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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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10000/120/3501

A1/15

Action After Visit of Prince Umberto

opened Ap. 2, 1945. Closed June 3, 1945
Ap. - June 1945

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"CREMONA" GRUPPO.

No. 125/R.P. Spec.

P.M./U. 3 June, 1945.

Subject:- Request of Gen. ZANUSSI GIACOMO.

To:- Chief-of-Staff, Italian Army.

Herewith a request made by Gen. ZANUSSI GIACOMO, Gruppo 2^o I/c, to be released from present employment and placed on waiting list.

In consideration of the Gruppo's present position, I consider it preferable that, in the event of the acceptance of his request, no replacement is made for the time being.

Information to this effect has been communicated to S.I.C.L.U.

General Commanding,
Clemente Prineri.

To S.I.C.L.U. - For information.

COMANDO GRUPPO DI COMBATTIMENTO "CREMONA"

n.125/R.P. Spec.

P.M.(64), 3 giugno 1945

O G G E T T O: Domanda del Generale ZANUSSI GIACOMO.

A S.E. IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO

- Posta Militare 1800 -

.....

Trasmetto una domanda del Generale ZANUSSI
GIACOMO vice comandante, intesa ad essere collocato a
disposizione.

Nell'attuale situazione del Gruppo di Combat-
timento ritengo preferibile che, se la domanda sarà
accolta, egli non venga per il momento sostituito.

Di questo ho informato il 51° B.I.U.

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
- Clemente Primieri -

.....

AL 51° BRITISH LIAISON UNIT

S e d e

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1674

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
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AL 51° BRITISH LIAISON UNIT

Sede

367

... per informazione.



IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
- Clemente Primieri -

[Handwritten signature]

PERSONAL and CONFIDENTIAL.

Lt-Col. B.W. WEBB CARTER,
21 British Liaison Unit.

5 Jun 45.

Dear

This is to inform you that - much to my surprise - I was told yesterday that General ZANUSSI, the Vice Commander of "OPERA" wished to be relieved of his appointment. The ostensible reason given in ZANUSSI's application (which I have seen) is that as he is implicated in the BOATTA case he wishes to be relieved of a post which brings him before the public eye. I am certain there is more behind it but cannot discover what.

I had a long discussion with FRIMERI about it. His view is that ZANUSSI wishes to avoid responsibility and does NOT wish to be involved in any definite policy. FRIMERI said he had brought no pressure on ZANUSSI but was glad he was going. I then sent for ZANUSSI, having told FRIMERI that I was going to do this. There was a lot of talk about "I speak to you with brutal frankness, IV Colonel" but I gathered very little. ZANUSSI said he had resigned on entirely his own responsibility and that NO pressure had been brought on him. He admitted that he did NOT see eye to eye with FRIMERI on certain matters but emphasized that these matters were those of method as opposed to policy.

ZANUSSI said he was aware that he had my confidence and that there was no question of his being told he was "persona non grata" with the Allies.

Personally I have a high opinion of ZANUSSI who showed skill and determination in battle. He is, I think, one of those naughty little men who are hails of fire when in command but rather misuses as subordinates.

The atmosphere here is better. I have met GERVASONI - one of the new Regtl Comds - and took a very good view of him.

I enclose a copy of letters from the Field Marshal and General McCroony which had a good effect. I also enclose a copy of the reply which I drafted for FRIMERI to sign.

Yours

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC,
Land Forces Sub Comm (M.M.I.A.),
ROME.

1636

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Major General L. BROWNING, CB, CBE, MC,
Land Forces Sub Comd (M.M.I.A.),
ROME.

366

Subject: Letter of Field Marshal Alexander

I have received from H. Q. 8th Army letters, copies of which I herewith attach, signed by Marshal Alexander and General Kie Cresary.

They refer to the known incidents of breach of discipline on 16th May.

On my own account, independently of the comments I had already made on the incident, I have taken steps to carry out the orders of the 8th Army Commander. The latter desires that the contents of the letter, the ~~letter~~ of Field Marshal Alexander be brought to the notice of Colonel Musco ~~and~~ commanding 21st Inf Regt. and to Colonel Ferrara who commanded 22nd Inf. Regt., both ~~at~~ **365** at the disposal of the Ministry of War.

I take the liberty of suggesting that it would be ~~preferable~~ correct to send through me, hence through OIBHU, to the 8th Army Commander an assurance (to his request).

I enclose, for information, copy of the letter I have sent to the 8th Army Commander.

Gen. Primmison.

500



GRUPPO DI COMANDAMENTO .CREMONA.

P.M. (64), 21 giugno 1945

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE

n. 123 /R.P.Spec.

OGGETTO: lettera del Maresciallo Alexander.

A S.E. IL CAPO DI S.M.R.E.
e, per conoscenza:
AL 51° BRITISH LIAISON UNIT

P.M. 3800

S E D E

Ho ricevuto dal comando dell'8^a Armata le lettere che unisco in copia a firma del Maresciallo Alexander e del Generale Mc Creery.

Esse riguardano i noti incidenti disciplinari del 16 maggio u.s.

Ho per conto mio, indipendentemente dai commenti che avevo già fatto dell'accaduto, provveduto per eseguire gli ordini del comandante dell'8^a Armata. Questi gradisce che della lettera del Maresciallo Alexander sia data verbale comunicazione al Colonnello Musco già comandante del 21° reggimento fanteria e al Colonnello Ferrara già comandante del 22° reggimento fanteria, ora a disposizione del Ministero della Guerra.

./.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Mi permetto subordinatamente suggerire che sarebbe opportuno far giungere, mio tramite, e quindi tramite 51° B.L.U. al comandante dell'8^a Armata un cenno di assicurazione.

Accludo, per doverosa informazione, copia di lettera inviata al comandante 1^a8^a Armata.

Lu Annunzio

303

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Lt Col B W Webb Carter
54 British Liaison Unit
C M F

2 June 1945

Dear

I have this morning handed to Generale PRIMIERI the correspondence regarding the visit of H R H The Lieut General of the Realm. I have also drafted the enclosed reply to the Army Commander which the Generale will sign. The Generale asked me if he was expected to resign his command. I replied that I had no instructions on that point but that I presumed if such was the Field Marshal's wish it would doubtless have been conveyed to him.

There has been a pretty fair purge here done by the Generale on Italian lines and into which I have NOT delved very deeply. The result is that by various means - in some cases a judicious medical board - the greater number of the undesirable rank and file have been eliminated.

I am starting a Divisional School for junior officers run by the BLU on British lines laying especial emphasis on discipline, drill and man-management. This will take some 40 officers a week. We intend to give them a rousing shake-up.

I enclose an extract from the Communist organ in ROME. This is considered here to be the work of Col MUSCO. As regards the statement in the paper that "the Allies demanded the head of Col MUSCO" I emphasised to the Generale at the time that I was tendering him advice and that I had no power to relieve MUSCO and FERRARA of their commands and that it was his responsibility.

I am NOT at all sure that good will NOT come out of evil in this case. The Gruppo has had a good shake up and will have more. Of the new Regtl Comdrs one has arrived and has impressed me very favourably.

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Yours

302

Brigadier Sir HENRY FLOYD Bt C B E.,
Chief of Staff
Main H Q Eighth Army

H Q Gruppo Cremona
P O 64

To : Lieut General Sir Richard MCCREERY, K C B., D S O., M B E.

Lieut Colonel Webb Carter has handed me your letter and the copy of a letter from Field Marshal ALEXANDER on the subject of the recent visit of H R H The Lieut General of the Realm.

I am sure, as a soldier, you will appreciate the grief and shame that such an incident caused me. The pain is rendered more acute by the fact that I feel the Cremona have reason for modest pride in their achievements in the field under your command. The contents of your letter and that of the Field Marshal will be brought to the notice of all concerned.

It is perhaps some little extenuation of my responsibility to state that the demonstration was the work of a well organised minority of my infantrymen introduced into the Gruppo when I had to collect reinforcements at any cost to meet the demands of our role in holding the line. The normal flow of reinforcements which should have been provided from the Depot at CESANO was NOT available until March of this year and I had - perforce - to make my own arrangements to collect volunteers from anywhere. These men fought well undoubtedly but had received no basic training and could NOT be described as soldiers.

As you are aware, I have taken strong disciplinary action and removed from their commands the two Colonels concerned and also the Bn Commanders of the two bns. I have also taken action to discharge a number of the rank and file who I know were behind the incidents. I am fully cognizant that the politics of my unhappy country can be no concern to you and the steps I have taken - in full consultation with Col Webb Carter - are directed purely with the object of rendering the CREMONA an efficient military unit and one deserving of the honour of further employment with the Eighth Army.

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(signed) Clemente Primieri

Generale

Encontro
Sua
L'UNITA.

Organo del Partito Comunista Italiano. Saturday 26th May 1945.

(Page 2, Column 1)

Translation

Three painted Nails

.....
.....

The Joys of the Lieutenantcy

The Lieutenant (General of the Realm) has been to visit units of the 'Legnano' and 'Cremona'. He was 'affectionately greeted' reports "L'ITALIA NUNCI". Here are the proofs of affection: the soldiers of the 'Cremona' have saluted the Lieutenant (General of the Realm) stiff at present arms and whistling noisily (evidently whistling after the American fashion expressing joy) and displaying a poster with "OPORTO" written on it. Those of the 'Legnano' were slightly more violent and fired machine gun shots, as a salute naturally.

And if they were to occupy themselves of other things?

The Allies have taken an interest in the manifestations in honour of the Lieutenant (General of the Realm) and they have requested and obtained from the Minister Casati, the head of Colonel Musco, commander of the Regiment in which the whistling was stronger and more plentiful. In advice and a lesson for any further visits.

Extract

from

UNITA

Organ of the Italian Communist Party
Organ of the Partito Comunista Italiano
Saturday 26th May 1945

(Page 2 Column 1)

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PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Lt Col B W Webb Carter
54 British Liaison Unit
C M F

2 June 1945

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Brigadier Sir HENRY FLOYD Bt C B E.,
Chief of Staff
Main H Q Eighth Army

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

MAIN HEADQUARTERS,
EIGHTH ARMY,
C.M.F.

1023 COS

29th May 1945

Lt-Col. B. Webb Carter,
GSO 1, 51 BLU.

The Army Commander directs that you will hand to
General Primieri the enclosed correspondence which refers
to the recent visit of the Lieutenant-General of the Realm.

H. G. ...
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

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COPY

MAIN HEADQUARTERS,
EIGHTH ARMY,
C.M.F.

1023 COS

29th May 1945

General Clemente Pristeri,
COC, Cassino Gruppo.

I have received instructions from the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theatre, to convey to you his grave displeasure at the incidents which arose when the Lieutenant-General of the Realm inspected the formation under your command on 16th May 1945.

I attach to this letter a copy of the letter I have received from the Supreme Allied Commander on this matter.

I know how much you yourself must regret such lack of discipline, and I am sure that the Commanders of both Regiments have been changed since the visit took place. I am surprised that such behaviour could have occurred in a formation which has recently distinguished itself on the battlefield under your leadership.

I desire you to carry out the Supreme Allied Commander's instructions, and convey the contents of his letter to the senior officers and also to the soldiers who conducted themselves in such an unsoldierlike manner.

(signed) P.L. MCCORMY

Ident-General,
COC Eighth Army.

under your command on 16th May 1945.

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(signed) R.L. McCREERY

Lieut-General,
GOC Eighth Army.

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CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Supreme Allied Commander

26th May 1945

TO: General Officer Commanding,
Eighth Army, CAF.

I am delighted to receive a report that certain soldiers of the Cassino Groupo demonstrated against the Lieutenant-General of the Realm when he imposed that formation on 16th May 1945.

I am not in the least interested in the political implications which this disorderly conduct showed. I view it as a matter of military discipline. That my soldiers should show such ill reserved behaviour on parade to an inspecting officer discloses a bad state of discipline in the unit, and does great disservice to the Cassino Groupo, which has already made a fine name for itself in the recent fighting.

