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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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10000/120/3509

G1/12

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Jan. 1964

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

10000/120/3509

G1/12

Cremona Gruppo Intelligence Summaries

Jan. 1945 - Apr. 1945

907
931

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

Subject: Intelligence Summary.

51 British Liaison Unit

G 1/12

2000
CSI 5 Corps
CDO 5 Corps (c/o AGRA)
CSI 56 Div
CSI 78 Div
CSI 8 Inf Div
21 Tg Bde
MAIN (WEST)
G 11 RA

Grenada Group Intelligence Summary No. 30 herewith translated and
passed to you for info.

Field,
24 Apr 45.
/KS.

By [Signature] Capt
Lieut Colonel,
General Staff.

CREMONA GROUP

SECRET

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 30

Compiled from info received up to 2000 hrs 13 Apr 45

PART I

ENEMY SITUATION

In the last few days our tps have advanced across the SINIO, LA CAVALLINA, CANALE FUSIGNINO and this a.m. occupied posts on right bank of SANTERNO, between CANALE DI DORTIVICA to the North and ALFONSIENE - FERRARA way to the South.

The attack was resumed at dawn to-day and after overcoming strong enemy resistance our tps crossed the R. SANTERNO this afternoon at 343528 and on Route 16 and have occupied CA GURLO at 353556 and CA DIENESCHI at 344544.

PW captured up to 1900 hrs to-day 277 - two of them officers and 15 to be classified.

No news is yet at hand regarding enemy cas but it is probable that they are by and mostly due to the by air and ground bombardment which preceded the attack.

The PW all belong to units which we know to be in the line. The enemy's problem of reserves will be greatly increased by the losses suffered in cas and PW.

On 1300 from HQ Coy 40 Jaeger's said that the 25 Jaeger was on the 11 Apr deployed with 1, 2 Bns and remainder of 3 about 1 Km East of FILO 357575. This task was to stop the adv in VALLE DI COMACCHIO. He adds that HQ of 42 Jaeger Div was, on the 11th, in a shelter, near CA DI NUOVA 359564. The cockhouses of 1/40 had been withdrawn firstly to ARGENA and later to MOLINELLA.

On the evening of the 8th, about 40 tics, (incl PANTHERS, and Mr IVS) coming from IMOLA and on their way to LONGISTRINO stopped for a short halt at FILO 357575.

Route 16 from DISTILL to ARGENA is impassable after by air bombardment. All traffic has to be diverted through BENEDELLA - CASCIANO, MESSATE.

Other PW, nearly all from 40 Jaeger agree that the 5 Bns of the Regt were deployed on SANTERNO. 1 Bn consisted of only 150 men. The CO was MAJ Maj GOTZE. The OC II/40 was Capt NEUSCHNER who was killed near ALFONSIENE. Only 8 men remain from III Bn.

Most prisoners give the same particulars regarding withdrawals,

(a) to SANTERNO,

(b) to north

PW captured up to 1900 hrs to-day 277 - two of them officers and 15 to be classified.

No news is yet at hand regarding enemy cas but it is probable that they are by and mostly due to the by air and ground bombardment which preceded the attack.

The PW all belong to units which we know to be in the line. The enemy's problem of reserves will be greatly increased by the losses suffered in cas and PW.

At 1900 from HQ Coy 40 Jaeger's said that the 25 Jaeger was on the 11 Apr deployed with 1, 2 Bns and remainder of 3 about 4 Km East of FILO 357575. Its task was to stop the adv in VALLE LI COMACCHIO. He adds that HQ of 42 Jaeger Div was, on the 11th, in a shelter, near CA DI NUOVA 359564. The coathouses of I/40 had been withdrawn firstly to ARGENTIA and later to MOLLINELLA.

On the evening of the 8th, about 40 tics, (incl PANTHERS, and Mc IVE) coming from IMOLA and on their way to LONG-STERLING stopped for a short halt at FILO 357575.

Route 16 from IMOLA to ARGENTIA is impassable after by air bombardment. The traffic has to be diverted through BINDELLA - CASCONOVA MISSARE.

On the 11th, nearly all from 40 Jaeger agree that the 3 Bns of the Regt were deployed on SANTERNO. 1 Bn consisted of only 150 men. The CO was MAJ J. GOTTZ. The OC II/40 was Capt NEUSCHNER who was killed near ALFONSINE. Only 8 men remain from III Bn.

Most prisoners give the same particulars regarding withdrawals,

(a) to SANTERNO,

(b) to RENO,

and then to PO, (this from rumours current in the Div).

936

/PAGE II

PART II

1. ESTABLISHMENT, STRENGTH, WEAPONS

Deserters from 142 Arty Regt (42 J. Div) 10 Tp, taken on 13 Apr at 383524 say that the tp had 150-mm guns in position between ARANERA and FLO. From there the tp was to go beyond the PO. The Div to which 10 Tp belongs is in area CASIONE MASSARI 349584. Mines have been laid on Route 16 from LA PASTORELLA to FERRARA. It across RENO at BASTIA was intact at 1200 hrs 13 Apr.

Deserters from 142 Arty Regt II Div, 4 Tp, (75-mm guns) taken at VOLTEANA 385524 state that the tp lost for FLO.

A deserter from 4 Coy 40 Jaeger taken at 426526 on 13 Apr states that Rifle Coy str is now 20 men (maximum) and 40 - 60 men for sp Coy. The deserter was in DR and states that the Germans had defence lines on SANTIAGO, RENO and PO.

2. ENEMY METHOD

Two captured enemy documents show that our security methods must be tightened. One is a copy of a telephone conversation between British Units on SENO sector near COTIGNOLA. The telephone line was tapped.

The other was an intercepted WT message which says that on 7 Apr, Indian Tps, probably of 8 Div were opposite II/1059 GR.

3. DEFENCE MEASURES

Signs on German minefields

'S' Mines

'T' Mines

Mixed Mines

0	0	0
+	+	+
+	+	+

4. CASUALTIES

42 J. Div

HQ
Coy HQ

40 J. Regt

16 Coy A/Tk
18 Coy RHQ
I Bn - HQ
1 Coy
2 Coy
4 Coy
5 Coy
II Bn - HQ
7 Coy
8 Coy

2 2 1 3 4 1 6 19 2 9 1 5

935

One Officer

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The other was an intercepted WT message which says that on 7 Apr, Indian Tps, probably of 8 Div were opposite IL/1059 GR.

3. DEFERENCE MEASURES

Signs on German minors

'S' Mino

AT # Minor

Microbicides

○	△	+
○	△	○
○	△	△

SALTWATER

42 J. Div

QEH

Qoy HQ

40 J. Rest

16 day Δ/T_L

is Coy RHQ

工部局

1 Coy

2 Coy

4007

5 Coy

III - HQ

7 Coy

8 Day

0.50g

142 Liberty Road

Arm & Ration Unit

10

155

6. 7. 8.

CT

362 Inf Div

AT 11/15/01

1060 GR, II PM, 8 Cov

62 Arty Regt, 4 Tp

Other Units

6 Regt (Nebo1worfor) 1 To

14 J. Div (deserter 4 months ago
hiding in Alfonsino)

22. 15416929153 24222 111 1 $\frac{1}{75}$

One Officer

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: Intelligence Summary.

SECRET

51 British Liaison Unit.
G 1/12.

To : G S I 5 Corps.
C B O 5 Corps(a/o AGRA)
GSI 56 Div
GSI 78 Div
GSI 8 Ind Div
21 Tk Bde
MIU(West)
G II RA.

Cronona Gruppo Intelligence Summary No 29 herewith translated and passed to
you for infm.

Field,
12 Apr 45.
/HPWB

11/12/45
Ltout Colonel.
General Staff.

934

CREMONA GROUP.INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2.Compiled from info received up to 201 hrs 11 Apr 45.PAGE I.ENEMY SITUATION.

Up to 1800 hrs today total PWs captured 136 including two officers. An approx idea can now be formed of enemy's new deployment.

The location of I/40 Jaeger was not definitely established but it was thought to be the Spit in support of 162 Div. Two NCO prisoners from Regt HQ Coy and HQ Coy II Bn 40 Jaegers gave information of movements of I Bn which was 42 Div's only reserve. Ordered to proceed to the Spit it was stopped and took up positions N of the RENO. This was due to the fact that III/25 Jaeger suffered heavy casualties in the action W of Lake COMACCHIO leaving the left flank of the 42 Div in a very precarious position.

Two PWs from 4 Coy 40 Jaeger gave further details as follows: I Bn 40 Jaegers was taken from MADONNA DEL BOSCHI (One says MADONNA DEL BOSCHI N of RENO, the other MADONNA DEL BOSCHI at 460525) two days ago and taken to CANALE DI FUSIGNINO and took up positions as follows: 2 Coy at C. CORELLI 427528. They add that last night it went forward to CANALINI and is astride track coming from FODDO SOLARPA. The 1st Coy is on its left and the 7th Coy II Bn on its right. The Bn was to withdraw this morning or this evening. One of the PWs says they were to withdraw to a line near ARGENTI, the other to the prepared positions on CANALE DI FUSIGNINO. They say that the I Bn 40 Jaeger has suffered only slight casualties. This is the first indication we have had of the deployment of the enemy after withdrawal.

The I Bn and II Bn, 25 Jaegers had orders to withdraw along the ARGENTI road and others say to the RENO. After the heavy losses suffered by the III Bn we are certain that few remain.

The 40 Jaeger is still deployed in front of us on the CANALE DI FUSIGNINO with the I Bn the only one complete on the left and the much reduced II and III Bns on the right. A PW from III Bn states that the Coys of this Bn, before one attack, only consisted of 35 men.

The 1060 Regt on the right of 40 Jaeger, since the withdrawal has lost the entire 7 Coy with its CO. They were all taken prisoners. A state that the two Bns had to leave behind one Coy which was to hold our advance and then withdraw. This they were unable to do owing to the speed of our advance; it is further believed that even the two retreating Bns may have suffered some heavy losses.

Apparently the order to withdraw was not given to the 1st Bn, 956 Regt on our right. A PW confirms this by his statement that whilst he was at EOLI, he got to know that the order for a withdrawal was limited to the troops in the area of ARGENTI. However, even if the 956 Regt had no order to withdraw they did so eventually when attacked, leaving behind 32 PWs from the 1st Coy. These PWs did not know the direction of retreat of their units or their commander.

The behaviour of PWs proves their low morale of the enemy. With few exceptions they were all willing to talk. Some had even put on civilian clothes, intending to mix with civilians and hide in houses until our troops had gone through. Austrians were unaware that the Red Army had reached Vienna and nearly all of them were in the dark as to the real situation in the city.

The location of I/40 Jaeger was not definitely established but it was thought to be the Spitt in support of 162 Div. Two NCO prisoners from Regt HQ Coy and HQ Coy II Bn 40 Jaegers gave information of movements of I Bn which was 42 Div's only reserve. Ordered to proceed to the Spitt it was stopped and took up positions N of the RENO. This was due to the fact that III/25 Jaeger suffered heavy casualties in the action W of Lake COMACCHIO leaving the left flank of the 42 Div in a very precarious position.

