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Units + Formations Reorganization

NOV. ¹⁹⁴⁵ - MAR. 1947

TRANSLATION

From: Ministry of Defence.

Ref: 430/Ord/I

To : H.Q.s Infantry Divisions.
Land Forces Branch for info.

Date: 24 March 1947.

Subject:- Denomination of units of the infantry divisions.

1. There exist at the moment in the infantry divisions:
 - a) - units which have retained the designations of the units from which they were drawn at the time of the formation of the combat groups and which therefore have a very irregular numbering, of little use and not justified on the grounds of tradition and valour,
 - b) - units to which no designation has yet been given.

It is therefore apparent that it is necessary to revise the denominations of the a/m units.

2. To fix the denominations - partly taking into account what has already been learnt from practice - the following principles have been taken as a basis :

- services units

- a) assigned to the divisions on the W.E.:
 - to attribute to each unit only the name of the divisions to which it belongs:
i.e. "Friuli" medical section
 - to attribute, in case of more than one unit of the same type:
to field hospitals, being easily interchangeable, besides the name of the division, a progressive number independent of the division to which they belong:
i.e. 1st field hospital " Friuli"
2nd " " " Friuli"
3rd " " " Cremona"

to the light mobile workshops the name of the units to which they are assigned.

To See	
A/Q	
"Q"	
Q Liaison	
Q Maint	
Q (AE)	

I 50051

-2-

i.e. "87[^] inf regt" light mobile workshops
"2[^] cavalry" " " "

b)- not assigned to the divisions on the W.E. (auxiliary units): to attribute only a progressive number:

i.e. 1[^] surgical unit
2[^] " "
3[^] " "

- companies included in engineer and signals battalions:
to attribute a progressive number:

i.e. "Friuli" engineer battalion
1[^] engineer company
2[^] " "
3[^] field park company

- artillery trades units: to attribute the name of the division to which they belong:

i.e. "Friuli" artillery trades unit.

3. - The new denominations, shown in the attached list, will come into effect immediately.

Sgd. MARRAS
Gen.

R.A.G.

G. (501)

Q for wife.

Enclosure to letter 430/Ord/I dated
24 Mar 1947.

CHANGE OF DENOMINATIONS OF UNITS OF THE INFANTRY

DIVISIONS

Present denomination		Next denomination	
SERVICES			
26th	Medical Section	"Friuli" Medical Section	
54th	" "	"Cremona"	" "
51st	" "	"Legnano"	" "
184th	" "	"Folgore"	" "
104th	" "	"Mantova"	" "
82	Field Hospital	1st Friuli Field Hospital	
960	" "	2nd Friuli Field Hospital	
84	" "	3rd	"Cremona" " "
333	" "	4th	" " " "
244	" "	5th	"Legnano" " "
332	" "	6th	" " " "
516	" "	7th	"Folgore" " "
517	" "	8th	" " " "
248	" "	9th	"Mantova" " "
501	" "	10th	" " " "
Supply Section (denomination to be assigned)		"Friuli" Supply Section	
		"Cremona"	" "
		"Legnano"	" "
		"Folgore"	" "
		"Mantova"	" "
20th	Transport Unit	"Friuli" Transport Unit	
44th	" "	"Cremona"	" "
250th	" "	"Legnano"	" "
184th	" "	"Folgore"	" "
104th	" "	"Mantova"	" "

-2-

Mobile Workshop for Div. HQ.
(denomination to be assigned)

"Friuli" Div. Mobile Workshop
"Cremona" " " "
"Legnano" " " "
"Folgore" " " "
"Mantova" " " "

L.A.D. (denomination to be assigned)

L.A.D. (a)

Mobile Park (denomination to be assigned)

"Friuli Mobile Park
"Cremona" " "
"Legnano" " "
"Folgore" " "
"Mantova" " "

AUXILIARY UNITS

34th Surgical nucleus
130th " "
131st " "
216th " "
29th X Ray ambulance
133rd " "
113th Dental ambulance
114th " "
1st Bakery Section
2nd " "
316th " "
317th " "
318th " "

1st Surgical nucleus
2nd " "
3rd " "
4th " "
1st X Ray ambulance
2nd " "
1st Dental ambulance
2nd " "
1st Bakery Section
2nd " "
3rd " "
4th " "
5th " "

COMPANIES OF THE ENGR. BNs

"Friuli" Engr. Bn.

5th Engr. Coy
52nd " "
Field Park Coy

"Friuli" Engr. Bn.

1st Engr. Coy
2nd " "
3rd Field Park Coy.

-3-

"Cremona" Engr. Bn.

29th Engr. Coy.
 77th " "
 Field Park Coy.

"Legnano" Engr. Bn.

3rd Engr. Coy.
 51st " "
 Field Park Coy.

"Folgore" Engr. Bn.

10th Engr. Coy.
 184th " "
 Field Park Coy.

"Mantova" Engr. Bn.

4th Engr. Coy.
 79th " "
 Field Park Coy.

"Cremona" Engr. Bn.

1st Engr. Coy.
 2nd " "
 3rd Field Park Coy.

"Legnano" Engr. Coy.

1st Engr. Coy.
 2nd " "
 3rd Field Park Coy.

"Folgore" Engr. Bn.

1st Engr. Coy.
 2nd " "
 3rd Field Park Coy.

"Mantova" Engr. Bn.

1st Engr. Coy.
 2nd " "
 3rd Field Park Coy.

COMPANIES OF THE SIGNAL BNs."Friuli" Signal Bn.

Signal Coy for Div. HQs.
 " " " Infantry Regts.
 " " " Arty Regts.

"Cremona" Signal Bn.

