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A/186/4 FOLGORE GENERAL - 1st Cover

AG. - OCT. 1945

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A. 186/4

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Subject: Staff List and Location Statement
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 23 H. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
 24 H. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

1. Herewith Staff List and Location Statement in respect
 of 22 H. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

2. Description of previous Staff Lists and Location Statements
 in respect of 22 H. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

3. Age on admission to 22 H. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

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CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 17 OCT 65
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

TO: [REDACTED]
FROM: [REDACTED]
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Brigadier Guido Pistori
Colonel Mario de Micheli

Lt. Col. Umberto de Martino
Major Raffaele Giuscino
Major Giovanni Locatelli
Major Giovanni Petrucci
Lt. Col. Amadeo Gennarelli

Major Vallerotti

Major Pistori
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1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Adjutant

Lt. Col. Michele Stella
Capt. Pasquale Migliaccio1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Major Domenico Fenucci

1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Major Giuseppe Giordano

2ND AIRBORNE DIVISION

Adjutant

Capt. Emilio Trucchi

3RD AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Capt. Terenzio Sciabo

4TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Major Carlo Fontana

5TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Capt. Guido

6TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Lieut. Aldo Dampieri

7TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

C.O.

Capt. Pietro Patterlin

C.O. City Command Bologna

C.O. City Command Ferrara

Lt. Col. Guido Lorenzi (2 i/s Head)

Lt. Col. Sciabo

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POLARIS INFANTRY DIVISION -- LOCATION STATEMENT

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B 1282

CHINA
SUSAN
RIO DE JANEIRO
RIO DE JANEIRO
RIO DE JANEIRO

B 2295

PIEMONTE

A 9772

BOLEZANO

A 7824

TRINCO

B 2295

PIEMONTE

B7564

PIEMONTE DI OLLONE

B 7251

PIEMONTE DI OLLONE

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Ref: Report on POLISH ORIGIN GROUP

Local Forces Sub-Comm. A.C.

H.M. L.A.

Ref 10/10.

28 Aug 45.

A. This report concerns a special visit paid by the Senior L.O. to the POLISH Combat Group, in company with Col. F.G.P. Shawcross, D.O., of R.O. 5 Army, from 19-22 Aug 45.

The visit was the result of the following exchange of communications, and I accompanied Col. Shawcross at the request of 5 Army.

1. AFM signal EX33175 of 7 Aug, asked 5 Army with copy to Lisbon and Alcon, requesting 5 Army to investigate cases of terrorism on the part of the POLISH Group and asking whether substitution by the POLISH Group in that area would assist matters.

2. 5 Army signal 7774 of 9 Aug in reply to above, saying that substitution would not help matters as existing conditions were due to the fact that Italian troops were not well disciplined and that there was no choice between the two groups.

This signal went on to say that the Provincial Commissioner of BELMONT and the Provincial Commissioner of TRENTO agreed that no improvement would result from the suggested change-over. The matter would take a long time owing to the dispersed lay-out of both groups and was NOT recommended.

3. AFM signal 3776 of 16 Aug which pointed out that the Italian Govt had specifically asked for the change-over and that on political grounds it was considered most necessary. The Regional Commissioner fully supported this view and felt that his Provincial Commissioner was probably agreed by their desire to have no troops at all. If complete Group not removed, the signal requested that the TRENTO Regt, as most undesirable, should be substituted.

4. AFM signal EX30257 of 17 Aug, in reply to (2) above, pointing out that the POLISH Group was substantially true, that a state of unsatisfactory discipline will not be tolerated. Agreed that relief was not desirable. There would be no useful purpose in replacing POLISH by Allied troops as in any case Italians would have to assume responsibility in September. Senior Allied Commander directs that action be taken urgently in connection with it. It is noted that a state of discipline in POLISH 15 Army to forward orders and

between the two Groups.

This signal went on to say that the Provincial Commissioner of BELMUD and the Provincial Commissioner of TUNNO agreed that no improvement would result from the suggested change-over. The signal would take a long time owing to the dispersed lay-out of both Groupd and was NOT recommended.