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The I Bn and II Bn, 25 Jaegers had orders to withdraw taking the ARGENT road and others say to the RENO. After the heavy losses suffered by the III Bn we are certain that few remain.

The 40 Jaeger is still deployed in front of us on the CANALE DI FUSIGNANO with the I Bn the only one complete on the left and the 2nd reduced II and III Bns on the right. A PW from III Bn states that the Coys of this Bn, before one attack, only consisted of 35 men.

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The behaviour of PWs proves their low morale of the enemy. With few exceptions they were all willing to talk. Some had even put on civilian clothes, intending to mix with civilians and hide in houses until our troops had gone through. Austrians were unaware that the Red Army had reached Vienna and nearly all of them were in the dark as to the real situation in their country, though they are convinced that ruin is facing them.

933

PART II.VE - STRENGTH - ARMAMENT.1060 Gr Regt - I Bn.

The 8 Coys are made up of 3 Pls of 3 Sections. The 11 Coy (The 4th) is equipped with 11 MGs and mortars. Strength of 1st Section, 1st Pl, 2 Coy is 1 MCO and 4 men, 2 Section consists of 1 MCO and 5 men and 3 Section 1 MCO and 4 men. Total strength of 2 Coy and 50 men. Equipment of section: 1 42 MG and 2/3 panzerfaust. The 2 Coy has also received 2 Ofenrohr from the 14 Coy which was broken up.
(Source: Deserters taken in sector of I/22 Regt on 7 Apr 45)

PERSONALITIES.362 Inf Div.

1060 Gr Regt - I Bn Commanded by Capt Kungni.
2 Coy " " Lt Regt.

LOSSES.42 Jaeger Div.

25 Jaeger Regt.
16 1/4 Tk Coy.
18 Coy Regt HQ
I Bn 1 Coy
2 2 Coy
3 3 Coy
4 4 Coy
5

2 PWs
3 "
2 "
3 "
1 "
2 "

40 Jaeger Regt.

18 Regt HQ Coy
I Bn, 4 Coy.
II Bn, HQ

1 PW
3 "
3 "
5 "
23 "
1 "
1 "
1 "
5 "
2 "

III Bn, 11 Coy
15 Coy

142 Arty Regt, 10 Tp.142 Arty Bn

362 Arty Regt, I Bn, 1 Coy.
1060 Gr Bn

13 Gun Coy.14 1/4 Tk Coy.

I Bn, 2 Coy
4 Coy

II Bn, 6 Coy

2 PW
6 "
32 "
1 "
7 "
18 "
5 "
5 "

362 Inf Div.
1060 Gr Regt-I Bn Commanded by Capt Kingai.
2 Coy " " Lt Rogel.

LOSSES.

42 Jaeger Div.
25 Jaeger Regt.
16 A/Tk Coy.
18 Coy Regt HQ
I Bn 1 Coy
2 2 Coy
3 3 Coy
4 4 Coy
5

40 Jaeger Regt.
18 Regt HQ Coy
I Bn, 4 Coy.
II Bn, HQ
6 Coy
7 Coy
8 Coy
9 Coy
10 Coy
III Bn, 11 Coy
15 Coy

142 Arty Regt, 10 Tp.
142 Engr Bn
362 Arty Regt, I Bn, 1 Coy.
1060 Gr Regt
13 Gun Coy.
14 A/Tk Coy.
I Bn, 2 Coy
4 Coy
II Bn, 6 Coy
7 Coy
362 Arty Regt
35 Inf Div (Descriptor)

2 PWs
" 3
2 2
3 1
1 2
2

1 PW
" 3
" 3
" 5
" 23
" 1
" 1
" 1
" 5
" 2

2 PW
" 6
" 32
" 1
" 7
" 18
" 5
" 5
" 42
" 7
" 1

186 PWs

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject :- Intelligence Summary

~~SECRET~~

51 British Liaison Unit

G 1/12

To :- G S I Eighth Army
G S I 5 Corps
G B O 5 Corps (c/o 1 AGRA)
G S I 8 Ind Div.
21 Ft Pde.
5 NORTH LITON
G S I (WEST)
G II RA.

General Group Intelligence Summary No. 28 herewith translated and passed to you for info.

Field
pr 45
/TMM

St. Michael's
Lieut Colonel
General Staff

931

CHRONOLOGICAL

JUN 1964

Compiled from info received up to 2000 hrs 5 Apr 65

SECRET

ENEMY SITUATION

Yesterday a deserter from 7 Coy 1060 Inf Regt crossed to our lines to give himself up. He is of German nationality and, although he was very willing to talk, he did not appear to be very intelligent and was not conversant with the present situation. On a number of occasions he was unable to distinguish the right from the left, but he stated that 7 Coy, along with 1, 2 and 4 Coy's from part of the 1st Bn. Also with this Bn are 13 Coy, support weapons, and 4 Coy's. From his statements 7 Coy's position can be determined as running from 401450 to 401447. This location was obtained also from a deserter of 14 Coy of the same Regt, who gave himself up on 20 Mar to those on our left.

In spite of our deserter's belief, it is considered that 7 Coy constitutes part of the 2nd and not the 1st Bn, although it is possible that in the interval the two Bns of 1060 Inf Regt may have switched over their sub-sections. In the absence of further info on this situation, it must be remembered that the 1060 Inf Regt had held, and continues to hold, the positions which were already known to us. The confirmation is found in Summary No. 507 of 5 Corps, which gives the following deployment as that of the 1060 Inf Regt, 362 Div:

1st Bn to the North from 427453 to 401450

2nd Bn to the South from 401450 to 391441

The 1st Bn has all three Coy's up, while the 2nd Bn has two Coy's up and one in res. 256 Inf Regt is still deployed on the right of 1060 Inf Regt, with the 1st Bn from 390441 to 378432, and the 2nd Bn from 378432 to 364421. The latter Bn has only two Coy's up, in all probability. Further to the right of this Regt, the 1059 Inf Regt of 362 Div is deployed, and this contains elements of the 10th Battalion.

The problem concerning the Bns already mentioned would seem to be clarified by the identification of 1 Coy of the 1059 Regt on Easter 362, which a deserter asserted to be the southern Bn of the Coy, and to the right of which was believed to be the 1st Bn of 117 Regt of 95 Inf Div. If this situation has any foundation of truth, then the Southern Bn of 362 Div remains as on 366 Morning.

Seeing that the two Bns have been identified, it would seem likely that the 1059 Inf Regt, the third Regt of 362 Div, is deployed with its two Bns in the line, and thus it can be concluded that this Div can only hold the 362 Area Bn in res. Among other things, this Bn must serve to give relief to the Bns in the line.

From various sources the presence of units of Mussolini's pseudo-Republic, among the enemy thus deployed on our left, had been ascertained. A deserter from 7 Coy of the 1059 Regt gave himself up to those on our left, and the deserter who came over to us yesterday, have indicated the presence of small bodies of these units to the 1st Bn of 362 Div.

from a deserter of 14 Coy of the 1060 Inf, who gave himself up on 20 Mar to those on our left.

In spite of our deserter's belief, it is considered that 7 Coy constitutes part of the 2nd and not the 1st Bn, although it is possible that in the interval the two Bns of 1060 Inf Regt may have switched over their sub-sectors. In the absence of further info on this situation, it must be remembered that the 1060 Inf Regt has been continuously to hold, the poem which was already known to us. The confirmation is found in Summary No. 507 of 5 Corps, which gives the following deployment as that of the 1060 Inf Regt, 362 Div :-

1st Bn to the North from 427453 to 409450

2nd Bn to the South from 409450 to 390444

The 1st Bn has all three Coys up, while the 2nd Bn has two Coys up and one in res. 362 Inf Regt is still deployed on the right of 1060 Inf Regt, with the 1st Bn from 390444 to 378432, and the 2nd Bn from 378432 to 362424. The latter Bn has only two Coys up, in all probability. Further to the right of this Regt, the 1059 Inf Regt of 362 Div is deployed, and this contains elements of the 10th Flottilla HQ.

The problem concerning the Bns already mentioned would seem to be clarified by the identification of 1 Coy of the 1059 Regt on the right of 362, which a deserter asserted to be the southern Bn of the Coy, and to the right of which was believed to be the 1st Bn of 117 Regt of 98 Inf Div. If this situation has any foundation of truth, then the Southern Bn of 362 Div remains as on 362 Northward.

Seeing that the two Bns have been identified, it would seem likely that the 1059 Inf Regt, the 1st Bn of 362 Div, is deployed with its two Bns in the line, and thus it can be concluded that this Div can only hold the 362 Regt in in res. Among other things, this Bn must serve to give relief to the Bns in the line.

930

From various sources the presence of units of Insulin's pseudo-Republic, among the enemy units deployed on our left, had been ascertained. A deserter from 7 Coy of the 1059 Regt who gave himself up to those on our left, and the deserter who came over to us yesterday, have identified the main of small bodies of these Bns to SW of 3 Pelito 5640 and in the vicinity of Insulin. From Appx "A" to Int Summary No 59 of 5 Corps, it can be learnt that an HQ Bn of 10 Flottilla HQ appears to be deployed along one Bn of front from Northward 404 approx to 386. A wounded HQ from this Bn has supplied info concerning the 'Lupo' Bn, now withdrawn from the line on account of its loss, and concerning the 'Galleoni' Bn, whose composition has not been ascertained. All these Bns appear to form part of the 10 Flottilla HQ, under command of the Prince Norghese.

The role which these Bns have carried out, and continue to carry out, in the 362 Div is not yet known. Our deserter of yesterday reported that he had seen only small parties of them of some 20 - 25 men with Germans on their left and right.

...../2

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

- 2 -

The serious reverse suffered by the enemy in the battle of ground of Comacchio and the successful issue of the operations resulting in the capture of 930 PW, of whom 550 are Germans, will probably have repercussions upon the deployment of the enemy firms facing us, who will be sent to sector threatened.

The breakdown of these PW shows that the 142 Reco, of old acquaintance, can be considered as destroyed. One Coy of the 'Bersaglieri' 114 Div can also be considered as written off, having lost 91 PW. Only one Coy of the 1st Bn of 314 Regt, 162 Div, was saved; the same can be said of 236 Reco of the same Div. What the enemy have been detached to deal with this situation is unknown, but the only unit which appears to be available is the 2nd Bn of 40 Jaeger, which is known to be in res. In this respect, we are still in the realm of conjecture: new identifications will provide us with better chances of judging the effects of the successful operation in this tongue of ground upon the disposal of the enemy firms which face us.

2442. II

2442. II

562 Div

1060 151

II Bn

7 Coy

by 11

area 410/42

4 pr.

929

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

51 British Liaison Unit

C 1/12

Subject:- Intelligence Summary

To:-
G S I Eighth Army
G S I 5 Corps
C B O 5 Corps (o/o 1 AGRA)
G S I 8 Ind Div
21 Tlc Bde
2 CDO Bde *5 NORTH*
MILU (WEST)
Partisan LO *10 RA*

Cronos Group Intelligence Summary No. 24 herewith translated and passed to you for information.

