

Acc

10000 | 120 | 3005

10000 | 120 | 3005

A/OIO

Employment of Italian Army Policy

MAY 1945 - AUG. 1946

1645
1668

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

70506/16644.14/19.11

Rome, 29 August 1946.

Dear Admiral,

RECEIVED 3- SEP 1946

With reference to your letter No. 8251/46 of 16 May 1946, I can assure you that, according to precise information received from the Ministry of Treasury, the assignment of funds for the services of the 803 Bn C.S. remains unchanged and that the Ministry of War has been enabled to carry out the payments left in suspense.

Cordially yours,

For the President

The Undersecretary of State

/s/ Paolo Gappa

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome.

1608

EC. DIST - 30 Aug
Lgt. Attard: Ex Comm
Action → LAND FORCES S/C
: CC

TRANSLATION

From: M.of W.

Ref: II3I45//I/3

To : MMIA

ISI.3II
Date: 28/6/46


Subject: Balance of 808 Battalion (c.s.) -

Further to letter n° 109792/I.3 dated May 13th , we assure you that the allocation of funds of 808 Battalion (c.s.) will not undergo any reduction regarding the monthly requirement of the estimated 6.000.000 lire.

sgd... Lombardi
Col.

1637

AM/ot



Ministero della Guerra

- Gabinetto -

Proprio
11/1/43
1/1/3 Allegato

131-3-1

OGGETTO bilancio dell'808 Battaglione c.s.

Risposta al Toglio del
Dir. Ser. N.2

ROMA

Roma 28 GIU. 1946

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB
COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

A seguito lettera n. 109792/I.3 del 13 maggio u.s.
si assicura che le assegnazioni di fondi all'808 Batta-
glione C.S. non subiranno riduzioni rispetto al fabbisog-
no mensile di 6.000.000 di lire preventive.

d'ordine
IL CAPO DEL CABINETTO

Handwritten signature

1636

1500

Risposta al Signor del

2

7

à l'ordine
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
Stenard

1600	1500
date	1/2
1650	1/7

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

SECRET

(24)

A OIO

Ref: 3251/EC

16 May 1946

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

RECEIVED
6927 16 MAY 1946

I am informed that the Minister of Finance has directed the Minister of War to reduce the budget of 808 CS Battalion from 6,000,000 to 2,000,000 per month.

I am directed to remind you that under the terms of the handover of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government 808 CS Battalion was retained under the operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

In view of the adverse effect on the efficiency of the Battalion, which such a reduction in its budget would have, I am to request that you take immediate steps to have the direction of the Minister of Finance suspended pending further consideration of this question.

Please furnish an assurance that in the meantime the budget will remain at its present figure of 6,000,000 lire.

I am further to inform you that the Supreme Allied Commander will be prepared to consider any proposals which the Italian Government may care to submit for the reduction of expenditure on the Battalion, and to ask that you submit any such proposals without delay.

Yours very truly,

/Sgd/ ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Doctor Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

1605.

Copy to: Land Forces S/c.
See (28)

ARG

Drayl f AC
as attached.

But first check with
Ebsworth what the True
position is

SP

Spec
Dr. Borahessu

EC Thermal
Follow thru personally pls.
W

CIPHER

H/ 2508

F 65515

301705 B

MAY 1 0900

IMPORTANT

AFHQ SIGNED SAGMED
 ALCOM ROME.

SECRET

Dear P.M.

To.

Diff
 The Prime Minister.**SECRET**

1 am

some the

THIS HQ HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE HAS DIRECTED THE

MINISTER OF WAR TO REDUCE THE BUDGET OF 808 CS BATTALION FROM 6000000 TO 2000000

LIRE PER MONTH. *I am directed to* PLEASE BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND

REMINDE HIM THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HANDOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE CONTROL OF

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 808 CS BATTALION WAS RETAINED UNDER SAGMED'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL *at the Supreme Allied Command*

IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE BATTALION WHICH SUCH A REDUCTION

IN ITS BUDGET *is bound to* HAVE ~~YOU SHOULD~~ REQUEST THE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE IMMEDIATE

STEPS TO HAVE THE DIRECTION OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE SUSPENDED PENDING REFERENCE TO

THIS HQ *and to* FURNISH AN ASSURANCE THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE BUDGET WILL REMAIN AT ITSPRESENT FIGURE OF 6000000 LIRE. *I am further to inform you that the Supreme Allied* AT THE SAME TIME IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS

