had to be sanctioned by him. The Romans had a saying very appropriate (who is guarding the guard?).

We do not want to discuss the military capacity of the young Maresciallo. We do not want to discuss his faith in Democracy because it is so recent that it cannot yet be doubted.

We think that the past of Maresciallo is not endowing him of the quality required for the work of purging the Army.

1230

*Told by Flaminio on 22 Feb
that Maresciallo left my mess
out against me etc*

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DRAFT

EWS/hjp

I have been advised by General Browning and Sir Noel Charles that in an informal discussion with you, Mr. MacMillan and Sir Noel on July 12th, General Browning advanced the view that, from a purely military viewpoint, the Italian Comando Supremo was a "fifth wheel" and should be abolished. General Browning further stated that after hearing his views, you were of the opinion that representations to this effect should be made to the Italian Government.

I have discussed this question in its broader phases with General Browning and have prepared a memorandum, copy attached, on which he and I are now in complete agreement.

He has therefore authorized me to say that, in view of the considerations set forth in the attached memorandum, he withdraws his recommendation --- made from a purely military point of view --- that the Comando Supremo be abolished.

I have worked closely with Marshal Messe since his return from U.K. in November 1943. He is purely a soldier and I have every confidence in his personal integrity and freedom from political activity. As set forth in the attached memorandum, I recommend that no action be taken at this time to press the government to abolish the Comando Supremo and propose to take no steps to this end unless you instruct me to the contrary.

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Encl.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner
1204

General Sir Henry Maitland, Wilson, GBE, KCB, DSO, ADC
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Allied Force Headquarters
APO 512

Told Stone on 25 Jul that I
could not agree to C.S.
on military grounds
Wary & Air Force S.O. 3 agree
with me 2.8 25 Jul

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

EWS/hjp

MEMORANDUM:

21 July 1944

COMANDO SUPREMO

The Italian Comando Supremo is the organ through which certain functions of the three Armed Force, Army, Navy and Air, are co-ordinated.

The Comando Supremo today has four main functions, 1. SIM (Military Intelligence Service); 2. Military Law and Justice; 3. General Administration; 4. Epuration.

The operations undertaken by SIM, which is directly under the command of the Comando Supremo, are so well known to Allied Military Intelligence and Security Authorities that no purpose is served here in discussing this service in detail. It does not seem practicable to separate SIM into three separate intelligence services-- Army, Navy and Air. It should remain under co-ordinated direction, but there may be grave repercussions if this organisation were to come under political direction, through the abolition of the Comando Supremo, rather than under its present military direction.

Recognising this same principle, ACC with AMI concurrence, recently transferred Italian civil censorship (mails, telegraph and telephone) from the political control of the Minister of Interior to the Comando Supremo, where it had been before MUSOLINI, for political intelligence purposes, transferred it to the Ministry of Interior. Public reaction was excellent. It is believed that if the Comando Supremo were abolished and civil censorship were restored to the Minister of Interior or to the Army, the public reaction would not be good.

Military Law and Justice. The Comando Supremo exercises control of wartime military penal justice. The institution, modification, the suppression of wartime military courts and the designation of the highest officials of such bodies is a function of the Comando Supremo. The Comando Supremo also issues, through proclamations, regulations having the force of law on matters concerning laws and penal procedure in wartime as well as judicial military organisation.

General Administration. The Comando Supremo co-ordinates policy as to disciplinary measures, general personnel rules, promotions, and, in particular, the nomination of general and flag officers. At the moment, the Comando Supremo has adopted a policy of opposing the creation of additional admirals and generals, notwithstanding, apparently, the strong desires on the part of

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Epuration and Defascistisation of Officers. This is a new function recently delegated by the Government to the Comando Supremo, and it seems obvious that something of the kind is necessary to insure that epuration is carried on in an identical manner in all three armed forces, free of political favouritism. If the Comando Supremo were abolished under Allied pressure, the public and press might feel that we desired to hinder the work of epuration.

Elimination of the Comando Supremo, in my judgment, would therefore have three unfortunate results;

- a. It would make the co-ordination of the Army, Navy and Air administration political rather than military.
- b. It would make the Italian services more acutely a political problem than they are today with damage to the war effort.
- c. At a time when the Italian public is clamouring for greater military effort by ITALY, the announcement of the abolition of the Comando

/Sheet 2

785020

Sheet 2

Supremo would have a most disquieting effect.

On the other hand, the Italian Armed Forces are directed operationally today by Allied military authorities and no executive action by the Comando Supremo counter to such Allied control can be permitted. Subject to this restriction, it is recommended that consideration of elimination of the Comando Supremo be deferred at this time.

1202

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