

785020

ACC

10000/120/3392

SD/3

Orig. of m

Jan. - Apr

785020

10000/120/3392

SD/3

Org. of Male Units

"A File"

7382
7455

Jan. - Apr. 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Deficiency of Senior NCO's -
252 and 253 Pack Tpt Gps

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
 (N.M.I.A.)
 File No. SE/3
1 April 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. The following senior NCO's are deficient against RE in 252 and 253 Pack Tpt Gps:-

SHRE 2.6

	252 Gp	253 Gp
4 Staff Sjt Majors	4	4
CQMS	4	4
1 Staff Sjt Farriers	4	4
Sjt Farriers	4	3
Sjt Saddlers	3	4
Sjt Wheelers	4	4
Vot Sjts	4	4

2. Please say which of these deficiencies can be filled immediately, and what steps you can take to fill the remainder.

3. Please treat as urgent.

W. H. A.
 Major General
 N. M. I. A.

Internal: A
 ST

7455

R 2 1/4

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : MMIA LO REAR EIGHTH ARMY

301500A

TO : MMIA ROME

RESTRICTED

REF : 424

IMPORTANT

REF YOUR SD 2532 DATED 28 DEFICIENCIES AS AT 27 MAR FOLLOWS (.)
MAFESCIALLI DI MAGGIORITA 4 MAFESCHIALLI MANISCALCHI 4
SERGENTI SELLAI 16 SERGENTI CARRADORI 4 OR INTERPRETERS 15 (.)
12 RTTS SIGNALLED TO ARRIVE PERIOD 1 - 8 APRIL N O T REPEAT N O T
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action Copy: SD/3/1
SD/3

ep 31 Mar

7454

785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

147

FROM : MMIA LO 1 DISTRICT

TO : MMIA (ROME)

RESTRICTED

REF : SD 2532

DEFICIENCIES OF 253 PACK GROUP ON 24 MARCH (.) 1 MEDICAL OFFR
4 CQMS 20 FARRIER SJTS 4 VETERINARY SJTS 16 INTERPRETER PTES
8 FARRIER CPLS 13 SADDLER PTES 22 DRVS MT

SD DISTRIBUTION:

SD/3

am 29 mar 45

C 2/4

RAB

7453

144

MMIA

18/7/50 A

REAR EIGHTH ARMY FOR MMIA LO
DISTONS FOR MMIA LO

SD 1532RESTRICTED

SIGNAL PRESENT DEFICIENCIES OF PACK TPT OPS AGAINST W R BY
TRADES AS FOLLOWS (.) FOR MMIA LO EIGHTH ARMY (.)
152 PACK TPT OP (.) FOR MMIA LO DISTONE (.) 200
PACK TPT OP (.) GIVE DATE AM AT WHICH FIGURES ARE QUOTED

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANTAUTHENTICATED 12/11/50

7452

Internal: File: SD/3

WBS

128/3

S I C N A L

FROM: MMIA

TO : 54 AREA FORMIA LO
804 ITALIAN BRD TRANI

261845A.

INFO: AFHQ FOR G-1 BR G-3 ORG MOV V & R
HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
DISPOS
FIFTH ARMY BR INCR FORMIA LO
DISPOS FOR MMIA LO
54 AREA FORMIA LO
SIGS OFFICE BALETTA FOR O'DONNELL
HQ LFA

SD 2525S E C R E T

FIRST (.) 812 MIDEAST MULETEERS WILL BE DISPOSED AS FOLLOWS (.)
A (.) 172 TO FIFTH ARMY BR INCR AS BID IN MMIA SD 2507
OF 22 SERIAL 14 (.)

B (.) 150 TO 1 FD REMOUNT DEP PASSO CORESE (.)
C (.) 150 TO 812 BASE REMOUNT DEP PERSANO (.)

D (.) 220 TO 305 SOMBRONE INCL FOLLOWING
SPECIALISTS (.) FARMERS 1 SGT 7 CPLS 5 PTES (.)

SADDLERS 1 SGT 4 CPLS 13 PTES (.)
INTERPRETERS

1 PTE (.)

E (.) 120 TO BARI FOR LFA (.) FOR MMIA LO
54 AREA (.) CONTACT MAJ BENN HQ LFA TO ARRANGE
SELECTION (.)

7451

SECOND (.) THIS HQ WILL BID FOR MOV OF SERIALS B C D E IN
WEEK STARTING 9 APR (.)

THIRD (.) FOR AFHQ (.)

YOUR FX 47807 FHGCT OF 22 REMERS

SIGS OFFICE BARLETTA FOR O'DONNELL
HQ MIA

SD 2525

SECRET

FIRST (.) 812 MIDEAST MULETEERS WILL BE DISPOSED AS FOLLOWS (.)

A (.) 172 TO FIFTH ARMY BR INCR AS BID IN M M I A SD 2507

OF 22 SERIAL 14 (.)

B (.) 150 TO 1 ED REMOUNT DEP P A S S O C O R E S E (.)

C (.) 150 TO 812 BASE REMOUNT DEP P E R S A N O (.)

D (.) 220 TO 30 S S O M B R O N E INCL FOLLOWING

SPECIALISTS (.) FARRIERS 1 SGT 7 CPLS 5 PTES (.)

SADDLERS 1 SGT 4 CPLS 13 PTES (.)

INTERPRETERS 1 PTE (.)

E (.) 120 TO B A R I FOR L F A (.) FOR M M I A L O

54 AREA (.) CONTACT MAJ B E N N HQ L F A TO ARRANGE

SELECTION (.)

7451

SECOND (.) THIS HQ WILL BID FOR MOV OF SERIALS B C D E IN

WEEK STARTING 9 APR (.)

THIRD (.) FOR A F H Q (.)

YOUR F X 47507 F H G C T OF 22 REFERS

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

Internal: Ministry of War

A

ST

NOV (2)

FILE: SD/3

WE

R/3

SECRETSUBJECT: Org of Pack Tpt Coys (BR-ITI)

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. SD/3
16 March 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. The following designations of British Cadres attached to Pack Tpt Units (BR-ITI) are passed for information,

2. The Cadre for each Group Headquarters is organised on W.E. NA/807/2 (A1/8/2) 3 Offrs, 3 OR's, total 6 all ranks.

3. The Cadre for each Pack Tpt Coy is organised on W.E. NA/298/2 5 Offrs, 13 OR's, total 18 all ranks.

4.

British Cadre, RASC for 3 Italian Pack Transport Company	"	"
British Cadre, RASC for 4 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC for 7 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC for 14 (Cav Gp) Italian Pack Transport Company	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 250 Company (Italian Pack Transport)	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 252 Italian Pack Transport Group Headquarters	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 266 Italian Pack Transport Company	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 267 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 268 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 269 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 253 Italian Pack Transport Group Headquarters	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 270 Italian Pack Transport Company	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 271 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 272 " " "	"	"
British Cadre, RASC 273 " " "	"	"

Copy to: MEIA LO 8TH ARMY
MEIA LO 5TH ARMY BR INCR

Major General
M. M. I. A.

1. The following designations of British Cadres attached to Pack Tpt Units (BR-ITT) are passed for information.

2. The Cadre for each Group Headquarters is organised on W.E. NA/807/2 (A1/8/2) 3 Offrs, 3 QR's, total 6 all ranks.

3. The Cadre for each Pack Tpt Coy is organised on W.E. NA/298/2 5 Offrs, 13 QR's, total 18 all ranks.

4. British Cadre, RASC for 3 Italian Pack Transport Company
British Cadre, RASC for 4 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC for 7 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC for 14 (Cav Gp) Italian Pack Transport Company

British Cadre, RASC 250 Company (Italian Pack Transport)
British Cadre, RASC 252 Italian Pack Transport Group Headquarters

British Cadre, RASC 266 Italian Pack Transport Company
British Cadre, RASC 267 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC 268 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC 269 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC 253 Italian Pack Transport Group Headquarters

British Cadre, RASC 270 Italian Pack Transport Company
British Cadre, RASC 271 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC 272 " " " "
British Cadre, RASC 273 " " " "

Copy to: MMIA LO 8TH ARMY
MMIA LO 5TH ARMY BR INCR
MMIA LO 1 DIST
O.C. ER CADRE 802 IRD ORVIETO

Internal: GIII Orbat
A
Q
ST

WS

Major General
M. M. I. A.

S I G N A L

FROM NMIA

1745 A

TO AFHQ

INFO LPA

NMIA LO 52 AREA

NMIA LO 54 AREA

OS BR CALRE 804 BRD

SD RUM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REF YOUR SIGNAL PX 47807 DATED 221504 AND PX 48085 OF 221845 (.)

UNDERSTAND A F H Q. MOVED THIS DRAFT TO 804 3 R D (.)

PRIORITY IMPORTANTAUTHENTICATED DOBBS, Major

SD/8

ek

844826
R-3

M.M.I.A.

Effective date 12 March 45

CM/797/1

CMMA

MMIA 3504
RESTRICTED 139

PACK TRANSPORT INCREMENT (ITALIAN
ARMY) TO LANDING SUPPORT REGIMENT
(To maintain 144 Mules)
WAR ESTABLISHMENT

5/7/3

Amblt No.	-
Date	12 Mar 45
Officers	5
O.Rs.	254
Total	259
M.Cs.	-
Vehicles	-
Trailers	-

(i) Personnel

Detail	Company headquarters	Three troops (each)			Horse section	Total, pack transport increment (Italian Army) to landing support regiment
		Troop headquarters	Four sections (each)	Total, each troop		
Captain or subaltern	1	1		1		1
Subalterns	1					4
Total, officers	2	1		1		5
Company quartermaster-serjeant	1	1		1		1
Troop serjeants	1					3
Administrative serjeant	1					1
Veterinary serjeant	1					1
Total, staff-serjeants and serjeants	3	1		1		6
Tradesmen -						
Corporals	2	3		3		11
Lance-corporal	1					1
Privates	2	4		4		14
Non-tradesmen -						
Corporals	2	2	1	4	1	21
Lance-corporals	2	9	12	57	13	2
Privates	15					199
Total, rank cm' file	24	18	13	70	14	248
Total other ranks	27	19	13	71	14	254
Total pack transport increment (Italian Army) to landing	29	20	13	72	14	259

	Company headquarter	Troop headquarter	Four sections (each)	Total, each troop	Horse section	Total, personnel (Italian transport and support regiment)
Captain or subaltern	1	1		1		1
Subalterns	1					4
Total, officers	2	1		1		5
Company quartermaster-serjeant	1	1		1		1
Troop serjeants	1					3
Administrative serjeant	1					1
Veterinary serjeant	1					1
Total, staff-serjeants and serjeants	3	1		1		6
Tradesmen -						
Corporals	2	3		3		11
Lance-corporal	1					1
Privates	2	1		4		14
Non-tradesmen -						
Corporals	2	2	1	5	1	21
Lance-corporals	2	9	12	57	13	2
Privates	15					199
Total, rank and file	24	18	13	70	14	248
Total other ranks	27	19	13	71	14	254
Total rank transport increment (Italian Army) to raiding support regiment	29	20	13	72	14	259
(ii) Distribution of tradesmen and rank and file non-tradesmen						
Tradesmen -						
Barriers (including 3 corporals)		2		2		6
Saddlers (including 3 corporals)		2		2		6
Shoemakers	1	1		1		4
Cooks	2	2		2		8
Clerks, General Duties	2					2
Total, tradesmen	5	7		7		26

THE QUARTERS

24 MAR 1945

A. G.

RESTRICTED

CM/797/1

SHEET NO. 1

PACK TRANSPORT INCIDENT (ITALIAN
ARMY) TO RAIDING SUPPORT INCIDENT

WAR ESTABLISHMENT

(ii) Distribution of tradesmen and rank and file non-tradesmen - continued

Detail	Company headquarters	Three troops (each)			Horse section	Total, pack transport increment (Italian Army) to raising support regiment
		Troop headquarters	Four sections (each)	Total, each troop		
Non-tradesmen -						
Corporals	2	2		2		8
N.C.Os. i/c sections (corporals)			1	4		12
Batmen (including 4 for British cadre)	6	1		1		9
Officers' mess orderlies (including 1 for British cadre)	2					2
Sanitary dutyman (lance-corporal)	1					1
Medical officers' orderly (lance-corporal)	1					1
Medical orderlies						1
Drivers/sanitary duties						1
Water dutyman	1					1
Pack drivers						4
Orderlies	1		12	48		144
L.M.G. detachment	1			1		4
Interpreters	3			1		12
Driver, I.C. (for British cadre)	1			3		4
Horse section (including 1 corporal i/c)	1			1	14	14
Total, non-tradesmen	19	11	13	63	14	222
Total, rank and file	24	18	13	70	14	248

(ii) animals

Mules
Horses

144
26

(ii) Animals

rules
Horgos

26
1171

This establishment will NOT be implemented without I.T.H.O. authority.
(184/1987A)

(File 746/CR-3)

785020

COPY IF MING SIGNAL

138

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGCT

221504

TO : MMIA HQ LFA

SECRET

REF : FX 47807

IMPORTANT

FOR MMIA (.) HQ LFA PROPOSE SEND OFFICERS TO T A R A N T O TO
 ARRANGE MOVEMENT I T A L I A N A R M Y E X P W M U L E T E E R S TO
 B A R I AREA FOR FORMATION R S R M U L E C O Y (.) YOU WILL ARRANGE
 SELECTION SUITABLE MEN TO NUMBER 120 AND FOR YOUR REF TO CONTACT
 MAJOR B E N N (L F A) ON U S H E R TELEPHONE EXCHANGE TO FIX
 DETAILS (.) YOU WILL SELECT BALANCE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO COMPLETE
 W E T M / 7 9 7 / 1 IN ACCORDANCE WITH REQUISITION 8 PRIORITIES AND
 WILL BID FOR MOVEMENT IN NORMAL WAY (.) FOR L F A (.) REPORT
 PROGRESS UNIT AS DIRECTED APPENDIX A TO MY A S D / 9 2 2 . 1 (8)
 OF 14 (.) N O M U L E T E E R PERSONNEL AVAILABLE BEFORE 9 APRIL AS
 LEAVE PERIOD ORDERED

SD DISTRIBUTION:

SD/3
 SD/41/3
 SD/2/2

ws 23 Mar

CL.
 Why does this take two days
 to get from the military clerk.
 to me? S. 1100
 25 Mar.

Register No. 56/22

MESSAGE FORM

Call	Srl. No.	Priority	Transmission Instructions
		P	CIPHER SECRET

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

FROM (A) AFHQ	Originator Signed SACMED	Date-Time of Origin 221504	Office Date Stamp
TO	MMIA HQ LFA	SD Disin SD/3 SD/41/3 SD/2/2	Message Instructions
	(W) For Information (INFO)	Capin	GR

424

Originator's No. Fx 47807 SECRET citz FH GCT

for MMIA @ HQ LFA propose SLD.
 officers to TARNTO to arrange movement MMIA
 away six PW newsletters to BART area for
 formation RSR make copy @ You will arrange
 selection suitable use to number 120 and for you
 asp. to contact Major BENN (LFA) ⁷⁴⁴ on USTER
 telephone. Exchange to fix details @ you will
 select balance personnel required to complete WE
 TM/797/1 in accordance with requisition 8
 priority and will bid for movement in house (Wag)
 Fx LFA @ Report progress with as directed

785020

SUBJECT: 786 Pack Transport Coy.

