

ACC

10000/120/4426

12'6' 56

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TRAINING DIRECTIVES

Jan. - Sept. 1945

4227
4247

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18 JAN. 45 - PHOEN. 144119 -

21

4 Feb. 45 - 1200 ft. 8000 ft.

21

14 Sep 45 - From H.M.17 -

The Combat Groups - 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 46th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 51st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 55th, 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 64th, 65th, 66th, 67th, 68th, 69th, 70th, 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 75th, 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 81st, 82nd, 83rd, 84th, 85th, 86th, 87th, 88th, 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, 96th, 97th, 98th, 99th, 100th

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Address by G.C. HMIN.

217

G.S.O. I 56 B.L.D.
21A
RESTRICTEDSUBJECT: Address by GOC MMIA

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MMIA)

G / 95

14 Sep 45

TO : MMIA Outstation IOs
GSOs 1 BLUs att Combat Gps
Comd 'F' BL & TU

1. Attached hereto is copy of address given by GOC MMIA to Senior Italian War Ministry officials on 14 Sep 45.
2. This document is for your personal information so that you will be in the picture if Territorial and Div comds discuss with you. It is necessary that the information contained in the document should first reach Italian officials through Italian Ministry of War channels and you are requested NOT to use this information for the present for purposes other than personal knowledge of what is being examined this end in ROME.

rd

*L.M. Ingledew.*Lt.-Col.
GS.

21 SEP 1945

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4240

R E S T R I C T E D

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E

G/3

14 September 1945

Address by G.O.C., M.M.I.A. to give an
outline of Allied views and intentions
as regards the future organization and
training of the ITALIAN ARMY.

1. Creation of existing Italian Army.

- (a) The existing Italian Army represents an ad hoc build-up to suit immediate Allied war needs and dependent on factors such as supply, time available, the development of the war etc.
- (b) It bore little relation to what ITALY will need as a post-treaty army. Yet we always had one eye on the future and tried to develop an organization which would fit post-war without detracting from the immediate war effort.
- (c) The result is that now we already have an organization which can be and is being changed into a shape which will produce an army to meet Italian needs during the Interim period until the Peace Treaty is signed.
- (d) We have the Ministry of War, the Territorial H.Q.'s organization, the Gruppi, 3 I.S. Divs, the Services, CESANO, etc - and we are now planning to expand Territorial H.Q. from 2,000 to 7,000 and creating 10 I.S. Bdes.
- (e) The immediate object of the Allies is to create this Italian Army and raise its quality and efficiency.

2. Peace Treaty Terms.

I do not know what these will be. That is a matter for the Allied

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2. Peace Treaty Terms.

I do not know what these will be. That is a matter for the Allied Governments and is not yet settled. So do NOT think that I can tell you anything about this to-day. I want to make that quite clear. I don't know.

3. Post-treaty set-up.

- (a) The post-treaty Italian Army will depend on the size, composition and armament authorized by the Allies, and on the matter of conscription or a long service army (much on the British model).

/... (b)

-2-

3. (Contd.)

- (b) Nevertheless, we have got to think ahead in anticipation and try to design a proper framework which will suit an army of any size that ITALY is likely to be allowed.
- (c) ITALY, undoubtedly, in any event, will only be able to afford a small army, and I know as soldiers that you will agree with me that it is far better for her to have a small army of high quality than a large army of low quality. So that simplifies our problem.

4. Discussions with A.F.H.Q.

- (a) I have been having discussion with A.F.H.Q. and other Allied authorities on this whole matter and I have called you together today to explain in broad outline what are the present Allied ideas and intentions subject to approval by higher authority. After I have explained this in outline, our respective staffs can examine the problem and its implications in greater detail.
- (b) We have proceeded on the assumptions that :
- (i) owing to war and the circumstances under which it was born, the existing Italian Army requires complete reorganization throughout.
 - (ii) the Allies are prepared and determined to assist in this reconstruction and I have no doubt that ITALY will welcome this.
 - (iii) the future Italian Army must be brought right up to date and purged of all the inefficiencies and out of date procedures⁴²⁴⁵ which existed under the Fascist Regime.
 - (iv) quality not quantity is to be the keynote.

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(c) The Italian Army proved in the post-armistice war that it had advanced a long way since the chaos of early 1944, but there is still a very long way to go yet.

(d) We appreciate that the full reconstruction will take time, but we must make a start now and go all out NOW to put a proper Italian Army on its feet. I know I can rely on your cooperation in this.

/.....(e)

-3-

4. (contd.)

(e) I am now going to outline to you the Allied views on general organization and training.

5. Conscription versus a long service voluntary army.

(a) With a small army, with key-note quality, there is no doubt in my mind that a long service army is far the best in every way for ITALY and I believe you thoroughly agree with me.

(b) Some aspects of this are :-

(i) Modern training takes months. Unless the army is trained, it is no use. Therefore, with a conscript army, you have to have large training staffs to train the whole call-up authorized each year. During early training men are away from their units. The result is that the size of the effective part of the army is small and unable to fulfil its function.