Signal Coy for Div. HQs.
 " " " Infantry Regts.
 " " " Arty Regts.

"Legnano" Signal Bn.

Signal Coy for Div. HQs.
 " " " Infantry Regts.
 " " " Arty Regts.

"Folgore" Signal Bn.

Signal Coy for Div. HQs.
 " " " Infantry Regts.
 " " " Arty Regts.

"Friuli" Signal Bn.

1st Signal Coy (for Div. HQ.)
 2nd " " (for Infantry)
 3rd " " (for Arty)

"Cremona" Signal Bn.

1st Signal Coy (for Div. HQ.)
 2nd " " (for Infantry)
 3rd " " (for Arty)

"Legnano" Signal Bn.

1st Signal Coy (for Div. HQ)
 2nd " " (for Infantry)
 3rd " " (for Arty)

"Folgore" Signal Bn.

1st Signal Coy (for Div. Hq)
 2nd " " (for Infantry)
 3rd " " (for Arty)

-4-

"Mantova" Signal Bn.

Signal Coy for Div. HQs.
 " " " Infantry Regts.
 " " " Arty Regts.

"Mantova" Signal Bn.

1st Signal Coy (for Div. HQ)
 2nd " " (for Infantry)
 3rd " " (for Arty)

DIV. ARTILLERY TRADES UNITS.

Div. Artillery Trades Units
 (denomination to be assigned)

"Friuli" Div. Artillery Trades Unit.
 "Cremona" Div. Artillery Trades Unit.
 "Legnano" Div. Artillery Trades Unit.
 "Folgore" Div. Artillery Trades Unit.
 "Mantova" Div. Artillery Trades Unit.

NOTES

Denomination of the unit to which it is assigned.

JOINT PINKS HEADQUARTERS
Italian Military Affairs Section
Land Forces Sub Section
(formerly MIA)

33

Tel: 489084
Ext: 322

SECRET/8/10/47

21 Feb 47

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE-ARMY.
(For attention of Col. BALAZS).

Subject: Mantova Inf. Division.

1. It is suggested that the assistance of a
MIA officer would prove of great benefit to the Mantova
Inf. Division when deciding on the new locations and
arranging the moves of their workshops.

2. If you agree please inform this HQ and the
services of Capt. HORTON of 5 RM will be made available
for this purpose.

5th Army Command
John Meyer
for Major General,
Director.

PTAJ/cb

Copy to: O.G. 5 RM

Internal: 'q' (DAS) ←

To See	
AO	
"Q"	NBE
Q Liaison	
Q Maint	
Q (AE)	

R. 21/2/47
gmlw

I Sq. 051

COPY

SUBJECT: ORBAT - ECONOMIC FOR MANPOWER IN NEW ITALIAN ARMY

6 British Liaison Unit,
Tel: 217 Area 415
Ref: G/3/2
1st Oct '46

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG.
(MIA) ROME
for G(SD)

1. Within 6 Comiliter there are nine (9) Territorial Depots, none of which belong to any existing regiment.

Depots No 49-57
(Serials 515-523 ORBAT)
(No 4/4)

11 Inf Regt
35 Inf Regt
6 Autieri
3 Lorried Inf Regt
Lancers V.B.
3 Pd Artig Regt
21 Motorised Artig Regt
6 Heavy Artig Regt
2 Eng Bridging Regt.

2. The staff of these totals 63 offrs and 63 men.

3. In addition some 10 ORs are required from 6 Inf Regt to carry out guard duties at the depots.

4. In view of the ceiling permitted to the Italian Army, it is evident that the parent regiments, of the a/n depots, can never be reformed. It is, therefore, suggested that the Ministry of War be advised to close the depots, sell the materials which are of no further use to the Army and then effect an economy in manpower.

An exception might well be (although in the Republican Army the name would need changing) that of "Lancieri Vittorio Emanuele", if it is decided to retain this regiment as one of the "recess bns" of an Inf. Div.

5. These matters have been discussed with General CERIOA who states that he has constantly pointed out to the Ministry of War the necessity of cutting out all unnecessary units and depots which are only links with the past and have no value for the new Italian Army, which in his opinion should have every available man with actual field or active formations.

RCF/sb

Internal:

'A'

'Q'

SD/103

SD/92/1

32

(?)
Major
G.S.

1 50/051

COPY
TRANSLATION

FROM : MINISTRY OF WAR

REF: 4444/Ord/I

TO : M.M.I.A.

Date: 4 Sept 1946

SUBJECT: Designation of Units

Reply to your SD/112 of 27 August 1946.

This S.H. fully agrees with the proposals contained in the a/m letter.

The necessary executive instructions are being issued.

Sgd. Liassi, Gen.

ED Distribution

SD/112

A

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RE

SIGS

CC. RE.

TO	
A/Q	
Q	
Q 1	
Q 2	
ORD	
REME	

S/A 051 9/9/46 RE

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MINISTRY OF WAR
 SRE
 Services - IA & Engrs Secs

DIFFERENCE IN ALLOTMENT ON INF REQNS BETWEEN MIA AND THIS SERG (ORG AND MOB)

UNIT		Pistols	SMG 45 automatic	Rifles .303	Bren	Mortars		
						81mm	4.2"	2"
							(1)	
Inf HQ Regt. & Mortar Coy	MIA suggested Allotment	20	78	144	6	1	8	-
	Allotment finally agreed on							
	(Org & Mob of SRE)	+5	-46	+45	-1	+1		
		25 (20+5)	32 (11+21)	189 (144+45)	5	5	8	-
Inf Bn	MIA suggested Allotment	32	164	436	48	19	-	9
	Allotment finally agreed on							
	(Org & Mob of SRE)	+9	-2	+36		-4		
		41	162	472	48	15	-	9
Total Difference for an Inf Regt		+32	-52	+153	-1	-11		

(1) or 81 mm mortars.

