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ACC

10000 | 120 | 3016

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10000/120/3016

A 016 Manpower North Italy

Apr - May 1945

2088
2107

COPY OF INCOMING SIGNAL

From: AFHQ sgd SACMED cite FHGCT

25I900B

To : Action MMIA

Info: I5 Army Gp. 5 Army 8 Army AAF/SC Pensouth Pentase
Distone Distwo Distthree ALCOM RAAC

FX 8204I (.) RESTRICTED (.) My FX 72843 of 09 (.) New para
First (.) Control line for move of Italian Army and Italian
co-operators personnel on authzd leave now extended to river
PIAVE from mouth to road-river crossing ? G 6494 thence road
B 6712, B 5762, B 8875 thence due NORTH to AUSTRIAN frontier (.)

New para

Second (.) No moves for any Italian Military personnel EAST of
this line nor into prohibited frontier zone viz belt 25 rpt 25
kms in depth along FRENCH? SWISS and AUSTRIAN frontiers (.)

Third (.) Demobilised personnel may move EAST of line with
proper documents from MMIA (.) New para

Four (.) Italian personnel on duty may proceed EAST of line
in para I above only with permission I5 Army Gp or 8 Army (.)

Five (.) For MMIA only (.) NO rpt NO objection to publicity
scheme your A/OI6 of 27 Apl (.) Emphasize only limited rail
facilities exist in NORTH ITALY (.) Your SD 2674 of 12 refers (.)

'A' DISTR.

Original A 020
Action Copy A 016
Info GSD (2)
Float.

Important.

A. 2/ Confirm the War time have this & publish it.

Weyne For action para 5.

2107

W.P.
Ad.

Subject: Liberated Italian Army Leave
Personnel - Transportation.

A016, (3)

LAND FORCES SUB COM A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E

A 207

23 May 45.

To : AFHQ for G3 Org. Foreign.

1. Herewith as requested by you a Table showing numbers of leave and demobilisation personnel requiring movement from various locations to the North of Italy.

SPA

S.P. ARCHER, Captain .
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.

✓

Copy to: 'A'I, M.M.I.A.

ECC.

2106

DETAILS OF ITALIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL.
REQUIRING TRANSPORTATION TO W. ITALY FOR LEAVE AND DEMOBILIZATION.

ORIGIN OR PRESENT LOCATION	DESTINATION—PROVINCE.										
	NAPLES.		FIGURIA.		PIEMONTE.		LOMBARDIA.		VENETO.		
	Leave.	Demob.	Leave.	Demob.	Leave.	Demob.	Leave.	Demob.	Leave.	Demob.	
ROME AREA	683.	143.	140.	214.	31.	1201.	216.	1187.	272.	837.	220.
NAPLES AREA.	4160.	3187.	3187.	899.	971.	6828.	3442.	5778.	6373.	5581.	5954.
BARI AREA.	239.	124.	70.	13.	171.	36.	129.	168.	360.	102.	
SARDINIA.	415.	38.	103.	20.	168.	118.	589.	177.	630.	245.	
IGLIE.	514.	18.	49.	25.	186.	28.	541.	62.	545.	31.	
FORL											
209 DIV.	1943.	686.	152.	96.	616.	558.	1824.	1008.	1508.	1346.	
FLORENCE AREA.	94.	19.	35.	10.	57.	11.	135.	47.	108.	45.	
MILAN	22.	3.	4.	0.	15.	3.	73.	13.	22.	2.	
BOLOGNA.	27.	1.	1.	0.	5.	0.	16.	1.	9.	1.	
TRIESTE GRUPPO.	654.	13.	191.	5.	337.	11.	1158.	28.	316.	13.	
TRIESTE.	780.	15.	431.	17.	574.	32.	1497.	43.	1385.	49.	
CRISTONA.	944.	17.	278.	12.	366.	16.	1232.	25.	923.	14.	

+ Includes RTC. ICF. CESANO.

DETAILS OF ITALIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL.

TRANSPORTATION TO N. ITALY FOR LEAVE AND DEMOBILISATION.