HQ WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MAY COME TO

SUBMIT FOR THE REDUCTION OF EXPENDITURE ON THE BATTALION. *and to ask that you* AN EARLY REPORT ON THE PRIME*submit any such proposals without delay.* MINISTERS REACTIONS TO YOUR APPROACH IS REQUESTED.**CIPHER TELEGRAM**

This message will not be distributed outside
 British or U.S. Government Department or
 Headquarters
 without being
 O.T.P. need

AC DIST

ACTION: ~~FINANCE~~ *Land Forces S/C*INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER *A. C.*

EX COMMISSIONER

ECON SEC

-1- FORCES

POLAD A

B

HEADQUARTERS

1664

FILE

SKELETON

SECRET

COPY

SUBJECT: Budget - 808 CS BattalionLand Forces Sub-Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E .

A 010

4 May 1946.TO : Ministry of War

1. It is learned from an AFHQ signal received by AC copy to M.M.I.A., that the Minister for War has been directed by the Minister for Finance to reduce the budget of 808 CS Battalion from 6,000,000 to 2,000,000 Lire per month. The Minister for Finance is being reminded that 808 CS Bn. is retained under the Supreme Allied Commander's operational control and that no reduction in budget will be permitted without his approval.

2. Any proposals which the Ministry of War may wish to make for the reduction in 808 CS Bn. budget should be made through this Mission.

A.H. Gilmore Lt Col
forMajor General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : G (SD)

AHG/as

1633

Translation.

From:- M. of W.
To:- MMIA.

Ref:-109792/1/3
Date:- 10th. May 46

Subject:- Budget of the 808th Bn. C.S.

Reply to your letters A/OLO dated 4th. and 6th. May 46

The reduction in the budget of the 808th Bn CS has not been the result of a decision taken by this Ministry, but has been the consequence of the total reduction of funds which, proposed by the M. of Treasury, the Branches of the Government have allotted to the M. of W., mainly in accordance with the very limited possibilities of the ^{Budget} ~~Finance~~ of the Italian State.

This Ministry will not ~~continue~~ ^{fail} to insist on the matter to the competent branches of the government to which ~~also~~ copy of your letters will ^{also} be forwarded.

The confirmation requested in para 2 of the letter dated 6th May 46 will be given as soon as similar confirmation is received from the M. of Treasury which has already been approached urgently.


Sgd. Lombardi.

19/5

W2

1662

No further action yet
15/5.



Sà/oc

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

Gabinetto

Prot. N. 9792/11/3 Allegati

Risposta al disp. del 4 e 5 maggio 1946

Roma, 13 MAG 1946

Dir. Sec. N. A. 010

OGGETTO : bilancio dell'808° battaglione C.S.

A.

Alla LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

La diminuzione del bilancio dell'808° battaglione C.S. non è stata la conseguenza di una deliberazione specifica presa da questo Ministero per la diminuzione di quel bilancio, bensì la conseguenza della complessiva diminuzione dei fondi che su proposta del Ministero del Tesoro gli organi del Governo hanno assegnato al Ministero della Guerra, principalmente in base alle ridottissime possibilità del bilancio dello Stato italiano.

Questo Ministero non mancherà di continuare l'opera di insistenza già intrapresa presso gli organi competenti del Governo, ai quali sarà data anche conoscenza delle lettere di cotesta Missione.

La conferma richiesta al capo 2 della lettera del 6 maggio c.a. sarà data non appena analoga conferma sarà data dal Ministero del Tesoro, già interessato di urgenza.

d'ordine
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO

P. Santarini

Oggetto: bilancio dell'808° battaglione U.S.

17.

Alla LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

La diminuzione del bilancio dell'808° battaglione U.S. non è stata la conseguenza di una deliberazione specifica presa da questo Ministero per la diminuzione di quel bilancio, bensì la conseguenza della complessiva diminuzione dei fondi che su proposta del Ministero del Tesoro gli organi del Governo hanno assegnato al Ministero della Guerra, principalmente in base alle ridottissime possibilità del bilancio dello Stato italiano.

Questo Ministero non mancherà di continuare l'opera di insistenza già intrapresa presso gli organi competenti del Governo, ai quali sarà data anche conoscenza delle lettere di cotesta Missione.

