Declassified E.O. 12958, Section 3.5(c), NSC Memo, 11/24/98 By: 785020

ACC

10000/120/4656

AQ

Serial number 8.A. 12063 Registered 3.VII.1950 No. 785020

10000/120/4656 AQ/48 VISITS PARADES, INSPECTIONS 7928 7971

WAR DIARY. JUNE 1946

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC No. 785020

SD

Subject:- Visit to Palermo.

Major N.F.Chance,
Royal Irish Fusiliers,
G.2. Schools.
12. B.L.U.
C.M.F.

16th. June 1946.

Commander,
12. B.L.U.
C.M.F.

Reference my visit to Palermo.

In view of the fact that any interpreter who may be at Palermo might be biased in favour of the Instructors at that C.A.R., and also that the record of these Instructors on S.I.V.A. courses has been bad; I consider that it would be advisable for my interpreter and training adjutant, Ten. Faerber, to accompany me, or to follow as soon as possible.

1071

AA & QMG	
DA & QMG	
DC "A" & "Q"	
DADST	
DADOS	
DADRS	
Pay Services	
Salvage	
Int	
Ops	
Tn	
NCS	
PRO	
18 JUN 5-14	Pte 45

4455

SUBJECT :- Visits to Schools.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 470808)

Ref : A/A8/1711

12 June 1946

1. In view of his impending departure, Colonel L.H. Thaley, accompanied by Lt. Col. W.I. Nadlan, proposes to visit the various Military Schools during the week ending 22nd June '46.

2. The programme of visits is given below and CSOs II concerned are asked to notify this office if the times and dates are convenient.

3. Colonel Thaley would like the opportunity of seeing the Colonels Commandant of the various Schools and CSOs II are asked to arrange this where possible.

Colonel.
Comd. 12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

AHQ/ivar

Distribution: Lt. Col. Nadlan, G-1 Div, MMA.
Major CHAUVEL.
Major DUNN.
Major ALEXANDER.
Major CHEVERS.
Major TYDEMAN.
Major CHAPMAN.
For Info : DAA & QMG, 12 B.L.U.
CSO III, 12 B.L.U.

7970

PROGRAMME OF VISITS

Monday 17 June
Leave H.Q. Central Military Schools 08.30 hrs.
Arrive Motorisation School, Cecchignola 09.00 hrs.
Arrive Signal School, Cecchignola 10.00 hrs
Arrive Armoured Car School Tor di Quinto 11.30 hrs.

Wednesday 19 June
Leave H.Q. Central Military Schools 08.30 hrs.
Arrive Engineers School Civitavecchia 09.45 hrs.
Arrive School of Tactics, Civitavecchia 10.30 hrs.
Arrive Artillery School Lao di Leste

285020

2. The programme of visits is given below and CCOs II concerned are asked to notify this office if the times and dates are convenient.

3. Colonel Mabey would like the opportunity of seeing the Colonels Commandant of the various Schools and CCOs II are asked to arrange this where possible.

Colonel.
Comd. 12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

AMG/rsw

Distribution: Lt. Col. [illegible], G-1 Div, H.Q.
Major [illegible].
Major [illegible].
Major [illegible].
Major [illegible].
Major [illegible].
Major [illegible].

For Info : [illegible], 12 B.L.U.
CSO XXI, 12 B.L.U.

7970

PROGRAMME OF VISITS

Monday 17 June	Leave H.Q. Central Military Schools	08.30 hrs.
	Arrive Motorisation School, Cecchignola	09.00 hrs.
	Arrive Signal School, Cecchignola	10.30 hrs
	Arrive Armoured Car School for di Quinto	11.30 hrs.
Wednesday 19 June	Leave H.Q. Central Military Schools	08.30 hrs.
	Arrive Engineers School Civitavecchia	09.45 hrs.
	Arrive School of Nautics, Civitavecchia	10.30 hrs.
	Arrive Artillery School Duo d' Aosta Caserma, Civitavecchia	11.15 hrs.
	Lunch 12 B.L.U. Offrs Mess Santa Marinella	
Thursday 20 June	Leave H.Q. Central Military Schools	08.30 hrs.
	Arrive School of Infantry, Cesano	09.15 hrs.
	Leave Cesano	10.00 hrs.
	Arrive School of Artillery, Nettuniano	10.30 hrs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.5(b)/NARS Date 28 Feb 2020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5D2 No. 785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM 48

CALL	CIRCUIT No. NR 8830	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
MEDY			

SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

	DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
FROM (A) 12 B.L.U.	11. B
TO (FOR ACTION) 10 B.L.U.	MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS / GR
TO (FOR INFORMATION)	
(REF. No.)	(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) UNCLASSIFIED

For Major H.M. DAVIS (.)

Ref. Telephone conversation (.)

Visit cancelled (.)

SENT
1313/11
DATE TIME
OPR. INITIALS

7969

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE	DTG OR TOR 111246 / Opr.
	ORIGINATING SECTION:	TIME CLEARED
	A. G. AUTHENTICATION OFFICER Major	
	ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION: Major	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC Nr. 785020

SUBJECT :- Visits to Patients in Hospital.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : NAPLES 476303)

Ref : AG/43/1804

24 May 1946

To: C.O.,
100 (Br) General Hospital.

No: 14/20677 Pte. [redacted], RASC.

Reference your letter M/4A, dated 17 May '46.

1. While the above named soldier has in fact been visited by an NCO of this Unit, it is to be regretted that no officer has visited the soldier. Although wishing to make excuse for the obvious reflection on the welfare of the Unit, the Unit has been extremely short staffed and has had the additional work of a change of location. Unfortunately too, the custom of regular visits to hospitals tended to lapse during the war and many officers do not realise their responsibility in this respect.

2. An officer of this Unit has been detailed to visit the soldier and orders given that should prevent any re-occurrence of this incident.

7968

W.L.P.C.

Major, R.[illegible],
Comd. 12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

WLP/mcr

Internal.
File.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/3303 No. 785020

Subject:-Visits to patients in Hospital. Ref:- H/164.

To
Officer Commanding,
No.12 B.I.U.,
E.A.S.C.,
C.M.F.

53

M2 83277 Pte. Bannister, L.ASC.

It is notified for your information that the above-named soldier, who was admitted to this hospital on 4 May 44, has not yet been visited by a representative of your unit.

AA & QMG	
RAA & QMG	
SC "A" & "Q"	
DADT	
DADOS	
DADME	
[illegible]	
Nebelgb	
Int	
RA	
RC	
RCS	
PRO	

17 May 44
ST

21 MAY 1944 | Pte 45

4057

S. MACKENZIE, Lt-Colonel, RAMC.,
Commanding, 100 (Br) General Hospital.

7967

12 BRIT. LIAISON UNIT
for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

29 April 46.

Report of visit to B.L.U's in Northern Italy, by D.A.A. & Q.M.G.
12 B.L.U.

---

1 B.L.U. - TURIN.

Various points were brought up at this H.Q. by the Commander and G.II, as follows :-

(1) Shortage of Instructors, principally Cpls. and Sgts and Subalterns. 16 of the former and 15 of the latter are the figures given.

(2) The most serious problem was the transport situation - both Italian and British :

(a) Italian.
M.T's. given by S.M.R.E. did not provide for adequate means for transport for the C.A.R. and spare parts for vehicles held were not forthcoming. I saw the Comparative Table between transport for a C.A.R. and that of Combat Groups, and I was given to understand that many vehicles of the Combat Groups were not being used whatsoever and that petrol was still being drawn and used for other purposes.

The only possible method of solving this problem would be to brigade the Combat Group vehicles on British lines and have, for example, a G.T. Coy under Command of, say, the Territorial H.Q. This could be used on authority of the Commander, Territorial H.Q. as and when required. Maintenance could still be the responsibility of the Combat Groups. For operational work the G.T. Coy would cease to be under command of the Territorial H.Q.

(b) British.
Shortage of spares - especially tyres - is the chief worry. It was considered by the Commander of 1 B.L.U. that it would be much better to requisition Fiat Civilian cars for the British [illegible] and should these vehicles break down, parts would be readily procurable from the Fiat Works at Turin.

(3) G.II brought up the question of training infantry and wished to know if we are still training recruits on tripods, Bren (fixed lines). I told him I had seen some tripods at Cesano and as far as I know we were certainly showing them the method of application. I have confirmed this with Major Price, since, and it is in fact the case. G.II 1 B.L.U. stated these were now obsolete and [illegible] had been for some considerable time, and they were not actually teaching them; apart from the fact that in any case they had no tripods whatsoever. He wondered if this would

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3(E)(2)(b) NO. 285020

16 of the former and 15 of the latter are the figures given.

(2) The most serious problem was the transport situation - both Italian and British :

(a) Italian.
W.E's. given by S.M.E.F. did not provide for adequate means for transport for the C.A.P. and spare parts for vehicles held were not forthcoming. I saw the Comparative Table between transport for a C.A.P. and that of Combat Groups, and I was given to understand that many vehicles of the Combat Groups were not being used whatsoever and that petrol was still being drawn and used for other purposes.

The only possible method of solving this problem would be to brigade the Combat Group vehicles on British lines and have, for example, a G.T. Coy under Command of, say, the Territorial H.Q. This could be used on authority of the Commander, Territorial H.Q. as and when required. Maintenance could still be the responsibility of the Combat Groups. For operational work the G.T. Coy would cease to be under command of the Territorial H.Q.

(b) British.
Shortage of spares - especially tyres - is the chief worry. It was considered by the Commander of 1 B.L.U. that it would be much better to requisition ~~the~~ Fiat Civilian cars for the British [illegible] and should these vehicles break down, parts would be readily procurable from the Fiat Works at Turin.

(3) G.II brought up the question of training infantry and wished to know if we are still training recruits on tripods, Brem (fixed lines). I told him I had seen some tripods at Cesano and as far as I know we were certainly showing them the method of application. I have confirmed this with Major Price, since, and it is in fact the case. G.II 1 B.L.U. stated these were now obsolete and ~~[illegible]~~ had been for some considerable time, and they were not actually touching them; apart from the fact that in any case they had no tripods whatsoever. He wondered if this would cause any trouble in future with recruits. It is my own opinion that cases will occur of this nature unless a definite training syllabus is made out by M.M.I.A. and put in full circulation.

2 B.L.U. - [illegible].

The C.A.P. for this Headquarters is 5 hours' away at CUNEO. The chief problem at this H.Q. was the question of British transport. There is a very acute shortage of inner tubes for Cars, principally Austin Utility 600 x 16. It frequently happens that it is almost impossible for the DAA & QMG and G.II to visit C.A.Ps. without breaking down en route.

It appears that very recently an increase in the establishment has been given to 'B' Type HQs by the addition of a Training Officer for the C.A.P. This officer is wanted urgently by 2 B.L.U. and they would prefer to have an Infantry Officer of A/S Group 35 or over, who will live with the C.A.P.

This B.L.U. wished to have more visits by Departments of M.M.I.A.

966

Unclassified A.G. 13/55 Section 1-4/7/55 No. 785020

3 B.A.U. - MILAN.

There are two C.A.Rs. at this H.Q., one at COMO and one at BERGOLA. Everything seemed to be in order and there were no problems.

They receive many visits, principally from officers going on Leap, Release, etc.

(a) Local Adm.

The problem was solved with reference to the RAOC Training Instrument O.R. (Offr. Gibbs) who was due to be released on A/S Gp.29 and who had been posted to 12 B.A.U. I told them it would be quite in order to retain this N.C.O. on attachment and inform CRE as per AMOs. We would not take him on strength at Cesena.

There were no problems at the B.A.U. at BOLOGNA or FLORENCE, principally because they had good communications with M.M.I.A. Departments.

[signature]
Major R.A.C.
D&A & QMG.

7965

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(d)(3) NN 285020

retain this H.C.C. at attachment and inform CCS as per Q(b)a. We would not take him on strength at Caserta.

There were no problems at the B.B.U. at BOLOGNA or FLORENCE, principally because they had good communications with M.M.I.A. Departments.

[signature]

Major R.A.C.
DAA & QMG.

7965

AA & QMC
BAA & QMC
SC "A" & "Q"
DADPT
DADOS
DADME
CS
PRO

30 APR 1945 | File 45

2415

Classified E.O. 12958 Section 3.6(b)/NNDB No. 785020

SUBJECT :- Visit to Schools

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(50)

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 66318/9)

Ref : .O/48/1476

30 April 1946

To: Major G.K. ALEXANDER, R.A.
Major V.H. CHAPMAN, R.E.
Major H.P. CHANCE, R.U.R.P.
Major A.T. TWIDE, ROME.

For Info: HQ. AIC.

1. On TUESDAY 2 MAY 1946 I have arranged for Major H.J. BATCHED, RMA & QMC and Major A.T. TWIDE, RAOMC to visit Civitavecchia for the purpose of visiting the various Italian Schools and answering any problems brought out by the British officers i/c the schools.

2. The programme will be as follows :

1110 hrs Visit to E & M School.
1200 hrs Visit to School of Artillery.
1300 - 1400 hrs Lunch at Villa MARCHESINO (rations will be taken)
1430 hrs Visit to School of Tactics.
1510 hrs Visit to School of Engineers.
1600 hrs Return to CERANO.

Will Major CHANCE please arrange to be at the Villa MARCHESINO at 1330 hrs.

3. British Officers i/c Schools are asked to have any problems ready for discussion divided into two headings :

(a) Points re accommodation and equipment of Schools.

(b) Purely domestic problems of all descriptions.

7964

Colonel.
Comd. 12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

HJH/rmw

Internal.

File.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-103/NSC 10 285020

For Diary: 7/30 III.

1. On TUESDAY 2 MAY 1945 I have arranged for Major E.J. HAYFORD, D&A & QMG and Major A.T. TWIGG, DAIMS to visit Civitavecchia for the purpose of visiting the various Italian Schools and answering any problems brought out by the British Officers i/c the Schools.

2. The programme will be as follows :

1110 hrs Visit to N.C.O. School.
1200 hrs Visit to School of Artillery.
1300 - 1400 hrs Lunch at Villa MARCHELLINO (rations will be taken)
1430 hrs Visit to School of Tactics.
1510 hrs Visit to School of Engineers.
1600 hrs Return to CINANO.

Will Major CHANCE please arrange to be at the Villa MARCHELLINO at 1330 hrs.

3. British Officers i/c Schools are asked to have any problems ready for discussion divided into two headings :

(a) Points re accommodation and equipment of Schools.

(b) Purely domestic problems of all descriptions.

7964

Colonel,
Comd. 12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

Lilly/rmw

Internal.

File.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-403/NNDS No. 285232

Subject: Conference.

42P

12 BRITISH ARMOUR-AID UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY MISSION.
Ref: AU/MB/1445.
5 March 45.

To: All Officers, 12 B.A.U.
Commander (for information)
Officers Mess.

1. A conference will be held at 10.00 hrs. on TUESDAY, 7 March 45, in DMA & QS Office this H.Q., for the purpose of discussing more fully the requirements in respect of supplies and material for the Italian Army, brought out at the recent M.F.I.I. Conference.

2. The following officers are requested to attend :-

Major PRICE.
Major CHAPPS.
Major ROW.
Major GRIFFITH.
Major HALKET.
Major TWIER.
Major CHAPMAN (if available).

Capt. TENTERMAN.
S/Ldr. STOCKLEY.

3. Owing to recent changes in method of compilation of returns required, Officers are requested, in their own interests, not to commit anything to paper until after this conference.

7963

[signature]
Major D.A.A.G.
DMA & QS.

PJH/el.

Distrib:-

Photostat Co. 1065 Boston 1-149/3000 M. 285020

1. A conference will be held at 10.00 hrs. on TUESDAY, 7 March 44, in DMA & QMG Office this H.Q., for the purpose of discussing more fully the requirements in respect of supplies and materials for the Italian Army, brought out at the recent M.E.T.U. conference.

2. The following officers are requested to attend :-

Major PRICE.
Major CHANCE.
Major HOW.
Major SKINNER.
Major HALMET.
Major TWIDE.
Major CHAPMAN (if available).

Capt. TURNBULL.
S/Ldr. BROCKLEY.

3. Owing to recent changes in method of constitution of returns required, Officers are requested, in their own interests, not to commit anything to paper until after this conference.

7963

[signature]
Major A.A.C.
DMA & QMG.

WO/95/1.

Internal.
DMA.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS no. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSA No. 785020

44

DIRECTING SIGNAL

FROM : NSALA 10 [illegible]

TO : 1 BLU 5 BLU 9 BLU
2 BLU 6 BLU 10 BLU
3 BLU 7 BLU 11 BLU
4 BLU 8 BLU 12 BLU

DECLASSIFIED

REF : 0167 Jan Cairo

REF MY 0160 DATED 04 (.) SUBMIT STATEMENT TO THIS HQ UNDER HEADINGS C AND A/C ANY POINTS YOU WISH TO RAISE FOR DISCUSSION AT CONFERENCE 28 AND 29

PRECEDENCE IMMEDIATE

AUTHENTICATED

Interval : Last A Serials 1
2
3
4

File No.S/33/3

7962

COMD

Action to be taken made under your own arrangements

AA & OMC	
DAA & OMC	
SC "A" & "Q"	
DADPT	
RADOP	
DADNI	
12 Jan	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

OUTGOING SIGNAL

DATE TIME
04 1670 A

FROM : NATO

TO : 1 BLU 7 BLU
2 BLU 8 BLU
3 BLU 9 BLU
4 BLU 10 BLU
5 BLU 11 BLU
6 BLU 12 BLU - CESANO

REF : @ 160

UNCLASSIFIED

WARNING ORDER (.) A CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD AT HQ NATO
R O M E ON 28 AND 29 JAN (.) AGENDA FOLLOWS (.) ALL
OFFRS COMMANDING BLU'S TO ATTEND (.) IN ADDITION TO CMC
BLU'S AS REPS FROM 'A' TYPE BLU'S ONLY MAY ATTEND IF
DESIRED (.) NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFRS ATTENDING TO MAJOR PEAK
NO WKLY TELEX 478167 BY 21 JAN (.) MAJOR PEAK WILL MAKE ALL
ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY FOR ACCOMODATION OF OFFRS AND OTHER
RANKS WHETHER B R I T I S H OR I T A L I A N AND WILL
ARRANGE TRANSPORT OR GARAGE FOR CARS OF OFFRS ATTENDING (.)
VISITORS SHOULD REPORT E L I S E O HOTEL TELEX 478871
NEAR P O R T A P I N C I A N A ON ARRIVAL

7961
OUTGOING

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED

INTERNAL LIST 'A'

FILE : C/33/3

JW

AA & CNC
HAA & CNC
SC "A" & "Q"
DADMT
DADOS
DADME

Reg Increment

Schools
Inf
RA
EW
EOS
PRO

1946 | File 42

1079

12 Oct 11

43

Subject : Agenda for Conference.

HQ ADVANCE SUB COMD, AC of S(G-3),
G/3/3
15 Jan 46

To : Lt Col [illegible]

Folio 43

Ref this HQ Signal O-1[illegible] dated 4 Jan 46.

Herewith Agenda for the Conference of ZIS Chiefs to be held at HQ ADVANCE on 28 and 29 Jan 46.

Date	Time	Subject
28	0815-0940	Address by C.G.C.
	0940-1005	Address by Dep Comd
	1015-1130	G (SE and I) discussion.
	1130-1300	G (Trg) discussion.
	1300-1500	Lunch party GRAND HOTEL.
	1515-1715	Open for further discussion of any points raised at morning conference.
29	0815-1015	G&R discussion
	1030-1230	A/C discussion
	1430-1630	Open for further discussion of any points raised at morning conference.

* 7960

Note:

(a) All meets, including pers in AC Building in Conference Room

Classified S.R. 1946 Section 3(b)(1)/NND No. 785020

Ref Time Sig 34 and W.16 dated 4 Jan 46.

Herewith Agenda for the Conference of SIU Chiefs to be held at HQ MGIA on 28 and 29 Jan 46.

Date	Time	Subject
28	0915-0940	Address by C.O.C.
	0940-1015	Address by Dep Chief
	1015-1130	G (SD and I) discussion.
	1130-1300	S (Trg) discussion.
	1300-1500	Lunch party (MESS HALL).
	1515-1715	Space for further discussion of any points raised at morning conference.
29	0915-1015	G2RR discussion
	1030-1130	A/C discussion
	1430-1630	Space for further discussion of any points raised at morning conference.

7960

Notes

(a) All meeting discussions will be in A Building in Conference Room which will be kept at Control.

(b) Afternoon discussion as required in various Branch Offices.

(c) Details in regards to G, G2RR, and A/C discussion will be available at Watch Office where visitors report on arrival 27 Jan 46.

Internal:

1Cpy 1,2 (Less Section 17.)

AA & QMG
DAA & QMG
SC "A" & "P"
DAGCT
DAFOE
DADWB
Key Personnel
Schools
Inf
SA
AE
AGF
10 1-2 48.

2A. Col. GS.

1305

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND No. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB NO. 785020

"F" BRITISH LIAISON & THE UNIT,
R.T.C. I.C.F.

16 Nov 45.

42

48

Dear General Ronco,

The Officers of "F" B.L. & T.U. will be very pleased if you would care to attend an informal lunch at their mess on Monday, 19th November, at 12.45 a.m.

We have also asked Prince Paul Rodzianko of the 16th Royal Hussars who we understand was a colleague of yours at the re-organisation of the Sabauda Division in Sicily, and who has expressed a desire to renew your acquaintanceship.

Yours

Major, [illegible].
BLA & [illegible].

Internal.

FLAT.

7959

Declassified E.O. 13065 Section 3-402/NSC No. 785020

Head file

(4)

ROMAN AREA ALLIED COMMAND
APO 794, US ARMY

Ref:- 69A
18 Oct 45

SUBJECT:- Visit - Deputy Military Secretary

TO :- All concerned.

COPY TO:- DEP MIL SEC, GHQ CMF.

1. The Deputy Military Secretary proposes to visit ROMA on 3/4 Nov 45.

2. He is prepared to grant interviews to any officer on those days, but, owing to the limited time at his disposal, only those officers who wish to raise points which cannot be answered locally will present themselves for interview.

3. Units will forward to this HQ by 29 Oct 45 the names of officers desiring an interview, giving a brief statement of the points to be raised.

4. Location and times for interview will be notified later.

A.L.LOUDEN
Major
for Lt-Col
AA & QMG

DISTRIBUTION:- LIST "B" (Br)

ALL/ar

AA & QMG
DAA & QMG
SC "A" & "Q"
DADOS
DADOS
DADMS
for Information
GL
ACS
PRO
19.10.1945 File 48

4477

7958

S-E-C-R-E-T

FILE
18
40

Programme - Visit of Lieutenant General Sir William D. Morgan, KCB., DSO., MC.

Ref: Map Sheets: 1/25,000 - 143/NE
143/NW
143/SE

- - - - - - - - - -

Time

1100 hrs — Arrive X xxs CHIENTIA NUOVA 605827 - Meet Commanding General XXC ICP and escorting staff.

1125 hrs — Arrive Artillery Barracks REGGIANO - Meet Commanding Officer and inspect barracks and training.

1145 hrs — Leave Artillery Barracks.

1150 hrs — Arrive Engineer Training Ground - Meet Colonel Commanding Genio Reggiment and OC Engineer School. Inspect Training, and if not inspect Genio Barracks.

1200 hrs — Leave for CESANO.

1235 hrs — Arrive CESANO.
Inspect OC.RR Guard of Honour (Entrance to Chemical Factory).

1245 hrs — Visit Officers Mess 'P' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT.
Meet Officers of 'P' BL & TU.

1300 hrs to 1430 hrs — "PISANO" Division HQ Officers Mess - Lunch. 7957

1430 hrs — Visit Physical Training School - Meet Commandant and Inspect Training.

1445 hrs — Visit Infantry School. - Meet Commandant and Inspect training.

1500 hrs — Leave Infantry School.

1505 hrs — Visit Hospital.

Visit ends.

W.L. Roe Major
for Colonel,
Commander

Forwarded to WO1 Letter Address No. 285020

1100 hrs — Arrive X rds CENTRIA NUOVA 605827 - Meet Commanding General 8TC ICF and escorting staff.

1125 hrs — Arrive Artillery Barracks BRACCIANO - Meet Commanding Officer and inspect barracks and training.

1145 hrs — Leave Artillery Barracks.

1150 hrs — Arrive Engineer Training Ground - Meet Colonel Commanding Genio Reggiment and CO Engineer School. Inspect Training, and if not inspect Genio Barracks.

1200 hrs — Leave for CESANO.

1235 hrs — Arrive CESANO.
Inspect CC.PR Guard of Honour (Entrance to Chemical Factory).

1245 hrs — Visit Officers Mess 'P' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT.
Meet Officers of 'P' BL & TU.

1300 hrs to 1430 hrs — "PICENO" Division HQ Officers Mess - Lunch. 7957

1430 hrs — Visit Physical Training School - Meet Commandant and Inspect Training.

1445 hrs — Visit Infantry School. - Meet Commandant and Inspect training.

1500 hrs — Leave Infantry School.

1505 hrs — Visit Hospital.

Visit ends.

W.L.R. Hayes for
Colonel,
Commander
'P' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT,
8TC ICF

Distribution:
MMIA 6 copies.
RAAC 3 copies.
8STC ICF 2 copies.
'P' BLTU 1 copy for each officer.
War Diary 1 copy

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3(E)(2)(B) No. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNMS No. 785020

Files 38

SUBJECT :- Visit of General Officers to the Centre - 11 Aug 45.

08.30 - 10.30 hrs	-	Visit to All Arms Instructors School, (MANZIANA).
	-	Tactical Course : Demonstrative drills of all courses (Infantry Platoon Attack).
	-	Weapon Training Course : Lecture on 3-in Morter, Lectures on Platoon Weapons (2-in Morter, PLAT).
10.45 - 11.15 hrs	-	Visit to Engineer Training Regiment, (BRACCIANO).
11.20 - 1200 hrs	-	Visit to Artillery Training Regiment, (BRACCIANO)
13.00 hrs	-	Lunch at CESANO.
16.00 - 16.45 hrs	-	Visit to Mechanics School and D & M School, (CESANO).
17.00 - 18.00 hrs	-	Visit to Infantry School, (CESANO).
	-	Course for Lance Corporals.
	-	Training of a Section in the Attack, (School room).
	-	Training in Platoon Weapons (Schoolroom).
	-	Training for Day and Night movement, (Outdoor)
	-	Mines Training (Ambush and surprise).

NOTE : Police and Specialists Schools are left out as there are no courses running at present.

Distribution : Col L.H. MACKAY OBE.
Maj A.M.C. GELLARDI. RA.
Maj W.L. PRICE. N.Staffs.
Maj P.J. ANDREWS. RASC.
Maj E. HERTINGDON. King's Own.
Maj.A.P. GRANT. RA.
Capt. L.E. GULLICK RA.
Maj C.T. LARKINGPON. DE.
Maj E.W. BRADLEY Irnioks.
Spares (6).

18

1956

37

COMANDO DIVISIONE "PICENO"
C.A.C.F.I.C.
Ufficio Addestramento

nr.5384/Add. di prot. P.M.92 - 7 agosto 1945

OGGETTO : visita ufficiali generali al Centro.-

ALLO STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
Ufficio Operazioni e Addestramento P.M. 3800
e, per conoscenza :
→ ALL' "F" B.L.T.U. (Col.Mackay) S E D E

****

A modifica foglio nr.5279/Add. data 4 agosto, trasmetto copia del programma concordato per la visita del giorno 11 c.m. con i particolari di dettaglio .=

IL COMANDANTE
Generale Ezio Vegni)

7955

P. C. C
IL TENENTE COLONNELLO
Capo Ufficio Addestramento
(Ugo Silvi)

Inviata a distribuita

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5D5 NO. 785020

SUBJECT :- Visit of General Officers to the Centre - 11 Aug '45.

08.30 - 10.30 hrs	-	Visit to All Arms Instructors School, (MANZIANA).
	-	Tactical Course : Demonstrative drills of all courses (Infantry Platoon Attack).
	-	Weapon Training Course : Lecture on 3-in Mortar, Lectures on Platoon Weapons (2-in Mortar, PIAT).
10.45 - 11.15 hrs	-	Visit to Engineer Training Regiment, (BRACCIANO).
11.20 - 1200 hrs	-	Visit to Artillery Training Regiment, (BRACCIANO)
13.00 hrs	-	Lunch at CESANO.
16.00 - 16.45 hrs	-	Visit to Mechanics School and D & M School, (CESANO).
17.00 - 18.00 hrs	-	Visit to Infantry School, (CESANO).
	-	Course for Lance Corporals.
	-	Training of a Section in the Attack, (School room).
	-	Training in Platoon Weapons (Schoolroom).
	-	Training for Day and Night movement, (Outdoor)
	-	Mines Training (Ambush and surprise).

NOTE ; Police and Specialists Schools are left out as there are no courses running at present.

7954

Distribution : Col L.H. MACKAY OBE.
Maj A.M.G. GHILARDI. RA.
Maj W.L. PRICE. N.Staffs.
Maj F.J. ANDREWS. RASC.
Maj E. HERTINGDON. King's Own.
Maj.A.F. GRANT. RA.
Capt. L.E. GULLICK RA.
Maj C.T. LARRINGTON. HE.
Maj E.W. BRADLEY Irwiaks.
Spares (6).

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

36

1922

BROS V MEBY 62533
FROM DMT 56 AREA 8217GUB
TO COMB F BLU AND THG UNIT RTO ICE CESANO
DMT/255 RESTRICTED . PROPOSE VISITING YOU MORNING 4 JULY TO DISCUSS
FUTURE TRAINING POLICY . INFORM ME GRAND HOTEL ROME IF TIME UNSUITABLE
ST 1952
VENT NR 533 1943 NS S K
RD 533 1943 JWR AR KKK

1973

AG & QMC
DAA & QMC
DE "A" & "F"
DA Dist
DA Inf
DA Sig
Exhibit 3.7.45. pp. 48

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC0 NO. 785020

FILE

33

'F' SEC. INTO. REF.

Ref: N/HQ/714

10 June 45.

To: Major J.A.F. Gribble, Lemo.Fus.
Garibaldi Regiment
VERONO.

Will you please call at this Headquarters on Tuesday morning, the 12th June.

Major R.A.
DAA & QMG.

AMSO/ah.

7952

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG No. 785020

32

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

DAA & QMC
ROMAN AREA ALLIED COMMAND
APO 794, US ARMY
DATE
TIME
By Messenger

2

IZO/rlp
30 May 1945

AG 000.3

SUBJECT: Special Message From The Supreme Allied Commander

TO : See Distribution

1. The following is a special message from the Supreme Allied Commander to all the Allied armed forces in the Mediterranean Theater:

"The territory around Trieste and Gorizia and East of the Isonzo River is part of Italy known as Venezia Giulia. The territory around Villach and Klagenfurt is part of Austria. The above Italian and Austrian territory is now claimed by Marshal Tito who wishes to incorperate it in Jugoslavia. We have no objection to claims being put forward by Marshal Tito to this territory. His claims will be examined and finally settled with fairness and impartiality at the Peace Conference, in exactly the same manner as other disputed areas throughout Europe. Our policy, as has been publicly proclaimed, is that the territorial changes should be made only after thorough study and after full consultation and deliberation between the various governments concerned. It is, however, Marshal Tito's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini and Japan. It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems; this is one of the cardinal principles for which the peoples of the United Nations have made their tremendous sacrifices in an endeavor to obtain a just and lasting peace. It is one of the cornerstones on which our representatives, with the approbation of world public opinion, are now at work at San Francisco to build a system of world security. We can not now throw away the vital principles for which we have all fought. Under these principles it is our duty to hold these disputed territories as trustees until their ultimate disposal is settled at the Peace Conference. Within these territories our duty and responsibility is to keep law and order by our military forces and to ensure a peaceful and secure life for their peoples through our Allied Military Government. We may be relied on to act impartially as we do not covet these territories ourselves. In this situation I tried my best to come to a friendly agreement with Marshal Tito, but did not succeed. The United States and British Governments have therefore taken the matter up directly with Marshal Tito. The Soviet Government has been kept fully informed. We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal Tito is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement of his territorial claims, or whether he will attempt to establish them by force. It has always been my policy to keep you all, whatever your rank, fully informed about the general situation and the objects for which you have fought. I send you this message so that you may know the issues which are now at stake."

(Over)

3-55-21

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7951

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC NO. 785020

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

2. This message will be read to all troops under your command at the first formation after receipt.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BROWN:

I. E. Ehrk
I. E. CREEK
Captain AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION
"R"

[redacted] Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

FILE

31

SECRET: Landing Ground.

'Y' Exp. Dep. Ec.

Ref: AQ/A2/GR.

5 Jan 1945.

To: H.Q.,
R.A.F., I.G.E.

It is understood that the R.C.A.F., Major General A. Drew, will be visiting GREEN by plane. Will you please take the necessary action to ensure that the landing strip is ready and kept free of weeds until after his visit.

[redacted]
Major R.A.
DA & QMG.

RM/ab.

Internal.
File.
Int.

7950

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC8 NO. 785020

(8) 0V26 9/15

SIGNAL. 30

FROM : M.M.I.A. 25/1140 B

TO : SO BLU
51 BLU
52 BLU
53 BLU
56 BLU
"P"BLU

INFO : REAR EIGHTH ARMY FOR MMIA LO
FIFTH ARMY BR INCR FOR MMIA LO

REF: A 1072.

RESTRICTED

CONFERENCE OF REPS FROM BLU'S WHICH WAS PROPOSED FOR ABOUT 20 MAY AT CESANO IS INDEFINITELY POSTPONED OWING TO CHANGED CONDITIONS (.) FOR MMIA LO EIGHTH ARMY (.) PLEASE INFORM COL HOWARD (.) ALL SNFM

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT TO ALL

AUTHENTICATED Robert Cecil Capt.

INTERNAL: G

G1.

16 May 5 [illegible] 48

1092

7949

1512608

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC NO. 785020

29

3240

ZNOV V 0322 HR14727 IMMEDIATE

FM CSAHO

ZNOV FM ELM

TO AMLIA LO REAR S ABNY

"T" ELM . RTC ICF (GESTERA)

SUBJ DT .

GES(.) RESTRICTED(.) REF [redacted] ADVSD DTG 181(.)

IT CONTEMPLATE TRC ONLY GR GENERAL AS QUESTION

IS WHETHER ELMO REP ELM O[redacted]ON TRC ZNC

TNI 141930

TXNT HR14727 ATP 24 IC

RECD HR14727 AT 20125 GP AA

7948

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NARS No. 785020

70

HQ ROMAN AREA ALLIED COMMAND
APO 794 US ARMY

Ref: AMA117

7 May 45

SUBJECT: Visit of DADT to 'F' HQU

ADST RAAC

Reference your ST/14 dated 5 May 45. NR.

Visit of DADT to 'F' HQU for the purpose of obtaining information required by DST HQ, should be arranged direct with CC 'F' HQU.

A.L. LOUDEN,
Major,
For Lt-Col,
AA & QMG.

BWW/lv

Copy to: CO 'F' HQU

7947

7 May 45 hr 48

(970)

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(1) NND No. 785020

C CMTC, Benevent

23

8211

LPOT V LAEL HR3D


FROM CENTRAC 121302
TO HTC/ICF
INFO HT
RESTRICTED

CC 887 (.) FOR LT COL MACKAY RA FROM FOSTER-GREENWOOD (.)
HOPE TO VISIT YOUR TRAINING CENTRE ON 19 APR (.) WILL ASSUME
THIS IS CONVENIENT UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED
HT 121302Z

7946

SENT HR82 1715Z JM AR KWK
HR 82 RECD. 1217152 PJ2 32

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020



SECRET.

22

PROGRAMME - VISIT OF MAJOR GENERAL L. MATHESON, C.B., D.S.O.

6 APRIL, 1945.

Ref: (a) Sheets:-
1/25,000 - 14/ II NE
" - 14/ II NW
" - 14/ II SE

A/B

"Q" MAL. DEO. ETC.
c/o Lt.Col.Turner M.C. Cmdt.
A.C. (MIR) MADE.
A2/AP/31.
5 April 1945.

09.00 hrs. Arrive Fort-Ferdi 057736 - Host Lieut-Col. A.McKelvie, R.A.

09.30 hrs. Arrive outskirts TIMEZGHI - Host Major T. Lowe, Kings Own, Officer i/c Battalion.

Visit Battalion and meet Commanding Officer of Battalion Regiment.

10.20 hrs. Leave TIMEZGHI.

10.30 hrs. Arrive Cross-roads 0239.
Turn right to Lake MELGIANO.

11.00 hrs. Arrive Posto di Ilisso, Recruits Regiment, 14/II.
Host Capt. T.D.C. Ward, Recce.
Drive through Deep area.

11.30 hrs. Leave Recruits Regiment area.

11.40 hrs. Arrive MELGIANO.

11.50 hrs. Arrive MATTINA. Host Major E. Hartington, Kings Own, Officer i/c School. 1945

Visit Main Instructional Building.

12.05 hrs. Leave MATTINA.

12.50 hrs. Arrive CESANO, Officer's Mess - Host General Vidil, C/S. MALAVOLTI and Lt.Col. DIVO.

13.10 hrs. Lunch.

15.00 hrs. Leave for ROME.

---0---

Classified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1) NND 785020

9.50 hrs. Arrive outskirts VITERBO - Lieut Major T. Lusty, Kings Own, Officer i/c Airfield Instruction.

Visit Quarters and meet Commandant, Officer of Guard and Regiment.

10.45 hrs. Leave VITERBO.

10.50 hrs. Arrive Orvieto-road 627365.
Turn right to Lake BOLSENA.

11.00 hrs. Arrive Post. Al Mlepo, Recruits Regiment, 5.4.361.
Lieut Major T.C.C. Marti, Rocco.
Drive through Camp area.

11.20 hrs. Leave Recruits Regiment area.

11.30 hrs. Arrive MONTALTO.

11.50 hrs. Arrive MONTANA. Lieut Major E. Buntington, Kings Own, Officer i/c Schools.

Visit Main Instructional Building.

12.05 hrs. Leave MONTANA.

12.30 hrs. Arrive CERANO, Officer's Mess - Lieut General VERNI, Col. MALVASI and Lt.Col. SIVO.

13.10 hrs. Lunch.

13.50 hrs. Leave for ROME.