DESTINATION		PROVINCE									
LIGURIA		T. MONTE		ROMA		VENEZIA					
De-ol.	Leave.	De-ol.	Leave.	De-ol.	Leave.	De-ol.	Leave.	De-ol.	Leave.		
140	214.	31.	1201.	216.	1187.	272.	837.	220.	21	+	
3187											
1187.	899.	971.	6828.	3142.	5778.	6393.	2681.	5254.			
124.	70.	13.	171.	36.	129.	160.	360.	102.			
68.	103.	20.	168.	110.	589.	177.	690.	245.			
18.	49.	25.	186.	28.	541.	62.	345.	31.			
606.	192.	96.	615.	558.	1824.	1008.	1588.	1346.			
19.	35.	10.	57.	11.	135.	47.	108.	45.			
3.	4.	0.	15.	3.	72.	13.	22.	2.			
1.	1.	0.	5.	0.	16.	1.	9.	1.			
13.	191.	5.	357.	11.	1158.	28.	315.	13.			
15.	431.	17.	574.	32.	1497.	43.	1305.	49.			
17.	278.	12.	366.	16.	1232.	25.	923.	14.			

+ Includes RTO. ICF. CESANO.

FROM : M M I A

TO : (FOR ACTION) A P H Q

18

B

REF: A 1080

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REFERENCE FX 73976 (.) FIRST (.) INFORMATION FROM PBS SHOWS OUT OF
21,000 STRENGTH 2,510 WERE AWOL ON 16 MAY AND THAT A NUMBER OF MEN
PREVIOUSLY AWOL WERE RETURNING TO UNITS (.) SECOND (.) THIS ABSENCE
HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED AS SOON AS ALL ITALY LIBERATED AS LARGE NUMBERS
OF MEN HAD HOMES IN ENEMY OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND DID NOT KNOW CONDITION
OF FAMILIES (.) SEE OUR O 16 OF TWENTY FOUR APRIL (.) THIRD (.) ITALIAN
WAR MINISTRY HAS STRONGLY ALL COMMANDS TO PERSONALLY INFORM MEN OF
NECESSITY OF REMAINING ON THE JOB UNTIL DEMOBILIZED OR GRANTED LEAVE
AND TO TAKE ENERGETIC ACTION TO PREVENT DESERTION (.) FOURTH (.) NOW
THAT DEMOBILIZATION OF OLDER CLASSES AND LEAVE FOR MEN TO SEE FAMILIES
HAS BEEN APPROVED BELIEVE DESERTION RATE WILL FALL (.) FIFTH (.) ADEQUATE
MEN NOW ~~AVAILABLE~~ AVAILABLE ON CALL TO REPLACE MEN WHO DESERT AND WHO DO
NOT RETURN

PRECEDENCE

AUTHENTICATED

C. P. KERR, COLONEL.

2104

SECRETSECRET

SUBJECT: EFFECT ON THE ITALIAN ARMY OF THE
LIBERATION OF NORTH ITALY.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MILIA)

4/316 ✓

24 APR 45

TO : A.F.H.Q. (3 copies)OBJECT

1. The object of this letter is to examine the effect of the liberation of NORTH ITALY on the Italian Army, particularly as regards its strength, discipline and equipment.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

2. AS NORTH ITALY is liberated, a variety of new factors (many unpredictable) will come into play. Among the major ones are:-

- (a) The feeling of elation at the success of battle and liberation.

While tending to make the Italian Army proud of its efforts, this will also tend to make the volatile Italian "kick over the traces" and resort to acts of indiscipline such as desertion, A.W.O.L., fracas with allied troops etc.

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The last mentioned already tends to increase ²⁴⁰⁰ the matter has been taken up strongly with the Minister of War, who in turn has issued an equally strong letter to all Commanders.

(b) The desire of men to re-unite with their families

All with homes in the North will want to see their families at once and many will go without leave. Many with homes in the South will also want to go, feeling that the war is over and that there is no serious reason why they should not go.

