

785020

ACC

10000/120/2037

Im

Aug

Interim Army

Aug. 1945 - Sept. 1946

CCPV/eg.

(33)

Subject:- ISSUE OF BRITISH WEAPONS TO
ROME TERRITORIAL COMMAND.

8 British Liaison Unit,
 C.M.F.
 Tel. Rome - 84,3140.
 58/Q

24 September 1946.

To :- Headquarters,
 M.M.I.A.

WP
vide 8 BLO report
for Sep 46
WP

On the verbal request of Col. A/Q M.M.I.A. attached
 is an appendix showing present holdings of British weapons issued
 to 1st. Regt. Granatieri.

Weapons in excess of present strengths of units are
 held centrally by units concerned.

RHC/eg.

R.H. CHARLES, Major.
 G.S.O.II

TO	
A/Q	WP
Q	
C.I.	
C.O.	
C.M.	
REMI	

2/10/46
pa

Isa/054

CCFY./eg.

PRESENT HOLDINGS OF BRITISH WEAPONS.

	<u>Regtl. HQ</u>			<u>1st.Bn.</u>			<u>2nd.Bn.</u>			<u>3rd.Bn.</u>			<u>Mortar Coy.</u>			
	Holdings	WE	+ -	Holdings	WE	+ -	Holdings	WE	+ -	Holdings	WE	+ -	Holdings	WE	+ -	TOTALS.
RIFLES.	88	86	+2	468	472	-4	472	472	-	472	472	-	98	94	+4	+2
BRENS		NIL		46	48	-2	48	48	-	48	48	-	5	5	-	-2
P.I.A.T.	2	2	-	14	15	-1	15	15	-	15	15	-	2	2	-	-1
T.S.M.G.	-	12	-12	-	162	-162	-	162	-162	-	162	-162	-	25	-25	-523.

N.B. The present holdings include the 1602 rifles issued as reported under this unit Monthly Report for August 1946. Rome Territorial Command report however that on arrival the following arms were found unserviceable - 4 rifles, 2 Brens, and 1 P.I.A.T.

COPY./eg.

PRESENT HOLDINGS OF BRITISH WEAPONS.

<u>1st. Bn.</u>		<u>2nd. Bn.</u>		<u>3rd. Bn.</u>		<u>Mortar Coy.</u>			
WE	+ -	Holdings	WE	+ -	Holdings	WE	+ -	Holdings	WE - + - TOTALS.
472	-4	472	472	-	472	472	-	98	94 +4 +2
48	-2	48	48	-	48	48	-	5	5 - -2
15	-1	15	15	-	15	15	-	2	2 - -1
162	-162	-	162	-162	-	162	-162	-	25 -25 -523.

holdings include the 1602 rifles issued as reported under this unit Monthly August 1946. Rome Territorial Command report however that on arrival the arms were found unserviceable - 4 rifles, 2 Brens, and 1 P.I.A.T.

SECRET

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES

Anne

Serial	Unit	British					Italian.		
		Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles	Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles
Part 2	Inf Divs (5)	1,574	1,512	252	3,546	391	-	-	-
Part 3	Internal Security Divs (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	157	112
Part 4	Independent Regts (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	134	57
Part 5	Trg. Bats	52	133	15	286	15	-	-	-
Part 6	Services (Adm Units)	-	-	-	-	-	-	405	502
Part 7	CC.RR	45	300	-	8	-	159	1,046	627
	RESERVE								
	GRAND TOTAL	1,671	1,945	267	3,840	406	159	1,742	1,298

(32)

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES



Annexure ZA to SQ.054 dated
4 Jan 46.

British				Italian.				
Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles	Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles.
512	252	3,546	391	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	157	112	221	5
-	-	-	-	-	134	57	189	5
133	15	286	15	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	405	502	1,351	190
300	-	8	-	159	1,046	627	252	87
945	267	3,840	406	159	1,742	1,298	2,014	287

1 2 4 7

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



SECRET

SERIAL	UNIT	BRITISH								
		Pistol .38	Rifle .303	Thompson M.C.	L.M.G. (Bren)	Mortar 2"	Mortar 3"	Mortar Piat	Signal Pistol	6 Pounder
Part 2	Infantry Divisions (5)	2,145	29,506	12,678	2,510	540	208	787	316	17
Part 3	Internal Security Divisions (3)									
Part 4	Independent Regiments (10)									
Part 5	Training Establishments	48	5,616	363	233	113	26	136	66	24
Part 6	Services (Adm Units)									
Part 7	CC.RR ++									
	RESERVE									
	GRAND TOTAL	2,193	35,122	13,041	2,743	653	234	923	382	202

++ Includes Finance Guards, Public Safety Agents, etc.

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SUMMARY OF WEAPONS

BRITISH						ITALIA									
	Mortar Fiat	Signal Pistol	6 Pounder	17 Pounder	25 Pounder	40 mm	L.H.G. Motley Twin	Mortar 4.2"	M.M.G. .303	Rifles Snipers	M.G. Rifle Broda 30 6.5mm	Automatic Musket 9 mm	Musket 1891	Revolver	Pistol 9 mm Beretta
8	787	316	178	40	163	59			24	77					
											356	580	15,228	89	1,636
											320	480	19,990		300
26	136	66	24	7	23	8				34					
													27,593		624
											4,054	4,698	116,755	30,996	46,527
											405	105	30,399	347	785
	923	382	202	47	186	67			24	111	5,135	5,863	209,965	31,432	49,872

Annexure ZA to SQ.054
dated 4 Jan 46.

ITALIAN

M.G. Rifle Breda 30 6.5mm	Automatic Musket 9 mm	Musket 1891	Revolver	Pistol 9 mm Boretti	Pistol 7.65	Pistol 6.35	45 mm Mortar	81 mm Mortar	M.G. 8 mm Breda 37	Grenades
356	580	15,228	89	1,636				202	367	
320	480	19,990		300						
		27,593		624						
4,054	4,698	116,755	30,996	46,527		2,057			103	
405	105	30,399	347	785	1,057	21		458	3,154	
5,135	5,863	209,965	31,432	49,872	1,057	2,078		660	3,624	

SERIAL	UNIT	B R					
		.38 for Pistol	.303 Ball	.45 Ball for Thompson MG	.303 Tracer	Mortar 2"	Mortar 3"
Part 2	Inf Divs (5)	37,198	7,422,684	3,438,667	233,155	66,667	40,108
Part 3	Internal Security Divs (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Part 4	Independent Regts (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Part 5	Trg Establishments	3,972	2,292,939	558,556	-	55,960	12,537
Part 6	Services (adm Units)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Part 7	CC.RR.	-	-	-	-	-	-
	RESERVE	-	154,136	-	-	-	-
	GRAND TOTAL	41,170	9,869,759	3,997,223	233,155	122,027	52,045

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Declassified E.O. 12061 Section 3-402/NNNG NO.

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B R I T I S H												
	Mortar. Plat	Signal Pistol	6 Pounder	17 Pounder	25 Pounder	40 mm	Mortar 4.2"	.303 for MMG	Grenades	M.G. Rifle Bred 30 6.5. mm.	Automatic Musket 9 mm.	Musket 1891
3	23,657	6,251	11,257	3,516	49,047	15,986	-	23,668	59,133	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	537,763	248,350	1,292,
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35,240	120,000	1,999,
0	3,265	13,215	1,823	963	1,751	4,075	-	-	57,254	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,329,
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,095,457	1,367,100	7,580,
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,582,666	2,110,833	2,992,
18	26,340	19,166	15,680	4,479	50,798	20,061	-	23,668	166,387	27,251,126	3,846,283	16,194,

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Annexure ZA to EQ.051 dated 4 Jan 46

I T A L I A N

Revolver	Pistol 9 mm.	Pistol 7.65	Pistol 6.35	.45 mm Mortar	81 mm Mortar	M.C. 8 mm Breda 37	Grenades
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	41,142	-	-	-	22,522	1,047,469	-
-	6,400	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	1,872	-	-	-	-	-	-
844,710	484,702	-	54,913	-	-	108,960	121,469
303,356	78,496	4,333	795	-	196,744	12,576,060	1,266,498
1,148,066	612,612	4,333	55,700	-	219,266	13,732,129	1,387,967

COPY SIGNAL

BRITISH ARMY CIPHER MESSAGE

STCS SERIAL 2216

URGENT 0416103

FROM C(SD) CEF

TO MIA

F70023. SMOKE FOR GENERAL CHALKEN. FROM CHIN OF UAF.

RESEARCH EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN ARMY.

CHE. I HAVE BEEN INTO THE PROBLEM SINCE OUR OCCUPATION OF 30 JULY AND PERL
THE MAIN FACTORS ARE (A) ISSUES OF STORES TO ITALIAN ARMY FROM 557 BOD NOW
WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY DELAY CLOSING D FOR AND CAUSE FURTHER DOV OF PERSONNEL.

IF ANY CASE AS MIA COULD NOT GET AN OVERALL PICTURE OF CURRENTS OF DEPT
UNTIL FINAL LISTS ARE COMPLETE THEY PRACTICAL RESULTS COULD BE EXPECTED. IT
IS CERTAINLY NO BASIC ADVANTAGE OF ALSO CONCENTRATED IN 557 BOD CLOSING DOWN QUICKLY

(B) THE HANDOVER OF COMPILER (MIST?) DEPARTS OR BUILDINGS
DIRECT TO ITALIAN ARMY WOULD NOT ONLY CONTRAINDICT THE SPIRIT OF OUR INSTRUCTIONS
BUT WOULD COMMIT ITALIAN ARMY TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR LARGE QUANTITIES OF USELESS
STORES. USEFULNESS OF STORES IN 557 BOD IS VERY LIMITED GOING TO UNBALANCED
NATURE OF STOCKS.

TWO. WE HAVE TODAY RECEIVED SIGNAL FROM THEOPHOS CONCERNING THAT WE HAVE BEEN
ISSUING NOT ONLY GLOBAL SURVIVORS IN RELATION TO ITALIANS AND THAT IT MAY BE
NECESSARY FOR US TO SHIP BACK LARGE QUANTITIES OF STORES AT EXPENSE OF ITALIAN
ARMY.

THREE. IN ANY CASE PERL THAT YOU WILL HAVE TO CONCENTRATE ON POLICY FOR
REPLACEMENT OF THEATRE ITALIAN ARMY AND IN SO DOING WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT FUTURE MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED. PRACTICAL ISSUES OF BRITISH
EQUIPMENT WILL NOT THEREFORE BE OF GREAT HELP TO YOU.

FOUR. THEREFORE WE CAN BEST HELP YOU AS FOLLOWS (A) BY GIVING YOU AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE INFORMATION AS TO WHAT WE HAVE. BRITISH EQUIPMENT STILL IN AVAILABLE 00

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ORDERED TO ITALIAN ARMY WOULD NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE
BUT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR LARGE QUANTITIES OF UNBALANCED
STOCKS. UNBALANCED STOCKS IN 557 BOD IS VERY LIMITED ORDER TO UNBALANCED
NATURE OF STOCKS.

TWO. WE HAVE TODAY RECEIVED SIGNAL FROM PROPHETS OBSERVING THAT WE HAVE BEEN
ISSUING NOT ONLY GLOBAL SUPPLIES IN RELATION TO ITALIANS AND THAT IT MAY BE
NECESSARY FOR US TO SHIP BACK LARGE QUANTITIES OF STOCKS AT REQUEST OF ITALIAN

ARMY.

THUS, IN ANY CASES THAT YOU WILL WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON POLICY FOR
EQUIPMENT SPARE PARTS ITALIAN ARMY AND IN SO ORDER WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT FUTURE MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT BELONGING. VARIOUS ISSUES OF BRITISH

COMMITMENT WILL NOT THEREFORE BE OF REAL HELP TO YOU.
TWO. THEREFORE WE CAN BEST HELP YOU AS FOLLOWS (A) BY GETTING YOU AS EARLY AS
POSSIBLE INFORMATION AS TO WHAT USEFUL BRITISH EQUIPMENT WILL BE AVAILABLE SO

THAT BY THE TIME YOU CLOSE YOU WILL HAVE AN OVERALL PICTURE TO TAKE INTO
ACCOUNT IS PLANNING. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU ARE TO RECEIVE COPIES OF ALL
REGULATION PERSUS PERSUASION BY 557 BOD. (B) BY CLOSING DOWN 557 BOD AS EARLY AS

POSSIBLE SO THAT COMBINED ARE AVAILABLE WITH LEAST POSSIBLE DELAY. SUGGEST THAT
AC ARRANGES WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR INDIA AND ITALIAN ARMY TO TAKE PART INTO
THE HANDOVER AND THAT IN THIS YOU ASSIST THE BRITISH SUPPORT OF ADMIRAL STONE.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/HNDG NO.

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WEAPONS

W E A P O N S																		
LMG Hotley Twin	Mortar 2"	Mortar 3"	Mortar 4.2"	PIAT	Pistol Signal	LMG	300 Browning	Rifle Snipers	6 pr	17 pr	25 pr	37 mm	40 mm	M.O.	Cars 4 Str	Jeep	2 Str Car	15 cwt GS
-	145	210	80	1260	1470	260		210	135	80	240	180	2340		175	360	450	1570
-	162	108	48	366	702	144		126		12	12		549		36		69	570
-	270	180	80	610	1170	240		240					770		50		90	840
-	628	82	-	678	366	144	12	64	22	27	58	4	32	429	51	18	72	150
													604		173		203	271
-	1475	580	208	2914	3708	688	12	610	157	119	310	4	212	XXXXX 4772 XXXXX	XXXX 485 XXXX	XXXX 924 XXXX	XXXX 3401 XXXX	
LMGs Preda 30	Mortar 4.5 mm													Motor cycle combi nation				
2318	108													2803	312	300	406	1077
-	1475	580	208	2914	3708	688	12	610	157	119	310	4	212	7575	797	681	330	4478

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/UNDC NO.

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VEHICLES

M.C.	Cars 4 Str	Jeep	2 Str Car	15 cwt GS	15 cwt office	15 cwt MT	15 cwt water	3 ton GS	4 x 2	5 ton GS 4 x 4	Tech Vans All sizes	Ed Arty Tractors	AAA Arty Tractors	Tractors A/PK	Arty Trailers	Scout Cars	Arm Cars	ambulances	15 cwt 4 x 4	Arm O P	Carriage
Transport for Part 1 provided by the Adm Bpt Coy att respectively to each K.																					
340	175	50	190	1570	70	315	210	1805	725	495	360	180	90	490	165		110x xx	90	335		411
349	36		69	570	6	6	30	345	24	3											
770	50		90	840	10	10	50	450	40										72		54
429	51	18	72	150		12	12	1480	39	17	25	18	14	58	15		12 xx	7	120		90
304	173		203	271			11	2116		142									36	2	33
xxx	xxx		xxx	xxx				xxx		xxx								290			8
2 xx	485 xxx	378	924 170	3401 4230	86	373	316	5296 3555	828	657 700	385	198	104	548	180		100x xxx				
33-	312	300	406	1077				1074		79											
5	797	68	1330	1478	86	373	316	6343	828	736	385	198	104	548	180		168				
																	290	387	563	2	600

PA Army Tractors	IMA Army Tractors	Tractors A/Tk	Army Trailers	Scout Cars	Arm Cars	Ambulances	15 cwt 4 x 4	Arm O P	Carriers Universal	Carriers 3" Mortar	Carriers M H G	Carriers Lloyd	30 cwt Slave Bty Charging	3 ton store	Trailers 10 cwt	Trailers 1 ton GS	Trailers Water
360	180	90	490	165	110x 11	90	335		449	210	520		10	120	225	95	125
							72		54	126	312				87	18	42
							120		90	210	520				120		70
25	18	14	58	15	12 10x	7	36	2	33	28	32				18		5
						290			8								
					100x												
385	190	104	548	180	122 100x	387	563	2	600	574	1384		10	120	450	113	242
					168												
385	198	104	548	180	290	387	563	2	600	574	1384	-	10	120	450	113	242

D. (1) SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT		PERSONNEL		WEAPONS							
Serial No.	UNIT	Officers	O.R.s	Pistols .38"	Rifles	T.M.C. .45"	L.M.G.	MC Combi. netion	5 ton TVC	Portoc. min	Gun 3.7 4.5.
PART 1 (a)	Central Comd ROME	843	1157	1071	929						
(b)	Territorial Comd HQ (11)	871	1787	1140	1518						
(c)	Military District HQ (99)	847	1229	1324	752						
(d)	Regimental Depots (90)	632	634	902	364						
PART 2	Inf Divs (5)	2835	49345	2970	28507	17600	267			60	
PART 3	Internal Security Divs (3)	846	14325	840	9579	3984	9				
PART 4	Independent Regts (10)	1170	21460	1160	11490	5700	15				
PART 5	Trg Establishments	1744	10066	2508	55986	2797	239		7		4
PART 6	Services (Adm Units)	3466	21443	4571	22625	140	1				
XXXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXX	XXXXXX					XXXXX			
	XXXXXX TOTAL ARMY LESS CC.RR.	XXXXXX 13254	XXXXXX 124446	16486	134750	30521	767	XXXXX	7	60	4
	CC.RR. WEAPONS (ITALIAN)			Pistols Model 34	Auto Rifles 38	Carbines Model 1891					
		1339	63205	64544	17585	45596					
PART 7	CC.RR.										
	GRAND TOTAL	14593	187651	16486	134750	30521	767	-	7	60	4

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PERSONNEL						WEAPONS					
Officers	O.R.S	Pistols .38"	Rifles	T M G .45"	ENG	100mm mortar	3 ton TWC	Portec TWC	Gun 5.7 A.S.	Trucks 6 ton 4 x 2 Diesel	
043	1157	1071	929								
071	1767	1140	1518								
047	1229	1324	752								
032	654	902	364								
035	49345	2970	28507	17600	267			60			x Reserve of 40 incl CC.FR.
046	14325	840	9579	3984	9						
070	21460	1160	14490	5700	150						
044	10066	2506	55946	2797	239		7		4	24	
066	21443	4571	22625	1440	1						
009	63205					XXXX					
006	XXXXX	16486	134750	30521	767	XXXX	7	60	4	24	
054	124446										
		Pistols Model 34	auto Rifles 38	Carbines Model 1891							
09	63205	64544	17585	45596							
093	187651	16486	134750	30521	767	-	7	60	4	24	

SUBJECT:- Equipment for Italian Interim Army.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
ROME Tel. No. 478103
Q.138
13 May 1946

TO : ORD

Reference GHQ letter 8159/Q1 of 7 May 46.