(ii) With a conscript army of one year's service, you have to turn over and train 100% of the call-up each year; but with a long service army of 5 years minimum, only 20% which eases the training commitment and thus enlarges the "effective" part of the army.

(iii) A long service army would be a complete break with the past, which (though I am not a politician) seems to me to be an excellent thing politically and for army prestige.

(c) There are, of course, many other aspects which you realize as well as I do. The argument against long service is the COST. But I 4244 doubt if really the cost is very much greater. The main increase is

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(c) There are, of course, many other aspects which you realize as well as I do. The argument against long service is the COST. But I 4244 doubt if really the cost is very much greater. The main increase is the extra pay for volunteers. But you will have to pay a conscript a living wage in future, higher than in the past - and I doubt if you would have to pay the volunteer much more. We are getting many volunteers today, though perhaps these are not drawn from the best types available.

/....(a)

-4-

5. (contd.)

- (d) In any event, I will tell my staff to examine the question with you and get your views. Personally, I think it far better to have a small long service, dependable army of high quality than a larger, less stable, conscript army of the same cost.
- (e) The CCRR give us a guide as to how a voluntary, long service army could be put into effect i.e. system, conditions of service, etc.

6. Call-up

- (a) If conscription continues to be the form of producing men for the army, I want you to examine the American system of call-up. (EXPLAIN)
- (b) It has worked excellently; is completely fair; and takes away an even % of men from each part of the country, thus assisting national economy.
- (c) I feel myself that it is the system ITALY needs and superior to your present methods.
- (d) It would make monthly call-ups possible, thus easing the strain on the training organizations and enabling that to be adjusted to meet a continuous and even flow of recruits.

7. Inflow and training of recruits.

- (a) This DIAGRAM (on blackboard) gives an outline of how we envisage recruits being taken into the Army, trained and delivered to units, (EXPLAIN DIAGRAM ATTACHED).

- (b) We have based the design so that :-

- (i) it can fit either the voluntary or the conscription army.

The matter is merely one of degree of size of the training establishments.

- (ii) an even flow of recruits can be dealt with and all training

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- (ii) an even flow of recruits can be dealt with and all training organizations are full simultaneously, thus reducing training overheads and maintaining the effective strength of the army.

- (iii) the recruit gets a thorough grounding before he goes to his unit. This enables the C.O. of the unit to concentrate on collective training.

/....(iv)

4243

-5-

7. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

- (iv) the higher training establishments (except Military Academy at MODENA and Staff College in ROME) are planned to be concentrated round ROME, with obvious advantages of supervision and control by the Ministry of War; and are also concentrated by arms, which means economy of equipment.
- (v) collection and initial training of recruits is by Regions, thus preserving Territorial association and avoiding waste of time and transport in travelling.
- (vi) it is a system which we can start putting into force as soon as we get permission from higher authority.
- (vii) incidentally troops under training at CESANO are a potential valuable I.S. reserve centrally located.
- (c) In many ways it is a complete break with the past, but it will undoubtedly be a more efficient machine for the purpose and the country round CESANO is ideal for training. Sentiment of using former artillery barracks at TURIN, for instance, must give way to efficiency. You remember the sentence in the Bible about "putting new wine into old bottles"! We have nevertheless tried to make the best compromise possible.
- (d) (i) We have CESANO and BRACCIANO Schools already in being. We looked ahead and have secured further accommodation at CIVITAVECCHIA.
- (ii) Now we must go ahead with planning and organizing the P.T.C.'s and I.T.C.'s, as well as adjusting CESANO and the other schools nearby.
- (iii) We must decide quickly on the barracks and locations of the

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(iii) We must decide quickly on the barracks and locations of the P.T.C's and I.T.C's which should be alongside each other. If the most suitable site in any place is occupied by the Allies, I will see if that can be freed for you.

(iv) We must get the District H.Q.'s and Depots organized and functioning. The Depot (in our system) would have a

/...dua.1

-6-

(a) (contd.)

(i) (contd.)

(iv) (contd.)

dual role of an outfitting H.Q. and a Regimental Depot. I feel that District H.Q.'s and Depots should be merged to save overheads, movement and accommodation. I should like this examined in detail.

(v) We must get the CESANO and other nearby schools properly fitted up with suitable accommodation, roads etc. I am glad to see improvement there as regards this BUT WE MUST get the gas plant completely removed. We cannot have a civilian business in CESANO. It must be purely military - the shrine of the Italian Army, which in time will become a "show-piece"!

(vi) The great difficulty I see is on what figures are we to base the accommodation necessary? You need twice as much for a turnover of 200,000 as you do for 100,000. We don't know what the Peace Treaty will say. The turnover of recruits (and thus size of training staff) will be different for conscription to long service. But we have one advantage i.e. that we will start in a small way and increase gradually. So, even if we make a mistake we can alter it. I think we had better work backwards from a total figure of (say) 140,000 for the Interim Army plus 50%, i.e. about 200,000 or so on a conscript basis. That is the only figure I can think of to work on, and we can adjust up or down from that later - though I must repeat ~~that~~ it is a pure guess as I do NOT know what the Peace Treaty figures will be or whether it will be conscription or voluntary service.

