

ACC

10000 | 120 | 4576

100 | 1 | 1

Fa

10000/120/4576

AQ/1/1

GENERAL MEMORANDUMS

Feb. 10, 1945 - May 6, 1945

3813
3920

SECRET - Index of the UN REP

30

File

UN REP
Date 11/1/48

6 May 45

UN REP

Copy to 1- LHM FAMES HAS CEM AC (MHA) (For Information)

1. The nation's position of hostility has led to a number of questions as to whether the Centre at CHENGO is to be retained in its present form or be reduced or increased.

2. The answer to these questions is not known by the writer, but we agree at AMH.

3. The whole question is governed by the following factors :-

(a) The anticipated view of the Post-war Italian Army.

(b) The view to which the present Italian Army will be put during the transition phase from war to peace conditions.

All that is known is that Higher Authority as a result of their recent performances in Northern Italy have the most complete confidence in loyalty and steadiness of the new Italian Army and intend to make the fullest possible use of this army alongside the Allied Forces engaged in police, civil control and reconstruction in Northern Italy.

With this in mind I have been ordered to ensure that the standard of training for which in the last months we have all been working shall not be relaxed in the slightest degree. I repeat the standard must not be relaxed, but I am very anxious that while this standard should be kept as high as possible all ranks should have an increased portion of their time devoted to organized games, sports and exhibitions. All organized exercises should be acted to inspire in their progress as such entertaining and can be introduced without interfering with the standard of technical training.

It is hoped that all ranks will bear in mind that it is our object to produce the new Italian Regular Army comprising highly trained officers and men working together in complete harmony and with every aspect of selfless and unselfish given the proper place in the daily programme.

It is our duty to ensure that all officers and men are fully aware of the high standards accorded to them in being the builders and maintainers of a new army. While in uniform appearance - while in technical

Copy to :- LAND PUNISH CASE NO. 10 (1972) (For Information)

1. The sudden cessation of hostilities has led to a number of queries as to whether the Centre at CHAND is to be retained in its present form or be reduced or increased.

2. The answer to these questions is not known by the writer, 18.12.72, as appears at para 1.

3. The whole question is governed by the following factors :-

- (a) The authorized size of the Post-war Italian Army.
- (b) The uses to which the present Italian Army will be put during the transition phase from war to peace conditions.

4. All that is known is that Higher Authority as a result of their recent performances in Northern Italy have the most complete confidence in loyalty and steadiness of the new Italian Army and intend to make the fullest possible use of this Army. Moreover the Allied Forces engaged in Police, for General and re-organization in Northern Italy.

5. With this in view I have been ordered to ensure that the standard of training for which in the last months we have all been working shall not be relaxed in the slightest degree. I repeat the standard must not be relaxed, but I am very anxious that while this standard should be kept as high as possible all ranks should have an increased portion of their time devoted to unopposed games, sports and exhibitions. All Imperial Commanders should be asked to include in their programmes as such entertaining training as can be interwoven without interfering with the standard of technical training.

6. It is hoped that all ranks will bear in mind that it is our object to produce the new Italian Northern Army consisting highly technical Officers and men working together in complete harmony and with every aspect of welfare and entertainment given its proper place in the daily programme.

7. Hence it is our duty to ensure that all Officers and NCOs are fully aware of the high privilege accorded to them in being the builders and architects of a new Army. While in personal appearance - while in technical ability - in other words efficiency must be the aim of every commander however junior in rank. The new Army on a peace-time basis cannot tolerate slack, slovenly or disinterested Officers and NCOs. The most valuable officer should be taken to officers any officer or NCO who is so blind to the importance of his task as to fail to ensure every aspect of his duty to make himself worthy of his responsibilities.

0263

- 2 -

6. This is no time for complacency. The new Italian Army has already exceeded all expectations for its fighting qualities. Let it regain its pre-war reputation for rigid discipline, efficiency and wariness.

RM/ell

Internal

File

Float (2)

fol
Lieut-Col RA

3919

SUBJECT: Civilian Construction Contractors at
CELANO, MAGGIORANO AND MINZIANI, and
their influence on Tunisia.

1. ILM, ILMCO, ILM,
c/o Land Forces São Paulo,
A.C. (MIL) HQ.

Ref: 0.1/1/160

29 March 1946.

To: H.Q.
Land Forces São Paulo.
A.C. (MIL) HQ. (P copies).

1. It is an unfortunate but incontestable fact that the process of
training, and in some cases the actual opening of schools of instruction,
are being seriously delayed by the relatively slow progress in the rebuilding
and reconstruction of the buildings in the area covered by the A.C.

2. All contractors have been placed by the Director General of Engineering,
S.M.S.B. Gen. Cartolozzo, with various civilian contractors, and while the
standard of work varies and the degree of progress is inconsistent, it may be
said generally that the majority of contractors have done very well indeed in
the face of almost insuperable difficulties.

The list of firms employed
is given at Appendix 'A'.

3. These difficulties are mainly those of building supplies and transport.

(a) The position with regard to building material appears to be that all
material, without exception, is controlled by R.A.A.C. authorities under
the jurisdiction of R.A.A.C. Civilian contractors receiving status
or material have, in the first place, to obtain releases of the
regulate building material through R.A.A.C. channels. The only alternative
is to purchase in the open market which, in the present state of
Italian industry, involves prohibitive costs.

(b) The next problem is to transport such material material to the site.
There are virtually no motor lorry trucks available in Italy and
very elaborate procedure is required to enable contractors to obtain
partly worn trucks through U.D. sources.

Hence, coupled with the delay in obtaining the initial releases, further delay
is caused by the frequent breakdown of the worn-out and inadequate transport
available.

4. U.S.F., R.A.A.C. has authorized the release of a large quantity of
building material and further help - considerable proportion of this was already
on the site, but such supplies are rapidly becoming exhausted and the problem
referred to in the preceding paragraph is now becoming increasingly serious.

1. It is an unfortunate but incontrovertible fact that the two areas of training, and in some cases the actual operating duties of schools of instruction, are being seriously delayed by the relatively slow progress in the rebuilding and reconstruction of the buildings in the area covered by the A.A.C.

2. All contracts have been placed by the Director General of Reconstruction, S.M.A.C. Gen. Corleone, with various civilian contractors, and while the standard of work varies and the degree of progress is inconsistent, it may be said generally that the majority of contractors have done very well indeed in the face of almost insuperable difficulties. The list of firms engaged is given in Appendix 'A'.

3. These difficulties are mainly those of building supplies and transport.

(a) The position with regard to building material appears to be that all material, without exception, is controlled by U.S. authorities under the jurisdiction of A.A.A.C. Civilian contractors requiring stores or material have, in the first place, to obtain releases of the requisite building material through A.A.C. channels. The only alternative is to purchase in the open market which, in the present state of Italian industry, involves prohibitive cost.

(b) The next problem is to transport such released material to the site. There are virtually no motor lorry lines available in Italy, and very disquieting procedures are required to enable contractors to obtain partly worn tyres through U.S. sources.

Hence, coupled with the delay in obtaining the initial release, further delay is caused by the frequent breakdown of the worn-out and inadequate transport available.

4. C.S.E., R.A.A.C., has authorized the release of a large quantity of building material and particularly a considerable proportion of this was allowed on the site, but such supplies are rapidly becoming exhausted and the problem referred to in the preceding paragraph is now becoming increasingly serious.

5. In an endeavour to improve matters, the officer made a direct approach to C.S.E. with a request that his Department should take a direct initiative in speeding up the contracts and appoint an A.A.C. officer personally to follow the work. 3918

6. C.S.E. ordered a formal survey of the contract position to be made, as a result of which a comprehensive report was prepared.

7. It is understood that this report was discussed with the British Commander of R.A.A.C.

8. At a meeting in Rome on 28 March, the writer was informed that it had been decided that, in view of the immense extent of the work involved, C.S.E., R.A.A.C., was unable to meet the requests referred to in paragraph 5, and, in fact, was unable to do anything more than at present, to insist in checking up the completion of the work.

...../..

- 2 -

3. The target date for the basic completion of all construction is believed to have been 1st April 1945, as on that date it was anticipated that all training and schools of instruction would be able to proceed, unhindered by deficiencies in buildings. This is not the case and it is considered essential that I.L.B. of Forward Group should be informed that the supply of trained reinforcements will be strictly limited until facilities for training are substantially improved.

10. The following are the main factors which impede the progress of training:-

(a) The approach road to OSSING is rapidly becoming impassable and as it is the only practicable route to SOET and to BRACOLANG and MANZARA, all vehicles are compelled to use it. Its condition is such that vehicles are deteriorating very rapidly and the strain on the repair facilities at the Centro (19 Port Workshops has now left) is excessive.

(b) The same applies equally to the road between BRACOLANG and Mambura.

Contracts for (c) have been placed some time ago, but owing to lack of materials and transport, virtually nothing has been done. It is believed that as this is now classed as a military road it falls within the jurisdiction of 104 C.R.B., who actually placed the contract.

(c) MANZARA - Central Training Schools.

Six large huts for the Weapon Training School require erection; only three are actually completed, but progress is continuing rapidly. The large private house for the Medical School requires conversion; work has only just started. The earliest date, if adequate materials are available, is 30 April. Another hut is required for the School of Administration.

(d) BRACOLANG. Engineers and Signals School.

Doors are required for all rooms - the masons are absent in the C.R.B.'s report. There are virtually no windows and the walls consist of a large number of holes. Earthwork and masonry reconstruction are not yet completed.

(e) BRACOLANG - Artillery Barracks.

Work is proceeding well and although a great deal remains to be done, it is not seriously affecting training.

(f) Workshops School - OSSING.

Deficiencies of cement, transport and raw power are seriously impeding the completion of the essential buildings, though much outstanding progress has been made in the case of housing districts.

- (b) The same applies equally to the road between Interoceanic and Interoceanic.

Contracts for (c) have been placed some time ago, but owing to lack of materials and transport, virtually nothing has been done. It is believed that as this is now classed as a military road it falls within the jurisdiction of 104 C.I.B., who actually placed the contract.

(c) MAIZANA - Central Training Schools.

Six large huts for the Women Training School require erection; only three are actually completed, but progress is continuing rapidly. The large private house for the Technical School requires conversion; work has only just started. The earliest date, if adequate materials are available, is 30 April. Another hut is required for the School of Administration.

(d) MASSINGA. Engineers and Signals School.

Doors are required for all rooms - the others are shown in the C.I.B.'s report. There are virtually no windows and the walls consist of a large number of holes. Latrines and washing accommodation are not yet completed.

(e) MAPOLE - Artillery Barracks.

Work is proceeding well and although a great deal remains to be done, it is not seriously affecting training.

(f) Meekwina School - C.I.B.

Deficiencies of cement, transport and man power are seriously impeding the completion of the essential buildings, though quite satisfactory progress has been made in the face of these difficulties.

(g) Drivers School - C.I.B.

The same remarks apply to this School also, in addition, the water supply is not yet completed.

Nevertheless, it is hoped that both these Schools ((f) and (g) above) will be operating, though not at maximum efficiency or output, by 30 April.

(h) C.I.B. School - C.I.B.

The construction of a prison, which is essential, although surveyed has not yet commenced. Repairs to doors and windows, and wall structural alterations still remain to be carried out, but these are not seriously affecting the state of training.

...../3.

(3) Nos. 1 & 2 Infantry Bns. and The Infantry School, OMAN.

None of these buildings have any windows or doors. The former have been bricked up, with the result that barracks rooms are depressing and dark. The replacement of these brick walls by cyprus, artificial glass is an enormous task, but is considered essential if the morale of the troops, who live and work in these buildings, is to be maintained.

Progress in being made and training is steadily improving, but on the principle of "beats men in campers men", the task is made a great deal more difficult by the lack of decent amenities.

Cooking, accommodation, washing and latrine facilities are improving, but an immense amount of constructional work remains to be done.

Finally the electrical contract is in itself an enormous undertaking and as there appears to be a complete absence of essential electrical equipment, it is very much feared that this will never be completed, unless the matter is taken up at a higher level.

Conclusion.

11. In order to minimise over-crowding and to enable buildings originally designed for living to be utilized as class rooms, the training unit is being made of tents. Each school or group has now a small tented annex, where surplus students are accommodated, but the supply of tents is inadequate to meet all demands. The position would be greatly improved if huts could be provided for class-rooms and mess rooms, and with this in view, application has been made for the supply of:

292 - 100-2b. tents (100 have been released by Harco).
and 66 - Nissan (or equivalent) huts.

Of the latter six have been released but have not yet arrived.

12. It is felt that the most serious consideration should be given to a very high level to the problems of the Contractors, and that further consideration might well be given to the advantages which would accrue if the full resources of the I.E. were devoted to assisting these Contractors in the execution of the immense tasks which they have undertaken. All buildings in the area are now being surveyed and it is the intention, as soon as repair contracts can be placed, to utilize these for reconstruction in lieu of tents. It is understood that the Ministry of War has no longer any interest in these buildings for other purposes.

For Mr. ...

2017

to be done.

Finally the electrical contract is in itself an onerous undertaking and no town appears to be a complete absence of essential electrical equipment, it is very much feared that this will never be completed, unless the latter is taken up at a higher level.

Conclusion.

11. In order to minimize over-crowding and to enable buildings originally designed for living to be utilized as class rooms, the habit use is being made of tents. Each school or group has some small tented rooms, where surplus students are accommodated, but the supply of tents is inadequate to meet all demands. The position would be greatly improved if huts could be provided for class-rooms and mess rooms, and with this in view, application has been made for the supply of:

292 - 180-lb. Tents (100 have been released by Nairobi).
and 66 - Messon (or equivalent) huts.

of the latter six have been released but have not yet arrived.

12. It is felt that the most serious consideration should be given to a very high level to the problems of the Gentrators, and that further consideration might well be given to the advantages which would accrue if the full resources of the A.S. were harnessed to assisting these Gentrators in the completion of the immense tasks which they have undertaken. All buildings in the area are now being surveyed and it is the intention, as soon as reliable estimates can be placed, to utilize them for accommodation in lieu of tents. It is understood that the Ministry of War has no longer any interest in these buildings for other purposes.

