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Salaz ADM - NORTH - ITALY

Opened Feb. 17, 1945 - Closed Sept. 24, 1945

Feb. - Sept. 1945

4862

RESTRICTED

Rapid Forces Sub Com,
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RAB/wtl

AG 386.3/163 - 0

24 September 1945

SUBJECT: Organization and Administration of German Service Units
Under British Control in ITALY and AUSTRIA.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, file as above,
subject: "Organization and Administration of German Service Units in
ITALY and AUSTRIA," dated 8 August 1945 as amended by letter, this head-
quarters, file and subject as above, dated 29 August 1945.

2. Index page to above instructions is amended to delete the as-
terisk after the subject "Postal."

3. Paragraph 18, page 12, (Inclosure 2 to letter dated 29 August
1945, mentioned above) is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

"18. PW/SEP MAIL - GERMANS AND AUSTRIANS.

a. GENERAL. A two way mail service is instituted for the
use of PW/SEP of German and Austrian nationality, to those areas of
GERMANY and AUSTRIA occupied by BRITISH, US and FRENCH Forces.

b. ADDRESS.

- (1) The postal address of PW/SEP held in PW Camps will
be:

Number	Rank	Name
No	'AJ' PW Camp	
NAPLES, ITALY via MUNSTER		

- (2) The postal address of PW/SEP working in German
Service Units or permanently working in hospitals
will be:

Number	Rank	Name
Unit Designation		
'AJ' PW Camp		
NAPLES, ITALY via MUNSTER		

eg. A 90000 Cofr SCHULTZ, H.
808 German Gen Tpt Coy,
'AJ' PW Camp
NAPLES, ITALY via MUNSTER.

c. OUTGOING MAIL. Csc PW Camps and German Labour Units will
despatch outgoing correspondence from PW/SEP under official cover to

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Mr. PWH, File AG 326.3/153 - 0
 dtd 24 Sept 45 (Cont'd)

'AJ' PW Camp
 NAPLES, ITALY.

a. INCOMING MAIL.

- (1) If the addressee is not with the unit to which correspondence is addressed, the OC Camp or Unit should redirect it to his new camp, or unit, or to any hospital to which he may have been admitted, if the necessary particulars are known. Redirected correspondence should be included with outgoing correspondence and forwarded to 'AJ' PW Camp in accordance with the arrangements outlined in paragraph c above.
- (2) If the addressee's new address is not known, the OC Camp or Unit should have it endorsed 'Left Unit. Address not known'. Such correspondence should be forwarded to FFW OZE, either directly in official packages or bags or through 'AJ' PW Camp for onward transmission.
- (3) Correspondence received at FFW OZE will be re-addressed in accordance with the addressee's latest known location. Redirected correspondence will then be forwarded in official packages or bags as appropriate, either directly to the unit of address or through 'AJ' PW Camp for onward transmission.

c. Instructions for the use of official buff postcards AFW 3494 are at Appendix I."

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

1 Incl
 Appendix I to letter,
 AFHO, File and subject
 as above, dtd 8 Aug 45.

R. A. Sturges
 R. A. STURGES
 Captain, AGD
 Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

100 - Hq British Troops in AUSTRIA
 10 - DESAL Rear Hq British Troops
 in AUSTRIA
 10 - Hq British Military Mission
 in GREECE
 100 - Hq XIII Corps
 50 - Hq No. 1 District
 125 - Hq No. 3 District
 5 - Hq Rome Area Allied Comd
 10 - Hq Allied Commission
 25 - Hq 21 Army Bde
 10 - Hq 214 Sub Area
 2 - Land Forces Sub Com, AG

10 - GME 2d Echelon
 1 - Tr (Main Rome)
 150 - Hq No. 2 District
 1 - Signals (B)
 1 - Hq Inf
 2 - DST
 1 - Med (B)
 12 - Ord (B)
 1 - INF
 1 - PM (B)
 25 - D. Labour
 1 - SACS
 1 - CAO
 1 - D/CAO
 1 - AGOS (B)
 1 - G-1 (A)
 1 - G-1 (B) A1
 1 - G-1 (B) A2
 1 - G-1 (B) A3
 1 - G-1 (B) A5
 2 - G-2
 1 - G-3 (Ops)
 1 - G-3 (Org-2)
 1 - G-3 (Org-3)
 3 - MFOUS: FCM CO
 1 - Arty Sec

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Ltr AMHO, File AG 380.3/163 - 0
 dtd 24 Sept 45 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION: (Cont'd)

- 2 - Engrs (B)
- 1 - Prints (B)
- 1 - IV & RS
- 1 - Postal (B)
- 1 - D. Salvage
- 1 - DEIC
- 1 - Army Fire Service (B)
- 2 - Camp Comdt (Br) AFHQ
- 1 - AFHQ Messing Unit (B)
- 1 - G-3 (Org-4)
- 10 - G-3 (AMO)
- 1 - DMP
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-4 M & Tn
- 1 - USMPT
- 1 - CML (SUMPT)
- 1 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - Log Plans
- 1 - Central Stats
- 2 - C(Print)
- 2 - C(L)
- 2 - G-5
- 1 - RAC
- 1 - Survey (B)
- 1 - Tn (B)
- 2 - C-in-C Med
- 1 - RAF MEDME (AIS)
- 50 - MEDME (RAF-Org)
- 25 - Spares to G-3 AMO
- 1 - PW Accounts Office CM
- 1 - Welfare (B)
- 1 - DMP (for ACC)
- 2 - AG Records

INFORMATION COPIES:

- 1 - The Under Secretary of State for War, The War Office LONDON.
- 1 - GHO, Middle East
- 1 - GHO, Middle East (for C(AF)4)

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Appendix "I" to AFM letter AG 386.3/163-0
dated 8 August 1945.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
USE OF BUFF POST-CARD - AFM 3494
POST TO AND FROM GERMANY.

1. On receipt of this instruction every Prisoner of War/Surrendered Enemy Personnel will be permitted to complete and despatch to his next of kin one buff postcard. This will contain prisoner of war authorized address. (See Paragraph 18). Upon receipt of this card the next of kin may tear off the bottom half of the card and post it back to the sender with a message not exceeding 25 words. If the buff cards cannot be delivered, due to the absence of the addressee, it will be automatically forwarded to a Central Inquiry Bureau in the appropriate zone of occupation.

2. The supply of these buff cards is limited. Only one card will be issued to each Prisoner of War. The prisoner will be required to show his pay book or other documents as evidence that his registered next of kin resided in the BRITISH, US or FRENCH zone. Buff cards will NOT be issued to prisoners whose next of kin reside in the RUSSIAN occupied Zones of GERMANY or AUSTRIA.

3. On 19th September any GERMAN civilian in the BRITISH, US or FRENCH Zones who had not received a buff card and who had reason to believe that a near Wehrmacht relative was in BRITISH, US or FRENCH zones or in prisoner of war camps under BRITISH control, may write a message not exceeding 25 words on a special green coloured postcard and despatch it to the Central Inquiry Bureau, Hamburg.

4. The Central Bureau will, wherever possible, effect contact between the member of the Wehrmacht and his next of kin by the interchange of addresses and redirection of the green and buff postcards.

5. Both the member of the Wehrmacht and the civilian having once received the address of their relative, may conduct future correspondence by ordinary postcard not exceeding 25 words once per week in accordance with the existing Postal and Censorship arrangements. This card is AFM 3494. Each PW is permitted to have one AFM 3494 per week.

6. For the purpose of this scheme the term near relative will cover:

Wife	Brother	) where no other near relative is living.
Mother	Sister	
Father	Son	
Legal Guardian	Daughter	

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Appendix I to ltr AFHQ, AG 386.3/163-0
dated 8 August 1945 (Cont'd)

7. In cases where Part (iii) of the buff card is addressed to a destination in the US or FRENCH Zones, the sender will delete the word "Hamburg" from Part (iv) and insert "American Zone" or "French Zone" whichever is appropriate.

8. On receipt of a reply from next of kin the prisoner may proceed as in paragraph 5.

9. Prisoners will be informed that any attempt to mutilate or disfigure the buff cards, or to send messages in code may result in this privilege being withdrawn.

S/9/24 ←

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: HQ ALCON DITS ACEXO

05 HFT

TO : AMO LIGURIA REGION
AMO PIEMONTE REGION
AMO LOMBARDIA REGION
AMO VENEZIA REGION FOR REGIONAL COMMISSIONERS

REF : 4831

S E C R E T

IMPORTANT

A F H Q HAVE RECOMMENDED TO COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
THAT THE COMPARTMENTS OF LIGURIA, PIEMONTE, LOMBARDIA,
VENEZIA TRIDENTINA (LESS BOLZANO PROVINCE) AND VENEZIA
PROPRIA (LESS UDINE PROVINCE) SHOULD BE HANDED BACK TO
THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ON 30 SEPTEMBER (.)

ALCON RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE HANDBACK OF BOLZANO
AND UDINE PROVINCES ARE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION BY

A F H Q

DIST

CA SEC
ECOM SEC
LAND FORCES S/C
NAVY S/C
AIR S/C

ED DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/1

Info: A
Q (Two)

ws 07 Sep 48

Q.2
S/9/24. ←

2006

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

S/Q/24.5

FROM: ALEXANDER CITE FIREO

R122222Z
011143 ZTO : AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
ALSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: ALCEM ROME

S E C R E T

REF : PX 40187
NAF 1059

IMPORTANT

IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL POLICY REAFFIRMED IN FAN 536 IT IS PROPOSED TO HAND BACK TO ITALIAN JURISDICTION THE FOLLOWING COMPARTMENTS ON 30 SEPTEMBER 45 OR 21 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF ORDERS FOR HANDOVER, WHICH EVER DATE IS THE LATER: LIGURIA, FRIEDMANTZ? LOMBARDIA, VENEZIA TRIDENTINA (LESS BOLZANO PROVINCE) AND VENEZIA PROPRIA (LESS UDINE PROVINCE) (.)

HANDBACK OF BOLZANO PROVINCE AND TREVIS AREA, WHICH FAN 536 DIRECTS SHALL BE RETAINED INDEFINITELY UNDER ALLIED MILITARY GOVT, AND OF REMAINDER OF UDINE PROVINCE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE COMMUNICATION (.)

EXCEPT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA, BOLZANO AND UDINE PROVINCE THE ONLY AREAS ON MAINLAND OF ITALY REMAINING UNDER A M G CONTROL WHEN PROPOSED HANDOVER IS COMPLETE WILL BE COMMUNES OF NAPLES AND LIVORNO INCLUDING IMMEDIATELY ADJOINING AREAS WHICH CONSIST OF COMMUNES OF PISA AND GILLES SALVETTI (.) THESE COMMUNES WILL BE

HANDBACK OF BOLZANO PROVINCE AND TARVIS AREA, WHICH FAN 536 DIRECTS SHALL BE RETAINED INDEFINITELY UNDER ALLIED MILITARY GOVT, AND OF REMAINDER OF UDINE PROVINCE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE

COMMUNICATION (.)

EXCEPT FOR VENEZIA GIULIA, BILZANO AND UDINE PROVINCE THE ONLY AREAS ON MAINLAND OF ITALY REMAINING UNDER A M C CONTROL WHEN PROPOSED HANDOVER IS COMPLETE WILL BE COMMUNES OF NAPLES AND LIVORNO INCLUDING IMMEDIATELY ADJOINING AREAS WHICH CONSIST OF COMMUNES OF PISA IN COLLE SALVETTI (.) THESE COM UNITS WILL BE HANDED BACK AS SOON AS MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS PERMIT (.) AS PROPOSED HANDBACK OF TERRITORY IS ONLY FEASIBLE IF ADEQUATE ARMED FORCES CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE ITALIAN GOVT AT THE SAME TIME, YOUR APPROVAL IS REQUESTED FOR:

A (.) THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAF 1051 AND 1059

B (.) THE HANDBACK OF TERRITORY PROPOSED AS PARA 1 (.)

ALLIED COMMISSION WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO INFORM ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ITALY BEFORE ANY HANDOVER OF TERRITORY TO ITALIAN JURISDICTION TAKES PLACE

SD DISTRIBUTION:

action: C/L

Info: A;

Q (two)

WS 03 Sept 45

DIST

Info action: CA Sect *
Info : * * *

Land Forces * * *

S/O 24

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

AFO 386.2/163 - 0

29 AUGUST 1945

SUBJECT: Organization and Administration of German Service Units under
British Control in ITALY and AUSTRIA

TO: All concerned

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, File AFO 386.2/163-0 dated 8 August 1945, subject: "Organization and Administration of German Service Units in ITALY and AUSTRIA".

2. The following changes and additions will be made to the instructions attached to the above letter:

- a. Add new index page attached as inclosure 1 in front of page 1.
- b. In paragraph 1a amend "District" to read "21st Special Area".
- c. In paragraph 2b, first sentence, amend "G-3 AFO" to read "C-3 (Org-2)". Amend second sentence to read: "When proposals are received from formations outside this headquarters, C-3 (Org-3) will forward them to the Staff Branch concerned before consideration by the War Establishment Committee".
- d. In paragraph 4b amend "C-3 AFO" to read "C-3 (Org-2) in over".
- e. In paragraph 6a amend "C-3 AFO" to read "C-3 (Org-2)".

Hand Forwarded
Sub Com. H/L
S/Q/24
MSE/25

a. Add new index page attached as inclosure 1 in front of page 1.

b. In paragraph 1a amend "Number 1 District" to read "P10 Special Area".

c. In paragraph 2b, first sentence, amend "C-3 AMO" to read "C-3 (Org-2)". Amend second sentence to read:- "When proposals are received from formations outside this headquarters, C-3 (Org-3) will forward them to the Staff Branch concerned before consideration by the War Establishment Committee".

d. In paragraph 1b amend "C-3 AMO" to read "C-3 (Org-2) item over".

e. In paragraph 1a amend "C-3 AMO" to read "C-3 (Org-2)".

f. Amend third sentence of paragraph 3j to read:- "When employed within depots, installations, and general working areas, guards are not required".

g. Amend paragraph 11i to read:- "i. In the case of units employed in AUSTRIA, the British Commander in Chief and High Commissioner for AUSTRIA will issue separate instructions on the lines of paragraphs c, d, and h above."

h. Remove and destroy page eleven and substitute new page, inclosure 2 attached hereto.

3. The following changes will be made to appendices:

APPENDIX 3: Amend note under heading to read:- "Ten copies to be sent through appropriate channels to C-3 (Org-3) AFHQ".

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S/Q/24. ←

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Ltr AFHQ, File AC 336.3/163 - 0 ,
 dtd 29 Aug 45 (Cont'd)

APPENDIX C: Amend main addressee to read: "AFHQ, Box C-3 (ORG-2)".

APPENDIX D: Amend main addressee to read: "AFHQ, Box C-3 (ORG-2) Manager" ADD "Copy to O2E (DEW)".
 Para (b) change "increase/decrease" to read "increase/decrease".

APPENDIX G: Amend main addressee to read "C-3(ORG-2)".

4. A back card cover was originally omitted and is now attached hereto.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

R. H. Stuebel
 R. H. STUEBEL
 Captain, AGP
 Asst Adjutant General

3 Incls

- 1 - New Index Page
- 2 - Substituted pages 11, 12 & 13
- 3 - Back card cover

DISTRIBUTION:

100 - Lg Russian Troops in AUSTRIA	1 - SAC	1 - C-3(ORG-4)
10 - DPMIL Rep: Hq British Troops in AUSTRIA	1 - CAO	10 - C-3(ORG)
10 - Hq British Military Mission in AUSTRIA	1 - D/CAO	1 - DM
50 - Hq XIII Corps	1 - G-1(A)	1 - C-4(A)
50 - Hq No. 1 District	1 - G-1(B)	1 - C-4(B) in
75 - Hq No. 3 District	1 - G-1(B)	1 - G-1(B) (S/DEP)
30 - Lg Rome Area Allied Comd	1 - G-1(B)	1 - G-1(B)
10 - Hq Allied Commission	2 - G-2	1 - Log Plan
		1 - Control State

3 - Det. call cover

1907. C. 52

1 - CUP, MIDDLE TEST, 1 - CUP, MIDDLE TEST (FOR Q(AE)).

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21

mit (2) 1 - DET (10r ACC)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF GERMAN SERVICE UNITS UNDER BRITISH CONTROL IN ITALY AND AUSTRIAI N D E X

Page	Paragraph	SUBJECT
1	1	Selection and Organization of Personnel.
1	2	War Establishments.
2	3	Priorities for Formation and Progress Reports.
2	4	Application for Formation, Conversion or Disbandment of Units.
3	5	Equipment and Clothing.
4	6	Movement of Personnel or Units.
5	7	Accommodation and Works Services.
5	8	Guards and Security.
6	9	Maintenance, Supplies, PTI, POL.
7	10	Reinforcement and Documentation.
8	11	Discipline.
10	12	Military Behaviour and Treatment.
11	13	Medical and Hygiene.

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CONCLUSIONS

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Page Eleven

c. MILITARY COURTESY AMONG GERMANS

- (1) Germans may continue to render appropriate courtesies to their own officers by rendering the military salute in effect prior to 1933. The Nazi salute and the "Heil Hitler" greeting are forbidden.
- (2) No German National Anthem or similar military music will be played or sung.
- (3) Military funerals for German personnel may be permitted at the discretion of the District Commander under such limitations and with such restrictions as he may deem necessary.
- (4) German personnel may continue to observe and render the same courtesies to their own officers and NCO's as are permitted by their regulations, as herein modified.

d. FLAGS AND EMBLEMS

- (1) When passing an unexcused national colour or standard of one of the United Nations, Germans will uncover. When being passed by such colour or standard, they will stand at attention uncovered.
- (2) Public or private display of Nazi flags and other paraphernalia of the Nazi party or any of its affiliated formations, is prohibited.
- (3) (a) The "Folksabzeichen" and all Nazi insignia, emblems, decorations or medals will be removed.
- (b) The "Volksdo" on caps will be removed.
- (c) "Wehrmacht" medals and decorations for merit, long service or campaign may be worn, provided all Nazi emblems e.g. Swastikas are obliterated or removed.

- (1) When wearing an uncreased national colour or standard of one of the United Nations, Germans will uncover. When being passed by such colour or standard, they will stand at attention uncovered.
- (2) Public or private display of Nazi flags and other paraphernalia of the Nazi party or any of its affiliated formations, is prohibited.
- (3) (a) The "Totenkopfzeichen" and all Nazi insignia, emblems, decorations or medals will be removed.
- (b) The "Korvetten" on caps will be removed.
- (c) "Wehrmacht" medals and decorations for merit, long service or campaign may be worn, provided all Nazi emblems e.g. Swastikas are obliterated or removed.

13. MEDICAL AND DENTISTRY.

a. German Medical officers and orderlies will be posted to all major German units and arrangements will be made by WE sponsors for inclusion within WE personnel.

b. If small numbers of Germans are employed with British or local medical units, where it is not practicable for them to be sent to the nearest German medical officer, they will be treated as necessary for the officers in medical charge of the British units.

c. For hospital treatment, existing German wings attached to British hospitals will be used as much as possible. These wings are at present attached to:

63 British General Hospital - CASERTA
45 British General Hospital - TARANTO

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EXTRACTED

Page Twelve

Where concentrations of German Service Units justify formation of further German hospital wings, such units will be formed on War Establishments to be submitted through Medical Branch (British) at this headquarters, and will be attached to selected British medical units. German hospital wings will be under command and supervision of the Officer Commanding and staff of the British unit concerned.

d. Where German units are employed outside practicable range of a German hospital wing, a detachment of German medical personnel, on a War Establishment to be submitted through Medical Branch (British) at this headquarters, will be attached to form a unit sick bay or reception station.

e. As far as possible, captured or surrendered enemy medical stores will be used to equip and maintain German hospital wings and medical detachments. German medical medical officers will be supplied with stores from the nearest German hospital wing or reception station.

f. As changes in the disposition of German Service Units occur, Army, District or equivalent headquarters will make what medical arrangements are possible within their own resources in accordance with those instructions, and will submit detailed proposals and requirements through departmental channels for what is needed from resources outside their own area.

g. HYGIENE

The responsibility for the general hygiene and sanitation of German Service units will rest within the units themselves. The senior German officer, or in units without officers, the senior warrant officer or non-commissioned officer, will be held responsible for the preservation of health of his men. War Establishments should include trained sanitary personnel to the same normal for British units. German medical officers will act as advisers to German units on all matters pertaining to hygiene and sanitation, but general supervision will be undertaken by the responsible British authorities.

units are possible within their own resources in accordance with these instructions, and will submit detailed proposals and requirements through departmental channels for what is needed from resources outside their own area.

5. HYGIENE

The responsibility for the general hygiene and sanitation of German Service units will rest within the units themselves. The senior German officer, or in units without officers, the senior warrant officer or non-commissioned officer, will be held responsible for the preservation of health of his men. War Establishments should include trained sanitary engineers to the scale normal for British units. German medical officers will act as advisers to German units on all matters pertaining to hygiene and sanitation, but general supervision will be undertaken by the responsible British authorities.

17. RELIGIOUS ARRANGEMENTS

- a. Where there are large concentrations of German surrendered personnel a hut or tent will be provided for the use of the German pastor. Where possible, the accommodation will be so divided as to provide a private office and a quiet room.
- b. Arrangements will be made by the OC of the unit to which the Pastor is permanently attached to enable him to visit other German prisoners personnel where no Pastor is attached.

18. POSTAL

No arrangements can be made for postal facilities until the postal system has been re-established in Germany. When this has been effected, instructions will be issued further to this paragraph.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page Thirteen

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19. VEHICLE SIGNS AND MARKING NUMBERS

a. German unit vehicles will carry the following vehicle signs and marking numbers:

- (1) Bridge Classification sign
- (ii) WD or Captured Vehicle Number
- (iii) Maximum speed sign
- (iv) Vehicle Marking number
- (v) German Identification sign

b. Vehicle marking numbers are allotted by this headquarters and will be published in "Org-Progress - German Service Units". Application for numbers may be made to this headquarters in advance in the case of units already marking. Numbers will be displayed in the normal manner on a background of the colours applicable to the equivalent British Arm of Service.

c. No "Portation sign" will be carried but in its place vehicles will show German identification sign consisting of white letters "GER" four inches high stencilled on a black ground nine inches square.

inches high stencilled on a black ground nine inches square.

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COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: MMIA LO NE ITALY

511400 B

TO : HQ MMIA ROME

REF : MM/766

RESTRICTED

REF YOUR SIGNAL 0-123 DATED 25 JULY (.)

DETAILS ARE AS FOLLOWS (.) FROM AUSTRIAN

BORDER ALONG WESTERN PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY OF

UDINE TO TREVISO PROVINCE THEN

ALONG WESTERN TREVISO BOUNDARY TO JUNCTION

PADUA PROVINCE THEN ALONG WESTERN AND SOUTHERN

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY OF VENICE PROVINCE TO

THE SEA

"G" DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/1
I
A
Q (Three)
Q (MOV) (Two)
RE
X
SP (Two)
MED
REME
LAB
PROVOST
WELFARE

WS 04 Aug 45

200

LAND FORCE

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 503/377/EC.

12 July 1945.

SUBJECT: Transfer of Administrative Responsibility in NW ITALY
from FIFTH ARMY to No. 2 District.

TO : Distribution below.

1. Para 1.b. of AFHQ letter 16 323/061 LOR-O dated 5 July 45 is extracted below for information and guidance.

"With effect from 15 July 1945 Phase II in NW ITALY will begin. On and from this date HQ 2 District will be responsible,
....., for territory as under:

Compartimento of LIGURIA.
Compartimento of PIEMONTE
Compartimento of LOMBARDIA. (less the Provincia of MANTOVA.)
Provincia of PAVIA. } In the Compartimento of EMILIA
Provincia of PLACENZA. }

2. Consequent upon the commencement of Phase II in NW ITALY, effective 15 July 45, the instructions contained in para 2 of the Chief Commissioner's letter CC 1014 dated 11 June 1945 and para 2 of the Executive Commissioner's letter 517/68/EC dated 25 June 45, that copies of important correspondence be sent to SCLO FIFTH ARMY and SCLO IV Corps, are cancelled.

3. Civil Affairs Section, Headquarters IV Corps, will close 2400 hours, 15 July 1945.

S. 11/11/45

"With effect from 15 July 1945 Phase II in NW ITALY will begin. On and from this date HQ 2 District will be responsible,

....., for territory as under:

Compartimento of LIGURIA.
 Compartimento of PIEMONTE
 Compartimento of LOMBARDIA (less the Provincia of MANTOVA.)
 Provincia of PAVIA)
 Provincia of PLACENZA.) In the Compartimento of EMILIA

2. Consequent upon the commencement of Phase II in NW ITALY, effective 15 July 45, the instructions contained in para 2 of the Chief Commissioner's letter CC 1014 dated 11 June 1945 and para 2 of the Executive Commissioner's letter 517/68/EC dated 25 June 45, that copies of important correspondence be sent to SCLO FIFTH Army and SCLO IV Corps, are cancelled.

3. Civil Affairs Section, Headquarters IV Corps, will close 2400 hours, 15 July 1945.

St. John 11/68

Chief Staff Officer,
 To Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

C.A. Section (10)
 Economic Section (15)
 Estab Section (8)
 Navy Sub-Commission
 Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIL.)
 Air Forces Sub-Commission
 Communications Sub-Commission
 War Material Disposal & LW 3/C.
 Liaison Div.
 Information Div.

R.C. LOMBARDIA Region
 " PIEMONTE Region
 " LIGURIA Region
 " EMILIA Region
 SCLO FIFTH Army
 SCLO IV Corps
 PRO
 Archives Branch
 Messago Centre

SURJECT:- Administration of Surrendered
Enemy Forces in Italy.

Headquarters, Eighth Army.
Headquarters, No. 1 District.
Headquarters, No. 2 District.
Headquarters, No. 3 District.
GHQ., 2nd Echelon.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

G1(BF)/3251/4/A2.

16 Jul 45.

1. Reference AFHQ Instructions for the Administration of Surrendered Enemy Forces in ITALY, AG 386.3/163 LOC.0 dated 7 July 45, para 5(e)(2).

2. All enemy personnel held in British custody who at the date of the above Instructions were classified as Prisoners of War will remain so classified until further directions are issued by this Headquarters.

ACM/EP

Copy to:- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Commanding General, Fifth Army.

Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section.

1 - SAC, Med.

1 - D SAC, Med

5 - MCOUSA PW Comd.

1 - S & T

1 - Surgeon

A.S. HANSDORF,
Lieut-Colonel, A.A.G.,
for Major General,
DAG, G.1(Dr).

above instructions were classified as Prisoners of War will remain so classified until further directions are issued by this Headquarters.

AGM/1P

Copy to:- Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.
Commanding General, Fifth Army.
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section.

1 - SAC, Med.
1 - D SAC, Med
1 - C/S, AFHQ
1 - CAO
1 - A/CAO
1 - C/S MTOUSA
5 - C-in-C Mod
1 - C/IAW
4 - Air C-in-C Mod
3 - CG, AFHQ
3 - AFHQ/ATO
3 - CG, RAAC
3 - Repl & Trng Comd, MTOUSA
3 - CG, ABC
2 - G-1 (A)
2 - G-1 (B)
3 - G-2
4 - G-3
3 - G-4 (A)
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - Log Plans
4 - G-4 (Mov & Trn)
2 - Q (Maint)
2 - Q (AE)
3 - G-5
2 - Engr (A)
2 - Engr (B)
2 - Signals
2 - Liaison
2 - Works

5 - MTOUSA PW Comd.

