

ACC

10000/120/3161

A/1

10000/120/3161

A/183

803 BRD - RAVISCANINA

GENERAL - 1st Comd

MAR.-AUG. 1945

3473
3487

A. INTER-BRANCH MINUTE SHEET

Date	Pass to (Section)	Ref Folio	Remarks
1 June	G.O.C. (through C.)	8	para 2. This jerking up (together with the action we hope the minister will take on folio 5) should suffice for Rossi at the moment. para 3 we circled Tim. Wen report a <u>2</u> MOSSD. <u>he</u> allowed para 5 I earnestly hope I may be allowed now to re-open the question of a small detention barracks (perhaps for BR-IT1 only) which we could do without a W.F. and without extra nations. I think the ruling of May 1944 is out of date. <u>If I put up a reasonable case would you reconsider it?</u> P.S. noted - good. <u>W.P. Grant.</u>
2 Jun	G.O.C.	8	1. I feel Gen Clowes has forwarded a sensible letter genuinely appealing for our help. The tone appears to be "I don't know much about the Italian Army and as I have no standards to go on, will MIA please help through the Ministry of War end to a slightly greater extent". 2. It seems "a point of honour" policy of M of W to appoint all the best officers to Combat Groups. Would it not be possible now that (a) active hostilities have ceased and (b) more ex PW officers are returning to this country, for Ministry of War to take out of combat two or three of the very best officers (providing they are suitable administratively) and place them in Base Depots with the promise that if they made a good show in their new sphere they would be returned to combat in exchange for others in say 6 or 8 months. 3. Detention barracks. I suggest we discuss with M of W who will no doubt want to include within their post-war ceiling.

Cond 3.0 with impact
by phase 3 later with
↓

2 Jun

G.O.C.

8

NOTE:

Formation of
Experimental Consecutive
Centre (Det Bks) being
imposed to

File A.02).

WP

1. I feel Gen Clowes has forwarded a sensible letter genuinely appealing for our help. The tone appears to be "I don't know much about the Italian Army and as I have no standards to go on, will WMA please help through the Ministry of War end to a slightly greater extent".

2. It seems "a point of honour" policy of M of W to appoint all the best officers to Combat Groups. Would it not be possible now that (a) active hostilities have ceased and (b) more ex PW offrs are returning to this country, for Ministry of War to take out of combat two or three of the very best offrs (providing they are suitable administratively) and place them in Base Depots with the promise that if they made a good show in their new sphere they would be returned to combat in exchange for others in any 6 or 8 months.

3. Detention barracks. I suggest we discuss with M of W who will no doubt want to include within their post-war ceiling. If so, I suggest we should agree.

Ami.

Lt-Col, GS.

3407

of May 1944 is a reasonable case would you reconsider the matter?

W.P. Clowes.

P.S. noted - good.

MI/ca

12/45

URGENTISSIMO F.A. P.A.

807° CAMPO TRANSITO
M.E.I.A. SOTTOCOMMISSIONE
TRASPORTI
COMILITER
DIVISIONE SABAUDA
DIVISIONE AOSTA
STAMAGGIORE MOBILITAZIONE
DETRAMILES
DETRAMILES

RAVISCANINA (telegramma)

A
R O M A (fono a mano)
N A P O L I (telescritto)
M E S S I N A (telescritto)
P A L E R M O (telescritto)
S E D E (fono a mano)
N A P O L I (telescritto)
P A L E R M O (telescritto)

STAMAGGIORE TRASPORTI N° 10060/F/12/P (.) DESTINATARIO 807° CAMPO
TRANSITO RAVISCANINA ET PER CONOSCENZA M.E.I.A. SOTTOCOMMISSIONE TRA-
SPORTI ROMA ET COMILITER NAPOLI ET DIVISIONE SABAUDA MESSINA ET
DIVISIONE AOSTA PALERMO ET STAMAGGIORE MOBILITAZIONE SEDE ET DETRA-
MILES NAPOLI ET DETRAMILES PALERMO (.) TRASPORTO 350 COMPLEMENTI DA
807° CAMPO TRANSITO RAVISCANINA AT DIVISIONE SABAUDA MESSINA ET 100
COMPLEMENTI DA STESSO CAMPO AT DIVISIONE AOSTA PALERMO (.) SI EFFET-
TUERA' RISPETTIVAMENTE IN 10 ET 3 CARRI CHIUSI CON PARTENZA DA AIRANO
GIORNO 1212 CON PRIMO TRENO UTILE (.) STAMAGGIORE TRASPORTI 12000