122/ah.

Internal.

171 HLU 300 100 (2 copies)
161 HLU " " (1 copy)
151 HLU " " (5 copies)
File. ✓
Plot.
War Diary (2)

Lieut-Col. R.A.

3917

12. RTJ G.1/4/1968

DATE 20 MAR. 1945

017550

01-10-00

CHITREO

1998

CASSETTA
FUNCTIONAL,
PRACTICAL.

• **DIFFUSION**

CHRYSLER
MADE IN CANADA

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 2000; 283: 2686-2692.

WILEY

"	GENGASI ENO. MARCO.	-	-	-	CESANO
"	VERIDOTTO CESARE	-	-	-	CESANO
"	PICCONI ANGELO	-	-	-	CESANO
"	VITTORI VITTORIO	-	-	-	CESANO
"	ARNALDO	-	-	-	CASERTA FUNZIOVALLI, BRACCIALINO.
"	LABOR	-	-	-	BRACCIALINO.
"	FRIGERONTI	-	-	-	CASERTA. COSENZ BRACCIALINO
"	FRIGERONTI	-	-	-	MANZIANA.
"	CAPELLINI	-	-	-	MANZIANA.

3916

FILE/20

24
25
26
27
28
29

100 100 100 100 100
 100 100 100 100 100
 100 100 100 100 100
 100 100 100 100 100
 100 100 100 100 100

DOI: 10.1002/for

Get your car

REPORT ON THE DEPOSITIONS TAKEN AT A COURT HOUSE HEARING AT
THE COURT HOUSE, NEW YORK, ON JANUARY 19, 1905, AT 10.00 A.M.,

Inventory: Col. W. Talbot, D.S.O., R.O. - 1811-1814.
Lt. Col. A. H. M. S. - 1814-1817.
Major J. B. M. S. - 1817-1824.
Major J. B. M. S. - 1824-1834.

CONTRACT

A number of our national and provincial newspapers have commented on this. In Mexico, the course of the last ten days and weeks were mentioned in December by *El Sol* of 17 March 45.

- (1) These were carefully considered and it was agreed that any alterations should be based on the following requirements:-
- (a) That the manner of organization should be sound etc.
- (b) That conditions (i.e., satisfaction and training etc.) should be kept to the absolute minimum.
- (c) That organization and location is primarily a British responsibility and that for F.I.O. he shall not have right of veto first by decision-making, to whom the functions of the Italian command.
- For F.I.O.'s functions is to observe and not to exercise responsibility for executive decisions.
- (d) That in the meanwhile the approved War Establishment should be shared by, although additional staff and facilities previously normally an allotted for in F.I.O. Immediately 22/11/59 of March, when considered the formation of a new Regiment, would be by itself for to meet the increased duties of the F.I.O.
- (2) It was decided that the general duties of the F.I.O. should follow the form indicated in the draft of Appendix 'A' hereto. This follows etc:-
- (a) A Recognition Regiment (with no support) at the moment (to be known as F.I.O.) with a certain relative capacity of, (under 3915) (to be known as F.I.O. staff).

1. The principle of a minimum and maximum number of personnel for each section. It was decided that a minimum of 10 personnel for an internal unit of the regiment to which they belong, and will be established in all units by their own command. They will, however, be concentrated in a headquarters (or detachment) of the regiment, corresponding to the number in the internal unit, and in accordance with the command of the headquarters of a section (regiment).

2. The principle of a minimum and maximum number of personnel for each section. It was decided that a minimum of 10 personnel for an internal unit of the regiment to which they belong, and will be established in all units by their own command. They will, however, be concentrated in a headquarters (or detachment) of the regiment, corresponding to the number in the internal unit, and in accordance with the command of the headquarters of a section (regiment).

(2) The Artillery Co. will be a separate unit, organized by the 1st Battalion, and will be directly responsible to the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, of the 1st Bn.

The Artillery Co. will not consist of 100 personnel (including personnel of the 1st Battalion) but will be organized by the 1st Battalion, and will be responsible for the maintenance of the personnel of the 1st Battalion.

(3) The Artillery Co. will consist of 100 personnel (including personnel of the 1st Battalion) but will be organized by the 1st Battalion, and will be responsible for the maintenance of the personnel of the 1st Battalion.

The Artillery Co. will consist of 100 personnel (including personnel of the 1st Battalion) but will be organized by the 1st Battalion, and will be responsible for the maintenance of the personnel of the 1st Battalion.

The Artillery Co. will consist of 100 personnel (including personnel of the 1st Battalion) but will be organized by the 1st Battalion, and will be responsible for the maintenance of the personnel of the 1st Battalion.

(2) The Artillery Co. will be a separate entity controlled by Col. Adams, who will be directly responsible to General Mitchell, Director of Training at No 1,000. The training expenses will not exceed (including transport fees) - \$1,000 a month up to the salary of selected Artillery personnel. In being selected, to hold the position personnel pay \$250 per month in not available in the meantime, not this over will be estimated in all respects by the personnel of the Artillery Co.

[illegible]

The second law will consist of regulations only and it will be extended and administered by approval of the general director. Second, enforcement by those expected to observe them, not by the violation of law. It is not anticipated that any individual or group will be required. The Federal Bureau (collective punishment) will not occur. In order to an excess of articles, the nation of either the American or European, which the nation authorized, should be enforced. Enforcement in the nation is not by article, but. Plans will be made to control one on the other. There is a total of 100,000 by the military, to be used in any emergency, until it is possible to observe them. The military controls. While in this and they will receive adequate instructions in their own interests.

[illegible]

(1) The Justice of the Standard of Technical and Intellectual prior to their completion by General Gage & his team, the use of such information as is known. It is known that when the line across the river, it will probably be necessary to establish the equivalence of a S.S. in the Standard zone. In the meantime, a determination of the position of the line (with no further) will be sufficient to establish the position of the line.

100

Its administrative staff and training equipment will be furnished by implementing the application contained in WFI/MS/35 in so far as it relates to the original first or 'Patrioti' Bn. Authority will be sought for this by M.M.I.A.

At a later date the whole Reinforcement Holding Regiment, complete with its staff and equipment, will be transferred to the forward zone as soon as circumstances warrant.

Major LEWY will be responsible for providing supervision in the establishment of both the camps for the SERVIZIO Bn. and the Reinforcement Holding Regt.

3. Thus the total strength of the R.T.C. for which accommodation will be provided will amount, (inclusive of permanent staff) to 15,000, which is considerably in excess of the paper ceiling, but it should be borne in mind that :-

(a) It is improbable that the Reception Camp will be at its full capacity of 2,500, and

(b) The Reinforcement Holding Regt., although administered and commanded by the R.T.C., is definitely surplus to Establishment and was not contemplated in the original ceiling of 11,250 (plus administration and training staff).

4. By this means the grave problems of accommodation which have hitherto seriously hampered training, appear to be overcome and every effort will be made to put these decisions into effect as soon as possible. Requirements of tonnage and lashing and accommodation stores will be prepared by the D.A.A. & Q.M.G. and the necessary tenders submitted through the proper channels.

5. It is understood that the personnel of the Carabinieri Division, the subject of proposal No.3, sub-para. c and d of Appendix 'B' to G.1/1/39, will be diverted elsewhere and that no provision for their accommodation at CIESANO need be made.

6. The foregoing covers up all the points raised in Memorandum G.1/1/39 of 17 March with the exception of Proposal No.4 (f) - (Assessment of holding capacity) which it is understood to be a purely Italian matter and the final authorization of the new War Establishment for the B.I.V. at CIESANO, which is being held in abeyance until after the 23 March, when the new War Establishment of M.M.I.A. is being considered.

[Handwritten signature]

Lieut-Col. R.A.

LTC/ah.

(a) It is probable that the Reception Camp will be at its full capacity of 2,500, and

(b) The Reinforcement Holding Regt., although administered and commanded by the R.F.C., is definitely surplus to Establishment and was not contemplated in the original outfit of 11,250 (plus administration and training staff).

4. By this means the grave problems of accommodation which have hitherto seriously impeded training, appear to be overcome and every effort will be made to put these decisions into effect as soon as possible. Requirements of tonnage and hutting and accommodation stores will be prepared by the D.A.A. & Q.M.G. and the necessary indents submitted through the proper channels.

5. It is understood that the personnel of the Garibaldi Division, the subject of proposal No.3, sub-para. c and d of Appendix 'B' to G.1/1/39, will be diverted elsewhere and that no provision for their accommodation at CESSANO need be made.

6. The foregoing covers up all the points raised in Memorandum G.1/1/39 of 17 March with the exception of Proposal No.4 (f) - (Assessment of holding capacity) which it is understood to be a purely Italian matter and the final authorization of the new War Establishment for the B.L.U. at CESSANO, which is being held in abeyance until after the 25 March, when the new War Establishment of H.M.I.A. is being considered.


120/ah.

Ident-Col. R.A.

Distribution:

H.S. Land Forces Sub Com. AG(1021A) {4 copies}
H.Q., R.F.C., I.C.F. {2 "
Lt.Col. L.H. Mackay, R.A.
Lt.Col. Dolan, R.A.
D.A. & Q.M.G.
Staff Capt.
Major Leahy (G.II Training).
Major W.B. Price (G.IV Inf.Trn)
Major Ward.
G.III B.T.U.
S.O.R.E.
D.A.D.M.E.
D.A.D.S.T.
D.A.D.C.S.
Provost.
File.
Fleet.
War Diary (2 copies).

3913




Note: Each Bn. comprises approx 1,000 men under training and each of the Inf Coys approx 300 men, whilst the specialist coy has a strength of approx. 100 men.

Inf. School.
Established

Specialists
School.
To be established

3912



approx 1,000 men under training and each of the Inf Coys 300 men, whilst the specialist coy has a strength of approx. 100 men.

Inf. School.

Established

Specialists School.

To be established

8100-100: Co-ordination of Radio in
the G and H Divisions.

16
18 MARCH 1945

1st Lt. Col. L.H. Hickey, R.A.
2nd Lt. Col. L.H. Hickey, R.A.
3rd Lt. Col. L.H. Hickey, R.A.

Ref: S.1/1/3.

18 March 1945.

NOTES ON QUESTIONS FIELD AT CHAND, 09.30 AM.
18 MARCH 1945.

Present: Lt. Col. L.H. Hickey, R.A.
Lt. Col. L.H. Hickey, R.A.
1st Lt. Col. L.H. Hickey, R.A.
Major W.J. Price, M. Staff.
Major Lecky.
Major Blackland, M.A.

On 17 March 1945, I.O.C. ordered the following movements from
No. 1 Regiment (Infantry) to :-

(a) The Artillery Bn.	- 532.
(b) The Engineer Bn.	- 261.
(c) The 'Misto' Bn.	- 266.
TOTAL	859.

As, however, communication is these transfers is not available at CHAND, this order was cancelled and the following decisions were made :-

(1) Under N.H.I.A. authority 8/1/29/13 of 17 March 45, the Artillery Bn. at CHAND is to be transferred to CHAND and is to be commanded by Col. L.H. Hickey, formerly commander of No. 1 Regiment. Col. L.H. Hickey, formerly commander of No. 1 Regiment, is to be transferred to CHAND and is to be commanded by Col. L.H. Hickey, formerly commander of No. 1 Regiment. They were requested to report on the situation on a regular basis. They were requested to report on the situation on a regular basis.

The principle was established that all Artillerymen from whatever source shall invariably be administered and trained by the Artillery Bn. Col. L.H. Hickey inferred the meaning that Col. PIKE had arrived at CHAND to assume command of the Engineer Regiment (now consisting only of Engineers and Signallers).

Major Blackland was instructed to make arrangements for the concentration of 261 Signals, or No. 1 Regiment, in not more than 2 days at the CHAND barracks. Major Blackland estimated that the total of 261 Signals at CHAND would then amount to approximately 750.

(2) Major Blackland pointed out that there were already 250 signallers at CHAND barracks, and on April 1st it was anticipated that a further 500

1. On 17 March 1965, I.C.S. ordered the following transfers from No. 1 Regiment (Infantry) to :-

(a) The Artillery Bn.	- 352.
(b) The Engineer Bn.	- 261.
(c) The 'Misto' Bn.	- 266.
TOTAL	679.

As, however, accommodation for these transfers is not available at IMACULADO, this order was cancelled and the following facilities were made :-

(1) Major M.M.I.A. authority 8/6/25/13 of 17 March 65, the Artillery Bn. at IMACULADO becomes an independent entity and is commanded by Col. de Mista, formerly commander of No. 3 Regiment. Col. Palma and Lt. Col. Loma, M.A. were requested to find a suitable site in the vicinity of the Artillery barracks to form a tented camp to accommodate the 352 Artillerymen from No. 1 Regiment. They were requested to report as soon as possible on a suitable location and the number of tents and huts required.

The principle was established that all Artillerymen from whatever source shall invariably be accommodated and trained by the Artillery Bn. Col. Lima informed the Acting Chief Col. ELIZABETH had arrived at IMACULADO to assume command of the Engineer Regiment (now consisting only of Engineers and Signallers).

Major Blackland was instructed to take arrangements for the accommodation of 751 Genio, or No. 1 Regiment, in not more than 2 blocks at the Genio barracks. Major Blackland estimated that the total of 2,000 at IMACULADO would then amount to approximately 750.

3911

(11) Major Blackland pointed out that there were already 250 signallers at IMACULADO barracks, and on April 1st it was anticipated that a further 500 would arrive from NOCERA. He emphasized that there was no accommodation for as many as 750 signallers in addition to Genio proper, and asked that urgent consideration should be given to this matter. He suggested that the transfer of the 500 Signallers from NOCERA to IMACULADO should be postponed until accommodation problems had been solved.

(14) Pending official approval of the formation of the 4th Regiment, it was decided to transfer personnel of the 'Misto' Bn. together with its administrative Headquarters, to a tented camp in the vicinity of Stadium, Cuchino. Major Lasky was instructed to make a survey and to commence organizing the camp immediately. The first stage would be to receive the 200 'Misto' personnel and its Headquarters from IMACULADO, and the second to receive the 266 'Misto' personnel drafted from No. 1 Regiment. It was emphasized that these transfers should be completed as rapidly as possible.