1. It appears from para 1 of the above quoted letter that "Q" Branch, GHQ have agreed in principle to the issue of equipment as well as weapons. Since, however, there is no mention in the above quoted letter of any specific quantities of webbing equipment, it is assumed that this will be arranged as outlined in para 2 of the GHQ letter which states "These issues will be made direct from British Depots to the Italian Army under arrangements to be agreed by Ordnance Directorate with M.M.I.A. direct".

2. Therefore it is requested that you arrange with Ordnance Directorate that the following quantities of web equipment is made available at the British Depots at the same time as the weapons:-

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Equipment, Basic, sets (less Mess tins and large Packs)	40,000
Pouches, utility, sets	8,000
Slings, rifle	23,000
Troops, bayonet	23,000
Cases, binocular	4,000
Cases, compass	4,000
Pouches, ammunition, revolver	2,000
Haversacks, small, Officers	2,000
Slings T.M.G.	9,000
Holsters, revolver	1,850
Holsters, Pistol signal	1,850

W. Bradley Major
E.W. BRADLEY,
Major, Innisks,
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

(Large packs)

Pouches, utility, sets
Slings, rifle
Frogs, bayonet
Cases, binocular
Cases, compass
Pouches, ammunition, revolver
Faversacks, small, Officers
Slings T.M.C.
Holsters, revolver
Holsters, Pistol signal

40,000
8,000
23,000
23,000
4,000
4,000
2,000
2,000
9,000
1,850
1,850

E. W. Bradley, Major

E.W. BRADLEY,
Major, Innisks,
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to:- S/Q.054
G(SD);
G(TTG);
10 B.L.U., NAPLES

EWB/or

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Equipment for Italian
Interim Army

8159/91

7 May 46

TO: ORD Directorate (5 copies)

Reference ESD/81/3 of 29 Mar 46, Minute 2.

RECEIVED
6545
9 MAY 1946

1. Approval is now given by para 7 of AFHQ signal NAT 1135 (not to all) for the issue forthwith of the balance of weapons and equipment required by the Italian Interim Army.

2. These issues will be made direct from British Depots to the Italian Army under arrangements to be agreed by Ordnance Directorate with MMIA direct.

3. The issues will officially be regarded as 'on loan' but the normal ORD procedure of issues will NOT be followed. Instead the vouchering will be as for issues to the Italian Army prior to 14 Nov 45. Previous issues made 'on loan' are governed by this policy, and outstanding vouchers will be amended accordingly. Items concerned are listed in Appendix 'A' to this letter. Copies of lists attached to bundles of vouchers in accordance with normal repayment procedure should be forwarded to this HQ for Financial adviser (Br).

4. The equipment now to be issued is detailed at Appendix 'B' to this letter. Normal maintenance will not be scaled, but major items only will be issued.

5. It is emphasised that issues are to be made from surpluses i.e. not at the expense of the British, S. African or Greek Armies. However issues will be made if necessary from stocks which would otherwise be returned to UK vide para 4 of War Office letter Q(AE)5/373 of 28 Feb 46.

JJE/AG

Copy to: G(SD)
G(Trg)
RAC
RA
Inf
RE

Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA)
HQ Allied Commission Rome
G2(B)
G1(C)
PA (B)
REME

W.D.A. CLARE, Lieut-Colonel,
For Brigadier,
DQMG.

Allen

See 47

5. It is emphasised that issues are to be made from surpluses i.e. not at the expense of the British, S. African or Greek Armies. However issues will be made if necessary from stocks which would otherwise be returned to UK vide para 4 of War Office letter Q(AU)5/373 of 28 Feb 46.

See 114
W.D.A. CLARKE, Lieut-Colonel, for Brigadier, DMC.
SEE 47

JJF/AG

Copy to: G(SD)
 G(Trg)
 PAC
 RA
 Inf
 RE
 SIGS (B)

Land Forces Sub Commission (LMA)
 HQ Allied Commission ROME
 Q2(B)
 Q1(C)
 PA (B)
 RENE

1/5/46
Ro

→ AS/0054

Copies also sent to: - P 138
9(2nd) 9/A/6
9(2nd) 9/1
9(2nd) 9/10/30
9(2nd) 9/10/30
9(2nd) 9/10/30

10340

1 2 6 5

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CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 'A' TO 8159/41 DATED
MAY 46

AUTHORITIES DETAILING ITEMS ISSUED TO ITALIAN
INTERIM ARMY 'ON LOAN' WHICH ARE NO LONGER
SUBJECT TO CRD 'ON LOAN' PROCEDURE

CHC letter reference	Date	Equipments	Remarks
8159	8 Feb 46	Weapons for GARS	
EX 60362(Sig)	8 Feb 46	Staghounds and Daimler Scout Cars	Ex ARG
8159	12 Feb 46	Weapons for Inf Bns	
8159	15 Feb 46	Arty Tractors and Sights Dial	
MSD/81/3/A	26 Feb 46	Armd Ops Qty 2	Release Note No. 8850
8159	4 Mar 46	Web Eqpt for Cars	
MSD/81/3B	3 Apr 46	25 pr Eqpts w/o Muzzle brakes Qty 2	
MSD/81/3A	9 Apr 46	Appx A Inf and Arty weapons	Appx B sig eqpt already issued, as amended by ESD/81/3H of 19 Apr 46

Q138
Ex 60362
8159 of 9 May 46
Q138

QD/3191
7 May 46
Arty trailers Q138

Q138
Q138

EST/81/3A

Apr 46

Appx A Inf and
weapons

Appx B sig
eqpt already
issued, as
amended by
EST/81/3A
of 19 Apr 46

138/649

82/3191
See App B

7 May 46

Any stolen Q's

Q 138

138/649

8159 of 9 May 46

Q 88A

in Q 138

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 'B' TO 8159/31 DATED MAY 46

EQUIPMENT NOW AUTHORIZED TO BE ISSUED
DIRECT TO ITALIAN INTERIA ARMY

Letter Ref:	Date	Equipment	Remarks
AMIA letter 84 034	21 Feb 46	Appendix 'C' Coln 2 Vehs	To be provided from surpluses especially those at 13 Veh Pk (Ord letter DCS/3/21/3 of 2 May 46 refers)
GHQ letter 8159	12 Mar 46	Appendix 'A' Coln (e) Weapons.	Excl 4.2 in Mor. Figs amended by ESD/81/3 of 8 May 46
GHQ letter 117/3 (BA Branch)	22 Mar 46	Balance of requirement in Appx 'A' 'B' and 'C' not shown as available ex British School of Artillery.	Excl Predictors, Height and Range finders, and RADAR eqpt ESD/81/3A of 3 Apr 46, 29 Apr 46 and War Office signal 18810 GS(V)1 of 1 May 46 refers.
8159	20 Apr 46	Tools as available	ESD/81/3B of 5 Apr 46 refers.
ESD/81/3B	9 Apr 46	Med Arty Eqpt incl tractors	8159/Q of 13 Apr 46 refers. <i>Tractors available</i>
ESD/81/3B	29 Apr 46	Para 2 60 Portees Type B	NOT on loan
ESD/81/3H	30 Apr 46	Sig Eqpt.	8159 of 2 May 46 refers as amended by ASD/81/3H of 4 May 46.
ESD/81/3J	6 May 46	Tyres and Tubes	As available from recent War Office Global Surplus

* See addition to App A

1268

785020

ex British School of
Artillery.

8159	20 Apr 46	Tools as available	ESD/81/3B of 5 Apr 46 refers.
ESD/81/3B	9 Apr 46	Med Arty Light incl tractors	8159/Q of 13 Apr 46 refers.
ESD/81/3B	29 Apr 46	Para 2 60 Portees Type B	NOT on loan
ESD/81/3B	30 Apr 46	Sig Light	8159 of 2 May 46 refers as amended by ESD/81/3B of 4 May 46.
ESD/81/3B	6 May 46	Tyres and Tubes	As available from recent War Office Global Surplus

+ See addition to app A

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Italian Interim Arm.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,

M.M.I.A.

R O M R

✓ 1/2.054

26 April 1946

TO : CHQ (for C(AD)).

Reference Minutes of Conference forwarded under your RDD/BL/3 of 27 Mar 46 and conversation (Col. PIRILLY/Maj. INGLIS) today 26 Apr 46.

1. The attitude of the Italian Government and exactly on this part of the Italian authorities would appear to effect only sub-paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of para 18 of the Minutes.

2. The direct transfer of equipment is strongly urged in view of the attitude revealed in the appended correspondence which is summarized below:-

(a) Appendix "A". Letter from Chief Commissioner, to the Prime Minister, dated 16 Feb 46. No reply yet received. Hastening action taken verbally and in writing (see Appx. "B"). Executive Commissioner is pressing the Italian Government for a written reply.

(b) Appendix "C". Letter from War Ministry to Council of Ministers dated 9 Mar 46. Note reply at Appendix "D" comes from the offices of A.R.A.R. The War Ministry write again on the 25 April 46, Appendix "E", this time to A.R.A.R. with a copy to the Council of Ministers.

The gist of this correspondence is that the War Ministry will obtain nothing from A.R.A.R. unless treasury approval is first obtained and further that A.R.A.R. refuse to "freeze" material considered by the War Ministry of value to them pending a treasury decision.

3. The reference made in para 1 of Appendix "E" to "free recovery" is not clear. The War Ministry have been informed that all material which may be transferred direct is to be regarded as "on loan" from the Allies pending final adjustment. This will again be made clear to them.

4. It is emphasized that unless direct release is approved by the Combined Chiefs that the essential military requirements in I.T. types will suffer to the advantage of other Government Departments and civilian agencies.

Government for a written reply.

(b) Appendix "C". Letter from War Ministry to Council of Ministers dated 9 Mar 46. Note reply at Appendix "D" comes from the offices of A.R.A.A. The War Ministry wrote again on the 25 April 46, Appendix "E", this time to A.R.A.A. with a copy to the Council of Ministers.

The gist of this correspondence is that the War Ministry will obtain nothing from A.R.A.A. unless treasury approval is first obtained and further that A.R.A.A. refers to "freedom" material considered by the War Ministry of value to them pending a treasury decision.

3. The reference made in para 1 of Appendix "E" to "free recovery" is not clear. The War Ministry have been informed that all material which may be transferred direct is to be regarded as "on loan" from the Allies pending final adjustment. This will again be made clear to them.

4. It is emphasized that unless direct release is approved by the Combined Chiefs that the essential military requirements in U.S., types etc. will suffer to the advantage of other Government Departments and civilian agencies.

S. P. D. [Signature]
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

[Handwritten mark]

Copy to: "C"

RMO/ox

Appendix "A" to
 91.054 of 25 April 46.

16 February 1946

Ref: 9006/23/46.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You must be as concerned as I am in regard to the provision of equipment for your New Italian Army, and you are, no doubt, equally anxious about the very serious deficiency at present existing in arms, ammunition, vehicles and spare parts.

As you know, it has been decided as an interim policy that much of this equipment must come from captured enemy stocks and from Allied military surpluses which are handed over to the Italian Government and distributed mainly through the Agency of A.R.A.S.

The duty of ensuring that the Italian Army is properly equipped, as well as the responsibility for allocating material in the hands of A.R.A.S. and of the other government agencies or ministries, lies with your Government. Unfortunately, you have many economic difficulties with which to compete. There are bound to be conflicting interests which may not against the best interests of the Army. For instance, cases have been brought to my notice of motor vehicles and spare parts suitable for, and badly needed by, the Carabinieri, being allotted elsewhere.

In order to give the War Minister a fair opportunity of obtaining the equipment he requires, it would appear necessary that he should have a greater knowledge of the equipment available and the opportunity of acquiring priority for its allocation to the Army. I suggest that this must be done by including in the A.R.A.S. organisation a small nucleus of qualified Army officers who could inspect material as it becomes available, advise the War Minister of that which is suitable for his requirements and ensure allocation to the Army where necessary. I would ask you to consider adopting this suggestion at once, particularly as, if there is any case of doubt, the War Minister could obtain an Allied opinion from the Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCA) at any moment. You might, of course, wish to consider similar representation of the Minister for Air and Marine, either as a joint effort, or separately.

As a further help to the War Minister I am instructing the Commander of the Land Forces Sub-Commission to arrange for the maintenance of permanent liaison with the Allied Surplus Disposal Agencies by means of suitable Italian officers who would thereby obtain early information of material to be released and advise the War Ministry accordingly.

You will agree, I know, that it is essential that confidence in the interim Italy Army be established both in Italy and among the United Nations. This can only be done if the needs of the Army are appreciated and provided by the Italian Government. The proposals outlined above would go a long way to ensure this.

Very truly yours,

signed W.S. LUSH
 Acting Chief Brigadier

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
 Land Forces S/C (LSCA)
 Navy S/C. Air Forces S/C

Sec. Sec. (for CSM Branch)

Appendix "B" to SO.054 of 26 April.

SUBJECT : Maintenance Italian Army - Allied Surplus Materials.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C.

M.M.I.A.

R O M E

Q.006

5 April 1946

TO : A.C. (for Executive Commissioner).

Reference your 9006/255/EC of 2 Mar 46.

1. It is understood no reply has yet been received to your 9006/255/EC of 16 Feb 46 to the Prime Minister.
2. The attached copy of a letter addressed to the War Ministry by A.R.A.R. is forwarded for your information.
3. The situation remains unsatisfactory.
4. Meanwhile GHQ have been requested to approve direct transfer of Allied Military Surplus stores, see this Sub-Commission letter Q.006 of 2 April 46, copy attached.

Signed: W. PIGNEY, Colonel,
for Major General
M.M.I.A.

Copy/ra

Appendix "O" to 32.024 of 26 April.

TRANSLATION

FROM : Ministry of War
 TO : Presidency of the Council of Ministers
 M.M.I.A. for info.
 Ref: 206548
 Date: 7.3.46
 SUBJECT : Assignment to the Armed Forces of War residual materials.

1) Ever since the Allies manifested intentions of ceding to the Italian Government the depots of materials formed by them in Italy, this Ministry has been concerned with gaining possession of those usable for Army purposes, which must be split as follows:

- The materials formerly of military ownership which, according to A.F.H.Q. instructions issued during the war period, must be freely returned to the Army (H.Q., A.C.G. letter R.C. - M.M.C. Section, A.F.O. 394, of 10.8.1944 and admin. instruction No. 30 copy enclosed);
- The materials not originally of the military administration which it would suit the Army to purchase.

2) Taking into consideration the regulations which control the functioning of the A.R.A.R. and given that the Military Territorial Commands are taking care of the guard duties on all the materials ceded by the Allies, instructions have been given (in circulars 22520/11 of 20.11.45, and 202600/11 of 4th Feb last, copy enclosed) that the Military Territorial Commands in agreement with the local representatives of the A.R.A.R., make arrangements as soon as possible to examine all the stores held in the depots and immediately afterwards:

- withdraw the stores formerly of War administration ownership and recognised as such, without dispute, by the local A.R.A.R. representatives;
- propose the purchase of stores not of military ownership which are considered useful.