1 - S & T

1 - Surgeon

1 - Medical (B)

1 - Ord (A)

1 - Ord (B)

1 - REHE

1 - Tn (B)

1 - Tn (A)

1 - DMS

2 - FMG (A)

2 - Provost Marshal (B)

1 - JA

1 - DMG (B)

1 - PWR

1 - Labor

1 - AG Postal

1 - Postal (B)

3 - QM

1 - GNS

1 - Fis Dir

1 - Fin Adv (B)

1 - US POLAD

1 - British Res Min

1 - Hq AFIRS Rome

3 - LFSC (MHA)

3 - SHAF

2 - AG Records

1 - AG M & D

2598

"P" Division "H"
Action 6 QV

A.S. HANCOCK,
Lieut-Colonel, A.A.C.,
for Major General,
IAC, G.4(Br).

SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512P419 RAS/TB
: : : : :
: **SECRET** :
: Auth: SAC, [Signature] :
: Initials: [Signature] :
: Date: 7 July 1945 :
: : : : :
7 July 1945

AC 386.3/163 LCG-0

SUBJECT: Administration of Surrendered Enemy Forces in Italy

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
Commanding General, MTCUSA POW Command, APO 88
Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
Headquarters, Eighth Army
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District1. References

- a. 15th Army Group Administrative Directive Number 3, 18 April 1945, subject: "Control and Administration of Surrendered Enemy Forces".
- b. Eighth Army Administrative Directive Number 2, subject: "Surrender of Enemy Forces".
- c. AFHQ letter, AC 386.3/163 LCG-0, 19 May 1945, subject: "Administration of Surrendered Enemy Forces in Italy".

2. Object - The object of these instructions is to incorporate in one document current policies for the handling of surrendered army forces in Italy.

3. Previous Instructions - The instructions contained in references a and b above remain in force except as modified by this letter. Reference c is hereby rescinded and the provisions of this letter substituted therefor.

4. Scope of Instructions

a. The instructions contained herein are applicable to enemy forces taken or surrendering in Italy.

b. Enemy personnel, except those of Italian Nationality, taken or surrendering in Austria will be held in that country pending repatriation, and not removed to Italy.

5. Generala. Status of Enemy Forces

- (1) All enemy personnel, including those of the Luftwaffe, who had not passed through Army cages before 1400 hours 2 May have been termed "Surrendered Enemy Forces", and have not been regarded as prisoners of war except on the specific authority of AFHQ/MTCUSA.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LOG-O,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

- (2) All enemy personnel remaining in Italy who have been taken and classified as prisoners of war are reclassified as "surrendered enemy forces" retroactive to 2 May 1945 and will be treated as such. Exceptions to this policy will be published separately by AFHQ/ITCUSA as required.
- (3) All personnel of whatever nationality who surrendered or were taken while serving with the enemy will be regarded initially as surrendered enemy forces. Instructions concerning segregation are given in paragraph 7b.
- (4) SS Personnel will be confined separately, and will be classed as recalcitrants (see paragraph 7d below).
- (5) Enemy personnel at present in hospitals will, on discharge, be treated as surrendered enemy forces, and sent to final concentration areas. Those who cannot be disposed of in this manner will be classed as recalcitrants and confined.

b. Policy

- (1) Surrendered enemy forces and prisoners of war will be divided equally between British and US forces. Guard and administrative functions are the responsibility of the force having custody of the surrendered enemy personnel and prisoners of war.
- (2) Insofar as practicable consistent with their employment by the Allied forces, surrendered enemy forces will carry out their own administration and maintenance using their own administrative organizations under Allied supervision. To this end, enemy forces will be formed in 'ad hoc' formations and unit organizations as far as is necessary to enable them to be self-administering. This policy does not absolve Allied military authorities concerned from the ultimate responsibility for the administration of surrendered enemy forces.
- (3) The policy regarding the use of specially qualified technical troops will be furnished as required. Under no circumstances will any enemy personnel be regarded as co-operators.

c. Concentration and Accommodation

a. Concentration areas

- (1) The British main concentration area will be as shown at trace at Appendix "D". This does not preclude subsequent removal of enemy personnel to other locations as required.

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- Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LCG-O,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

- (2) Surrendered enemy forces controlled by the US will be concentrated in an area or areas conveniently sited for supply and administration. Enemy personnel employed by MTOUSA major commands will be held in areas conveniently located to places of employment.

b. Scale of Accommodation - Surrendered enemy forces will be accommodated under field conditions. A guide to the British scales of accommodation which will be provided is at Appendix "A". The US scale has been announced in Administrative Memorandum Number 4, Headquarters MTOUSA, 20 May 1945, subject: "Scale of Accommodations and Standards of Construction for Enemy Personnel in Labor Camps". In all cases maximum use will be made of enemy stores in accordance with allocations made by AFHQ/MTOUSA.

c. Evacuation of Civilians - Civilians within the final concentration area will not be evacuated unless it is essential for their safety, and at the instigation of AC/AFHQ.

d. Buildings

- (1) Buildings, or portions thereof, will not be used for the accommodation of surrendered enemy forces unless surplus to Allied and civil requirements and then only with the authority of the appropriate Allied Military Commander, and with the consent of the Allied Commission.
- (2) Buildings presently used as hospitals for surrendered enemy forces may continue to be so used at the discretion of Allied Commanders.
- (3) Buildings may only be requisitioned if they are to be used for hospitals or offices. Such requisitioning will be subject to the following conditions:
 - (a) There will be no eviction of civilian inhabitants.
 - (b) Permission must previously have been given by the appropriate Allied Commander and by Allied Commission.

e. Action to be taken Prior to Assembly in the Final Concentration

AFHQ

- (1) Primary disarmament of enemy personnel.
- (2) Preliminary concentration and formation of enemy personnel into units for administrative purposes. Such units should be capable of carrying out all internal administration.
- (3) Segregation and dispatch to concentration area of SS and other recalcitrant troops. These will be moved as soon as possible.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 336.3/163 LCG-O,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

(4) Movement of surrendered enemy forces to the final concentration areas.

(5) Administration of surrendered enemy forces.

f. Action to be Taken Inside the Final Concentration Areas

(1) Reconnaissance of the areas and allocation of localities to enemy forces.

(2) Reception and segregation of SS troops.

(3) Reception of surrendered enemy forces other than SS troops.

(4) Provision of guards.

(5) Administration of surrendered enemy forces.

g. Allocation of Responsibilities

(1) The MTOUSA POW Command will be responsible for any action remaining to be taken in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6 above, and for all surrendered enemy forces and prisoners of war under US control.

(2) Eighth Army will be responsible:

(a) For administering all enemy personnel in hospitals in the Army area.

(b) Arranging for the disposal of all enemy personnel discharged from hospitals in the Army area in accordance with paragraph 5 a (5) above.

(3) The MTOUSA POW Command and 1 District each will be responsible within their own spheres of responsibility for all actions to be taken in accordance with paragraph 6f above.

h. Movement to Main Concentration Areas - Details of movement between the British main concentration area under Number 1 District and the MTOUSA POW Command will be arranged locally by the Number 1 District and the MTOUSA POW Command. Movement between the major commands of MTOUSA and the MTOUSA POW Command will be arranged by the MTOUSA POW Command. Any differences which may arise will be adjusted by AFHQ/MTOUSA.

7. Administration

a. General

(1) The US final concentration areas will be the responsibility of the MTOUSA POW Command.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 ICG-C,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

- (2) The British main concentration area will be the responsibility of Number 1 District.

b. Segregation of Enemy Personnel

- (1) Italian Nationals will be concentrated separately. The number so held will be taken into consideration in adjusting the total holdings of enemy personnel by the US and British in accordance with the policy established in paragraph 5 b (1) above.
- (2) As far as practicable other personnel will be segregated by nationalities.
- (3) While the surrendered enemy forces are being held in the concentration areas the following directives will apply:

(a) Russian Nationals

Headquarters MTOUS. letter, file AG 383.7/414 D-O, 31 May 1945, subject: "Disposition of Soviet Citizens" as amended by Headquarters MTOUS. letter, same file and subject, dated 4 June 1945.

AFHQ letters, file CR/3491/2 G-1 (Gr), 6 March, 7 March and 15 March, all 1945.

(b) Other Nationals (exclusive of the Italian Republican Army)

Headquarters MTOUS. letter, file AG 383.6/326 PIC-O, 26 February 1945, subject: "Administrative Instructions for the United States Prisoner of War Enclosures in MTOUS.", Chapter XVIII, paragraph 7.

..FMV Administrative Memorandum Number 60, 14 December 1944 except:

1. Where specific instructions to the contrary have been issued.
2. Chetniks will be retained in the British concentration area and segregated into a separate enclave, to await disposal instructions which will be issued by AFHQ.

- (4) Separate instructions have been issued regarding the disposal of senior enemy officers.

c. Technical Troops - Technical troops used as such in accordance with paragraph 5 b (3) above will be distributed between the US and British in accordance with instructions from AFHQ/MTOUS..

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LAG-O,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

d. Recalcitrant Enemy Personnel

- (1) Personnel named by Counter Intelligence Staffs as dangerous to security, or who prove troublesome, will be termed "recalcitrant".
- (2) Such personnel will be separated from the remainder of the surrendered enemy forces as early as possible, and held in confinement when specified by AFHQ/TOUSA. They will not be given PW status.
- (3) Recalcitrants will be segregated from any personnel granted PW status by competent authority.
- (4) All SS troops will be considered recalcitrant and treated in accordance with sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above.

e. Employment - Instructions regarding the employment of enemy forces have been issued separately. (AFHQ letter, AG 386.3/163 GCT-O, 15 June 1945, subject: "Employment of German Prisoners of War and Surrendered Personnel - Priority List Ten).

f. Documentation

- (1) Detailed documentation will be carried out by Allied military headquarters concerned for:
 - (a) Recalcitrant personnel
 - (b) Personnel of Allied nationality.
- (2) Instructions concerning the documentation and maintenance of records for all surrendered enemy personnel held in this theater are contained in AFHQ letter, AG 386.3/163 G.P-O, 13 June 1945, subject: "Instructions for the Documentation of Enemy Surrendered Personnel".

g. Bounds

- (1) Concentration areas will be placed off limits to all Allied military personnel except those concerned in the administration of the areas.
- (2) No fraternization will be allowed between surrendered enemy personnel and Allied or co-belligerent personnel. In their respective areas, FIFTH and EIGHTH Armies, through A.D., will be responsible for insuring that civilians comply with this non-fraternization order. Headquarters Allied Commission will be similarly responsible in other areas.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LCG-O,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

h. Guards - FIFTH and EIGHTH Armies will be responsible for the provision of guards for enemy forces while under their control. The AFHQ/AFMUSA PCW Command and Number 1 District similarly will be responsible for the provision of guards in the concentration areas under their respective jurisdiction. The necessary troops will be allotted by AFHQ/AFMUSA to Number 1 District and the AFHQ/AFMUSA PCW Command for this purpose. Arrangements for guarding when enemy forces are employed in accordance with letter referred to in paragraph 7c will be in accordance with paragraph 11 of above reference letter.

i. Discipline

- (1) Surrendered enemy forces will be responsible for maintaining a high standard of discipline.
- (2) All Allied commanders will insure that the persecution of non-Nazis, non-Germans and non-Fascists is prevented.
- (3) Such summary jurisdiction as may be necessary to maintain discipline in the final concentration areas may be left to enemy commanders within the discretion of Allied commanders concerned. Enemy courts martial may be permitted to function under Allied supervision.
- (4) All crimes, of whatever nature, may at the discretion of the appropriate Allied commanders be tried in AMC courts established for the purpose or by courts martial, notwithstanding any powers of summary jurisdiction which may have been given to enemy commanders.
- (5) Available enemy military police and provost personnel will be distributed as necessary among concentration areas.

j. Maintenance

- (1) Enemy Service Units - Such units as are required to enable forces to maintain themselves will be formed by the headquarters concerned. The AFHQ/AFMUSA PCW Command will make available to AFHQ/AFMUSA major commands and Number 1 District such service units as are required, if available, to maintain enemy forces. The obligation of the AFHQ/AFMUSA PCW Command to provide enemy service units to Number 1 District ceases when the principal adjustment in holdings of enemy forces by the British and US has been made as provided in paragraph 5 b (1) above. Co-ordination and allocation of enemy service units between the US and British will be the responsibility of AFHQ/AFMUSA.
- (2) Enemy stocks of maintenance supplies - FIFTH and EIGHTH Armies will obtain details of locations and quantities of enemy stocks of maintenance supplies located in their areas. Surrendered personnel required to operate enemy dumps or depots may continue to be so employed subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 c above.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/103 LOG-O,
dat 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

(3) Use of enemy maintenance stocks

- (a) Maximum use of enemy stocks will be made for the maintenance of surrendered enemy forces. Overall allocation of enemy stocks will be the responsibility of AFHQ/AFHQCS.
- (b) Subject to particular circumstances which may arise, Allied stocks of rations (Class I Supplies), Engineer and Ordnance stores (Class II and IV Supplies of all Technical Services) will not be used for this purpose, until enemy stocks have been exhausted.

(4) Allied assistance in the maintenance of surrendered enemy forces - In the interim stage, pending the locating of enemy stocks and the organization of the necessary service units, Amies, AFHQSA, PCW Command and Number 1 District will perform such maintenance activities for surrendered enemy forces as are necessary.

K. Transport

- (1) In order to economize in motor transport, enemy forces will be maintained as far as practicable by animal transport.
- (2) Animal, in preference to motor, transport will be used for local details within the concentration areas. This is desirable for security reasons as well as to economize on motor fuel and vehicles.
- (3) Subject to the limitations of (1) and (2) above, surrendered enemy forces will be allowed to retain minimum scales of motor transport as laid down by Allied military headquarters concerned. Enemy units required to work under Allied supervision will be allowed to retain such transport and equipment as are necessary to carry out their task.
- (4) Enemy transport units in excess of requirements for enemy administration, may be used in relief of Allied administrative resources and for the movement of civil supplies. Allocation of this transport will be the responsibility of AFHQ/AFHQCS.

1. Rations - Surrendered enemy forces whether fed from enemy or Allied stocks will be provided with a ration of approximately 2000 caloric value. A ration of approximately 2900 caloric value will be allowed for heavy workers. (Heavy workers are those working more than 4 hours daily for the Allied army). Detailed scales have been issued separately.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 306.3/163 LCG-O,
dtd 7 Jan 1945 (Cont'd)

m. Forage - The scale to be issued for captured animals will be as follows:

Animals in work - full scale.

Animals not in work - scale to be governed by the condition in which animals are found. Normally this will be fifty per cent (50%) of usual scale.

n. Surrendered Enemy Material - Separate instructions have been issued in AFHQ letter, File AG 306.3/163 LCG-O, dated 22 June 1945, subject: "Disposition of Captured Enemy Material in Italy".

o. Medical - In view of the danger of malaria:

(1) Personal and unit anti-malarial precautions will be enforced.

(2) General anti-malarial precautions throughout the concentration areas will be carried out as required.

p. Welfare - Enemy welfare services may be permitted to function under supervision. No Allied material or entertainment will be provided.

q. Postal Facilities - Initially no postal facilities will be provided for surrendered enemy personnel. Further instructions will be issued later if required.

r. Pay of Enemy Forces - Separate instructions will be issued.

s. Local Purchase and Use of Currency

(1) Surrendered enemy forces will not be permitted to make any local purchases on their own account. Should it be found economical to supply them with such local products as may not be required for civilian or Allied military use, such products will be purchased by Allied military authorities, in conformity with existing AFHQ/ETOUS instructions as to method of procuring local resources. For the purpose of accounting, separate records will be maintained of all such purchases.

(2) Accounts outstanding against the enemy in respect of purchases made previous to surrender will be forwarded to AG/AFHQ for such investigation or other action as may be considered appropriate.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 306.3/163 LOC-O,
dtd 7 July 1945 (Cont'd)

t. Allowance of Resale/EPI Items - Separate instructions are being issued to provide the minimum allowance of Resale/EPI items necessary for sanitation and health.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

2 Incls

- 1 - Appendix "A" - Suggested scales of accommodation.
- 2 - Appendix "B" - Trace showing British concentration area for surrendered enemy forces.

DISTRIBUTION:

10 - Each addressee	1 - FELE
1 - S.C. Med	1 - Tn (B)
1 - B S.C. Med	1 - Tn (A)
1 - C/S, AFHQ	1 - DITS
1 - C.O.	2 - PKG (A)
1 - A/C.O.	2 - Provost Marshal (B)
1 - C/S MTOCSA	1 - JA
5 - C-in-C Med	1 - DJLG (B)
1 - COMLVMW	1 - Pay
4 - Air C-in-C Med	1 - Labor
3 - CC, AMF/MTO	1 - AG Postal
3 - AMSC/MTO	1 - Postal (B)
3 - CC, RMC	3 - CM
3 - Repl & Trng Comd, MTOCSA	
3 - CO, AGC	1 - GWS
2 - G-1 (A)	1 - Fis Dir
2 - G-1 (B)	1 - Fin Adv (B)
3 - G-2	1 - US POLAD
4 - G-3	1 - Br Res Mtr
3 - G-4 (A)	1 - Hq AFLES Rome
1 - G-4 (B)	2 - O22
1 - Log Plans	3 - LFSC (MIA)
4 - G-4 (Mov & Tn)	3 - SMIET
2 - Q(Maint)	2 - AG Records
2 - Q(IE)	30 - Scores, G-4 Plans
3 - G-5	1 - AG R & D
2 - Engr (A)	
2 - Engr (B)	
2 - Signals	
2 - Liaison	
2 - Work	
1 - S & T	
1 - Surgeon	
1 - Medical (F)	
1 - Ord (A)	
1 - Ord (B)	

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APPENDIX "A" to
ltr, AFHQ, AG
386.3/103 LOC-O,
dtd 7 July 1945.

SUGGESTED SCALES OF ACCOMMODATION

(German scales may be used but will NOT exceed those given below).

1. General area to be 50-sq yards per man.
2. Staging Camp or Bivouac scales for all ranks will be all tentage except as follows:

Deep Trench latrine seats.....	5%
Field Urinals 10' long.....	1%
8-ft Double Sided Ablution Benches.....	2%
Kitchen Wash-up Benches.....	1%
Duck Board 6'6" long.....	5%
Incinerator.....	0.1%
Litter Cages.....	1%
Grease Interception Boxes.....	1%
Showers.....	Nil
Mobile equipment to be used.	
Static water reserve storage.....	2-gals
per head	
Water supply to give 5-gals per head per day	
Flyproofed food store and food preparation room, at 1-f-s. per head	

NOTE: Screen surrounds are required to Ablution Benches and to latrines and urinals, and Proof cover is required before October. Water points should be established for mobile showers, near kitchen wash-up in food preparation room and near ablutions.

3. Water supply to be 5-gals per head per day for all purposes with 2-gals per head storage.

4. HOSPITALS IN AREA

Scale as for Bivouac/Staging camps above.

5. VEHICLES

100 - sq yards per vehicle. No hard standings or wash down points will be constructed.

6. ANIMALS

50 - sq yards per animal. No hard standings will be constructed and only the minimum construction to give paddocks and uncovered lines. Water supply - 10 gals per animal per day.

Inclosure #1

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APPENDIX "A" (Cont'd)

7. DEPOTS AND WORKSHOPS

To be existing covered accommodation where authorized, standing and roads. Covered accommodation will only be used for goods that would deteriorate if stored in the open.

8. ANCILLARY BUILDINGS

Bath-houses, laundries, bakeries, cookhouses, etc, are not authorized for initial occupation to Bivouac/Staging Camp scales in final concentration area.

9. LIGHTING

Lighting will be only that which can be made available from surrendered forces mobile equipment. Firstly for hospitals, secondly Workshops Depots and Offices.

10. TRANSIT CAMPS FOR RECALLOITMENT PERSONNEL




These will be required for 5,000 in British and US areas. They should be constructed to Bivouac/Staging Camp scales and fenced with guard-walks as P. compounds, divided internally into 1,000-man pens.

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TRACE showing BRITISH CONCENTRATION AREA

for SURRENDERED ALLY FORCES

Ref Map 1 : 250,000 ITALY Sheet 19 RAVENNA



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APPENDIX "B" to
1st, AFHQ, AG 386
163 LOG-0, dtd 7 July
1945.
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Included in

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1126 AG 325/001 100-0, dtd 5 July (Cont'd).

4. LOCAL RESOURCES

All existing contracts for procurement of local resources by the US Army will remain in force.

5. RESPONSIBILITY FOR MOVEMENTS AND TRANSPORTATION

With effect from 15 July 1945 the Movement of MILITARY (authorized transportation - EXCLUDED) will assume full executive responsibility in the territory referred to in paragraph 1 b of this instruction.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Edward R. Hight
Colonel, AG
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

CG Fifth Army	1 - 5	Ord (A)	74
1st No 1 District	6 - 10	Ord (B)	75
CG Allied Commission	11 - 15	1st	76
2nd, Mediterranean	16	2nd (A)	77
3rd, Mediterranean	17	3rd	78
Chief of Staff	18	4th (A)	79
C-1	19	5th (A)	80
C-2	20	6th (A)	81
C-3	21	Judge Advocate	82
C-4	22 - 36	7th (A)	83
C-5	37	8th	84
C-6	38 - 41	9th	85
C-7	42 - 45	10th	86
C-8	46 - 49	11th	87
C-9	50 - 53	12th	88
C-10	54 - 57	13th	89
C-11	58 - 61	14th	90
C-12	62 - 65	15th	91
C-13	66 - 69	16th	92
C-14	70 - 73	17th	93
C-15	74 - 77	18th	94
C-16	78 - 81	19th	95
C-17	82 - 85	20th	96
C-18	86 - 89	21st	97
C-19	90 - 93	22nd	98
C-20	94 - 97	23rd	99
C-21	98 - 101	24th	100
C-22	102 - 105	25th	101
C-23	106 - 109	26th	102
C-24	110 - 113	27th	103
C-25	114 - 117	28th	104
C-26	118 - 121	29th	105
C-27	122 - 125	30th	106
C-28	126 - 129	31st	107
C-29	130 - 133	32nd	108
C-30	134 - 137	33rd	109
C-31	138 - 141	34th	110
C-32	142 - 145	35th	111
C-33	146 - 149	36th	112
C-34	150 - 153	37th	113
C-35	154 - 157	38th	114
C-36	158 - 161	39th	115
C-37	162 - 165	40th	116
C-38	166 - 169	41st	117
C-39	170 - 173	42nd	118
C-40	174 - 177	43rd	119
C-41	178 - 181	44th	120
C-42	182 - 185	45th	121
C-43	186 - 189	46th	122
C-44	190 - 193	47th	123
C-45	194 - 197	48th	124
C-46	198 - 201	49th	125
C-47	202 - 205	50th	126
C-48	206 - 209	51st	127
C-49	210 - 213	52nd	128
C-50	214 - 217	53rd	129
C-51	218 - 221	54th	130
C-52	222 - 225	55th	131
C-53	226 - 229	56th	132
C-54	230 - 233	57th	133
C-55	234 - 237	58th	134
C-56	238 - 241	59th	135
C-57	242 - 245	60th	136
C-58	246 - 249	61st	137
C-59	250 - 253	62nd	138
C-60	254 - 257	63rd	139
C-61	258 - 261	64th	140
C-62	262 - 265	65th	141
C-63	266 - 269	66th	142
C-64	270 - 273	67th	143
C-65	274 - 277	68th	144
C-66	278 - 281	69th	145
C-67	282 - 285	70th	146
C-68	286 - 289	71st	147
C-69	290 - 293	72nd	148
C-70	294 - 297	73rd	149
C-71	298 - 301	74th	150
C-72	302 - 305	75th	151
C-73	306 - 309	76th	152
C-74	310 - 313	77th	153
C-75	314 - 317	78th	154
C-76	318 - 321	79th	155
C-77	322 - 325	80th	156
C-78	326 - 329	81st	157
C-79	330 - 333	82nd	158
C-80	334 - 337	83rd	159
C-81	338 - 341	84th	160
C-82	342 - 345	85th	161
C-83	346 - 349	86th	162
C-84	350 - 353	87th	163
C-85	354 - 357	88th	164
C-86	358 - 361	89th	165
C-87	362 - 365	90th	166
C-88	366 - 369	91st	167
C-89	370 - 373	92nd	168
C-90	374 - 377	93rd	169
C-91	378 - 381	94th	170
C-92	382 - 385	95th	171
C-93	386 - 389	96th	172
C-94	390 - 393	97th	173
C-95	394 - 397	98th	174
C-96	398 - 401	99th	175
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INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Sender's Reference: FX 97174
 Date/Time of Origin: 220918B

Message Centre No: N 65/22
 Date Time Rec'd: P
 Precedence:

SIGNALS

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE PRODS
 TO: ACTION DISTON. DISTWO INFO 5 ARMY 15 ARMY GROUP ALLIED
 COMMISSION FOR MMIA

SECRET
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Q
 22/6

- ONE. REFERENCE RECENT DISCUSSIONS 1 DISTRICT 2 DISTRICT AND 5 ARMY ON ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BRITISH TROOPS IN NORTH ITALY. THIS HQ LETTER AG323/061 LOG-O DATED 16 JUNE 45 REFERS. FOLLOWING IS ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN 1 AND 2 DISTRICTS.
- TWO. ALL BRITISH TROOPS IN 5 ARMY AREA WHICH ARE NOW MAINTAINED BY 216 SUB AREA WILL BE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF HQ 1 DISTRICT.
- THREE. ALL BRITISH TROOPS IN 5 ARMY AREA WHICH ARE NOW BEING MAINTAINED THROUGH GENOA OR BY 215 SUB AREA WILL BE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF HQ 2 DISTRICT.
- FOUR. THIS WILL PLACE THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY BETWEEN 1 AND 2 DISTRICTS GENERALLY ALONG THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF THE PROVINCES OF BOLZANO TRENTO VERONA MANTOVA REGGIO EMILIA WHICH IS THE EVENTUAL PLANNED BOUNDARY BETWEEN HQ'S 1 AND 2 DISTRICTS WHEN 5 ARMY CEASE TO EXERCISE ALL CONTROL OVER THEIR PRESENT AREA IN NORTH ITALY.
- FIVE. FOR MMIA. REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO SECURE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS IN RESPECT OF ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATIONS TO CORRESPOND WITH ABOVE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted even in Cipher form being paraphrased. (Messages marked need not be paraphrased).

Copy sent to
 A
 G.
 ST

28/4/45

OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : MMIA
 TO : AFHQ
 INFO : DISTWO - MMIA LO NW ITALY - DISTONE FOR MMIA LO
 5 ARMY FOR BR INCR - 5 ARMY BR INCR FOR MMIA LO
 REF : SD 2785

DATE 20 1645 TIME B

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT IS REALLOCATION OF ITALIAN ARMY A D M DIV
 H Qs (.) IN VIEW INCREASING ITALIAN ARMY COMMITMENTS
 DISTWO AND REALLOCATION BRI - IT IS WITH
 BR INCR 5 ARMY STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT 231 A D M
 DIV H Q AT PRESENT UNDER COMD 5 ARMY PASS TO UNDER COMD
 DISTWO FORTHWITH

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

INTERNAL: A (Two)
 Q (Three)
 File : SD/35

/JW 20 JUNE 45.