Distribution:

H.Q., Local Forces Sub Comm. AC (ROME)	-	5 copies.
H.Q., M.T.O., A.C.F.	-	6 "
HQ TAC. HQ. 2TF.	-	6 "
HQ DEL. HQ. XXF.	-	12 "
Major T.C.C.Marti, Rocco.	-	3
Major E. Buntington, Kings Own.	-	3 "
Major T. Lusty (Kings Own).	-	3 "
War Diary.	-	2 "
File.		
Fleet.		
Spares.	-	9 "

7945

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(1)(2) NND 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

LRGE V HEDY 15524 IMPORTANT
FROM DMT 56 AREA 191700A
TO WUTA FOR BTU
DOA BT
DMT/745 RESTRICTED . FINDLATER ARRIVING CEBAO THURSDAY 22 MAR TO DISCUSS WITH MACKAY PRICE AND IF NECESSARY MAKE QUESTION OF BRITISH PERSONNEL FOR BYZZ BTU . MATTER IS URGENT .
HOPE APPLICATION FOR GR PERSONNEL HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE SECOND ECHELON . DMT/45/1/BTI DATED 6 AND 17 MAR REFER
BT 121700A
SENT 1932A 1520 JR B K
RD BT 19224 1830R JC 51

GMIA (Nor) in 11/20 out 1/20 3829 21

7944

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

FORACTION FOR INFO
S E C R E T
Date 2/13. File #8

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5(D) NO. 785020

COPY

1/14

FROM : ITALIAN SIGNAL SCHOOL NOCERA 18 MPT

TO : BLU RTO ICF C/o MMIA

INFO : SOR SIGS MMIA

20

G/19 (.) RESTRICTED (.) THOMAS AND ITALIAN COMMANDANT

SIGNAL SCHOOL VISITING CESANO 21 MAR

FOR ACTION FOR INFO
G-2
Date 19/3 File 18

19 1120 A

7943

Declassified E.O. 12065 Sec 3.402/NNDC No. 785020

Plant

19

HQ ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND
APO No 794 US ARMY.

CONFIDENTIAL.

1048

Ref: 69A.

12 Mar 45.

SUBJECT:- Visit - Representative of the Military Secretary, War Office.

FORACTION FOR IN
S & N
1/3 48

TO: Distribution List "B" (British).

1. Lt Col C.W.G.LYNCH, CBE, MC, Assistant Military Secretary, War Office, will visit ITALY early in April for a short tour.

2. He is prepared to grant interviews to any officer during his tour, but owing to the distances to be travelled and the limited time that can be spared in this country, it is requested that only those officers who wish to raise points which cannot satisfactorily be answered locally will present themselves for interview.

3. Interviews for officers of this Command (including Allied Commission) will take place in ROME on approximately 3 Apr 45. The number of interviews is limited. Please forward to this HQ by 18 Mar 45 the names of any officers desiring an interview, giving a brief statement of the points to be raised.

7-13-35

EVW/ss.

L. LOUDEN,
Major,
for Lt Col,
AA & QMG.

Names to be submitted to S.C. please

1 7942

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC Nr. 785020

F" BLU-RTE-8F c/o MMIA-11 0

18

ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND
APO 794, US Army

Ref: Q 203
15 Mar 45

Subject:- Inspectorate of Army Equipment

To :- See Distribution.

1100

1. An Inspectorate of Army Equipment commanded by Lt-Col J.T.Campbell, TD, R. Scots, has been allotted to 2 District to carry out inspections among units forthwith, commencing with British Units of Rome Area Allied Command.

2. Commander 2 District has intimated that he wishes every facility to be given to the Inspectorate in carrying out its task and that Lt-Col Campbell shall have an opportunity of addressing all O's C Units and QM's or unit Admn Offrs of each area and sub area before he commences inspections therein.

3. In view of this, all O's C units and their QM's or Admn Offrs will attend at Room No. 1 Faculty of Law ("Aula Magna") University City, Rome, at 1100 hrs Monday 19 Mar 45 when Lt-Col Campbell will explain in detail the object and method of his inspections.

FORMATION FOR INFO
Date 16/3/45

R.H.Dimmock
Lt-Col.
AA & QMG

DISTRIBUTION:

List "R" (British)

7941

Corrigendum S.O. 12(1) Section 3-(d)/WHM No. 785020

FILE

SECRET

SUBJECT: Visit of Field Marshal Rt Hon H.R.L.G.Alexander.

'Y' MAN HQ 207.

Ref: Y/48/7

10 March 45.

To: H.Q.
R.T.C., I.G.F.

1. I have been informed that the following will comprise the Field Marshal's party on Monday 12 March 45 :-

Field Marshal Rt Hon H.R.L.G. Alexander, GCB. OBE. DSO. MC. ADC.
Brigadier J. Anderson, (G.3 Org)
Major D. Barnes. (G.3 Org)
P.A. to Field Marshal.
Major General Browning, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.
Colonel Fidday, D.S.O., M.C.
Major Burman.
Brigadier Shoesmith, (D.M.T)
Lieut-Col. Watt.
Brigadier A. Lee. (Commander R.A.A.C)
R.A.A.C. Staff Officer.

2. In addition, in response to the kind invitation of General Mattioli, the following personnel from P.L.U. will be present at lunch:

Lieut-Col. D.H.Mackay.R.A.
Major W.L. Kelso.
Major A.M.S.Galardi, R.A.

7940

Lieut-Col. R.A.

1295/45.

Internal
Wile.
Floss.

1 15

SUBJECT :- Visit of Field Marshall.

'R' Trg Inst IRTC ICP.
Ref BTI/G2/11

Commander 'F' SEC IRTC ICP. 19 Mar 45.

1. Ref details of Fd Marshalls visit.

2. There is nothing in the training line for the Engineers to be seen in the Barracks at BRACCIANO.

3. Between the hours the Fd Marshall is at BRACCIANO, there will be a party of 50 on Bailey Bridging, a party of 50 on Minewarfare and a party of 50 on Fieldworks at the Training Ground, where as much time as is required can be spent if need be.

4. The difficulty of an immediate turn round of the numerous vehicles can be overcome while the FM is having a look round on foot.

5. It is suggested that the following itinerary is worked to :-

1020. Arrive Training Ground. Vehs turn round while FM sees training in operation. Meet Col FISICARO, Capt LE TOCQ and myself.

1030. Leave Training Ground.

1055. Arrive main entrance to Genio Barracks.
Meet:-

Magg DE NORI
Maj HUNTINGDON
Maj WARD
Maj THOMAS.

See Sigs class proceeding on 22 Det. (Agreed Lt Diplomatique Rep)

1045. Depart.

1120. Arrive Posto di Blocco CESANO (Only a 30 minute drive).

Major RE.

7939

285020

2. There is crossing on the training land for the regiment to be seen in the Barracks at [illegible].

3. Between the hours the FM Marshall is at MERACLANO, there will be a party of 50 on Bailey Bridging, a party of 50 on Minewarfare and a party of 50 on Fieldworks at the Training Ground, where as much time as is required can be spent if need be.

4. The difficulty of an immediate turn round of the numerous vehicles can be overcome while the FM is having a look round on foot.

5. It is suggested that the following itinerary is worked to :-

1020. Arrive Training Ground. Veics turn round while FM sees training in operation. Meet Col MISIGAMO, Capt LE TOCQ and myself.

1030. Leave Training Ground.

1035. Arrive main entrance to Cerdo Barracks.
Meet:-

Magg DE NOSI
Maj HUNTINGDON
Maj WARD
Maj THOMAS.

Dem Sigs class proceeding on 22 Oct. (Agreed Huntingdon Capt R Sigs)

1045. Depart.

1120. Arrive Posto di Blocco CESANO (Only a 30 minite drive).

J C Bluett

Major RE.
SOPE
BTI IRTC 1CF.

JCB/rnw

FOR ACTION FOR INFO
SEEN
Date 10/3 File 8/8

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-5(b)/NNDS MR 78-220


7939

TOP SECRET

14

Subject: S.A.C's Inspection of the D & M School RTC ICF.

PROPOSED ROUTE.



1130 hrs.

S.A.C. arrives at gate, entrance to D & M School. Introduced to Captain HÖHLICK, A/DADST, Major RAIMONDI, C.C. School, Lt. NAPOLEONI, Adjudant, and Administrative Subaltern;

1131 hrs.

Taken, as per attached plan, by the office into the big shed, through the office and NCOs rooms under construction, then out onto the road at the back of the shed. Taken past the present sleeping quarters of the men.

1132 hrs.

Reenter the big shed by the far door into the proposed barrack room, thence through the barrack room into the mess room and into the kitchen.

1133 hrs.

Goes out of the side door of the kitchen and is led to the hangar to view the hard vehicle standings under construction.

1134 hrs.

7938

Goes past the hard standings and, at the side of the hangar finds two blocks of vehicles drawn up with the drivers lined up in front. Dress: Overalls with caps and anklets web, without belts. The Parade will be commanded by 2 Lt. SIMONI, who will report the men present to S.A.C.

Restricted by S.O. 11954 Section 3 (3)(B)(II) as amended
285020

1131 hrs.

Taken, as per attached plan, by the office into the big shed, through the office and NCOs rooms under construction, then out onto the road at the back of the shed. Taken past the present sleeping quarters of the men.

1132 hrs.

Reenter the big shed by the far door into the proposed barrack room, thence through the barrack room into the mess room and into the kitchen.

1133 hrs.

Goes out of the side door of the kitchen and is led to the hangar to view the hard vehicle standings under construction.

1134 hrs.

7938

Goes past the hard standings and, at the side of the hangar finds two blocks of vehicles drawn up with the drivers lined up in front. Dress: Overalls with caps and anklets web, without belts. The Parade will be commanded by 2 Lt. SIMONI, who will report the men present to S.A.C.

1137 hrs.

S.A.C. guided back to front gate of School, where he is handed over to Major HILTON, R.E.M.E.

Captain.
Coldstream Guards.
A/D.A.D.S.T.

10 Mar. 45.

Principal Ref. 17565 Section 3-46/Home No. 285020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

13

SUBJECT:- Visit of V.I.P.

"F" SIT., INTC., IOP.

Commander,
"F" SIG., INTC., IOP.

Ref: MI/A.4/16

10 March 1945

1. The following is a brief programme of the tour of the V.I.P.

2. The V.I.P. will, on leaving the Factory Buildings, drive straight up the CASATO road entering the fourth Lotto in the neighbourhood of the OFFICINA AUTOMOBILISTICA (see attached sketch). The transport will follow the lanes as per the attached sketch.

3. At the entrance to the fourth Lotto there will be a Guard of six men including a Sergeant and Trumpeter. He will proceed directly to the point marked "X" on the attached sketch where he will meet the following Officers:-

1155 hrs. Col FERDINANDO BORELLO.
(Comd., No.1 Regt).
Col M. TANZI.
(Comd., Infantry School).
Ten Col GUISEPPE BONOLA.
(Comd., 1 Bn, 1 Regt).
Magg. AGOSTINO CARNAPA.
(Comd., 2 Bn, 1 Regt).
Magg. FEDERICO D'AGOSTINI.
(Comd., 3 Bn, 1 Regt).
~~Major Maldini, H. Staffe.~~
~~C.S.M. Bolli, Infantry Regiment.~~

FORACTION FOR INFO
SEEN
Date 10/3 File 48

4. A variety of training will be going on as per attached sketch which the V.I.P. may or may not wish to look at. He will then be invited to inspect the barracks of No.1 Regiment being drawn towards 3 Bns barracks.

5. 1205 hours. Having inspected the barracks he will then proceed to visit the Infantry School as per attached sketch. At the Infantry School training in 6-pdr, 3inch mortar and Platoon weapons will be in progress.

6. 1215 hours. Proceed as per attached sketch past No.2 Regiment training to No.2 Regimental barracks. Meet Regimental Commander of No.2 Regt and officers as follows:-

Col N. PAZZAGLIA.
(Comd., No.2 Regiment).
Ten Col A. MAZ.
(Comd., 4 Bn, 2 Regt).
Lt Col. MASSO.
(Comd., 5 Bn, 2 Regt).
Ten Col C. VISCONTA.
(Comd., 6 Bn, 2 Regt).

7937

and the remaining officers of the B.I.U.

1229 hours. Proceed via No.2 Regimental S.D. to Football Field where will be drawn up representatives of the centre including a guard of honour from 336 Infantry Regiment.

7. General Notes.

All Traffic Control personnel will have blancoed gaiters and belts, gloves and helmets.

Car park areas will be marked with white-wash on the ground.

Troops will dressed wearing equipment and steel helmets.

Guards will be placed at entrance to each Regiment.

W.L. Parke Major
Major, G.S.O.II,
Inf Training.

Field.
WLP/amj.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

12

SUBJECT: Details of route through Mechanics School.

'F' HLU RTC ICF.
RSME/MISC/3.
10 March 1945.

To: COMMANDER.

Ref your V/48/S dated 9 March 45.

1. 11.37 Capt. Valentini Pietro. Capt. Sodu, Ten.Savio, S/Ten.Carobbi and, Major C.H.C.Hilton, D.A.D.M.E.
will at entrance of D & M School, and are introduced by SAC.
Route to be follows :-

1) Vehicle Mechanics, armourers and gun fitters building.
2) Garage.
3) Stores. (Technical and M.T.)
4) Fitters shop.
5) School workshop.
6) Commandant's office.
7) Dining room.
8) Driver Mechanics building.
9) Canteen building.
10) Sleeping quarters, (Instructors and students).
11) Workshops.

FORACTION FOR INFO
SEEN
Date 9/3. File 48

7935

2. After visitors alight, cars will be directed by RSME Sgt. round Cement Sheds to the entrance to the Mechanics School.

3. Visit will terminate at the entrance to the Mechanics School.

4. Dress - British Instructors - Best battle-dress, white belts and gaiters.
Italian " - Best battle-dress, except those working, who will wear clean denims.

5. Senior R.C.O. (Italian) will call all ranks in the Section to attention, when the Field Marshall visits and remain at attention until ordered to "Repose".

Major.
DADME.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC No. 785020

COMANDO 152ª DIVISIONE FANTERIA
"PICENO"

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE

10

8 marzo 1945

Dear Colonel,

I have the great pleasure to invite You, Major Price and Major Gelardi to the luncheon party that we are going to offer to the British Very Important Personality when he will be here for a visit to this Centre.-

Any other Officers under your command will be welcomed.=

Sincerely yours

FORACTION FOR INFO
S... N
Date 8/3 File 3

Accepted with
Major Price & Gelardi

LT. COL.
L. H. MACKAY

CC. B.L.U. - H.T.C. - I.C.F. -

7934

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

2051 8

NOMK AREA 09 1200A

7 H (BRACCIANO) - "F" HLD (CESANO)

MMIA

SD 1244 SECRET (.)

WARNING ORDER (.) SAC WILL VISIT SEVEN HUSSARS AND ICG RTC MONDAY ONE TWO MAR (.) DETAIL OF TIMINGS FOLLOW WHEN KNOWN

FORACTION FOR INFO
Date 10 2 File 128

PRIORITY
GJ British

09/120

FA to
Dep Comd
GJ British

7933

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET. 7

SUBJECT: Visit of Field Marshal Sir H.R.L.G.Alexander.

'F' HQ NO XF.

Ref: F/45/7

10 March 45.

To: M.O.
R.T.O., I.O.F.

1. I have been informed that the following will comprise the Field Marshal's party on Monday 12 March 45 :-

Field Marshal Sir H.R.L.G. Alexander, GCB. CBE. DSO. MC. ADC.
Brigadier J. Anderson, (D.S Org)
Major D. Barnes. (D.S Org)
P.A. to Field Marshal.
Major General Browning, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.
Colonel Pilsley, R.A.O., R.C.
Major Rouse.
Brigadier Greenhill, (D.M.T)
Lieut-Col. Bate.
Brigadier A. Lee. (Commander R.A.A.C)
R.A.A.C. Staff Officer.

2. In addition, in response to the kind invitation of General Mattioli, the following personnel from R.L.U. will be present at lunch:

Lieut-Col. L.J.Morley.R.A.
Major W.L. Price.
Major L.M.C.Galbraith, R.A.

7932

Lieut-Col. R.A.

125/62.

Internal.
Gen.
Plans.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Restrictions No. 785020

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

M48R6
File

SUBJECT :- Detail for Field Exercise Visit

File

Ref YR/8/5
(7 Mar 45)

1000 hrs - Artillery Bureau: BRACCIANO.
Naval Artillery Training in progress.

Col HEIN to attend detailed programme of 15 minutes period.

1000 hrs - Engineer Bureau: BUCCIANO.
Male orientation engineer School.
Lent Officers detailed.
Visit to Signals School, where 22 Learners to Students in progress.

Maj BLAKELY and Capt TERRY to coordinate exact details and minute programme for period involved.

7931

1130 hrs - Naval Inspection of US.Ml.

1130 hrs - Drive through Factory Buildings.
Halt at entrance to Driver's School and disembark.
Lent Officers detailed.
Visit through Driver's School.

Capt MORRIS to prepare detailed route.

Personnel engaged in normal maintenance duties will stand by their vehicles.

Return through Cabral to R & R School
Largest case of the buildings.

Maj HEIN to prepare detailed route.

Personnel engaged on projects School consultation.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG No. 785020

1155 hrs - No 1 Regiment H.Q. move.
Rest Officers detailed.
Inspect Ground Floor Barrack Rooms of No 1 Battalion.

Maj Hicks to prepare detailed programme of period, showing routes.

1210 hrs - No 2 Regiment arrives.
Inspect Ground Floor Barracks.

Maj Hicks to prepare details as above.

1225 hrs - Remaining Officers will be waiting in Entrance Hall to be presented.

1235 hrs - Motor cars and proceed to Football Ground.

Maj Hicks to prepare route to Inspection Point.

Legal Operations Officer to arrive Derby night and be installed and tested motor cycle.
Maj Hicks.

1430 hrs - Formal Parade and Address.

Lt-Col RA

Lt-Col [illegible]
Maj [illegible]
Maj [illegible]
Capt [illegible]
Capt [illegible]

Reports required to be available in each Office by 1800 hrs Saturday 10 May 45.

7930

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

RAAC MESSAGE FORM 935 4

CIPHER

CIRCUIT No.	PRIORITY	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
NR		

SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

SUBJECT: SIGNED RACEID CITE FIXUP

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN 061845

FROM (A)

MMA RAAC "F" ELU(CINCAMS)

TO (FOR ACTION)

file

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS GH

CH 1 - 2 - 3

TO (FOR INFORMATION)


FX 30911

(REF. No.)

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET

CONFIRMING TELETYPE CONVERSATION.

SAO LETTERS TO VERIF XXX FYO AND ZH RPT ZH ON 12



87

DECLASSIFIED 071685 A

7929

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	REFERENCE	TIME OF TOR	GTC
	ORIGINATOR'S EDITOR		
	A. G. AUTHENTICATION	TIME CLEARED	
	ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION		

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-(B)/5(B) NN. 785020

TOP SECRET.

3

SUBJECT: Visit of Field Marshal Sir H.R.L.G.Alexander, K.C.B.

'Y' B.L.U., R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref: Y/h3/3.

7 March 45.

To: H.Q.
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Herewith please find six copies of programme (Nos. 13 - 18) of Field Marshall Sir H.R.L.G. Alexander's visit on 12 March 1945.

Capt. R.A.
Staff Captain.

HRH/sh.

Internal.
File.
Fleet.

7928

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC No. 785020

TOP SECRET. 3

SUBJECT: Visit of Field Marshal Sir H.R.L.G.Alexander, G.C.B.

'F' B.L.U., R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref: V/Adj/3.

7 March 45.

To: H.Q.
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Herewith please find six copies of programme (Nos. 13 - 18) of Field Marshall Sir H.R.L.G. Alexander's visit on 12 March 1945.

Capt. R.A.
Staff Captain.

HEH/ah.

External.

File.
Float.

7928


1296

[redacted] 785020

ACC

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[redacted] Patent No. 785020

10000|120|4656 CT A1

DIRECTIVES

July 11, 1944. Aug. 8, 1946

1
135

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC No. 785020

SUBJECT : Training Handbook

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN GENERAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel: 40931 Ext 345)

Q/A.1/1182

8 August 1946

TO : G.C. 12 B.L.U.

Infantry School

Herewith details of Courses as requested.

Serial	Course	Attended by	Duration	Remarks
1	Coy Comdrs	50-60 Offrs	6 weeks	Teaches practically the handling of the Company in the principle operations of war. Lectures and T.E.W.T.S. involving battalion & supporting arms. In addition, other subjects as Interpretation Air photographs, Organisation & Methods of Training, Camouflage etc. are included.
2	Pln Comdrs	50-60 Offs & N.C.Os	6 weeks	Teaches the Junior Officers and Senior N.C.O. Advanced fieldcraft and Battle Drill. A outline of Company Training & Tactics is also given. In addition to subject contained in I.T. vol.VIII which forms the basis of the course, Mine Warfare Use of explosives, Control of Artillery fire by Infantry, W.T. procedure and Map & Airphotograph reading are also taught.
3	Sec. Comdrs	50-60 N.C.Os.	6 weeks	Follows the general lines of Serial 2 but concentrates on field & section leading. The Platoon is the highest formation involved.
4	Pln. Weapons	30 Offs 90 N.C.Os	4 weeks	To produce instructors in Platoon Weapons. In addition to normal & mutual instruction in L.M.G. Rifle, Grenade, T.M.C, Bayonet, 2" Mortar & P.I.A.T. Lectures and demonstrations and practical periods are given on:- Application of Fire, Cooking, Conduct of Range Practices, Elementary Theory, Duties of T.O. & S.M.I.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Serial	Courses	Attended by	Duration	Remarks
5	3" Mortar	36 Off. 36 N.C.Os	9 weeks	Subjects taught include (I) Elementary & Advanced Mortar handling. (II) Wireless procedure. (III) Fire Control & Observation of fire. (IV) Detachment Section & Platoon Battle Drill. (V) Predicted Shooting (VI) Maintenance of Equipment & Ammunition (VII) Outline of the Carriers & Track repairs
6	Sniper	10 Off. 20 N.C.Os	4 weeks	To produce Unit Instructors, Teaches: Use of Sniper Rifles & Telescope. Zeroing. Camouflage & Field-craft. Use of telescope. Observation & Reports. Construction of Sniper Posts. Range Practices day & night.
7	M.M.G.	36 Offrs. 36 N.C.Os	?	Course not yet stabilised owing to change from Vickers to Vrede M.M.G.
8	Carriers P.I. Cadre	10 Off. 20 N.C.Os	4 weeks	To teach driving and Maintenance of Carrier. Syllabus includes Maintenance task System, Mechanical subjects & unit repairs. Documentation & 406 Inspections, Convoy & Cross Country driving. Recovery of vehicles.
9	Cadet Officer	200	4 months?	The programme & policy as regards these two serials has not yet been decided by the Ministry of War.
10	Cadet N.C.O.s	400	2 months	British O.C.T.U. programmes have been submitted but not yet approved. At present these serials used for C.A.F. course instruction.
11	Recruit M.M.G.	400	8 ? weeks	Until the Pamphlet is divided into lessons, it is difficult to accurately estimate the time of training.
12	Recruit 3" Mortar	390	5 weeks	Elementary and advanced handling of 3" Mortar, Maintenance of Equipment & Ammunition. Use of W.T.
13	Recruit Sniper	60	4 weeks	A more elementary version of Instructors Course.
14	Carrier	50	4 weeks	To provide drivers for tracked vehicles of specialist platoons. Students will normally do this course in addition to specialist training.
15	Range Finder	50	4 weeks	At the present not formed owing to shortage of equipment. Selected personnel to be selected from M.M.G. & 3" Mortar Student. 1540

Major H. Staffs
GSO II Trg. & Int. 2

Ma/ma.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS No. 785020

SUBJECT : Training Handbook

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN OVERSEAS MILITARY MISSION
(Tel : AMG081 Ext. 545)

C/A.1/3181

6 August 1946

To : C.C.
12 B.L.U.

Armoured Car School

Reference AS/1/1967 of 26 July 1946.

Herewith Details of Courses as requested.

Serial No.	Course	Attended by	Duration	Remarks
1	Regt. Instr.	25-30 Offs. 40-45 NCOs	2 months	Instruction in Tactics, Gunnery, W.T., Map Reading, Driving, Mechanics & Maintenance of Staghound

Major G.S.O. II
Trg. & Def. Trg.

WLP/ap

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB NO. 785020

12 PERSONNEL LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN OFFICERS MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Appl.: AG9081 MCB:545)

G/A.1/1180.

6 August 1946

SUBJECT : Training handbook

TO : G.C. 12 P.L.U.

Military Police School

Reference AG/1/1967 of 26 July 1946.
Herewith details of courses as requested.

Serial	Course	Attended by	Duration	Remarks
1	Military Police	15 Offrs 75 N.C.O 75 Cd	4 weeks	Object to teach work of Div. Provost. Training in the traffic control, Road Moves, Traffic Accidents, Handing of P.W. Arrest & Military law.

Major H. Sterie
GSO II Trg. & Def. Trg.

WL22/180

Delegassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC No. 785020

SUBJECT: Training Handbook.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : [illegible] Ext 545)

G/L.1/4179

6 August 1946

To: C.C.
12 B.L.U.

Physical Training School

Reference AC/1/1967 of 26 June 1946.

Herewith details of courses as requested.

Serial No.	Course	Attended by	Duration	Remarks.
1	Regt. Instr. Course	100 Offrs N.C.Os.	3 months.	Trg in Basic Tables, Rifle & Log Exercises, Endurance Trg. Leadership, Athletics, Coaching & Org of Meetings, Swimming, Boxing, Agility, Refereeing, Wrestling, Unarmed Combat & Athletic Physiology

Major, R., Asst.
GSO II Trg & Ind. Trg.

WLP/mgt

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel: ROME 478808)

Ref: G/A.1/1145

41

18 June 1946

SUBJECT :- Infantry Training Instruction- Infantry Observation Posts and Counter Mortar Organisation.

To : G.S. Infantry School .
Officer i/c Training,
H.Q. Central Military Schools.

Observation Posts.

While it is the duty of all ranks to observe to the fullest the movement of the enemy, and also for the sub unit commander to set up and man his own observation post, whenever possible an observation post should be set up by the Battalion Intelligence section.

This observation post must be selected so that it is in addition to and does not duplicate the observation post of the Companies.

It must therefore be sighted so that it covers a wide section of the enemy front ,not merely a small section, which would be the task of a sub unit O.P. Moreover care should be taken that the O.P.is used only for the purpose for which it is designed and does not become either a command post or the rendezvous of those who merely wish to have a look at the front.

The sighting of the observation post will be governed by the following considerations.

1. It must have the maximum field of observation of the enemy area combined with the maximum shelter from enemy ground and air observation.
2. It must have a covered line of approach.
3. It must have its own signal communications or be near to a unit signal terminal.
4. The post must have adequate protection.
5. It must be coordinated with other observation posts either Infantry or of other arms to prevent duplication.

The normal type of activity which may be observed are :

1. Progress of enemy constructional work.
2. Enemy routine, times of stand-to, and reliefs.
3. Vehicle movement in rear areas.
4. Location of weapons of all sorts by sound, flash or smoke.

At night in particular the taking of bearings on all flashes is of paramount importance.

Equipment.

A unit observation post should be equipped with the following stores.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNMS 10 285020

Observation Posts.

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3. Vehicle movement in rear areas.
4. Location of weapons of all sorts by sound, flash or smoke.

At night in particular the taking of bearings on all flashes is of paramount importance.

Equipment.

Each O.P. must have the following stores:

1. Binoculars and Compass.
2. Large Scale Map and Panorama of the area.
3. Watch.With second hand if possible.
4. Message Pad.
5. Pointers Staff.
6. A telephone or other means of communication.

150

Routine.

At least two men should be on duty at all times, one to observe, the other to record. Strict orders must be given to prevent the post being located by the enemy. A strict track discipline must be observed and the route to the post clearly indicated.

No lights or smoking or fires of any kind should be permitted.

./.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNCD No. 285020

Form of Report.

Reports should be made as follows:

Time	Observation	Action Taken.
08.15	Enemy Arty. 12 rds H.E. Farm 813272. Number of guns 3 bearing 121.	
09.16	3 vehicles enter copse 819334.	Artillery Informed.

The report should be headed by the following:

Unit.
Location of O.P.
Reference map.
Date.
The report being signed by the responsible N.C.O.
If any deductions are possible from the observations they should be included.

Counter Mortar.

In the British Army a fairly elaborate counter Mortar Organisation has been built up as a result of experience during the war. Even if personnel for this are not allowed on the establishment of Italian Combat Divisions some form of counter mortar organisation should be formed.

As it is the Infantry which is normally most concerned with the opposing enemy mortars, it is largely up to them to supply the information necessary for the location of enemy mortar batteries.

Other than the use of special instruments, the normal means of detection of enemy mortars will be:

1. By intersection of a number of bearings taken on the sound or flash of the enemy weapons.
2. Aerial Photographs.
3. Examination of Craters.
4. Appreciation from map or photographs of likely enemy positions.

It is therefore essential that all ranks are trained in reporting instantly any enemy mortar activity, as the more the intersections that can be obtained the more accurate the fixing of the position is likely to be.

Reports are normally submitted as follows:
A Time of Commencing of shelling.
B Time at which shelling ends.
C Map Reference of Observer.
D Type of shell fired.

Restricted E.S. 12061 Section 1 Para 22 No. 285220

The report should be headed by the following:

Unit.
Location of O.P.
Reference map.
Date.
The report being signed by the responsible M.O.O.
If any deductions are possible from the observations they should be included.

Counter Mortar.

In the British Army a fairly elaborate counter Mortar Organisation has been built up as a result of experience during the war. Even if personnel for this are not allowed on the establishment of Italian Combat Divisions some form of counter mortar organisation should be formed.

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It is therefore essential that all ranks are trained in reporting instantly any enemy mortar activity, as the more the intersections that can be obtained the more accurate the fixing of the position is likely to be.

Reports are normally submitted as follows:
A Time of Commencing of shelling.
B Time at which shelling ends.
C Map Reference of Observer.
D Area being shelled.
E Number and Nature of guns or Mortars.
F Number of Bombs fired.
G Damage done if any.
H Bearing to flash or sound. Stating if grid or Magnetic Bearing.

If the time of flight can also be given it is of use.

The report should be headed as to whether it refers to Bombing Shelling or Mortar Fire.

The Information sent back by the Battalion is collated by the Assistant Counter Mortar Officer at Brigade.

He may be an Infantry Officer Specially appointed, and should have a staff of about 2 clerks, 2 Signal personnel, D.R. and Transport.
The clerks must be capable of plotting on a 1/25000 Artillery Board.

./.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNDB no. 785020

Besides having the normal Infantry Communication, line or W.T. must be arranged to the Artillery Regiment in Support of the Infantry Brigade, to the Operation Room of the Heavy A.A. and to the 4.2. Mortars.
A similar Organisation being set up on a divisional level.

The weapons most effective in dealing with the mortar Will be found to be the /Heavy A.A. gun and the 4.2.Mortar.

In addition to the information received from the Infantry Source, information will be received from interpretation of air photographs, Artillery Observation posts and possibly from prisoners of war.

By tapping every source, the counter mortar organisation should be able to fix at least a number of the enemy locations.

The task of the Counter Mortar Officer at Brigade will mainly be to produce immediate retaliation to enemy fire. That of the division counter mortar officer more deliberate destructive shoots, based on positive identifications.

Major. G.S.O. II
Trg. & Inf. Trg.

Internal
File/
MLW/ap

Restricted 6-9, 1000 Forms 3-600/MMC No. 28020

immediate retaliation to enemy fire. That of the division counter mortar officer more deliberate destructive shoots, based on positive identifications.

Major. G.S.O. II
Trg. & Inf. Trg.

Internal

File

WLP/sp

Declassified E.O. 12065 Review 3-4[illegible] No. 28520

FILE

(40)

SUBJECT :- Battalion Intelligence Section.

12 SCREEN LIAISON UNIT
for the
BRITISH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SCHOOLS
(Tel : NORTH 4/8208)

Ref : G/L.1/1331

4 June 1940

To: Officer i/c Training,
HQ, Central Military Schools.

Reference verbal conversation.

1. It is agreed that the running of Intelligence Courses should not be held at the Infantry School, as this subject is of somewhat of wider interest.

2. It is not considered feasible or desirable to train any other personnel other than the officers and possibly the sergeants of the section, the training of other ranks being a Unit responsibility.

3. The following are the tasks of Unit Intelligence Officers in the British Army.

(a) The organisation of a system of Intelligence within the Unit.

(b) The detailed study of the enemy force opposing the Unit. Strength, morale, dispositions, etc.

(c) The collection of information concerning the progress of the battle on the front and also on the flanks of the Unit.

(d) To study and report on the topography of the enemy area and surrounding country.

(e) To collate, examine and evaluate information obtained from Unit sources, i.e. from observation, patrols, prisoners, and to pass on the information obtained to those concerned.

(f) To obtain and distribute to all concerned, information received from higher authority.

(g) To furnish when required to the Commanding Officer, an appreciation of the enemy capabilities and possible course of action.

(h) To ensure that proper Unit situation maps and intelligence reports are kept and that these are up to date.

(i) To ensure the supply of maps, air photographs and intelligence

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.5(c) NN 785220

Reference verbal conversation.

1. It is agreed that the running of Intelligence Courses should not be held at the Infantry School, as this subject is of economy of wider interest.

2. It is not considered feasible or desirable to train any other personnel o ther than the officers and possibly the sergeants of the section, the training of other ranks being a Unit responsibility.

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(e) To collate, examine and evaluate information obtained from Unit sources, i.e. from observation, patrols, prisoners, and to pass on the information obtained to those concerned.

(f) To obtain and distribute to all concerned, information received from higher authority.

(g) To furnish when required to the Commanding Officer, an appreciation of the enemy capabilities and possible course of action.

(h) To ensure that proper Unit situation maps and intelligence reports are kept and that these are up to date.

(i) To ensure the supply of maps, air photographs and intelligence summaries to the Unit.

(j) To arrange the disposal of prisoners, captured equipments and materials.

(k) To liaise with other arms and Units for the purpose of acquiring information.

(l) To train all ranks, and in particular the Unit Intelligence Section in the acquisition and reporting of information and habits of the enemy.

(m) To assist the Unit security officer in the application and enforcement of security measures.

(n) To make all ranks security minded, and to instruct them in their conduct in the event of capture and in methods of escape.

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5(b) No. 785220

4. The above are the main tasks. In addition in certain operations, the Unit Intelligence Officer may be responsible for the guiding and route finding of the Battalion, again the unit intelligence officer as a Staff Captain of the Battalion Headquarters may on occasions both receive or issue orders on behalf of the Commanding Officer.

The latter might occur, for example, during the advance. The Battalion Commander goes forward with his Intelligence Officer to receive orders from the Brigadier, after receiving orders from the Brigadier he will probably require to make a reconnaissance. To save time, the Intelligence Officer who has been present at the Brigadier's orders can pass on to the Company Commanders, the Battalion Commander's warning order and the plan of the information and probable intention of the Commander. Then the Commander after his reconnaissance, has only to give the actual details of the operation.

5. The probable sources of information to the Intelligence Officer are ground reconnaissance and observation, patrol reports, identifications of and documents from prisoners. Issued, and possibly most important, by liaison with other Units and higher authority and flanking headquarters. As each type of Unit has its intelligence officer to which the Unit Intelligence officer has direct access, he should be able to achieve by visits, an accurate picture of operations.

6. Training.

(1) Officers.

The training of intelligence personnel should be as much decentralised as possible, and provision for the training of reserve personnel must be included. However, the intelligence officer must continually study the various manuals and publications on enemy and allied organisations and equipment. He should as far as possible be capable of speaking the language of the enemy and that of the country in which he is fighting though neither of these are essential on the Unit level. The following are subjects which might be taught as practically as possible.

(1) Principles and organisation of Intelligence.
(2) Nature and of information in the field.
(3) Sources of information in the field.
(4) Recording and distribution of information.
(5) Ground observation and reconnaissance.
(6) Briefing and interrogation of patrols.
(7) Examination, disposal etc of prisoners of war, deserters, civilians etc.
(8) Examination and disposal of captured documents and materials.
(9) Intelligence duties in Unit, regiment, division, and Intelligence duties of other arms.
(10) Army Air Co-operation.
(11) Organisation of own and allied forces.
(12) Tactics, organisation, equipment, uniforms, and tactical signs of enemy forces.
(13) Chemical warfare Intelligence.

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(10) Army Air Co-operation.
(11) Organisation of own and allied forces.
(12) Tactics, organisation, equipment, uniforms, and tactical signs of enemy forces.
(13) Chemical Warfare Intelligence.
(14) Counter Battery and counter mortar organisation, shell and bombing reports.
(15) Appreciations and reports.
(16) Duties of Counter intelligence personnel and Unit security.
(17) Signal Security.
(18) Map reading, sketching and air photograph interpretation.
(19) Enemy and situation maps.
(20) Organisation of Unit intelligence office.

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While it is desirable to avoid the course becoming anything of the 'cloak and dagger' type of course, nevertheless, it is important that the Unit Intelligence Officer should have a good knowledge of the various ways intelligence is gained so that he may never miss opportunities for the collation of information.

...../3.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NND No. 785020

6. Continued.

(15) Training of other ranks of the Intelligence Section should include the following.

(1) General principles of intelligence.
(2) Information required in the field.
(3) Sources of information.
(4) Examination, recording, and transmission of information.
(5) Indications and deductions.
(6) Reconnaissance.
(7) Observation, siting and functioning of O.P's. Liaison with Artillery O.P's.
(8) Report and Message writing.
(9) Military definitions, abbreviations and Conventional signs.
(10) Treatment, examination and disposal of prisoners, deserters and captured documents etc.
(11) Siting, and organisation of Unit collecting point for prisoners.
(12) Organisation for own forces.
(13) Organisation of enemy forces up to a division.
(14) Enemy tactics, weapons, uniforms, tactical signs.
(15) Map reading.
(16) Use of stereoscope and air photographs.
(17) Use of compass and protractor.
(18) Fi eld sketches and Panoramas.
(19) Construction of cloth and sand table models.
(20) Situation maps.
(21) Chemical Warfare intelligence.
(22) Duties of Counter Intelligence personnel.
(23) Office work in the field, Codes, and Ciphers as used.
(24) Divisional Intelligence Organisation.
(25) Boundary Section and operational role of the section.