The Directorate Generals have direct contact with the A.R.A.R. both for settling controversies which arise regarding the military ownership of some of stores and for establishing prices and methods of handing over in respect of the stores the purchase of which is recommended by the Military Territorial Commands.

3) Therefore an organization already exists which, in agreement with the A.R.A.R., guarantees this Ministry being timely informed of stores ceded by the Allies. Officers of the Military Territorial Commands, specialised in each type of stores, examine the said stores and are in a position to prove their belonging to the Military Administration or to recognise their utility. Other officers of the individual Directorate Generals are particularly competent to settle eventual controversies between Directorate of A.R.A.R. and the Ministry of War and deal with the purchase of utilisable stores.

I consider therefore that the assignment of one or more officers to the A.R.A.B. can not be of any appreciable advantage,

4) On the other hand, a measure which I would consider as essential to permit of the Army making speedy use of military stores, is that of obtaining from the Allied Authorities that the materials formerly belonging to this administration be handed over, on the basis of the A.F.H.Q. instructions, direct to the representatives of the Ministry of War before the depots are handed over to the A.R.A.B.

5) This fundamental measure would have to be integrated by some contemporaneous instruction designed to perfect the organization shown in para.2. More specifically, it would be necessary for the provincial offices of the A.R.A.B., immediately upon being handed over a depot by the Allies, to draw a list of the stores to the Military Territorial Command controlling the area and, subsequently, forward this list to the A.R.A.B. Directorate General showing quite clearly the stores requested by the Military Command for purchase, or, eventually, because they have been identified as belonging to the Military Administration. Naturally, such stores would have to be held at the disposal of this Ministry.

6) Finally, I think that the presence of an Italian officer at the Office of the Chief Disposal Officer may be of advantage, in order that he may inform this Ministry, or the Military Territorial Commands concerned direct, of stores on the point of being ceded.

This would avoid the inconvenience sometimes noted, of the Military Territorial Commands being informed of the cession of the stores-depots after the Allied guard personnel have been removed, i.e., after the ~~ALLIED GUARD PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN REMOVED~~, said stores have been subject to removals and degradations.

I have already given instructions to this effect on the direct request of the M.M.I.A.

Sgd. BROGIO

War Minister.

Cong/ra

TRANSLATION

FROM A.R.A.S.

Ref: AAR/IR/8307/SBG

TO Ministry of War
and to MIA (for info)

Date: 29/3/46

SUBJECT: Assignment of War salvage to the Armed Forces

With reference to letter 205458 of the 9 ult, this Establishment considers it necessary to point out as follows:-

(a) We agree with the proposal made in para 2, i.e. that the Military Commands will arrange for the withdrawal of materials formerly belonging to the War Administration, which are recognized as such without any dispute by the local representatives of the AAR, and will signal to the various Directorates General of Your Ministry information regarding the material of which it is not possible to affirm without dispute, military ownership.

(b) The proposal advanced in para 4 does not seem advisable to this Establishment since direct action on the part of the Allied Command to representatives of War Ministry before the Depots are handed over to the A.R.A.S. would have the disadvantage of making the Allies deal with two departments instead of only one and would definitely cause a delay in the handing over of the Depots to the A.R.A.S.

(c) We have no comments to make on the proposal put forward in para 5, i.e. that the provincial Departments of the AAR, as soon as a Depot has been handed over to them by the Allies will send a list of materials contained therein to the local Military Territorial Command and subsequently arrange to forward this list to the Directorate General of the AAR, pointing out explicitly the materials asked for by the Military Command for purchase or because identified as belonging to the Military Administration.

(d) It does not appear advisable to this Establishment to hold "Frozen" (as proposed in the last part of para 4) the materials the purchase of which has been requested by Your Ministry. In fact, to keep such materials frozen in the Depots would mean a delay in the normal development of the operations which this Establishment must carry out, and consequently delay the introduction on to the market of materials which could be of the greatest use in national reconstruction.

The difficulty would then be increased most appreciably if we had to extend this procedure to all other Administrations of the State MINISTRIES. This would mean a delay in the normal development of the operations which this Establishment must carry out, and consequently delay the introduction on to the market of materials which could be of the greatest use in national reconstruction. Therefore, would not freeze the materials which it is desired to purchase and therefore all the relative negotiations would have to be dealt with urgently so that the necessary decisions could be taken before the war materials were sold to the public. Naturally this Establishment would arrange to give the maximum collaboration to the representatives of Your Ministry in order that the requirements of the

departments instead of only the depots to the A.R.A.A. handling over of the depots to the A.R.A.A.

(c) We have no comments to make on the proposal put forward in para 5, i.e. that the provincial Departments of the ARAR, as soon as a depot has been handed over to them by the Allies will send a list of materials contained therein to the local Military Territorial Command and subsequently arrange to forward this list to the Directorate General of the ARAR, pointing out explicitly the materials asked for by the Military Command for purchase or because identified as belonging to the Military Administration.

(d) It does not appear advisable to this Establishment to hold "frozen" (as proposed in the last part of para 4) the materials the purchase of which has been requested by Your Ministry. In fact, to keep such materials frozen in the depots would mean a delay in the normal development of the operations which this Establishment must carry out, and consequently delay the introduction on to the market of materials which could be of the greatest use in National reconstruction.

The difficulty would then be increased most appreciably if we had to extend this procedure to all other Administrations of the State. This would mean that the materials would not freeze the materials which it is desired to purchase and therefore all the relative negotiations would have to be dealt with urgently so that the necessary decisions could be taken before the said materials were sold to the public. Naturally this Establishment would arrange to give the maximum collaboration to the representatives of Your Ministry in order that the requirements of the Military Administration may be satisfied.

S. D. SOLALI,
Director General.

Appendix "B" to SO.054
of 26 April 1946

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY OF WAR

From War Office

Subject.- Assignment to the F.A.A. of warlike salvage.-
TO : Direzione Generale A.R.A.R.

copy to Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri
Lavori Forcos del Commission AC. (MIA)

No 208960/II

23/4/46

ref. your letter 1/2/3507/30g. dt. 29th. ult.

1 I deem it right that the realization of the proposition made by this Ministry with his letter of 9th. ult. sub.no. 206498, para 4, namely "the obtaining from the Allied Authorities of military materials should be a direct transfer to the military authorities before the stocks are handed over to the ARAA", does not represent any inconvenience.

It is therefore, above all, necessary for the selection of R.O. materials to take place in order to avoid the withdrawal and payment by the ARAA of materials for which the Supreme Allied Authorities have already granted the free recovery.

2 If it is wished for the Army to have any profit by purchasing material from this Institute, it is necessary to block the materials requested by the Military Territorial Hqs. awaiting the approval of the purchase. Otherwise, being in competition with private and civilian firms which have the privilege of deciding immediately the purchases, this Department would have only the materials not required by other agencies. The result of slight delay will not bring serious disadvantages.

However, instructions will be given so that decisions concerning the purchases may be taken with the shortest delay.

signed The Minister

7" BUCK SLIP

ACTION REQUIRED

OT

Q2

12

On arrival

Re: Staff Tables ^{in the}
Position is that ~~staff~~ we. is going
through all the new proposed C.R.'s
and approving a number at a time.
to M.A. state they cannot start making
out new Staff Tables until all new
C.R.'s are through — as for only some
Medical C.R.'s have been formalized
until the new Staff Tables have been
published we are unable to give to you
details of new Ws. authorized and here and
there.

3.

Full Plate

24 Apr

Medical writers and writers
until the news staff tables have been
published in are unable to give to the
details of news which authorized and record
deficiencies.

[Signature]

→ file ROR
24 Apr

FILE NO. SQ 054

"Q" DUCK SLIP

DATE	SECTION or SERVICE	ACTION REQUIRED
4 Apr	FROM Q	TO G(SD)
		Ref SQ 054 21 Feb to Army. para 1 state: w.e. of transport figures may be subject to some reduction. It is understood for eg. NYC, approved establishment has been cut considerably. Are you amending your SD/109 6 Dec? If so SQ 054 21 Feb will need to be amended also.

RAC

Mass Factor will be considered in
the future. Cut is not possible for some
time. We are thinking of it. It is
possible that that will be re-considered
in one or two months.

RAC

21 Feb will should be

also

RAC

Stage Twelve with the removal of
the concrete and the removal of the
for all with the removal of the
which that will be removed
and a month

RAC

3 Mar 6 (cont)

At a conference held at M.M.I.A. on the
21st MARCH 1946
to discuss

MAINTENANCE STORES REQUIRED BY THE ITALIAN ARMY TO LAST FROM
15th NOV 1945 UNTIL 31st DEC 1947 (excluding the 60 days
maintenance pack already prepared)

ATTENDED BY:

Lt.Col. R.A. CURTIES R.A.
Lt.Col. W.D. NEOLAM. Kings
Lt.Col. A.E.C. SOUTHEY O.B.E., R.B.
Lt.Col. A.J. READ R.A.O.C.
Major E.V. BRADLEY. Innisks
Col. PIGONE
Ten.Col. JAMMARINO
Ten.Col. MABISSI
Ten.Col. CADONI
Ten.Col. COLONNA
Maj. SERGIO

A.Q.M.G.
G-1 (Trg)
G-1
A.D.O.S.
D.A.Q.M.G. (1)
Div.Gen.del Genio
Div.Gen.del Genio
Div.Gen.di Commis.
Stato Mag. RE. Uf. Ser.
Div.Gen.d'Artiglier
Div.Gen.d'Artiglier

the following points were decided upon as policy to be observed
in the later and more detailed stages of the conference which would
be conducted by A.D.O.S.

1. All equipment necessary to maintain the efficiency of the
Italian Army which cannot be produced by the Italian Government,
will be requested by M.M.I.A. from the British Government. Such
requirements will be the minimum necessary in order that the
Italian Government may be sooner in a position to provide the
Italian Army with what is needed.
2. The only method of explaining to the British Authorities
what detailed equipment is required, is by reference to the
British Ordnance Vocabulary.
3. These Ordnance Vocabularies have been carefully prepared
and contain the items considered essential to maintain the
fighting efficiency of the unit concerned. Such items as cannot
be produced by the Italian Government should therefore all be
requested, since the deletion of any one item must be considered
liable to impair the fighting efficiency of the unit.
4. In certain cases it may be that the items can be produced
by the Italian Government, but, not in sufficient quantity by
December 1947.

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3. These Ordnance Vocabularies have been carefully prepared and contain the items considered essential to maintain the fighting efficiency of the unit concerned. Such items as cannot be produced by the Italian Government should therefore all be requested, since the deletion of any one item must be considered liable to impair the fighting efficiency of the unit.

4. In certain cases it may be that the items can be produced by the Italian Government, but, not in sufficient quantity prior to December 1947. A special list should be prepared of such items.

5. For simplicity it is proposed to deal with complete sections or sub-sections of the Ordnance Vocabulary. This may result in certain sections being omitted from the list of requirements although individual items may in fact be required. Such items must form the subject of a separate request.

2,

6. It is recommended that, as soon as possible, a special equipment list be prepared for each unit; showing items provided from (a) Italian (b) British sources. Such lists will be of the greatest assistance in enabling Territorial Commanders to make their requirements known to the Ministry.

7. It is desirable that the present time when requests are being made for the issue of maintenance stores that the deficiencies known to exist in the five infantry divisions are reported. It is assumed that these divisions were complete to scale as regards British weapons on the 14th November 1946 whereas, in fact, it is known that certain deficiencies (i.e. Bayonets) exist.

EWE/lm

36

MMIA

02

GHC (C (33))

ED 3172

RESTRICTED

31

REF HQ/31/3 DATED 27 PARA 19 (.) IN ADDITION TO STAFF STUDY FOR
COMBINED STUDY OF STAFF 342 IT NOT AGREED BY COMMISSIONER THAT AN
IMMEDIATE SIGNAL WOULD BE SENT REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO ISSUE AT
VEHICLES AND SPACES REQUESTED SURPLUS BY NEW BRITISH
REORGANIZATION PROGRAM DIRECT TO ITALIAN ARMY AND NOT
THROUGH MINISTRY OF SUPPLY (.) CONSIDER THIS MOST
IMPORTANT SINCE REQUEST TOUR OF NORTH ITALY FROM 15 TO
31 MAY CONFIRMS THAT ITALIAN ARMY MOST GRAVELY DEFICIENT
IN THIS RESPECT (.) SEE ALSO THIS HQ. Q 006
DATED 02

15 on 606

[Signature]

3/2/50
RSC

G (33)
RECEIVED

80/109

A.H.C. MATHIAS, Lt Col

IS/9054

RECEIVED 1 - APR 1946
3692

ESD/81/3

29 Mar 46

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT 1415 HRS
ON MONDAY 18 MARCH 46 ON THE PROVISION
OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE INTERIM ITALIAN ARMY

<u>Chairman</u>	Colonel	ROBERTSON	D/DQM, GHQ
<u>Present</u>	Colonel	PIDSLAY	MIA
	Lt-Col	SOUTHEY	MIA
	Lt-Col	CURTIES	MIA
	Lt-Col	HEAD	MIA
	Lt-Col	BHUNT	MIA
	Major	HIBBARD	MIA
	Lt-Col	SPALFETON	Log Plans, GHQ
	Major	COVILLE	'Q', GHQ
	Major	PROUDFOOT	'Q', GHQ
	Lt-Col	CORLETT	ORD, GHQ
	Lt-Col	NICHOLSON	ORD, GHQ
	Major	FODEN	ORD, GHQ
<u>Secretary</u>	Major	INGLIS	G(SD), GHQ

1. This conference was held to discuss certain points of detail regarding supply of BRITISH equipment, either raised by MIA or arising out of AFHQ Policy Conference held at 1415 hrs on 18 Mar 46.

These minutes should be read in conjunction with the minutes of that meeting.

2. Most of the present difficulties arise out of the present policy, and will be resolved if the recommendations for modifying that policy are agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Weapons

Further issues "on loan" are required for the Inf Regts. These will be made on the same basis as the issues for the GAR's.

MIA to state requirements.

Action

MIA

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1. This conference was held to discuss certain points of detail regarding supply of BRITISH equipment, either raised by MILA or arising out of AFHQ Policy Conference held at 1115 hrs on 18 Mar 46.

These minutes should be read in conjunction with the minutes of that meeting.

(31)

2. Most of the present difficulties arise out of the present policy, and will be resolved if the recommendations for modifying that policy are agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Weapons

Further issues "on loan" are required for the Inf Regts. These will be made on the same basis as the issues for the CAR's.

MILIA to state requirements.

amm

27,000 tons waiting for hand-over.

G(SD) will arrange for this to take place as soon as possible.

/5.....

(34)

MILIA

G(SD)

Action

5. Special Equipment

MMIA still have to state requirements of special eqpt e.g. ammouners kits etc. See minute 32 of Conference of 27 Feb 46.

6. Maintenance and Spares

Sealing

This will be done by ORD, GHQ.

7. Vehicles

(a) The 60 days MT (and Arty) spares referred to in Minute 24 of Conference of 27 Feb (reference ESD/81/3 of 2 Mar 46) were still awaiting clearance on 18 Mar but have since been cleared for direct hand-over.

(b) This 60 days maintenance does NOT include major assemblies and tyres (normally covered by that term).

(c) Regarding assemblies

Col A/Q MMIA said 600 engines are required now for one Div alone.

ORD rep said no engines are available nor are they likely to be until the final close-down when some may be declared. It is impossible to hand-over any now without detriment to our own requirements. It is hoped to include a small proportion of gear box and axle assemblies.

(d) Regarding tyres

Col A/Q MMIA stressed the very serious situation now existing.

It was pointed out that tyres are subject to global control, and are specifically excluded in the original Combined Chiefs of Staff directive.

Approx 100,000 tyres (some in need of repair) are now being declared to Ministry of Supply.

8. Issues

It was pointed out that, with certain exceptions, nothing could be handed over for several months owing to the enormous

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ORD

ORD

I

(c) Regarding assemblies

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ORD

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Approx 100,000 tyres (some in need of repair) are now being declared to Ministry of Supply.

Issues

It was pointed out that, with certain exceptions, nothing could be handed over for several months owing to the enormous volume of work in hand in connection with closing down the theatre.

MMLI/hro
CHQ, CANT.

W. H. G. S.
Maj. G.S.
Secretary.

1290

785020

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCE

G(SD)
USD/04/3
27 Mar 46

Telo : FREEDOM 254

SUBJECT : AFHQ Conference on Equipment for
MILITARY Interim Army - 10 Mar 46.