(15) It was agreed that as the transfers from No. 1 Regiment represented Infantry recruits should be drawn from the 'ORFELD' Camp to replace them and transferred to No. 1 Regiment. It was anticipated that a total of not less than 1,000 from the Orfelo Camp could be so transferred and attached into No. 1.

...../a

(vii) It was found that a good size 11.0 x 11.0 x 11.0 mm. small machine was provided in permanent station, for study, and other equipment at a station of 11.0 x 11.0 x 11.0 mm. which is to be held at 11.0 x 11.0 x 11.0 mm. on the 11.0 mm.

10

1997

23/AB:

2005-2006

U.S. Natl. Archives GPO: Sales & Dist.
Stock No. 60-789

(4) (no fee)
(3)

11. *Chrysomelidae* (10 spp.)

Lit. Q.2. T. I. 1980:27.

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

100

● 1990年10月1日起，凡在我国境内销售的商品，其包装物上必须印有“中国制造”字样。

Figure 6

100

10

100

0.111 0.010.

0-1785-0672-9

100

100

• *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038

• **•**

• • • • •

100

1. *Introduction*

413

3410

14

SUBJECT: Re-organisation of the 1st in GERMANY and HUNGARY.

17. H.I.B., I.T.P., I.C.P.
c/o Land Forces Sub Comm.
A.S. (H.I.B.) HQ.

Ref: G4/1/39.

17 March 1945.

For I.C.
Land Forces Sub Comm. (H.I.B.) - 4 copies.

Copies for information, to:
H.Q., H.I.C., I.C.P. (2 copies).

1. The object of the present Memorandum is to indicate a means by which certain unsatisfactory features which at present impede training and efficiency can be overcome, and to indicate the best means of absorbing and training new elements which it is anticipated may arrive in the near future.
2. The whole proposal is built on the framework contained in this office Memorandum ref: H.I.B./35/35 of 6 March, under heading "Proposed increase of the Establishment at GERMANY".
3. To enable these proposals to be put into effect, definite authorisation as to order of points is required and it is therefore suggested that a meeting should be called at the earliest possible date, when these proposals can be discussed and a reply given to the specific questions mentioned at the end of each paragraph. It is suggested that this meeting might be held at the H.I.B. Office in Rome, to enable the responsible authority on each point to attend with the minimum of inconvenience.
4. The following gives a list of the main problems:-
 - (a) The reception camp at GERMANY is too close to the Central Schools at MANTOVA, as turbulent, untrained recruits are inclined to cause disturbances and thus interfere with the concentration of the students. To overcome this, the camp is being moved during the course of the next few days to a new location on the North shore of Lake Bracciano, in the vicinity of TRIVULZIO BORGO, map ref: 5336. The requisite facilities for the formation of the camp, water, etc., are available. The camp is being furnished to accommodate 2,500 recruits and the long-term policy envisages its displacement by mid-summer, as it is hoped that the whole of the personnel will then have been absorbed into one or other of the training Regiments.

(b) The present set-up at GERMANY - HUNGARY is broadly as follows: 3909

1. The object of the present Memorandum is to indicate means by which certain unsatisfactory features which at present impede training and efficiency can be overcome, and to indicate the best means of absorbing and training new elements which it is anticipated may arrive in the near future.
2. The whole proposal is built on the framework contained in this office memorandum ref: HRT/35/33 of 6 March, under heading "Proposed Increase of War Establishment at CESSANO".
3. To enable these proposals to be put into effect, definite authorization and number of points is required and it is therefore suggested that a meeting should be called at the earliest possible date, when these proposals can be discussed and a reply given to the specific questions mentioned at the end of each paragraph. It is submitted that this meeting might be held at the M.I.A. Office in June, to enable the responsible authority on each point to attend with the minimum of inconvenience.
4. The following gives a list of the main problem :-

- (a) The reception camp at MUGLIO is too close to the Central Schools at MANZILLO, as turbulent, unruly recruits are inclined to cause a disturbance and thus interfere with the concentration of the students. To overcome this, the camp is being moved during the course of the next ten days to a new location on the North shore of Lake Incomiano, in the vicinity of MARIANO ROMEO, map ref: 5396. The requisite facilities for the formation of the camp, water, etc., are available. The camp is being formed to accommodate 2,500 recruits and the long-term policy envisages its displacement by mid-summer, as it is hoped that the whole of the personnel will then have been absorbed into one or other of the Training Regiments.

- (b) The present set-up at CESSANO - BRACCIANO is broadly as follows: 3909

No.1 Regiment of 3 Battalions, at CESSANO, on Infantry training.

There are no insuperable problems connected with this Regiment for which no solution can be found.

No.2 Regiment of 3 Battalions, at CESSANO, on Infantry Training, to which the same remarks apply.

No.3 Regiment at BRACCIANO, comprising 1 Battalion of Artillery,

1 Battalion of Engineers (including Signallers) and 1 Minto Bn.

It is the problems connected with this Regiment which are the main subject of this Memorandum.

In addition, there are the various schools (S. M. School, S. M. School, U.S. School, etc.) located at CESSANO, which deal

with Signallers. No serious problems other than those dealing with conventional delays in repair work are presented by any of these and this problem is being unofficially handled.

5. Proposal No. 1 :-

(a) That the Artillery Bn. be made a separate, independent Battalion (on 6/1/44 of 13 heavy guns), and that it should have all connection with No. 3 Regiment.
Is this approved?

(b) That Col. PALLA, now commanding No. 3 Regiment, should be given command of the Independent Artillery Bn., and that 7/Cpl. SAMUEL, at present commanding, be transferred to a Forward Group, where he is anxious to go and where it is understood a vacancy exists.
May these transfers be approved and put into effect forthwith?

(c) That authority should be granted by M.M.I.A. to S.M.R.B. to post the necessary staff additional staff to the Independent Artillery Bn., to enable it to function efficiently as an independent unit.
Can this be done?

6. Proposal No. 2 :-

(a) That the present No. 3 Regiment be re-organized on a two-Battalion basis.
This involves :

(i) The separation of the Artillery Bn. in the manner already suggested.
(ii) The removal of the 'Pia's' Bn. in the manner discussed in a later paragraph (6).

(iii) The division of the present composite Engineer Bn. into two separate Battalions, one of which will be confined entirely to Engineers, i.e. Sappers proper, and the other to Signals personnel, i.e. equivalent to I.C.S., and specialist signallers for other arms.

(b) The present Battalion H.Q. staff of the composite Engineer Bn. will form the Bn. H.Q. of the 'Sapper' Bn.
Is this approved?

(c) A new Battalion H.Q. staff under a new Lieut-Col. be formed to command and administer a new 'Signal' Battalion. It is thought that the majority of the personnel and equipment required will become available when the move at MOZAM is transferred to MOCIM. My authority be granted for this re-organization and permission be granted to S.M.R.B. to post the requisite personnel (if any are required), not provided by the MOCIM staff?

7. Proposal No. 3 : (Reference to VII/15/35 of 6 March).

(a) Application was made in the above mentioned memorandum for permission to form a 4th Regiment for certain specific purposes.
Is this proposal approved in principle?

As circumstances now render its formation, at any rate as a nucleus, essential, my this proposal be formally implemented forthwith and authority granted for the provision of the War Establishment equipment and stores referred to in Appendix 'D' and 'E' of the above mentioned memorandum.

3408

enable it to function efficiently as an independent unit.
Can this be done?

Proposal No. 2 :-

(a) That the present No. 3 Regiment be re-organised on a two-Battalion basis. This involves :-

- (i) The separation of the Artillery Bn. in the manner already suggested.
- (ii) The removal of the 'Minto' Bn. in the manner discussed in a later paragraph (8).
- (iii) The division of the present composite Engineer Bn. into two separate Battalions, one of which will be confined entirely to Engineers, i.e. Sappers proper, and the other to Signals personnel, i.e. equivalent to R.C.S., and specialist signallers for other arms.

(b) The present Battalion H.Q. staff of the composite Engineer Bn. will form the Bn. H.Q. of the 'Sappers' Bn. Is this agreeable?

(c) A new Battalion H.Q. staff under a new Lieut-Col. to be formed to control and administer a new 'Signals' Battalion. It is thought that the majority of the personnel and equipment required will become available when the school at ROCESTER is transferred to LUDLOW. My authority to be granted for this re-organisation and permission be granted to M.M.I.A. to post the requisite personnel (if any are required), not provided by the ROCESTER staff.

Proposal No. 3 : (Reference of M.I./55 of 5 March).

(a) Application was made in the above mentioned memorandum for permission to form a 4th Regiment for certain specific purposes.

Is this proposal approved in principle?

As circumstances now render its formation, at any rate as a nucleus, essential, may this proposal be formally implemented forthwith and authority granted for the provision of the War Establishment equipment and stores referred to in Appendix 'D' and 'E' of the above mentioned memorandum.

(b) The above mentioned memorandum visualised No. 4 Regiment to comprise two battalions, the first of which was to be devoted exclusively to 'Patriots', and the second to Specialists.

It now appears that the intention to train 'Patriots' as a unit to be sent forward, ultimately as a Reserve Unit, to one of the Groups is not likely to be required, as the 8th Army have different ideas as to the constitution of the Reserve groups. Hence, arrangements have already been made to post the great majority of the Patriots as normal reinforcements in the drafts going forward during the weeks ending March 17th and 24th respectively.

Such Patriots as remain will be a negligible factor.

It is proposed that this principle be noted with the approval of M.M.I.A.

(c) It is anticipated that within the next five to six weeks, from 800 to 1,500 soldiers of the disbanded Gurkha Division, will be arriving at CEYLON. It is understood that it is the intention of M.M.I.A. that :-

- (1) These men shall retain their individuality as members of the Gurkha formation.

...../3

- (iii) That they will be trained as a unit, or, if the means exceed 500, as two units; each unit to be comprised of a Battalion.
- (iii) That they will have their own equipment.
- (iv) That, after selection and assignment, they will be posted to a forward base as organic additional battalions.
- (v) That a formation letter authorizing the issue of the necessary armor and equipment will be issued in the near future.
- (vi) That in the meantime they will require clothing and training.
- (ii) It is therefore proposed :-
- (i) To form Nos. 1 and 2 Battalions of No. 4 Regiment with the personnel of the Garibaldi Division.
- (ii) That the equipment asked for in Appendix 'B' of D.F.I. letter (originally destined for Potential Reconnaissance Bn.) shall be devoted to the two new Garibaldi battalions.
- Is this approved and may authority be granted for the issue of the necessary War Establishment equipment?
- (iii) It is believed that this equipment will be adequate for the training of the present number of 1500 Garibaldi personnel, but it is hoped that permission may be granted for the issue of further equipment, if required, when the exact details of the type of personnel in the Garibaldi Division are known.
- (c) The Specialist Bn. as detailed in the above mentioned D.F.I. letter is essential and in view of the great demand for specialists, no time should be lost in forming it.
- Is this approved in principle and may the War Establishment equipment asked for in Appendix 'B' to D.F.I. letter be authorized forthwith?
3. There remains the question of the 'Mito' Bn., to which reference is made in paragraph 5 above. This Battalion is at present located at BRACCIANO and administered by the C.O. of No. 5 Regiment. Nevertheless, the majority of the training of the personnel of the Mito Bn. is carried out at CESSANO, in the various schools located there, or in Specialist locations such as Hospitals, Orphanage, etc. There are no facilities for training this class of Specialist in BRACCIANO and it is felt very strongly that the Mito Bn. should be located at CESSANO. Further, owing to the nature of the training, only a very small proportion of the Battalion are actually serving with it, the majority being away on attachment under instruction.

Proposed No. 4 :-

- (a) That the Mito Bn. be detached from No. 3 Regiment at BRACCIANO and becomes an integral part of the Specialist Bn. of No. 4 Regiment at CESSANO. Is this approved?
- (b) That the Bn. Mito, staff and administrative staff of the Mito

- (ii) That the equipment asked for in Appendix 'B' of H.F.I. Letter (originally destined for the 1st Cavalry Div., Vietnam Bn.) shall be devoted to the new Gerbil Group, Vietnam Bn.
- Is this approved and my authority be granted for the issue of the necessary for establishment equipment?
- (iii) It is believed that this equipment will be adequate for the training of the various number of 1500 Gerbil personnel but it is hoped that permission may be granted for the issue of further equipment, if required, when the exact details of the type of personnel in the Gerbil Division are known.
- (a) The Specialist Bn. as detailed in the above mentioned H.F.I. Letter is essential and in view of the great demand for specialists, no time should be lost in forming it.
- In this regard it is suggested that the new establishment equipment be included in Appendix 'B' of H.F.I. Letter be authorized immediately?
3. There remains the question of the 'Misto' Bn., to which reference is made in paragraph 6 above. This Battalion is at present located at BRACCIANO and administered by the H.Q. of No. 3 Regiment. Nevertheless, the majority of the training of the personnel of the Misto Bn. is carried out either at CESSANO, in the various schools located there, or in Specialist locations such as Hospital, Gendarmes Superieure, etc. There are no facilities for training this class of Specialist in BRACCIANO and it is felt very strongly that the Misto Bn. should be located at CESSANO. Further, owing to the nature of the training, only a very small proportion of the Battalion are actually serving with it, the majority being away on attachment under instruction.
- Proposed No. 4 :-
- (a) That the Misto Bn. be detached from No. 3 Regiment at BRACCIANO and becomes an integral part of the Specialist Bn. of No. 4 Regiment at CESSANO. Is this approved?
- (b) That the Bn. H.Q. staff and administrative staff of the Misto Bn. be absorbed into the new Specialist Bn., and from the nucleus of the additional staff asked for in Appendix 'B' of H.F.I. Letter of the Administrative and Command staff of the Specialist Bn. My authority for this be granted?
2. The new No. 4 Regiment (A.C. Gerbil Group and Specialist own Misto Bn.) will be located in a tented or hatted camp in the area to the East of Lake Bracciano, in the vicinity of Lake Martignano. A suitable site is not being reached.
- At present the Misto Bn. has the total complement of about 1500 personnel and is being moved to implement this proposal. My authority be granted for the release of the additional tents and hatted at the earliest possible moment?
10. In my "Recruitment" of 13 March, paragraph 1, I asked for four Administrative officers for attachment, to supervise administrative training. Insults are still occurring which render the presence of these officers most essential. Can permission be obtained for the attachment of these officers, and can they be sent here as soon as possible?