CAPO UFFICIO
Col. O. Bagliacchi

L. m. c. 73

COPY OF INCOMING SERIAL

FROM : MMIA LO DISTHREE
TO : MMIA
INFO : DISTONE FOR MMIA LO
REF : EM 407

141800 B

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

REF YOUR QSD 2840 OF 12 AND SPOKE STANTON -THREEP (.)
AS NO DISBANDMENT ORDER ISSUED BY OR THRU DISTHREE THEY
DO NOT CONSIDER MATTER AFFECTS THEM (.) IS FURTHER ACTION
REQUIRED OF THIS OFFICE

SD DISTRIBUTION

ACTION COPY SD/26/2
INFO "A"
" " "C" (TWO)

3484

SUBJECT:- Movement of Reinforcements - ITALIAN

183
A-15
3 District
Baseball 22
300/12A
21 Jun 45

MIA ✓

803 BRD (for action under para 3)
ILO

1. Instances are constantly occurring of units sending transport to 803 Italian BRD to collect reinforcements without any previous warning having been given to the BRD and without any authority having been given by 227 Division.
2. In the past 803 Italian BRD has tried to meet these unauthorized demands, in order to save time and transport, but this causes grave inconvenience to the Depot, and may well lead to the Depot being unable to meet commitments previously accepted.
3. In future 803 Italian BRD will only release reinforcements on receipt of authority from 227 Division and after at least 24 hours notice of time of collection has been given.
4. Please arrange with 227 Division to instruct all under command accordingly.

JNV/JR

No action. Staff asked to educate units of
little in combat with procedure.
Maj Gen
Comd

Subject - HOHENY KIRCH on 503 ITALIAN
BASE IPT DETOT

Ref. 1/61/JF.

3 June 45

To, HQ 2 District
Copy to:-
MMTA Rome

GENERAL: During the month of May the general situation in the Camp has shown some improvement. This improvement is due almost entirely to the presence of the additional Br personnel attached to the Br Cadre, and it is still felt that the removal of these personnel would result in an immediate slackening off of both organization and discipline. No 1 Bn has now become fairly well organized and the Italian Bn Commander has succeeded in introducing organized feeding arrangements and roll calls and a certain amount of elementary training. No 2 Bn has shown no such improvement. It was unfortunate that the Br officer in charge of this Bn was recalled to his Unit in the middle of the month as he was in Age/Service Group 1. Despite the efforts of the Br WO and his Sergeants little co-operation has been received from the Italian officers. An adverse report has been rendered to the Camp Commandant on the Italian Commander. No 3 Bn has shown a marked improvement within the last ten days on the appointment of a new Italian Bn Commander and at present there is no reason to believe that this improvement will not continue.

CAMP ORGANISATION: The problem of satisfactory documentation is still causing considerable difficulty and the position with regard to the segregation of specialists has not yet been properly solved by the Italian Camp staff.

TRAINING: Elementary training on a very limited scale has been achieved. This consists solely of marching drill, P.T., and a small amount of area drill. The Italian officers and NCOs are still unable to get a full Coy on Parade and have very little or no control over their men.

DISCIPLINE: The Discipline is still extremely lax and can be traced to two main causes. As stated above the officers and NCOs have little or no control over the men and in many instances appear to be afraid of them. The second cause is the lack of any adequate form of punishment or detention. This latter point is receiving attention and it is hoped to start a new system which may prove effective.

HYGIENE: The cleanliness of the camp has definitely improved. The main trouble in this section is the provision of box latrines in all instances which are not used as intended by the Italian soldiers.

WELFARE: A Welfare Officer has been attached from 227 Div. ³ He has succeeded in increasing to a small extent supplies available to the canteen and has

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WELFARE: A Welfare Officer has been attached from 227 Div. ³ He has succeeded in increasing to a small extent supplies available to the canteen ^{drinks} but on to date one show. So far the allocation of flour, etc. from Br sources for Italian canteens has not been received.

CLOTHING: This matter still constitutes a major problem as the supplies of ID available are quite insufficient to meet the demands of the numbers of men arriving in and departing from the Camp.