Land Forces Sub Commission 10 MILA (4)
Allied Commission
RACG

G-3 AFHQ
G-5 AFHQ
CIC
Q GHQ
G-4 MTOUSA
Ord GHQ
PA GHQ

G-DET
SD/04
G-TRC
Q WOK
Spone

1. Minutes of the Conference held on 10 Mar 46 are attached.

2. ACTION is required as follows :

MILA	-	Mins. 15 and 16
E.A. (Brit)	}	- Min. 17
G-5 AFHQ		
G(SD) GHQ	-	Mins. 11 and 19
Q GHQ	-	Min. 16

SEE HQ

100-111-1-1

G-4 HQUSA
Ord CHQ
PA CHQ

Spore

1. Minutes of the Conference held on 16 Mar 46 are attached.

2. ACTION is required as follows:

DATA - Mins. 15 and 16

F.A. (Brit) }
G-5 AMHQ } - Min. 17

G(SD) CHQ - Mins. 11 and 19

Q CHQ - Min. 16

MAIL/15

for file
K.W. MALCOLM,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

SEE HQ

*IS 19.054
AGM4.*

24.3.46

ESD/ST/3

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT AFHQ AT 1415 HRS
ON MONDAY 18 MARCH 1946 ON THE PROVISION OF
EQUIPMENT FOR THE ITALIAN INTERIM ARMY

<u>Chairman</u>	Brigadier ANDERSON	G(SD) CHQ GEP
<u>Present</u>	Colonel JERR	AFIA
	Colonel FURBER	AFIA
	Lt-Col SOUTHEY	AFIA
	Lt-Col ALBERT	AFIA
	Lt-Col CHURCH	AFIA
	Brigadier VARNIS	G-3 AFHQ
	Lt-Col HENRI	G-3 AFHQ
	Lt-Col THOMSON	G-3 AFHQ
	Major STODOLITE	G-3 AFHQ
	Lt-Col SMITHSON	Log Lt-ns
	Colonel ROBERTSON	'Q' Branch CHQ
	Lt Col BLANKE	'Q' Branch CHQ
	Major ITCHINOOT	'Q' Branch CHQ
	Colonel LAMLEY	G-4 AFHQ
	Lt-Col RUSSET	G-4 AFHQ
	Lt-Col COLETT	Ord Branch CHQ
	Lt-Col WILSON	Financial Adviser (Brit)
<u>Secretary</u>	Major IVALLIS	G(SD) CHQ

1. The Chairman said that the object of the conference was to reach a definite conclusion on the policy to be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the provision of equipment for the ITALIAN Interim Army, together with methods recommended for implementing that policy.

2. The Chairman said that progress had so far been very slow. He proposed to deal with the main outline of the problem and to leave details to be dealt with at a later conference.

3. A/C of S G-3 AFHQ outlined how the ITALIAN Interim Army fitted into the operational picture. S.C.'s interest in the efficiency of the Army lies in seeing that it is capable of:-

(a) ensuring internal security

Secretary

Major

INCLIS

G(DD) GHQ

1. The Chairman said that the object of the conference was to reach a definite conclusion on the policy to be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff regarding the provision of equipment for the ITALIAN Interim Army, together with methods recommended for implementing that policy.
2. The Chairman said that progress had so far been very slow. He proposed to deal with the main outline of the problem and to leave details to be dealt with at a later conference.
3. 1/2 of S G-3 AMHQ outlined how the ITALIAN Interim Army fitted into the operational picture. S.G.'s interest in the efficiency of the Army lies in seeing that it is capable of:-
 - (a) ensuring internal security
 - (b) acting as a deterrent to any unfriendly neighbours
 - (c) defending ITALY'S frontiers, with Allied help.

/4.....

4. The Chairman then read relevant passages from various important documents in order to ensure that the general background to the problem was known.

5. The Chairman read extracts from the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive to AIC authorising the handing over of the ITALIAN Armed Forces under Allied Command to the ITALIAN Government (PIN 624 of 29 Sep 45) which states:-

"Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be furnished in the following priorities:-

- (A) From indigenous ITALIAN resources, including captured material (except GERMAN weapons) and local manufacturing.
- (B) By purchase from appropriate U.S. and U.K. surplus disposal agencies in ITALY, stocks which are available to the disposal agencies.
- (C) Through the ITALIAN Government import programme.

Sale of warlike equipment available to authorised surplus disposal agencies to the ITALIAN Armed Forces of the types and quantities of equipment that are normally used for internal security purposes, is authorised for transfer as approved by SACRED or his successors. In the case of lethal GERMAN warlike equipment transfer will be made only under military arrangements. Requirements that can NOT be met from the sources listed above, should be loaned from U.S. and BRITISH military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 Jan 46. Hereafter these items are to be returned on demand or transferred through surplus agencies.

You should note the financial arrangements consequent upon this policy remain to be settled."

6. The Chairman read extracts from AICQ policy directive to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission (LAC, Letter L.G.094.7410(3D)-0 of 2 Nov 45) which states:-

" Warlike Equipment and Spares

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of U.S. and BRITISH origin (including lend/lease) in possession of these units being used to make up the ITALIAN Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri, as may be surplus to U.S. and BRITISH requirements, together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus

from U.S. and BRITISH military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 Jan 46. Hereafter these items are to be returned on demand or transferred through surplus agencies.

You should note the financial arrangements consequent upon this policy remain to be settled."

5. The Chairman read extracts from LMG policy directive to the Chief Commissioner Allied Commission (LMG Letter LG.091.7419(4B)-0 of 2 Nov 45) which states:-

" Warlike Equipment and Spares

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of U.S. and BRITISH origin (including lend/lease) in possession of these units being used to make up the ITALIAN Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri, as may be surplus to U.S. and BRITISH requirements, together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the U.S. and BRITISH requirements, will be disposed of to the ITALIAN Government.

Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources.

/In the.....

In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to U.S. and BRITISH disposal organizations, disposal to the ITALIAN Government will be effected through the respective U.S. and BRITISH disposal organizations in accordance with established procedure, but with priorities requested for its sale to the ITALIAN Government. In the case of lethal BRITISH warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military."

The Chairman read extracts from AFHQ policy directive to the Commander Land Forces Sub Commission, AG (1111) (reference AFHQ letter AG 094.711 OCT-0 of 3 Dec 45) which stated:-

" It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the ITALIAN Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency."

The Chairman read extracts from the Minutes of a meeting held at GHQ by 'G' Branch GHQ on 11 Dec 45 to discuss, in the main, provision of maintenance for the BRITISH equipment handed over to the ITALIAN Army (ref GHQ/6453/6/1(1111) dated 13 Dec 45).

The Chairman read extracts from a letter from GHQ to CG ARMSA putting forward certain proposals regarding provision of equipment to the ITALIAN Army (reference GHQ letter GHQ/81/38 of 13 Jan 46) which states:-

- "(a) That the Order of Battle and Staff Equipment Tables proposed by AFHQ (their reference 63/109 of 5 Dec 45) were agreed in principle by GHQ.
- (b) That provision of equipment for the BRITISH Army was a BRITISH commitment of higher priority than for the ITALIAN Army.
- (c) That it was proposed, in the interests of standardization, to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that only the Carabinieri should be equipped from indigenous resources.
- (d) That it was considered by GHQ that the third source of supply mentioned in the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive, i.e., the ITALIAN Government import programme, was not a practicable proposition in view of the delay that would be involved in the urgency for equipping the Army as soon as possible, and that it was proposed to recommend that material not fund from BRITISH or AMERICAN surpluses be provided from some other source.
- (e) That provision of one year's maintenance and spares

putting forward certain proposals regarding provision of equipment to the ITALIAN Army (reference GHQ letter ASD/81/38 of 18 Jan 46) which states:-

- "(a) That the Order of Battle and Staff Equipment Tables proposed by MILI (their reference ED/109 of 6 Dec 45) were agreed in principle by GHQ.
- (b) That provision of equipment for the GREEK Army was a BRITISH commitment of higher priority than for the ITALIAN Army.
- (c) That it was proposed, in the interests of standardisation, to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that only the Carabinieri should be equipped from indigenous resources.
- (d) That it was considered by GHQ that the third source of supply mentioned in the Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive, i.e., the ITALIAN Government import programme, was not a practicable proposition in view of the delay that would be involved and the urgency for equipping the Army as soon as possible, and that it was proposed to recommend that material not issued from MILI or ITALIAN surpluses be provided from some other source.
- (e) That provision of one year's maintenance and spares from surpluses would of course have to be supplied by the ally providing the particular equipment.
- (f) That certain equipment could not be provided from BRITISH surpluses."

CG HQUUSA was asked for agreement on the general policy and for details of the equipment that could be provided from U.S. surpluses.

/10.....

10. The Chairman read extracts from CG WFOUSA's reply to the foregoing letter (reference D-568 of 2 Feb 46) which states:-
- "(a) That it was agreed that the proposed standardisation was desirable.
 - (b) That the bulk of the military type items required had been shipped out of the theatre and the bulk of the civilian type items had been declared to the AMERICAN Disposal Agency (ODIC).
 - (c) That CG WFOUSA is not authorized to make sales of surplus equipment and that the ITALIAN Government could obtain AMERICAN surpluses of civilian type items by submitting requirements to the ODIC in Rome."
11. The Chairman then read extracts from a Staff Study for the Chief of Staff, Italy, reference G-3 let or G-3/38, which had been agreed by
- G-3 (AMIC)
 - G-4 (AMIC)
 - G-5 (AMIC)
 - G-6 (AMIC)
 - G-7 (AMIC)
- but which had not yet been put before the Chief of Staff.
- (It was agreed later that this study should go forward to the Chief of Staff AMIC.)
12. The Chairman stressed the point made to Chief of Staff AMIC by the Commander Land Forces Sub Commission, reference his letter G-3/054 of 5 Mar 46, namely that:-
- " It would appear that some other source (than the three mentioned in the original directive), such as BRITISH reserves or extra theatre surpluses should be tapped if an effective ITALIAN Army is to be equipped as ordered."
13. The Vehicle situation was discussed at some length.
- (a) G-1 1/2 AMIC in stressing the deplorable situation that now exists, said:-
- (i) Regarding Load Carriers only - of a total entitlement of approx 12,000 approx 1,000 are held, of which about 2,500 are in such a condition that they should be considered as written off, thus making total required 2,500. To meet this during the remainder of 1946 it

but which had not yet been put before the Chief of Staff.

(It was agreed later that this study should go forward to the Chief of Staff AFHQ.)

12.

The Chairman stressed the point made to Chief of Staff AFHQ by the Commander Land Forces Sub Commission, reference his letter SO/054 of 5 Mar 46, namely that:-

" It would appear that none other source (than the three mentioned in the original directive), such as BRITISH reserves or extra theatre surpluses should be tapped if an effective ITALIAN Army is to be equipped as ordered."

13.

The Vehicle situation was discussed at some length.

(a) Col V/2 MFA in stressing the deplorable situation that now exists, said:-

(1) Regarding Load Carriers only - of a total entitlement of approx 12,000 approx 5,300 are held, of which about 2,500 are in such a condition that they should be considered as written off, thus making total required 8,500. To meet this during the remainder of 1946 it was estimated that ITALIAN repair facilities would allow approx 1,200 to be repaired provided spares were available, and that approx 2,100 might be received from ITALIAN industry, leaving 5,300 to come from Allied surpluses.

(11) It is estimated that the reorganisation of the ITALIAN motor industry will begin to produce vehicles for the Army during the latter half of 1947 and it can be assumed that by the end of 1947 the ITALIAN Army transport will be entirely supported by ITALIAN industry.

/(b).....

(b) Deputy Commander MIA stressed and it was agreed by all present, that the vehicles should be provided as far as possible from BRITISH sources because of :-

(i) the desirability of achieving maximum standardisation of types

(ii) the financial problems involved in the purchase of AMERICAN vehicles (which have to be paid for in cash).

(c) QED representative said that, as a very rough estimate, subject to alteration when details were available, after other priorities had been met, about 35,000 load carriers of mixed types and classifications with approx six months mixed spares would be declared surplus on the close down of CAF, and that they would all be runnors although not Class I.

(d) The Chairman said that he thought that the ITALIAN Government would be unwilling to buy a lot of old vehicles.

(e) Col A/Q MIA said that they wanted to buy the minimum to last them until the end of 1947 when they hoped to be self supporting in vehicles.

(f) QED representative said that there were not sufficient vehicle spares in the theatre to cover up to the end of 1947 and that as a very rough estimate (again subject to alteration when details were forthcoming) about six months maintenance and spares were likely to be available. The position might be better than this when the details were known.

QED representative agreed that "maintenance and spares" for MT covered major assemblies and tyres and inner tubes, but that major assemblies, particularly engine assemblies, were in fact not available and that tyres and tubes were subject to global control and were excluded from the original Combined Chiefs of Staffs' directive.

Col A/Q MIA said the question of tyres was very important as it was obviously no good providing vehicles and spares unless spares included tyres. The tyre position of the vehicles at present held by the ITALIAN Army was critical.

(g) Deputy Commander MIA said he did not think the ITALIANs would take vehicles with only six months spares even if it was only a paper transaction. He said that there must be many hundreds of tons of spares for the various vehicles concerned somewhere in the world and surely there must be some way of getting these spares into the hands of the ITALIAN Army. Surely they could come in on the import programme and be paid for. He considered that this point must be put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman agreed

Col. A. J. [redacted] agreed that "maintenance and spares" for MT covered major assemblies and tyres and inner tubes, but that major assemblies, particularly engine assemblies, were in fact not available and that tyres and tubes were subject to global control and were excluded from the original Combined Chiefs of Staff's directive.

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- (c) Deputy Commander [redacted] said he did not think the ITALIANS would take vehicles with only six months spares even if it was only a major transaction. He said that there must be many hundreds of tons of spares for the various vehicles concerned somewhere in the world and surely there must be some way of getting these spares into the hands of the ITALIAN Army. Surely they could come in on the import programme and be paid for. He considered that this point must be put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Chairman agreed

- (h) The Chairman said that the really important point was that it seemed that the bulk of the vehicles could be produced and could be maintained until the end of this year and that he did not think that it was in the power of the ITALIAN Government to object to this course.
- (i) Deputy Commander [redacted] said that it was essential that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should specifically state what was to be done and what the source of supply was to be.

/14.....

- 6 -

14.

It was agreed that the indigenous source of supply was impracticable and that the import source of supply was in practice useless.

Deputy Commander MIA said that there was at the moment an ITALIAN Mission in WASHINGTON, with cash, unable to buy for the ITALIAN Army because UNRRA had priority. They definitely would buy spare parts for vehicles if they were allowed to do so.

15.

Certain points on the agenda submitted by MIA were then taken.

Col A/Q MIA said that the War Ministry was now considering the future long-term reorganisation of the Army. He said it was likely that they might then require certain items not authorised at present, such as tanks and med arty. It would be a mistake to destroy surplus equipment which might later be required for supply to the ITALIANS.

Col A/Q MIA said that he would write to AMF on this subject.

16.

There was some discussion as to what exactly constituted "lethal warlike equipment" authorised for direct transfer to the Army.

Col A/Q MIA said that whatever the legal interpretation was, the following items should be transferred direct.

- (i) Weapons
- (ii) 'A' Vehicles (to be interpreted particularly to cover all vehicles which it was unlikely that the ITALIAN Government would be allowed to manufacture.)
- (iii) All instruments required for fire direction and control.
- (iv) Wireless sets.
- (v) Maintenance and spares for all the above.

The Chairman said that this point would be examined and a suggested ruling put up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

D/DPR, CM undertook to examine this point.

Col A/Q MIA said that he would submit a list of all equipment which he considered should be transferred direct.

17.

Financial Adviser said that so far as he knew there was no development in arriving at a definite financial agreement and that at the moment the only records that were kept were of equipment actually transferred (these records are kept by the Allied Commission and not by MIA) and that no values were shown on these records.

*Min of Meeting
18 Mar*

- 2006
- (iii) All instruments required for fire direction and control.
 - (iv) Wireless sets.
 - (v) Maintenance and spares for all the above.

The Chairman said that this point would be examined and a suggested ruling put up to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

2/DME, GPO undertook to examine this point.

Col. A. J. MIA said that he would submit a list of all equipment which he considered should be transferred direct.

17. Financial Adviser said that so far as he knew there was no development in arriving at a definite financial agreement and that at the present the only records that were kept were of equipment actually transferred (these records are kept by the Allied Commission and not by MIA) and that no values were shown on these records.

Col. A. J. MIA said that this was a very important point and must be settled, because the War Ministry had to know what financial load they were incurring.

It was pointed out that this is solely a BRITISH problem and does not arise in the case of U.S. material.

It was agreed that the Financial Adviser and reps of G-5 AFHQ would look into the question and summon a small Financial Conference later.

/ All present.....

18. All present were agreed that the policy to be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be :-

(a) ~~That the Carabinieri and all other armed bodies should, with certain specific exceptions, be equipped with indigenous weapons. requir~~ *Combined* *See (33)*

(b) ~~Weapon and equipment, other than vehicles, should be provided by the Italian Army. The Army proper should be equipped with ending for supply.~~ *in some cases* *supplying* *make* *order*

(c) In the interests of standardization the War Office should provide from BRITISH stocks weapons not available from theatre surpluses.