- 4 -

11. There seems to be some doubt as to the holding capacity of the buildings at CSMC and MAGDORE. I think it would be a great advantage if an expert in quartering could make a survey of the available accommodation and outfit, even and for all, how many Italian soldiers can reasonably be accommodated in the space available.

Can such an expert be provided?

12. A summary of the requests made in this memorandum is attached at Appendix 13; and it is hoped that the meeting asked for may be called at the earliest date, in order to provide an answer to these problems, many of which are very pressing.

13. Proposals for the new War Establishment for the P.I.U. at CSMC are embodied in this office letter ref: A/57/9 of 14 March. In view of the greatly increased responsibility of the P.I.U., which now handles training as well as administration, it is felt that the additional personnel and vehicles asked for will be very urgently required, and it is hoped that energetic steps may be taken to obtain authority for their provision.

1231/adj.

Internal:

Adm. & QG.
Staff Capt.
G.I. Training.
G.I. Infantry Coy.
G.I. L.T.B.
G.I. Signal.
S.O.B.E.
D.A.D.M.E.
D.A.D.S.F.
D.A.D.O.S.
Provost.
File.
Post.
War Diary (2)

14 March 1945
Lieut-Col. R.L.

3906

15. Proposals for the new War Establishment for the F.F.C. at GERRARD are contained in this office letter ref: 1/68/9 of 14 March. In view of the greatly increased responsibility of the F.F.C., which now handles trading as well as administration, it is felt that the additional personnel and vehicles asked for will be very urgently required, and it is hoped that emergency steps may be taken to obtain authority for their provision.

Inventory:

D.A. & G.
 Staff Capt.
 C. II Training.
 C. II Infantry Tr.
 C. III H.T.D.
 C. II Signals.
 E.O.R.E.
 D.A.D.M.E.
 D.A.D.S.T.
 D.A.D.O.S.
 Payrool. ✓
 File.
 Plots.
 War Diary (2)

APPENDIX 154.
 D.D. 11/1/39
 101.17 Mar. 45.

TENTS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR UNITED POSITION CAMP
AND FOR No. 4 BATTALION.

(1) United Position Camp.

Strength - 2,500, all ranks.

Company H.Q.
 3 Bns.

Person
 Data (a) 101-lb.
 Tents (b)

26 375

(2) No. 4 Battalion.

Strength - 2,500, all ranks.

H.Q. No. 4 Battalion.
 3 Battalions.

26 375

TOTAL 52 750

Less 500 Tents in hand, of
 which 40 are permanently
 allotted.

480

TOTAL required.

52 290

Notes:

(a) Tents will be used for :- Messes,
 Cookhouse,
 Laundry Room,
 Offices.

(b) Tents are calculated on :- 1 Tent per 1000-1500, and above.
 1 " " 2 Officers.
 1 " " 4 Assistant Officers.
 1 " " 6 Sergeants.
 1 " " 8 Bn. & Plie.

3905

Strength - 2,500, all ranks.

Comp H.Q.
3 Bns.

(2) Re.A. Regiment.

Strength - 2,500, all ranks.

Re.A. No. 4 Regiment.
3 Battalions.

Less 500 Tents in hand, of
which 40 are permanently
allotted.

TOTALS required.

Notes:

(a) Huts will be used for :-
Messes.
Cookhouses,
Dormitory Rooms,
Officer.

(b) Tents are calculated on :-
1 Tent per Lieut-Col. and above.
1 " " 2 Officers.
1 " " 4 Junior Officers.
1 " " 6 Sergeants.
1 " " 8 Staff & File.

3905

ATTACHMENT 14
 No. 7, 1/1/59
 142.17 142.15.

S U M M A R Y.

Proposal No. 1.

- (a) May the Artillery Bn. of No. 3 Regiment be formed into an independent unit?
- (b) May Col. Palma, C.O. No. 3 Regiment, be transferred to command the Independent Artillery Bn., and 2/C L. Santodon posted to a forward centre?
- (c) May the requisite additional staff for the Independent Artillery Bn. be authorised?

Proposal No. 2.

- (a) May the present Engineer (No. 3) Regiment be re-organised on a two-Bn. basis; one Sappers and the other Signals, and a new Sapper Colonel be placed in command vice Col. Palma?
- (b) May the present staff of the combined Engineer Bn. be allotted to the new Sapper Bn.?
- (c) May a new Battalion I.C. staff, recruited from the personnel coming from HQCEB, and augmented as necessary, be formed to command the new Signals Battalion?

Proposal No. 3.

- (a) May the formation of No. 4 Regiment be approved forthwith and the necessary War Establishment equipment asked for be authorised?
- (b) May approval be given and the necessary instructions issued, for the posting of 'patriots' to forward groups as vacancies become available?
- (c) Is the appointment of the instructors of M.A.S.A. with regard to personnel of the Garibaldi Division correct?
- (d) May Nos. 1 and 2 Bns. of No. 4 Regiment be formed from personnel of the Garibaldi Division as they arrive at CESEMO?

(11) May the War Establishment equipment asked for in Appendix 'F' of R.S.L. letter be authorised and devoted to the training of the Garibaldi personnel in lieu of the 'patriots' for which it was originally designed?

(12) May further equipment be authorised if the members of the Garibaldi personnel exceed those originally entered for in 'patriots'?

- (c) May No. 3 Bn. - the Specialist Bn. - of No. 4 Regiment be formed forthwith and may the War Establishment equipment asked for in Appendix 'F' be authorised?

Proposal No. 4.

- (a) May the 'MISO' Bn. be detached from No. 3 Regiment and transferred to CESEMO to form part of No. 3 Bn. (Specialist) of No. 4 Regiment?

Proposal No. 2.

- (a) May the present Engineer (No. 3) Regiment be re-organized on a two-Bn. basis; one Sappers and the other Signals, and a new Sapper Colonel be placed in command vice Col. Pulin?
- (b) May the present staff of the combined Engineer Bn. be allotted to the new Sapper Bn.?
- (c) May a new Battalion H.Q. staff, recruited from the personnel coming from HQCEG, and augmented as necessary, be formed to command the new Signals Battalion?

Proposal No. 3.

- (a) May the formation of No. 4 Regiment be approved forthwith and the necessary War Establishment equipment asked for be authorized?
- (b) May approval be given and the necessary instructions issued, for the posting of 'patriots' to forward groups as vacancies become available?
- (c) Is the augmentation of the battalions of M.H.I.A. with regard to personnel of the Garibaldi Division correct?
- (d) May Nos. 1 and 2 Bns. of No. 4 Regiment be formed from personnel of the Garibaldi Division as they arrive at CEHNO?
- (e) May the War Establishment equipment asked for in Appendix 'B' of P.F.I. letter be authorized and devoted to the training of the Garibaldi personnel in lieu of the 'patriots' for which it was originally designed?
- (f) May further equipment be authorized if the numbers of the Garibaldi personnel exceed those originally catered for in 'patriots'?
- (g) May No. 3 Bn. - the Specialist Bn. - of No. 4 Regiment be formed forthwith and may the War Establishment equipment asked for in Appendix 'B' be authorized?

Proposal No. 4.

- (a) May the 'MISTO' Bn. be detached from No. 3 Regiment and transferred to CEHNO to form part of No. 3 Bn. (Specialists) of No. 4 Regiment?
- (b) May the Bn. H.Q. of the 'MISTO' Bn. be transferred to No. 4 Regiment to form the nucleus of the Bn. H.Q. staff of No. 3 (Specialist) Bn.?
- (c) May such additional staff as are required and asked for in Appendix 'B', be authorized for No. 3 Bn. of No. 4 Regiment?
- (d) May additional baggage and huts asked for in Appendix 'A' hereto, be authorized?
- (e) May the four officers required for administrative training be attached immediately?
- (f) Can the holding capacity of the Centre be assessed by an expert?

REMARKS:

May the new War Establishment for the P.I.U. at CEHNO, contained in this office letter ref: A/61/9 of 14 March be authorized and implemented in the earliest possible date?

3904

SUBJECT: PARTISANS.

1. It, as is obviously intended, the re-organized Italian Army is to be an efficient fighting instrument with a certain standard of discipline and efficiency, and which may be called upon to undertake law and order in Italy, very serious consideration must be given to the problem of the 'partisans'.

2. To enable the difficulties to be fully appreciated, some reference must be made to the origin of the 'partisan' movement.

3. During the advance into the Apennines, North of Florence and Pisa, the Germans carried out a systematic policy of pillage and murder in many of the mountain villages. In order to protect their warehouses and children, to safeguard their property and to prevent themselves being carried away into labor camps, a number of the able bodied men of the villages formed themselves into small bands, which, living in the mountains and woods near the villages, harried the Germans whenever they had the chance. A considerable number of Germans died from these partisan attacks and the most serious reprisals were inflicted on some of the villages -- for example, S. M. A. A village some four miles East of Florence, where 138 villagers were burnt in the village square with the aid of the pans from the village church, and every house in the village was burnt.

4. As a result of incidents of this nature, the partisans developed an intense hatred of the Germans and this, coupled with their local knowledge of the countryside, proved of value to the Allies as the advance slowly penetrated into the mountains. As the advance proceeded and more villages were liberated, the size of the bands increased as two or more village groups joined together under the leadership of some outstanding personality. Examples of these were Pigno at Siena and Poggio in the San Rossore-Orbassano area.

5. Then, at the end of the autumn, the advance virtually stopped, there were two distinct types of partisans. The first comprised those ordinary towns villages already liberated who (in the 5th Army area) were fed, clothed and organized by Italian speaking personnel of the American G.I.C. The second were those who were still maintaining partisan activities on the German side of the line and who were supplied to some extent by food and ammunition which was dropped to them from the air. With the coming of winter, this method of supply became troublesome and large numbers of the second type of partisan groups came through our lines, where they were collected in camps awaiting disposal.

6. Up to this stage, it may be said broadly that all partisans, with very few exceptions, were inspired by an intense hatred of the Germans and were interested in very little else but killing them and collecting arms and sabotage. Politics, if considered at all, were a comparatively secondary matter.

7. During, however, in the limited facilities for maintaining these partisan groups available to the 5th Army (no doubt a similar position existed in the 6th Army, but of this I have no personal knowledge), only a proportion of the total number of partisans available could be utilized in the forward

App's to F.B.I.
6/10/57 dated
12

into small bands, which, living in the mountains and woods near the villages, harassed the Germans whenever they had the chance. A considerable number of Germans died from these partisan attacks and the most famous example were inflicted on some of the villages -- for example, S. ANA, a village some four miles east of TRIESTE, where 130 villagers were burnt in this village square with the aid of the pens from the village church, and every house in the village was burnt.

4. As a result of incidents of this nature, the partisans developed an intense hatred of the Germans and this, coupled with their local knowledge of the countryside, proved of value to the Allies as the advance slowly penetrated into the mountains. As the advance proceeded and more villages were liberated, the mass of the bands increased as two or more village groups joined together under the leadership of some outstanding personality. Examples of these were Stagno at BELLIA and Povo at the MARCHIO-VALLE area.

5. Then, at the end of the autumn, the advance virtually stopped, there were two distinct types of partisans. The first comprised those coming from villages already liberated who (in the 5th Army area) were fed, clothed and organized by Italian speaking personnel of the American G.I.C. The second were those who were still maintaining partisan activities on the German side of the line and who were supplied to some extent by food and ammunition which was dropped to them from the air. With the coming of winter, this method of supply became precarious and large numbers of the second type of partisan groups came through our lines, where they were collected in camps awaiting disposal.

6. Up to this stage, it may be said broadly that all partisans, with very few exceptions, were inspired by an intense hatred of the Germans and were interested in very little else but killing them and committing acts of sabotage. Politically, if considered at all, were a comparatively secondary matter.

7. Owing, however, to the limited facilities for maintaining these partisan groups available to the 5th Army (no doubt a similar position existed in the 8th Army, but of this I have no personal knowledge), only a proportion of the total number of partisans available could be utilized in the forward area, and the remainder either went into or to continue in the rear area.

8. It is natural that the forward leaders collected the best possible types for incorporation in their forward fighting bands, while those who were less staunch or who had joined the movement for that they could get out of it, were relegated to the rear. It is believed that the selected bands are still doing first-class service as guerrillas in the forward area, but their discipline and fighting quality is bound to vary considerably according to the individual, their locality and their leader.

9. The Germans have provided food and shelter, and although the proximity available at Geron does not permit of attempts at shooting, it appears likely that a number of volunteers, attracted by the thought of free living, managed to get themselves incorporated into the ranks of the various partisans, although the majority of these had neither engaged in any fighting nor had any intention of doing so. It was at this stage that the political factor became predominant and the Communist element developed an ascendancy. It is these politically minded groups who are now being drafted into Italy under the generic title of *partigiani*. In the interests both of (a) the Italian

3903

any and (b) the good men of genuine patriots, even nations must be established to make the real patriots to be distinguished from the hypocrites. The policy for dealing with the latter has yet to be determined. (The recording agencies refuse to make?)

10. It is in no sense the duty of a B.I.R. to interfere in internal politics, but where political freedom interferes with the north running of the railway traffic, it is no longer possible to ignore the subject.

11. Hence it may be possible to make a few comments on the political aspect of the present situation in China. There are, in fact, three separate classes of individuals:-

(a) The true Communist who is considerably over-represented in the Communist Government like the members of Italy. Such men include the Union-Secretary of State for War, Mr. L. B. Smith, and within the group there are a number of Communists with strong political convictions who would, considerable power. This power is not necessarily directed against the Army, but there is undoubtedly a strong animus against the Royal House and all those who have sworn allegiance to it. The latter include all the officers and the Government.

(b) The second class consists those labelled 'patriots', of whom, unfortunately, by no means all are derived from the original revolutionary. The number tend to be solely interested in what they can get out of it.

