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A 210 Carabinieri Naples

Dec. 1945 - Feb. 1946

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ITEM INDICING  
SUSPECTS COMM.

1. In the December 1945 Public Safety report No. 1C/14601/10/28 of 19 Dec 1945 drew the attention of MIA to the unsatisfactory service being given by certain senior army officers, particularly in the KMT Legion.  
 On the 15 Feb 1946 and again on 28 Feb 1946 MIA have sent 10 messages to MIAFSCB requesting independent reports which confirm a number of the allegations contained in the original DS report. (See.)

It is alleged that there are a group of Communists in MIAFSCB who are continually bringing influence and pressure to bear on the SCU.

These are

?

- (a) Rev. Mario Palacio Communist Leader at MIAFSCB and formerly Under Secretary of War.  
 (b) Rev. Eugenio Muntal Communist who is Consultant on the Education Committee.  
 (c) Capt. Ugo Sillie who was confidential secretary to Palacio when he was US of War and followed him to Nanking.  
 This officer is said to have been indoctrinated with Comunism, he obligated to Palacio, and held a supreme power over

It is alleged that there are a group of Communists in NAPLES who continually bring influence and pressure to bear on the CCPA.  
where are.

(a) Mr. Mario PALEO Communist Leader at NAPLES and formerly

Under Secretary of War.

(b) Mr. Eugenio MONTI Commissar who is President of the  
Production Committee.

(c) Mr. Ugo CALCO COM who was confidential secretary to  
BILANCINI when he was US of War and followed him to NAPLES.  
This Officer is said to have been indoctrinated with Commu-  
nism, he obiliated to BILANCINI, and hold a strange power over  
the Commanding General of the Division.

(d) Mr. Domenico OTTAVIANI assigned to MUNICIPAL IN THE  
city as President of the Production Committee.

That the influence of this group extends to high places is borne out; it is  
alleged by the fact that CALCO and OTTAVIANI have both been ordered transferred  
out of NAPLES and both have ignored the orders.

In September 1945 Gen. FRANCESCO Comandante General asked for approval to

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- transfer one Lt-Col Casillo MCOL Considering the witness Legion, Non NPA  
to LEGION. MCOL is reported on by all who came in contact with him as  
had political and efficient officer influenced by any politician or politics,  
and contacted only with regard to his job. MG refused approval.
- But this after Gen. MIRIMET called on FS in person and again asked for appro-  
val saying that "for disciplinary reasons he had ordered Major transferred  
from Legion, MG that MIRIMET, Head Comptroller for Sanctions, had demanded that  
either the orders to ~~Major~~<sup>Major</sup> be cancelled or LEGOL be transferred.  
~~cancel~~
- LEGOL has now been transferred, where he left under political pressure  
of lower culture than LEGOL.
- On 20/11/1961. The excuse for this driven by MIRIMET, that LEGOL was not a full  
Colonel, does not hold water since the COL Legion is commanded by a Lt-Col
6. See, UNICA, Comitato Unidad, and UNI, Solidarita, Committees, concerned only  
with issues, are reported to be extremely weak characters, concerned only  
with issues, concerned however, was brought to bear, and Gen. MIRIMET in-  
formed LEGOL that LEGOL must be allowed to choose his own.

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on MARCH 21. The excuse for this given by TADDEI, that REOLI was not a full Colonel, does not hold water since the QMS Legion he commanded by a Lt-Col of lower calibre than REOLI.

5. TADDEI gave a decision to the effect that MARCHI could not nominate anyone QMB even to serve under him as chief of the Upuration Commission; after investigation this decision was fully supported by Gen. TADDEI, deputy Com. COUNCIL. Political pressure however, was brought to bear, and Gen. TROZZI informed TADDEI that MARCHI must be allowed to choose his men.
6. Gen. BRAVO, commanding 11 PLAT DIV., and Gen. SAVARNAIA, commanding the MARCHI's brigade, are reported to be extremely weak characters, concerned only with holding down a lucrative job by keeping on good terms with their superiors. They are completely dominated by the group referred to in para 2. It is common knowledge among commandants in Naples.
7. Gen. TADDEI, deputy commander, is a very experienced and much respected QMS officer. Furthermore TADDEI can only see himself fit and often he is sent for experience.

