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Feb. - June 1945

Subject :- Report on Combat Group MANTOVA.

SECRET

56 BLU
1 C

MMA. (6)

29 June 45

Copy to :- RHC ICF. (2)
1 District. (2)
DET. (4)

PART I - GENERAL

OBJECTS.

1. The objects of this report are :-

- (a) To estimate the degree of success achieved in preparing the Group for war.
- (b) To record any lessons which might be useful in the event of a similar enterprise being undertaken with some other army.
- (c) To assess the value of the Combat Group as a basis for the post war Italian Army.

BRIEF HISTORY.

2. In September 1945 the MANTOVA Division formed part of the garrison of CALABRIA. In November 1944 it was moved to the S. GIORGIO area, and 56 BLU was attached to it. By 1 Jan 45 it was nearly complete in personnel, a small training and maintenance scale of British equipment had been issued, and a cadre of Italian officers and NCO's had been trained in British weapons. Serious training began with the New Year, but was hampered by bad weather, inadequate equipment, and poor living conditions. The equipping of the Group began early in March, and was almost complete by 15 April, when the Group moved to the area PADDA near SIENA. By 2 May, when the war in Italy ended, the move had been completed, and the programme of training for a holding role had been finished except for two final exercises. It is thought that the Group could have been ready for battle a few weeks earlier if equipping had begun at the end of January.

SUMMARY OF TRAINING.

3. The operational roles for which the Group was to be trained were defined by the DET as follows :-

- (a) To take over a defensive sector on the Italian front, and carry out an active defence.
- (b) After experience in that role to participate in...

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3. The operational roles for which the Group was to be trained were defined by the DMT as follows :-
 - (a) To take over a defensive sector on the Italian front, and carry out an active defence.
 - (b) After experience in that role to participate in attacks in conjunction with Allied troops.
4. Particulars of training by arms are shown below in the report on each arm. The policy of the BLU was to leave the Italian commanders to train their own troops by Italian Army methods.

The part played by the British officers was :-

- (a) To instruct in British methods when Italian methods were inapplicable with British equipment.

-2-

(b) To instruct in tactical and technical methods which were developed since 1943, when the majority of Italian officers lost contact with modern military thought.

(c) To advise Italian officers in overhauling such parts of the operational and administrative system as were found to be out of date and inefficient.

5. The "all arms" aspect of training was conducted as follows :-

(a) A series of cloth model discussions was held, to decide standard layouts and methods for :-

Tactical layout of the Group in defence.
Administrative layout of the Group in defence.
Signal Plans.
Layout of Main and Rear HQ.
Etc.

The conclusions reached were recorded and issued to the Group. The cloth model appeals to Italian officers and was most successful as a method of instruction.

(b) A series of exercises was held, with and without troops, including signals exercises based on the above layouts.

NOTE :- In view of the static role defined in para 3 above, mobile exercises were not practised above battalion level.

(c) The final exercise was to have been a defensive exercise, lasting four days, in which the whole Group was to take part, and in which reliefs in the field were to be carried out.

(d) In addition a good deal of miscellaneous training was carried out including :-

- (i) Recce and written orders by Group HQ.
- (ii) Lectures and training films.
- (iii) Demonstrations by the CMC.

6. The problem of instruction in driving and maintenance was a very big one. Several hundred drivers had to be trained, and the number of vehicles for instructional purposes was inadequate. Driving schools were formed, which visited units in turn. The policy was, first to "brush up" and "pass out" men with some previous experience, and afterwards to train beginners until they were safe on the road, leaving their final training to be carried out under unit arrangements.

7. Except for a small number of officers, the state of training in December 1944 was very low, but the great majority of all ranks worked with enthusiasm and the standard reached was satisfactory. It is thought that had the war continued through the summer the Group would have carried out a holding role with success. The short term policy of the BLU has not, however, eliminated the following weaknesses.

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- (a) Inability of senior Italian officers to grasp the fundamental defects in their military system.
(b) Failure to delegate authority.
(c) Failure to concentrate supporting arms and administrative resources.

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-3-

(d) "Rank consciousness". Examples :-

- (i) Senior officers consider it derogatory to take orders from staff officers of a higher formation who are junior to them in rank.
- (ii) Commanders will not accept technical advice from Medical Officers, Signal Officers etc.
- (iii) A competent British-trained officer is sometimes suddenly superseded by the posting of a senior officer who has no knowledge of British methods.
- (e) Failure to insist on adequate professional standards. Commanders sometimes show great reluctance to remove an inefficient subordinate.
- (f) Failure to insist on compliance with orders. An Italian commander is apt to think that his duty is done when he has issued an order. Officers rarely make thorough inspections to ensure that their orders are carried out.
- (g) Weak power of command of officers. Italian officers seldom understand that the way to treat men is to treat them well but strictly, and to arrange alternating periods of hard work and complete rest. Instead, they are apt to neglect their wants, and treat them softly.
- (h) The complete absence of a Staff system as understood in the British Army.
- (i) Low standard of junior officers. The great majority are in every way inferior to those in the British Army.
- (j) Almost complete absence of good NCO's. There are a certain number of good technical NCO's, but nothing equivalent to the WO's and NCO's of the British Army.

ORGANIZATION.

8. The Combat Group is thought in the main to have been suitably organized. A larger and more complex formation would have been difficult to manage. The following comments are not exhaustive, but are intended as a guide for any future enterprise of a similar nature.

- (a) The HQU was suitably organized. Certain additional personnel were required, and were obtained without difficulty through O2E.
- (b) Though suitable for a holding role, the Group is too small to be the basic formation of a post war army. An army composed of Groups could never take on an army composed of normal formations.
- (c) The following were found to be sources of weakness :-
 - (i) Over centralized Group HQ staff.

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- (e) Failure to insist on adequate professional standards. Commanders sometimes show great reluctance to remove an inefficient subordinate.
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B. The Combat Group is thought in the main to have been suitably organized. A larger and more complex formation would have been difficult to manage. The following comments are not exhaustive, but are intended as a guide for any future enterprise of a similar nature.

- (a) The ELU was suitably organized. Certain additional personnel were required, and were obtained without difficulty through OZE.
- (b) Though suitable for a holding role, the Group is too small to be the basic formation of a post war army. An army composed of Groups could never take on an army composed of normal formations.
- (c) The following were found to be sources of weakness :-
 - (i) Over centralized Group HQ staff.
 - (ii) Distribution of 6 pr Atk guns to inf regts and bns. It is thought that an Atk Regt of one battery of 8 - 17 prs and three 12 gun 6 pr batteries would have ensured better co-ordination.

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- (iii) Organization of the 25 prs. Four 8 gun batteries supporting two infantry regiments is unsatisfactory, especially as there is no provision for artillery representation at Infantry Regiment HQ.
- (iv) Inclusion of the Signal Coy in the Engineer Battalion.
- (v) Organization of the Provost in two independent sections, with no Provost HQ, increases the difficulty of traffic control.

It is thought that the policy of ensuring simplicity by interfering as little as possible with the existing Italian organization was a sound short time policy. It is, however, thought that such serious weaknesses as those named above should not have been accepted.

ADMINISTRATION.

9. In December 1944 the administrative staff and units shared the general defects of the rest of the Combat Group. In particular they suffered from :-

- (a) Inability to organize on a divisional level.
- (b) Failure to appreciate the importance of concentrating their resources.
- (c) Refusal to accept responsibility.
- (d) Lack Of "drive", in submitting indents or following up temporary non-availabilities.
- (e) The fact that the service units are regarded as very inferior to any of the arms.
- (f) In addition they were faced with a great problem due to the complete reorganization of nearly all the service units. The S & T Coy, Carabinieri Sections, Ordnance Field Park and the Medical Sections were all on a modified British establishment. The stores and equipment they were handling, the system of accounting, supply, replacement and evacuation were foreign and bore only a slight resemblance to their own far less adaptable organization.

10. Training was therefore directed to remedying the chief faults outlined above.

- (a) A system of "Officers Days" was started at which lectures and cloth model exercises were held to teach officers and WO's the establishment and principles of operation for the Group administrative organization.
- (b) Exercises were held for all ranks, and later, when vehicles and equipment were received, these took place on the ground.

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- (b) Exercises were held for all ranks, and later, when vehicles and equipment were received, these took place on the ground.
- (c) Technical training of all kinds was started and courses held both inside and outside the Group. A great deal of outside assistance was readily forthcoming from the RASC, RACQ, REEF and RAMC.
- (d) Unit administrative staffs and personnel of the infantry and artillery were all trained in the new methods of supply.

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(e) Every effort was made to enhance the prestige of the service units in the eyes of the rest of the Group by a series of demonstrations.

(f) By reorganization both of the Army HQ and Regimental Staffs it was possible to decentralise to some extent and to force junior officers to accept a greater amount of responsibility.

11. A good measure of success was attained in the service units themselves and these soon became capable of maintaining the Group with little difficulty. On the other hand it rapidly became obvious that it was well nigh impossible to train the administrative personnel of the arms (Artillery, Infantry and Engineers) in their duties. This was due to the fact that all "AQ" functions are regarded as rather degrading and for this reason are allotted to the less intelligent and able officers.

The role of Adjutant in a bn will be allotted to an inefficient Coy Commander. It is thought that to make a success of administration in the post war Italian Army the following points require to be stressed in training.

(a) A complete reorganization of the system of supply which eliminates the present rigid Regimental Depot system.

(b) The importance of all service units, and the fact that without them the fighting troops are as helpless as if they were disarmed.

(c) The importance of the staff and commanders accepting and putting into effect the advice of the technical officers e.g. Medical, EME.

(d) A complete clean up of the Commissariat Corps. This Corps appears to be very out of date and slack and is further tied down by an endless amount of paper work. It deals with nearly all articles both of permanent and consumable supply with the exception of ammunition, vehicles and weapons. From the experience gained with this Combat Group it would appear that this system is unsatisfactory and that the Commissariat Corps should be broken down into clearly defined sections in order to deal with the various commodities and stores handled. The old system of ammunition supply through the Artillery has been superseded in this Group, but only a temporary method is now in use which is not altogether satisfactory, and will obviously require amendment. The Ordnance Corps has had immense success and the British system of supply of vehicles and stores has both interested and been understood by the Italians.

(e) The training of all officers of the services who are to occupy important positions on Divisional, Corps etc staffs at a school where the principles of war and the problems of the various arms are taught and discussed with members of the fighting arms present. This should overcome the system, only partly amended in this Group, where a service unit officer was not allowed to site even a hospital or dump, but had to accept a staff decision, often made off a map.

(f) The formation of a large reserve of technicians. It has been found that very few of the Italian officers or NCOs are trained in technical work.

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- (f) The formation of a large reserve of technicians. It has been found that very few of the Italian officers or NCO's have the mechanical sense which can now be associated with nearly all Allied officers and NCO's. They lack not only the knowledge, but also the desire to acquire the skills necessary to operate and maintain the instruments and machines now at their disposal.

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(g) Lastly impressing on the services that their responsibility is not only supply, but in an emergency they must be prepared to assist the fighting troops in combat. For this reason every man must be kept in touch with the up to date situation and be trained to use his weapons effectively. On the other hand the officers of the various arms must be made to realise their administrative responsibility towards their men and be taught to accept only the best possible living conditions. They must also be made to demand the highest possible standards of hygiene, cleanliness, and care of arms and equipment from the soldiers under their command.

CONCLUSIONS.

12. It is believed that battle would have proved that the Group is now trained for the operational role given in para 3.

13. It is thought that apart from the comments in para 8 (c), the plan for organizing and training the Group was sound.

14. It is thought that the Group is not a sound basis for the post war Italian Army for the following reasons :-

(a) The Group is not a Division, and is unsuitable for the "general purposes" of war. (It is, however, thought that Italian officers are not at present capable of training and handling full size divisions).

(b) The weaknesses in para 8 (c) are fundamental faults of organization and cannot be accepted in a modern army.

15. The real weakness of the Italian Army is its officers. There is good material in Italy, but for a long term policy, the following steps are thought to be essential :-

(a) A thorough "purge" of the senior ranks.

(b) A Staff College which will introduce vigorous modern military thought in to the army.

(c) A cadet school to build up a supply of young officers of a good type.

(d) A complete overhaul of the administration and Staff system of the army.

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PART II - LESSONS BY ARMS

16. Artillery.

Proficiency. Considering the paucity of training equipment in the early stages, the proportion of untrained recruits and the late arrival of vehicles, the personnel of this Regiment have shown a high degree of enthusiasm to reach their present state of training.

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-7-

No. 10 RA Training Team before the formation of the Combat Group, and the School of Artillery since, have made it possible for them to adopt British weapons and to a certain degree British methods.

Experience alone will teach co-operation with the infantry, and speed in producing fire. Fire has been produced quickly and accurately, but the old Italian traditions are hard, and the urgency of well timed and adequately concentrated fire is not appreciated.