SD/3.

137

British Increment (A Branch)
Rear HQ Fifth Army
CMF

MMIA

Phone No: LIGHTNING REAR 162

Copy to: ST
MMIA L.O.145 A20 Mar 45

130

Reference your letter SD/3 dated 6 Mar 45.

1. 786 Coy RA3C (Pack Tpt) was formed to complete 4 Pack Group at a time when Arab Muleteers were not available. Thus, although formed with Italian Muleteers, it was formed on the same basis as a North African Coy, with a much larger Cadre of British Officers and NCOs than is the case with normal Italian Coys of 21 Pack Group.
2. If 786 Coy is re-organised on the standard Italian Pack Coy W.E., the chief effect of this re-organisation will be the substitution of British Officers and NCOs by Italian Officers and NCOs, and any such change is neither desired nor recommended by this HQ. The operation of 786 Coy on its present WE has been found perfectly satisfactory and no variation is desired. Furthermore there is no lack of esprit de corps in the unit.
3. It is therefore strongly recommended that as long as 786 Coy is performing its present duties with 21 Pack Group, no action be taken to change its W.E. in any way.

7445

HDL/RY

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: <u>SD/3</u>
DATE: <u>22/3</u>

for Col.
DA & QMG.

136

SD 13

20 Mar 45

TO : - G-1 (B)

1. Authority is granted for the formation of ~~Pack Transport~~ ~~Increment~~ (Italian Army) to Raiding Support Regiment on WE CM 797/1 w.e.f. 12 Mar 45 and under the supervision of HQ LFA.
2. Personnel will be found by Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (IMIA).
3. Will you please issue the necessary instructions to implement the above authority.

DANIEL NOCE,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

CHG/jhg

Copy to :- CG 15 Army Gp
HQ Eighth Army
HQ LFA
Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MMIA)
G-3 (Org-4)
G-3 (Org-4)
Q(AE)
HQ Infantry
O2E (Stats)

MMIA - 'G'

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: 50/1
DATE: 23 Nov

1271

SUBJECT:- Designation of Units.

SECRET

HQ. Land Forces Sub. Commission (MMIA).

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
CF/1059/G-1(ER)(Ser.1825)
18 Mar 45.

BRITISH CADRES, RASC TO ITALIAN ARMY UNITS NT

Reference AFHQ letters G.1.(B)1003/264/4.1 dated 21 Mar 44,
CR/1116/G-1(ER)(Ser.1042) dated 14 Nov 44 and CR/1155/G-1(ER)(Ser.1305)
dated 28 Dec 44.

The designations of Units given in the letters under reference will be amended to read as follows:-

- " British Cadre, RASC for 3 Italian Pack Transport Company
- British Cadre, RASC for 4 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC for 7 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC for 14 (Cav Gp) Italian Pack Transport Company
- British Cadre, RASC 250 Company (Italian Pack Transport)
- British Cadre, RASC 252 Italian Pack Transport Group Headquarters
- British Cadre, RASC 266 Italian Pack Transport Company
- British Cadre, RASC 267 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC 268 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC 269 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC 253 Italian Pack Transport Group Headquarters
- British Cadre, RASC 270 Italian Pack Transport Company
- British Cadre, RASC 271 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC 272 " " " "
- British Cadre, RASC 273 " " " "

So Dis
S.D/3
S.D/12
1 space

7443

19 MAR 1945

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: 82/2.
DATE: 20/3.

Field-Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

DISTRIBUTION:-
(as per letters under reference)

Subject:- Pack Tpt Centre - FOSSOMBRONE.

Liaison Officer,
Land Forces Sub Comm.
A.C. (MMIA)
c/o HQ., I District.
Ref LG/G23

14 March 45.

To:- Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
M. M. I. A. R O M E.

Attached copy of letter reference above Centre
for your information. It would appear that the train-
ing at FOSSOMBRONE will be considerably delayed.

J. H. Brown
Capt.
MMIA/IO., I District.

MMIA A.	R 15/3
FILE REF	SD 42/6
Date Recd	15/3/45

P/19/3

*Q1. } for info.
Q2.*

RAC

7442

C O P Y

Subject:- Pack Animals.HQ No I District, GME.
ST/S/53
12 March 45

DST AFHQ

Copy to:- DDST 15 Army Gp.
'G'
'Q'
Med
MMIA LO

1. Attached are copies of letters from Comd 253 Lt Pack Tpt Gp regarding the outbreak of ringworm amongst mules recently received from No I Field Remount Depot.
2. It is hoped that by all the precautions taken the disease will be isolated to the animals affected.
3. It is requested that no further supply of mules is made to the Group from No I Field Remount Depot until the infection has been checked by them.
4. The number of animals affected will mean that the training and organisation of the Group will be appreciably hindered, and it is now understood that Lt Col. Macdonald, Veterinary Officer Eighth Army, has visited the Group and recommended that saddles shall be withheld from all mules until all cases are clear. This may mean a delay in training for a considerable period.
5. Conversation A/DDV & RS AFHQ and ADST(T) I District of 10 March 45, DDST(T) AFHQ and DDST I District of 11 March and this HQ signal ST T 95 of 11 March 45 refer.
6. A copy of the Veterinary Officer's recommendations will be forwarded as soon as received. CG 253 Gp has been instructed that, pending further orders, these must be followed implicitly. At the same time, Comd 253 Gp feels that it would be justifiable to confine the "no saddling" order to such mules as have cases of ringworm, this allowing training to proceed in the remaining tps.
7. May a decision on this point be given please. (Conversation DDST I District - ADST(T) AFHQ of 12 March refers).
8. The number of cases of ringworm in 253 Pack Tpt Gp was reported to be 85 this morning, and ADST 6I Area has proceeded to FOSBOMERONE today to investigate the position personally.

Sgd. ???????? Colonel,
Deputy Director of Supplies and Transport.

MESSAGE FORM

FROM : MMIA

12 17 20 A

TO : AFHQ G-3 ORG(FOR), LAND FORCES ADRIATIC,

INFO : WAR MINISTRY

ORIGINATOR'S NO SD 247

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE SD 1648 OF 10 (.) CONFIRMING CONVERSATION GRAHAM - HOLT
SUGGEST ITALIAN INCREMENT TO LEA MULE TPT COY BASED ON TROOP OF
ITALIAN PACK TRANSPORT COY CM/800/1 (.) WOULD POINT OUT THAT PROPORTION
OF MULES TO MEN PROPOSED BY LEA APPROX DOUBLE THAT IN CM/800/1 (.)
CONSIDER THIS IMPRACTICABLE

PRECEDENCE

AUTHENTICATED

Q2
S & T

file SD/3

785020

CONFIDENTIAL*Landforces*

AFK/13a

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/029 OCT-C

9 March 1945

SUBJECT: British Cadres for Italian Pack Tpt Coys

TO: President
Allied Commission
FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA)

1. The Italian report inclosed with your letter, SD/3, dated 6 February 1945 has been carefully examined.

2. In principle, the possible reduction of Allied cadres will have to be reviewed along with the reduction of other Allied staffs working with the Italian army, in order to achieve the relaxation of control envisaged by FAN 487. It is not considered desirable to take action in this isolated case against the advice of user formations, until such time as it can be shown that the principle can be applied universally to all Allied staffs working with the Italian army.

3. It might be pointed out with advantages to the officers concerned that when they prove by their own ability that they can maintain Allied standards, then it will be possible to reduce or withdraw Allied supervision.

4. The matter will be considered further when the principles are capable of more universal application. For the present it is regretted that the Italian request cannot be granted.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

A. B. King
8439
A. B. KING
Lt Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

copy furnished
15th Army 14 MAR 1945

MMIA	SD/3
FILE REF	SD/3
Data Recd	11

CONFIDENTIAL

14 Mar

132

C O P Y

From : HQ LAND FORCES ADRIATIC

10 1230 A

To : AFHQ for LMLA

Ref : SD 1648

CONFIDENTIAL

This HQ is required to submit proposed WE for mule transport coy to AFHQ (.)
Coy is to maintain 144 mules and to be formed of approx 14 British Officers
and Senior NCO's on seperate WE from approx 80 Italian muleteers (.). May
guidance be given in composition of self contained Italian Increment to mule
transport coy as this HQ has no comparative WE for basis of new proposals

SD Dist

Action copy to: (SD/3)

jw

REF - SD 2447

2438 -

785020

LIKE V LAEE NR 23 R R
 FROM HQ LAND FORCES ADRIATIC 101230A
 TO AFHQ FOR NMIA
 GR --- BT

SD1645. CONFIDENTIAL. THIS HQ IS REQUIRED TO SUBMIT PROPOSED W E
 FOR MULE TRANSPORT COY TO AFHQ. COY IS TO MAINTAIN 144 MULES AND TO
 BE FORMED OF APPROX 14 BRITISH OFFICERS AND SENIOR N C O S ON
 SEPARATE W E FROM APPROX 80 ITALIAN MULETEERS. MAY GUIDANCE BE GIVEN
 IN COMPOSITION OF SELF CONTAINED ITALIAN INCREMENT TO MULE TRANSPORT
 COY AS THIS HQ HAS NO COMPARATIVE W E FOR BASIS OF NEW PROPOSALS.

BT 101230A

SENT NR23

10/1725A


ZE

E B B

R-23--1726A---J O E---KK

MMIA	RH
FILE REF	5013
Date Recd	11

101926



Disb
 5013
 7437
 copy

785020

131

FROM MMIA
TO AFHQ CITE MHGAB
INFO 15 ARMY GROUP
DISTONE

08 15.5 A

SD 2418

SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION *(Restricted)*

YOUR TX 36127 PARA THIRD

(.) FOLLOWING

COMBAT PERSONNEL ARRIVED ORVIETO CAMP UNDER 1 DIST
COMMAND AGAINST REQUIREMENT 2000 MADE UP 1400 EX PICENO
600 EX COMBAT (.)

15 JAN	377	FROM 235/336 REGT
17 JAN	160	FROM 336 REGT
23 JAN	220	FROM BENEVENTO
27 JAN	600	FROM 332 REGT AND 120 AUT BN
26 JAN	352	FROM CESANO
27 JAN	220	FROM CESANO

TOTAL 1929 (.) BALANCE TO 2000 WAS PROVIDED EX
700 WHO MOVED TO ORVIETO 7 JAN DELETED FROM CAMPS AT
TARANTO AND TRANI (.) YOUR PARA FIFTH AGREED

PRECEDENCE

Restricted

7436

AUTHENTICATED

Skint

INTERNAL
Spec Sec
Mov
SD/3/1
SD/42/6
SD/42/2
SD/3

130

SECRET

SUBJECT: 260 Iner to 786 Pack Tpt Coy - MR-JTI
E.E. X11/122/2 Offrs A. ORs 275

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. SD/3

6 March 45

TO : REAR 5 ARMY FOR BR INCH

Copy to: REAR 5 ARMY FOR BR INCH NIA LO

1. War Ministry have requested the reorganization of the above increment on to the regular Pack Tpt Coy W.E. - CM/800/1 (offrs 10 ORs 485).
2. A copy of their letter is attached.
3. Your recommendations are requested please.


Major General
M. M. I. A.

Internal: ST

WE

74332

C O P Y
T R A N S L A T I O N

FROM: SMRE

Ref.: 10996

TO : MMIA

Date: 23/2/45

SUBJECT: *260 Iner 6*
786 Pack Transport Coy

* 1. Differing from the other units belonging to ~~the~~ *260 Iner 6* 21st Pack Transport Group, (231st Division) which are constituted under the W.E. A1/1/1 the 786th Pack Transport ~~Coy~~, has a staff of 4 officers and 275 NCOs and ORs. However, actually in ~~the~~ view of the work carried out, ~~this~~ *260 Iner 6* unit has ~~applied~~ strength of 4 officers and 410 NCOs and ORs.