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8. Gen. BREUER has been in command for a considerable time, yet he has not paid one single visit to the N.P.L.S Legion, which is one of the most important in the country.

*Antonie L. Breuer*  
~~General Secretary~~  
M.M.I.L.

15/10

~~Intelligence Case~~  
~~Information~~  
F.B.I.

4316

AHP/nm

Subject : - Gen. Brunetto Brunetti.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 British Liaison Unit  
Tel. 53623 NUTS  
CCB/C/S

CC. BR section,  
Land Forces Sub Comm, AD (MIL).  
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COPY TO : - Lt-Col. H. L. Gillmore, OAB, MIL.

28 Feb 46

As a result of the enquiry concerning Major PANCETTA, a summary of the information obtained relating to Gen. Brunetti may be of interest.

1. It is now definite that Lt-Col. Meoli's transfer from the MILLS Legion was due to left wing political pressure on Brunetti who admitted it. Further to excuse that Meoli was transferred because he was not a full colonel does not hold water. The MIL Legion is commanded by Lt-Col. Ferinetti, a man of much smaller calibre than Meoli.

2. The decision of Meoli, later confirmed by Teddei, that the Local Commission, Sandini, could not nominate CC. BR to serve with him, was overruled by Brunetti, again under left wing pressure.

3. Although Teddei is a very experienced CC. BR officer and is much respected, Brunetti has ordered him to leave HQ and work in another villa. Further Teddei can only see Brunetti if and when he is sent for. The duty of supervising police operations which is normally that of the vice-commandant has been taken from Teddei and assumed by Brunetti although the latter has no CC. BR experience.

4. Brunetti has now been in command for a considerable time, yet he has not paid one visit to MILLS Legion, which is one of the most important in the country.

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2. The decision of Meoli, later confirmed by Teddei, that the local separation Commission, Mancini, could not nominate GR. MR to serve with him, was overruled by Brunetti, and, under left wing pressure.

3. Although Teddei is a very experienced GR. MR officer and is much respected, Brunetti has ordered him to leave HQ and work in another villa. Further Teddei can only see Brunetti if and when he is sent for. The duty of supervising police operations which is normally that of the vice-commandant has been taken from Teddei and assumed by Brunetti although the latter has no GR. MR experience.

4. Brunetti has now been in command for a considerable time, yet he has not paid one visit to NIZZ Legion, which is one of the most important in the country.

*C / May 15*

CCB  
CMB/ee  
Major.  
CO. H. Liaison Officer.

*Mo. 5/15*

*4315*

ccw(A)

(B)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
AFQ 324

Tel: 473427

AC/14601/10/PS

15 February 1945


SUBJECT : Carabinieri situation at Naples.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (MILIA)

1. Reference report of Captain Claude Hayes,  
CCRS/3/9 of 15 February 1945.

2. The report confirms the investigation  
made by this Sub-Commission and which was embodied  
in our report AC/14601/10/PS of 15 December, 1945,  
copy of which was supplied to you.

3. This Sub-Commission is in agreement with  
the recommendations of Captain Hayes as set out in  
para 10 and 11 but unless General Santa Maria is  
removed from Naples, Lt. Col. Reoli's position will  
become intolerable and, in our opinion, it would only  
be a question of time when he would be framed in such  
manner as to possibly ruin his career.



JOHN W. CHAPMAN  
Colonel, JAGD  
Director

JWC/tm

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Capt. C.B. MARES.  
10 British Liaison Unit.

15 Feb 46

2A

Dear S. R. D.