RATIONS: A visit from the Catering Adviser 3 District and the attachment for 3 days of an AGO GNS has led to an improvement in the feeding arrangements. These have now been arranged on a 2 Bn basis and with the exception of No 2 Bn there have been no complaints. Bread is still below standard but it is understood that w/c effect from next week this will be drawn from Naples.

TRANSPORT: This is still quite inadequate and the situation is made more difficult by the mediocre standard of driving and mechanical knowledge of the Italian drivers. A ROSE AGOS has been attached for one month to instruct and supervise the Italian drivers and it is hoped that this will raise the standard of maintenance. He is, however, seriously handicapped in his work by the fact that all transport is being used continuously for the greater part of the day.

Field.

(J.O.A. ANDERSON)

Capt, RSP

O.C. (Br Cadre) 803 Italian Base Bt Depot.

CONFIDENTIAL

H.O. 3 DISTRICT

C. M. F.

29 May 45

From Major General N. C. MORGAN.

CC/24.

My Dear Browning,

1. Thanks for your letter A/133 of 21 May 45. I have also seen copy of your letter of same number addressed to the Ministry of War.

I have since had a long discussion with Gen ROSSI, covering most matters concerning RAVISCHINI which have been previously discussed, and others.

2. As regards ROSSI himself, not having any previous association with the Italian Army, I find it difficult to assess his worth, as I have no standard to judge by. He is not a high flier, but I feel that he is conscientious and does his best in circumstances which are admittedly difficult. Moreover, I do not think he has had proper backing by the Ministry of War in such matters as the provision of officers, and welfare facilities. You infer in your letter that, as regards the replacement of unsuitable officers, the remedy lies in Gen ROSSI's hands. In effect, all he is able to do is to submit adverse reports on those considered unsuitable, and this he has done in many cases. For replacement he is almost entirely dependent upon the Ministry of War, and, generally speaking, all he has so far received are either old gentlemen put back into uniform or else young and inexperienced officers. I feel very strongly that, knowing the shocking state into which this war had deteriorated at APOLLO, the Ministry of War should have made strenuous efforts to put things right. Judging by what I have seen they have done little to help. In the circumstances I am not prepared to recommend that ROSSI be sacked.

3. My remarks about Gen ROSSI apply largely also to Col MUSCO. I think that he, too, has not had a fair run for his money. From what I have seen and heard of him I think that he has done his best, and it is not for lack of zeal and energy on his part that so little improvement has been effected. Again, he is not a high flier, and if it were possible to find a really good replacement for him on the grounds that, after a strenuous period of command, he is in need of a change, I should not object. I would not, however, subscribe to his removal on disciplinary grounds.

4. As regards GILBERT. You have got to remember that he took over the run was at its lowest ebb, and that such improve-

unsuitable officers, the remedy lies in Gen ROSSI's hands. In effect, all he is able to do is to submit adverse reports on those considered unsuitable, and this he has done in many cases. For replacement he is almost entirely dependent upon the Ministry of War, and, generally speaking, all he has so far received are either old gentlemen put back into uniform or else young and inexperienced officers. I feel very strongly that, knowing the shocking state into which this BRD had deteriorated at ATRACOLA, the Ministry of War should have made strenuous efforts to put things right. Judging by what I have seen they have done little to help. In the circumstances I am not prepared to recommend that ROSSI be sacked.

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4. As regards GARRATT. You have got to remember that he took over the cadre when the BRD was at its lowest ebb, and that such improvement as has been made since is due principally to his efforts and to those of his (re-inforced) cadre. It is unfair to compare this BRD with TRANT (I don't know CRIZZO) as, when I took over here certainly, TRANT was already running well, while ATRACOLA was a shambles. At the same time I agree that GARRATT is not the ideal man for the job, and I have in fact contemplated replacing him, provided: (a) I can find a suitable relief, and (b) the change-over would not react adversely on GARRATT.

5. As regards punishment. So long as we have to depend on the existing BRD personnel to staff the camp I'm afraid there will be little improvement on existing conditions. To move the punishment compound away from the camp without providing an efficient staff to run it would merely serve to make it more of a holiday resort than it is at present.

I appreciate that special detention barracks are not authorized, but I fail to appreciate how, when a disciplined army such as the British Army finds them necessary, an undisciplined one such as the Italian Army can expect to carry on without them.

6. Training is, strictly speaking, not my concern, but as it has a

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- 2 -

very direct bearing on the discipline of the camp. I wish to urge that something be done to improve the standard of efficiency of the PWs, the poor quality of which is already known to you.