Field.
Mar 45.
/KS.

S. J. [unclear]
Lieut Colonel.
General Staff.

928

CREMONA GROUPINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 24

Compiled from information received from 2000 hrs Mar 4 to 2000 hrs Mar 8 1945

PART IENEMY SITUATION

Since our attack of Mar 2 and 3 the enemy has given no indication of any great activity in the Eastern sector, except for a little shelling and mortaring. In all probability he has been compelled to regroup his troops and to re-organise his defensive line. In view of the limited fighting ability of the 162 Div, it would be interesting to know if the 142 Recce has remained in the tongue of ground to the East of the Valli di CIELICCHIO. If this is the case, it will need reinforcements to replace the casualties suffered at our hands. For the time being, therefore, it may have remained as part of the 162 Div in order to increase the number of Germans as compared with the Russian element.

During recent days the enemy's shelling of the bridge at LA GILIA 501511 has been particularly heavy. Nor has there been any slackening in the defensive works. This points to the defensive and delaying nature of the enemy's activity, which leads to the exploitation and increase of all natural and artificial obstacles. The absence of any substantial Div reserves, as the Inf Regts appear to have all their Divs in the line, lends weight to this supposition.

In the event of our going over to the attack, we must expect a determined resistance at first. The natural and artificial obstacles would delay our advance and give the enemy the chance of pulling back and forming a new line. The chief obstacles in the area of concern to us consist of minefields and tracks already flooded, or which may be flooded, and streams. Of these, the flooded areas and streams are for the most part well known, but the minefields have yet to be detected. The greatest possible assistance must be given by all in this task of detection.

PART IIINFORMATION FROM OUR OWN UNITS

Probable OP at 635572.

Weapon-pits for automatic arms at 48755000 - 48655050.

Probable weapon-pit for automatic arms at 49175189.

Loop-holes in the Northern dyke of the RENO at 49925270 - 49185270.

Large loop-hole and earth works at 49575270.

921

of the 162 Div, it would be interesting to know if the 142 Roco has remained in the tongue of ground to the East of the Valli di COLICCHIO. If this is the case, it will need reinforcements to replace the casualties suffered at our hands. For the time being, therefore, it may have remained as part of the 162 Div in order to increase the number of Germans as compared with the Russian element.

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PART II

INFORMATION FROM OUR OWN UNITS

Probable OP at 635572.

Weapon-pits for automatic arms at 48755030 - 48655050.

Probable weapon-pit for automatic arms at 49175189.

Loop-holes in the Northern dyke of the RENO at 49925270 - 49135270.

Large loop-hole and earth works at 49575270.

A hollow on the Northern dyke of the RENO in 49985270 probably with mortar.

Loop-hole in Southern dyke of the RENO 50065256 - 50185250.

Loop-hole in 49245200.

Wire fence going Eastwards at 50645262.

/Guns at.....

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Guns at 61765682 - 62465850 - 61965700 - 63145720 - 61685846 - 62085984 - 607577 - 608605.

INFORMATION FROM CIVILIANS (Covering period Dec 44 to Jan 45)

There is a minefield made up of M/Tk and M/Per mines, 150 metres from CASAMENEGATTI (Casa dell'Olmo 596587) towards Chiavica Leonardo 610560. This extends for a distance of about 30 metres on both sides of the dyke and is about 20 metres wide.

There is also a minefield 20 x 20 metres 20 metres in front of Chiavica Leonardo 610560.

In the area between Osteria 614560, Il Casale 613560 and Faluppa 609565 there should be many mines, to the left and right of the road, all tied together (trip-wires).

Up to two months ago, the Germans used to use a small path running nearly parallel with the road, for getting to Faluppa 609565 from Chiavica Leonardo 610560.

Half way between Chiavica Leonardo 610560 and Osteria 614560 there used to be three bunkers of reinforced concrete of about 20 cm in thickness with armour plating of 18 - 20 mm in thickness and with a steel cover of 1.20 m in diameter at the entrance. These bunkers were only slightly raised above the level of the dyke and were camouflaged with grass. The first was about 50 m from Chiavica Leonardo 610560, and the others were spaced out at intervals of 30 metres. The bunkers were armed with one heavy MG.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SECRET

Subject:- Intelligence Summary

51 British Liaison Unit

To : G S I Eighth Army
G S I 5 Corps
C B O 5 Corps (o/o 1 AGRA)
G S I 8 Ind Div
HQ RA (2)
21 Tlc Bde
2 ODO Bde
MAIU (WEST)
Partisan IO

G 1/12

Cremena Gruppo Intelligence Summary No. 23 herewith translated and passed to you for information.

Field.
5 Mar 45.
JAS/KS.

JH Gualfield
for Ltout Colonel.
General Staff.

CHINA GROUPINTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 23

Compiled from information received from 1600 hrs Mar 3 to 2000 hrs Mar 4, 1945.

PART IENEMY SITUATION

After our attack during the day of Mar 2, the enemy sent troops of the 162 Div southwards in order to reinforce the 142 Recoce Bn, which had already been heavily engaged. These troops took up positions in the strong point at CASA DEI VENTI, and put in a very feeble counter-attack at first light.

Our following advance was so swift that it took the old defenders of the 142 Bn and the new by surprise. All the PW were in agreement upon the statement that, seeing themselves so swiftly surrounded, they laid down their arms.

The 7th Coy of the 303 Inf Regt and the 2nd Squadron of the 142 Recoce Bn were captured almost intact along with their respective Comds.

The 162 Div only arrived in the sector a few days ago; it had come from the PI GENZ. area. The move was carried out on foot and by night marches. It would seem, therefore, that this Div is in the process of relieving the 142 Recoce Bn, which has to be reformed. It is believed that the 3rd Squadron is being reformed in the LONG-STERNO area.

It is not possible to determine the deployment of this Div from the troops which we have taken. It is to be remembered, however, that this Div will have a double front to hold, that on the sea and that on the RENO. The 314 Inf Regt and the 236 Arty Regt of this Div have been identified. Identification of another Inf Regt is lacking, although a number of PW tell of its presence here.

PART IIENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Taken on Mar 3 at CASA DEI VENTI.

42 Jaeger Div
142 Recoce Bn, 2nd Squadron: 35 PW including 1 Officer.

162 Inf Div

303 Inf Regt

7 Coy - 94 PW including 1 Officer.
8 Coy - 10 PW.

314 Inf Regt

Our following capture was of the 142 Bn and the new by surprise. All the PW were in agreement upon the statement that, seeing themselves so swiftly surrounded, they laid down their arms.

The 7th Coy of the 303 Inf Regt and the 2nd Squadron of the 142 Recce Bn were captured almost intact along with their respective Comds.

The 162 Div only arrived in the sector a few days ago; it had come from the ZI GENZ area. The move was carried out on foot and by night marches. It would seem, therefore, that this Div is in the process of relieving the 142 Recce Bn, which has to be reformed. It is believed that the 3rd Squadron is being reformed in the LONG-STRING area.

It is not possible to determine the deployment of this Div from the troops which we have taken. It is to be remembered, however, that this Div will have a double front to hold, that on the sea and that on the HENO. The 314 Inf Regt and the 236 Arty Regt of this Div have been identified. Identification of another Inf Regt is lacking, although a number of PW tell of its presence here.

PART II

ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Taken on Mar 3 at CASA DEI VENTI.

42 Jaeger Div
142 Recce Bn, 2nd Squadron: 35 PW including 1 Officer.

162 Inf Div

303 Inf Regt
7 Coy - 94 PW including 1 Officer.
8 Coy - 10 PW.

314 Inf Regt
Coy HQ, 1 Bn - 2 PW
2 Coy - 2 PW
4 Coy - 5 PW
14 Coy - 12 PW

236 Arty Regt
1 Trp - 6 PW including 1 Officer.

/ENEMY ORGANISATION AND STRENGTH.....

ENEMY ORGANISATION AND STRENGTH

The coys of the 303 Inf Regt have a strength of approximately 90 men, half being Russian (all being Ptes except for a few junior NCOs).

The coys of the 314 Inf Regt are almost the same in strength and composition.

Comd 303 Inf Regt	-	Col CHRISTIANI
Comd 2nd Bn	-	Capt FRANKER
Comd 2 Coy, 314 Inf Regt	-	Capt MILNE

FW STATE

(a) Arrivals at Gruppo Caga -

March 2	-	29
March 3	-	166 (including 3 Officers and 72 Russians)
Total		<u>195</u>

(b) Evacuated through medical channels - 18 (including 1 Officer).
Grand Total 213

RWT/KS.

OPINION GROUP.

Intelligence Summary No. 22.

Compiled from information received from 200 hrs 28 Feb to 1600 hrs 3 Mar 45.

PART I.

Enemy Situation.

Our attack of yesterday has clarified the situation regarding the deployment of the 42 Jaeger Div, which faces us along the whole of our sector. In the tongue of ground between the Lake of COMACCHIO and the sea, the Div's recon bn (142nd) is deployed, and is reinforced with troops of the 162 Inf Div. This Bn relieved troops of the 144 Jaeger Div (probably 144 Recon Bn) in the area about the middle of February.

The 162 Div, which PW give as deployed further to the North, will have, therefore, a dual role; to deal with any attack coming from the sea and from the South, reinforcing on the latter front the 142 Recon Bn of the 42 Jaeger Div. In all probability the 142 Recon Bn holds the responsibility for the sector.

Four PW captured this morning, belonging to the 7th Coy of the 303 Inf Regt, have stated that they departed from COMACCHIO during the night for the purpose of reinforcing the Southern Sector. Providing that the PW have not been able to determine its deployment, events will show what strength this Div can afford to send to the Southern Sector.

Within a little, therefore, the enemy situation before our attack was as follows:-

At TORRE DI PRETORO (636567) = 2nd Sqn, 142 Recon Bn (One Bazooka Section) and 13s of the 4th Sqn of the same Bn; outpost at CASA FILIPPONE (635557).

At CASERTA (614560) = One Pl of the 1st Sqn, 142 Recon Bn (2 MG Sections and one by MG Section).

At CHIAVICA PEDONE (588561) = One Pl of the 1st Sqn, 142 Recon Bn (3 MG Sections and one by MG Section) and 2 '84' mortars of the 4th Sqn, 142 Recon Bn.

Among the troops of the 162 Inf Div sent as reinforcements to the 142 Recon Bn appear:-

One Pl of the 14th Coy of the 314 Inf Regt.
1st Tp, 1 Bty, 256 Arty Regt with 4 '105s' (Italian) and 2 '49s' (Italian) in area 6158.

PART II.

Enemy Identifications.

At CASA FILIPPONE 635557:-

Div. This Bn relieved troops of the 414 Jaeger Div (probably 142 Recce Bn) in the area about the middle of February.

The 162 Div, which PW gave as deployed further to the North, will have, therefore, a dual role; to deal with any attack coming from the sea and from the South, reinforcing on the latter front the 142 Recce Bn of the 42 Jaeger Div. In all probability the 142 Recce Bn holds the responsibility for the sector.