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- (e) We must also now train instructors for P.T.C's and I.T.C's, and in fact get everything ready as soon as possible to take on the first big call-up. We can "live on our fat" from ER-ITI's and US-ITI's and local volunteers, we estimate, till December. By that time we anticipate having ^{ing} demobilized down to the 1919 class inclusive. It looks as

/...if we

-7-

7. (contd.)

(e) (contd.)

if we will want a call-up in January, so all must be ready before Xmas - say 15 December. There is not too much time. We must hurry, hurry, hurry.

8.

Officers.

(a) We agree to your having the military academy at MODENA. This raises the whole question of provision of officers on which any army basically depends. We have already started with the grading and removal of existing officers down to Major inclusive. That is one aspect - sorting out and keeping the best officers you have, and rehabilitating P.W. officers that you keep, by a course at CESANO.

(b) (i) The other angle is the provision and training of new entry into the Army. I would like you to examine now the question as to whether All "new entry" should not do 6 months in the ranks first before going as cadets to the Military Academy. The British and all the Dominion troops do this and it has been an unqualified success and invaluable to the officer. Later on, as he then understands how his men live in the Army.

(ii) Frankly, we feel that your whole basis of officer training academic and not human or personal enough. We feel that the relationship between officer and man is not what it should be in a democratic world and to get the best team work. We feel your course for cadets is much too long.

(iii) I would like you to examine the whole business in the light of what we have found so beneficial in the Allied Armies.

(iv) Till MODENA is ready and with the requisite instructors, we

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(iv) Till MODENA is ready and with the requisite instructors, we shall have to continue temporarily with LECCE - though here again the forthcoming courses should be modernized and adjusted.

(v) As I say, the officer question is vital. No out of date tradition or procedure must stand in the way of producing the right type of modern army officer worthy of ITALY and which

/....she

8. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(v) (contd.)

she needs so badly. We must start to build now for posterity and the word "Impossible" does not exist in my Dictionary !

9. Staff College.

This is not of such urgency but we want your views on this,

10. Standardization.

(a) Frankly, we feel that one of your troubles is the lack of standardization in your army organization, You have so many different types of units, all on different war establishments, An army cannot be really efficient thus. It complicates everything (training, reinforcements, supply - everything) and SIMPLICITY is a major element in military efficiency.

(b) (i) Till now, we have had I.S. Divs and Bdes on a different W.E. to the Gruppi. That could not be helped. But now we must plan to get on to a standard Infantry organization.

(ii) I have told my staff to examine with you as to whether the hastily-put-together Gruppo organization is correct. We will then adjust it and put I.S. Divs and Bdes on a similar organization. A ^{group} Gruppo Regiment is about the same strength as an I.S. Bde. We ~~will~~ call these converted I.S. Bdes "Independent Regiments". They need not have the same full scale of equipment but should be inter-changeable with Gruppo Regiments.

(iii) These "Independent Regiments", (similarly to all formations, units and establishments in a Territorial Region) will be under the

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(iii) These "Independent Regiments", (similarly to all formations, units and establishments in a Territorial Region) will be under the command and supervision of the Territorial Regional Commander.

(iv) CESANO, BRACCIANO and CIVITAVECCHIA Schools would be the exception. These should be controlled by one General under orders of the Ministry of War.

(v) M. of W. would lay down the standard syllabus for P.T.C's

/..... I.T.C's

-9-

10. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(v) (contd.)

and I.T.C.'s, thus ensuring standardization of training. But the Territorial Commander would supervise and issue all orders.

(vi) The whole lay-out, as you see, is a SIMPLE one, with decentralization to the Territorial Commanders combined with central control by the M. of W.

(vii) One last aspect of standardization is the matter of "Alpine Groups". We query whether these need a separate organization and W.E. to the Gruppi. The Gruppi (and all British and American Divisions) fought in the mountains of ITALY perfectly effectively with the aid of "Alpine increments" e.g. mule companies, etc. The same should apply as regards "Alpine Groups" based on the fundamental Gruppo organization. We thus would have a uniform training for all recruits, who could then do their specialized or higher training in their units.

11. Services.

(a) Pari passu with plans for all the reorganization I have mentioned must be plans for the reorganization of the services and the M. of W. to correspond.

(b) We think, for instance, that you must have a separate signal corps, a separate R.E.M.E. corps divorced from all other services, a separate Training Directorate which will have a very big task.

(c) I would like you to examine this also with my staff.

12. Conclusion.

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
I want to emphasize that what I have said is subject to confirmation by higher authority. It is intended to be the best forecast I can make for us to plan now and thus take time by the forelock.