2538

SECRET

REF/1ja AP 221

126

AG 323/061 LOG-0

SUBJECT: Administration of NORTH ITALY

TO: Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District

1. REFERENCES: Reference is made to the following AFHQ letters:

Subject: a. IG 323/061 GDS-O, dated 25 January 1945 and 30 January 1945,
Administration of NW ITALY.

b. AG 323/061 LOG-O, dated 19 May 1945, Subject: Administration of NORTH ITALY.

c. AG 323/061 GCT-O, dated 10 June 1945, Subject: Command and Administration FLORENCE City Command.

The instructions contained in these letters will continue in force except as modified in this instruction.

2. OBJECT: The object of this instruction is to allocate the responsibilities for administration of British maintained forces in that part of NORTH ITALY under control of Fifth Army (Phase I).

3. METHOD: a. Allocation of Responsibilities for Administration. Responsibility for administration of British maintained troops under command Fifth Army with effect from 23 June 1945 will be allocated as follows:

- (1) HQ 1 District will be responsible for the administration of the FRIULI and FOLGHE Gruppi and HQ 216 Sub-Area (British Element BOLOGNA City Command).
- (2) HQ 2 District will be responsible for the administration of all British maintained troops other than those mentioned in paragraph (1) above.

b. Disbandment of British Increment Fifth Army. British Increment Fifth Army will be disbanded at a later date. Detailed instructions will be issued separately.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE COMMUNICATIONS: Allied Force Headquarters will deal direct with HQ Nos 1 and 2 Districts on British administrative matters affecting British maintained troops in Fifth Army, sending copies of letters and signals to HQ Fifth Army, where it is necessary for the latter HQ to be kept informed.

SECRET

SECRETLtr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 GCT-O,
dtd 16 June 1945 (Cont'd)

5. LLIAISON: The following personnel found from the British Increment Fifth Army, will remain at HQ Fifth Army for liaison duties with British troops under command Fifth Army and with HQ Nos 1 and 2 Districts.

Colonel GS	one
GSO Grade I	one
GSO Grade II	one
DAGMG	one
DADST	one

6. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE: Separate instructions will be issued giving the procedure for the placing of bids for rail tonnages for the maintenance of British troops in Fifth Army area.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Fifth Army

No 1 District

No 2 District

SAC, Mediterranean

D/SAC, Mediterranean

Chief of Staff

CAO

A/CAO

C/S MTOUSA

C-in-C, Med

COMNAVMAF

Air C-in-C, Med

G-1 (A)

G-1 (B)

G-2

G-3

G-4 (A)

G-4 (B)

G-4 (Plans)

Log Plans

G-4 (Mov & Tr)

Q(Maint)

Q(ME)

G-5

Engrs (A)

Engrs (B)

Signals

Survey

Liaison

Works

S & T

Surgeon

COPY NO

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DMT

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FA

QM

Pet Sect

Coml Sect

CEMS

US GCC

Fis Dir

5 Airborne Div Plans

FSTO

Med Shipping Board

US POLAD

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Dtd 16 June 1945 (Cont'd)DISTRIBUTION: (Cont'd)COPY NO

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HEADQUARTERS
6TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

15

INFO COPY

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.: : By Auth of
.: : CG, 15TH AG
.: : Intls: PWT
.: : DATE: 5/26/45:
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26 May 1945

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northwest Italy.

TO: See Distribution.

1. Attached is copy of the minutes of a conference held at this Headquarters on 24 May 1945 on "The Occupation of Northwest Italy".
2. It is requested that action, where indicated in these minutes, be taken without further instructions.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCCREERY:

A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

RALPH E. TATE
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-4

DISTRIBUTION:

External:

ATFO

WITOU SA

Fifth Army

Fifth Army (Brit. Increment)

IV US Corps

(5)

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A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

ACTION : 9/6
INFO : 2585 WP Aug
Q. Ch

SPARE : TWO

OFFICIAL:

Ralph H. Tate

RALPH H. TATE
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-4

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MCUSA	(20)
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2 District CP	(6)
Fwd 2 District	(2)
FBS	(10)
Nov NW Italy	(1)
Allied Commission	(10)
MCIA	(5)
MRS	(5)

Internal:

C/S	(1)
D.C. of S., (Br)	(1)
G-1	(1)
G-2	(1)
G-3	(5)
G-4	(5)
Q	(10)
A	(4)
Nov	(1)
Engr	(2)
Signal Section	(4)
AG Records	(5)

SO-26-515

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MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ 15 ARMY GROUP ON 24 MAY 49 ON
OCCUPATION OF NW ITALY.

1. PRESENT:-

Presiding - Brig-Gen R.H. Tate, AG of S G-4, 15 Army Group.

ATHQ - Colonel R.B. Rathbone, G-3(Org)
Colonel J.M. Mitchell, G-5
Lt.Col. E. Boyd, G-4(A).

15 Army Group

Brig C.E. Packard, DC of S(Gr)
Brig W.H.D. Ritchie, DA & QMG.
Brig B.T. Godfrey-Faussett, CE.
Colonel P.D. Miller, G-3(Ops)
Colonel C.S.D'Cree, G-4
Colonel N.W. Monfort, G-5
Colonel C.H.K. Smith, DMS.
Lt.Col. W.J. McConnell, G-3(Plans)
Lt.Col. F.K. Eberhard, G-4(Plans)
Lt.Col. G.J.F. Mackay, AQMG.
Lt.Col. D.H. Cameron, SC RE.1
Major E.H. Jennings, G-3(SD)
Major E.C. Scott, DMAG.
Major C.H. Fitch, EAQMG(Mov)
Major W.B. Watkeys, Signal Section
Capt J.E. Palmer, G-1.

Fifth Army - Colonel E.M. Clarke, G-4
Colonel A.E. Sutherland, G-5
Lt.Col. D.M. Annand, AQMG(Gr Incr).

IV US Corps - Colonel A.T. Lacey, G-4

PEG - Colonel E.T. Foster, G-4

2 District - Lt.Col. Sir N.J. Mordaunt, St. CSO.1
Lt.Col. G.A. Chadwyck-Healey, AQMG.

Br. Col. L. B. Cameron, G-1
 Major E. R. Jennings, G-3 (SD)
 Major E. C. Scott, DAG.
 Major C. H. Peton, DAGMG (Moy)
 Major W. B. Watkeys, Signal Section
 Capt G. E. Palmour, G-1.

Fifth Army - Colonel E. M. Clarke, G-4
 Colonel A. J. Sutherland, G-5
 Lt. Col. D. M. Annand, AQMG (Br Iner).

IV US Corps - Colonel A. T. Lacey, G-4

PES - Colonel E. T. Foster, G-4

2 District - Lt. Col. Sir N. J. Mordant, Bt. GSO. 1
 Lt. Col. G. A. Chadwyck-Healey, AQMG.

Moy, NW Italy - Colonel G. Coaker
 Major D. W. Greenway

Allied Commission Brigadier M. S. Lush

2584

GENERAL.

2. Brig-Gen Tate explained that the object of the conference was to examine the existing position in NW Italy and to determine what steps had been or could be taken to facilitate the handover of responsibilities for NW Italy by Fifth Army to 2 District and Allied Commission, i.e. to implement Phase 2 of the Occupation as defined in 15 Army Group Administrative Directive No. 1 dated 16 Feb 45, when the French situation is clarified sufficiently for an operation in point of view to enable such handover to take place.

PARENT POSITION.

3. (a) Surrendered Forces.

Fifth Army stated that those were being evacuated to Concentration Areas as quickly as possible, and that the task should be completed within ten days, except for those in hospitals.

(b) Captured Material.

This has been collected into dumps by Fifth Army, and location

lists have been made. Cataloguing was, however, not yet complete. It was pointed out to 2 District that dealing with captured material would represent a considerable commitment when they assumed responsibility, and they agreed to examine the problem, liaise with Fifth Army, and submit a suggestion to AFHQ for any extra staff, etc., which they considered they might require. It was agreed that AFHQ should be asked to hold a conference on this subject at an early date at HQ 15 Army Group to clarify outstanding points.

ACTION: - 2 District
AFHQ.

(c) Partisans.

The intention of CG Fifth Army was to complete disarming of partisans by 7 June 45. Difficulties might, however, be expected over disarming partisans operating near the Franco-Italian frontier, as long as the present situation existed.

(d) Requirement of Coordinated Troops.

CG 15 Army Group, stated it was considered that two full operational divisions in addition to security troops were required as long as the Franco-Italian frontier situation was tense. The 6 St. Armoured Division was a wasting asset, and no other British troops were likely to be available so long as the dangerous situation remained critical.

(e) Allied Coordination.

Brigadier Lamb stated that Regional HQs were now in position and functioning under Fifth Army control. Phase 2, under which 13 would assume responsibility for civil administration, could, therefore, be implemented without much difficulty. He considered that 13 were prepared to face the extra transport commitment, if Army transport was withdrawn, provided all 13 transport was operating under Fifth Army was returned to AC control.

The main problems still to be solved were:

required so long as the Franco-Italian frontier situation was tense. The 6th Armoured Division were a trusting asset, and no other British troops were likely to be available so long as the general situation remained critical.

(c) Allied Participation.

Brigadier Inch stated that Regional HQs were now in position and functioning under Fifth Army control. Phase 2, under which HQ would assume responsibility for civil administration, could, therefore, be implemented without much difficulty. He confirmed that HQ were prepared to face the extra transport commitment, if Army transport was withdrawn, provided all HQ transport now operating under Fifth Army was returned to HQ control. The main problems still to be solved were:-

- (i) The Franco-Italian frontier with them
- (ii) Disarming of Partisans
- (iii) Unemployment - The solution of this lay in the provision of rest materials, particularly coal, which was now under investigation at AFHQ.

(d) 2 District.

Sq 2 District was still settling in, moving in units and installations and not really functioning except for 57 Area in 6760. Their Engineers and Signals were, however, landing assistance to IV Corps. 2 District stated that they considered they would be ready to take over Phase 2 responsibilities by 10 June 45, provided the necessary signal communications could be made available to them as the principal HQ. This would, of course, mean the return of any signal units they now had operating with IV Corps. As HQ Army Group pointed out that some Fifth Army District units would in any case have to be left under 2 District to complete certain outstanding tasks such as unloading.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2 OF THE OCCUPATION.

4. (a) Problem

Brigadier Inch said the problem was to consider how in the

light of the foregoing remarks:-

(i) Was implementation of Phase 2 possible at an early date?

or (ii) Was partial implementation, whereby 2 District and 2 took over responsibility for certain eastern areas of NW ITALY, a practical proposition?

(b) Total Implementation of Phase 2.

Fifth Army stated that the G3 felt very strongly that so long as he was responsible for law and order in any territory he must be completely in command. The completion of the responsibilities in para. 3(a) and (b) above would not necessarily enable Fifth Army to relinquish their control over NW ITALY. The Franco-Italian frontier situation was not yet settled, and Fifth Army could only relinquish control, if responsibility for this was assumed by AFHQ. 2 District was not organized for possible active operations, nor could they administer US troops. It was concluded, therefore, that until these problems were solved there could be no total implementation of Phase 2.

(c) Partial Implementation of Phase 2.

After discussion it was agreed for the reasons given below that partial implementation was a more practicable:-

(i) IV Corps L of C would have to continue to run through any area handed over to 2 District.

(ii) Signals facilities were insufficient to cope with two major HQs in NW ITALY, both operating at the same time.

(iii) Fuel control, whereby IV Corps retained operational command and 2 District assumed certain administrative responsibilities was not considered practicable.

(iv) Similarly, it was not considered that Regional

(c) Partial Implementation of Phase 2.

After discussion it was agreed for the reasons given below that partial implementation was a more practicable:-

- (i) IV Corps L of C would have to continue to run through any area handed over to 2 District.
- (ii) Signal facilities were insufficient to cope with two major HQs in NW Italy, both operating at the same time.
- (iii) Full control, thereby IV Corps retained operational command and 2 District assumed certain administrative responsibilities was not considered practicable.
- (iv) Similarly, it was not considered that Regional Commissioners could be put under direct command of Allied Commission so long as Fifth Army were responsible for the territory. It was, however, recommended that AG set up an Advance Echelon in Italy, which would co-ordinate Regional activities through Fifth Army and with whom Fifth Army could deal as one entity.

ACTION:- APPROVE
Implementation.

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(d) Future Requirement of Operational Troops.

2 Districts stated they considered at least the equivalent of one division and one brigade would have to be allotted to watch the French frontier, even if the French now withdrew behind it, and it was doubtful if Italian troops were suited for this task. The gradual departure of the 6 SA Armored Division, and the continued requirement of all available British troops for NE Italy, might mean the retention of one US Division for some time. JHQ was asked to consider this matter and state their policy.

ACTION:- APPROVE.

(c) Redeployment of US Troops.

2 District asked what speed US Troops were likely to be withdrawn on implementation of Phase 2. Brig-Gen Tate stated this would depend on redeployment and training schedules still under consideration.

215 SUP-187.

5. In reply to a question by 14HQ, 2 District stated that in Phase 2 they would like 215 Sub-Area to remain at FLORENZA to run the roadhead, as long as until 68HQ was fully opened.

LOCAL INDUSTRIES - NW ITALY.

6. 2RS asked what would be the position in Phase 2 of certain contracts which they were now placing on behalf of 14HQ, and by agreement with British Army, with local industries in NW ITALY. Brig-Gen Tate stated they would then tie up with 14HQ, so that allocation could be controlled by the Industrial Planning Board and 2 District informed.

ACQUAINTANCE

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AG 306.3/163 LCG-O

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AP 966

FVB/GB

: : : : :
 : S E C R E T :
 : Auth: SAC MT :
 : Initials *GAH* :
 : Date: 18 May 1945 :
 : : : : :

18 May 1945

SUBJECT: Administration of Surrendered Enemy Forces in ITALY

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
 Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
 General Officer Commanding, No 1 District
 Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782
 Headquarters, Eighth Army

1. REFERENCE is made to the following:

- a. 15th Army Group Administrative Directive Number 3, 1945, subject: "Control and Administration of Surrendered Enemy Forces".
- b. Eighth Army Administrative Directive Number 2, 1945, subject: "Surrender of Enemy Forces".

2. OBJECT: The object of this instruction is to define the policy for the administration of surrendered enemy forces in ITALY.

3. PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS: The instructions mentioned in paragraph 1a and b above will remain in force except where specifically modified in this instruction.

4. SCOPE OF THE INSTRUCTION:

a. This instruction is applicable to enemy forces taken, or surrendering in ITALY.

b. The policy regarding those taken or surrendering in AUSTRIA is that they will be held in that country and not removed to ITALY. Separate instructions will be issued on this subject.

5. GENERAL:a. Status of Enemy Forces

- (1) All enemy personnel, including those of the Luftwaffe, who had not passed through Army cages before 1400 hours 2 May will be termed "Surrendered Enemy Forces", and will not be regarded as PW, except on the specific authority of AFHQ/MTUSA.

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Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 386.3/163 LOG-O
dated 18 May 1945 (Cont'd)

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- (2) In principle it has been agreed that enemy personnel who have been taken as PW can be made "Surrendered Enemy Forces". Necessary instructions on this matter will be issued from time to time by AFHQ/MTUSA.
- (3) All personnel of whatever nationality who surrender or were taken whilst serving with the enemy will be regarded as enemy personnel. Instructions concerning segregation are given below at paragraph 7b.
- (4) SS Personnel will be confined separately, and will be classed as recalcitrants (see paragraph 7d below).
- (5) Enemy personnel at present in hospitals, and estimated to number some 40,000 will, on discharge, be treated as surrendered enemy forces, and sent to the final concentration areas. Those who cannot be disposed of in this manner will be evacuated to PW cages.

b. Extent of the Problem

- (1) The number of personnel in ITALY to be regarded as surrendered forces is estimated at 218,000.
- (2) Enemy stocks of food and clothing etc., are not yet known but are not believed to be substantial.

c. Policy

- (1) Responsibility for guarding and administration of PW or surrendered enemy forces will be divided equally between the British and the US. Adjustments of holdings in each category are being made in accordance with instructions from AFHQ/MTUSA.
- (2) Surrendered enemy forces will carry out their own administration and maintenance, using their own administrative organization under Allied supervision. To this end enemy forces will be formed into 'ad hoc' formation and unit organizations as far as is necessary to enable them to be self-administering. This policy does not absolve Allied military authorities concerned from the ultimate responsibility for the administration of surrendered enemy forces.
- (3) The policy regarding the use of technical troops will be notified separately. Under no circumstances will any enemy personnel be regarded as co-operators.

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Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 386.3/163 LOG-O
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6. CONCENTRATION AND ACCOMMODATION

a. Concentration Areas

- (1) Preliminary concentration will be carried out by Fifth Army in or near the present locations of enemy fortifications.
- (2) The final concentration areas will be as follows:
 - (a) British - as shown at trace at Appendix 'B'.
 - (b) US - as notified by CG MTOUSA (probably SOUTH of the APENNINES in PRS territory).

b. SCALE OF ACCOMMODATION: Surrendered enemy forces will be accommodated under field conditions. A guide to the scales of accommodation which will be provided is shown at Appendix 'A'. In the provision of these, the maximum use will be made of enemy stores in accordance with allocations made by AFHQ/MTOUSA.

c. EVACUATION OF CIVILIANS. Civilians within the final concentration area will not be evacuated unless it is essential for their safety, and at the instigation of AC/AMG.

d. BUILDINGS

- (1) Buildings, or portions thereof, will not be used for the accommodation of surrendered enemy forces unless surplus to Allied and civil requirements and then only with the authority of the appropriate Allied Military Commander, and with the full consent of the Allied Commission.
- (2) Buildings at present occupied by the enemy for hospitals, etc. may be left in their possession at the discretion of Allied Commanders.
- (3) Buildings may only be requisitioned if they are to be used for hospitals or offices. Such requisitioning will be subject to the following conditions:
 - (a) There will be no eviction of civilian inhabitants.
 - (b) Permission must previously have been given by the appropriate Allied Commander, and by Allied Commission.

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Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 386.3/163 LOG-O
dated 18 May 1945 (Cont'd)

e. Action to be taken outside the final concentration areas

- (1) Primary disarmament of enemy personnel.
- (2) Preliminary concentration and forming of enemy personnel into unit and formation organization for administration purposes. These units should be capable of carrying out their internal administration.
- (3) Segregation and despatch to concentration area of SS and other recalcitrant troops. These will be moved as soon as possible to their areas.
- (4) Movement of surrendered enemy forces to the final concentration areas.
- (5) Administration of surrendered enemy forces.

f. Action to be taken inside the final concentration areas

- (1) Reconnaissance of the areas and allocation of formation localities to enemy forces.
- (2) Reception and segregation of SS troops.
- (3) Reception of surrendered enemy forces other than SS troops.
- (4) Provision of guards.
- (5) Administration of surrendered enemy forces.

g. Allocation of Responsibilities

- (1) Fifth Army will be responsible for action to be taken in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6c above, for all surrendered enemy forces and PW within the Fifth Army area.
- (2) Eighth Army will be responsible:
 - (a) After co-ordination with Fifth Army, for moving all surrendered enemy forces within their area, other than those in hospital, into Fifth Army area.
 - (b) For administering all enemy personnel in hospital in the Army area.
 - (c) Arranging for the disposal of all enemy personnel discharged from hospital in the Army area in accordance with paragraph 5 a (5) above.

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Ltr, AFHQ, file AG 386.3/163 LCG-0
dated 18 May 1945 (Cont'd)

- (3) PBS and 1 District will be responsible, within their own areas, for action to be taken in accordance with paragraph 6f above.

h. Movement to Final Concentration Areas

- (1) Details of movement to final concentration areas, including phasing-in of units, will be arranged between 1 District and Fifth Army in respect of movement to the British concentration area, and between PBS and Fifth Army in respect of movement to the US concentration area. 15th Army Group will keep themselves informed in order to adjust any difficulties which may arise.
- (2) Specialist units required by PBS and 1 District to be moved in to the final concentration area previous to the main body of surrendered enemy forces will be notified by PBS and 1 District to Fifth Army and moved accordingly.

7. ADMINISTRATION

a. General

- (1) The US final concentration area will be the responsibility of PBS.
- (2) The British final concentration area will be the responsibility of HQ 1 District.

b. Segregation of Enemy Personnel

- (1) All Italian nationals will be concentrated separately by Fifth Army within their area and administered by them. Half the number so held will be deemed to be held by the US on British account and a corresponding adjustment will be made in the number of personnel of other nationalities held by the British to provide the equal division of the overall holding.
- (2) Personnel will be segregated by nationalities provided that by so doing the ability of enemy formations and units to administer themselves is not prejudiced. Segregation of nationals other than Italians need not be complete until surrendered enemy forces have arrived in the final concentration areas.
- (3) While the surrendered enemy forces are being held in the Army areas and in PBS and 1 District areas, the following directives will apply:

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- (a) Russian nationals
HQ MTOUSA letters, file AG 383.7/414 A-O, dated 9 April 1945 and 9 March 1945, subject: "Disposition of Soviet Citizens"

AFHQ letters, file GR/3491/2/G-1 (Pr) dated 6 March 1945, 7 March 1945 and 15 March 1945.

- (b) Other Nationals (exclusive of the Italian Republican Army)
HQ MTOUSA letter, file AG 383.6/323 FMG-O, dated 26 February 1945, subject: "Administrative Instructions for the United States Prisoner of War Enclosures, Chapter XVIII," paragraph 7.

AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 60, dated 14 December 1944, except that:

1. Poles, Czechs and Austrians will be retained in the British concentration area, segregated by nationalities, and AFHQ informed of the numbers involved.
2. Chetniks will be retained in the British concentration area and segregated into a separate enclave, to await disposal instructions which will be issued by AFHQ.

- (4) Separate instructions will be issued regarding the disposal of senior enemy officers.

c. Technical Troops. Technical troops, used as such in accordance with paragraph 5, c (3) above, will be distributed between the US and British in accordance with instructions from AFHQ/MTOUSA.

d. Recalcitrant Enemy Personnel

- (1) Personnel named by Counter Intelligence Staffs as dangerous to security, or who prove troublesome, will be termed "recalcitrant".
- (2) Such personnel will be separated from the remainder of the surrendered enemy forces as early as possible, and held in confinement when specified by AFHQ/MTOUSA. They will not be given PW status and will be segregated from PW in cages.
- (3) All SS troops will be considered recalcitrant and treated in accordance with sub-paragraph (2) above.

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e. Classification of Useful Workers. Classification of useful workers will be carried out by the enemy within the final concentration areas. Separate instructions will be issued regarding detailed procedure and categories of workers classed as "useful". These personnel will be returned to GERMANY first. No indication, however, must be given to the enemy of the purpose of this classification.

f. Documentation

- (1) Detailed documentation as for FW will be carried out by Allied military HQ concerned for:
 - (a) Recalcitrant personnel
 - (b) personnel of Allied nationality
- (2) Documentation of surrendered enemy forces other than those given in sub-paragraph (1) above will be the responsibility of the German authorities.

g. Bounds

- (1) Preliminary and final concentration areas will be placed off limits to all Allied military personnel except those concerned in the administration of the areas.
- (2) No fraternization will be allowed between the enemy and Allied or co-belligerent personnel. In their respective areas, Fifth and Eighth Armies, through their attached AMG, will be responsible for insuring that civilians comply with this non-fraternization order. HQ Allied Commission will be similarly responsible in FBS and I District territory.

h. Guards. Fifth and Eighth armies will be responsible for the provision of guards within their respective areas. FBS and I District will be similarly responsible for the provision of guards in the final concentration areas within their territories. The necessary troops will be allotted by AFHQ/TOUSA to FBS and I District for this purpose.

i. Discipline

- (1) The enemy will be responsible for maintaining a high standard of discipline among his forces. 25.9
- (2) All Allied commanders will insure that the persecution of non-Nazis, non-Germans and non-Fascists is prevented.
- (3) Such summary jurisdiction as may be necessary to maintain discipline in concentration areas may be left to enemy commanders within the discretion of Allied commanders concerned. Enemy courts martial may be permitted to function under Allied supervision.

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Ltr, AFHQ, IG 386.3/163 LOG-O
dtd 18 May 1945 (cont'd)

- (4) All crimes, of whatever nature, may at the discretion of the appropriate Allied commanders be tried in AMG courts to be set up for the purpose, notwithstanding any powers of summary jurisdiction which may have been given to enemy commanders. Separate instructions will be issued.
- (5) Enemy military police and provost personnel will be distributed as necessary among concentration areas.

j. Maintenance

- (1) Enemy stocks of maintenance supplies. Armies under the direction of 15th Army Group will obtain details of locations and quantities of enemy stocks of maintenance supplies located in their area. Enemy personnel required to operate enemy dumps or depots will continue to be so employed.
- (2) Enemy administrative units. Such units as are required to enable surrendered enemy forces to administer themselves will be formed by Fifth and Eighth Armies. Fifth Army will make available to FRS and HQ I District such administrative units as are required to maintain enemy forces in the final concentration area. Coordination and allocation of enemy administrative units between Fifth Army, FRS and I District will be the responsibility of AFHQ/TOUSA on recommendation made by CG 15th Army Group.
- (3) Use of enemy maintenance stocks
 - (a) Maximum use of enemy stocks will be made for the administration of surrendered enemy forces. Overall allocation of enemy stocks will be the responsibility of AFHQ/TOUSA.
 - (b) Subject to particular circumstances which may arise, Allied stocks of rations (Class I Supplies), Engineer and Ord Stores (Class II and IV Supplies) will not be used for this purpose, until enemy stocks have been exhausted.
- (4) Allied assistance in the maintenance of surrendered enemy forces. In the interim stage, pending the locating of enemy stocks and organization of the necessary administrative units, Armies, FRS and I District will perform such administrative activities for surrendered enemy forces as are necessary.

k. Transport

- (1) In order to economize in motor transport, enemy forces, where situated near supply dumps, will be maintained as far as possible by animal transport.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LOG-0
 dtd 18 May 1945 (cont'd)

- (2) Animal, in preference to motor transport, will also be used for local details within the concentration area. This is desirable for security reasons as well as to economize petrol and L.T.
- (3) Surrendered enemy forces will be allowed to retain minimum scales of motor transport as laid down by Allied military HQs concerned. Enemy units required to work under Allied supervision will be allowed to retain such transport and equipment as are necessary to carry out their task.
- (4) Enemy transport units, in excess of requirements for enemy administration, may be used in relief of Allied administrative resources and for the movement of civil supplies. Allocation of this transport will be the responsibility of AFHQ/TOUSA.

1. Rations

- (1) Surrendered enemy forces whether fed from enemy or Allied stocks will be provided with a ration of 2,000 caloric value. An increased scale may be allowed for heavy workers. Detailed scales are being issued separately.
- (2) Local food resources will not be used for the maintenance of these forces without authority from AFHQ/TOUSA.

m. Forage. The scale to be issued for captured animals will be as follows:

- (1) Animals in work - Full scale
- (2) Animals not in work - scale to be governed by the condition in which the animals are found. Normally this will be 50% of usual scale.

n. Surrendered Enemy Material.

Separate instructions have been issued in AFHQ letter AG 386.3/163 LOG-0, dated 22 April 1945, subject: "Disposition of Captured Enemy Material in ITALY."

o. Medical

- (1) Available enemy medical units, personnel and stores will be distributed throughout concentration areas. Static hospitals will not be moved without authority from AFHQ. 258
- (2) All available dressing stations and field hospitals which can be moved will be sent in advance of the main body of the surrendered enemy forces to the final concentration areas.