I am led to believe that the average standard of Italian PWs is low, due largely to the fact that the best type of soldier is not attracted to extending his service after having completed his colour service, and that this state of affairs is by no means peculiar to RAVISCANNA.

If this is so, would it not be a good thing, and is it not possible, to set up a school (or schools) of instruction where PWs could be put through their paces and licked into a bit of shape?

Yours ever

R. Colson

PS. Since writing the above I have had a chat with HET who is going to look into the question of running courses of the type I suggest at CRESMA.

I should like to back up HET's suggestion that at least one interpreter per Bn be found as soon as possible (DET/89/2/Act 1 of 17 MAY 45 addressed to you refers).

PPS. I am arranging to replace Garatti.

W.

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W.

3481

Major General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC.,
Land Forces Sub-Commission, (MIA)
ROME.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

A.183

21 May, 1945.

My dear

Thanks for ringing up on 19 May re RAVASCHINI. You will have got by now a copy of the strong letter I wrote to the War Ministry (A.183 dated 12 May) as a result of your letter 338/6 dated 10 May.

There seem to be two aspects (a) the control (b) the matter of proper punishment, which really depends on (a).

If the Italian officers are no good, you should "get onto the back" of your Adm. Div. Comd. to replace these with better officers or ginger up the existing incumbents to do their job. If the Adm. Div. Comd. does not compete, sack him! i.e. write to me under para 9(d) of A.P.H.Q. A.C. 091.711/169 GCF-ON Command and Administration of the Italian Army" and I'll get the War Ministry to replace him. The matter is up to you.

If I may speak frankly, we in M.M.I.A. are doubtful about the drive and ability of Major GARRATT, your cadre comd. at the Camp. He is not nearly as good as the fellows at TRIPI and CRIVIZIO where all is going very well. You will agree that much depends on the personality of the officer holding that appointment. Personally, I think you might do better than Major GARRATT. There must be plenty of officers about now who have the requisite drive to take charge and I commend this to you.

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5. In regards punishment, you realise that specific detention barracks are not authorised. But with the proper officers who will really see that men do not like punishment and with a location where the delinquents cannot be seen by their pals or have access to the outside world, it should, it seems to me, be possible to produce adequate punishment locally.

6. Lastly, you will be glad to hear that we have a batch of specially picked Italian officers (Litherto P...) coming in a few days from NUBLE EAST and I have told the War Ministry to select and send down to you the best of these.

Yours

Major General H. CLOUGH,
G.O.C. 3 District.

(Copy to D.M.E. - ref. his 89/2/MTI of 17 May).

SUBJECT: Italian Base Depot - RAVISCAHIA

MM 1. 'G' / TRG

917891

19 MAY

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING

AFHQ, CEF

Tel: 16872

DMT/89/2/121

17 May 45.

NO 1.1.1.4.

Copy to:

HQ 3 District

G-5 Org (2) AFHQ

Reference 3 District 538/3 dated 10 May 45.

FORWARDED

1. Although a number of the points mentioned below are not directly the concern of ITM they have a very definite affect on training. The various suggestions made by HQ 3 District in the above report are strongly endorsed and these notes are issued in amplification in addition to these suggestions.

BRITISH CADET

2. The British officers and NCOs who have been attached to the camp have made great efforts to get training going. Their job is made extremely difficult as there is not a single interpreter in the camp. It is strongly urged that at least one interpreter per bn be found as soon as possible.

ITALIAN PERMANENT STAFF (para 2 of 3 District report refers)

3. This is the crux of the problem. The British officers report that the Italian officers and NCOs do not get their orders obeyed and in fact that discipline is still deplorably bad.

It is considered that this state of affairs will continue until the right type of Italian officer is found. As a result of discussions with the British Cadet it is recommended therefore that the following officers be attached to RAVISCAHIA as soon as

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ITALIAN EQUIPMENT STAFF (para 2 of 3 District report refers)

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It is considered that this state of affairs will continue until the right type of Italian officer is found. As a result of discussions with the British Cadre it is recommended therefore that the following officers be specially selected from the Gruppi and posted to PAVESANINIA as soon as possible.

2 Bn Comds
10 Coy Comds
up to 50 NCOs

It is considered that the British Cadre should keep a close control of these replacements to ensure that the undesirable officers and NCOs do in fact go and that the best are retained.