The ability of the anti-tank and anti-aircraft detachments is reasonably good but their respective co-ordinations have not been tested.

A firm and impartial discipline and the punishment of officers and NCO's rather than men for avoidable mistakes and losses has reflected itself unmistakably in this Regiment. A fair standard of welfare has resulted, also a negligible degree of loss of clothing and equipment, a fair standard of discipline on the roads, and a reasonably low proportion of absentees.

The most serious defect in the organization is the failure of the WE to provide any mechanics for repair of **and** fault finding in vehicles, other than the regiment's LAD.

17. Engineers.

(a) Standard of Training Achieved.

- (1) Policy. The engineer training policy laid down by AFHQ was that the engineer units should receive training only in the use of British equipment with which they were not familiar and that they were not to be trained in RT, Mechanical Equipment or Wet Bridging. In other respects the units were to be considered as trained. In practice the task was much more difficult and by the time the units were reorganized to the new WE they were virtually new and had to be trained from scratch.

- (11) Method. Training was carried out by Italian officers and NCO's who had attended courses at the School of Mechanical Engineering. The number of trained instructors were not considered suitable for Combat Group Engineers, showing that the original selection had not been done with sufficient thoroughness.

- (111) Syllabus. Training carried out was :-

1. Mine Warfare.
2. Elementary Dry Bailey Bridging.
3. Fieldworks and Roadworks.
4. Demolitions and use of British Service Explosives.
5. Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles.
6. General Military Training including Weapon Training.

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5. Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles.
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(iv) Conclusion. It is considered that the task of training the engineers has been achieved i.e. they are trained sufficiently to be able to operate in a defensive role. They are not capable of mobile operations.

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-8-

(b) Suggested Improvements in Training for the Future.

- (i) Discipline. The principle cause of the shortcomings of the engineer units is bad discipline, resulting in bad organization in training and works. Any future training must be designed to obviate this fundamental failing.
- (ii) Training. Generally the Italian officer has very little idea of how to train his men. Officers and NCO's will have to be more thoroughly trained at Military Training Establishments before this can be improved.
- (iii) Junior Officers and NCO's. The present standard is poor. Junior officers are quite well informed but they lack the drive to put their ideas into practice. NCO's are very poor. Steps should be taken to produce a much improved type of Junior officer and NCO.

(c) Engineers in Post War Italian Army.

The present organization is unsuitable for divisional engineers. Suggested improvements are :-

- (i) Engineers and Signals should be completely separate.
- (ii) CME should have adequate staff.
- (iii) Transport of Field Coys should be increased to equal the British scale to make them completely mobile.
- (iv) Field Coys should be equipped and trained in RT and Mechanical Equipment.
- (v) Training should commence from the beginning with individual training. Sappers must learn to be soldiers first.

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Signals.

- (a) Degree of Success Achieved in Preparing the Group for War.
 - (i) Training. It was found that the majority of Signal personnel (Signal Coy personnel and Regimental Signallers) were already partially technically trained. The training undertaken consisted therefore for the major part, of training in the use of British equipment.
 - (ii) Such new ground had to be covered, however, especially in the case of Signal Office organization and procedure, which were practically non-existent in the Italian Army.

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- (iii) All individual training was successfully completed and on exercises held to date communications have proved satisfactory.

(b) Equipping.

Equipping of the Group with Signal equipment, was satisfactorily completed.

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(c) Lessons Learned.

(i) The major change considered essential is the splitting of the Signal Coy from the Engineer Battalion. The Signal Coy can never function properly in action as a coy of the Engineer Battalion, nor can one officer be expected to cope with the work of a CRE and a Coyd Signals.

(ii) The Combat Group staff are not sufficiently signal minded. They do not understand the correct use of the signal communications at their disposal. Consequently liaison between staff and signals has been poor. It is felt however that this would have greatly improved after a period in the line.

(iii) The question of repair of signal equipment has been very pressing throughout owing to the shortage of trained instrument mechanics. It is thought that if the Group had gone into action it would have been necessary to call upon a RELE Telecomm Section to assist with the repair of Signal equipment.

(a) Value as a Basis for the Post War Italian Army.

(i) It is thought that the training given to the Signal Coys in the various Combat Groups and the experienced gained by those that have been in operations will prove invaluable after the war.

(ii) Before the signals in the post war Italian Army can however be satisfactory it is considered that the under mentioned are essential :-

The formation of a separate Signal Corps and the setting up of a Signal Training Centre for training officers and OR's. It is thought that the best of the officers from the Signal Coys of the five Combat Groups could form a cadre of instructors for the Signal Training Centre.

The organization of the Signal Corps on British lines e.g. Divisional Signals, L of C Signals, etc.

A complete revision of the present train of thought as regards signal communications in the field.

The latest views of signals in the field should be taught at the Italian Staff College. Signal training should be an integral part of all officers' training.

Development of signal equipment for the Italian army. The Italian signal equipment for field use is in many cases cumbersome and obsolete.

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- The organization of the Signal Corps on British lines e.g. Divisional Signals, L of C Signals, etc.
- A complete revision of the present train of thought as regards signal communications in the field.
- The latest views of signals in the field should be taught at the Italian Staff College. Signal training should be an integral part of all officers' training.
- Development of signal equipment for the Italian army. The Italian signal equipment for field use is in many cases cumbersome and obsolete.
19. Infantry.
- (a) Standard Achieved.
- (i) The Group has reached the standard laid down in IWT directive. It is now sufficiently trained to take over and hold a sector, and would, after battle experience be capable of participation in attacks with limited objectives.

-10-

- (ii) Defence has been much emphasized during training. Commanders have been taught to think along safe lines. Glaring weaknesses of the Italian systems have been eradicated.
- (iii) Senior officers are slow to convince and retain a sneaking regard for Italian methods.
- (iv) Junior officers are generally bright and keen and anxious to demonstrate that Italians are just as good soldiers as the British. They realise (the senior officers do not) that antiquated methods and lack of foresight and planning contributed more to their defeat than antiquated equipment and lack of tanks and guns.
- (v) NCO's are poor compared with British equivalents, they have no disciplinary control over their men. Much time is wasted in chatter and argument on parade. Off parade NCO's fraternise with inevitable "loss of face".
- (vi) The rank and file are extremely hardy. They are mostly witty and keen. They show interest in their new weapons and equipment. Technically they learn fast. Mortars, wireless etc are great hobbies to the men and they work excellently to perfect themselves. They show the normal soldiers aversion to drudgery but are none the less capable of enormous feats of labour on very little food.

(b) Methods.

- (i) The system adopted in training has proved a success. The six Majors were each charged with a battalion and in addition each Major was put at the head of a school or department i.e. Carrier School, Mortar School, Subalterns TEWTS, Senior officers TEWTS, Junior Officers Course etc. In this way there was community of thought and method between the specialists and the battalions.
- (ii) Group schools were run for specialists, with the object of obtaining a level standard of training in the Group, to instruct officers and OR's in the weapon and to teach the Italian instructors to use British instructional methods. All these objects have been attained. All Group schools were supervised by British officers and sergeants.
- (iii) At a later stage the Group schools were divided into regimental schools, where advanced and tactical handling was taught.
- (iv) Finally when senior officers were considered competent

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(iii) At a later stage the Group schools were divided into regimental schools, where advanced and tactical handling was taught.

(iv) Finally when senior officers were considered competent all training was done at battalion level, under direct Italian supervision. The high standard of the anti-tank, mortar and carrier personnel has justified this policy.

-11-

- (v) British NCO's were invaluable in the schools, particularly for shortening drills and for supervising care and maintenance periods.

(c) Basis for Post War Army.

- (i) The regiment is not a tactically sound organization. The HQ as at present constituted is not sound. Too much 'A' & 'Q' work is thrown on the HQ as these subjects are barely touched at Battalion HQ.
- (ii) The three company infantry battalion is unsound. Four coys. could be formed from existing strength. 'A' & 'Q' must be considered at battalion level and staffs provided for this purpose.

20. Supply & Transport.

(a) Standard of Training Achieved.

- (i) It is considered that the 104 Supply & Transport Coy has been trained and had developed sufficiently on British lines and system to carry out its role under active service conditions.

The biggest problem in training is to ensure that the company maintains its II at a high enough standard to enable the company to meet all commitments allotted to it.

The RASC system of vehicle maintenance and inspection, and the 16 task system has been adopted.

Technical instruction on supplies has been implemented by means of courses at the RASCED and also by daily handling of commodities whilst engaged in the normal role of div maintenance.

It is considered that both officers and OR's of the company responded well to instruction and have displayed a high degree of enthusiasm, but a lack of initiative on the part of junior officers and NCO's, tends to produce a weakness in the unit as a whole. This weakness is principally displayed in interior economy, discipline and management, and failure to ensure that system and drill when taught is carried out with the utmost efficiency. The OC Company, a regular soldier, has shown excellent insight and clarity in understanding the British administration system in the field. He has worked extremely hard and his unit has shown a good standard of efficiency.

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(ii) 318 Field Bakery has had very little opportunity to work completely on British methods owing to lack of equipment and essential vehicles. The unit, however, has always functioned, by using requisitioned civilian premises, and the technical quality of their work is high.

12/.....

-12-

(b) Lessons Learned.

- (i) At first the Italians did not appreciate very clearly the true need for thorough and systemised MT maintenance. However it is now thought that the Italians are beginning to appreciate the need of such a system in relation to their own responsibilities and war role.
- (ii) It is considered that the training in British methods will not have been in vain, and if the future Italian Army is to be based on British Army principles, 104 Supply & Transport Coy will have a firm foundation on which to develop.

21. Medical.(a) Equipping.

Equipping was complete to scale and sufficient to enable medical services to function efficiently in the field.

(b) Medical Officers.

The majority had war experience, but suffered from an inferiority complex and were considered by officers of other services to represent only a "Doctor" and not an officer capable of performing regimental duties.

The ADMS previously had very little authority and played very little part in organizing his units O.C. sitting unit locations. Regimental Medical Officers lacked sufficient authority to advise regiment and battalion commanders. Appeal to the ADMS in cases where regimental commanders refused advice made very little difference. 6900

Taking into account the short time available, attempts to increase the authority of the ADMS and MO's generally, were satisfactory and promising. Satisfactory progress in instructing officers was also made in the following subjects :-

- (i) Tactical considerations in sitting units.
- (ii) Map reading.
- (iii) Interior economy.
- (iv) Welfare of men.
- (v) The officers responsibility for the care, maintenance and inspection of unit vehicles and weapons.
- (c) Hygiene and Sanitation.

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(v) The officers responsibility for the care, maintenance and inspection of unit vehicles and weapons.

(c) Hygiene and Sanitation.

This at first was bad and it was found necessary to take the following steps :-

(i) To bring home the necessity for stringent rules for hygiene and sanitation where large bodies of men are concerned.

(ii) To instruct all concerned in even the most elementary precautions.

-13-

- (iii) To ensure that regimental officers realize their responsibility to the CO for all hygiene and sanitation orders issued by the ADMS through the Group HQ.
- (iv) To ensure that the ADMS had sufficient authority on the HQ staff to enforce orders.

Very satisfactory progress was made in this direction. The present ADMS understands the need for stringent precautions and has succeeded in raising the standard of hygiene and sanitation in the Group to a satisfactory standard.

(d) Medical OR's.

The majority have had war experience, and in most cases little training was necessary to bring them to a satisfactory standard. The average soldier was found to be an enthusiastic trainee. At first they were content to live under very bad conditions. They have now been shown a new standard comparable to that existing in the British Army, but it is thought that they will retain this standard only if they are forced to do so by the presence of British trained officers.

(e) General Medical Organization.

The organization is now such that the medical units could support the Group satisfactorily and efficiently in the field.

(f) Lessons Learned.

- (i) Ranks of Medical Officers. It is thought that the rank of the ADMS could well be increased to that of Lt-Col, and the SMO's to regiments, CO's Medical Section and hospitals should carry the rank of major.
- (ii) The OR's are capable and willing, provided they have a good type of officer.
- (iii) It is thought that MO's should receive current publications in some form similar to the British "Army Medical Bulletin".
- (iv) At present senior medical officers are not staff trained and until they are no real progress can be expected.
- (v) It is thought that instead of a hygiene and anti-malaria platoon attached to the medical section, a separate hygiene and anti-malaria section should be formed commanded by a major.

(g) Value as Basis for Post War Italian Army.

It is thought that the majority of medical officers, especially the ADMS have been trained in a manner which would be of great value to the Italian Army.

6904

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(g) Value as Basis for Post War Italian Army.

It is thought that the majority of medical officers, especially the ADMS have learned about and appreciate British methods. If the post war Italian Army is to be based on the British Army it is felt that with further staff college experience these officers would be of value in forming such an army.

Similarly the medical units who have absorbed to a certain extent British methods, should have their value in forming the new army.