7. The above subjects are what are taught to British Intelligence Sections. Further details can be given if required.

W. L Pr. c

Major, G(S) II
Trg & Int Trg.
HQ British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

VLL/rmr

Internal.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(a) NS. 285220

(10) Evasion, concentration camps & prisoners escorts and captured documents etc.
(11) Siting, and organisation of unit collecting point for prisoners.
(12) Organisation for own forces.
(13) Organisation of enemy forces up to a division.
(14) Enemy tactics, weapons, uniforms, tactical signs.
(15) Map reading.
(16) Use of stereoscope and air photographs.
(17) Use of compass and protractor.
(18) Fixed obstacles and defences.
(19) Construction of cloth and sand table models.
(20) Situation maps.
(21) Chemical warfare intelligence.
(22) Duties of Counter Intelligence personnel.
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W.L. Price

Major, GSO II
Org & Inf Org.
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/bcs

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Sheet.

145

Public Record Office, 1843 Section Reference No. 285020

Subject:- Instruction : C.A.R.'s.

39

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 478808)

Ref : C/A1/1124
24 May 1945

To:- 'G' Training
M.M.I.A.
RCMG.

As a result of poor reports of the standard of Instruction by N.C.O.'s at C.A.R.'s, particularly in respect of Weapon Training, I have paid particular attention to this matter in the last few weeks. The mistakes of instructors at the old S.I.V.A. and CSSADO will naturally be passed on to the recruits and it is thought that these are the same mistakes observed and unfavourably commented on.

1. Sequence of the lesson.

The directives given in the pamphlets are not being followed faithfully. A bad part of the instruction being when the instructor should demonstrate with squad imitating. The instructor usually gives a demonstration and then exercises squad.

Again, when the book says the instructor should test each man i;e. for aiming or trigger pressing, the instructor calls out the man individually while the remainder of the squad does nothing, as opposed to practising in their own time.

Next in the lesson is the final practise of the complete lesson, and the strengthening and quickening exercise which should always be introduced. This becomes dull repetition as opposed to the lively competitive exercise it should be.

2. Questioning.

The Italian Instructor tends to be far to slow and deliberate when asking questions. Also the art of correcting faults by question is not fully appreciated. If an instructor sees a man make a mistake, while for example loading practise is on, he should attempt to correct the mistake not by going up to the man and physically altering the position of the man, but by a question, the answer to which will correct the mistake; and in 90 % of cases not only the recruit in error but also any other offenders in the squad will have realised and corrected their mistake before the question is answered.

The best way to ensure instructors question properly is to make all instructors write down at least 30 questions from each lesson then

Allied Control Commission Italy No. 285020

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Again, when the book says the instructor should test each man i.e. for aiming or trigger pressing, the instructor calls out the man individually while the remainder of the squad does nothing, as opposed to practising in their own time.

Worst in the lesson is the final practise of the complete lesson, and the strengthening and quickening exercise which should always be introduced. This becomes dull repetition as opposed to the lively competitive exercise it should be.

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The best way to ensure instructors question properly is to make all instructors write down at least 30 questions from each lesson then at least 10 will flash to the mind during the lesson.

Again the British fault of "Now we are going on with lesson 7 pamphlet 8" is only too evident. Often the best introduction to a lesson may be a question.

3. Drill Cartridges.

Instructors read "When the aiming disc is used drill cartridges will not be used". This develops into "for this lesson drill cartridges will not be used" and soon the use of drill cartridges becomes the exception rather than the rule. It must be a rule that drill cartridges are brought on parade for every musketry lesson.

4. Stores.

Instructors are far too casual about ensuring they have all stores, and even more so that the stores are the correct ones.

If the lesson says a figure 5 target the Italians appear to think ant bit of paper will do.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-102/NNDC No. 28220

5. General Presentation of the Lesson.

The Italian Instructor talks too much and does not make the men work. L.M.G. instruction is far better than the rifle, because normally only one man is working at once. This type of instruction tends to be introduced into Rifle Instruction. It must be pointed out that if 10 brens were available for a squad the sequence of training would be that of the rifle which is infinitely superior. Again many instructors try to cover lack of knowledge of the lessons by too much talk and in some cases introduction of material outside the lesson.

Conclusion.

Faults observed are of course not universal but are widespread and are being corrected. It is felt that Senior Officers at C.S.R.'s would do well to check against the pamphlet the rifle instruction in particular.

If however the Italians wish good weapon Training they must pay more attention to the weapon Training wing of the Infantry School.

This at the moment is commanded by a Lt, though a Senior Officer is promised, and is still without proper ranges and facilities as so often requested.

W. Staffs

Major N.Staffs
Comd 12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

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W.L. Price

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/3056 no. 785020

AA & QMG
BAA & QMG
SC "A" & "Q"
DADOT
DADOS
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Records
AA & QMG (Main) rec'd 1.

92 Brit (SE)

SUBJECT : Training Handbook.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C.(MMIA)

TRG/1.

12 April 46.

TO : Distribution below. 1 6 2725

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of Trg Handbook "Italian Army Training and Training Establishments" produced by this HQ reviewing all trg and trg facilities in the Italian Army.

2. Every effort is being made to have copies of maps either printed or photographed, and should this prove possible copies will be forwarded to addressees as soon as available.

Copies of maps showing the location of schools throughout Italy and the layout of the Base Schools will in any case be forwarded shortly.

3. It is suggested that, should it prove impossible to obtain sufficient copies of all maps to allow of full distribution, individual addressees might like to prepare and insert those maps particularly relevant to their interests.

4. Addressees are requested to ack on form of receipt below.

H. Macmillan
for Major-General i/c
M. L. I. A.

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Chief Clerk
2 please send off this week.

21 enclosures

(37)

SUBJECT :- Company Training - Hill Warfare.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 64318/9)

Ref : G/A.1/1084

17 April 1945

To: Officer i/c Training,
Central Military Schools.

O.C., Infantry School.

1. This does not deal with Mountain Warfare requiring specially trained troops or special equipment but deals with fighting in hilly country such as can be taken on by ordinary troops without special equipment and requiring only minor modifications to the normal training.

2. The following points should be noted in preliminary training.

(i) Physical fitness assumes even greater importance than before.

(ii) Troops must be self reliant, and administration and personal hygiene receive increased attention.

(iii) Location of weapons by sound is more difficult in hills and needs plenty of practise.

(iv) Silence in all operations must be stressed.

(v) Conservation of ammunition is of paramount importance, and must be strictly controlled during training.

(vi) Keeping direction and map reading are increasingly more difficult and must therefore be practised more than is usual. Air photographs are probably better than maps and all officers and NCOs must be trained in their use.

(vii) Sniping comes into its own. Company as well as Unit snipers must be trained.

(viii) Men must be trained to keep wider distances between individuals and sub-units. Normally men should work in pairs with wide intervals between pairs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-303/NNSC No. 285020

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(viii) Men must be trained to keep wider distances between individuals and sub-units. Normally men should work in pairs with wide intervals between pairs.

(ix) Operations will take a greatly increased length of time in comparison to the operations in normal country. All Commanders must realise this. In the same way men should be taught to maintain an even pace and the previous emphasis on speed modified.

(x) Patrolling has greatly increased chances of success, and is usually possible by day as well as night. All patrols must b e prepared to fight.

(xi) All ranks must realise the importance of keeping to high ground. Gullies and re-entrants are obvious lines of approach and as such will always be covered by enemy fire and usually mined as well. They should therefore be avoided.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 285020

2. (Continued).

(xii) Special attention must be paid to loads of individuals. This will be dealt with more fully ina later paragraph.

(xiii) A knowledge of semaphore by all ranks is most useful.

3. The attack.

The Company Commander must consider in making his plan :

(i) The probable restriction on the amount of ammunition available.

(ii) The increased amount of time he must allow for the approach and the attack.
He will therefore probably come to the conclusion that a timed fire plan is not practicable.
He will probably carry out his attack in two phases :-

1. The move from the start line to a forming up position as near as possible to the enemy position he is assaulting, and in dead ground to the enemy.

2. The actual assault.

During 1, any supporting fire will be aimed at screening the approach from enemy observation. The signal for supporting fire for the actual assault will normally be given when the Company has prepared and, if necessary, rested in the forming up position.

In planning for the Company assault the Commander in addition to assaulting the highest feature of the hill, should attempt to work L.M.G.s round the flanks and shoulder of the hill to try as far as possible to cover the reverse slopes of the hill. The assault too, should ensure that the feature has in fact been fully cleared.

The fire plan should ensure that reverse slopes are fully engaged. Artillery fire being mainly directed against enemy on forward slopes, Mortar fire against reverse slopes.

Both Anti-tank and Light Anti Aircraft guns, if it is possible to deploy them, will be found to be most effective in the ground role.

In the approach stage, owing to their increased range, MMGs will be most useful in giving covering fire and neutralising the enemy.

Even if tanks are not likely to be encountered it is always worth while bringing one or two PIATs with the assaulting troops, as they are most effective against stone sangars, or steel portable pill-boxes which may be encountered.

4. Consolidation.

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Even if tanks are not likely to be encountered it is always worth while bringing one or two PIATs with the assaulting troops, as they are most effective against stone sangars, or small portable pill-boxes which may be encountered.

4. Consolidation.

It is of great importance that once the assault has gone in that troops consolidate quickly. Only a few men with automatic weapons need remain on the forward slopes, the remainder withdrawing and reorganising on the reverse slope. The Commander must immediately re-organise a reserve in case of an enemy counter attack.

5. Defence. 140

High ground is essential for observation, on the other hand it is usually difficult to defend as fire from Infantry weapons will tend to be plunging fire and fields of fire will be short.

The forward slopes of hills must, however, be covered to protect observation posts.

...../3.


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5. (Continued).

If possible, the Commander should attempt to cover these slopes with fire from a flank, preferably from some sort of defilated position. Mortar and Artillery fire covering the dead ground.

The main Infantry Position should be on the reverse slopes. It is, however, useless to put men there in the event of an attack they cannot use their weapons properly.

The most desirable type of position might be :



A = Forward slope for outpost troops and snipers.

B = Reverse slope for the Infantry localities in depth.

C = Rear forward slope for Supporting Arms (MGs etc)

Y = Rear O.Ps.

D = Reserves, Mortars, etc.


X = Forward O.Ps and main point of defensive fire, if outpost overrun or withdrawn.

Mines will be most useful in channeling enemy attacks.

6. Fieldworks.

The ground is likely to be rocky and therefore sangars (stone or rock emplacements) must be built. Care must be taken that these are sufficiently high and are not skylined. The light lines must be avoided.

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X = Rear O.Ps.

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Mines will be most useful in channeling enemy attacks.

6. Fieldworks.

The ground is likely to be rocky and therefore sangars (stone or rock emplacements) must be built. Care must be taken that these are sufficiently thick and are not obvious. Straight lines must be avoided.

7. Patrolling.

As has been previously stated, this offers every opportunity. Patrols should always work with at least two elements if their objective is offensive.

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(a) An attacking force.

(b) A firm base.

The firm base should contain among other things a number of stretcher bearers. Patrols are likely to penetrate a considerable distance into enemy lines and if men become wounded, considerable difficulty will be encountered in evacuating them.

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Declassified D.O. 1/85 Section 3-4(b)/1985 No. 285020

7. (Continued).

All day patrols should be in touch with battalion H.Q. by wireless, their messages should have priority. Patrols are likely to be able to penetrate to enemy positions and may often discover enemy concentrations or movement out of sight of the normal O.P's. If concentrations of artillery fire can be brought down by the patrol it will be extremely disconcerting to the enemy.

In the same way it is often possible to place an O.P and telephone either directly overlooking, or even behind the enemy forward positions.

8. Administration.

The difficulty of supplying troops by motor transport will be the main problem and mules may have to be used.

Troops should be trained to use any animals or local type of transport which may be met. It is, of course, preferable to have proper equipment but men should be able to improvise saddlery by using blankets, straps from equipment and ropes.

If wanting a long period of animal transport, a battalion will require about 75 mules and a Company 10. No additional personnel will be given to the battalion, the drivers of motor transport, otherwise who must be used. The vehicles being ferried forward.

While again it is desirable for special equipment to be used, i.e. rucksacks Everest Carriers etc, it is not essential. If the large pack is carried on the back and the haversack on the side, sufficient stores can be carried by the rifle company to last 48 hours.

Normally each man would carry :-

Clothing worn. Battle Dress.
Shirt and Underclothes.
Socks and Boots
Anklets Web.
Cap Comforter - Not Steel helmet.

In pack and Haversack.
Gas Cape.
Water Bottle.
Blanket.
48 Hour Ration.
Emergency Rations.
Washing Kit.
1 pair Socks.
1 Housewife.
1 Jersey Pullover.
1 Mess tin, Knife, fork and spoon.
1 small bag +++
1 pair boot laces.
Mosquito cream, Water sterilization tablets.

+++ See Note at the end.

Declassified D.O. 1961 Section 3 (1)(b)(ii) No. 285220

which may be met. It is, of course, preferable to have proper equipment but men should be able to improvise saddlery by using blankets, straps from equipment and ropes.

If working a long period/ animal transport, a Battalion will require about 75 mules and a Company 10. No additional personnel will be given to the Battalion, the drivers of motor transport, storemen etc must be used. The vehicles being forried forward.

While again it is desirable for special equipment to be used, i.e. rucksacks Bivouac Carriers etc, it is not essential. If the large pack is carried on the back and the bivouack on the side, sufficient stores can be carried by the rifle company to last 48 hours.

Normally each man would carry :-

Clothing worn. Battle Dress.
Shirt and Underclothes.
Socks and boots
Anklets W/B.
Cap Comforter - Hat Steel helmet.

In pack and Bivouack.
Gas Cape.
Water Bottle.
Blanket.
48 Hour Ration.
Emergency Rations.
Washing Kit.
1 Pair Socks.
1 Housewife.
1 Jersey Pullover.
1 Mess tin, Knife, fork and spoon.
1 small bag +++
1 pair boot laces.
Mosquito cream, Water sterilization tablets.

+++ See Note at the end.

Each man will then carry in addition his normal scale of arms and ammunition with the exception of such personnel as signallers with 18 or 38 sets, who must split the load between them, one for example carrying the set and spare batteries and the other the clothing for both.

If mules are available, the first priority would be given to the Mortar Platoon and to the Battalion 22 Sets. If, however, they are not, porters must be found to carry the equipment.

In the case of the Mortar Platoon, it is probable that only 4 of the 6 mortars would be taken, however when this reduction means that the majority of men are carrying the weapon and without porters, little ammunition can be carried.

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.....5.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(3)(3) NO. 285020

8. (Continued).

Porters will be found by withdrawing men from the rifle Companies and the gun number from specialist platoons which will not be able to operate in very hilly country, i.e. carrier platoon.

It should be possible to find as many as 106 men for this duty. It is, however, wasteful, and if possible porters should be found from outside sources.

9. Feeding Arrangements.

Reference has already been laid on the importance of men being able to look after themselves. It will rarely be possible for regular hot meals to be brought up and men must be able to cook themselves. As with any other subject, mass time cooking needs organising, as if each man attempts to cook his own ration, he will probably not eat at all. The Section Commander must detail tasks, 1 man to fetch wood, 1 to cook potatoes etc.

10. Packing Facilities.

When a Company is ordered to change from the normal scale of clothing to the man pack basis, the Company 2 i/c vehicle would bring up all the packs. The soldiers will ensure that they start out with clean clothes, any dirty clothing and the remainder of the clothing he is not going to carry will be put in a sandbag, labelled and will return with the 2 tonner to 'B' Echelon.

The Company 2 i/c should arrange that all dirty clothes be washed by the men of the Company left out of battle.

If mess clothing gets wet he will be in a position to send up clean, dry clothing.

NOTE: The sandbag carried is for when the Company actually attacks. The mess heavy equipment can be left at a convenient place to be collected later, and the men carry magazines etc in the sandbag.

It is more of use if a rucksack is being carried rather than the pack and haversack.

The points given are very rough and very little details. If further details are required of loads etc, they can be supplied.

D.L. Price
Major GSO II
Trg & Def Dy
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

WLH/rmw

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(6) NLS No. 2006220

etc.

10. Packing Facilities.

When a Company is ordered to change from the normal scale of clothing to the man pack basis, the Company 3 ton vehicle would bring up all the packs. The soldiers will ensure that they start out with clean clothes, any dirty clothing and the remainder of the clothing he is not going to carry will be put in a sandbag, labelled and will return with the 3 tonner to 'B' Echelon.

The Company 2 i/c should arrange that all dirty clothes be washed by the men of the Company left out of battle.

If more clothing gets wet he will be in a position to send up clean, dry clothing.

NOTE: The sandbag carried is for when the Company actually attacks. The mess heavy equipment can be left at a convenient place to be collected later, and the men carry essential etc in the sandbag.

It is more of use if a rucksack is being carried rather than the pack and haversack.

The points given are very rough and very little detail. If further details are required of loads etc, they can be supplied.

D.L. Price
Major GSO II
Org & Inf Wng
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian General Military Schools

WJH/rsw

Appendix
File.

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Appendix A.G. 1943 Section Archives No. 28e020

File (36)

SUBJECT :- Notes on Company Training - Night Attack.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 66318/9)

Ref : G/L.1/1062

15 April 1946.

To: Officer i/c Training,
Comando Scuole Centrali.

Officer i/c Infantry School.

1. The Company night attack dealt with here concerns the Company when a part of a larger force, and does not deal with the Company Raid.

The attack will probably be made against strong enemy positions. While the attack will probably be silent during the approach to the start line, or with diversionary activity elsewhere, the actual attack will normally be made under full Artillery support in barrage or concentration form.

The higher Commander will already have made all necessary arrangements for ensuring surprise and covering the noise of forming up. Aids to maintaining direction will probably also be provided. These might include 40 mm guns firing tracer to indicate the direction and flanks of the attack or Artillery incendiary and illuminating shells fired into the enemy positions.

Nevertheless, the problem of keeping direction always exists and will be one of the main points to be considered by the Company Commander.

An assembly area or forming up area, and a start line will always be given in the orders. The zero hour for the attack to commence will normally be the time when the troops cross the start line. The start line will normally be some clear feature running parallel to the objective so that assaulting troops may start the attack at 90° to the objective. This may well be a road or track or line of trees. Assaulting troops will not normally stop on the start line, which serves as already explained as a check point for keeping direction and for timing the attack. The start line however, will normally be secured by patrols.

In the rear of the start line will be the forming up position. This should as far as possible be in a dead ground to the enemy.

The battalion intelligence officer is responsible for the guiding of the Companies from the assembly areas to the forming up positions, and the marshalling of troops in the forming up positions. For staff, he has his section but will probably also require to borrow one or two men from each Company. The forming up position should also be taped and clearly marked to ensure the complete absence of confusion. Shaded coloured lights are

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NARS Date 28 OCT 80

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2. Company formations and methods of attack.

It is very difficult to find a suitable formation for a night attack. If men are too widely dispersed they get lost or loose confidence. On the other hand casualties from mines and shell fire will be very heavy if too much emphasis is laid on control. It must be remembered that one of the main reasons for the attack will probably be to enable the sappers to gap a minefield and allow the armour to pass through. The Infantry must therefore adopt a formation which will enable them to cross these minefields with the minimum casualties.


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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS No. 28e32

2. (Continued).

In the opinion of the writer, the best formation is something like this :

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In the diagram above, 'A' represents the Company objective and main enemy position. 'B' is an Anti Tank minefield and 'C' the enemy outpost position covered by anti-personnel minefield at 'D'.

The Company adopts a formation with in front at 'E', a fighting patrol of about a platoon strength. This patrol is led by the best Platoon Officer and contains the best soldiers of the Company.

The armament is as a fighting patrol rather than as a platoon, men being armed with SMG's, Grenades and L.M.Gs. If required, additional weapons can be borrowed from other Units of the Battalion so that the remainder of the Company has its normal armament. The men are lightly clad and carry the minimum of equipment.

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Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) no. 785020

...../3.

2. (Continued).

The task of this party is to clear the enemy outposts and to penetrate as far as possible into the enemy position.

On encountering anti-personnel mines, they will leave a guide or guides to indicate to the remainder of the Company any gaps they may have found or made.

A couple of hundred yards or so behind will come the Company guide party. This consists of a few men for local protection, the Company Commander and 38 set operator, an Officer or NCO with compass and another man to check the distance travelled.

The other two platoons follow as shown in the diagram with the Platoon Commander leading. Section in single file spaced out to the maximum of visibility - i.e., about 10 yards between sections and 5 yards between men.

The L.M.G. number however moves up level with the Section Commander. Each platoon thus being able to fire to the front at least 3 L.M.Gs and 3 T.M.Gs.

During the advance to the objective the Company Commander will watch any signs of enemy resistance and should be able to judge the weak points. If possible, he should attempt to infiltrate through, leaving the mopping up to reserve companies.

If however, heavy resistance is met he will be obliged to alter the formation, which is easily done as his Commanders are readily to hand.


The advantages of this formation are :

(1) The forward body ensures that the few men in the enemy outposts will not disorganise the main body of the Company.

(2) The Company Commander has more control over his Company and can infiltrate better than if he advances with his whole Company deployed.

(3) Obstacles and bottle-necks can be passed with little confusion.

Another way which has been tried is as follows :



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)/NARA, Date 28 Feb 20

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
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
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
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2. (Continued).


This formation should work out as follows. If leading sections are fired on they return fire while flank sections advance, i.e.


A





B





The theory is however, better than the practise and unless the ground is very smooth it is a most difficult formation to keep.

Finally, the Company could adopt the normal deployed formation. This is quite satisfactory except men always tend to bunch in towards the Centre.


3. Once real close contact has been gained control becomes very difficult. It is essential therefore that every man in the Company knows where the objective is and gets there. If he doesn't he should be Court Martialled. If men are allowed to get away with excuses of 'I got lost' or 'I didn't know where the objective was', it is most unfair to the men who have got to their objective.

4. Once the objective has been reached consolidation must be immediate. If daylight breaks and the Company is not dug in, they haven't a chance.

The Company Commander must clear by patrols some distance in front of the objective. If not, he will wake up in the morning to find an 88mm or other bit of unpleasantness dominating his position.

5. A night attack succeeds largely dependent on the supply and

Classified by 1301 Station Staff/RWK as 285020





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5. A night attack success is largely dependant in the morale and confidence of the troops of both sides. While the German and Japanese will creep up silently to the position, once surprise has been lost however, they will shout phrases of English or the language of the troops they are attacking to cause confusion and give the impression of numbers. I.S.)

It can be very disconcerting and a few men firing wildly and shouting to the defence to surrender will have a big effect if the defending troops are not well trained. Also, it heartens the weaker spirited of the attackers if they see and hear that their side is doing well.

On the other hand, if the defence have first class troops, shouting is the quickest way to a coffin. Indian troops attack silently and are very effective. British troops are usually silent, but the Officers and NCOs make a lot of noise.

...../5.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.5(b)(2) NN 285020

5. (Continued).

It is a matter of choice for the Commander, but if you are going to shout all must shout, if silent all must keep silent.

It is exactly the same with the use of tracer at night. A decision must be made judging the morale of the troops.

+++

The first time troops attack at night, tracer and shouting is recommended. If an L.M.G. opens fire and a whole platoon rifles and brens fires tracer back it will usually decide it is not worth firing. Again, at night with shell fire and other noises it is often only the sight of tracer that makes one realise one is being fired at and tracer always appears much worse than it is.

W.L.Price

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WO 204/10285 No. 285220

W.L.Price

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Internal.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5(D) NR 285020

SUBJECT:- Notes on Company Training
& The Company in the attack.

FILE

(35)

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel: ROME 66318/9)

Ref: Q/A.1/1080.

12 Apr 46.

To: Officer i/c Training,
HQ, Central Military Schools.

O.C. Infantry School.

1. The notes on the Company in the advance has already given the types of offensive action which the Company might have to perform in the encounterbattle. The actions it is proposed to describe here deal with the attack where the company forms part of the battalion or brigade attacking, and secondly with the company performing a previously prepared counter attack. In both cases it is presumed that plenty of time for preparation is available.


2. The first case given where the Company attacks as part of a bigger operation will usually offer comparatively little scope to the Company Commander to take an original plan.

The attack is probably supported by artillery, tanks and aircraft. The Company is given a clearly defined objective and is restricted by other units for room and manoevre, and in nearly all cases the attack is a frontal one for the Company even though it may be a flanking movement taken as a whole. It is not therefore proposed to go in any great detail with this type of attack.

There are however one or two points worth considering.

The first is that due to the restriction on manoevre imposed by the complexity of the operation as a whole far too many Company Commanders do not really make a plan but are content to merely deploy their Company and follow up the artillery barrage concentrations.

This is what might be called the ruler method. The Brigade Commander divides the objective into two and allots half to one battalion and half to another, with one battalion in reserve. The battalion commander does the same with his battalion (probably after a few moths in action he has only three rifle companies). The Company Commander sub allots in the same way with the following result



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NARS no. 285220

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
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Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6)(7)(8) NND 785020

This is probably a little exaggerated but is not very much. From personal experience there have been many cases where although from air photographs an enemy platoon position has been clearly located in the attack the dividing line between two companies has passed right through the middle of the enemy locality with resulting confusion.

It will be found that merely deploying a company and walking like sheep behind a barrage is wasteful in men and demoralising to the soldiers.

3. If over printed air photographs are avilable the Company Commander will have plenty of information on which to make a plan. If not he must rely on reconnaissance, reports, and common sense.

He should therefore make his plan by asking himself the following questions.

(a) What have I got against me ?

(b) What weapon and troops have I got at my disposal ?

(c) What is the most efficient way of using these troops to gain the objective ?

If he asks himself these questions he may find and probably will find that the normal company organisation does not provide the best answer. While it is desirable as far as possible to keep the platoon organisation it is not essential and the company may well be formed into a number of battle groups of strength in proportion to the task that they have been set.

As in the platoon battle drill for clearing a pillbox one party is detailed to clear the wire, another to actually assault the pillbox so in the Company attack should definite tasks to special groups be given.

4. The main preoccupation of the company commander in the attack will be the consolidation or as it is more usually called nowadays "re-organisation".

If good information has been received about the enemy, such probably will be the weight of supporting fire that the actual attack will almost certainly be successful. The Company Commander, if he is not a fool, will have lost comparatively few men on reaching the objective.

Once he gets on the objective it is a different matter. If the attack has been made at last light the Commander is comparatively fortunate as he can move his men around under cover of darkness, and by ostentatious patrolling mislead the enemy as to the depth of the attack. If however, the attack is made at first light or by day the Company will get shelled extremely heavily and if proper arrangements have not been made there are likely to be many casualties.

The Company Commander must therefore not put more men on the objective in the first place than is absolutely necessary to capture it. Having captured it he must hold it by fire and have the minimum number of men on the objective, strengthening the number of men when it gets dark.

In the writers opinion any help is better than no help. In the Platoon

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 785020

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
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In the writers opinion any hole is better than no hole. In the Platoon Battle drill great emphasis is placed on getting "Clear of the Objective". This is very well in theory but in practice seldom possible unless under cover of darkness. If the assault pushes much forward it will come under fire from reserve positions. To put a matter of 30 - 40 yards forward and attempt to scratch new holes serves little purpose.

The idea is to attack at least one position beyond what is intended to be held, consolidating on the main objective and withdrawing from the further objective, i.e.,



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB no. 785220

Company 'A' for example attacks and captures ridge 'B' and 'C' passes through, attacks and captures 'A' and withdraws under cover of smoke. The enemy will probably bring down defensive fire on 'A' but during this time Company 'A' has made plenty of time to consolidate.

This method was much advocated at one time in this theatre of operations but was rejected on the grounds that it was bad for the morale of the soldiers to be asked to withdraw from a position they had captured.

This argument is of course not a particularly sensible one as the attack on the furthe objective is in the nature of a raid and if it is explained as such to the troops morale should not be affected.

4. In any case the Company Commander must make full arrangements for the consolidation.

These will include measures to ensure the digging-in in the shortest possible time. The British entrenching tool is almost useless, the German model was much better design but made of poor material.

It will be necessary to carry a number of shovels with the assaulting companies. These can be carried on the back held by the haversack straps. Further supplies will be brought up by the carrier on success with the ammunition.

Many experiments have been made with explosives (beehives and 75 Grenades) to increase the speed with which a company can dig in but without success. It is useful if each man carries a number of empty sandbags.

5. During the attack the company commander should as far as possible move around and control and encourage his men. The second-in-command (acting) should however remain with company headquarters and the wireless set. This should move from bound to bound, observation points to observation points. It is extremely difficult for the 48 set operators to keep up with the company and it is very difficult to pass messages on the move. In addition the artillery officer (FOO) will move in a similar way. A headquarters must act smoothly and without confusion.

In one exercise of MAHURI Division during a company attack the first man on the objective was the company commander followed by his 48 set operator. No good ! Either the company commander must stay back with his wireless or leave the 2 i/c to manage the headquarters.

Provided the company commanders original orders were clear and his 2 i/c is intelligent there is no reason why the company commander and his runner should not move around a little.

6. The counter-attack by reserve company in defensive position.

This allows the company commander far more scope as he will probably have

Declassified N.D. 11/68 Section 3(E)/NARS No. 285020

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Provided the company commanders original orders were clear and his 2 i/c is intelligent there is no reason why the company commander and his runner should not move around a little.

6. The counter-attack by reserve company in defensive position.

This allows the company commander far more scope as he will probably have artillery and mortars under his direct command and will probably have had time to rehearse it.

The counter-attack should go in as far as possible as immediately a position is over-run. The company commander must have everything ready so that a signal is all that is necessary for the attack to begin. The fire plan etc, having been laid on previously.

Counter attacks either fail or are completely successful. There are no partial successes. If successful the prisoners will be numerous and if unsuccessful the killed and wounded proportionally big.

The company commander must make arrangements for this in advance. If a company captures a couple of hundred prisoners and previous arrangements have not been made when the company commander arrives on the objective and starts counting his company he will find that he has only about 50%.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-103/NSC Nr. 285020

The remainder are taking back prisoners.

The Company might be divided into 3 Groups (using as far as possible the platoon organisation but with minor modification)

1) The assault Group
These to be mainly armed with T.M.C's and Grenades.


2) Support Group
The majority of brens and 2" Morters of the Company

3) The Consolidation Group
Rifles, pick and shovels etc.

On the attack taking place the assault group goes in at lightening speed firing from the hip, under covering fire of Support Group(arty etc) allotted to company.

The consolidation group moves as a second wave, picking up empty magazines etc, and mopping up any enemy left.

On success the support group rejoins assault group while the consolidation group dumps tools and ammunition, spare magazines they have been carrying, assembles and removes prisoners, wounded etc and generally clears up battlefield. The consolidation group is responsible for all man handling of stores until such a time as the company has been re-organised on its original basis




Declassified D.O. 11041 Section 3 (E)(3)(b) No. 285220

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= Positions of over-run coy.

= Rear of coy area.

= 2" Mortar Smoke

= Assault Group assaulting

A A A A A A A = Consolidation Group

S = Support Group

= Covered line of approach

H H H = Brens of Carrier Section att to Coy.

D = Original Area of Counter attack Coy.

The above diagram represents a coy area over-run, which must be retaken by "D" Coy. A cover line of approach exist as marked (this may be a gully or dead ground).

No sign of attack is given until assault group and support group are in position carriers have been re-sent to the other flank to give impression counter-attack is coming from that flank.

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On signal for assault, assault group assault at 90 degrees under cover of all available weapons. If properly prepared and rehearsed no weapon need have ranged previously. If artillery and mortar fire is used these should produce a brief but heavy concentration before the assault lifting on to enemy route for reinforcements or withdrawal.(The gunner should not require previous ranging as it will only be a matter of a reduction of hundreds of yards on his normal S.O.S. fire for the over-run company.

Attack Conclusion.

For a successful attack two things are important

(I) A plan to deal with the situation as it is not as it ought to be according to the regulations.

(II) Determination and speed on behalf of the attacking troops. If the men really charge not merely double, fire like mad and look determined no difficulty will be experienced.
Advancing at a dignified walk with the rifle at the "en guard" position may have been excellent at Waterloo but it is the quickest way to ensure a position for the widow.

W.L. Price


Major,
GHI Trg & Inf Trg.
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

Internal.
File.

After Note.

Before the attack starts the Company Commander and Artillery Officer should arrange off the map a number of defensive fire tasks to enable fire to be brought down immediately the objective is taken. These should be given some simple code name

e.g.



Restricted by G.O. 11583 Section 3-4(b)/NARS on 28502

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
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
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e.g.





Probable Enemy forming up area for counter attack.

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* S.O.S.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC No. 785020

FILE

(34)

SUBJECT :- Notes on Company Training.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66318/9)

Ref : G/A.1/1074

8 April 1946.

To: Officer i/c Training.
M2, Central Military School.

Officer i/c
Infantry School.

Attached are a series of Notes on Company Training and Tactics. The Company Tactics are not dealt with in detail in any British Manual and there is considerable variation between individual Units in the ways of dealing with any tactical problem. Any points which are given do not pretend to be official in any way.

The Notes are divided as follows :-

(1) Company Organisation and Training General.

(2) Company as Advance Guard.

(3) Company in the Attack.

(4) Company in Night Attack.

(5) Company in Hill Warfare.

W. L. Price

Major GSO II
Trg & Def Trg
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/rsw

NOTES ON COMPANY TRAINING. 1.

1. Training General.

Operation A

Whilst a fairly rigid battle drill can be taught at a Platoon level, each Company will require a different plan and considerable thought before the Company is committed.

It is not therefore recommended that a great many of these Company Exercises as such are done but rather that the Company Commander should ensure :-

(a) That he has 3 first class platoons and a Company Headquarters which functions smoothly.

(b) That the Commander himself and his second in command know their job and are capable of handling the Company and whatever weapons may be put under command.

(c) That the Company administration is sound.

(d) That there is an efficient battle procedure in the Company.

(e) That the Company is physically fit.

(f) That he has the best Company Sergeant Major in the Battalion.

With regards to (a), having selected three good Platoon Commanders the Company Commander should prepare a training syllabus not a programme with dates by which certain items must have been completed. At these points test exercises or inter-platoon competitions should be set. The detail programme, except for special periods where the whole company may be required i.e. special lecture, drill parades, inspections etc, should be left entirely to the Platoon Commander. The Platoon Commander must be made entirely responsible for the training of his platoon as is the Section Commander for his section. Provided the Platoon Commander produces results he should be allowed to choose his own hours of work and places of parade.

The Company Commander during this stage should help in producing stores, transport and outside assistance for demonstrations etc. He should ensure that fatigues are distributed throughout the company and that there is the minimum outside interference in the training possible.

These interferances are likely to be :

(1) Chaplains and Medical Officers arranging parades during training hours.

(2) Regimental fatigues where double the number of men necessary are asked for.

(3) Leave. The Company Commander should try to arrange for a whole Platoon to go on leave at once rather than for 3 or 4 men from each platoon.

(4) Too many men employed as storemen, room orderlies etc.

(5) Change of training policy and "brain waves" from higher Commanders.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 785020

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(4) Too many men employed as storemen, room orderlies etc.

(5) Change of training policy and "Trade Waves" from higher Commanders.

The Company Commander must make full use of his test exercises and ensure that they are sufficiently fully inspired, to bring out all faults not only of Commanders but also of individuals.

During this time the of Platoon training the Company Commander will be preparing his Company exercises and preparing his headquarters. 1.25 Company Commander during this time must also instruct his staff, i.e. 2 i/c, CSM, MT Corporal, etc. He must ensure that his officers and CSM are fully aware and capable of using W/T correctly, that whatever system of code is in force is fully understood, that the standing orders of the Company are satisfactory and up to date. He should also ensure that vehicle loading trials are held. In war time in particular, the rifle company Commander will continually have to watch this otherwise he will find that individuals collect so much personal kit that the loading of his vehicles is impossible.

...../2.

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The Company exercises are best done after each phase of training rather than all in a block after the platoon training, i.e. after platoons have practiced the attack a Company exercise is done on this subject.

When a Company exercise is done it is essential that a reasonable amount of supporting arms are available, i.e. 3-in Mortars, Carrier Sections etc, that the whole company is on the exercise, the enemy and umpires being provided by another company and that Battalion HQ is always represented by an Officer and a wireless set. If the exercise is done badly it must be done again.

Physical fitness of the company is of the greatest importance. It takes a few hours to teach a man how to fire a 2-in Mortar but it needs at least 3 months to get him physically fit for action. Long route marching is a waste of time (in the opinion of the writer) as it slows mens actions and produces a dull plodding type of soldier. If the company can cover ten miles in 1 hour and 45 minutes with full equipment and ammunition, the commander should be reasonably satisfied. During exercises, ensure that men really do move quickly and not merely amble along day dreaming. Plenty of sharp walk and runs should be included in any Company Training Programme.

Unless the Company has good administration, and administration does not mean piles of paper and unnecessary records, it will never do well in training or action. It is difficult to spend too much time ensuring that everything is going to be ready.

How many times does one see confusion caused in distributing packs at night, because they are not properly marked, not only with the mans name but with his section tally. Also torches that do not work because the battery is flat. How few Officers and NCOs have a complete set of chinagraph pencils and how few know how to fold a map correctly? To name only a few of the many points which require attention.

Administration can best be practiced by surprise exercises in the middle of the night. At maximum efficiency it will take about a quarter of an hour for the men to appear on parade with full ammunition etc, and a further 20 minutes for vehicles to be loaded etc.

Duties of Personnel.

1. Company Commander.

While in theory he is responsible for everything normally he will be responsible for :-

(a) The training of his Company.
(b) The handling of the Company in action.
(c) The discipline of the Company.

2. The Second in Command is responsible for the following to the Company Commander.

(a) The administration of the Company.
(b) The organisation of the transport.

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2. The Second in Command is responsible for the following to the Company Commander.

(a) The administration of the Company.
(b) The supervision of the transport.
(c) The training of reinforcements at 'B' Echelon during action.
(d) The organisation of the rest periods when the Company comes out of the line, and the Welfare side in general.

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3. The Company Sergeant Major is responsible to the Company Commander for :-

(a) The routine and discipline of the company.
(b) The training of Company Headquarters personnel.
(c) The supply of ammunition in the field.
(d) The rendering of returns as required in the field.
(e) The local defence of Company HQ in the field.

...../3.

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4. The Company Quartermaster Sergeant is responsible (under the direction of the 2 i/c)

(a) The pay of the Company.
(b) The supply of rations.
(c) The clothing and equipment of the company.

5. The transport corporal is responsible to the 2 i/c for

(a) The mechanical efficiency of the vehicles.
(b) The training of Company drivers.

6. The Platoon Commanders in general have the same responsibilities towards their platoons as the Company Commander and 2 i/c towards the Company. The platoon sergeant the duties of the Company Sergeant Major, and Company Quartermaster Sergeant.

Chains of Command.

It will be found then that the orders may be issued in any one of the following ways.