3. ALDM signal 3776 of 16 Aug which pointed out that the Italian Govt had specifically asked for the change-over and that on political grounds it was considered most necessary. The Regional Commissioner fully supported this view and felt that his Provincial Commissioners were probably swayed by their desire to have no troops at all. If complete Group not removed, the signal requested that the BELMUD Regt, as most undesirable, should be substituted.
 4. ALDM signal 185037 of 17 Aug, in reply to (2) above, reserves allegations re POLONEE substantially true, such a state of unmitigated discipline will not be tolerated. Agreed that relief was not desirable. There would be no useful purpose in replacing POLONEE by Allied troops as in any case Italians would have to assume responsibility in September. Senior Allied Commander directs that action be taken urgently in conjunction with MILA to raise standard of discipline in POLONEE; 5 Army to forward comments and recommendations.
 5. ALDM signal 143624 of 18 Aug. Outlines acceptance of 5 Army recommendation of non change-over (see 2 above) and goes on to say that 5 Army and later ALDM will doubtless replace all or part of POLONEE if such future action considered necessary.
 6. 53 BEL signal 0 135 of 10 Aug and 50 BEL signal 0 136 of 10 Aug (in both cases copies to MILA) recommend that change-over is NOT effected.
- 3538
- B. The following individuals were interviewed by Col. Chawasco and myself.
1. Provincial Commissioner BELMUD (Lt. Col. MacIntyre)
 2. Genl POLONEE Combat Group (Gen. MacLennan)
 3. Sindaco of BELMUD.
 4. Genl 3rd Bn BELMUD Regt (Major Casey)
 5. Genl BELMUD Regt (Col. Basso)
 6. Secretary of Sindaco of COPIA d'ARREDO.
 7. Genl IV Territorial Bn POLONEE (Gen. Maggioni)
 8. Provincial Commissioner TUNNO (Major Davis)
 9. Genl BELMUD Combat Group (Gen. Scattini)

(2)

In addition, the matter was discussed with CNO 1's of 90 and 55 REGTS.

One large dump of captured enemy material concerning which there had been reports of losses, and which was guarded by men of the 102ND Regt, was visited. A summary of points noted will be given later on in this report.

C. As a result of our questioning, the following information was brought to light.

1. 1st Col. MacFarlane (and Prov Comd REGTS)

There have in the past been a large number of petty incidents and some major ones against the REGTS. These complaints have fallen off recently and the Prov Comd has ceased to bother about them. No major cases have been reported recently. There was one recent case of a black market cognac deal in which soldiers were involved. Also, on 12 and 13 August, some men of the REGTS in company with civilians, concentrated outside the Police Barracks at REGTS. Also, on 12 and 13 August, civilians who had been arrested, shots were fired by the REGTS but no casualties had resulted and the demonstrators dispersed.

Prov Comd said that the local Communist population probably regarded the arrival of the REGTS as the first demonstration of Italian Govt control over Southern Italy. At the back of their minds they do not want to belong to REGTS. It was significant that most of the houses which had suffered thefts were Italian and not Italian.

Prov Comd reported that nearly all the soldiers had feathered their nests and had at least 10,000 lire in their pockets. He quoted an instance of a REGTS man offering half a million lire for a car, and producing the money out of his pocket.

Said that REGTS might be better than the REGTS, but left another Gruppe, as there was the danger that a new Gruppe might copy the previous one and start lining their own pockets.

Said that the Prefect of REGTS in REGTS and has always recommended the substitution of the REGTS by REGTS.

Prov Comd's general opinion is that things are now quiet and that the behaviour of the REGTS has improved.

2. General Piazzoli (Comd REGTS Combat Group)

In taking over the Gruppo from Gen. Neri, he found it much better than he had been led to expect. He has got rid of several fairly senior officers and has forwarded a further list of 25 officers to the Ministry

regarded the arrival of the PULGONE as the first demonstration of Italian Govt control over Southern Tyrol. At the back of their minds they do not want to belong to ITALY. It was significant that most of the houses which had suffered thefts were Tyrolean and not Italian.