(c) Finally there are the 'sell-outs', many of them children, for of them, indeed. They are easily attracted by a political party and are easy prey for the experienced political centers. Their final allegiance is secured by the present of a beautiful red coat, which, until it was forbidden, was worn across the shoulders in uniform. (In parentheses, the fact that the wearing of this red coat has been practically stopped out testifies to some measure of discipline being acceptable).

12. Hence, among the old 12,000 in 1930, we have a considerable few who are currently endeavoring to build up an Army, a strong political element opposed to the Royal House and a very large number of rabbits who will follow the strongest leader. It is unfortunate that the Government officers in the Centre is not that of the officers and B.I.Rs. (with few exceptions) but of the Communist Government.

13. In that the problem is primarily political and not military, the solution lies, to a large extent, outside the scope of the B.I.R. authority. However, certain recommendations may be made and alternative solutions discussed.

(a) The B.I.R. (like the League of Nations) has no physical force to make its orders being obeyed. The full execution of orders depends entirely on the personality of those entrusted with their execution. Hence a very great improvement in the standard of Indian officers

the other Secretary of State for War, Mr. Butler, and within the camp there are a number of Officers with strong political convictions who will considerable force. This group is not necessarily directed against the Army, but there is unfortunately a strong animus against the Royal House and all those who have even allegiance to it. The latter include all the Officers and the Government.

(b) The social class groups are labelled 'intellectuals', of whom, unfortunately, by no means all are divorced from the original strands of the movement. The remainder tend to be totally absorbed in that they can get out of it.

(c) Finally there are the 'all-eyes', any of them children, few of them educated. They are easily attracted by a political party and are easy prey for the unscrupulous political machine. Their final allegiance is secured by the prospect of a beautiful red coat, which, until it was forbidden, was worn across the shoulders in uniform. (In parenthesis, the fact that the wearing of this red coat has been practically stamped out constitutes to some measure of discipline being acceptable).

12. Hence, among the old 12,000 in 1940, we have a considerable number who are mutually antagonistic to build up an Army; a strong political element opposed to the Royal House and a very large number of rebels who will follow the strongest leader. It is unfortunate that the strongest influence in the Centre is not that of the Officers and N.C.O.s. (with few exceptions) but of the Communist Organizers.

3902

13. In that the problem is primarily political and not military, the solution is, to a large extent, outside the scope of the B.L.I. authority. However, certain recommendations may be made and alternative solutions discussed.

(a) The B.L.I. (also the League of Nations) has no physical force to ensure the orders being obeyed. The full execution of orders depends entirely on the personality of those entrusted with their enforcement. Hence a very great improvement in the standard of British Officers throughout the Centre is essential. It is understood that B.L.I. agree to the necessity but whether sufficient short-term officers are available remains to be seen.

(b) Dissident elements must be dispersed; the best center for the purely political leaders is to be known than until now suitable means can be devised. Dispersal is not possible within the Centre as, in order of the size, it is really only a large camp and no amount of dispersal will prevent the holding of central political meetings during rest days here. Hence dispersal must be on a permanent basis.

The problem of the political leaders is essentially delicate and it is felt that the assistance of NW. B.L.I. should be enlisted to find a solution.

(c) An alternative suggestion has been made that all 'politicals' should be concentrated in a single camp (other than officers) and there given special treatment. In the writer's opinion such a course would be

highly dangerous as it would tend to produce two entirely separate armies with different standards of discipline, training and loyalty.

In conclusion, the following points should be borne in mind when considering the whole position:

- (a) German youth recruits are properly called up and enlisted, many of the 'Hitler Youth' have only drifted into the Army, either because they want to kill Germans; their home are still in enemy occupation and the Army provides the necessary living facilities, or because they are of the gutter type and intend to earn personal profit. At the conclusion of hostilities very large numbers of these will desert as the incentives to stay in the Army will no longer exist. Although we cannot expect a 100% success, there is much to be done a strong campaign in favour of trying to convert as many as possible into soldiers. (Incidentally this reinforces the plan for good British officers as the key to the problem).
- (b) In spite of the observations of General Browning and Mr. Palmer, there are still a considerable number of prisoners who have not been repatriated. They are well hidden and it is not anticipated that with the resources available, any steps can be taken by the Italian authorities to ensure they are isolated.
- (c) Lots of intelligence, such as supplied on the German front still persists, but these are not regarded as seriously (the G.I.s. considerably get involved about), as the more general question which is the prime object of this report. That steps can be taken to assimilate the 'prisoners' into the Army and to establish the present political activities which militates against discipline and efficiency.

15. Attached, at Appendix 'A', is the position of prisoners at present as on 7th March 1945.

W.H.G.

8 March 45.

W.H.G.
Lieutenant Colonel, R.A.M.

3901

APPENDIX 'A'Position with regard to patriots in CUBANO on 7 March 1965.

(1) Approximate totals:			
No. 1 Regiment	-	<u>27</u>	
No. 2	-	<u>150</u>	
			<u>177.</u>
(2) Number of separate Bands,		-	<u>6</u>
(a) Banda "IGUAL" - PINOIA area.	Commander Bayardo Hernandez.	100	
(b) Banda "CAMARAT" - ALTA APURIM.	Commander Olegario Martinez.	50	
(c) Banda "BOMBARDIERO" - BELLEZA.	Commander Abelardo Lopez.	200	
(d) Banda "TRUJAN" - PAREDES.	Commander S. San, Madrid.	50	
(e) Banda "PLANTACION" - MESA AZUL.	Commander Olegario Martinez.	50	
(f) Banda (no name) - PINOIA.	Commander Juan Leo.	50	
		<u>600</u>	

All the above are in the 2nd Regiment.

The remaining patriots are not incorporated in any particular Band.

100
177

3900

SUBJECT: Recapitulation.

171 B.I.U., R.I.O., I.C.P.
C/o Land Forces Sub Comm.
A.C. (MILIA) XXXX.

Ref: G/1/4/11

13 March 1945.

To: H.C.
Land Forces Sub Comm. AC (MILIA)

1. The following is a recapitulation of the more important points discussed during the last two or three days.

(1) It is hoped that four administrative British Officers can be attached to the R.I.O. for a period of from two to three months to assume responsibility for administrative training.

It is felt that this side of training is of equal importance with the technical side and, in fact, unless urgent steps are taken the technical training will, as at present, continue to suffer. It is understood the attachment of these Officers lies within the jurisdiction of R.H.I.A.

(2) New Italian Officers.

It is understood that application is being made for the posting of 68 Italian Officers ex R.O.I. sources or from Officers at present unemployed and resident in Italy. With regard to senior officers, the following is the proposed allocation :-

One Engineer Colonel to command the Engineer Regiment. (Para. 3 refers)

One Infantry Colonel to replace Col. Rardam, the present commander of No. 2 Infantry Regiment.

One Lieut-Col. (Infantry) to replace Lt. Col. Lighieri, the present Capo di Stato Maggiore.

One Engineer (Signals) Lieut-Col. to command the proposed independent Signals Battalion, to which reference is made below.

The junior officers, that is Majors, Captains and Subalterns, will be spread throughout the Centre with a view to increasing the overall efficiency of the whole Pistoia Division.

(3) The proposed re-organisation of No. 3 Regiment.

The present arrangement whereby the Artillery Bn. is part of No. 3 Regiment, has been found not entirely satisfactory, and after consultation with Lieut-Col. Debon it is submitted that greater efficiency will be achieved if the Artillery Wing is converted into an independent Artillery Battalion with its own administration and commanded by a full Colonel.

3849

(1)

It is hoped that four Administrative British Officers can be attached to the R.I.C. for a period of from two to three months to assume responsibility for administrative training.

It is felt that this side of training is of equal importance with the technical side and, in fact, unless urgent steps are taken the technical training will, as at present, continue to suffer. It is understood the attachment of these Officers lies within the jurisdiction of M.N.I.A.

(2)

New Italian Officers.

It is understood that application is being made for the posting of 68 Italian Officers on P.O.W. courses or from Officers at present unemployed and resident in Italy. With regard to senior officers, the following is the proposed allocation :-

One Engineer Colonel to command the Engineer Regiment. (Para. 5 refers)

One Infantry Colonel to replace Col. Durieux, the present commander of No. 2 Infantry Regiment.

One Lieut-Col. (Infantry) to replace Lt-Col. Ingilieri, the present Capo di Stato Maggiore.

One Engineer (Signals) Lieut-Col. to command the proposed Independent Signals Battalion, to which reference is made below.

The junior officers, that is Majors, Captains and Subalterns, will be spread throughout the Centre with a view to increasing the overall efficiency of the whole P.O.W. Division.

(3)

The proposed re-organisation of No. 3 Regiment.

The present arrangement whereby the Artillery Bn. is part of No. 3 Regiment, has been found not entirely satisfactory, and after consultation with Lieut-Col. Dain it is submitted that greater efficiency will be achieved if the Artillery Wing is converted into an Independent Artillery Battalion, with its own administration and commanded by a full Colonel. The Colonel suggested for this command is Col. Palma, the present Commander of No. 3 Regiment, who is an Artilleryman. It is not considered that such additional administrative staff will be required to meet this re-organisation. It will be remembered that the Artillery Bn. is at present accommodated in separate barracks, and hence by this separation, the Artillery will become entirely self-contained, which, in the writer's opinion, is very desirable.

With regard to No. 3 Regiment, it is suggested that this should now comprise 3 Battalions, made up as follows :-

1st Bn. A true Engineers Bn. under the command of Lt-Col. Piccinini.

2nd Bn. Will be confined to Signals personnel only and although, in the Italian Army, these are regarded as part of the Engineers as a whole, it is felt that much greater efficiency will be achieved if they are treated as a separate entity. It is for this Bn. that the new Signals Lt-Col. is asked for.

3rd Bn.

Will comprise the "Misto".

This is at present commanded by Maggiore De Meri, but

...../2

judging by the complete absence of results from the organization which at present exists, his efforts are not very successful. It is therefore submitted that he might well be replaced.

However, the whole position of the "Kisto" Battalion requires most careful overhaul and it is hoped, within the course of the next few days, to submit some suggestions as to how greater efficiency can be achieved. The whole problem is linked up closely with the provision of specialists and tradesmen, to which your 2/6/29/38 file refers of 7 March and of 10 March refer. These are being dealt with in a separate letter.

(4) Training Staff.

It is understood, after consultation with Brigadier Smeeth, D.M.S., that it is proposed to send to Genoa either a G.I. Training Organisation or a G.I.I of the same function. After the visit of the Field Marshal it will be obvious that the degree of organization required to co-ordinate balanced training throughout the whole Centre is very grave and requires the full-time services of a highly competent Officer. It is very much hoped that representations will be made to enable such an officer to be posted here with as little delay as possible. At present, these duties are being shared by the writer and Major E.L. Price, whose proper function is G.I.I, Infantry Training, and it is maintained that such a compromise does not promise to highest efficiency.

(5) 'Patrioti'.

Pertinaciously to my memorandum on 'Patrioti' it is understood that orders will be passed to me for R.I.C. to post the four smaller bands of approximately 50 each to forward Group at the first possible opportunity. If this is done, the 'Patrioti' position will be considerably alleviated but we will be left with one band of 300 and another of approximately 100. Subject to the decision of S.A. Army, it is hoped that permission will be obtained to post these en bloc to MATROVA, in order to form the nucleus for the contemplated Recon Battalion for that Group.

(6) Canteen, Supplies.

The Field Marshal made a very definite statement that it was his wish that a proper Canteen (M.A.A.P.I.) organization should be established for the Italians, with as little delay as possible. It is understood that this matter has been under consideration for a considerable time and it would be much appreciated if Higher Authority could lend every assistance in their power to enable the Field Marshal's wishes to be complied with.

1122/ab.

Atkinson
Lieut-Col. R.A.P. 3848

er's G.I. of the same function. After the visit of the Field Marshal it will be obvious that the degree of organization required to coordinate balanced training throughout the whole Centre is very grave and requires the full-time services of a highly competent Officer. It is very much hoped that representation will be made to enable such an officer to be posted here with as little delay as possible. At present, these duties are being shared by the writer and Major W.L. Price, whose proper function is G.II, Infantry Training, and it is maintained that such a compromise does not press to highest efficiency.

(5) 'Patrioti'

Further to my remarks on 'Patrioti' it is understood that orders will be passed to me for E.2.6. to post the four smaller bands of approximately 50 each to forward Group at the first possible opportunity. If this is done, the Patrioti position will be considerably alleviated but we will be left with one band of 350 and another of approximately 100. Subject to the decision of 8th Army, it is hoped that permission will be obtained to post these on bloc to MANROSA, in order to form the nucleus for the contemplated Recon Battalion for that Group.

(6) Centers, Supplies.

The Field Marshal made a very definite statement that it was his wish that a proper Canteen (N.A.A.F.I.) organization should be established for the Italians, with as little delay as possible. It is understood that this matter has been under consideration for a considerable time and it would be much appreciated if Higher Authority can lend every assistance in their power to enable the Field Marshal's wishes to be complied with.

IRM/ah.

Internal.
File. ✓
Fleet.

Plancher
Lieut-Col. R. 3898

P.S. At the 'A' Conference held at Denno today it was decided to recommend that the "Misto" Bn. be detached from No. 5 Regiment (which then becomes Engineers and Signals only). and be attached to No. 4 Regiment, for which authority has already been sought. "Misto" training is better conducted at Cosimo, where facilities exist. At present the whole of No. 4 Regiment will have to be accommodated in tents.

SUBJECT: Man Management.

P I L S

71 MU. HQ., IOP.

Ref: G.1/1/9
2 March 48.

To: R.F.C., I.C.P.