LB/ar

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

FLOW AND TRAINING OF RECRUITS



FLOW AND TRAINING OF RECRUITS


8 Weeks

Travelling Time
NOT specified

Period needed by
Unit C.O. for
selection of
Specialists

Travelling Time
NOT specified

Various periods
required to train in
different Subjects



Each Arm has its own Centre or Centres. Recruits passing out of these will have completed individual training. Infantry will have completed Section Training and Other Arms an equivalent standard.

On arrival in Unit & in subsequent period C.O. will watch recruits and select those he wishes to have trained as Specialists. They will be posted to the appropriate school in accordance with requirements.

At the Specialist Schools for each arm of the Service recruits will complete the courses of various lengths laid down

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Man Management.

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
ATHQ CEF

Tel: 16872

DET/87/MT1

7 Feb 45.

50 BLU
51 BLU
52 BLU
53 BLU
56 BLU

Col S.C.W. PEA (RMC)

Copy to: G 3 Trg (Br) ATHQ
G 3 Trg (Br) 15 Army Gp (20)
MHA (5)

General.

1. It is evident from reports of the first actions of CRIMONA Gp and from the observation of training of the other Gruppi that it is in man management and leadership that the Italian Officer and NCO is most lacking.
2. This is a fault of which, I am sure, you are fully aware but I make no apology for emphasizing it, as until we can improve the standard of man management within the Gruppi we can not hope to produce divs fit to take their place alongside the Allies in the line.
3. These notes are therefore an attempt to analyse the problem and to offer some suggestions which will help to improve this vital aspect of soldiering.

The Problem.

4. It must first be realized that the Italian national characteristics as affected by Fascism do not produce the same relationship between officer and man as is found in the armies of the Democratic nations.

For this reason the Italian officer does not understand the necessity of looking after his men, and similarly, the man does not expect it.

The problem therefore is not to improve something which already exists, but to persuade the Italian officer that our system of man management is the relationship between our officers and men is sound and does in fact produce better results.

Psychological aspect.

53 BUJ
56 BUJ
Col S.O. 7.7. WFA (RAC)

Copy to: G 3 Trg (Dr) AMHQ
G 3 Trg (Dr) 15 Army Gp (20)
ISIA (5)

General.

1. It is evident from reports of the first actions of GRIMONA Gp and from the observation of training of the other Gruppi that it is in man management and leadership that the Italian Officer and NCO is most lacking.
2. This is a fault of which, I am sure, you are fully aware but I make no apology for emphasizing it, as until we can improve the standard of man management within the Gruppi we can not hope to produce divs fit to take their place alongside the Allies in the line.
3. These notes are therefore an attempt to analyze the problem and to offer some suggestions which will help to improve this vital aspect of soldiering.

The Problem.

4. It must first be realized that the Italian national characteristics as affected by Fascism do not produce the same relationship between officer and man as is found in the armies of the Democratic Nations.

For this reason the Italian officer does not understand the necessity of looking after his men, and similarly, the man does not expect it.

The problem therefore is not to improve something which already exists, but to persuade the Italian officer that our system of man management is a better relationship between our officers and men is sound and does in fact produce better results.

Psychological aspect.

5. To put this idea across is not an easy task particularly during training and before considering the methods by which we can do it, it is essential to study the psychological aspect.

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The Italian Nation is a defeated nation, and therefore suffers from an inferiority complex. It is essential that we do everything in our power to get the army back on its feet and engender in all ranks a pride in themselves and their army.

Any attempt therefore to point out faults or change customs must be most tactfully put if we are to achieve any results.

It is quite useless to attempt to drag them into it and the object can be achieved only if the Italians will adopt it of their own free will.

Suggested methods.

6. Logically we must start at the top and work down. The first step is therefore to persuade the senior officers - Bde and In comds - that a special drive on man management is necessary. This could be done by the following ways.

- (a) Arranging attachments of Italian senior officers to selected British units in order that they may see for themselves.
- (b) By discussion between British officers of the BLUs and Italian officers.
- (c) Obtaining assistance of MOs to preach the importance of personal hygiene and sanitation.
- (d) To persuade senior Italian officers to take a personal and active interest in the welfare of their men.
- (e) Officers of the BLU must accompany Italian officers during visits of inspection to cook houses, canteens etc.

7. As soon as the senior officers have been converted, you are over the first fence. The next big task is to see that a sense of the urgency of this is passed on by the Italians to the junior officers and NCOs. It must be impressed on them that each officer and NCO must personally play an active part in this.

All lectures and discussions are useless unless all concerned will put into action what they have learnt from discussions and talks.

The following are some ways in which this can be done:-

- (a) By the example and supervision of senior Italian officers and officers of the BLU.
- (b) Special lectures and discussions and films.

+ (c) As to this letter is a copy of the pamphlet "The Officer and Fighting Efficiency". This will be found useful as a basis

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- (a) By the example and supervision of senior Italian officers and officers of the BLU.
- (b) Special lectures and discussions and films.
- + (c) Att to this letter is a copy of the pamphlet "The Officer and Fighting Efficiency". This will be found useful as a basis for discussion and it may be worth while to have extracts translated so that each officer and NCO may have a reminder of his responsibilities towards his men.
- (d) All exercises and TETTs must include problems designed to bring out and prove beyond argument the importance of personal hygiene and man management, etc.