Prov Cairr mentioned that nearly all the soldiers had feathered their nests and had at least 10,000 lire in their pockets. He quoted an instance of a PULGONE man offering half a million lire for a car, and producing the money out of his pocket.

Said that CC.RR might be better than the PULGONE, but NOT another Gruppo, as there was the danger that a new Gruppo might copy the previous one and start lining their own pockets.

Said that the Prefect of TRIESTE is Socialist and has always recommended the substitution of the PULGONE by CC.RR.

Prov Cairr's general opinion is that things are now quiet and that the behaviour of the PULGONE has improved.

2. General Pialoni (Cmd PULGONE Combat Group)

On taking over the Gruppo from Gen. Marzetti, he found it much better than he had been led to expect. He has got rid of several fairly senior officers and has formulated a further list of 25 officers to the Ministry of War for removal.

Believes that the present state of discipline is fairly good, and is confident that the men will obey the orders of their officers if they have to act in aid of the civil power.

Invited us to speak to local civil authorities and obtain their views. The General has spoken to the Mayor and told them not to be on "paratroop".

Said he was favourably impressed by the first 500 men of the Carabinieri Regt, who are replacing the San Marco Marine Regt, but says that the new Regt is at least 1000 below strength as compared to the San Marco.

Would welcome reinforcements as reinforcements to make up this deficiency, particularly in view of fact that the Carabinieri Regt are largely Alpine troops. He is working out a plan for their training, but it will be very difficult in view of duty-guarding duties.

The Vice-Comd and Chief of Staff of the Gruppo were present at this interview.

3. Mayor of TRIESTE.

Tyrolean. Said that the men of the PULGONE had definitely stolen quite a lot of people's property, but that the civilians had also done so; it was mainly due to the lack of carabinieri in the district.

For example, the troops took tyres and sold them to civilians. It was impossible to trace the receivers. There had not been much theft lately as there was not much left to steal. Had not heard of any money being stolen.

(3)

Mayor of BATHUNO (continued)

There had been trouble in the local hotel owing to the troops demanding food and creating a disturbance when supplies ran out. The Mayor had obtained help from the local military commander (Major Henry) who had posted H.C.O.'s at the hotel during meal hours. This had put a stop to further incidents.

There had been no cases of shooting, no trouble in connection with the female population, and no major incidents of any kind. On the whole, relations between soldiers and civilians were good.

4. Major Henry (Command BATHUNO Regt at BATHUNO)

This officer gave a very favourable impression. He has been in BATHUNO only about 3 weeks, during which time there have been no major incidents. He began in close touch with the Mayor and has told him to ease and report any trouble at once.

His assisted local authorities by repairing bridges, etc, and relations are cordial.

Part of his command are permanently engaged on searching for German escaped SS men in the mountains.

5. Colonel Henry (Command BATHUNO Regt ; HQ at BATHUNO)

Stated that there had been only two major incidents in the Regiment during the past 3 months :-

- (a) A case of murder, which was not provoked. Two men of the Regt had been severely beaten up by about 20 local peasants. As a reprisal two German soldiers of the Regt had gone to the house of one of the ring-leaders, and after some altercation, shot him. The culprit has since been awarded 13 years imprisonment. Col. Henry paid for the funeral expenses and gave the widow 5000 Lira.
- (b) A case of rape, which is still under investigation. Col. Henry says however that he has a statement from the girl concerned to the effect that she consented, but had to invent the story of rape in order to justify her condition to her fiancé. This same girl was stated to have had her hair cut off by the soldiers; the Colonel has seen her and states that this is not the case.