-2-

(b) The desire of men to re-unite with their families. (con't)

There are in addition, an estimated total of 50,000 over-age personnel which have been held because their homes are in the North, but who are entitled to demobilization when their homes are freed. These comprise the 1913 and older classes, limited service troops and the first four months of the 1914 class. We are already demobilizing such men whose homes are in liberated Italy. Your AG 091.718/121 OCT-0 dated 29 March 1945 refers.

(c) The attitude of the Patriots

This needs no comment. The Allied policy has been decided on and it is hoped that this problem will be solved by the methods proposed.

The inevitable results of the above will be losses in strength, discipline and equipment, ranging in degree according to developments and the steps taken now to deal with the situation when it arises.

SUMMARY

3. (a) At MMA request, the Italian War Ministry have produced an estimate of the numbers of serving soldiers whose homes are in the North. Their estimate is about 120,000 including the 50,000 mentioned in para 2(b). Possibly this is an over-estimate. But the War Ministry have asked all units for figures by 1 May; though with the poor and slow Italian intercommunication, the dispersion of the numerous Italian formations and units, and the continuous turn-over

(c) The attitude of the patriots

This needs no comment. The Allied policy has been decided on and it is hoped that this problem will be solved by the methods proposed.

The inevitable results of the above will be losses in strength, discipline and equipment, ranging in degree according to developments and the steps taken now to deal with the situation when it arises.

STRENGTH

3. (a) At MMIA request, the Italian War Ministry have produced an estimate of the numbers of serving soldiers whose homes are in the North. Their estimate is about 120,000 including the 50,000 mentioned in para 2(b). Possibly this is an over-estimate. But the War Ministry have asked all units for figures by 1 May; though with the poor and slow Italian intercommunication, the dispersion of the numerous Italian formations and units, and the continuous turn-over of personnel, these figures are not likely to be ²⁴⁰²very exact. At any rate the estimate gives us a figure to work on for the time being.

(b) (1) Owing to the ceiling we cannot call up men now to meet potential losses and these latter are an uncertain quantity. Nor could we replace abnormal losses as they occur by the normal call up procedure, which takes time to implement and involves considerable transportation and administrative commitments.

.....3/...

-3-

STRENGTH (cont'd)

2. (b) (ii) In the North however there should be a fairly big source of taxable manpower in the shape of volunteers, patriots and ex-soldiers of military age. These could be collected and absorbed ad hoc more readily and with greater administrative ease, which would in turn assist the political situation.

(iii) On the other hand, in any event presumably administrative (particularly as regards clothing and equipment) and transportation difficulties will continue to limit new intakes to a maximum of 19,000 a month.

(c) From the above it would seem that:-

(i) No definite plans can be made now owing to inevitable lack of data and of accurate knowledge of future developments.

(ii) If wastage is normal and the Italian Army is to be kept up to strength, over-age personnel would have to be held (some for at least 2 months, owing to the limiting administrative factor of 19,000 a month) till replaced from another source.

(iii) But wastage is bound to be abnormal and there are likely to be serious repercussions if the over-age personnel are retained too long.

(d) Therefore, it is recommended that:-

(1) Plans be made ad hoc as the situation develops.

(ii) A reduction in strength due to abnormal wastage be accepted temporarily.

to limit new intakes to a maximum of 10,000 a month.

(c) From the above it would seem that:-

(10) No definite plans can be made now owing to inevitable lack of data and of accurate knowledge of future developments.

(11) If wastage is normal and the Italian Army is to be kept up to strength, over-age personnel would have to be held (none for at least 3 months, owing to the limiting administrative factor of 10,000 a month) till replaced from another source.

(11.1) But wastage is bound to be abnormal and there are likely to be serious repercussions if the over-age personnel are retained too long.

(d) therefore, it is recommended that:-

(i) Plans be made ad hoc as the situation develops.

(ii) A reduction in strength due to abnormal wastage be accepted temporarily.