+ Pamphlet will follow.

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8. Reinforcement of the RTC will be dealt with in the same way. Special periods on all tactical and administrative courses will be allotted to the subject.

Special emphasis will be laid on leadership and man management in the junior leaders courses.

Examples of good and bad man management etc should be circulated by BLUs from time to time to assist in driving the lessons home.

9. These notes are in no way a comprehensive précis on the subject, and no doubt you will be able to think of many other ways of achieving the object.

I wish you to give this your immediate attention and I would like to know in due course what steps you are taking to deal with the problem.

I wish also a special paragraph to be included in the Progress Reports, indicating what success you are achieving.

MM

NEOW/mt

Brig.
D.M.T

H. G. Kennington

- 4232

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NEOW/mt

Bridg.
D.M.T

H. G. Kendrington

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SUBJECT: Italian Combat Groups - British Directives.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

S/C/29/33

18 Jan 45.

To: Ministry of War (2 copies)

copy to:	50 B.L.U.	6 copies.
	51 B.L.U.	6 "
	52 B.L.U.	6 "
	53 B.L.U.	6 "
	56 B.L.U.	6 "
	R.T.C. (Maj CELARDI)	10 copies.
	A.F.H.Q.	20 "
	15 Army Group	20 "
	D.H.T.	10 "
	1 District	4 "
	2 "	1 "
	3 "	3 "

1. In continuation of my S/C/29/33 dated 16 Jan 45, herewith the following British Directives for Italian Combat Groups, for necessary action:

No 13	Reinforcements
No 20	Ordnance Equipment.
No 21	Supplies, Ammunition and P.O.L.

trs. WE.
sten
spares 50.

W. Pidsley Colonel
for Major General.
M.M.I.A.

22 JAN 1945

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CONFIDENTIALITALIAN COMBAT FORCEBRITISH DIRECTIVE No. 13 - REINFORCEMENTS

1. The provision, accommodation, training and allocation of reinforcements of all kinds for Combat Groups is the responsibility of SMRE within the terms of this Directive and with such help from MMCA as is required. The object at all times will be to keep Groups up to their approved strength with well-trained men of the required types without waste of manpower or material.
2. The Reinforcement Training Centre is located at CESANO station (15 miles N. W. of ROME).
3. All reinforcements for Combat Groups will be held on the strength of the Reinforcement Centre and will not exceed 15% of the authorised strength of the Combat Troops.
4. The Reinforcement Centre will be responsible for:-
 - (a) Testing, selection and allocation of suitable personnel to appropriate units within the Depot, according to their territorial physical, technical or personal qualifications for the various arms of the service and in suitable proportions to meet expected requirements.
 - (b) Documentation and administration in accordance with Italian Army Regulations.
 - (c) Equipment and clothing, in accordance with scales approved for the Combat Force.
 - (d) Training in basic, combat or technical duties, in accordance with standards laid down by Allied Comds (through the Allied Director of Military Training D.M.T.)
 - (e) Allocation to units in accordance with deficiencies reported.
5. Unit Commanders will inform Group HQ weekly by means of a strength state on the prescribed specimen of their deficiencies as follows:-
 - (a) Killed or died - from date of death.
 - (b) Wounded or sick - after 15 days or as soon as evacuated from the Group Field Hospital Area.
 - (c) Missing or absent - after 15 days absence.
 - (d) Permanently posted away from unit - from date of posting.

Reinforcements are sent to the Depot

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 - (b) Wounded or sick - after 15 days or as soon as evacuated from the Group Field Hospital Area.
 - (c) Missing or absent - after 15 days absence.
 - (d) Permanently posted away from unit - from date of posting.

Reinforcements are not to be demanded to replace men on courses or away on temporary duty or attachment, or otherwise absent under 15 days.
 6. Strength States and Deficiencies from units will be consolidated at Group HQ and sent weekly (on Saturdays) by quickest means to the R.T.C., copies being sent to S.M.R.E. and to the HQU concerned. Special demands in the case of heavy casualties may be made at any time.

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7. The R.T.C. Commander will normally supply the reinforcements demanded without further authority as far as he is able, if there are not enough available reinforcements he will apply (through his Liaison Officer) to M.M.I.A. for a decision on priorities.
8. Movement of reinforcements from R.T.C. to units will be the responsibility of M.M.I.A. Liaison Officer at the R.T.C. who will receive instructions on this matter from HQ M.M.A. Transit Camps may be established in forward areas to facilitate this. Normally a basic allocation of 200 men per Group per week will be allotted on railways to cover anticipated demands; extra rail or road transport being provided as necessary.
9. The number of reinforcement held in the R.T.C. will be shown each week on a statement to be sent by the R.T.C. Commander to S.M.R.E. and to the Liaison Officer for forwarding to M.M.I.A. This will form the basis for enlistment for further men and will show the numbers of reinforcements:-
 - (a) authorised.
 - (b) present
 - (c) available for posting.
 - (d) received during past week.
 - (e) despatched during past week.