I wish you to inform the Commander of the Cassino Groupo and the senior officers concerned of my extreme displeasure. The matter will also be brought to the notice of the soldiers concerned.

(signed) H.R. ALEXANDER,

Field Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

Caizzo demonstrated against the Lieutenant-General of the Realm whom he suspected that furnished on 16th May 1945.

I am not in the least interested in the political implications which this discovery entails. I view it as a matter of military discipline. That my soldiers should show such ill mannered behaviour on grounds to an inspecting officer discloses a bad state of discipline in the unit, and does great dishonour to the German Group, which has already made a fine name for itself in the recent fighting.

I wish you to inform the Commander of the German Group and the senior officers concerned of my extreme displeasure. The matter will also be brought to the notice of the soldiers concerned.

(signed) H.R. ALEXANDER,

Field Marshal,
Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean Theatre.

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PERSONAL

Lieut Col B W Webb Carter
51 British Liaison Unit
C M F

26 May 45

Dear

Thank you very much for the help you gave to Guy FISHER and to Generale ZANUSSI. Both tell me that you did all you could. I gather that your stuff at CESANO is NOT too bright - I don't see how we can expect anything better until they bring in conscription. Our volunteers were brave enough in battle but are the most appalling scum out of the line.

CREMONA expect to move up to the UDINE area sometime soon after June 1st and I hope we will have shed the worst of our undesirables and got in some reasonable stuff by then.

Yours

B.W.C.

Lieut Colonel MCKAY R H A
F British Liaison Unit
C M F

BWVC/RGT

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F British Liaison Unit
C M F

BWVC/RGT

354

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

26th May 1948.

5.

Dear General,

To start with, over here, I trust in you is still retained. I was told as much yesterday by H. E. Rocco, and it will be repeated to me by H. E. Casali, tomorrow. In fact, it is quite possible that the bearer of this letter will also carry for you from H. E. Rocco the answer to your letter on the same subject.

With reference to Walter Carter's letters: The one I carried for Lt. Col. McKay has had excellent results, and, as I shall explain later, he did all that was possible to co-operate.

On the contrary, the letter addressed to General Browning, has, up to now, had no results. In spite of my insistence and the fact that he was in the office, I was unable to hand him personally the letter. Instead I gave it to Baumann to whom I explained the importance and the urgency of the points touched upon by the B.I.U. I informed that it was a matter of the immediate dismissal of undisciplinables and a case of a request for "preferential treatment" of the "Comandante" with regards to re-enforcement, he (Baumann) stated that the M.M.I.A. had no say in the matter.

"These are orders that only VIII Army can issue. They give the orders and we carry them out". I enquired if he spoke for himself or for General Browning and was told that it was for the latter.

Conclusion?... Tomorrow, as I shall explain further, I hope - but only hope - to meet Pippen. He may confirm totally or in part Baumann's

W. M. L. A.

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Conclusion?... Tomorrow, as I shall explain further, I hope - but only hope - to meet ~~Piggy~~ ^{B.B.} He may confirm totally or in part Baumann's statement. It is, however, positive that M.M.I.A. cannot or does not want to interfere in the affairs of the "Cremona". This, at least, is my impression.

Therefore, it is better that the "major" issues be settled between us and W. Carter first, and W. Carter and the VIII Army after. Otherwise we shall not do anything else but waste time.

Let us proceed.

The question of re-enforcement.

I was lucky that no one else turned up for

The conference which was cancelled at the last moment. It was better so as this gave me the opportunity of discussing in detail the subject with Lt. Col. Makay and him. The conclusions arrived at were later approved by Generals Regni and Mattioli.

Two solutions were considered. These solutions were already suggested to Piculey, who I am to meet - 3 days! - tomorrow.

1/1. Casano, in 8 to 10 days time, to give us two excellent superior officers in exchange of three to four of ours, (Carlini, Lombardo, Ligioni and De Rhodes), four Company Commanders, 500 new drafts of the younger classes. In another 20 days we are to receive another 200. After that we are not to expect and further drafts for some time.

Obviously, as part of this solution, I shall attempt to obtain from the Ministry or the "Stato Maggiore" the replacement of officers as required.

2/1. That the whole "Garibaldi" Regiment be given to us. This Regiment is 2,400 strong of which 1,400 belong to the 1917 class or over, the majority northerners and Alpines - or mountain artillery fencers turned into Infantrymen - of the "Taurinense". The Regiment has a similar establishment to ours. It would be transferred to us as a whole with its commander (Col. Ramnik, who I know) and its officers. The Regiment has the same training and wears uniforms the same as ours. Over and above they wear the "Garibaldian" red neckerchief. To Webb-Carter, these men are, or appear to be

of ours, (Carlini, Lombardo, Liguori and De Rhoden),
four Company Commanders, 500 new drafts of the
younger classes. In another 20 days we are to
receive another 200. After that we are not to expect
and further drafts for some time.

Obviously, as part of this solution, I shall attempt
to obtain from the Ministry or the "Stato Maggiore"
the replacement of officers as required.

2) That the whole "Garibaldi" regiment be given to us.
This Regiment is 2,400 strong of which 1400 belong to
the 1914 class or over, the majority northerners and
alpiners - or mountain artillery gunners turned into
infantrymen - of the "Fascist". The regiment
has a similar establishment to ours. It would
be transferred to us as a whole with its commander
(Col. Rainich, who I know) and its officers. The
Regiment has the same training and wears uniforms
the same as ours. Over and above they wear the
"Garibaldian" red neckerchief. To be sure, these
men are, or appear to be, anything but communists.
Also, once having been with Tito's communists how
can they be expected to remain communists? The
Regiment appears to enjoy a very solid and reliable
discipline.

Excluding the possibility that the Regiment may
always be appointed in sections and lots to our
other units then there remain three possibilities:

CONFIDENTIAL
and PERSONAL

23 May 45

Lieut Col B.W. Webb Carter
51 British Liaison Unit.

8
A/1/5

Dear

Thank you for your letter of 21 May by hand of FISHER.

I quite see your point about PRIMIERI. He has had a good shake up and may be all right but he is essentially weak. However while I remain with the Gruppo I can keep him up to the bat more or less.

As regards the two sacked Regt Comdrs - MUSCO and FERRARA. The position is that I advised PRIMIERI to sack them. I told him if he didn't I would inform 8 Army and they would sack them but that it would be far better and would strengthen his position if HE took the action. PRIMIERI agreed and both Coms went on that understanding.

PRIMIERI subsequently read to me the letter to SIME reporting this and in this he said that 8 Army had insisted on their going. I pointed out that this was NOT so and he said he would alter it.

I am informed by FISHER who saw Col MUSCO in ROME that PRIMIERI wrote to him telling him he was relieved of his comd and saying this was the decision of 8 Army. Of course I know that PRIMIERI is trying to avoid responsibility and in view of the uncertain political future of ITALY it is perhaps understandable if not commendable. I want however to make it quite clear that although I pressed him to take action and he was a frightened man he agreed that it was HE who took action.

I have of course kept 8 Army informed and they approve my action. They are writing to you I believe. We are miles away from them now and letters take a long time so I have to take action first and tell people afterwards in matters of urgency.

PRIMIERI has also dismissed the two Dn Comds concerned - LOMBARDO (1/24) and CARLINI (11/22) and thrown in DE BENEDETTI (2 1/2 c 22 Regt) for good measure. I have urged the dismissal of the latter for months.

I want however to make it quite clear that it is PRIMIERI who has acted and NOT 8 Army though I have NO doubt that 8 Army would have functioned if asked.

As regards replacements. I believe ZANUSSI is bringing back a Col DANICO. We now want a Col Giorgio GERFASOMI at present employed by AMB at ROVIGO. This officer wants to come and is well known to FERRERZANI our Chief of Staff under whom he served in the past. AMB are willing to release him. I would be grateful if you would function in this matter.

Reinforcements. I hear there is talk of the GARIBOLDI Regt coming to us. I hear good reports of it and would be glad to have one km of it in each Inf Regt. I gather that they would be about two km strong after the necessary discharges. I also hear that ROWNIK wants to keep his Regt complete which is understandable. I doubt however if PRIMIERI is strong enough to have a "private army" (as I suspect the Garibaldi of being) under him. If therefore ROWNIK insists on keeping his Regt intact I fear we must look to CRESANO.

I do think that in view of our urgent need and that this is the only Gruppo to be employed by 8 Army that CRESANO should have a certain preference in reinforce-

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he said that 8 Army had insisted on their going. I pointed out that this was NOT so and he said he would alter it.

I am informed by FISHER who saw Col MUSCO in Rome that PRIDERI wrote to him telling him he was relieved of his command and saying this was the decision of 8 Army. Of course I know that PRIDERI is trying to avoid responsibility and in view of the uncertain political future of ITALY it is perhaps understandable if not commendable. I want however to make it quite clear that although I pressed him to take action and he was a frightened man he agreed that it was HE who took action.

I have of course kept 8 Army informed and they approve my action. They are writing to you I believe. We are miles away from them now and letters take a long time so I have to take action first and tell people afterwards in matters of urgency.

PRIDERI has also dismissed the two Bn Comds concerned - LOMBARDO (1/21) and CARLINI (11/22) and thrown in DE FIDEN (2 1/2 22 Regt) for good measure. I have urged the dismissal of the latter for months.

I want however to make it quite clear that it is PRIDERI who has acted and NOT 8 Army though I have NO doubt that 8 Army would have functioned if asked.

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I do think that in view of our urgent need and that this is the only Gruppo to be employed by 8 Army that CRESANO should have a certain preference in reinforcements. I hear from ZANUSSI that Col PISIZZY is telling him that CRESANO is NOT the only Gruppo etc which is very true but I think we do warrant a certain priority in reinforcements.

1702

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- 2 -

Finally, having referred to MIA letter A 020 of 23 March 48, it appears that the Colonels are being disposed of in accordance with para 6 I of that letter.

Yours

R. White

Major General L. BROWNING CR., OBE., MC.

M.M.I.A.

HMES.

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3
 a) To take the Regiment as it stands and turn it into the 22nd "Garibaldi", with, let us assume, the II Bn. of the 22nd Regt. as the 3rd Battalion. You may engage as to how to dispose of the remaining two battalions of the present 22nd. I believe that in one, two, three or four months, the unclassifiables dismissed (and there must however go immediately), the volunteers and the older classes released, the strength of the units would come down extremely. Thus we have a clear picture of the whole thing in phases: today the three Bns of the "Garibaldi" or two only (and one of the 22nd Regt), one or two Bns of the "Garibaldi" (and two or one Bn of the 22nd).

b) Bring the "Cremona" to 3 Inf Regts. even on the strength of 2 Bns each: 21st - 22nd and "Garibaldi".

c) Apportion to each of the 21st and 22nd Regts. one battalion of "Garibaldi" (as the "Fiumi" had done with the Granadiers). The Col. of one of the Regts. would be Ravnitz. The 3rd Bn. of the Garibaldi would be suppressed.

Of the time possibilities, the last - if accepted - might be the best. I have taken a trip to Viterbo to speak, confidentially, to Ravnitz on this subject. I have not found him and hope to see him tomorrow morning, before I talk to Piddley.

But, independently to my interview, in view of the complex nature of the problem, I do not intend to assume a definite decision on the 1st and 2nd solutions, and on 4, 5 and c/ until I have been told what you, Pedenzone and Webster. Carter have to say.

St. Col. Mackay and those at Cesano are all for the 2nd solution ("Garibaldi"). I was much impressed by the behavior

two Btlns (and one of the 22nd Regt), one
of the 22nd Regt).

By bringing the "Cremona" to 3 Inf Regts, even on the strength
of 2 Btlns each: 21st - 22nd and "Garibaldi".