(11.1) In view of the possibly reduced commitments of the Italian Army after liberation of the North and of a possibly lower than 310,000 post-war ceiling, the question of a permanent reduction in strength be considered.

(iv) The above be explained to Armies, Districts etc. so that they will not demand that units be at full strength when this is not possible and perhaps unnecessary or even in-advisable.

.....d/...

DISCIPLINE

-4-

3. (d) (v) In principle, the 50,000 over-age personnel be demobilized as soon as operational factors permit.
- (vi) Replacements be drawn in the first instance from the North.
- (vii) Every effort should be made to minimize abnormal wastage by the methods shown below.

DISCIPLINE

4. (a) It is likely that attempts will be made by large or small parties to desert and return to their homes, in some cases even using stolen unit transport and taking supplies and arms for the journey. Alternatively attempts may be individual. There will undoubtedly be numerous other acts of indiscipline with which the present physical and moral powers of the Italian disciplinary machine may be unable to cope. I am hopeful that it will stand the strain, but the Italian under stress of emotion is a somewhat unpredictable individual. Moreover, there will be many cross-currents, some subversive e.g. the attitude of the patriots to the regular army; the attitude of the North to the South and to the existing Government; Communist or subversive propaganda; the remnants of Fascist influence; the resurgence of nationalistic feelings etc.
- (b) Even when Italy (or the major part of it) is liberated, the Allies will have a considerable interest in the maintenance

parties to desert and return to their homes, in some cases even using stolen unit transport and taking supplies and arms for the journey. Alternatively attempts may be individual. There will undoubtedly be numerous other acts of indiscipline with which the present physical and moral powers of the Italian disciplinary machine may be unable to cope. I am hopeful that it will stand the strain, but the Italian under stress of emotion is a somewhat unpredictable individual. Moreover, there will be many cross-currents, some subversive e.g. the attitude of the patriots to the regular army; the attitude of the North to the South and to the existing Government; Communist or subversive propaganda; the remains of Fascist influence; the resurgence of nationalistic feelings etc.

(b) Even when ITALY (or the major part of it) is liberated, the

Allies will have a considerable interest in the maintenance of law and order, both on the grounds of general peace and rehabilitation and also from the aspect of untrammelled avenues of supply for the further prosecution of the war further north.

(c) Control will of course follow the normal stages - Allied Army and A.M.B. control; A.C. control, Italian Government control. Nevertheless the Ministry of War are responsible for Italian Army internal administration, discipline, punishments etc.

The Minister therefore, on my advice, is sending out a strong circular to all commanders -

(1) Calling attention to the whole matter of discipline

as ITALY is progressively liberated.

.....5/...

-5-

DISCIPLINE

4. (c) (11) Insisting on rigid enforcement of same, so that the Italian Army shall continue to play its valuable part in aid of the Allied war effort.

PUBLICITY AND PROPAGANDA

5. (a) A major corollary to discipline is publicity and propaganda; and much will depend on this psychological approach to the problem. The publication in the Italian Army newspaper ("La Patria") of information, plans and decisions regarding leave, demobilization, pay etc. would at least show the soldier that his problems are being tackled. Education on current conditions, the difficulties of the problems and the necessity not to hinder Allied efforts, combined with a statement on the consequences of disobedience and disorder should help considerably.

- (b) I recommend action on the lines shown in Appendix "A".

LEAVE

6. (a) A further corollary to discipline is the matter of leave. The existing authorized percentage for leave is 5. The problem in the North is also bound up with the question as to the rate of demobilization of the 50,000 over-age personnel whose homes are in the North. Leave will have to continue on a unit basis, both on operational and practical grounds so as to prevent the complete emasculation of a unit full of Northerners. The number of Northerners varies so much as between unit

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(b) In my A/19/1 of 25 Mar. I recommended an increase in the leave % to 10 as soon as an appreciable portion of ITALY was freed. The date on which this can be authorized cannot be stated now, as obviously it must depend on the progress in liberation. But it would undoubtedly help discipline and morale if you would agree now in principle to such an increase "as soon as an appreciable portion of ITALY is liberated and in so far as operational conditions permit", to be followed later perhaps

.....6/...