The Colonel stated that on arrival in the area he had been asked whether the appointments of Mayors should go to Italians or to Tyroleans. He stated that he was of the fact that two thirds of the local

5. Colonel Ronco (Card Ronco Regt ; II) at DUELLANO

Stated that there had been only two major incidents in the Regiment during the past 5 months :-

- (a) A case of murder, which was not unprovoked, two men of the Regt had been severely beaten up by about 20 local pro-mafia. As a reprisal two Sardinian soldiers of the Regt had gone to the house of one of the ring-leaders, and after some altercation, shot him. The culprit has since been awarded 18 years imprisonment. Col. Ronco paid for the funeral expenses and gave the widow 5000 Lira.
- (b) A case of rape, which is still under investigation. Col. Ronco says however that he has a statement from the girl concerned to the effect that she consented, but had to invent the story of rape in order to justify her condition to her fiancé. This same girl was stated to have had her hair cut off by the soldiers ; the Colonel has seen her and states that this is not the case.

The Colonel stated that on arrival in the area he had been asked whether the appointments of Mayors should go to Italians or to Tyroleans. He had replied that in view of the fact that two thirds of the local population were German-speaking, the local Mayors should be Tyroleans.

He himself is on very good terms with the civil authorities and has given them assistance in many ways. His Regt is non-political, but is anything anti-communist.

Said that there was a definite Nazi element amongst the Sud-Tyrol Volkspartei, which is an organisation working for the return of the S. TYROL to AUSTRIA. These extremists (a minority in the party) invent and spread stories about RACONIS atrocities, which are generally un- founded. In Col. Ronco's opinion the Prefect of RACONIS, though a self-proclaimed Socialist, is in reality ultra-Communist and is at the root of the trouble and magnifies small incidents to the detriment of the RACONIS.

As an example of cordial relations existing between military and civilians, Col. Ronco said that over 100 civilians had recently attended the funeral of one of his men who had been accidentally killed ; this was entirely spontaneous and on their own initiative.

(4)

6. Secretary to Mayor of CORTEZ.

Had nothing but good words for the behaviour of the HIRIO men stationed in this town. There had been no trouble whatsoever.

7. General Negroni (Command IV Territorial HQ, BILBAO)

Said that he had never had the POLICIA under his command, but only administratively. Could therefore speak freely as a looker-on.

On arrival in the area the POLICIA looked like everyone else. It was the result of disturbed conditions at the end of hostilities, and the same had occurred after the last war. What the civilians resented was that the Grupo had behaved like occupying troops of a foreign power, and not like liberators of their own land.

There had been a mass of captured material and the temptation to turn things to their own advantage had been too much for them. There was also the desire to keep as much material in ITALY and prevent it falling into Allied hands and leaving the country. Officers as well as men were in the pocket and for this reason the discipline of the Grupo had been undermined. The officers could no longer order the troops to desert as the latter all knew that their officers had also benefited. This state of affairs had apparently been tolerated by Gen. Morigi.

The arrival of Gen. Piazueli had greatly improved the situation. He was an honest man, energetic and quick to take action. He has removed some of the catalysts amongst the officers and is working out more.

Gen. Negroni regards the substitution of the San Marco Regt by the Caribald as a good thing. He would like to see the HIRIO removed too, or anyway "organized". There is no need to teach the HQ, Services, Artillery Regt or Engineer Bn of the PULMON, who are all good.

Relations between the Grupo and civilians has now greatly improved and there is no resentment as regards the retention of the GVI so in the area except on political grounds. For instance, the "Volunteers" do not like having Italian troops in the area. The Prefect of BILBAO originally advocated administrative autonomy for NORTH and BILBAO, which was all right as far as it went. He subsequently started spreading socialist republican propaganda instead of leading to a policy of reconstruction. The Prefect now regards the presence of the PULMON in the area as an obstacle to his political aims in view of the forthcoming elections.

He receives reports from his party and encourages them to bring disaster

mined. The officers could no longer order the troops to desert as the latter all knew that their officers had also benefited. This state of affairs had apparently been tolerated by Gen. Nogradi.

The arrival of Gen. Fialorini had greatly improved the situation. He was an honest man, energetic and glad to take action. He had removed some of the culprits amongst the officers and in doing so more.

Gen. Nogradi regards the substitution of the Ben Negro Regt by the Carabinieri as a good thing. He would like to see the REGT removed too, or anyway "expatriated". There is no need to touch the IR, Services, Artillery Regt or Engineers in of the REGT, who are all good.