UNDESIRABLES

4. There are at present a number of rfts held at the camp who are either unsuitable for posting as rfts or admitting discharge from the army. These men are having the worst possible effect on discipline and it is urged that they be removed at an early date. One example is of some parachute rfts who have apparently refused to do any work at all.

928

AMMUNITION

5. The 1000 Italian type rifles have been received and elementary weapon training will be started. It is recommended that an allotment of ammunition be made to enable this subject to be taught effectively. Initially it is considered that each Base Depot should have an allotment of 100,000 rds.

CONCLUSION

6. Although the move of the camp from AFRAGOLA has resulted in a decrease in deserters and a general improvement in the running of the camp, little progress has as far been made in organising training on a systematic and progressive basis. In spite of the very considerable help given in British officers and NCOs and the suitability of the area for training, the results are disappointingly poor. It is considered that the suggestions noted above will go a long way toward organising training on a sound basis.

132 6003
in 66
Brig.,
D.M.T.

3478

Subject: 803 B.R.D., RAVISCARINA.

LAND FORCES SUB COM A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) ROME
A 183

18 May 45.

To : Ministry of War.

1. Recent reports from Allied Commanders concerned indicate that the administration and discipline of the Italian Army Reinforcements at 803 BRD, RAVISCARINA CAMP are still far from satisfactory, and that in some respects the conditions are nothing short of scandalous.
2. Some of these shortcomings are due to circumstances outside the control of Colonel BUSO (O.C. the Camp) but the majority of them appear to be matters which he should be capable of rectifying.
3. The most serious matter outside the Camp itself is that occasioned by the total unsuitability of many of the men called up, or who have volunteered to join the Italian Army. Physically, mentally and morally, many of these men should never have been accepted, and in addition to costing the Allies clothing, equipment and rations, they are a strain on the Italian Government, in so far as their pay and other responsibilities are concerned, as in the end no good is attained from their services. I must again ask you to either take immediate and effective steps to prevent the enlistment, either as a volunteer or as a conscript,

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4. The following matters inside the Camp itself have been going wrong for some time and immediate steps are necessary to right them:

(a) Documentation. The system is bad, incomplete and ineffective. Cases have occurred of a man coming forward one day under a certain name, receiving his equipment and clothing, absenting himself and reappearing under a different name to receive a 2nd issue to replace the one which he has presumably sold.

(b) The system of punishment whereby a man under sentence is placed behind a wire fence inside the Camp, where he neither does any work, drill or training, and where, although in theory deprived of cigarettes and wine, does in practice receive them from friends through the wire, is known to exist and must be eradicated. It appears to Allied Authorities that the Italian officers and N.C.Os. either do not understand, or are afraid to enforce basic discipline and punishment.

(c) Many of the Italian officers and most of the N.C.Os. are of a very low type. You will please cause a list of the

-2-

officers to be prepared and a report rendered to me through the O.C., British Cadre in the Camp on their suitability for their present duties. You should also instruct the O.C. Camp to deal ruthlessly and energetically with inefficient N.C.Os.

(d) Much trouble is taken by Allied officers to assist with Welfare and Recreation, but in spite of this very little practical results appear to have been obtained. The Canteen is poorly stocked and the reading and writing rooms are still almost devoid of furniture. There is still no projector for the cinema; there is no radio receiver; and the organization of games and sports is practically non-existent.

5. This state of affairs would tend to show that there is something wrong with the commanding and administration of the Camp, and I require a special report on the Camp Commandant and his Battalion Hq Commanders, stating whether in your opinion these are considered fit to retain their appointments.

2.13.
Major General,
M.H.F.A.

Copy to:

HQ 3 District (your 330/6 dated 10 May, 45 refers)
BR Cadre 803 HND (3 District letter 330/6 dated 10 May refers)

L.B.

Major General,
H.M.I.A.

Copy to:

HQ 3 District (your 338/G dated 16 May, 45 refers)
BR Cadre 803 BRD (3 District letter 338/G dated 10 May
refers)

1A 2.

3477

200.

CONFIDENTIAL3 District
Ext 8
338/G

10 MAY 45

X AmcAmcAFHQ (G-1 Br)
AFHQ (G-3 Org For)

AFHQ - DMT

MIA - Naples

Comd 56 Area

Gen Rossi, Comd 227 Italian Abn Div.
Brit Cadre 803 Italian Base Rft Dep.