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LOG-O
dtd 18 May 1945 (cont'd)

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(3) In view of the danger of Malaria

- (a) Personal and unit anti-malarial precautions will be enforced.
- (b) General anti-malarial precautions throughout the final concentration areas will be carried out.

p. Welfare. Enemy welfare services may be permitted to function under supervision. No Allied material or entertainments will be provided.

q. Postal Facilities. Initially no postal facilities will be provided for surrendered enemy forces. Further instructions will be issued later.

r. Pay of Enemy Forces

(1) FW

Payment to FW will be made in the usual manner in accordance with standing regulations for FW.

(2) Surrendered Enemy Forces

- (a) No payments in either Metropolitan or Allied Military Lire will be made to surrendered enemy forces while they remain in ITALY.
- (b) The question of any payment which might be made on discharge is being investigated and further instructions will be issued on this subject at a later date.

s. Local Purchase and use of Currency by the Enemy

- (1) The enemy forces will not be permitted to make any local purchases on their own account. Should it be found economical to supply them with such local produce as may be not required for civilian or Allied military use, such produce will be purchased by Allied military authorities on enemy behalf, in conformity with existing AFHQ/MTUSA instructions as to method of procuring local resources.
- (2) Accounts outstanding against the enemy in respect of purchases made previous to surrender will be forwarded to AC/AMG for such investigation or other action as may be considered appropriate.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

2 Incls

- #1 - Appendix "A"
- #2 - Appendix "B"

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Mr, AFHQ, AG 386.3/163 LOG-O
 dtd 18 May 1945 (Cont'd)

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SECRETAPPENDIX "A"SUGGESTED SCALES OF ACCOMMODATION

(German scales may be used but will NOT exceed those given below).

1. General area to be 50-sq yards per man.
2. Staging Camp or Bivouac scales for all ranks will be all tentage except as follows:

Deep Trench latrine seats	5%
Field Urinals 10' long	1%
8-ft Double Sided Ablution Benches	2%
Kitchen Wash-up benches	1%
Duck Board 6'6" long	5%
Incinerator	0.1%
Litter Cages	1%
Grease Interception Boxes	1%
Showers	Nil
Mobile equipment to be used.	
Static water reserve storage	2-gals
per head	
Water supply to give 5-gals per head per day	
Flyproofed food store and food preparation room, at 1-f-s. per head	

NOTE: Screen surrounds are required to Ablution Benches and to latrines and urinals, and Proof cover is required before October. Water points should be established for mobile showers, near kitchen wash-up in food preparation room and near ablutions.

3. Water supply to be 5-gals per head per day for all purposes with 2-gals per head storage.

4. HOSPITALS IN AREA

Scale as for Bivouac/Staging camps above.

5. VEHICLES

100 - sq yards per vehicle. No hard standings or wash down points will be constructed.

6. ANIMALS

50 - sq yards per animal. No hard standings will be constructed and only the minimum construction to give paddocks and uncovered lines. Water supply - 10 gals per animal per day.

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Inclosure 1

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APPENDIX "A" (CONT'D)

7. DEPOTS AND WORKSHOPS

To be existing covered accommodation where authorized, standing and roads. Covered accommodation will only be used for goods that would deteriorate if stored in the open.

8. ANCILLARY BUILDINGS

Bath-houses, laundries, bakeries, cookhouses, etc, are not authorized for initial occupation to Bivouac/Staging Camp scales in final concentration area.

9. LIGHTING

Lighting will be only that which can be made available from surrendered forces mobile equipment. Firstly for hospitals, secondly Workshops Depots and Offices.

10. TRANSIT CAMPS FOR RECALCITRANT PERSONNEL

These will be required for 5,000 in British and US areas. They should be constructed to Bivouac/Staging Camp scales and fenced with guard-walks as PW compounds, divided internally into 1,000-men pens.




Inclosure #1

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TRACE showing BRITISH CONCENTRATION AREA

for SURRENDERED GERMANY FORCES

Ref Map 1 : 250,000 ITALY Sheet 15 R VINDA




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APPENDIX "B"

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 323/061 LOG-O

AP 964 RVE/afb

 S E C R E T
 Auth: S.E. M
 Initials: ()
 Date: 19 May 1945

 19 May 1945

SUBJECT: Administrative Instruction, NORTH ITALY.

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464
 Headquarters, Eighth Army
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
 General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
 General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District
 Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782

LAND FORCES 9c

1. GENERAL

a. This instruction supersedes those contained in AFHQ letters AG 323/061 CDS-O, dated 3 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", and 9 April 1945, subject: "Occupation of Northeast Italy", which are hereby rescinded.

b. The instructions contained in AFHQ letters AG 323/061 CDS-O, dated 25 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW Italy", and 30 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW Italy", will continue in force except as modified in this instruction.

2. OBJECT - The object of this instruction is to define the policy for the administration of forces in NORTH ITALY.

3. SCOPE OF THIS INSTRUCTION - For the purpose of this instruction NORTH ITALY is divided into:

a. NW ITALY comprising:

Compartimento of LIGURIA
 Compartimento of PIEDMONTE
 Compartimento of LOMBARDIA (less the Provincia of MANTOVA)
 Provincia of P.A.R.A. } In the Compartimento of EMILIA
 Provincia of PLACENZA }

Instructions referred to in paragraph 1 b above are modified accordingly.

b. US Corridor comprising:

Compartimento of VENEZIA TRIDENTINA
 Provincia of VENEZIA (in the Compartimento of VENEZIA PROPRIA)
 Provincia of MANTOVA (in the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA)
 Provincia of REGGIO EMILIA } in the
 Provincia of MODENA } Compartimento
 That part of the Provincia of BOLOGNA WEST } of EMILIA
 of the present No 1 District boundary }

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/001 LOG-O,
 dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

c. NE ITALY comprising:

Compartimento of VENEZIA PROPRIA

d. VENEZIA GIULIA.

4. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES - Within their respective areas Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for:

a. The administration of ground forces under their command and such maintenance of air forces located in the Army areas as is a ground force responsibility.

b. Civil administration and relief measures in conjunction with Army AEC organizations.

c. The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HEADQUARTERS

a. NE ITALY - Responsibilities and arrangements for administrative matters and military government at present in force will continue until a date to be notified by AFHQ. As from that date these responsibilities will be assumed as follows:

- (1) All supply and administrative matters for US forces as directed by Commanding General, LTCUSA.
- (2) Administration of British forces by Headquarters 2 District under direct command of AFHQ.
- (3) Military government by Headquarters Allied Commission. Headquarters 2 District will be the controlling agency as defined in Administrative Memorandum Number 11 of 24 January 1943.

b. US Corridor

- (1) Administration and military government will continue to be the responsibility of Fifth Army. At a date to be notified by AFHQ this responsibility for the whole or part of this territory will pass from Fifth Army to Headquarters 1 District and Headquarters Allied Commission respectively.
- (2) Supply responsibility in respect of US forces will be as directed by Commanding General, LTCUSA in accordance with normal administrative procedure.
- (3) During the period of Fifth Army's responsibility, such administration of British troops, as must be performed by a British headquarters, will be the responsibility of Headquarters 1 District.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 LOC-0,
 dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

c. NE ITALY (OTHER THAN VENEZIA GIULIA)

- (1) As the Army rear boundary is progressively moved forward to the Italian frontier, administrative and military government responsibilities will be assumed by Headquarters 1 District and Headquarters Allied Commission respectively for areas behind this rear boundary with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA.
- (2) Supply responsibility in respect of any US forces which may be located in the area will be as directed by CG MTOUSA.
- (3) Headquarters 1 District will be the controlling agency as defined in Administrative Memorandum Number 11 dated 24 January 1943.

d. VENEZIA GIULIA - Separate instructions will be issued regarding this Compartimento when it is no longer within the Eighth Army area.

e. Layout of Static Headquarters - Letter, this headquarters, AG 323/061 OCT-0, dated 19 April 1945 will be amended separately.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SURRENDERED ENEMY FORCES - Separate instructions will be issued.

7. DEVELOPMENT OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION

a. NW ITALY - British requirements will be supplied through GENOA. United States requirements will partly be supplied through GENOA and partly by road BOLOGNA-PLACENZA and later by rail when developed.

b. US Corridor - United States requirements will be supplied by rail and road BOLOGNA-VISIGNA-VERONA-BRENNER.

c. NE ITALY (less VENEZIA GIULIA) - Maximum use of rail capacity NORTH from BOLOGNA will be made, balance of requirements being met by sea through VENICE. Should there be US requirements in NE ITALY, the following general policy will obtain regarding the use of Lines of Communication.

- (1) United States supply requirements of items peculiar to US forces will be moved by rail and road NORTH from BOLOGNA.
- (2) The primary route for British requirements and United States common user requirements will be by sea through VENICE.

d. VENEZIA GIULIA - British and United States requirements will be provided through TRIESTE, supplemented as necessary by Lines of Communication given in 7 c above.

e. AUSTRIA - British requirements will be provided through VENICE and thence by rail and road through TRIESTO. An alternative Line of Communication through the BRENNER will also be developed. United States requirements will be provided through SOUTH GERMANY.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 LOG-0,
dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

8. PORTS

a. Import Requirements

- (1) Maximum military and civil tonnage (exclusive of bulk fuels and coal) to be imported through VENICE and TRIESTE will be 6,500 tpd.
- (2) Of this figure, imports through TRIESTE will, as a temporary measure, be limited to 2,000 tpd.
- (3) VENICE will be developed to enable the full tonnage of 6,500 tpd to be handled if required.

b. VENICE

- (1) The port will be developed as a "seahead" to enable the tonnage given in sub-paragraph a (3) above to be discharged and cleared through it.
- (2) The opening and operation of the port will be a British responsibility in respect of all tonnages handled. Should it be necessary to handle substantial US tonnages the US may be called upon to give countervailing assistance and clearance at a port elsewhere in Italy.
- (3) Responsibilities under (1) and (2) above will be those of AFHQ. The responsibility for initial preparations, as specifically directed by AFHQ, will be delegated to Headquarters Eighth Army.
- (4) AFHQ, in conjunction with Headquarters Eighth Army, US Headquarters concerned and FOTALI will prepare the key plan. The Chairman of the Sitting Board, on which these authorities will be represented, will be provided by AFHQ.

c. TRIESTE - Eighth Army will be responsible for operating TRIESTE as a seahead to enable the tonnage given in sub-paragraph a (2) to be discharged and cleared through it. Should it be desired to increase this figure application will be made to AFHQ.

d. Allocation of resources between VENICE and TRIESTE - Initial preparations referred to at b (3) above will include the allocation of administrative resources at present designated for TRIESTE, between that port and VENICE, subject to adjustment by AFHQ when the Key Plan for VENICE is determined.

9. RAILWAYS - The priorities of railway construction, capacities and estimated dates of completion will be notified separately.

10. ROADS

a. Priority of repair and construction will be as follows:

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Ltr, AFHQ, AC 323/061 ICG-0,
 dtd 19 May 45 (Cont'd)

(1) Eighth Army/1 District territory

First priority VICENZA-TREVISO-UDINE with connection
 VENICE-TREVISO.
 Second priority FERRARA-PADUA-TRIESTE-PONTOGRUARO-
 MONFALCONE and UDINE.

(2) Fifth Army territory

First priority BOLOGNA-OSTIGLIA-VERONA-VICENZA.
 Second priority VERONA-BRESCIA.
 Third priority BOLOGNA-MODENA-PARMA.

b. The headquarters in whose territory the above roads are situated will be responsible for the repair and construction. If US assistance is allotted in the case of the first priority listed under paragraph a (1), separate instructions will be issued.

11. POL BULK STORAGE AND PIPELINES

a. Bulk storage facilities will be provided at VENICE to supply military and civil requirements. This will be the responsibility of AFHQ.

b. Pipeline construction will take place to provide the following:

- (1) Two 4-inch pipeheads, fed from LIGONZO, one at ROVIGO and one at P.DUA.
- (2) Two 4-inch pipeheads, fed from VENICE, at TREVISO.
- (3) One 4-inch pipehead, fed from LEGHORN, at MODENA.
 One 4-inch pipehead, fed from LEGHORN, at BOLOGNA.
 One 4-inch pipehead, fed from LEGHORN, at NOVARA.
- (4) As second priority to all above - extension of NOVARA pipeline to VERONA.

12. LAYOUT OF ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS

a. Advanced base installations, including hospitals, to serve forces in AUSTRIA will be located in AUSTRIA. These installations will not be established without authority from AFHQ.

b. No reserves will be held at TRIESTE. As a temporary measure only such facilities will be established as are necessary to meet the local needs of a corps of three divisions and to hold a ten (10) days maintenance stock of supplies for this force. These supplies and maintenance requirements of troops in the area will be held WEST of the IGONZO.

c. No reserves will be held at VENICE. Depots will be provided to allow for the handling of imports up to 5,000 tons of US and British military stores, and for the holding of transit stocks up to a maximum of ten (10) days for troops supplied through VENICE.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 LCC-O,
dtd 19 May 45, (Cont'd)

d. Separate instructions will be issued regarding the breakdown by nature of commodity, British and US, of the 5,000 tpd to be handled at VENICE.

13. MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE - Provisions of Administrative Memorandum Number 16 of 20 March 1945 will apply. Amplifying instructions regarding:

a. Allocation of tonnages through VENICE or TRIESTE while these ports are in Eighth Army area.

b. The procedure for demanding requirements of US forces under command of Eighth Army, will be issued later.

14. CIVIL SUPPLIES

a. Civil supplies will be made available to the civil population, except in VENEZIA GIULIA, on a scale sufficient to prevent unrest and disease. No civil supplies will be provided for VENEZIA GIULIA until instructions to do so are issued.

b. Within the Army areas Armies will be responsible, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations, for the provision of such supplies.

c. Behind the Army rear boundaries the provision of civil supplies will be the responsibility of Headquarters Allied Commission.

BY ORDER OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. H. Christenderry
C. H. CHRISTENDERRY
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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(see next page)

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 LOG-O,
 dtd 11 May 45 (Cont'd)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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 : Initials: *W. J. H.* :
 : 3 April 1945 :
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 : 3 April 1945 :

AG 323/061 GDS-O

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northeast ITALY

TO: Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
 General Officer Commanding, No. 1 District
 General Officer Commanding, No. 2 District

Received *Wash* *4 Apr*
1945

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<i>2/c</i>	<i>A/P</i>
<i>G.I.</i>	<i>G.I.P. WP</i>

1. GENERAL. Operational Directives on the occupation of Northeast ITALY have been issued as follows:

a. AFHQ letter, AG 323/061 SACS-O, dated 18 March 1945, subject: "Directive - Occupation of NE ITALY", which deals with the situation which will arise in the event of the withdrawal of the enemy from the PO Valley to some general Alpine line.

b. AFHQ letter, AG 337/147 SACS-O, dated 31 March 1945, subject: "Local German Surrender in ITALY", (not to all addressees) which deals with the situation which will arise should German forces in ITALY surrender on or about their present line.

2. OBJECT. Object of this memorandum is to give the administrative instructions corresponding to the operational directives in paragraph 1.

3. PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED. Administrative instructions in respect to the occupation of Northwest ITALY are given in AFHQ letter, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dated 25 January 1945, subject: "Occupation of NW ITALY", as amended by AFHQ letter, same file, dated 30 January 1945. These instructions remain unchanged in the event of a German withdrawal (paragraph 1 a, above). In the event of a German surrender or collapse, they will be subject to certain modifications as given in the following paragraphs.

4. SCOPE OF THIS INSTRUCTION. Northeast ITALY is defined as follows:

Compartimenti di VENEZIA TRIDENTINA
 VENEZIA PROPRIA
 VENEZIA GIULIA
 EMILIA (except the provincia of PLACENZA)

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 325/061, ODS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45
 "Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

Provincia of	SONDRIO	)	
	BRESCIA	)	
	BERGAMO	)	in the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA
	MANTOVA	)	
	CREMONA	)	
	APUANIA/MASSA	)	
	LUCCA	)	in the Compartimento of TOSCANA
	PISTOIA	)	

i.e., that part of NORTH ITALY not covered in the instructions referred to in paragraph 3 above.

5. PHASES

a. The definition of "phases" of the occupation of NE ITALY given in the AFHQ directive referred to in paragraph 1 a above, is also followed in this instruction.

b. Phase I will be deemed to be complete, and Phase II to start, in respect to any particular territory, when the rear boundary of Armies is moved forward and the territory passes from control of Armies to HQ 1 District, HQ 2 District, or CG PBS.

6. TERRITORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HEADQUARTERS

a. In the case of progressive liberation of NORTH ITALY as a result of enemy withdrawal:

- (1) The territory to be controlled by HQ 2 District will be as given in the administrative instructions on NE ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above.
- (2) HQ 1 District and CG PBS will take over the responsibilities of the Armies as the rear army boundaries are moved forward.
- (3) At a later stage, on completion of enemy withdrawal from NORTH ITALY and when the Army rear boundaries have been moved forward to the Austrian frontier and VENEZIA GIULIA, boundaries of static HQs will be adjusted to correspond with those laid down in sub-paragraph b, below.

b. In the case of the simultaneous liberation of NORTH ITALY, as would occur as a result of enemy surrender or collapse, the eventual territories to be controlled by static HQs in ITALY will be as defined in AFHQ directive referred to in paragraph 1 a, above.

c. Initially, VENEZIA GIULIA will be the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army. Subsequent responsibility for this Compartimento will be as follows:

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 523/051 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45
Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

d. Instructions giving the territorial responsibilities of PBS and District HQs will be issued separately in amplification of instructions already issued in paragraph 15, AFHQ letter, AG 091.711-005 GCT, dated 3 January 1945, subject: "Reorganization of British Command and Static Headquarters", and AFHQ letter referred to in paragraph 1 a, above.

7. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF ARMIES. Within their respective areas, Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for:

a. The administration of ground forces under their command and such maintenance of Air Forces located in the Army area as is a ground force responsibility.

b. The initiation, in conjunction with Army AMG organizations, of civil administration and relief measures.

c. The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

8. ALLOCATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATIC HQs in NE ITALY

a. HQ 1 District will be responsible for:

- (1) The local administration of all British troops in its territory and in that of PBS, North of the northern boundary of the Compartimento of TOSCANA.
- (2) The coordination, in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission, of matters being undertaken in its territory jointly by military and civil authorities.
- (3) The execution of specific administrative tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

b. HQ 2 District will be responsible for the local administration of all British troops in the territory of PBS, within the boundaries of the Compartimento of TOSCANA, in addition to the responsibilities defined in the administrative instruction referred to in paragraph 3 above.

c. CG PBS will be responsible for:

- (1) Supply matters in respect to US Forces in Fifth Army ~~Area~~ 9 accordance with normal administrative procedure.
- (2) Supply matters in respect to US Forces in the territory under its control.
- (3) The coordination, in conjunction with HQ Allied Commission, of matters being undertaken in its territory jointly by military and civil authorities.

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45
"Occupation of NS ITALY" (cont.)

- (4) The execution of specific tasks as given in succeeding paragraphs.

d. HQ Allied Commission will be responsible for:

- (1) The continuation of civil relief measures
(2) The development and operation in accordance with policies laid down by AFHQ of essential communications, industries and public utilities which are not a military responsibility.

9. DEVELOPMENT OF Ls OF C IN NORTH ITALY. Subject to changes which may be dictated by the course of operations, relative state of damage to communications or other considerations:

a. The US CZ will be by rail and road from LEGHORN through BOLOGNA and the BRESCIA to AUSTRIA.

b. The British Ls of C will be:

- (1) By rail northward from ANCONA to railheads on line 87 and extensions of this line in the FERRARA area, and by road FERRARA-PADUA-UDINE.
(2) By sea, through the port of TRIESTE, and thence by the least damaged road and rail route to AUSTRIA.

10. PORTS.

a. It is not planned to open the port of VENICE immediately on capture. Later, when resources can be spared for the purpose, it will be opened for the importation of civil supplies.

b. TRIESTE will be developed as a military port and opened as a higher priority than VENICE.

c. With reference to the administrative instructions on NW ITALY referred to in paragraph 5 above, there are sufficient naval and military resources available to enable GENOA and TRIESTE to be opened simultaneously. However, should any conflict arise in the allocation of resources between these two ports, TRIESTE will have priority.

d. Naval responsibilities in respect to the opening and operation of TRIESTE and VENICE have been given to FOTALI.

e. TRIESTE

- (1) TRIESTE will be developed to enable 6,000 tpd to be discharged and cleared through it.

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4tr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 8 Apr 45.
 "Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

- (2) The opening and operation of the port will be a British responsibility in respect of all tonnages handled. Should it be necessary to handle US tonnages the US will give counter-vailing assistance in discharge and clearance at a port elsewhere in ITALY.
- (3) TRIESTE will be developed as a transit port forming the southern end of the L of C to AUSTRIA and only the minimum necessary installations will be established at the port.
- (4) Responsibility under a (1), (2) and (3) will be undertaken initially by HQ Eighth Army subject to the following reservations:
 - (a) The key plan for the port will be prepared by AFHQ in conjunction with HQ Eighth Army, CG US base section concerned and FOTALL.
 - (b) Chairman of the Siting Board, on which the HQs given in (a) above will be represented, will be provided by AFHQ.
 - (c) Allocation of tonnages between HQ Eighth Army and other bidders, whose requirements are not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, will be made by AFHQ.

c. VENICE

- (1) The opening and operation of the port will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission in all respects other than those which are a naval responsibility (see sub-paragraph d above).
- (2) Other than certain organizational assistance of a supervisory nature, it is unlikely that any military resources can be allotted to HQ Allied Commission for this purpose. The extent of this assistance will be notified later.

11. RAILWAYS.

a. The general order of priority of repair and construction will be as follows:

<u>First Priority</u>	: PRATO-BOLOGNA Single line FAENZA-BOLOGNA FAENZA-FERRARA
<u>Second Priority</u>	: BOLOGNA-VERONA-BRENNER BOLOGNA-PARMA Double line FAENZA-BOLOGNA
<u>Third Priority</u>	: PARMA-ALESSANDRIA-TURIN Easiest route to MILAN GENOA-ALESSANDRIA

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-0, dt 3 Apr 45,
 "Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

b. In addition to the above a line leading north to AUSTRIA from TRIESTE will be repaired. This line will be inserted into the above priorities according to operational requirements and the time required to move such locomotives and rolling stock, as may be necessary, to put the line into operation.

c. The above order of priority will be subject to adjustment in accordance with the speed and manner in which NORTH ITALY is occupied and whether the occupation follows a progressive enemy withdrawal or surrender.

12. ROADS

a. Fifth and Eighth Armies will be responsible for road repair and construction within their own areas to meet the operational requirements of CG 15th Army Group.

b. Should the whole of NORTH ITALY be liberated simultaneously as a result of enemy surrender or collapse, responsibility and priority for repair of roads during Phase II will be as follows:

<u>Priority 1</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
BOLOGNA-MODENA-VERONA	CG PBS
BOLOGNA-FERRARA-PADUA	HQ 1 District
<u>Priority 2</u>	
VERONA-BRESCIA	CG PBS
<u>Priority 3</u>	
Best route PADUA-UDINE-TRIESTE	HQ 1 District
MODENA-PIACENZA	US HQ, designated at the time by CG MTOUSA and HQ 2 District in their respective territories
<u>Priority 4</u>	
GENOA-ALESSANDRIA	HQ 2 District
<u>Priority 5</u>	
PIACENZA-ALESSANDRIA-TURIN	HQ 2 District
Best route to MILAN	HQ 2 District

c. Responsibility for the subsequent repair of the road L of C leading north from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA will be allotted in the separate instructions referred to in paragraph 6 c.

13. IWT. HQ Allied Commission will be responsible for the restoration and operation of the IWT system to the maximum extent possible for the movement of civil supplies.

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

a. Bulk storage facilities will be developed as follows:

- (1) At TRIESTE, to supply military and civil requirements. This will be a military responsibility.
- (2) At VENICE, to supply civil requirements. This will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission. The provision of facilities at TRIESTE will have first priority.

b. Pipeline construction will take place to provide the following four-inch lines:

- (1) From ANCONA - one via BOLOGNA to FERRARA) One of these lines
-) to be extended to
- one via RAVENNA to FERRARA) ROVIGO.
- (2) From LEGHORN - one to BOLOGNA
- one via BOLOGNA to MODENA
- one via BOLOGNA to VERONA

a. In Phase I the provision of supplies for the civil population will be the responsibility of Armies, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations.

b. In Phase II the provision of supplies for the civil population will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission.

c. Should German forces in ITALY surrender or collapse on or about their present line, and subject to overriding operational requirements, the following will be undertaken as a military responsibility to assist HQ Allied Commission in the movement of civil supplies:

- (1) Movement of 350 tpd to PADUA. This will be a British responsibility to be undertaken by HQ Eighth Army in Phase I and HQ I District in Phase II.
- (2) Movement of 400 tpd to VERONA. This will be a US responsibility to be undertaken by CG Fifth Army in Phase I and CG PBS in Phase II.

This assistance is in addition to the movement of 605 tps to PARMA which has been accepted as a British military responsibility in the administrative instructions on NW ITALY referred to in paragraph 3 above.

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NE ITAL (cont'd)

d. AFHQ/MTUSA will be responsible for the allocation of the necessary resources to enable the responsibilities allotted to the HQs concerned in sub-paragraphs c (1) and (2) above, to be implemented. These resources will be subject to recall and should be assumed to be available for a period not exceeding one month.

16. ADMINISTRATION OF ENEMY FORCES FOLLOWING A CAPITULATION IN ITALY.

a. General. The policy will be that the surrendered enemy forces will carry out their own administration. To this end enemy forces will retain or, where they have disintegrated, be reformed into formation and unit organizations. In accordance with this general policy, as amplified in sub-paragraphs b and g below, the arrangements for the concentration, holding and maintenance of enemy surrendered forces will be the responsibility of Fifth and Eighth Armies under the coordinating direction of CG 15th Army Group. When the Army rear boundaries are moved forward (Phase II) this responsibility will pass to AFHQ/MTUSA. Separate instructions on this subject will be issued at the time.

b. Concentration of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will be concentrated where they can be easily maintained and where they can be put to work in accordance with the Terms of Surrender, in relief of Allied administrative resources. The most suitable area, from these points of view, is that between the River PO and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route, major towns in the area and the malarial coastal belt adjoining the ADRIATIC Coast). Subject to operational requirements, this area should be the main concentration area for enemy forces surrendering south, and in the general vicinity of, the PO. As soon as it is operationally possible, forces surrendering north of the PO should be moved to this concentration area.

c. Holding and Evacuation of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will be held in the main concentration area. Recalcitrant enemy personnel will be evacuated to PW cages south of the APENNINES. Movement of these recalcitrant elements out of Army areas will be the responsibility of AFHQ/MTUSA. Ultimate disposal of surrendered enemy forces will be the subject of separate instructions as required.

d. Accommodation of Surrendered Enemy Forces. Surrendered enemy forces will accommodate themselves, using their own resources. Use will be made of warehouses, large buildings, etc., only if these are not required for Allied military or civil purposes. There will be no requisitioning of houses for the accommodation of enemy forces.

e. Maintenance of Surrendered Enemy Forces. The maximum use of enemy administrative resources will be made for this purpose. When these resources are exhausted these forces will be maintained from Allied depots. Except for such items as are declared surplus to Allied military and civil requirements, local resources will not be used for the maintenance of these forces without the authority of AFHQ.