MINISTRY OF WAR
 BUREAU
 SERVICES - RA & Engrs Sects

OF THE RECORDS BETWEEN MEDIA AND THIS DATE (ORG AND MOB)

Type	Rifles .303	Bren	Mortars				Vickers .303	Pi tol Signal	Rifle snipers
			Plat	1st (1)	2nd	3rd			
	144	6	4	8	-	-	-	-	-
6	+45 186 (82+98)	-1 5	+1 5	8	-	-	-	-	-
	136	48	19	-	9	6	8	39	7
2	+36 172	48	-4 15	-	9	6	8	39	7
52	+153	-1	-11						

S/R-05 (5)

OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : MONTA

DATE TIME
06 05 00 4

TO : 13 CORPS

REF : SD 3147

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

YOUR SIGNAL 1440 OF 1 (.)

ONE (.) POOL DIVIDED INTO CENTRAL POOL AND TWO DISTRICT
POOLS (.)

TWO (.) CENTRAL POOL UNDER DIRECT COMMAND MINISTRY OF WAR
AND THIS HQ LOCATED ROME AND PERSONNEL
AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION DISTRICT POOLS TO MEET
ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS AS THEY ARISE (.)
THREE (.) DISTRICT POOLS UNDER COMMAND DISTRICT HQS BUT
REINFORCED AND CONTROLLED BY MINISTRY OF WAR
THROUGH ADM REGT HQS WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE LOCAL
ADM (.)

FOUR (.) PROPOSE ADD SEPARATE POOL FOR 13 CORPS
COMPRISED AS YOU REQUIRE AND ADD NOTE THAT SENIOR
CAPT ACTS AS OC (.) POOL WILL THEN BE ADM AS
FOR DISTRICT POOLS (.)

FIVE (.) UNDERSTAND DISBANDMENT ORDER 862 ITALIAN LIAISON
UNIT BEING ISSUED BY GHQ (.) PROPOSE THAT PENDING
APPROVAL OF ADMT TO POOL OF ITALIAN LIAISON OFFERS
CM/884/1 PERSONNEL STILL REQUIRED BE ATTACHED 718
ADM REGT FOR ALL PURPOSES

THREE (.) DISTRICT POOLS UNDER COORDINATED DISTRICT
REINFORCED AND CONTROLLED BY MINISTRY OF WAR
THROUGH ADM REGT HQS. WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE LOCAL

ADM (.)

FOUR (.) PROPOSE ADD SEPARATE POOL FOR 13 CORPS
COMPRISED AS YOU REQUIRE AND ADD NOTE THAT SENIOR
CAPT ACTS AS OC (.) POOL WILL THEN BE ADM AS
FOR DISTRICT POOLS (.)

FIVE (.) UNDERSTAND DISBANDMENT ORDER 862 ITALIAN LIAISON
UNIT BEING ISSUED BY GHQ (.) PROPOSE THAT PENDING
APPROVAL OF ADM TO POOL OF ITALIAN LIAISON OFFERS
CM/384/1 PERSONNEL STILL REQUIRED BE ATTACHED 718
ADM REGT FOR ALL PURPOSES

PRECEDENCE

IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

Copy to: MINISTRY OF WAR

Internal: 2, 9, FILE: SD/18/2

JW

SQ.051

SECRET - IMMEDIATE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 8251/390/EC.

4. December 1945.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

In continuation of my 8251/EC of 28 Nov 45 and the discussion with Brigadier YATES on the above subject in my office, ROME, on 3 Dec 45:

1. General BROWNING saw Signor JACINI, the War Minister, personally immediately after the discussion, as agreed.

2. Signor JACINI accepted the following:

- (a) that the three (Combat) Infantry Divisions in the MILAN, TURIN and GENOA areas respectively should remain there;
- (b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, FOLGORE Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APPENNINES. He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible;
- (c) that FRIULI Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve FRIULI of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of BOLZANO Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:

505 Bn at BOLZANO with one company at MERANO,
508 Bn at TRENTO with one company at VERONA,
514 Bn moving to BRESSANONE area.

Signor JACINI would like the Independent Regiment HQ moved to BOLZANO and the three Battalions located at BOLZANO, MERANO and BRESSANONE respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be relieved of guard duties by Allied troops. He wishes the existing FRIULI units in TRENTO to remain, particularly bearing in mind the "symbolic" and political reasons in that important area, an aspect which he stressed generally throughout the discussion with General BROWNING.

3. In view of the above, which appears reasonable and suitable to AFHQ views, it is suggested that:

- (a) 5 District be ordered to make a recon and plan immediately in conjunction with Ministry of War through Land Forces Sub-Commission AG (MILIA) in order to allot suitable accommodation for the troops as in para 2(b) above.

quested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible:

- (c) that FRIULI Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve FRIULI of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of BOLZANO Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:

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5. In view of the above, which appears reasonable and suitable to AFHQ views, it is suggested that:

- (a) 3 District be ordered to make a recon and plan immediately in conjunction with Ministry of War through Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MILA) in order to allot suitable accommodation to POLICORE as in para 2(b) above, the necessity of finding a swift and reasonable solution even at the expense of closing up Allied troops being stressed.

- (b) 2 District be instructed to adjust locations of FRIULI and the BOLZANO Independent Regt as far as possible in accordance with para 2(c) above, in conjunction with General NEGRONI, Commanding BOLZANO Territorial Region through No. 4 B.L.U. accredited to General NEGRONI's HQ.

5/12 RLB
G Dist
M/C G/10
Info PA to GOC
Info Cols through HQ all over
Info Bol N/C
Info ST (two)
Info cc.