The enclosed report appears to be rather political, but I think you will agree that little purpose is served by re-equipping the CO.RR if, as I fear, they are to come under the control of politicians. The case of Meoli is one example, and the matter of Recorella is another. Enquiries so far show that far from being a menace, he is bitterly anti communist, but matters are still at too early a stage for me to be able to make a definite decision. I have a letter of introduction to Taddei from Zanchino here. Taddei probably knows more about the case than anyone else. If you have no objection I will come to ROME to see Taddei. He is a friend of Zanchino's and will probably "talk". I should also like to talk to you on the general situation. I also want to change my 4 x 4 box Chevrolet if possible. I have of course far greater distances to cover than other LO's and this car is so slow and has such a high petrol consumption that it is useless, particularly as there are very few petrol points in S. Italy. (One Legion is at CATANZARO)

Things are pretty comfortable here and I am settling down to the job all right.

O  
P.S. As a matter of interest, Graziani is arriving here today from N. AFRICA to be handed over to the Italian authorities.

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Subject : - CC.RR. Progress Report.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 British Liaison Unit  
CC.RR. Section.  
Tel. 53623 NAPLES  
CCHB/G/9

Lend Forces Sub-Comm, AC., (NAPLES),  
CC.RR. Section.

COPY TO :- GSO I.

15 Feb 46

1. This report contains a general indication as to the CC.RR situation in this Brigade Area together with two recommendations which are most strongly urged.

2. NAPLES is the Divisional HQ. (Gen BRANCA), the Brigade HQ. (Gen SANTA MARIA), and the Legion HQ. (Col MOLLI) of the Territorial Region.

3. I have not visited Divisional HQ as this appears to be out of my province. I have visited Brigade HQ and have had a conference with General SANTA MARIA. The impression which I obtained, and which has received confirmation from other sources, is that SANTA MARIA is merely an office holder whose chief business is retaining a comfortable and lucrative post by keeping on good terms with his superiors. Information regarding BRANCA is that he is also a nonentity whose lack of calibre is similar to that of SANTA MARIA.

4. Apart from the characters of the two officers, there is considerable doubt as to whether Divisional and Brigade HQ's serve any useful purpose and a report will be submitted when further information is received.

5. The commander of the NAPLES Legion, Col. MOLLI, is of a very different type. He is, first and last a carabinieri officer solely occupied with his duty. He made an excellent impression and Public Safety S. C. who have known him over a considerable period, rate him very highly. His discipline is strict, even harsh at times, but he does not spare himself and strict discipline is necessary to maintain the morale and prestige of the CC.RR. in this most difficult area.

6. CC.RR. HQ. have for a long time been trying to obtain his transfer but this has always been resisted by AMG NAPLES. AMG now having ceased to exist, CCQ have immediately ordered his transfer to CC.RR. Training School at ROMA as CCQ have extensive abilities will

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I have visited Brigade HQ and have had a conference with General SANTA MARIA. The impression which I obtained, and which has received confirmation from other sources, is that SANTA MARIA is merely an office holder whose chief business is retaining a comfortable and lucrative post by keeping on good terms with his superiors. Information regarding BRUNDTI is that he is also a nonentity whose lack of calibre is similar to that of SANTA MARIA.

4. Apart from the characters of the two officers, there is considerable doubt as to whether Divisional and Brigade HQ's serve any useful purpose and a report will be submitted when further information is received.
5. The commander of the NAPLES Legion, Col. MEOLI, is of a very different type. He is, first and last a carabinieri officer solely occupied with his duty. He made an excellent impression and Public Safety S. C. who have known him over a considerable period, rate him very highly. His discipline is strict, even harsh at times, but he does not spare himself and strict discipline is necessary to maintain the morale and prestige of the CG, RR in this most difficult area.
6. CG, PR. GHE have for a long time been trying to obtain his transfer but this has always been resisted by AMG NAPLES. AMG now having ceased to exist, CGQ have immediately ordered his transfer to CG, RR Training School at POME as Administrative Officer, a post where his excellent executive abilities will be entirely wasted. It cannot be too strongly recommended that MEOLI be allowed to retain his position here. Reasons of a grave nature necessitating the transfer may exist, but unless they do it is requested with the greatest urgency that the order transferring MEOLI be cancelled.
7. It is understood that MEOLI is to be replaced by a Col. MAURO. Nothing is known of this officer other than that he was the principal in an unsavoury scandal concerning the wife of a junior officer, who committed suicide on hearing of his behaviour. Unless MAURO is equally as capable as MEOLI, his appointment will have a serious effect on the discipline and cohesion of the NAPLES Legion. In any event, the transfer of the command of such an important Legion at this difficult period is considered most undesirable.
8. MEOLI has always resisted political interference in CG, RR matters and it is certain that he has not ingratiated himself with left wing elements in the area. It is therefore felt that his transfer may have resulted from a political move in conformity with the well known left wing aim of obtaining control of, or seriously weakening the police force. As this theory may appear to be rather far fetched, a case in point tending to show that General BRUNDTI himself is not immune from left wing political pressure is the