-14-

22. Ordnance.Standard of Training Achieved.

- (a) The training of the ODP has proceeded satisfactorily and it is considered that they could function reasonably well in an operational role.
- (b) Officers, clerks and storemen attended a 14 day course at the RAOC School of Instruction, the results being most beneficial.
- (c) In the event of a similar enterprise being undertaken in future it is essential that two officers be trained in administrative duties, similar to those of DADOS, one being responsible for Vote 9 Stores, the other for Vote 7 & 8 Stores.
- (d) Great stress has been placed on interior economy, unit sanitation, care and maintenance of arms and equipment and it is felt that this, with the British system of supply in the field will be of value in the formation of the post war Italian Army.

23. Mechanical Engineers.

- (a) The Mechanical Engineer units have been mobilised to approximately 90% of personnel, the main deficiencies being skilled technicians who are not available from any source at present, e.g. Radio Mechanics, Electricians, Instrument Mechanics etc. The remaining personnel have adapted themselves easily to British equipment and methods.
- (b) British equipment, tools and machinery lorries have been received practically to scale, the only serious substitution is 30 cwt breakdown vehicles in lieu of the 3 ton type.
- (c) The lack of experienced engineering and workshop officers and warrant officers is apparent and a strong OC workshop would ease the responsibility of the Group Chief Mechanical Engineer.
- (d) The LAD's have not been mobilised any length of time but given the necessary information, as the workshops of their respective regiments and units, they should function satisfactorily.

24. Carabinieri.

- (a) Of all the units of the Combat Group the Carabinieri are probably the unit which responded the most to British methods of organization, discipline and training. The Carabinieri Regiment is the equivalent to our Corps of Military Police, but was not formerly responsible for traffic control, only for discipline and field security. Traffic control was the task of a separate organization, the Lovieri.
- (b) Training was therefore directed to the following points :-

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- (b) Training was therefore directed to the following points :-
- (i) Traffic control and route signing.
 - (ii) Disciplinary duties.
 - (iii) The achievement of a high standard of turn out and discipline.

-15-

(b) contd. The sections were instructed by a Cpl of the Cmp lent by the Provost Marshal's office AHEQ and this NCO stayed with sections for six weeks. A high standard of training was achieved especially in (i) and (ii) and the units were inspected by a representative of the Provost Marshal who rendered a very satisfactory report.

(c) The chief faults noticed were :-

- (i) Lack of interest in the maintenance of vehicles and weapons.
- (ii) Lack of drive in checking soldiers for minor faults e.g. saluting.
- (iii) Lower standard of intelligence in signing roads. Signs often placed in stupid places or where they are not easily seen.

On the other hand the sections maintained a high standard of :-

- (iv) Shepherding convoys along difficult routes by use of motor cyclists.
- (v) Initiative in clearing up traffic jams.

Further they command the respect of the soldiers of the Group and their presence is a big factor in maintaining good order when difficulties arise.

(d) Finally it is considered that the Carabinieri are capable of carrying out the role of British Provost in the post war Italian Army providing that :-

- (i) A higher standard of intelligence is demanded for entry into the Corps.

- (ii) That their training is brought up to date and concentrated on traffic control and disciplinary duties. At the present moment the issue is confused by the fact that they are often called on to investigate matters which could be dealt with by the SIB or ISS. This type of work is too specialised to be handled efficiently by Group police and should not be included in their duties.

6932

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CMP
ATG/ec

[Signature]

Lt-Col.
GS.

SECRET

56 BLU PROGRESS REPORT NO. 8

1 G

/2 Apr 45.

DMT.

Copy to :- MMIA.

AFHQ., G III Org (Foreign)

AFHQ., G III Training (Br)

RTO ICF.

1 District (3)

PART I - GENERAL PROGRESS TO 7 APRIL 19451. ARTILLERY.

(a)

25 pr.

Gunners of 2 and 4 Batteries fired a total of 800 rds at EBOLI 26 to 29 Mar 45. The following are extracts from IG's report :- The shooting by officers of the rank of Capt and above was effective with very few exceptions. Reaction to fall of shot is quick and knowledge of general principles is sound. In general the shooting by subalterns is well below the standard required. These two batteries have attained proficiency in firing STONKS. To simplify the procedure and to fit in with the organization of an Italian Combat Group, each battery (8 guns) is distributed over the whole front of the STONK.

The correction of the moment found by shooting at a Datum and by computation with a meteor telegram, agreed within 2 minutes and 10 yds on 28 Mar and within 3 minutes and 30 yds on 29 Mar. Except for one case of gross error, predicted fire on to targets of known co-ordinates was satisfactory. Straddles or direct hits were obtained in most cases.

3 Battery fired 200 rds on to a small target area near their billets on 4 and 5 Apr. The second day showed marked improvement but more practice is needed to produce a response of normal speed. 3 Capts and 6 subalterns observed. Throughout all the shoots it has been found that first attempts lack faith and common sense checks; but once the Italians have found that the magic works they are keen and accurate and cut out a surprising amount of their chatter. Without British supervision the common sense check is not dependable.

(b)

17 pr.

KVC IOW.

1 District (5)

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(b) 17 pr.

Training mostly confined to the despatch of sub-sections to occupy and live on a gunsite for 24 hrs.

-2-

(c) 40 MM.

Gunnery after 3 weeks at School of AA EBOLI have received the following report :- All detachments have proved to be efficient at drill and have obtained a good standard of smartness. The care and maintenance of equipment has improved and is now generally satisfactory. All detachments have shown confidence in firing and have obtained satisfactory results both at Gun and Eye shooting control. Atk drill was good and reactions were quick. A promising workmanlike bty. A good standard has been attained, well up to the standard of units at practice camp. If the present standard is kept up the unit should, as far as its actual gunnery is concerned, prove satisfactory in operational shooting.

(a) Specialists.

Specialists appear to be better grounded in the book than in practical application. Practice will remedy this.

It is considered that the artillery regt could fulfill its normal role in static warfare.

2. ENGINEERS.

(a) Progress of Training.

Coys are now fairly well equipped with special equipment and vehicles. Equipment and vehicles have been allocated to pls. Training has consisted chiefly of use of technical equipment, practice loading of vehicles and training of personnel in small convoy runs. Drivers to fill WT's have been initially trained at the Battalion Driving School and their further training is now the responsibility of the C's C coys.

3. SIGNALS.

Regimental Signallers.

693v

All intensive signal training has now been completed and all Signal Schools within the Group have closed.

Applied signal training is continuing within regts.

Two HQ and Signal exercises have now been held and the following main points have been noted :-

- (i) The organization and functioning of signal offices needs much practice. This is a complete innovation for the Italian Army.
- (ii) Signal officers at Regimental HQ's do not completely understand their position as signals advisers to the Regt Comds.
- (iii) Liaison between staff and signals is poor.

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- (ii) Signal officers at Regimental HQ's do not completely understand their position as signals advisers to the Regtl Comds.
- (iii) Liaison between staff and signals is poor.
- (iv) Many technical points require improvement, i.e. Line laying, Leading into signal offices, correct supervision of wireless nets.

It is thought that further intensive training of staff and signals is required before the Group is ready for battle.

-3-

4. INFANTRY.(a) 6 pr.

All numbers are basically trained and have fired full charge. The drill behind the gun is good. Lloyd carrier drivers are still a problem however this is being overcome, but the low standard of training of drivers is likely to slow down tactical training. It is considered the six pr coys and pls will function adequately in battle.

(b) 3" Mortars.

A high standard of basic training has been reached and tactical training is progressing satisfactorily. Firing results have been generally good. The mortar coys and pls are fit to do their job in battle.

(c) Regimental Signallers.

An adequate but not very high standard has been reached, much practice is still required in all forms of signal work.

(d) Carrier Universal.

Tactical training has begun. However much remains to be done, drivers require much more experience especially in cross country work and in moving their carriers expertly and quietly about a battle field. Maintenance is not up to standard.

(e) Assault Pioneers.

Well trained in mine laying and lifting and handling of explosives but little has been done in other aspects of the assault pioneers work.

(f) Drivers IC.

Driver training is progressing but the drivers turned out by the Regimental Schools need considerable road experience before they can be considered well trained. Maintenance is not good.

(g) Officers.

Officer training is fairly satisfactory but a large amount still remains to be done in the more technical subjects such as map reading, mine warfare, use of air photos, supervision of vehicle maintenance etc. Also most officers need practice in the practical application of their training i.e. in handling their commands.

(h) Tactical.

Bn training is beginning. Coy training was on the whole satisfactory. Considerable attention must be paid to night work.

(b) 3" Mortars.

A high standard of basic training has been reached and tactical training is progressing satisfactorily. Firing results have been generally good. The mortar coys and pls are fit to do their job in battle.

(c) Regimental Signallers.

An adequate but not very high standard has been reached, much practice is still required in all forms of signal work.

(d) Carrier Universal.

Tactical training has begun. However much remains to be done, drivers require much more experience especially in cross country work and in moving their carriers expertly and quietly about a battle field. Maintenance is not up to standard.

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(h) Tactical.

Bn training is beginning. Coy training was on the whole satisfactory. Considerable attention must be paid to night work of which the Italian soldier has little experience.

(i) General.

It is considered that with a further short period of training the infantry will be ready for war with the exception of one bn which has suffered under a bad commander. This commander has now been changed and it is hoped the bn will pick up rapidly.

-4-

5. SUPPLY & TRANSPORT.(a) Composite Platoons.

Normal duties. Coy exercises in the field, Supply, Petrol and Ammunition points established during exercises.

(b) Driving and Maintenance.

Since the last Progress Report the WE of the Coy has been increased by 3 x 3 ton 4 x 2 GS per Transport Pl and 3 motor cycles solo per pl. These vehicles have been drawn by the Coy. Also an increase in WE has been made of 3 drivers 10 per transport pl and 5 drivers 10 per RDI. No driver reinforcements have yet been posted to the coy. Of the 122 drivers on strength, 25 are still in the training state, but it is considered that within 10 days these learners should be efficient enough to take over vehicles.

Convoy exercises have been held within the coy and the standard achieved is reasonably good. The standard of maintenance is satisfactory.

It is considered that the coy is capable of carrying out its war role, although the driver situation needs very careful watching.

Equipping of the coy is up to scale and there are no major deficiencies. Practice of deployment of the coy as a whole and of its defence when deployed, is needed.

6. ORDNANCE.

It is considered that the Ordnance Fd Pk can fulfill its role in battle.

7. MEDICAL.

The Medical Section is fully capable of fulfilling its war role but owing to deficiencies of personnel, cannot remain in action for a long period.

8. MECHANICAL ENGINEERS.

The tradesmen at present with the workshops are considered trained but there are still serious shortages of various types of tradesmen. The workshops can function adequately in the field.

9. PROVOST.

Are fully trained and carry out their duties well.

6920

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Convoy exercises have been held within the coy and the standard achieved is reasonably good. The standard of maintenance is satisfactory.

It is considered that the coy is capable of carrying out its war role, although the driver situation needs very careful watching.

Equipping of the coy is up to scale and there are no major deficiencies. Practice of deployment of the coy as a whole and of its defence when deployed, is needed.

6. ORDNANCE.

It is considered that the Ordnance Pl can fulfill its role in battle.

7. MEDICAL.

The Medical Section is fully capable of fulfilling its war role but owing to deficiencies of personnel, cannot remain in action for a long period.

8. MECHANICAL ENGINEERS.

The tradesmen at present with the workshops are considered trained but there are still serious shortages of various types of tradesmen. The workshops can function adequately in the field.

9. PROVOST.

Are fully trained and carry out their duties well.

PART II - STATE OF TRAINING OF TRADESMEN & SPECIALISTS.

10. See Appendix 'A' attached.

PART III - BALANCE OF PROGRAMME TO BE COMPLETED.

11. SPECIALIST TRAINING.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

12. NON SPECIALIST TRAINING.

(a)	<u>Artillery.</u>	
	Deployment of the regt and handling of MT.	
(b)	<u>Engineers.</u>	
	General Military Training	45%
	Sapper Training	40%
	Maintenance & operation of vehicles & Fd Plant	55%
(c)	<u>Signals.</u>	
	Deployment of signal resources of the Group, organization of signal offices.	
(d)	<u>Infantry.</u>	
	Battalion training.	
	Gas training.	
	Handling of MT.	
(e)	<u>Supply & Transport.</u>	
	Specialist Tradesmen	20%
	Field duties	20%
	Weapon Training	20%
(f)	<u>Ordnance.</u>	
	Weapon Training	50%
(g)	<u>Medical.</u>	
	Deployment of medical resources of the Group.	
(h)	<u>Mechanical Engineers.</u>	
	Weapon Training	50%

13. GENERAL.

The three outstanding needs of the Group are :-

12. NON SPECIALIST TRAINING.

- (a) Artillery.
Deployment of the regt and handling of MT.
- (b) Engineers.
General Military Training 45%
Sapper Training 40%
Maintenance & operation of vehicles & Rd Plant 55%
- (c) Signals.
Deployment of signal resources of the Group, organization of signal offices.
- (d) Infantry.
Battalion training.
Gas training.
Handling of MT.
- (e) Supply & Transport.
Specialist Tradesmen 20%
Field duties 20%
Weapon Training 20%
- (f) Ordnance.
Weapon Training 50%
- (g) Medical.
Deployment of medical resources of the Group.
- (h) Mechanical Engineers.
Weapon Training 50%

69.