2. As a result of the a/m difference, the following inconveniences happened:-

(a) The platoons have no Italian Officers, and the Captain commanding the unit has to enforce discipline, even when the platoons ~~as~~ *often* happens, are working independently.

(b) In case of absence of the Captain, there is no officer who can replace him efficiently considering that the 3 remaining officers are: subaltern for administration, a Medical Officer and a Chaplain.

(c) The lack of esprit de corps with other units of the group, which also carry out the same duties.

3. For the a/m reasons this SMRE suggests the need for reorganizing *260 Iner 6* 786th Pack Transport ~~Coy~~ on the basis of the ~~A1/1/1~~ W.E. A1/1/1. *

We are waiting to hear the decision of the MMIA.

(Sgd) General in Charge

A. SANTI

7434

785020

C O P Y

RCM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CI TE FHGT

051439A

TO : 15 ARMY GROUP
DISTONEINFO: MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
REAR EIGHTH ARMY
NMIAFX 37923CONFIDENTIAL

15 ARMY GROUP SD 1309 OF 04 (.) HEADQUARTERS 252 ITALIAN PACK TPT GP AND 266,
267, 268, 269 ITALIAN PACK TPT COYS ARE RELEASED FORTH ITH FOR CALLING FORWARD
BY EIGHTH ARMY (.) DISTONE WILL ENSURE UNITS COMPLETE BEFORE MOVE (.) ON ARRIVAL
UNITS PASS TO UNDER COMD EIGHTH ARMY

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

7433

WS

SD DIST.: SD/3/1 (Action Copy)
SD/42/6

COPY

From : MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
To : AFHQ
Info : DISTONE/ 15 ARMY GROUP/ REAR EIGHTH ARMY/ MMIA ROME/
Ref : SD 2266
CONFIDENTIAL
Ref 15 Army Group SD 1309 of 04 rep ST Rear Eighth Army is
visiting HQ 252 Italian Pack Tpt Gp on 7 March

SD DistAction copy to: SD/3/1
SD/42/6

jw

7432

785020

COPY

FROM : HQ 15 ARMY GP
TO : AFHQ MAIN EIGHTH ARMY.
INFO : MMIA : REAR EIGHTH ARMY : DISTONE

041600ASD 1309CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR G3 ORG (*) REQUEST YOUR RELEASE HQ 252 ITALIAN PACK TPT GP AND 266
267 268 AND 269 (*) ITALIAN PACK TPT COYS FOR CALLING FORWARD BY
EIGHTH ARMY FROM FOSSOMBRONE (*) FOR EIGHTH ARMY (*) ON RELEASE OF
ABOVE SIGNAL AFHQ RPTD 1 DISTRICT DESTINATION AND DATE REQUIRED TO MOVE

Precedence -

SD DIST:

Action copy: SD/3/1
SD/42/6

tvs.

7431

785020

COPY

131

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHEAB

021235A

TO : MIA

INFO: 15 ARMY GROUP
DISTONE

FX 36127

RESTRICTED

125 SD/3/1 SD/7 SD/42

YOUR SD 2321 OF 21 FEB (.) FIRST (.) DISPOSAL OF PICENO PERSONNEL
NOT CLEAR (.) SECOND (.) YOUR SD 1939 OF 15 DEC STATED 2,000 WOULD
BE PROVIDED FOR NEW PACK TPE COYS (.) REDUCTION THIS NUMBER TO
1,400 PROPOSED IN YOUR SD 1975 OF 20 DEC AND AGREED TO IN MY
FX 73171 OF 23 DEC PROVIDED FIT MULETERS COULD BE SUPPLIED TO
FULL NUMBER IN TIME (.) THIRD (.) 1 DISTRICT REPORTED ON 19 FEB
THAT ONLY 503 PICENO PERSONNEL SO FAR REPORTED ORVIETO FOR NEW
COYS WITH RESULT REMAINDER MULETERS HAVE BEEN PROVIDED IN MAJORITY
FROM POOR TYPE SICILIANS (.) FOURTH (.) REPORT DETAILED DISPOSAL
OF ORIGINAL 2,000 EX PICENO PERSONNEL (.) FIFTH (.) ENSURE NO MORE
SICILIANS SENT TO NEW PACK COYS OR TO REINFORCE EXISTING COYS UNLESS
SPECIALLY QUALIFIED

WS

SD DIST.: SD/3/1
SD/42/6
SD/42/2
SD/3

7430

C. CONFIDENTIAL

130

SUBJECT: Italian Mule Holding Unit - RSR - BR-ITI

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. SD/3
2d Feb 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Copy to: MMLA LC 54 AREA
MMLA LC 52 AREA
3 DISTRICT

1. An Italian Mule Holding Unit has been formed by Headquarters Land Forces Adriatic for the Raiding Support Regiment. A War Establishment is being prepared for the unit which is BR-ITI and at the moment consists of:-

(a) 26 Italian Army Muleteers.

(b) 26 Italian Prisoners of War captured by the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation and handed over to Land Forces Adriatic.

(c) 2 Italian volunteers who gave themselves up to the British Troops in Yugoslavia.

54 Total

2. Please arrange for the personnel at para 1(b) and 1(c) to be enlisted into the Italian Army and for the necessary administrative arrangements to be made through 230 Adm Div Hq.

3. The unit will be carried in Cat 3 (BR-ITI).

Major General
M. M. I. A.

7429

Internal: A
Q (2)
S.T.

WS

R^{2/3}

INFO COPY
RESTRICTED

RHF/lja

129/1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/029 GGT-0

19 February 1945

SUBJECT: Enlistment into the Italian Army

TO: President
Allied Commission
FOR: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMA)

A.
Copy 6(13) ←

1. Headquarters Land Forces Adriatic has formed an Italian Mule Holding Unit for various operations carried out by the Raiding Support Regiment. This unit consists of twenty six (26) Italian Army muleteers provided under authority contained in letter, this headquarters, file AG 091.711/137 GGT-0, dated 17 October 1944, subject: "Italian Muleteers", twenty six (26) Italian Prisoners of War captured by the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation and handed over to LFA, and two (2) Italian volunteers who gave themselves up to British troops in Yugoslavia.

2. Request that you arrange for the latter parties, total twenty eight (28) men, to be enlisted into the Italian Army through Headquarters 330 Italian Division, and for the necessary administrative arrangements to be made for the clothing and payment of these men.

3. AWE is being prepared by LFA and will be submitted by them in due course. The Unit will be BR-ITI.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

R. H. FRASE
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

82/3/1 SECRET
(1-1-45) (30)

7428

M.M.A.	728
FILE REF	50/3.
Date Recd	23/2

RESTRICTED

785020

COPY

128

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGAB

TO : MNIA

251706A

INFO: 15 ARMY GP
DISTONEFX 33426RESTRICTED

SEE YOUR SD/3 OF 4 FEB ADDRESSED TO MINISTRY OF WAR CALLING
FOR DATE BY WHICH NEW PACK TRANSPORT GPS REQUIREMENTS OF
INTERPRETERS WILL BE MET (.) STATE IF REPLY NOW RECEIVED

7427

WS

SD DIST.:

SD/22/1

SD/3

Info.

action

785020

LEKT V. LAEE NR23

CVP 1

FROM LAEE 251706Z

TO MMIA

INFO TO ARMY GP DISTONE

CDEB FT

EX33426 RESTRICTED

SEE YOUR SD/S OF 4 FEB ADDRESSED TO MINISTRY OF WAR CALLING FOR DATE
 BY WHICH NEW PACK TRANSPORT GPS REQUIREMENTS OF INTERPRETERS WILL
 BE MET. STATE IF REPLY NOW RECEIVED. SIGNED SACRED CITE INGA 7426

BT

SENT NR25 CESR B

R-28---1935A J O E K

MMIA	PR 2672
FILE REF	SD/22/1
Date Recd	26/2/45

SD/22/1
 SD/23/1

4
 CRT

D/3316
 ACT - handwritten 11/1/25 61/25

252010

Translation

Copy

S.M.3.

121

From: S.M.R.E.
To: M.M.I.A.

Ref: 10996
Date: 23/2/45

Subject: 486 ~~Baggage~~ ^{Pack Transport Coy} Unit.

- 1) Differing from the other units belonging to the 21st ^{Baggage} ~~Baggage~~ ^{Pack Transport} Group (231st Division) which are constituted under the W/E A.I./I the 486th ~~Baggage~~ ^{Pack Transport} group, has a staff of 4 officers and 245 NCO's and OR's. However actually in the view of the work carried out the same unit has an actual strength of 4 officers and 410 NCO's and OR's. ~~However actually~~
- 2) As a result of the a/m difference, the following inconveniences happened.
 - a) The platoons have no Italian officers, and the Captain commanding the unit has to enforce discipline, even when the platoons as it oftenly happens, are ~~not~~ working ~~independently~~.
 - b) In case of ~~an~~ absence of the captain, there is no officer who can replace him efficiently ~~considering that the~~ ^{3 remaining officers are:} a subaltern for Administration, a medical officer and a chaplain.
 - c) The lack of esprit de corps with other units of the group, which also carry out the same duties.
- 3) For the a/m reasons this establishment ~~S.M.3.E~~ ^{S.M.3.E} suggests the need for reorganising the 486 Pack Transport unit on the basis of the A.I./I W.E.

We are waiting to hear the decision of the M.M.I.A.

Signed: General in Charge
A. Santi

J. Fold

26 Jan 45 486 Pack Inf Coy is carried in Part 3
Summary Bk III - WE as stated strength as stated
18. 26/2

Summary
not Pte Enry
1/1/45

IN

SEGRETO

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO E MOBILITAZIONE
- Sezione Ordinamento -

N° 10996 /ord.di prot.

P.M.3800, li 23 febbraio 1945

OGGETTO: 786° Reparto salmerie.-

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (MMIA)

R O M M

SD

23/2

1°) - A differenza degli altri reparti appartenenti al 21° Gruppo Salmerie (231ª Divisione), che sono costituiti sull'organico AI/I/I, il 786° reparto salmerie ha un organico di 4 ufficiali e 275 sottufficiali e truppa. Però attualmente, in dipendenza del lavoro che svolge, il reparto stesso ha una forza presente di 4 ufficiali e 410 sottufficiali e truppa.

2°) - In conseguenza delle differenze predette si hanno i seguenti inconvenienti:

- i plotoni non hanno ufficiali italiani e pertanto sul solo capitano comandante il reparto grava l'onere della disciplina, anche quando i plotoni, come normalmente avviene, sono impiegati isolatamente;
- in caso di assenza del capitano non vi è alcun ufficiale che lo possa sostituire efficacemente, dato che i rimanenti 3 ufficiali sono: 1 subalterno di amministrazione, un medico ed un cappellano;
- mancanza di omogeneità con gli altri reparti del gruppo, che pure svolgono gli stessi compiti.

3°) - Pertanto questo S.M. prospetta le necessità di riorganizzare il 786° reparto salmerie su organico AI/I/I.

Si resta in attesa di conoscere le decisioni di codesta

M.M.I.A.-



IL GENERALE ADDETTO
(Alessandro Santi)

[Handwritten signature]

1°) - A differenza degli altri reparti appartenenti al 21° Gruppo Salmerie (231^a Divisione), che sono costituiti sull'organico AI/I/I, il 786° reparto salmerie ha un organico di 4 ufficiali e 275 sottufficiali e truppa. Però attualmente, in dipendenza del lavoro che svolge, il reparto stesso ha una forza presente di 4 ufficiali e 410 sottufficiali e truppa.

2°) - In conseguenza delle differenze predette si hanno i seguenti inconvenienti:

- i plotoni non hanno ufficiali italiani e pertanto sul solo capitano comandante il reparto grava l'onere della disciplina, anche quando i plotoni, come normalmente avviene, sono impiegati isolatamente;
- in caso di assenza del capitano non vi è alcun ufficiale che lo possa sostituire efficacemente, dato che i rimanenti 3 ufficiali sono: 1 subalterno di amministrazione, un medico ed un cappellano;
- mancanza di omogeneità con gli altri reparti del gruppo, che pure svolgono gli stessi compiti.

3°) - Pertanto questo S.M. prospetta le necessità di riorganizzare il 786° reparto salmerie su organico AI/I/I.