Four PW captured this morning, belonging to the 7th Coy of the 303 Inf Regt, have stated that they departed from COMACCHIO during the night for the purpose of reinforcing the Southern Sector. Providing that the PW have not been able to determine its deployment, events will show what strength this Div can afford to send to the Southern Sector.

Within a little, therefore, the onmy situation before our attack was as follows:-

At TORRE DI PRELORO (636567) = 2nd Sqn, 142 Recce Bn (One Reconnaissance Section) and 100s of the 4th Sqn of the same Bn; outpost at CASA FILIPPONE (635557).

At GASTELLA (614560) = One Pl of the 1st Sqn, 142 Recce Bn (2 Reconnaissance Sections and one by IG Section).

At OHLAVICA PEDONE (588561) = One Pl of the 1st Sqn, 142 Recce Bn (3 Reconnaissance Sections and one by IG Section) and 2 '84' mortars of the 4th Sqn, 142 Recce Bn.

Among the troops of the 162 Inf Div sent as reinforcements to the 142 Recce Bn appear:-

One Pl of the 14th Coy of the 314 Inf Regt.
1st Tp, 1 Bty, 236 Arty Regt with 4 '105s' (Italian) and 2 '149s' (Italian) in area 6158.

PART II.

Enemy Identifications.

922

At CASA FILIPPONE 635557:-

2	from 14th Coy 314 Inf Regt (162 Inf Div)
6	" 2nd Sqn, 142 Recce Bn
1	" 4th Sqn, 142 Recce Bn
4	" 7th Coy, 533 Inf Regt (162 Inf Div)

At OHLAVICA PEDONE 588561:-

4	from 14th Coy, 314 Inf Regt (162 Inf Div)
13	" 1st Sqn, 142 Recce Bn
3	" 1st Tp, 1st Bty, 236 Arty Regt (162 Inf Div)

..... 2/..

Strength - Arms and Equipment - Personnel.

142 Pz Bn. Consists of 1st, 2nd and 4th Sgns. This Bn has a strength of about 300 armed as follows:-

1st and 2nd Sgns as lorried infantry. 4th Sqn with Panzerfaust MGs and four '81' mortars. About a month ago it was brought up to strength.

Each Sqn has a hy pl armed with Faust patronen and MGs.

O.C. 1st Sqn - Liout LEHLE.

O.C. 4th Sqn - Liout von BERTHEIM.

FIN 03846.

162 Inf Div. Is made up of mixed elements. 303 Inf Regt and 314 Inf Regt form part of it.

14th Coy consists of about 60 men and has 18 Ofenrechrs and 2 LMGs. It suffered serious casualties at REINI; it actually has only one pl. O.C. Coy - 2/Liout SIEBERT (the former commander was Capt SCHNEID).

This Coy left UDINE on foot and marched for 14 days, reaching this sector about ten days ago.

236 ARMY REGT.

1st Bty { 1st Tp at 615581 (about 100 men).

2nd Tp at 615583 very near to the road on the left of the road running N to S.

3rd Tp - Const - location not known.

MTN 56570

2nd, 3rd and 4th Batteries left this sector on the arrival of 1st Bty - their location has not been ascertained.

O.C. 1st Tp - Capt POSCHLINGER

O.C. 2nd Tp - Liout REID.

O.C. 1st Bty - Maj. VOLLM

O.C. Right was Liout-Col. von LEFORT (he has since left).

GOC 162 Inf Div - Maj-General von LEICHTENDORF.

Subject: Intelligence Summary.

SECRET.

To: GSI Eighth Army
GSI 5 Corps

51 British Liaison Unit.

C 2/1.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject :- Intelligence Summary

SECRET

To :-
G S I 8 Army
G S I 5 Corps
G S I 1 Cdn Div
21 Tk Bde
N I H
HQ RA (2)
MAIU (WEST)
File _____

51 British Liaison Unit

@ 2/1

German Gruppe Intelligence Summary No 19 herewith
translated and passed to you for information.

Field
22 Feb 45
RWT

11. 12. 44
for Lt Col
General Staff

ORIGINATOR

Intelligence Summary No 19

Compiled from information received from 2000 hrs 16 Feb to 2000 hrs 20 Feb, 1945

PART I

Enemy Situation

There has been no substantial change in the general situation in regard to the enemy. With the continuous movement of motor convoys, laden with stores, from Piedmont in direction of Milan, the numbers of large scale troop movements in N Italy persist. The deductions from these movements are still in favor for speculation, while awaiting decisive events which will clearly show the enemy's intentions and action.

The situation on the sector of the front, which is of the greatest interest to us, remains unchanged. The enemy continues with his patrol activity, and during recent days this has been especially lively on the eastern sector of our line. Among other things, unusual movement of troops, increased work on defenses and heavier mortar fire have been observed here. Thus, the impression is given that, while the enemy is working in feverish haste to strengthen and hold the ground, the main object of his continued patrol activity is the taking of prisoners. He hopes to elicit from the prisoners taken the information from which our present or future intentions may be deduced.

As regards the Italian front, it is beyond doubt that at this present time the enemy is living in suspense, a suspense which grows more tormenting and which can, with reason, be defined only as tragic in the situation on other fronts gradually grows worse.

What developments will there be in operations on this our front? When will the hour strike? Are preparations now in hand?

These are the questions which the German High Command will seek by all possible means to ascertain and define. For this reason it must be borne in mind that, should patrolling fail to bring results, he will not hesitate to try some action in strength, although very limited in scope, provided that he can obtain from prisoners the information which is so important to him.

PART II

1. Enemy Organization

a. From our forward troops

On the afternoon of Feb 16 the enemy began defense work at 503522. Mortar at 511527.

During the night of Feb 16 two I.M.G.s were observed at C. ELIZOL (495541). After the enemy shelling on Feb 17, an unexploded 150 mm shell was recovered from the vicinity of the strong point at C. MATTIOLI (497509). Defense work at 495540.

to the enemy. With the continuous movement of motor convoys, laden with stores, from Piedmont in direction of Milan, the rumors of large scale troop movements in N Italy persist. The deductions from these movements are still mottos for speculation, while awaiting decisive events which will clearly show the enemy's intentions and action.

The situation on the sector of the front, which is of the greatest interest to us, remains unchanged. The enemy continues with his patrol activity, and during recent days this has been especially lively on the eastern sector of our line. Among other things, unusual movement of troops, increased work on defenses and heavier mortar fire have been observed here. Thus, the impression is given that, while the enemy is working in feverish haste to strengthen and hold the ground, the main object of his continued patrol activity is the taking of prisoners. He hopes to elicit from the prisoners taken the information from which our present or future intentions may be deduced.

As regards the Italian front, it is beyond doubt that at this present time the enemy is living in suspense, a suspense which grows more tormenting and which can, with reason, be defined only as tragic in the situation on other fronts gradually grows worse.

What developments will there be in operations on this our front? When will the hour strike? Are preparations now in hand?

These are the universal questions which the German High Command will seek by all possible means to ascertain and define. For this reason it must be borne in mind that, should patrolling fail to bring results, he will not hesitate to try some action in strength, although very limited in scope, provided that he can obtain from prisoners the information which is so important to him.

PART II

I Enemy Organization

1. From our forward troops

On the afternoon of Feb 18 the enemy began defense works at 503522. Mortar at 511527.

During the night of Feb 18 two LKs were observed at C GLAZOL (495511).

After the enemy shelling on Feb 17, an unexploded 150 mm shell was recovered from the vicinity of the strong point at C MANTUORI (497509). Defense works at 495510.

German troops have reoccupied the post 525331.

During the night of Feb 18 the forward troops heard unusual movement of wagons behind the enemy line, and, in particular, on the road OSTERIA (514560) - CASINO (513564). Noise of wagons and probably tracked vehicles also on rd leading from C SINO towards the East.

New defensive positions have been constructed on the bank of the RENO between C IMILICHO (596557) and CILVIG - INOMINO (6056).

It has been observed that additional mortars have been brought into action on the eastern end of our sector.

/to sheet 2 -

- 2 -

2. Iron Partisans

The enemy holding party at PRATO DEL POZZO (517527) has probably been reinforced.

The sector to the East of C LEPRA (519520) is believed to have been recently reinforced by enemy troops. This information would confirm the reports from our forward troops, who had observed an intensification of defensive works and increased enemy activity in the wood to the South of C DEI VERDI (63655625).

5 - 6 guns have probably arrived in area C PATRIENI (6159) (6158). The presence of a "black hole" is reported at ARGENTI.

It is believed that the enemy has constructed well camouflaged "hundreds" on the road from 44055510 to 436542.

Three medium calibre guns, facing S E, at 474543.

Enemy OP in stoop at 473546.

The Germans are believed to have made breaches in the bank at 466582 in order to flood the M'NTELLO area.

3. Iron Civilians

A civilian, who crossed the lines a few days ago, confirms that the Germans in the LA ROTA area were probably relieved during the first days of Feb by troops of whom the greater part is Austrian. The new arrivals wear an ivy leaf on green cloth on the arm and a similar sign, in metal, on the cap.

The following news refer to Feb 5 -

Up to Feb 5 a German HQ, organisation unknown, was situated at MESOLA (F.77 - Corrao 602942) in the castle Estenso and in the elementary schools. This HQ was linked by phone with the light house of GORO (F.77 - 7180), with SCORDOVARI (7891) and VENICE.

On Feb 3 some 300 Germans were seen to arrive at VOLANO (6281); they were billeted in sheds along the shore; they had light armament (MGs and few A/T guns) and their equipment was of inferior quality.

The Germans in the VOLANO area possess very little means of transport. The following information has been supplied, only in very rough approximation. A troop of 6 guns "88s" at 588662 (F.65-ADRI). A similar tp. situated at 587056 (F.65-ADRI). The guns are camouflaged with nets, and the area being sandy and without vegetation, would permit their being revealed by air reconnaissance. The guns are placed in posts of reinforced concrete, and are not linked by communication trenches. Probably all round field of fire.

The outskirts of MESOLA are protected by 6 posts in reinforced concrete, camouflaged with cone roofs and false chimneys in order to give them the appearance of inhabited houses.

The bridge at 661974 (F-77) has been ruined.

There is only casual coastal watch from the beach at GORO to the mouths of the PO di GORO and di GUGG and along the shore of S. GIO DEI SCOROVARI.

All German troops in the area have respirators A/G.

(Source: Civilian Information Report)

2 - 6 guns have probably arrived in area C PATRIGNANI (6159) (6158). The presence of "Milkmaid" is reported at ROCCO. It is believed that the enemy has constructed well camouflaged "bunkers" on the road from 44055510 to 436542. Three medium calibre guns, facing S E, at 474543. Enemy OP in steeple at 473546. The Germans are believed to have made breaches in the bank at 466582 in order to flood the MATELLIO area.

3 - From Civilians

A civilian, who crossed the lines a few days ago, confirms that the Germans in the LA ROTTA area were probably relieved during the first days of Feb by troops of whom the greater part is Austrian. The new arrivals wear an ivy leaf on green cloth on the arm and a similar sign, in metal, on the cap.