13. GENERAL.

The three outstanding needs of the Group are :-

- (i) An improved standard of driving and maintenance.
- (ii) Practice for staff and signals in their duties in the field. At present Div HQ is more advanced than the Regimental HQ's.
- (iii) Experience for all units in living and working in battle conditions.

6/.....sheet

-6-

The above sub-para (i) is the subject of constant attention by British and Italian officers. It is a big problem, and will take time to overcome. It is hoped to deal with (ii) and (iii) by holding a continuous exercise in the Radda area.

PART IV - COURSES & SPECIALIST TRAINING COMPLETED.

14. See Appx 'B' to 56 BLU Progress Report No. 7 dated 26 Mar 45 -
Serials 1, 2, 3 & 4.



In the Field,
AG/ec

Will 6956
Lt-Col.
GS.

Attached :- Appendix 'A' - State of Specialists & Tradesmen.
Annexure 1 - Exercise No. 4. (DFT only)
Annexure 2 - 56 BLU Progress Report No. 7. (1 District only)

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



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Appendix 'A' to 56

MECHANICAL ENGINEERS

[illegible]

Appendix 'A' to 56 BRU Progress Report No. 8
dated 12 Apr 45

MECHANICAL ENGINEERS

VEHICLE & TRANSPORT			MEDICAL			ORDNANCE			ELECTRICAL ENGINEERS			TOTALS			Serials
Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(u)
6												18	18		1
												4	4		2
												62	13	49	3
												7	6	1	4
												1	1	1	5
												4	3	1	6
												57	54	3	7
												61	72	9	8
												3	3	3	9
17			4	4			8	8				142	198		10
122	43	43	57	42	15	12	38	25	13			1082	862	220	11
14	3		4	1	2							59	41	18	12
												21	12	12	13
			1	1			2		2			49	33	16	14
			2	1	1							64	42	22	15
												2	2		16
												17	6	11	17
	3											43	43		18
												15	10	5	19
												59	59		20
17							5	3	2	2	6	3	3		21
			20	20								332	284	48	22
												20	20		23
												129	110	19	24
											2	2			25
												14	11	3	26
1												10	6	4	
												4	4		

6954

Serial	Tradesmen or Specialists	GROUP HQ				PROVOST				ARTILLERY				INFANTRY				WE
		WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)
27.	Sheet Metal Workers																	1
28.	Sanitary Personnel																	1
29.	Stretcher Bearers	2	2							2	2			125	125			4
30.	Storemen	4	4															4
31.	Telecommunications Tech																	1
32.	Turners																	1
33.	Vehicle Mechs																	11
34.	Watersmen																	0
35.	Welders																	2
36.	Carriers & Drivers									2	2			124	109	22	22	
37.	Carriers & Lloyd Drivers													62	60	22	22	
38.	Geniometrist													11	8	6		
39.	Gun Nos 1									64	64							
40.	6 pr Gun Numbers +													160	130			
41.	3" Mortar Numbers +													120	120			
42.	Regimental Signallers +									211	253	58	58	335	335			
43.	Survey Personnel									68	68							
44.	Infantry Pioneers													60	50			
45.	Artificers RA									5	2	3	3					

+ Are fully trained basically but require tactical training.

[illegible]

TRANSPORT				MEDICAL			ORDNANCE				MECHANICAL ENGINEERS & LADs				TOTALS				
Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	Serials
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
			52	52							4	2	2		5	2	3		27
			110	93	17										52	52			28
10							20	20	2	2	24	10	14		24	227	17		29
											3		3		3	50	16	2	30
											3	3			6	4			31
							3	3			36	35	1	1	55	47	8	2	32
															8	6	2		33
											4	2	2		6	2	3		34
															114	112	32	52	35
															82	60	22	22	37
															12	8	6		38
															94	92			39
															180	180			40
															120	120			41
															466	508	58	50	42
															68	63			43
															60	60			44
															5	2	3	3	45

RESTRICTED

39A

SUBJECT: Drivers for MANTOVA.
-----LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(M.E.I.A.)B/G/29/38
22 March 45TO : D.M.T.
-----Copy to: 56 BLU, ✓
"F" BLU, RTC ICF.

32B

Reference your DMT/88/MTI of 17 March.

1. The deficiency of drivers in MANTOVA Group is fully realised and every effort will be made to meet it. In the last week 190 trained drivers have been posted to MANTOVA (of whom 40 are for No. 1 M.A.C.).

2. The problem has been discussed with Lt/Col GIBBON and it is planned to solve it as follows :-

- (a) Training as drivers of personnel already in Group.
- (b) Posting from RTC of men suitable to be trained as drivers.
- (c) Posting of a further 100 trained drivers from RTC ICF by the middle of April.

6953

for
Major General
M.E.I.A.

ok

27 MAR 45

27 MAR 1945

15

56 BLU PROGRESS REPORT NO. 7

SECRET

3819

1 C

26 Mar 45.

INT.

Copy to :- MIA.

AMHQ., G III Org (Foreign).
 AMHQ., G III (Br) Training.
 RTO ICF.

PART I - GENERAL PROGRESS TO 22 MAR 45.1. ARTILLERY.(a) 25 pr.

Gunnery 1st Gruppo fired 673 rds at EBOLI on 12, 13 and 14 Mar. Improvement was remarkable and by the third day response to fire orders achieved normal speed. The four EC's and twelve Captains of 25 pr Gruppo did observation of fire with varied but improving success.

(b) 17 pr.

Gunnery fired 200 rds at EBOLI 19 and 21 Mar. This Gruppo now has 12 WGP's capable of doing number 1 and 36 proficient layers (more than 4 per detachment) mostly of high quality.

(c) 40 mm.

Gunnery have been at School of AA, EBOLI for three weeks, during which they have only fired 600 rds at sleeve targets and 200 rds Atk. Sleeve towing aircraft seldom turned up when ordered. This Gruppo has its 12 DC's, 12 Nos 1 and 36 proficient layers (50% above WE).

(d) Specialists.

The firing has so far shown specialists to be soundly grounded but slow in execution.

2. ENGINEERS.(a) General.

With the arrival of substantial quantities of

1. ARTILLERY.

(a) 25 pr.

Gunners 1st Gruppo fired 673 rds at EBOLI on 12, 13 and 14 Mar. Improvement was remarkable and by the third day response to fire orders achieved normal speed. The four FO's and twelve Captains of 25 pr Gruppo did observation of fire with varied but improving success.

(b) 17 pr.

Gunners fired 200 rds at EBOLI 19 and 21 Mar. This Gruppo now has 19 KCO's capable of doing number 1 and 36 proficient layers (more than 4 per detachment) mostly of high quality.

(c) 40 pr.

Gunners have been at School of AA, EBOLI for three weeks, during which they have only fired 600 rds at sleeve targets and 200 rds Atk. Sleeve towing aircraft seldom turned up when ordered. This Gruppo has its 12 DO's, 12 Nos 1 and 36 proficient layers (50% above WE).

(d) Specialists.

The firing has so far shown specialists to be soundly grounded but slow in execution.

2. ENGINEERS.

(a) General.

With the arrival of substantial quantities of technical equipment and vehicles, emphasis during the past two weeks has been on organization of coys and training of drivers.

(b) Sapper Training.

Training in elementary dry Bailey bridging, line warfare, demolitions, roadworks and fieldworks has continued. Difficulty is still experienced in persuading officers that once their units have learned to do a particular type of work, they must continue training in the same sub set until the maximum efficiency has been attained.

-2-

(c) Weapon Training & General Military Training.

Firing of all weapons has continued, each coy being allotted the open range for two days per week. The standard of care of arms is improving.

(d) Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles.

The Battalion Driving School is functioning satisfactorily. There are now 9 vehicles allotted for training and the driver situation is in hand. By 31 Mar sufficient drivers will be trained to fill establishment. Training will continue to prepare as many spare drivers as possible.

3. SIGNALS.

Intensive training of the Signal Coy has now finished. A "drive" on interior economy has been held preparatory to the pls going out to join their regts.

4. INFANTRY.(a) Specialists.

All specialists are basically trained with the exception of Carrier Drivers and Drivers IC. Training is designed to complete this by 15 Apr.

Advanced training of Mortar and 6 pr detachments continues. Tactical training of Carrier Pls is due to begin on 26 Mar.

(b) Officers.

Map reading, compass, REMTS and R/T are being studied. The detailed organization of bns and flns is studied periodically in order to instruct all officers in the value of the flns they fight in.

(c) Tactics.

Training progresses. British methods are studied and practised (though in some cases with reluctance). Pl and Coy training is now finished. A high standard of fieldcraft has been reached and pl tactics are, in the main, satisfactory. Coy training was in places disappointing but energetic steps have been taken to put faults right.

Bn training commences 25 Mar 45.

(d) Small Arms.

There has recently been a marked improvement in interest in small arms. Shooting and maintenance has greatly advanced.

5. SUPPLY & TRANSPORT.(a) Composite Platoons.

6951

3. SIGNALS.

Intensive training of the Signal Coy has now finished. A "drive" on interior economy has been held preparatory to the pls going out to join their regts.

4. INFANTRY.(a) Specialists.

All specialists are basically trained with the exception of Carrier Drivers and Drivers IC. Training is designed to complete this by 15 Apr.

Advanced training of Mortar and 6 or detachments continues. Tactical training of Carrier Pls is due to begin on 26 Mar.

(b) Officers.

Map reading, compass, TENTS and W/T are being studied.

The detailed organisation of bns and flns is studied periodically in order to instruct all officers in the value of the flns they fight in.

(c) Tactics.

Training progresses. British methods are studied and practised (though in some cases with reluctance).

Pl and Coy training is now finished. A high standard of fieldcraft has been reached and pl tactics are, in the main, satisfactory. Coy training was in places disappointing but energetic steps have been taken to put faults right.

Bn training commences 26 Mar 45.

(d) Small Arms.

There has recently been a marked improvement in interest in small arms. Shooting and maintenance has greatly advanced.

5. SUPPLY & TRANSPORT.(a) Composite Platoons.

Both pls are carrying out their normal duties and receiving practice in handling and recognition of supplies, POL and P.A.

Supply point and Bulk Breaking point are still functioning satisfactorily.

(b) Driving and Maintenance.

The Coy is now at full strength in test vehicles, 3 ton GS 4 x 2. This 2nd line transport is carrying out Div maintenance duties.

One convoy exercise has been held, employing three secos, one sec from each transport pl being involved.

The standard of driving and vehicle maintenance remains fairly satisfactory.

6. ORDNANCE.

Owing to the large amount of transport and other material arriving in the port, all training has now been suspended, but valuable practical experience is being obtained.

7. MEDICAL.

Progress is satisfactory.

8. MECHANICAL ENGINEERS.

Progress is satisfactory but there is still a serious shortage of certain types of equipment.

PART II - STATE OF TRAINING ON SPECIALISTS & TRAINING.

See Appendix "A" attached.

6930

PART III - BALANCE OF PROGRAMME TO BE COMPLETED.

10.

It is hoped to carry out the following before 15 Apr 45 :-

- (a) Skeleton exercises for Headquarters, Signals and Services Units.
- (b) Simple battalion exercises.
- (c) Further discussions to settle points of organization and battle procedure.

11.

SPECIALIST TRAINING.

See Appendix "A" attached.

7. MEDICAL.

Progress is satisfactory.

8. MECHANICAL ENGINEERING.

Progress is satisfactory but there is still a serious shortage of certain types of tradesmen.

PART VII - STATE OF TRAINING OF SPECIALISTS & TRADESMEN.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

8950

PART VIII - PRINCIPLE OF PROGRAMME TO BE COMPLETED.

10.

It is hoped to carry out the following before 15 Apr 45 :-

- (a) Skeleton exercises for Headquarters, Signals and Services Units.
- (b) Simple battalion exercises.
- (c) Further discussions to settle points of organization and battle procedure.

11. SPECIALIST TRAINING.

See Appendix 'B' attached.

12. NON SPECIALIST TRAINING.

- (a) Tradesmen.

Elementary Dry Battery Bridging
Mine Warfare

35%
40%

4/..... 31000

-4-

Fieldworks 25%
 Demolitions 30%
 Weapon Training 35%
 Road & Track Construction 25%
 Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles 50%
 Water Supply 100%
 Fieldcraft and Battledrill 70%
 Maintenance and Operation of British Field Plant 80%
 Store Keeping 45%

(b) Signals.

Tactical employment of signals.

(c) Infantry.

Battalion training.

(d) Supply & Transport.

Specialist Tradesman 20%
 Field duties of ST Coy 50%
 Weapon Training 30%

(e) Ordnance.