Si resta in attesa di conoscere le decisioni di codesta

M.M.I.A.-



IL GENERALE ADDETTO
(Alessandro Santi)

785020

126

MESSAGE FORM

DATE TIME OF ORIGIN

21 0840 A

FROM: MMLA

TO : AFHQ

INFO: I5 ARMY GROUP

DISTONE

O.C. BR CADRE ITALIAN RFT DEPOT ORVIETO

SD 2321

124

CONFIDENTIAL

FHGAB

FX 29906 OF 19 (*) FIRST (*) UNDERSTAND FROM ORVIETO THAT FOLLOWING MULETEER

RFTS ARE AVAILABLE FOR FOSSOMBRONE (*) 500 WHOM ORVIETO DEPOT HAVE ALREADY ASKED

DISTONE TO MOVE (*) FURTHER 200 ALSO READY FOR WHOM MOVE NOW REQUIRED (*)

TOTAL 700 (*) SECOND (*) PICENO PERSONNEL LESS NORMAL ITALIAN WASTAGE ARRIVED ORVIETO

IN JAN (*) PERSONNEL ALREADY SENT TO FOSSOMBRONE FOR 253 GP WERE LARGELY EX PICENO (*)

FURTHER 72 ARE INCLUDED IN 500 MENTIONED PARA FIRST (*) THIRD (*) DEPOT FURTHER

REPORTS THAT PERSONNEL EX 7 MTN REGT WERE DISPOSED AS FOLLOWS (*)

501 INCLUDING CMRS WERE RECEIVED AT ORVIETO (*) 408 WERE SENT TO FOSSOMBRONE

IN DRAFTS OF APPROX 200 ON 14 AND 16 FEB (*) APPROX 50 WILL BE INCLUDED IN DRAFT

OF 500 MENTIONED PARA FIRST (*) SICKNESS LEAVE AND ABSENCE ACCOUNTS FOR BALANCE (*)

FOURTH (*) FURTHER 140 MULETEERS ARE NOW UNDER YOUR ORDERS TO MOVE FROM TRANI

DIRECT TO AREZZO FOR FIFTH ARMY BR INCR

7423

INTERNAL

AQ

ST

MOV

File: SD/42/6

PRECEDENCE

IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

70. K. H. H. H.

C O P Y

Info COPY

125

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACMED CITE FHGAB

191942A

TO : MMIA

INFO: 15 ARMY GROUP
DISTONEFX 29906RESTRICTED

SUBJECT IS ITALIAN PACK TPT COYS FORMING FOSSOMERONE (.) FIRST (.) UNDERSTAND FROM
15 ARMY GROUP: (A) 700 MULETEERS STILL REQUIRED (B) NO EX-PICENO PERSONNEL HAVE
YET ARRIVED (C) ONLY 200 OUT OF 500 PERSONNEL EX 7 MTN REGT HAVE ARRIVED (.) SECOND (.)
REQUEST YOU TAKE UP IMMEDIATELY WITH ORVIETO BASE DEPOT AND REPORT TO THIS HQ EARLIEST
THE NUMBER OF BASICALLY TRAINED RFTS AT ORVIETO AVAILABLE TO BE MOVED TO FOSSOMERONE (.)
DESIRABLE TO INCLUDE IN THIS NUMBER AS MANY PERSONNEL EX PICENO AND EX 7 MTN REGT AS
POSSIBLE

WS

SD DIST.: SD/42/6 (Action Copy)
SD/3
SD/3/1

7422

Translation

From: - SMKE.

To: - MMIA.

Ref: - 351/SP/L.

Date: - 13th Feb 45.

124

Subject: - Interpreters for Pack Tpt. Groups.

SD/3

Ref. SD/3 dated 4th inst.

1) The following modifications, as referred to in
 upn letter in respect of W/C of Pack Tpt Groups, have been made:-

		<u>Officers.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
Group HQ.	- 1 Officer interpreter	1	-
Pack Tpt. Coy. HQ.	- 1 L.O. x 4.	4	-
	- 1 Interpreter bellin x 4	-	4
	- 1 " " x 16	-	16
		<u>5</u>	<u>20</u>

2) Up to the present the upn have been assigned:-

- 252 Group — 3 Officers 1 bellin.
 - 253 " — 3 " "

Arrangements have been made to move to:-

- 252 Group — 2 Officers 1 Cpl.
 - 253 " — 1 " 1 Pte.

3) It results that:- at 252 Group FOSCOMBRONE,
 there are two officers interpreters not assigned
 by this office.

~~The request has been forwarded to Foscombe~~
 Training Centre ^{has been requested} to inform this office of the exact number
 of interpreters of the two Pack Tpt Groups.

(Sgd) H. SANTI.

R16/2

Lt. FAURE.

C17/2

GR/re.

STATO MAGGIORE R.ESERCITO
Ufficio segreteria e personale
Sezione Interpreti

IN

N° 337 / SP./h di prot.

P.M.3800, /3 febbraio 1945

OGGETTO: interpreti per gruppi salmerie.-

ALLA L.F.S.C. - A.C. - (M.M.I.A)
(rif.foglio SD/3 del 4 corr.)

- R O M A

e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
- Gabinetto - Uff. C.A. -
(rif.301645/C.A. del 5/2/c.a.)

- S E D E

14/1

1. Sono state apportate le modificazioni, come comunicato con il foglio a riferimento, alle cifre dell'organico dei Gruppi Salmerie e cioè:

	Ufficiali	Soldati
- C.do Gruppo - 1 uff. interprete	1	-
- C.do Comp.Salmerie 1 uff.colleg.	4	4
1 soldato interp.	-	16
1 soldato interp.	-	-
	5	20
	=====	=====

2. Fino ad ora sono stati assegnati:

- al 252° Gruppo : 3 ufficiali - 1 soldato
- al 253° Gruppo : 3 ufficiali -

E' già stato disposto il movimento per:

- il 252° Gruppo : 2 ufficiali - 1 caporale
- il 253° Gruppo : 1 ufficiale - 1 soldato.

3. Risulta che presso il 252° Gruppo a Fossombrone si trovano altri due ufficiali interpreti non assegnati da questo S.M..

E' stato richiesto al Centro addestramento di Fossombrone di comunicare la situazione esatta degli interpreti dei due Gruppi Salmerie.-

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
-Alessandro Santi-



[Handwritten signature]

785020

COPY

123/1

FROM : ST 61 AREA 12 1900 A
 TO : G(SD) 1 DIST
 INFO : AMHQ CIES RECT. 15 ARM GROUP. MATA. 71 SUB AREA. ST DISTONE.
 REF : SEM/3196 CONFIDENTIAL

REF SD 41 dated 2 Feb (.) Report on formation of 252 Italian Pack Tpt Group (.) (A) All coys 20 percent deficient but since we allow 1 man per mile this is not an operational disadvantage (.) (B) 3 Coys complete in essential equipment for operations (.) (C) 47 Officers - 2100 GRN (.) (D) 450 (.) (E) 78 to camp staff 100 to 21 Pack Group not rejects - 116 deserters (.) (F) 164 to ORVIETO rejects (.) (G) 12 Feb 45

this an Orvieto return?

SD Dist
 SD/3 - Action copy.
 SD/42/2
 SD/42/6

higher form A

B.
 15/2

7419

12/18/2

LROF V MWRU 12/509 QVR 4
FROM ST 61 AREA 119777 121900
TO (1) G. (SD) 1 DIST
INFO (2) AFHQ CITE FAGCT (3) 15 ARMY GP (4) MMIA
(5) 71 SUB AREA (6) ST DISTNE

BT
STM/3196 (.) CONFIDENTIAL(.) REF SD 41 DATED 2 FEB(.) REPORT ON
FORMATION OF 252 ITALIAN PACK TPT GP (.) (A) ALL COYS 20 PER CENT
DEFICIENT BUT SINCE WE ALLOW 1 MAN PER MULE THIS IS NOT AN
OPERATIONAL DISADVANTAGE(.) (B) 3 COYS COMPLETE IN ESSENTIAL
EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATIONS(.) (C) 47 OFFICERS - 2100 ORS(.)
(D) 450 (.) (E) 70 TO CAMP STAFF 100 TO 21 PACK GROUP NOT
REJECTS - 116 DESERTERS(.) (F) 164 TO ORVIETO REJECTS(.) (G)
12 FEB 45

BT
SENT C.W. 2148 BB
RECD 0777 509 2148 REB AR-K

535

SD
13/1

(8/4/45)
50/42/2 35
50/42/6 54

C O P Y

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP

TO : AFHQ CITE FHGCT

INFO: MMIA 5 ARMY (BRIT INCR "A")

A 205

NO DATE TIME

SECRET

REF YOUR FX 19207 OF 01 (.) YOUR AG 091 711/029 GCT-9 OF JAN NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED
 THIS HQ (.) FIRST (.) UNDERSTAND PROGRAMME REFERRED TO IS SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED
 IN YOUR FX 83648 OF 12 JAN (.) UNDER THAT PROGRAMME UNDERSTAND JAN RPTS FOR 5 ARMY
 (BRIT INCR) NOW HELD ORVIETO AWAITING CALLING FWD BY 5 ARMY AND 100 RPTS FOR 8 ARMY
 EN ROUTE EX FOSSOMBRONE (.) SECOND (.) REQUEST ALL FUTURE MULETERRS RPTS BE DESPATCHED
 5 ARMY (BRIT INCR) AS 3 UK TPT COY NO (NO) LONGER UNDER COMMAND 8 ARMY

WB

SD DIST.: SD/42/6 (Action Copy)

SD/3

SD/3/1

-7417

785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM

9/65

CIPHER	CIRCUIT No.	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
	NR 6518	NIL	QVR 2

SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM (A) 15 ARMY GROUP

This Message will NOT be distributed outside British Government Departments or Headquarters, re-transmitted, even in Cipher, without being PARAPHRASED (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

TO (FOR ACTION) AFHQ CITE FHGCT

MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR

TO (FOR INFORMATION) MMIA 5 ARMY (BRIT INCR 'A').

(REF. No.) A 205

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

REF YOUR FX19207 OF 01.

YOUR AG091 711/029 GGT-9 OF JAN NOT RPY NOT RECEIVED THIS HQ. FIRST. UNDERSTAND ~~PROGRAMME~~ PROGRAMME REFERRED TO IS SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED IN YOUR FX83648 OF 12 JAN. UNDER THAT PROGRAMME UNDERSTAND JAN RFTS FOR 5 ARMY (BRIT INCR) NOW HELD ORVIETO AWAITING CALLING FWD BY 5 ARMY AND 100 RFTS FOR 8 ARMY EN ROUTE EX FOSSOMERONE. SECOND. REQUEST ALL FUTURE MULETEER RFTS BE DESPATCHE D 5 ARMY (BRIT INCR) AS 3 UK TPT COY NO (NO) LONGER UNDER COMMAND 8 ARMY

DECIPHERED AT 1720

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

PRECEDENCE:

ORIGINATING SECTION:

A. G. AUTHENTICATION:

ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION:

THI OR TOR

Op.

TIME CLEARED

Action 1720

SD 42/6

SD 3

SD 3/1

7416

5 copies

SECRET

SUBJECT: British Cadres working with
Italian Pack Tpt Coys

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
 (M.M.I.A.A.)
 File No. SD/3 ←
 6 Feb 45

TO : AFHQ (4)

1. The att copy of a report was handed in D.C. form by an officer of the Italian War Ministry to an officer on my staff.

2. British cadres are at the moment as under:-

	Italian Strength Offrs ORs	Br Cadres Offrs ORs
Pack Tpt Coy (less 250 Pack Coy)	10 485	6 11 Sgts
Gp Hq	4 31	2 3 ORs

3. (a) The underlying intention of JAM 457, new directive from GCS, is to give the Italians more responsibility. I think that the case of these Pack Tpt Coys is one where we can do so.

(b) By reducing these British Cadres to (say) 1 officer and 1 batman-driver per Gp Hq and Coy, we would:-

- (i) give more responsibility to the Italians,
- (ii) save Allied manpower,
- (iii) raise the morale of the Italian personnel in these units.

(c) On the other hand, 15 Army Gp, who are in operational command of these Coys, may not agree to such a reduction.

(d) However, I recommend that the reduction be given a trial. The Cadres can always be increased again if a loss of efficiency results.

L. B.

Major General
 M. M. I. A.

2. British cadres are at the moment as under:-

	<u>Italian Strength</u>		<u>Br Cadres</u>	
	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Pack Tpt Coy (less 250 Pack Coy)	10	485	6	11 Sgts
Gp HQ	4	31	2	3 ORs

3. (a) The underlying intention of FAM 487, new directive from COS, is to give the Italians more responsibility. I think that the case of these Pack Tpt Coys is one where we can do so.

(b) By reducing these British Cadres to (say) 1 officer and 1 batman-driver per Gp HQ and Coy, we would:-

- (i) give more responsibility to the Italians,
- (ii) save Allied manpower,
- (iii) raise the morale of the Italian personnel in these units.

(c) On the other hand, 15 Army Gp, who are in ~~operational~~ ^{total} command of these Coys, may not agree to such a reduction.

(d) However, I recommend that the reduction be given a trial. The Cadres can always be increased again if a loss of efficiency results.

Internal: A/q

wa

L.B.

Major General
K. M. I. A.

TRANSLATION

From Bq 21st Ind. Pack Tpt. Gp.

Cadre of Pack Tpt. Units with the 8th Army

In the Italian Pack Tpt. Units of the 8th Army, under my control, the Italian cadre is in every case (excluding the medical section) duplicated by a British cadre. Every Italian officer has beside him a British officer (not even of the same rank) and in each platoon there are British NCO's, either on normal duties with the unit or having special missions. The responsibility for everything that affects the service is thus split. British cadres should be responsible for everything that can be termed as operational and for the proper care of the animals, the Italian cadres being responsible for the discipline and administration of the men.

So far we have thus carried on:

Anyone can easily understand how impossible it is to have a dual command in a unit without creating numerous incidents and without diminishing the potential output of the unit. The Italian officers of the units under my control are all fully capable of commanding, according to their rank, units or platoons of Pack Tpt. Troops and they are all officers with experience of animals, because they have all been for a long time in cavalry units and, with a few exceptions among the younger ones, they have all commanded combatant units at the front.

The morale of my officers is low, in fact very low, and the reason is one which is evident. To wit: I expected, or rather I felt sure, when, during last March, I took over the command of this Group that, after an initial period which would have enabled British HQ's to become aware of the quality and capabilities of the Italian officers, the latter would have been left to themselves and made solely responsible for everything relating to the Service. I now see that the situation as it is cannot last.

I have stated that the morale of the Italian officers is low. The reasons are important and the drawbacks which they entail are many and large.