(d) Fighting vehicles, where possible, should be BRITISH supply to obviate complications regarding weapons etc.

(e) Other vehicles should be, so far as possible, BRITISH supply in preference to AMERICAN supply in order to reduce the various types and makes of vehicle from the maintenance and spares point of view.

(f) It is essential that maintenance and spares up to end of 1947 be provided for all equipment handed over.

This must include tyres and inner tubes for vehicles.

(g) That most items of equipment, in particular vehicles, should be handed over direct to the ITALIAN Army to ensure that the necessary proportion to make that Army efficient reach the ITALIAN Army.

(h) That all maintenance and spares, being based on the holdings of the Army, should also be transferred direct to the Army.

19. The Chairman concluded by saying that he considered that the Conference had achieved its object. A definite policy would be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the lines agreed at the Conference.

At the same time the various snags which would arise in implementing this policy would be clearly stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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- (a) That all maintenance and spares, being based on the holdings of the Army, should also be transferred direct to the Army.
19. The Chairman concluded by saying that he considered that the Conference had achieved its object. A definite policy would be recommended to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the lines agreed at the Conference.
- At the same time the various snags which would arise in implementing this policy would be clearly stated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[Handwritten signature]

Maj. GS,
Secretary.

MT/ure
GEO, OAT

March, 196.



ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

HSD/424.

14. March 1946.

SUBJECT : Administration - Interim Italian Army.
TO : Land Forces Sub Commission AC (MMLA), ROME.

1. Your letter SQ.054 of 5 Mar 46 on the above subject has been received.
2. The unsatisfactory state of affairs concerning the equipment of the interim Italian Army is appreciated by this HQ and every effort is being made to speed up the decisions and action necessary. To this end a conference is being held in AFHQ at 1100 hours on Monday, 18 Mar 46, at which it is hoped that the necessary data will be forthcoming in order that a signal may be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in order to get their policy. In addition a separate conference will be held later in the day in order to deal with the points of detail.
3. Instructions for the conference have already been despatched separately to your headquarters.

Wm MacLeod

M.W.M. MACLEOD,
Major General,
Chief of General Staff.

AS/0054

PROPOSED AGENDA

FOR

AFHQ CONFERENCE ON EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN ARMY.

1. Object of Conference.

- (a) Based on AFHQ Directive of 2 Nov 45.
- (b) Changed conditions and postwar necessities necessitate review of means and sources of supply of equipment.
- (c) Statement of present equipment position by M.M.I.A. Consideration of Post War as well as Interim Army.
- (d) Need of ensuring serviceability and maintenance of equipment issued, particularly if payment is insisted on.

2. Supply of Arms and Ammunition.

- (a) Firm decision required on the recommendation that Arms and Ammunition for Army (less Carabinieri) should be of British origin.
- (b) Provision of requisite spares, replacements and maintenance for as long as provision remains a British commitment.
- (c) Training commitment urgent, now being met by loan - further loans needed for Inf Regts.

(d) Review of requirements by M.M.I.A.

(e) Question of responsibility for scaling

(f) Question of local manufacture for Carabinieri etc.

3. Lethal Warlike Equipment.

- (a) Definition required preferably to include 'Vehicles and their instruments etc. essential to operation of weapons and possible signal equipment.

(b) Review by M.M.I.A. of requirements in addition to arms (in item 2 above).

4. MT and Spares.

- (a) M.M.I.A. statement of present position.
- (b) Insufficient available from Theatre surpluses. Alternative solutions to

(c) Training commitment urgent, now being met by loan - further loans needed for Inf Regts.

- (d) Review of requirements by M.M.I.A.
- (e) Question of responsibility for scaling
- (f) Question of local manufacture for Carabinieri etc.
- (a) Definition required preferably to include 'A' Vehicles and their instruments etc. essential to operation of weapons and possible signal equipment.
- (b) Review by M.M.I.A. of requirements in addition to arms (in item 2 above).
- (a) M.M.I.A. statement of present position.
- (b) Insufficient available from Theatre surpluses. Alternative solutions to be considered.
- (c) Recommend at least the five Inf Divs be completed to full W.E. and full scale of spares up to end of 1947 be provided soonest.
- (d) Remainder of Italian Army to improvise from Italian and other miscellaneous sources.

/s...L (e)

3. Lethal Warlike Equipment.

4. IT and Spares.

-2-

4. MT and Spares (contd.).

- (e) Essential that no equipment is forced on Italy without adequate maintenance.
- (f) Question of responsibility of working out details of spares and replacements.

5. Repair and Maint. Services and Replacements.

- (a) Need for greater assistance if proper use is to be made of all equipment issued.
- (b) Make recommendations re technical vehicles and machines ex British Workshops.
- (c) Can supplies be obtained from reserves, surpluses or manufacture outside this Theatre.
 Engineers - Bridging & Machines (MMTA)
 Signals - Wireless & Line } state-
 Mechanical - Workshops machines } ment on
 Medical - Drugs } each case

6. Specialist Equipment.7. Captured Enemy Material.

Situation now cleared up by GHQ letter 5072/2(CEIS) of 4 Mar 46, but much valuable material has meanwhile been lost.

8. Finance.

Original Directive stated that financial arrangements would be made known later.
 Italian finances are in poor shape and some terms of reference either imposed or agreed are desirable.
 What is present position.

9. British Personnel.

Decisions on above matters may involve considerable staff study and preparation of schedules etc. Whose responsibility will this be. M.M.I.A. Staff and Services already fully occupied. Technical assistance will be needed in any case on ORD and REME sides. M.M.I.A. increment should remain.

10. Any other points.

Sup End.

financial arrangements would be made known later.
Italian finances are in poor shape and some terms of reference either imposed or agreed are desirable.
What is present position.

9. British Personnel.

Decisions on above matters may involve considerable staff study and preparation of schedules etc. Whose responsibility will this be. M.M.I.A. Staff and Services already fully occupied. Technical assistance will be needed in any case on ORD and REME sides. M.M.I.A. increment should remain.

10. Any other points.

VP/er

Dep. Comd.
BGS
APB
G (SD)
G (T)
Dnd
REME
Q1
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+ 5.

SUBJECT: Administration - Interior Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
80.054

March 1946

MEMORANDUM TO : A.F.H.Q. (for Chief of Staff).

1. Your directive (AG.O9L.711 CDT-0) of 3 Dec 45 states "It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time to a high state of efficiency". The Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) is responsible to you for the formation, organization, training and administration of this Army (which includes the Carabinieri) in accordance with Allied Policy.

2. Allied Policy regarding the formation, organization and training has been laid down and is being complied with as far, and as quickly as circumstances permit. On the administrative side however important matters of policy have still to be settled and means are still looking for implementing decisions already taken. This is particularly so in the provision and maintenance of arms, transport and equipment. In this respect, in spite of continuous effort and numerous discussions between the staffs concerned, very little progress has been made since 15 November 1945.

3. A serious situation is now developing in which the Italian Army will find itself inadequately equipped for any operation role and dangerously short of the necessary means for training or even for day to day administration. If decisions are not reached and implemented in the near future all progress in reorganization and all hope of giving effect to Allied Policy will be jeopardized and much of the good work already done will be lost.

4. (a) The general administrative policy was laid down in your directive AG O9L.711 CDT-0 of 2 Nov 45, (paras 10-15 inclusive) in which three sources of supply were named:-

- (1) Indigenous Italian resources
- (ii) US and UK surplus disposal agencies.
- (iii) Italian Government Export program.

(b) Certain limitations regarding priority, availability, economy and finance were imposed or have become inevitable.

(c) Certain decisions regarding types and nationalities of arms and equipment to be adopted were sought but have not yet been given.

(d) It was stated that lethal warlike equipment would be issued direct through military channels and not through surplus disposal agencies.

5.

4. (a) The general administrative policy was laid down in your directive AG 091.711 (S.0 of 2 Nov 45, (paras 10-13 inclusive) in which three sources of supply were named:-

- (4) Indigenous Italian resources
(42) US and UK surplus disposal agencies.
(44) Italian Government's Import programme.

(b) Certain limitations regarding priority, availability, economy and finance were imposed or have become inevitable.

(c) Certain decisions regarding tyons and nationalities of arms and equipment to be adopted were sought but have not yet been given.

(d) It was stated that lethal warlike equipment would be issued direct through military channels and not through surplus disposal agencies.

5. A review of action already taken is attached at Appendix 'A' from which it will be seen how little and how slowly progress has been made.

6. The present position, in outline, is as follows:-

(a) Transport, situation critical, an excess of worn out vehicles without adequate spare parts. The issue of further unserviceable vehicles would be worse than useless as:-

(2) the Itolom H.T. grade organization is stretched to the limit

(11) பொது சேவை அமைச்சர் அவர்கள்

100006 (control).

6. (contd) Serviceable vehicles with adequate maintenance systems are before required immediately.

(b) Army. No firm decision on whether British Army are to be issued throughout to the Italian Army. I consider this essential on the grounds of uniformity and interchangeability. Training centres are now being issued on loan pending a decision, but from the organisation and training angle this is unsatisfactory.

(c) Captured material. Much valuable Army material has been lost and will continue to be lost until the present policy is reviewed in favour of the Italian Army.

(d) Letal equipment is ordered to be released to Italian Army direct through MIA and NOT through disposal agencies. This should be altered to and 'A' vehicles included; so far doubt exists. At any rate it is not working.

7. Generally it seems that the considerations on which the original directive was based have not been proved correct. For instance:-

(a) of the three sources for essential material (para 4 (a) above):-

(1) indigenous sources cannot produce much before 1947.

(2) Allied surpluses within the theatre do not exist.

(3) Italian import programme is impracticable on financial and economic grounds.

It would appear therefore that some other source such as British reserves or extra-theatre surpluses should be tapped, if an effective Italian Army is to be formed, as ordered.

(b) The re-arming of the Italian Army cannot be effective until a decision on the type of arm and ammunition to be issued has been given.

8. Direction is urgently needed on these and the other matters referred to in the attached preceds and I earnestly request that you will give an opportunity for discussing them fully at a conference at AFHQ at a very early date.

L. B. B. B. B.
Major General,
M. H. I. A.

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3. Direction is urgently needed on these and the other matters referred to in the attached records and I earnestly request that you will give an opportunity for discussing them fully at a conference at AFHQ at a very early date.

L. Browning

Major General,
E. I. A.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
R.M.I.A.
S/O 054

INTERIM ITALIAN ARMY

Points for discussion at GHQ Conference 27 February 1946.

1. AFHQ Directive of 2 Nov 45.

(a) para 6 (a) Assist Italian Government in Administration of Army.

para 7	3 Internal Security Divs	15,000
	7 Inf Regts }	22,500
	3 Alpini " }	
	5 Inf Divs	50,000
	Command & Admin	40,000
	Trg & Rfts.	12,500
		<u>140,000</u>

para 10 Italian Army to be self administering and no longer dependent on Allied Base & L of C Units

para 11 (i) Indigenous resources (OEM)
(ii) Purchase from Allied Surplus Disposal Agencies
(iii) Import programme.

para 12 up to one years maintenance to be disposed of to Italian Government.
Lethal Br. Warlike equipment transfer direct by military.

para 13 Subsistence - responsibility of Italian Government w.e.f. 1 Dec 45.

para 16 Accounting. Financial arrangements remain to be settled.

AFHQ Directive AG 091.711 OCT-0 of 3 Dec 45.

(b) para 1 It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency.

Para 2(b)(2) you will be responsible to the SAC for giving advice to AFHQ.

para 3 It will be your duty to advise and assist the Minister of War in such detail as you

by military.

para 13 Subsistence - responsibility of Italian Government w.e.f. 1 Dec 45.

para 16 Accounting. Financial arrangements remain to be settled.

ARMQ Directive AG 691.711 GCV-0 of 3 Dec 45.

(b) para 1 It is the policy of the United States and British Governments that the Italian Army shall be brought, in the shortest possible time, to a high state of efficiency.

Para 2(b)(2) you will be responsible to the SAC for giving advice to LTHQ.

para 3 It will be your duty to advise and assist the Minister of War in such detail as you consider necessary.

para 5 The term "Italian Army" includes Carabinieri

para 10 As far as possible the Italian Army will be equipped, and administered on lines generally similar to those employed in the British Army.

para 14 You will be responsible for screening the demands of the Italian Ministry of War for such equipment and supplies as continue to be found from Allied Military sources. You will also exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

/...2

-2-

1. (b) (contd.)

para 17 You will be advised of the financial agreements under which the provision of any equipment or supplies is undertaken by the British and United States Governments.

2. Present Position.

(a) Clothing, reasonably adequate - no margin.

(b) Food, transport, POW precarious.

(c) Equipment & weapons.

(i) Italian - ample for CC.RR with surplus (except Pistols)

(ii) British - under scale for Inf Divs. on loan for GAR's
NO maintenance.

3. Difficulties.

(a) Lack of Support Italian Government.

(b) Policy regarding disposal of CEM
examples: MI and K.T. spares. See para 1 (a) "quote 11"

(c) Policy regarding disposal of Allied Surplus.
See para 1 (a) "quote 11"

(d) Financial.

See para 1 (a) "quote 16" and 1 (b) "quote 17".
Treasury not prepared to give blank cheque.
War Ministry do not know how they stand.

(e) Technical.

See para 1 (a) "quote 10". Not easy to replace British. REHE and Ordnance Installations.

4. Remedies.

(a) C.C. letter to President of Council.

Army representation on ARAR.

ACIA representative with Principal Disposal Officer.

(b) C.I.M.

Italian Ammunition not released.

Arms in Boretta Factory. CC.RR want most modern weapons.

ARAR not interested in the Army. Allies allow useful military equipment to be used for civilian

(a) Financial.
See para 1 (a) "quote 16" and 1 (b) "quote 17".
Treasury not prepared to give blank cheque.
War Ministry do not know how they stand.

(c) Technical.
See para 1 (c) "quote 10". Not easy to replace
British. REHE and Ordnance Installations.

4. Remedies.

(a) C.C. letter to President of Council.
Army representation on ARAR.
MMA representative with Principal Disposals Officer.

(b) C.E.M.
Italian Ammunition now released.
Arms in Boretta Factory. SCAR want most modern
weapons.
ARAR not interested in the Army. Allies allow
useful military equipment to be used for civilian
purposes. UNRRA may help Civilian Economy but
will NOT help armed forces.
Examples.
Proposed amt to CDM directive. Direct release
to MMA who will decide priority. Government can
order War Ministry to give to civilians if
necessary.

/....3

4. (c) (cont'd).

(c) Ministry of Supply do not appear to have instructed their Principal Disposals Officer who is not clear as to position regarding Italian Army. Lethal weapons and 'A' Vehicles. Signal equipment. Transport. Priority must be given Army and direct transfer approved for weapons. 12 months maintenance? So far nil.

(d) Expendable stores sold on "credit".

Other stores on "loan".

Pricing? Is Italian Government prepared to "buy"?
Unconducive to buy Class 5 vehicles with no spares.
Desirable Italian Army should be homogeneous as to weapons but this not of Italian Government choosing.
What is financial angle?

(e) OAR Bologna. Spare parts machinery and tools.
Scaling. Identification and listing. REME
and OMD personnel. British transport a millstone.
Cannibalization impracticable on so large a scale.

5. CONCLUSION.

Organisation and Training plans well advanced.
Morale good in spite of many grave difficulties.
Administration weak and liable to fail completely.
If British war like equipment is to be adopted heavy responsibility to see adequate assistance given. See
1 (b) "quote 14" and 1 (a) "quote 10".
Transport situation merits special attention.
Given identical circumstances could the Allies solve the problem?

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO.