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appointment of CG. RR to act as investigators for the local committee of epuration. Apart from the fact that it is entirely wrong that CG. RR should be employed as secret political investigators under the orders of a civilian body, the circumstances of their employment shed considerable light on BRUNETTI's integrity. CG. RR employed by the Epuration Committee of NAPLES consist of 6 NCO's and 14 carabinieri. When MEOLI received the order to delegate CG. RR to serve under MANGINI, chief of the commission and a well known communist, he selected the men he considered suitable. MARCINI went to see MEOLI, told him that he did not want the men allotted to him, & produced a list of the men he needed. MEOLI immediately refused to consider this proposition and told MANGINI that MEOLI commanded the Legion and that the responsibility of nominating the men was his alone. Political machinery was then set in motion with the result that Gen. TADDEI was sent to NAPLES to conduct an enquiry which resulted in the complete justification of MEOLI's action. Shortly afterwards MEOLI received an order from Gen. BRUNETTI that MANGINI must be allowed to employ the men that he had previously specified.

9. This order was carried out and the Epuration squad of CG. RR is now commanded by a Brigadier OTTALI, aged about 23, who openly declared his communist convictions despite the fact that CG. RR are not allowed to indulge in politics. OTTALI's attitude is well known in NAPLES and is the subject of criticism of CG. RR.

10. It is therefore requested that steps be taken to prohibit the use of CG. RR for epuration purposes, CG. RR having always by law and inclination been non-political.

11. Finally it is once more urged that steps be taken to have the order of transfer of Col. MEOLI rescinded.

*C. C. R. - C. C. R. - C. C. R.*

Capt.

CG. RR Liaison Officer.

C.M.F.

GBH/eo

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OTTIZI's attitude is well known in MAPLES and is the subject of criticism of the CC, TR,

- It is therefore requested that steps be taken to prohibit the use of G-2, R.R. for epuration purposes, &c., etc., having always by law and inclination been non-political.

John G. Clegg

CET  
CET/SC

CC, PR, Liaison, Officer.

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**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
APG 394

Tel : 478427

AC/14601/10/PS

19 December 1945

SUBJECT : Conditions within the  
C.C.M. at Naples.

TO : Chief Commissioner (thru CA Section).

1. About the middle of September, 1945, Public Safety Sub-Commission received from the Commanding General, C.C.M., a request to approve the transfer of Lt. Col. Camillo MEOLI, Commanding Officer of the Naples Legion, from Naples to Messina. Following the usual custom we requested comments from ANC Naples, whose officers expressed strong disapproval of the proposed transfer. We then declined to approve the transfer. Shortly thereafter General Brunetti called in person at this Sub-Commission and pressed for approval of the transfer stating that he had ordered the transfer of a major from Naples for disciplinary reasons and that Nenni, High Commissioner for Sanctions against Fascism, had demanded that either the orders transferring the major be cancelled or Lt. Col. Meoli be transferred. My suspicions being aroused by this insistence, particularly in view of the fact that the Public Safety Officer at Naples had suggested the need of an investigation not only of the Naples Legion but also of the Brigade and Division Headquarters, approval was again withheld and I caused an investigation to be made. Reports of the investigation disclose the following situation.