The following news refer to Feb 5 -

Up to Feb 5 a German HQ, organisation unknown, was situated at MESOLA (F.77 - Corrochio 602942) in the castle Estense and in the elementary schools. This HQ was linked by phone with the light house of GORO (F.77 - 7180), with SCORDOVARI (7891) and VENICE.

On Feb 3 some 300 Germans were seen to arrive at VOLANO (6281); they were billeted in sheds along the shore; they had light armament (MGs and few A/T guns) and their equipment was of inferior quality.

The Germans in the VOLANO area possess very little means of transport. The following information has been supplied, only in very rough approximation. A troop of 6 guns "88s" at 583062 (F.65-ADRIA). A similar tp. situated at 587050 (F.65-ADRIA). The guns are camouflaged with nets, and the area being sandy and without vegetation, would permit their being revealed by air recon. The guns are placed in posts of reinforced concrete, and are not linked by communication trenches. Probably all round field of fire.

The outskirts of MESOLA are protected by 6 posts in reinforced concrete, camouflaged with cone roofs and false chimneys in order to give them the appearance of inhabited houses.

The bridge at 661971 (F.77) has been mined.

There is only casual coastal watch from the beach at GORO to the mouths of the PO di GORO and di GNOCC and along the shore of S.000 DEI SCORDOVARI.

All German troops in the area have respirators A/G.

(Source: Civilian Interrogation Report)

CONFIDENTIAL

51 British Liaison unit

G 2/1

CREMONA GROUP

Intelligence Summary No. 18

Information received from 2000 hrs 18/15 to 2000 hrs Feb 18 1945

PART I

Enemy Situation

From partisan sources comes the report that the enemy units in the area to the East of LOMBARDINO 4257 have been relieved during the first 10 days of Feb. The strength of the enemy in this area is estimated at some 200 men; these are believed to come from units of the 114 Jaeger Div, which, for the most part, consist of AUSTRIANS, POLISH and a few FRENCH, and only the smallest GERMAN element. This report confirms previous information, since the identification of the 2 battalions on Feb 14 showed the presence of 741 J.R., deployed to the North of the 1250 and to the West of the Lake of COMACCHIO.

Reports from various sources are in agreement on the fact that the units of this Div are making great use of animal-drawn transport, especially oxen, in view of their being almost entirely lacking in M.T. Transport is being used to move reports, information from our forward troops shows that the noise of transport, much more than that of M.T., is continually being heard.

The enemy is still working hard and with feverish haste upon defence works. He is working to fill the round into his defence plan, so that from it he may have the greatest advantage in what must be for him a hopeless resistance. To the west strength and the morale of his units, already haunted by defeat, the enemy is attempting to bring prepared obstacles to the rescue. The features of the round land themselves to this stubborn but useless resistance.

In the meantime he does not relax his propaganda activity, carried out chiefly by means of pamphlets which are sent over regularly in great numbers. The theme is always the same, and is repeated with a monotony which has become tiresome. The absolutely negative results should by now have convinced the enemy of the uselessness of this activity which tends to bore rather than arouse our men, although in the early days some amusement was caused. However, he persists and hopes, with the obscurity which is typical of his race - let him hope in such hope he wishes to die.

Translated and passed to you for information Capt

Signature

Field,
Feb 45.
107/15.

Ident Colonel 918
General Staff.

Enemy Situation

From partisan sources comes the report that the enemy units in the area to the East of LAKESTADT 4257 have been relieved during the first 10 days of Feb. The strength of the enemy in this area is estimated at some 200 men; these are believed to come from units of the 114 Jaeger Div, which, for the most part, consist of ALGERIANS, POLISH and a few FRENCH, and only the smallest GERMAN element. This report confirms previous information, since the identification of the 2 batteries on Feb 14 showed the presence of 741 J.R., deployed to the North of the RENO and to the West of the Lake of COMAGGIO.

Reports from various sources are in agreement on the fact that the units of this Div are making great use of animal-drawn transport, especially oxen, in view of their being almost entirely lacking in M.F. Tanks and other weapons to some extent, information from our forward troops shows that the noise of transport, much more than that of M.F., is continually being heard.

The enemy is still working hard and with feverish haste upon defence works. He is seeking to fill the ground into his defence plan, so that from it he may have the greatest advantage in what must be for him a hopeless resistance. So the work strength and the morale of the enemy are already hampered by defeat, the enemy is attempting to bring prepared obstacles to the rescue. The features of the ground lend themselves to this stubborn but useless resistance.

In the meantime he does not relax his propaganda activity, carried out chiefly by means of pamphlets which are sent over regularly on in great numbers. The theme is always the same, and is repeated with a monotony which has become tiresome. The absolutely negative results should by now have convinced the enemy of the uselessness of this activity which tends to bore rather than arouse our men, although in the early days some amusement was caused. However, he persists and hopes, with the certainty which is typical of his race - let him hope if in such hope he wishes to die.

Meld,
Feb 45,
KTB/MS.

Translated and passed to you for information Carl

J.L. Guarnieri
Ident Colonel 918
General Staff.

/PART II. Enemy Defences.....

PART IIEnemy Defenses1. From our forward troops.

It is believed that the enemy unit holding CHIAVICA PEDONE 588569 has been relieved.

Enemy numbers believed to be situated at 518528 ~ 511527 ~ 517524 ~ 517527 ~ 511533 ~ 599559 ~ 52055292 ~ 48555191.

Report that mine has been erected in front of enemy post at CHIAVICA PEDONE. Enemy IDs at 492518 ~ 504525 ~ 4945119 ~ 488507 ~ 4945215 ~ 49555185. Increased defensive tones to East of CHIAVICA PEDONE 605559.

Explosions observed in area of C.S. CRISPINO 6156 and FALCONE 6056. It is believed that the enemy is carrying out defensive works.

2. From partisans

The enemy has brought other troops into the area N.W. of LA ROTA 5053.

In the same area the Indian army, which on Feb 13 brought down fire on S. ALFREDO, is situated. Aerial photographs of Feb 17 show 2 guns at 50395367.

One gun (calibre unknown) at 401529.

The enemy has mined the bank to South of RUA DI VALLE NUOVA 4955. The road from the bridge of C. CESTI 48975465 ~ C. ALFONSO 5053. DI VALLE NUOVA has been cleared.

The bridge of C. CESTI 42975465 has probably been mined.

The enemy has sent reinforcements of some 200 ~ 300 men to the points between M. LONCHI DEI BOSCHI 4753 and C. IERRE 5152. The greater part of the reinforcements are situated between C. BASSINELLI 506528 and C. IERRE 5152. Thus, S. ALFREDO on Feb 13. Our fire caused a number of casualties and some ambulances made four journeys.

In the same area relief of units has taken place, and it is believed that two of many different nationalities are there now.

In the area North of VALLE DI CICCIO to OLIVERO and CESTI 493746 there are armed motor-bombs; the HQ of this organization is situated in the school of S. C. ALFONSO 389750.

At C. BASSINELLI 433573 a unit charged with the task of patrol of the road CHIAVICA, especially by night, is billeted.

On the bank at 444547 a heavy calibre S.P. takes up position during the night. It probably comes from VILLO, a village on the LONGASTRINO ~ B. S. L. road. Gun and mortar at cross-roads at 512540. Aerial photographs of Feb 17 show a heavy mortar or gun post at 51255399.

Gun situated at 48605305. Aerial photos of Feb 17 show this report to be accurate. Technical C. IERRE 519528 and the bank the enemy has mined and defense works using two trunks and rubble from houses nearby. The small house and the parking station of the "Canalotto" are probably used as shelter and as a way of reaching the river.

The N.W. corner of the mine factory 507536 has been reinforced. 91. The factory is shell-proof. The villa opposite the factory is probably used as a headquarters.

15 4 3 3

785020

believed that the enemy is carrying out defensive works.

2. From northwards

The enemy has brought other troops into the area N.W. of LA ROTTA 5053. In the same area the modern army, which on Feb 13 brought down 200 on S. ALBERTO, is situated. Aerial photographs of Feb 17 show 2 guns at 50395367. One gun (calibre unknown) at 484529.

The enemy has moved the bank to South of RUA DI VALLE NUOVA 4955. The road from the bridge of C. GUSTI 48975465 - CAVALLERIA 5055 - 5057. DI VALLE NUOVA has been cleared.

The bridge of C. GUSTI 48975465 has probably been mined.

The enemy has sent reinforcements of some 200 - 300 men to the points between M. LONCHI, DEI ROSCHI 4753 and C. LENTE 5152. The eastern part of the reinforcements are situated between C. DISESTI 506528 and C. LENTE 5152. These reinforcements arrived after our action which followed the enemy's shelling of S. ALBERTO on Feb 13. Our fire caused a number of casualties and reinforcements made four journeys.

In the same area relief of units has taken place, and it is believed that two of many different nationalities are there now.

In the area North of VALLE DI COLLOCCIO to C. LONCHI and C. LENTE 5152 there are several motor-buses; the HQ of this organization is situated in the school of S. C. LONCHI 505750.

At C. LENTE 5152 a unit charged with the task of patrol of the road C. LENTE 5152, especially by night, is billeted.

On the bank at 484547 a heavy calibre S.P. takes up position during the night. It probably comes from FLO, a village on the LONGASTINO - LENTINI road.

Our and mortar at crossroads at 512540. Aerial photographs of Feb 17 show a heavy mortar or gun post at 51255399.

Our situation at 48605305. Aerial photos of Feb 17 show this report to be accurate. Between C. LENTE 5152 and the bank the enemy has carried out defence works, using two tanks and rubble from houses nearby. The small houses and the pumping station of the "Canalotto" are probably used as shelters and as a way of reaching the river.

The No. 7, corner of the rice factory 507536 has been substantially repaired. It is shelled. The villa opposite the factory is probably used as an officers quarters.

It would appear that our army fire at LA ROTTA 5053 caused casualties to the enemy to the sum of 20 dead and many wounded. At 504539 there were 2 dead, 3 wounded and a gun put out of action.

Separate weapon pits have been dug along the bank of the PO CA. VALLE 50530 up to C. LENTINI 500528. This information is confirmed by aerial photos of Feb 17, which show weapon pits, in range of 2 - 3 as the following points: 49575326 - 49525300 - 49595321 - 49625305 - 49675296 - 49925287 - 49345270 - 49995270 - 48775327 - 48645227 - 48885358 - 48875375 - 48845384.

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54 British Infantry Unit

G 2/1

ORFEDONA GROUP

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 17

Based on information received up to 2000 hrs 15 Feb 45

PAGE ONE

ENEMY SITUATION

The progress made by the attacking blows of the Russian Army on the Eastern Front, and their victorious march towards the heart of the Reich, have caused military commentators, during the last few days, to speculate on the desperate situation in which the German Army is struggling, with a view to estimating its further power of resistance. Mindful both as in a relentlessly increasing tide and compelled to plug an ever increasing number of leaks, maintained by its own propaganda which has overblown its resistance to the "European War", pushed almost to the extreme limit of its manpower and material resources, it is obvious that the German High Command is struggling with the problem in an attempt to ride the storm which is about to engulf it.