4. Application to each of the 21st and 22nd Regts, one battalion
of "Garibaldi" (as the "Finelli" had done with the
Granadiers). The Cdr. of one of the Regts. would be
Ravnik. The 3rd Btl. of the Garibaldi would be
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Of the three possibilities, the last, if accepted, might be
the best. I have taken a trip to Viterbo to speak, con-
fidentially, to Ravnik on this subject. I have not found
him and hope to see him tomorrow morning, before
I walk to Pistoia.

But, independently to my interview, in view of the complex
nature of the problem, I do not intend to assume a definite
decision on the 1st and 2nd solutions, and on 4, 5, and C/
until I have been told what you, Pederyani and Webb.
Carter have to say.

St. Col. McKay and those at Cesano are all for the 2nd
solution ("Garibaldi"). I was much impressed by the behavior
of these soldiers, their attitude etc. But, before I have
spoken to Ravnik, I hesitate to decide, as one must take
into consideration so many things, viewing the whole
affair not only ~~the~~ through our ways of seeing things, but
also the British way.

However, Redda leaves today at 2200 hrs. He should
report to you between 1300 and 1400 hrs tomorrow 21st.
Tomorrow evening send me your answer, telling me which
appears to you the most convenient solution, and I shall
attempt to have it adopted. Send it by an officer, who
could arrive here by 1400 and 1500 hrs of the 22nd. So, in

The afternoon of the 22nd, having been told your wishes, spoken to Rawhik, and seen the gentlemen concerned here, I shall definitely conclude the subject.

Discharges.

Once the acceptance of 8th Army has been obtained, I would get rid of myself immediately of the 4-500 undecimables.

I would have them disarmed by battalion, at different hours of the same day (0800 hrs ~~hrs~~ 1/21 hrs, 0900 hrs 1/21, etc), then I would have them transferred by trucks to a camp, a 100 to 200 km. from Adhia. I would have the camp well guarded and organized - I would put Sangi in command! - and they would be kept there until further orders or discharge.

In any case, tomorrow I shall also discuss this matter with the collaborators, the S.M and the Ministry. I shall furthermore discuss the matter of ~~volunteers~~ the discharge of the volunteers (this must be accelerated further if the 2nd solution is decided upon) and of the older classes etc.

Tomorrow evening, 21st, the remainder of the officers with me will leave for Adhia, To them I shall furnish details and facts of tomorrow's interview.

I shall remain until such time as I have ~~seen~~ ~~seen~~ definitely seen definite and executive orders issued.

My regards to Padergani and Webb Carter.

Kanussi

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I shall remain until such time as I have ~~more~~
~~clear~~ ~~orders~~ ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~government~~ ~~to~~ ~~see~~ ~~definite~~
and executive orders issued.

My regards to Padergani and Webb Carter.

Zanussi

.....

P.S.

Scoticagna has seen Lastriati, who assured him that
those of the "Garibaldi" are ferocious anticommunists
in spite of their red neckerchief. It is always the
same: they went with Tito... Those that go with
Tito ~~are~~ finish by fighting him: the British included...

After all even Garibaldi wore the red neckerchief
and he certainly was not "red".

26 maggio 1945

Caro Generale,

Prima di tutto, qui conservo piena la fiducia in Te. Me l'ha detto l'Ecc. Ronco ieri, me lo ridirà domani l'Ecc. Casati. Non è escluso, anzi, che il latore della presente Ti porti anche una risposta dell'Ecc. Ronco al riguardo (risposta alla lettera da Te inviata, intendo).

Poi, lettera Webb Carter. Ottimo esito ha avuto quella recata da me al Ten. Col. Makay, che come dirò poi, ha fatto tutto il possibile per venirci incontro.

Sinora nessun esito, invece, ha avuto quella diretta al Generale Browning. Nonostante le mie insistenze, pur essendo egli in sede, non ho potuto consegnarla personalmente a lui, ma a Baumann al quale, ho rappresentato l'importanza e l'urgenza dei punti che il B.L.U. toccava. Saputo che si trattava da una parte di congedare subito gli indesiderabili, dall'altra di accordare complementi "di preferenza" al "Cremona", ha affermato che la M.M.I.A. non ha voce in capitolo sull'argomento.

"Sono ordini che può dare solo l'VIII Armata. Questi ordini, e noi eseguiamo" Chiestogli se parlava in nome suo o del generale Browning, ha risposto che parlava in nome di quest'ultimo.

Conclusione? Domani, come dirò più oltre, spero -ma spero soltanto!- di incontrare Fildaley. Può darsi che egli rettifichi in tutto o in parte l'affermazione di Baumann. Ma è positivo che la M.M.I.A. o non può o non vuol intrigersi più negli affari del "Cremona". Questa almeno la mia impressione.

Ergo, per le cose "grosse" meglio regolarle tra

quella recata da me al Ten.Col. Makay, che come dirò poi, ha fatto tutto il possibile per venirci incontro.

Sinora nessun esito, invece, ha avuto qualità diretta al Generale Browning. Nonostante le mie insistenze, pur essendo egli in sede, non ho potuto consegnarla personalmente a lui, ma a Baumann al quale, ho rappresentato l'importanza e l'urgenza dei punti che il B.L.U. toccava. Saputo che si trattava da una parte da congedare subito gli indesiderabili, dall'altra di accordare complementi "di preferenza" al "Cremona", ha affermato che la M.M.I.A. non ha voce in capitolo sull'argomento.

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Ergo, per le cose "grosse" meglio regolarle tra noi e Webb Carter prima, tra Webb Carter e l'VIII Armata poi. Altrimenti, perdiamo tempo, e nulla più.

E andiamo avanti.

Questione complementi.

Ho avuto la fortuna di non trovare nessun ... corrente, perché la riunione nota è stata all'ultimo momento, sospesa. Meglio, anche perché ho potuto trattare a fondo la questione con i Ten.Col. Makay e Sivo, essendo poi le conclusioni

tratte con queste due egregie e competenti persone approvate dai generali Vegni e Mattioli.

Sono state ventilate due soluzioni, già prospettate a Pidsley, con il quale mi incontro -spero!- domattina.

1°)- Cesano ci dà entro 8-10 giorni 2 ottimi ufficiali superiori in cambio di 3-4 nostri (Carlini, Lombardo, Liguori e De Rhoden), 4 comandanti di compagnia, 500 nuovi complementi di classi giovani. Tra 20 giorni ne avremo altri 200. Poi non è da prevedere di poter ricevere altro per notevole tempo.

Con questa soluzione, evidentemente, vedrò di ottenere l'eccedenza di ufficiali che ci è necessaria dal Ministero o dallo S.M.

2°)- Ci viene dato subito l'intero reggimento "Garibaldi" costituito da 2700 uomini (1700 di classi dal 1947 compreso in su, in maggioranza settentrionali ed alpini -o art. da montagna diventati fanti- della "Taurinense"). Il reggimento ha formazione uguale a quella dei nostri. Verrebbe in blocco con il suo comandante (Col. Ravnik, che io conosco) e i suoi ufficiali. E' istruito e vestito uguale all'uniforme in distribuzione tra noi, la divisa. In più un fazzoletto rosso "garibaldino" al collo. Per Webb Carter sono, o almeno appaiono, tutt'altro che comunisti. E poi dopo essere stati coi comunisti di Tito, come potrebbero esserlo ancora? Ha una disciplina che appare molto, ma molto solida.

Escluso che si possa frazionarlo in piccoli ³⁴⁸ gruppi di uomini o reparti. Allora vi sarebbero tre possibilità:

a)- prendere il reggimento com'è, e farlo diventare il 22°

tempo.
Con questa soluzione, evidentemente, vedrò di ottenere l'eccedenza di ufficiali che ci è necessaria dal Ministero o dallo S.M.

2°)- Ci viene dato subito l'intero reggimento "Garibaldi" costituito da 2700 uomini (1700 di classi dal 1917 compreso in su, in maggioranza settentrionali ed alpini -o art. da montagna diventati fanti- della "Taurinense"). Il reggimento ha formazione uguale a quella dei nostri. Verrebbe in blocco con il suo comandante (Col. Ravnik, che io conosco) e i suoi ufficiali. E' istruito e vestito uguale all'uniforme in distribuzione tra noi, la divisa. In più un fazzoletto rosso "garibaldino" al collo. Per Webb Carter sono, o almeno appaiono, tutt'altro che comunisti. E poi dopo essere stati coi comunisti di Tito, come potrebbero esserlo ancora? Ha una disciplina che appare molto, ma molto solida.

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a)- prendere il reggimento com'è, e farlo diventare il 22°

"Garibaldi", con il Terzo btg. possiamo, tratto dal II/22

MI potresti chiedere che ne facciamo dei rimanenti btg. dell'attacco 22; ma penso che tra 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 mesi, congedati gli indesiderabili (questi fuori subito però!), i rimanenti volontari e le classi anziane la forza dei reparti scenderebbe di molto. E allora ecco che potremmo vedere la cosa per fasi: oggi, tutti e

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tre i btg. del "Garibaldi" o due soli (e 1 del 22°),
1-2 del "Garibaldi" (e 2-1 del 22°);

b)- portar il "Cremona" a 3 reggimenti fanteria, magari
su due battaglioni: 21°, 22°, e "Garibaldi";

c)- Immettere in ognuno dei reggimenti 21° e 22° 1 btg.
"Garibaldi" (come la "Friuli" ha fatto per i granatieri
ri). Il comandante di uno dei reggimenti sarebbe
Ravnik. Il terzo btg. "Garibaldi" si scioglierebbe.

Delle tre eventualità, l'ultima -se accettata- potrebbe
essere la migliore. Ho fatto una corsa a Viterbo per parlarne con
Ravnik, a titolo confidenziale. Non l'ho trovato. Spero di vederlo
domattina, prima del colloquio con Pidsley.

Ma, indipendentemente da tale colloquio, io, data la
complessità del problema, non intendo prendere posizione risoluta
sulla 1° o 2° soluzione, e sulla a); b), c) di questa senza aver
sentito che cosa ne pensate Tu, Federzani e Webb Carter.

Il Ten.Col. Makay e quelli di Cesano sono per la 2° soluzione
("Garibaldi"). Io sono rimasto ammirato dal contegno dei sol-
dati dal modo come si presentano etc. etc. Ma prima di aver parlato
con Ravnik, esito a pronunciarmi, perché bisogna tener conto di tante
cose, con mentalità non soltanto nostra, ma anche inglese.

Comunque, l'èda parte alle 22 di oggi. Sarà da te alle
13-14 di domani 21. Domani sera spediscimi la tua risposta, che mi dica
quale soluzione vi pare più conveniente, che io vedrò di far trion-
fare quella. Spediscila con ufficiale; il quale potrebbe essere qui
per le 14-15 del giorno 22. Cosicché nel pomeriggio del 22, sentite
le tue idee, parlato con Ravnik, preso ulteriore contatto con i mes-
seri di qui, tirerò la fila della questione.

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Congedamenti

Ottanta il "placet" dell'VIII armata, mi libererei subito dei 4-500 indesiderabili.

Idi farei venir disarmati per btg. in ore diverse di uno stesso giorno (ore 8 il 1/21, ore 9 il 11/21 etc.) e poi li caricarei su autocarri e li raccoglierei a 100 - 200 Km. da Adria, in campo

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ben guardato, e organizzato -metterei Sanzi, alla testa!- dove o resterebbero sino a nuovo ordine o verrebbero senz'altro prosciolti dalla ferma.

Ad ogni modo, domani e dopo parlerò anche di ciò con coobelligeranti, S.M. e Ministero. E parlerò dell'invio in congedo dei rimanenti volontari (da accelerare soprattutto se si viene alla 2^ soluzione) e delle classi più anziane etc. etc.

Domani sera, 21, partiranno per Adria 2 rimanenti ufficiali che sono con me. Ad essi fornirò dati circa i colloqui di domani.

Io resterò sinché non vedrò emanati ordini definitivi ed esecutivi. E intanto mi occuperò delle rimanenti questioni e questioni celle.