1. The following notes, which are based on the type of instruction given to junior Officers of the British Army when they first join the Army, may be of some assistance to you in preparing your own Directive, which I understand it is your intention to send out to all the Officers under your command.
2. Man management is concerned directly with the well-being and personal care of the serving soldier. It is the duty of every officer, of whatever rank, to take a personal interest in the comfort and personal problems of every soldier under his command.
3. In the British Army every young Officer is expected to know certain basic facts about every soldier in his command. For instance, he should be informed as to the civilian background, as to his domestic situation, whether he is financially dependent on his Army pay, whether his home is entirely satisfactory and if there are any problems associated with his home life.
4. It is realised that in a Reinforcement Depot of this nature it is a matter of considerable difficulty for even the most enthusiastic officer to make himself acquainted with all the necessary information relating to soldiers who, perhaps, will only be under his command for a matter of a few weeks or even days. But, the principle remains unaltered. No soldier can be efficient if he is suffering under a sense of grievance, and it is the duty of every officer, however short may be the time during which the soldier is serving with him, to make himself acquainted with the particular problems and potential causes of dissatisfaction of every soldier with whom he comes in contact.
5. It is obvious that in any organization, whether it be British or of any other European nation, which is attempting to create a vitally important link in the life of the nation, as is represented in this instance by the CESSAND R.F.C., there will be innumerable difficulties both of supply and administration. It is felt that the inevitable difficulties which will arise can be overcome if, as appears the case, every officer of both nations works together to solve the problems as they arise in a spirit of unity and co-operation. Only by an intimate knowledge of the individual problems of the soldiers in the depot can the ideal result be achieved.
6. It should be the object of every officer to ensure that no soldier under his command has any legitimate cause for complaint. A sense of grievance is a potential source of discontent and in the worst cases of serious

3897

2. Man management is concerned directly with the well-being and personal care of the serving soldier. It is the duty of every officer, of whatever rank, to take a personal interest in the comfort and personal problems of every soldier under his command.
3. In the British Army every young officer is expected to know certain basic facts about every soldier in his command. For instance, he should be informed as to the civilian background, as to his domestic situation, whether he is financially dependent on his Army pay, whether his home is entirely satisfactory and if there are any problems associated with his home life.
4. It is realized that in a Reinforcement Depot of this nature it is a matter of considerable difficulty for even the most enthusiastic officer to make himself acquainted with all the necessary information relating to soldiers who, perhaps, will only be under his command for a matter of a few weeks or even days. But, the principle remains unaltered. No soldier can be efficient if he is suffering under a sense of grievance, and it is the duty of every officer, however short may be the time during which the soldier is serving with him, to make himself acquainted with the particular problems and potential causes of dissatisfaction of every soldier with whom he comes in contact.
5. It is obvious that in any organization, whether it be British or of any other European nation, which is attempting to create a vitally important link in the life of the nation, as is represented in this instance by the CEMAHO R.T.O., there will be innumerable difficulties both of supply and administration. It is felt that the inevitable difficulties which will arise can be overcome if, as appears the case, every officer of both nations works together to solve the problems as they arise in a spirit of unity and comradeship. Only by an intimate knowledge of the individual problems of the soldiers in the depot can the ideal result be achieved.
6. It should be the object of every officer to ensure that no soldier under his command has any legitimate cause for complaint. A sense of grievance is a potential source of discontent and, in the worst cases, of serious acts of indiscipline. In the present instance it is known that a number of soldiers feel that the British have been negligent in the provision of essential clothing and equipment. It should be explained that every effort is being made to provide all that is necessary and that delays are, unfortunately, inevitable owing to the immense demand from all theatres on all supplies. In these circumstances it is of the utmost importance that every possible use should be made of the equipment which is available. The comfort of the soldiers is of the first importance and under no circumstances should a single article of clothing be kept in store if there is a single soldier in the camp who is short of any article which is available. This is a very typical example of man management, whereby consideration for the physical comfort of soldiers by their officers will go a long way to minimise any discontent that may be incident. It is astonishing that a soldier should be walking about in a civilian shirt and trousers with no underclothes whatever, when ample supplies are available in the Regimental stores.

3897

...../2

7. In the British Army there are a number of organizations which look after the domestic problems of all soldiers. It is realized that in present circumstances it will take a certain amount of time for similar organizations to be developed in Italy. It becomes, therefore, a matter of the first importance that all officers should take the greatest interest and exhibit the warmest sympathy in all cases of domestic hardship occasioned by the present call-up of recruits for the Italian Army.

8. There remains the important question of health. In a camp such as this at Cassino, where it is anticipated that as many as 50,000 soldiers will pass through the Camp in the course of a year, it is essential that the very highest standards of cleanliness and hygiene are maintained at all times, and that every officer makes it his duty to ensure that regulations issued for the safeguarding of health are adhered to with the strictest discipline. If only ten soldiers from each of the six Regiments in the Cassino camp transgress the rules of hygiene each day, within a very short time the whole area will become a stinking cess pit. This is intolerable and officers a very grave danger to health. No effort should be spared by example and by the most rigid discipline, to avoid the risks of an epidemic. On this particular subject there cannot be too much emphasis laid on the importance of laying down and rigidly adhering to the very strictest rules of hygiene, and no single instance of slovenliness or carelessness should be allowed to pass without the strongest disciplinary action being taken against the offender.

9. Finally, the question of pride in the Italian Army. There is in Cassino the nucleus of a great organization which will have its effect on the final peace settlement. Unless all ranks appreciate their duty and the important role which they are called upon to play, the value of this great effort will be largely nullified. It is an old saying that no dirty soldier will ever make a good soldier. Pride in one's appearance, scrupulous attention to such matters as shaving and cleanliness of uniform engender a proper pride in the Army, and it should be the duty of all officers to ensure that at no time does any soldier, by slovenly habits or personal laziness, lower the tone of the whole Division. It is fully realized that problems of water supply and other difficulties connected with the unfinished state of the Camp make these problems a matter of the greatest difficulty, but it is by overcoming obstacles of this nature that the officer, whether he be Italian or British, justifies the honour which it is his proud privilege to carry.

John L.

Lieut-Col. R.A.

discipline. If only the soldiers even each of the six standards in the camp transgress the rules of hygiene each day, within a very short time the whole area will become a stinking cess pit. This is intolerable and causes a very grave danger to health. No effort should be spared by example and by the most rigid discipline, to avoid the risks of an epidemic. On this particular subject there cannot be too much emphasis laid on the importance of laying down and rigidly adhering to the very strictest rules of hygiene, and no single instance of slackness or carelessness should be allowed to pass without the strongest disciplinary action being taken against the offender.

9. Finally, the question of pride in the Italian Army. There is in creating the nucleus of a great organization which will have its effect on the final peace settlement. Unless all realize appropriate their duty and the important role which they are called upon to play, the value of this great effort will be largely nullified. It is an old saying that no dirty soldier will ever make a good soldier. Pride in one's appearance, scrupulous attention to such matters as shaving and cleanliness of uniform engenders a proper pride in the Army, and it should be the duty of all Officers to ensure that at no time does any soldier, by slovenly habits or personal laziness, lower the tone of the whole Division. It is fully realized that problems of water supply and other difficulties connected with the unfinished state of the camp make these problems a matter of the greatest difficulty, but it is by overcoming obstacles of this nature that the officer, whether he be Italian or British, justifies the honour which it is his proud privilege to carry.

L.S.H./ah.

Internal.

File.

Flout.

Spores (2)

John L.

Lieut-Col., R.A.

3896

C O P Y

X

1st Maj. W.C. 307,
c/o 1st Air Force 1st Div.,
AG (MIA) 1000R,
Ref: G. 1/4/8
2 March 1946.

8

W.C.

SUBJECT: No. 1 Recipient.

To: Colonel G.O.P.N. Sec.
Comd. 1st B.F.B., B.F.B., I.O.B.
Copy to: Maj., 1st Air Force 1st Div.
A.O. (MIA).
B.O.; B.F.B.; I.O.B.

There appear to be three main problems connected with this recipient which require fairly urgent consideration. These are:-

- (1) The slow progress of the engineering experiment for reconstruction.
- (2) The problem of accommodation.
- (3) The difficulties associated with training.

(1) Engineering.

I visited General Cartelans on the evening of 1 March and expressed my sincere dissatisfaction with the progress of the work and the inefficiency of the construction. The General promised to visit Birmingham on 2nd March and to put the four of 1st into the construction, and if this produced no real results, to cancel the contract. I explained the futility of failing to make use of the large number of available soldiers - - actually only 16 are being employed, whereas 200 could be easily employed and the machinery for paying them already exists. The General has promised to give me a personal report after his visit. He has done so & followed on submitted (which will contain a printed more efficient programme).

(2) Accommodation.

Attached is a print of the Engineers' block at Birmingham. (1st Rec. 1/4/46 - 5)
The designed accommodation is as follows:-

1st Rec. Block	300
Signals Block	300
Engineers Block	300
	<u>900</u>

103/4/46 26

(The schools building is not intended to provide living accommodation).

3895

This breaks down to:

Indonesians - 474; all of whom could be accommodated in their proper block.

Malays - 267, who could be accommodated in their block, and leaving space for the Indian from Sumatra, when that school is transferred to Indonesia.

Malindi - 377

Of those it appears that the Malindi should be transferred to the Indonesian school at Oosterveld as soon as possible, and if accommodation for the whole matter is not available, some bargeage must be provided.

Malindi should be turned out to various Ordnance depots for training as it seems illogical to attempt to train Indonesians personnel in any other place than in Indonesia itself. A small number could be trained at the Indonesian Centre and then attached to Indonesian Ordnance stores in Oosterveld.

Medical.

There should obviously be trained in hospitals and dispensary reports. A medical training without a supply of whole bodies to practice on some districts, though it might perhaps be necessary to run a short course at Oosterveld in order to find out whether the men are in fact suited for their job. There could be used as substitutes to the British M.D.s, who are expected to supervise hygiene.

Indonesians.

There is inevitably a shortage of doctors in all times, and it is that should be needed at Oosterveld is to retain such personnel for sufficient time to test their ability, when they can be posted to other areas. Postage a short refresher course in British vehicles might be needed, but it is obviously almost not to make the fullest use of a class of men urgently needed both in the Gambia and the U.S. Corporation.

By this means it appears possible to reduce the lists of doctor in Indonesia very considerably, and a part of the building becomes available for the overflow of Indonesians and Malaysians. Some will have to remain, but the present position whereby the lists building becomes a dump for all those who are incapable of being trained as either dentistry, engineers or Malaysians, will be avoided.

There remains the Medical Coy. 188, which I understand is in process of being broken up and its personnel divided either to the Indonesian or British schools at Oosterveld, or posted to other areas.

3894

Artillery should be turned out to various Ordnance camps for training as it seems illogical to attempt to train Ordnance personnel in any other place than an Ordnance Depot. A small number could be trained at the Magazine Centre and some attached to Regiment Ordnance stores in Gona.

Mechanics

There should obviously be training in Mechanics and Comprehension of a technical training without a supply of able bodied to provide on some level. It might be necessary to run a short first-aid course at Lavondere in order to find out whether the men are in fact suitable for their job. (Can could be used as substitutes to the British R.S.M. who are expected to supervise hygiene.)

Drivers

There is undoubtedly a shortage of drivers in all arms, and that should be needed at Lavondere is to obtain such personnel for the purpose of a short refresher course in British vehicles might be needed, but it is obviously absurd not to make the fullest use of a class of men urgently needed both in the Group and the U.S. Companies.

By this means it appears possible to reduce the plato further in Lavondere very considerably, and a part of the building becomes available for the overflow of Regiments and Signallers. There will have to be a short refresher course in British vehicles might be needed, but it is obviously absurd not to make the fullest use of a class of men urgently needed both in the Group and the U.S. Companies.

There remains the Medical Coy. 128, which I understand is in process of being broken up and its personnel divided either to the Mechanics or Drivers' schools at Gona, or posted to other troops.

Finally the Artillery 202. This was a company to take over the machine gun position. The present of their imminent return to the Artillery Battalion must be approved on Col. Den and his S.I.I. set about solving the problem, which is not evident that additional accommodation and training stores will be required to cope with an Artillery strength of some 1,350, with a designated basis of approximately 600.

3. Training

Efficient references has already been made to the training of these personnel. It is felt that if these steps are put into effect at once, the Regiments and Signallers will have a better chance of getting on with their job in the manner originally intended. It is felt that it should be intended to have a number of these Regiments who, when training, should be intended to be transferable or technical training, should be transferred to U.S. Companies, organizations not covered by the U.S. Companies.

W.S./ch. Assistant: Major General
(for instructions)
File
Plot.

Ident. Col. H.S.

3894

SECRET

SECRET - Conditions at Camps N.I.S. on 27 Feb. 45.

*Before
Landed and
planned
by*

1000 1000 1000
o/o Land Forces Reg. Centre HQ
(N.I.S.A.) HQ
Ref: 6A/1/6
27 Feb. 45.

Land Forces Reg. Centre HQ
(N.I.S.A.)

1. As a result of recent conferences and discussions, the following facts emerge and certain decisions have been taken.

2. The present ceiling for the whole N.I.S. is based on 7,500 accommodation, including equipment and furniture, though not yet up to authorized scale, is adequate for this number of men to be involved.

3. All input to the N.I.S. now is concentrated at the new Camp designated G.M.S., near Inverclyde. They will be held in this camp, where they will undergo initial, elementary training under the supervision of Major Ward, Recon Corps, until they can be accommodated and trained at the General Training Centre.

4. It is the intention to increase the ceiling at G.M.S. to 11,000 as soon as possible, but this will necessitate approximately 50 increases in training equipment and furniture. N.I.S. are taking steps to obtain these additional requirements. N.I.S. anticipate that this will not be available before the end of April.

5. Although, output has been approximately 1,000 per week. This is now being reduced for an indefinite period to 500 per week. An input will remain at 1,000, it is hoped in due course to build up to the full period of eight weeks training considered by N.I.S. to be the minimum essential.

6. At present, accommodation exists for, and training facilities are adequate, to meet the following allocation of troops under training:-

In No. 1.	(Output as Inf. Recpt. Regt.)	-	2,000
In No. 2.	(Input as Inf. Recpt. Regt.)	-	3,500
In No. 3.	(Composite Regt.)	-	2,000
			<u>7,500</u>
			3843

All officers held on strength above this figure will be accommodated at G.M.S. and will remain there until, in the normal course of events, vacancies exist in the two Recon Regts. This process will be continuous and continuous.