There are divergent opinions on the merits of a German withdrawal in Italy first to the line of the Po, and later to the Brenner, and on the intention of the German High Command in this respect.

While on the one hand one can appreciate the necessity for shortening the front and the resultant economy in force, on the other hand, there are political reasons and, even more important, the new significance of the rich industrial area of N. Italy since the loss of Silesia, which may strongly influence any decision.

In spite of rumours regarding the thinning out of German troops in Italy becoming more insistent, the only confirmation of such process is information regarding the relief of certain German units (mostly in the Piedmont area) by pseudo Fascist Republic units. This form of relief was, however, in operation before the opening of the Russian offensive.

The enemy has carried out other changes among the units deployed on the Adriatic sector, quite probable that certain units have been withdrawn from the solely for the purpose of reorganisation and refitting. Nevertheless, elements of the 356 Inf Div., recently relieved by the 362 Inf Div., have been seen near Verona, probably en route for the Brenner. The last that was heard of 16 SS Div was a report that on the morning of the 7th, during a period of considerable traffic on the rails out of Italy, three trains of SS troops passed through TRIESTE going East. Immediately after this it was said that a number of troops estimated at one or two divisions, was arriving in the area North of UDINE, so that it would appear that the div is on its way. Nothing is known of the location of the 710th Inf Div, which may have been relieved by 114 Jaeger.

While this survey of the general situation in regard to the enemy serves to show that the operations on the Eastern Front have not as yet produced any great repercussions on the Italian front, one cannot dismiss the possibility of such events occasioned by sudden changes there.

Up to the present, the enemy units which face the Gruppo have provided no indication of changes of this kind. If the departure of the 16 SS Div has occasioned an extension of the deployment of the 42 Jaeger, the appearance of units of the 114 Jaeger on its left would lend support to the view that troops, at least in the line, have been filled. If, however, in accordance with information gleaned from deserters, the 42 Jaeger has all its units full, except for the III/25 whose location has not been accurately determined, it remains to be seen what strength the enemy holds in immediate reserve on our front.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

its manpower and material resources, it is obvious that the German High Command is grappling with the problem in an attempt to ride the storm which is about to engulf it.

There are divergent opinions on the merits of a German withdrawal in Italy first to the line of the Po, and later to the Brenner, and on the intention of the German High Command in this respect.

While on the one hand one can appreciate the necessity for shortening the front and the resultant economy in force, on the other hand, there are political reasons and, even more important, the new significance of the rich industrial area of N. Italy since the loss of Silesia, which may strongly influence any decision.

In spite of rumours regarding the thinning out of German troops in Italy becoming more insistent, the only confirmation of such process is information regarding the relief of certain German units (mostly in the Piedmonte area) by pseudo Fascist Republic units. This form of relief was, however, in operation before the opening of the Russian offensive.

The enemy has carried out other changes among the units deployed on the Adriatic sector without it being probable that certain units have been withdrawn from the solely for the purpose of reorganization and refitting. Nevertheless, elements of the 356 Inf Div., recently relieved by the 362 Inf Div., have been seen near Verona, probably on route for the Brenner. The last that was heard of 16 SS Div was a report that on the morning of the 7th, during a period of considerable traffic on the rails out of Italy, three trains of SS troops passed through TRIESTE going East. Immediately after this it was said that a number of troops estimated at one or two divs, was arriving in the area North of UDINE, so that it would appear that the div is on its way. Nothing is known of the location of the 710th Inf Div, which may have been relieved by 114 Jaeger.

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In any case, the enemy has shown no slackening in his patrol activity, and his fire power has been maintained not so much by artillery, as by mortar fire. It is perfectly certain that the strange ideas which the enemy held in the first days, and which ended with the attack on the night of the 2nd Feb., must have been completely dispersed, for those were aimed at testing our powers of resistance and the fighting spirit of our troops. Having not failed in this clash, the enemy has now intensified, particularly in recent days and more often than has been his normal custom, his attack by propaganda, both by pamphlets and the spoken word, all of which has been without effect.

G-II + III i 90

I do NOT sign this blank. I will sign a covering note saying it is false. for information

18 Feb 45

De...
Lieut Colonel
General Staff

(Source : Eighth Army Publication)

2. GERMAN NIGHT FIGHTING TACTICS.

Evidence of increased German emphasis on night fighting and rules of night tactics are found in an undated document recently captured which contains excerpts from a manual "Night Movements and Night Attacks", under preparation. Pertinent extracts from the document follow :-

(i) General.

At night the enemy's superiority is least effective. Therefore night is our best ally. It must be used for daring attacks and all marches. Attacking at night reduces losses and may bring great success to units under courageous leadership. Particularly, an enemy who feels helpless without tank and air support and who spends many nights in buildings, must be beaten at night.

Orders for night attacks must be given early to permit careful preparation. The later the unit the earlier should the order be issued.

Irregular timing of the beginning of the attack increases surprise which is of the greatest importance. Therefore, the following measures should be taken.

Inconspicuous reconnoitering and registering of fire distributed over several nights.

Continue normal combat activities. No noises, no lights, no shifting of units before nightfall.

Conditions are favourable when the tgt can be seen at 50 metres distance. Pitch-black nights usually cause failure.

Spotlights facilitate aimed firing and blind the enemy. When several spotlights are directed against a low-hanging bank of clouds, the reflected light will produce the brightness of a half-moon.

It may be a great help to set on fire barns and buildings located on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy.

Parachute flares should NOT be used, because their long burning time and short range provide the enemy with light to set his own units prepared. If the enemy lights up the forefield, smoke candles should be released quickly.

The attack will rigidly follow the direction previously ordered. No changes in direction can take place once an attack is under way.

The tgt of the attack must be reached one or two hours before daybreak to allow time for organizing for defence under the cover of darkness.

(ii) Infantry Night Attacks.

Individual hand-to-hand combat is decisive. Therefore, attack in deeply staggered wedge form with a strong point.

Use but few daring men and many weapons.

Assault squads and pls should lead. Try to overcome the by weapons of the enemy with light weapons.

The attack should be launched from positions which are as close as possible to the enemy.

Leave those final assault posts on a whistle signal or visual signal. The foremost assault squads and pls throw themselves upon the enemy with loud yelling and destroy him in individual hand-to-hand combat.

The attack may take place with or without arty support. Where complete surprise of the enemy may be anticipated, that is on dark nights, attack without arty promises greater success.

Arty fire at night follows special rules, because aimed single shots are NOT feasible as a rule. Fire should be directed against probable strong points and area targets. A bell shaped cover should be provided against enemy counter-thrusts, according to a determined fire plan.

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Parachute flares should NOT be used, because their long burning time and short range provide the enemy with light to set his own units prepared. If the enemy lights up the forefield, smoke candles should be released quickly.

The attack will rigidly follow the direction previously ordered. No changes in direction can take place once an attack is under way.

The tgt of the attack must be reached one or two hours before daylight to allow time for organizing for defence under the cover of darkness.

(ii) Infantry light attacks.

Individual hand-to-hand combat is decisive. Therefore, attack in deeply staggered wedge form with a strong point.

Use but few daring men and many weapons.

Assault sounds and pls should lead. Try to overcome the hy weapons of the enemy with light weapons.

The attack should be launched from posns which are as close as possible to the enemy.

Leave these final assault posns on a whistle signal or visual signal. The foremost assault squads and pls throw themselves upon the enemy with loud yelling and destroy him in individual hand-to-hand combat.

The attack may take place with or without arty support. Where complete surprise of the enemy may be anticipated, that is on dark nights, attack without arty promises greater success.

Arty fire at night follows special rules, because aimed single shots are NOT feasible as a rule. Fire should be directed against probable strong points and area tgts. A bell shaped cover should be provided against enemy counter-thrusts, according to a determined fire plan.

(iii) Infantry and Tanks.

Night attack by armoured units or armoured Kampfgruppen may be extraordinarily successful. Tanks, however, should NOT be used without infantry.

The following conditions are necessary for a successful night attack with tanks. Sufficient vision. Tgts must be visible from a distance of 150 to 200 metres.

Suitable terrain and favourable ground conditions.

Night attacks by tanks with armoured inf riding on vns promises great success. The tanks attack first, the inf follow closely behind or accompany the attack on the flanks. After reaching the target, the inf take up defensive posns. The vns are pulled back while it is still dark and then put into readiness as a reserve against counter-attacks.

Motor noises of approaching tanks should be drowned by low-flying raiders, by arty fire and loudspeaker broadcasts. These noises must NOT be made for the first time during the night of the attack, but should also be produced during several previous nights.

"MORTON" GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL
31 British Liaison Unit
G 2/1

INFORMATION SUPPLY NO 15

Compiled from information received from 2000 hrs 4th to 2000 hrs 10 Feb 45

PART I.

THE SITUATION

With the departure of the 16th Div 83 the enemy is now further weakened on our front, but it is probable that he feels equally secure in view of the fact that the rivers are in full spate and a large part of the country is flooded. It is not possible to establish whether the compromise to which the enemy has consented to occupy the front held formerly by the 16th SS, is to remain or whether it is a temporary measure while awaiting the arrival of another division.

The Southern boundary of the 42nd Jaeger Div is not defined, but, with the 2nd and 1st Bns of the 40th R.J. astride the railway (the 2nd to the South and the 1st to the North) the gap between the 362 Div could conveniently be filled by the 3rd Bn. In such case the 25th R.J. would have switched its sector boundary to the South of the road MONTANA (4749).

In view of the units known to be present and those presumed to be, the enemy lay-out along our front could be as follows :-

2nd Bn	25th R.J.	4851
1st Bn	25th R.J.	4853
?	25th R.J.	4749 ?
1st Bn	40th R.J.	4847
2nd Bn	40th R.J.	4546
?	40th R.J.	4445 ?
?	1060th R.Gr.	4445 ?
2nd Bn	1060th R.Gr.	3644

The deserter, captured on the evening of the 8th by our neighbours, belonged to the sound ranging Pl. of Coy HQ of the 25th R.J.

His Pl was assigned to the II/25 with the tank, it seems, of locating the poems of our neighbours.

The 8th Coy is at 485142, and the 1st Bn further to the South.

The deserter stated that the attack on our poems launched on the night of Feb 2nd ended disastrously for the II/25. Out of the 75 men involved in this action 10 were killed and 24 wounded. It seems that the German army helped to produce this result.

Other info, supplied by the prisoner, is contained in the 3rd para of Part II. This has been checked by the inspection of aerial photographs taken on the same day, the 8th, and by the side of each item the result of photograph interpretation has been inserted.

The fact that a deserter from an enemy unit on the front of the "Gruppo" has given himself up to our neighbours instead of surrendering to our forward troops would lead us to believe that the Germans, utterly detested by the whole of the Italian people on account of the atrocities wrought to add to our injuries, are fearful of falling into our hands, and therefore, in no case would do this of their own will.

(Source 1 Cdn Corps I.S.)