Tel

MIA 10

Italian Liaison Offr, 3 Dist.

1. The following matters relating to the IERD at PAVISCAPIA, based on a recent inspection, carried out by myself, and on reports submitted by members of my staff and by the OC Br Cadre add, are referred for your information, and action where necessary. Most of the points now brought up have already formed the subject of previous representation by me.

2. DISCIPLINE. Since the move from APPACOLA this has shown considerable improvement; there is now a semblance of order about the Camp, parades and a certain amount of training are carried out and the general atmosphere of the Camp is a much healthier one.

It is, however, unfortunately true that such improvement is entirely due to the laudable efforts of the temporarily reinforced British Cadre and to a small proportion of the Italian Officers. A large proportion of the Italian officers and an even bigger proportion of the Italian NCOs are, to all intents and purposes, useless. I have previously drawn attention to this matter and would now reiterate most strongly that unless more efficient Italian officers and NCOs are posted to the Depot any further improvement is problematical. In fact, a deterioration is more than likely, in view of the likelihood that the additional Br NCOs attached to the Cadre will shortly be withdrawn.

A further factor militating against the improvement of discipline is the apparent lack of means of enforcing punishment. The system at present in vogue is that a man awarded imprisonment is lodged in a barbed wire compound within the camp perimeter. There, I am informed, he is not allowed to be allowed to perform duties, while the only deprivation he suffers are his pay, wine and cigarettes (the latter in theory only). The system is basically rotten, and Italian officers and NCOs are

82/27
DATE: 2/13/5

WP

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2. DISCIPLINE. Since the move from AFRASOLA this has shown considerable improvement; there is now a semblance of order about the Camp, parades and a certain amount of training are carried out and the general atmosphere of the Camp is a much healthier one.

It is, however, unfortunately true that such improvement is entirely due to the laudable efforts of the temporarily reinforced British Guard and to a small proportion of the Italian Officers. A large proportion of the Italian officers and an even bigger proportion of the Italian NCOs are, to all intents and purposes, useless. I have previously drawn attention to this matter and would now reiterate most strongly that unless more efficient Italian officers and NCOs are posted to the Depot any further improvement is problematical. In fact, a deterioration is more than likely, in view of the likelihood that the additional Br NCOs attached to the Camp will shortly be withdrawn.

A further factor militating against the improvement of discipline is the apparent lack of means of enforcing punishment. The system at present in vogue is that a non-warden imprisonment is lodged in a barbed wire compound within the camp precincts, where, I am informed, he is not allowed to be killed or to perform fatigues, while the only deprivations he suffers are his pay, wine and cigarettes (the latter in theory only). The system is basically rotten, and is aggravated by the fact that the majority of Italian officers and NCOs are afraid of enforcing punishment.

As a matter of urgency I consider that a punishment barrack or compound should be established away from the Camp where men undergoing punishment may really be punished.

3.

RECREATION

- (a) A canteen has been established; it was poorly stocked on the occasion of my recent inspection, but the situation will, presumably, improve when the Depot begins to receive its share of rations for canteen use. The premises were completely devoid of furniture.
- (b) A reading and writing room exists but is devoid of furniture and reading material.
- (c) Cinema. A projector is urgently required.
- (d) Recreation. Beyond a few footballs, no sports gear has been provided. More footballs, some indoor games, books and periodicals, and a radio receiver are required.

...../Sheet 2

3:78

Sheet 2

4. TRAINING. Elementary training is now carried out and is reasonably satisfactory. This, however, is largely due to the supervision of the Br officers and NCOs att'd to the Cadre. The anticipated early withdrawal of the latter necessitates the necessity for improving the standard of the Italian officers and NCOs by:-

(i) Replacement of the inefficient.

(ii) Cadre training under Br officers and NCOs while the latter are still available.

Attendance at parade is disappointingly small, a reflection of the poor state of discipline prevailing in the camp.

5. MESSING. I am not altogether satisfied that the men are getting enough to eat, and have arranged for a Br Catering Supervisor to visit the camp and to report on the matter.

RG/JMK

A. Collins

Maj Gen.
Comd.

Subject: Afragola Transit Camp.

Land Forces Sub Comm.A.C.

(M.M.I.A.)

ROME

Q/84

7 May, 1945.

To: 3 District.

Reference you 146/4 Q dated 30 Apr 45.