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RUC/er

Appendix "A" to S.O. 054
dated March 1946

ARMY ACTION ON MAINTENANCE OF ITALIAN ARMY

<u>Date</u>	<u>Reference</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
24 Nov 45	Q.695	Sudden cessation of British L of C facilities on 15 Nov considered likely to cause immediate deterioration in efficiency. Impossible for Italian Army to become self supporting overnight. AFHQ requested to provide maintenance facilities weapons & transport of Inf Divs pending transfer of spare parts etc to the War Ministry.
23 Nov 45	Q.027	AFHQ requested to convene conference to decide policy as to future maintenance.
6 Dec 45	SN/103	Forwards to AFHQ complete staff tables for weapons & vehicles required by Italian Interim Army & CC.RR.
14 Dec 45	GHQ/64.53/6/0(45)	Minutes of Conference held at GHQ, 50 days maintenance (if available) provided for equipment & transport actually in possession on 15 Nov 45.
4 Jan 46	31.05A	Forwards to GHQ statement of weapons and transport held by the Italian Army and CC.RR.
10 Jan 46	WHM/61/3B	Agrees "in principle" to issue of British weapons.
1 Feb 46	Q.002	Report to Chief Commissioner stressing need for review of :- (a) Government support to Army (b) Disposal of GEM (c) Disposal of Allied Surplus Material as apparent that Army is not receiving the minimum needed for adequate maintenance.
4 Feb 46	SN/2	D/O Letter from GOC to CAO re provision of British equipment for Interim Army.
4 Feb 46	Q.005	Request to GHQ for release of British weapons for GARA in time for first call up.
5 Feb 46		Reply from Chief Disposals Officer to WHM Q.005 of 31 Jan 45. Position not clear as to disposal of British surplus material to Italian Army.
7 Feb 46	Q.005	Request to GHQ for release of British weapons to complete two Inf Divs transferred to Inf Divs.
15 Feb 46	9006/40	Request by Chief Commissioner that GEM policy be reviewed and regulations amended in favour of Italian Army. GHQ as to convene conference to consider progress made in equipping Italian Army and provision of maintenance.
24 Feb 46	SN.054	Detailed report on present position of Italian Army Gpt.

3 2 3

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minimum possible

13/0 letter from GOC to GAG re provision of British equipment for Interim Army.

Request to GAG for release of British weapons for GAGs in time for first call up.

Reply from Chief Disposals Officer to MMIA 9.003 of 31 Jan 45. Position not clear as to disposal of British surplus material to Italian Army.

Request to GAG for release of British weapons to equip late two Inf Bns transferred to Inf Divs.

Request by Chief Commissioner that GAG policy be reviewed and regulations amended in favour of Italian Army. GAG as to convene conference to consider progress made in equipping Italian Army and provision of maintenance.

Detailed report on present position of Italian Army Vpt.

Request to GAG for guidance on financial procedure and position of War Fin via a visit Italian Treasury.

Conference at G(AG) Branch, GAG, to consider provision and maintenance of Interim Army. Position explained by MMIA. AG/equipment of GAG in possession on 15 Nov maintenance for

has been provided. No weapons have been released for AGs. No indication has been received as to future provision of weapons, transport or maintenance.

4 Feb 45 10/2

4 Feb 45 9.003

5 Feb 45

7 Feb 45 9.003

15 Feb 45 9006/AG

24 Feb 45 90.054

26 Feb 45 9.101

27 Feb 45

Subject : Italian Army Transport.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. Rome.
(M.M.I.A.)

S.Q. 054

21 February 1946.

To : A.F.H.Q. (10 copies)

See 412

1. In the Staff Tables attached to this HQ letter SD/109 of the 6th of December 1945 were given figures of the total transport requirements of the Italian Army. These figures may be subject to some reduction as the result of further detailed examination of the proposed War Establishment, but are unlikely to be substantially reduced.

The present position is illustrated at Appendix "A" and is very far from satisfactory.

The Italian Army holds a number of British and Italian vehicles, the proportion between the two being as stated at Appendix "B". It is obviously desirable that as soon as possible the Italian Army should be equipped with Italian transport of homogeneous type, the only exception being type "A" vehicles, which, it is assumed, will continue to be provided from British sources.

2. Vehicles, both British and Italian, at present in operation are, for the greater part, nearing the end of their life, and if a conservative estimate of "wastage" is added to the present deficiencies against W.E. the position is shown to be extremely grave. The total deficiency by types is illustrated at Appendix "C".

3. If the Italian Army is to be efficiently maintained, it is essential that this deficiency in transport is made good. The vehicles required can only be obtained from one of the following three sources :-

- (a) Reconditioned Italian Vehicles at present held in large numbers in "Inefficient" Vehicle Parks.
- (b) From the Italian Motor Industry.
- (c) From allied sources.

4. The existing Italian Army workshops are designed to maintain vehicles already on charge by units in the respective Territorial Commands. They have only a very limited capacity available for reconditioning recovered vehicles. The War Ministry are endeavouring to arrange contracts with selected civilian firms in order that the output of reconditioned vehicles may be increased, but, as will be seen from Appendix "C", coln 7, the number obtained is not likely to be large.

5. As regards provision from the Italian Motor Industry, enquiries made through Economic Section A.C. indicate that the Government plan a 200% reactivation of the industry in 1946. Details of the target production and

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5. As regards provision from the Italian Motor Industry, enquiries made through Economic Section A.C. indicate that the Government plan a 200% reactivation of the industry in 1946. Details of the target production and essential imports are given at Appendix "D".

It is difficult to give any firm figures as to the number of vehicles the War Ministry may expect to obtain from this source. It is considered that these are most unlikely to exceed those given at Appendix "C", coln 8, unless the Italian Government are required to give priority in this respect to the armed forces, which will necessitate further U.N.R.R.A. assistance to meet the needs of the civil economy.

2/.....

2/12/46

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6. Any assistance from Allied sources must necessarily be a short term policy, but there would appear to be no alternative at present. If it is decided that sufficient British vehicles and spare parts cannot be made available, the balance would presumably come from American sources. The difficulty of training mechanics and handling large quantities of M.T. spares, both British and Italian, will be immediately aggravated. Plans are prepared and very earnest endeavour is being made to establish at Bologna an Italian Army Base Workshop, where British vehicles will be maintained.
- It is emphasised that in addition to the deficiencies shown in coln 9 of Appendix "C", 42 months maintenance spares are required for the British vehicles already held, (Vide Appendix "B"). The majority of these vehicles are nearing the end of their life - eg. in one of the Infantry Divs there are 600 engines needing complete replacement. This is not surprising, as the vehicles were generally in poor condition when issued, and have since experienced more than 12 months war service conditions.
7. Apart from the deficiency in vehicles, there is a serious shortage of tyres and of the raw material needed for the repair of tyres. No mention of this item is made in the report from Economic Section, on which the figures given at Appendix "D" are based. It is, however, known that there are a number of newly manufactured motor vehicles awaiting the provision of tyres before they can be put on the market. The Army is being hampered by being denied a share of the limited tyre and tyre repair facilities under control of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
8. Finally there is the question of the supply of POL. At present, the War Ministry monthly requirements are passed by Land Forces Sub Commission to LHQ (Combined Petroleum Committee). Although these demands are passed on only after scrutiny, to provide some guarantee that they are not in excess of the Army's needs, they are frequently cut in proportion to the total stocks available. In the near future it is anticipated that the War Ministry will be required to bid direct through Italian channels to the Ministry of Fuel and Power, when it is anticipated the Army will receive less than it is getting at present. A further communication will be made separately on this subject.
9. To sum up, the transport of the Italian Army is at present inadequate, and will rapidly deteriorate unless further Allied assistance is made available. From the figures given at Appendix "C, columns 7 and 8, it would appear that insufficient assistance is forthcoming for the Army from the Italian Government. The provision of transport is but one example of the difficulties in making adequate provision for the armed forces from the Italian national economy.
- If the Italian Army, as required by the C.C.S., is to be efficiently maintained, there is no alternative but to continue Allied assistance, any vehicles provided being accompanied by an adequate supply of tyres and spare parts.
- I recommend the present position be closely examined, with a view to a very early decision as to the extent of Allied assistance to be given, bearing in mind the impossibility of obtaining an assurance from the present Italian Government that the necessary provision for the Army can be made by them.

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If the Italian Army, as required by the C.O.S., is to be efficiently maintained, there is no alternative but to continue Allied assistance, any vehicles provided being accompanied by an adequate supply of tyres and spare parts.

I recommend the present position be closely examined, with a view to a very early decision as to the extent of Allied assistance to be given, bearing in mind the impossibility of obtaining an assurance from the present Italian Government that the necessary provision for the Army can be made by them.

For signing
Major General
M.M.I.A.

Copy to: A.C. for Executive Commissioner

Internal: "C"

ORD

R.E.M.E.

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Appendix
S.Q.054

UNIT	Type "A" Vehicles			Motorcycles			Passenger Vehicles			Load Carriers		
	Held	W.E.	%	Held	W.E.	%	Held	W.E.	%	Held	W.E.	%
Infantry Divisions	1574	2640	<u>52%</u>	1512	2265	<u>68%</u>	413	995	<u>42%</u>	3554	4605	<u>76%</u>
Internal Security Divs.	-	564	<u>nil</u>	153	528	<u>30%</u>	40	90	<u>44%</u>	257	1038	<u>25%</u>
Independent Regiments	-	940	<u>nil</u>	110	770	<u>14%</u>	43	140	<u>31%</u>	195	1470	<u>13%</u>
Training Establishments	52	274	<u>19%</u>	133	465	<u>29%</u>	15	337	<u>4%</u>	286	781	<u>37%</u>
Services (Adm. Units)	59	-		402	712	<u>56%</u>	260	260	<u>100%</u>	1414	2284	<u>62%</u>
CC.FR.	255	144	<u>176%</u>	1434	14764	<u>10%</u>	714	1061	<u>67%</u>	341	1980	<u>17%</u>
TOTAL	1940	4562	<u>42%</u>	3744	19504	<u>19%</u>	1485	2883	<u>56%</u>	6047	12158	<u>48%</u>

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TTL

Appendix "A" to M.M.I.A. letter
S.Q.054 dated 21 February, 1946.

Passenger Vehicles			Load Carriers			Other Vehicles.		
Held	W.E.	%	Held	W.E.	%	Held	W.E.	%
413	995	<u>42%</u>	3554	4605	<u>76%</u>	395	660	<u>60%</u>
40	90	<u>44%</u>	257	1038	<u>25%</u>	6	51	<u>12%</u>
43	140	<u>31%</u>	195	1470	<u>13%</u>	6	80	<u>8%</u>
15	337	<u>4%</u>	286	781	<u>37%</u>	15	66	<u>23%</u>
260	260	<u>100%</u>	1414	2294	<u>62%</u>	135	620	<u>22%</u>
714	1061	<u>67%</u>	341	1980	<u>17%</u>	61	161	<u>38%</u>
1485	2883	<u>56%</u>	6047	12158	<u>48%</u>	618	1638	<u>37%</u>

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NHDD NO.

785020

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SUMMARY OF VEHICLES HELD

Appendix
Letter
21 Feb

UNIT	BRITISH					ITALIAN			
	Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles.	Type "A" Vehicles.	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers
Infantry Divisions (5)	1,574	1,512	252	3,546	391	-	-	161	8
Internal Security Divisions (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	153	40	257
Independent Regiments (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	110	43	195
Training Establishments	52	135	15	286	15	-	-	-	-
Services (Adm. Units)	-	-	-	-	-	59	402	260	14,114
CC.FR	45	300	-	8	-	210	1134	714	533
RESERVE									
TOTAL	1,671	1,945	267	3,840	406	269	1,799	1,218	2,207

VEHICLES HELD

Appendix "D" to MIA
letter S. 3.054 dated
21 February 1946.

		ITALIAN				
Load Carriers	Other Vehicles.	Type "A" Vehicles.	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles.
3,546	391	-	-	161	8	4
-	-	-	153	40	257	6
-	-	-	110	43	195	6
286	15	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	59	402	260	11,114	135
8	-	210	1134	714	333	61
840	406	269	1,799	1,218	2,207	212

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix "C" to M.
S.Q.054 dated 24

TYPE (1)	DEFICIENT (A) (2)	WASTAGE			TOTAL DEFICIENCY (2) + (5) = (6) (6)	TO BE PROVIDED	
		British (3)	Italian (4)	Total (5)		From Reconditioned Vehicles (7)	From Motor Industry (8)
"A" Vehicles	2600	?	-	?	2600	-	-
Motorcycles	15700	700	1200	1900	17600 (B)	400	1050
Passenger Vehicles	1400	100	700	800	2200	300	300
Load Carriers	6100	900	1600	2500	8600	1200	2100
Other Vehicles	1000	50	100	150	1150	100	200

NOTE : (A) All figures are expressed in round numbers
those given at Appendix "A"

(B) When CC.RR Staff Tables are revised this
be reduced to 10300.

Appendix "C" to MHA letter
S.O. 054 dated 24 Feb. 46.

TOTAL DEFICIENCY (2) + (5) = (6)	TO BE PROVIDED			TOTAL
	From Reconditioned Vehicles (7)	From Motor Industry (8)	From Allies (9)	
(6)				(10)
2600	-	-	2600	2600
17600 (B)	400	1050	16150	17600
2200	300	300	1600	2200
8600	1200	2100	5300	8600
1150	100	200	850	1150

All Figures are expressed in round numbers based on those given at Appendix "A"

When OC.RR Staff Tables are revised this number may be reduced to 10300.

TARGET PRODUCTION FIGURES 1946

A.	Light trucks (load up to 3-5 tons)	18,000 units
	Heavy trucks (load up to 7 tons)	16,000 units
	Light delivery vans	16,500 units
	Road tractors	600 units
	Trailers for light trucks	9,000 units
	Trailers for heavy trucks	15,000 units
	Trailers for road tractors	1,200 units

B. RAW MATERIALS REQUIRED.

Pig Iron	56,400 tons
Other ferrous products	232,700 tons
Copper	4,154 tons
Aluminum	16,841 tons
Zinc	1,134 tons
Lead	1,275 tons
Nickel	142 tons
Antimony	142 tons
Lumber	140,500 tons
Coal	120,600 tons

The prime materials underlined above will have to be imported from abroad. Lumber, coal and some of the ferrous products requirements will be partially imported origin, whereas the rest of the prime materials will be of local origin.

Zinc	16,841 tons
<u>Lead</u>	1,134 tons
<u>Nickel</u>	1,275 tons
<u>Antimony</u>	142 tons
Lumber	142 tons
Coal	140,500 tons
	120,600 tons

The prime materials underlined above will have to be imported from abroad. Lumber, coal and some of the ferrous products requirements will be partially imported origin, whereas the rest of the prime materials will be of local origin.

Subject:- Equipment of the Italian Armed Forces.

52

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(M. H. I. A.) RMR.
S.O.O.S.
11 February, 1946.

To:- War Ministry.

Reference is made to your L/447/REV of 29 Jan 46.

1. Allied intention is that the Interim Italian Army, less the C.A.R., shall be provided with British War-like equipment. Modern Italian weapons thus released would be available for the re-arming of C.A.R. units, while in addition, armoured cars and signal equipment for C.A.R. are likely to be made available from British surplus stocks.
2. A detailed examination is now being made of the requirements of the Italian Army in the above respect and of the availability in the C.M.F. of weapons and signal equipment required. You will be kept fully informed as to progress in this respect.
3. Every endeavour is being made by M.H.I.A. to secure an early release of the British weapons required for:
 - (a) C.A.R's.
 - (b) The two Bns. transferred into Combat Divisions and at present armed with Italian weapons.

Ras
Major General,
M. H. I. A.

By L.O.

Copy to:- "G"
"X" Branch.

RAC/Ten

"Q" BLOCK SLIP

FILE NO

10054

(30)

DATE	SECTION or SERVICE		ACTION REQUIRED
	FROM	TO	
8 Feb	Q	AQ via G.	Ref. (19) see draft for approval attached. Do you wish to amplify remarks on signal equipment etc. RAC
	G(SD)	BGS.	This seems to be adequate; and is as much as we can say at the present time.
	BGS	AQ.	OK. but I think <u>Baumann</u> should take it round & give unofficial amplification verbally. W.P.
9 Feb	AQ	AQMS.	I agree with this RAC

785020

Translation

19

From: M of W

ref: 4/I47/Serv.

to: MNIA

29 January 1946

Subject: Arms and ammunition for the units of the Italian Army.

In order to determine the balance of expenses for the year 1946 and make an estimate of the eventual stocks of materials to be handed over to the industrial factories during this year, this Ministry should know if British armament will be adopted- or at least if it is estimated that it will be adopted-, for all the units of the Army(Internal Sec.Divs- Inf.Terr.Regts.-General duties). We need this information in order ~~to~~ to forecast future requirements and determine what orders should be given for the manufacture of small arms and automatic arms ammunition, ~~which~~ of which there is a deficiency, also as far as simple training requirements are concerned. It is understood that in the event of the affirmative these orders would be limited to the CCRR and Police Forces requirements, presuming that said units ~~will~~ ~~maintain~~ will continue to retain the Italian armament.

We would also like ~~you to give us~~ ^{you to give us} ~~information~~, always in order to determine the balance requirements of the Admin. of the Ministry of War, a/m info concerning Signals materials (W/T and wire).

C/u

Liuzzi

SEE 22

Q 125

R/4w
12/2/46

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

24 JAN 46.

775

ESD/81/3

23 Jan 46

18

SUBJECT : Italian Munitions Production and the
Re-equipping of the Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MOTIA)

13

Reference your S/Q.054 of 16 Jan 46.