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Ltr AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O, dtd 3 Apr 45,
"Occupation of NE ITALY" (cont'd)

f. Use of Enemy Transport and Service Units. Enemy transport and service units will be used for the maintenance of the surrendered enemy forces regardless of whether they are being maintained from their own resources or from Allied depots. Maximum use of enemy animal transport will be made for this purpose in place of enemy motor transport units. The latter units will be used to assist in the movement of civil supplies in relief of Allied military transport employed on this task (see paragraph 15 c).

g. Disposal of Surrendered Enemy Material. Separate instructions will be issued on this subject.

17. PARTISANS. Policy regarding partisans is defined in AFHQ signal F 23918, dated 14 February 1945 to HQ 15th Army Group only. Instructions regarding their feeding, clothing, payment and hospitalization will be issued separately.

18. REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

a. Initially, refugees and displaced persons will be subject to a "standstill" order, to be issued through military channels by CG 15th Army Group.

b. In Phase I, Armies, in conjunction with their attached AMG organizations, and in Phase II, HQ Allied Commission, will be responsible for screening, registering and maintaining displaced persons.

c. Overall plans for the disposal of these persons will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission in conjunction with the military HQ concerned in matters affecting their movement within ITALY.

19. RUSSIAN CIVILIANS. Feeding, clothing and hospitalization of Russian civilians will be a military responsibility to be implemented in Phase I by Armies, and in Phase II by PRS and the District HQ concerned.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD-MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christensen
C. W. CHRISTENSEN
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

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"Occupation of NE ITALY"

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PAD & CD	87		
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Liaison	89 - 90		
Works	91 - 92		
S & T	93		
Surgeon	94		
Medical (B)	95		
Ord (A)	96		
Ord (B)	97		
REME	98		
Tn (B)	99		
DMRS	100		
Provost Marshal General (A)	101		
Provost Marshal (B)	102		
Judge Advocate	103		
DJAG (B)	104		

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

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 : Initials: :
 : 30 January 1945 :
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AG 323/061 GDS-0

30 January 1945

SUBJECT: Occupation of NW Italy.

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777.
 Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394.
 General Officer Commanding, No. 2 District.

Paragraph 3, letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 25 January 1945, is rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

3. Definition. NW Italy is defined as the area for which Headquarters No. 2 District is to be responsible, viz:

- a. The Compartimento of LIGURIA.
 - b. The Compartimento of PIEMONTE.
 - c. The Provincia of VARESE)
 - d. The Provincia of COMO)
 - e. The Provincia of MILANO) In the Compartimento of LOMBARDIA
 - f. The Provincia of PAVIA)
 - g. The Provincia of PIACENZA)
- In the Compartimento of EMILIA
(this province may not initially be under No. 2 District).

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

Jack Carter
 JACK CARTER,
 Captain, AGO,
 West Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

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dtd 30 January 1945

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1. **ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND PLANNING**

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25 January 1945

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dtd 25 Jan 45, (cont'd)

5. Division of Administrative Responsibilities - Phase I.

a. Headquarters Fifth Army (British Increment), or such British Headquarters as may be nominated, will be responsible for the maintenance of British forces.

b. Headquarters Fifth Army, or such other headquarters as may be designated by Commanding General, 15th Army Group for the occupation of NW ITALY, will be responsible for:

- (1) Allied Military Government.
- (2) The initiation of civil relief measures.
- (3) The execution of the tasks assigned in accordance with paragraph 9 below.
- (4) Initiating the mobilization of civil resources in conjunction with Headquarters, Allied Commission.

c. During Phase I, Headquarters No 2 District will be placed under command Commanding General, 15th Army Group, who will insure that it is given the facilities for reconnaissance and the establishment of its headquarters in preparation for its subsequent assumption of responsibilities in Phase II (see paragraph 6 below).

6. Division of Administrative Responsibilities - Phase II.

a. Headquarters No 2 District under direct command of this headquarters will be responsible for:

- (1) The maintenance of British forces in NW ITALY.
- (2) The execution of the tasks assigned in accordance with paragraph 9 below.
- (3) The coordination of those matters which are being undertaken jointly by the military and civil authorities.

b. Headquarters, Peninsular Base Section, or such other headquarters as may be directed by Commanding General, MTOUSA, will be responsible for the maintenance of United States forces.

c. Headquarters, Allied Commission will be responsible for:

- (1) Allied Military Government.
- (2) The continuation of civil relief measures.
- (3) The development and operation of essential communications, industries and public utilities which are not essential to the military (see paragraph 10 below).

SECRET

SECRETRef, LHM, 22 325/000 GHS-0,
dtd 25 Jan 45, (cont'd)

7. Naval Assistance. Flag Officer, Northern Area has been made responsible for mine clearing and salvage at GENOA to enable a target figure of 8,000 tons per day to be handled through the port.

8. Military Assistance to be Afforded by This Headquarters.

a. This headquarters will be responsible, through the appropriate subordinate military headquarters, for affording the military assistance shown below. This responsibility will be implemented by the provision of military personnel and resources or by the organization, under military supervision, of civilian labor and resources. It is the intention to withdraw gradually most of the military personnel and resources as soon as civil labor and resources can be mobilized to take over and the initial tasks of the military detailed below have been completed.

b. This headquarters will be responsible for:

(1) Port of GENOA.

(a) Repair of the port to enable 8,000 tons a day to be discharged and cleared.

(b) Discharging and clearing 2,000 tons daily which will include the maintenance of the military forces in NW ITALY.

(c) Controlling and coordinating all discharge and clearance up to a total of 8,000 tons daily.

(2) Railways.

(a) Repair of the following railways:

BOLOGNA - ALESSANDRIA

ALESSANDRIA - TURIN

The easiest route to MILAN

GENOA - ALESSANDRIA

(b) The priority in which the railways will be restored is that given above, contingent on the state of demolition found to have been carried out by the enemy when the area has been entered.

(3) Pipeline and Bulk Storage.

(a) The military supervision of,

(b) Supply of materials for, and

2533

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SECRET
Ref: [REDACTED], 12-32970-1 (053-0),
dat 25 Jan 45, (cont'd)

(c) Construction and operation of bulk storage facilities at GENOA and one (1) 4-inch pipeline from GENOA to ALESSANDRIA.

(4) Roads. Repair of the following roads:

(a) GENOA - ALESSANDRIA

(b) PIACENZA - ALESSANDRIA - TURIN

(c) PIACENZA - MILAN

(Subject to physical reconnaissance priority for repair will be in the order given above.)

(5) Traffic Control. Traffic control on the main arteries of military supplies.

(6) Public Utilities. Coordination of the rehabilitation of electric power and water systems at GENOA and such other places as may be notified.

(7) Signal Communications. Coordination of the repair of the main State Cable routes.

(8) Training of Drivers. Training of Italian drivers for vehicles which will be under the control of Headquarters, Allied Commission for the delivery of civil supplies.

(9) Movement of Civil Supplies for Allied Commission by Road. Pending the development of GENOA, the delivery of civil supplies to a point NORTH of the present stockpiles. The location of the delivery point, and the quantity to be delivered will be contingent on the operational situation at the time NW ITALY is evacuated by the enemy. For planning purposes Headquarters, Allied Commission can assume that the military will deliver a daily tonnage of 500 tons at PARMA.

9. Implementation of AFHQ Responsibilities.

a. This headquarters will control direct, and will provide all resources necessary for, the execution of responsibilities under 8b (1), (2), (3) and (8). For local administration the units concerned will be placed under Headquarters Fifth Army in Phase I and of Headquarters No 2 District in Phase II.

b. Responsibilities under paragraph 8b (4), (5) and (6) are delegated to Headquarters Fifth Army during Phase I and Headquarters No 2 District during Phase II.

c. This headquarters will provide all resources necessary for carrying out the responsibility under paragraph 8b (9). Responsibility for the movement of the supplies at and forward of railhead will be delegated to Headquarters

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Ltr, AFHQ, 33 323/051 (PS-0),
dtd 25 Jan 45, (cont'd)

Fifth Army by this headquarters, who will place the resources necessary at the disposal of Headquarters Fifth Army for the purpose.

10. Responsibilities of Headquarters, Allied Commission. Headquarters, Allied Commission will be generally responsible for insuring that as the first consideration unrest and disease are prevented and as the second essential industry is rehabilitated and opened. Particular responsibilities are as follows:

a. Food. Headquarters, Allied Commission will be responsible for providing initially a minimum daily bread ration of 200 grams. The maximum use will be made of indigenous resources, only the minimum balance required being imported.

b. Provision of Civil Resources for Military Tasks set out in Paragraph 8 Above. Headquarters, Allied Commission will be responsible for the provision of civilian manpower and materials to assist the military in the execution of the tasks detailed in paragraph 8 above.

c. Provision of Civil Resources for Commitments Which are not a Military Responsibility. Headquarters, Allied Commission will be responsible generally for the economic development and rehabilitation of NW ITALY, and the provision of civil resources for this purpose, within the limits of such policies as may be established by this headquarters. The following matters in particular will have priority, subject to the requirements under paragraph 10b above, in the allocation of civil resources:

(1) Provision, through Land Forces Sub Commission (SMIA), of drivers to operate vehicles under the control of Headquarters, Allied Commission; such drivers to be Italian military personnel.

(2) Mobilization of civil workshop facilities for the rehabilitation of Italian vehicles found in the area.

(3) Maintenance and repair of all vehicles under the control of Headquarters, Allied Commission, used for the transportation of civil supplies, on a sufficient scale to deal with the situation where all vehicles are working on a double shift basis.

(4) Mobilization of local engineer resources in labor and materials for reconstruction and repair of:

Bridges
Roads
Railways

2502

other than those set out in paragraph 8 above, work in connection with bridges and roads being coordinated by the Chief Engineer, Headquarters No 2 District and that in connection with railways by the Director, Military Railway Service, (Italy).

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 323/061 GDS-O,
 dtd 25 Jan 45, (cont'd)

(5) Provision of dock labor for handling port discharge tonnage in excess of that which is a military responsibility.

(6) Provision of labor and materials for rehabilitation of essential industries and public utilities which are not a military responsibility.

11. Planning.

a. Phase I. Headquarters 15th Army Group will be responsible for planning the military and civil commitment either direct in conjunction with Allied Military Government representatives of Headquarters, Allied Commission or by delegation through Headquarters Fifth Army in conjunction with Allied Military Government Fifth Army.

b. Phase II. Headquarters, Allied Commission, in conjunction with Headquarters No 2 District, will be responsible for planning this phase.

c. The various forms of assistance to be given by the military as outlined in paragraphs 8 and 9 above will be operative both during Phase I and Phase II. The planning in respect of this assistance is the responsibility of this headquarters. As it is not possible to insure close control of such detailed planning, or the initial implementation of the plan from this headquarters, this responsibility must be delegated. As Headquarters No 2 District will be finally responsible for the long term planning and execution of the tasks involved this responsibility is delegated to Headquarters No 2 District who will coordinate such planning on behalf of this headquarters.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenberry
 C. W. CHRISTENBERRY, Jr.
 Colonel, AGD,
 Adjutant General.

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Subject: - POLOONA.TOP SECRET.HQ AAF,
C.M.F.

2030/30/32.

31 July 44.

M.M.I.A.	
FILE REF	1
Date Recd	1/1/44

HQ, MAAP.
HQ, ACC.

1. Attached are notes on a conference held by the CAO, at which the policy in regard to the establishment of an Adv Base at POLOONA was outlined.
2. The first key plan for this Adv Base is now being prepared, and it is requested that you forward to this HQ as soon as possible full details on programs attached, for all accommodation, etc., which you will require in the POLOONA Area.


Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.Copy to: - MELA
Air Forces Sub-Commission, ACC.

(X)

2506

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MAIN HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

1012/4/Q1

Notes on CAO's Conference held on
22 Jul to discuss Advanced Base BOLOGNA.

Present:-

CAO	(presided)	DDST
DAG		Rep DNS
Col A		DDOS
DAG		DDMS
DAG (Prov)		DDlabour
Col Q		Ref Sec.
Col Q (AF)		
DW		

1. C.A.C. stated that it had been decided after discussion with C.G.S. to establish an Adv Base at BOLOGNA.

2. Reserves.

It was decided that the following scale of reserves would be held based on a total of eighteen divisions:-

1st stores	10,000 tons
Supp	15 days reserves + 10 days working margin.
Ord stores	(a) Vols 7 and 8 - 20 days reserve + 10 days working margin.
	(b) Vols 9 technical stores covering tyres, tracks, gun barrels and

at BOLCOMA.

2. Reserves.

It was decided that the following scale of reserves would be held based on a total of eighteen divisions:-

- | | |
|------------|---|
| 15. stores | 10,000 tons |
| Supps | 15 days reserves + 10 days working margin. |
| Ord stores | (a) Total 7 and 8 - 20 days reserve + 10 days working margin. |
| | (b) Total 9 technical stores covering tyres, trucks, gun barrels and heavy assemblies - 20 days reserve + 10 days working margin. |
| | (c) Controlled stores as ordered by Q(AB) and CSO. |
| | (d) Ordn - 15 days reserve + 10 days working margin. |
| | (e) Vehicles - it was considered that the 2000 '31' vehicles was the minimum number which should be held forward and that details should be examined by Q(AB) in conjunction with Ord. 'A' vans except and holding would remain at the Base as servicing facilities were required for Base workshops. |

POL in containers - 10 days reserves + 5 days working margin.

3. Use of L CHORR and ANCOM. It was decided that these two ports would be regarded as transit ports and that facilities would be required for the holding in transit of stores brought through the ports intended for BOLCOMA. Details were already being worked out in respect/...

2.

respect of LAMHORN but it was considered that the ARCONA layout, at present based on a holding of 30 days reserves and working margin for six days, should be adjusted to meet the new requirements. In doing this, regard will be paid to the role of ALCONA in the maintenance of POLICORPS and EIGHTH ARMY. It would be necessary to revise hospital accommodation, at present based on 3,000 beds, to meet a requirement of 4,500 only. An MAC would be required at LAMHORN and BOLOGNA.

4. Stores movement forward to BOLOGNA.

DEMG (Mev) outlined the movement capacity. On original information supplied by Q it was estimated that it would take some 80 days to accumulate the necessary holdings at BOLOGNA. As a result of decisions above regarding reserves which enable considerable reductions to be made, it was felt that this period could probably be reduced. Movement forward was dependent on rate of construction of the ARCONA/BOLOGNA and LAMHORN/BOLOGNA lines. It was unlikely that rail facilities on the central ALCONA and axis would go beyond FLORENCE in which case a substantial road lift would be inevitable. (Mev) agreed to examine lift forward by rail in conjunction with Q.

When possible direct handling from shipping to trains would be practised. It was considered however that transport action in respect of many items would be necessary.

Steps will be taken to see if prolonging of technical stores for ALCONA could be avoided. Action Q and Q(Mev).

necessary holdings at BOLONGA, as a result of decisions above regarding reserves which enable considerable reductions to be made, it was felt that this period would probably be reduced. Movement forward was dependent on rate of construction of the ANCON/BOLONGA and LAGORN/BOLONGA lines. It was initially thought that facilities in the central LAGORN area would be placed beyond FLORENCE in which case a substantial road lift would be inevitable. (Nov) agreed to examine lift forward by rail in conjunction with B.

Where possible direct handling from shipping to trains would be practised. It was considered however that transit action in respect of many items would be necessary.

Steps will be taken to see if preloading of technical stores for ANCON could be obtained. Action Q and Q(Nov).

5. Personnel.

Base depots in the LAGORN area and those projected for ANCON would remain as planned. CRU and transit camps would only be required in the BOLONGA area. Feasibility of lifting personnel by sea to LAGORN will be examined by Q(Nov).

6. Medical.

BOLONGA area would be developed as a Medical area.

7. Inland waterways.

Q(Nov) were to examine further the inland waterway system in the vicinity of FLORENCE which place might be suitable as part of the Adv Base, especially for engineer stores and other heavy lifts. Its use, however, was dependent on progress of operations owing to its close proximity to the River PO.

B./...

8. Adm units.

The role of ANCONA and LECHORN and the forward RHs as transit areas would necessitate additional adm units and a considerable increase above the ordinary Labour requirement. Services would examine their special requirements in this connection and report to Q.

9. Planning.

Q in conjunction with Q(Mov) would draw up instructions for Services incorporating the decisions in these minutes, which would enable them to assess the total tonnages required to be handled forward and the number and type of adm. units required to handle these. After consultation with Services, Q would approach A.F.H.Q. on the question of release of reserves with A.A.I. for the necessary stocking of the Adv Base.

27 Jul 44.

Distribution :-

$$\begin{array}{l} G(S, D.) \\ Q(A, E.) \\ Q(Mov). \\ R, E, \\ Works. \\ In (Pr). \end{array}$$

S. T.
Mod.
Ord.
R. E. M. E.
Pay.
V & R.

Labour.
Sal.
E. F. I.
Postal.
Plans.
File.
War Diary

~~Major-General,~~
Chief Administrative Officer.

Distribution :-

G(S.D.)
 Q(A.E.)
 Q(Mov).
 R.E.
 Works.
 Tn (Dr).

S.T.
 Med.
 Ord.
 R.E.M.E.
 Pay.
 V & R.

Labour.
 Sal.
 E.F.I.
 Postal.
 Plans.
 File.
 War Diary (2)

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Serial No.	UNIT		STRENGTH			STORAGE		
	Type of Unit	Unit nominated	Offrs	ORs	Vehicles 100 Vchs	Covered sq. ft.	Open sq. yds.	Road

APPENDIX "A" TO 2036/30/02
 DATED 30 JUL 44

G T H	S T O R A G E			TONNAGE	Labour.
Vehicles	Covered	Open	Road		Capacities for transient
M/C Vols	sq. ft.	sq. yds.			personnel, rfts, PWs etc.
					Patients

SUBJECT:- BOLAGNA

To:-	"A"	RETE
	Works	DC EMI
	Tn (Tr)	SAL
	ST	Postal
	Mod	Pay
	Ord	V & IG

Reference para 9 of "Note
reference Advanced Base BOLAGNA"

In order that plans may
are requested to give the informant
1 AUG 44.

Copy to:- G(SD)
Plans
G(Mov)
RE
Labour

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

LOG. PLANS SECTION

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 Auth: SAC
 Initials: *WMT*
 19 Mar 45
 Copy No. *30*

Log. P. 177

SUBJECT: - Administrative requirements in EMER in the event
 of a German surrender or withdrawal.

Reference Draft Appreciation, subject as above, Log. P. 177 dated 17 Feb.

1. Appreciation has been prepared in final form and is attached for information.
2. Appendix "B", "Requirements and availability of load-carrying transport in terms of GT and Truck Coys", is being issued separately on a restricted distribution.
3. The various points made on the draft Appreciation at the two meetings held at Hq 15 Army Group on Monday, 26 February 1945, have been included in the attached paper. Certain adjustments in the calculations, which have been suggested as a result of staff examination in the light of further information which has become available since the Appreciation was issued in draft, have also been included.

Ex. Com. Dist: Copy No. 26 - Ex. Com.
 27 - P. H. H. H.
 28 - E. C. W. S. C.
 29 - C. A. S. C.
 30 - LAND FORCES
 31 - W. H. D. H. H. H.
 32 - N. ITALY PLANNING
 33 - EMER. REVIEW

Robert B. Robertson
 for B. H. ROBERTSON,
 Lieutenant-General,
 Chief Administrative Officer.

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ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. Plans Section

Log. P. 177

19 Mar 45

SUBJECT:- Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event
of a German surrender or withdrawal

1. Appreciation on "Administrative requirements in ITALY in the event
of a German surrender or withdrawal", prepared in final form, is
attached.

[Signature]
W. DONAHUE,
Colonel, GSC,
G-4 Plans.

[Signature]
A.M. MILNE,
Colonel,
Log. Plans.

A.M. Milne

A.M. MILNE,
Colonel,
Lo3. Plans.

2505

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A.S. Donahue

A.S. DONAHUE,
Colonel, GSC,
G-4 Plans.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. Plans Section

Log. P. 177

19 March, 1945

FINAL

APPRECIATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
IN EVENT OF A GERMAN SURRENDER
OR WITHDRAWAL

OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND

1.
 - a. Russian operations, possibly severing KESSELING's maintenance communications, or a crumbling of German resistance on the Eastern and Western Fronts, may result in either of the following situations arising in this theatre in the near future :
 - i. KESSELING may surrender on his present line or attempt to withdraw his forces into AUSTRIA before surrendering, or
 - ii. KESSELING may attempt to keep his forces in the field on any one of a number of prepared positions SOUTH of the Austrian frontier.

The German Navy and Air Force may not surrender at the same time as the German Army.

- b. The situation in the event of KESSELING surrendering at or near his present line is, from the administrative standpoint, the most urgent problem which might arise, though in certain circumstances it may not be the worst case. In general terms, however, the broad administrative policy to meet the situation will cover the action required in other possible situations. This appreciation, therefore, only considers in detail the situation in the event of KESSELING surrendering at or near his present line.

2. Briefly, the operational plan to meet the situation in para 1 b. above

The German Navy and Air Force may not surrender at the same time as the German Army.

b. The situation in the event of KESSELING surrendering at or near his present line is, from the administrative standpoint, the most urgent problem which might arise, though in certain circumstances it may not be the worst case. In general terms, however, the broad administrative policy to meet the situation will cover the action required in other possible situations. This Appreciation, therefore, only considers in detail the situation in the event of KESSELING surrendering at or near his present line.

2. Briefly, the operational plan to meet the situation in para 1 b. above is likely to be:

a. To place Allied formations astride the German L of C between the German forces and the Austrian frontier so as to prevent any German withdrawal into AUSTRIA.

b. To occupy NE and NW ITALY and clear these areas of enemy forces ²⁵⁴

c. To move British and US occupational forces into AUSTRIA as soon as administrative considerations allow.

For political and operational reasons it is essential that AUSTRIA be occupied as early as possible, the operational requirement, which has been accepted for planning purposes, being the establishment of a substantial portion of the occupational forces in AUSTRIA not later than 4 - 6 weeks after surrender by German forces in ITALY takes place.

OBJECT OF APPRECIATION

3. The object of this Appreciation is to consider the administrative action required to meet the situation outlined in para 1 b. above insofar as it affects present German Occupied ITALY.

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MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS

4. The principal administrative tasks will be :
 - a. Maintenance of 15 Army Group and supporting Air Forces.
 - b. Disarmament and maintenance of surrendered German Navy, Army and Air Forces.
 - c. Establishment of a L of C or Is of C for the maintenance of Forces in AUSTRIA.
 - d. Expedition of Allied Military Government in present German Occupied ITALY.
 - e. Provision and distribution of supplies for the civil population in German Occupied ITALY.

DEMOLITIONS, OBSTACLES AND SEA MINESFIELDS

5. The German L of C into AUSTRIA and communications within present German Occupation ITALY have already been extensively damaged as a result of Allied bombing. If the Germans have not withdrawn from ITALY before surrendering it is unlikely that a systematic program of demolitions will be carried out but instances of deliberate destruction by fanatics and die-hard are to be expected. If the Germans withdraw before surrendering, demolitions in NORTH ITALY are likely to be considerable, especially if they are able to withdraw without close pursuit.

6. The Northern ATLANTIC Sea and the LIGURIAN Sea are heavily mined and clearance of sea routes will be a formidable naval commitment. In current conditions, provided the German Navy declares the location of minefields and be able routes leading through them, the time required to open sea routes for shipping will be considerably shortened.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP

General

5. The German in of 6 late ALGERIA and communications within present Germany Occupied ITALY have already been extensively damaged as a result of Allied bombing. If the Germans have not withdrawn from ITALY before surrendering it is unlikely that a systematic programme of demolitions will be carried out but instances of deliberate destruction by fanatics and die-hards are to be expected. If the Germans withdraw before surrendering, demolitions in NORTH ITALY are likely to be considerable, especially if they are able to withdraw without close pursuit.

6. The Northern ADRIATIC Sea and the LIGURIAN Sea are heavily mined and clearance of sea routes will be a formidable naval commitment. In surrender conditions, provided the German Navy declare the location of minefields and be able to lead routes leading through them, the time required to open sea routes for shipping will be considerably shortened.

MAINTENANCE ON US ARMY GROUP

7. General

- a. Initially, the maintenance of Fifth and Eighth Armies and supporting Air Force forward of railheads existing at the time of enemy surrender or withdrawal, will have to be by road.
- b. Estimated daily maintenance requirements of that portion of a divisional area forward of railhead, in the event of an enemy surrender or withdrawal, are set out at Appendix "A", para 4.
- c. The operational plan for the occupation of NORTH ITALY, which has been assumed in this paper, is as follows:

Phase I

Three divisions moving to the VERONA area and up to the Austrian frontier on the TRIESTE-MILANO axis.

Phase II

Movement of the surrendered German forces by US and British operations not required for the other phases of this plan.

Phase III

Our divisions moving to NE ITALY.

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- 3 -

PHASE IV

Three divisions moving to NW ITALY.

The above plan is given in terms of equivalent divisions. Actual composition of forces, and nationality of divisions for each of the above Phases, will depend on the plan made by CG 15 Army Group.

- d. Phase I will be carried out before the other Phases. Phase II will take place some time to complete and will be continuing during Phases III and IV. It is probable that part of the occupational forces will be established in AUSTRIA before these Phases have been completed.

8. Administrative Factors

The time required to open ports and restore railway communications will result in a long tail of C in the initial stages of this plan. While administrative resources of service units generally will be strained to meet the above operational plan, the availability of load carrying transport is likely to be the principal administrative limitation.

9. Transport required by HQ 15 Army Group to meet commitments in ITALY.

- a. Transport requirements have been estimated on the following assumptions :-

- i. US railheads are in the PRATO-FLORENCE area.
 - ii. US airheads are in the RADICOSA area.
 - iii. British railheads and airheads are in the FORLI - BOLOGNA area.
- b. Details of load totals of requirements and availability of transport units are shown in Appendix "B".

- c. Summary of position is as follows : (all figures in equivalent 2¹/₂ ton Truck Coys and 3 ton GF Coys).

US Truck Coys Br AF Coys

- i. Requirement to meet Phases I & IV simultaneously

69

37

iii. Availability of Truck Coys and

2. Transport required by HQ 1st Army Group to meet commitments in ITALY.

a. Transport requirements have been estimated on the following assumptions :-

- i. US railheads are in the PRATO-FLORENCE area.
- ii. US airheads are in the ADIGOSIA area.
- iii. British railheads and pipeheads are in the FORLI - BOLOGNA area.

b. Detailed calculations of requirements and availability of transport units are shown in Appendix "B".

c. Summary of position is as follows : (all figures in equivalent 2 1/2 ton Truck Coys and 3 ton GT Coys).

	US Truck Coys	Br GT Coys
i. Requirement to meet Phases I to IV simultaneously	69	37
ii. Availability of Truck Coys and GT Coys in surrender conditions to support formations engaged in Phases I to IV	72	40
iii. Balance of Truck Coys and GT Coys	10	3

d. The balance of 10 Truck Coys and 3 GT Coys as shown in sub-para c.iii above might be employed initially to assist in the movement of civil supplies and later to maintain the occupational forces in AUSTRIA.

e. The sources from which the transport shown in sub-para c.ii above might come should be considered in the light of the theatre distribution of transport at the time, but, in the case of GT Coys the following would be the means of its provision :-

- i. Redirection of GT Coys now with Armies.
- ii. Redirection of 2nd and 3rd line transport of formations, not engaged in Phases I to IV.