1. The drafts from SARDINIA numbering approximately 1,000 will continue at about four day intervals until the beginning of June, after which time, there should be no further traffic of personnel. Arrangements have already been made for trains to meet the ship and except in emergency there should be no need for transit facilities.

2. No drafts are to be anticipated from CALABRIA, future call-ups being in the North. Sicilians will be moved direct to destinations and will not stage at Naples.

3. It is agreed that transit camp facilities for maximum 500 are required for casualties and it is considered adequate accommodation can be found in NAPLES which would be preferable to AFRAGOLA.

The matter should be raised with the senior M.M.I.A.L.O. at NAPLES who is already acquainted with the problem. The available barracks accommodation should be adequate if necessary R.E. work can be approved.

4. It is to be anticipated that 803 BMD at RAVASCANINA will progressively diminish in importance and the necessary staff for transit should be available from this source and render unnecessary the provision of a new transit camp staff.

R.A. Curties
R.A. CURTIES Lt. Col.
for Major General.
M.M.I.A.

Copy: MMIA G(SD)
MMIA A
MMIA LC NAPLES.

3475

Subjects Move of 82D AHEAD.

Col. G.
Col. A.
GEO 1.
ST.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(H.M.I.A.A.)
E O ME
Q/54

3/ Mar 48

CAMP SITE.

PAVINGSTONE H2007.

Inspected 30 Mar by Major Spray 3 Dist rep. & Staff Officer
56 Area, O.C. 82D and O.C. 8r Cadre.
All well satisfied with the site and welcome the change.
Plan to move men into four barracks, three training and
one holding. Cooking initially to be on BA basis, later
on Coy basis.

DATE OF MOVE.

Commencing 11 April 750 men a day will be transferred.
Present holding 6000. 3 requested to avoid any further
intake until these numbers can be reduced.

ADMIN.

Major Borey coordinating arrangements and dealing with
227 Div. 8r are arranging packs 42000 to be despatched
to railway station VALPARAISO on 6, 14, 21, 28 April.
Bread from Naples until Bakery can be established at
PINDIMONTE.

TRANSPORT

82D are short of vans on estab. 3 District have matter
in hand. Proposed raise ME to give 10 3 Ton lorries
instead of 5 as at present.
3 Dist will provide transport for move. 8r will make available
one pin Special Ten Coy at disposal 227 Div 7 - 10 April.
both dates incl.

MILITARY

82D has good cinema but no projector. 82D lacks all

DATE OF MOVE.

Commencing 11 April 750 men a day will be transferred. Present holding 6000. I requested to avoid any further intake until these numbers can be reduced.

ADMIN.

Major Spry coordinating arrangements and dealing with 227 Div. ST are arranging packs 42000 to be despatched to railway station Valmoro on 6, 14, 21, 28 April. Bread from Naples until Bakery can be established at PIEDIMONTE.

TRANSPORT

BED are short of vans on estate. 3 District have matter in hand. Proposed raise ME to give 10 8 Ton lorries instead of 5 as at present. 3 Dist will provide transport for move. ST will make available one pin Special Tpt Coy at disposal 227 Div 7 - 10 April. both dates incl.

WELFARE

Camp has good cinema but no projector. BED lacks all forms of recreational gear which are essential now unit is to be located in the country. Important Welfare arrangements are the best possible and that this unit gets special attention until they settle down.

WAC/ah

Agreed for move that
ties in with 802
H: BED. agreed.
3/4

Alcanta 3.2.75

H.A. CURTIS Lt. Col.
AQM. MMIA.

MMI
FILE: 50/42/1
DATE: 1/4

*Q are dealing with welfare
The unit with a HE NAT
6/4 7/4*

A 183 ✓
MESSAGE FORM

DATE TIME OF ORIGIN

04

E

FROM : NMIA
TO : MINISTRY OF WAR
REF NO : SD 2562

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR INFORMATION SHIRAZ (*) 803 BASE REINFORCEMENT DEPOT WILL MOVE BY
ROAD FROM AFRAGOLA TO HAVDAGHINA ADVANCE PARTY 4 APRIL MAIN BODY
COMMENCING 11 APRIL (*) MAIN BODY WILL MOVE AT RATE OF 750 PER DAY
(*) ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE BY 3 DISTRICT THROUGH 56 AREA AND 227
ARM DIV

Precedence URGENT

Authenticated _____

SD INTERNAL:

File No : SD/31

A/183 ✓

WHE.

3473

0061