Weapon Training 50%

(f) Medical.

Fd duties of Med Sec & Fd Hosps 25%
 Weapon Training 40%

(g) Mechanical Engineers.

Weapon Training 50%

6943

PART IV - SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES.13. KEY PERSONNEL.

The outstanding difficulty is the deficiency of poor quality of certain key personnel. The driver position has improved, but is still serious.

(b)	<u>Signals.</u>		
		Tactical employment of signals.	
(c)	<u>Infantry.</u>		
		Battalion training.	
(d)	<u>Supply & Transport.</u>		
		Specialist Tradesmen	20%
		Field duties of ST Coy	50%
		Weapon Training	50%
(e)	<u>Ordnance.</u>		
		Weapon Training	50%
(f)	<u>Medical.</u>		
		Fd duties of Med Sec & Fd Hosps	25%
		Weapon Training	40%
(g)	<u>Mechanical Engineers.</u>		
		Weapon Training	50%

6948

PART IV - SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES.13. KEY PERSONNEL.

The outstanding difficulty is the deficiency or poor quality of certain key personnel. The driver position has improved, but is still serious.

14. TACTICAL METHODS.

Italian infantry are apt to lie down and do nothing for long periods in the middle of an attack. Great difficulty is experienced in curing them of this fatal habit.

5/.....sheet

-5-

15. DAILY INSPECTIONS.

Italian officers appear to be incapable of carrying out a daily inspection of their men, equipment and accommodation. Even the best units require constant help from British officers to maintain a satisfactory standard, particularly in vehicle maintenance, care of arms, cookhouses and latrines.

PART V - MISCELLANEOUS.

16. MAN MANAGEMENT.

Nothing to add to previous report.

17. HARDENING FOR BATTLE.

Exercises are being framed with the object of hardening officers and men to the physical strain of battle.

18. SENIOR OFFICERS.

One Inf Regt, and one Bn Comd are being replaced on grounds of inefficiency.

19. TRAINING OF SENIOR PERSONNEL.

A very successful exercise has been held to train Recon Group HQ and Service units in their duties in the field.

PART VI - COURSES & SPECIALIST TRAINING COMPLETED.

6948

20

See Appendix 'B' to Progress Report No. 5. Serials 1, 2, 4 - 9, 11, 12.

Also Appendix 'B' to Progress Report No. 6. Serial 1.

A Program of Courses now running or envisaged is attached at Appendix 'B'.

R-11

16. MANAGEMENT.

Nothing to add to previous report.

17. HARDENING FOR BATTLE.

Exercises are being framed with the object of hardening officers and men to the physical strain of battle.

18. SENIOR OFFICERS.

One Inf Regt, and one Bn Comd are being replaced on grounds of inefficiency.

19. TRAINING OF SERVICE PERSONNEL.

A very successful exercise has been held to train Rear Group HQ and Service units in their duties in the field.

PART VI - COURSES & SPECIALIST TRAINING COMPLETED.

6948

20

See Appendix 'B' to Progress Report No. 5. Serials 1, 2, 4 - 5, 11, 12.

Also Appendix 'B' to Progress Report No. 6. Serial 1.

A Programme of Courses now running or envisaged is attached at Appendix 'B'.



In the Field.
AG/cc

R. V. L.
Lt Col.
GS.

Attached :- Appendix 'A' - State of Training of Tradesmen & Specialists.
Appendix 'B' - Programme of Courses.

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



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Appendix 'A' to 56 BLU Progress Report No. 7
dated 26 Jan 45

MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
& LADs

SUPPLY & TRANSPORT				MEDICAL				ORDNANCE				MECHANICAL ENGINEERS & LADs				TOTALS				Serial
WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
6	6															18	18			1
												4	4			4	4			2
																62	13	49		3
												7	6	1		7	6	1		4
												1		1		1		1		2
												4	2	1		40	34	6	1	6
																57	51	6	1	7
												4	4			81	66	15	2	8
												3		3		3		3		9
17	17			4	4			8	8			8	8			142	128			10
11	119	22	22	57	12	15	12	38	25	13		24	23	1	1	1058	741	317	266	11
17	13	4		4	1	3						59	41	18	18	143	77	56	22	12
																24		24	24	13
				1		1	1	2		2		13	6	12		49	31	18	4	14
				2	1	1						25	20	5		64	41	23	16	15
												2	1	1		17	7	10		16
																43	43			17
3	1	2														15	12	3		18
																59	47	12		19
																24	24			20
17	13	4	4					5	3	2	2	6	3	3		332	275	59	56	21
				20	20											20	20			22
																129	110	19		23
												2	2			14	11	3	1	24
																10	6	4	1	25
1	1															4	4			26

6946

		GROUP HQ				PROVOST				ARTILLERY				INFANTRY				
Serial	Tradesman or Specialist	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)
27.	Sheet Metal Workers																	
28.	Sanitary Personnel																	
29.	Stretcher Bearers	2	2															
30.	Storemen	4	4							2		2		125	125			
31.	Telecomms Tech																	
32.	Turners																	
33.	Vehicle Mechs																	
34.	Watemen																	1
35.	Welders																	
36.	Carriers U Drivers									2	2			124	105	36	36	
37.	Carriers Lloyd Drivers													82	60	22	22	
38.	Conicmetrist													11	8	6		
39.	Gun Nos 1									61	52		12					
40.	6 pr Gun Munitions +													180	180			
41.	3" Mortar Numbers +													120	120			
42.	Reconnaissance Signallers +									311	277	34	60	335	335			
43.	Survey Personnel									68	18	50	52					
44.	Infantry Pioneers													60	55	7	7	
45.	Artificers RA									5	2	3	3					

[illegible]

SUPPLY & TRANSPORT				MEDICAL				ORDNANCE				TECHNICAL & GUNNERS				TOTALS				
VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	Social
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
				52	52							4	2	2		5	3	2		27
				110	90	20										52	52			28
10	10							28	26	2	2	24	10	14		244	222	22		29
												2		2		66	50	16	2	30
												3	3			3	1			31
								2	2			36	35	1	1	79	43	9	1	52
																8	7	1		33
												4	2	2		3	3			34
																144	108	36	36	35
																82	60	22	22	36
																12	8	3		37
																64	52		12	38
																180	180			39
																120	120			40
																646	612	34	60	41
																68	18	50	52	42
																60	53	7		43
																5	2	3	3	45

Appendix 'B' to 56 BL

PROGRAMME OF COURSES

c769

Ser	Subject	From	To	Location	No of Students	Responsibility		
						Initial Arrangements	Training	
1.	Vehicle Maintenance	18 Mar	14 Apr	EROLI	16	G II RI	RATD	Train in
2.	Mine Warfare Field Engineering	15 Mar	24 Apr	Group Area	55	SO RE	MANOVA Eng. En	Train in
3.	" "	26 Mar	31 Mar	" "	55	"	"	"
4.	Gas Warfare	26 Mar	12 Apr	GENEVENTO	4	G II	OMTC	Train in

PROGRAMME OF COURSES

Appendix 'B' to 56 BLU Progress Report No. 7
dated 26 Mar 45

c 569

From	To	Location	No of Students	Responsibility		Object
				Initial Arrangements	Training	
Mar	12 Apr	EBOLI	16	G II RI	RAMD	Train Driver Mechanics
Mar	24 Apr	Group Area	53	SO RE	RAITOVA Eng: Bn	Train Infantry Pioneers
Mar	31 Mar	" "	53	"	"	" " "
Mar	12 Apr	RENEVENTO	4	G II	CAFC	Train instructors in Gas Warfare.

32A

SUBJECT: Reinforcements.DISBURSEMENT OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFTR ONE

101-1102

101/28/101

17 Dec 45.

MEMO

= Copy to: 56 HMF =

1. 56 HMF Progress Report No 6 shows a deficiency of 451 trained drivers.

2. It is strongly urged that every effort be made to ease the training problem by porting to MATROVA Group as many drivers as possible from the first output of the D & H School at the RTO ICF.

19 MAR 1945

HMF/ndc

6944

101/28/101

SECRET

56 BLU PROGRESS REPORT NO. 6

DATE

Copy to :-

MAJIA
AFHQ., G III Org (Foreign)
AFHQ., G III (Br) Training.
RTC ICT.

PART I - GENERAL PROGRESS TO 7 MAR 45.

1. ARTILLERY.

- (a) 25 pr. Progress satisfactory.
- (b) 17 pr. Progress satisfactory.
- (c) 40 mm. Progress satisfactory.

Progress satisfactory. All 12 detachments are now at both with stationery and moving targets, they were highly commended for their gun drill and the standard of laying was average.

- (d) Driving & Maintenance.
The recent arrival of vehicles has brought driving instruction into full swing.
- (e) Specialists.

Specialist training progresses but more reinforcements of specialist quality are required. The majority of signallers can now be considered as technically trained but much remains to be taught in practical application of their technique to the requirements of Artillery methods.

2. ENGINEERS.

- (a) General.

Training has continued according to programmes. The change of training area has proved an advantage, giving personnel more interest. With all personnel under cover, a higher standard of interior economy and administration can be expected and is being obtained in the case of 4 Field Coy, but 79 Field Coy and 5 Field Coy still have...

1. ARTILLERY.

(a) 25 yr. Progress satisfactory.

(b) 17 yr. Progress satisfactory.

(c) 40 mm.

Progress satisfactory. All 12 detachments are now at EBOLI. At the end of their first days firing in an A B role both with stationary and moving targets, they were highly commended for their gun drill and the standard of laying was average.

(d) Driving & maintenance.

The recent arrival of vehicles has brought driving instruction into full swing.

(e) Specialists.

Specialist training progresses but more reinforcements of specialist quality are required. The majority of signallers can now be considered as technically trained but much remains to be taught in practical application of their technique to the requirements of Artillery methods.

6943

2. ENGINEERS.

(a) General.

Training has continued according to programmes. The change of training area has proved an advantage, giving personnel more interest. With all personnel under cover, a higher standard of interior economy and administration can be expected and is being obtained in the case of 4 Field Coy, but 79 Field Coy and 5 Field Park Coy still have a great deal of legwork to make up.

(b) Weapon Training & General Military Training.

Firing on open range continues. Firing with PIAT has commenced. Care of areas in all units except 4 Field Coy is still poor.

The Bn Driving School is now functioning. A short course for instructors has been completed, and the first batch of drivers are now being trained. Owing to the shortage of vehicles for this purpose, only 40 drivers and 20 motorcycleists can be trained at one time. This is insufficient, as this school has also to cater for the Signal Coy, and will be increased as more vehicles become available.

Progress of training of the Signal Coy is satisfactory and is due to be completed by 15 mar. The company will then split into its platoons which will go to regiments and Group HQ for tactical training.

The technical training of Regimental Signallers has now been satisfactorily completed but they still require tactical training.

(a) Specialists:

(i) 3" mortars. All mortar platoons have now been trained in basic handling and firing, and are now fully capable of carrying on their training independently when their G 1098 equipment arrives. Meanwhile training continues to be centralised at the Regimental Schools. On the ranges a high standard of shooting has now been attained.

(ii) 6 prs. 100% of 4 tk personnel have now been trained in basic gun drill. 50% of these have fired at EBOLI and have been doing an advanced course. The remaining 50% are firing at EBOLI on 6, 7 and 8 Mar. At this stage of training a great deal of time is being devoted to Bran-attachment firing on the regimental ranges.

(iii) Carriers. Regimental Carrier Schools are now established at SALAM and ARIMU respectively. After settling in and carrying out necessary maintenance a little time has been spent by 140 Gt in low gear driving and 76 Regt has progressed up to rough country work.

(iv) Signals. Training has now commenced under En arrangements. There are still some signallers to return from ALIVILLA.

(b) Officers.

Officers have been fully occupied in platoon and company tactical training. Great keenness has been shown in general, but they are still lacking in tactical experience. The officer situation is still unsatisfactory, but has improved recently.

(c) Small Arms.

Range shooting with Rifle, Bron and TSif is continuing on a large scale, and good results are being attained. 2" target shooting has been

4.

INVENTORY.

The technical training of Regimental Signallers has now been satisfactorily completed but they still require tactical training.

(a) Specialists.

(i) 3" mortars. All Mortar Platoons have now been trained in basic handling and firing, and are now fully capable of carrying on their training independently when their G 1098 equipment arrives. Meanwhile training continues to be centralized at the Regimental Schools. On the ranges a high standard of shooting has now been attained.

(ii) 6 prs. 100% of A tk personnel have now been trained in basic gun drill. 50% of these have fired at EOLI and have been doing an advanced course. The remaining 50% are firing at EOLI on 6, 7 and 8 Mar. At this stage of training a great deal of time is being devoted to Brun-attachment firing on the regimental ranges.

(iii) Carriers. Regimental Carrier Schools are now established at SALVA and ARLMO respectively. After settling in and carrying out necessary maintenance a little time has been spent by 100% in low gear driving and 76 Regt has progressed up to rough entry work.