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8/2054

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-2-

(c) FOLCORE to remain in its present location till its move direct to its new area SOUTH of the APPENNINES, in order to avoid a double move - FOLCORE meanwhile being ordered to stand by to move at short notice.

MSA

EMERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ
Land Forces S/C (MILA) (20)
Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Venetia Region
IO No. 2 District
HQ 2 District
HQ 3 District

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Ref: 6251/EC.

28. November 1945

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces

TO: AFHQ (for Chief of Staff)

1. HISTORY

(a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces, and therefore must consider now the ultimate disposition of the various formations and units.

(b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brigadier XATIS and Major General BROWNING/Brigadier LUSH recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signals FX 54297 dated 24 November and FX 54298 dated 25 November.

(c) As a result of this, Colonel PIDSLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission, AC) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 November with Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and discussed the whole matter with GOC 8 District, returning to ROME on Sunday, 25 November.

(d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a conference with Signor JACINI, still functioning as Minister of War, on 26 November, by Brigadier LUSH and General BROWNING.

(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS

(a) The Eastern frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 Corps.

(b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to retain troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult security situation are involved.

(c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also be on Italian responsibility.

24 November with Executive Committee with GOC 3 District, re-
and discussed the whole matter with GOC 3 District, re-
turning to ROME on Sunday, 25 November.

(d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government,
the matter was discussed at a conference with Signor
JACINI, still functioning as Minister of War, on 26 Nov-
ember, by Brigadier LUSH and General BROWNING.

(e) The following represents the views of the Allied
Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Gov-
ernment as stated by Signor JACINI.

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- (b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian con-
trol. The Italians therefore must be permitted to retain
troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult
security situation are involved.
- (c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also
be an Italian responsibility. The withdrawal of British
troops from the French frontier introduces a delicate
situation. To avoid incidents, it is advisable that no
major move of Italian troops to that frontier should be
made, though limited patrol movement is necessary to avoid
French infiltration.

b. but

At 6/10

Info RA to GOC

Info Coss from Col Albert

Col A/Q

A.

ST (100)

cc

5/12

Rif

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(d) The internal security question will be dealt with by Italian troops in the following order of employment:

- (i) CC.RR
- (ii) CC.RR mobile columns
- (iii) Independent Regiments (see also Para 3(a) below)
- (iv) Combat Divisions.

The main function of Combat Divisions therefore is frontier defence and only in cases of extreme urgency should they be used for internal security.

(e) The resignation of the present Italian Government on 24 November, complicates the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

(f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal law and order will rest with the Italian Government, subject to SAC's over-riding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to bind themselves in advance to a fixed distribution of their available Forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Infantry Divisions for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

3. MILITARY FACTORS

(a) Excluding services and headquarters and training installations, the following FIGHTING TROOPS are available:-

(i) Five Infantry Divisions (PRIULI, CREMONA, LEGNANO, FOLGORE, MANTOVA). These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are up to WF as follows:-

Total Division.	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment.....	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion.....	770
Artillery Regiment.....	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

(ii) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WF:-

Total Regiment..	2,500
Each Battalion	800

One Regiment per Territorial Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B") but Battalions are up to WF.

(i) Five Infantry Divisions (PARMA, CREMONA, LEGNANO, FOLGORE, MANTOVA). These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are up to WE as follows:-

Total Division.....	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment.....	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion.....	770
Artillery Regiment.....	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

(ii) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WE:-

Total Regiment.....	2,500
Each Battalion.....	800

One Regiment per Territorial Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B") but Battalions are up to WE.

(iii) Three IS Divisions of two Brigades each of two Regiments of two Battalions. Vide Appendix "B", SABAUDA and ACSTA IS Divisions in SICILY are at 90% of WE, while CALABRIA IS Division in SARDINIA is approximately at 80% of WE viz:-

Total IS Division.....	5,000
Each Brigade.....	2,200
Each Regiment.....	1,000
Each Battalion.....	530

They are equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

(b) A large part of the Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments are employed on guarding dumps and installations, and are widely dispersed. Supervision and training to any major extent is thus not possible at present. The present state of training is low in consequence, and further because there has been a heavy change-over of personnel due to:-

(i) Reduction in strength compared with that at the time of the German surrender.

(ii) Demobilisation of older classes - which is continuing.

(iii) Reduction of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units and transfer of soldiers of military age to formations as above.

The greater part of the older and better trained men and of tradesmen and specialists have been or are about to be released from the Army. Replacements are being trained at the maximum speed. To restore the efficiency of the Army, it is advisable that formations be relieved of their extensive guard duties and concentrated as far as possible in order to undertake controlled and extensive training.

Should, as is desirable for standardisation and other reasons, Independent Regiments and IS Divisions be equipped with British equipment, the necessity for intensive training will be further increased.

(c) AFHQ view is that apart from possible frontier trouble, the probable areas for employment of the strategic reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the HEEL of ITALY. They consider that this points to a distribution of three Infantry Divisions NORTH of the APPENNINES and two SOUTH.

(d) Morale, particularly in the Infantry and IS Divisions, is reasonably good at present. Italian officers and men regard service near the frontier as an honour, and would view a move from the frontier southwards as a withdrawal, especially if without Allied or Italian replacement. The War Ministry has similar views from a political and prestige angle.

Each Infantry Division has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move southwards. Much would depend on the published reason for the move.

(e) Any move southwards would ease the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical

equipped with Divisional training will be further increased.

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Each Infantry Division has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move southwards. Much would depend on the published reason for the move.

(e) Any move southwards would ease the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical locations of Independent Regiments and other permanent Italian military installations. Climate in the South favours a move in this direction during the winter.