914

St. Michael's

by the 16th SS, in to remain or whether it is a temporary measure while awaiting the arrival of another division.

The Southern boundary of the 42nd Jäger Div is not defined, but, with the 2nd and 1st Bns of the 40th R.J. astride the railway (the 5th to the South and the 1st to the North) the gap between the 362 Div could conveniently be filled by the 3rd Bn. In such case the 25th R.J. would have attached its sector boundary to the South of the road KOLNIZZI (4749).

In view of the units known to be present and those presumed to be, the enemy lay-out along our front could be as follows :-

2nd Bn	25th R.J.	4851
1st Bn	25th R.J.	4853
?	25th R.J.	4749 ?
1st Bn	40th R.J.	4847
2nd Bn	40th R.J.	4846
?	40th R.J.	4445 ?
?	1060th R.Gr.	4445 ?
2nd Bn	1060th R.Gr.	5844

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(Source 1 Cdn Corps I.S.)

11 Feb.

ENEMY INTERESTS

1. Info from our forward units.
Medium calibre guns at 613565 - 507531
Mortars at 51855310 - 619565 - 635557 - 632563
MGs at 507560 - 625561 - 655551 - 649565

2. Info supplied by prisoners.

2 medium calibre guns in vicinity of houses 502536
Kitchens and stores in the house 505536

Only a few Germans remain in the area of LONGASTRILLO. The departing troops transported munitions and stores in four wagons. The munitions not able to be carried away were thrown into wells.

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St. Albans
Lt Col GS

3. Info supplied by the deserter from the 25th A.S., captured on the evening of the 8th inst. Some of this has been checked by the examination of aerial photos. of the area concerned, taken on the morning of the same day, the 8th. The two sources of info tally in so far as a soldier's observations are concerned by the photographic revelations, and, in substance, in the comparison the degree of truth in such info, with slight modification, stands confirmed.

From the deserter	From the photographs
at 48125126 : 2 gun '150'	Two JAL pits - for 75s or 100 mortars Not suitable for guns '150'
at 48355134 : 2 '75s'	Nothing revealed.
at 486512 : 2 mortar	2 small pits presumably for mortars but not suitable for mortars
at 483506 : 6 heavy mortars at 48203068 : 3 heavy mortars	Behind the house at 48245058 six pits presumably for mortars.
at 48437094 : 3 heavy 100s at 48735000 : 3 '150' at 100s	Might be correct. There are many holes caused by unsetting of trees: could be utilized as pits for automatic weapons.
at 483505 : mines	Might be correct, being a good position for mines: not revealed on photos, however.

C LOUJI 491503 has been evacuated.

C POLHET 482506 occupied by 2nd personnel and by other 24 men.

at 48125726 daily at 1700 hrs the natives arrive.

every evening at 2200 hrs fighting and recon patrols go out.

C.

at 48255134 : 2 1/2
at 4825512 : 2 no mortar
at 4825501 : 6 heavy mortar
at 48255066 : 3 heavy mortar

behind the house at 48245053 are posts
presumably for mortars.

Light is correct. There are many holes
caused by uprooting of trees; could be
utilized as posts for automatic weapons.

Light is correct, being a good position
for mines: not revealed on photos.,
however.

O HOUSE 481503 has been encountered.

O HOUSE 482505 occupied by original personnel and by other 24 men.

at 48125726 daily at 1700 hrs the missions arrive.

every evening at 2200 hrs fighting and recon patrols go out.

SECRETHQ "CHROMA" GROUP54 British Liaison Unit
C 2/4Intelligence Summary No 14

Compiled from information received from 2000 hrs 6th to 2000 hrs 8th Feb, 1945.

PART IENEMY DISPOSITION

Between the 4th and 6th of Feb a deserter from the 10th Coy and a prisoner of the 8th Coy, 3rd PARA Regt were captured by Allied troops in area 0425. It cannot yet be stated that the whole of the 14th Coy, 3rd PARA Regt is located in the hands of Ground COMBAT, and it is more reasonable to suppose that the German HQ, identified as the "Hauptstadt" of a section of parachute tank destroyers, was sent into the area, along with his small unit, either for the purpose of training other troops, or to reinforce the local anti-tank defence, or even with the dual role.

Our forward troops provide information of the deployment of assault units from 644560 to the sea.

From I.S. No. 234. of 1 Gen Corps, it is learnt that the sector, held by the 16 Div S.S., is now held in part by the 362 Div Df and in part by the 42 Jaeger. Consequently, for the moment, the 16 S.S. has not been relieved by another Div, but its sector has been taken over by the units on the flanks, which have thus widened their own front.

Field.

9 Feb 45.
107/13Major General.
General Staff.PART IIENEMY DEFENCES

Certain civilians, from the area of VOLANO II. 622842, escaped yesterday evening in a boat and this morning reached PONTO CURSINI, where they were picked up by our troops. They have supplied the following information (Ref Map 1:100,000):-

Defensive works:- Trenches and dug-outs, trees felled and new roads constructed by the Germans to EAST of VOLANO II. 622842 in the plantation along the shore. Nearness posts, mainly MGs, along the shore to the NORTH and SOUTH of PONTO II. 608665 of PONTO CARLUCCI. Posts for automatic weapons along the shore at VOLANO II. 608665 (a place not indicated on Map 1:100,000). Posts of approx. depth 1.10m, and 1.10m 1.50m in area L. HULLA (between S. GALLI and BLICO II. 646765 and C. HULLA II. 641754). Some of these posts were already warned by MGs. Gun posts of cement at

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

In conversation with
Ident Colonel.
General Staff.

Part III

Certain civilians, from the area of VULVINO R. 622842, escaped yesterday evening in a boat and this morning reached PONTO CORSIUM, where they were picked up by our troops. They have supplied the following information (Ref Map 1:40,000):-

Weapons posts, mainly ICS, along the shore to the NORTH and SOUTH of PORTO N. 608665 of PORTO CARLOTTI. Posts for automatic weapons along the shore at VOLLANO (NORTH) (a place not indicated on Map 1:100,000). Posts of approx depth 1.0m, and 1.5m in area LA MULA (between C. CARLOTTI BLACC N. 696765 and C. MENTIA N. 644754). Some of these posts nearer the sea were already razed by ICS. Gun posts of cement at LUSOLA N. 602912.

Minefields:- Towards the end of Nov 1944 the Germans mined a stretch of ground from the bridge at H. 608806 towards the WEST, ending in a place called HANDBOIN. Minefields in the stretch of ground, along the road, from POMPO CHAMBAIN to a distance of approx 1500 m. towards the AREA of HANDBOIN. LA FORTUNE (not indicated on Map

- 2 -

1:103,000) is mined. Area flanking the road from VACCAJURO N. 55937 to PUPPORA N. 55884 is also mined. Minefields not exactly located in area PORTO CARIBAUDI - C. CANALE DEL RILUO N. 646765.

Demolitions: It is believed that the road from S. GUTSEPER N. 594723 to LA FORTANA has been prepared for demolition.

Flooding: The Germans have made a breach in the bank of the VALLE CARVONE in the vicinity of point N. 586804, and another in the bank of CAHNEVE N. 640844. VALLE ISOLA, to NORTH of COMACCHIO, is already flooded.

INFORMATION CONCERNING TROOPS AND THEIR MOVEMENT

It would seem that VOLANO N. 622842 is a rest area for troops from the line. Up to 15 - 20 days ago VOLANO was occupied by a 400-odd men of Jaeger, who were changed every 5 - 6 days. Later the strength was reduced to 20-odd men. At PORTO CARIBAUDI there are some S.S. elements and 5-6 medium tanks. In recent days, 2 heavy tanks and a number of light tanks (armed with calibers 20 guns) have been seen. Some days ago a unit of 3 '84' mortars, situated at VOLANO, departed for ARIANO N. 501884. A month ago, one Coy S.S. from VOLANO and 2 Coy S.S. from VACCOLINO were noted. These men came from the front and said they were making for ARIANO.

TOPOGRAPHY

In order to estimate the consequence of a breach in the banks upon us, the following information has been obtained from competent technicians:

The dangerous point is at the crossing 47957, where the CANAL di CARINIA passes under the SEHIO. It would be sufficient to demolish this work to raise the SEHIO, which has a notable flow of water during the period Feb 10 - 28, overflood into the CANAL di CARINIA, thereby flooding the plain surrounding this river. Such flooding would be made the easier by breaching along CANAL di CARINIA, the ditch VERGHI and the drain RICHETTA. In all probability this flooding would oblige us to abandon our forward points. The enemy also, however, would be obliged to draw back his defenses.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

It would seem that VOLANO II-622842 is a rest area for troops from the line. Up to 15 - 20 days ago VOLANO was occupied by a 100-odd men of Jaegers, who were engaged every 5 - 6 days. Later the strength was reduced to 20-odd men. At FORNO CARBONATI there are some S.S. elements and 5-6 medium tanks. In recent days, 2 heavy tanks and a number of light tanks (armed with caliber 20 guns) have been seen. Some days ago a unit of 3 '84' mortars, situated at VOLANO, departed for BRINO di POLESSE II. 520967. Approx. a month ago, one Coy S.S. from VOLANO and 2 Coys S.S. from VACCOLINO were moved. These men came from the front and said they were making for BRINO.

TOPOGRAPHY

In order to estimate the consequence of a breach in the bank upon us, the following information has been obtained from competent technicians:-

The dangerous point is at the crossing 4755', where the GILIE di BONTINO passes under the BRINO. It would be sufficient to demolish this work to melt the BRINO, which has a notable flow of water during the period Feb 10 - 26, overflow into the CANALE di BONTINO, thereby flooding the plain surrounding this river. Such flooding would be made the easier by breaching along the GILIE di BONTINO, the ditch VENTRO and the drain PIGNETTA. In all probability their flooding would oblige us to abandon our forward posts. The enemy also, however, would be obliged to draw back his defenses.

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CREMONA COMBAT GROUP

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 12

From information received from
2000 hrs 2 Feb to 2000 hrs 3 Feb.

PART I

ENEMY SITUATION.

Yesterday evening two Polish deserters from 40 Jäger Regt helped throw a little light on the enemy's dispositions along the PNSEI VEDUHO and VEDUHO NORTH of Route 16. Singularly well-informed, they say that their coy, 3 Coy, holds along the WEST bank of the VEDUHO from 468477 - 465459: a large sector for the strength they give of 45 men. They have three outposts totalling 6 men on the VEDUHO, each 20 yds apart in the area 470474, whilst the coy has a POO at 465468. To add to this 2 coy is NORTH, 1 Coy is in reserve, and 23 tys are to the SOUTH.

This lay out changes previous theories that were formed as a result of statements made by a former PW who said that 25 Regt inhabited this area NORTH of the RY. In addition yesterday's deserters believe III Bn to be NORTH of I Bn and II Bn to be in reserve. If this is true then II Bn have relieved, possibly by a Bn of 25 Jäger Regt, which presumably holds NORTH to the RY. In any case, with I Bn 40 Regt immediately NORTH of the RY, 25 Regt is the logical bet as the defender of the division's Northern sector.