LEAVE

-5-

6. (b) (cont'd) by a further extension to 15% "when ITALY or the major part of it is fully liberated". Publication of such an Allied decree would undoubtedly be beneficial and would perhaps merely anticipate what might happen anyway. I doubt if the effect on Allied troops would be harmful.

CONCLUSION

7. (a) It is realized that the form which the liberation of NORTH ITALY will take cannot be foreseen completely, depending as it does to a great extent on the policy of withdrawal adopted by the German High Command.
- (b) Nevertheless, the above is an attempt to anticipate possible developments and to minimize as far as possible any breakdown in the Italian Army which might hinder or upset Allied plans.
- (c) I would therefore be grateful for -
- (1) Your decisions as regards paras 5(a), 5(b) and 6.
- (11) Your orders as regards any further action you consider I should take, in the light of the above.
- (111) The whole matter to be treated as one of URGENCY, in order that I may have time to implement all action necessary.

Signed L.B. 2098

by the German High Command.

(b) Nevertheless, the above is an attempt to anticipate possible developments and to minimize as far as possible any breakdown in the Italian Army which might hinder or upset Allied plans.

(c) I would therefore be grateful for -

(1) Your decisions as regards paras 3(d), 5(b) and 6.

(ii) Your orders as regards any further action you consider I should take, in the light of the above.

(iii) The whole matter to be treated as one of URGENCY, in order that I may have time to implement all action necessary.

Signed L.B. 2098

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

c/c

(Copy to - H.Q., A.C. for Executive Commissioner)

Appendix "A" to MIA letter
A OLS of 24 April 1945

LIBERATION OF NORTH ITALY
PUBLICITY PROGRAM

The following columns should, it is suggested, appear in "LA PAZINA" as soon as possible, subject to the security aspect, details being written by Italians and agreed with MIA Publicity Officer, and made known in "Liberation Columns". The articles to be written in plain language, easily understandable by all. Emphasis to be placed on the fact that the efforts of Italian soldiers are for the sake of Italy, not only the Allies. When stating facts make them clear and concise.

1. Looking Ahead

Preliminary announcement - Italian Command with the Allied HQ is thinking out plans for allowing soldiers to get news of and to visit or return to their families in North Italy at the earliest moment that military consideration permit. Further articles will appear on this subject showing aspirations, considerations, plans and methods to be adopted. Not an easy problem. Patience and self discipline needed for the common good, but long and good service will be rewarded and shirkers or unruly will not go unpunished. Details later.

2. Reunion in North Italy- Italian Command desire to reunite with their families soldiers who have done their duty. Plans for
- (a) Liberation Leave for all with homes in North Italy.
 - (b) Desobilization for men of 1913 and older *ages*.

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- (a) Liberation leave for all with homes in North Italy.
- (b) Demobilization for men of 1615 and older ^{20 years}

It will take time. Details are nearly complete and will soon be published.

3. Liberation and Discipline - While waiting for news of liberation, leave and demobilization, it is well to remember and reiterate need for strong discipline when the time comes. Reason

- (a) to make the scheme work justly to all concerned;
- (b) not to prejudice the war effort and military requirements of the Allies; (c) to arrange proper supplying of

passes, transport and pay; (d) ensure adequate punishment of those who try to take the matter into their own hands to the detriment of their comrades' chances; (e) keep up the good name of Italy. Tell to remember that other members of the Allied Armies have been away from their homes for several years, e.g., British, Americans, Poles, Greeks, etc., with no immediate possibility of returning. Everyone has a job to do and until it is finished, each man should feel it his duty to remain at his post. Present and future objective for Italians: establish the firm and determined purpose of democratic Italy to assume her place in the family of nations.

4. Liberation Leave - Scheme in general - numbers - time factor, transport, return punctually - others waiting; punishment of those who don't return punctually; patience - justice - hardship to others. Transport has many commitments. In addition to the pressing military transport needs, there are in addition the civilian requirements, e.g., transporting food, water, medical supplies, clothing etc. all for Italians.