GOC, 2 District from the accommodation point of view would like one Infantry Division at any rate moved south of the APPENNINES. He can let FRIULI stay, with an

adjustment of its area locally. LEGNANO and CREMONA do not interfere - nor does MANTOVA. From 2 District point of view, therefore, a move of FOLCORE SOUTH of the APPENNINES would be adequate as regards the accommodation angle.

On the other hand, 2 District stated that there were large areas which they were not using or from which they were withdrawing Allied troops, and that adequate accommodation for one Italian Division (thus accommodating all five such North of the APPENNINES) might well be found after recon., particularly in the area MANTOVA - MODENA - PIACENZA. The Italians also consider that this should be possible.

It is understood that AFHQ have ordered FOLCORE to move to the BRESCIA area, the move to be completed by 10 December.

(f) Provided bids for rail transportation or POL were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.

(g) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or POL.

4. At the discussion with Signor JACINI on 26 November he stated the Italian Government's views as follows:...

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Infantry Divisions of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the question:

- (a) Military
- (b) Internal political
- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being sea. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely populated agricultural areas of the South. To hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY. ROME is well catered for and in any case the key of ROME is MILAN. Southern areas, such as BARI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem. In any event, Independent Regiments are there as a reserve.

As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Infantry Division in the GENOVA area.

Divisions of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the question:

- (a) Military
- (b) Internal political
- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being sea. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely populated agricultural areas of the South. Who hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY. ROME is well catered for and in any case the key of ROME is MILAN. Southern areas, such as BARI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem. In any event, Independent Regiments are there as a reserve.

As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Infantry Division in the GENOA Area, but as MANTOVA Division are esconced there and their accommodation is not wanted by the Allies, they would like to leave MANTOVA in situ to avoid a move.

The fifth Infantry Division (FOLGORE) should be somewhere in the PO Valley if accommodation can be found, which the Italians think is possible (see third Sub-para of 3(e) above). Failing this, FOLGORE should be as close to BOLZANO as possible.

To sum up, the Italian Government, who will shortly be in operational control of these Divisions would prefer to locate all

five Infantry Divisions North of the APPENNINES. But, if pressed, they would agree to moving one SOUTH of the APPENNINES as near BOLOGNA as possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) IS Divisions to remain in situ.
- (b) Independent Regiments to remain in projected locations and be constituted up to full WE as soon as possible.
- (c) LEGNANO, CREMONA and MANTOVA to remain in situ.
- (d) Locations of FRIULI to be readjusted locally with 2 District to enable this Division to guard the ALTO ADIGE.
- (e) A recce. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District to discover whether FOLGORE can be accommodated in the PO Valley.
- (f) A simultaneous recce. to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of FOLGORE South of the APPENNINES in case the recce. as in (e) does not succeed.
- (g) No administrative difficulty over FOLGORE move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.
- (h) It is advisable to relieve Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments of guard duties, to enable them to train.
- (i) It is strongly recommended, with full concurrence of GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC (MIA) that proposals (j) - (f) above be accepted, that the FOLGORE Division be located as near to the PO Valley as possible and that AFHQ:

(i) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY;

(ii) give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence;

(a) On ITALO-AUSTRIA frontier;

(b) on ITALO-FRENCH frontier.

COPY TO: *US AFHQ*
Land Forces S/G (MIA)

Elmer W. Stone
ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

to train.

(1) It is strongly recommended, with full concurrence of GOC Land Force Sub-Commission, AC (MIA) that proposals (f) - (f) above be accepted, that the POLCORE Division be located as near to the PO Valley as possible and that AFHQ:

(i) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY:

(ii) Give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence:

(a) On ITALO-AUSTRIA frontier;

(b) on ITALO-FRENCH frontier.

W. W. Stone

ELDERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

COPY TO:

US AFHQ
Land Force S/C (MIA)
Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Venezia Region
LO NO. 2 District
Executive Commissioner
HQ, NO. 2 DISTRICT
HQ, NO. 3 DISTRICT - 5 -

APPENDIX "A"

Phone conversation Brig. YATES/Gen BROWNING at 1000 hrs - 23 Nov 4

1. C.G.S., A.F.H.Q. wishes me to see the Italian Government and persuade them to:-

- (a) Move FRIULI and FOLGORE out of BOLZANO Area.
- (b) Move two Combat Divs South of the APPENNINES.

2. A.F.H.Q.'s view is as follows:-

(a) The Italians need an efficient Army and we are prepared to give it to them.

(b) The Combat Divisions cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

(d) In any event, FRIULI and FOLGORE must move out of BOLZANO Area because:-

(1) The area is not suitable for training;

(ii) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES and two South.

(f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration over-ride necessary military ones.

(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

(d) In any event, FRIULI and FOLGORE must move out of BOLZANO Area because:-

(1) The area is not suitable for training;

(11) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES and two South.

(f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration over-ride necessary military ones.

(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

3. Brig. YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an order from A.F.H.Q. and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-arrange their administrative plan.

4. Gen. BROWNING stated that this was all a matter for "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C." and that therefore it would have to be tackled in full conjunction with Chief Commissioner, A.C. Brig. YATES agreed.

23 Nov. 45

Signed: L. Browning,
Maj. Gen.

APPENDIX "B"

LOCATIONS

LEVICO
BASSANO DEL GRAPPA
S. BONIFACIO
TRENTO
LEVICO
various

BRESSANONE
DOBBIAICO
BOLZANO
COLLE ISARCO
ORTISEI
VARIOUS

TURIN
ASTI
VERCELLI
CHIERI
CASAL MONFERRATO
VARIOUS

BERGAMO
BERGAMO
SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

TURIN
GENOA
BRESCIA
VERONA
PADUA
MODENA

UNITFRIULI DIV.