1. Action on the letter under reference has been passed to this Headquarters by AFHQ. Arrangements are being made for the release to the Italian Ministry of War of 8 million rounds of 9mm ammunition (Parabellum) to meet the requirements of Carabinieri units equipped with 9 mm Auto/Carbines.

2. Authority already exists for the manufacture of ammunition to meet the requirements of the Carabinieri under AFHQ letter reference AC 388.3/087 GSC-9 of 2 Aug 45, and in consequence it is requested that arrangements be made by you for a sufficient quantity of 9 mm Pistol and 7.65 mm Pistol ammunition to be manufactured to meet the Carabinieri requirements of these natures.

S/Q.050

38

Action
in 2009

AAH/hn/C(SD)

for A.D. WARD,
Major General,
Chief of General Staff.

COPY TO: - G-5 AFHQ (IRS 311/18 of 18 Jan refers)

G-3 AFHQ (your Minute 2 to above G-5 IRS and
conversation Lt Col FOSTER - Major HOLMES
refer)

S/Q.054

R 24-1-46
RS

SUBJECT:-

Italian Munitions Production and the Re-equipping
of the Italian Armed Forces.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.

R O M E

S/O.054

1 January 1946

TO : A.P.H.Q.

1. Reference is made to this Headquarters letter of 16 January 1946,
file and subject as above.

2. The Italian War Minister has now requested authority to manufacture
ammunition additional to that reported in our letter under reference, for use
of CC.RR units for training, and Royal Finance Guards and Agents of Public
Safety for training and reserve.

3. Paragraph 7 of our original letter therefore should be amended to
read:

"7. The Italian War Minister has represented that the
following amounts of small arms ammunition are necessary
for training and reserve of CC.RR, Royal Finance Guards
and Public Security Agents.

Your decision as to whether or not manufacture can
commence is therefore requested.

<u>Nature</u>	<u>Quantity to be approved.</u>
9 mm Auto/Carbino	8,000,000 (a)
9 mm Pistol	8,000,000 (b)
7.65 mm Pistol	500,000 (b)
10.35 mm Pistol	1,400,000 (b)
6.35 mm Pistol	110,000 (b)

NOTE : (a) unless available from Allied sources, see para 1 above.
(b) Italian weapons and no corresponding ammunition held
by Allies."

4. Appendix "A" of above mentioned letter should be amended to include
the firm of LEON BEAUX of BALAZATE, MILAN, capable of producing small arms
shell casings and the firm of NOBEL of AVIGLIANA, TURIN, capable of producing
gun powder for small arms.

17. The Italian War Minister has represented that the following amounts of small arms ammunition are necessary for training and reserve of CO.P.R., Royal Finance Guards and Public Security Agents.

Your decision as to whether or not manufacture can commence is therefore requested.

<u>Nature</u>	<u>Quantity to be approved.</u>
9 mm Auto/Carbine	8,000,000 (a)
9 mm Pistol	8,000,000 (b)
7.65 mm Pistol	500,000 (b)
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6.35 mm Pistol	110,000 (b)

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(b) Italian weapons and no corresponding ammunition hold by Allies. "

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Copy to:- A.C. for Executive Commissioner,
Navy Sub-Commission,
Air Force Sub-Commission,
A.C. for Economic Section,
A.C. for Public Safety Sub-Commission,
File Q.009

JW/ar

W. F. Fisher Colonel
for Major General,
M.H.I.A.

RAE
22-4-56
2. 22-4-56

SUBJECT:-- Italian Munitions Production and the Re-equipping of the
Italian Armed Forces.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.O.,
M.I.I.A.,
ROME
S/Q.054

16 January 1946

TO : A.F.H.Q.

1. This Headquarters has received a request from the Italian Ministry of War for the release from Allied stocks of 8,000,000 rounds of cal. 9 mm ammunition (Parabellum) or alternatively, permission to manufacture the same quantity in Italian munitions plants. The ammunition is requested in order to maintain a holding of 1,000 rounds of ammunition for each automatic carbine in use by Carabinieri units. A total of 10,000 of these automatic carbines was released to the Carabinieri from the BERETTA Arms Factory at GARDONE in your C-5 000.5 of 7 Nov 45, subject: "Arms for the Italian Police Forces".
2. Present holdings of 9 mm automatic carbine ammunition in the Italian Army dumps are approximately 2,000,000 rounds. See Annexure "ZA" to this H.Q. S/Q.054 of 4 Jan 46.
3. It is therefore requested that a release of 8,000,000 rounds of cal. 9 mm Parabellum ammunition be made to the Italian War Ministry if Allied stocks are available in the theatre. If stocks are not available, an interim decision is desired on the question of manufacture of small arms ammunition either in private Italian firms by contract to the Italian War Ministry, or within munitions plants owned and operated by the Italian War Ministry. As it is understood the CC.RR will continue to be equipped with Italian weapons, Small Arms Ammunition manufacture, if permitted, would be restricted to the quantity needed to complete CC.RR holdings.

4. Discussion on the necessity of manufacture to meet the needs of the of the Army as a whole must await the decision as to the arming of the Italian Army (less CC.RR) from British stocks, as requested in our SD/109 of 4 Jan 46, subject "Policy-provision of British Arms for Italian Army".

5. A list of firms prepared to commence small arms ammunition manufacture is attached at Appendix "A". The War Ministry state there would be little delay in commencing production and are anxious to authorize the necessary preliminary preparation.

6. Additional requests have been made by the Italian Ministry of War for permission to manufacture 500,000 rounds each of 9 mm and 7.65 mm for pistols assigned to CC.RR units. The 9 mm cartridge for the automatic carbine will not fit the 9 mm pistol. Stocks of 9 mm pistol ammunition stand at 78,496 rounds and stocks of 7.65 mm pistol ammunition stand at 4,333 rounds, vide Annexure "ZA" to our letter S/Q.054 dated 4 Jan 46.

private Italian firms by contract to the Italian War Ministry, or within munitions plants owned and operated by the Italian War Ministry. As it is understood the CC.RR will continue to be equipped with Italian weapons, Small Arms Ammunition manufacture, if permitted, would be restricted to the quantity needed to complete CC.RR holdings.

4. Discussion on the necessity of manufacture to meet the needs of the of the Army as a whole must await the decision as to the arming of the Italian Army (less CC.RR) from British stocks, as requested in our SD/109 of 4 Jan 46, subject "Policy-provision of British Arms for Italian Army".

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7. Unless reserves of the ammunition available for certain weapons in present use by the CC.RR are to fall dangerously low, it is necessary to provide the following calibres.

Your decision as to whether or not manufacture can commence is therefore requested.

1/.....2

SEE 18

-2-

<u>Nature</u>	<u>Quantity to be approved.</u>
9mm Auto/Carbine	8,000,000 (a)
9mm Pistol	500,000 (b)
7.65mm Pistol	500,000 (b)

NOTE: (a) unless available from Allied sources, see para 1 above.

(b) Italian weapons and no corresponding ammunition held by Allies.

W. P. Fisher
Major General,
M.N.I.A.

Copy to:-
A.C. for Executive Commissioner,
Navy Sub-Commission,
Air Force Sub-Commission,
A.C. for Economic Section,
A.C. for Public Safety Sub-Commission,
File Q.009.

Appendix "A" to IMLA letter
S/O.054 dated Jan 46.

List of Italian Plants capable
of producing Small Arms Ammunition.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
A. Private Firms:	
FIOCCHI	LECCO (LOMBARDIA)
BOMBARDI - PARODI - DELFINO	COLLEREGGIO (FROSINONE)
SOCIETA' METALLURGICA ITALIANA	CAMPOTIZZO (PISTOIA)

A.C. for Economic Section,
A.C. for Public Safety Sub-Commission,
File Q.009.

Appendix "A" to IPIIA letter
S/G.054 dated Jan 46.

List of Italian Plants capable
of producing Small Arms Ammunition.

NAME

LOCATION

A. Private Firms:

FIOCCHI
BOERINI - PARODI - DELFINO
SOCIETA' ATTILURGICA ITALIANA

LECCO (LOMBARDIA)
COLLETERO (FROSINONE)
CAMPOTIZZORO (PISTOIA)

B. War Ministry Controlled Establishments:

1006 FUSE SECTION
1007 EXPLOSIVE WORKSHOP

CAPUA (CAMPANIA)
FONTANA LIRI (FROSINONE)

SECRET

(11)

Subject:- Italian Army Equipment and Transport HoldingsLand Forces Sub Committee on A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) RMO.

✓ S. S. 054.

4 January 1946.To:- A.F.S.G. C(32)Reference this H.C. letter S. S. 054 dated 20 December 45,
and annexure "B" forwarded therewith.

1. As that time no information was available concerning the
British ammunition held by Combat Divisions. This has now come to
hand and rounded figures concerning the British weapons, ammunition and
transport held at present by the Italian Army are forwarded herewith.

2. For convenience of reference, a new annexure "CA" is
attached (20 copies), which should be substituted for annexure "B".
A comparative table is appended which shows the difference between
annexure "B" and that now submitted.

ABC.
Major General.
M. M. I. A.

SEE 45Copy to:- H.C. A.C.
Ministry of War.Internal:- C (D)

RMO/pen

Comparative Table.

ARMED

Weapons	Z	ZA	Difference	
Pistol .38	2,356	2,193	643	
Rifle .303	27,123	35,122	7,929	
Thompson M. 1919	14,326	13,044	1,285	
L.M.G. (Bren)	2,244	2,743	502	
Notar 2"	393	653	260	
Notar 3"	170	334	64	
Mortar Pist	1,022	923	99	
Signal Pistol	1,238	382	856	
6 Pounder	86	202	160	
17 Pounder	77	47	30	
25 Pounder	230	186	44	
40 mm	168	67	101	
L.M.G. Hotley Twin	45	-	45	
Mortar 4.2"	64	-	64	
B.M.G. .303	192	24	168	
Rifle Snipers	168	111	57	

ARMED

Armament	Z	ZA	Difference	
.38 for Pistol	3,972	41,170	37,198	
.303 Ball	2,327,291	9,869,759	7,542,468	
		1,997,223	1,110,687	

	100	67	45	64	160	57
40 mm						
L.M.O. Hotley Twin	45	-				
Mortar 4.2"	64	-				
M.M.C. .503	192	24				
Blindon Salvers	168	111				
<u>ASSEMBLY</u>						
Ammunition	3	3A	Difference			
.38 for Pistol	3,972	41,170	37,198			
.303 Ball	2,327,297	9,869,759	7,542,462			
.45 Ball for TUG	558,536	3,997,223	3,438,687			
.303 Tracer	-	233,155	233,155			
Mortar 2"	52,400	122,027	69,627			
Mortar 3"	12,530	52,818	40,288			
Mortar Plat	3,283	26,340	23,057			
Signal Pistol	13,215	19,456	6,241			
6 Powder	1,023	15,880	14,857			
17 Powder	963	4,479	3,516			

Comparative Table continued.....

AMERICAN Continued.....

Ammunition	Z	ZA	Difference
25 Pounder	1,751	50,798	49,047
40 mm	4,075	20,061	15,986
.303 for L.M.G.	-	23,668	23,668
Grenades	-	116,387	116,387

TRANSPORT

Vehicles	Z	ZA	Difference
Type "A" Vehicles	2,355	1,671	684
Motorcycles	1,675	1,345	330
Passenger Vehicles	330	257	73
Load Carriers	2,648	3,840	1,192
Other Vehicles	645	406	239

1349

Passenger Vehicles	580	267	1,172	239
Load Carriers	2,663	3,840		
Other Vehicles	645	406		

SECRET

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES

Anne

Serial	Unit	British					Italian.		
		Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles	Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles
Part 2	Inf Divs (5)	1,574	1,512	252	3,546	391	-	-	-
Part 3	Internal Security Divs (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-	157	112
Part 4	Independent Regts (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-	134	57
Part 5	Trg. Ests	52	133	15	286	15	-	-	-
Part 6	Services (Adm Units)	-	-	-	-	-	-	405	502
Part 7	CC.RR	45	300	-	8	-	159	1,046	627
	RESERVE								
	GRAND TOTAL	1,671	1,945	267	3,840	406	159	1,742	1,298

SUMMARY OF VEHICLES

Annexure ZA to SQ.054 dated
4 Jan 46.

British			Italian.				
Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles	Type "A" Vehicles	Motorcycles	Passenger Vehicles	Load Carriers	Other Vehicles.
252	3,546	391	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	157	112	221	5
-	-	-	-	134	57	189	5
15	286	15	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	405	502	1,351	190
-	8	-	159	1,046	627	252	87
267	3,840	406	159	1,742	1,298	2,014	287

1352

Declassified E.O. 17065 Section 3-402/IRHDC NO.

785020

SECRET

SERIAL	UNIT	BRITISH								
		Pistol .38	Rifle .303	Thompson M.C.	L.M.G. (Bren)	Mortar 2"	Mortar 3"	Mortar Flat	Signal Pistol	6 Pounder
Part 2	Infantry Divisions (5)	2,145	29,506	12,678	2,510	540	208	787	316	17
Part 3	Internal Security Divisions (3)									
Part 4	Independent Regiments (10)									
Part 5	Training Establishments	48	5,616	363	233	113	26	136	66	2
Part 6	Services (Adm Units)									
Part 7	CC.RR ++									
	RESERVE									
	GRAND TOTAL	2,193	35,122	13,041	2,743	653	234	923	382	202

++ Includes Finance Guards, Public Safety Agents, etc.

1353

785020

SUMMARY OF WEAPONS

BRITISH

Mortar 3"	Mortar Pint	Signal Pistol	6 Pounder	17 Pounder	25 Pounder	40 mm	L.M.G. Votley Twin	Mortar 4.2"	M.M.G. .303	Rifles Snipers	M.G. Rifle Breda 30 6.5mm	Automatic Musket 9 mm	Musket 1891	Revolver
208	787	316	178	40	163	59			24	77				
											356	580	15,228	89
											320	480	19,990	
26	136	66	24	7	23	8				34				
													27,593	
											4,054	4,698	116,755	30,996
											405	105	30,399	347
234	923	382	202	47	186	67			24	111	5,135	5,863	209,965	31,432

1354

785020

WEAPONS

Annexure ZA to SQ.054
dated 4 Jan 46.

ITALIAN											
Rifles Snipers	M.G. Rifle Breda 30 6.5mm	Automatic Musket 9 mm	Musket 1891	Revolver	Pistol 9 mm Boretta	Pistol 7.65	Pistol 6.35	45 mm Mortar	81 mm Mortar	M.G. 8 mm Breda 37	Grenades
77											
	356	580	15,228	89	1,636				202	367	
	320	480	19,990		300						
34											
			27,593		624						
	4,054	4,698	116,755	30,996	46,527		2,057			103	
	405	105	30,399	347	785	1,057	21		458	3,154	
111	5,135	5,863	209,965	31,432	49,872	1,057	2,078		660	3,624	

1355

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/UNDO NO.

785020

SERIAL	UNIT	B R					
		.38 for Pistol	.503 Ball	.45 Ball for Thompson MG	.303 Trench	Mortar 2"	Mortar 3"
Part 2	Inf Divs (5)	37,198	7,422,684	3,438,667	233,155	66,067	4,488
Part 3	Internal Security Divs (3)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Part 4	Independent Regts (10)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Part 5	Tng Establishments	3,972	2,292,939	550,556	-	55,960	12,331
Part 6	Services (adm Units)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Part 7	CO.RR.	-	-	-	-	-	-
	RESERVE	-	154,136	-	-	-	-
	GRAND TOTAL	41,170	9,869,759	3,997,223	233,155	122,027	52,819

1356

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO.

785020

B R I T I S H											
Mortar 3"	Mortar Pint	Signal Pistol	6 Pounder	17 Pounder	25 Pounder	40 mm	Mortar 4.2"	.303 for MMG	Grenades	M.G. Rifle Bred 30 6.5. mm.	Automatic Musket 9 mm.
4,100	23,057	6,251	18,537	3,516	49,047	15,986	-	23,668	59,133	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	537,763	248,350
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35,240	120,000
12,330	3,265	13,215	1,823	963	1,751	4,075	-	-	57,254	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,095,457	1,367,100
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22,582,066	2,110,833
52,013	26,340	19,166	15,820	4,479	50,798	20,061	-	23,668	166,387	27,251,126	3,846,283

Annexure ZA to SQ.05A

I T A L I A N

	M.G. Rifle Bred 30 6.5. mm.	Automatic Musket 9 mm.	Musket 1891	Revolver	Pistol 9 mm.	Pistol 7.65	Pistol 6.35	.45 mm Mortar	81 mm Mortar	M.G. 8 mm Breda 37	
133	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	537,763	248,350	1,292,771	-	41,142	-	-	-	22,522	1,047,449	
	35,240	120,000	1,999,000	-	6,400	-	-	-	-	-	
254	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	-	-	2,329,200	-	1,872	-	-	-	-	-	
	4,095,457	1,367,100	7,580,407	844,710	484,702	-	54,913	-	-	108,960	
	22,582,066	2,110,833	2,992,909	303,356	78,496	4,333	795	-	196,744	12,576,060	1
387	27,251,126	3,846,283	16,194,287	1,148,066	612,612	4,333	55,791	-	219,266	13,732,429	1

Annexure ZA to SQ.054 dated 4 Jan 46

I T A L I A N

Revolver	Pistol 9 mm.	Pistol 7.65	Pistol 6.35	.45 mm Mortar	81 mm Mortar	M.C. 8 mm Breda 37	Grenades
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	41,142	-	-	-	22,522	1,047,469	-
-	6,400	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	1,872	-	-	-	-	-	-
44,710	184,702	-	54,913	-	-	108,960	121,469
3,356	78,496	4,333	795	-	196,744	12,576,060	1,266,498
48,066	612,612	4,333	55,700	-	219,266	13,732,429	1,387,967

SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Army - Equipment and Transport Holdings.