5. Demobilization and Mobilization Scheme - General conditions, pay, transport and clothing. Patience and self-discipline required while turn is waited for. To be effective and without prejudice to military requirements, demobilization must be orderly, by classes based on age. Demobilization must be effect by mobilization of younger classes. The

2046

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During demobilization, every effort will be made by Allied and Italian Commands for quick and efficient release of personnel. Outline briefly how Italian soldiers are demobilized. (a) That units are authorized to issue discharge papers; (b) Travel orders and fiscal pay

will be given at time of discharge and every effort made to arrange for transportation.

6. Summary

Since 8 Sept 1943 much has been accomplished. Combat Groups are fighting courageously driving the praise of Allied leaders; thousands are in service units doing excellent and important work so vital to the war effort; many others are performing the dangerous and noble task of clearing the fields of Italy from mines left by the Germans so that these fields may again be plowed and furnish food to Italy. None of these tasks, to which thousands of Italian military personnel are assigned, can be drastically curtailed overnight. Italians have not been able to see their families and friends for a long time but this is one of the hardships common to soldiers of all nations. The ultimate goal, to which all Italians have dedicated themselves, is within reach. For that final effort to be successful the organized, disciplined effort of every Italian soldier is asked for and expected.

Appx 3"

NOTES ON THE DISCIPLINARY ASPECT OF THE EFFECT ON THE ITALIAN ARMY

1. The following more serious forms of indiscipline may have to be faced as a result of the effect of the end of fighting in Italy on Italian mentality and temperament:-

- (a) Individual desertions both to newly liberated homes and to homes in South Italy, in increasing numbers.
- (b) Mass desertions in organized groups who may be prepared openly to defy authority.
- (c) Refusal to work for the Allies on military duties after the liberation of Italy is accomplished.
- (d) Crimes against Allied persons or property such as attempts to seize supplies, transport or clothing.
- (e) Disobedience of orders of Italian officers, for personal political or "social" reasons.
- (f) Political demonstrations ^{leading to} ~~or~~ disorders.

In all these, the question for consideration is their immediate and ultimate effect on the Allied War effort. Their effect, ^{on} the efficiency and well being of the Italian Army and nation bear indirectly upon this.

2. The Italian War Ministry is responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander, through MIA, for the administration (including discipline) of the Italian Army; this responsibility is met by Italian officers and NCOs and by units of the Carabinieri specially selected for such duties. It is not considered that either of these authorities would be able to enforce the obedience of unpopular orders in the circumstances envisaged. The question whether or to what extent Allied Military police or troops should become involved in this

to defy authority.

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3. The tone and severity of orders issued at such times, particularly of orders involving personal or family inconvenience have an important bearing on the subject. Justice ⁱⁿ of the treatment as between different categories of troops and particularly as between soldiers and officers is essential: officers must be required to suffer, if necessary, even greater inconveniences than their men. Unnecessary restrictions ought to be removed or avoided. The greatest amount of privilege of freedom should be allowed. Pardon of certain past

defaulters might be considered. In general the subject matter and method of giving all orders should be very carefully considered and coordinated beforehand.

4. The extent to which orders are to be obeyed, though normally unquestionable, appears at this stage of the war to be sometimes a matter for discussion; in this case it is essential to consider it because the will to enforce orders is dependant on the power to do so. This is dangerous ground and it may be best to lay down that any necessary latitude or concession to personal feelings will be considered and included in the ~~order~~ order, which once given must be obeyed in full. If not obeyed, the question of subsequent punishment, whether by immediate action or by ^{upset} reform to higher authority is one for consideration. Disobedience though not immediately punished or resisted, cannot be condoned.

5. The question of prevention or correction of disobedience by using force has many serious aspects and may well, if not properly handled, lead to bloodshed, widespread affrays and later, (if seized on by political agitators), to civil war. A policy directive on how the question should be handled in its early stages, so as to enforce such discipline as is necessary to safeguard Allied interests without initiating trouble which might have the reverse effect, would appear to be needed by The Ministry of War.