- HQ
- 87 Inf. Regt.
- 88 Inf. Regt.
- 35 Arty. Regt.
- 120 Eng. Bn.
- Services

FOLGORE DIV.

- HQ
- Nembo Regt.
- Garibaldi Regt.
- 124 Arty. Regt.
- 184 Eng. Bn.
- Services

CREMONA DIV.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGNANO DIV.

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA DIV.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 166 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

I.S. Regts.

No 1 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
No 2 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
No 3 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
No 4 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
No 5 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
No 6 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
No 7 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA Div.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 168 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

I.S. Regts.

- | | | |
|-------|-----------|---------|
| No 1 | I.S. Regt | (2 Bns) |
| No 2 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 3 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 4 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 5 | I.S. Regt | (2 Bns) |
| No 6 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 7 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 8 | I.S. Regt | (1 Bn) |
| No 9 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |
| No 10 | I.S. Regt | (3 Bns) |

SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

TURIN
GENOA
BRESCIA
VERONA
PADUA
MODENA
LUCCA
VITERBO
BARI
NAPOLI

1 2 2 3

785020

APPENDIX "B"

LOCATIONS

LATERINA
VITERBO
VITERBO
AREZZO
ROME

MESSINA
PALERMO
CAGLIARI

UNIT

Miscellaneous Guard Bns.

- 513 Guard Bn
- 528 Guard Bn
- 529 Guard Bn
- 515 Guard Bn
- Grenadier Bn

I.S. Divs

SABAUDA DIV
AOSTA DIV
Cagliario Div

1224

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO.

785020

OUTGOING SIGNAL

(14)

FROM : NMIA

DATE 28 TIME A

TO : AFHQ

INFO : ALCON
DISTWO
DISTWHEE

REF : C - 134

SECRET

REF YOUR FX 54297 AND FX 54298 BOTH DATED 24 (.) VIEWS
OF DISTWO, ALCON AND ITALIAN MINISTRY OF
WAR HAVE BEEN OBTAINED AND COORDINATED (.) AS REQUIRED
BY LAST SENTENCE OF FX 54297, DETAILED APPRECIATION UNDER
SIGNATURE CHIEF COMMISSIONER ALCON
FOLLOWS SOONEST

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

AUTENTICATED

INTERNAL:

FILE : C/10

Jw 28 Nov 45.

28/11
R
66

5/9/054

RAC

225

785020

CONFIDENTIAL SIGNAL

SEE 12-0141

FROM : AMHQ BICORD SACRED CITY STREET

TO : RMLA

INFO : DISTRO
DINTHREE
ALGER

R&F : PX 54297

24 1239 A

SECRET

IMPORTANT

13

Rae

REFERENCE DISTRO CABLE SD1/2574 OF 20 NOV AND CONFIRMING VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED ALREADY (.) ONE (.) RELIEF OF ITALIAN GRUPTI FROM GUARD DUTIES IN DISTRO IS BEING IMPED BY FACT THAT SUFFICIENT ACCOMMODATION FOR RELIEVING TROOPS DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS ON BELIEF A PROPORTION OF GRUPTI ARE MOVED OUT OF DISTRO (.) TWO (.) IT IS APPROVED POLICY THAT ITALIAN ARMY WHICH WE ARE IN PROCESS OF RETURNING TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL SHALL BE RAISED TO HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE (.) IT WILL BE APPRECIATED THAT THIS CAN NOT BE DONE AS LONG AS IT REMAINS LARGELY EMPLOYED ON GUARD AND OTHER STATIC DUTIES NOR CAN IT BE CONSIDERED AS AVAILABLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES WHILE SO EMPLOYED (.) PLANS HAVE THEREFORE BEEN MADE TO RELIEVE ALL ITALIAN TROOPS FROM GUARD DUTIES (.) THREE (.) THEN RETURNED TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL THE FIVE ITALIAN GRUPTI WILL FORM THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGIC RESERVE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE LOCATED ACCORDINGLY (.) FOUR (.) BEARING IN MIND THE AREAS IN WHICH INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS ARE POSSIBLE AFTER THE NORTHERN PROVINCES HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE GRUPTI SHOULD BE LOCATED GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS: (A) THREE GRUPTI NORTH OF THE APENNINES (B) TWO GRUPTI SOUTH OF THE APENNINES (.) FIVE (.) YOU ARE REQUESTED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF WAR TO THE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF GRUPTI SHOWN IN PARA 4 ABOVE ON RECEIPT OF WHICH DETAILED MOVE ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED BY THIS HQ (.) IN THE EVENT THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF WAR DOES NOT AGREE YOU SHOULD FORWARD THEIR REASONS AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

27/11 R

'G' DISTRIBUTION: ACTION: C/10-INFO: SD/43/1, A, C

SEE 14

5/8/05

785020

SECRET

AF 801

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
ATO 512/WP
: : : : :
: S E C R E T :
: Auth: SAC, MT :
: Initials: *WAC* :
: Date: 17 Nov 1945 :
: : : : :

AG 370.5 MATH-O

17 November 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army Movement.

TO: All Concerned.