Ricordami e Paderzani e Webb Warner. E abbini devotamente

tuo Zanussi

A l'ufficiale che mi porta domani la tua risposta, ti prego far consegnare -se giunte- che il serg.magg. Messina, del Genio, doveva portarmi da Milano e Brescia.

Una postilla

Scott. ha visto Iastricati, il quale gli ha assicurato che quelli della "Garibaldi" sono ferocemente anticomunisti a malgrado del fazzoletto rosso. Sempre lui: sono andati con Tito... Tutti quelli che vanno con Tito finiscono poi col combatterlo: inglesi compresi...

Del resto Garibaldi lo portava; e non era certo "rosso"

Io resterò sinché non vedrò emanati ordini definitivi ed esecutivi. E intanto mi occuperò delle rimanenti questioni e questioni delle celle.

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Del resto Garibaldi lo portava; e non era certo "rosso"

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23rd May 1945

Dear General,

I have received your kind letter of 21st through Bastonick who will return to you this evening carrying this letter.

I counted on leaving here tomorrow, but today, N.E. Rones made me wait a whole afternoon, which might oblige me to retard my return to Adria.

On the whole the results are excellent... even though, on principle, moves had been turned up by everyone... granted the exchange unlimited ending or leave to the 1915 class and older classes. I would not as yet avail myself of the authority to send on leave the youngest classes, instead I would do the opposite: since, in my opinion, we must first find out what would be our remaining strength. Also, another reason for this, is the fact that a circular discharging all volunteers enlisted for the duration of hostilities, is being published immediately. (I hope to carry this circular back with me.)

Results of my stay in Rome, after two news, long interviews with Pidalley - very amiable and comprehending - & many contacts with the War Ministry and S.M.

Positions are being made ^{as under} for the immediate necessities: (the substitution in rank and file of new blood in lieu of the undesirable in the "Cremona", and of the first lot of volunteers to be dismissed).

- by permitting and authorising the sending away of undesirables. It is not as yet defined - but I shall stay on here to have defined - where there are to be sent.

- by the assignments, as detailed in attached, which I have requested in writing in agreement with Pidalley and which N.E. Rones has signed. The letter has, since 1500 hrs today, been in the hands of M.M.A., who will, I think, not be long in giving the necessary authority. There remains to be decided - and I shall get this decision - as to whom we can send for the Officers and men; the staff ^{to be sent from the end of this month.} (Pidalley

With regard to future needs, that is to say, with regard to the deficiencies that will occur in the "Comms" when even the second lot of volunteers has been sent home (in two or three months) no decision has yet been reached.

The problem has been put forward, but not solved. Besides, the solution need not be so pressing.

It is obvious that we must be given from 2,000 to 2,500 men (according to the number of volunteers that request to stay on). Where to find them?

For the present, there is no idea.

Are we to turn to the "Garibaldi" regiment? I have spoken to you about this yesterday, and we shall speak again. It is a solution that may have excellent points in favour: but further contacts with Ravnik are necessary to avoid leaving in the Gruppo a "freak" Regt.

Are we to have further drafts from Cesano? The problem is tied up with extensive possible recruiting, which is still being considered. Let us hope that a transition from the Carabinieri to the actual fact will be quick!

M.E. Rocco is back. With Luni and Vegni has been fixed the question of officers and men. See note (!) in first page.

~~But~~ We may send for 2 senior officers, 4 Captains, 800 men between Sunday and Monday.

Before 6th June we may also have Col. D'Amico, 2 senior Officers, 3 Captains.

Before the end of June, the rest of the Captains to make up the twelve.

We shall return on the other hand, four senior officers and seven to eight Coy. Cars.

I shall obtain a decision tomorrow morning as to where to send the undesignables. I shall leave immediately after.

I hope to be with you on the night of the 25th.

All the best to Pedergani.

You don't do this yesterday, and we shall expect a solution that may have excellent points in favour; but further contacts with Ravnik are necessary to avoid having in the Gruppe a "freak" Regt.

Are we to have further drafts from Cesano? The problem is tied up with superior possible recruiting, which is still being considered. Let us hope that a transition from the consideration to the actual fact will be quick!

M.E. Ranco is back. With him and Veqni has been fixed the question of officers and men. See note (1) in first page. We may send for 2 senior officers, 4 captains, 500 men between Sunday and Monday.

Before 6th June we may also have Col. D'Amico, 2 senior officers, & 3 Captains.

Before the end of June, the rest of the Captains to make up the Twelve.

We shall return on the other hand, four senior officers and seven to eight Coy. Cdrs.

I shall obtain a decision tomorrow morning as to where to send the undisciplined. I shall leave immediately after.

I hope to be with you on the night of the 20th.
All the best to Pedergoni.

O Hereditarily.

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Lamini.

23 maggio 1945

Caro Generale,

Ho ricevuto la tua cortese del 21 a mezzo Barbaricchi, che riparte stasera con la presente.

Contavo di ripartire anch'io domani, ma oggi l'Ecc. Ronco mi ha fatto perdere il pomeriggio e ciò potrà obbligarmi a ritardare il ritorno ad Adria.

Praticamente benissimo - anche se formalmente qui hanno torto un pò tutti il naso ... - L'invio in licenza illimitata del 1915 e più anziani. Non adotterei ancora il provvedimento di invio in licenza per i giovanissimi, invece: giacchè prima occorre, a mio avviso, sapere esattamente quanti soldi ci restano in cassa, ovvero quanti soldati restano nelle nostre file. Anche perchè è di imminente emanazione la circolare che congeda i volontari arruolatisi sino "alla fine" delle ostilità (spero, la circolare, di portarmela dietro).

Conclusione delle mie giornate romane, dopo due nuovi lunghi colloqui con Pidsley - molto amabile e comprensivo - e svariati contatti col Min. Guerra e S.M..

Alle necessità immediate (via gli indesiderabili dal "Cremona"; vengano allo stesso gli ufficiali e i complementi atti a sanare le deficienze che si verificheranno tra breve, per effetto dell'allontanamento degli indesiderabili e del congedamento del primo blocco di volontari), si provveda:
- con la concessione o autorizzazione che sia di liberarci degli indesiderabili. Resta da definire - e resto per definire - dove dovranno mandarsi;

- con le assegnazioni di cui al foglio annesso, che io ho scritto d'accordo con Pidsley e che l'Eccellenza Ronco ha firmato. La lettera è già dalle 15 di oggi nelle mani della M.M.I.A., che

tata del 1915 e più anziani. Non adotterei ancora il provvedimento di invio in licenza per i giovanissimi, invece: giacchè prima occorre, a mio avviso, sapere esattamente quanti soldi ci restano in cassa, ovvero quanti soldati restano nelle nostre file. Anche perchè è di imminente emanazione la circolare che congeda i volontari arruolatisi sino "alla fine" delle ostilità (spero, la circolare, di portarmela dietro).

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- con le assegnazioni di cui al foglio annesso, che io ho scritto d'accordo con Pidsley e che l'Eccellenza Ronco ha firmato. La lettera è già dalle 15 di oggi nelle mani della M.M.I.A. che non tarderà, penso, a dare il necessario "via". Resta da definire, - e resto per definire - quando dovrò mandare a prendere gli ufficiali e la truppa; "quando" che non andrà oltre la fine mese e che vedrò di accelerare, visto che il primo giugno avrà inizio il nostro movimento. (*)

(*) Definito, mandiamo a prendere i primi ufficiali e 500 uomini lunedì prossimo venturo.

Questo, ripeto, per le necessità immediate. A seconda dell'esito dei tugi contatti con Gervasoni, verrà lui (il Min. Guer) a pronta a sanzionare il trasferimento) o manderemo a prendere poi, domenica mattina, il Col. Donadoni.

Nei riguardi delle necessità future, e cioè delle deficienze che si verificheranno nelle file del "Cremona" quando anche il secondo blocco di volontari se ne andrà a casa (fra due - tre mesi), non sono state prese decisioni.

Il problema è stato posto, ma non risolto. E, d'altronde, non occorre risolverlo dall'oggi al domani.

Ovvio che bisognerà dardi altri 2.000 - 2.500 uomini (a seconda che sia notevole o piccolo il numero dei volontari che chiederanno di rimanere in servizio). Dove trattarli?

Per il momento, non se ne ha l'idea.

Ricorrere al reggimento "Garibaldi"? Te ne ho parlato ieri, e ne riparleremo. E' una soluzione che ha dell'ottimo; ma saranno necessari ulteriori contatti con Ravnik, per evitare di avere nel Gruppo un reggimento "tabù".

Aver altri complementi da Cesano? Il problema è connesso ad ulteriori affluenze, le quali sono allo studio. Speriamo che dallo studio si passi rapidamente ai fatti concreti!

E' ritornato l'Eccellenza Ronco. E con lui e Vegni è stato definito l'invio degli ufficiali e della truppa, di cui alla postilla (") fatta a pagina 1.

Fra domenica e lunedì possiamo venirli a prendere 8 ufficiali superiori, 4 capitani, 500 uomini di truppa.

Entro il 6/6 possiamo avere il Colonnello D'Amico, due ufficiali superiori, tre capitani.

Entro la fine di giugno, i rimanenti capitani per arrivare ai dodici.

28th May 1945

Dear Lanusei,

Replying to your letter of the 21st,
I consider that we cannot absorb in the "Cranona"
a formation, however good, commanded by a "Condottiero".

Perhaps this expression of mine may sound exaggerated by
it expresses my idea.

On the other hand, if Ravinik's "Gonibaldi" has
traditions to live up to, so also the colours of the 21st and
22nd even if besmirched by an unsavoury incident,
have equal honours gained in the struggle against
the Germans.

Therefore, if the solution of one Ravinik battalion
for each of our Regts. is accepted, well and good;
otherwise we renounce to the "Gonibaldi". In this
case it will be necessary to insist, as much as possible,
to have the most from Casano.

It is a case of having at our disposal a unit under
orders which will serve to re-establish, amongst high
low, the conception of discipline on which a new regular
army may be founded.

I should like to know, (and I am aware of your efforts
on this subject), where the undersecretary are to be
sent.

Agreed on Col. D'Amico. We are
working with regards to Genovani.

Thanks & kind regards
Pirini

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for each of our Regts. is accepted, well and good;
otherwise we renounce to the "Garibaldi". In this
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orders which will serve to re-establish, amongst high
level, the conception of discipline on which a new regular
army may be founded.

I should like to know, (and I am aware of your efforts
in this subject), where the undersigned are to be
sent.

Agreed on Col. D'Amico. We are ~~sent~~

working with regards to Garosani.

Thanks, kind regards
Pierini

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

P.M. (64), 23 maggio 1945

Caro Zanussi,

Riferimento alla tua del 21.

Ritengo che non si possa inserire nella "Cremona" una formazione, anche se piena di buoni requisiti e comandata da un "Giovanni dalle Bande Nere". Forse questa mia espressione è un po' esagerata ma credo che fissi le idee.

D'altra parte se la "Garibaldi" di Ravnik ha delle tradizioni da difendere, anche le Bande del 21 e 22, se pur offuscate da uno spiacevole incidente, hanno pari tradizioni nella lotta antitedesca.

Pertanto se si accetta la soluzione organica di un btg. Ravnik per ognuno dei nostri reggimenti sta bene: altrimenti si rinuncia alla "Garibaldi". In questo caso occorre insistere per avere quanto più possibile complementi buoni da Cesano.

In definitiva si tratta di avere delle unità comandabili e che possano servire per ristabilire, in alto e in basso, il concetto di disciplina su cui basare il nuovo esercito regolare.

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./.

1723

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Interessa, come già ti stai interessando, definire dove devono essere inviati gli indesiderabili.

Stà bene per il colonnello D'Amico. Ci stiamo interessando per Gervasari.

Grazie e cordialità.

028

21st May 1945

6.