6. The whole matter will, it is felt, have been considered in respect of Allied Armies; a comprehensive ~~prominent~~ policy on its applicate to the Italian Army working with the Allies is considered a necessity.

by immediate action or by refusal to higher authority, if an immediate action is not taken, disobedience though not immediately punished or resisted, cannot be condoned.

5. The question of prevention or correction of disobedience by using force has many serious aspects and may well, if not properly handled, lead to bloodshed, widespread affrays and later, (if seized on by political agitators), to civil war. A policy directive on how the question should be handled in its early stages, so as to enforce such discipline as is necessary to safeguard Allied interests without initiating trouble which might have the reverse effect, would appear to be needed by The Ministry of War.

6. The whole matter will, it is felt, have been considered in respect of Allied Armies; a comprehensive ~~prominent~~ policy on its applicability to the Italian Army working with the Allies is considered a necessity.

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D R A F T

Appx "C"

LIBERATION OF NORTH ITALY
PUBLICITY SCHEME

The following columns should appear in la Patria from time to time. Details being written by Italians and agreed with MMIA publicity officer, and made known in "Liberation Columns". The articles to be written in plain language, easily understandable by all. Emphasis to be placed on the fact that the efforts of Italian soldiers are for the sake of Italy, not the Allies. When stating facts make them clear and concise.

1. Looking Ahead - Preliminary announcement - Italian command with the Allied HQ is thinking out plans for allowing soldiers to get news of and to visit or return to their families in North Italy at the earliest moment that military consideration permit. Further articles will appear on this subject showing aspirations, considerations, plans and methods to be adopted. Not ~~easy~~ ^{an easy} problem patience and self discipline needed for the common good, but long and good service will be rewarded and shirkers or unruly will not go unpunished. Details later.
2. Reunion in North Italy - Italian Command desire to reunite soldiers who have done their duty. Plans for (a) Liberation Leave for all with homes in North Italy. (b) Demobilization for men of 1913 and older classes. ^{It} ~~will~~ ²⁰⁹² take time. Details are nearly complete and will soon be published.

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3. Liberation and Discipline - While waiting for news of liberation, Leave and demobilization, it is well to remember and reiterate need for strong discipline when the time comes. Reason (a) to make the scheme work justly to all concerned; (b) not to prejudice the

war effort and military requirements of the Allies;

(c) to arrange proper supplying of passes, transport and pay; (d) ensure adequate punishment of those who try to take the matter into their own hands to the detriment of their comrades chances; (e) keep up the good name of Italy. Well to remember that other members of the Allied Armies have been away from their homes for several years, e.g., British, Americans, Poles, Greeks, etc., with no immediate possibility of returning. Everyone has a job to do and until it is finished, each man should feel it his duty to remain at his post. Present and future objective for Italians: establish the firm and determined purpose of democratic Italy to assume her place in the family of nations.

4. Liberation Leave - Scheme in general - numbers - time factor, punctually transport, return ~~transmission~~ - others waiting; punishment of those who don't return punctually: patience - justice - hardship to others. Transport has many commitments. In addition to the pressing military transport needs, there are in addition the civilian requirements, e.g., transporting food, water, medical supplies, clothing etc. all for Italians.
5. Demobilization and Mobilization Scheme - General conditions, pay, transport and clothing. Patience and self-discipline

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5. Demobilization and Mobilization Scheme - General conditions, pay, ²⁰⁹¹ transport and clothing. Patience and self-discipline required while turn is waited for. To be effective and without prejudice to military requirements, demobilization must be orderly, by classes based on seniority. Demobilization must be offset by mobilization of younger classes. The two problems are interrelated and every soldier must be intelligent enough to understand this.

During demobilization, every effort will be made by Allied and Italian Commands for quick and efficient release of personnel. Outline briefly how Italian soldiers are demobilized. (a) What units are authorized to issue discharge papers; (b) travel orders and final pay will be given at time of discharge and every effort made to arrange for transportation.