La conferma richiesta al capo 2 della lettera del 6 maggio c.a. sarà data non appena analoga conferma sarà data dal Ministero del Tesoro, già interessato di urgenza.

d'ordine
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO

Giuliani

TR	1200	1001
IN	14/5	
78	1545	14/5

14/5

File: (2)

HQ MMIA CWP

10

B

MINISTRY OF WAR

A 773

UNCLASSIFIED

REF THIS HQ LETTER A/OIO OF 4 ²⁰ AND 6 ²¹ MAY (.) MAY BEARLY PLEASE
BE EXPEDITED

mf.

IMPORTANT

File A/OIO ✓

J.D. STOCKER, Maj.

1660

Subject : Budget:- 808 C.S. Battalion.

(21)

Land Forces Sub Comm. AC.
(M.M.I.A.), R O M E.
Tel: 489081 Ext:380.

✓ A/O10

6 May 46.

To : Ministry of War.

(20)

Further to our letter A O10 of 4 May 46.

1. Will you please furnish this headquarters with a full report, giving the reasons for the cut in the budget, and what action your Ministry is taking in the matter.

2. May this report please be rendered at the earliest moment for onward transmission to AFHQ.

Meanwhile please confirm that the budget remains at its original figure pending consideration of any proposals put forward.

Att. Gillmore & Co
Major-General,
En M.M.I.A.

/f.g.

1659

Subject:- Budget - 808 CS Battalion

Land Forces Sub-Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) ROME.

—A 010

4 May 1946.

To : Ministry of War

1. It is learned from an AFHQ signal received by AG copy to M.M.I.A., that the Minister for War has been directed by the Minister for Finance to reduce the budget of 808 CS Battalion from 6,000,000 to 2,000,000 Lire per month. The Minister for Finance is being reminded that 808 CS Bn. is retained under the Supreme Allied Commander's operational control and that no reduction in budget will be permitted without his approval.

2. Any proposals which the Ministry of War may wish to make for the reduction in 808 CS Bn. budget should come through this Mission.

THB
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

1658

Copy to G (SD)

AGC/as

For 6/5.

INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

CIPHER

Message Centre No: H/ 2508

Originator's Reference: F 65515

Date / Time of Origin: 301705 H

Date Time Rec'd: MAY 1 0900

Precedence: IMPORTANT

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACHED

TO : ALCOM ROME.

SECRET

SECRET

THIS HQ HAS BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE HAS DIRECTED THE MINISTER OF WAR TO REDUCE THE BUDGET OF 808 CS BATTALION FROM 6000000 TO 2000000 LIRE PER MONTH. PLEASE BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND REMIND HIM THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HANDOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 808 CS BATTALION WAS RETAINED UNDER SACHED'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE BATTALION WHICH SUCH A REDUCTION IN ITS BUDGET IS BOUND TO HAVE YOU SHOULD REQUEST THE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO HAVE THE DIRECTION OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE SUSPENDED PENDING REFERENCE TO THIS HQ. AND TO FURNISH AN ASSURANCE THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE BUDGET WILL REMAIN AT ITS PRESENT FIGURE OF 6000000 LIRE. AT THE SAME TIME IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS HQ WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MAY CARE SUBMIT FOR THE REDUCTION OF EXPENDITURE ON THE BATTALION. AN EARLY REPORT ON THE MINISTERS REACTIONS TO YOUR APPROACH IS REQUESTED.

ATTENTION TRIBUNAL

it be distributed outside
current Departments of
submitted even in Cipher

AC DIST

MMIA

ACTION: ~~FINANCE~~

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER

1657

1A

MINISTER OF WAR TO REDUCE THE BUDGET OF 808 CS BATTALION FROM 6000000 TO 2000000

LIPS PER MONTH. PLEASE BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND REMIND HIM THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE HANDOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY TO THE CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT 808 CS BATTALION WAS RETAINED UNDER SACRED'S OPERATIONAL CONTROL. IN VIEW OF THE ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE EFFICIENCY OF THE BATTALION WHICH SUCH A REDUCTION IN THE BUDGET IS BOUND TO HAVE YOU SHOULD REQUEST THE PRIME MINISTER TO TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO HAVE THE DIRECTION OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE SUSPENDED PENDING REFERENCE TO THIS HQ. AND TO FURNISH AN ASSURANCE THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE BUDGET WILL REMAIN AT ITS PRESENT FIGURE OF 6000000 LIRA. AT THE SAME TIME IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS HQ WILL BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WHICH THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MAY MAKE SUBMIT FOR THE REDUCTION OF EXPENDITURE ON THE BATTALION. AN EARLY REPORT ON THE MINISTERS REACTIONS TO YOUR APPROACH IS REQUESTED.