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,

M.M.I.A.

R.O.M.E.

S/3.054

2. 11 December 1945

TO : AFHQ for G(SD) (20)

1. Reference your FX.53377 dated 16 Nov 45, and this H.Q. letter SD/109 dated 6 Dec 45, I enclose herewith as Annexure "Z" details of equipment and vehicles at present held by the Italian Army.

2. This has been prepared on parallel lines to the Staff Tables submitted under my letter referred to above, and comprises:-

"Z" (1) Weapons, both British and Italian

"Z" (2) Ammunition, both British and Italian

"Z" (3) Transport, both British and Italian.

3. In the case of "Z" (3), vehicle holdings have been given under the following categories:-

Type "A"	for details as to
Load Carriers	this classification
Passenger Vehicles	see Notes attached "Z" (3)
Motorcycles	
Other Vehicles	

4. All details as to exact types, W.D. numbers etc. of British vehicles at present held by the Italian Army are being obtained and will be forwarded separately.

L. Browning
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

3. In the case of "Z" (3), vehicle holdings have been given under the following categories:-

Type "A"	for details as to
Load Carriers	this classification
Passenger Vehicles	see Notes attached "Z" (3)
Motorcycles	
Other Vehicles	

4. Full details as to exact types, W.D. numbers etc. of British vehicles at present held by the Italian Army are being obtained and will be forwarded separately.

L. Browning
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to:- HQ, Allied Commission,
Ministry of War,
List "A" less 17 & 19 } Less
List "B" } Annexure "Z"

RAC/ar

2/12/42

TOP SECRET

Copy #2

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Economic Section

Ref. 7.00/23

18 October 1945

SUBJECT : Italian Army Supply Responsibility
TO : Executive Commissioner

1. Reference your 8851/5/45 of 13 October 1945 and correspondence attached thereto.

2. Our 75 - 100/5/23 of 11 September 1945 further refers. Your 681 accepted, practically in entirety, the plan proposed by SACMED in Ref 1039 of 23 August 1945. Within the time intervening, it is felt that no further developments have presented themselves to alter the general situation or responsibilities outlined in our above letter.

3. Close contact with MMIA has been and will be maintained by this Section. Upon receipt of the draft of the theatre directive, the matter will be taken up immediately with MMIA and full study made of the proposed supply and economic responsibilities made thereon.

(Signed)

CHARLES W. WATSON

Col

Chief, Supply Division

E. B. FORNEY

Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

MMIA —

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

22 Sep 45.

FILE NO : ESD/81/3.

SUBJECT : Holdings of Vehicles and Equipment in ITALIAN GRUPPI.

TO : HQ No 2 District
HQ No 3 District
HQ Allied Commission (Land Forces Sub Commission (MILA)).

Reference ESD/81/3 of 8 Sep 45.

1. It is clear that when the interim ITALIAN Army is handed over to the ITALIAN Government on 30 September that the Gruppi must have transport on a scale sufficient to meet operational requirements and greater than the minimum laid down in the above quoted letter.
2. The longer the interval of time before the issue of extra transport the greater will be the chance of the Gruppi being able to look after it and in the meantime all possible steps will be taken to improve the standard of maintenance in the Gruppi.
3. Detailed recommendations for the re-issue of transport will be made by MILA when the operational requirements are clearer.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER :

AAH/vj/ORG-B.

W. D. Morgan
for W.D. MORGAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.COPY TO : SACS
CAO
ACOS(B)
Q(Maint)
Q(AE)
Ord(B)
RELE

SECRET

Land Forces Sub-Com, AG (MIA)

TS/Q/3

13 Sep 45

My dear

1. Your ESD/81/3 of 8 Sep and your subsequent phone call as to whether MIA considers the scale sufficient to train on.

2. My reactions are that:-

- (a) as Gruppi have their full complement now and "wasting down" will take time, the AFHQ order can possibly stand pro tem.
- (b) the reduced scale as per Appendix 'A' of ESD/81/3 of 8 Sep might be sufficient for training if each Gruppo was reasonably concentrated, which it is not.
- (c) the equipment required for training is affected by the dispersion of units, which varies considerably (even perhaps from month to month) and is a District matter at present and will be an Italian matter later.
- (d) The matter of operational efficiency affects the matter even more than training. If the Gruppi are to be the "hard core" for resisting possible external aggression and frontier defence as well as a reserve for I.S., the Allies will have to keep them equipped until the Italians can produce their own munitions industry if this is allowed. A mixture of British and Italian weapons would destroy efficiency in the Gruppi and complicate everything beyond measure.
- (e) The whole question is bound up with a decision on the highest level on the points raised in my TS/Q/3 of 11 Sep - which, in turn, affect the reorganization and training programme which Maj-Gen WARD and I envisage as the correct one for the Italian Army of the future and which we are now starting to plan for in advance.

Yours

possible external aggression and from the defence as well as a reserve for I.S.; the Allies will have to keep them equipped until the Italians can produce their own munitions industry if this is allowed. A mixture of British and Italian weapons would destroy efficiency in the Group and complicate everything beyond measure.

(e) The whole question is bound up with a decision on the highest level on the points raised in my TS/Q/3 of 11 Sep - which, in turn, affect the reorganization and training programme which Maj-Gen WARD and I envisage as the correct one for the Italian Army of the future and which we are now starting to plan for in advance.

2

Yours

L.B.

Brigadier J. D'A. AMERYSON, ISO
G-3 (O&E),
Allied Force Headquarters, C.M.F.

P.S. I presume Maj-Gen HENNINGSEN will consent on your order, particularly from the operational angle.

1365

Declassified S.O. 12055 Section 3-402/NOAC NO.

785020

ESD/81/3
8 SEP.

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Copy #3

③3

IDD/sc

11 Sept. 1945

Tel: 267

Ref: TS-100/B/ES

SUBJECT: Italian Army supply Responsibility

TO : Chief Commissioner
(Thru: Executive Commissioner)

Attached is report with respect to supply responsibility
Italian Army.

(sgd) E B. McKinley

E. B. McKINLEY
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

1 Incl:
m/a

Copy m m DA

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 394

ECONOMIC SECTION

Ref. TS - 100/H/MS

11 September 1945

SUBJECT : Supply Responsibility Italian Army

TO : Chief Commissioner

1. Reference TS 37481 dated 22 August 1945 (REF 1059, TOP SECRET).
SACRED plan for Italian Army.

2. Problem presented:

How is the supply of the "interim force" Italian army to be accomplished and what are the responsibilities of the Allied Commission with respect thereto.

3. Factors bearing on the Problem:

a. The SACRED proposed plan, REF 1059, provides for the following:

- (1) The supply responsibility is for the Italian government.
- (2) The channels of supply will be the same as those now used for the civilian economy.
- (3) Appropriate Allied agencies, i.e., AC through Food, Industry, Commerce, EAC, Land Forces S/C's, and petroleum authorities will support the Italian government.

b. There are adequate means for the immediate support of the Italian Army because:

- (1) Land Forces S/C has stocks of food in reserve to last for two months.
- (2) Land Forces E/C has control of enough clothing and materials for the army for one year.
- (3) Food import programs provide sufficient reserves to loan the army the required foods if other sources do not meet requirements.
- (4) PUL is covered by petroleum authorities.
- (5) Motor vehicles are becoming available through the priority IMIA has on ex Italian military vehicles.
- (6) British and American military stocks may be drawn upon to cover the lag between requisition and receipt of stocks.

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2 - Supply Responsibility Italian Army

c The further assurance of adequate supply will be provided by requisitions to be submitted upon approval of the plan.

4. The adequacy of tires and tubes for the Italian army is the least clear supply item at the moment, but with the opening of the tire industry, ~~any~~ difficulty with these items should diminish.

5. Summary

In summary, it is to be expected that the Italian government will be able to discharge its supply responsibilities to the Italian force without interruption.

(Signed)

CHARLES W. WALTON

CHARLES W. WALTON

Chief, Supply Division

cc:

Executive Commissioner

✓MIA

Production Division for Industry S/C

Food S/C

Commerce S/C

Requisition Branch

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Chief, Supply Division

cc: Executive Commissioner
✓ MIA
Production Division for Industry S/C
Food S/C
Commerce S/C
Requisition Branch

201

TOP SECRET

Subject: Equipment for Italian Army and CC.RR

SECRET

Land Forces Sub Commission,
A.C. (M.M.I.A.) ROME
T/S/Q/3

11 September 1945.

To: A.F.H.Q.

Reference is made to your AG.400/005 OLS-Q dated
28 August 1945.

1. The Italian Army and CC.RR for the purpose indicated
may be divided into four categories:

- (a) Combat Groups, including GESARO Trng. Establish-
ments - now armed with British equipment.
- (b) Internal Security Bdes. - to be armed with Italian
equipment.
- (c) Internal Security Divs. - to be armed with Italian
equipment.
- (d) CC.RR - to be armed with Italian equipment.

2. Assuming that the Combat Groups continue to retain their
British Equipment (with adequate reserves for training and
maintenance), the remainder of the Italian Army has, generally
speaking, enough warlike equipment for its purpose (though
somewhat out-of-date by modern standards).

3. On the other hand, the existence of two different types
of equipment (British and Italian) in the same small army
complicates beyond measure the training, interchangeability,
and thus efficiency of that army.

4. (a) After recent discussion with Maj. Gen. WARD, 3.2,
Assistant Chief of Staff, and Brig. Gen. KERRIE (U.S.A.), 3.2,
A.F.H.Q., it was agreed that categories 1(a), (b) and (c) above
should be basically on the same organization and receive the
same training initially.

(b) The corollary to this is that these should be
trained on and use the same equipment. The Combat Groups must
be the "hard core" on which the Army is based. I.S. Bdes.
and Divs. must therefore correspond. The conclusion thus is
that the warlike equipment for categories 1(a), (b) and (c)
above (including such training establishments as are necessary)
should be British. The CC.RR can be Italian equipped.

5. The recommendation in para. 4(b) is strongly urged.
It infers that the Italian Army will be permitted to acquire
(by purchase or otherwise) adequate British equipment for the
purpose. This should present no difficulty in view of the

3. On the other hand, the existence of two different types of equipment (British and Italian) in the same small army complicates beyond measure the training, interchangeability, and thus efficiency of that army.

4. (a) After recent discussion with Maj. Gen. WARD, G.3, Assistant Chief of Staff, and Brig. Gen. EBERLE (U.S.A.), G.3, A.F.H.Q., it was agreed that categories 1(a), (b) and (c) above should be basically on the same organization and receive the same training initially.

(b) The corollary to this is that these should be trained on and use the same equipment. The Combat Groups must be the "hard core" on which the Army is based. I.S. Bdes. and Divs. must therefore correspond. The conclusion thus is that the warlike equipment for categories 1(a), (b) and (c) above (including such training establishments as are necessary) should be British. The CC.RR can be Italian equipped.

5. The recommendation in para. 4(b) is strongly urged. It infers that the Italian Army will be permitted to acquire (by purchase or otherwise) adequate British equipment for the purpose. This should present no difficulty in view of the vast stocks of surplus war material available. It would also tide over the critical immediate future, while the Italians are producing a munitions industry, if they are allowed such under the Peace Treaty and if they can afford such. The advantage to Italian Economy of purchase of British Equipment as compared with a vastly expensive munitions industry, is obvious. This is all a matter of the highest policy.

6. (a) The less suitable alternatives are:
(i) to equip the 3 I.S. Divs. with Italian equipment - for disadvantages see para. 3
(ii) to have the lighter weapons (e.g. rifles, light automatons etc.) of Italian origin, with the remainder of the equipment British. This is complicated and there would not be enough at the moment to equip the whole of

-2-

6. (a) (ii)

categories 1(a), (b) and (c) with this.

(b) It must be stressed again, however, that if the Allies wish to "take the lead" off themselves by forming an adequate post-treaty Italian Army within a short period, from now, the only simple and really effective solution is as in para. 4(b) and 5 above.

(c) It is considered essential, in any event, that the 10 I.S. Bdes. be constituted and armed on the same basis as the 10 Inf. Regts. of the 5 Combat Groups, thus providing a reserve for the Combat Force in the event of emergency.

7. (a) It is only possible to write in general terms as it is not known yet what the treaty strength of the Italian Army will be.

(b) Moreover, it is desired to emphasize that, with the exception of Combat Groups equipped with British vehicles, the Italian Army is short of M.T. and practically destitute of tyres. This was represented in para. 6 D(4) of MAP 1059.

8. In conclusion, I might add that I discussed this whole question with Maj. Gen. WARD, and he informed me that he would be examining the whole matter.

R. Browning

Major General
R.M.I.A.

/slb.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 400/005 GDS-0

T/S 10/3.

28 August 1945

SUBJECT: Equipment for Italian Army and Carabinieri

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)Copy to G.
COT scan

1. Reference is made to AFHQ cable FX 37481 (NAF 1059), dated 22 August 1945, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the future administration and supply of the Italian Army and Carabinieri.

2. For planning purposes, it is requested that this headquarters be furnished information, in general terms, as to the availability of reasonably modern warlike stores to equip the Italian Army and Carabinieri from stocks now in their possession or from captured enemy materiel of Italian origin. Adequacy of maintenance for this equipment should also be furnished. Information is also requested, in general terms, as to stores and maintenance which are not available.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

8 Sep 45.

TS/R/3

FILE NO : ESD/81/3.


SUBJECT : Holdings of Vehicles and Equipment in ITALIAN GRUPPI.

TO : No 2 District.
Hq Allied Commission (Land Forces Sub Commission).

Reference AMHQ Signal FX 23937 of 27 July.

1. It has been decided that no withdrawals of vehicles or equipment shall be made from the Italian Gruppi.
2. Vehicles, Artillery Equipment and Mortars will, however, be allowed to waste down to the quantities indicated in Appendix 'A' attached and no further releases of these items (if demanded) will be made except to bring Gruppi up to the scales shown; nor will any special issues of equipment be made without reference to this Headquarters. Approval for special releases will only be given in very exceptional circumstances.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER :

W.D. MORGAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

AAH/vj/ORG-B.

Copy to : AG of S (Br).

(K)

APPENDIX 'A' to ESD/81/3
of 8 Sep 45

SCALES TO WHICH VEHICLES, ARTILLERY EQUIPMENTS AND
MORTARS OF ITALIAN GRUPPI SHALL BE ALLOWED TO WASTE
WITHOUT REPLACEMENT.

ITEM	SCALE PER GRUPPO		
1. <u>'A' Vehicles</u>			
(a) Cars Lt Recon	27	17	
(b) Carriers (all types)	80	110	
(c) Trucks and Personnel	10	10	
2. <u>'B' Vehicles</u>			
(a) MCs	300	230	
(b) Cars 4x2 Lt Utility			
Cars 5-cwt 4x4	72	72	
(c) Cars 4-str 4x2	14	14	
(d) Trucks 15-cwt 4x2 GS	300	245	
(e) Lorries 3-ton 4x2 GS	300	243	
(f) Gun towers			
(i) 25 pr	28	12	
(ii) 17 pr	4	2	
(iii) 6 pr	18	18	
(iv) 40 mm BOFORS	8	4	
3. <u>ARTILLERY EQUIPMENTS.</u>			
(a) Guns 25 pr	24	8	
(b) Guns 17 pr	4	2	
(c) Guns 6 pr	18	18	
(d) Guns 40 mm BOFORS	8	4	
4. <u>MORTARS</u>			
(a) 3"	20	20	
(b) 2"	100	100	

NOTE: Deficiencies in Gun and Mortar stores will not be replaced if holdings are greater than the following percentages of existing scales:-

(a) 25 Pr	50	25%
(b) 17 pr	50	25%
(c) 6 pr	50	50%
(d) 40 mm BOFORS	50	33 1/3rd %
(e) 3" Mortar	50	50%
(f) 2" Mortar	50	66 2/3rd %

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