Dear Primisi,

I have had many conversations:

with regards to my talk with Pideley, with whom I shall have another interview tomorrow at Luncheon:

I have explained the question of the volunteers, which recapitulated is as follows:

- 300 to 400 undesirable to be discharged as soon as possible;
- 3000 other volunteers to be discharged within the next 3 months (except for those - perhaps 1000 - who would like to remain on)

He agrees ~~with~~ the immediate discharge of the undesirable, and, together we examine the ways and means (similar to the suggestions made by me yesterday, with the inclusion of the grant of the "Merit" certificate, a good talk to the worst offenders, etc.).

We consider and take into account the necessity for planning the discharge of the bulk, which we cannot hope ever to be able to keep on indefinitely (and which will neither be convenient for us to keep).

It is therefore necessary within three months to make up the deficiencies that will occur in the "Cannon". The methods as discussed and visualized yesterday are discussed. He will submit them to General Browning, which I await your answer and M. E. Casati will give his opinion (see further).

Interview with Rocco - Duggi - Nothing special.

Interview with M. E. Casati:

He understands perfectly our needs of the present (to send away the undesirables) and of the future (reinforcements to substitute the discharge of volunteers). With regards to the undesirables he recommends that these are not sent all to Cesano or any other place, as this might incur the risk of a new kind of "march on Rome", but suggests that they be apportioned in small lots to other units (to be detached). Some may be sent away on termination of my 333

He agrees to agree, and, together we examine the way and means desiderata, and, together we examine the way and means (similar to the suggestions made by me yesterday, with the inclusion of the grant of the "Merit" certificate, a good talk to the worst offenders, etc.).

We consider and take into account the necessity for planning the discharge of the bulk, which we cannot hope ever to be able to keep on indefinitely (and which will neither be convenient for us to keep).

It is therefore necessary within three 3 months to make up the deficiencies that will occur in the "Crimina". How? The methods as discussed and visualized yesterday are discussed. He will submit them to General Brownning's opinion (see further).

Interview with Rocco - Duggi - striking special.

Interview with H.E. Casali:

He understands perfectly our needs of the present (to send away the uneliminables) and of the future (re-enforcements to substitute the discharge of volunteers). He regards to the underinabilities he recommends that there are not sent all to Casano or any other place, as this might incur the risk of a new kind of march on Rome; but suggests that they be apportioned in small lots to other units (to be discharged). Some may be discharged right away on termination of employment. He does not intend with regards to re-enforcements, he does not intend the "Garibaldi" (22nd Regt) solution. He suggests, always to be told, however, what decision we have taken.

Interview with Calareu. He is friendly to us and holds himself at our disposal (I shall send for him before I return to Adria); I have no other colonels. He will provide, try arrangement with me, for the selection of the other superior officers, which with Duggi (who I shall see tomorrow) I shall arrange for the officers of lower ranks.

Interview with Ravnik, the Garibaldi's commander. I put
to him, ~~various~~ ^{various} ~~problems~~ ^{problems}, the possibility you are aware
of. He votes for the idea of the " ~~armored~~ Regiment as a whole"
of 2 to 3 batts, (as already thought by S. E. Casali). He is not
afraid of finding himself without men because of discharges,
for he has continuous requests from other volunteers, who he
himself will personally select.

I understand?
I await your answer and the decision of M.M.I.A. so as
to arrive to a conclusion. Ravnik, has impressed me
very well, that appears to me a signed little "self-satisfied"
to handle his men, but who will not readily be able
to handle. We have already experienced such things not
to worry at another repetition of similar experiences...
Definite conclusion (at least up to time of writing).
M.M.I.A. through Baumann had beaten a retreat,

through Pidsley is once again forward. No doubt they
will help. But, certainly, whilst M.M.I.A. is agnostic
with regards to the "Garibaldi" solution, I do not believe
they want to give us the best of Casano. (I refer to the
two I spoke of yesterday). "There is not only the "Cremona"
Pidsley would ~~prefer~~ ^{prefer} to me whilst I struggled to form
that the Cremona ~~is a~~ ^{is a} ~~potential~~ ^{potential} ~~element~~ ^{element}
as well as the extraordinary number of its volunteers, and
its behaviour - fully recognized by all, Italians & English -
in the field.

The Ministry and S.M. will do anything to help
us (in perspective of the selected solution); and, above all, in
the & matter of officers they will meet our requests
with a good heart. But it is a heart which,
with all the best will, has small possibilities.
I have spoken of Ravnik and his solution. They
would be of excellent soldiers; Apolitical, disciplined,
& ~~well~~ ^{well} ~~trained~~ ^{trained}. But;
- ~~contrary~~ ^{contrary} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~what~~ ^{what} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~said~~ ^{said} ~~yesterday~~ ^{yesterday}; they would not
be available before another two months or at the
present time.

to handle his men; but who will not easily be in our hands. We have already experienced such things not to worry at another repetition of similar experiences...

Definite conclusion (at least up to time of writing).
M.M.I.A. through Baumann had beaten a retreat, through Pideley is now again forward. No doubt they will help. But, certainly, whilst M.M.I.A. is agnostical with regards to the "Gambaldi" solution, I do not believe they want to give us the best of Cesano. (I refer to the two I spoke of yesterday). "There is not only the 'Comuna' Pideley would ^{hear to me whilst I attempted to prove} that the Comuna ^{is a perfect performance} because of ^{its} assignment to the 8th Army as well as the extraordinary number of its volunteers, and its behaviour - fully recognized by all, Italians & English - in the field.

The Ministry and S.M. will do anything to help us (in spite of the selected solution); and, above all, in the matter of Officers they will meet our requests with a good heart. But it is a heart which, with all the best will, has small possibilities.

I have spoken of Ravinik and his solution. They would be excellent soldiers; Apolitical, disciplined, while dressed, well trained. But:

~~They are not available~~
- contrary to what was said yesterday, they would not be available before another two months, as at the present they are committed to an exhaustive a large programme of leave for the troops; they will bring with them a new "line" ^{which} ~~from~~ from certain points of view would be excellent. But other "lines" they might bring with them may have a dubious effect (2 lines are commanded by Captains, one by a lieutenant).

- They have, as I mentioned above, a commander who possesses a prestige and a record altogether "personal". He would, logically enough, defend both to the end; even when the interest of the service might demand otherwise - which obviously is much less logical.

3

The meantime, whilst I await your letter and whilst Pidsley sees Brownie to day, the real and basic necessities of our to day are:

1. Eliminate the undesirable element, as soon as possible;
2. Obtain, as soon as possible, a number of officers to replace those already missing and to substitute those useless ones who still remain.

When we have succeeded in this, we may say that we have at least reached some good result. The first point is already unanimously agreed upon, and the second point will be solved, if not 100% at least 60-70% between Tuesday and Wednesday.

We still have some time in which to decide on the subject of the replacements which will make up for the deficiencies caused by the mass exodus of volunteers. Certainly there is no time to waste on the subject of the "Garibaldi" regiment. It is a case of either grabbing or letting go, for already there are many who desire it and want it. If a decision must be taken, it must be now or, at the latest, ^{within} next week (or after, we have discussed the subject together); otherwise it will end by being given to some other Gruppe or retained as a regiment of "elite" during garrison duties in the Capital or some other town.

I have finished my report. I trust that within tomorrow or after tomorrow I shall settle our immediate needs (away with the undesirables and for us any capable officers), and if I can put my hand on other personnel acceptable as eventual reinforcements for the "Cremona", I may also decide ~~upon~~ something in this line.

I have seen Pinesse, who was going to the Ministry, calm and smiling. He will see me again tomorrow. I shall also see again Ferrara, tomorrow.

41

Tuesday and Wednesday.

We still have some time in which to decide on the subject of the replacements which will make up for the deficiencies caused by the mass exodus of volunteers. Certainly there is no time to waste in the subject of the "Garibaldi" requirement. It is a case of either grabbing or letting go, for already there are many who desire it and want it. If a decision must be taken, it must be now or, at the latest, ^{willing} next week (or after we have discussed the subject together); otherwise it will end by being given to some other Gruppe or retained as a requirement of "elite" diving & garrison duties in the Capital or some other town.

I have finished my report. I trust that within tomorrow or after tomorrow I shall settle over immediate needs (away with the undesirables and for us any capable officers); and if I can put my hand on other personnel acceptable as eventual reinforcements for the "Crimena", I may also decide ~~upon~~ something in this line.

I have seen Bruce, who was going to the Ministry, calm and smiling. He will see me again tomorrow.

I shall also see again Ferrara, tomorrow. I have never seen, nor heard anything of Fisher. But this is not important as the meeting we were both called for, did not meet.

Regards to all
Zanuffi.

H. E. does recommend tact in the dismissal of the undesirable, so as to avoid any further political speculations of the affair. I am counting on leaving Wednesday or Thursday evening, and so be back there Thursday or Friday evening. More likely Friday.

21 maggio 1945

Caro Primieri,

Colloqui veri.

Colloquio con Pidsley, che rivedrò domani a mezzogiorno e col quale resterò a colazione.

Gli ho illustrato la questione dei volontari, che si riassume:

- in 3-400 indesiderabili da congedare al più presto;
- 3000 altri volontari da congedare entro 1-2-3 mesi (salvo volere -un migliaio?- che vorranno restare sotto).

Conviene circa congedo immediato degli indesiderabili, e ne esaminiamo insieme le modalità (simili a quelle da me dette ieri, con esclusione di consegna di diploma benemerita, sermone di più reprobri, ecc.)

Si rende conto della necessità di pensare poi al consolidamento della massa, che noi non potremo riuscire a trattare definitivamente (e che non ci conviene neppure trattare).

E' necessario quindi, entro questi 1-2-3 mesi ripianare le deficienze che si manifesteranno nel "Grenone". Come? Vengono in causa le soluzioni già prospettate ieri. Ne riferirò al Generale Browning, intanto che io attendo la tua risposta e che l'Ecc. Casati pronuncierà la sua opinione (vedi oltre).

Colloquio con Rocco-Muzzi. Nulla di speciale.

Colloquio con Ecc. Casati. Comprende benissimo le nostre necessità presenti (via gli indesiderabili) e future (immisio ni che compensino l'esodo dei volontari). Circa gli indesiderabili raccomanda di non spedirli tutti a Cesano o tutti in altro posto, chè rischierebbe di venire fuori una marcia su ... Roma di nuovo genere; ma di distribuirli un po' qua un po' là, tra vari enti (da definirsi). Alcuni saranno da congedare addirittura per forza.

Circa le immisio ni non esclude la soluzione "Garibaldi" (22°). Aspetta comunque di conoscere (come d'oltremare) ...

Conviene circa congedo immediato degli indesiderabili, e ne esaminiamo insieme le modalità (simili a quelle da me dette ieri, con esclusione di consegna di diploma benemerita, sermone di più reprobri, ecc.)

Si rende conto della necessità di pensare poi al congedamento della massa, che noi non potremo riuscire a trattare definitivamente (e che non ci conviene neppure trattare).

E' necessario quindi, entro questi 1-2-3 mesi ripianare le deficienze che si manifesteranno nel "Cremona". Cosa? Vengono in causa le soluzioni già prospettate ieri. Ne riferirà al Generale Browning, intanto che io attendo la tua risposta e che l'Ecc.Casati pronuncerà la sua opinione (vedi oltre).

Colloquio con Rocco-Luzzi. Nulla di speciale.

Colloquio con Ecc.Casati. Comprende benissimo le nostre necessità presenti (via gli indesiderabili) e future (immisio ni che compensino l'esodo dei volontari). Circa gli indesiderabili raccomanda di non spedirli tutti a Cesano o tutti in altro posto, che rischierebbe di venire fuori una marcia su ... Roma di nuovo genere; ma di distribuirli un po' qua un po' là, tra vari enti (da definirsi). Alcuni saranno da congedare addirittura per ~~fi~~arma. Circa le immissioni non esclude la soluzione "Garibaldi" (22°). Aspetta comunque di conoscere (come d'altronde Ecc.Rocco e Luzzi) quale decisione prenderemo.