The Italian officers (who, I repeat, are all fully capable of performing their duties) feel slighted and wounded in their pride, when they see that they have always beside them British officers who, because they are responsible for the operational side, logically feel that they are the commanders of the unit and, though they do not openly say so, they make it clear, wanting to enforce their authority in everything that relates to service (even regarding personnel).

I can even affirm that in this Group instead of appreciating the quality of the Italian officers, these are continuously slighted and consequently the prestige of the Italian officer before his own men is reduced. It is obvious that this undermines the principle on which the Army is based.

The Italian officer is considered by the British officer as a "link" between himself and the soldier. Under these conditions the Italian officers' output is small and, whilst unit commanders are forced to disregard everything concerning operations and animals and their care, subaltern platoon

mand in a unit without creating numerous incidents and without diminishing the potential output of the unit. The Italian officers of the units under my control are all fully capable of commanding, according to their rank, units or platoons of Pack Lpt. Troops and they are all officers with experience of animals, because they have all been for a long time in cavalry units and, with a few exceptions among the younger ones, they have all commanded combatant units at the front.

The morale of my officers is low, in fact very low, and the reason is one which is evident. To wit: I expected, or rather I felt sure, when, during last March, I took over the command of this Group that, after an initial period which would have enabled British HQ's to become aware of the quality and capabilities of the Italian officers, the latter would have been left to themselves and made solely responsible for everything relating to the Service. I now see that the situation as it is cannot last.

I have stated that the morale of the Italian officers is low. The reasons are important and the drawbacks which they entail are many and large.

The Italian officers (who, I repeat, are all fully capable of performing their duties) feel slighted and wounded in their pride, when they see that they have always beside them British officers who, because they are responsible for the operational side, logically feel that they are the commanders of the unit and, though they do not openly say so, they make it clear that they want to enforce their authority in everything that relates to service (even regarding personnel).

I can even affirm that in this Group instead of appreciating the quality of the Italian officers, these are continuously slighted and consequently the prestige of the Italian officer before his own men is reduced. It is obvious that this undermines the principle on which the Army is based.

The Italian officer is considered by the British officer as a "link" between himself and the soldier. Under these conditions the Italian officers' output is small and, whilst unit commanders are forced to disregard everything concerning operations and animals and their care, subaltern platoon commanders take an interest in their units merely out of a sense of duty.

Furthermore unit commanders very often find it impossible, owing to lack of transport (often asked for but never obtained), to exercise control over their units. Whilst in fact the British officer commanding the British cadre has a jeep assigned to him, the officer commanding the unit must make use of the most varied and improvised ^{of} transport in order to carry out his duties.

It is because of these reasons that the Italian officer sometimes cannot raise enough enthusiasm to give his unit at war complete efficiency and sound morale; and it must be admitted that they are justified since it cannot be expected that an officer being merely a "transmitter of orders" and far less that he should act as NCO to the British officer.

- 2 -

It is an old saying that "the morale of the soldier is parallel to that of his officer" and when the officers' morale is low that of the soldier equals it.

Duties, under present conditions, are carried out, but unit discipline suffers considerably from the lack of prestige of their officers. The soldier is intelligent and sees and hears everything. He notices the conditions in which his officer finds himself and, though he may be spiritually with his officer in his sad plight, he nevertheless logically greatly relaxes in his discipline.

All the above is merely in the best of cases and in reality matters are very often much worse.

Friction between Italian and British cadres, though not always reported to higher commands (it would be necessary to send a report in almost every day), has a great effect on the general running of the unit and creates an atmosphere in which the necessary cooperation does not easily develop. The presence of British NCO's in the platoons is demoralizing as is also the presence of blacksmiths, saddlers, mechanics and other specialists. The Italian personnel to whom they are attached are all capable, and if the men do not yield their full output it is because they can see clearly they are not trusted. Furthermore these British NCO's, as a rule, act in a way which does not fit in with the Italian mentality, and often they lack tact and education.

In the present situation of the nation, in which a small number of men are under arms, commanded by officers who love their country and loathe the German, I can affirm with pride before all that if in the units under my control desertion has been limited to a reasonable figure, and if units have not disbanded, it is solely due to the cohesive and gathering action of my officers carried out day by day and certainly not to the action of the British personnel. The latter with their superior attitude towards the Italian personnel have made the carrying out of duties much more difficult.

Bearing in mind that during the last few months Allied commands have been able to judge the work of combatant Italian units led exclusively by Italian officers and that (though lacking everything) these units wherever they have been in action have given a good account of themselves and have everywhere been praised by the Allied High Command; bearing in mind also that the 250 Pack Ppt. Unit, led solely by Italian officers (with only one English captain as L.O.), also forms part of this group and that this unit has, for some months now been working with an Allied unit and has won their full trust; bearing in mind, as I have previously stated, the spirit and professional capacity and the sense of duty of my officers, I maintain that, if it is desired to obtain a smooth and efficient running of the group (certainly better than present), it is necessary that the Italian officers be made DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE for everything in accordance with their rank, and that all British officers and NCO's be withdrawn from the units where they are absolutely superfluous. Only one British L.O. will be necessary who, together with the Italian interpreter officer, will assist the unit commander with whatever he is in direct contact with Allied units with his own unit.

Though it is a fact that from the day on which I took command of this

It is an old saying that "the morale of the soldier is parallel to that of his officers" and when the officers' morale is low that of the soldier equals it.

Duties, under present conditions, are carried out, but unit discipline suffers considerably from the lack of prestige of their officers. The soldier is intelligent and sees and hears everything. He notices the conditions in which his officer finds himself and, though he may be spiritually with his officer in his sad plight, he nevertheless logically greatly relaxes in his discipline.

All the above is merely in the best of cases and in reality matters are very often much worse.

Friction between Italian and British cadres, though not always reported to higher commands (it would be necessary to send a report in almost every day), has a great effect on the general running of the unit and creates an atmosphere in which the necessary cooperation does not easily develop. The presence of British MCO's in the platoons is demoralizing as is also the presence of blacksmiths, saddlers, mechanics and other specialists. The Italian personnel to whom they are attached are all capable, and if the men do not yield their full output it is because they can see clearly they are not trusted. Furthermore these British MCO's, as a rule, act in a way which does not fit in with the Italian mentality, and often they lack tact and education.

In the present situation of the nation, in which a small number of men are under arms, commanded by officers who love their country and loathe the German, I can affirm with pride before all that if in the units under my control attention has been limited to a respectable figure, and if units have not disbanded, it is solely due to the cohesive and gathering action of my officers carried out day by day and certainly not to the action of the British personnel. The latter with their superior attitude towards the Italian personnel have made the carrying out of duties much more difficult.

Bearing in mind that during the last few months Allied commands have been able to judge the work of combatant Italian units led exclusively by Italian officers and that (though lacking everything) these units wherever they have been in action have given a good account of themselves and have everywhere been praised by the Allied High Command; bearing in mind also that the 250 Pack Ppt. Unit, led solely by Italian officers (with only one English captain as L.O.), also forms part of this group and that this unit has, for some months now been working with an Allied unit and has won their professional trust; bearing in mind, as I have previously stated, the spirit and professional capacity and the sense of duty of my officers, I maintain that, if it is desired to obtain a smooth and efficient running of the group (certainly better than present), it is necessary that the Italian officers be made DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE for everything in accordance with their rank, and that all British officers and MCO's be withdrawn from the units where they are absolutely superfluous. Only one British L.O. will be necessary who, together with the Italian interpreter officer, will assist the unit commander with whatever he is in direct contact with Allied units with his own unit.

Though it is a fact that from the day on which I took command of this

atmosphere in which the necessary cooperation does not easily develop. The presence of British NCO's in the platoons is demoralizing as is also the presence of blacksmiths, saddlers, mechanics and other specialists. The Italian personnel to whom they are attached are all capable, and if the men do not yield their full output it is because they can see clearly they are not trusted. Furthermore these British NCO's, as a rule, act in a way which does not fit in with the Italian mentality, and often they lack tact and education.

In the present situation of the nation, in which a small number of men are under arms, commanded by officers who love their country and loathe the German, I can affirm with pride before all that if in the units under my control desertion has been limited to a reasonable figure, and if units have not disbanded, it is solely due to the cohesive and gathering action of my officers carried out day by day and certainly not to the action of the British personnel. The latter with their superior attitude towards the Italian personnel have made the carrying out of duties much more difficult.

Bearing in mind that during the last few months Allied commands have been able to judge the work of combatant Italian units led exclusively by Italian officers and that (though lacking everything) these units wherever they have been in action have given a good account of themselves and have everywhere been praised by the Allied High Command; bearing in mind also that the 250 Peak Tpt. Unit, led solely by Italian officers (with only one English captain as L.O.), also forms part of this group and that this unit has, for some months now been working with an Allied unit and has won their praise and trust; bearing in mind, as I have previously stated, the spirit and professional capacity and the sense of duty of my officers, I maintain that, if it is desired to obtain a smooth and efficient running of the group (certainly better than present), it is necessary that the Italian officers be made DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE for everything in accordance with their rank, and that all British officers and NCO's be withdrawn from the units where they are absolutely superfluous. Only one British L.O. will be necessary who, together with the Italian interpreter officer, will assist the unit commander with whatever he is in direct contact with Allied units with his own unit.

Though it is a fact that from the day on which I took command of this group, I have made a selection of officers, eliminating those who, in my opinion, were not suitably qualified for their particular duties, it is also a fact that the frequent change of officers in the units is due to the "good" officers seeking by all means to obtain a transfer from this group because their present position is unbearable, and it is often these officers who, imbued with enthusiasm, had applied to be posted to my unit.

Another important point to be borne in mind is that as long as the dual cadre continues to exist a large number of men are employed in general duties, i.e. orderlies, messes, stores, all require double the personnel than that which would be necessary if the British cadres were withdrawn.

After having commanded this group for eight months, I can say that I have done everything possible to cooperate efficiently with the Allied commands under which my units have operated and in fact in the interest of the service I have even foregone that natural sense of humanitarianism is respect of my

- 3 -

my men who have had extremely long periods in the front lines.

Even under these most critical moral conditions the units under my control have always given excellent service and this is proved by the numerous praises and commendations made by the Hq's of the Allied units under which my units have operated.

In the interests of the service, for the sake of the respect due to discipline and for the sake of the prestige and dignity of the Italian officers, I ask that the whole responsibility of the units and of the service be entrusted to the Italian officers since these are qualified to command a unit or a platoon not only because of their professional experience in Pack Tpt. but because they alone know the mentality of the Italian soldier and how he should be led and treated.

The heavy losses in dead and wounded and the hardships suffered by my men in one year of intense and interrupted service entitle me to ask that the present situation be ended.

30 Nov. 1944

/s/ Maj. BARBATO

7412

TRANSLATION.

From: HQ 21st Ind. Paok Ppt. Co.
 Report.

Cadre of Paok Ppt. Units with the 21st Army.

In the Italian Paok Ppt. Units of the 8th Army, under my control, the Italian cadre is in every case (excluding the medical section) duplicated by a British cadre. Every Italian officer has beside him a British officer (not even of the same rank) and in each Platoon there are British HQ's, either on normal duties with the unit or having special missions. The responsibility for everything that affects the service is thus split. British cadres should be responsible for everything that can be termed as operational and for the day-to-day care of the animals, the Italian cadres being responsible for the discipline and administration of the men.

So far we have time carried on!

Anyone can easily understand how impossible it is to have a real command in a unit without creating numerous incidents and without diminishing the potential output of the unit. The Italian officers of the units under my control ~~have~~ are all fully capable of command, according to their rank, units or platoons of Paok Ppt. Troops and they are all officers with experience of animals, because they have all been for a long time in cavalry units and, with a few exceptions among the younger ones, they have all commanded combatant units at the front.

The morale of my officers is low, in fact very low, and the reason is one which is evident. To wit: I expected, or rather I felt sure, when, during last March, I took over the command of this Group that, after an initial period which would have enabled British HQ's to become aware of the quality and capabilities of the Italian officers, the latter would have been left to themselves and need solely responsible for everything relating to the service. I see that the situation as it is cannot last.

I have stated that the morale of the Italian officers is low. The reasons are important and the drawbacks which they entail are many and large.

The Italian officers (who, I repeat, are all fully capable of performing their duties) feel slighted and wounded in their pride when they see that they have always beside them British officers who, because of their responsibility for the operational side, logically feel that the commanders of the unit and, though they do not openly say so, they take it clear ~~when~~ ^{when} venting to ~~intend~~ ^{intend} enforce their authority in everything that relates to service (even regarding personnel).

I can even affirm that in this Group instead of appreciating the quality of the Italian officers, these are continuously slighted and consequently the prestige of the Italian officer before his own men is reduced. It is evident that this undermines the principle on which the unit is based.

The Italian officer is considered by the British officer as a "liar" between himself and the soldier. Under these conditions the Italian officer's output is small and, whilst unit commanders are forced to disregard everything concerning operational animals and their care, subaltern platoon commanders take an interest in their units merely out of a sense of duty.

Furthermore unit commanders very often find it impossible, owing to lack of ~~time~~ ^{time} of transport (often asked for but never obtained), to exercise control of their units. Whilst in fact the British officer commanding the

6 officers 11 days with 121A
 each 91 Cms 10.4.45 485 Cms

2 officers 3000 mts 500 H.A.
 with 2 H.A. + 31 H.A.

the Italian cadre is in every case (excluding the medical section) duplicated by a British cadre. Every Italian officer has beside him a British officer (not even of the same rank) and in each platoon there are British NCO's, either on normal duties with the unit or having special missions. The responsibility for everything that affects the service is thus split. British cadres should be responsible for everything that can be termed as operational and for the proper care of the animals, the Italian cadres being responsible for the discipline and administration of the men.