It will be similar in form to that used by units and Group HQ for demanding reinforcements.
10. Replenishment of the R.T.C. is the responsibility of the Ministry of War after such consultations with M.M.A. regarding recalls, and calling up as are needed to maintain the authorised holding of reinforcements. In planning for this, consideration will be given to the anticipated wastage due to all causes, to returns from hospital, imprisonment or other absence, and to the yield of various districts, so that strength may be maintained without exceeding the authorised ceiling.

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ITALIAN COMBAT FORCE.BRITISH DIRECTIVE NO 20. ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT.1. ORGANISATION.

Each Combat Group H.Q. has an Ord Field Park which is responsible for supplying (and replacing parts to) all vehicles, guns and technical equipment. In addition there is an Ordnance 'Dump' through which are obtained all supplies of clothing and General stores. Stocks of technical spares are held in the Field Park on approved scales which may not be exceeded. There is a small holding of clothing and General Stores in the 'Dump'.

Indents for spares and replacements when received are either met from existing holdings or passed to a larger Ordnance unit or installation for supply. Indents and correspondence on Ordnance matters addressed to British Army authorities outside the Combat Group will be sent by or through the British Ordnance Officer (D.A.D.O.S.) on the Staff of the B.L.U. This officer is responsible for the technical supervision of all Ordnance Supply matters.

2. ENTITLEMENT OF ORDNANCE STORES.

Combat Group personnel and units will be clothed and equipped in accordance with scales laid down in 'Normal Equipment Lists for an Italian Combat Group', which are common to all units, and 'Special Equipment Lists' which show scales of Special Equipment for particular units.

3. METHOD OF REPLACEMENT.(a). Controlled Stores. (published list is held by D.A.D.O.S.).

Losses of controlled stores such as vehicles, guns, wireless etc., must be reported to D.A.D.O.S. daily as they occur. A certificate to the effect that equipment is beyond local repair, signed by a R.E.M.E. officer, must accompany subsequent indents. D.A.D.O.S. publishes lists, amended from time to time as necessary, showing controlled stores which must be so reported.

(b). Non-controlled Stores.

M.E. spares, wireless and signal spares and gun spares are obtainable from the Ordnance Field Park on production of the unserviceable part.

(c) General.

Items of clothing and equipment will be replaced when they are worn out or are destroyed by enemy action. Indents must be submitted by units on Army Form G 997, in triplicate. These should be in bulk and rendered monthly. A list of stores to be indented for in bulk is published by D.A.D.O.S. of B.L.U. through whom all indents must be passed. Clothing and General stores are obtained through the D.A.D.O.S. 'Dump'.

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3. METHOD OF REPLACEMENT.

(a). Controlled Stores. (Published list is held by D.A.D.O.S.).

Losses of controlled stores such as vehicles, guns, wireless sets etc., must be reported to D.A.D.O.S. daily as they occur. A certificate to the effect that equipment is beyond local repair, signed by a R.E.M.E. officer, must accompany subsequent indents. D.A.D.O.S. publishes lists, amended from time to time as necessary, showing controlled stores which must be so reported.

(b). Non-controlled Stores.

M.T. spares, wireless and signal spares and gun spares are obtainable from the Ordnance Field Park on production of the unserviceable part.

(c). General.

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4. GENERAL.

D.A.D.O.S. publishes instructions as necessary giving detailed instructions, e.g. when bulk indents must be rendered, lists of various controlled stores etc. He acts as adviser on all matters of supply of Ordnance Equipment and should be consulted in any case of doubt.

5. CONDEMNATION.

General stores (other than clothing) which become unserviceable will be sent to the Ordnance 'Dump' for condemnation. Such stores may be condemned only on the authority of the British D.A.D.O.S. or his representative. Clothing may be condemned by the Officer Commanding unit, and will be returned to D.A.D.O.S. 'Dump' when condemned.

CONFIDENTIALITALIAN COMBAT FORCEBRITISH DIRECTIVE No. 21 - SUPPLIES, AMMUNITION & POL.1. ORGANISATION WITHIN GROUPS

(a) Each Combat Group is allotted one Supply and Transport Company (Trasportive reformimenti) for the carriage and delivery to units of the Group of the rations, ammunition and petrol and lubricants, and also to hold certain reserves of certain commodities. This transport is known as 2nd Line Transport.

(b) The Supply and Transport Company is organized as follows:-

1. Company H.Q. 3 Transport Platoons, each of 30-5 ton vehicles, subdivided into 5 Sections, each of 6-3 ton vehs.
- ii. 2 Composite Platoons containing the technical and other personnel needed for the receipt, handling, storage, issue and accounting of rations, ammunition and petrol and lubricants.