Copy for TELEGRAM
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for abased).

AC DIST
ACTION: ~~MMIA~~

1657 11

INFO: CHIEF COMMISSIONER

EX COMMISSIONER

LCOM SEC

FILE

L. PAGES

SKELETON

POLAD A

B

ACTION

SECRET

A010

17

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 0/3/2

Maj. Gen. WARD visited us Monday, 18 Oct 48, and has promised to take up the u/a 5 points which are outstanding by AFHQ:-

(1) Accommodation

He will instruct "G" at AFHQ that on application by us for certain accommodations for ITI Army, ITI Army is to have priority.

(2) Armament for Interim Army

It is essential that we know for training purposes what the future policy is with regard to the new Interim Army.

(3) MMIA WE

Gen. WARD promised to take hastening action with LONDON.

(4) MMIA Directive

Gen. WARD will hasten.

(5) Directive re handing over ITI Army to ITI Government

Gen. WARD promised to speed up.

Lt. Col.
C. S.

18 Oct 48

Copy to: Col. A/Q
G II (Trg)

1656

WB

SUBJECT:- Italian P.O.W.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.
M.M.I.A.
R O ME
A/CLO

11 September 1945

TO : G3 (Org) AFHQ (for Brig. J. D'A ANDERSON, DSO)

1. I attach a copy of a letter 9007/EC of 5 Sep from Chief Commissioner A.C., which affects the new W.E. of M.M.I.A. which Major General WARD and I discussed in detail recently.
2. The background of all this as you know, is in AFHQ File AG 091,711/115 SAC-O (referred to in para 1 of Chief Commissioners letter).
3. If it is AFHQ's order that I take over this extra civilian commitment, I shall need the 4 officers and 3 EM/OR's added to my W.E.
4. May I have Major General WARD's decision.

L. Branning
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to:- G3 AFHQ
HQ Allied Commission

1655

Seen. B.F. if no repl 11 Oct.

AAC. Ask Brig Anderson about this when he comes here on 12 Oct & let me know repl 17 Oct.

A/P.

I spoke Brig Anderson. We are definitely going to get the 4 officers and 3 EM/OR's spelled to.

AAC. 13/10

SP

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref: 9007/EC.

5 September 1945.

SUBJECT: Italian POW Division.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MIA).

1. In my 3251/170/EC of 24 May 45, para 4(a), addressed to AFHQ, copy to you, I recommended that the Division of the War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission known as the Italian POW Division should be taken over by your Sub-Commission forthwith, and gave reasons therefor. AFHQ replied in their AG 091.711/115 SAC-O of 10 July 45, para 6, that this transfer would be a matter of domestic arrangement when MIA passed from under direct operational control of AFHQ.

2. As you know it is intended that the operational control of the Italian Army should pass to the Italian Government by 30 September.

3. For administrative reasons it has been found necessary to divorce the Italian POW Division from the War Materials Disposal Sub-Commission and at the present time it forms part of the Civil Affairs Section as a separate Division. It is my intention as soon as the turnover to the Italian Government of the Northern Regions has been completed, gradually to reduce the responsibilities of the Civil Affairs Section and as from 30 September I must ask you to take over the responsibility for the Italian POW Division together with any officers who may be necessary for that Division at that time. At the present moment the Division consists of 4 officers, 3 EM/GRs and 14 civilian clerks.

4. The Division is at present continuing its delegation of responsibility to the High Commissioner for Italian POW and by the end of the month this delegation should have been considerably increased, although it will not be completed. You should therefore make arrangements for the inclusion of a small group of officers for this work in any new WE that you may be considering for the future of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) and I would suggest that your staff should consult with the Italian POW Division of the CA Section to this end.

5. I fully realise your objection to the assumption of further responsibilities in connection with the work of your Sub-Commission but without repeating the arguments put forward previously I consider that the responsibility of supervising the work of that section of the Ministry for War which deals with repatriated Italian POW cannot be avoided.