Paragraph 2, letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above,
dated 10 November 1945, is amended as follows:

"2. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army now held in the ITI-ITI Category, together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI Category, will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government, except as stated in paragraph 5 of the letter cited in paragraph 1, above."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

M. Francis Aman
M. FRANCES AMAN
1st Lt, AD
Asst Adjutant General

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5 - CG, Peninsular Base Section	2 - G-4 (A)	1 - Claims &
5 - CG, Rome Area Allied Command	1 - TEN (A)	Hirings
5 - British Ministry of Supply	1 - CGS, GHQ CMF	1 - Q (AF)
5 - OFLC	1 - Dep Mil Sec	1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
5 - C-in-C Mediterranean	1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF	1 - R&F
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1 - SACS	1 - "A" (Br)	2 - TEN, GHQ CMF
1 - CAO	1 - GHQ 2d Echelon	1 - Civil Affairs,
1 - G-2	1 - Medical, GHQ CMF	GHQ CMF
1 - Signals	1 - Pay, GHQ CMF	60 - MATH, AFHQ
1 - FVB	1 - GS(I), GHQ CMF	2 - AG Records
1 - G-3, AFHQ	10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF	1 - AG M&D
1 - Pet Sec	1 - RE, GHQ CMF	
1 - G-5	1 - Signals, GHQ CMF	
1 - UNFOLAD	1 - Log Plans	
1 - BR RES MIN	1 - Q (Maint)	

SECRET

1227

785020

(10)

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FROM : MILA

TO : DISINFO

INFO : CHQ COM
 13 GORES
 DISINFORM
 50 BLU
 51 BLU
 52 BLU
 53 BLU
 56 BLU
 MILA LO NW ITALY
 7 AGRA
 59 AREA
 217 AREA
 60 SUB AREA

CONFIDENTIAL

50/05u

(9)

AMEND MY SD/92/3 DATED 08 AS FOLLOWS

ONE (.) PARA 1 PHASE 1 AFTER QUOTE 15 NOV 45 UNQUOTE
 ADD QUOTE TROL THOSE UNITS WHICH BY REASON OF BEING
 IN AMG TERRITORY REMAIN TEMPORARILY UNDER ALLIED
 OPERATIONAL COMD CIL. BUT WHICH FOR ALL OTHER PURPOSES
 REMAIN UNDER THOSE UNITS UNQUOTE (.)

TWO (.) PARA 2 (4) AFTER QUOTE UNDER ITALIAN OR COMD
 UNQUOTE QUOTE EXCEPT THOSE UNITS WHICH BY REASON
 OF BEING IN AMG TERRITORY REMAIN TEMPORARILY UNDER
 ALLIED OF COMD UNQUOTE (.) ALL INFO

228

785020

SD 3055

CONFIDENTIAL

AMEND MY SD/92/3 DATED 08 AS FOLLOWS

ONE

(.) PARA. 1 PHRASE 1 AFTER QUOTE 15 NOV 45 UNQUOTE
ADD QUOTE INCL THOSE UNITS WHICH BY REASON OF BEING
IN ANG TERRITORY REMAIN TEMPORARILY UNDER ALLIED
OPERATIONAL COMD CMA. BUT WHICH FOR ALL OTHER PURPOSES
REMAINE IN-ALL UNITS UNQUOTE (.)

TWO

(.) PARA 2 (.) AFTER QUOTE UNDER TITLISH OF COMD
UNQUOTE QUOTE EXCEPT THOSE UNITS WHICH BY REASON
OF BEING IN ANG TERRITORY REMAIN TEMPORARILY UNDER
ALLIED OR COMD UNQUOTE (.) ALL INCL

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

AUTHENTICATED

Atty Gen's Cy

003

INITIAL :

Q (Two)
ST (Two)
Med
RTE
Ord
WE
Z
SD/106
SD/94
War Diary (Two)

15/11 R. 16.

110/101

1 2 2 9
SECRET

13 794

17M IA Alcom
(1-5)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

DCI/wp

SECRET
:Avon: SAC, MT
:Initials: *P.K.*
:Date: 10 Nov 1945
10 November 1945

AG 370.5 MATN-O

SUBJECT: Italian Army Movement.

TO: All Concerned.

Christenberry
SD Q. (2)
G (1)

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, file AG 091.711 G(SD)-O, dated 2 November 1945, subject: "Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government".

2. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army now held in the ITI-ITI Category, together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI Category, will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government.

3. The Italian Government will also assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri on that date.

4. From 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will be responsible for arranging the movement of Italian Army units, personnel and stores except as detailed in paragraph 6. It will place bids for movement on the Allied military authorities only when transportation facilities are directly controlled by those authorities.

5. As regards rail movement, the Italian Government will make arrangements directly with the Italian State Railways for the movement of units, personnel and stores, informing the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) and Transportation Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ITALY as required. Such movement will be subject to the provisions of letter, this headquarters, file AG 531 TPN-O, dated 17 October 1945, subject: "Operation and Control of Italian Railways" - eg, the Italian State Railways will at all times give first priority to the movement of Allied military traffic.

6. The Allied military authorities will continue as at present to arrange the movement of personnel and units which remain in the US-ITI or BR-ITI Category and their reinforcements, and of units which are under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. They will also be responsible for movement of stores which are supplied through US or British service channels.