For matters of major importance or policy :- Company Commander to his platoon commanders and 2 i/c.

For matters affecting routine and discipline :- C.S.M. to Platoon Sergeants.

For major matters of administration :- 2 i/c to Platoon Commanders.

For minor matters of administration :- CQMS to Platoon Sergeants.

It will be seen that in the British army decentralisation is practiced more than in the Italian Army.

If the Company Commander has picked his sub-ordinates well in action he should not have to bother with anything except the actual conduct of the battle.

Providing the Company Commander keeps his 2i/c fully informed of the situation, intentions and any particular desires he may have, he should have no administration worries whatsoever.

The chain of supply for ammunition is as follows :-

Platoon Sergeant.

Coy Sergeant Major (Coy Reserve)

Regimental (Battalion) Sergeant Major (Battalion Reserve)

Ammunition Point.

Rations :-

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Major, and Company Quartermaster Sergeants.

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Ammunition Point.

Rations :-

Platoon Sergeant. ++

Company Quartermaster Sergeant. ++

Regimental (Battalion) Quartermaster Sergeant ++

Supply Point (Brigade RASC Officer)

Clothing :-

Platoon Commander.

Company 2 i/c

Quartermaster

Brigade Ordnance Warrant Officer.

A.D.O.S. Disp.

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...../4.

NOTE :- ++ While an Officer at each level probably signs the indent vouchers, the work is done by those mentioned.

In the case of clothing the officer must take a more personal interest.

Stationery, Army Forms etc (less maps). The Company Sergeant Major's responsibility. He indents to the Battalion Orderly Room Sergeant.

Maps.

The supply of maps is the responsibility of the Battalion Intelligence Officer.

Organisation of Transport and Vehicle Loads.

Normally transport of the Battalion is divided into three sections, 'P', 'A' and 'B' Echelons.

'P' Echelon is the transport which remains either with the Company or under the direct control of the Commander Commander.

In the case of a Company (British) this would normally consist of the Company Carrier and Jeep. Possibly also a 15-cwt.

'A' Echelon consist of the vehicles with stores most likely to be required for fighting purposes and with the Company this probably would consist of 2 15-cwts.

'A' Echelon will be under command of the Battalion MTO and situated about 4 - 6 miles behind the line. Usually the cooks 3 ton truck will be with 'A' Echelon, but not always.

'B' Echelon trucks contain stores for replenishment and maintenance. They will be under the Quartermaster and are usually in a Brigade area 10 miles or so back from the line.

The loads will of course vary according to operations, and the packing of stores is one of the main problems in the preparatory period the company commander must consider. The weather, the type of operation to be performed, will always mean that the loads of individual vehicles will vary.

However, the following golden rules will apply:-

(1) No junk or personal surplus kit must be carried. The trucks at the disposal of the company are so limited that the Company Commander must decide whether certain items are to be carried. Particularly after a period of rest, much surplus stores will have been collected. If every man collects an extra blanket for example, the loading becomes impossible. Particularly must the kits of officers and NCOs, cooks and storemen be watched. The Company Commander must himself set a good example by carrying the minimum of kit.

This is not to say that only the most war essential stores be

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This is not to say that only the est war scale of stores be carried. It is a poor company which cannot carry a few extra items of comfort and spares. But they must be stores which may be used for the Company in general and not for individuals.

(2) No vehicle should carry all of a particular item, loads must be split amongst vehicles to minimise the effect of a hit on a vehicle.

(3) Italian troops may fire more than British, but normally Commanders tend to carry too much ammunition. Particularly items like PIAT bombs etc. It must be remembered that in some cases food and water or picks and shovels are equally as important as ammunition. It should not be forgotten that an additional 50 rounds of Small Arms Ammunition carried by each man will make little difference to the soldier but will save a lot of weight on the truck.

...../3

Whitehall 6.0. 12555 Section 1-10/7/44 No. 28022

The load of "not to exceed 15-cwt" can for practical purposes be ignored in war time, but the load should not exceed 30 cwt.

(4) The load must be evenly distributed with any additional weight in the front of the vehicle. Officer must check the springs of the vehicle.

(5) All items must be clearly marked and the loading be a model of neatness.

As a general guide, loads will normally be (Rough outline only).

Numbers.	Vehicles.	Loads.
'F'	Jeep ++ / Carrier	Ammunition (Selection) Picks and shovels, Maps, Stationery Box, Stretcher, Spare bulbs and batteries.

NOTE :- ++ British Org only.

'A'	15-cwt.	Ammunition (Selection) Picks and shovels and tools Spare barrels, parts, tripods, reserve magazines. At least a day's dry rations and Water. Oil and cleaning materials.
'A'	15-cwt	Remainder of ammunition. Blankets (1 per man) Camouflage Nets. Anti Gas stores. Hurricane Lamps Spare signal batteries etc.
'A' or 'B'	3 Ton Docks.	Filled Packs and Greatcoats of Company. Cooking utensils. Rations - 2 days. Water. 5 x 18C pdr tents.
'B'	15-cwt	Bivouac Tents for company. Spare Office Equipment. Shoemaker kits etc.

Public Record Office Reference No. WO 171/1061 Section 1-1st/48th Bn.

28522

Spare Packs and Battalion.

NOTE :- ↔ British Org only.

'A'	15-cwt.	Ammunition (selection) Picks and shovels and tools Spare barrels, parts, tripods, reserve magazines. At least a day's dry rations and Water. Oil and cleaning materials.
'A'	15-cwt	Remainder of ammunition. Blankets (1 per man) Camouflage Nets. Anti Gas stores. Harricane Lamps Spare signal batteries etc.
'A' or 'B'	3 Ton Lorry.	Kitbag Packs and Greatcoats of Company. Cooking utensils. Rations - 2 days. Water. 5 x 160 pdr tents.
'B'	15-cwt	Riveting Tents for company. Spare Office Equipment. Shoemaker kits etc.
"		

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)(NARA) By _____ NLS 85-220

F.L.E.

(33)

SUBJECT :- The Company in Advance.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY MISSION
(Tel : ROME 663(B/))

Ref : B/A.1/1076

11 April 1946.

To: Officer i/c Training,
HQ, Central Military Schools.

C.O. Infantry School.

1. Normally, in flat country with plenty of roads etc, it would be rare to find a Rifle Company leading the advance. Normally this would be the task of the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment or to a mixed force with a portion of Motried Infantry.

2. However in broken, hilly country, with few roads (and those mined) against a retreating enemy, it will be quite common to find an Infantry Company leading the advance, either along the main axis or infiltrating along a subsidiary route.

3. The country, it may be reasonable to suppose will offer a considerable amount of cover and will not be strongly held. An example might be the GIULIANI country or the ground between PESCANTINA and the GARDA LAKE. On the other hand it is not impossible that vehicles will not be able to keep up with the leading company and the Commander must rely on his wireless communications for support. This does not deal with a mixed force where the Infantry commander might have tanks etc in support.

4. The Company Commander, however, will probably have an Artillery Forward Observation Officer (FOO) and a 3-in Mortar representative with him. Probably also an Engineer (Artisan) representative and a small party (sub section) of some Unit Pioneers.

None of these are essential and might even be called unnecessary provided the Infantry Officers can really use wireless efficiently and control fire properly.

5. The Infantry Commander is advised at all times to have a 2 i/c at Company Headquarters. The proper 2 i/c will, of course, be at rear echelon, and this means that the Senior Platoon Commander must be withdrawn and his Platoon commanded by a Sergeant.

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6. The advance might be as follows :-



(1) Leading Section.

Gap

Platoon "C" Group.

2 Section.

Platoon H.Q.

3 Section.

Gap "C" Group.

2 Platoon.

3 Platoon.

Coy HQ followed by Transport.

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47. The distances between units will depend on the nature of the country but as far as possible the distance between the leading section and the Platoon 'O' Group will be such that the Platoon Commander will be able to observe the leading section but at the same time will not be affected by any small arms fire aimed at the leading section. Similarly the Company 'O' Group should be able to watch the leading platoon while not becoming involved themselves.

8. In very close country it may be advisable for the Company 'O' Group to be protected by a section of 2 Platoon.

9. In the advance, the AS or 18 set should be with the Company Commander and not with Company H.Q. (an exception to the normal rule) unless he leaves the Company for orders. The Company despatch rider, if any, will move with the Company H.Q.

10. Any transport should move behind the Company in bounds.

11. The Company Commander must continually report progress and send back information whether negative or not.

<u>On Encountering the enemy.</u>

1. While in training the leading platoon should be encouraged to attempt to fight its way forward. The Company Commander must remember the enemy is unlikely to put out posts merely to be mopped up by the first section that comes along.

He should therefore apply the golden rule :

(a) Multiply the number of men seen or reported to have been seen by five.

(b) Double the account of L.M.Gs which have fired.

Thus, if 3 men and 2 L.M.Gs have fired, the plan should assume that there are 15 men and 4 L.M.G's.

It is much better to waste a little time and be certain of success than to commit sub-units hastily and with little chance of success.

2. If the leading platoon has little chance of success in an attack of its own, the Company Commander will order it to stop, either over the 38 set, by signal, or verbally.

In many cases it may be found that the leading platoon is already in difficulties, particularly if the enemy have been well concealed and held their fire. For this reason the Company Commander must always be ready to bring down supporting fire from Artillery or his own weapons. If his own troops are very close to the enemy he must use smoke, if a reasonable distance from the enemy he may use H.E. If an Artillery Officer is present, on this type of occasion he should be discouraged at attempting to produce great accuracy i.e. lengthy ranging. A few shells in the general area usually have the desired effect.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-401/NNSC No. 285020

10. Any transport should move behind the Company in bounds.

11. The Company Commander must continually report progress and send back information whether negative or not.

On Encountering the enemy.

1. While in training the leading platoon should be encouraged to attempt to fight its way forward. The Company Commander must remember the enemy is unlikely to put out posts merely to be mopped up by the first section that comes along.

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Thus, if 3 men and 2 L.M.Gs have fired, the plan should assume that there are 15 men and 4 L.M.G's.

It is much better to waste a little time and be certain of success than to commit sub-units hastily and with little chance of success.

2. If the leading platoon has little chance of success in an attack of its own, the Company Commander will order it to stay, either over the 38 set, by signal, or verbally.

In many cases it may be found that the leading platoon is already in difficulties, particularly if the enemy have been well concealed and hold their fire. For this reason the Company Commander must always be ready to bring down supporting fire from Artillery or his own weapons. If his own troops are very close to the enemy he must use smoke, if a reasonable distance from the enemy he may use H.E. If an Artillery Officer is present, on this type of occasion he should be discouraged at attempting to produce great accuracy i.e. lengthy ranging. A few shells in the general area usually have the desired effect.

3. If told to stop, this does not mean that the Platoon Commander of the leading platoon should do nothing. He will realise he is likely to be the first platoon in the Company Commander's plan. He must therefore select the most suitable fire positions for his platoon, attempt to estimate accurately the enemy positions.

If possible, he should attempt to make the enemy believe he has withdrawn or is manoeuvring to a flank. Above all, he should not just sit down and fire back. Swipe by all means, but the futile firing so often seen on NIVA exercises by the fire platoon only draws mortar or artillery fire.

The aim should be silence, broken only by the occasional shot from the time first contact has been broken, until the torrent of fire which should cover the final assault.

...../3.

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.5(c)/NNSA By: [illegible] NO. 2850220

4. The Company Commander should if necessary make a reconnaissance of the ground with his 'H' Group (i.e. probably with his Gunners and 3-in Mortar Commanders).

The following points other than the normal selection of covered lines of approach should be borne in mind.

(a) If he used Artillery and 3-in Mortar fire on the objective, both must range first. Artillery fire attracts counter fire and probably gives away the time for the final assault.

(b) It is probable that he has not located all the enemy positions. If he puts everything on the located positions he has nothing left in the event of an emergency.

(c) The fire of a Company is considerable and usually sufficient if every weapon is used in the final assault. Moreover it can be used right up to the last moment.

5. It is therefore suggested that the Artillery and Mortar fire is used as far as possible to seal off the area to be attacked and against suspected supporting positions, provided there is reasonable ground for Infantry manoeuvre.

If the ground is very open the fire must probably be aimed at the objective. In this case the Artillery and Mortar Commanders must attempt as far as possible to screen their purpose during the ranging.


6. As soon as the recce group has formed a plan the supporting Commanders should be released to give out their own orders and get on with any ranging necessary.

7. The Company can attack either frontally, from a flank or in a pincer movement. Normally in training the flank attack should be encouraged but in practice the attack is likely to be more a combination of frontal and flank.

8. The Pincer Movement.

This is almost impossible to control properly but might occasionally be used, as the ground, if suitable is probably the most disconcerting method from the enemy point of view, on the other hand it is extremely hard to time properly and very easy to have both assaulting parties shoot each other up.

Diagrammatic Plan.



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(a) No. 285020

be used right up to the last moment.

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
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Diagrammatic Plan.



.....fm

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6) NO. 285220

4. Continued.


As will be seen if 2 and 3 Platoons are to assault at the same time, great care will have to be taken that they do not shoot each other up.

It will also be noted that a lane with the diagram has been left to give close covering fire for each platoon. It might be necessary for Platoon also to leave a lane to watch their flanks.

1 Platoon, the five platoon, would move up with Company H.Q. on success signal.

All 2-in Mortar would probably be controlled with Company H.Q. under the Company Sergeant Major.
1 Platoon would have the task of 'Mopping Up'.
The 2 i/c should go with the Platoon which has the longest way to go and should give the signal for the start of the attack. The Company Commander in this case must remain at Company H.Q.


Flank Attack.



In this case it is decided that the right flank offers a reasonable line of approach but it is considered that there might be another easy part at 'A'.

Classified R.O. 13681 Section 3-403/Form 10. 285020

In this case must remain at Company H.Q.



In this case it is decided that the right flank offers a reasonable line of approach but it is considered that there might be another enemy post at 'A'.
2 Platoon is therefore sent first to cover 'A' and provide a secure for 3 Platoon to assault. 3 Platoon leaves an L.M.G. or 2 L.M.Gs at 'B' and assaults as in the diagram. 2 Platoon then follows as a second wave assault. 117

this
2-in Mortar of 2 Platoon goes with the Platoon in/case. The other mortars again can either be centralised or left with the platoons.


In some cases it will not be necessary for the whole of 2 Platoon to move to the flank but only the Bren Groups. The remaining riflemen making up the assault platoon.

If it is at all possible it is always desirable for an L.M.G. to work to such a position that it can cover any withdrawal made by the enemy.

...../5.

INITIAL ATTACK - 1st STAGE.

Approved for Release by NARA on 11-25-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526, Declassification Review by NSA/CSS Policy 1-52
NR. 285020



116

II II = 3" MORTAR

↕ - BREN GROUPS PL (1)

✱ - SMOKE 3" MORTAR

↕ - BREN GROUPS 2 PL


V - 2" MORTARS UNDER CSM

COVER


II II

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6) NO. 785020


FRONTAL ATTACK STAGE



28520



Classified S.D. 12065 Section 3-403/4008 By: 285220





II II


. . . . = RIFLEMEN
2 + 3 PLS


0 0 0 0 = RIFLEMEN
1 PL

✱ = HE 3" MORTAR

In the preceeding diagrams it is imagined that the enemy is on a ridge with an intervening small hill or fold in the ground which once reached, affords a certain amount of cover.

In all examples given section and platoon formations will be such as to suit the ground.





= = = = = RIFLEMEN
1 + 3 PLS

o o o o o RIFLEMEN
1 PL

⁂ = HE 3" MORTAR

In the preceding diagrams it is imagined that the enemy is on a ridge with an intervening small hill or fold in the ground which once reached, affords a certain amount of cover.

In all examples given section and platoon formations will be such as to suit the ground.

Artillery fire has not been shown in diagrams but will be used in accordance with points given.

Once the attack has gone in the Company should re-organise as quickly as possible and continue the advance.

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

MJ2/sas

Internal. File.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

FILE (32)

SUBJECT :- Training Policy.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66318-9)

Ref : G/3.1/1060

27 March 1946.

To: Officer i/c Training,
HQ, Central Military Schools.

Officer i/c,
Infantry School.

1. As a result of observation of training of over a year, there would appear to be something wrong with the methods of training or that too much effort is being made to making the training interesting and too little concentration on discipline and leadership on the part of Junior Officers and NCOs.

The following show that something is wrong with the methods employed at the moment.

(i) Though this is a School and is supposed to teach students how to maintain their arms, the recent armament inspection has revealed that weapons of the Centre are in a deplorable state. This, of course, does not apply merely to the Infantry School, as in fact nor do the general remarks of this letter.

(ii) Fatigue parties under NCOs work well only when an Officer appears on the scene, and not always then. With the result that the tasks take 5 times as long as they should.

(iii) While on a visit from a Senior Officer, or General, the standard of guards and turn-out is fairly good, but on normal days it is quite the reverse. Again, while exercises may be well carried out, the moment it is over they struggle back to billets, few Officers or NCOs attempt to do anything about it. The result is that a false impression of the standard required is given to the student.

2. The following remedies are suggested.

(a) That every effort is made to inculcate a sense of responsibility

Classified F.O. 1060 Section 3 (2) (b) (ii) dated 28/5/20

Officer I/c,
Infantry School.

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2. The following remedies are suggested.

(a) That every effort is made to inculcate a sense of responsibility in young Officers and NCOs. At present when an Officer has pointed out to him that a man is improperly dressed he will reply "Yes, I know, but he is not in my Company". 113

(b) That every man in the Centre should appear at a Master Parade every day and if possible, undergo some instruction. Far too many men hold jobs where they are left entirely to their own devices. Officers employed on 'Q' appointments should ensure that their soldiers are the smartest and most efficient in the Centre. No man should hold an employed job unless he is a fully trained soldier.

(c) If an NCO places a soldier in arrest, the case must be dealt with without delay.

...../Page 2.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.5(c)/NNDB no. 785020

(d) There are many soldiers who have been too long at CESMAC and who should be changed with young soldiers from the new intakes on completion of their training.

(e) That more inter-unit competitions be run, a shield or cup being competed for monthly, for the smartest company for example.

(f) If an Officer, NCO or man does something above average, he should stand to gain for his efforts. At the moment it probably pays better to do nothing.

(g) Command and management of men by students must be given top priority in estimating their reports, not only their ability on instruction, but as far as possible out of working hours.

(h) That Saturday mornings, except in the case of Officers students be devoted entirely to drill parades, cleaning of arms and inspections by Commanders. There is no particular hurry about courses in peacetime, and 1 day a week "lost instruction" can be made up by increasing the length of the course.

(i) It is essential that adequate leave periods are given between courses, and that the efforts to improve internal discipline as well as the standard of instruction be made during these intervals.

W.L. Price

Major GSO II
Trg & Inf Trg
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/rw

Internal.

File.
Fleet.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3(E)(2)(B) NR. 285220

(h) That Saturday mornings, except in the case of Officers students be devoted entirely to drill parades, cleaning of areas and inspections by Commanders. There is no particular hurry about courses in peacetime, and 1 day a week "lost instruction" can be made up by increasing the length of the course.

(i) It is essential that adequate leave periods are given between courses, and that the efforts to improve internal discipline as well as the standard of instruction be made during these intervals.

W.L Price

Major GSO II
Trg & Inf Trg
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/rcw

Internal.

File.
Fleet.

112

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT :- Notes on the Military Police School.

(31)

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : G/B.1/1053

22 March 1946.

To: 'G' Trg,
Land Forces Sub Comm AC (NMIA).

(A) Policy.

The Police School caters for the Carabinieri of Combat Divisions principly, teaching the normal duties which may fall to the Divisional CMP. In addition the School is prepared, if necessary, to run courses for Regimental Police and DAPMs.

(B) (i) English Designation :-

"The Military Police School".

Italian Designation :-

"Scuola Polizia Militare".

(ii) The School is located at CESANO do ROMA 61706.

(iii) The War Establishment is 3 Officers, 12 NCOs and 18 ORs.

(iv) See Main Plan.

(v) NIL.

(C) (i) Syllabus,

The following subjects are taught, duration 4 weeks.

(1) Drill (½ hour daily).
(2) P.T. " " "
(3) Map Reading.
(4) Highway Code.
(5) Traffic Signals.
(6) Route Signing.
(7) Route Reconnaissance.
(8) Sector Control.
(9) Control of Work Tickets.
(10) Vehicle Parking.
(11) Vehicle Markings.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5(D)(2) NR. 285020

(A) Policy.

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(B) (i) English Designation :-

"The Military Police School".

Italian Designation :-

"Scuola Polizia Militare".

(ii) The School is located at CESANO de ROMA 61786.

(iii) The War Establishment is 3 Officers, 12 NCOs and 18 ORs.

(iv) See Main Plan.

(v) NIL.

(C) (i) Syllabus.

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(1) Drill (½ hour daily).
(2) P.T. " " "
(3) Map Reading.
(4) Highway Code.
(5) Traffic Signals.
(6) Route Signing.
(7) Route Reconnaissance.
(8) Sector Control.
(9) Control of Work Tickets.
(10) Vehicle Parking.
(11) Vehicle Markings.
(12) Bridge Classifications.
(13) Traffic Accidents.
(14) Handling of POWs.
(15) Military Law.
(16) Weapon Training.

111

(ii) Total number to be catered for 150, but usually 100 NCOs and men.

(iii) Depends on the number of special courses required (i.e. DAPM etc) normally 8 courses a year.

...../Page 2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

(D) The Police School provides a form of refresher course and much needed 'smartening up' of students. It does not attempt to teach all the various phases of Carabinieri training, i.e. Investigations etc.

The Police School accommodation has recently been improved by the addition of part of the disbanded Hospital. It is however, not an ideal site for a School as other duties still tend to be given the police by H.Q. Central Military Schools.

W.L. Price

Major G3C II
Trg & Inf Trg
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

WLP/rew

Internals

File.
Float.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NND No. 785020

W.L. Pace

Major G3C II
Trg & Inf Trg
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools

WLP/raw

Internal.

File. ✓
Float.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(5)(D) NO. 285020

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
Ufficio Operazioni e Addestramento
Sez. Addestramento

30

^^^^^^^^^^

nº1460/R/3 di prot. add. Roma, li 8 marzo 1946
OGGETTO: Addestramento personale collegamenti.-

....indirizzi omessi.....

1.- Si concorda sulle durata dei corsi per gli specializzati delle trasmissioni reggimentali della fanteria e dell'artiglieria, che viene ad essere stabilita in tre mesi, da effettuarsi alla Scuola genio collegamenti subito dopo l'addestramento preliminare ai C.A.R.

2.- I calcoli degli specializzati dei collegamenti del genio sono stati fatti:

- sugli organici in vigore al momento in cui é stato preso in considerazione l'addestramento presso le scuole, organici ora in rielaborazione;
- per dare al Comando Scuole Centrali un orientamento, sia pure approssimativo, della consistenza del personale da addestrare;
- col proposito, espresso nel foglio nº4463/R/4 del 31 dicembre 1945, di inviare alla scuola tutto il contingente, e di destinare alla specializzazione le reclute più dionee, riservando ai servizi del genio quelle meno idonee.

Non si crede vi siano difficoltà a diminuire, se sarà opportuno, il numero delle reclute che é stato previsto siano avviate alla scuola: offrirebbe maggiore difficoltà aumentarlo.-

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
f°G.Liuzzi

COMANDO SCUOLE CENTRALI MILITARI
Ufficio Addestramento

Ba/ma

nº01X832/genio di prot. Cesano di Roma, li 18 marzo 1946

AS & QMG
DAA & QMG
SC-A & C

AL COMANDO SCUOLA COLLEGAMENTI -CECCHIGNOLA-
L 12° R.L.U. - S E D E -
(rif.f.G/A.I/991 del 14/2/946)

Archivio Centrale dello Stato - Fondo Ministero della Difesa - Esercito - busta 285020

nº1480/R/3 di prot. Sud.
OGGETTO: Addestramento personale collegamenti.-

....inidrizzi omessi.....

1.- Si concorda sulla durata dei corsi per gli specializzati delle trasmissioni reggimentali della fanteria e dell'artiglieria, che viene ad essere stabilita in tre mesi, da effettuarsi alla Scuola genio collegamenti subito dopo l'addestramento preliminare ai C.A.R.

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f°G.Liuzzi

COMANDO SCUOLE CENTRALI MILITARI
Ufficio Addestramento

BA/ma

Cesano di Roma, li 18 marzo 1946

nº01I832/genio di prot.

AL COMANDO SCUOLA COLLEGAMENTI -CECCHIGNOLA-
- - - -

SUBJECT :- Notes on Bayonet Training.

29

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : C/L.1/1031

6 March 1946.

To: Officer i/c Training,
Central Military Schools.

Copy to: C.O.,
Infantry School.

1. The attached copy of additional lessons on Bayonet Training, taken from a recent British Publication is forwarded for information and possible adoption.

2. The value of bayonet training is often debated but there is no doubt that it is of value if only for the physical exercise it provides and the extra practice it gives in the handling of the rifle, thus improving shooting.

3. The bayonet, when employed in war, is nearly always used in conditions of restricted visibility, i.e. in Jungle country, street fighting or at night or in conditions of fog or smoke. Therefore, except in the most elementary lessons, training should be carried out in similar circumstances.

4. It is suggested that valuable training can be got from exercises as in stage III particularly if the bullet as well as the bayonet is employed. If a disused house can be found, excellent practice in use of the bullet and bayonet can be achieved in the same way, particularly if the house is in half-darkness or partially filled with smoke.

W L Pace

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/mcr

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-101/NSC No. 285220

Copy to: G.O.,
Infantry School.

1. The attached copy of additional lessons on Bayonet Training, taken from a recent British Publication is forwarded for information and possible adoption.

2. The value of bayonet training is often debated but there is no doubt that it is of value if only for the physical exercise it provides and the extra practice it gives in the handling of the rifle, thus improving shooting.

3. The bayonet, when employed in war, is nearly always used in conditions of restricted visibility, i.e. in Jungle country, street fighting or at night or in conditions of fog or smoke. Therefore, except in the most elementary lessons, training should be carried out in similar circumstances.

4. It is suggested that valuable training can be got from exercises as in stage III particularly if the bullet as well as the bayonet is employed. If a disused house can be found, excellent practise in use of the bullet and bayonet can be achieved in the same way, particularly if the house is in half-darkness or partially filled with smoke.

W. L. Pace
Major G.S.O. II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/mcw

Internal.

File.

Fleet.

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Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3 (E)(2)(B) No. 285220

ADVANCED BAYONET TRAINING.

Exercise for Developing "Split Second" Action and Alertness.

Stage I.

Object - To practice men in the split-second engagement of an enemy at ground level, i.e. in shell holes, fox holes, slit trenches etc.

Method - Have about eight bayonet ground sacks in a rough circle or rectangle at varying distances from the student. The student at the commencement of the exercise will be in the centre facing any direction. Each sack to have a 12-in circle painted on it. Inside the circle is painted the figures 1 to 8 consecutively. Each sack has therefore its own number.

Conducting - The Instructor orders any number, viz: "EIGHT". On this command the student runs home the bayonet in any normal or unorthodox manner he chooses. He is not allowed to :-

(a) change direction before making his point;

(b) obtain direction before making his point;

(c) Pause to consider where the number is.

His next number is rapidly ordered as he is in the act of withdrawing from the numbered sack previously ordered.

Scoring (for competition purposes). - For each point which, in the Instructor's opinion, would have caused penetration, two points within the 12-in circle and one point on remainder of the ground sack.

Points to Note:

(1) The numbers 1 to 8 should, in the elementary stages, run consecutively round the circle. They can be varied, i.e., intermixed, later as progress is made.

(2) Men rapidly become good at points to the left or left rear. Points to the right are much more difficult. More training is therefore necessary in this direction.

(3) The speed obtained even in the early stages is too quick to be measured even with a stop watch.

Stage II.

Object - As for Stage I except at waist (approx) level, i.e., enemy coming from behind trees, hidden in and behind bushes etc.

Method - Reconnaitre in close country a group of about eight small trees and/or large bushes with a gap (large enough for one man with a rifle and bayonet) in centre.

Site the same eight numbered ground sacks at about waist or chest height.

Fix the sacks in position by tying to the slender trunks lower branches [illegible] if not available, then strong cord. The sacks

Declassified I.A.W. 1998 Section 3(4)(b) WO. 285/22

be disclosed. He is now allowed to :-

(a) change direction before making his point;

(b) obtain direction before making his point;

(c) Pause to consider where the number is.

His next number is rapidly ordered as he is in the act of withdrawing from the numbered sack previously ordered.

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Site the same eight numbered ground sacks at about waist or chest height.

Fix the sacks in position by tying to the slender trunks lower branches etc, using wire, or if not available, then strong cord. The sacks should be at irregular intervals and at varying heights.

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Conducting - As for Stage I.

Scoring - As for Stage I.

Points to Note:

(1) As for 1 and 2 in Stage I.

(2) Much smaller sacks than those issued as ground sacks should be used.

(3) Siting the sacks is important for the success of this stage. They should be positioned to represent an enemy only half seen behind a tree or behind a bush (so that the student has to lunge right through the bush) or enemy hiding in lower branches etc.

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Points to Note (Cont'd)

(4) Position student so that there are lower branches forming an obstruction in certain directions. This prevents him from simply swinging his bayonet round in the direction of the enemy. By this means he is compelled on occasions to swing his rifle in a contrary direction to that in which he eventually makes his point.

Stage III.

Object - To exercise men ON HIS MOVE in "split-second" engagement of enemy suddenly located, i.e. in emergency.

Method - Reconnoitre a "line of advance" through wooded, gorse and shrub covered country which would, if possible, be interspersed with shell holes, trenches, sunken roads and other ordinary obstacles.

Lay tracing tape from start to finish of "line of advance" selected.

Site the same eight or more numbered ground sacks at different points along the route.

Conducting - Student is ordered to advance at reasonable brisk walk along the tracing tape. He is told that he must engage with a bayonet any enemy he encounters. That these may be in front or behind him, to right or left, or even up (in trees) or down (in slit trenches etc).

Scoring - As for Stages I and II.

Points to Note.

(1) As for 2 in stage I.

(2) The sacks should be varied in size according to the target it is intended to represent, e.g. small Jap in bottom of a trench, large Hun resting behind a bush.

(3) Siting the sacks is of paramount importance. Examples of their possible positioning are :-

(a) In and on the near side of a trench so that the student cannot see it until he has jumped, or is jumping, the trench.

(b) Beyond an impenetrable large bush or hedgerow. The student has to decide in a flash whether to go around the bush or through an easily spotted large gap in the hedgerow at lightning speed.

(c) As the student comes on to high ground have a sack sited below in such a position that the student must jump over a wire obstacle or crash through a bush on to his opponent, pointing as he goes.

(4) Progression in this stage can be obtained by having the exercise done :-

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(4) Progression in this stage can be obtained by having the exercise done :-

(a) At the walk.

(b) At a steady double.

(c) At half speed.

(d) At (a) or (c) above whilst passing through a smoke screen.

(e) In failing light (dusk) and/or first light (dawn).

(5) In this stage the direction of the "line of advance" and the position of the sacks should be constantly changed.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

12 Bde (3)

(28)

SUBJECT: Training

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MMIA)
TRG/1

Mar 46

TO : List 'B'

Reference this HQ letter TRG/1 of 4 Mar 46.

1. The excerpts referred to in para 1 of the above mentioned letter were taken from the recently issued British Army Publication "The Principles of Training", of which you have had a copy.

2. Typed copies were made of this publication, excluding those portions of no interest or inapplicable to the Italian Army.

WIX/cll

for Major-General,
LMIA.

AA & QMG
DAA & QMG
SC "A" & "Q"
DADT
DADOS
DADST
PRO

7 MAR 1946 | File R.1

2025

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SUBJECT: Routine Annual Training

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MCIA)

TRG/1
4 MAR 46

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. I forward herewith excerpts from a publication recently received from the U.K. on the Principles of Training in the hope that it may be of interest to the Italian Army.

2. It is the British practice to make the training of the Army follow an annual cycle starting with the training of the instructors required for the current year and culminating in collective training of all arms in unit and formation exercises during the summer months.

The object of this letter is two-fold:-

PART 'A': To give a general resume of the annual training cycle as operated in the British and Dominion Armies;

PART 'B': To show how this system could be applied to the ITALIAN Army with special reference to the needs of the present year 1946/7.

3. Both have been written largely to stress the Infantry aspect of training but the principles are equally applicable to all other arms of the service. The methods by which the different types of training, referred to in the following paragraphs, are carried out are described in considerable detail in the publication attached.

4. It may be thought that an annual cycle of training is unsuitable for an Army into which conscript recruits are fed at four monthly intervals: it is suggested, however, that this is not so for the following reasons:-

(a) The climatic conditions, particularly in the North of ITALY where the majority of the active Army will be stationed, makes it undesirable to carry out Collective Training during the winter months.

(b) Collective training has three main objects, shown here in their order of importance:

(i) Practicing senior officers and staffs in the handling of formations and their maintenance in the field;
(ii) The training and exercising of the leaders of all grades
(iii) The exercising of the troops and specialists.

(c) Provided therefore that the conscript recruits are fully trained in their weapons and basic battle drills they can be fitted in to the training cycle at any stage of its progress without detriment to the formation training and with benefit to themselves.

PART 'A'

1. In the BRITISH system Annual Training is considered under four headings:-

(a) Training of officers and NCOs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)(NARS) NR. 285020

exercises during the summer months.

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.....

PART 'A'

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(a) Training of officers and NCOs.
(b) Cadre training of battalion and company instructors
(c) Individual training of all ranks
(d) Collective training

2. (a) Training of officers and NCOs

(i) A unit whose officers and NCOs are untrained and unfit to train others can never be an efficient unit. It is therefore the duty of commanders at all levels to train their subordinates.

(ii) The Junior Leader must be taught:-

(a) The technique of map reading and compass
(b) Message writing
(c) Wireless procedure
(d) Appreciations and orders
(e) Basic drills for reconnaissance, deployment, and movement by road or rail.
(f) Cooperation with other arms and services
(g) Sub-unit administration.

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(iii) This is carried out by including subaltern officers and senior NCOs in the annual battalion cadres, by the use of sand model exercises and exercises without troops. These are run by both company and battalion commanders. Study periods are organised when tactics and administration are studied by means of manuals, lectures and discussions.

(iv) In the BRITISH Army it is considered that the platoon commander, being primarily a leader, must be fully capable of performing every duty which may fall to the lot of his subordinates.

For this reason he must be a fully competent instructor in all platoon weapons. He must be capable of compiling and organising his own programmes and training, and of personally undertaking the detailed instruction involved.

(v) Tactically and administratively the minimum standard is that any officer should be fit, after a short period in any rank, to assume command of the next higher rank.

(vi) Thus the Commanding Officer, (while ensuring that his subordinates are capable of discharging their own duties) has to find time to train them to undertake the duties of their immediate seniors.

(vii) Specialist officers and NCOs are not forgotten. The commanding officer selects replacements each year for these specialists. They are trained by the existing specialist officers. All new class specialist officers and NCOs attend courses at army schools to perfect their knowledge before taking over from their predecessors.

(viii) This necessary training of officers occupies the whole twelve months of the year. During the winter months, when outdoor training for the mass is not practicable, the commanding officer organises lectures and discussions. Tactics are closely studied by these methods and by sand model exercises and TEWTs.

Organisation and administration, the welfare of the soldier and a variety of other subjects are taught and learned in the comfort and friendly atmosphere of the officers own unit.

During the summer months the officer applies himself to the practice of what he has learned in theory and to the practical training of his troops on the ground.

(b) Cadre training of battalion etc instructors

Each year instructor losses of the previous twelve months are replaced. The years training starts with courses (normally in battalions, but in many instances at a higher level). In this period it is ensured that adequate numbers of instructors are trained to permit each company or equivalent sub-unit getting through its training without any help from outside sources. Such training

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Each year instructor losses of the previous twelve months are replaced. The years training starts with courses:(normally in battalions, but in many instances at a higher level). In this period it is ensured that adequate numbers of instructors are trained to permit each company or equivalent sub-unit getting through its training without any help from outside sources. Such training embraces all aspects of individual training, including all weapon training applicable and that part of field training which can be considered as individual rather than collective training. Normally, instructor training takes place during the winter and early months of any year with the object of having finished it in time to take full advantage of the Spring and Summer weather which is needed for the mass training of the rank and file.

(c) Individual training of all ranks

(i) The subjects to be covered are:-

(a) Weapons and equipment
(b) Fieldcraft
(c) Observation training
(d) Physical training
(e) Driving and maintenance training

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(f) Wireless and signals
(g) Map reading
(h) First aid
(i) Hygiene and water discipline
(j) Interior economy

(ii) That part of the above which applies to him is given to every soldier under arms by the instructors already trained.

(iii) The object of the individual training is to make every man so conversant with his weapons, equipment and task, that he is fully able to apply his knowledge instructively during the next stage of training or in battle.

(iv) Owing to the diversity and complexity of equipment in modern armies it is not now considered the best practice to try to train all ranks in all weapons. Rather it is the policy to ensure that every man has a thorough general military grounding and subsequently to train them as specialists in one weapon and as an adequate "stand-in" on one other. Weapon training generally is confined to the basic weapons common to all arms - the rifle, Bren, grenades etc.

(v) The training of specialists - signallers, stretcher-bearers, mortar and MG personnel, drivers, despatch riders etc - requires special consideration. The ideal is to have 100% trained reserve of each type of specialist within the unit.

The commanding officer nominates replacements each year for his specialists. They are trained by the existing specialist officers and NCOs until they are fit and capable of taking their places. The procedure is called: "Annual Training of New Class Specialists". By this system of specialist "turn-over" an adequate reserve is maintained.

Trained specialists will undergo a period of refresher training each year.

(vi) The logical conclusions to individual training is the annual range classification course, and standard tests in other equipment.

During individual training, re-training on all types of equipment is carried out.

(d) Collective training.

(i) This is Battle Training. By successive stages the soldier is hardened and made fit for his forthcoming exertions.

(ii) In successive stages he is taken through platoon and company training and is finally ready for the exertions of battalion exercises and higher formation manoeuvres. Not until the commander is satisfied with results must the next higher stage of training be attempted. In the British system every battalion goes annually through platoon

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NOTE 1 : It is worth noting here that individual training is the time for training the soldier in the ranks.

NOTE 2 : Platoon and company training is the company commanders' opportunity to train his officers and himself.

NOTE 3 : Battalion training is the battalion commanders' chance to train his company commanders and to judge the standard achieved throughout his battalion in its earlier stages of training.