W. H. Stone
REAR ADMIRAL, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5, AFHQ
CA Section

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGDS

DATE/TIME
220918B

TO : ACTION DISTONE DISTVO

INFO: 5 ARMY 15 ARMY GROUP ALLIED COMMISSION FORMMIA

REF : FX 97174

SECRET

- ONE REFERENCE RECENT DISCUSSIONS 1 DISTRICT 2 DISTRICT AND 5 ARMY ON ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BRITISH TROOPS IN NORTH ITALY. THIS HQ LETTER AG323/061 LOG-O DATED 16 JUNE 45 REFERS. FOLLOWING IS ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN 1 AND 2 DISTRICTS.
- TWO ALL BRITISH TROOPS IN 5 ARMY AREA WHICH ARE NOW MAINTAINED BY 216 SUB AREA WILL BE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF HQ 1 DISTRICT.
- THREE ALL BRITISH TROOPS IN 5 ARMY AREA WHICH ARE NOW BEING MAINTAINED THROUGH GENOA OR BY 215 SUB AREA WILL BE THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF HQ 2 DISTRICT.
- FOUR THIS WILL PLACE THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARY BETWEEN 1 AND 2 DISTRICTS GENERALLY ALONG THE WESTERN BOUNDARY OF THE PROVINCES OF BOLZANO TRENTO VERONA MANTOVA REGGIO EMILIA WHICH IS THE EVENTUAL PLANNED BOUNDARY BETWEEN HQ'S 1 AND 2 DISTRICTS WHEN 5 ARMY CEASE TO EXERCISE ALL CONTROL OVER THEIR PRESENT AREA IN NORTH ITALY.
- FIVE FORM M.I.A. REQUEST YOU TAKE ACTION TO SECURE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS IN RESPECT OF ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE FORMATIONS TO CORRESPOND WITH ABOVE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Action (Copy 5/8/24)

D 28/6

1653

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

INFO COPY
ONLY

AO 70

SECRET
By Auth of
CG, 15TH AG
Intls: *guy*
DATE: 5/26/45

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northwest Italy.

TO: See Distribution.

1. Attached is copy of the minutes of a conference held at this Headquarters on 24 May 1945 on "The Occupation of Northwest Italy".
2. It is requested that action, where indicated in these minutes, be taken without further instructions.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCCREERY:

Regt. H. Tate
RALPH H. TATE
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-4

A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

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- Fifth Army (20)
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- IV US Corps (5)
- 2 District CP (6)
- Fwd 2 District (2)
- PBS (10)
- Mov NW Italy (1)
- Allied Commission (10)
- MMIA (5)
- MRS (5)

DISTRIBUTION

Action: *guy*

INFO → (A) *guy*

1652

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL McCHERRY:

A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

RAIP H. TATE
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-4

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PBS (10)
Mov NW Italy (1)
Allied Commission (10)
MMA (5)
MRS (5)

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D.C. of S., (Br) (1)
G-1 (1)
G-2 (1)
G-3 (5)
G-4 (5)
Q (10)
A (4)
Mov (1)
Engr (2)
Signal Section (4)
AG Records (5)

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: G/CP

INFO → (A) NR

1852

SPARE : TWO

DATA	
Col. A.	100
A. 1°	100
A. 2°	100
A. 3°	100
Med.	100
Welfare	100
Personnel	100
Log.	100

SECRET

80-26-515

SECRET.

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ 15 ARMY GROUP ON 24 MAY 45 ON
OCCUPATION OF NW ITALY.

1. PRESENT:-

Presiding - Brig-Gen R.H. Tate, AC of S G-4, 15 Army Group.

ATHQ - Colonel R.E. Rathbone, G-3(Org)
Colonel J.H. Mitchell, G-5
Lt.Col. B. Boyd, G-4(A).