Relations between the Gruppo and civilians has now greatly improved and there is no resentment on regards the retention of the Gruppo in the area except on political grounds. For instance, the "Volunteers" do not like having Italian troops in the area. The Prefect of BELLUNO originally advocated administrative autonomy for TREVISO and VENEZIA, which was all right as far as it went. He subsequently started spreading socialist republican propaganda instead of moving to a policy of reorganization. The Prefect now regards the presence of the VOLUNTEERS in the area as an obstacle to his political aims in view of the forthcoming elections.

He receives reports from his party and encourages them to bring disfavor on the Gruppo.

Gen. Nogradi thinks that the original choice of an Italian Combat Group for this particular area was a mistake. Carabinieri would be more popular as they go down well with the German-speaking population. The necessity for troops would however remain. The G.I. would maintain public order but would require the backing of the troops for any major disturbances.

A French Mission was in the BELLUNO area last day. The apparent ³⁵ plan was to unite the people of NED ARDIE to form a bloc under French protection against Russian influence. This mission was requested to leave by the Americans.

Gen. Nogradi stated that in his opinion the REGT I Group had not had the same temptations and opportunities for looting as the REGT. The REGT was composed of a more stable type of men, largely German, and their discipline had been better and fewer changes had been necessary.

The Vol. group do not give any trouble. They are quiet and understanding and are rather willing to see what the future will bring. They will probably co-operate peacefully with REGT, as it would be to their advantage normally.

Gen. Nogradi concluded by expressing a hope that the Allies will remain for some time in this part of ITALY, at any rate until the Italians can themselves organize things on sound lines.

(5)

8. Major Harris (AME S. 11110)

Confirmed that relations between military and civilians were satisfactory. There had been no serious incidents in 1940.

He had had experience of both groups and did not consider the AME any better than the WHOLE.

In his opinion the Italian Guards over days sell material to the civil population. (Oral 50 AME) states that he has had no reports to this effect from Major Harris.

He said that road blocks afford opportunity for extracting hard money from civilians carrying doubtful cargoes.

There are about 700 AME in the district but they are widely dispersed and cannot check up on everything.

9. Gen. Battaglia (Oral 11111) Combat Group

Has much opposed to change-over of the two groups as he considered that morale would suffer.

Considers that relations between his men and local civilians are cordial. Was reticent about "incidents" but gave the impression that there had been several of minor importance.

10. Visit to Captured German Wireless Station (Oral 11112)

The dump is a few miles west of 11111 and is off the main road and concealed in a wood. There are several huts containing a quantity of valuable material including wireless parts, whilst other material and vehicles are parked or stacked in the open under the trees.

German personnel are engaged in sorting the stores under I.O. supervision. The Guard however is provided by the AME 100.

A theft of wireless valves had occurred some time previously. On being questioned, the Italian Lieutenant (who has 17 men available for Guard duties) stated that the valves had disappeared during the time when German personnel were sleeping in the huts, and before his men took over.

As this was all "old history" and the subject of an enquiry carried out about two months ago by 5 AME, we did not pursue the matter further; but it is interesting to note that this is possibly an instance of the Italians being wrongly blamed for loss of stores.

The Lieutenant has now made a complete inventory of all the stores and seems to have the situation in hand. It was pointed out to him that the two existing sentries by night are insufficient for such a large dump, to which access can easily be gained through the very scanty wire surround.

The dump in a few miles west of BUNDO and is off the main road and concealed in a wood. There are several huts containing a quantity of valuable material including wireless parts, whilst other material and vehicles are parked or stacked in the open under the trees.

German personnel now engaged in sorting the stores under U.S. supervision. The dump however is guarded by the NZSO regt.

A tight of wireless valves had occurred some time previously. On being questioned, the Italian Lieutenant (who has 7 men available for Guard duties) stated that the valves had disappeared during the time when German personnel were sleeping in the huts, and before his men took over.

As this was all "old history" and the subject of an enquiry carried out about two months ago by 5 Army, we did not pursue the matter further; but it is interesting to note that this is possibly an instance of the Italians being wrongly blamed for loss of stores.