(iii) By the results of classification tests in individual training and the battalion's performance in collective training, the higher commander may judge the efforts and value of the battalion commander.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 1.4(a)/1.4(c) By [illegible] NARS, Date 2-25-20

(iv) During collective training the types of exercises to be carried out are:-

(a) Battle drills
(b) Field firing
(c) Skeleton exercises
(d) One sided exercises
(e) Two sided exercises

(v) As already said, in the BRITISH system battalion and Regtl training takes place annually, but higher formation training at less frequent periods.

3. The foregoing is a very brief resume of the training cycle in the BRITISH Army. In subsequent paragraphs the needs of the Italian Army will be considered, bearing in mind the problems peculiar to that Army, and an endeavour will be made to show how the BRITISH cycle of training could be applied to the various units of the ITALIAN ARMY.

PART 'B'

1. In considering the training needs of the ITALIAN Army during the coming year it will be necessary to consider separately the very different needs of:-

(a) Units already equipped with British equipment;

(b) Units not as yet equipped with British equipment.

2. This is necessary as in one case we have a problem of revising an already known doctrine, whereas in the other we have to initiate a new doctrine.

3. The outstanding factor making for a difference in the treatment of the two categories is the time factor:-

(a) Time needed for training;

(b) Time required for collection and distribution of British arms to certain units.

Let us consider the possible training on a month to month basis:-

Month	Units already Brit Equipped	Units not yet Brit equipped
Jan	Officer and NCO winter training	Theoretical training
Feb	Officer and NCO winter training	Theoretical training

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Jan	Officer and NCO winter training	Theoretical training
Feb	Officer and NCO winter training	Theoretical training
Mar	Cadre training of instructors	Instructors to CESANO for course on British equipment
Apr	Individual training	Cadre training of battalion and company instructors 1st course
May	Individual training	Individual training of a part of a unit. Cadre training of instructors 2nd course.
Jun	Collective training	Individual training
Jul	Collective training	Individual training
Aug	Collective training	Collective training
Sep	Collective training	Collective training
Oct	Officer and NCO winter training	Officer and NCO winter training

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4. Thus it can be seen that for units not yet equipped, training must be at least two months behind to allow for the necessary training of instructors, and that a further lag may be created whilst awaiting the completion of re-equipment.

5. In making suggestions, therefore, this HQ bases its argument on two main premises:-

(a) That units already equipped could complete Individual Training far sooner than is the case for non-equipped units, and that consequently more time exists for their Collective Training. As a result, Collective Training can go to a higher level this year.

(b) That the exact reverse applies for units not already equipped. More time is needed to draw equipment and to ensure an adequate standard of Individual Training. This cuts down the time available for Collective Training which, since it is essential to complete fully the training at lower levels, precludes much Collective Training above battalion level.

TRAINING OF OFFICERS AND NCOs

6.

(a) This has been continuous during the winter, though in many cases the instruction has not been organised as it might have been. Work has however taken place.

(b) In units already British equipped the study of equipment, and training to use it, will have reached a level which permits of cadre training at units starting early in March.

(c) In units not yet equipped all such technical instruction will, with the changed equipment, have to be re-done to encompass the new equipment before training can commence.

(d) Selected instructors will do courses at CESAMO during March and it would appear that by mid-April a start could be made on instruction within units.

CADRE TRAINING OF INSTRUCTORS

7.

(a) Infantry divisions already equipped with British weapons will have trained adequate numbers of instructors to run cadres.

(b) Internal security divisions and territorial regiments will get their first batch of instructors trained at CESAMO during March and April.

(c) Immediately upon return to their units, instructors must commence the cadres which will train the company and battalion instructors. This

Declassified E.O. 12065 Sec. 3.5(b)/NNMS No. 285020

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(c) Immediately upon return to their units, instructors must commence the cadres which will train the company and battalion instructors. This may take as long as three months if two or more classes must be run. The essential is that (since this is the basis on which the whole structure will be built) this instruction should be of the highest order and should continue, if necessary to the exclusion of other training, until the requisite standard of perfection has been reached by all student instructors.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

8.

(a) Remembering that this is the basis of everything it would be wise, in ordering training for units not yet re-equipped,

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to suggest a date well-ahead as the date for completion, and pointing out that at the discretion of commanders this date may be postponed until complete efficiency is reached.

(b) For other units this HQ recommends a generous allotment of time in order to get all ranks up to the standard expected from the recruits leaving CRR to join units.

(c) Noticeable weaknesses which could be eradicated during individual training are:-

(i) MT driving and maintenance
(ii) Drill and bearing both on and off parade
(iii) Maintenance of weapons and daily cleaning standard
(iv) Hygiene and sanitation standards
(v) Physical and recreational training.

These subjects should be specially mentioned in any directive issued and commanders should be instructed that as a result of training very much higher standards are expected and demanded.

COLLECTIVE TRAINING:

9.

(a) From para 3 of part 'B' (above) it appears unlikely that re-equipping units will have much time for training at the regimental level, though every effort should be made to train the senior officers of these units. A study week specially run for these officers would help them in training their cmds during the following winter, 1946/7. This week might well be held about October/November 1946, and could, if such training were ordered, be combined with the manoeuvres of one or other of the [illegible]. Exercises to be carried out by the Division could first be [illegible] by these officers, who would later see the tr ops actually manoeuvring on the ground under their own commanders.

(b) In com units of formations already re-equipped opportunities will exist for training at the regimental level, and wherever possible this should be organised.

WINTER TRAINING

10. General Training.
Part 'A', para 2 (viii) suggests winter training and para 2(b) suggests courses in battalions or at a higher level.

It is the opinion of this HQ that the needs of the ITALIAN Army would best be met by the establishment of Divisional or Regimental Schools to supervise winter study and officer and NCO training. It must be borne in mind, however, that these schools must not run in competition with Army schools - their object must be:-

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Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.6(b)/NNCP No. 782020

(v) Physical and recreational training.

These subjects should be specially mentioned in any directive issued and commanders should be instructed that as a result of training very much higher standards are expected and demanded.

COLLECTIVE TRAINING

9.

(a) From para 5 of part 'B' (above) it appears unlikely that re-equipping units will have much time for training at the regimental level, though every effort should be made to train the senior officers of these units. A study week specially run for these officers would help them in training their commds during the following winter, 1946/7. This week might well be held about October/November 1946, and could, if such training were ordered, be combined with the manoeuvres of one or other of the [illegible] Division. Manoeuvres to be carried out by the Division could first be [illegible] by these officers, who would then see the troops actually manoeuvring on the ground under their own commanders.

(b) In most units of formations already re-equipped ample time will exist for training at the regimental level, and wherever possible this should be organised.

WINTER TRAINING

10. General Training.
Part 'A', para 2 (viii) suggests winter training and para 2(b) suggests courses in battalions or at a higher level.

It is the opinion of this HQ that the needs of the ITALIAN Army would best be met by the establishment of Divisional or Regimental Schools to supervise winter study and officer and NCO training. It must be borne in mind, however, that these schools must not run in competition with Army schools - their object must be:-

99

(i) To train officers and NCOs for whom vacancies do not exist at Army schools;

(ii) To assist the formation commander to implement his own policy for the preparatory training of his command;

(iii) In the case of newly equipped formations, to raise the general standard of officer and NCO knowledge of the new weapons and the new methods imposed by them.

L. Browning
Major-General,
BRITISH.

WIM/fc

Copy to: [illegible] as to para 9(a) for [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NND No. 285020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSDD No. 785020

SUBJECT: 2" Mortars.

26

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel: ROME 66319)

Ref: G/A.1/1010

26 Feb.46.

To: H.Q.
Central Military Schools

1. If proper training is to be carried out, it is considered that not more than 52 - 2" Mortars can be spared for C.A.K's.

2. In any case this number is to be considered as a loan.

3. It should be remembered that the 2" Mortar is not the private property of the Infantry, but of all arms, and that only Infantry recruits will have received instruction in this weapon at their C.A.K's.

W.L.Price

Major W.Staffs.
G80.II Trg. & Inf.

WLP/eh.

Internal

File.
Float.

98

FILE

25

SUBJECT :- Artillery Co-operation with Infantry.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : G/A.1/1007

23 February 1946.

Officer i/c Training,
Comando Scuole Centrali Militari.

O.C. Infantry School.

1. The following extract of R.A. Training Memorandum is forwarded to you for information.

Co-operation with Infantry. Use of No. 18 Sets.

1. The ideal method of securing close Artillery support is for the Commander of the attaching troops to have an Artillery officer with them, but this will often not be possible because the location of Infantry Headquarters will not necessarily be suitable for an Artillery O.P. If however, the supporting Artillery O.P. is linked to the Infantry No. 18 set frequency the co-operation between the two arms can be very close. This frequency is the property of the Infantry, and the O.P. Officer listens in in order that he can be called upon to give supporting fire. Except to test his communications when the net is quiet the gunner will speak on this frequency only when spoken to.

2. Target Indications. The following Methods, which are simple, and acceptable to Infantry and Artillery, will be used.

(i) Map Reference. When the target is easy to describe and can be located on the map, the Infantry will pass its map reference, e.g. :-
"Farm buildings, map reference 436598".
"Active Mortars".
"Neutralise for 3 minutes"
This is the simplest method and the one least open to error. It will be used whenever possible.

(ii) Compass point and distance from a reference object. The Infantry ensure that the Artillery have identified some unmistakable object as a reference point and then fix the target by giving its direction and distance ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ (in yards) from the reference object, using one of the eight cardinal points of the compass (North, South, East, West, etc.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b) NARS Date 2/28/20

Comando Scuole Centrali Militari.

O.C. Infantry School.

1. The following extract of R.A. Training Memorandum is forwarded to you for information.

Co-operation with Infantry. Use of No. 18 Sets.

1. The ideal method of securing close Artillery support is for the Commander of the attacking troops to have an Artillery officer with them, but this will often not be possible because the location of Infantry Headquarters will not necessarily be suitable for an Artillery O.P. If however, the supporting Artillery O.P. is linked to the Infantry No. 18 set frequency the co-operation between the two arms can be very close. This frequency is the property of the Infantry, and the O.P. Officer listens in in order that he can be called upon to give supporting fire. Except to test his communications when the net is quiet the gunner will speak on this frequency only when spoken to.

2. Target Indications. The following Methods, which are simple, and acceptable to Infantry and Artillery, will be used.

(i) Map Reference. When the target is easy to describe and can be located on the map, the Infantry will pass its map reference, e.g. :-
"Farm buildings, map reference 436598".
"Active Mortars".
"Neutralise for 3 minutes"
This is the simplest method and the one least open to error. It will be used whenever possible.

(ii) Compass point and distance from a reference object. The Infantry ensure that the Artillery have identified some unmistakable object as a reference point and then fix the target by giving its direction and distance ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ (in yards) from the reference object, using one of the eight cardinal points of the compass (North, South, East, West, N.E., S.E., N.W., S.W.). If no suitable reference object exists, the Infantry Officer may use his own position in place of a reference object, passing its map reference in a pre-arranged code. The following examples illustrate the two cases.

(a) "Reference Red House in corn-field".
"North East 300, mortars in cabbage patch".
"Neutralise 2 minutes".

(b) "I am at DERUQ" (pre-arranged code).
"South 500, M.Gs in garden of cottage".
"Neutralise 2 minutes".

(iii) Compass Point and distance from a four-round salvo. In country which is unmapped or particularly featureless, the Infantry Officer may begin by calling for a salvo. He will then use this salvo (which may or may not contain one round of smoke) as a reference point, and will proceed as in (ii). The Artillery Officer must ensure that the salvo falls in a safe place on ground which is easily visible both for the Infantry and for himself.

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC No. 785020

Example :-

Inf ...	...	"Fire salbo at reference object".
Arty ...	...	"Shot".
Inf ...	...	"Reference salvo, target is north west 200".
		"Mortars in Corse".
		"Neutralise 3 minutes".
Arty ...	...	"Target identified".

(iv) Prominent features obvious to both observers. If the eye can be carried easily from a reference object to a target, following an obvious feature of the ground, this may be used in place of a compass direction as in (ii) e.g.

"Reference lone haystack" (considered unmistakable).
"Right 300 along track".
"Mortars in dark field."

3. Engagement of Targets.

(i) If these methods of target indication are used, the Artillery officer should be able to identify the target whenever it is visible from his O.P. As soon as he is certain of the target he will report "Target identified" to the Infantry and will engage the target by normal methods.

If he is unable to identify the target, it may be clear from the indication that it is in ground which is dead from his present O.P., and it may be clear in which direction the O.P. should be moved in order to obtain command of the target. If so, it will generally be best to move the O.P. at once, in order that the target may be identified and the shoot then conducted in the normal way.

(ii) In featureless or very enclosed country the artillery officer may be unable to identify the target and may be uncertain whether his inability is due to the target being hidden from him or merely to the difficulty of identification. In this case he will report to the Infantry "Target not identified. Send corrections". He will concentrate the lines of fire of his troop and fire a salvo at what he considers to be :-

(a) A safe place.

(b) On visible ground.

(c) As near as possible to the target.

He will report "Shot" to the Infantry, who will then report the position of the target with reference to the salvo by the method of 2, (iii), e.g. :-

"Reference salvo, target is south east 400."

The Artillery Officer will give the necessary orders as a result of this correction and if he is still unable to identify the target will continue to ranges, using section salvoes. The Infantry will continue to send corrections until the Artillery Officer reports "Target Identified". The Artillery Officer will decide when to go to fire for effect, which he will normally begin with one round of gun-fire. The Infantry will send a correction or will report the fire as effective.

(iii) It will be noted that both for indication and for correction

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NSC By 28520

3. Engagement of Targets.

(i) If these methods of target indication are used, the Artillery officer should be able to identify the target whenever it is visible from his O.P. As soon as he is certain of the target he will report "Target identified" to the Infantry and will engage the target by normal methods.

If he is unable to identify the target, it may be clear from the indication that it is in ground which is dead from his present O.P., and it may be clear in which direction the O.P. should be moved in order to obtain command of the target. If so, it will generally be best to move the O.P. at once, in order that the target may be identified and the shoot then conducted in the normal way.

(ii) In featureless or very enclosed country the artillery officer may be unable to identify the target and may be uncertain whether this inability is due to the target being hidden from him or merely to the difficulty of identification. In this case he will report to the Infantry "Target not identified. Send corrections". He will concentrate the lines of fire of his troop and fire a salvo at what he considers to be :-

(a) A safe place.

(b) On visible ground.

(c) As near as possible to the target.

He will report "Shot" to the Infantry, who will then report the position of the target with reference to the salvo by the method of 2, (iii), e.g. :-

"Reference salvo, target is south east 400."

The Artillery Officer will give the necessary orders as a result of this correction and if he is still unable to identify the target, will continue to range, using section salvoes. The Infantry will continue to send corrections until the Artillery Officer reports "Target Identified". The Artillery Officer will decide when to go to fire for effect, which he will normally begin with one round of gun-fire. The Infantry will send a correction or will report the fire as effective.

(iii) It will be noticed that both for indication and for correcting fire the Infantry use the same procedure. It is hoped that the Infantry will not be called upon to correct fire for any length of time.

NOTE. It is essential that the Infantry Officer is consistant in his corrections. He should not judge his distances by what he imagines is the correction of the Artillery Officer.

If, for example, the first salvo falls 200 yards short of the target, it is probable that the next salvo will fall 200 yards beyond, as the Gunners will be attempting to bracket the target. The Infantry Officer must not imagine that his original estimate was wrong abd must continue to employ his original unit of measure.

W.L. Price

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/rmw
Internal.
File.
Float

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)(NARS) By 28522

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSB No. 785020

23

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : G/A.1/1001

20 February 1946.

To: H.Q.
Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MOIA)

Lodge. 14.

SUBJECT :- Training.

Reference your G/TM/1 dated 7 January 1946.

Herewith please find Plan of Barracks in respect of Scuola Meccanici e Operai di Artiglieria, as requested in your above quoted letter.

W.L.Pace

Major GSO II,
Trg & Def Trg.
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/rew

Internals.

File.

95

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-403/NNDB No. 785020

(22)

12 RECEPTION ISATION UNIT
For the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel: ROME 66319)

Ref: G/A.1/991

14 Feb.46.

To: Comando
Scuola Centrali Militari.

SUBJECT: Training of Recruits at Signals School.

Herewith copy of this H.Q. letter G/A.1/977 dated 6 Feb.46, for your information.

W L Pace
Major. W.Staffs.
G90.II Trg. & Inf.

WLP/al.

Internal
File.

SUBJECT :- Training of Recruits at Signals School.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : G/A.1/977

6 February 1946.

Comd. 12 B.L.U.

SO.R.Sigs, M.M.I.A.

1. The proposed SMRE training programme for Signal Recruits will give the Signals School a number of students varying between 1,820 and 2,150. With the required permanent staff of 900, this would mean that approximately 3,000 men would have to be accommodated in the School. A plan showing the proposed allocation of accommodation is being prepared.

2. The suggested division of students between Artillery Signallers, Infantry Signallers and Signals proper appears to be adequate but considerable criticism can be made of the allotment of trades within each category.

3. (a) Infantry Signallers.

It is intended that all these personnel should be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists in different trades as suggested by SMRE. They would be given a three months' course which would include wireless operation, exchange operating and line laying but would include only the rudiments of morse telegraphy which could be taught later when the men have been posted to field units.

An exception should be made in the case of signallers for 4.2-in Mortars and M.M.G. who require a more extensive training in wireless and should be given a full four months course.

(b) Artillery Signallers.

It is intended that these personnel should also be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists. They could be given a three months course and morse telegraphy could be taught after posting to field units.

(c) Combat Divisional Signals.

The suggested MMIA War Establishment of a Combat Div. Sigs, which may be taken as a guide, totals 399 rank and file, of which the principle tradesmen are as under.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

1. The proposed SMRE training programme for Signal Recruits will give the Signals School a number of students varying between 1,820 and 2,150. With the required permanent staff of 900, this would mean that approximately 3,000 men would have to be accommodated in the School. A plan showing the proposed allocation of accommodation is being prepared.

2. The suggested division of students between Artillery Signallers, Infantry Signallers and Signals proper appears to be adequate but considerable criticism can be made of the allotment of trades within each category.

3. (a) Infantry Signallers.

It is intended that all these personnel should be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists in different trades as suggested by SMRE. They would be given a three months' course which would include wireless operation, exchange operating and line laying but would include only the rudiments of morse telegraphy which could be taught later when the men have been posted to field units.

An exception should be made in the case of signallers for 4.2-in Mortars and M.M.G. who require a more extensive training in wireless and should be given a full four months course.

(b) Artillery Signallers.

It is intended that these personnel should also be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists. They could be given a three months course and morse telegraphy could be taught after posting to field units.

(c) Combat Divisional Signals.

The suggested NMIA War Establishment of a Combat Div. Sigs, which may be taken as a guide, totals 399 rank and file, of which the principle tradesmen are as under.

D.Rs.	30
Elec Sigs	21
Inst Mechs	21
Linesmen	43
Operaters - wireless	131
Operaters - Line	26
Switchboard Ops	17
Drivers I.C.	76

93

AA & QMG
B&A & QMG
DADOS
PRO

G/A.1.

Directorate R.O. 12641 Section 1-4-67/MOS No. 285220

3. (c) Continued.

The suggested training programme allows for the training annually of the following recruits.

D.Rs	NIL
Elec Sigs	90
Instr Mechs	45
Linesmen	420
Operaters Wireless	480
Operaters Line	210
Switchboard Ops.	120
+++ Drivers I.C.	NIL
Unallotted trades	780

+++ It is assumed that these drivers will be trained at the D & M School.

It will be seen that the great disparity exists between the various trades and it is suggested that the numbers to be trained in each trade annually should be approximately as under.

D.Rs.	210
Elec Sigs	150
Inst Mechs	150
Linesmen	300
Operaters Wireless.	900
Operaters Line.	200
Switchboard Operaters	120

If drivers I.C. have to be provided from the recruits allotted to the Signals School, these figures must be reduced by 20% to allow for the provision of drivers.

(d) Signals for Territorial Commands.

The suggested yearly intake of personnel for training as signals for territorial commands is 2,100. It is suggested by SMRE that these are trained as under.

Wireless Operaters	750
Line Operaters.	1,350

The proposed War Establishment by SMRE for a Territorial Command Signals Company, which may be taken as a guide, allows approximately 100 rank and file of which the main tradesmen are as under.

Instrument Mechs	2
Radio Mechs	2
Electricians	4
Wireless Operaters	18
Teletype Ops	6

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNSA By 285020

+++ It is assumed that these drivers will be trained at the D & M School.

It will be seen that the great disparity exists between the various trades and it is suggested that the numbers to be trained in each trade annually should be approximately as under.

D.Rs.	210
Elec Sigs	150
Inst Mechs	150
Linesmen	300
Operators Wireless.	900
Operators Line.	200
Switchboard Operators	120

If drivers I.C. have to be provided from the recruits allotted to the Signals School, these figures must be reduced by 20% to allow for the provision of drivers.

(d) Signals for Territorial Commands.

The suggested yearly intake of personnel for training as signals for territorial commands is 2,100. It is suggested by SHAEF that these are trained as under.

Wireless Operators	750
Line Operators.	1,350

The proposed War Establishment by SHAEF for a Territorial Command Signals Company, which may be taken as a guide, allows approximately 100 rank and file of which the main tradesmen are as under.

Instrument Mechs	2
Radio Mechs	2
Electricians	4
Wireless Operators	18
Teletype Ops	6
D.Rs.	5
Switchboard Operators	16
Linesman	30

92

At present there are nine of these units and it can readily be seen that the proposed training programme bears little relation to the needs of these units. In addition there exists the Ministry of War Signals Battalion and it is not known whether or not reinforcements for this Unit are to be provided from the Signals School intake or-not. In addition no allowance is made for Signals for the three Internal Security Divisions, which at present have no signal unit allotted to them.

...../3.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(b)(3) NS. 785020

3. (d) Continued.

It is suggested that the recruits allotted to territorial command signals should be trained approximately as under.

Linesmen	40%
Wireless Operators	20%
Switchboard Operators	15%
Teletype Operators / Line Operators	10%
D.R.s.	5%
Electricians / Instrument Mechanics	10%

4. The proposed duration of courses is adequate and reasonably well trained tradesmen can be produced during the time allowed.

S.L. Rennie

Major, R.Sigs,
S.O. R.Sigs,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

DRS/rsw

Internal.

File.

Copy to Central Schools

Historical F.S. 12301 Section 3-HQ/RMSO No. 285020

Major, R.Sigs,
S.O. R.Sigs,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

DMS/rsw

Internal.

File.

Copy to Central Schools

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.5(b)/NNDB no. 785020

FILE

(2)

SUBJECT :- Training of Recruits at Signals School.

12 SIGNAL HEADQUARTERS UNIT
for the
TRAINING CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOL.
(Tel : [illegible] 6631)

Ref : Q/A.1/377

6 February 1946.

Comd. 14 S.H.U.

SO.M.Sigs, M.M.I.A.

1. The proposed [illegible] training programme for Signal Recruits will give the Signals School a number of students varying between 1,[illegible] and 2,150. With the required permanent staff of 400, this would mean that approximately 3,000 men would have to be accommodated in the School. A plan showing the proposed allocation of accommodation is being prepared.

2. The suggested division of students between Artillery Signallers, Infantry Signallers and Signals proper appears to be adequate but considerable criticism can be made of the allotment of trades within each category.

3. (a) Infantry Signallers.

It is intended that all these personnel should be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists in different trades as suggested by [illegible]. They would be given a three months' course which would include wireless operation, exchange operating and line laying, but would include only the rudiments of morse telegraphy which could be taught later when the men have been posted to field units.

An exception should be made in the case of signallers for A.A.-in Barters and R.A.C. who require a more extensive training in wireless and should be given a full four months course.

(b) Artillery Signallers.

It is intended that these personnel should also be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists. They could be given a three months course and morse telegraphy could be taught after posting to field units.

(c) Combat Divisional Signals.

The suggested [illegible] War Establishment of a Combat Div. Sigs. which may be taken as a guide, totals 599 rank and file, of [illegible]

40

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNSA NO. 285022

give the figure known a number of students varying between [illegible] and 2,150. [illegible] the required permanent staff of 300, this would mean that approximately 3,000 men would have to be accommodated in the school. A plan showing the proposed allocation of accommodation is being prepared.

2. The suggested division of students between Artillery Signallers, Infantry Signallers and Signals proper appears to be adequate but considerable criticism can be made of the allotment of trades within each category.

3. (a) Infantry Signallers.

It is intended that all these personnel should be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists in different trades as suggested by [illegible]. They would be given a three months' course which would include wireless operation, exchange operating and line laying, but would include only the rudiments of morse telegraphy which could be taught later when the men have been posted to field units.

An exception should be made in the case of signallers for L.A.-in Harbours and R.N.D. who require a more extensive training in wireless and should be given a full four months course.

(b) Artillery Signallers.

It is intended that these personnel should also be trained as regimental signallers and not as specialists. They would be given a three months course and morse telegraphy would be taught after posting to field units.

(c) Depot Divisional Signals.

The suggested [illegible] War Establishment of a Depot Div. Sigs, which may be taken as a guide, totals 599 rank and file, of which the principle tradesmen are as under. 90

D.R's.	30
Elec Sigs	21
Inst Mechs	21
Linesmen	43
Operators - wireless	131
Operators - Line	26
Switchboard Ops	17
Drivers I.C.	76

...../2.

Permanent Records Section, Ottawa. No. 285020

3. (c) Continued.

The suggested training programme allows for the training annually of the following recruits.

R.Es	NIL
Elec Engs	90
Instr Mechs	45
Linesmen	470
Operators Wireless	480
Operators Line	210
Switchboard Ops.	120
*** Drivers M.T.	NIL
Unallotted trades	700

*** It is assumed that these drivers will be trained at the R.A.S.C. School.

It will be seen that the great disparity exists between the various trades and it is suggested, that the numbers to be trained in each trade annually should be approximately as under.

R.Es.	240
Elec Engs	150
Inst Mechs	150
Linesmen	300
Operators Wireless.	300
Operators Line.	200
Switchboard Operators	130

If Drivers M.T. have to be provided from the recruits allotted to the Signals School, these figures must be reduced by 20% to allow for the provision of drivers.

(d) Signals for Territorial Formations.

The suggested yearly intake of personnel for training as signals for territorial commands is 2,100. It is suggested by WO11 that these are divided as under.

Wireless Operators	750
Line Operators.	1,350

The proposed War Establishment by arms for a Territorial Command Signals Regmt, which may be taken as a guide, allows approximately 160 rank and file of which the main tradesmen are as under.

Instrument Mechs	2
Radio Mechs	2
Electricians	4
Wireless Operators	10
Linesmen	40

Public Record Office Ref. No. 1-497/1/3 Section No. 28520

******* It is hoped that these figures will be available by the 31st March.

It will be seen that the great disparity exists between the various trades and it is suggested that the numbers to be trained in each trade annually should be approximately as under.

R.E.	210
Line Sgts.	150
Inst Techs	150
Linemen	300
Operators Wireless.	300
Operators Line.	300
Switchboard Operators	120

If Artizan I.C. have to be provided from the recruits allotted to the Signals School, these figures must be reduced by 20% to allow for the provision of Artizans.

(d) Signals for Territorial Formats.

The suggested yearly intake of personnel for training as Signals for territorial formats is 2,100. It is suggested by WO16 that these are trained as under.

Wireless Operators	750
Line Operators.	1,350

The proposed War Establishment by WO16 for a Territorial Corps Signals Company, which may be taken as a guide, allows approximately 160 rank and file of which the main tradesmen are as under.

Instrument Techs	2
Cable Techs	2
Electricians	4
Wireless Operators	16
Teletype Ops	2
R.E.	5
Switchboard Operators	16
Linesmen	30

89

At present there are nine of these units and it can readily be seen that the proposed training programme bears little relation to the needs of these units. In addition there exists the Ministry of War Signals Battalion and it is not known whether or not reinforcements for this Unit are to be provided from the Signals School intake or not. In addition no allowance is made for Signals for the three Internal Security Divisions, which at present have no signal unit allotted to them.

...../3.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 785020

3. (d) Continued.

It is suggested that the recruits allotted to territorial control signals should be trained approximately as under.

Linemen	40%
Wireless Operators	20%
Switchboard Operators	15%
Teletype Operators)	
Line Operators)	10%
R.E.s	5%
Electricians)	
Instrument Mechanics)	10%

4. The proposed duration of courses is adequate and reasonably well trained tradesmen can be produced during the time allowed.

Maj

Major, R.C.Sigs.,
for Brigadier,
12 Brigade Liaison Unit for the
Allied General Military School

mm/rmw

Internal.

File.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5 NND 963220 By NARA Date 2/5/98

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNCP No. 785020

0 0 12 BLJ 0

20

SUBJECT :- Services and Welfare Training

Land Forces Sub Comm A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) ROME
TRG/26/7

11 Feb 46

Ministry of War

1. In order that this HQ may be more fully informed on training policy you are requested to advise us as to the general policy to be adopted at the Welfare and Services School - RETI.

2. The main points on which we require enlightment are :-

(a) Scope of the School. Subjects to be taught.

(b) List of proposed courses in each subject.

(c) Particulars of Students to attend each projected course shown in (b) above.

(d) Any other relevant matter you may consider interesting.

for Major-General.
M. M. I. A.

WLM/ell

Copy to :- 12 Bde to Central Military School

Internal

TRG/1

1642

SUBJECT :- Notes on the Training of Infantry.

19

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : G/A.1/368

31 January 1946.

SPECIALISTS.

1. The following notes are purely made as a guide to ensure that a fairly accurate estimate can be arrived at as to the numbers to be trained and the equipment required to train them with. In many cases the detail of establishments are not to hand in which case the corresponding British Establishment is used.

2. The Units to be dealt with are :-

(a) 4.2-in Mortar.

(b) 3-in Mortar.

(c) M.M.G.

(d) Snipers.

(e) Signals.

(f) Pioneers.

3. The Establishments on which the following notes are based are given in Appendix 'A'. It is realised in some cases these do not strictly apply. They do, however, give a guide.

4. Appendix 'B' gives where personnel should be trained. This is worked out from Establishment. Ordinary Drivers to be trained as Specialists, i.e. Mortarmen but Driver Operators, always as Signallers.

5. Appendix 'C' gives the number of sub-units previously referred to in the various formations that have to be considered.

6. Appendix 'D' gives the numbers of men to be trained if there was 100% wastage annually. It is realised of course that this is not the case but that initially in the case of the 4.2-in Mortar and the M.M.G. this does apply. In any case the desired figure can be obtained by taking a percentage of the total according to the number

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NARS No. 285020

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6. Appendix 'D' gives the numbers of men to be trained if there was 100% wastage annually. It is realised of course that this is not the case but that initially in the case of the 4.2-in Mortar and the M.M.G. this does apply. In any case the desired figure can be obtained by taking a percentage of the total according to the number of regular specialists.

F/L M.L.Price

Major GSO II,
Trg & Def Trg.
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

MLP/rew

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.6(b)/NNDB No. 785020

ANNEXURE "A"

To: 12 B.L.U. letter ref:
G/A.1/968 d.31 Jan.46

(1) 4.2" Mortar. A British platoon of 4 Mortars.
(From Small Arms Training)

Transport

Universal Carrier 1. Platoon Commander (Sub.) - Pistol.
Corporal (O.P.A.) - Sten.
2 Driver/Operators. - Rifles.
Equipment:- 1 No.18 Set.
1 No.22 Set.
(with Remote Control - 880 yds Cable)
1 Telephone D.Mk.V.
3 Cable Drums (each 440 yds).

Universal Carrier 2. 2nd i/c (Subaltern) - Pistol.
Corporal (M.P.O.A.) - Rifle.
2 Driver Operators. - Rifles.
1 No.22 Set. (with Remote Control and 880 yds. cable).
Telephone Exchange u/C.10.
3 Telephones D.Mk.V
3 Cable Drums (each 440 yds).
P.I.A.T. and 12 Bombs.

Motor Cycles. 1 - 3 Platoon Sergeant. - Sten.
2 Orderlies. - Sten.

Lloyd Carrier 1. No.1 Section.
Sergeant (Section Comd.) - Rifle.
Driver Operator. - Sten.
Batman. - Rifle.
1 - 22 Set.
Telephone Loudspeaker..
No. 2 Junction Box and batteries.
L.M.G.
1000 rds S.A.A.
20 Bombs.

Towing.

Mortar Trailer 1. 44 Bombs.

Lloyd Carriers 2-3 (each) Corporal (No.1) - Rifle.
No.2, 3, 4. - Rifles.
Driver Each - Sten.

Towing Mortar Trailers 2 - 3 (each) 22 Bombs.
4.2 Mortar.
Telephone
Loudspeaker No.2.
2 Cable Drum.

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285020

Universal Carrier 1.	Platoon Commander (Sub.) - Pistol. Corporal (O.P.A.) - Sten. 2 Driver/Operators. - Rifles. Equipment:- 1 No.18 Set. 1 No.22 Set. (with Remote Control - 880 yds Cable) 1 Telephone D.Mk.V. 3 Cable Drums (each 440 yds).
Universal Carrier 2.	2nd i/c (Subaltern) - Pistol. Corporal (M.P.O.A.) - Rifle. 2 Driver Operators. - Rifles. 1 No.22 Set. (with Remote Control and 880 yds. cable). Telephone Exchange w/C.10. 3 Telephones D.Mk.V 3 Cable Drums (each 440 yds). P.I.A.T. and 12 Bombs.
Motor Cycles. 1 - 3	Platoon Sergeant. - Sten. 2 Orderlies. - Sten.
Lloyd Carrier 1. Towing. Mortar Trailer 1.	No.1 Section. Sergeant (Section Comd.) - Rifle. Driver Operator. - Sten. Batman. - Rifle. 1 - 22 Set. Telephone Loudspeaker. No. 2 Junction Box and Batterins. L.M.G. 1000 rds S.A.A. 20 Bombs. 44 Bombs.
Lloyd Carriers 2-3 (each) Towing Mortar Trailers 2 - 3 (each)	Corporal (No.1) - Rifle. No.2, 3, 4. - Rifles. Driver Mech - Sten. 22 Bombs. 4.2 Mortar. Telephone Loudspeaker No.2. 1 Cable Drum. 24 Bombs.

No.2 Section.

Lloyd Carrier 4. Towing Mortar Trailer 4.	Sergeant (Section Comd) - Rifle. Driver Mech. - Sten. L.M.G. 1,000 rds S.A.A. 48 Bombs. 44 bombs.

Secret W.O. 2565 Section 3 100/7/40 No. 28528

Lloyd Carriers 5 - 6 (each)

Corporal (No.1) - Rifle.
Nos. 2, 3, 4. - Rifles.
Driver Mech - Sten
22 bombs.

Mortar Trailers 5 - 6 (each)

4.2" Mortar.
Telephone Loudspeaker
No.2 and Cable Drum

Mortar Trailers 5-6 (each)

24 bombs.
4.2" Mortar
Telephone Loudspeaker
Boards Artillery No.2.
No.2 and Cable Drum.
24 bombs.

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(2) War Establishment of 3" Mortar Platoon.
(from S.A.F. Vol.9)

Platoon H.Q.

Pl. Comdr.
Fitter M.V. (M3A4 utt)
Dvrs Tplr
Driver Mech.
1 - 18 Set. and 1 - 38 Set.

No.1 Section.		No.2 Section.		No.3 Section.	
3 M/Cs.	Cpl.		Cpl.		L/Cpl.
	No.1 Det	No.2 Det	3	4	5	6
Carriers 6.	Sgt.	Cpl.2 i/c	Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Ditto
	3 Mortar Nos.	3 Mortar Nos	No.1 Det.	No.2 Det.	No.1 Det.	No.2 Det.
	Dvr.Mech.	Dvr.Mech				
3 x 15-cwt Trucks.	Pl.Sgt. Driver/Batman. 90 Bombs. PIAT & 6 Rounds 2 x 38 Sets.		Mortarman Driver i/c 90 Bombs PIAT & 6 rds. 2 No.38 Sets.		Mortarman Driver i/c 90 Bombs. PIAT & 6 rds. 2 No.38 sets.	
1 3-ton Lorry. (Adm.Vl).		Driver i/c. 270 Bombs.				

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 285020

(2) War Establishment of 3" Mortar Platoon.
(from S.A.T. Vol.9)

Platoon H.Q.

Pl. Comdr.
Fitter M.V. (M&SM etc)
Range Taker
Driver Mech.
1 - 18 Set. and 1 - 38 Set.

No.1 Section.		No.2 Section.		No.3 Section.	
5 M/Cs.	Cpl.	Cpl.		L/Cpl.	
	No.1 Det	No.2 Det	3	4	5	6
Carriers 6.	Sgt.	Cpl.2 i/c	Ditto	Ditto	Ditto	Ditto
	3 Mortar Men.	5 Mortar Men	No.1 Det.	No.2 Det.	No.1 Det.	No.2 Det.
	Dvr.Mech.	Dvr.Mech				
3 x 15-cwt Trucks.	Pl.Sgt. Driver/Batman. 90 Bombs. PIAT & 6 Rounds 2 x 38 Sets.		Mortarman Driver i/c 90 Bombs PIAT & 6 rds. 2 No.38 Sets.		Mortarman Driver i/c 90 Bombs. PIAT & 6 rds. 2 No.38 sets.	
1 5-ton Lorry. (Adm.Pl).		Driver I/C. 270 Bombs.				

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(3) M.M.G. Platoon. British W.E. No.11/240/1.

Platoon Commander	....	1
Platoon Sergeant.	....	1
Range Takers	....	2
Drivers & Batmen	....	7
D.R.	....	1
Driver Operators	....	2
Sec.Comdrs	....	2
Section Corporals	....	2
Gun Numbers	....	16

...../3.

Confidential E.D. 11565 Section 3-402/HQS No. 285020

Equipment: 1 Truck 15-cwt. G.S. 4 x 2
8 Carriers Universal.
1 L.M.G.
1 P.I.A.T.
4 M.M.G.
1 No.18 Set.
1 No.22 Set.
Directors - 2.
Rangefinders - 2.
Drawing Boards and Sets.
&c. &c.

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(4) H.Q. Sniper Section.

1 Sergeant.
1 Corporal.
2 Lance Corporals.
4 O.Rs.

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(5) Signal Platoon H.Q., From Italian Sources. (Possibly obsolete)

Platoon Commander	.....	1
Sergeant Major	.....	1
N.C.O. (for exchange)	.....	1
Privates "	.....	3
N.C.O.(Telephone)	.....	1
Privates "	.....	2
N.C.O's (Lineman)	.....	2
Privates "	.....	6
Sergeant Major (R/T)	.....	1
L/Cpls. "	.....	6
Privates. "	.....	8
Sergeant Major (General)	...	1
L/Cpl. "	...	1
Privates. "	....	6
D.Rs. "	....	5

Equipment:
6 Radios
1 Exchange.
5 Telephones.
1 Pullerphone.