15 Army Group

Brig C.D. Packard, DC of S(Br)
Brig W.H.D. Ritchie, DA & QMG.
Brig B.T. Godfrey-Faussett, Q2
Colonel P.D. Miller, G-3(Ops)
Colonel C.S. D'Orsa, G-4
Colonel N.W. Monfort, G-5
Colonel C.H.K. Smith, DMS.
Lt.Col. W.J. McConnell, G-3(Plans)
Lt.Col. F.K. Eberhard, G-4(Plans)
Lt.Col. G.J.F. Mackay, AQMG.
Lt.Col. D.H. Cameron, SO RE.1
Major E.H. Jennings, G-3(SD)
Major B.C. Scott, DAAG.
Major C.H. Fitch, DAQMG(Mov)
Major W.B. Watkeys, Signal Section
Capt J.E. Palmour, G-1.

Fifth Army

- Colonel E.M. Clarke, G-4
Colonel A.E. Sutherland, G-5
Lt.Col. D.M. Annand, AQMG(Tr Incr).

IV US Corps

- Colonel A.T. Lacey, G-4

PBS

- Colonel E.T. Foster, G-4

2 District

- Lt.Col. Sir N.J. Mordaunt, Bt. GSO.1
Lt.Col. C.A. Chadwyck-Healey, AQMG.

Nov, NW Italy

- Colonel G. Coaker
Major D.W. Greenway

Allied Commission Brigadier M.S. Lush

GENERAL.

1651

Brig-Gen Tate explained that the object of the conference was to

Colonel P.D. Miller, G-3 (Ops)
 Colonel C.S. D'Orsa, G-4
 Colonel N.W. Monfort, G-5
 Colonel C.H.K. Smith, DMS.
 Lt.Col. W.J. McConnell, G-3 (Plans)
 Lt.Col. F.K. Eberhard, G-4 (Plans)
 Lt.Col. G.J.F. Mackay, AQMG.
 Lt.Col. D.H. Cameron, SO RE.1
 Major E.H. Jennings, G-3 (SD)
 Major E.C. Scott, DAAG.
 Major C.H. Fitch, DAAG (Mov)
 Major W.B. Watkeys, Signal Section
 Capt J.E. Palmour, G-1.

Fifth Army - Colonel E.M. Clarke, G-4
 Colonel A.E. Sutherland, G-5
 Lt.Col. D.M. Annand, AQMG (Incor).

IV US Corps - Colonel A.T. Lacey, G-4

PBS - Colonel E.T. Foster, G-4

2 District - Lt.Col. Sir N.J. Mordaunt, St. GSO.1
 Lt.Col. C.A. Chadwyck-Healey, AQMG.

Mov, NW Italy - Colonel G. Coaker
 Major D.W. Greenway

Allied Commission Brigadier M.S. Lush

1651

GENERAL.

2. Brig-Gen Tate explained that the object of the conference was to examine the existing position in NW ITALY and to determine what steps had been or could be taken to facilitate the handover of responsibilities for NW ITALY by Fifth Army to 2 District and Allied Commission, i.e. to implement Phase 2 of the Occupation as defined in 15 Army Group Administrative Directive No.1 dated 19 Feb 45, when the French situation is clarified sufficiently for an operation point of view to enable such handover to take place.

PRESENT POSITION.

3. (a) Surrendered Forces.

Fifth Army stated that these were being evacuated to Concentration Areas as quickly as possible, and that the task should be completed within ten days, except for those in hospitals.

(b) Captured Material.

This has been collected into dumps by Fifth Army, and location

lists have been made. Cataloguing was, however, not yet complete. It was pointed out to 2 District that dealing with captured material would represent a considerable commitment when they assumed responsibility, and they agreed to examine the problem, liaise with Fifth Army, and submit demands to AFHQ for any extra staff, etc., which they considered they might require. It was agreed that AFHQ should be asked to hold a conference on this subject at an early date at HQ 15 Army Group to clarify outstanding points.

ACTION:- 2 District
AFHQ.

(c) Partisans.

The intention of G3 Fifth Army was to complete disarming of partisans by 7 June 45. Difficulties might, however, be expected over disarming partisans operating near the Franco-Italian frontier, so long as the present situation existed.

(d) Requirement of Operational Troops.

G-3, 15 Army Group, stated it was considered that two full operational divisions in addition to security troops were required so long as the Franco-Italian frontier situation was tense. The 6th SA Armoured Division were a wasting asset, and no other British Troops were likely to be available so long as the Yugoslav situation remained critical.

(e) Allied Commission.

Brigadier Lush stated that Regional HQs were now in position and functioning under Fifth Army control. Phase 2, under which AC would assume responsibility for civil administration, could, therefore, be implemented without much difficulty. He confirmed that AC were prepared to face the extra transport commitment, if Army transport was withdrawn, provided all AC transport now operating under Fifth Army was returned to AC control.