Colloquio con Calaresu. Andico è a nostra disposizione (lo manderò a prendere prima di ritornare su); non ho altri colonnelli. Provvederà d'intesa con me alla scelta degli altri ufficiali superiori, mentre ^{con} Falugi (che vedrò domani) provvederà a quella degli ufficiali inferiori.

Colloquio col Ravnik, comandante "Garibaldí". Gli prospetto in modo "strettamente confidenziale" la possibilità nota. E' per quella "blocco di reggimento" su 2-3 btg., già vista da Ecc.Casati. Non ha paura di restar senza uomini a causa dei congedamenti perché ha continue richieste di volontari, che selezionerà personalmente .

Impressioni?

Aspetto la tua risposta e la decisione della M.M.I.A. per tirare la fila della matassa. Ravnik mi ha fatto un'ottima impressione, ma mi pare un pò "montato". Rischiamo di avere un colonnello che avrà sì, alla mano i suoi, ma che non sarà molto facilitante nelle nostre mani. E ne abbiamo già avuti altri per non rifar, senza una certa preoccupazione, l'esperienza già fatta ...

Conclusioni definitive (sino al momento in cui scrivo, per lo meno).

La M.M.I.A., che con Faumann si era tirata indietro, con Pidsley si mette ancora avanti. Senza dubbio ci aiuterà. Ma, certo, mentre per la soluzione "Garibaldí" é agnostica, non credo voglia darci tutte il meglio di Cesano (i 700 uomini di cui parlavo ieri) "Non c'è soltanto il "Cremona", mi ha ripetuto Pidsley più volte, per quanto io mi affannarsi a dimostrargli che il "Cremona", e per l'assegnazione all'8^a Armata, e per lo stragrande numero di volontari che ha nelle sue file, e per il comportamento sul campo -da tutti, italiani e inglesi, pienamente riconosciute- meritasse una preferenza.

Ministero e S.M. faranno di tutto per agevolarci (quale che sia la soluzione prescelta); e soprattutto nella partita ufficiali ci verranno incontro di gran cuore. Ma é un cuore che, accanto a molta buona volontà, non ha molte possibilità.

Di Ravnik e delle soluzioni sue, ho detto. Sarebbero soldati "chic"; apolitici, disciplinati, ben vestiti, bene addestrati. Ma:

- non sarebbero disponibili, contrariamente a quanto detto ieri,

ella mano i suoi, ma che non sarà molto facilmente nella nostre mani. E ne abbiamo già avuti altri per non rifar, senza una certa preoccupazione, l'esperienza già fatta ...

Conclusioni definitive (sino al momento in cui scrivo, per lo meno).

La M.M.I.A., che con Barman si era tirata indietro, con Pidsley si mette ancora avanti. Senza dubbio ci aiuterà. Ma, certo, mentre per la soluzione "Garibaldi" è agnostica, non credo voglia darci tutto il meglio di Cesano (i 700 uomini di cui parlavo ieri) "Non c'è soltanto il "Cremona", mi ha ripetute Pidsley più volte, per quanto io mi affannarsi a dimostrargli che il "Cremona", e per l'assegnazione all'8^a Armata, e per lo stragrande numero di volontari che ha nelle sue file, e per il comportamento sul campo -da tutti, italiani e inglesi, pienamente riconosciute- meritasse una preferenza.

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Di Ravnix e della soluzione sua, ho detto. Sarebbero soldati "chic"; apolitici, disciplinati, ben vestiti, bene addestrati. Ma:

- non sarebbero disponibili, contrariamente a quanto detto ieri, prima di due mesi, avendo ora in corso su vasta scala l'invio in licenza dei militari;
- porterebbero una nota nuova, e da certi punti di vista ottima; ma pure ne porterebbero altre di dubbio effetto (2 btg. sono comandati da capitani, 1 da un tenente);
- hanno, come già detto più sopra, un comandante che ha un prestigio e un passato tutti "personali" e ne difenderà. L'uno e l'altro a denti stretti -il che è logico- anche quando l'interesse del servizio potrebbe essere diversamente -il che è assai meno logico, come ovvio-

D'altro canto -ferma sino a domani la sospensiva che derivante dalla lettera attesa da te e dal colloquio che avverrà oggi tra Pidsley e Browning- provvedimenti realmente e fondamentalmente necessari oggi per noi sono:

1° - eliminare gli indesiderabili, al più presto;

2° - ottenere al più presto un letto di ufficiali che sostituisca quelli già perduti e gli inetti, che restano ancora.

Quando si riesce a ciò -e il 1° punto è già accettato da tutti, e il 2° sarà risolto, se non al 100%, almeno al 60-70% tra martedì e mercoledì- possiamo già ritenere di aver raggiunto un buon risultato.

Per la successiva immissione, che in pari le deficienze provocate dall'ulteriore esodo della massa dei volontari, abbiamo davanti un po' di tempo per decidere. Certo, non ne abbiamo per il reggimento "Garibaldi": qui si tratta di mettere avanti le mani e di lasciarlo andare, perché molti appetiti e molte cupidigie si velgono su di lui. Se si deve fermare, bisogna fermarlo ora o, al più tardi, entro la settimana (ovvero dopo che della cosa si sia riparlato assieme); altrimenti finirà a qualche altro gruppo di combattimento e come reggimento d' "élite" per O.P. presso la capitale o Dio sa da quale altra parte.

Ho finito il "bottone". Certo tra domani e dopodomani di concludere circa i bisogni immediati (via da noi gli infedeli arabi; e... noi (escludo ogni significato fascista...) uffici miei cari); e se avrò elementi prebenti di giudizio per le future immissioni al "Cranone" non escludo di poter arrivare a qualche decisione anche in questo settore.

330

Ho visto Masce, che andava dal Ministero. Calmo e sorridente. Mi rivedrà domani.

Rivedrà domani anche Ferrara.

tutti, e il 2° sarà risolto, se non al 100%, almeno al 60-70% tra martedì e mercoledì - possiamo già ritenere di aver raggiunto un buon risultato.

Per le successive immissioni, che ri pari le deficienze provocate dall'ulteriore esodo della massa dei volontari, abbiamo davanti un pò di tempo per decidere. Certo, non ne abbiamo per il reggimento "Garibaldi": qui si tratta di mettere avanti le mani o di lasciarlo andare, perché molti appetiti e molte cupidigie si volgono su di lui. Se si deve fermare, bisogna fermarlo ora o, al più tardi, entro la settimana (ovvero dopo che della cosa si sia parlato assieme); altrimenti finirà a qualche altro gruppo di combattimento o come reggimento d' "élite" per O.P. presso la capitale o Dio sa da quale altra parte.

Ho finito il "bottone". Conto tra domani e dopodomani di concludere circa i bisogni immediati (via da noi gli indesi Geraboli; a... noi (esclude ogni significato fascista...) ufficiali ce- paci); e se avrò elementi prebanti di giudizio per la futura immissione al "Cramone" non escludo di poter arrivare a qualche decisione anche in questo settore.

330

Ho visto Musco, che andava dal Ministero. Calmo e sorridente. Mi rivedrà domani.

Rivedrò domani anche Ferrara.

Non ho mai visto, né saputo nulla di Fisher. Ma ciò non ha importanza, dato che la riunione per la quale eravamo convocati non c'è stata.

Molte cose cordiali, e saluti a tutti
Devotamente - Zenussi

Boc. Ronco raccomanda tutte nella estromissione degli indesiderabili, per evitare che si mettano speculazioni politiche sulla faccenda. Confermi di ripartire mercoledì o giovedì sera, e quindi di essere già o giovedì sera o venerdì sera. Più probabile la seconda soluzione (venerdì)

COMANDO GRUPPO DI COMBATTIMENTO "CREMONA".

03/2-60.

Subject: Movement - Offrs.

21 May 45.

51 BLU.

The following Officers are relieved of their Commands and placed at disposal of Ministry:-

Col. Ettore MUSCO
Col. Arturo FERRARA
Lt-Col. Giulio CARLINI

Sent to CESENA.

Lt-Col. DE RHODEN Mario.

Surplus to Est and to be sent to Mobilisation Centre.

Maj Salvatore LIGUORI.

Lt-Col. Leonardo Genovese will relieve Lt-Col. DE RHODEN as 2 i/c.

Maj Melogli Giovanni will relieve Lt-Col. CARLINI.

Capt Aldo Lombardo will be released as soon as possible.

Steps are being taken to remove all junior officers and other ranks who have not given complete satisfaction.

(sgd) IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
Clemente Primieri.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

2 Italian Offrs Confidential File.

334

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(sgd) IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
Clemente Primieri.

2. Italian Office Confidential File.

4

DO/EGS/9.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Colonel J.C. PRESTON, D.S.O.,
Main HQ EIGHTH ARMY,
C.M.F.

19 May 45.

My dear *Brian*

2.

Many thanks for your letter and report. I am sorry that you should have been troubled and it must have made you feel rather awkward. I have made a precis for the Chief of Staff of what happened. I have also told him what action you took and your advice to the Generale. I have suggested that we should refer the matter to M.M.I.A. for them to deal with pointing out that it is a pity such things should happen whilst serving with EIGHTH Army under whom they have performed so splendidly in battle.

I am to report at Naples on 23 May to fly home on leave to England. You came back with Jocelyn Gurney I gather, who has just arrived as GSO I (Trg).

In haste.

Yours *Tracy*

Tracy

Lt Col B.W. WEBB CARTER, D.S.O.,
51 B.L.U.,
C.M.F.

333

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

Subject : Discipline - Cremona Group.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

21 May, 1945.

My dear *Webb - Carter*

1. Thank you for your letter of 16th May.
2. I had already heard something about these incidents from INFANTE but not so fully as you explained.
3. I agree that it is most unfortunate that the trouble should have occurred after the excellent record of Cremona Group in battle and the high praise given to it from all sides. But I am afraid that, with the present political temper and confusion in Italy, such incidents are likely to occur. I think that the Prince was very dignified and correct in acting as he did. To punish the delinquents would tend to make martyrs of them and might bring the business into the political arena. I hope that the rest of those regiments will be so sick at what occurred that they will tell the delinquents so in no uncertain voice and that they have let down the regiment and its traditions. If so, good may come of it in the long run.
4. Of course the trouble lies, as always, in the officers. The level is low and unfortunately many if not most of the best Italian officers are Prisoners of War. When moving officers we therefore have to consider as to whether we can set anything better. Nevertheless MUSCO and FERRARA seem not to be able to control their regiments.
5. On the other hand I cannot initiate their removal. Cremona Division is under an Allied Commander and so the decision must rest with him as to whether to initiate the removal of these two officers. You would have to recommend this to 8th Army who would then write to me to get the Minister of War to remove them and send replacements.
6. Now as regards PRIMIERI. He has been a success in battle. From that point of view his stock is high.

of Cremona Group in battle and the high praise given to it from all sides. But I am afraid that, with the present political temper and confusion in Italy, such incidents are likely to occur. I think that the Prince was very dignified and correct in acting as he did. To punish the delinquents would tend to make martyrs of them and might bring the business into the political arena. I hope that the rest of those regiments will be so sick at what occurred that they will tell the delinquents so in no uncertain voice and that they have let down the regiment and its traditions. If so, good may come of it in the long run.

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6. Now as regards PRIMIERI. He has been a success in battle. From that point of view his stock is high. ³³² It seems clear from your letter that he is not commanding his division now as he should. But it occurs to me that if we remove PRIMIERI and MUSCO and FERRARA all at once, there are liable to be political or press repercussions. People (including the Patriots) may say "the Allies have talked a lot about how well the Groups did, particularly Cremona, and now they have sacked three senior officers

/ including

including the Commander. What is behind this? Did the groups really do as well as people say or was it only Ministry of War propaganda to bolster up the prestige of the official army vis a vis the patriots and everyone else". That is the sort of thing that occurs to me and the effect on Cremona itself might even be harmful, but you are in a better position than I am to say this. So, for what it is worth, I think it might be inopportune to sack PRIMIERI at this moment. Perhaps a really strong warning to him coupled with the removal of two of his regimental commanders as an object lesson, might suffice.