7. Movements Liaison Officer, MMIA will be withdrawn on 15 November 1945. Henceforward, MMIA will deal directly with Allied Force Headquarters on movement matters affecting the Allied military authorities.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

TS/A/3
9005 — *C. W. Christenberry*

C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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(See Reverse Side)

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 370.5 M&TH-O,
 dtd 10 November 45 (Cont'd)

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 1 - SACS
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 1 - G-3, AFHQ
 1 - Pot Sec
 1 - G-5
 1 - USPOLAD
 1 - BR RES MIN
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 1 - Fiscal Director
 1 - G-3, MTOUSA
 2 - G-4 (A)
 1 - TPN (A)
 1 - CGS, GHQ CMF
 1 - Dep Mil Sec
 1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF
 1 - Financial Advisor
 1 - "A" (Br)
 1 - GHQ 2d Echelon
 1 - Medical, GHQ CMF
 1 - Pay, GHQ CMF
 1 - GS(I), GHQ CMF
 10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF
 1 - RE, GHQ CMF
 1 - Signals, GHQ CMF
 1 - Log Plans
 1 - Q (Maint)
 1 - S&T
 1 - Postal, GHQ CMF
 1 - Labour
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 1 - Q (AE)
 1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
 1 - REME
 1 - Q (MOV)
 2 - TPN, GHQ CMF
 1 - Civil Affairs, GHQ CMF
 60 - M&TH, AFHQ
 2 - AG Records
 1 - AG M&D

~~SECRET~~

COPY INCOMING SIGNALS/8054
081950 A (H)

FROM : DISTWO
TO : 7 AGRA - 59 AREA - 217 AREA
60 SUB AREA
INFO : GHQ CMF - MMIA - MMIA LO NW ITALY
50 BLU - 51 BLU - 52 BLU - 53 BLU
56 BLU
REF : GO/4116

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT FUTURE OF BLU ATT TO COMBAT GROUPS (.)
OBVIOUS THERE IS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING AND
FOLLOWING BRIEF IS CORRECT AND ACCORDING TO
GHQ CMF AND MMIA ORDERS (.)

- 1 (.) EFFECTIVE 142400 A NOV ITALIAN COMBAT TPS IN
ITALIAN GOVT CONTROLLED TERRITORY REVERT TO
CONTROL OF ITALIAN GOVT (.) ITALIAN COMBAT TPS
IN AMG CONTROLLED TERRITORY REMAIN UNDER OF COMD
THIS HQ AND UNDER ADM COMD OF THE ITALIAN
TERRITORIAL COMD IN WHICH THEY ARE (.)
- 2 (.) SAME DATE TIME BLUS NOW WITH GROUPS ATTACHED TO
HQ OF CERTAIN TERRITORIAL COMDS WHERE THEY WILL
CONTINUE TO LIAISE BETWEEN GROUPS AND AREA OR
SUB AREA HQS (.)
- 3 (.) THERE IS NO RPT NO CHANGE OF TERRITORY FROM AMG
TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL ON THIS DATE (.)
- 4 (.) REPS BLUS WILL STAY WITH COMBAT GROUPS UNTIL 14
NOV ALTHOUGH MANY OFFRS AND PERSONNEL WILL MOVE
BEFORE THEN TO TERRITORIAL COMDS (.)
- 5 (.) LETTER FOLLOWS

SD DISTRIBUTION - ACTION : G/8 ; INFO : A, Q (two)

sb 9 Nov 45
10th R&P

785020

SECRET 789

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711 G(SD)-0

MFA/vp
: : : : :
: SECRET :
: Auth: SAC, MI :
: Initials: *M. H.* :
: Date: 2 Nov 1945 :
: : : : :
2 November 1945

SUBJECT: Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government.

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)

S/R 054

I. GENERAL.

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organization, training and administration.

II. HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

a. US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to nil. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

b. Administration and maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

9/11 R 66

S/R 054

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and overriding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

a. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theater, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

b. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

c. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

a. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

b. The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MFA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MFA) will shortly be issued.

III. FUTURE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organization. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

SECRET
SECRET

SECRET

tr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-O,
atd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

a. Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men,
two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000.

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
territorial regions on mainland 25,000.

Total 40,000.

b. Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

Total 50,000.

c. Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region.

Headquarters Total 9,000.

d. Administration. Total 31,000.

e. Training and Reinforcements.

Total 10,000.

140,000.

8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA).

10. Administration.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

b. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

c. BRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

d. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

b. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardization of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri:

- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorized by Allied Force Headquarters.
- (2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.
- (3) Through the Italian Government import program.

c. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 b above, will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import program, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11 b, above:

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

- (1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 c, below.
- (2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures.

d. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import program.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organizations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

a. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

b. Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

c. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

a. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MMIA are rescinded.

b. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 b (2), above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting.

a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in sub-paragraphs b and c below, will apply.

b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

c. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BRI-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through ANLC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

(See Next Page)

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
 dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

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 5 - GOC, Number 3 District
 5 - CG, Peninsular Base Section
 5 - CG, Rome Area Allied Command
 5 - British Ministry of Supply
 5 - ANLC
 5 - C-in-C Mediterranean
 5 - Air HQ RAF, Italy
 1 - SACS
 1 - CAO
 1 - G-2
 1 - Signals
 1 - PWB
 1 - G-3, AFHQ
 1 - Pot Sec
 1 - G-5
 1 - USPOLAD
 1 - BR RES MIN
 1 - CG, MTOUSA
 1 - G-1 (A)
 1 - Surgeon (A)
 1 - Fiscal Director
 1 - G-3, MTOUSA
 1 - Engr (A)
 1 - G-4 (A)
 2 - OM
 1 - Ord (A)
 1 - TPN (A)
 1 - CGS, GHQ CMF
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 1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF
 1 - Financial Advisor
 1 - "A"
 1 - GHQ 2d Echelon
 1 - Medical, GHQ CMF
 1 - Pay, GHQ CMF
 1 - GS(I), GHQ CMF
 10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF
 1 - RE, GHQ CMF
 1 - Signals, GHQ CMF
 1 - Log Plans
 1 - Q (Maint)
 1 - S&T
 1 - Postal, GHQ CMF
 1 - Labour
 1 - Claims & Hirings
 1 - Q (AE)

1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
 1 - REME
 1 - Q (MOV)
 2 - TPN, GHQ CMF
 1 - Civil Affairs, GHQ CMF
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SECRET

1 2 3 9