(iv) Signals. Training has now commenced under Bn arrangements. There are still some signallers to return from ALAVILLA.

(b) Officers.

Officers have been fully occupied in platoon and company tactical training. Great keenness has been shown in general, but they are still lacking in tactical experience. The officer situation is still unsatisfactory, but has improved recently.

(c) Small Arms.

Range shooting with Rifle, Bren and TSF is continuing on a large scale, and good results are being attained. 2" mortar shooting has been difficult owing to shortage of 2" mortars. Shooting with the PLT continues. The care of arms while improving, still in some cases leaves much to be desired and all OC's have been asked to give their full attention to this matter. In addition to a number of dirty weapons, many have been found jammed with broken pull throughs etc.

5/.....sheet

(d) Tactical Training.

Platoon training has progressed favourably, but difficulties are being encountered owing to the lack of competent company commanders and experienced platoon commanders. Demonstration platoons are being trained in each battalion. Night training has been most satisfactory. Generally both officers and men show great enthusiasm for tactical training, and fieldcraft is of a high standard. Commanders still need a considerable amount of training, especially in making appreciations, plans and in issuing concise orders. Some schemes are still most unrealistic.

5. SERVICES.

(a) Supply & Transport.

(i) Driving & Maintenance.

Both driving and the standard of maintenance of vehicles has improved during the past fortnight to a high degree. The RASC maintenance system is fully employed and adhered to.

(ii) Weapon Training.

Weapon training and the care of weapons is reaching a satisfactory state. It is estimated that by 17 Apr all ranks of the company will have fired rifle, TSG and Bren LMG.

(b) Ordnance.

Progress is satisfactory. Apart from training of drivers and in the use of small arms it is now considered that the ODP can function reasonably well in an operational role.

(c) Medical.

Progress is satisfactory. All Regimental stretcher bearers are attending a four day course in the following subjects :-

Elementary Anatomy and Physiology.

Arrest of Hemorrhage.

Application of Splints.

Application of Bandages.

Various ways of carrying a wounded person.

6941

All stretcher bearers will have attended the course by 2 Apr. Regimental nursing orderlies are attending courses at the 501 and 248 Field Hospitals.

(a) Mechanical Engineers.

Training is proceeding satisfactorily. Workshop and battalion armourers have been trained. Valuable experience is being gained daily in the repair of the Group's British equipment.

(e) Provost.

All drivers and motor cyclists have been trained. Training is progressing satisfactorily in all provost duties and it is considered that the Provost Sections will shortly be fully trained.

(a) Supply & Transport.(i) Driving & Maintenance.

Both driving and the standard of maintenance of vehicles has improved during the past fortnight to a high degree. The RASC maintenance system is fully employed and adhered to.

(ii) Weapon Training.

Weapon training and the care of weapons is reaching a satisfactory state. It is estimated that by 17 Nov all ranks of the company will have fired rifle, TMC and Bren LMG.

(b) Ordnance.

Progress is satisfactory. Apart from training of drivers and in the use of small arms it is now considered that the OFP can function reasonably well in an operational role.

(c) Medical.

Progress is satisfactory. All Regimental stretcher bearers are attending a four day course in the following subjects :-

Elementary Anatomy and Physiology.

Arrest of Haemorrhage.

Application of Splints.

Application of Bandages.

Various ways of carrying a wounded person.

6941

All stretcher bearers will have attended the course by 2 Apr. Regimental nursing orderlies are attending courses at the 504 and 248 Field Hospitals.

(d) Mechanical Engineers.

Training is proceeding satisfactorily. Workshop and battalion armourers have been trained. Valuable experience is being gained daily in the repair of the Group's British equipment.

(e) Provost.

All drivers and motor cyclists have been trained. Training is progressing satisfactorily in all provost duties and it is considered that the Provost Sections will shortly be fully trained.

PART II - STATE OF TRAINING OF SPECIALISTS & TRADES MEN.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

4/.....sheet

PART III - BALANCE ON PROGRAMS TO BE COMPLETED.7. SPECIALIST TRAINING.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

8. NON SPECIALIST TRAINING.(a) Artillery.

70%

(b) Engineers.

Elementary Dry Bailey Bridging

45%

Mine Warfare

45%

Fieldworks

50%

Demolitions

55%

Weapon Training

45%

Road and Track Construction

35%

Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles

85%

Water Supply

100%

Fieldcraft and Battledrill

80%

Maintenance and Operation of British Field Plant

90%

Store Keeping

60%

(c) Signals.

Weapon Training

80%

(d) Infantry.

Port platoon, company and battalion training. Advanced specialist training including firing and tactical work.

(e) Services.

(i) Supply & Transport.

Field duties of ST Company
Weapon Training

50%

30%

(ii) Ordnance.

Weapon Training

50%

(iii) Medical.

Field duties of Medical Section and Hospitals
Weapon Training

25%

50%

(iv) Mechanical Engineers.

Weapon Training

50%

6940

(b) Engineers.

Elementary Dry Bailey Bridging	45%
Mine Warfare	45%
Fieldworks	30%
Demolitions	35%
Weapon Training	45%
Road and Track Construction	35%
Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles	85%
Water Supply	100%
Fieldcraft and Battledrill	30%
Maintenance and Operation of British Field Plant	90%
Store Keeping	30%

(c) Signals.

Weapon Training	30%
-----------------	-----

(d) Infantry.

Part platoon, company and battalion training. Advanced specialist training including firing and tactical work.

(e) Services.(i) Supply & Transport.

Field duties of SF Company	50%
Weapon Training	30%

(ii) Ordnance.

Weapon Training	50%
-----------------	-----

(iii) Medical.

Field duties of Medical Section and Hospitals	25%
Weapon Training	50%

(iv) Mechanical Engineers.

Weapon Training	50%
-----------------	-----

PART IV - COURSES & SPECIALIST TRAINING COMPLETED.

See Appendix 'D' to Progress Report No 5. Serials 3, 10.

5/..... sheet

6940

-5-

10.

For Programme of Courses now running or envisaged see Appendix 'D' to Progress Report No. 5 and Appendix 'D' attached.

PART V - SPECIAL DIFFICULTIES.

11.

The following difficulties have been largely overcome :-

(a) Bad living conditions.

(b) Lack of clothing and equipment.

The following difficulties remain :-

(a) Lack of specialists, especially drivers.

(b) A certain number of bad officers, including unit commanders. This being dealt with by MIA and SARE, and the position is improving.

(c) Shortage of certain items of equipment including 2" mortars.

12.

PART VI - MISCELLANEOUS.

13.

MANAGEMENT.

(a) A number of officers are being sent on an Italian Army Welfare course.

(b) Living conditions continue to improve.

(c) Amenities are improving, including unit canteens, recreation rooms, and games. In some units the standard is still low.

(d) The question of Italian Army welfare and leave is being taken up with MIA.

14.

TRAINING OF DIV HQ.

A paper exercise is in progress.

15.

CONCLUSION.

Much remains to be done, and the Group is still far below the standard of an Allied formation, but with better conditions the rate of progress is improving.

6923

12.

- (a) Bad living conditions.
 - (b) Lack of clothing and equipment.
- The following difficulties remain :-
- (a) Lack of specialists, especially drivers.
 - (b) A certain number of bad officers, including unit commanders. This being dealt with by IMA and SMC, and the position is improving.
 - (c) Shortage of certain items of equipment including 2" mortars.

PART VI - DISCIPLINE.

13.

MANAGEMENT.

- (a) A number of officers are being sent on an Italian Army Welfare course.
- (b) Living conditions continue to improve.
- (c) Amenities are improving, including unit canteens, recreation rooms, and games. In some units the standard is still low.
- (d) The question of Italian Army welfare and leave is being taken up with IMA.

6939

14.

TRAINING OF DIV HQ.

A paper exercise is in progress.

15.

CONCLUSION.

Much remains to be done, and the Group is still far below the standard of an Allied formation, but with better conditions the rate of progress is improving.

In the Field.
AG/cc



Attached :-

- Appendix 'A' - State of Training of Specialists & Tradesmen.
- Appendix 'B' - Programme of Courses.
- Annexure - Training - Infantry. (DIT only)

C. J. Jacobs
Lt-Col.
GS.

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



20
50
50
50

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

[illegible]

ENGINEERS INC.

[illegible]

Appendix 'A' to 56 ILU Progress Report No. 3
dated // Apr 45

TECHNICAL ENGINEERS

PLY & TRANSPORT

MEDICAL

ORDNANCE

LADA

TOTALS

Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	Serial
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
6															18	18			1
												1	1		4	4			2
												7	6	1	62	13	49		3
												1	1	1	7	6	1		4
												4	3	1	1	2	11	1	5
															40	2			6
															57	44	13		7
												1	1		81	66	15	1	8
												3	3		3		3		9
17			4	4			8	8				8	8		142	197	1		10
119	22	22	57	20	37		38	14	24			24	23	1	1058	607	151	203	11
12	5		4	1	3							59	41	18	143	73	70	18	12
															24		24	24	13
			1		1		2	1	1			18	6	12	49	32	17		14
			2	1	1							25	20	5	64	40	24	16	15
												2	1	1	17	7	10		16
															13	43			17
1	2														15	12	3		18
															59	34	25		19
															24	24			20
11	6	17					5	3	2			6	3	3	332	254	78	34	21
			20	20											20	20			22
															129	62	67	67	23
												2	2		14	10	4	1	24
															10	6	4	1	25
1															4	4			26

6937

Serial	Tradesmen or Specialist	GROUP HQ				BOWST				ARTILLERY				ENGINEER			
		VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Try	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Try	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Try	VE	Trained	To be trained	Under Try
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)
27.	Sheet Metal Workers																
28.	Sanitary Personnel																
29.	Stretcher Bearers	2	2							2		2		42	87	91	
30.	Storemen	4	4														
31.	Telecommunications Tech																
32.	Turners																
33.	Vehicle Mechs																
34.	Watermen																
35.	Welders																
36.	Carriers U Drivers									3		3		141	90	51	30
37.	Carriers Lloyd Drivers													82	60	22	30
38.	Geniometrists													14	7	7	
39.	Gun Hos 1									64	52		12				
40.	6 pr Gun Hunters +													180	180		
41.	3" Mortar Hunters +													120	120		
42.	Regimental Signallers +									311	277	34	60	335	335		
43.	Survey Personnel									60	18	50	52				
44.	Infantry Pioneers													60	53	7	
45.	Artificers R									5	2	3	3				

+ Are fully trained basically but require tactical training.

[illegible]

SUPPLY & TRANSPORT				MEDICAL				ORDNANCE				MECHANICAL ENGINEERS				TOTALS				Serial
(a)	(b) Trained	(c) To be trained	(d) Under Trg	(e) WE	(f) Trained	(g) To be trained	(h) Under Trg	(i) WE	(j) Trained	(k) To be trained	(l) Under Trg	(m) WE	(n) Trained	(o) To be trained	(p) Under Trg	(q) WE	(r) Trained	(s) To be trained	(t) Under Trg	
				52	52							4	2	2		5	3	2		27
				110	90	20										52	52			28
10	10							26	26	2	2	24	10	14		24	131	113		29
												3		3		66	50	16	2	30
												3		3		3		3		31
								3	3			3	3			4	4			32
												36	35	1	1	55	46	9	1	33
																8	7	1		34
												4	2	2		6	3	3		35
																122	90	24	30	36
																82	60	22	1	37
																14	7	7		38
																0	52		12	39
																180	180			40
																120	120			41
																645	612	34	60	42
																68	10	50	52	43
																60	53	7		44
																5	2	3	3	45

Appendix 'E' to 56 Progress
data

Ser	Subject	From	To	Location	No of students	Responsibility	
						Initial Arrangements	Training
1.	Air Photo Interpretation	26 Feb	11 Mar	SAN SEVERO	7	G II	Air photo Interpretation School
2.	Maintenance	18 Mar	14 Apr	EBOLI	16	G II RA	RAID

6930

Appendix 'B' to 56 Progress Report No. 6.
dated 11 Mar 45.

	To	Location	No of students	Responsibility		Object
				Initial Arrangements	Training	
Feb	11 Mar	SAN SEVERO	7	G II	Air photo Interpretation School	Train IO's
Mar	14 Apr	EBOLI	16	G II RA	RATD	Training Driver Mech's

Subject :- Progress - Driver Training.

URGENT

56 BLU
1 G

11 Mar 45

RA.
RE.
Sigs.
ST.
Ord.
Med.
REME.
Trg Inc. ARIANO.
Trg Inc. ATRIPALDA.

Reports are required at the conference on Tuesday 13 Mar of the progress of driver training.

All officers are requested to ascertain as far as possible the true figures of drivers trained and under training.

In the Field.
AG/ec

6930
[Signature]
Lt-Col.
GS.

Subject :- Progress Report No. 5.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

56 HLU
1 G

26A
12 Mar 45

Reference your 5/G/29/32/5 dated 5 Mar 45.