TOP SECRET

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- 4 -

iii. Re-allocation of Artillery Fls.

iv. Units in transport allocated in the L of C to docks, depots, etc, base maintenance and miscellaneous details.

f. In order that a plan may be prepared which could be put into operation without delay, a review of the sources from which the required US and British transport is to be drawn should be made.

g. Less transport is likely to be available under withdrawal conditions to support formations following up an enemy withdrawal. On the other hand, the occupation of NORTH ITALY is likely to be slower under withdrawal than under surrender conditions.

RESEMBLING'S FORCES

10. Summary of estimated strength of RESEMBLING'S forces and considerations affecting their surrender and disarmament are given in Appendix "C".

11. Administration of RESEMBLING'S Forces

1. It is the Allied intention that RESEMBLING'S forces should surrender themselves. The object of 15 Army Group should therefore be to:

- i. prevent the disintegration of enemy units and formations.
- ii. reform into organised bodies such units as have disintegrated in the course of surrender.

iii. prevent the enemy from destroying his antitank and supplies.

2. RESEMBLING'S forces should be concentrated in areas which will give least opportunity for escape to the NORTH, where they will have some degree of cover, can be easily maintained, and where they can be put to useful work in relief of Allied administrative resources. The area between the River PO and Highway 9 is particularly suitable for these requirements, and German divisions and auxiliary troops surrendering in the general vicinity of the PO and SOUTH

It is the Allied intention that REISELBERG's forces should surrender themselves. The object of 15 Army Group should then be:

- i. prevent the disintegration of enemy units and formations.
- ii. reform into or unified bodies such units as have disintegrated in the course of surrender.
- iii. prevent the enemy from destroying his materials and supplies.

REISELBERG's forces should be concentrated in areas which will give him the opportunity for escape to the NORTH, where they will have some degree of cover, can be easily maintained, and where they can be put to useful work in relief of Allied administrative resources. The area between the River RO and Highway 9 largely meets these requirements, and German Divisions and auxiliary troops surrendering in the general vicinity of the RO and SOUTH of the river should be concentrated there. Divisions in NE and J. MAIN initially should be concentrated in those parts, but the intention should be to move these formations SOUTH of the RO as soon as circumstances allow. The area between the RO and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route and major towns in the area) should therefore be the main concentration area for REISELBERG's forces. As the coastal belt to a depth of 12 miles from the EAST coast is highly marginal, this part of the area should not be used.

12.

German Forces

While REISELBERG's forces may be technically PW after their surrender it is not possible for them to be held in PW cages. It should be the policy to hold under observation the major part of REISELBERG's forces in the main concentration area, keeping the remainder in their units and formation organizations under their own control.

Such main units as are required for the maintenance and administration of REISELBERG's forces, should, subject to sub-para c. below, be kept intact. Maintenance requirements of the German forces may necessitate the employment of some of these units outside the main concentration area.

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- a. Recalcitrant enemy personnel should be segregated from the remainder of the enemy forces and should be moved to PW cages SOUTH of the ARTHURINES. For this purpose it may be necessary to establish enclosures in or near the main concentration area for the temporary holding of these personnel prior to their removal to cages SOUTH of the ARTHURINES. The establishment of these transit PW enclosures within or near the main concentration area should be an Army responsibility, the maximum use being made of German labour and materials.

4. Summary of PW camp accommodation in ITALY is given at Appendix "D".

5. PW may be employed in construction and repair subject to the following conditions :-

i. That they work under supervision.

ii. That they are not employed on any work prohibited by Articles 9, 31 and 32 of the GENEVA Convention.

15. Maintenance.

- a. Supplies

i. Until they are exhausted, existing enemy stocks of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be used.

ii. When supplies are no longer available from enemy sources, the provision of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be an Allied responsibility. This estimated commitment, which is given in detail at para 3 of Appendix "A" should be an equal British and US responsibility. The German Army should draw the necessary supplies from Allied depots using their own transport.

- b. Tentage and Accommodation Stores

While the German Army has no appreciable quantity of tentage they are equipped with bivouacs/shelter halves and groundsheet. Material necessary to establish their own sanitation and sanitary facilities etc should be available in their own dumps. In

Maintenancea. Supplies

- i. Until they are exhausted, existing enemy stocks of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be used.
- ii. When supplies are no longer available from enemy sources, the provision of food, medical stores, clothing etc should be an Allied responsibility. This estimated commitment, which is given in detail at para 3 of Appendix "A" should be an equal British and US responsibility. The German Army should draw the necessary supplies from Allied depots using their own transport.

b. Tentage and Accommodation Stores

While the German Army has no appreciable quantity of tentage they are equipped with bivouacs/sidder halves and groundcloths. Material is necessary to establish their own solution and sanitary facilities etc should be available in their own dumps. In respect of these materials it should be the policy to make use of the German Army's resources. Establishments of these facilities should be carried out under Allied supervision to ensure economical use of materials.

c. Administrative Units

German service units required for the maintenance of RESERVEING forces should continue to be employed for this purpose. As it is intended to replace Allied military transport employed on the movement of civil supplies by German motor transport, the maximum use should be made of animal transport for the maintenance of RESERVEING's forces. Any animals not required for this purpose should be taken over and used to meet Allied military and civil requirements.

ADMINISTRATIVE OF IN ON D INTO AUSTRALIAGeneral

Paragraph 9 above it will be noted that sufficient transport is not likely to be available to maintain the full forces in AUSTRALIA until

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- a. Railroads and bulk petrol pipelines can be established considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than those set out at para 9 above, r
 - b. A port has been opened considerably nearer to AUSTRIA than existing railheads through which maintenance requirements for forces in AUSTRIA can be imported.
15. Is of C for Forces in AUSTRIA
- a. Choice of L of C for the occupational forces in AUSTRIA will depend on the degree of damage to rail and road communications and also, in respect of NE ITALY, on the political situation in VENETIA GIULIA. It is essential, therefore, that planning of the administrative requirements in ITALY to support the occupational forces should be flexible. If these considerations allow it is intended to develop Is of C as follows:

The US intent to use LEGHORN as the port through which the maintenance requirements for their forces in AUSTRIA will be imported. They will be moved from that port by rail and road via POLIGNA and the BRESCIA route. This is a convenient L of C but will be very expensive in transport until the BRESCIA rail route has been opened. Later, US forces in AUSTRIA may be maintained from the US L of C running through SOUTH GERMANY.
 - b. In view of the longer distance to the British zone by the BRESCIA route, the British intend to use TRIESTE as the main port for the import of maintenance supplies for the British occupational forces and to move supplies Northwards from this port into AUSTRIA by the latest assigned L of C. TRIESTE will not be required for the import of military tonnage unless political considerations should preclude the use of TRIESTE in which case it will be necessary to develop TRIESTE as a military port.

- a. TRIESTE should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled. An HQ Eighth Army will be responsible for the occupation of VENETIA GIULIA, and, later, for the British zone in AUSTRIA, initially the port should be the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, its opening and development being a first priority task. This responsibility should be subject to the following

the bottom opened. Later, US forces in AUSTRIA may be maintained from the US L of C running through SOUTH GERMANY.

In view of the longer distance to the British zone by the BRENNER route, the British intend to use TRIESTE as the main port for the import of maintenance supplies for the British occupational forces and to move supplies Northwards from this port into AUSTRIA by the shortest detour of C. VENICE will not be required for the import of military tonnage unless political considerations should preclude the use of TRIESTE in which case it will be necessary to develop VENICE as a military port.

TRIESTE should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled. As HQ Eighth Army will be responsible for the occupation of VENETIA, GALLI, and, later, for the British zone in AUSTRIA, initially the port should be the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, its coming and development being a first priority task. This responsibility should be subject to the following reservations:

i. Allocation of tonnage imported through TRIESTE as between HQ Eighth Army and other holders, whose maintenance was not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army, should be made by JAHQ.

ii. The Key Plan for the port should be prepared by JAHQ in conjunction with HQ Eighth Army, POWELL and US Base Section be concerned. The Chairman of the Siting Board, on which these authorities would be represented, should be provided by JAHQ.

iii. Should US tonnage require to be imported through TRIESTE, they will be handled by the British, the US giving countervailing assistance by relieving British resources, including transport, employed at a port elsewhere in ITALY.

At Appendix "A", para 5, it is estimated that 6,000 tons per day is likely to be the maximum tonnage required to be handled through TRIESTE at any one time.

TRIESTE should be developed more as a transit port than an advanced base, installations being kept to a minimum both as regards number and size. Such advanced base installations as may be required for the support of the British occupational zone and which need not be situated near the port, should be in AUSTRIA.

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ARMED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY

16. a. Requirements with Fifth and Eighth Armies will advance with the allies as in normal practice. The method by which military government will be imposed in VENEZIA GIULIA is still under consideration.
- b. Army rear boundaries are likely to be moved forward rapidly in the event of a German surrender or withdrawal. Regional Hqs of the Allied Commission, should, therefore, plan with District Hqs and PEs in respect of the areas of occupation behind Army boundaries.

PROVISION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SUPPLIES IN NORTH ITALY

17. Requirements

- a. Civil requirements for NORTH ITALY are summarized at Appendix "A", para. 2.
- b. Requirements by month will depend on the speed at which NORTH ITALY is secured and the facilities available for distribution. The following is a summary, produced as a guide only, of the estimated civil supply tonnage requirements compiled on the basis of assumptions:

i. The full occupation of NORTH ITALY takes place progressively over a period of two months.

ii. Civil supply items are provided from imported sources to enable an impact ration of 100 grams to be supplied in the first month, rising to 200 grams in the second and 300 grams in the third month.

iii. Civil, IOL and reconstruction supplies are phased in, in accordance with the distribution facilities.

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>First Month</u>	<u>Second Month</u>	<u>Third Month</u>
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1. Requirements by means will depend on the speed at which NORTH ITALY is occupied and the facilities available for distribution. The following is a survey, produced as a guide only, of the estimated civil supply tonnage requirements compiled on the following assumptions:

i. Full occupation of NORTH ITALY takes place progressively over a period of two months.

ii. Civil supply items are provided from imported sources to enable an impact ration of 100 grams to be supplied in the first month, rising to 200 grams in the second and 300 grams in the third month.

iii. Coal, POL and reconstruction supplies are phased in, in accordance with the distribution facilities.

Serial	Item	First Month	Second Month	Third Month
1	Civil Supplies	1,600 tpd	3,400 tpd	5,650 tpd
2	Coal	-	1,000 tpd	4,100 tpd
3	Packed POL	400 tpd	750 tpd	750 tpd
4	Reconstruction Supplies	-	-	250 tpd
5	TOTAL	2,000 tpd	5,150 tpd	10,750 tpd

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9. Breakdown between NW ITALY and the remainder of NORTH ITALY is outlined to be as follows:-

	First Month	Second Month	Third Month
NW ITALY	1,150 tpd	3,200 tpd	7,600 tpd
Remainder of NORTH ITALY	850 tpd	1,950 tpd	3,150 tpd
TOTAL	2,000 tpd	5,150 tpd	10,750 tpd

10. Requirements as shown above may be reduced if surrender occurs after July when the harvest will be available.

Distribution of Civil Supplies

General

The rate of acceptance of civil supplies will be governed by

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the possibility of distribution. The problem of internal distribution should be eased after July when the harvest will be available, and transport will not be required to the same extent on long hauls to main centres of distribution.

b. Military Assistance

It is considered that the following military assistance should be given to HQ Allied Commission for the distribution of civilian supplies :-

- i. 500 tons at FADUA } This has already been accepted as a British military commitment.
- ii. 400 tons at VERONA } These should be US and British commitments respectively and would require 10 US Truck Coys and 3 British GT Coys - shown to be available in para 5.
- iii. 350 tons at FADUA }

Since the transport and truck coys would be required for the movement of military supplies when AUSTRIA is occupied, this assistance should only be assured to be available for a period not exceeding one month.

c. Other Transport

The following non-military transport might be available to assist in distribution :

- i. Local indigenous vehicles which it is estimated will be sufficient only to distribute imported supplies from provincial areas to outlying areas, and for the coverage of local produce.
- ii. Transport available at the time from HQ Allied Commission resources, (probably only a small amount).
- iii. 1,700 trucks on order from WASHINGTON estimated to be available in mid-April and the remainder by late May.

C. Other Transport

The following non-military transport might be available to assist in distribution:

- i. Local indigenous vehicles which it is estimated will be sufficient only to distribute imported supplies from provincial centers to outlying areas, and for the carriage of local produce.
- ii. Transport available at the time from HQ Allied Commission resources, (probably only a small amount).
- iii. 1,700 trucks on order from WASHINGTON estimated to be available in May / mid-April and the remainder by late May.
- iv. 2,000 trucks on order from WASHINGTON due to arrive between May and late July.
- v. Captured enemy transport. (After allowing for the requirement for the maintenance of the surrendered enemy, some 5,000 vehicles might be available, of which about 2,000, operated by Germanized transport companies under Allied supervision, would be needed to release the military vehicles mentioned in para. B. above.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PARTISANS AND REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS

Partisans

There are estimated to be about 100,000 Italian partisans who have been operating in North Italy in support of the Allies. It is SACRED's policy to treat these partisans generously when they are disbanded. They will be concentrated in a special area where they will be screened, disarmed and found employment. While they are in collecting centres, the partisans will be paid, clothed, fed and given medical treatment. HQ Fifth and Eighth Armies in conjunction with their attached HQs, will be responsible for this commitment in respect of partisans located within the Army areas. HQ Allied Commission will be similarly responsible in respect of partisans located behind Army rear boundaries. Ration and clothing scales and sources of provision will be notified by A.S. It is anticipated that partisans may

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be held in collecting centres for periods of up to three months, but it will be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission to find them employment as soon as possible, either in the Italian Army or as labour to assist the military, or in Italian industry and agriculture. In dealing with patriot forces, the provisions in this HQ signal F 26918 dated 14 May 1945 will apply.

20. Refugees and Displaced Persons

These persons, with the exception of Russians, are the responsibility of the Allied Commission for all purposes. Russians will be a military responsibility. Initially these persons should be subject to the "Stand Still" order, issued through military channels, for a minimum period of thirty days. In particular, responsibility for screening and registration should be that of HQ Allied Commission and HQ Staff's attached to HQs Fifth and Eighth Armies in conjunction with G-2. The subsequent movement of refugees and displaced persons should be the responsibility of HQ Allied Commission as part of the overall plan in respect of these persons, movement requirements being co-ordinated with the military authorities concerned.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA (See Appendix "E")

21.

- a. Instructions have already been issued regarding the area of responsibility of HQ 2 District in May 1945. It is considered that, by a later stage, on the assumption of responsibility by HQs Fourth, Fifth Army, the Eastern boundary of HQ 2 District should be extended so that the whole of the Congrativno of LOZARICA (except the Province of PLAVOVO) is included in the territory of HQ 2 District, since such an arrangement would make the military and civil boundaries as nearly coincident as possible. In these circumstances the Province of PLAVOVO might be included in HQ 2 District's area.

b.

As it is intended that US forces in AUSTRIA will be maintained from a corridor of the BELTHER route, the US will require a corridor from BOLDOVA running NORTH to the BELTHER. US should gradually assume responsibility for this corridor as the rear boundary of Fifth Army moves northwards.

- c. The present area of HQ 1 District's responsibility should be extended northwards to the BELTHER.

Instructions have already been issued regarding the area of responsibility of HQ 2 District in NW ITALY. It is considered that, at a later stage, on the assumption of responsibility by FES from HQ Fifth Army, the Eastern boundary of HQ 2 District should be extended so that the whole of the Compartimento of IONBARDIA (except the Province of MANTOVA) is included in the territory of HQ 2 District, since such an arrangement would make the military and civil boundaries as nearly coincident as possible. In those circumstances the province of VERONA might be included in HQ 2 District's area.

As it is intended that US forces in AUSTRIA will be maintained from RECHEN by the BERLIN route, the US will require a corridor from BOLOSHA running NORTH to the RECHEN. FES should gradually assume responsibility for this corridor as the rear boundary of Fifth Army moves Northwards.

The present area of HQ 1 District's responsibility should be extended Northwards to follow the rear boundary of Eighth Army. HQ Eighth Army, with an Area HQ under command, should, however, remain responsible initially for VERONA AREA.

The present area of HQ 2 District's responsibility will be taken over by HQs 1 and 3 Districts as defined in para 15 of JFHQ letter AG 091.1/1/005 GCI-C dated 3 Jan 45.

The recommended layout to conform with the principles set out in the sub-para 2 to 4 above is given in Appendix "E" attached.

EMPLOYMENT OF HQs AND COMMUNICATIONS

22. Ports

Main ports in NORTH ITALY are likely to be used for the following purposes. They should be developed as a military and civil responsibility as shown below.

Port

Traffic

Genoa

Largely for the import of civil supplies and of a small military tonnage for the occupational troops in NW ITALY

Opening, operation and development

As defined in JFHQ letter AG 323/061 GDS-C dated 25 Jan 45.

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<u>Port</u>	<u>Traffic</u>	<u>Opening, operation and development</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
TRINIDAD	Military port for the maintenance of forces in VENEZUELA and BOLIVIA and for the import of civil supplies for PE PERU and BOLIVIA. It is also required for the import of civil supplies for GUAYMALA.	Military responsibility (see para 15 d. above)	Responsibility HQ Allied Commission
VENICE	Import of civil supplies and possibly bulk petrol		Civil responsibility
PISE	Not required for military purposes; when opened would be used for the import of civil supplies.		

b. Tonnage requirements

It is estimated that the following approximate tonnages will have to be imported through military controlled ports:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civil</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
TRINIDAD	3,000 tpd	3,000 tpd	6,000 tpd	Breakdown of tonnage is given in Appendix "A".
GENOA	1,000 " Up to 7,000 "	3,000 "		Only 2,000 tpd discharged and cleared as a military responsibility.

c. Minesweeping and Naval Salvage

The naval estimate of the time required to open the main ports in NORTH ITALY is as follows:

it is estimated that the following approximate tonnages will have to be reported through military controlled ports:

Port	Military	Civil	Total	Remarks
TRIESTE	3,000 tpd	3,000 tpd	6,000 tpd	Breakdown of tonnage is given in Appendix "A".
GENOA	1,000 " up to 7,000 "	8,000 "		Only 2,000 tpd discharged and cleared as a military responsibility.

2. Minesweeping and Naval Salvage

The naval estimate of the time required to open the main ports in NORTH ITALY is as follows:

Port	Time Required	Made up by
TRIESTE	6 - 8 weeks or 10 - 12 weeks	4 - 6 weeks minesweeping via Istrian coast, 2 weeks salvage work. 8 - 10 weeks minesweeping if enemy occupation of ISTRIA forces us to sweep the longer and more heavily mined route via VENICE.
GENOA	6 weeks	4 weeks minesweeping. 2 weeks salvage work to penetrate the block-ships.
VENICE	10 - 15 weeks	6 - 8 weeks minesweeping, perhaps 4 - 6 weeks salvage work and dredging.

In the time required for minesweeping and naval salvage, units with equipment for port clearance and repairs should have carried out initial works on the quays, except in the case of GENOA where road demolitions may necessitate bringing repair units and equipment in by sea. Naval minesweeping and salvage resources are available to enable the ports of TRIESTE and GENOA to be opened.

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similarly. The port of VENICE cannot be opened at the same time without considerably reducing the above findings. Naval port parties are, however, available for TRIESTE, GENOA and VENICE.

1. Port Routine

TRIESTE and GENOA contain many deep-water berths and if systematic construction of these ports has not been carried out, the port requires units available should be sufficient to repair the facilities required at these ports. There are not likely to be any other units available to repair VENICE until such units can be obtained from TRIESTE or GENOA.

2. Transportation and Transport Units

There should be sufficient British Docke Operating Coys and US Port Operations, allowing for civil stevedore labour now employed and estimated to be available, to handle military commitments at Italian ports. It is unlikely that any transportation units will be available which could be given to HQ Allied Commission to assist in the operation of VENICE. G3 and Truck Coys for port clearance are allowed for in Appendix "B".

3. Lighthouse

About 6,000 tpd of lightering has been earmarked on the East coast for NORTH ATLANTIC ports. This will meet the requirements at TRIESTE (not likely to be more than 2,000 - 3,000 tpd) and the balance will be available for VENICE, where initially, ships for the port will be worked overboard. There is about 3,000 tpd of lightering for GENOA available on the WEST coast. The IPT Coys available in ITALY will be scarcely sufficient to meet require units and it will be necessary to train local civilians as quickly as possible at GENOA and VENICE to handle harbour craft.

4. Military Assistance to HQ Allied Commission

The assistance to be given to HQ Allied Commission for the

Italian ports. It is unlikely that any transportation units will be available which could be given to HQ Allied Commission to assist in the operation of VENICE. GT and Truck Coys for port clearance are allowed for in Annex "B".

2.

Lights

About 6,000 tpd of lighters has been earmarked on the EAST coast for NORTH ATLANTIC ports. This will meet the requirements at BREMEN (not likely to be more than 2,000 - 3,000 tpd) and the balance will be available for VENICE, where initially, ships for the first lot will be worked overseas. There is about 3,000 tpd of lighters for GPO, available on the WEST coast. The IUT Coys available in ITALY will be scarcely sufficient to meet requirements and it will be necessary to train local civilians as quickly as possible at GPO, and VENICE to handle harbour craft.

3.

Military assistance to HQ Allied Commission

The assistance to be given to HQ Allied Commission for the opening and operation of GPO is defined in AFHQ letter 335/AFHQ dated 25 Jan 1945. In respect to VENICE no military units are likely to be available to assist in opening and operation of the port and HQ Allied Commission should, therefore, rely on civilian personnel. The only assistance which could be provided from military sources would be certain personnel and assistance in the form of Movement Control and Engineer supervision.

4.

Diversion of Resources

It is possible that in the event of German withdrawal or surrender, German prisoners will continue to hold out in one or more of these main German ports. In such circumstances arrangements would have to be made to divert resources from one port to another.

25.

Roads

a. The priority of repair of roads will depend on :-

- i. The operational plan, and
- ii. The extent of demolitions.

b.

The presently planned Phases for the occupation of NORTH ITALY are set out in para 7 c. above. Subject to demolitions which may enable an alternative route to be repaired more quickly, as suggested, that route should be developed and responsibility for their repair allotted as follows :-

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- Priority 1 - Fifth Army Front to BOLOGNA - MODENA - VERONA
 Eighth Army Front to BOLOGNA - FERRARA - PADOA
- Priority 2 - VERONA - BRENTER
Priority 3 - Best route PADOA-UDINE-TRIESTE
- Priority 4 - MODENA - PLACENZA
Priority 5 - PADOA - MANTOVA - TREVISO
- Best route to MILAN
- Priority 6 - Locust damaged L of C from TRIESTE to AGENA.

- : Fifth Army/FBS
 : Eighth Army/
 1 District
 : Fifth Army/FBS
 : Eighth Army/
 1 District
 : Fifth Army/FBS
 / 2 District
 : Fifth Army/
 2 District
 : Fifth Army/
 2 District
 : Fifth Army/
 2 District
 : Fifth Army/
 2 District
 : Eighth Army

2. There will be enough bridging material to carry out the reconstruction of the above roads provided that only about 50% of the material is encountered. The policy governing the use of PW on roads is given in para 12.2. above.
3. Until all routes are open to BOLOGNA to handle the transport of communication material, transport by road across the ALPINES may be a bottleneck for Fifth Army and 2 District.

Railways

4. Enemy operations and damage done by Allied bombing especially to the repair of railways a long term project. Priorities for repair of railways should, therefore, be allotted with a view to:
- i. handling long term commitments, and
 - ii. handling transport for other tasks as quickly as possible.

on road map is given in para 12 c, above.

4. Until all routes are open to BOLOGNA to handle the transport of construction material, transport by road across the APENNINES may be a possibility for Fifth Army and 2 District.

2d. Railways

- a. Heavy demolitions and damage done by Allied bombing especially to the bridge on which the repair of railways a long term project. Immediate action for repair of railways should, therefore, be allotted with a view to:

- i. Handling long term commitments, and
 - ii. Releasing transport for other tasks as quickly as possible.
- b. Priorities for repair of railways are at present allotted as follows:

Priority 1 - LUXEMBOURG-TRARVO-BOLOGNA
Bologna line ANCONA-FANUZZA

Priority 2 - Best route to FERRARA

Priority 3 - OSTONIA-ANCONA

- c. In the event of NW ITALY being uncovered before the remainder of ITALY, priority for the repair of railways in NW ITALY, contingent on the extent of demolition, has been laid down as follows (Army letter AC 543/061 GDS-O dated 25 Jan 1945) :-

- i. BOLOGNA-ANCONA-FANUZZA
- ii. ANCONA-FANUZZA-TURIN
- iii. The easiest route to MILAN
- iv. ANCONA-FANUZZA

- d. In the event of a German surrender or withdrawal involving the

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uncovering of the state of NORTH ITALY priorities in sub-
b and c above should be adjusted, contingent on the extent of
developments, to conform with the following order of priority :-

- Priority 1. Single line FERRARA-BOLONGNA
- Priority 2. Completion of line PR NO-GREZZANO-BOLONGNA
- Priority 3. Single line BOLOGNA-PARMA
- Priority 4. Best route BOLOGNA-BRESCIA

There are construction units available to work on both priorities
1 and 2 above. It should also be possible to start working on
Priority 3 before these are completed. It is considered that
as the building of a 10 bridge will be a long term job, construction
units should be set to work on this task as early as possible.

If the development of the railway forward of TRIESTE is required
before the completion in sub-para d. above are completed, such
development would be a competing requirement for transportation
units.

Use of NORTH ITALY IRT SYSTEM

The system has generally fallen into a state of disrepair since
it is not suited to the main flow of enemy supply from NORTH to
SOUTH. The majority of serviceable craft have been withdrawn
either for overseas traffic or for use as pontoon crossings of
the Po in lieu of major bridges destroyed by Allied air attack.
Fallen bridges across black navigable channels at a number of
points. Iron gorges and bays have been withdrawn to operational
ports. Further damage may occur as a result of enemy intentions
to flood the PO Valley and destroy locks and dams. Extensive
mining may also be carried out by the enemy if he has not already
done so.

It is considered that sections of the IRT system might best be
used for distribution of local produce where serviceable craft
are available. Local threat

Use of NORTH ATLANTIC System

A. The system has generally fallen into a state of disrepair since it is not suited to the main flow of enemy supply from NORTH to SOUTH. The majority of serviceable craft have been withdrawn either for coastwise traffic or for use as pontoon crossings of the PO in lieu of major bridges destroyed by Allied air attack. Fallen bridges across block navigable channels at a number of points. Landings and tugs have been withdrawn to operational ports. Further damage may occur as a result of enemy intentions to flood the PO valley and destroy locks and dams. Extensive mining may also be carried out by the enemy if he has not already done so.

B. It is considered that sections of the IRT system might best be used for distribution of local produce where serviceable craft are few, in short navigable stretches of waterway. Local wheat produced from the SWANSEA area might be distributed to the MANTUA-FAIRFAX area. Enemy produce from the SWANSEA-FAIRFAX area might be distributed in the SWANSEA-FAIRFAX area. It would not be safe to use the IRT for use of inland waterways for movement of large tonnages of civil supplies over long distances.