One platoon will always operate with the Company. The Second Platoon is to reinforce existing allied installations and may therefore be detached from the Company, although remaining under command.

- iv. 3 Relief Driver Increments of which 1 R.D.I. is allotted to each Transport Platoon and contains personnel for duty as relief drivers and also for loading duties.

(c) A Workshop Platoon of the Mechanical Engineer Company is attached containing the mobile equipment and technical personnel necessary to repair and maintain the vehicles of the Company, plus any other vehicles which may be affiliated to the Company for maintenance, e.g. Vehicles of Division Hq.

(d) In addition each Combat Group is supported by a small Field Bakery intended as an increment to allied field bakeries, but capable of operating independently.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMMANDER

The Officer Commanding the Supply and Transport Company is responsible:-

- (a) To the Group Commander for the operation, administration and general and technical efficiency of his unit.
- (b) To advise the Group Commander on technical matters connected with the operation of his service, e.g. Vehicle loadings, handling of rations, storage and handling of ammunition and petrol, carriage of troops by M.T. etc.

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- (b) To advise the Group Commander on technical matters connected with the operation of his service, e.g. Vehicle Loadings, handling of rations, storage and handling of ammunition and petrol, carriage of troops by M.T. etc.
- (c) To administer his service within the Group in accordance with the policy and technical instructions issued by higher command.

3. SUPPLY & REPLENISHMENT IN FORWARD AREAS

(a) Reserves

- i. Each unit in the Group holds certain authorised reserves of rations, ammunition and POL known as Unit or 1st. Line Reserves.

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ii. The supply and transport company holds other authorised reserves of rations etc. known as 2nd. Line Reserves.

iii. Further reserves are held at every link of the supply chain.

(b) Principle of Replenishment

The principle is that anything expended by a unit, is replaced from the 1st. Line reserve, which in turn is replenished from the 2nd Line reserve held by the Supply and Transport Company. The latter then restores its authorised reserve holdings by drawing from its own source of supply.

(c) Transport

Transport in the forward areas may normally fall into three classes:-

i. The transport of the fighting units known as 1st Line transport.

ii. The Supply and Transport Company, known as 2nd Line transport.

iii. A Transport Pool which may be formed under Army command.

These three classes operate as follows:-

1st Line Transport. Carries everything the unit needs to fight and live and transports replenishment supplies received from 2nd Line transport.

2nd Line Transport. Responsible for transport between the point at which delivery is made to 1st Line transport and the point at which the supply and transport company draws what it needs to maintain the Division.

Army Transport Pool. Responsible for transport of supplies forward from the Line of Communication Terminal to the point at which the Supply and Transport Company takes delivery.

4. THE SUPPLY SYSTEM - BASE TO 2nd LINE

i. Supplies of all commodities from the Base normally arrive daily at the Terminal of the L of C transportation system at a point called the HEAD, which may be a Rail, Road or Sea - HEAD, dependent upon the means of transportation employed.

ii. At the Head is established a Maintenance Area known as the Rail/Road/Sea Head Maintenance Area.

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Army Transport Pool. Responsible for transport of supplies forward from the Line of Communication Terminal to the point at which the Supply and Transport Company takes delivery.

4. THE SUPPLY SYSTEM - BACK TO 2ND LINE

i. Supplies of all commodities from the Base normally arrive daily at the Terminal of the L of C transportation system at a point called the HEAD, which may be a Rail, Road or Sea - HEAD, dependent upon the means of transportation employed.

ii. At the Head is established a Maintenance Area known as the Rail/Road/Sea Head Maintenance Area.

Under suitable operational conditions the Supply and Transport Company draws its requirements direct from this Maintenance Area, on a Time Table.

iii. In Mobile Operations and where the Rail Head Maintenance Area is too far back a Forward Maintenance Area may be established under Corps Control from which the Supply and Transport Company would draw its requirements.

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iv. If no forward Maintenance Area is established and the Rail-head Maintenance Area is too far back to enable the supply and transport company to draw direct then the requirements of the supply and transport company will be taken forward by the Army Transport Pool to an agreed point known as the Refilling Point, where they will be transferred to the supply and transport company.

5. THE SUPPLY SYSTEM - 2ND LINE TO UNITS

i. Where the distances between the forward units and the supply and transport company is not great, e.g. not more than about 10-15 Km., 1st Line vehicles from units may come back to the supply and transport company to draw what is required.

ii. Where this distance is more than 15 Km. it is normal for the supply and transport company to carry supplies to within easy reach of the forward units.

When this is done transfers of supplies from 2nd Line Vehicles to 1st Line vehicles are effected at definite map reference locations known as POINTS.

There are normally separate POINTS as follows:-

(a) Ammunition Points

Normally hold ammunition of all types to a scale laid down by the staff and whilst established remains open 24 hours a day.

as vehicles of the supply and transport company at the A.P. are emptied they are automatically replaced by full vehicles from the company location.

(b) Petrol Points

Normally hold a fixed amount of P.O.L. and are usually established daily for a definite period (usually about 2 hours).