Para 2 (a) The position is not yet firm, as several changes have taken place in the last few days. A further report on this point will be forwarded shortly.

Para 4 (b) A number of changes have been made in the Junior infantry officers. The Group Commander keeps RHE informed of his wishes.

Para 11 Several infantry company commanders have been posted recently, but a number are still deficient, notably in 2/76, 3/76 and 3/114 bns.

Para 12 The bad characters referred to are unteachable riff-raff, worse than anything we find in the British army. A fair number of the worst have now left this Group.

Para 13 Lt-Col Howard is handing a copy of this note to RHE.

In the Field.
ANG/ec

Az
Lt-Col.
GS.

6934

SUBJECT : Progress Report No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

S/G/29/32/5
✓ March 45

TO : 56 B.L.U. ✓

20A

I. The following comments are made on your Progress Report No. 5 of 26 February :-

Para 2(a) - Is the Group Commander satisfied with his Engineer officers or does he require any replaced?

Para 4(b) - Is the Group Commander satisfied with his Infantry Junior officers: If not; what has he done about it?

Para 11 - The War Ministry is again being reminded of this shortage of Company Commanders: Please report progress.

Para 12 - Bad characters exist in all armies: They cannot be merely exchanged at the RTC. Each one must be dealt with individually, according to his particular trouble; by his own officer, whose job it is to understand and tackle these problems.

Para 13, 16 - Good.

Para 18 - Agreed. Please forward a copy of the note referred to in (c) as this may prove valuable to other formations and/or units.

[Signature] 693
for Major General
M.M.I.A.

the following comments are made on your Progress
Report No. 5 of 26 February :-

- Para 2(a) - Is the Group Commander satisfied with his Engineer officers or does he require any replaced?
- Para 4(b) - Is the Group Commander satisfied with his Infantry Junior officers: If not; what has he done about it?
- Para 11 - The War Ministry is again being reminded of this shortage of Company Commanders: Please report progress.
- Para 12 - Bad characters exist in all armies: They cannot be merely exchanged at the RTC. Each one must be dealt with individually, according to his particular trouble; by his own officer, whose job it is to understand and tackle these problems.
- Para 13, 16 - Good.
- Para 18 - Agreed. Please forward a copy of the note referred to in (c) as this may prove valuable to other formations and/or units.

ek

[Signature] 693~
for Major General
M.M.I.A.

19
8 MAR 1945

SECRET

56 BLU PROGRESS REPORT NO. 5

14A

10

26 Feb 45.

DWT.

Copy to :-

MMIA
AFHQ., G III OTC (Foreign)
AFHQ., G III (Br) Training.
RTC ICF.

PART I - GENERAL PROGRESS TO 22 FEB 45.

ARTILLERY.

(a) 25 pr.

All four batteries have fired approximately 150 rounds each. Considerable progress is anticipated as a result as this has taught lessons which only firing can teach. 37 officers at an average of 17 rounds per officer did observation of fire under instruction. The standard of observation was in most cases good. The standard of laying was good. The production of fire was slow but usually accurate.

(b) 17 pr.

These require more firing for gun numbers who have not already had that experience. It is thought that this Gruppo has not made much progress since firing at ISOLI 30 Jan - 1 Feb.

(c) 40 mm.

Progress in Aircraft Recognition and in gun drill for recruits has been good. More firing is required and has been requested from School of Artillery from 5 to 11 Mar.

(d) Specialists.

Troop Command Post specialists are promising and made no obvious mistakes during firing. Gruppo Command Post specialists have not been tried out yet.

ENGINEERS.

(a) Sapper Training.

Progress is fair. The most serious fault lies in the lack of organisation on the part of platoon officers and WCOs. The men are keen and providing they are in the picture they will work satisfactorily.

2.

PART I - GENERAL PROGRESS TO 22 FEB 45.1. ARTILLERY.(a) 25 pr.

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(d) Specialists.

Troop Command Post specialists are promising and made no obvious mistakes during firing. Gruppo Command Post specialists have not been tried out yet.

2. ENGINEERS.(a) Sapper Training.

Progress is fair. The most serious fault lies in the lack of organisation on the part of platoon officers and NCOs. The men are keen and providing they are in the picture they will work satisfactorily.

(b) Weapon Training and General Military Training.

All personnel have fired their weapons on the open range.

3. SIGNALS.

The first series of courses for Regimental Signallers have been completed. The training of the Signal Coy is proceeding satisfactorily.

4. INFANTRY.(a) Individual Training.

Progress is satisfactory, but has been slowed down owing to the arrival of untrained recruits. Individual and platoon training are now being carried out simultaneously.

(b) Collective Training.

In some battalions section training has been excellent. In others it has been hindered by a lack of capable officers. Platoon training is now in progress. Instruction is based mainly on Inf Training 1944, Part VIII, and on the Group Junior Leaders' Courses. In some battalions there are company commanders who have not enough knowledge to organize platoon training, and it is necessary to organize it on a battalion basis, with the help of demonstration platoons.

5. SERVICES.(a) Supply and Transport.(i) Driving and Maintenance.

Training of the remaining learner drivers is proceeding very slowly owing to the constant breaking down of the available training vehicles. The company however is fairly strong in qualified drivers (approx 25%) and these drivers have been used for the collection of vehicles or British vehicle parts involving practice in long distance and convoy driving. Vehicle maintenance is showing signs of slight improvement and full instruction has been given to the company in RASC methods and system of vehicle maintenance.

(ii) Weapon Training.

Proceeding satisfactorily since the last progress report, 100 ORs have fired Bren LMG, TS.G and Rifle on the range.

(iii) Technical Training.

The supply system within the Group has been altered to give the Composite Platoon practice in the system of supply in the field. One Composite Platoon now functions as if located in an TMA the other as if in a Div. paint area.

(b) Ordnance.

Training is proceeding satisfactorily.

(c) Medical.

training are now being carried out simultaneously.

(b) Collective Training.

In some battalions section training has been excellent. In others it has been hindered by a lack of capable officers. Platoon training is now in progress. Instruction is based mainly on Inf Training 1904, Part VIII, and on the Group Junior Leaders' Courses. In some battalions there are company commanders who have not enough knowledge to organize platoon training, and it is necessary to organize it on a battalion basis, with the help of demonstration platoons.

5. SERVICES.

(a) Supply and Transport.

(i) Driving and Maintenance.

Training of the remaining learner drivers is proceeding very slowly owing to the constant breaking down of the available training vehicles. The company however is fairly strong in qualified drivers (approx 85%) and these drivers have been used for the collection of vehicles ex British vehicle par's involving practice in long distance and convoy driving. Vehicle maintenance is showing signs of slight improvement and full instruction has been given to the company in RASC methods and system of vehicle maintenance.

(ii) Weapon Training.

Proceeding satisfactorily since the last progress report, 100 ORs have fired Bren LMG, T3.G and Rifle on the range.

(iii) Technical Training.

The supply system within the Group has been altered to give the Composite Platoon practice in the system of supply in the field. One Composite Platoon now functions as if located in an RA the other as if in a Div. pint area.

(b) Ordnance.

Training is proceeding satisfactorily.

(c) Medical.

(i) Water Duties.

A training team consisting of 10 MCOs and 1 Medical Officer has received instruction at the School of Hygiene, LEMEVENO. This team will be used to instruct Watermen and Drivers, when the vehicles are available.

(ii)

The remainder of the training is proceeding satisfactorily.

- (a) Mechanical Engineers.
Training is proceeding satisfactorily.
- (e) Provost.
Training is proceeding satisfactorily.

PART II - STATE OF TRAINING OF SPECIALISTS & TRADESMEN.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

PART III - BALANCE OF PROGRAM TO BE COMPLETED.

7. SPECIALIST TRAINING.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

8. NON SPECIALIST TRAINING.

- (a) Artillery.
The amount of training still required will remain at 80% until it is available.

(b) Engineers.

Elementary Dry Bailey Bridging	55%
Mine Warfare	55%
Fieldworks	40%
Demolitions	40%
Weapon Training	50%
Road and Track Construction	45%
Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles	95%
Water Supply	100%
Aircraft and Battle Drill	85%
Maintenance and Operation of British Field Plant	100%
Store Keeping	60%

(c) Signals.

Weapon Training

(d) Infantry.

Platoon, Company and Battalion training.
Specialists advanced tactical training.

80%

6023

6. See Appendix 'A' attached.

PART III - BALANCE OF PROGRAMME TO BE COMPLETED.

7. SPECIALIST TRAINING.

See Appendix 'A' attached.

8. NON SPECIALIST TRAINING.

(a) Artillery.
The amount of training still required will remain at 80% until it is available.

(b) Engineers.

Elementary Dry Bailey Bridging 55%
Line Warfare 50%
Fieldwork 40%
Demolitions 40%
Weapon Training 50%
Road and Track Construction 45%
Driving and Maintenance of Vehicles 95%
Water Supply 100%
Fieldcraft and Battle Drill 85%
Maintenance and Operation of British Field Plant 100%
Store Keeping 60%

(c) Signals.

Weapon Training 80%

(d) Infantry.
Platoon, Company and Battalion training.
Specialists advanced tactical training.

(e) Services.

(i) Supply and Transport

Field duties of SF Coy 80%
Weapon Training 40%

4/.....ended

-4-

(ii) Ordnance
Practice in receipt, issue and recognition of stores is
still required.

Weapon Training 50%

(iii) Medical

Field Duties of Medical Section & Hospitals 30%

Weapon Training 60%

Driving Instruction 85%

(iv) Mechanical Engineers

Weapon Training 50%

PART IV - COURSES AND SPECIALIST TRAINING COMPLETED.

9. COURSES COMPLETED.

See Appendix 'B' to Progress Report No. 4, Serials 1 - 9 inclusive,
Serials 11 - 14 inclusive and 17 & 18. See also Appendix 'B' attached, Serial 1.

10. GENERAL.

A programme of courses now running or arranged is attached at
Appendix 'B'.

PART V - SPECIAL DEMONSTRATIONS.

11. LEADERSHIP COMPANY COMMANDERS.

A number of companies, notably in 2/76, 5/76 and 5/114 Ins, are
short of Company Commanders. This has been represented to S.M.E. by Group HQ,
and to 114 by 56 B.M. Up to now, their absence has not seriously affected
training, but they are badly needed now that collective training has
begun.

12. BAD CHARACTERS.

Most units have a number of men, mostly new recruits, whose influence
is actively harmful. It is hoped that these may be replaced in due course by
trained men of good character from the RTC IOT.

60%
85%

(iv) Mechanical Engineers

Weapon Training

50%

PART IV - COURSES AND SPECIALIST TRAINING COMPLETED.

9. COURSES COMPLETED.

See Appendix 'B' to Progress Report No. 4. Serials 1 - 9 inclusive, 11 - 14 inclusive and 17 & 18. See also Appendix 'C' attached. Serial 1.

10. GENERAL.

A programme of courses now running or arranged is attached at Appendix 'B'.

PART V - SPECIAL DISCIPLINES.

11. INFANTRY COMPANY COMMANDERS.

A number of companies, notably in 2/76, 3/76 and 5/414 Bns, are short of Company Commanders. This has been represented to SERG by Group HQ, and to HQ by 56 Bn. Up to now, their absence has not seriously affected training, but they are badly needed now that collective training has ~~been~~ **6028**

12. BAD CHARACTERS.

Most units have a number of men, mostly new recruits, whose influence is actively harmful. It is hoped that these may be replaced in due course by trained men of good character from the RTC ICF.

PART VI - MISCELLANEOUS.

13. MOVES OF ENGINEERS & INFANTRY.

The move from tented camps to villages has done much to improve living and training conditions, and to rouse morale. The new training areas are good. The move itself was a valuable experience, 5/76 in marched over 30 miles in a day and arrived in very good heart.

5/.....sheet

-5-

14. QUALITY OF UNITS.

A small number of units are below standard. This is mainly traceable to poor commanding officers. In most cases these have now been replaced by better men, and an improvement has begun.

15. INTERIOR ECONOMY.

In some units this is still poor. In others it is comparable with that of Allied units in similar living conditions.

16. MORALE.

A minority of men see no point in fighting. Others are worried about their families in the NORTH, and take no interest in anything else. The majority are in good heart, and appear to be quite ready to fight.

17. FUTURE PLANS.

The Group has received the majority of its British clothing, and is to be completely equipped by 31 Mar. 15 Apr is thought to be a suitable date for moving to a forward training area.

18. MANAGEMENT.

This question is constantly under review by all British officers. On the whole, it is thought that the standard is not so bad as was expected, though far below the best British standard. The following statement shows the position in this Group.

Credit :-

- (a) The men have been made reasonably comfortable in their present locations. Really, shameful neglect is rare.
- (b) The senior officers take a real interest in their men, and frequently ask for amenities for them.
- (c) Officers of all ranks appear to know a good deal about their men. Even Regimental commanders know large numbers of men by name.
- (d) Orderly officers attend regularly at meals.