6. Resume' - Since 8 Sept 1943 much has been accomplished. Combat

Groups are fighting courageously drawing the praise of Allied leaders; thousands are in service units doing excellent and important work so vital to the war effort; many others are performing the dangerous and noble task of clearing the fields of Italy from mines left by the Germans so that these fields may again be plowed and furnish food to Italy. ^{None} More of these tasks to which thousands of Italian military personnel are assigned, can be drastically curtailed overnight.

Italians have not been able to see their families and friends for a long time but this is one of the hardships common to all soldiers. The ultimate goal, to which all Italians have dedicated themselves, is within reach. For that final effort to be successful the organized, disciplined effort of every Italian soldier is asked for and expected.

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APPENDIX "A"

1. Numbers of men with losses in Enemy Occupied ITALY - 47%.

(a) 1918 and older classes and limited service troops	50,000
(b) 1st four months of 1914 class	7,000
(c) remainder of 1914 and 1915 classes	20,000
(d) younger classes	65,000
	<u>142,000</u>
	TOTAL

i.e. 47% of total army strength of 300,000.

2. Estimated losses by demobilization and desertion

Demobilization of 1(a) and (b)	57,000
Normal wastage for June	4,000
ANOL	15,000
	<u>76,000</u>
	TOTAL

3. Possible leave programs.

A leave program would have to be arranged for the 66,000 Northerners not included in Para 2, apart from any sent to substitute losses under para 2.

At rate of 10% leave, approximately 15,000 Northerners can be on leave at one time. If leave period incl travelling time is 3 weeks, it would be over 3 months before all above 66,000 would have had leave. If 142,000 are considered for leave, it would take 7 months.

4. Sources of further manpower - if required.

Call-up of 1924 and 1925 classes.

Calabria	16,000
Campania	29,000
Latino	14,000
Puglia, Lucania and Molise - balance	5,000
Abruzzi	7,000
Sicily	29,000
Umbria and Marche	10,000
	<u>203,000</u>

4,000
18,000
76,000

TOTAL

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Call-up of 1924 and 1925 classes.

Calabria	16,000	
Campania	20,000	
Lazio	14,000	
Puglia, Lucania and Molise - balance	5,000	
Abruzzi	7,000	2050
Sicily	29,000	
Umbria and Marche	10,000	
Toscana	10,000	
	<u>120,000</u>	
Volunteers from North Italy	20,000	say

TOTAL

DRAFT

A016

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR.

INFO :

1. During the liberation of North Italy, the task of maintaining personnel of Italian Army units ^{at} full strength will present certain difficulties due to :-
 - (a) Disorganisation of and strain on transport facilities
 - (b) Need for replacing older age groups domiciled in North Italy who are due for demobilisation.
 - (c) Anticipated increase in absences due to leave and other causes.
 - (d) Changes in operational needs and the general military situation.
2. In order to avoid loss of strength and operational efficiency, due to a high proportion of new untrained men being assigned at any one time, it is considered necessary to anticipate events and to select and assign certain additional personnel as early as possible.
 3. Authority is therefore given as a temporary measure for certain units to hold extra men up to a maximum of ^{5%} of their ~~22~~ ¹⁰ of their strength.
 4. To implement this units will state on their next strength return whether they desire and are able to accept any or all of this increase. Commanders of Arm Divs will endorse their requests and Commanders of Reinforcement Depots concerned will thereafter action (within the limits approved) suitable reinforcements to maintain this extra strength.
 5. Separate instructions will be issued to Commanders of Depots ²⁰ the detailed method of implementation and of selection and replacement of personnel.
 6. This directive does not imply or authorise any increase in the overall ceiling of any category of the Italian Army which remains as at present

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5. Separate instructions will be issued to Commanders of Depots ²⁰ regarding the detailed method of implementation and of selection and replacement of personnel.
6. This directive does not imply or authorize any increase in the overall ceiling of any category of the Italian Army which remains as at present and will not in any case be exceeded.