C. It is unlikely that military craft can be introduced into the IRT system until after VENICE is opened, which may not be until 3 - 4 months after capture. Few military craft are in any way suitable to negotiate the inter-connecting canals and locks. No military units will be available. As it is recommended under para 2. above that the IRT system should be used for civil purposes, its development should be the responsibility of HQ British Command. Plans should be made to make the maximum use of this means of transportation.

Bulk PUL

D. Determination of Present Pipelines

1. The Army: The construction of the pipeline planned to follow directly away to the ARSENAL Gap should cease if no further occurs on the present line. The other British Army pipeline should be extended to BOLOGNA.

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11. Fifth Army: One of the Fifth Army pipelines should terminate at BOLOGNA, the other being extended as rapidly as possible to VERONA. The feasibility of the extension of the line beyond VERONA is still under examination. It might also be necessary to provide a third pipeline to BOLOGNA.

12. GENOA

Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at GENOA to meet military and civil requirements. One 4-inch pipeline will be provided from GENOA to ALESSANDRIA.

13. TRIESTE

Plans have been made to provide bulk facilities at TRIESTE on similar lines to those at GENOA to meet military and civil requirements except that construction work at TRIESTE will be undertaken by military personnel. This development can take place simultaneously with the development of the pipelines FORLIMONDI-BOLOGNA and RAVENNA-VERONA, and with the provision of bulk facilities at GENOA. No pipeline supplies, however, will be available to construct a pipeline NORTH into AUSTRIA from TRIESTE unless materials are recovered from the taking up of existing authorised constructions.

14. VENICE

VENICE has the largest bulk installations in the Northern Adriatic. The installations will be rehabilitated to supply civil requirements but should be a lower priority to projects A, B, and C. Above in the use of military resources. HQ Allied Commission should be responsible for the rehabilitation of these installations holding maximum use of civilian personnel and resources.

15. REORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES NECESSARY CONSEQUENT ON GERMAN SURRENDER

27. a. Allied administrative resources forward of railheads will be

FOR THE POLISH, POLISH, and POLISH, and with the provision of bulk facilities at GERMANY. No pipeline supplies, however, will be available to construct a pipeline NORTH into AUSTRIA from GERMANY unless materials are recovered from the taking up of existing authorized constructions.

1. VENICE

VENICE and the largest bulk installations in the Northern Adriatic. The installations will be rehabilitated to supply civil requirements but should be a lower priority to projects a, b, and c. above in the use of military resources. HQ Allied Commission should be responsible for the rehabilitation of these installations making maximum use of civilian personnel and resources.

RE-ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED FORCES NECESSARY CONSEQUENT ON GERMAN SURRENDER

27. a. Allied administrative resources forward of railroads will be strained to their utmost for some time after a German surrender. From an administrative point of view it is, therefore, essential that all unnecessary formations and units which can readily be moved should be withdrawn as soon as possible to areas near developed ports and railroads from which they can be used economically maintained or be used for any tasks to which they can be conveniently converted.

- b. Administrative units of formations not required for operational or occupational tasks and withdrawn to base and L of O areas might be used to assist in base and L of O work relieving AFHQ service troops so that the latter may augment these working with armies.

- c. The present organization of certain service units will be unsuitable for static tasks and consideration should be given to their re-organization to fit them for their new static functions.

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MAIN CONCLUSIONS

28. Maintenance of 15 Army Group (paras 7 - 9)

- a. Under surrender conditions it is considered that it will be possible to make available to Armies sufficient load-carrying transport to enable them to accept the surrender of KESSELING's Army and to undertake the occupation of NL and NW ITALY simultaneously.
- b. If enemy ground forces are moved into AUSTRIA before the port of TRIESTE is open, or the SUMMER rail route is partially restored, the increased transport commitment will limit the size of the forces which can be maintained in NE and NW ITALY until rail communications in NORTH ITALY have been developed.

29. Administration of KESSELING's forces (paras 10 - 13)

- a. KESSELING's forces should be made to administer themselves.
- b. They should be held under observation in the general area between the River Po and Highway 9 (exclusive of this route and major towns in the area). They should retain their formation and unit organizations. Only reinforcements should be moved to PW cages SOUTH of the APENNINES.
- c. The maximum use of German service units and administrative resources should be made.

30. Reestablishment of L of C into AUSTRIA (paras 14 - 15)

- a. Selection of Ls of C can only be provisional at this stage as planning must be flexible.
- b. Subject to E. above, the US Zone should be maintained by the SUMMER route, and the British Zone by the least damaged L of C running NORTH from the port of TRIESTE.
- c. TRIESTE should be British controlled and operated in respect of all transport, and initially made the responsibility of Eighth Army. This responsibility should be subject to certain specific

2. The maximum use of German service units and administrative resources should be made.

30. Re-establishment of L of C into AUSTRIA (paras 14 - 15)

1. Selection of Ls of C can only be provisional at this stage as planning must be flexible.
2. Subject to 1. above, the US Zone should be maintained by the BREMENER route, and the British Zone by the least damaged L of C running NORTH from the port of TRIESTE.
3. TRIESTE should be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnage handled, and initially under the responsibility of Eighth Army. The responsibility should be subject to certain specific reservations as given in para 15 d.
4. TRIESTE should be developed more as a transit port than as an advanced base, and should be capable of handling up to 6,000 tpd.

31. Provision and Distribution of Civil Supplies in NORTH ITALY (paras 27, 28)

Military assistance in respect of the movement of civil supplies should be given to HQ Allied Commission as follows :-

- a. 500 tpd to ROMA (British military responsibility)
- b. 400 tpd to ANCONA (US military responsibility)
- c. 350 tpd to MILAN (British military responsibility)

2) Allied Commission should plan on this assistance being available for one month only.

32. Static HQs (para 21)

1. The proposed area of HQ No. 1 District's responsibility should be extended North-Eastwards, following the rear boundary of Eighth Army, to the West on boundary of VENEZIA GIULIA. Initially HQ Eighth Army should remain responsible for VENEZIA GIULIA.

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- b. The area of responsibility of HQ No. 2 District in NE ITALY as given in previous instructions should be later extended Eastwards to include all the provinces of the Compartimenti of LOMBARDIA except that of MANTOVA. The provinces of PARMA should also be included in the responsibility of HQ No. 2 District.
- c. PPS should control the corridor on the axis of the BOLOGNA - BRESCIA route.

33. Development of Ports and Communications

a. Ports (see 22)

- i. TRIESTE should be a military port. VENICE should be used for civil supplies and should be operated by HQ Allied Commission.
- ii. There should be sufficient naval and military resources to open GENOA and TRIESTE simultaneously. No military assistance, other than certain organizational assistance, supervisory in nature, can be given to HQ Allied Commission to assist in the opening and operation of VENICE.

L. Roads (see 23)

Main priorities for repair, subject to conditions at the time, should be as given below.

Priority 1. BOLOGNA to VERONA and to PADUA

Priority 2. VERONA to BRESCIA

Priority 3. PADUA to TRIESTE and MODENA to PLACENZA

Priority 4. GENOA to ALESSANDRIA

Priority 5. PLACENZA to MILAN and the best route to MILAN

Priority 6. Least damaged route running NORTH from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA

b. Route (para 25)

Main priorities for repair, subject to conditions at the time, should be as given below.

- Priority 1. BOLOGNA to VERONA and to PAVIA.
- Priority 2. VERONA to the BRENNER.
- Priority 3. PAVIA to TRIESTE and MODENA to FLORENCE.
- Priority 4. GENOA to ALESSANDRIA.
- Priority 5. PIACENZA to TURIN and the best route to MILAN.
- Priority 6. Latest damaged route running NORTH from TRIESTE to AUSTRIA.

c. Railways (para 24)

In the event of surrender taking place in ITALY, present planned priorities for the repair of rail routes should be adjusted. Subject to conditions at the time, they should be as follows :-

- Priority 1. Single line PAVIA - BOLOGNA.
- Priority 2. Completion of line PRATO - GENOVA - BOLOGNA.
- Priority 3. Single line BOLOGNA - PAVIA.
- Priority 4. Best route BOLOGNA - BRENNER.

d. WT (para 25)

Reports of the condition of the WT system in NORTH ITALY make it unlikely that this method of transport will give any great assistance in early stages to the movement of supplies in NORTH ITALY. It should, however, be used to the maximum extent possible for the movement of civil supplies, and its development should be the responsibility of the Allied Commission.

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g. Bulk POL (para 26)

Present planned pipeline projects should be adjusted. One pipeline should follow Fifth Army to VERONA as rapidly as possible, and one of the 3d Army pipelines should be extended to BOLOGNA. Simultaneously with these pipeline developments, it should be possible to provide bulk facilities at TRIESTE and GENOA. The allocation of military resources for the rehabilitation of VERICE should be a lower priority than the above requirements. Rehabilitation of VERICE should be the responsibility of the Allied Commission, making use of civil personnel and resources.

3d.

Re-organization of Allied Forces necessary consequent on German Surrender (para 27)

1. Operational units not required in the forward areas should be withdrawn to base areas to facilitate their maintenance.
2. To meet the particular requirements arising from surrender conditions, the organization of certain units may have to be revised to fit them for static tasks.

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MAINTENANCE DATA

APPENDIX "A"
to LGS. P. 177
dated 19 Mar 45

1. ARMY

During the phase of operations involving the occupation of NORTH ITALY, the maintenance requirements of that portion of a div slice forward of RH are based on the following data :-

a. British

i. Strength :-

Personnel	25,000
Vehicles (incl M/cycles)	6,000

ii. Maintenance :-

Supplies, incl HFI and Postal	<u>incl.</u>
at special rates	70
POL at 6 galls per vehicle	20
Ordn Stores	160
Misc incl Medical	70
	17
	3
Total	<u>340</u>

b. US

i. Strength :-

Personnel	25,000
Vehicles (incl M/cycles)	5,000

ii. Maintenance :-

Class I rations at 6 lbs per man	<u>incl.</u>
Class II Ord and Miscellaneous	70
Class III POL at 6 galls per veh	40
Class IV Ordn Stores	160
Class V Ammunition	90
	20
Total	<u>400</u>

NOTE : In the event of a German withdrawal in lieu of surrender, an increase in strength is required.

Total

340

L. US

i. Strength :-

Personnel

Vehicles (incl W/cycles)

25,000

5,000

ii. Maintenance :-

tnd

Class I rations at 6 lbs per man
 Class II Ord and Miscellaneous 70
 Class III POL at 6 galls per veh 40
 Class IV Engg Stores 130
 Class V Ammunition 90
 20

Total

400

NOTE : In the event of a German withdrawal in lieu of surrender, an increase in ammunition requirements would be offset to some extent by a decrease in POL requirements. There would, however, probably be an increase of 50 tnd in the total div requirements under such conditions.

2. CIVIL

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Civil supplies (excluding POL and coal) required to be imported for present German occupied Italy are estimated as shown below :

Serial	Compartimento	Total on		Total on	
		100 grams ration + tpd	200 grams ration ++ tpd	300 grams ration tpd	
1.	PIEMONTE	625	810	1,090	
2.	LIGURIA	275	355	470	
3.	LOMBARDIA	1,070	1,380	1,850	
4.	EMILIA (excl provincia of FORLI and RAVENNA)	250	315	420	
5.	Provincia of AVELLINO and LUCCA in TOSCANA	80	105	140	

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APPENDIX 'A' (Cont'd)

Serial	Compartimento	Total on 100 grams ration + tpd	Total on 200 grams ration ++ tpd	Total on 300 grams ration tpd
6.	VENEZUELA ARIDENTINA	115	145	200
7.	VENEZUELA GIULLA	165	215	290
8.	VENEZUELA PROPRIA	670	875	1,180
9.	TOTAL	9,250	4,260	5,640

- 10023: + Food requirement, including supplemental feeding, equals
50% of requirement on 300 grams basic ration.
- ++ Food requirement is 70% of requirement on 300 grams basic
ration.

3. GERMAN ARMY

Assuming that the surrendered German Army are cut off from their source
of supply, the Allied maintenance responsibility in respect of this force is
based on the following data :-

2. Strength:-

Personnel Vehicles	1,000,000 16,000
(of which 5,000 may be used to maintain German Army)	
Horses and Mules	100,000
(of which the Italians may seize 30%)	
Maintenance:-	tpd.
Food 3 1/2 lbs per man	1,560
For 5,000 vehicles @ 6 galls per vehicle	140
Medical	15
For 30 @ 6 lbs per animal	270
Total	1,985

4. REFORM THROUGH TRAINING

A. Strength:-

Personnel
Vehicles

1,000,000
16,000
(of which 5,000 may be used
to maintain German Army)
100,000
(of which the Italians may seize 30%)

B. Maintenance:-

Supplies 3 1/2 lbs per man
FOG for 5,000 vehicles @ 6 galls per vehicle
Medicine
Forage @ 6 lbs per animal
Total 1,985

A. IMPORTS THROUGH TRINITY

The requirement for the maintenance of the occupational forces is about half the total requirement when allowance is made for civilian supplies and extraordinary items peculiar to surrender conditions. The various requirements to be handled through the port may not occur simultaneously, and as far as the fall requirements for AUSRIA are concerned, they cannot be imported until a communication between TRINITY and the principal centres in AUSRIA has been established. A possible breakdown of tonnages required to support British and US commitments in AUSRIA and British commitments in that part of NE ITALY best served from TRINITY is given below :-

1. British (excl Bulk POL).

Serial	Major	Temporary Requirement tpd	Eventual Requirement tpd	Remarks
1.	Ground Forces in AUSRIA	1,000	Three div. and ext tps including 50 (AUSRIA)	Three divs
2.	Ground Forces in VENEZIA			
3.	FLP in AUSRIA			

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APPENDIX 'A' (Cont'd)

Serial	User	Temporary Requirement tpd	Eventual Requirement tpd	Remarks
4.	RAF in VENEZUELA, GUELL.		30	Two sqns
5.	Civil Forces ITALY		800	
6.	Allied AF and Russian civilians in Br zone	260		until evacuation completed
7.	Civil requirements in AUSTRIA		1,000	300 gramma ration
8.	Civil requirements in VENEZUELA		650	300 gramma ration
9.	GUELL, and FOPRA			
10.	Engineer stores Reserves and contingency allowance for unforeseen items such as part maintenance of the GUELL armed forces	300	350	for 30 days only
Total			4,420	
b. US (excluding Bulk POL) - see sub-part 2. below.				
1.	Gramma forces in AUSTRIA		1,200	Three divs and att tps including USGOC
2.	USAF in AUSTRIA		400	
3.	Civil supplies for US zone in AUSTRIA		1,000	300 gramma ration
4.	Allied AF and Russian civilians	260		
5.	Reserve and contingency allowance for unrescued items such as part maintenance of the GUELL armed forces		400	
Total			3,000	

b. US (continuing bulk 304) - see sub-part c. below.

1.	Ground forces in USSR.	1,200	Three divs and att tps including USGOC
2.	USAF in USSR.	400	
3.	Civil supplies for US zone in USSR.	1,000	300 grease ration
4.	Allies and Russian civilians	260	
5.	Reserve and contingency allowance for unrec'd items such as port maintenance of the GEMALD armed forces	400	

Total

3,000

c. The impact of US tonnage through TRIESTE is only a possible commitment depending on the condition of the BREITNER route. In any event it is unlikely that the whole of the US requirements will be moved through TRIESTE as a permanent commitment and a figure of half the requirements should be assumed, in addition to the total British requirements, as a basis for planning the extent to which the port should be developed.

d. There may also be an eventual commitment of up to 1,000 tpd of civil supplies for YUGOSLAVIA to be handled through the port.

e. Allowing for the factors outlined above it is considered that plans for the development of TRIESTE should be made to enable 5,000 tpd to be handled through the port.

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APPENDIX "C"
to Log, P. 177
dated 19 March 45

INFORMATION REGARDING KESSELMAYER'S FORCES

4-2 INFORMATION

Strength

a. Personnel

Total German Strength 300,000 of which combat forces are estimated at 250,000 to 300,000.

Strength of Italian and other forces maintained by KESSELMAYER

500,000
TOTAL 1,300,000

Of the Italians it is considered some 300,000 may return to their homes leaving a total commitment of PW of 1,000,000.

b. Vehicles

16,000

of which 5,000 may be required to maintain the German Army.

c. Animals

100,000

of which the Italians may seize some 30%

Supplies

a. It is estimated that with formations and in depots the enemy has some 20 days rations.

b. A large but incalculable portion of the rations is thought to be obtained locally in Italy.

c. A principal supply base is thought to be in the middle area, with several other depots in scattered areas NORTH and SOUTH of the EC.

Surroundings

3.

5. Vehicles 15,000
of which 5,000 may be required to maintain the German Army.
 6. Animals 100,000
of which the Italians may seize some 30%
2. Supplies
 - a. It is estimated that with formations and in depots the enemy has some 20 days rations.
 - b. A large but incalculable portion of the rations is thought to be obtained locally in Italy.
 - c. A principal supply base is thought to be in the VICOLO area, with several other depots in scattered areas NORTH and SOUTH of the PO.

3. Surrender

This may take one of two forms :-

- either a. The enemy may surrender as an organized body with no breakdown in command or administration
- or b. The enemy may disintegrate and surrender piecemeal by units and individuals, in many cases throwing away their arms and equipment.

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IMPLICATIONS OF SURRENDER

4. Responsibility of Allied Formations

Formations of Fifth and 21st Armies, in their advance, should be responsible for accepting the surrender of enemy formations, effecting their disarmament, preparing the necessary documentation and supervising their administration.

5. Liaison

Armies should be responsible for the provision of Liaison Staffs from within their own resources to be attached as necessary to German Corps, Divisional and other administrative HQs. Staff increments to the German Army Group HQ and Army HQs should also be provided in a scale to be notified by AFHQ. Suitable officers for these increments, who should be found by detachment from present employment, should be nominated by AFHQ.

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APPENDIX "C" (Contd)

5. Control

For ease of control enemy formations should be concentrated in groups of four or five divisions. In regard to the main concentration area it is considered that two Corps, each of two or three divisions will be necessary to perform the tasks detailed in para 3 a. above. It will be desirable that these Corps should be, from right to left, one British and one US, the inter-Corps boundary being the railway FERRARA - BOLOGNA, which is the proposed boundary at a later stage between FBS and HQ No. 1 District (see Appendix "E" para 2). With the advances of Fifth Army the US Corps should pass to under command of AFHQ/AFMUSA, supply responsibility being that of FBS. In respect to the advance of Eighth Army, the British Corps should pass to under command of AFHQ except for local administration which should be the responsibility of HQ No. 1 District.

7. Disarmament

2. Primary Disarmament should be carried out immediately on surrender by combat forces under Fifth and Eighth Armies wherever the enemy may be found. Allied guards should be placed over dumps of enemy material and the enemy should be marched to the concentration area. German Formations should be permitted to retain sufficient transport for their own maintenance and such housekeeping and medical equipment as they may require to establish their own camps. Scale of equipment which should be retained by enemy formations is being prepared and will be issued in an AFHQ Memorandum. The Staff of the Land Forces Division (AUSTRIA) and US Group Control Council will be available to advise on disarmament matters.

2. The existing enemy dumps and depots should also be taken over by the Allies as soon as possible. Formations should carry out this task in respect of the areas for which they are made responsible. A proportion of German Service Troops should be left at the dumps and depots to assist formations in this task.

2. Enemy materials from dumps created in the course of primary disarmament and from existing dumps and depots should be disposed of in the following manner :-

1. Stocks of food, clothing, domestic equipment, engineer stores, etc. required for the maintenance of the German Army should be

camp. Scale of equipment which should be retained by enemy formations is being prepared and will be issued in an AFHQ Memorandum. The Staff of the Land Forces Division (AUSTRIA) and US Group Control Council will be available to advise on disarmament matters.

- b. The existing enemy dumps and depots should also be taken over by the Allies as soon as possible. Formations should carry out this task in respect of the areas for which they are made responsible. A proportion of German Service Troops should be left at the dumps and depots to assist formations in this task.
- c. Enemy materials from dumps created in the course of primary disarmament and from existing dumps and depots should be disposed of in the following manner :-
 - i. Stocks of food, clothing, domestic equipment, engineer stores, etc, required for the maintenance of the German Army should be left in situ, to be used for that purpose subject to Allied supervision.
 - ii. Material and vehicles required by the Allies (for re-issue to Allied units to assist in civil relief and rehabilitation, for G-2 purposes or for shipment out of the theatre) should be moved into Allied or enemy dumps or depots.
 - iii. Base material which is not required for the maintenance of the German Army or for Allied war purposes should be left under Allied guard. This material will be destroyed or disposed of in accordance with instructions to be issued later.
- d. Enemy materials and vehicles under c. ii. above which are dumped in course of primary disarmament, or taken over in existing dumps in the main concentration area, should be moved to parks preferably SOUTH of Route 9.
- e. Enemy materials and vehicles under c. i. and ii. above dumped or found in existing dumps NORTH of the PO, should be concentrated in German depots existing NORTH of the PO.
- f. The guarding, sorting and moving of enemy material in respect of dumps in the main concentration area, (para d. above) and in the area NORTH of the PO (para e. above) should be initially a Fifth and Eighth Army responsibility under the direction of CG 15 Army Group.

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APPENDIX "C" (Contd)

The receiving and sorting of enemy material in parks SOUTH of Route 9 should be an AFHQ/NTUSA responsibility exercised in accordance with normal administrative procedure through District/Zone Section HQs, but certain units will have to be withdrawn from armies for this purpose.

4. Technical assistance in the sorting and classifying of enemy material should be given by the German service organizations under Allied supervision and instructions.

5. The main use of German labour and vehicles should be made in the dumping and moving of enemy material.

6. The main task of sorting and classifying enemy material is likely to be in respect of dumps NORTH of the PO. AFHQ should provide certain additional service personnel who will be placed at the disposal of the armies to assist in inspecting enemy dumps and depots.

7. Naval disarmament at CANTO, SHELLE, TRINITE and other ports will be conducted by a small Naval Staff sent there for the purpose. This staff will probably be British. Guards for enemy Naval barracks, dumps and storehouses will, however, require to be provided by the military authorities as these cannot be provided by the navy. This commitment will be small.

8. The Forces Commander will be responsible for determining the action to be taken to dispose of enemy air force equipment and materials, other than explosives. Bombs and other explosives, except for any that may be required by the Air Forces for intelligence purposes, will be a military responsibility for disposal, the Air Force providing technical advice and assistance as necessary. It will be a military responsibility to guard enemy air material, and to co-ordinate inter-service activities where necessary. Army assistance will be required for the eventual disposal of such material as is not required by the Air Forces.

be conducted by a small Naval Staff sent there for the purpose. This staff will probably be British. Queries for enemy Naval Barrage, dumps and storehouses will, however, require to be provided by the military authorities as these cannot be provided by the Navy. This commitment will be small.

1. The Air Forces Commander will be responsible for determining the action to be taken to dispose of enemy air force equipment and materials, other than explosives. Bombs and other explosives, except for any that may be required by the Air Forces for intelligence purposes, will be a military responsibility for disposal, the Air Force providing technical advice and assistance as necessary. It will be a military responsibility to put enemy air material, and to co-ordinate inter-service activities where necessary. Army assistance will be required for the eventual disposal of such material as is not required by the Air Forces.

2. Captured Animals

When sufficient animals have been allotted to the German Army for their maintenance, there should be a considerable surplus which can be taken over by the Allies for civil and military purposes. Personnel from existing Allied V & R Units, not required under current conditions should be used to form centres for animal collecting centres.

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APPENDIX "D"
to Log. R. 177
dated

PM ACCOMMODATION AT PRESENT AVAILABLE

1. British

<u>Location</u>	<u>Capacity</u>
ITALY (forward areas with armies)	3,000
E of C	14,000
TURKEY	20,000
NORTH AFRICA	10,000
MIDDLE EAST	35,000

2. US

AFRICA	22,000
INDONESIA (transit only)	10,000
AFRICA	6,000 (with authorized expansion to 13,000)

4.3553A

LEGHORI (transit only)

FLORENCE

22,000

10,000

6,000 (with authorized
expansion to
13,000)

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APPENDIX 2
to L93.P.177
dated 19 March 45

STATIC HQ LAYOUT

LAYOUT OF STATIC HQs

1. The following layout has formed the basis of forward planning:
 - a. US to control a corridor on the axis of the Fifth Army advance on the BRENNER route.
 - b. Eighth Army to control Compartimento of VENEZIA CIVILIA, HQ 55 Area being allotted to Eighth Army for this purpose.
 - c. HQ 1 District to control NE ITALY up to boundary of VENEZIA CIVILIA with two additional Sub-Area HQs under command.
 - d. HQ 2 District to control NW ITALY with HQ 57 Area, HQ 59 Area and HQ 454 Sub-Area under command.
 - e. BOLOGNA to be administered by a US HQ responsible to CG FES with a British increment attached.
 - f. HQ FLORENCE Command, as at present constituted, to pass under CG and CG FES when the Army boundary is moved NORTH of FLORENCE, with the proviso that the present allocation of rest and leave facilities should not be disturbed without reference to AFHQ.

BOUNDARIES

2.
 - a. General
It is considered that boundaries should follow as closely as possible the existing provincial boundaries.
 - b. Boundaries of No. 1 District
It is considered that No. 1 District should be bounded as follows:-
 - NORTH - The NORTH boundary of the Province of BELLUNO and UDINE.
 - EAST - The EAST boundary of the Province of UDINE.
 - SOUTH - The SOUTH boundary of the Provinces of ASCOLI and

BOUNDARIES2. General

It is considered that boundaries should follow as closely as possible the existing provincial boundaries.

B. Boundaries of No. 1 District

It is considered that No. 1 District should be bounded as follows:-

NORTH - The NORTH boundary of the Province of EMILIA and ROMAGNA.

EAST - The EAST boundary of the Province of UDINE.

SOUTH - The SOUTH boundary of the Provinces of ASCOLI and PERUGIA.

WEST - The WEST boundary of the Provinces of :-

BERGAMO
VICENZA
TREVISO
ROVERETO

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The WEST boundary of the Province of FERRARA from its northernmost limit to the railway PAVIA-BOLIGNA.

The railway PAVIA-BOLIGNA from where it crosses the WEST boundary of VERONA Province to BOLIGNA inclusive.

Route 9 from BOLIGNA to the present inter-army boundary. The present inter-army boundary to its junction with the present 55 Area boundary.

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(S) (U) (M) (N) (P)

The present 50,000 HMT primary element location with the Army boundary to be identical with the 50,000 HMT boundary.

The present 100,000 HMT primary element location with 201 Subarea 100,000 to the junction with 201 Subarea 100,000.

This arrangement would give to HQ 2 District the whole of the Compartimentos of VENEZUELA, PARAGUAY, and PROVINCE of VERONA.

c. The precise boundaries through the Province of VERONA and PARAGUAY must be decided in accordance with administrative requirements and locations of administrative units.

ORGANIZATION OF HQ. 1 DISTRICT

3.

a. District HQ

VERONA is considered to be the best location for HQ 1 District since it is centrally situated and has good road and rail communications NORTH and SOUTH.

b.