2. At the bottom is Avv. Mario PALERMO, communist leader at Naples and formerly under Secretary

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of War. Then appears Mr. Cesario MANGINI, a truculent Communist, who is President of the Epuration Committee. When Palermo was Under Secretary of War he had assigned to him as his confidential secretary one Major Ugo CAICCO of the C.R.R., who thus became not only indoctrinated with Communism but also obligated to Palermo. When Palermo was retired as Under Secretary and returned to Naples, Major Caicco also returned to Naples to an assignment in C.R.R. Brigade Headquarters, where he has acquired a strange control not only over the Commanding General of the Division, as one informant reported, "Caicco commands at Naples". Mangini caused the assignment to himself as President of the Epuration Committee, Brigadiere Domenico OTTAVI of the C.R.R., who either has been given, or has assumed, such authority that he determines the action to be taken in many of the separation cases, is permitted to sign relevant papers in such cases and is using his obvious power to apply pressure in high circles. Mangini also has assigned to him 10 carabinieri whom he asked to by name. His original request for these men was denied but he went high enough to get the order assigning them.

3. General Amedeo BRANCA, Commanding General of the Naples Division C.R.R. and General Mario SANTAMARIA, Commanding General of the Naples Brigade, C.R.R. are both said to be completely under the domination of the group described in para. 2. One of my informants who has known General Branca for a number of years states that for the past several months the general has acted like a man in a daze or one who has something preying on his mind to such an extent that he cannot put his thoughts on anything else. General Santamaria is said to be essentially a weak character.

4. Practically every officer of the C.R.R. in the Naples Division has been informed that he is under investigation for epuration so that each one lives with this sword of Damocles hanging over his

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head and fully aware that it can fall at the whim of the Palermo-Moncali-Caico-Ottazzi group. The effect of this situation on morale and efficiency can be understood.

5. That the influence of this a/m group extends even in higher circles is indicated by the fact that both Major Caico and Brigadiere Ottazzi have been ordered transferred out of Naples and that both have ignored the orders. Major Caico gets away with it by taking 3 months sick leave in Naples where he continues to engage in his various activities while being free from any obligations of routine duty. It is not known how the Brigadiere is able to ignore orders except through the application of superior influence. It is understood that there are regulations which require orders of transfer to be obeyed and sick leave taken at the place to which transferred unless the transferee is too sick to travel (which Caico is not).

6. The reports made to me state that Lt. Col. Scoll is an excellent, efficient officer, apparently honest and non-political, whose one desire is to perform his duties properly, without fear or favor. Apparently he will not fit into the schemes of the a/m group and, therefore, pressure is being applied for his transfer.

7. My informants also reported on another officer of CC.RR. who is assigned to and working with the S.I.C. at Naples, a Major FOGHELLI. Whether or not this officer is involved in undermining the CC.RR. at Naples is not known but my informants states that he is a close personal friend of Mario Palermo and that he is the instigator, if not the author, of articles in the Communist newspaper at Naples, attacking CC.RR. officers and the C.C.P. It is reported that this officer, at the time of the Naples "Four Days" in 1943, claimed three months sick leave, left his CC.RR. command and went into hiding where he remained until about two weeks after the arrival of the Allied Forces in the city. He then came out of hiding, reported for duty without medical check over, and obtained

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a posting to S.I.M. He immediately began ingratiating himself with Allied officers until he is now so solidly entrenched that, stated my informant he cannot be moved on any order but than one issued by the Supreme Allied Commander. He is reported to entertain Allied officers on a scale beyond his means as an officer of the C.C.R.R.

8. It is recommended:
  - a. That Major Caico be transferred from Southern Italy and that he be ordered to take his sick leave at the place to which he is transferred.
  - b. That Generals Branca and Santemaria be retired to private life.
  - c. That Brigadiere Ottazzi be transferred from Naples and that steps be taken to ensure his compliance with orders of transfers.
  - d. That the 28 carabinieri assigned to the Epuration Committee at Naples be ordered withdrawn, and returned to normal duty. (Carabinieri, other than those regularly assigned to Intelligence Corps, ought not to be used in political investigations).
  - e. That Major Focorlini be transferred out of S.I.M. and from Southern Italy.
9. This sub-Commission believes that this matter is urgent.

JFC/we

JOHN J. CHAPMAN  
Colonel, JAGD  
Director.

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