2. The present ceiling for the whole B.I.U. is based on 7,500. Accommodations, training equipment and instructors, though not yet up to authorized levels, in advance for this number of men to be handled.

3. All input to the B.I.U. now is accounted at the new Camp Seagraves, near MILLIAM. They will be held in this camp, where they will undergo initial, elementary training under the supervision of Major Ward, Messes Corps, until they can be accommodated and trained at the Messes Training Center.

4. It is the intention to increase the ceiling at Messes to 11,000 as soon as possible, but this will necessitate approximately 30 increases in training equipment and instructors. B.I.U. are taking steps to obtain these additional requirements. B.I.U. anticipates that these will not be available before the end of April.

5. Hitherto, output has been approximately 1,000 per week. This is now being reduced for an indefinite period to 500 per week. As input will remain at 1,000, it is hoped in due course to build up to the full period of eight weeks training authorized by B.I.U. to be the minimum essential.

6. At present, accommodation exists for, and training facilities are adequate, to meet the following allocation of troops under training :-

In No. 1. (Count as Inf. Reception Regiment)	-	2,000
In No. 2. (Count as Inf. Training Regiment)	-	3,500
In No. 3. (Reserve Regiment)	-	2,500
		7,500

3893

All officers held on strength above this figure will be accommodated at MILLIAM and will remain there until, in the normal course of duty, vacancies exist in the two Messes Regiments. This process will be continuous and automatic.

7. The plan for the future (A.O. to implement the increase of ceiling to 11,000) is as follows :-

No. 1 Regiment (to be known as Elementary Training Regt). - 5,000
(Troops will spend three weeks in this Regiment, this period being part of the essential eight weeks course required).

No. 2 Regiment (to be known as Advanced Training Regiment). - 3,500

No. 4 Regiment (also an advanced training Regiment). - 1,750
Authority is not granted for the formation of this Regiment, nor is it required until the essential equipment and instructors for training horses available. (Accommodation will be in tents in the Messes garden).

Troops will spend the balance of their eight weeks training period in these Regiments.

SECRET ; - Future planning at OCSMO.

SECRET

WAS REG INV.
a/c Land Forces Sub Comm
AO (MILA) HQD.
Ref: 8/5/15.

24 Feb. 45.

Land Forces Sub Comm
AO (MILA) HQD.

In reply to your 8/5/43 of 22 February 45.

1. It is noted that the proposals contained in my memorandum of 18 February are approved as a basis of policy.

2. Dealing initially with the question of financing during the present stage when the ceiling remains at 7,000. The policy has been discussed with Col. New and it is agreed that financing will be applied not only to new recruits but also in the selection of drafts for despatch to forward troops. This is in fact being done with the object of ensuring during the transition stage (that is the next eight weeks) that those men with the highest standard of military knowledge will be the first to be drafted.

3. The following table gives an indication of the programme for the next eight weeks based on the presumption that intake will average 1,000 per week and for simplicity, that output drafts will average the same figure (i.e. 800 to each of the forward troops). It will be realized that these figures are necessarily arbitrary as the rate and type of intake and output will inevitably vary considerably.

ANTICIPATED POSITION AT OCSMO AT THE END OF FEBRUARY.

Soldiers actually in the camp (including OCSMO, REMOUNTS and OCSMO) but exclusive of permanent staff.

In Nos. 1 & 2 Regts. (i.e. Reception and Training Regts.) 6,000
In No. 3 Regt. (Artillery etc.) 2,000
In OCSMO Camp 2,000
10,000

Dealing with Nos. 1 and 2 Regts. (Infantry only) the stage of training at the dates given should be related to the following table:

1st March No. of men with 2 weeks training. 4,000
1000
Horse (just drafted from OCSMO) 1000 6000
3891
5th March 5 3000
2 1000
1 1000
Horse 1000 6000

2. Dealing initially with the problem of housing during the present stage when the ceiling remains at 7,800. The policy has been discussed with Col. Ben and it is agreed that housing will be supplied not only to new recruits but also in the selection of drafts for assignment to forward areas. This is in fact being done with the object of ensuring during the transition stage (that is the next eight weeks) that those men with the highest standard of military knowledge will be the first to be drafted.

3. The following table gives an indication of the programs for the next eight weeks based on the presumption that intake will average 1,000 per week and for simplicity, that output drafts will average the same figure (i.e. 200 to each of the forward groups). It will be realized that these figures are necessarily arbitrary as the rate and type of intake and output will inevitably vary considerably.

ANTICIPATED POSITION AT OCEANO AT THE END OF PERIOD.

Soldiers entirely in the camp (including USAMO, HAWAIIAN and CHINA) but exclusive of permanent staff.

In Nos. 1 & 2 Regts. (i.e. Reception and Training Regts.) 6,000
In No. 3 Regt. (Artillery etc.) 2,000
Is CHINA Camp 2,000
10,000

Dealing with Nos. 1 and 2 Regts. (Infantry only) the stage of training at the dates given should be related to the following table:

1st March	No. of men with 2 weeks training.	4,000	
	1	1,000	
	Horse (just drafted from CHINA)	1,000	3,891
8th March		3,000	6,000
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	6,000
15th March		2,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	6,000
22nd March		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	6,000
29th March		None	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	
		1,000	6,000
		None	

- 2 -

No. 3 Regiment (Dispositive).	3/100.	8,450.
Infantry.	-	2,000
	-	1,000
	-	11,550

As before, my services not absorbable in the foregoing will be held at 0.0.0.0 until vacancies become available. As to whether 0.0.0.0 can be absorbed in the long run depends entirely on the flow of income. As long as income exceeds output, it will be required and will serve as a reserve for the reconstruction of reconstruction waiting to be treated.

It is pointed out that a time will come when approximately 1,000 per week will become available with their full eight weeks' training. These must be held in reserve as they will along the flow of training; nor does it appear likely, with present conditions, that all can be absorbed in forward groups. Major authority is asked to give timely consideration to the transfer of the personnel of these "forward" groups. After a 0.0.0.0. (as has been suggested) in another place and the re-constitution of the 0.0.0.0. division as a separate entity would appear to provide the solution.

2. Training Organization.

It is understood that it is the intention of Higher Authority to withdraw the 0.0.0.0. from 0.0.0.0 in the near future. Therefore, administration and training will be the responsibility of H.M.I.A. through Study 0.0.0.0. at the 0.0.0.0. He will have a Training Department directly under command of H.M.I.A. to assist him on the training side. H.M.I.A. will have no executive authority, but will, through his representative, function in an advisory capacity to the H.M.I.A. It would be appreciated if confirmation could be given whether the above correctly interprets the 0.0.0.0., H.M.I.A.'s intentions.

On the foregoing assumption, British officer personnel at the H.M.I.A. 0.0.0.0. (excluding Training Department) will be required as follows :-

0.0.0.0.1.	(A & B and Training).	Ident-Off. Training.
BA & HQ.	-	Major Colville.
0.0.0.0.0.0.	-	Major Jeffery.
0.0.0.0.0.0.	-	Capt. Harland.
0.0.0.0.0.0.	-	Major Hilton.
Staff Captain.	-	Capt. Moore.

All the above, with the exception of the 0.0.0.0.0.0. (temporarily filled by - 3890 Capt. Harland) have arrived.

One commandant, originally included in the establishment, has not been approved by 0.0.0.0. His presence is essential - it is a full time job and with limited contractors and organization his removal would mean that the 0.0.0.0. will never be completed.

9. Training Organization

It is understood that it is the intention of Higher Authority to establish two B.I.I. from 1960 in the near future. Thereafter, administration and training will be the responsibility of B.I.I. through their C.I.I. at the B.I.I. He will have a training element directly under command of B.I.I. to assist him on the training side. B.I.I. will have no executive authority, but will, through his representative, function in an advisory capacity to the B.I.I. It would be appreciated if confirmation could be given whether the above correctly interprets the C.I.I., B.I.I.'s intention.

On the foregoing assumption, British officer personnel at the B.I.I. Camp (including training element) will be required as follows:-

<u>Table</u>		
	(A & B and Training)	
C.I.I. 1.	-	Ident-Col. Mackay.
B.I.I. 1.	-	Major Gellard.
B.I.I. 2.	-	Major Jeffery.
B.I.I. 3.	-	Capt. Hewitt.
B.I.I. 4.	-	Major Hillman.
Chief Captain.	-	Capt. Moore.

All the above, with the exception of the B.I.I. 1. (temporarily filled by Capt. Hewitt) have arrived.

Only element, originally included in the establishment, has not been approved by B.I.I. His presence is essential. It is a full time job and with Italian construction and organization his removal would mean that the Camp will never be completed.

Training Element

C.I.I. 1.	(Defence)	Major Price.
B.I.I. 1.	(School)	Major Hastings.
B.I.I. 2.	(Signal Training)	
B.I.I. 3.	(Training element & organization)	Major Hewitt.
B.I.I. 4.	(Signal element)	Major Macdonald.
B.I.I. 5.	(Signal element)	Capt. Hewitt.
B.I.I. 6.	(Signal element)	Capt. Moore.
B.I.I. 7.	(Signal element)	

Of the above, B.I.I. 1. (B.I.I.) has not arrived and is urgently required. B.I.I. 2. (Training element and organization) is not included in the establishment, but if B.I.I. 1. (Training element) from the B.I.I. is taken over, his work must be carried out and it is perfectly clear that B.I.I. 1. (Training) cannot possibly carry out these duties in addition to the supervision and organization of Infantry training of over 8,000 recruits.

In addition, while the B.I.I. Camp remains essential, Major Hewitt must remain to supervise it, as from experience it has been shown that the Italian personnel are not capable of handling a large number of untrained recruits without British supervision.

10000	10000	10000	10000	10000	10000
-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------

- (a) Hence it will be seen that with a balanced input and output of 1000 per week, it will not be possible to produce a draft with more than FIVE weeks training.
- (b) The obvious course would appear to be to suspend all drafts for three weeks, which would raise the period of training for those required for drafts to the essential eight weeks. It is understood that the forward draft are at present up to establishment in general duty soldiers (although deficient in specialists) and unless there are heavy casualties, it would appear probable that a three weeks cessation of drafts could be accepted.
- (c) It is pointed out however, that such a standstill order on drafts would increase the total holding in the Camp to 13,000, of which, 14th existing training facilities and staff, it would be necessary to keep 5,000 at GHEMO. It is not anticipated that this would cause any serious problems, if some additional tentage can be made available.
- (d) As a compromise, drafts might be reduced to 500 per week for six weeks, which would achieve the same results in a longer period. Input would, of course, remain at 1,000 per week. It is understood that a solution on these lines would be acceptable to the training staff, subject to additional training equipment and staff arriving to meet the gradual increase in the number of men under training.
4. (a) The Training Staff are keenly alive to the necessity, pointed out in your para. 2, of increasing the ceiling of men under training to the final ceiling of 11,850. It is understood that strong representations are being made to the D.A.F. for the necessary additional training equipment and instructional staff. Subject to its arrival, a progressive increase in the numbers under training in Nos. 1 and 2 Regiments can commence at an early date.

4. (a) The Training Staff are keenly alive to the necessity, pointed out in your para. 2, of increasing the ceiling of men under training to the final ceiling of 11,850. It is understood that strong representations are being made to the D.M.R. for the necessary additional training equipment and instructional staff. Subject to its arrival, a progressive increase in the numbers under training in Nos. 1 and 2 Regiments can commence at an early date.

(b) In order to reach the final figures visualized in Appendix
MIA 3/6/29 43 of 3 Jan. (revised 6 Feb.) it is suggested that as soon as
equipment permits, the transfer from OJLHO to Hon. 1 and 2 Regiments should
be increased from 1000 per week to 1,150 per week, thus ensuring that at the
expiration of a further eight weeks the number under training at OJLHO will
have reached 11,200 and the number of men in OJLHO Camp will be reduced 2000.

5. If the suggestions contained in paras. 5b and 4b were both put into effect, the final position would be as follows :-

No. of men with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839,

any soldiers (although deficient in specialties) and unless there are heavy casualties, it would appear possible that a three week rotation of drafts could be accepted.

(c) It is pointed out however, that with a staff still over on drafts would increase the total holding in the camp to 13,000, of which, with existing training facilities and staff, it would be necessary to keep 5,000 at OHLIO. It is not anticipated that this would cause any serious problems, if some additional tentage can be made available.

(d) As a compromise, drafts might be reduced to 500 per week for six weeks, which would achieve the same results in a longer period. Input would, of course, remain at 1,000 per week. It is understood that a solution on these lines would be acceptable to the training staff, subject to additional training equipment and staff arriving to meet the gradual increase in the number of men under training.

4. (a) The Training staff are keenly alive to the necessity, pointed out in your para. 2, of increasing the ceiling of men under training to the final ceiling of 11,250. It is understood that strong representations are being made to the D.H.F. for the necessary additional training equipment and instructional staff. Subject to its arrival, a progressive increase in the numbers under training in Nos. 1 and 2 Regiments can commence at an early date.

(b) In order to reach the final figures visualized in Appendix B, it is suggested that as soon as equipment permits, the transfer from OHLIO to Nos. 1 and 2 Regiments should be increased from 1000 per week to 1,150 per week, thus ensuring that at the expiration of a further eight weeks, the number under training at OHLIO will have reached 11,200 and the number of men in OHLIO Camp will be reduced 2000.

5. If the suggestions contained in paras. 3b and 4b were both put into effect, the final position would be as follows :-

No. of men with 8 weeks training.	1150	
7	1150	
6	1150	
5	1150	
4	1150	
3	1150	
2	1150	
1	1150	
	<u>1150</u>	9200
no training held at OHLIO (apart from to establishment)		2000
other training in No. 3 Regiment		2000
		<u>13200</u>

- 3 -

Thereafter, if the General for drafts does not reach the available supply of men with eight weeks training, D.M.F. will no doubt arrange to organize a more advanced course of instruction for all those who have completed the preliminary eight weeks course.

J.H. Macdonald
Lt. Col., R.A.

L.M.F./M.