(6) R.E. Pioneer Platoon, British.

Captured E.D. 13th Section 1-402/43 No. 285020

(4) S.A. Sniper Section.

1 Sergeant.
1 Corporal.
2 Lance Corporals.
4 G.Rs.

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(5) Signal Platoon N.Z., from Italian Sources. (Possibly obsolete)

Platoon Commander	.....	1
Sergeant Major	.....	1
N.C.O. (for exchange)	.....	1
Privates " "	.....	3
N.C.O.(Fullerphone)	.....	1
Privates "	.....	2
N.C.O's (Linesmen)	.....	2
Privates "	.....	6
Sergeant Major (W/T)	.....	1
L/Cpls. "	.....	8
Privates. "	.....	8
Sergeant Major (General)	...	1
L/Cpl. "	...	1
Privates. "	....	6
D.Rs. "	....	5

Equipment:

6 Radios
1 Exchange.
6 Telephones.
1 Fullerphone.

(6) N.Z. Pioneer Platoon, British.

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Platoon Commander	.....	1
Platoon Sergeant	.....	1
Drivers L/C	.....	3
Bricklayers	.....	1
Carpenters	.....	6
Masons	.....	1
Batman-Drivers.	.....	1
Pioneers	.....	8

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(5) NN 285020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/3056 No. 785020

Specialist	Infantry School			Artillery School		Engineer School		Signal School		D & M or Unit	
	Courses	Recruit Wing	Range Wing Finder	Courses	Recruit	Courses	Recruit	Courses	Recruit	Courses	Recruit
4.2-in Mortar	2 Offrs 9 NCOs	21						5 (Ind 22 Set)			
3-in Mortar	1 Offr 10 ECO	30	1								1
M.M.G.	1 Offr 5 NCO	24	2					2 (Ind 22 Set)			
Sniper	4	4									
Pioneer						1 Offr 3 NCO	18				
Signallers								1 Offr 3 NCO	43 ##		

Signal figures may change according to whether 4/Sgt is made as result of course

Declassified E.O. 13005 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

Appendix 'B' to G/A.1/968
Dated 31 January '46

Artillery School		Engineer School		Signal School		D & M or Edit		TOTALS.
Courses	Recruit	Courses	Recruit	Courses	Recruit	Courses	Recruit	
				5 (Incl 22 set)				2 and 25
						1		1 and 42
				2 (Incl 22 Set)				1 and 33
								8
		1 Offr 3 JCO	18					1 and 21
				1 Offr 3 JCO	43 ??			1 and 46

Figures may change according to whether L/Cpl is made as result of course.

Appendix "A"
Inst. 37

Specialist	Number of Platoons in Regt.	Number of Regiments in Army	Add Units of Div Troops in.
4.2-in Mortar	3	26	NIL
3-in Mortar	3	26	5
M.M.G.	6	26	5
Sniper	3	26	NIL
Pioneer	3	26	NIL
Signallers	3	26	5 ??

/// Probably differently constituted.

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)/NNSA NO. 785020

Appendix 'G' to G/A.1/968
Dated 31 January 1946

...s Regt.	Number of Regiments in Army	Add Units of Div Recce Sq.	Total Number of Platoons.
	26	NIL	52
	26	5	83
	26	5	161
	26	NIL	78
	26	10X	78
	26	5 [illegible]	83

...ably differently constituted.

Permanent E.O. 11095 Section 3-401(b)(3) NO. 785020

SPECIALISTS	Infantry School			Artillery School		Engineer School		Signal School	
	Courses	Recruits	Range Later	Courses	Recruits	Courses	Recruits	Courses	Recruits
4.2-in Mortar	64 offr 288 NCO	672	NCL						160 (incl 22 Sch)
3-in Mortar	63 offr 630 NCO	2430	83						
M.M.G.	161 offr 805 NCO	3864	322						342(incl 22 Sch)
Sniper	312 NCO	312							
Pioneers				78 offrs 234 NCO	1404				
Signallers Regimental								83 offrs 249 NCO	3569
TOTALS	2,543	7,338	405	312	1434			332	4,051

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC Mo. 785020

Appendix 'D' to G/A.1/968
dated 11 January 1946

	Artillery School		Engineer School		Signal School		D & M or Unit	
Range Taker	Courses	Recruits	Courses	Recruits	Courses	Recruits	Courses	Recruits
XXI.					160 (incl 22 Sct)			
XB							83	
322					322(incl 22 Sct)			
			78 Offrs 1404 ORs					
					83 Offrs 5569 ORs			
209		312	1404		332	4051		83

Outline of Schools.

A.1

(18)

Note: This is an outline of only those schools which must be functioning by 1 March 1946. Other schools which Ministry of War says are to be established are still in the argument stage between Min of War and M.M.I.A.

1. Infantry School. CESANO

(a) Recruits Wing to train recruit specialists such as carrier drivers, 3" Mortar men, ~~6 pr Gunners~~. Machine Gunners (Medium Impal)

(b) Courses Wing Weapon training courses and Instructors courses for Officers and NCOs in all Infantry subjects.
Tactical leaders courses.
Mines and Explosives. Weapon Training ETC

2. Artillery School. BRACCIANO

(a) Recruits Wing to train recruits in 25 pr, 17 pr, 40 mm.

(b) Courses Wing Refresher and conversion courses for Officers and NCOs. Specialist training for Gunner specialists. Instructors courses.

3. Engineer School. N.V.D.

(a) Recruits Wing to train recruit Sappers in all types of Eng work, incl road construction, bridging (incl Bailey), mines and explosives and demolitions. Courses for Inf etc. Pioneers.

(b) Courses Wing Courses for Officers and NCOs. Instructors courses, ~~Bridge Heads Courses~~.

4. Signal School. CECCIGNOLA

(a) Recruits courses in all trades and grades for personnel of Signal Corps, Inf, Arty etc, etc.

(b) Instructors courses, officer and NCO refresher courses.

5. Ration School. (All Arms) CIVITAVECCIA
Settle Courses and Junior Leaders Courses
Courses for Coy and Pl Comds
Courses for Senior Officers
Instructors Courses.
No Ration School

6. Administration School RIETI

Courses in Hygiene, Adm, Man Management for all ranks. Senior offrs Courses. Instructors courses in all subjects.

7. P.T. School RIETI

Courses for Instructors in P.T., fencing, judging and refereeing.

8. Police School. RIETI

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Authority N.A. 11043 Section 3(a)(2)/NWRC No. 285020

(a) Recruits Wing to train recruits in 25 pr, 17 pr, 40 mm.

(b) Courses Wing Refresher and conversion courses for Officers and NCOs. Specialist training for Gunner specialists. Instructors courses.

3. Engineer School. N.V.D.

(a) Recruits Wing to train recruit Sappers in all types of Eng work, incl road construction, bridging (incl Bailey), mines and explosives and demolitions. Courses for Inf etc. Pioneers.

(b) Courses Wing Courses for Officers and NCOs. Instructors courses, ~~Radio Mech Courses.~~

4. Signal School. CECCIGNOLA.

(a) Recruits courses in all trades and grades for personnel of Signal Corps, Inf, Arty etc, etc.

(b) Instructors courses, Officer and NCO refresher courses.

5. Tactics School. (All Arms) CIVITAVECCHIA. Battle Courses and Junior Leaders Courses No
Courses for Coy and Pl Comds
Courses for Senior Officers
Instructors Courses.

6. Administration School R.I.E.T.I.

Courses in Hygiene, Adm, Man Management for all ranks. Senior offrs Courses. Instructors courses in all subjects.

7. P.T. School R.I.E.T.I.

Courses for Instructors in P.T., fencing, judging and refereeing.

8. Police School. R.I.E.T.I. 79

Regtl Police courses, Military Police courses, Traffic Control and Road Move courses.
Officer and NCO courses.

9. Driving School. PT CECCIGNOLA.

Driving and Maintenance Courses.

10. E & M. School. CECCIGNOLA & CIVITAVECCHIA

Gun Fitters and Armourers Courses. Driver Mechs, Motor and Vehicle Mechs Courses. Tradesmens courses for various types Mechanics.

11. Automob. NCO. School. Wings of Artillery School

To train NCOs of the Automob Corps in all duties in the Corps.

Cecciguola

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(a)(2) NND No. 785020

CECCL Roma

12. Automob. Specialist School.

To train various highly specialised tradesmen for Italian Army M/Shops.

Automob. CECCI

13. Instructors School.

To train Instructors for the various Automobilistics Trg Estabs.

RIETI Wings of Recruit Schools

14. Commissariat NCO School.

To train NCOs of this Corps in all departments of the Corp's work.

15. Military Academy.

To train Cadets for commissions in all Arms of the Service.

----------oOo----------

Outline of the T.T.C.

1. 11 T.T.C will be established throughout Italy. One will serve each of the Territorial Zones.

i.e.	TURIN	FLORENCE
	MILAN	ROME
	GENOA	NAPLES
	BOLZANO	BARI
	UDINE	SICILI
	BOLOGNA	

2. Each is designed to accomodate and train about 3,700 recruits every four months.

3. A certain number of civilians will be employed on the permanent staff.

4. Each Centre will have a Personnel Selection Board attached to it.

5. Infantry recruits will receive up to Section training. Other Arms recruits will go ~~after~~ after 28 days to the recruit wings of their Arm of the Service School.

WAR OFFICE A.G. 13/65 Section 3 (GEN) No. 785020

SUBJECT :- Notes on the Duties of GSO II Infantry.

17

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66319)

File

Ref : G/A.1/955

23 January 1946.

1. As in the new Establishment there are two GSO II's Infantry, unless the duties are clearly defined a certain amount of overlap is bound to occur.

2. The previous title of GSO II Schools in these notes will be refered to as GSO II Infantry (A), that of GSO II Infantry as GSO II Infantry (B).

3. It is suggested that the work of the GSO II Infantry at the School of Co-operation will require a more intensive supervision than that of the GSO II at the School of Infantry. In any case in the latter instance, owing to the large number s, advice and broad supervision is all that is possible.

4. It is therefore considered that the following division of responsibilities is desirable.

GSO II (A) (Major CHANCE).

Supervision of Co-operation School. Production of Training Policy. Preparation of Tactical Doctrines, Demonstrations, and Training Instructions, covering Infantry Training in general.

GSO II (B) (Major PRICE).

Supervision of Infantry School. Supervision of any Infantry Training carried out apart from the School of Co-operation.
All Office work connected with the Infantry Training, other than purely local work of the GSO II (A).
Supervision of the P.T. School.

5. The above division of work cannot be final. It is considered, however, that Major CHANCE, as he is at the Senior School, must produce the Common Doctrine, Methods and Lessons of which there is a pressing need at the moment. The other GSO II to relieve as far as possible Major CHANCE of all routine items and office work.

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Microfilmed by the Imperial War Museum Reel No. 28520

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It is realised that in many cases (i.e. Weapon Training detail) the policy will come from Infantry School. However, the tactical handling of the Battalion Group and higher training is at present untouched by present regulations, and the preparation of these will be more than a full time task for GSO II (A).

6. Normally in the event of variance of policy, that of GSO II (A) to be accepted. In the event of violent disagreement, the matter to be refered to the Commander.

DLP.

Major GS
Trg & I
12 British Lia.
Italian Central A

DLP/rw.

Declassified T.O. 11583 Section 3 NND/NWPG NO. 785220

SUBJECT :- Infantry Training Notes No. 1.

10

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.
(Tel : ROME 66319)

Ref : G/A.1/958

22 January 1946.

Capo Ufficiale Addestramento,
Comando Scuole Centrale Militari.

To avoid dealing separately with a number of minor points of training it is proposed to issue at intervals a few notes and observations on Infantry matters. Many of the points are from British Training Manuals.

1. New Methods of Instruction.

While considerable interest is shown in this at S.I.V.A. it is apparent that only lip service is paid to this elsewhere. A lecture or demonstration to a course is insufficient. The importance is to ensure that the methods do get down to the NCO.

It is considered that the most vital part of training is to ensure that Instructors have the necessary models, diagrams and other training aids necessary to produce the perfect lesson.

It is considered in most cases that staffs of draughtsmen, model makers, carpenters etc are inadequate and that insufficient preparation of lessons is being undertaken. A precis of suggested Methods of Instruction and Demonstrations has been forwarded and it is suggested that these be suitably translated and passed to Units.

It is also hoped to have a British Method of Instruction Team here in February.

A good suggestion for lectures is that it should be made a rule that all lecturers should have an assistant to produce if necessary the diagrams and other aids, and before the lesson to have prepared the layout of the stores.

2. Library.

The absence of any Quiet Room with books is a notable feature of most schools. A military library is essential if a broader interest is to be taken in the military profession.

The provision of a few comfortable chairs for students off duty is essential. It is realised that there is a shortage of furniture but deck chairs are a beginning as shown by the Artillery.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NND) #: 785020

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Note - a few training manuals do not constitute a library. The provision of it would seem partly a training and partly a welfare matter.

3. Tough Training.

While barracks etc should be as comfortable as possible it is of a great importance that Officers and men should not get soft.

It is very noticeable the number of Officers and men who even on a warm sunny day, walk around at funeral pace with greatcoats on and their hands in their pockets.

The greatcoat should only be worn when very cold and during stationary periods, never on drill and similar periods.

Toughness and physical fitness are essentials for the Infantry and the Infantry School must ensure that this aspect of training is constantly in the fore. On the other hand it can be carried to the extremes when more attention is paid to the cold than the lesson being taught.

...../2.

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3. (Continued)

At the moment it is considered that instruction is too "pansy". (Pelline).

4. Firing from the hip with rifle, and T.M.G.

While this should be taught for close combat fighting it should be remembered that it is very inaccurate. Quick aimed shooting from the shoulder is more effective for 50 - 70 yards ranges and should be practised.

5. Wireless Communications and Training.

The IMPORTANCE of this cannot be too strongly emphasised. All Infantry Officers must :-

(a) Know how to speak over the wireless and preserve signal security and procedure.

(b) Control Artillery fire over the radio. Allied Infantry patrols have met with remarkable success in both Europe and Burma by this, in some cases the Infantry Officers controlling the fire of the Division Artillery. Patrols also can keep direction at night by Wireless.

(c) In the future organisation of the Infantry School the Medium Machine Gun and the 4.2 Mortar will be taught. While the platoon organisation of the latter are not definite for the Italian Army, it is certain that a knowledge of the 48 set and 22 set, will be necessary for the Instructors.

(d) It is essential therefore, that an adequate number of Officers are trained NOW for the Infantry School in 22 Set, 18 set, Field Telephone and 38 set and a signal section formed at the School.

6. Rafting and Vlestation.

This is another subject which at present is not touched upon at the Infantry School.

A waterobstacle must not present an insuperable barrier just because there is no boating and bridging available. A battalion must be able to get all its men, supporting arms, and a portion of its transport across without outside assistance. Therefore all necessary subjects should be taught or demonstrated.

The basic training of knots and lashings, use of clothing and equipment for crossing streams, is easily taught here at CDSMHO. The heavier work of rafting, anti-tank guns etc, might well be given as a demonstration by the Genie.

7. Visual Training by night.

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7. Visual Training by night. 75

The following points should be stressed a s aids to good vision at night.

(a) Always glance at objects out of the corner of the eye, not directly. The direct vision should be about 10 away from the object to be studied. In many cases when driving at night the road is seen clearer if you look at the hedge.

(b) Do not study one object too long.

(c) If it is necessary to use a light (say to read a map), cover one eye with the hand. (Also good before going into a cinema if you want to find a seat quickly).

(d) Use binoculars as much as possible.

...../3.

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8. Digging.

Digging appears even more unpopular in the Italian Army than the British Army. It is nevertheless a vital part of training. The carrying of tools and the taken consolidation should be carried out on all attack exercises. At least one exercise should be of sufficient length to include the digging and camouflage of weapon pits. NOT just scrapes on the ground.

The carrying of 3 or 4 empty sandbags by each man of the Company would be found to assist quick consolidation. This phase is easily the most difficult of all operations.

9. Weapon Training.

3-in and 4.2-in Mortar - Amendments to Range Tables.

It has been known for some time that the 50 per cent probability zones quoted in the range tables for these two equipments are considerably smaller than those usually obtained in service with present ammunition.

Furthermore it is felt that it would assist users if the permissible safety zones both for active service and training were to be set out clearly in the range tables.

For these reasons arrangements are being made to amend the existing range tables to read as follows :-

3-in Mortar.

(a) 50 per cent probability zones.

Charge	At all elevations the approximate 50 per cent probability zones are	
	Length	Breadth
	yds.	yds.
I	75	15
II	150	25

All rounds in general fall within a rectangle of which the length and breadth are four times those of the 50 per cent zones.

(b) Safety Zones for Active Service.

Charge	Overhead Fire.	Flanking Fire.
	yds.	yds.
I	250	150
II	400	150

(c) Safety Zones on Training.

Overhead fire. The Mortar should not be used for firing over the heads of troops on training unless these troops are within

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For these reasons arrangements are being made to amend the existing range tables to read as follows :-

2-in Mortars.

(a) 50 per cent probability zones.

Charge	At all elevations the approximate 50 per cent probability zones are	
	Length	Breadth
	yds.	yds.
I	75	15
II	150	25

All rounds in general fall within a rectangle of which the length and breadth are four times those of the 50 per cent zones.

(b) Safety Zones for Active Service.

Charge	Overhead Fire.	Flanking Fire.
	yds.	yds.
I	250	150
II	400	150

(c) Safety Zones on Training.

Overhead fire. The Mortar should not be used for firing over the heads of troops on training unless these troops are within 200 yds of the mortar.

Flanking Fire. 300 yds. Charge 1 and 2.

4.2-in Mortar.

(a) Fifty per cent Probability Zones under Service conditions.

At all elevations the approximate 50 per cent probability zones for both streamline and cylindrical bombs are :-

Charge	Length	Breadth.
	yds.	yds.
1 and 2	150	40

All rounds will, in general, fall within a rectangle of which the length and breadth are four times those of the 50 per cent zones.

...../4.

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(b) Safety Zones on Active Service.

Charge	Overhead Fire yds	Flanking Fire. yds.
1 and 2	500	250

(c) Safety Zones on Training.

Overhead Fire. The 4.2-in Mortar should not be fired over the heads of troops in training.

Flanking Fire. 500 yds. Charge 1 and 2.

4.2-in Mortar - Fire Orders.

(a) Repitition of Fire Orders by No's. 1. - For some months past all No's 1 have been trained to repeat all fire orders back to the Command Post Commander. On some occasions, especially when the wind has been blowing from the Command Post towards the Mortar Post, this drill has not,worked smoothly. While the orders from the Command Post have easily been heard and understood by the mortar numbers, their answers have not been heard by the Command Post Commander. On other occasions it has seemed that the work of the Mortar Post, and the fire discipline, have been handicapped and slowed down by unnecessary and lengthy repetitions. For these reasons some mortar platoons have suggested discontinuing the drill. Research has prevail, however, that the majority favour continuing it for the following reasons :-

(i) There is very little chance of any mortar number mistaking a fire order, if the Command Post Commander can check that it has been received correctly. In this connection they emphasise that it is often necessary to correct the No's 1 when they repeat the orders back.

(ii) When the mortar numbers furthest away find difficulty in hearing the orders from the Command Post, they are able to pick them up as they are repeated back down the mortar line, and are saved from the necessity of asking for them again.

There will, therefore be no change in the existing official teaching. All mortar numbers will be taught to repeat fire orders back to the Command Post.

(b) Fire Control - Flanking Safety.
It has been found that some instructors and fire controllers are confused over the allowances which must be made for flanking safety before and after main points from impact have been established.

The following notes are intended to remove any such confusion :-

(i) The safety limit for flanking fire is a point on the ground [illegible] the point of impact of the mortar whose

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No's 1 have been trained to repeat fire orders back to the Command Post Commander. On many occasions, especially when the wind has been blowing from the Command Post towards the Mortar Post, this drill has not worked smoothly. While the orders from the Command Post have easily been heard and understood by the mortar numbers, their answers have not been heard by the Command Post Commander. On other occasions it has seemed that the work of the Mortar Post, and the fire discipline, have been handicapped and slowed down by unnecessary and lengthy repetitions. For these reasons some mortar platoons have suggested discontinuing the drill. Research has proved, however, that the majority favour continuing it for the following reasons :-

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The following notes are intended to remove any such confusion :-

(i) The safety limit for flanking fire is a point on the ground 150 yards from the main point of impact of the mortar whose bombs are falling nearest the point of our own troops.

(ii) Just as a minimum safety range for overhead fire is calculated before fire opens, so the fire controller must calculate how close to his own troops the mortars can be laid until he has discovered, by establishing main points of impact, just where the mortars are firing. It is obvious that they cannot be laid as close as 150 yards to the position, as any slight inaccuracy in the calculation of range and line would bring the fire too close to our own troops, and their position to within the safety limit. Therefore, until a main point of impact has been established mortars must NOT be laid within 300 yards of our own troops. This does not necessarily imply that the bombs will fall that distance from the position, but it does ensure that they will not fall dangerously close to it.

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9 (b) (Continued).

(iii) The fire controller will calculate the line from the mortars to our own troops' position, and lay the mortars off by the angle which subtends 300 yards at the range of the mortars to that position. The following table will serve as a guide :-

Range	Angle subtended by 300 yds.
500 yards	34°
1000 "	17°
1500 "	11°
2000 "	9°
2500 "	7°

Until a main point of impact has been established for each mortar in the fire unit, mortars will NOT be switched nearer to our own troops.

(iv) When this has been done and the fire controller knows exactly where his mortars are firing, fire may be brought nearer to our own troops, provided that no part of their position is ever within 150 yards of the nearest main point of impact. This distance is the safety limit.

(v) If the fire controller has to measure this distance from an observation post approximately at right angles to it, the 150 yds must be converted by degrees, the size of the angle depending on the distance from the fire controller to the target.

The following table will serve as a guide :-

Distance.	Degrees subtended by 150 yards.
500 yards	17°
1000 "	9°
1500 "	6°
2000 "	5°
2500	4°

While it is comparitively rare that a target to be engaged is as close as this to the flank of our own troops, the above procedure must be learnt and strictly adhered to. One of the forthcoming amendments to Pamphlet 9 incorporates this teaching in Lesson 69 (Safety).

10 Naming of Barrack Blocks.

Particularly in a Centre like CHERRIGNOLA, it is difficult without a plan to identify the exact locations of various Schools quickly and while most barracks have names (i.e. Duca d' Aosta) this name is nowhere shown at the barracks.

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Major, GSO II,
Trg & Int Trg,
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

WLP/rsw

Internal.

File.
Fleet.

Intelligence R.O. 1961 Section 1-102/XXXX No. 285020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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DISTRICTS ORGANIZATION OF SCHOOLS

COOPERATION SCHOOL I

Courses to be run at CIVITAVECCHIA for Field Officers of various arms and services.- Owing to the importance of the arguments to be dealt with and to the number of men necessaries for practical demonstrations it is advisable that the School should be independent, commanded by a General and under the direct supervision of S.M.R.E.

Following Premises to be occupied:

-Palazzo Gargano : H.Q. of Scool.

"Duca D'Aosta" Barracks: (ex Arty. Barr.) Infantry Formation Regiment.

"Duca degli Abruzzi" Barracks: Tactics & Logistics Courses (S.Rooms, installations, Student's Billets)

-"Sacile" Barracks: (Actually Mech. Sch.) Arty. Formation Group.

-"Aurelia" Barracks: (Act. 1st Regiment) Engineers Sections (Signal. & F.T.)-Pers.

Courses to be started within the month of April if the necessary works could be completed before.

Each Cours to last 8 weeks - 40 Students on the whole.

As the principal object of the above School is to instruct Comm. of Battalions, Sections or of corresponding Offices the teaching should be Mostly applicatory.

As it is not suitable to use only for purposes of demonstration only, an excessive quantity of Troops (1st Inf. Reg., 1st Arty. Group, 1st Sign. Coy., 1st F.T. Coy., 1st A.A.F.V. & Armd car Coy.) we suggest that for the same purpose should be used Btg., Groups or Coy. of Infantry Divisions (by turns of six months or one year each).

In this way the alternation of the various Units employed for training purposes at Civitavecchia would rise in a short time training standard of the whole Army and besidedes it would stir up the spirit of competition.

Each Btg. returning to its Unit after a period of training at Civitavecchia will be for all the Regiment a good example of training.

For each Regiment a permanent Staff could remain in Civitavecchia for the administration of the dependant training Btg. The same could happen for the Groups of Engin. Coys, Platoons & Sections.

Owing to existence of the Central Milit. Schools having a different character of training just to avoid any misunderstanding the Cooperation School of Civitavecchia could be called "Center of Cooperation Studies".

II- The CENTRAL MILIT. SCHOOLS- would comprehend all the other Schools as:

-Infantry School of Cesano
-Arty. School of Bracciano
-Sign. School of Cecchignola
-Field Engin. School of Pietralata
-Mechanisation School of Cecchignola
-F.T. School of Cesano
-M.P. School of Cecchignola
-Services & Welf. Scool of Rieti.-

The H.Q. of the Central Schools to be removed to Rome and dependent directly from the S.M.R.E. Their task would be to supervise, to control and to direct all

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the dependant Schools according to the orders given by S.M.R.E.

The various Schools should be independent as much as possible especially with reference to the Services and administration of Personnel. In this way the School H.Q. would be relieved of the other tasks except of those having connection with the Training and would take the feature of a real D.M.T.

III - INFANTRY SCHOOL -to occupy all the Cesano Area. Its strength is not well known as yet but it is supposed that it will not be over 5000 men, permanent strength enclosed.

The School would deal with,:

-a) Courses of Tactics for inf. Officers (Coy.& Plat.Comm.) and for N.C.Os (Squad Ldr Comm.-)
-b) Courses for Arms Instructors,
-Platoon arms
-
- Snipers
-Carriers
-c) Courses for forming N.C.Os
-d) Courses for Infantry Specialists, (Recruits'), except the Pioneers and the Gunners & Pzs Gunners that could be better trained by the Arty. and Engin. Schools.

The location of services and billets to be as follows:-

H.Q. = Hospital or similar Building within the 3rd zone'
Tactics Courses = } 4th zone area
Courses for N.C.Os = }
Courses for Arms } 3rd zone area
" " " Spec. }

Officers Billets & N.C.Os Bill.-with family :2nd zone area;
Transports & Services -Fabbrica Chimica - (ex B&M and D&M Schools)

What remains of the "Fabbrica Chimica" could be used for the Civilians (Shops, Chemistry, Schools, Cinema, Dwellings)
The Premises actually used by the CO.MI . could be used as a military village for the Students.
The bigshed of the Driver School to be transformed as a Theatre .

IV - ARTY.SCHOOL to occupie all the Bracciano Area with a Detachment at S.Severa or Civitavecchia with all the necessary materials and targets for the anti-tk tank sh.

V- SIGNALS SCHOOL At the Cecchignola : The area already occupied being quite sufficient for further necessities.
The School should be disjoined from the Engin. Regiment.

VI - FIELD ENGIN.SCHOOL To be located not far from a river and in such a place

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where a large zone could be available for the training with explosives and rocky ground also for training.

The Pietralata zone answeres to all the above requirements but it should be handed over by the Allied as soon as possible so that all the necessary works and ranges could be prepared for the training of the new recruites. In any case before the end of February the F.Eng.Shool must be transferred because the Barracks of Bracciano must be handed over to the Arty.School.

VII - MECHANISATION SCHOOL - including two Schools:
-Driver School - at the Cecchignola
Mechanics School & Arty..rtis.School - at Civitavecchia

Two more School are supposed to be attached. Same Schools to started at Rome care of the Inspectorate of Mechanisation. One more School - Tank Driver S. - to be started in future.

The zone mostly fit for a Mechanis.S. is that of the Cecchignola because of the ground available and of the existing buildings. It is necessary therefore to transfer the M.S. to Cecchignola from Civitavecchia on the first days of January because the new Courses should be started the 14th of January.

With reference to the Mechanis.S. it would be better to make things clear, (because The new Shools to be started in Rome (Repaires School & Instructors S.) could turn out to be an useless copy of the S.M.O.A.

Our Army lacks - or it existence is not well clears-of Radio, Mechanicin of precision and electricity Repairs Shops. These Services should be unified and a new Corp or Service should be constituted (taking the R.E.M.E. as example) for all kind of Mech. & Electr. Repaires (S.R.E.M.). The question is very important and in this case the training of Drivers and Kanteinance (D & M) could be abolished and eventually combined to the analogous Treining of Carriers.

Nothing is known yet about the Tank-Driver School that should be transfered to ~~Civitavecchia~~ Tarquinia although the same could be conveniently settled at Civitavecchia. Tarquinia is however much more convenient for a Tank-Driver School.

VIII - P.T.SCHOOL - To be transfered to Rieti. The present Premises of the Shool at at Cesano are quite satisfactory so that it is useless for the School to be transfered until a more convenient location will be found (part of the Foro Mussolini or one of the many P.T. Buildings built.....

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built by the Fascists.For the moment it is much better to let it stay where it is moreover that all the works that are beeing done for the above School will be useful in a second time for the Infantry School. At Cesano for a long time there will be surely no lack of room.

The transfer of above School that in any case could not happen before the the month of March,is for the moment quite useless.

IX - N.P. SCHOOL - For many a good reason it is much better that this School should not be located too far from the H.Q. of the Central Schools.The location of Cecchignola will be most convenient for same and the ground there,is mostly convenient for the training of Motorcyclists.

X - SERVICES & WELFARE SCHOOL - To include all the Courses of Logistics (except those for Field Officers),of Higiene and Wellfare of soldiers,previously run by SIVA.

To above Courses others should be added for Clerks,Administration personnel,Store-Keepers,Draughtsmen,Shorthandwriters etc..

It should be besides the Center for the wellfare of all the Schools and an example of organisation not only for the training but for anything else.

The School could be started on April next.

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It is absolutely necessary that the plan of the reorganisation of the Schools should be discussed,examined and definitly settled as soon as possible.

No change of location and of programs of the Schools should not be ordered during the Courses and all new dispositions should be given and decided in accordance with the present situation of the Courses.

ORGANIZZAZIONE DEFINITIVA DELLE SCUOLE

E - SCUOLA DELLA COOPERAZIONE

a Civitavecchia.-

Vi si svolgeranno corsi per ufficiali superiori delle varie armi e dei servizi.-

Date il livello elevato degli studi e l'entità delle truppe occorrenti alla fisionomia applicativa dei corsi, é opportuno che tale Scuola sia completamente autonoma, alle dirette dipendenze delle S.M.R.E.ed al comando di un generale.-

L'utilizzazione degli impianti potrebbe essere la seguente:

- Palazzo Gargano: Comando della Scuola
- Caserma duca degli Abruzzi: Corsi tattici e logistici(aule, impianti, alloggi degli allievi)
- Caserma duca d'Aosta: (ex caserma art.) Regg. Fanteria di Formazione
- Caserma Sacile: (era Sc. mecc.)Gruppo Artiglieria di formazione
- Caserma Aurelia: (era I°Regg.) Reparti Genio(colleg. e artieri)di formazione.-

I nuovi corsi potrebbero avere inizio, qualora i lavori di sistemazione precedessero con la dovuta celerità, entro il prossimo mese di Aprile.

I corsi potrebbero avere la durata di 8 settimane per 40 allievi complessivamente.-

Dato che lo scopo precipuo di questa Scuola é la formazione dei Comandanti di btg. e di reparto e ufficio corrispondente, ai corsi stessi deve essere dato carattere eminentemente applicativo.-

D'altronde si riconosce che non é opportuno impiegare, ai soli fini dimostrativi tutte il complesso di truppe richiesto dal carattere dei corsi (I°Regg.ftr., I° gr.art., 1^ cp. colleg., 1^ cp.artieri, 1^ cp. carri e autoblinde) epperciò si suggerisce di utilizzare a tali scopi dei battaglioni, gruppi e compagnie delle divisioni di fanteria, a turno(semestrale o annuale).

In questo modo l'alternarsi di questi reparti

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- Caserma duca degli Abruzzi: Corsi tattici e logistici(aule, impianti, alloggi degli allievi)
- Caserma duca d'Aosta: (ex caserma art.) Regg. Fanteria di Formazione
- Caserma Sacile: (era Sc. mecc.)Gruppo Artiglieria di formazione
- Caserma Aurelia: (era I°Regg.) Reparti Genio(colleg. e artieri)di formazione.-

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In questo modo l'alternarsi di questi reparti in addestramento a Civitavecchia oltre a suscitare un sano spirito di competizione eleverebbe in breve tempo lo "standard" dell'addestramento in tutto l'esercito.

Il battaglione che rientra da Civitavecchia al termine del suo periodo di addestramento rappresenterà per gli altri reparti del suo reggimento una scuola vera e propria.-

A Civitavecchia, come quadro permanente ci sarebbe solo il Comando di reggimento destinato ad inquadrare i battaglioni in addestramento. Così per il gruppo nei riguardi delle batterie e le compagnie genio per i pletoni e sezioni.

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Bollettino n.p. 11961 Serie 3-A02/MMG no. 285020

Data l'esistenza delle Scuole centrali militari ed il diverso carattere dell'addestramento da esse impartito la Scuola di cooperazione potrebbe, eventualmente, assumere il nome di "Centro Studi Cooperazione" per non ingenerare confusioni con le predette Scuole Centrali

II- SCUOLE CENTRALI MILITARI - comprendenti tutte le altre Scuole e cioé:
- Scuola di fanteria a Cesano
- Scuola di Artiglieria a Bracciano
- Scuola Collegamenti alla Cecchignola
- Scuola Arieri a Pietralata
- Scuola della Meterizzazione alla Cecchignola
- Scuola di Educazione Fisica a Cesano
- Scuola di Polizia alla Cecchignola
- Scuola Servizi e Assistenza a Rieti.-

Il Comando delle Scuole Centrali dovrebbe essere dislocato a Roma e dipendere direttamente dallo S.M.R.E. col compito di coordinare l'attività delle varie scuole, emanare le direttive in base agli ordini dello S.M.R.E. seguire e controllare l'attività delle Scuole stesse.

Le varie scuole dovrebbero essere autonome il più possibile specialmente per quanto concerne i servizi e la parte personale e matricola.

Ciò permetterebbe al Comando delle Scuole Centrali di alleggerirsi dei compiti non connessi all'addestramento e quindi di assumere le caratteristiche di un ispettorato dell'addestramento (D.M.T.) vero e proprio.

III - SCUOLA DI FANTERIA occuperebbe tutta l'area di Cesano. Non si conosce ancora l'entità della forza da addestrare ma si può prevedere che non si supereranno le 5000 unità tra allievi e quadre permanente. 4.000 ÷ 5000

La Scuola dovrebbe svolgere:
- a) Corsi tattici per ufficiali inferiori (comand. di compagnia e di plotone) e per sottufficiali comandanti di squadra.
- b) Corsi per istruttori di armi:

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- Scuola di Educazione Fisica a Cesano
- Scuola di Polizia alla Cecchignola
- Scuola Servizi e Assistenza a Rieti.-

Il Comando delle Scuole Centrali dovrebbe essere dislocato a Roma e dipendere direttamente dallo S.M.R.E. col compito di coordinare l'attività delle varie scuole, emanare le direttive in base agli ordini dello S.M.R.E. seguire e controllare l'attività delle Scuole stesse.

Le varie scuole dovrebbero essere autonome il più possibile specialmente per quanto concerne i servizi e la parte personale e matricola.

Ciò permetterebbe al Comando delle Scuole Centrali di alleggerirsi dei compiti non commessi all'addestramento e quindi di assumere le caratteristiche di un ispettorato dell'addestramento (D.M.T.) vero e proprio.

III - <u>SCUOLA DI FANTERIA</u> occuperebbe tutta l'area di Cesano. Non si conosce ancora l'entità della forza da addestrare ma si può prevedere che non si supererranno le 5000 unità tra allievi e quadre permanente. 4000 ÷ 5000

La Scuola dovrebbe svolgere:

- a) Corsi tattici per ufficiali inferiori (comand. di compagnia e di plotone) e per sottufficiali comandanti di squadra.
- b) Corsi per istruttori di armi:
  - armi di plotone
  - armi di accompagnamento
  - snipers
  - carriere per armi di accompagnam.
- c) Corsi per la formazione di sottufficiali
- d) Corsi per specialisti di fanteria delle classi di leva esclusi i pionieri e i cannonieri da 6 libbre che possono meglio svolgere tali corsi presso le scuole del Genio e di Artiglieria.

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La dislocazione degli impianti ed alloggiamenti potrebbe essere la seguente:

C.do = All'Ospedale e edifici analoge del 3° lotto;

Corsi tattici
Corsi all. settuff. } Area IV lotto

Corsi armi
" specializzazione } Area III ° lotto

Abitazioni ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ ufficiali e sottufficiali con famiglia: Area II° lotto;

Trasporti e servizi - fabbrica chimica - (ex Scuole R&M e D&M)

Il rimanente della fabbrica chimica potrebbe essere edibite a villaggio civile(negozi, farmacia, scuole, cinema) e per abitazioni.
Quale villaggio militare per gli allievi potrebbe essere utilizzato il quadrato ora occupato dai CC.RR..
Il grosso capannone già della Scuola Autieri dovrebbe essere trasformato in teatro.

IV SCUOLA DI ARTIGLIERIA - Occuperebbe tutta l'area di Bracciano con un distaccamento a San Severa e Civitavecchia per il materiale e bersagli occorrenti per i tiri anticarro.

V SCUOLA COLLEGAMENTI - Alla Cecchignola come al presente;l'area di cui dispone è ampiamente sufficiente anche per i bisogni futuri.
Occorre però staccarla dal Reggimento Genio che ormai non ha più ragione di essere.

VI SCUOLA ARTIERI - E' indispebsabile sia collocata nelle vicinanze di corsi d'acqua e che disponga di una ampia area libera per l'addestramen e con gli esplosivi e di terreno idoneo per i lavori in roccia.
La zona di Pietralata risponde a questi re-

Allegato n. 285220

Il rimanente della fabbrica chimica potrebbe essere edibito a villaggio civile(negozi, farmacia, scuole, cinema) e per abitazioni.
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La zona di Pietralata risponde a questi requisiti. Occorrerebbe però che fosse lasciata libera dall'Autorità Alleata al più preste per iniziare in tempo utile la preparazione degli impianti e poligoni per l'addestramento della nuova classe. In ogni case entro la fine di febbraio la Scuola Artieri di deve trasferire per lasciare tutta la Caserma funzionale di Bracciano alla Scuola di Artiglieria.