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D. Conclusion.

As a result of the above interviews and further discussion with the GEC 4's of 50 and 53 ILL's, I consider that there has substantially been looting on a fairly extensive scale in the ITALIAN, and probably on a lesser scale in the PHILIP Group.

Conversely, however, can hardly be said to exist.

The original choice of the ITALIAN in this particular area was unfortunate, but I understand that it was a two-up which of the two groups was sent.

The arrival of Gen. Piazzi has undoubtedly done a great deal of good. The removal of the officers guilty of looting by the illegal disposal of goods is essential. A general grab-at-everything has been going on but is desirable, but the Regt should be allowed to maintain its identity. No change-over of the Group is now necessary in view of general reports of cordial relations between soldiers and civilians. Indeed, the arrival of a new Group might cause an outbreak of fresh incidents.

The substitution of the Prefect of BULANO by a more impartial man might ease the situation, but this is a matter outside the scope of this report.

Mr. E. E. E.

ed/P.M.A. MONTY, Ident-Col. G.S.O. 1 (L)
L.M. I.A.

ARMY FORM C 2135 (Large) MESSAGE FORM

| | | | | |
|------|----------|----------|---------------------------|--------------|
| Call | Srl. No. | Priority | Transmission Instructions | Register No. |
| | | | | 4 |

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNS USE ONLY

| | | | | |
|----------|-------|------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| FROM (A) | 53600 | Originator | Date-Time of Origin | Office Date Stamp |
| | | | 27/12/03 | |

For Action

17

TO

| | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----|
| (M) For Information (INFO) | Message Instructions | GR |
| | | |

Originator's No
 41-21
 Requested as to the arms of the service & what it offers for Fortgate today
 Proposed & F. Blue, Capt. Hall
 for action
 31/7

3531

| | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|-------------|--------------|
| This message may be sent
AS WRITTEN by any means
except <i>WIRELESS</i> | If liable to be intercepted or to fall
into enemy hands this message must
be sent IN CIPHER. | Originator's Instructions,
Degree of Priority | | Time | System Op. |
| | | | | Time or TOH | Time Cleared |
| Signed. | Signed. | | | | |

M.M.I.A.

28

B

53 B L U POLCORE COMBAT GROUP

1545

A 1139

RESTRICTED

NO REPLY REQUIRED TO OUR CABLE A 1126 OF 17 JUNE (.) PLEASE

REPLY

FILE: A 186/4.

IMPORTANT

3520

Henry Wilson Capt.

OUTGOING SIGNAL.

FILE

(2)

FROM : M.H.I.A.

DATE
17TIME OF ORIGIN.
B

TO : 53 B.L.U. POLSKE COMBAT GROUP.

REF: A 1126.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: _____

PLEASE STATE WHEN AND WITH WHAT TYPE OF TRANSPORTATION MARINARIO
DE COURTERE CMA EUGENIO OF S (.) MARCO REGIMENT HAS LEFT
FOR ROME (.) COURTESY REQUESTED AS SON OF ITALIAN NAVY
MINISTER (.)

PRECEDENCE: IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED: _____

FILE: A 186/4.

/el.

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: HQ 15 ARMY GP
TO : MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
NEAR EIGHTH ARMY
INFO: FIFTH ARMY
DISTONE
FOLGORE COMBAT GP
53 BLU
REF : SD1659

161530 B

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

101 ALL RANKS MEMBO REGT FOLGORE
COMBAT GP WHO WERE EMP ON SPECIAL AIRBORNE GP
ARE NOW AVAILABLE TO JOIN PARENT FAN (.) LOCATION
HQ ISAS FIESOLE (.) PARTY IN NON
MOBILE (.) NECESSARY TPT TO LIFT WILL BE PROVIDED
BY FOLGORE COMBAT GP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

S.D. DISTRIBUTION :
Action Copy : SD/43
Info : SD/43/1
" : A

Copy to : SOS
AG
DC of S Brit
G-3Air
G-4
A
Q
1605/50/57

3529

0171