Forward units collect P.O.L. in their own 1st Line Transport.

(c) Supply Points

Rations, mail, and other small stores are normally taken to Supply Points daily in supply and transport company vehicles as previously prepared detail loads for each unit, which normally collect in its own 1st Line transport.

Supply Points, like Petrol Points, are normally established to remain open for a definite period.

6. DETAILED SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS

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Supply points, like Petrol Points, are normally established to remain open for a definite period.

6. DETAILED SUPPLY ARRANGEMENTS

(a) Rations

On Day "D"

i. The unit makes out a ration indent three days ahead, and hands it to the supply and transport company representative when the unit goes to collect rations indented for previously.

ii. The supply and transport company summarizes all units' indents and sends a copy of this summary to the Maintenance

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area from which the company draws its requirements. This acts as a demand on the Maintenance Area.

On Day "D" plus 1

i. The supply and transport company vehicles go to the Maintenance Area (or Refilling Point) and draws the rations demanded on Day "D". These are issued in bulk by the Maintenance Area based on the summary demand.

ii. The supply and transport company vehicles go back to the company location, or other suitable location, and break down the bulk received from the Maintenance Area into separate parcels for each unit, based on the units' indents.

This process is known as Breaking Bulk and the point at which the work is done is known as the Bulk Breaking Point.

On Day "D" plus 2

i. The supply and transport company delivers the rations to the various units at an agreed map reference location known as a Supply Point. Units' 1st Line vehicles come to this Point and draw their rations, or

ii. Units' 1st Line vehicles come to the supply and transport company location itself and receive their rations there, if more convenient.

On Day "D" plus 3

The units get the rations.

(b) Petrol

A unit does not indent in advance for POL but sends daily to the petrol Point (see para 3(ii) (b)), sufficient vehicles to draw in bulk what POL is needed to refill vehicle tanks and restore the 1st Line Reserve. An estimate of the Groups probable requirements should be obtained by the Company Commander from the Commissariat Branch at the Group HQ. This will enable the Company Commander to know how many vehicles he need to send to the Petrol Point.

(c) Ammunition

i. A unit does not normally demand ammunition in advance.

Ammunition Points are established as stated in para 5 and a unit can draw what it needs at any time.

In emergency any unit can draw ammunition from any Ammunition Point.

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ii. Units' 1st Line vehicles come to the supply and transport company location itself and receive their rations there, if more convenient.

On Day "D" plus 3

The units eat the rations.

(b) Petrol

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Ammunition points are established as stated in para 5 and a unit can draw what it needs at any time.

In emergency any unit can draw ammunition from any Ammunition Point.

ii. If expenditure of artillery ammunition is expected to be heavy, gun ammunition may be dumped in quantity at, or close to, gun positions by the Second Line Company (even assisted by Army Pool Transport if necessary). This process is known as a Dumping programme.

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7. MISCELLANEOUS STORES

Perage; fuel for lighting, heating and cooking; disinfectants; water sterilization chemicals; extra rations for invalids; mail; parcels; small engineer stores; small ordnance stores; canteen stores; water, where necessary, and reserves of clothing etc are carried and delivered to forward units by the supply and transport company in accordance with the General principles and system outlined in the foregoing paragraphs.

8. CARRIAGE OF TROOPS BY MOTOR TRANSPORT

The supply and transport company of the Combat Groups does not consist of a number of vehicles allocated to specific purposes. It is, in effect, a pool of transport which divisional or higher formation Commanders may use for any required task.

One of the more frequent uses is to lift marching personnel, in regard to which the following points should be noted:-

(a) The transport platoon of 30 vehicles will carry the marching personnel of an infantry battalion.

(b) The following division of responsibilities governs arrangements for the movement of troops by M.T.

i. The Group HQ Staff is responsible for issuing complete orders for the move, which will include the running speed; density of vehicles on the road; halts; routes; traffic control posts etc. and for nominating an officer to command the column.

ii. The supply and transport company is responsible for providing the necessary vehicles; arrival at embussing points at the right time and in the right order of vehicles; serial numbering of all vehicles and for the move; providing spare vehicles; making arrangements to deal with breakdowns; march discipline.

iii. The appointed column Commander is the deciding authority in all matters during the move, but will avoid interference with the technical matters concerning the operation of the transport and will consult the officer in charge of the vehicles on all points affecting their proper operation.

iv. The officer in charge of the vehicles is responsible for technical control; march discipline; dealing with breakdowns; and maintaining correct speeds and density. He is NCT responsible for leading the column to its correct destination. This responsibility lies with the appointed Column Commander.

v. The officer in charge of the vehicles has not com-

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v. The officer in charge of the vehicles has not plotted his duty immediately troops have been debussed, but remains under command of column Commander until the latter states that the move is completed. If, however, no previous dispersal orders have been issued, the officer in charge of the vehicles will remain under command the column Commander until such orders are received.

Lt. Col.
M. M. I. A.

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