The main problems still to be solved were:-

- (i) The Franco-Italian frontier situation
- (ii) Disarming of Partisans
- (iii) Unemployment - The solution of this lay in the provision of raw materials, particularly coal, which was now under investigation at AFHQ.

(f) 2 District.

HQ 2 District was still settling in, working in units and

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The main problems still to be solved were:-

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- (iii) Unemployment - The solution of this lay in the provision of new materials, particularly coal, which was now under investigation at AFHQ.

(x) 2 District.

HQ 2 District was still settling in, most in units and installations and not really functioning except for 57 Area in COMA. Their Engineers and Signals were, however, lending assistance to IV Corps. 2 District stated that they considered they would be ready to take over Phase 2 responsibilities by 10 June 45, provided the necessary signal communications could be made available to them as the principal HQ. This would, of course, mean the return of any signal units they now had operating with IV Corps. CG 15 Army Group pointed out that some Fifth Army Engineer units would in any case have to be left under 2 District to complete certain outstanding tasks such as bridging.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2 OF THE OCCUPATION.

(a) Problem

Brigadier Tate said the problem was to consider now in the

light of the foregoing remarks:-

- (i) Was implementation of Phase 2 possible at an early date?
- or (ii) Was partial implementation, whereby 2 District and AG took over responsibility for certain eastern areas of NW ITALY, a practical proposition?

(b) Total Implementation of Phase 2.

Fifth Army stated that the CG felt very strongly that so long as he was responsible for law and order in any territory he must be completely in command. The completion of the responsibilities in para.3(a) and (b) above would not necessarily enable Fifth Army to relinquish their control over NW ITALY. The Franco-Italian frontier situation was not yet settled, and Fifth Army could only relinquish control, if responsibility for this was assumed by AFHQ. 2 District was not organized for possible active operations, nor could they administer US troops. It was concluded, therefore, that until these problems were solved there could be no total implementation of Phase 2.

(c) Partial Implementation of Phase 2.

After discussion it was agreed for the reasons given below that partial implementation was also impracticable:-

- (i) IV Corps I of C would have to continue to run through any area handed over to 2 District.
- (ii) Signals facilities were insufficient to cope with two major Hqs in NW ITALY, both operating at the same time.
- (iii) Dual control, whereby IV Corps retained operational command and 2 District assumed certain administrative responsibilities was not considered practicable.
- (iv) Similarly, it was not considered that Regional Commissioners could be put under direct command of Allied Commission so long as Fifth Army were responsible for the territory. It was, however, recommended that AG set up an Advance Echelon in ITALY, which would co-ordinate Regional activities through Fifth Army and with whom Fifth Army could deal as one entity.

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ACTION:- Allied
Commission

(d) Future Requirement of Operational Troops.

2 District stated they considered at least the equivalent of one division and one brigade would always be wanted to watch the French frontier, even if the French now withdrew behind it, and it was doubtful if Italian Group were suitable for this task. The gradual departure of the 6 SA Armoured Division, and the continued requirement of all available British troops for NE ITALY, might mean the retention of one US Division for some time. AFHQ was asked to consider the matter and state their policy.

ACTION

4

(e) Redeployment of US Troops.

2 District asked with what speed US Troops were likely to be withdrawn on implementation of Phase 2. Brig-Gen Tate stated this would depend on redeployment and training schemes still under consideration.

215 SUB-AREA.

5. In reply to a question by AMHQ, 2 District stated that in Phase 2 they would like 215 Sub-Area to remain at PLACENZA to run the roadhead, at any rate until GENOVA was fully opened.

LOCAL INDUSTRIES - NW ITALY.

6. PDS asked what would be the position in Phase 2 of certain contracts which they were now placing on behalf of STOUA, and by agreement with Fifth Army, with local industries in NW ITALY. Brig-Gen Tate stated they must take this up with AMHQ, so that allocation could be confirmed by the Industrial Planning Board and 2 District informed.

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ACTION:- Allied
Commission.

ACTION:- AFHQ.

LAND FORCES

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 8251/170/EO.

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organization and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (ALFA).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organized, disciplined units and a military organization distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the North and in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps has enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organization to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.