Copy to :- JFC HQ BCP

Internal

File

3888

Memorandum on the proposed future planning at Camp

1. On 13th Feb. number of officers from A.F.H.Q. visited Camp with the object of ascertaining the true position and of preparing a report on conditions for Higher Authority.
- (2) On 14th Feb. the U.K.N. Brigadier Kensington visited Camp and discussed Training problems with Col. Kea. As a result of this meeting Brig. Kensington sent a personal telegram to Brigadier Anderson at A.F.H.Q. requesting that orders should be given at a very high level to reduce the input into Camp and thereby give the Training Staff a chance of carrying out the duties which had been assigned to them.
- (3) On 15th Feb. Lt-Col. Mackay had occasion to visit Arras in connection with the winding up of his own Regiment.
- (4) On 16th Feb. Lt-Col. Mackay visited 33 Org at A.F.H.Q. with a view to obtaining a copy of the approved War Establishment to enable him to approach Headquarters 33 Org on the subject of posting certain personnel of his Regiment to the Camp centre within the approved War Establishment.
- It so happened that at the moment of his arrival, the report referred to in Para 1. was under consideration and the telegram from Brig. Kensington was under consideration by Brig. Anderson. As Lt-Col. Mackay happened to be in the building he was instructed to attend Brig. Anderson's conference to discuss latest matters. It was clearly understood that Lt-Col. Mackay had no official status and his presence was purely fortuitous.
- As the conference the following decisions were made:-
- (a) That Camp was originally designed for a ceiling of 7000 and that training personnel and equipment sufficient for this number had been supplied. Training would inevitably suffer if these facilities were utilized for a greater number of men and this would not occur.
- (b) That authority had been granted for the ceiling to be raised to 11,250 but this ceiling would in no circumstances be implemented until training facilities and personnel were made available.
- (c) That immediate steps would be taken to stop the flooding of Camp with British and untrained recruits who could not be trained and therefore impeded the progress of training. Owing to the relatively long time required to stop the flow of intake, it was inevitable that a considerable number in excess of 7000 would arrive at Camp.
- Orders were issued that these excess personnel would be established at Camp but that a camp would be established at Camp to accommodate these excess personnel. It was understood that this camp would be located in the vicinity of Camp thus avoiding the possibility of recruits without equipment) arriving with trainees at Camp. The present excess over 7000 (approx 1500) would be dissipated by normal drafting in accordance with the schedules already agreed.
- (d) High Army were informed that the standard of training of drafts from Camp would progressively improve but that in the interim

3887

(A) On 10th Feb. Lt-Col. Mackay visited G3 OZG at 4.30 p.m. with a view to obtaining a copy of the approved War Establishment to enable him to approach reinforcements G2E on the subject of posting certain personnel of his Regiment to the Cassano Centre within the approved War Establishment.

It so happened that at the moment of his arrival, the report referred to in Para 1, was under consideration and the telegram from Brig. Leuchington was under consideration by Brig. Anderson. As Lt-Col. Mackay happened to be in the building he was instructed to attend Brig. Anderson's conference to discuss these matters. It was clearly understood that Lt-Col. Mackay had no official status and his presence was purely fortuitous.

At the conference the following decisions were made:-

(a) That Cassano was originally designed for a ceiling of 7800 and that training personnel and equipment sufficient for this number had been supplied. Training would inevitably suffer if these facilities were utilised for a greater number of men and this would not occur.

(b) That authority had been granted for the ceiling to be raised to 11,250 but this ceiling would in no circumstances be implemented until training facilities and personnel were made available.

(c) That immediate steps would be taken to stop the flooding of Cassano with Patrioti and untrained recruits who could not be trained and therefore impeded the progress of training. Owing to the relatively long time required to stop the flow of intake, it was inevitable that a considerable number in excess of 7800 would arrive at Cassano.

Orders were issued that these excess personnel would not be taken into Cassano but that a camp would be established at a considerable distance from Cassano to accommodate these excess personnel. Near no circumstances would this camp be located in the proximity of Cassano thus avoiding the possibility of recruits (without equipment) mingling with trainees at Cassano. The present excess over 7800 (approx 1500) would be designated by normal drafting in accordance with the schedules already agreed.

(d) Fifth Army were informed that the standard of training of drafts from Cassano would progressively improve but that in the initial stages they must be content with drafts of virtually untrained recruits, but that at the end of eight weeks it was hoped that all drafts would have at least this period of written training. They have accepted this ruling. Steps were taken to ensure the provision of 400 tents ex I.I.F. sources and 2000 Italian shelter tents ex Italian sources.

(e) In order to implement the intention to increase the ceiling to 11,250 at the conclusion of eight weeks or at such time as the Training Commander considers that equipment and personnel are adequate, the numbers under training at Cassano will be progressively increased from 7800 to 11,250. In the meantime input into Cassano ex ORIOLIO (the proposed location of the reception camp for recruits will never exceed output. That is if 800 men are posted forward each, 800 recruits will be transferred from ORIOLIO to Cassano. Later when training facilities permit, the input will exceed output by such a number as can readily be absorbed by the training staff and this process will continue until the ceiling of 11,250 is reached, when input and output will again be made to balance.

3887

2.
The list of these decisions was embodied in a telegram which was despatched to M.D.I.A. Rome.
(5) On 17th Feb Lt-Col Mackay visited M.D.I.A. and discussed the report of these decisions with Lt-Col Ingledon. The decisions were accepted as finding a most satisfactory solution to the problem and permission was requested to establish the camp at Ingledon, which is some twenty miles away from Capalzo. Col Ingledon offered to make additional transport available for the transfer of personnel from Capalzo railroad to Oulmo and directed that the M.D.I. staff remain at all that was possible to establish the camp with as little delay as possible.

(6) On 18th Feb these decisions were communicated to Col Mac, who offered to place the services of Major Wors of his staff at the disposal of Lt-Col Mackay to assist in the organization of the camp and to supervise elementary training of the recruits in it. Pending formal approval of the location by A.F.M.A. all preliminary steps are being taken to prepare all that is necessary. It is understood from Col Ingledon that he will arrange with the War Ministry for the provision of all the essential Italian personnel required to administer the camp.

18 Feb 45.

LI-COI R.A.

3886

10 Feb 45

1. It is anticipated that the total training in 1945 and 1946 will be no less than 1,500,000 inclusive of all training personnel and staff.

2. Steps have been taken to ensure that the extensive basic education in military and naval will be rigorously controlled to ensure the existing standards are being maintained.

3. Four types of troops are to be anticipated:-

- (a) Heaviest mechanized soldiers' divisions to fight and if they are necessary are authorized to use use of weapons, about 100,000.
- (b) Personnel of existing troops returning from hospital etc., who are to a relative extent fully trained.
- (c) All-ages who have some service in the Italian Army at some time and are therefore accustomed to military discipline although not of service in the use of arms.
- (d) Specialists, the numbers of whom will be selected from untrained recruits as they are in accordance with the demands indicated by the only 'specialist' material.

Every effort will be made to direct untrained men-on-ship recruits with no military experience to another course. Those recruits who will be made by 1945 in conjunction with the...

The object of this movement is to indicate a course by which the mechanization and mechanization available at present and in 1946 will be at least to the best advantage to ensure that the value is derived from the short period of training which is contemplated.

4. The present layout envisages the following:-

19.1 Regiment of 1st Infantry

19.2 Regiment of 1st Infantry

3885

From time have been taken to insure that the emergency force
subsequently is voluntary and such will be rigorously controlled to
ensure the calling figure are being executed.

Four types of intake are to be organized as:

- (a) Period of undisciplined soldiers nervous to fight and of
when the majority are committed to the use of weapons, which
not British.
- (b) Overcrowd of existing Group4 returning from hospital care,
who are in a relative nervous fully trained.
- (c) Call-up who have been service in the Italian Army of war
time and are therefore subjected to military discipline
although out of action at the use of arms.
- (d) Specialists, the nature of whom will be selected from
undisciplined recruits or call-ups in accordance with the
criteria indicated by the daily 'economic' situation.

Every effort will be made to direct undisciplined non-motivated
recruits with no military experience to gun-bay warfare. These
arrangements will be made by IFA in conjunction with them.

The object of this conversion is to institute a system by which
the non-motivated and facilities available at present and in future
area shall be utilized to the best advantage to ensure that the utmost
value is derived from the short period of training which is
contemplated.

The present layout encompasses the following:-

Fig 1 Diagram of 1 Battalion

located at GILKIN, presently devoted to house-keeping,
provision of clothing and equipment and elementary
training.

Fig 2 Diagram of 2 Battalion

located at GILKIN, presently assigned as the Training
Institute for Infantry, from which all drafts to forward
Group4 are drawn as required.

Fig 3 Diagram of 3 Battalion

located at HEMELING, comprises:-

- 1 Infantry Battalion
- 1 Artillery Battalion and
- 1 Special Services Battalion.

- 2 -

5. (continued)

These other units will be trained in special missions and in control of organizations. Infante units are held out for the strength of each Battalion and hence those who are found unsuitable for training in a special unit will be transferred to the Infantry. The Infantry COG has already been granted powers to affect such transfers when necessary action on his own authority.

6.

It has been found that owing to the uncertainty over the availability of funds, there is a tendency for the organization of No 1 Regiment to be overextended, whereas owing to the low standard of military knowledge of the recruits, it has not been found possible to convert adequate numbers to No 2 Regiment with any hope that they would be capable of assimilating the standard of training which is now required in this Regiment. As the other two Artillery Battalions of No 1 Regiment are nearly 100 years old and it appears probable that the same prevailing tendency of this Battalion will have to be transferred to the Infantry. The Director will consider the implications of No 1 Regiment are mainly recruited much in accordance with tradition.

7.

As a temporary measure it has been decided to place the 1 and 2 Battalions on the same status and utilize both in operations units with a number of primary training units attached to them. To implement this, more 2,500 recruits from No 1 Battalion have been transferred to No 2 Battalion, thus equalizing the strength of the two Battalions on a basis of approximately 5,500 each. It is realized that this is a compromise and does not add to the training staff or other personnel or of their equipment and of the personnel available.

8.

It is understood that it is the function of the 1st to organize the allocation of the funds in such way that the training movement can produce the required number of soldiers trained to a given standard in the minimum time.

9.

With this in view the following proposal is submitted for the consideration of higher authority.

3884

Basically the proposal envisions the retention of No 1 and 2 Battalions in the form originally contemplated with a nucleus strength of 1,500 inclusive of Training Cadre. No 3 Battalion will also remain as originally contemplated. In addition, however, a fourth group will be formed to serve as a type of 4th to which will be drafted all those from the 1st Regiment above standard of training required to be sent to the Infantry for active service. By this means completion of No 1 Regiment will be expedited and the transfer of funds (after deduction of 10,000) from No 1 Regiment to No 2 Regiment will be accelerated.

7.

As a temporary measure it has been decided to place Nos 1 and 2 Battalions on the same station and utilize both as headquarters units with a measure of primary training where circumstances permit. In September this, some 2,500 personnel from No 1 Battalion have been transferred to No 2 Battalion, thus equalizing the strength of the two battalions on a basis of approximately 3,000 each. It is realized that this is a comparison and does not mean the training staff in each battalion are of their equipment and of the personnel available.

8.

It is understood that it is the intention of the staff to organize the allocation of the intake in such way that the training programme and provide the maximum number of soldiers trained for a given amount of time in each type.

9.

With this in view the following proposal is submitted for the consideration of higher authority.

3884

Basically the proposal envisages the retention of Nos 1 and 2 Battalions in the form originally contemplated each with a nucleus strength of 3,500 inclusive of Training Cadre. No 3 Battalion will also remain as originally contemplated. In addition, however, a fourth group will be formed to serve as a type of unit which will be drafted all those from the first regiment whose standard of training reaches that which is far from being to active service standard. By this means assignment of No 3 Regiment will be reduced and the transfer of intake (after documentation and approval) from No 1 Regiment to No 2 Regiment will be accelerated.

10.

With a widely varied standard of training which is inevitable in the four classes of recruits likely to be received, it is anticipated that the period of time in No 3 Regiment will vary considerably, in fact a trained soldier released from hospital after a short period out of the line might return almost from No 1 Regiment (where he is re-employed) to the 3rd. Considerable care will be necessary to ensure the maximum speed of throughput and to guard against the possibility of soldiers due to repetition of elementary training which is entirely unsuitable to the Italian temperament.

2000/3

210

11. It is appreciable that the establishment of a Fourth Unit - the OCU will necessitate drawing on the establishment of Nos 1 and 3 Regiment to provide the necessary permanent staff and training instructors, but with the generous allotment of instructors and the staff to recruits (approximately 1 to 5) it is felt that the thinking out can be well afforded.

12. LAST TERM

Reg 1 and 2 Regiment will remain in their present locations in GERMANY, each with a ceiling of 3,500. No 3 Regiment will remain at WILHELMSTRADE but it will probably be found necessary to place some limitations on the generous allotment of space originally contemplated. The maximum strength will not exceed 3,000 and will generally be below this figure.

The CBU will also be established in the PHILADELPHIA area. There will be no ceiling other than the basic limitation of 15,000 placed on the CBU as a whole. The personnel will comprise men who may be said to be trained, that is who are amenable to discipline and hence are law-abiding, which would not be practicable with raw recruits, say be taken. It is more probable that it will be necessary to incorporate the CBU personnel in a comparatively large number of scattered battalions, but under experienced Officers and good NCOs, this dispersal should introduce little difficulty.

- If this scheme is adopted in principle - new recruits will pass through No 1 Regiment at Colindale and drafts to Croyd will be drawn in all cases from 2007-1910, either from the GDI in the case of Infantry and from No 1 Regiment in the case of other arms. It is contended that this system will enable the Training Department to import the maximum standard of training in the shortest possible time and will greatly simplify the dispatch of trained soldiers to their Croyd as required.

10 February 15

L. H. H. H.
M. H. H. H.

DISCUSSION

Officer in Charge Special Section
Officer in Charge British Training Unit
C. Lie British Training Increment
Ident. JOURNAL (For Preparation of Translation and Submission to GOC BSO)
Dated 1 Jan (By) H.M.
Dated

- 366 -

2 2 7 3 |