7. I have discussed your letter and views with the Minister of War and he says that he is prepared to do anything the Allies wish, even to replacing PRIMIERI. But I must reiterate that I feel this is not a matter I can butt into from this end. It must be initially from you to 8th Army. I would suggest that you go and discuss the matter again with Brig. Floyd, telling him what I have said and be guided by his decision in the matter.

8. It is many ways tragic that this has happened to Cremona; of all the Groups, because it has undoubtedly played a part in battle of which you and in fact all of us in M.M.I.A. here may well be proud. However, there it is. These things happen. The Italians are not as other men are particularly under existing conditions. One must expect a great deal of trouble and friction with a defeated Italian nation which changed sides in the middle of a war; whose best troops by and large are P.W.; and in the division between North and South, typified by patriots on the one hand and the Official Italian army on the other; and with the monarchical question thrown in as a make weight! Regiments might have mutined or deserted or bloc/en with their arms; the patriots within regiments might have fought with the other soldiers etc. Therefore I think one does not want to take too serious a view of the Prince incident, though the discipline within those regiments is a serious matter.

9. Well, there are my personal views. Let me know in due course what action you are taking.

10. I hope you had a very good leave home which, 331

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9. Well, there are my personal views. Let me know in due course what action you are taking.

10. I hope you had a very good leave home which, **331** if I may say so was very well earned. My best wishes to you and yours.

Yours *Erh*

Langley Browning

Lt. Col. B. Webb-Carter, D.S.O.,
51 P.L.U.
C. M. F.

CONFIDENTIAL

Lt Col B W Webb Carter DSO
51 British Liaison Unit
C M F

A/1/4

Dear

Reference my letter to you of the 17th on the subject of Prince Umberto's visit to Gruppo CREMONA.
I spoke to Gen PRIMIERI last evening and as a result the two inf regtl comds (MUSCO and FERRARA) leave today. The Generale said if I had lost confidence in him he would go today too. I told him that was not within my sphere but that, in my opinion, he must radically alter his methods and instil discipline into his troops or I would have to render a report to Eighth Army on the unfitness of the Gruppo for any operations.

Generale ZANUSSI - the bearer of this letter - is charged with the duty of getting as much assistance from SMRE and MMIA as possible in the matter of officer replacements. We MUST have disciplinarians. The Generale is also anxious to send away the more active subversive elements in the Gruppo - about 70 in number. I think this is reasonable but OFFICERS - good officers - are the ultimate answer. I hope that the departure of both Regtl Comds will shake up their fellows.

I am sorry to bother you with this when I am sure you are very busy, but unless this Gruppo is taken strongly in hand I fear it will be useless to Eighth Army and to Italy. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could give Generale ZANUSSI what assistance you can in the problems which confront the Gruppo.

Yours

Webb

Major General I Browning, CB., CBE., MC.,
M M I A

BWVC/RGT

17A

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Yours

Blaker

Major General L Browning, CB., OBE., MC.,
M M I A

BWNC/RGT

330

Personal

Lt Col B W Webb Carter, DSO
54 British Liaison Unit
C M F

Dear

18 May 45

This will be a rather long epistle but I want to give you a completely off the record account of some unpleasant incidents affecting the Gruppo during Prince MAMMO's visit yesterday. You may consider it worth while giving a precis of this to the Chief of Staff.

The Prince arrived shortly after noon at PIONE DI SACCO the HQ of the 21st Regt (Col MUSCO). He was met by Generale PRININI, Generale ZANUSSI (Vice Comdr) the Gruppo Chief of Staff and self. We drove at once to inspect a parade of 1/21 Regt. The Bn was drawn up on parade with band and colour. H R H was received with a Royal salute and the band played the Royal Hymn. The inspection then started. I was amazed to hear a lot of shouting and whistling from the rear of the parade and thought there must be some civilians behind the troops. In point of fact it was about 40 or so soldiers in the rear rank. They shouted "Viva la Repubblica." As the inspecting party walked down the line the elder soldiers on the right began to sing the Regt song and a few bold spirits shouted "Viva la Monarchie." H R H only inspected the front rank. He walked back with exemplary calm amid the babel. The officers were impotent. The fair sized crowd of civilians gave H R H a good reception. We then drove on to the 7th Artillery where all passed off well.

After luncheon H R H went on with his programme and drove to COENIGO to inspect ILL/22 Regt and BILSA's Partisans. I preceded the party and found Col FERRARA (Comd 22 Regt) waiting to receive the Prince. I asked him if he could guarantee his troops behaving themselves on parade. He answered - a trifle naively - that "I have spoken to the man and they say if I do NOT play the Royal Hymn they will behave well, so I am playing the Regt March and I hope all will be well." Before I could give this officer my views of a Regt Commander who has to bargain with his troops to ensure they do not turn a parade into a political demonstration the Royal party arrived. H R H was received by a present and the playing of the Regt March. As the inspection began there was a certain amount of booing and whistling from the rear rank. There was no shouting. BILSA's Partisans - beautifully turned-out with symmetrically arranged red scarves and blanched equipment - stood like rocks and did NOT give a murmur, in striking contrast to the booing rabble of the Cremona Infantry. A very clever bit of work.

H R H did NOT hurry himself at all and spoke at length to several officers and a few civilians who again gave him a good reception. We then drove to the air strip and H R H flew to Eighth Army HQ.

He talked to me for about 1 hour, was obviously upset by the incidents and said he wanted no disciplinary action taken against the soldiers.

It was most unfortunate and made me very angry. It is of course the work of a few well organised subservice elements in the two inf regts and is a res 929

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Regt (Col NU300). He was met by Generale PRIMINI, Generale ZANUSSI (Vice Comdr) the Gruppo Chief of Staff and self. We drove at once to inspect a parade of 1/21 Regt. The Bn was drawn up on parade with band and colour. H R H was received with a Royal salute and the band played the Royal Hymn. The inspection then started. I was amazed to hear a lot of shouting and whistling from the rear of the parade and thought there must be some civilians behind the troops. In point of fact it was about 40 or so soldiers in the rear rank. They shouted "Viva la Republica." As the inspecting party walked down the line the older soldiers on the right began to sing the Regt song and a few bold spirits shouted "Viva la Monarchia." H R H only inspected the front rank. He walked back with exemplary calm amid the babel. The officers were impatient. The fair sized crowd of civilians gave H R H a good reception. We then drove on to the 7th Artillery where all passed off well.

After luncheon H R H went on with his programme and drove to CERVINO to inspect III/22 Regt and BILLO's Partisans. I preceded the party and found Col FERARA (Comd 22 Regt) waiting to receive the Prince. I asked him if he could guarantee his troops behaving themselves on parade. He answered - a trifle naively - that "I have spoken to the men and they say if I do NOT play the Royal Hymn they will behave well, so I am playing the Regt March and I hope all will be well." Before I could give this officer my views of a Regt Commander who has to bargain with his troops to ensure they do not turn a parade into a political demonstration the Royal party arrived. H R H was received by a present and the playing of the Regt March. As the inspection began there was a certain amount of booing and whistling from the rear rank. There was no shouting. Bulow's Partisans - beautifully turned-out with symmetrically arranged red scarves and blanched equipment - stood like rocks and did NOT give a murmur, in striking contrast to the booing rabble of the Granoma infantry. A very clever bit of work.

H R H did NOT hurry himself at all and spoke at length to several officers and a few civilians who again gave him a good reception. We then drove to the air strip and H R H flew to Eighth Army HQ.

He talked to me for about 1/2 hour, was obviously upset by the incidents and said he wanted no disciplinary action taken against the soldiers.

It was most unfortunate and made me very angry. It is of course the work of a few well organised subversive elements in the two inf regts and is a result of the large recruitment of "volunteers" straight out the streets last Feb, when the Gruppo infantry was lamentably short of men and fully extended. H R H failed to produce any reinforcements. These volunteers justified themselves in action and were brave.

As you are aware I have been very exercised about discipline in the infantry for some time and you may remember reading the enclosed letter which I think sums up the situation.

I saw Generale PRIMINI this afternoon and he - rather apprehensively - asked me for my advice. I said the political aspect was NO affair of mine. That if it was Prince Umberto or the Head of the Communist Party it was all the same to me in my official capacity. But that what DID affect me was the disgraceful exhibition of the lack of any control or any form of discipline etc etc.

I told him both Regtl. Commanders should go, in my opinion and also both En Comds, concerned. The Generale agreed and Messrs MESCO and FERRARA leave tomorrow.

The Generale asked me if he should resign and said if he had lost my confidence he would go tomorrow too (!) I answered that that was no affair of mine but that unless very strong action was taken to improve the discipline of his infantry it would be my duty to report to Eighth Army that Cremona was NOT fit for employment and that I should recommend that Gruppo LEGHANO be employed instead. I told him that the facile parades of sending easy numbers of unruly soldiers was no solution. He must get officers who could instill discipline.

It is a thousand pities that the Gruppo who have done very well in action really should have disgraced themselves like this. On the other hand the senior officers have had a very necessary shake-up and now have a clearer idea of the nature of their problems.

You may think I have exceeded my very vague terms of reference but I think you will agree that someone had to take a firm line if this Gruppo is to be of any use to us or to Italy.

Yours

Colonel J Preston D S O
BQ Main Eighth Army
C M P

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Yours

Colonel J Preston D S O
HQ Main Eighth Army
C M F

328

175
Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 45

Lieut Col B W Webb Carter
51 British Liaison Unit
C M F

Dear

There is, I believe, a conference at CESSANO to discuss the matter of recruits for Gruppi. I have heard that 8 Army proposes to leave all Gruppi behind with the exception of CUREMA, to which this B L U is accredited. I am off to 8 Army today to get orders.

In these circumstances I am sure you will agree that CUREMA should have a certain preference in the allotment of recruits - both as regards number and quality. CUREMA will be in its little way the representative of the new Italian Army and we want to put up a good show.

I have spoken to Henry HOWARD about this and is in agreement from the M M I A aspect.

I should be grateful if you could assist as much as possible.

Yours

B.W.C.

To : Lieut Colonel McKay R H A.,
Comd British Liaison Unit,
CESSANO

BWG/RBT

327

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B.W.S.

To : Lieut Colonel McKay R H A.,
Comd British Liaison Unit,
CESSANO

DMC/RCE

SUBJECT: DISCIPLINE.

FROM: CREMONA GROUP.
TO : C.O., 21st INF. REGT.
C.O., 22nd INF. REGT.
C.O., 7th ART. REGT.
C.O. 144th BTW. EGRS.
FOR INFORMATION: 51 B.L.U.

REF : 04/3800 PERSONAL - RESTRICTED

BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
MAY 1945
6 MAY 1945

Yesterday, with great regret, I was forced to take disciplinary measures against a brave Battalion Commander, because he allowed formal discipline in his dependant Units to descend to an unjustifiable lowering of tone.

His soldiers had not committed anything exceptionally grave in their lack of discipline, but it is sintonic, as well as sorrowful, that out of more than a hundred people I found only six who saluted the pennant of my staff car, and that, having descended from it, out of about twenty soldiers who were roaming around the immediate area of the Battalion H.Q., not more than three gave me a personal salute.

I take advantage of that, other than the experience of what I see in ADRIA and what I have seen at CHIOGGIA - people without hats, without regulation hats, with neckerchiefs of all fashions and colours, without jackets or with their jackets unbuttoned, who confront their superiors with their hands in their pockets even if they look them straight in the face, or who listlessly wander about with the classical air of the "ne'er-do-well"; vehicles of all types roving about in all direddions at all speeds for the most varied of motives, naturally above regulations, with civilians and young women aboard, etc., etc., - to dwell on the following points.