So far we have thus carried on!

Anyone can easily understand how impossible it is to have a dual command in a unit without creating numerous incidents and without diminishing the potential output of the unit. The Italian officers of the units under my control have all been all fully capable of command, according to their rank, units or platoons of Pack Tpt. Troops and they are all officers with experience of animals, because they have all been for a long time in cavalry units and, with a few exceptions among the younger ones, they have all commanded combatant units at the front.

The morale of my officers is low, in fact very low, and the reason is one which is evident. To wit: I expected, or rather I felt sure, when, during last March, I took over the command of this Group that, after an initial period which would have enabled British HQ's to become aware of the quality and capabilities of the Italian officers, the latter would have been left to themselves and made solely responsible for everything relating to the Service. I see that the situation as it is cannot last.

I have stated that the morale of the Italian officers is low. The reasons are important and the drawbacks which they entail are many and large.

The Italian officers (who, I repeat, are all fully capable of performing their duties) feel slighted and wounded in their pride, when they see that they have always beside them British officers who, because of the responsibility for the operational side, logically feel that the commanders of the unit and, though they do not openly say so, they make it clear ~~what~~ ^{that} they want to ~~impose~~ ^{enforce} their authority in everything that relates to service (even regarding personnel).

I can even affirm that in this Group instead of appreciating the quality of the Italian officers, these are continuously slighted and consequently the prestige of the Italian officer before his own men is reduced. It is ~~evident~~ ^{clear} that this undermines the principle on which the unit is based.

The Italian officer is considered by the British officer as a "link" between himself and the soldier. Under these conditions the Italian officers' output is small and, whilst unit commanders are forced to disregard everything concerning operations, animals and their care, subaltern platoon commanders take an interest in their units merely out of a sense of duty.

Furthermore unit commanders very often find it impossible, owing to lack of ~~means~~ ^{transport} (often asked for but never obtained), to exercise the control of their units. Whilst in fact the British officer commanding the

II

British cadre has a jeep assigned to him, the officer commanding the unit must make use of the most varied and improvised means in order to carry out his duties.

It is for these reasons that sometimes the Italian officer cannot raise enough enthusiasm to give his unit at war a complete efficiency and a sense of welfare; and it must be admitted that they are justified, since it cannot be expected that an officer, being merely a "transmitter of orders" and far less that he should act as NCO to the British officer.

It is an old saying that "the morale of the soldier is parallel to that of his officer" and when the officers' morale is low that of the soldier equals it.

Duties, under present conditions, are carried out, but discipline in the unit suffers considerably from the lack of prestige of their officers. The soldier is intelligent and sees and hears everything. He notices the conditions in which his officers find himself and, though he may be spiritually with his officer in his sad plight, he nevertheless logically greatly relaxes in his discipline.

All the above is merely in the best of cases and as nearly always the best of cases are far from reality matters are very often much worse.

Friction between Italian and British cadres, though not always specially reported to higher commands (it would be necessary to send a report in almost every day), has a great effect on the general running of the unit, creating an atmosphere in which the necessary cooperation does not easily develop. The presence of British NCO's in the platoons is ~~damaging~~, as is also the presence of blacksmiths, saddlers, mechanics and other specialists. Because the Italian personnel to whom they are attached is all capable, and if the men do not yield their full output it is because they can see clearly that they are not trusted. Furthermore these British NCO's, as a rule, act in a way which does not fit in with the Italian mentality, and often they lack tact and education.

In the present situation of the nation, in which a small number of men are under arms, commanded by officers who love their country and loathe the German, I can affirm with pride before all that if in the units under my control desertion have been limited to a reasonable figure, and if units have not disbanded, it is exclusively due to the cohesive and gathering action of my officers carried out day by day and certainly not to the action of the British personnel. The latter with their superior attitude towards the Italian personnel has made the carrying out of duties much more difficult.

Bearing in mind that during the last months Allied commands have been able to judge the work of combatant Italian units led exclusively by Italian officers and that (though lacking everything) these units wherever they have been in action have given a good account of themselves and have everywhere been praised by the Allied High Command; bearing also in mind that the 250 Pack Tpt. Unit, led only by Italian officers (with only one English captain as L.O.), also formed part of this group and that this unit has for some months now been working with an Allied unit and has won their praise and trust; bearing in mind, as I have previously stated, the spirit and professional capacity and the sense of duty of my officers, I maintain that, if it is desired to obtain a smooth and efficient running of the unit, (certainly better than the present

to that of his officer" and when the morale of the soldier is parallel of the soldier equals it.

Duties, under present conditions, are carried out, but discipline in the units suffers considerably from the lack of prestige of their officers. The soldier is intelligent and sees and hears everything. He notices the conditions in which his officers find himself and, though he may be spiritually with his officer in his sad plight, he nevertheless logically greatly relaxes in his discipline.

All the above is merely in the best of cases and as nearly always the best of cases are far from reality matters are very often much worse.

Friction between Italian and British cadres, though not always specially reported to higher commands (it would be necessary to send a report in almost every day), has a great effect on the general running of the unit, creating an atmosphere in which the necessary cooperation does not easily develop. The presence of British NCO's in the platoons is ~~damaging~~, as is also the presence of blacksmiths, saddlers, mechanics and other specialists. ~~because~~ if the Italian personnel to whom they are attached is all capable, and see clearly that they are not trusted. Furthermore these British NCO's, as a rule, act in a way which does not fit in with the Italian mentality, and often they lack tact and education.

In the present situation of the nation, in which a small number of men are under arms, commanded by officers who love their country and loathe the German, I can affirm with pride before all that if in the units under my control desertion ~~has~~ been limited to a reasonable figure, and if units have not disbanded, it is ~~exclusively~~ due to the cohesive and gathering action of my officers carried out day by day and certainly not to the action of the British personnel. The latter with their superior attitude towards the Italian personnel has made the carrying out of duties much more difficult.

Bearing in mind that during the last months Allied commands have been able to judge the work of combatant Italian units led exclusively by Italian officers and that (though lacking everything) these units wherever they have been in action have given a good account of themselves and have everywhere been praised by the Allied High Command; bearing also in mind that the 250 Pack Tnt. Unit, led only by Italian officers (with only one English captain as L.O.), also formed part of this group and that this unit has for some months now been working with an Allied unit and has won their praise and trust; bearing in mind, as I have previously stated, the spirit and professional capacity and the sense of duty of my officers, I maintain that, if it is desired to obtain a smooth and efficient running of the ~~unit~~ ^{group} (certainly better than the present one), it is necessary

III

that the Italian officers be made DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE for everything in accordance with their rank, and that all British officers and NCO's be withdrawn from the units where they are absolutely superfluous. Only one British L.O. will be necessary who, together with the Italian interpreter officer, will assist the unit commander whenever he is in direct contact with Allied units with his own unit.

Though it is a fact that from the day in which I took command of this group I have made a selection of officers, eliminating those who, in my opinion, were not suitably qualified for their particular duties, it is also a fact that the frequent change of officers in the units is due to the "good" officers seeking by all means to obtain a transfer from this group because their present position is unbearable, and it is often these officers who, ~~from whom~~ imbued with enthusiasm, have applied to be posted to my unit.

Another important point to be borne in mind is that as long as the dual cadre continues to exist a larger number of men are employed in general duties, i.e. orderlies, messes, stores, all require double the personnel than that which would be necessary if the British cadres were withdrawn.

After having commanded this group ~~during~~ ^{for} eight months I can say that I have done everything possible to cooperate efficiently ~~with~~ with the Allied commands under which my units have operated, and in fact in the interest of the service I have even foregone that natural sense of humanitarianism in respect of my men ~~(extremely long periods in the front line)~~ ^{who have been}.

Even under these most critical moral conditions the units under my control have always given an excellent service and this is ~~has~~ ^{has} proved by the numerous praises and commendations made by the HQ's of the Allied units under which my units have operated.

In the interests of the service, for the sake of the respect due to discipline and for the sake of the prestige and dignity of the Italian officers, I ~~ask~~ ask that the whole responsibility of the units and of the service be entrusted to the Italian officers since these are qualified to command a unit or a platoon not only because of their professional experience in Pack Tpt. but because they alone know the mentality of the Italian soldier and how he should be led and treated.

The heavy losses in dead and wounded and the hardships suffered by my men in one year of intense and uninterrupted service entitle them to ask that the present situation be ended.

30 Nov. 1944.

FMD:J/eb

s/ Maj. BARBATO.

120

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Interpreters for Peak Tpt Op

Rec

LAND FORCES REG-COM, A.G.
(M.B.I.A.)
File No. 80/5 ←
4 Feb 48

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

COPY TO: AFHQ for C-1 Br
HQ 15 ARMY CP for HQ
HQ 15 ARMY CP for ST
1 SIG
MIA 15 1 SIG
MIA 15 15th SIG

Ref your Ltr dtd of 18 Jan 48.

1. The WBS for a Peak Tpt Op (AL/35/1 and AL/2/2) authorizes the following interpreters:-

	OFFICER	POSS
Hq Op	1 Interpreter Offr	1
Hq Mech Coy	1 Offr (Liaison) } x 4 1 Interpreter Pte)	4
Hq Tp	1 Pte	16
		216
		240
		240

Please, therefore, correct the figures shown in your letter under reference.

2. It is requested that you report how many interpreters have now been supplied against the total requirement for both ops of 10 officers and 40 Ptes, and whether the balance can be provided.

3. This cancels MIA signals in 216 and 240 of 25 and 26 Jan res-
pectively.

W. H. H. H.
Major General

Ref your LMS 074 of 13 Jan 45.

1. The USA for a Pack Tpt Op (AI/55/1 and AI/1/1) authorize the following interpreters:

Req Op	1 Interpreter Offr	Offr	Pts
Req Pack Coy	1 Offr (Liaison) } x 4 1 Interpreter Pts }	4	16
Req Op	1 Pts	-	16
TOTAL			32

7408

Please, therefore, correct the figures shown in your letter under reference.

2. It is requested that you report how many interpreters have now been supplied against the total requirement for both Ops of 10 Offrs and 40 Pts, and whether the balance can be provided.

3. This message will signal to ALES and AF BIL of 20 and 24 Jan respectively.

Internal: 6/7/1

ms

Major General
H. H. I. A.

Q3.

C O P Y

119

FROM: 15 ARMY GROUP

TO : AFHQ CITE FHQCT

NO DATE TIME

INFO: MMIA 5 ARMY (BRIT INCR "A")

A 205SECRET

REF YOUR FX 19207 OF 01 (.) YOUR AQ 091 711/029 GGT-9 OF JAN NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED
THIS HQ (.) FIRST (.) UNDERSTAND PROGRAMME REFERRED TO IS SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED
IN YOUR FX 88648 OF 12 JAN (.) UNDER THAT PROGRAMME UNDERSTAND. JAN RPTS FOR 5 ARMY
(BRIT INCR) NOW HELD ORVISTO AWAITING CALLING FWD BY 5 ARMY AND 100 RPTS FOR 8 ARMY
EN ROUTE EX FOSSOMERONE (.) SECOND (.) REQUEST ALL FUTURE MULETEERS RPTS BE DESPATCHED
5 ARMY (BRIT INCR) AS 3 UK TPT COY NO (NO) LONGER UNDER COMMAND 8 ARMY

WS

SD DIST.: SD/42/6 (Action Copy)

SD/3

SD/3/1

7407

COLX

118

From : AFHQ signed SAC 03 1300 A
To : DYMACE
Info : 15 ARMY GROUP. 15-1A. 71 SUB AREA. MOVEMENT.
Ref : EA 20135 SECRET

Ball bid for AFUJA cell up personnel will be arranged week
12 Feb to 18 Feb (.) 253 Regt Transport Group will have departed
by 12 Feb current

SD Dist

Action copy: RM/2/2. RM/78. Nov(2). RM/3. SD/24/19.

7406

785020

C O P Y

FROM: DISTONE

TO : 61 AREA FOR ST
ITALIAN RFT DEPOT ORVIETO

021900

INFO: AFHQ CITE FHGCT
15 ARMY GROUP
MMIA
71 SUB AREASD 41CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST (.) FOR 61 AREA (.) FORWARD EARLIEST REPORT AS AT LATEST DATED ON PROGRESS
IN FMN 252 PACK TPT GP STATING (A) NUMBER OS COYS COMPLETED IN PERSONNEL (B) NUMBER
OF COYS COMPLETED IN EQUIPMENT (C) TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL SUPPLIED (D) NUMBER
REJECTS (E) NUMBER REJECTS ABSORBED INTO OTHER SERVICE UNITS (.) (F) NUMBER REJECTS
RETURNED TO ORVIETO (G) DATE REPORT (.) SECOND (.) FOR ITALIAN RFT DEPOT ORVIETO (.)
REPORT EARLIEST NUMBER OF COYS 253 PACK TPT GP COMPLETED IN PERSONNEL

WS

SD DIST.: SD/3 (Action Copy)
SD/42/2
AQ (2)

RUS

B-24640

LROF V LRAR NR 6344 T MEYT QVR 5
 QQY GR 8

FROM DISTONE 021900 A

TO 61 AREA FOR ST. ITALIAN RFT DEPOT ORVIETO

INFO AFHQ CITE FHGCT . 15 ARMY GROUP . MMIA . 71 SUB AREA

BT

SD 41 . CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST .

FOR 61 AREA . FORWARD EARLIEST REPORT AS AT LATEST DATED ON PROGRESS
 IN FMN 252 PACK TPT GP STATING (A) NUMBER OF COYS COMPLETED
 IN PERSONNEL (B) NUMBER OF COYS COMPLETED IN EQUIPMENT (C) TOTAL NUMBER
 OF PERSONNEL SUPPLIED (D) NUMER REJCTS (E) NUMBER REJECTS ABSORBED
 INTO OTHER SERVICE UNITS . (F) NUMBER REJECTS RETURNED TO ORVIETO
 (G) DATE REPORT . SECOND . FOR ITALIAN RFT DEPOT ORVIETO .
 REPORT EARLIEST NUMBER OF COYS 253 PACK TPT GP COMPLETED IN
 PERSONNEL

BT THI 2125

SENT NR 6344 2347 WR AR TNX

RD HUTTON NR6349 6348 6344 2350

4070

SD

3/2

58404

Action copy

5013

55/42/2

6

At 12(2)

1/16

COPY.

OM : DISTHREE
TO : 209 SUB AREA
INFO : AFHQ (G3 ORG FOR): MMIA

011735

SD 339RESTRICTED.

REF THIS HQ SD 212 OF 23 JAN NOT TO ALL (*) REPORT TO THIS HQ RPTD
AFHQ (G3 ORG FOR) NY IMMEDIATE SIG COMPLETED ARRIVAL OF ITALIAN PERSONNEL
7 MTN REGT (*) FOR AFHQ (*) SPOKE WATSON - SHAUGHNESSY THIS DATE

Precedence -

SD Dist: Action copy: SD/3
SD/3/1
FLOAT
B/B.

ts.

8403

785020

743 LROF V MEDY QVR3
FROM DISTHREE 011735
TO 209 SUB AREA

INFO AFHQ (G3 ORG FOR) : MMIA
QOX

SD339. RESTD. REF THIS HQ SD212 OF 23 JAN NOT TO ALL.
REPORT TO THIS HQ RPTD AFHQ (G3 ORG FOR) BY IMMEDIATE SIG COPLETED
ARRIVAL OF ITALIAN PERSONNEL 7 MTN REGT. FOR AFHQ. SPOKE WATSON
- SHAUGHNESSY THIS DATE

BT

ANORT:B:

~~SIG COMPLETE~~ LMI COMPLETED

RD

2255 A.MTH

B// VA KK

SD.

2/2

16/2

3003

8402

SD/3

SD/3

SD/3

SD/3

C O P Y

FROM: FREEDOM SIGNED SAC CITE FHGOT

011915

TO : DISTONE
15 ARMY GROUP

INFO: MMIA

SECRETFX 19207

FOR DISTONE (.) FORWARD EARLIEST REPORT ON PROGRESS IN
FORMATION 252 AND 253 PACK TPT GROUP HQ AND 8 NEW COYS
STATING

- (a) NUMBER OF COYS COMPLETED IN PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT
- (b) TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL SUPPLIED
- (c) NUMBER OF REJECTS
- (d) NUMBER OF REJECTS ABSORBED INTO OTHER SERVICE
UNITS
- (e) DATE OF REPORT (.)

FOR 15 ARMY GROUP (.) REPORT NUMBER OF FIT REINFORCEMENTS
FOR EXISTING PACK TPT COYS RECEIVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PROGRAMME (.) THIS HQ LETTER AG 091.711/029 GCT-O DATED
14TH JAN 45 REFERS

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

WS

SD DIST.: ~~SD/43/7~~ +2/6
SD/3
Float
B/B

11/12

A

785020

QVR
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

MSG Center No : N14/02
Classification : SECRET
Precedence : PRIORITY
From : FREEDOM
To : DISTONE 15 ARMY GROUP
MMIA

Date Time Rec'd : 011911
Date Time Sent :
Reference NR : EX 19207
Cite : FH667

- SECRET O Signed SAC O For DISTONE O forward
earliest report on progress in formation 252 and 253
pack tpt group HQ and 8 new coys stating
- number of coys completed in personnel and equipment
 - total number of personnel supplied Drain
20/34216
 - number of rejects 20/34216
 - number of rejects absorbed into other service units 20/34216
 - date of report O

For 15 Army Group O report number of fit reinforcements
for existing pack tpt coys received in accordance with
programme O Also HQ letter DG 041-711/029 GET-O dated 14th
JAN 45 refers O

260850

785020

MESSAGE FORM

FROM : MWIA 29 1800 A

TO : AFHQ G3ORG & DMT
15 ARMY GROUP SD & STINFO : ITALIAN RPTS DEPOT ORVIETO
ONE DIST
ONE DIST FOR MWIA LO
WAR MINISTRYREF : SD 2200 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT 253 PACK TPT GPX (*) THIS GP WILL BE COMPLETE 3 FEB (*) UNDERSTAND
ACCN NOT AVAILABLE FOR THIS GP AT FOSSOMBRONE UNTIL 9 FEB WHEN 252 GP DUE TO
MOVE OUT (*) AGREE WITH ONE DISTRICT 253 GP SHOULD MOVE 9 FEB

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANTAUTHENTICATED STANTON MAJOR

SD DIST:
AQ
ST
FILES/42/2
SD/42/7
SD/3
Float
Circulator

7399

SUBJECT: Formation of Pack Tpt Coy.

820/11

30 Jan 45.

The following details are passed to you for information:

FROM ; 15 ARMY GROUP 29.1214A

TO : AFHQ

INFO : MAIN EIGHTH ARMY
DISTONE
O2E
MMIA

A. 191 (*) CONFIDENTIAL.

REF MY SD 1197 OF 27 AND MAIN EIGHTH ARMY A 1377 OF 26 BOTH NOT TO ALL
(*) FIRST (*) UNDERSTAND BASUTOS FOR 7 MTN REGT NOW ACCEPTABLE AT
AQUILA 8 RPT 8 FEB (*) SECOND (*) TO ENABLE FORMATION OF PACK TPT
COYS TO PROCEED AS PLANNED ESSENTIAL ITALIANS ARRIVE ORVIETO NOT LATER
THAN 12 FEB FOR RE-EQUIPMENT PRIOR TO MOVE TO FOSSOMBONE APPROX 15
FEB (*) THIRD (*) REF YOUR AG 901 711/029 GGT -9 OF 23 JAN NOT TO
ALL (*) THIS HQ CAN NOT RPT NOT PROVIDE ROAD TPT (*) PRESUME DISTONE
WILL NOTIFY YOU DIRECT WHETHER THEY CAN PROVIDE (*) REQUEST YOU
ARRANGE MOVES IN ACCORDANCE FOREGOING IN CONJUNCTION AS NECESSARY WITH
DISTONE

Original & Copy to: G
SMRE
FLOAT -----

s/d Capt. R.E. 7398
S/Capt Q(M)
(The Lord Westbury)
Movements Liaison Officer.

SD Dist: Action copy: SD/3/1
SD/3 ←
Float
B/B.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Disbandment Increment 7 Mtn Regt RA.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

SD/3

24 JAN 45

TO : Ministry of War.

COPY to: MMIA LO 1 District (3) for ORVIETO & FOSSOMBRONE
MMIA LO REAR EIGHTH ARMY
MMIA LO FIFTH ARMY
MMIA LO FIFTH ARMY Br Incr

1. The Italian Increment to 7 Mountain Regiment RA (WE strength 559 plus 21 from Increment to Signal Section) is to be disbanded at the end of this month and the personnel made available for the formation of new Pack Transport Companies at FOSSOMBRONE.

2. It is desired that these men should form the nucleus of 270, 271, 272 and 273 Italian Pack Transport Companies, as they are trained muleteers.

3. Personnel of this Increment will be moved under Allied arrangements. If personnel arrive in time to join companies at ORVIETO, they will be distributed equally among the four (4) companies. If personnel do not arrive at ORVIETO in time, the four (4) companies will move to FOSSOMBRONE organized so that the Artillery Regiment muleteers can join them at FOSSOMBRONE.

4. Please make the necessary posting arrangements.

INTERNAL:

A/Q

Q(AE)

Gov

ST

SD/42/2

SD/42/6

File 7397
Major General
M.M.I.A.

29/-

1. The Italian Increment to 7 Mountain Regiment RA (WE strength 559 plus 21 from Increment to Signal Section) is to be disbanded at the end of this month and the personnel made available for the formation of new Pack Transport Companies at FOSSONBRONE.

2. It is desired that these men should form the nucleus of 270, 271, 272 and 273 Italian Pack Transport Companies, as they are trained muleteers.

3. Personnel of this Increment will be moved under Allied arrangements. If personnel arrive in time to join companies at CRVIETO, they will be distributed equally among the four (4) companies. If personnel do not arrive at CRVIETO in time, the four (4) companies will move to FOSSONBRONE organized so that the Artillery Regiment muleteers can join them at FOSSONBRONE.

4. Please make the necessary posting arrangements.

K. K. L. 7397

(- Major General
L.M.I.A.)

INTERNAL:

A/Q
Q(AE)
Nov
ST
SD/42/2
SD/42/6
Float
Circulator

20/-

COPY

27 1205 A

110


FROM : HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
TO : AFHQ
INFO : MIA. EIGHTH ARMY
REF : SD 1197 SD/2/1/3

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref my SD 1097 of 4 Jan not to Eighth Army (*) Request you now
arrange move of Italian personnel when released by 7 Mtn Regt from
AQUILA to ORVIBTO

SD DIST:

Action copy to: SD/3/4
Float



7396

LNOP V LNAR NR 1132

T MEYT QVR2

FROM HQ 15 ARMY GR 271225-A

TO AFHQ

INFO NMIA EIGHTH ARMY

QCY GR --- BT

SD1197

CONFIDENTIAL . REF BY SD 1097 OF 4 JAN NOT TO EIGHTH ARMY
REQUEST YOU NOW ARRANGE MOVE OF ITALIAN PERSONNEL WHEN RELEASED
BY 7 MTN REST FROM AQUILA TO ORVIETO

BT

1335

SENT NR 1132 RJW D1

RECD NR 1132 EP AR K 1354A

975

28/1

Action Gpy 2

SD/3 D2
Kloal 19

C O P Y

FROM 5 ARMY

251928

109

TO NMIA, INFO CG MTOUSA, CG 15 ARMY GROUP, CO PBS

2322

S E C R E T

Ref NMIA Cable SD/2212, time dated 21 NST. Para 1. Proposed reorganization letter, file AG320/2 of 24 Dec was not based on disbandment or reconversion in order to organize the 5 Pack Mule Coys. FIFTH ARMY ceiling was increased appropriately "from 12000 to 14000" when authorization for first few coys was made.

Para 2. Strength of 12381 on 18 Jan is correct as stated in NMIA cable. However, the impression that 1000 persons are actual under 210 Div in forward staging areas must be based on a miscomprehension due to our feeding PBS US-ITI troops in army area. These 1000 persons are not in Army area. PARA 3. Schedule of shipments requested in our 7485, dated 202046 still applies. PARA 4.A Regarding February requirements, assuming all shortages of muleteer and other services are filled by 1 Feb, requirements will be 45 per day for muleteers and 10 per day all others. PARA 5. Every man physically fit for muleteer duty is being used as such regardless of qualifications ref para 7 NMIA cable.

EK SD DISTR: Action copy SD/3/1

SD/3, SD/3/3, SD/43/1, SD/43, SD/41/1, Float (2)

785020

108

S I G N A L

FROM: MMIA

Date Time
24 1510 A

TO : 15 ARMY GROUP A

INFO: AFHQ G1 BR
15 ARMY GROUP SD AND ST
8 ARMY FOR MMIA LO
DISTONE
DISTONE FOR MMIA LOCONFIDENTIALSD 2131

PLEASE AMEND FOLLOWING EXTRACTS OF MMIA SD 2129 OF 23 JAN

TO READ (.) QUOTE (.) W E OF PACK GP AUTHORIZES 5 REPEAT
INTERPRETERS 16 PIE INTERPRETERS
5 OFFRS/(.) TOTAL FOR BOTH GPS 10 REPEAT 10 OFFRS 32 PTES (.)

UNQUOTE (.)

PRECEDENCE

IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

W. K. W. A. fInternal: War Ministry
AQ. A
ST
G 2(L)
SD/50 (2)
G/7/1
FILE: SD/3R26
1

7393

WES

0
SD/3.

107

Subject:- Italian Officers. Employment.

V

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
P O M E
AQ/11MINISTRY OF WAR.

24 Jan 45.

Ten. DE DOMINICIS Antonio.

1. It is reported that the above named English speaking Italian Officer is at present on the strength of the Italian Increment to 7 Mountain Regt R.A.
2. Will you please arrange for Ten De Dominicis to be posted as Interpreter to one of the pack mule Tpt Coys of 253 Pack Tp Group when the Italian Increment of 7 Mountain Regt R.A.. is disbanded.

*S.P. Archer Capt.*S.P. ARCHER, Capt.
for Major General,
M.M.I.A.Copy to:- H.Q. 15 Army Group
your 3074/13/A(0) of 18 Jan refers.
"G" M.M.I.A.

SPA/ab

D 25/1.
62(17) 7392

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

10

AG 091.711/029 GCT-0

SUBJECT: Italian Pack Transport Companies and Disbandment of Italian
Increment to 7 Mountain Regiment RA

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group, APO 777
General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District

1. Reference is made to 15th Army Group letter, file 3143/4(0), dated 16 January 1945 (not to all).

1 2. The Italian Increment to 7 Mountain Regiment RA (WE strength 559 plus 21 from Increment to Signal Section) is to be disbanded at the end of this month and the personnel made available for the formation of new Pack Transport Companies at FOSSOMBRONE.