As an interesting sidelight on defensive tactics I Bn 40 Regt has turned a picked assault pl for patrolling and raiding purposes which is kept behind the MBR, at present in the area 454477.

(Source 1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No 229)

On the Combat up front on the night of 1/2 Feb the enemy proceeded by neutralizing mortar and army fire, attacked some of our advanced posts at 4954 and 5054. The attacks which went on all night were all thrown back with heavy casualties to the enemy.

The evident intention of the enemy was to try and get possession of all those groups of houses with one stroke, which, while he could have extended his line of defenses still more to the east in front of 40350 VEDUHO + 30810 PIMATTA - 30810 he would also placed our posts at 40350 VEDUHO + 30810 PIMATTA 51552 - 30810 512547 in a critical situation as they would have found themselves with their left flank open.

The enemy had carefully prepared the attack but by their considerable movements that were noticed in the enemy lines in the two previous nights, we knew that they intended to attack.

To this there is the news given by one of our observers who at about 1415 hrs 2 Feb had seen an enemy unit in the region of a coy, pass along the bridge over the RY 462526 in a South direction. These were rifts who probably came to strengthen the night attack.

Until the general situation on our front remains unchanged, it is thought that the enemy who is waiting for our attack, will always try to improve their positions and then will probably renew last night's attack. If it has caused them heavy losses, there is no doubt that they obtained useful experience and information.

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

Our advanced units have located heavy enemy mortars at :- 536560 - 612565 - 613
504 - 517527 - 505526 - 608565 - 596557: other mortars in action from enemy positions

ition yesterday's activities. I believe I am to be relieved by a Bn of 25 Jaeger Regt, arve. If this is true then I Bn have relieved, possibly by a Bn of 25 Jaeger Regt, which presumably holds NORMI to the NEMO. In any case, with I Bn 40 Regt immediately NORMI of the rly, 25 Regt is the logical bet as the defender of the division's Northern sector.

An interesting sidelight on defensive tactics I Bn 40 Regt has formed a picked assault pl for patrolling and raiding purposes which is kept behind the MRL, at present in the area 454477.

(Source I Cdn Corps Int Summary No 229)

On the Combat front on the night of 1/2 Feb the enemy proceeded by neutralizing mortar and arty fire, attacked some of our advanced points at 4954 and 5054. The attacks which went on all night were all thrown back with heavy casualties to the enemy.

The evident intention of the enemy was to try and get possession of all those groups of houses with one stroke, which, while he could have extended his line of defenses still more to the east in front of FOSSO NEMO + SOGLIC PUEMATA - if NEMO he would also place our points at NEMO INMUSSA 51522 - C NEMO 512517 in a critical situation, as they would have found themselves with their left flank open.

The enemy had carefully prepared the attack by their considerable movements that were noticed in the enemy lines in the two previous nights, we knew that they intended to attack.

To this there is the news given by one of our observers who at about 1415 hrs 2 Feb had seen an enemy unit in the region of a coy, pass along the bridge over the NEMO 452525 in a South direction. These were rfts who probably came to strengthen the night attack.

Until the general situation on our front remains unchanged, it is thought that the enemy who is waiting for our attack, will always try to improve their positions and then will probably renew last night's attack. If it has caused them heavy losses, there is no doubt that they obtained useful experience and information.

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

Our advanced units have located heavy enemy mortar at :- 536530 - 542535 - 543 564 - 547527 - 505523 - 608565 - 596557; other mortars in action from enemy positions already noted at 588560 - 64985635. 105 guns have been discovered in position at 634 572 - 655566. A machine gun has been located at 522530 and another in a position already noted at 549526. A gun, may be SP, reported at 543525.

During the night a partisan patrol went to 534549 (C NEMO 10880 FORM) and from here has observed arty flashes at 548523 and 505536. Later it went up to 525574 where no trace of the enemy or civilians was found.

Field.
5 Feb 45

gpc
pm Lt Col G.S.
Capt

- 2 -

PART II

FLYING AND ROCKET BOMBS. THEIR USE IN ITALY BY THE GERMANS.

(Source Fifth Army G-2 Report No 509 from 1 Cdn Corps IS No 229)

PART III

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE.

(Source 15 Army Gp G-2 Notes No 14 from 1 Cdn Corps IS No 229)

PART 1.

1. Enemy Situation.

The enemy situation on our sector must be examined in the light of the general conduct of operations on the Italian Front.

For the Germans Northern Italy is a supply and industrial zone which the Germans will endeavour to use to the utmost, particularly now, as the offensives on the western and eastern fronts have robbed them of immense resources and rich lands.

The terrain in Italy, undoubtedly favours their operations and also on our sector there are a series of natural obstacles, sizeable rivers, canals and ditches etc, which generally speaking run parallel to the front forming several lines for withdrawal. These he always holds, strengthening them to make our advance slow and costly.

The line formed by Fosso VETRO, Fosso VECCHIO and the RENO which lies in front of our sector is the first that we shall have to overcome and it is evident that the enemy is fortifying it with defensive positions and strengthening it by occupying houses, thus transforming the line into one of strongpoints.

It is probable that they have the intention of linking this line of houses with that part of the line in the area of TERRA PROMESSA, which is the sector of the line to the west of Valle di COMACCHIO where we are directly opposite the enemy's main defence line.

2. Enemy Organisation.

Our raid on the morning of 29 Jan on Casa IOLLI 491506 gave us the following information on the defensive system of that strongpoint.

- Enemy posts in the neighbourhood of C. IOLLI are covered with tree trunks and earth and camouflaged with straw and branches.
- In front of the positions there is a wire fence about 30 cm high which also covers the surrounding ditches.
- All the occupants are armed with automatic weapons.
- Our reconce patrol which approached C. Iolli on the night of 31, observed that the enemy was working to strengthen the position.
- A SP gun was pointed at 511526.

Special Note extracted from 1 Cdn Corps, Intelligence Summary No 224 Dated 28 Jan 45.

Captured enemy small arms, arty eqpt and amn are still urgently required, and a fresh appeal has recently been made by AFHQ for 20,000 rifles. Such weapons are required not only for trg and technical purposes but for issue to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation and other Partisan Forces.

Part II.

1. Enemy Propaganda.

The enemy continues to drop leaflets on our line. These have had the audacity to state that captured Italian soldiers are now back in their homes in Northern Italy.

If the Germans kept their fantastic promises, but we are aware that he is not quite so simple, it would enable us to infiltrate a large number of agents into his lines.

Always repeating the theme, "Come over to our side and we will send you to the home of your family", one of the sheets reproduced photographs which purported to show a happy and fortunate soldier who had taken advantage of the German offer. The people depicted as the family on the photographs appeared far from happy and only three out of the 57 shown were smiling wanly.

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If our soldiers taken prisoner were treated with such consideration, there is little doubt that as soon as the necessary photographs had been taken, the family would find that he was to be despatched to a distant concentration camp.

2. Enemy Methods.

Of the two corpses belonging to 4 GAF BN zbv, found in area 0128 on 15 Jan, one was at first thought to have carried no weapons. When searched by our patrol, however, prior to burial, he was found to have strapped to the inside of his left wrist a small Beretta-type pistol, with the butt just above the wrist and the barrel pointing down his arm. No doubt this was intended to turn the tables on any would be captors: the weapons would escape a preliminary search and at a favourable moment, the pistol could by a swift movement be transferred to the right hand, ready for instant action. (Source 78 Div IS 752)

On the Western Front, a knife of apparently normal type was found in the greatcoat pocket of a German officer. Further examination revealed that a pistol was ingeniously set in the knife and it was obviously intended that this weapon should be used on his captors to facilitate escape.

Field.
1 Feb 45.
HPWB.

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE.
Clemente Primieri.

SECRET

CREMONA COMBAT GROUP

Office of the Chief of Staff - "I" Section

No "I" 1226

Pl 64 22 Jan 45

Information Bulletin No. 6

Based on information received from 20.00 hrs, 20 Jan, to 20.00 hrs 22 Jan 45.

PART I

1. Situation of the Enemy

The fact that the patrols sent out last night found little opposition to the East of the ditch VECCHIO suggests that some change, however small, has taken place on our front. This could be a large decrease in enemy strength.

However, if enemy action in the first instance might be reduced simply to rearguard fighting, he will always remain strong on our front, since he must defend that which, for him, is the most dangerous line, route No 16. In addition, the enemy has scattered many obstacles in our line of march.

From quite a reliable civilian source comes the following :-

- The bridge on the road to BASTIA 3456 (Sheet 88), hit by aircraft, has been successively repaired and camouflaged.
- The railway bridge in this same locality has also been hit, and can be used only by pedestrians.
- The area beside route No 16, adjacent to the above mentioned bridge, is thickly mined 3 Km before and three after this same bridge.
- Other mined localities are in area 3256 - 3356 - 3259 - 3459 - 3162 - 3262 - 3064 - 3264 - (Sheet 88). From these localities the civilian population has been made to evacuate.
- Also the bridge at 383553 (Sheet 89) has been hit by aircraft. The Germans have constructed at this same place a pontoon bridge which they have camouflaged, and which they use almost exclusively by night.
- In the area of the bridge at BASTIA many anti-aircraft weapons are sited (their position has not been completely ascertained).

PART II

TIME BOMBS

Delayed-action bombs have recently been found in the Third American Army area. The bombs were actuated by mechanism fitted to cause explosion up to 21 days. Such devices in general have been found in public buildings, barracks, plants of public utility, and buildings formerly occupied by German troops and HQs, which the enemy foresaw would be occupied by Allied troops.

At Saint Avold, buildings which had been examined several times by competent and experienced personnel, and which had been declared clear of explosives, were blown up.

At Baranville, after a building, mined by the Germans, had been blown up, civilians informed the Allied authority that they had been warned by the Germans to keep well away from this building.

As a result of the above, all buildings of public service (offices, electricity works, etc) and those buildings formerly occupied by enemy troops and HQs must be

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From quite a reliable civilian source comes the following :-

- The bridge on the road to BASTIA 3156 (Sheet 88), hit by aircraft, has been successively repaired and camouflaged.
- The railway bridge in this same locality has also been hit, and can be used only by pedestrians.
- The area beside route No 16, adjacent to the above mentioned bridge, is thickly mined 5 Km before and three after this same bridge.
- Other mined localities are in area 3256 - 3356 - 3259 - 3459 - 3162 - 3262 - 3061 - 3261 - (Sheet 88). From these localities the civilian population has been made to evacuate.
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Such devices in general have been found in public buildings, barracks, plants of public utility, and buildings formerly occupied by German troops and HQs, which the enemy foresaw would be occupied by Allied troops.

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As a result of the above, all buildings of public service (offices, electricity works, etc) and those buildings formerly occupied by enemy troops and HQs must be deemed to be insecure, and it must be ascertained if they have been mined, such information to be obtained not only by specialist engineer elements, but also by the interrogation of the civilian population, who may have been warned, or who may have noted suspected works in these places.

IL GENERALE OCCHIANTE

- Clemente Primieri -

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