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28502

VII SCUOLA DELLA MOTORIZZAZIONE - Comprende ora due Scuole:
- Scuola Autieri - Alla Cecchignola
- Scuola Meccanici ed Operai di Artiglieria - A Civitavecchia.

Sembra vi debbano essere aggiunte altre due Scuole, costituite, o in via di costituzione, a Roma a cura dell'Ispettorato della Motorizzazione, ed in avvenire, anche una Scuola Carristi.
La zona idonea per tutte le attività della Scuola della Motorizzazione è quella della Cecchignola sia come terreno che come impianti.
Occorre perciò trasferire la Scuola Meccanici da Civitavecchia alla Cecchignola e tale trasferimento dovrebbe aver luogo ai primi di gennaio (date che il 14 gennaio hanno inizio i corsi).
A proposito della Scuola della Motorizzazione occorrerebbe chiarire le idee: le due nuove Scuole in costituzione a Roma (scuole riparazioni e Scuola istruttori) sembrano in certo modo un doppione della S.M.O.A.
Al nostro esercito manca, ovvero non è ben definito, il servizio delle riparazioni radio, meccaniche di precisione e elettriche.
Occorrerebbe unificare questi servizi sul tipo del R.E.M.E. in un corpo e servizio della Riparazioni elettroMeccaniche (S.R.E.M.). La questione è molto importante e va riveduta poichè l'addestramento alla guida e manutenzione (B & M) dovrebbe essere messo a parte ed eventualmente riunito all'addestramento analogo dei cingolati.
Circa la Scuola Carristi non si sa ancora nulla. Sembra si voglia dislocare a Tarquinia ma si ritiene che possa trovar posto conveniente anche a Civitavecchia.
Il terreno di Tarquinia però è ottimo per l'addestramento dei carri.

VIII SCUOLA DI EDUCAZIONE FISICA. E' stato ordinato

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Cecchignola sia come terreno che come impianto.
Occorre perciò trasferire la Scuola Meccanici da Civitavecchia alla Cecchignola e tale trasefrimento dovrebbe aver luogo ai primi di gennaio (date che il 14 gennaio hanno inizio i corsi).
A proposito della Scuola della Motorizzazione occorrerebbe chiarire le idee: le due nuove Scuole in costituzione a Roma (scuole riparazioni e Scuola istruttori) sembrano in certo modo un doppione della S.M.O.A.
Al nostro esercito manca, ovvero non è ben definito, il servizio delle riparazioni radio, meccaniche di precisione e elettriche.
Occorrerebbe unificare questi servizi sul tipo del R.E.M.E. in un corpo o servizio delle Riparazioni elettro-meccaniche (S.R.E.M.). La questione è molto importante e va riveduta poichè l'addestramento alla guida e manutenzione (D & M) dovrebbe essere messo a parte ed eventualmente riunito all'addestramento analogo dei cingolati.
Circa la Scuola Carristi non si sa ancora nulla. Sembra si voglia dislocare a Tarquinia ma si ritiene che possa trovar posto conveniente anche a Civitavecchia.
Il terreno di Tarquinia però è ottimo per l'addestramento dei carri.

VIII SCUOLA DI EDUCAZIONE FISICA. E' stato ordinato di trasferirla a Rieti.
La presente sistemazione della Scuola a Cesano è molto soddisfacente e va sempre migliorando perciò finchè non si potranno avere impianti adatti (piccola parte dell'ex Foro Mussolini) e una delle tante grandi palestre costruite dal Fascismo si ritiene che sia preferibile lasciarla dov'è anche per il fatto che i lavori di miglioramento che si faranno non andranno perduti dopo il trasferimento della Scuola dato che gli impianti di Cesano potranno servire molto bene alla Scuola di Fanteria.
A Cesano inoltre per un bel pò di tempo non ci sarà certamente crisi di spazio.
Non si vede perciò la ragione del trasferimento

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che in ogni caso non potrà avvenire prima del mese di marzo prossimo.

IX SCUOLA DI POLIZIA - Per molte ragioni è conveniente che non sia lontana dalla sede del comando Scuole Centrali. Alla Cecchignola potrà sistemarsi egregiamente e disporre di terreno ideale per l'addestramento dei motociclisti.

X SCUOLA DEI SERVIZI E ASSISTENZA - Comprenderebbe tutti i corsi di Logistica (meno quelli per Ufficiali Superiori) di igiene e cura del soldato già della SIVA.
In più si dovrebbe provvedere all'addestramento (sottufficiali e truppa) del personale di ufficio, di contabilità, magazzinieri, disegnatori, stenografi ecc..
Dovrebbe inoltre diventare il Centro del benessere di tutte le Scuole e modello di organizzazione non solo ai fini didattici bensì anche a quelli del benessere.
La Scuola potrà iniziare il suo funzionamento nel prossimo aprile.

B' indispensabile che il piano della riorganizzazione delle Scuole sia discusso, esaminato e definito chiaramente al più presto .
E' necessario anche evitare, in modo assoluto che siano ordinati cambiamenti di sedi e di compiti delle Scuole durante lo svolgimento dei corsi. Le date relative debbono essere quindi concordate in base all'attività addestrativa in corso e in programma.

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quelli per Ufficiali Superiori) igiene e cura del soldato già della SIVA.
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Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.5(b)/NNDB no. 785020

~~SUBJECT: Training~~

Land Forces Sub-Cd., AC (INDIA)

G/TRG/1

7 Jan 45

TO : List A
List B

A3
Folio 51
Refers

1. I think it advisable to prepare a complete review of all training and training facilities in the Italian Army. This handbook will be called "Italian Army Training and Training Establishments". Action will therefore be taken accordingly forthwith.

2. The handbook will contain a complete list of the schools and training centres scheduled to be in operation on 15 Mar 45.

3. Each and every subject will be covered fully. The following information will be recorded for every establishment:-

(A) FOREWORD - Policy

(B) (i) English and Italian Designation
(ii) Location - map ref
(iii) HE of instrs and permanent staff
(iv) Plan of barracks showing lay-out in detail
(v) Maps showing reserved military areas, ranges or fields firing zones.

(C) (i) Syllabi of courses run and arrangement of squads or classes
(ii) Estimate of numbers to be catered for at each course
(iii) Totals to pass through each phase and/or school annually (show offrs - WOs - Ptes)

(D) Miscellaneous points of interest

4. DSO 1(Trg) will be editor in chief.

5. Target date for completion of the Handbook, 21 Feb 45.

6. Heads of Branches and Services are allotted assistant editorships as follows and will speak for their department at the editors meeting:-

(a) - Inf - Tac
- RA - Weapon Trg
- Sigs - Adm
- Engrs - PT
RAC - Police
} - DSO 1(Trg)

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(a) - Inf - Tac
- RA - Weapon Trg
- Sigs - Adm
- Engrs - PT
TTC - Police
} - GSC 1(Trg)

(b) - Art Repair
- Motorisation (Repair)
} - AMWO

(c) Med - AMWO

(d) CC.RR - GSC 1(CC.RR)

(e) - MT Trg
Commissariats
} - AMST

7. A meeting of assistant editors will be held on 1 Feb to assess work done to date and to compare notes as to best final form of the Handbook. It is hoped that by this date most of the work will have been completed and that the editor can start putting the whole work together.

Conference Rm HQ
Monday 1 2 1/2

L Browning

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Notes on Reorganisation and Training at R.T.C. I.C.F. [illegible]

F.C. (3)

'F' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref : G/A.1/899

19 November 1945.

1. Organisation.

The CENTRE is modelled on the divisional organisation and was based on the old 'PIGEON' Division. Broadly speaking each arm of the service, with the exception of Transport, ran both a Depot for Recruits and a School for Instructors and Commanders. Infantry and M.T. was centered on CESANO and other arms on BRACCIANO. (See Appendix 'A'.) It was originally intended that recruits of all arms should pass through the Reception Regiment and receive 4 months basic training, but this never proved possible. As a result of experience and changed circumstances the organisation as in Appendix 'B' is in force, though establishments in general have not been changed.

2. History of Centre.

The Centre started in January 1945. At that time, while the structure of most barracks was complete, almost all were without doors, windows and fittings of all types.

Infantry training started at CESANO in February but was of a most unsatisfactory nature until the end of March, as the equipment and clothing was insufficient to deal with the large numbers of men present in the Centre and the Instructors in most cases knew nothing about the weapons and tactics they were supposed to instruct in.

Until the end of March only the Signal and Artillery training was anything approaching satisfactory. Both these Schools were formed from existing Signals Schools, for Signals at MOGGIA and Artillery run by No. 10 Training Team, R.A.

The Instructors School, Police School, and Mechanics School all opened in April. The lateness in starting was in all cases due to non-availability of accommodation and Instructors. In general, however, the Centre was not able to produce satisfactory training results before the war finished, though a large number of men received elementary training.

With the finish of the war, improvement was gradual during June and July, but at the end of the latter month demobilisation began seriously affect the efficiency of the Centre. Particularly in technical arms of the the services the Instructors demobilised were impossible to replace. Moreover the closing of various Centres and the big demands by the Combat Groups for replacements gave this Centre in August and the beginning of September the nature of a Transit Camp and brought training, except at the Instructors School almost to a standstill.

October saw the start of the planning for the future training layout of the Centre, and the Centre undertook to try to produce 3,000 Instructors for Territorial Training

Released under the 1966 Public Records Act 28/220

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Until the end of March only the Signal and Artillery training was anything approaching satisfactory. Both these Schools were formed from existing Signals Schools, for Signals at NOCERA and Artillery run by No. 10 Training Team, R.A.

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October saw the start of the planning for the future training layout of the Centre, and the Centre undertook to try to produce 3,000 Instructors for Territorial Training Centres by the end of the year.

3. Present Training Progress. -61

The Instructors School, the Infantry School and the two Infantry Regiments are concerned with the production of Instructors for Territorial Training Centres.

	190	Senior Officers are under training at the Instructors School.
	398	Platoon Commanders at Infantry School.
1,	306	Senior N.C.Os are under training at the 2nd Regiment.
	956	Junior N.C.Os at the 1st Regiment.
TOTAL	2,850	Already trained.

This training is very rushed and in the case of those under training at the 2nd Regiment is being interfered with by the failure to complete to schedule the contract on the building.

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In some cases these are in the process of moving in while others are training more Instructors to meet future requirements.

1. Description of Schools and Regiments.

Instructors School. Situated at MANZIANA, is organised on the lines of the C.M.T.C., BENEVENTO. Courses run are as follows.

1. Tactical (3) for Senior Officers, Company Commanders and Junior Leaders.
2. Weapon Training School for Officers and N.C.Os in all Infantry Weapons.
3. Administration School. Covering the administration and Hygiene and Man Management.

The School normally has about 200 students. The training area at MANZIANA is excellent but accomodation is almost entirely requisitioned and is not good. Moreover, it will not allow for expansion. The School will change its form under the new Training scheme and will not remain in MANZIANA.

Artillery School. Situated at BRACCIANO. This School teaches both Instructors and recruits in 40mm, 25 pdr, and 17 pdr Anti Tank. Will remain at BRACCIANO but will take over accomodation at present occupied by Engineers and Signallers.

The situation as regards weapon is satisfactory and barracks are in good condition.

Engineer School. Situated at present at BRACCIANO. Training recruits and Instructors in Field Works, Bailey Bridging, Mines and Demolitions, Water Duties and Road Construction. No Wet Bridging and Assault Crossing is training is attempted at the moment. This School is due to move but the final location is not definitely fixed.

The present site is adequate for present needs but is not sufficiently large for the expansion required, and training facilities are limited.

Signals School. Situated at BRACCIANO and is capable of instructing up to 400 students, on the various equipments contained in British Infantry Divisions. This School is in the process of moving to new barracks at CECCIGNOLA. The Artillery School moving in vacated barracks.

D & M School. Was at CESANO but has recently moved to CECCIGNOLA, where the accommodation is far more satisfactory.

When all vehicles are on the road, can train up to 400 pupils in Driving and Maintenance. This School has suffered in the past by having unreliable vehicles and very poor accommodation.

E & M School. Situated at CIVITAVECCHIA where it has been for about one month. Teaches Fitters, Electrical Mechanics, Driver Mechanics, Gun Fitters and Armourers. At the moment it has a capacity of 400 but has never reached this figure owing to shortage of suitable pupils and Instructors. The present barracks is very suitable but will not allow for a great deal of expansion. The School has difficulties as the Italians have no equivalent of the British R.E.M.E. and many types of trades are not covered.

[illegible] situated at CESANO and designed to train N.C.Os and

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school and will not remain in MATTLIA.

Artillery School. Situated at BRACCIANO. This School teaches both Instructors and recruits in 40mm, 25 pdr, and 17 pdr Anti Tank. Will remain at BRACCIANO but will take over accommodation at present occupied by Engineers and Signallers.

The situation as regards ranges is satisfactory and barracks are in good condition.

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Infantry School. Situated at CESANO and designed to train N.C.Os and Infantry Specialist reinforcements. Original capacity was 400 but has been expanded and can now deal with double that number. A Physical Training School has been added. The principle difficulty is that it is still officially on its old establishment. This School will expand to include most of the CESANO Area. In general the CESANO area is very suitable for training, but accommodation is not all complete yet and living conditions for Officers and Men are not attractive.

Police School. CESANO. Capacity 150 students. Courses are run for Provost Officers and men, and Regimental Police. This School suffers from very poor accommodation, and will be moving.

No. 1 Infantry Regiment. Situated at CIVITAVECCHIA. Normally trains recruits but at the moment is training Junior N.C.Os. Maximum number of men able to be trained 1,200. Both Barracks and Training Area are very adequate. Is due to be disbanded under future organisation of Training Centre,

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No. 2 Infantry Regiment. Normally trains Recruits but at the moment is training Senior N.C.Os. Maximum Capacity of Regiment 2,500. At the moment the barrack accommodation is only half completed.

3. General State of Progress.

Accommodation troubles which have been one of the principle difficulties should be solved by the end of 1945. Training Equipment is generally satisfactory for normal purposes. While there are a number of improvised rifle ranges, a considerable amount of work is still required on these to be up to the standard of a peace time Centre.

Facilities for games and sports are still very remote, but it is difficult at the moment to find men and materials to do this work.

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'P' British Liaison &
Training Unit NEC ICF.

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Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'F' British Liaison &
Training Unit MTC ICF.

WLP/rsw

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R.T.C. I.C.F. CESANO

'F' N.L.O. ---------- H.Q., 'PICENO' DIVISION.

152 H.Q. Schools.

152 L.A.D. CESANO | 152 L.A.D. CESANO. | CAMOUFLAGE SCHOOL. CESANO. | RATION, CLOTHING & POL STORE - CESANO | 319 M.T. BAKERY CESANO. | 152 [illegible] CESANO

HQ No. 1 Reception Dept. CESANO.
- Bn.
- Bn.
- Bn.

HQ No. 2 Inf Regt CESANO.
- Bn.
- Bn.
- Bn.

HQ No. 3 Composite BRACCIANO
- Mixed Arms Bn.
- Engrs [illegible]

152 Infantry School CESANO.

152 Mt Div't School BRACCIANO

152 Italian Combat Force Sig Trg Centre BRACCIANO


152 Arty School BRACCIANO

152 D & M School CESANO.

152 Rec [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5D56 NO. 785020

ANNEXURE 'A'
ORIENTATION LAYOUT
CRITERIA 7,500.



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSG NO. 785020

R.T.O. I.C.F. CESANO.

'F' BL & TA & 152 I: Increase. H.Q. 'FICHTO' DIVISION, CE/734/1

152 H.Q. Schools.

155 Italian Workshops CESANO.

CARABINIERI SECTION

CARABINIERI SCHOOL CESANO.

1500 TONNE TPT PL. CESANO CE/553/1

RATION, CLOTHING & POL STORE CE/735/1 CESANO.

152 L.A.D. CE/540/1 CESANO.

319 [illegible] CESANO CE/

H.Q. No.1 Inf Regt Civitavecchia CE/734/1

Bn. Bn.

H.Q. No.2 Inf Regt CESANO. CE/740/1

Bn. Bn.

H.Q. No.3 Regt BRACCIANO

152 Combat Force Sig Trg Centre CECCHIGNOLA. CE/747/1

152 Infantry School CESANO. CE/750/1

P.T. School.


152 Arty School & Depot BRACCIANO. CE/743/1

152 Mechanics School CIVITAVECCHIA CE/752/1


152 D & T School CECCHIGNOLA. CE/991/1

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5D20 No. 785020

APPENDIX 'B'
FIELD LAYOUT
OPTION 11,200.



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NARS No. 785020



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDB No. 785020

Lake Bracciano

MANZIANA

Engineer Artillery

BRACCIANO

ANZIO

Regt Sig Bd Pol

56

Route 2

Route 1

Route 5

ROME

PECCHIGNOLA

Dim. School

Signal School

Ch. REGISTRY: General Notes - C.II (Inf)

'P' BRITISH LIAISON & TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref: A.1/322

5 Dec. 45.

To: Major R.M. Boyle, D.F.C.

Copy to: Capt. L.M. Roberts, Wilts.

1. Training.

Training programmes for Infantry School and Regiments are submitted usually weekly, though the detailed programme for the period of training is normally made out in the first place by myself.

Training from the Infantry point of view should run fairly smoothly up to December.

2. Future Planning.

I have discussed with Col. SIVO general outlines for the formation of an Infantry School. The main points are those of accommodation and, to a minor degree, M.C.O. training.

If the Infantry School is going to be properly accommodated and quarters for married families provided it is of paramount importance that this Centre should comprise the whole of CERANO, including the area at present under dispute with DEFENSA COSTIERA. As this Infantry Centre, with permanent staff, may consist of up to 5,000 bodies and also have in its midst the Comando Scuola Centrale Militari, there will be very little space left over. Col. SIVO and myself are in full agreement on measures to be taken which, as this includes the dissolving of the Hospital as an unnecessary luxury and its use as an H.Q. building, it is felt that some opposition may be made from Gen. HONCO. The only other accommodation problems are as follows :-

It is intended to keep the butted camp at MANCIANA as an advanced base or, in other words, as a Field Firing Camp, so as to be able to use the excellent range areas at MANCIANA for M.G. and 3" Mortar shoots, as the present training areas are too limited for the vast numbers anticipated.

3. Immediate Training Requirements.

At the earliest possible opportunity it will be essential to train vastly increased numbers of 3-inch Mortar and M.G. Instructors; also a limited number of Carrier Instructors. This should take place round about

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC No. 285020

1. Training.

Training programmes for Infantry School and Regiments are submitted usually weekly, though the detailed programme for the period of training is normally made out in the first place by myself.

Training from the Infantry point of view should run fairly smoothly up to December.

2. Future Planning.

I have discussed with Col. SIVO general outlines for the formation of an Infantry School. The main points are those of accommodation and, to a minor degree, N.C.O. training.

If the Infantry School is going to be properly accommodated and quarters for married families provided it is of paramount importance that this Centre should comprise the whole of CECANO, including the area at present under dispute with DIVISIONE CREMONA. As this Infantry Centre, with permanent staff, may consist of up to 5,000 bodies and also have in its midst the Comando Scuole Centrali Militari, there will be very little space left over. Col. SIVO and myself are in full agreement on measures to be taken which, as this includes the dissolving of the Hospital as an unnecessary luxury and its use as an H.Q. building, it is felt that some opposition may be made from Gen. BENCO. The only other accommodation problems are as follows :-

It is intended to keep the hutted camp at MANZIANA as an advanced base or, in other words, as a Field Firing Camp, so as to be able to use the excellent range areas at MANZIANA for M.G. and 3" Mortar shoots, as the present training areas are too limited for the vast numbers anticipated.

3. Immediate Training Requirements.

At the earliest possible opportunity it will be essential to train vastly increased numbers of 3-inch Mortar and M.G. Instructors; also a limited number of Carrier Instructors. This should take place round about Jan. 15 as far as possible. At the moment I have arranged, and there is running, an 3-inch Mortar Wireless Course. This must be extended and the universal introduction of the 38 set considered.

It is absolutely essential that now the Vickers .303 M.G. Pamphlets be forwarded to M.M.I.A. for translation into Italian so as to be ready when this new weapon applies. In view of the fact that the 6 pdr is no longer an Infantry weapon it is suggested that the 6 pdr NCO we have at present be replaced by an MG Instructor as I myself know nothing about either. This part about the M.G. is of paramount importance.

4. Other Infantry Matters.

My views on the P.T. School are well known. If they cannot go to RCSE then they should stop here

5. Roads and Squares in the Camp.

If nothing happens about this in the next week, General CURTIS-ZIZA should be chivvied. AFHQ Eng promised to supply Bitumen but also, unless chivvied, is, in my opinion, unlikely to do so.

...../2.

55

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND No. 285220

6. Other Work.

I am very worried that while the Ministry of War has undertaken the supply of all training materials and ammunition, that there will be difficulties here; if so we can always start on the old system. In the past a British Officer used to keep a check on all the equipment held by the Italians.

This has been allowed to lapse, though Capt. Smith officially holds the appointment of C.S.O.III Trg. & Eqpt. It is suggested that Capt. Roberts might interest himself in this.

7. General Remarks.

People here started to do some training now. It would seem that the main job would be to improve the standard of instruction and the training facilities.

Rifle Ranges are very bad. I have spoken to Col. ZUVO about this and the first repairs are under way, but a certain amount of shovelling is necessary here.

Training Materials -- The Italians are very short of training manuals and further British manuals will be of assistance to cover the interim period.

Probably the worst feature at the moment, though not an Infantry matter, is the appalling lack of trained fitters, armourers, etc. In the Centre, as at the moment we are probably 25% or more under our present Specialists establishment -- with the new, greatly enlarged Centre, we will probably be 90%. A drive is essential here.

Finally, with the disbandment of many units there will be a great deal of job hunting on the part of Italian Officers and I consider it is essential, with Col. Silva's aid, to watch some of the appointments for the new Schools.

(Sgd) W. L. PRIDE.

Major R.Staffs.
CSO.II. Trg.& Inf.Trg.

WLP/sh.

External.

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.5(c)/NNDB No. 785020

7. General Remarks.

People have started to do some training now. It would seem that the main job would be to improve the standard of instruction and the training facilities.

Rifle Ranges are very bad. I have spoken to Col. SIVO about this and the first repairs are under way, but a certain amount of chivvying is necessary here.

Training Materials -- The Italians are very short of training manuals and further British manuals will be of assistance to cover the interim period.

Probably the worst feature at the moment, though not an Infantry matter, is the appalling lack of trained fitters, armorers, etc. in the Centre, as at the moment we are probably 25% or more under our present Specialists establishment -- with the new, greatly enlarged Centre, we will probably be 70%. A drive is essential here.

Finally, with the disbandment of many units there will be a great deal of job hunting on the part of Italian Officers and I consider it is essential, with Col. Sivo's aid, to watch some of the appointments for the new Schools.

(Sgd) W. L. PRICE.

Major R.Staffs.
GSO.II. Trg.4 Inf.Trg.

WLP/ah.

External.

File.
Fleet.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/5(D) NS. 785282

(11)

SUBJECT :- Weapon Training - Methods of Instruction.

'P' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref : G/A.1/902

20 November 1945.

Officer i/c Training,
R.T.C., I.C.F.

1. Listening to Weapon Training instruction, it is noticed that too much useless talk and data is given on the various weights, names of parts, and minor differences between one mark of Bren and another.

2. Theory and useless details bore the class. The Instructor should present the characteristics in the light of how good the weapon is at its job in battle.

3. Much more life and action is essential on the part of both pupils and instructors in this mutual instruction, which tends at present to be more of a theory lecture than teaching the man how to use his weapon.

Declassified E.O. 12958 3.6(b)/NND No. 285230

'F' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref : G/A.1/902

20 November 1945.

Officer i/c Training,
R.T.C., I.C.F.

1. Listening to Weapon Training instruction, it is noticed that too much useless talk and data is given on the various weights, names of parts, and minor differences between one mark of Bren and another.

2. Theory and useless details bore the class. The Instructor should present the characteristics in the light of how good the weapon is at its job in battle.

3. Much more life and action is essential on the part of both pupils and instructors in this mutual instruction, which tends at present to be more of a theory lecture than teaching the man how to use his weapon.

W.I.P.

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'F' British Liaison &
Training Unit RTC ICF.

WIP/rsw

53

Internal.

File. —
Fleet.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNSA By ____ NARA Date 2/5/2020

-1 OCT Recd

(10)

SECRET

SUBJECT : Small Arms School Bulletin.

G-3 Training (Brit) AFHQ CMF

Tel : FREEDOM 551

BMT/32/2/MT1

29 Sep 45

British Troops Austria.
HQ Land Forces Greece.
HQ 13 Corps
HQ 5 Corps
HQ Infantry
~~BTI c/o MMIA~~
HQ Polish Base
HQ BMD
34 Special Trg Barracks.

Herewith copies of S.A.S. (Platoon Weapons) Monthly Bulletin No 18 and Infantry Heavy Weapons School Monthly Bulletin No 24 for your information.

Brigadier,
G-3 Ops and Trg

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(3)(A) By NARA Date 2/5/2020

HQ 13 Corps
HQ 5 Corps
HQ Infantry
~~HTI c/o MdIA~~
HQ Polish Base
HQ BHD
34 Special Trg Barracks.

Herewith copies of S.A.S. (Platoon Weapons) Monthly Bulletin No 18 and Infantry Heavy Weapons School Monthly Bulletin No 24 for your information.

[illegible]
Brigadier, C.M.F.
G-3 Ops and Trg.

A1.
Sent by
T.R.C.
R.A.
R.E.
R.C.S.
Pio

52

IZ4 4094

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)(3) NND 785020

S ALL A.C.S. SPECIAL (PLATOON WEAPONS) SECRET

MONTHLY BULLETIN No. 18

AUGUST, 1945

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. British Superiority. The superiority of our arm weapons over those of our late enemies is stressed in para. 9 of A.T.I. 52 of 1943 and on pages 38 and 39 of Jungle Jottings 1945. Mention of the fact to those under training will help to inspire confidence in the use of weapons.

2. Cancellation of W.2.A.'s, 6 and 7 A.F.I. 89/45. Amendments to S.A.T. pamphlets to take the place of these Weapon Training Memoranda have been prepared and will be published shortly.

3. Issue A.S.A. M.62 for .38" Pistol Ammunition - Modifications. It has been decided that the above-mentioned case will continue to be used for packing .38" pistol ammunition as it is light in weight (9 lbs.) and contains a suitable quantity of ammunition (180 rds.). It is a wooden box with a metal liner, and in order to ensure that it will be suitable for use in all parts of the world it will be modified as follows:-

(a) Waxed in addition to preservative (Trans Salts).
(b) Painted internally and externally.
(c) Sides of the box to be re-inforced by four angle irons in order to give added strength.
(d) Replacement of rope handle by a 4ft. strand wire handle with canvas grip, proceed by copper naphthenate solution.
(e) The steel split-pin and twine attachment to the lid to be replaced by a brass split-pin and galvanised steel wire.
(f) Labels will continue to be used for identification of contents, as due to the smallness of the surface and roughness of the wood, stencilling would not be clearly legible. Adhesive R.D. 11989, recommended by C.S.A.D. as suitable for the tropics, will be used. It is probable that white labels with black lettering will be used instead of the existing ones.

(C. of S. Midland Notes Jul 45)

4. Boxes A.S.A. - Liners for Universal S.A.A. Pack. Design D.7(L) 407/G/131 of Box A.S.A. M.62 for packing .303 ammunition and Design 87(L) 408/G/131 of Box A.S.A. M52 for 4 bandoliers packed .303", .303" in bandolier and .9 ms. ammunition have been provisionally approved pending design of a liner which will be 100% waterproof.

These designs have been introduced as an improvement over the existing M.29 liner and the existing M.52 etc. liner. The newly approved designs have creased-in sides and slightly rounded corners.

The M.52 No. 1 will be used for packing bullet Mk. 7 and Mk. 6 ammunition, and has two tear-off strips, allowing a full opening of the top of the liner, and no central bridge piece as incorporated.

The M.52 Mk. 2 will be used for carton and bandolier packed .303" and 9 m.m. in cartons. This design has a single tear-off strip, allowing a full opening of the top of the liner. It has also a V-shaped portion at one end from which bolted

Declassified D.O. 1983 Section 3 (1)(b)(iii) No. 285020

decided that the above-mentioned box will continue to be used for packing .38" pistol ammunition as it is light in weight (9 lbs.) and contains a suitable quantity of ammunition (500 rds.). It is a wooden box with a metal liner, and in order to ensure that it will be suitable for use in all parts of the world it will be modified as follows:-

(a) Dipped in [illegible] preservative (Tar Oil Salts).
(b) Painted internally and externally.
(c) Sides of the box to be reinforced by four angle irons in order to give added strength.
(d) Replacement of rope handle by a six strand wire handle with canvas grip, treated by copper naphthenate solution.
(e) The steel split-pin and tabs attachment to the lid to be replaced by a brass split-pin and galvanised steel wire.
(f) Labels will continue to be used for identification of contents, as due to the smallness of the surface and roughness of the wood, stencilling would not be clearly legible. Adhesive R.D. 11383, recommended by C.S.A.R. as suitable for the tropics, will be used. It is probable that white labels with black lettering will be used instead of the existing ones.

(A. of S. Liaison Notes Jul 45)

4. Boxes A.S.I. - Issues for Universal S.A.A. Pack. Design D.7(L) A07/G/131 of Box A.S.I. M52 No. 1 for cartons .303" ammunition and Design D7(L) A08/G/131 of Box A.S.I. M52 No. 2 for cartons packed .303", .303" in bandolier and .9 m.m. ammunition have been provisionally approved pending design of a liner which will be 100% waterproof.

These designs have been introduced as an improvement over the existing M.29 liner and the existing M.52 No. 1. The newly approved designs have pressed-in sides and slightly rounded corners.

The M.52 No. 1 will be used for Vickers belted Mk. 7 and Mk. 8 ammunition, and has two tear-off straps, allowing a full opening of the top of the liner, and no central bridge piece is incorporated.

The M.52 No. 2 will be used for carton and bandolier packed .303" and 9 m.m. in cartons. This design has a single tear-off strip, allowing a full opening of the top of the liner, but leaves a V-shaped portion at one end from which belted ammunition could not feed satisfactorily - hence the necessity for the separate designs.

Either design of liner will fit into the M.51 plywood box.

(M. of S. Liaison Notes Jul 45).

51

SECTION II - RIFLE

N I L.

SECTION III - MISC.

5. Bren Sending. Indian made Bipods are not designed for mounting on tripods. The figures laid down in A.T.I. 1938/15 and Appx. A to S.A.T. pamphlet No. 4 regarding sending, apply equally when firing from the bipod. The more skilled the firer the more satisfactory will be the results obtained.

(Infantry 2) P.T.O.

Permitted by G.O. 1945 Section 3-(2)(iii) No. 28020

SECTION IV - 2" MORTAR

6. 2" Mortar Battle Practice. A method of improving the standard of training has been successfully carried out by No. 7 I.T.C. Lincoln. An account of this will be found at Appendix "E".

SECTION V - P.I.A.T.

7. P.I.A.T. ammunition supplied by air. A.C.I. 925 of 1945 gives instructions as to how to dismantle loaded air containers or numbers of P.I.A.T. bombs which show unusual external damage after "free dropping" from aircraft.

SECTION VI - ANCHOR C PRIME

P I L

SECTION VII - GRENADES.

8. Booby traps. Details of making booby traps from No. 36 grenades are given on pages 60 and 61 of Jungle Jottings, 1945.

9. No. 36 Grenade - Risk of Detonator Fire.

(a) A report from [illegible] drew attention to the fact that the detonator tin is insufficiently supported in the standard No. 36 Grenade box to withstand air dropping in nose cones. The detonator tin is housed in a centre partition where it is a loose fit. If the grenade box sustains a heavy air landing the weight of the grenades wrecks this partition [illegible] spoiling the detonators.

It is suggested that [illegible] No. 36 Grenade have to be air dropped local action be taken to ensure that the detonator tins are previously wrapped in sacking so as to ensure a tight fit in the centre partitions.

(b) In the new No. 36 Grenade improved package this trouble should not occur since grenades are packed in quiver type packages, each quiver containing its individual detonator tin.

(I.S. No. 2.)

10. Grenade No. 84 (Smoke). A new batch of these grenades has been assembled to confirm that modifications to ensure correct functioning are satisfactory. Arrangements have been made for the change over in production from Grenades Nos. 80 to 84 but this is dependent upon a completely satisfactory performance of the modified Grenade No. 84.

(S.T.V. Lindsay letter No. 30).

11. Grenade No. 85. Further amendment to the nomenclature of this Grenade have taken place since issue of the last Lindsay Notes.

The marks will now be as follows:-

(a) Grenade No. 85 Rifle A.T. Mk. 1 - This grenade is fitted with Fuse 130 Mk. 1.

(b) Grenade No. 85 Rifle A.T. Mk. 2 - This has the same head as the grenade Rifle A.T. Mk. 1, but is fitted with fuse 431 Mk. 1 which differs from the Fuse No. 430 in that it has a larger magazine and is easier to assemble and inspect. This fuse will be common to grenade No. 85 Mk. 2 and grenade No. 87 Rifle W.P. Smoke Mk. 1.

(c) Grenade No. 85 Rifle A.T./A.P. Mk. 3 - This is the combined anti-tank and anti-personnel Grenade with the wire wound body referred to in para. 25 of June Lindsay letter. It will be fitted with a modified version of Fuse No. 431 with the Tail Tube and as many Fuse components as possible made of light alloy to compensate for the greater weight of [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.5(c) NND No. 285020

9. [illegible] Grenade - Retention of Detonator Tin.

(a) A report from [illegible] attention to the fact that the detonator tin is [illegible] supported in the standard No. 36 Grenade box to withstand air dropping in some cases. The detonator tin is housed in a centre partition where it is a loose fit. If the grenade box sustains a heavy air landing the weight of the grenades breaks this partition [illegible], exploding the detonators.

It is suggested that [illegible] No. 36 Grenade have to be air dropped local action be taken to ensure that the detonator tins are previously wrapped in sacking so as to ensure a tight fit in the centre partitions.

(b) In the new No. 36 Grenade tropical package this trouble should not occur since grenades are packed in quiver type packages, each quiver containing its individual detonator tin.

(I.E. No. 2.)

10. Grenade No. 81 (Z/T.U.). A new batch of these grenades has been assembled to confirm that modifications to ensure correct functioning are satisfactory. Arrangements have been made for the change over in production from Grenades Nos. 80 to 81 but this is dependent upon a completely satisfactory performance of the modified Grenade No. 81.

(S.W.V. Liaison letter No. 30).

11. Grenade No. 85. Further amendment to the nomenclature of this Grenade have taken place since issue of the last Liaison Notes.

The marks will now be as follows:-

(a) Grenade No. 85 Rifle A.T. Mk. 1 - This grenade is fitted with Fuze 430 Mk. 1.

(b) Grenade No. 85 Rifle A.P. Mk. 2 - This has the same head as the grenade Rifle A.T. Mk. 1, but is fitted with fuze 431 Mk. 1 which differs from the Fuze No. 430 in that it has a larger magazine and is easier to assemble and inspect. This fuze will be common to grenade No. 85 Mk. 2 and grenade No. 87 Rifle W.P. Smoke Mk. 1.

(c) Grenade No. 85 Rifle A.T./A.P. Mk. 3 - This is the combined anti-tank and anti-personnel Grenade with the wire wound body referred to in para. 25 of June Liaison letter. It will be fitted with a modified version of Fuze No. 431 with the Tail Tube and as many Fuze components as possible made of light alloy to compensate for the greater weight of head. No official nomenclature has yet been given to this Fuze which is still in the experimental stage.

(D. of A. Liaison Notes Jul 45).

12. Grenade 85 Rifle Practice Mk. 1. Designs have been produced of a Practice Grenade which will have the same weight and ballistics as the Grenade No. 85. Features of the design are that the drive, tail tube and drum tail are all easily replaceable, as they become damaged.

Sample Grenades have been produced and have been sent for acceptance trials. The policy is that only one practice grenade will be produced to cover the whole range of the new Rifle Grenade fired from the Grenade Projectors. To Para 3.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(a)(5) NN 28020

13. Grenade No. 87 (25/1091) A cause of blinds in the fuze of this grenade has now been isolated and corrected. It is believed that the final design will not normally give blinds. Some grenades with the improved fuze are awaited for an acceptance trial to be held shortly.

(S.W.V. Madison letter No. 30).

14. Grenade No. 88 (24/1042(c)). These grenades have given trouble owing to the discovery of delay failures after climatic storage. The delay artifice has been redesigned and a more satisfactory performance obtained. A number of these grenades is now awaiting an acceptance trial.

(S.W.V. Madison letter No. 30).

SECTION VIII - SNIPERS

15. Training.
(a) A sniper game and an account of sniping in Italy are given in VIZ No. 6 published in Jul 45 on pages 19-23.
(b) Attention is also called to Snipers and Sniping reproduced from A.T.M. No. 25 of 1944 on page 36 of Jungle Jottings 1945.

16. Special butts for Sniper Rifles. Trials at S.A. School and with 21 Army Group showed the butts to be satisfactory and definite improvement of the existing type. Due to present day policy, however, these butts will not be fitted to the existing sniper rifle, but will be considered for any new design of sniping rifles coming forward.

(D. of A. Madison Notes Jul 45).

SECTION IX - BAYONET.

N I L.

SECTION X - PISTOL

17. Pistol Revolver Webley .38" Mk. 4 No. 2 Approval has been given to the above mentioned pistol, which is the trade pistol manufactured during the war by Messrs. Webley and Scott and is similar to the pistol No. 2. This pistol has been approved as a Service weapon in order to standardise identification nomenclature and inspection.

(D. of A. Madison Notes Jul 45)

18. Holster Mk. 2 - 9 m.m. S/L Pistol F.N. Browning No. 2. Approval has been given to the Canadian drawings and specifications of the above-mentioned holster. The holster is made of webbing and incorporates a double flap in order to give complete protection from mud and dirt, and a compartment which holds a spare magazine. The cleaning rod is also carried in a loop inside the holster. Brass hooks and a belt loop are provided for alternative methods of attachment to the users equipment.