Subordinate HQs

i. The following subordinate HQs should be allotted to HQ 1 District :-

64 Area	
74 Sub-area	
201 " "	(From HQ 2 District)
207 " "	(or a Sub-area to be formed from a Beach Group Group HQ)
210 " "	(From HQ 3 District)

ii. The responsibilities of the subordinate HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories should be decided by Commander District.

c.

BOLOGNA and PLATONER

It is considered that the British elements at BOLOGNA and PLATONER should be under command HQ 1 District, and should be co-ordinating Allied units (in accordance with the instructions contained in HQ Administrative Instruction No. 11 dated 23 Jan 43).

District :-

61 Area
 74 Sub-Area
 201 " " (From HQ 2 District)
 207 " " (or 1 Sub-Area to be formed from a Bench Group
 (Group HQ)
 210 " " (From HQ 3 District)

ii. The responsibilities of the administrative HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories could be decided by Commander District.

2. POLICE AND FLAMINGO

It is considered that the British components of POLICE and FLAMINGO should be under command HQ 1 District, and should be co-ordinating Allied units (in accordance with the definitions contained in HQ 1 Administrative Memorandum No. 14 dated 23 Jan 43).

3. British Troops in HQ Territory

HQ 1 District would be responsible for the administration of the British troops in the HQ area (HQ 1).

ORGANISATION OF HQ 2 DISTRICT

4.

2. Territory in HQ 2

- i. In the initial stages territory in the HQ 2 area will be as laid down in HQ 2 District Memorandum No. 14 dated 23 Jan 43 (and also HQ 2 District Memorandum No. 15 dated 23 Jan 43).
- ii. At a later stage on the assumption of responsibility from HQ 1 by HQ 2 the territory in the HQ 2 area will be extended to include the whole of the HQ 2 area (including HQ 2 District) except the province of Kaimosi. In the HQ 2 area administrative and civil boundaries as now exist will be maintained. In these circumstances the HQ 2 area will be referred to HQ 2 District.

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APPENDIX "E" (Contd.)

of present responsibilities

Territory at present controlled by HQ 2 District should be handed over to Nos. 1 and 3 Districts as follows :-

i.	Territory at present controlled by HQ 59 Area	↑ District
"	" " " " 204 Sub-area	3 District
"	" " " " 209 " "	3 District

ii. Responsibilities in regard to ANM should be handed over to HQ 3 District.

iii. HQ 60 Sub-area would come into AMQ reserve.

2. Subordinate HQs

In NW ITALY the following subordinate static HQs would be under command HQ 2 District :-

57 Area
59 Area
151 Sub-area

4. Responsibilities outside ITALY

HQ 2 District would retain its responsibilities in regard to

203 Sub-area
SARDINIA +
CORSICA.

as laid down in AMQ letter LG 325/035 GOT-O dated 24 Jan 45.

* NOTE: Depending upon the administrative situation responsibilities in regard to SARDINIA may at a later date be transferred to HQ 3 District.

ORGANISATION OF HQ 3 DISTRICT

a. Territorial responsibility

Certain adjustments would have to be made in the responsibilities of HQ 3 District consequent upon the changes in respect of HQs 1 and 2 Districts. The responsibilities of subordinate HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories would be decided by Commander 3 District.

HQ 2 District would retain its responsibilities in regard to

203 Sub-Area
SARDINIA +
CORSICA

as laid down in LHQ letter AG 323/035 GOM-0 dated 24 Jan 45.

+ NOTE: Depending upon the administrative situation responsibility in regard to SARDINIA may at a later date be transferred to HQ 3 District.

ORGANISATION OF HQ 3 DISTRICT

5. Taking over of responsibility

Certain adjustments would have to be made in the responsibilities of HQ 3 District consequent upon the changes in respect of HQs 1 and 2 Districts. The responsibilities of subordinate HQs and the boundaries of their respective territories would be decided by Commander 3 District.

a. Subordinate HQs

The following subordinate HQs would be under command HQ 3 District :-

52 Area
54 Area
56 Area
94 Sub-Area
204 Sub-Area
203 Sub-Area
209 Sub-Area
ETNA (for certain purposes only)

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c. Territory at present controlled by HQ 204 Sub-Area

The responsibilities in respect of the territory at present controlled by HQ 204 Sub-Area would be taken over by the British Increment ROME Area.

RES

6. RES should ultimately be responsible for the following provinces in addition to its present territory and responsibilities :

BOLOGNA } in the Compartimento of VERONA in the Compartimento
TRENTO } of VENEZIA PROPRIA.

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APPENDIX "E" (Contd.)

-4-

MARINOVA in the Compartiments of LOMBARDIA

REGGIO EMILIA } " " " " EMILIA
MODENA }

PARMA (MASSA) }
LUNDA " " " " TOSCANA
PISTOIA }

WEST part of BOLOGNA + "




WEST part of FIRENZE +

+ for boundaries see para 2

7. A sketch map showing the proposed boundaries of Nos 1, 2 and 3 Districts and PES is attached at Annexure I.

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.


SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.






Annex 1

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Annexure 1

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COMPARTMENTS &
PROVINCES OF ITALY

LEGEND

COMPARTIMENTO BOUNDARIES

PROVINCIA BOUNDARIES

FRONTIERS

A.A.E. ENCLAVE

R.A.A.C.

P.B.S. TERRITORY

N°1 DIST. TERRITORY


- 2 -

- 3 -

BRENNER ROUTE


N.B. CORSICA, SARDINIA & N. AFRICA
are only the responsibility of the District H.Q's
indicated for certain limited functions notified
in current instructions.













12°

14°

16°



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15
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Log. P. 177

10 Mar 45

E.C. Plans - 14 Mar 45

Copy 16 - Ex Comm
 17 - General Advisors
 18 - WMC - SPW SC
 19 - LAND FORCES SC
 20 - N. ITALY PLANNING
 21 - ECON SEC
 22 - C.A. SEC
 23 - Ex Comm

To: CG 15 Army Group 1 - 8
 CG Fifth Army 9 - 12
 HQ Eighth Army 13 - 15
 HQ Allied Commission 16 - 23
 HQ 1 District 24
 HQ 2 District 25
 CG FRS 26

Minutes of meeting held by Chief Administrative Officer at HQ 15 Army Group at 1030 hrs, Monday, 26 Feb 1945 to consider AFHQ Planning Paper Log. P. 177 dated 17 Feb 1945 are attached.

A. M. Milne
 A.M. MILNE, Colonel,
 Log. Plans,
 Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION:

<u>External</u>	<u>Copy Nos</u>	<u>Internal</u>	<u>Copy Nos</u>
C-in-C Med	27 - 30	G-1 (P)	39
		G-1 (Mov & Tn)	40
		G-5	41
<u>Internal</u>		Q (Maint)	42
CAO	31	Q (AF)	43
A/CAO	32	Engrs	44
G-1 (A)	33	Sigs	45
G-1 (B)	34	Pct Sec	46
G-3	35 - 36	Log. Plans (Spares)	47 - 60
G-4 (A)	37 - 38		

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MINUTES OF CAO'S CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

AT 1030 HOURS 26 FEB 45

TO CONSIDER AFHQ PLANNING PAPER LOG. P. 177 DATED 17 FEB 45

PRESENT:-

CAO, Lt-Gen Sir H.H. ROBERTSON, St. KVOO, CB, CHE, DSO, MC. Presiding

AFHQ

MAJ-Gen A.O. DUFF, CHE, MC.
Brig-Gen A.L. HAMILTON
Brig J.D.A. ANDERSON, DSO.
Brig-Gen C.B. MACKEITH
Brig A.M. FINLISON, DSO, CHE.
Brig A.T. de Roe PHILLIPS, CB, OBE.
Brig-Gen C.M. SPOTTWOOD
Colonel A.M. MILNE, OBE.
Colonel G.R. VOGEL

G-4(B)
A/CAO
BGS, G-3 Org (B)
G-4(A)
ADAG(O)
DQMG (Mov & Tn)
G-5
G-4(Log Plans)
Pet Sec

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

MAJ-Gen M.A. DOWNHILL-ROGERS, CHE, DSO
Brig C.D. PUGH, DSO, OBE.
Brig-Gen D.M. BRANN
Brig-Gen R. TATE
Colonel P.D. MILLER, CHE.
Colonel J.H. RIMPE
Colonel A.M. LOYAN
Colonel F. MILDH, OBE.
Colonel W.C. McLENNON
Colonel T.R. HOW
Colonel W. McNESTROUT

CE.
D/CS (Br)
G-3
G-4
G-3
G-3(Sp Ops)
G-3(Plans)
Col "A"
G-4
DSC
G-5

Brig A.M. FINESTON, DSO, OBE.
 Brig A.T. de ROO PHILLIPS, CB, OBE.
 Brig-Gen C.L. SPOTTWOOD
 Colonel A.M. MILNE, OBE.
 Colonel G.H. WAGNELL

HQ 15 ARMY GROUP

Major-Gen H.A. CORNWALL-ROBERTS, CBE, DSO.
 Brig C.D. FICHAUD, DSO, OBE.
 Brig-Gen H.A. BRANN
 Brig-Gen R. WATTE
 Colonel B.D. MILLER, OBE.
 Colonel J.H. RIMPE
 Colonel A.M. LOGAN
 Colonel T. WELCH, OBE.
 Colonel W.G. MCMURDO
 Colonel T.R. HOW
 Colonel N. MONTFORT
 Capt H.C. HENRY, RN.
 Lt-Col R.T. FINEST, OBE.
 Lt-Col F.K. WELSHARD
 Lt-Col C.C. HOLCOMBE
 Lt-Col T.D. GERRIST
 Lt-Col G.J.V. MACKEY

FLAG OFFICER NORTHERN AREA, MED.

Capt D. HAMMARLEY JOHNSTON, MC.

HQ FIFTH ARMY

Brig-Gen E. CRAXTON-HUME
 Colonel C.A. RICH, OBE.
 Colonel E.J. O'NEILL
 Lt-Col L.A. HILL
 Lt-Col E.R. WALKER
 Lt-Col D.M. ARMAND
 Lt-Col A.E. SUTHERLAND, JR.

AFAC(G)
 DMS (Mov & Tn)
 G-5
 G-4(Log Plans)
 Pet Sec

CE.
 D/CS (Br)
 G-3
 G-4
 G-3
 G-3(Sp Ops)
 G-3(Plans)
 Col "A"
 G-1
 DESO
 G-5
 NLO
 G-3(Plans)
 G-4(Plans)
 G-4
 AAC
 AQMG

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Chief of Staff

G-5
 DA & QMG
 G-4
 G-3
 G-4
 AQMG
 G-5(excc)

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HQ EIGHTH ARMY

Brig G.P.H. STANTON, CBE.
Colonel J.C. FRESTON, DSO.
Group Capt C. BENSON
Lt-Col A.C. SCROPE, CBE.
Lt-Col W.D. ROGERS

DA & QTB
Col GS
AMG
ACMG
ACMG(M)

HQ ALLIED COMMISSION

Brig M.S. LUSH, CB, CBE, MC.
Brig J.A. DUNLOP, CBE, MC, TD.
Colonel W.J. LEGG
Major M.A.C. WALBOT

HQ AG
AC VENEZIE
HQ AC(Food Sub-Comm)
HQ AC

PBS

Brig-Gen F.R. OXY
Lt-Col S.M. FORRES

CG
G-4

HQ 1 DISTRICT

Major-Gen C.A. HENDYMAN, CB, MC.

GOC

HQ 2 DISTRICT

Major-Gen M.P. HAYES, CBE, MC.
Colonel D. MCGAN GRAY, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col Sir W.J. MOIDAUNT Bt.

GOC
DA & QTB
G-1

AMG

Colonel R.P. MAXWELL

RD PIEDMONT Region

HQ IV CORPS US

Colonel A.H. L'ECY
Colonel G.H. McMANUS
Colonel G.G. GIBBS

G-4
AC

HQ 2 DISTRICT

Maj-Gen H.P. HATES, CBE, MC.
Colonel D. LUGAN GRAY, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col Sir A.J. MONTAUNT Bt.

AMG

Colonel R.P. MAXWELL

HQ IV CORPS US

Colonel A.T. LAGRY
Colonel G.H. MONTAGUE
Colonel G.G. GIBBS

SIGNALS HQ L OF C ITALY

Brig W.C. BUCHANAN, CBE, MC.
Lt-Col F.S. PHENE

GENERAL

1.

C/O stated that it was not possible to reach such definite conclusions regarding the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY as had been reached in respect of NORTHWEST ITALY. The movement into NORTHEAST ITALY was to occupy a specific area from which there was no intention to advance; moreover, the occupation would not involve large scale offensive operations in the area. In contrast the movement into NORTHEAST ITALY

- a. would be only one stage in the advance into AUSTRIA,
- b. might well be a fighting advance.
- c. might be complicated by the surrender of HITSLER's Army,
- d. would give rise to political problems in relation to VENEZIA GIULIA, the solution of which lay outside the scope of military decision.

Problems involved in the occupation of NORTHEAST ITALY were not, therefore, capable of immediate solution.

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R3 PISMONTE Region

G-4
AC

C30

GOC

GOC
DA & QMG
G-1

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2. CAO emphasized that Log. P. 177 was a planning paper prepared for his consideration and was not an official instruction laying down approved administrative policy.
3. CAO then examined Log. P. 177 in detail. The following minutes should be read in conjunction with the appropriate paragraphs of the paper as indicated below.

GENERAL BACKGROUND (paras 1 and 2)

CAO stated that it seemed unlikely that KESSELRING would surrender before German resistance on the WEST and WEST fronts had crumbled. When surrender did occur, however, it might be necessary to occupy MONTHELY and MONTHELY ITALY simultaneously. There would also be operational and political pressure to occupy AUSTRIA, under the FRIEDMAN plan, as early as possible and this was not sufficiently emphasized in the paper. For planning purposes it must be assumed that there will be a requirement for Allied forces to enter AUSTRIA some four to six weeks after KESSELRING's surrender.

MAIN ADMINISTRATIVE TASKS (para 4)

In considering the difficult question of priorities, emphasis was laid on the importance of the distribution of civil supplies which, if neglected might result in a heavy military commitment to ensure the maintenance of law and order.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP (para 6)

 2. CAO stated, and G-3 15 Army Group, agreed, that surrender by KESSELRING was unlikely to occur before the end of March.
 - b. With regard to the development of rail communications for the maintenance of 15 Army Group, it was expected that the railway from LECHEN would be through to FLORENCE by early April and through the ALPENINNE tunnel by early May, though at this stage any forecast of completion of work on the ALPENINNE tunnel must be very provisional.
 2. With reference to para 6 c. of the paper the allocation of British and US divisions to the various tasks should not be laid down in the paper as this was the responsibility of G-3 15 Army Group.

5. In considering the difficult question of priorities, emphasis was laid on the importance of the distribution of civil supplies which, if neglected might result in a heavy military commitment to ensure the maintenance of law and order.

MAINTENANCE OF 15 ARMY GROUP (para 6)

6. a. CAO stated, and G-3 15 Army Group, agreed, that surrender by KESSELRING was unlikely to occur before the end of March.
- b. With regard to the development of rail communications for the maintenance of 15 Army Group, it was expected that the railway from LEGHORN would be through to FLORENCE by early April and through the APENNINE tunnel by early May, though at this stage any forecast of completion of work on the APENNINE tunnel must be very provisional.
- c. With reference to para 6 c. of the paper the allocation of British and US divisions to the various tasks should not be laid down in the paper as this was the responsibility of G3 15 Army Group.
- d. G-3, 15 Army Group, pointed out that NORTHWEST ITALY would probably be occupied by a composite force which would be US and British maintained. 2534

d. CAO stated that the administration of forces entering AUSTRIA would be an AFHQ responsibility. AFHQ/AFHQUSA, acting through static HQs in accordance with normal administrative procedure, would be responsible for administering formations remaining in ITALY.

TRANSPORT (para 6)

7. G-4, 15 Army Group, questioned whether rail capacity NORTH of ANCONA would be sufficient in the circumstances to meet all commitments. CAO stated that this would be further examined.
8. Calculations in load carrying transport made by HQ 15 Army Group differed slightly from the AFHQ figures in respect of the availability of British transport units but showed a considerably greater requirement for US truck units than those given in the AFHQ paper. CAO stated that the transport availabilities and requirements would be made the subject of further examination.

/ADMINISTRATION...

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ADMINISTRATION OF KESSELRING'S ARMY (paras 9 and 10)

9. a. CAO emphasized that the Germans must be made to administer themselves. It was therefore particularly important that units and formations of KESSELRING'S ARMY should be kept intact. If they had disintegrated they should be re-organized as soon as possible.

- b. It was agreed that the area between the River PO and Route 9 (excluding this route and the major towns in the area) should be the main concentration area for KESSELRING'S ARMY. As the coastal belt to a depth of 12 miles from the EAST coast was highly malarial, this part of the area would not be used.

- c. Surrendered forces would have to live in whatever tentage they possessed. Use might be made of big warehouses etc if these were not wanted for Allied military or Allied Commission purposes. There would be no requisitioning of houses for the accommodation of Germans.

- d. It was agreed that the responsibility for action under paras 10 g., d. and e. of this paper would be that of HQ 15 Army Group.

- e. It would not be the policy to evacuate civilians from the concentration areas.

HOLDING AND GUARDING (para 11)

10. It would not be possible to hold KESSELRING'S ARMY in PW cages. Only recalcitrant personnel would be removed to PW cages. These personnel would be initially held in PW enclosures in or near the concentration area, but such enclosures would be for transit purposes only. The policy would be to move recalcitrant personnel to cages SOUTH of the ARDENNES as early as possible. It might however, be advantageous to move additional PW gradually to cages SOUTH of the ARDENNES.

DISARMAMENT OF KESSELRING'S ARMY (para 12)

11. a. The division of responsibility between AFHQ, HQ 15 Army Group, Fifth and Eighth Armies would be as given in para 12 f. of the paper. AFHQ will issue the initial instructions on broad lines to HQ 15 Army

2. It would not be the policy to evacuate civilians from the concentration area.

HOLDING AND GUARDING (para. 11)

10. It would not be possible to hold KESSELING's Army in PW cages. Only recalcitrant personnel would be removed to PW cages. These personnel would be initially held in PW enclosures in or near the concentration area, but such enclosures would be for transit purposes only. The policy would be to move recalcitrant personnel to cages SOUTH of the APPENNINES as early as possible. It might however, be advantageous to move additional PW gradually to cages SOUTH of the APPENNINES.

DISARMAMENT OF KESSELING'S ARMY (para. 12)

11. 1. The division of responsibility between AFHQ, HQ 15 Army Group, Fifth and Eighth Armies would be as given in para 12 f. of the paper. AFHQ will issue the initial instructions on broad lines to HQ 15 Army Group who would issue the necessary instructions to the two Armies. HQ 15 Army Group would then supervise the execution of these instructions.
2. Experts from the disarmament staff which is being formed as part of Allied Commission, AUSTRIA, would be made available to give assistance in disarmament matters.
3. Chief of Staff, Allied Commission requested that the War Material Sub-Committee of the Allied Commission should be brought in on disarmament matters at an early date.
4. In view of the large number of personnel which would be required for guarding dumps, it was agreed that consideration should be given to the use of the Italian Army for this purpose.
5. It was agreed that German administrative units required to handle enemy supplies and material should not be deprived of vehicles and equipment necessary for carrying out their service functions.

/s.....

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d. It was agreed that as much use as possible should be made of animal transport for the maintenance of KASSELBERG's Army. This would require further examination by AFHQ in respect of the provision of fodder.

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE AND I OF C INTO AUSTRIA (para 14 and 15)

13. CAG stated that, taking into account the assistance to be given for the movement of civil supplies, para 14 of the paper was correct.
14. Reverting to the uncertainty of the political position in VERIZIA GIULIA, CAG emphasized the need for flexibility in the planning of administrative requirements in NORTHEAST ITALY. Because of this uncertainty the use of the term "advanced base" in reference to TRIESTE should be used with caution. While certain advanced base units would be required to support the occupational forces in AUSTRIA these might better be located in AUSTRIA rather than in VERIZIA GIULIA. If political reasons precluded the use of TRIESTE it would be necessary to develop VENICE as a military port.

15. CAG stated that if TRIESTE was used it would be British controlled and operated in respect of all tonnages handled. Should US tonnages require to be handled counterbalancing assistance would be given by the US at another Italian port. AFHQ would be responsible for producing the key plan for TRIESTE in conjunction with HQ Eighth Army, OC PBS and ROTALI and for the allocation of tonnages between HQ Eighth Army and other bidders whose maintenance was not the responsibility of HQ Eighth Army. AFHQ would also provide the Chairman of the Siting Board. As US tonnages may be handled through the port, OC PBS will be consulted in the preparation of the key plan and a representative of PBS will be a member of the Siting Board.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY (para 16)

16. CAG stated that a Military Government plan for VERIZIA GIULIA required further examination. Reference to the possibility that the government might be undertaken on a tripartite basis with Russian participation should be deleted from the paper.
17. CAG drew attention to the fact that the provinces of BOLZANO, TRIENTO and BELLUNO were largely German in population and administration.

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18. Civil administration in the Compartimento of VENEZIA GIULIA would be an Eighth Army responsibility through AFM, Eighth Army.
- PROVISION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SUPPLIES IN NORTH ITALY (paras 17, 18 and Appendix "A")
19. CMO stated that the figures given at para 2 of Appendix "A" were too high and would be revised.
20. Chief of Staff, HQ Allied Commission stated that it was intended to provide from imported sources the following civil ration :-
- | | |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| a. First month | Impact ration of 100 grammes. |
| b. Second month | 200 grammes ration. |

The balance of the civil ration during these two months would be made up from indigenous resources. CMO stated that on this basis the transport required for civil supplies as estimated in the paper was excessive.

21. CMO summarised as follows, the assistance which might be given by the military for the movement of civil supplies in NORTH ITALY, emphasising that this offer, in the uncertainty of the operational situation, should not be regarded as absolutely firm.

a. NORTHWEST ITALY

Delivery of 500 tons per day of civil supplies to PAVIA. This had already been accepted as a military commitment and would be a British responsibility.

b. NORTH ITALY

Delivery of 400 tons per day to VERONA. This would be a US responsibility.

c. NORTHEAST ITALY

Delivery of 350 tons per day to PAVIA. This would be a British responsibility.

Chief of Staff, HQ Allied Commission confirmed that this would be sufficient to provide a 100 gramme impact ration.

this offer, in the uncertainty of the operational situation, should not be regarded as absolutely firm.

2. NORTHWEST ITALY

Delivery of 500 tons per day of civil supplies to PAVIA. This had already been accepted as a military commitment and would be a British responsibility.

b. NORTH ITALY

Delivery of 400 tons per day to VERONA. This would be a US responsibility.

c. NORTHEAST ITALY

Delivery of 350 tons per day to PAVIA. This would be a British responsibility.

Chief of Staff, HQ Allied Commission confirmed that this would be sufficient to provide a 100 grume impact ration.

22. The CAC emphasized that the movement of civil supplies to PAVIA, VERONA and PAVIA would be undertaken by military transport. This assistance must, however, be subject to a time limit as the transport employed would be later needed for the maintenance of Fifth and Eighth Armies in their advance into AUSTRIA. While this assistance would be given for as long as possible, HQ Allied Commission should not plan on its availability for a period of longer than one month.

PARTISANS (para 19)

23. a. An instruction has already been issued on this subject by AFHQ (AFHQ Operation Instruction "Occupation of NW ITALY" dated 21 Dec 44 supplemented by Cable # 26518 of 14 Feb 45).
- b. It was agreed that the estimate of 100,000 partisans was acceptable as a basis for planning.
- c. It was agreed that transport and maintenance of partisans should be a military commitment within the Army areas and an Allied Commission commitment behind Army rear boundaries.

/REFUGES.....

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REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS (para 20)

24. a. It was agreed that HQ Allied Commission/JAGs attached to Army HQs would be responsible for Refugee Camps in Army areas but that Armies would assist as far as they were able.
- b. CAC stated that it was now firm that Russian civilians would be a military responsibility.

STATIC LAYOUT (para 21)

25. a. The map attached as Annexure 1 to Log. P. 177 required slight modification in respect of HRS boundary SOUTH of RMEZ. Also SICELY, S. COINLA and NORTH AFRICA should be shown as under HQ 3 District.
- b. CAC pointed out that the proposed boundary of HQ 2 District differed from that given in the instruction on NORTHWEST ITALY (JFH letter AF 523/061 GDS-0 dated 25 Jan 45 as amended by letter same reference of 30 Jan 45). The boundary given in this instruction was based on the assumption that active operations would be taking place to the EAST of Lake COMO in which circumstances part of the Province of LOMBARDIA would be required as an Army rear area. In the circumstances envisaged in Log. P. 177 it was desirable to make the boundaries of HQ 2 District coincide as far as possible with those of the Camp commands of LOMBARDIA.

POINTS (para 22)

26. a. CAC drew attention to the length of time which the Naval staff estimated would be required to clear the sea routes to GENOA and TRIESTE of mines. In surrender conditions, and provided the Germans were required to disclose the location of their minefields, it was possible that these times might be improved.
- b. Unless UNHCR was required for military purposes (see para 14 above) the port would be opened and operated by HQ Allied Commission. The only assistance which could be provided from military sources would be certain transportation assistance in the form of movement of goods and personnel. Priority for mine-sweeping would come

Instruction was based on the assumption that active operations would be taking place to the east of Lake Como in which circumstances part of the Province of Lombardy would be required as an Army rear area. In the circumstances envisaged in Log. P. 177 it was desirable to make the boundaries of HQ 2 District coincide as far as possible with those of the Compartimento of Lombardy.

PORTS (para 22)

26. 2. HQ has no intention to the length of time which the Naval staff considered would be required to clear the sea routes to GENOA and TRIESTE of mines. In surrender conditions, and provided the Germans were prepared to disclose the location of their minefields, it was possible that these times might be improved.
3. Unless VENICE was required for military purposes (see para 14 above) the port would be opened and operated by HQ Allied Commission. The only assistance which could be provided from military sources would be certain organizational assistance in the form of movement control and air supervision. Priority for mine-sweeping would come after the requirements for the opening of TRIESTE and GENOA.
4. With reference to the opening of the smaller ports in the LIGURIAN coast, CAC stated that this was a matter for negotiation and settlement between FONM and HQ 2 District.
5. It was agreed that the opening of a port to serve NORTHWEST ITALY would be essential. In the event of GENOA being held as a fortress by the enemy, the Navy may be asked to open SAVONA. HQ 2 District confirmed that they had planned to cover such an eventuality.

USE OF NORTH ITALY IWT SYSTEM (para 25)

27. Examination of the assistance to be obtained from the IWT network in NORTHWEST ITALY was very discouraging. HQ Allied Commission, however, should make plans to make the maximum use possible of this method of transportation. Chief of Staff, Allied Commission confirmed that this was being done.

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28. Other than the proposed pipeline from GENOA to ALESSANDRIA no further assistance could be offered to HQ Allied Commission as pipeline capacity in NORTH ITALY would probably be required to meet military and normal civil requirements now being handled. The CAO said that petroleum section would examine the possibility of the provision of a pipeline from PORTOFINO to BOLOGNA. No pipeline supplies would be available to construct a pipeline NORTH from TRIESTE into AUSTRIA unless materials were recovered from the taking up of existing or authorised construction.

FURTHER ACTION

29. Log. P. 177 would be revised incorporating the points made at the meeting and issued in due course to all concerned.

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