6927

(e) When questioned, men usually know the name of their platoon commander, and state that they speak to him nearly every day.

(f) Shower baths have been constructed in most units.

Debit :-

(a) The officers do not do much constructive planning for their men's welfare. If things are bad they are apt to remain bad.

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6927

- (d) Orderly officers attend regularly at meals.

- (e) When questioned, men usually know the name of their platoon commander, and state that they speak to him nearly every day.

- (f) Shower baths have been constructed in most units.

Debit :-

- (a) The officers do not do much constructive planning for their men's welfare. If things are bad they are apt to remain bad.

- (b) There is no evidence that officers think of their men when they themselves are tired.

- (c) There is reason to think that when a man has a difficult or complex personal problem, the officer is apt to shelve it. An Italian soldier once stated that the only way to get anything done was to complain to a British officer.

6/.....sheet

- (d) Many officers appear to make up for their poor man management by neglecting to enforce discipline.
- (e) Officers sometimes smoke on parade and do not always wear equipment when their men are wearing it.
- Action by MU :-
- (a) Example. The constant preoccupation of British officers with the welfare of the men must be an object lesson to officers and men alike.
- (b) Instruction. Officers constantly refer to man management, both in formal lectures and in casual conversation with Italian officers.
- (c) Written note. A note on man management by a British officer has been issued to the Division.

In the Field.
AC/ec


Lt-Col.
GS.

Attached :-
Appendix 'A' - State of Training of Specialists & Tradesmen.
Appendix 'B' - Programme of Courses.

CC2

Serial (a)	Tradesman or Specialist (b)	GROUP IN					GROUP II					GROUP III					GROUP IV				
		WE (c)	Trained (1)	To be trained (2)	Under Trg (3)	WE (4)	Trained (1)	To be trained (2)	Under Trg (3)	WE (4)	Trained (1)	To be trained (2)	Under Trg (3)	WE (4)	Trained (1)	To be trained (2)	Under Trg (3)	WE (4)	Trained (1)	To be trained (2)	Under Trg (3)
27.	Sheet Metal Workers																				
28.	Sanitary Personnel																				
29.	Stretcher Bearers	2	2																		
30.	Storeroom	4	4							2		2		126	87	91					
31.	Telecommunications Tech																				
32.	Turners																				
33.	Vehicles																				
34.	Watermen																				
35.	Welders																				
36.	Carriers U Drivers																				
37.	Carriers Lloyd Drivers									2		2		141	90	51	20				
38.	Commetrist													82	60	22	30				
39.	Gun Pos 1													14	7	7					
40.	6 pr Gun Gunners +									34	20	14	44								
41.	5" Port Gun Gunners +													180	180						
42.	Reconnaissance Signallers +													120	120						
43.	Survey Personnel									311	202	109	109	335	220		115				
44.	Infantry Pioneers									68	16	50	50								
45.	Artillery RA									5	2	5	5	60	52	7					

* Are fully trained basically but require tactical training.

[illegible]

BY & TRANSPORT			MEDICAL			ORDNANCE			ECHA HOLL NIGER'S			LAD'S			TOTALS				
Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
			52	52							4	2	2		5	3	2		27
			110	90	20										52	52			28
10							28	18	10	10	24	10	14		244	131	113		29
											3		3		66	42	24		30
											3	3			3	4	3		31
							3		3		36	34	2		4	4			32
															55	42	13		33
															8	8			34
											4	2	2		6	3	3		35
															144	90	54	30	36
															82	60	22	30	37
															14	7	7		38
															51	20	44	44	39
															180	180			40
															120	120			41
															216	122	224	224	42
															68	13	50	50	43
															60	53	7		44
															5	2	3	3	45

259

[illegible]

Appendix

FACHLEHRE

ENGINEER IN CHARGE				FIELD PARK				SIGNALS				SUPPLY & TRANSPORT				MEDICAL				ORDNANCE																			
WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg	WE	Trained	To be trained	Under Trg												
(6)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)	(v)	(w)	(x)	(y)	(z)	(aa)	(ab)	(ac)	(ad)	(ae)	(af)	(ag)	(ah)	(ai)	(aj)	(ak)	(al)	(am)	(an)
62	13	19																																					
24	16	8		12	12																																		
24	17	7		32	25	8	2																																
25	27	2		52	36	16	4																																
40	96			20	19	1		2	2				17	17			4	4			8	8																	
350	255	97		96	32	34		51	22	39			141	130	11	11	57	20	37		58	4	34																
48	12	36		15	10	5							17	10	7		4	1	2																				
6	6			11	9	2		11	11								1		1		2		2																
				21	15	6											2	1	1																				
								15	6	9																													
								43	43																														
12	11	1											3	1	2																								
36	23	13		3	3			1	1																														
134	131	23		24	24																																		
				30	11	19		22	18	4			17	11	6	17					5	5	2																
																	20	20																					

Appendix 'A' to 56 Progress Report No. 5 dated 26 Feb 45

MECHANICAL ENGINEERS

TRANSPORT				MEDICAL				ORDNANCE				LADs				TOTALS			
(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)	(q)	(r)	(s)	(t)	(u)
6															18	6	12		1
											4	4			4	1			2
											7	4	3		62	13	49		5
											1		1		7	4	2		4
											1		1		1		1		5
											1	3	1		40	31	9		6
											4	4			57	2	15	2	7
											4				81	2	13	4	8
											2		2		3		2		2
17			4	4			8	8			8	8			142	197	1		10
10	11	11	57	20	37		38	4	34		24	23		1	1058	576	482	32	11
10	7		4	1	3						59	41	18	18	143	71	69	18	12
											24				24		24		15
			1		1		2		2		18	6	12		49	32	17		14
			2	1	1						25	20	5		64	39	25	16	15
											2	1	1		17	7	10		16
															43	45			17
1	2														15	12	3		18
															59	34	25		19
															24	21			20
1	6	17					5	3	2		6	1	5		332	252	80	17	21
			20	20											20	20			22
															129	62	67	67	23
											2	2			14	7	7	1	24
															10	5	5		25
															4	4			26

SUMMARY OF COURSES

Appendix 'A' to

992

Serial No. (a)	Subject (b)	From (c)	To (d)	Location (e)	No of Students (f)	Responsibility Initial Arrangements (g)	Training (h)	
1.	Intelligence	14 Feb	25 Feb	FOZUOLI	10	G II	I Trg Cen	Train Un
2.	"	25 Feb	3 Mar	"	14	"	"	
3.	Maintenance Vehs. RA	15 Feb	contin- uous. Each course 2 days	Gp Area	12	DAA C Q4	ST Coy	Touch of
4.	Snipers	26 Feb	17 Mar	BENEVENTO	2	G II	CATC	Train S
5.	3" mortar	26 Feb	17 Mar	"	4	"	CATC	Train i
6.	Six pounder	26 Feb	17 Mar	EBOLI	6	"	RATD	
7.	Observation of Fire.	12 Mar	14 Mar	EBOLI		SO RA	RATD	OP offic
8.	Linear Tactics	26 Feb	17 Mar	BENEVENTO	4	G II	CATC	Train Ju
9.	Air Photo Interpretation	26 Feb	11 Mar	SAN SEVERO	7	G II	Air Photo Interpre- tation School	Train IC
10.	Repair & Maintenance of Weapons	1 Feb	1 Mar	Gp Area	12	SO REME	REME Trg Increment	Train Un
11.	Hygiene & Sanitation	10 Mar	17 Mar	BENEVENTO	6	G II	CATC	Train Un Regtl Of
12.	Field Sanitation	17 Mar	24 Mar	"	3	G II	CATC	Train Ju

PROGRAMS OF COURSES

Appendix 'B' to 55 HQU Progress Report No. 5.
dated 26 Feb 45

c92.

	From (c)	To (d)	Location (e)	No of Students (f)	Responsibility		Object (i)
					Initial Arrangements (g)	Training (h)	
	14 Feb	23 Feb	ROZZOLI	10	G II	I Trg Cen	Train Unit I.Os.
	23 Feb	3 Mar	"	14	"	"	"
	15 Feb contin- uous. Each course 2 days		Gp Area	12	DAK Gt Coy	ST Coy	Teach officers of Arty Regt maintenance
	26 Feb	17 Mar	BENEVENTO	2	G II	CMTC	Train Sniper instructors
	26 Feb	17 Mar	"	4	"	CMTC	Train instructors
	26 Feb	17 Mar	EBOLI	6	"	RATD	"
	12 Mar	14 Mar	EBOLI		SO RA	RATD	OP officers
	26 Feb	17 Mar	BENEVENTO	4	G II	CMTC	Train Junior Leaders
	26 Feb	11 Mar	SAN SEVERO	7	G II	Air Photo Interpre- tation School	Train IO
ence	1 Feb	1 Mar	Gp Area	12	SO REME	REME Trg Increment	Train Unit & Wksp Armourers
tion	10 Mar	17 Mar	BENEVENTO	6	G II	CMTC	Train Unit MOs & Senior Regtl Officers
	17 Mar	24 Mar	"	3	G II	CMTC	Train Junior Regtl Officers

0 3 7 9

Acc

10000/120/389

4/4

Ve

June 19

10000/120/389

4/v

Vehicles Issued to H.Q.

June 1945

509
519

Army Form G 043 (Pads of 100)

**WORKSHOPS REPORT ON STORES AND
CONDEMNATION CERTIFICATE (for use in Workshops)**

Commanding: 1. eating lunch
2. going to school

† With reference to your Workshop Repair Indent (A.F. G 1045) No. dated, the stores mentioned below have been sentenced as shown, due to Fair Wear except as otherwise stated.

[illegible]

1-¹ A.F. G1033 for these stores should be forwarded to _____,
_____, quoting this report as your authority.

2—*If stores are required in replacement, an indent should be submitted to your A.D.O.S., with this report attached.

Designation of Workshop

Station

Date _____

Approved by _____

B.C. Workshop

(10) applicable

* Not applicable in the case of complete A and B Vehicles

† Not applicable to field force units operating overseas, unless specifically instructed

TYPE OF VEHICLE... Cars 2 seater 4 x 2... W.E... 5...

[illegible]

SHEET NO. 1

517

TYPE OF VEHICLE Cars 4. seater 4x2 W.E. 3

[illegible]

SHEET NO. 2

[illegible]

TYPE OF VEHICLE... Cars Light... 4x4 W.E. ... 1

[illegible]

SHEET NO. 3

[illegible]

517

UNIT.....
TYPE OF VEHICLE... Trucks 15 cwt 4x2... V.E. 4

[illegible]

UNIT.....H.Q.....

TYPE OF VEHICLE..Trucks..15..wt..4x2..Water..W.E.....1.....

[illegible]

.....
T.4x2 Water W.E. 1SHEET NO. 5

CONTRACT No

CHASSIS No

ENGINE No

FROM

AUTHORITY

TO

AUTHORITY

NOTES

G.V.G. Bari

A/3130

513

UNIT... 11.4.....

TYPE OF VEHICLE... Trucks 15 wt 4x2 office. W.E..... 3.....

[illegible]

SHEET NO. 6

[illegible]

515

TYPE OF VEHICLE Lorries 3 Tm 4x2 W.E. 3

[illegible]

SHEET NO. 7.....

CONTRACT No	CHASSIS No	ENGINE No	FROM	AUTHORITY	TO	AUTHORITY	NOTES
			9V.P. Capus	A/3131	D.L.R.	01197	8-6-45
			"	A/3262			
			"	A/3131			
			104 MED SEC.	DISTONE G.I. 23			4x4
			" Adv. Med. Sec. 104	placed 28 June 45			F.S.S.

511

TYPE OF VEHICLE.. Motorcycles W.E. 10

MAKE	WD No	CONTRACT No	CHASSIS No	ENGINE No	FROM	AUTHORITY
B.S.A.	C5547222				GRV.P	A/2686
	C 4350468				6V.6.Bari	A/2966
	C 1430401				"	A/2966
	C 5119069				"	A/2966
	C 1430443				"	A/2966
	C 1450239				"	A/2966
	C 1450432				"	A/2966
	C 1431569				"	A/2966
	C 1450243				"	A/2966
	C 4349031				"	A/2966
	C 5214399				1147NF	DISTONE HOGT33 dated 22 Jan 45
	C 1452419				"	"

Weston

10

SECRET NO.

8

CONTRACT No	CHASSIS No	ENGINE No	FROM	AUTHORITY	TO	AUTHORITY	NOTES
			9 R.V.P.	A/2585			
			6 V. R. Beni	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966			
			"	A/2966	B.L.R.	OM 68	
			"	A/2966	B.L.R.	OM 78/28-5-45	
			"	A/2966			
			1141NF	DISTONE HQGT 33 dated 22 Jan 45			
			"	"			

510

F.S.S.

510

TYPE OF VEHICLE, *Cons 5wt 4x4* W.E. *NIL*

[illegible]

SHEET NO. 9

[illegible]

0 4 0 1