4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organization for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country.

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(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organization for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the War Material Disposal Sub-Commission known as the Italian POW Division. This Division should now be taken over by the Land Forces Sub-Commission forthwith and the whole problem dealt with by that Sub-Commission which normally deals with the Ministry of War.

(b) Clearance of Land Mines. It is submitted that immediate steps should be taken to employ all engineering units of the Italian Army for this purpose. Some of them must already be provided with apparatus: more can probably be obtained, even on loan from Allied troops. The employment of the Army

-2-

for this vital matter in the rehabilitation of agriculture would earn the gratitude of a vast number of the population who are now prevented from following their normal vocations and would increase the local production of food.

Hitherto, this matter has been handled by a Division of the Civil Affairs Section, who, with assistance from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, have achieved remarkable results. It is clearly, I submit, a function which should now be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

Areas to be cleared and priorities to be given could be decided by the Italian Government and, if necessary, by the Allied Military Government.

(c) Harvest. In line with most Continental countries which practise conscription, it has been the custom in this country to release during harvest time a large number of troops either on agricultural leave or on temporary duty to assist in the harvest. There are many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organised than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in FOECIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

5. I recommend, therefore, that the reception and welfare of Italian POW and the clearance of land mines should be undertaken by the Italian Army under the Italian supervision of the Ministry for War and under the Allied supervision of its counterpart in the Allied Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. I also recommend that the customary release of Italian service personnel for the harvest be approved.

6. There will be other fields in which I shall make recommendations for the employment of the Italian Army from time to time. It will need a reorientation in the ideas of the Ministry of War and a broadening of the directives of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It may need adjustment in the method of administration and the provision of food. But it is essential for the sake of the Army as well as for the rehabilitation of this country that we encourage the Italian Government to use the manpower they have at their direct command in the services of their country now no longer at war.

7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (ALL). Unfortunately, this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Com-

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7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIL). Unfortunately this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Commissioner's reply. I am in full agreement with the latter. The Land Forces Sub-Commission is an integral part of the Allied Commission and it must share with the other Sub-Commissions of this Commission the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation to which we have committed ourselves in this country. We must shift the balance from MIA and its completely military chain of command and outlook to the Land Forces Sub-Commission, the counterpart of the Ministry for War in the Italian Government.

8. I feel sure that you will welcome in this respect recommendations from this Commission as to the future of the Italian Army and their dispositions. If the Italian Army is to become part of the Italian nation we must detach them from their operational Allied commanders as rapidly as

-3-

possible and bring them, under the Ministry of War, more into the Italian picture as an instrument of the Italian Government rather than of the Allied command. I am requesting GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission to submit recommendations in implementation of this principle which, of course, will make the Land Forces Sub-Commission far more a part of the Allied Commission.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2) } With copies of relevant
Acting President } correspondence.
Chief Commissioner }
Land Forces Sub-Com (MIL) (2) —
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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

APO 512

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: Initials: [Signature] :

: Date: 2 May 1945 :

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DIB

AG 091.711/173 GGT-0

2 May 1945

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops Outside Italy.

TO: President, Allied Commission
 President, Allied Commission For: Land Forces Sub-Commission, MMIA
 Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
 Headquarters Fifth Army British Increment *
 Headquarters Eighth Army
 General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
 General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District *
 General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District

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1. Reference is made to letter, MMIA file G/6 dated 10 April 1945.
2. The following general policy has been established regarding the employment of Italian troops outside Italy:
 - a. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian troops in VENEZIA GIULIA.
 - b. The following exceptions to the above policy will be authorized:
 - (1) Use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels, and employment of Italian personnel at that port.
 - (2) Such other employment of Italian personnel in the immediate area of the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA as, for military reasons, might be unavoidable.
3. British Headquarters and units to which Italian troops are attached will shed such personnel at a suitable time before entry into AUSTRIA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Edmund R. Shugart
 EDMUND R. SHUGART
 Colonel, AGD
 Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Each Addressee
 (*) With copy of MMIA letter G/6 of 10 Apr 45
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| 1 - CAO | 1 - G-5 |
| 1 - G-1 (A) | 2 - AG Records |
| 1 - G-4 (A) | 1 - AG M&D |
| 1 - G-4 (B) | |
| 1 - G-1 (B) | |
| 1 - G-3 (Org-2) | |

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