✓3. It is desired that these men should form the nucleus of 270, 271, 272 and 273 Italian Pack Transport Companies, as they are trained muleteers. If personnel arrive in time to join companies at ORVIETO, they will be distributed equally among the four (4) companies. If personnel do not arrive at ORVIETO in time, the four (4) companies will move to FOSSOMBRONE organized so that the Artillery Regiment muleteers can join them at FOSSOMBRONE. Italian Postings will be arranged through Italian Administrative Division Headquarters.

4. If 15th Army Group and Headquarters 1 District are both unable to provide road transport for the muleteers from 7 Mountain Regiment, 15th Army Group will submit a bid to this headquarters for rail movement as soon as possible.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

R. H. FRESH 391

Captain, AGD,

Asst Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Each addressee
- 1 - Land Forces Sub Commission
AC (MMIA)
- 1 - Mov (Central)
- 1 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - Q (Maint)
- 1 - V & Rs
- 1 - G-4 (M & Tr)

4 - G-3 (Org-F)
1 - G-3 (Org-B)
1 - DST
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M & D

P22

SECRET

785020

SIGNAL

23 14 15 A

FROM : MMIA
 TO : 15 ARMY GROUP A
 INFO : AFHQ G1 BR
 15 ARMY GROUP SD AND ST
 DISTONE
 DISTONE FOR MMIA LO
 WAR MINISTRY
 8 ARMY FOR MMIA LO

REF : SD 2129

CONFIDENTIAL

MMIA SD 2083 OF 12 (.) WE OF PACK OF AUTHORITIES 10 OFFR. INTERPRETERS
 FOR BOTH GPS
 16 F. INTERPRETERS PER GP (.) TOTAL 20 OFFERS 32 PTES (.) AGAINST THIS
 MINISTRY OF WAR HAVE ALREADY SUPPLIED 6 OFFERS 1 SENIOR NCO 3 PTES SENT TO
 ORVIETO (.) 3 FURTHER OFFERS BEING SENT NOW

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANTAUTHENTICATED 10/2/64 H. C. H. K. A.INF. DIST:

AQ. A.

ST.

G 2(L)

SD/50 (2)

G/7/1

FILE: SD/3

7390

MESSAGE FORM

FROM NMIA

TO CG FIFTH ARMY

INFO MTCUSA, 15 ARMY GROUP, NMIA LO REAR FIFTH ARMY
PENEASE, PENSOUTH, NMIA LO PENSOUTHSD 2122SECRET

REFERENCE YOUR 7485 (.)

FIRST (.) YOUR PROPOSED ORGANIZATION IN FILE AG 320-2 OF 24 DEC INCLUDES 15 PACK MULE COMPANIES AND EVIDENTLY CONTEMPLATES DISBANDMENT OR RECONVERSION OF SOME PRESENT UNITS TO KEEP WITHIN CEILING OF 14,000 (.) SUGGEST THIS PROGRAM BE ACCOMPLISHED (.)

SECOND (.) YOUR STRENGTH REPORT OF 21 JAN FILE AG 337.2-2 SHOWS TOTAL STRENGTH OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO 210 DIV TO BE 12737 WHICH INCLUDES 356 PERSONS IN 4 VET HCSP WHICH ARE ITI-ITI CMA AND NOT US-ITI (.) ON A TOTAL US-ITI STRENGTH OF 12381 ON 18 JAN (.) THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE APPROXIMATELY 1000 PERSONS WHO ACTUALLY ARE UNDER 210 DIVISION COMMAND IN FORWARD STAGING AREAS AWAITING ASSIGNMENT AND ARE NOW CARRIED ON US RATION ACCOUNT (.)

THEREFORE TOTAL US-ITI ASSIGNED TO 210 DIVISION IS APPROXIMATELY 13381 (.) THIRD (.) 700 EX SICILY CALL-UPS DEPARTED REGGIC 20 JANUARY FOR ASTRONI FOR CONWARD ROUTING TO YCU (.) 13 PERSONS ARRIVED ASTRONI 20 JAN EARMARKED FOR 210 ENGR TAPCG CO (.) 65 PERSONS IN ASTRONI EARMARKED FOR 210 ENGR 288TY GR UP (.) TOTAL 778 ENROUTE TO YCU (.)

FOURTH (.) FIRST 600 EX LAZIC CALL-UP WHICH STARTED YESTERDAY BEING RUTED TO ASTRONI FOR CONWARD SHIPMENT TO YCU (.)

FIFTH (.) THEREFORE BY 1 FEB YCU SHOULD HAVE STRENGTH OF 14759 LESS ATTRITION CMA ESTIMATED AT 31 PER DAY FOR 15 DAYS (.) OR APPROXIMATELY 14,000 CMA WHICH IS CEILING (.)

FIRST (.) YOUR PROPOSED ORGANIZATION IN FILE AG 320-2 OF 24 DEC INCLUDES 15 PACK MULE COMPANIES AND EVIDENTLY CONTEMPLATES DISBANDMENT OR RECONVERSION OF SOME PRESENT UNITS TO KEEP WITHIN CEILING OF 14000 (.) SUGGEST THIS PROGRAM BE ACCOMPLISHED (.)

SECOND (.) YOUR STRENGTH REPORT OF 21 JAN FILE AG 337.2-2 SHOWS TOTAL STRENGTH OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO 210 DIV TO BE 12737 WHICH INCLUDES 356 PERSONS IN 4 VET HCSP WHICH ARE ITI-ITI CMA AND NOT US-ITI (.) ON A TOTAL US-ITI STRENGTH OF 12381 ON 18 JAN (.) THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE APPROXIMATELY 1000 PERSONS WHO ACTUALLY ARE UNDER 210 DIVISION COMMAND IN FORWARD STAGING AREAS AWAITING ASSIGNMENT AND ARE NOW CARRIED ON US RATION ACCOUNT (.) THEREFORE TOTAL US-ITI ASSIGNED TO 210 DIVISION IS APPROXIMATELY 13381 (.)

THIRD (.) 700 EX SICILY CALL-UPS DEPARTED REGGIO 20 JANUARY FOR ASTRONI FOR FORWARD ROUTING TO YOU (.) 13 PERSONS ARRIVED ASTRONI 20 JAN EARMARKED FOR 210 ENGR TAFCC CC (.) 65 PERSONS IN ASTRONI EARMARKED FOR 210 ENGR TAFCC CC (.) TOTAL 778 ENROUTE TO YOU (.)

FOURTH (.) FIRST 600 EX LAZIO CALL-UP WHICH STARTED YESTERDAY BEING ROUTED TO ASTRONI FOR FORWARD SHIPMENT TO YOU (.)

FIFTH (.) THEREFORE BY 1 FEB YOU SHOULD HAVE STRENGTH OF 14759 LESS ATTRITION CMA ESTIMATED AT 31 PER DAY FOR 15 DAYS (.) OR APPROXIMATELY 14000 CMA WHICH IS CEILING (.)

SIXTH (.) YOUR REQUIREMENT FOR FEB NOT YET RECEIVED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PAR 4b OF MTN USA LETTER 20 DEC FILE AG322.96/774 A-C (.) ACTION WILL BE TAKEN WHEN RECEIVED (.)

- 2 -

SEVENTH (.) INVITE ATTENTION TO PARAGRAPH 1 OF AFHQ SIGNAL PX 71184 OF
19 DEC QUOTE NECESSARY EVERY FIT MAN OF CLASSES 1914 TO 1924 FROM DRAFTS
SENT FORWARD BE USED BY YOU AS MULETEERS (.)
EIGHTH (.) WILL ENDEAVOR TO FILL YOUR REQUIREMENT FOR LIMITED NUMBER
OF SPECIALISTS FOR TECHNICAL UNITS AS IS BEING DONE FOR 210 ENGINEERS

PRECEDENCE . IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED

Rex E. Pinkley
*Major*Internal Distribution:

SD/3/1
SD/3
SD/3/3
SD/58
SD/58/1
SD/50 (2)

7388

785020

S2/3 103

R²⁴/1

Subject: Arms and Equipment for Italian Pack Tpt Coye.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) ROME
AQ/23/1

23 Jan 1945

To: Commanding General, Fifth Army.

Attached is a translated copy of a letter received from the Ministry of War, ref 826/67/A1 dated 19 Jan 1945, which is forwarded to you for information.

P. P. Parcell

PPT/le

P. P. PARDELL, J/Comd.
for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: Senior IGMA IO, Fifth Army
G(30) MMIA
G(AE) MMIA

P. P. Parcell

7387

7388

COPY TRANSLATION

From: Ministry of War.
To: MMIA (Info)

Ref: 826/67/A1

Date: 19 Jan 45

Subject: Issue of Arms and Equipment for Pack Tpt Units.

Reference AQ/23/1 dated 9 Jan 45 addressed to S.M.R.E.

The Directorates addressed above will issue to XX^o Pack Tpt Group, 210 Inf. Div. the following material:-

Art. Direct. Cosenza.

Automatic Pistols Beretta Type 34 Cal. 9	27
Pistol Holsters " " " "	27
Pistol Magazines " " " "	27
Carbine Type 91 T.S. Cal. 6.5	900
Carbine Type 91 T.S. Bayonets	200
Carbine Slings	900
Leather Pouches Type 907	900
Leather Bands for Belts 91	900
Belts with Attachments	12
En. Carts, Light	

Art. Direct Taranto.

Carbine Type 91 T.S. Cal. 6.5	264
Carbine Bayonets Type 91 T.S. with Scabbard	964
Carbine Slings	264
Leather Pouches Type 907	264
Leather Bands for Belts Type 91 with buckles	264
Belts with attachments	15
L.M.G.s, Breda 30 Cal. 6.5	8
En. Carts, Light	20
Harness with Pack Saddles for draft	

Art. Direct of Cosenza and Taranto will dispatch urgently the a/m stores to R.T.O. 5th Army at Vicarello.

Transport will be demanded from S.M.R.E. Transport Office.

Inform this office on completion.

7386

Sgd. Col. G. Campagna

Translation

SD/3.

102

FROM: S.M.R.E.
TO: H.M.I.A.

R²¹

93

REF: 126/SP/4.
DATE: 18 JAN. 1946.

Subject: Interpreters for the 22nd and 23rd.
Pack-train group.

Referring to teleprint No. SD/2083 of 12th inst.
The war establishment for the Pack-train
groups in question provides for 10 English-
speaking liaison officers and 32 English-
speaking liaison privates.

This S.M. has already forwarded:-
6 Officer Interpreters, of which 5
departed directly from this S.M.
1 Senior N.C.O.
3 Other Ranks.

The assignment of the other three
officers, who will reach their destination
within a few days, is proceeding.

SANTI

GEN.

G II (SA)

Please tell 15 day Gp

Ann.

P-21

GR./sg.



STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

UFFICIO SEGRETERIA E PERSONALE
-sez. interpreti-

N° 126 / SP. 4 di prot.
Allegati N.

P. M. 3800 li 18 gennaio 1945
LA L.F.S.C.-A.C. 102A
(M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

OGGETTO: interpreti per XXII e XXIII Gruppo salmerie.-
interpreters for 22 and 23 Packers gyps

e, per conoscenza :

ALL'UFFICIO ORD.E MOBILITAZIONE
-sez. ordinamento-

= S E D E =

Riferimento telescritto n°SD/2083 del
12 corrente.

Gli organici per i Gruppi salmerie in
oggetto prevedono n°10 ufficiali e 32 solda-
ti di collegamento parlanti inglese.

- Questo S.M. ha già destinato :
- n°6 ufficiali interpreti, di cui 5 avviati
direttamente da questo S.M. ;
 - " 1 sottufficiale;
 - " 3 militari di truppa.

E' in corso l'assegnazione di altri tre
ufficiali che raggiungeranno la destinazione
entro pochi giorni.-

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
-Alessandro Santi-

[Signature] 384

GR./sg.



STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

UFFICIO SEGRETERIA E PERSONALE
-sez. interpreti-P. M. 3800 *18* gennaio 1915

AL LA L.P.S.C.-A.C.

(M.E.I.A.)

ROMA

N° *126* / SP. *14* di prot.
Allegati N.
SD
201

OGGETTO: interpreti per XXII e XXIII Gruppo salmerie.-

e, per conoscenza :

/ ALL'UFFICIO CRD.E MOBILITAZIONE
-sez. ordinamento-

= S E D E =

Riferimento telexscritto n°SD/2083 del
12 corrente.Gli organici per i Gruppi salmerie in
oggetto prevedono n°10 ufficiali e 32 solda-
ti di collegamento parlanti inglese.

Questo S.M. ha già destinato :

- n°6 ufficiali interpreti, di cui 5 avviati
direttamente da questo S.M. ;
- " 1 sottufficiale;
- " 3 militari di truppa.

E' in corso l'assegnazione di altri tre
ufficiali che raggiungeranno la destinazione
entro pochi giorni.-IL GENERALE ADDETTO *7383*
-Alessandro Santi-P.C.C.
IL COLONNELLO CAPO UFF.
-A. Calaresu-
col. Lorenzini

101

MMIA

20 1200^A

AFHQ G1 (HR) G3 (Org)

15 ARMY GP

SD 2118

RESTRICTED

SUGGESTION CONTAINED IN 15 ARMY GP LETTER 3142/A(0)
OF 16 JAN IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY MMIA

Important

AQ
ST
SD/50 (2)
SD/3/1
File: SD/3

J. M. Longbraden
Dr. del

7382

1379