Italy, in order to rise again, has need, absolute need of the co-operation of England and America; political co-operation and, above all, economical co-operation. Now (at present) I do not know from the political point of view what the two Nations can do for us, but it does not need much to understand that under the economical point of view they will not pledge themselves in funds to Italy with their capital and their material until they have sufficient guarantee of seeing them well employed. Therefore it is necessary to inspire them with a minimum of faith. We have gained it on the field of battle, we must see that we do not lose it now that we have victoriously returned. But ~~we~~ we in order not to lose it, we must try and understand the two great Peoples in their mentality, in their desires, in their inclinations, of which the last are essentially turned to order, to seriousness, and to discipline.

This is why it is a duty for us Italians

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This is why it is a duty for us Italians, also independantly of other obvious reasons, to force ourselves to become ordered, serious and disciplined; but it is above all a duty for us military, who can be preferred as the guardians of order, called to ~~maintain~~ manifest personal proof of seriousness to the point of having the right of claiming it from others and to give example of that formal discipline non the less substantial without which no Nation which respects itself has possibility of citizenship and of life. And this is why that questions which do not give themselves any particular gravity, like those of going about with the jacket undone or of carrying civilians on vehicles, - I am first in acknowledging that essentially the discipline in the Units still exists and gives no cause for worry - assume a very notable importance before those, who tomorrow will be our Allies, for whom, ~~the going~~

very much more than for ourselves, the going about like that, badly dressed, unbuttoned, sleeves rolled up, is a deplorable sign of slackness of dress and control, of a lack of a sense of dignity, of an unpardonable forgetfulness of oneself as a man and, above all, as a soldier.

While hostilities were still on, the first and sacred obligation for us all was that of winning the war; but now that the war is won, it is our obligation, no less sacred and fundamental, to win the peace: that is to say, to reconstruct, to ascend in value, to demonstrate clearly and plainly that we are capable, in small things as well as big things, of esteem, of consideration and of support because we are really worthy of living as an organised Nation, conscious of ourselves and civilised.

These are the points which I would bring to the attention of the officers and dispose that they make this a subject of conversation and of admonition (or caution) between their dependant military. Do not come and tell me, for charity's sake, that these last will not listen or will not obey: say rather that they hear only that which want to hear and obey only that which they want to obey.

Some of them ~~will~~ ^{will} ~~listen~~, no; but the others, notwithstanding their past merits, will be immediately reprimanded or inexorably eliminated.

G. Zanussi

Translated by: G. Zanussi
1600 - 11/5/45

G. ZANUSSI Gen.
Group Vice Commander.

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G. Zanussi

G. ZANUSSI Gen.
Group Vice Commander.

Translated by: *G. Zanussi*
1600 - 11/5/45

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1759 / 2nd 24th / 13

RICERCA PERSONALE

COMANDO GRUPPO DI CANTIERI "CANTIERI"
Ufficio del Capo di Stato Maggiore
Sezione Personale e Segreteria

N. 04/1800 INTERVISTO PERSONALE P.M. 64 - 6 maggio 1949

Oggetto: Disciplina.

- AL SIG. COMANDANTE IL 210 REGIMENTO FANTERIA
- AL SIG. COMANDANTE IL 440 REGIMENTO FANTERIA
- AL SIG. COMANDANTE IL 7° REGIMENTO ARMIATA
- AL SIG. COMANDANTE IL 144° REGIMENTO ARMIATA

e, per conoscenza:

AL 51° B. I. U.

Ho dovuto con rincrescimento prendere loro provvedimenti disciplinari a carico di un valoroso comandante di battaglione, perché tollerava che presso reparti dipendenti la disciplina formale cessasse a un ingiustificato abbassamento di tono.

Nulla di eccezionalmente grave nella manovra che i suoi soldati avevano commesso. In è sintomatico, oltre che doloroso, che sopra un centinaio di persona in ne abbia trovate sei che salutavano il gagliardetto della mia autovettura; e che, sceso di macchina, sopra una ventina di soldati che si aggiravano nei pressi e nell'intorno dei locali dove è sito il comando di battaglione, non più di tra mi abbiano personalmente reso il saluto.

Prende lo spunto da ciò, oltre che dalle esperienze di quanto vedo ad Adria ed ho visto a Chioggia - gente senza cappello o con copricapi non regolamentari, mozza di fazzoletti di ogni foglia e colore, senza giubbotto o con il giubbotto sbottonato, che se ne va, mani in tasca, sceso ai superiori, magari guardandosi bene in viso, o che gira dinoccolata con la classica aria del lassaro; automezzi di tutti i tipi copressanti in tutte le direzioni e a tutta velocità per i più svariati motivi, naturalmente extra regolamentari, con civili e donne a bordo, etc. etc. - per soffermarci sui seguenti punti capitali.

L'Italia, per risorgere, ha bisogno, assoluto bisogno del concorso dell'Inghilterra e dell'America; concorso politico e, soprattutto, concorso economico. Che non so qual che del punto di vista politico che non i punti di vista economico esse non si impegnarono a fare in Italia con i loro capitali e i loro materiali, affinché non avremmo sufficienti giornali di vederli bene impiegati.

Bade è necessario ispirare loro un minimo di fiducia. Da 32/41

Sono perché è un dovere per noi italiani, anche indipendente-
 mente da altre ovvie ragioni, sforzarsi di diventare ordinati, serii,
 disciplinati; ma lo è soprattutto per noi militari, che possiamo es-
 sere preposti alla tutela dell'ordine, abbiamo ad esplicito perso-
 nale prova di serietà al fine di avere il diritto di esigerla dagli
 altri; e dare esempio di quella disciplina formale non meno che so-
 stanziale senza di che nessuna collettività che si rispetti ha po-
 sibilità di cittadinanza e di vita. Ed ecco perché questioni che non
 rivestono in sé particolare gravità, come quella dell'andare
 con la giubba sbottonata e del portare civili sopra un autocerro
 - sono il primo a riconoscersi che nella parte essenziale la disci-
 plina presso i reparti c'è ancora e non dà preoccupazioni - assun-
 go una importanza notevolissima nei confronti di quelli che domani
 saranno i nostri alleati, per i quali, assai più che per noi, l'as-
 dere in giro così, trascinando, sbottonato, sbraccato, è deplorabile
 segno di rilassatezza di costumi e di controllo, di deficiente ser-
 vo di dignità, di imperdonabile oblio di sé in quanto uomini e, so-
 prattutto, in quanto soldati.

Fin che duravano le ostilità, obbligo sacro e primo per tutti
 noi era quello di vincere la guerra; ma adesso che la guerra è
 vinta, è nostro obbligo non meno sacro e fondamentale di vincere
la pace e cioè di rimettere la corrente, di risalire in quota, di
 diastrare a chiare note che siamo capaci, nelle piccole cose nel-
 le grandi cose, di stima, di considerazione, di appoggio perché
 siamo effettivamente degni di vivere come collettività organizzata,
 consapevole e civile.

Questi i punti sui quali la 3.V. vorrà richiamare l'attenzione
 degli ufficiali e di coloro che con noi fecero oggetto di conver-
 sazione e di umanesimo tra i militari dipendenti. Non si si ves-
 ta a dire, per carità, che questi alcuni non ascoltano o non obbe-
 discono; si dica piuttosto che essi ascoltano soltanto chi sa
 farsi ascoltare e obbediscono solo chi sa farsi obbedire.

Gli altri, noi ma gli altri, quali che siano le loro benemerite
 e passate, o siano prontamente riprendendoli o vanno inesorabilmen-
 te eliminati.

IL GRAN COMANDANTE INT.
 - Giacomo Mancusi -

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

non rivestano in sé particolare gravità, come quella dell'andare con la giubba sbottonata o del portare civili sopra un autosegno - sono il primo a riconoscersi che nella parte essenziale la disciplina presso i reparti c'è ancora e non dà preoccupazioni - nessuno sarà importanza notevolissima nei confronti di quelli che domandano i nostri alleati, per i quali, stando più che per noi, l'andare in giro così, trascandato, sbottonato, sbrascato, è deplorevole segno di rilassatezza di costumi e di controllo, di deficiente senso di dignità, di imperdonabile oblio di sé in quanto uomini e, soprattutto, in quanto soldati.

Fin che duravano le ostilità, obbligo sacro e primo per tutti noi era quello di vincere la guerra; ma adesso che la guerra è vinta, è nostro obbligo non meno sacro e fondamentale di vincere la pace e cioè di rimontar la corrente, di risalire in quota, di dimostrare a chiare note che siamo capaci, nelle piccole come nelle grandi cose, di stima, di considerazione, di appoggio perché siamo effettivamente degni di vivere come collettività organizzata, consapevole e civile.

Questi i punti sui quali la 3.V. vorrà richiamare l'attenzione degli ufficiali e disporre che essi ne facciano oggetto di conversazioni e di monimento tra i militari dipendenti. Non si si venga a dire, per carità, che questi ultimi non ascoltano o non obbediscono i si dica piuttosto che essi ascoltano soltanto chi sa farai ascoltare e obbediscono solo chi sa farli obbedire.

Gli altri, noi ma gli altri, quali che siano le loro benemerite se pagate, o siano prontamente riprenderli o vanno inesorabilmente eliminati.

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE INT.
- Giacomo Zanussi -



BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
28 MAY 1945
104

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Subject: Disciplining.

CONFIDENTIAL.

51 British Liaison Unit.

To: The Generale Commandante,
GRUPPO CREMONA.

A 1/14.

I am very concerned about the obvious lack of any discipline in the Inf Regts of the Gruppo. I refer particularly to the behaviour of the personnel of 21 and 22 REGTS in RAVENNA, which is the subject of general remark by all Allied troops. I have - as I think you must be aware - a great interest in the Gruppo and it is a matter of considerable pain to me to see what a bad name these soldiers are gaining for CREMONA. Every day the streets are full of dirty, unshaven, half-naked Italian soldiers shouting and behaving like hoodlums. Every evening trucks, packed in defiance of all orders with about 40 men in each, drive past this HQ with all the occupants hatless and shouting. On occasions red flags are displayed on these trucks.

I share to the full your justifiable pride in the performance of your infantry in battle and it is to me all the more scandalous that the bravery shown by the CREMONA and the sacrifices of your numerous dead, should all be thrown away by the ill-disciplined behaviour of the troops when out of the line.

I know that it is the Officers who are to blame. I am convinced that from the two Regt Commanders down, the Officers lack the moral courage and true interest in their cause to check the numerous faults which they cannot fail to see daily. They attempt to gain a cheap popularity by overlooking grave faults of discipline. As you well know, this policy merely achieves the contempt of the troops.

It is amazing to me that Officers who are quite regardless of danger in battle should exhibit such moral cowardice. Surely all Officers must be conscious of the enormous implications of the employment of the Gruppi and the vast issues for the future of ITALY which are at stake.

It is, in my opinion, not too strong to say that Officers who fail to insist on compliance with your orders are sabotaging the cause of their country.

I am aware that the Infantry have had to absorb a large number of recruits straight off the streets and that there was no time to give these men the necessary basic training. But most of these recruits are mere boys who, if taken in hand at once by the Officers and with the example of the old soldiers of CREMONA before them, would have soon learnt discipline.

I must tell you that I should fail in my duty if I do not draw your attention to the fact that unless a marked improvement takes place, I must advise the Corps Commander to take strong action. If the present Commanders are unable to exercise discipline, other Officers who will

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I must tell you that I should fail in my duty if I do not draw your attention to the fact that unless a marked improvement takes place, I must advise the Corps Commander to take strong action. If the present Commanders are unable to exercise discipline, other Officers who will carry out your orders loyally must be procured.

As you are aware, Col HOWARD of MMIA is at this moment touring the Prisoner of War Camps in EGYPT, with a view to procuring senior competent and ruthless officers for employment with the Gruppi. It is hoped that as a result you will no longer be hampered in dismissing weak and lenient senior officers by the fear of being unable to replace them.

Field.
2 APR 45.
BWFC/INT.

B.W.C.

Lieut Colonel,
General Staff.

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