(D. of A. Madison Notes Jul 45)

19. Re-introduction of the Comb and Bent. The question of the re-introduction of the comb and bent in the design of the No. 2 .380" Pistol has been considered at some length and it is not considered that a change in design now is justified.

The change in design was introduced after thorough trials at the Small Arms School. The modified weapon was approved for Service in Jun 38. Opinions differed

Declassified E.O. 11905 Section 3(4)(b)(ii) or (iii) No. 285020

15. Training.

(a) A sniper game and an account of sniping in Italy are given in VIZ No. 6 published in Jul 45 on pages 19-23.

(b) Attention is also called to Snipers and Sniping reproduced from A.T.M. No. 25 of 1944 on page 36 of Jungle Jottings 1945.

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17. Pistol Revolver Webley .38" Mk. 4 No. 2 Approval has been given to the above mentioned pistol, which is the trade pistol manufactured during the war by Messrs. Webley and Scott and is similar to the pistol No. 2. This pistol has been approved as a Service weapon in order to standardise identification nomenclature and inspection.

(D. of A. Liaison Notes Jul 45)

18. Holster Mk. 2 - 9 mm. S/L Pistol F.N. Browning No. 2. Approval has been given to the Canadian drawings and specifications of the above-mentioned holster. The holster is made of webbing and incorporates a double flap in order to give complete protection from mud and dirt, and a compartment which holds a spare magazine. The cleaning rod is also carried in a loop inside the holster. Brass hooks and a belt loop are provided for alternative methods of attachment to the users equipment.

(D. of A. Liaison Notes Jul 45)

19. Re-introduction of the Comb and Bent. The question of the re-introduction of the comb and bent in the design of the No. 2 .380" Pistol has been considered at some length and it is not considered that a change in design now is justified.

The change in design was introduced after thorough trials at the Small Arms School. The modified weapon was approved for Service in Jun 38. Opinions differed regarding the wisdom of modification but being a definite demand from training the opposition of technical departments gave way.

The .380" pistol is not a war winning weapon and, therefore, comes under the recent ruling regarding non-essential modifications. Troops, who, of necessity require a more efficient pistol, e.g. Airborne Troops, are being equipped with the 9 m.m. Browning S.L. Pistol and the latest General Staff Policy Statement on this weapon states:-

FUTURE POLICY.

(a) As large stocks of pistols self-loader become available the G.S. intention is to hold them in pools for issue as occasion demands, rather than issue them progressively to all those in formations and units not armed with a rifle or machine carbine.

S.T.O.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(a)(3) NN 28520

(b) Further, while the ultimate aim is to replace all pistols revolver by pistols self-loading, it is accepted that the rate of replacement must depend on the rate of disposal of existing stocks of the weapon and on financial considerations.

(Infantry 2)

Bisley Camp,
Brookwood, Surrey.
6 Sep 45.
PK/EM.

J. J. Sandie
Colonel,
Comdt. Small Arms School (Platoon Weapons).

Distribution as for Monthly Bulletin No. 17 dated 7 Aug 45 plus

C.C. 161	C.C.T.S.	(2)
163	"	(2)
164	"	(2)
206	"	(2)
148	Pzs-C.C.S.U.	(2)

Enclosure to C.O. 13065 Section 2-102/7826 No. 28502

APPENDIX "A"

2" MORTAR BATTLE PRACTICE

The practice is conducted as follows:-

(a) A recce. is made to select target area, and 3 slit trenches dug at approx. 400 yards to represent target area. These need only be 12-15" deep.

(b) There are two Cadre N.C.O.s. detailed as instructors, one to test and brief Nos. 1 and 2, the other N.C.O. accompanies the Nos. 1 and 2 after briefing, to ensure safety precautions are carried out. The W.T.O. or Company Officer is in charge.

(c) Some 30 to 50 yards behind the area from which firing is to take place, a model approx. 8' x 4' is dug in the ground, which is a replica of the whole area, this can be done quite easily in 20 minutes.

The Nos. 1 and 2 then arrive in pairs and lie down behind the model. The N.C.O. then, by question and answer, makes No. 1 explain the ground, prominent features, sedge rows, etc. and tells the man that he is going to be exercised with live firing over ground which is similar to this model.

The No. 1 is then given the target and selects an aiming point and withdraws back a few feet where he is out of view of the target. No. 2 is in a position of observation. The instructor gives the order to fire, the N.C.O. then drops a piece of cotton wool on the mound to represent where the bomb has landed, after the second bomb, No. 2 has to make the necessary correction, shouting the correction in a loud voice.

The N.C.O. by question and answer, comments on the correction made by No. 2, and to the alteration of the angle of the barrel made by No. 1

The two numbers then change over and are put through a similar test.

(d) The pair are then put through the live firing practice.

(e) The officer points out the target to the pair, and they are left to choose their own lines of advance, which is roughly 40°, No. 1 to select his firing position and No. 2 his position of observation.

Other than the N.C.O. watching for safety precautions, they are not interfered with, and engage the target. After firing the requisite number of bombs, Nos. 1 and 2 change positions.

(f) If the live firing practice shows that they still have not fully grasped the procedure, they are re-tested on the model.

The reason for carrying out this method is that there are two real faults which definitely needed clearing up and they are:-

(a) The No. 1 when told by No. 2 (when 400, puts the barrel down instead of up.

(b) No. 2, thinking in terms of the barrel and not where the bomb had dropped when making corrections.

This procedure of Battle Practice is a slow one, if done thoroughly, but it is time well spent. The standard of 2" Mortar firing improves enormously.

Declassified D.D. 1950 Section 3 (d)/NWD No. 285020

The Nos. 1 and 2 then arrive in pairs and lie down behind the model. The M.C.O. then, by question and answer, makes No. 1 explain the ground, prominent features, hedge rows, etc. and tells the man that he is going to be exercised with live firing over ground which is similar to this model.

The No. 1 is then given the target and selects an aiming point and withdraws back a few feet where he is out of view of the target. No. 2 is in a position of observation. The instructor gives the order to fire, the M.C.O. then drops a piece of cotton wool on the model to represent where the bomb has landed, after the second bomb, No. 2 has to give the necessary correction, shouting the correction in a loud voice.

The M.C.O. by question and answer, comments on the correction made by No. 2, and to the alteration of the angle of the barrel made by No. 1

The two readers then change over and are put through a similar test.

(d) The pair are then put through the live firing practice.

(e) The officer points out the [illegible] to the pair, and they are left to choose their own lines of advance, which is roughly 40°, No. 1 to select his firing position and No. 2 his position of observation.

Other than the M.C.O. watching for safety precautions, they are not interfered with, and engage the target. After firing the requisite number of bombs, Nos. 1 and 2 change positions.

(f) If the live firing practice shows that they still have not fully grasped the procedure, they are re-tested on the model.

The reason for carrying out this method is that there are two real faults which definitely needed clearing up and they are:-

(a) The No. 1 when told by No. 2 down 100, puts the barrel down instead of up.

(b) No. 2, thinking in terms of the barrel and not where the bomb had dropped when making corrections.

This procedure of Battle Practice is a slow one, if done thoroughly, but it is time well spent. The standard of 2" Mortar firing improves enormously.

Myo

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC By 785020

Reproduced at the U.S. Army Signal Publications Agency No. 285020

[illegible] HEADQUARTERS [illegible]

[illegible] MORTAR PLATOON No.14

[illegible] 1945

[illegible] CONTENTS.

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[illegible] No. 285020

285020

1. New Establishment - Establishment of Signalling Instructor.

For some months now this School has had a Signalling Instructor, for whom provision is now made by the War Office on the War Establishment. His appointment has been found necessary only, as the greatly increased importance of signalling in the weapons taught at the School, especially the 3" and 4.2" mortars, where fire control may rely on a single wire.

The Signalling Instructor's duties, briefly, are:-

(a) To be responsible for the Signals Section and stores.

(b) To advise and take part in signals exercises and practice instruction.

(c) To attend tactical exercises and discuss from the communications point of view.

(d) To make available information on all signalling matters, by means of an information centre, publication of current and future signalling equipment, etc.

(e) To watch over the future development of signal equipment, ensuring that it is suitable for the various weapons at this School.

(f) To liaise closely with D.S.O. (Staff Duties) at the School of Artillery, Signals and Chemical, and with A.A.D.C., Shoeburyness.

The War Office has also agreed to the increase of 1 rank & file Operator on the War Establishment, both A. and B., to the Instructional Signal Detachment.

2. Publications - Signal Training (Wireless) Pamphlet No. 1, Signal Training, Part Two, Wireless Telegraphy.

This pamphlet, which was only recently issued, gives a very clear exposition of the principles for radio-telegraphy circuits. While the whole training is of interest and value, the following sections are of special interest to Instructors responsible for the assignment and handling of the various weapons at this School:-

Personnel of 3" Mortar Platoon, H/Qrs. Platoon & Comd. Pl. Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Personnel of A.A. Detachment Sup. Pl. Sections 4, 5, 7 and 8.

3. Organization - Personnel of Pl. & Sections.

Classified and Indexed No. 285020

(b) To advise and take part in drills, operating and procedure instructions.

(c) To attend tactical exercises and courses from the communications point of view.

(d) To make available information on all signalling matters, by means of an information service, publication of Orders and Instructions, research, etc.

(e) To watch over the future development of plant and gear, ensuring that it is suitable for the particular needs of this School.

(f) To liaise closely with S.S.O.2(Signals) at the School of Artillery, Signals and Infantry, and with S.S.O.2, 30th Corps.

The War Office has also agreed to the increase of three Other Ranks on the War Establishment, making, again, to the improved signal requirements.

2. Publications Signal Training (Wireless) Pamphlet No.1 - Short Wireless Part II - The Infantry Battalion.

This pamphlet, which was quite recently issued, gives a very clear exposition of the signal layout for various tactical situations. Whilst the whole pamphlet is of interest and should be studied, the following portions are of special interest to the Signal Officer who is responsible for the development and handling of the Signals layout at this School:-

Sections 1 to 3 inclusive and 5 - pages 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,

SECRET II - [illegible]

4. Role of Army Units

Ref. Man. Ic.3, para 6.

An decision on the Scout's approach for an increased scale of more write is unlikely for six months.

Copy

SECRET III - [illegible]

5. Signal Training of 3" Mortar Platoons.

Many units have requested copies of the pamphlet used at this School for teaching wireless procedure to mortar students. Unfortunately, the School cannot produce the number desired, and copies of them cannot be sent. All the subject matter is, however, contained in Signal Training (All Arms), Pamphlet No. 1, Parts I, II and III.

Parts I and II cover procedure and the pamphlet merely answers the lessons which must be learnt, and gives examples which are learnt on the mortar platoon wireless lay-out.

Part III deals with the [illegible] of fire orders by artillery, and the lessons on mortar fire control procedure are based on it. Since, however, mortar platoons may have difficulty to obtain this part of the pamphlet, and, as the lessons need one to be translated into mortar language, the two lessons from the School which is the subject are attached as Appendix 'A'. Preceding them are a few notes on the organisation and wireless lay-outs of the infantry mortar platoon, in order to explain uniformity of training, which is most important.

6. Fire Orders

It is the policy of this School to produce a number of fire orders to conform with their mortar training. They will consist of a number of photographs and sketches with explanations. They are intended to be a guide to [illegible]

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Copy

SECTION III - SIGNAL MORTAR

5. Signal Training of 3" Mortar Personnel.

Many units have requested copies of the wireless used at this School for teaching wireless procedure to mortar students. Unfortunately, the School cannot meet the number desired, and copies of them cannot be sent. All the subject matter is, however, contained in Signal Training (All Arms), pamphlet No.7, Parts I, II and III.

Parts I and II cover procedure and the wireless merely supports the lessons which must be learnt, and gives examples which are based on the normal platoon wireless layouts.

Part III deals with the ranging of fire orders by artillery, and the lessons on mortar fire control procedure are based on it. Since, however, mortar platoons may have difficulty in getting this part of the pamphlet, and, as the language used has to be translated into mortar terminology, the two lessons from the School dealing on this subject are enclosed as Appendix 'A'. Provided, then are a few notes on the wireless layouts of the Infantry mortar platoon, in order to stress importance of training, which is most important.

6. Fire Orders

It is the policy of this School to introduce a number of fire orders to accord with their mortar training. Under this system of a number of slides designed to illustrate various lessons. This is projected on to a white or lightly-coloured wall the pupils will draw exercise gross diagrams or enter in over the subject being taught.

Fire control lends itself particularly well to this form of treatment and a start has been made to produce a number of slides for the lessons in that section of S.A.T., Vol.I, pamphlet No.7. The first lesson taught is now No.37 (Observation of Fire - D.F. Unobserved), the slide for which has now been completed and is in production; its official number is 65. A second slide is now being made to cover Lesson 38 (Observation of Fire - D.F. Observed). The slide for Lesson 37 has thirty five (35) plates, and that for Lesson 38 will have a comparably fifty five (55) plates.

It is not intended to use the film strips in instruction at this School, since they do not lend themselves particularly well to the methods used. It is considered, however, that they will be very useful to unit instructors, and all students attending 3" mortar courses will, therefore, be given one. The film strips are refused, and taught how to make use of them. The projector is very simple to handle and can be mastered after a few minutes' instruction.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NND No. 285020

The chief advantage of this aid to instruction is that each instructor will have in the strip a guide to the best sequence of teaching each subject, from which he cannot deviate. Furthermore, the neat, complete notes and well-drawn diagrams will save much blackboard work, which will be especially helpful in the case of an instructor who finds drawing difficult.

The production of future strips will be notified in this Bulletin.

7. Mortar Platoons

Until such time as a decision has been reached on the most appropriate and useful form the mortar platoon is to take for the future, units may like to be reminded that they can obtain a small number of platoons for training from this School, on making a request in writing. As the stock held is limited, it will not always be possible to meet immediate requirements, but every effort will be made to do so, provided requests are reasonable.

In its present form each platoon can with care be kept several times. If it is placed under a tube it will last almost indefinitely.

8. Reporting of Ammunition Imperfect for Firing which Passes by Eye.

Cases have been reported of units, both in the field and in training, where the charges of ammunition prepared for firing have been ignited by flaming material dropping from the barrel when the instructing team fired. Although these charges are still satisfactory by the test unit rather than the tube have been worn away, the cover only reaches locally over this and is not a safeguard against their ignition. Once one or two charges have ignited from the flame may easily ignite several more very quickly, since the M.C. ammunition are highly inflammable. This is particularly important when a large number of tubes have to be screened and test fired, for the firing may in advance, on having a deficiency which, although fairly of the majority may be required. To overcome this, the following method is recommended:-

When a large number of tubes have to be screened for firing they should be stripped of their tail unit covers and the replaced tail fitted in their place. In this way the tail units and charges will be completely protected against damage and flame, and, at the same time, when imperfect is noticed, there will be no delay while covers are pulled off, and no risk of a secondary delay accidentally started in the tubes. About three inches of the end of the tail unit will project from the open end of the cover, and if the tube can easily be removed from it when necessary. The protection of this part of the tube against damage is not so important, but, to avoid a misfire being affected by heavy rain, the tubes should be covered with a cap suitable for the purpose.

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP78-03362A002800010001-8

25X1A

from this School, in sending a request in writing. As the stock held is limited, it will not always be possible to run a course immediately, but every effort will be made to do so, wherever requests are received.

In its present form one duplex case with cans can be used several times. If it is placed under a tank it will last almost indefinitely.

8. Precautions to be taken to Prevent Ammunition Exploding when Fired.

Instances have occurred in war, both in the field and in training, where the charges of ammunition prepared for firing have been ignited by flaming material issuing from the barrel when the cartridge has been fired. Although these charges are still protected by the bolt until after the bullet has been removed, the cover only rests loosely over them and is not a safeguard against their ignition. Once one of the charges have caught fire the flames may easily ignite several more very quickly, since the H.E.P. contained are highly inflammable. This is particularly dangerous when a large number of bombs have to be removed and kept ready for firing (as in defence, or during a delta-into attack when sustained firing of the carriers may be required). To overcome this, the following remedy is recommended:-

That a large number of bombs have to be prepared for firing they should be stacked at short (all) with covers and then replaced until fired in their cases. By doing this the full units and charges will be amply protected against corrosion and fire, and, if the cartridge does catch fire by accident, there will be only eight cartridge covers and bullets only, and no risk of a projectile being accidentally removed in the passage. About three inches of the top of the bomb will project from the open end of the case, and so the bomb can easily be recognised in the passage. The insertion of this part of the bomb against damages is not so important, but, to prevent undue bulge and strain by heavy rain, the bombs would be covered with a waterproof or gas cape.

9. Bomb Fitting on the Aerial Carrier

44

The introduction of the new eight and eight supporting bracket will necessitate a modification to the fittings which join the Blood on the back of the carrier carrier. The new bracket projects about two inches further above the upper of the carrier than the old, and, as the cradle must always be placed low down on the carrier to protect the bomber, the latter now rests on the surface of the carrier, and it is no longer possible to fit the cradle with its circular support. It will clearly damage the bracket if it rubs against the surface of the carrier and prevents the ability of the cradle at the same time. Therefore all the wood supports must be reduced about two inches in order to remedy this. A suitable modification is being designed and, when complete and found satisfactory, will be submitted for issue by a general modification to all carrier aircraft.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(d)(3) By 285020

10. Restriction Use of Rockets in Areas Heavily Mined by Friendly Troops.

A.C.I. 90/45 is republished for information:-

"1. Certain 10.5 barrels were manufactured in Africa of low tensile steel: these barrels must NOT be used for firing charges greater than Charge 1.
2. The affected barrels are of U.S. and U.K. manufacture, their serial numbers being 1 to 70. The barrels are stamped No...
Steps will be taken to identify and isolate these mortars for Charge 1 firing only.
3. Instructions for marking the barrels will be issued in A.C.I.'s."

SECTION IV - A.F.V. MATTERS

11. Penetration No.75 - Mark VIII

Ref. I.A.B. 75/10, para. 6).

Copies of Amendment (No.2) have been issued, and should be in possession of all concerned.

12. Turret A.F. Locker - Replacing of Shell Carried into Loading Tray

During firing it has been found that the shell carrying arms have a tendency to slacken. To overcome this effect the following have been ordered:-
(i) to fix a locking plate, and
(ii) to slot the screw position of the arms.

Trials are to be held to determine the value of these proposals. Meanwhile attention should be paid to these arms on any equipment user in use to maintain the tightness.

(A.F.V. Notes on Equipments, Apr. 45)

285020

3. Instructions for setting the controls will be issued in R.A.F.M.O."

[illegible] II - A.C.-[illegible]

11. [illegible] - Armament.

M.K. II.B. [illegible]. Par. (3).

Duties of Armourers (2.3) have been altered, and should be in possession of all concerned.

12. Hydraulic Motor - Tendency of Fluid Locking Into Stator Tubes.

During flying it has been found that these locking nuts have a tendency to loosen. To overcome this defect the following have been ordered:-
(i) to fit a locking plate, and
(ii) to plot the toned portion of the nuts.

Trials are to be made to determine the value of these proposals. Especial attention should be paid to these nuts on any equipment taken in use to maintain the tightness.

(A.C Notes on Development, Aug. 45)

13. Spar Grooves for Hydraulic A.C. Motor Equipment.

43

The Air Ministry have stated a requirement for the development of suitable gear to enable the Hydraulic A.C. motor equipment to be damped by parachute from aircraft. Accordingly, D.T.D.A.D. have been instructed to develop and prepare designs of a suitable gear.

(A.C Notes on Development, Aug. 45)

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SECTION I - GUN ATTACHMENTS

14. Gun Drills - Amendments

With the fitting of the T.S. pistol sight (referred to in A.T. No.93, para. 1(f) the following amendments to gun drills are necessary:-

Insert 1 - Para.1, line 5, before sentence beginning "He then takes up . . . ." insert -

"He raises and clamps the pistol sight."

Insert 2 - Para.3, line 1, after "elevation", insert -

"lowers and clamps the pistol sight."

The above amendments will be carried out in the usual way in the manual.

15. Ammunition Boots

The following are particulars of new ammunition boots which are going into production, primarily for tropical use:-

No.	Pending	Total Weight
S.Bts.a.	4 rds A.P.C.	7 lbs. 12 ozs.
S.B.1A	" T.S.	20 lbs. 12 ozs.
S.B2	" A.P.D.S.C.	24 lbs. 4 ozs.

SECTION II - AMENDMENTS TO A.P.

16. Scheme - Cancellation

28020

Insert 5 - Para.3, line 7, after "adjustment", insert -

"Before and during the flight."

The above amendment will be promulgated in the usual way in due course.

15. Aerodrome Boards

The following are particulars of new aerodrome boards which are being introduced, ordered, for practical use:-

No.	Pending:	Total Weight
C.C.S.A.	A pln A.F.C.	T. 1bs. 12 ozs.
C.C.S.B	" T.T.	C. 1bs. 12 ozs.
C.S.C.	" A.F.C.S.C.	D. 1bs. 4 ozs.

SECTION VI - RECREATION ROOMS.

16. Courses - Cancellation

Ref. A.M. No.93, para.2.

Owing to the completion of the Balloon School there will NOT be sufficient instructors for the following courses, which have, therefore, been CANCELLED:-

S.B.T.C. Commencing 25 Jan.
S.B.T.C. Commencing 10 Oct.

42

Withdrawn as less important document
28/0220

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

1 - [illegible]

1. Jobs Done in the Center Station

The pl cond is XX2.
Jobs 1 to 5 data are XX31 to XX35.
When 2 jets are working together on a section, the ordering of the four circles stations in the section are based on the ordering of the senior detachment. For example, when Jet 1 and 2 data are working together,

Set cond	is 34
Base plate	is 341
Re-examination act	is 342
Ft set	is 343

When a jet is working by itself, for example No.2 det,


Set cond	is 32
Base plate	is 321

When working on a center pl frequency, 3 may be left out of the indication; when on a cable cay or other frequency, it must be included in order to avoid confusion.

2. If Jobs is in Subject Station

(a) Two Jets:

In this example all four sets of No.1 section are in use:



As the section is working on its own frequency, the set cond is normal.

(b) One Station with one XX0



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285220


Complete

When working on a certain pl frequency, 2 may be left out of the illustration: when on a rifle coy or other frequency, it must be included in order to avoid confusion.

5.4 Platoons in the Sector Platoon


(a) The Section

In this example all four sections are to work:



As the section is working on its own frequency, the set could be control.

(b) The Platoon with one SEC




Signal personnel have been omitted from this diagram. The mortar officer may act as SEC, or he may be at the OP: in either case he will be control. The code-signs of the other two sets will be those of the sector section present, in this case No.2 section. If the mortar officer is acting as SEC, the OP will be 20 and the base plate will be 2CL.

If the mortar officer is at the OP, the SEC (2 set cmd) will be SC and the base plate will be 9CL.

Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU

(c) The platoon with two 4.7.0s

In this case the platoon of four is made up of Nos.1 and 3 sections: the mortar officer is in the CP and each section commander is acting as MFO.



2 - Fire orders reports

1. In general, normal MF procedure will be used, but the following special rules should be adopted as far as possible.

(a) The fire orders for the engagement of any one target should be reported as a single conversation, unless there is a long delay or an interruption. For the first transmission of the conversation and the first transmission after a long pause or an interruption, one of the longer types of call should be used. For all subsequent transmissions "Hullo" should be omitted in order to save time, and the shortest type of call used.

(b) The call should only be initially omitted (as in Lesson 3, para 6) when there is no possibility of confusion and WILL NOT be omitted in station shooting.

(c) All fire orders received at the base plate from a fire controller will be answered back so that the F.C. can know that they have been correctly received. This will be done in such a way that the two O.i can overhear the orders. Similarly, reports of "shot" and "bomb gone" will be answered back by the CP operator.

(d) If reception is poor, fire orders may be broken up and passed in a series of shorter transmissions.

2. The Section on a One Kit

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1) No. 285220

Base plate 2 (3K)

Fore plane 1 (3A)

2 - FIRE CONTROL EXERCISE

1. In general, normal HP procedure will be used, but the following special rules should be observed as far as possible.

(a) The fire orders for the engagement of any one target should be reported as a single conversation, unless there is a long pause or an interruption. For the first transmission of the conversation and the first transmission after a long pause or an interruption, one of the longer types of call should be used. For all subsequent transmissions "Radio" should be omitted, in order to save time, and the shortest type of call used.

(b) The call should only be entirely omitted (as in Re-son 3, para 5) when there is no possibility of confusion and WILL NOT be omitted in rotation shooting.


(c) All fire orders received on the base plate from a fire controller will be answered back so that the F.C. can know that they have been correctly received. This will be done in such a way that the Sec Cmd does not overhear the orders. Similarly, reports of "shoot" and "bombs gone" will be answered back by the CP operator.

(d) If reception is poor, fire orders may be broken up and passed in a series of shorter transmissions.

2. Two Sections on a Gun Pit

No.3 section is under command of "G" Coy and is working on "C" Coy frequency.

The CP set is not in use.



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Remember that:-

(a) Any U.K. ie control, no ACP messages within that section must be passed as Between ourselves.

(b) Once the SC has started to control fire, all other traffic must cease.

(c) As they are on a Dog net, in every emergency, "D" must be included in all link-signs.

Example:- (Destination writing an ourstation)

Gun Position	Gun Control	Battalion HQ
	(1) Table 24, Message for Sal, Sec Tgt, Chit No.2 enclosed 24 and 24A, over.	
		(2) 24A, Sec Tgt, Chit No.2 enclosed, over.
(3) 24, 3500, 2 Lines, Fire, over.		
		(4) 24A, 3500, 2 Lines, Fire, over.
		(5) 24A, shot 2, over.
(6) 24, shot 2, over.		
(7) 24, 3700 fire, over.		
		(8) 24A, 3700 fire, over.
(10) 24, shot 2, over.		(9) 24A, shot 2, over.

In the above example the Gun Control had previously given instruction for the section to pass messages without "Between" them.
If the Gun Control insists that the message be "between", then the procedure is as follows:-

Gun Position	Gun Control	Battalion HQ
	(1) Table 24, Message for 24A, 24 and 24A, over.	
(2) Table 24, send your message, over.		
		(3) 24A, 24, over.
	(4) 24, Sec Tgt, Chit No.2 Enclosing over.	
		(5) 24A, Sec Tgt, Chit No.2 Enclosing, over.

Finally, it will also be unnecessary to give the above signals if the

W.D. 1941 Pattern 3-10/42. 28020

(2) Hello 9A, [illegible] for 9A.
Sec Sqt, Drill No.2 standing
9A and 9A2, over.

(3) 9A, 8500, 2 Lines, Fire, over.

(4) 9A, shot 2, over.

(5) 9A, 8700 Fire, over.

(6) 9A2, sec Sqt, Drill No.2 standing, over.

(7) 9A1, 8500, 2 Lines, Fire, over.

(8) 9A2, 8700 Fire, over.

(9) 9A1, shot 2, over.

(10) 9A, shot 2, over.

In the above example the Sec Cmd had previously given ventilation for the section to pass Romanche without "Effects" time.
If the Sec Cmd wished that this change be "Ordered", then the procedure is as follows:-

Sec Cmd says

(1) Hello 9A, message for 9A1, 9A and 9A2, over.

(2) Hello 9A, send Sec Sqt, over.

(3) 9A, Fire over.


(4) 9A, Sec Sqt, Drill No.2 Standing over.

(5) 9A1, Sec Sqt, Drill No.2 Standing, over.

Finally, it will not be practicable to pass fire orders "through" control.

3. The Piston:

Legend as follows:-



Senior officer is IPC: No.2 Sec Cmd is Senior Sec Cmd at photo C.P.
Remember that since Officers only are involved FOW may be dropped.


Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)(3) NND 782080

Example:- (Control calling to two stations in succession)

Junior Officer says	S.C.O. says	Immediate says
(1) Hello C, Target 547246, Your control, C, over.		
	(2) Hello C, Wait, out. (3) Hello C, Target not identified, over.	
(4) C. Roger, out to you Hello Cl, my control, Fl Lt H.T. Left Bearing. Cl., over.		
		(5) Cl, Wilco, Fl Lt Cl, Left Bearing, over.
(6) Cl, 1100, 10° N of Z. Fire, over.		
		(7) Cl, 1100, 10° N of Z, Fire over. (8) Cl, Shot 4, over.
(9) Cl, Shot 4, over.		

4. The Platoon.

Layout as follows:-



Example (a):- JCO2 (3 sec comd) controls fire of whole platoon.

Fl Comd says	JCO2 says	Fl says
	(1) Hello E, my control, E. over.	
(2) Hello E. Wilco, out.		

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
(6) Sl. 1100, 10° R of 2.
Fire, over.

(7) Sl. 1100, 10° R of 2.
Fire over.
(8) Sl. shot 4, over.

(9) Sl. shot 4, over.

4. The Platoon

Layout as follows:-



Example (a):- LFO1 (1 sec cond) controls fire of whole platoon.

1Z Cond sheet.	LFO1 says	MTO says
	(1) Fire 2, no control, 2 over.	
(2) Fire 2. Time, out.		
	(3) Fire 2, reports for 2, 2 Sqns, Drill No.1 Ranging 2 and 2. over.	
	(4) 2, 2 Sqns Drill No.1 Ranging, over.	

Example (b):- SEPARATE CONTROL: Used when both LFOs wish to control the fire of their own sections simultaneously on the same frontage. Two LFOs will only be sent out if the 2C Training of the Platoon is "SEE SHOT AND THIS METHOD OF SHOOTING HAS NOT YET BEEN PRACTISED.

The following rules must be obeyed:-

(i) SERIOUS MIS-ORIENTATION, USING THE AIR IN TURN AND AVOIDING A DESTRUCTIVE BURST.

(ii) The fire orders of one section should be passed while the bombs of the other section are in the air.

(iii) One section will not attempt to pass an order till it has heard the other section report "gone".

(iv) ALL ORDERS AND ADJUSTMENTS MUST BE PREFACED BY THE LETTER OF THE SECTION CONCERNED.

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21 Dead ends	2T1(A) ends	2T1(A) ends	2T2(Z) ends	2T2(Z) ends

(1) Radio A, Radio Z, Voice control A and Z over.

(2) Radio A, Tilco, out.

(3) Radio Z, Tilco, out.

(4) Radio A, Message for A1, by control, See Tgt No 2, Pt.1 Bearing, A and A1, over.

(5) A1, Tilco, See Tgt No.1 Bearing over.

(6) A, 2000 G° R of Z, Fire, over.

(7) A1, 2000 G° R of Z, Fire over.

(8) A1, Shot 1, over.

(9) A, Shot 1, over.

(10) Radio Z, Message for Z, by control, See Tgt No.1 Bearing, Z and Z1 over.

(11) Z1, Tilco, See Tgt No.1 Bearing, over.

(12) Z, 1200 G° R of Z, Fire, over.

(13) Z1, 1200 G° R of Z, Fire over.

(14) Z1, Shot 1, etc.

(15) Z, Shot 1, over.

(16) A, 2000 right G°, Fire, over.

(17) A1, 2000 right G°, Fire, over.

(18) A1, Shot 1, over.

(19) A, Shot 1, over.

(20) Z, Shot 1, [illegible]

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285020

for A1, ay control,
Sec Dot Ch 2, Sh.1
Ranging, A and A1, over.

(5) A1, Pilot, Sec
Dot Ch2 Sh.1 Ranging
over.

(6) A, 2000 G° E
of E, Fire, over.

(7) A1, 2000 G° E of
E, Fire over.
(8) A1, shot 1, over.

(9) A, shot 1,
over.

(10) Bulls E, advance
for E, ay control,
Sec Dot Ch2 Sh.3
Ranging, E and E over.

(11) E, Pilot, Sec
Dot Ch2, Sh.3 Ranging,
over.
(12) E, 1700 G°
E of I, Fire, over.
(13) E, 1700 G° E of
E, Fire over.
(14) E, shot 3, over.
(15) E, shot 3,
over.

(16) A, 2000 W Dir
G°, Fire, over.

(17) A1, 2000 right
G°, Fire, over.
(18) A1, plot 2, over.

(19) A, shot 1,
over.

(20) E, 1900 fire,
over.
(21) E, 1900 fire,
over.
(22) E, shot 3, over.
(23) E, shot 3,
over.

(24) A, 2000, 3
rds mortar fire,
over.

(25) A1, 2000, 3
rds mortar fire,
over.

etc.


NOTE: "Bombs away" will NOT be reported during mission shooting.

285020

A - PROCEDURE FOR NEARBY FIRE CENTRE

1. When conditions for HF are bad, it will not always be possible for the fire controller to pass fire orders direct to the base units position. In this case orders will be passed through a relay station and the procedure will be a modified form of that shown in Lesson 4, para 2.

2. Control phase (fire criteria one correction through another station).



Sec. Cmnd: A1 Sec. target etc. over.
Readback: (no reply).
Sec. Cmnd: A3, relay to A1, over.
HF : A3, Tilo, over.
Sec Cmnd : A3, Section Target, etc. over.
(1) HF : A3 for A1, fire control, Section Target, etc. over.
(2) (Pause of 5 seconds)
Readback: A3, Section Target, etc, over.
(3) HF : A3, OK, over.
Sec. Cmnd: A3, 1700, zero lines, fire, over.
HF : A3, 1500, zero lines, fire, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
(4) Sec. Cmnd: A3, stop, over.
HF : A3, stop, over.
Sec. Cmnd: A3, stop, cancel 1500, 1700 fire, over.
HF : A3, stop, cancel 1500, 1700 fire, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
Readback: A3, stop, cancel 1500, 1700 zero lines, fire, over.
HF : A3, OK, over.
Readback: A3, shot out, over.
HF : A3, shot two, over.
(5) (Pause of 5 seconds)
Sec. Cmnd: A3, shot two, over.
(6) HF : A3, OK, over.

NOTES:
(1) Orders from the HF and original Sec Command back simultaneously, acting as [illegible]. The first transmission to the relay station must indicate

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(1)/NNSA no. 282020

(relay station)

A1

(30) Same plate
A1

Sec. Comd: A1 Sec. target etc. over.
Navigator: (no reply).
Sec. Comd: A3, relay to A1, over.
CP : A3, Pilot, over.
Sec Comd : A1, Section Target, etc, over.
(1) CP : A3 for A1, from control, Section Target, etc, over.
(2) (Pause of 5 seconds)
Navigator: A1, Section Target, etc, over.
(3) CP : A3, OK, over.
Sec. Comd: A3, 1320, zero three, fire, over.
CP : A3, 1500, zero three, fire, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
(4) Sec. Comd: A3, stop, over.
CP : A3, stop, over.
Sec. Comd: A3, stop, course 160°, 1700 fire, over.
CP : A3, stop, bearing 310°, 1700 fire, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
Navigator: A1, stop, course 160°, 1700 zero three, fire, over.
CP : A3, OK, over.
Navigator: A1, shot one, over.
CP : A3, shot one, over.
(5) (Pause of 5 seconds)
Sec. Comd: A3, shot one, over.
(6) CP : A3, OK, over.

NOTES:

(1) Orders from the CP are relayed and answered back simultaneously, saving an extra transmission. The first transmission by the relay station must indicate to the navigator that relay procedure has started.

(2) This allows the fire controller to say "Stop, over" and the relay station to answer him back if the order has been relayed incorrectly.

(3) The transmission "OK, over"
(a) Tells the navigator that the order has been answered back correctly.
(b) Tells the CP that the order has reached the navigator.
(c) Tells the CP that the relay station is ready for the next order.

(4) While the navigator writes, the CP says "Stop, over" and the relay station answers back, correctly. The navigator then corrects his wrong order.


(5) This is to ensure that navigator writing at the navigator end is corrected if necessary.

(6) See (3) above.

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
Publications S.D. 1000, Issue 1-6/2/1946 No. 285020

3. Intercept circuit five orders to control station number one station.



ZFC : Hullo Z, my control, Z, over.
Hullo Z, my control, Z, over.
(no reply)
ZFC: Hullo Z, message for ZD, relay to control, over.
CP : ZD, Hullo, over.
ZFC : Z, my control, over.
CP : Hullo ZD, message from Z, my control, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
A.P.: ZD, Hullo, over.
CP : ZD, Message from Z, my control, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
A.P.: ZD, Message from Z, etc, over.
CP : ZD, OK, over.

4. Intercept three orders to another station to each control.



ZFC : C for C1, Message for XC, etc, over.
C for C1, Message for XC, etc, over.
(no reply)
ZFC : Hullo C, relay to C1, over.
CP : C, Hullo, over.
CP : C, Message for XC, etc, over.

Exhibit No. 28620 Docket No. 28620

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNSC No. 285020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS No. 785020

SUBJECT :- 3-in Mortar WT Procedure.

'F' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
H.T.O. I.O.F.

Ref : G/A.1/858.

16 October '45.

Officer i/c Training HQ.

Major SMITH-HUGHES.

Herewith copy of British 3-in Mortar Platoon Fire Control procedure.

It is realise d that there are organisation differences but may be of interest, particularly to XIVA as a guide to procedure.

D. L. Price

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'F' British Liaison &
Training Unit HQ IOF.

WLP/rmw

Internal.
File.

MORTAR FIRE CONTROL PROCEDURE.

A - GENERAL.

1. Code Signs in the Mortar Platoon.

The pl comd is XYZ9.

Nos 1 to 6 dets are XYZ9A to XYZ9F.

When 2 dets are working together as a section, the code-signs of the four wireless stations in the section are based on the code-sign of the senior detachment. For example, when Nos 1 and 2 dets are working together,

Sec comd	is 9A
Base Plate	is 9A1
Re-organisation set	is 9A2
OP set	is 9A3

When a det is working by itself, for example No. 2 det,


Det comd	is 9B
Base Plate	is 9B1

When working on a mortar pl frequency, 9 may be left out of the link-sign; when on a rifle coy or other frequency, it must be included in order to avoid confusion.

2. RT Layouts in the Mortar Platoon.


(a) The Section.

In this example all four sets of No. 1 section are in use:



As the section is working on its own frequency, the sec comd is control.

(b) The Platoon with one MFC



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
~~Base Plate~~ is 9A1

When working on a mortar pl frequency, 9 may be left out of the link-sign; when on a rifle coy or other frequency, it must be included in order to avoid confusion.

2. RT Layouts in the Mortar Platoon.


(a) The Section.

In this example all four sets of No. 1 section are in use:



As the section is working on its own frequency, the sec comd is control.

(b) The Platoon with one MFC




Sound powered telephones have been omitted from this diagram. The mortar Officer may act as MFC, or he may be at the OP; in either case he will be control. The code-signs of the other two sets will be those of the senior section present, in this case No.2 section. If the mortar officer is acting as MFC, the OP will be 9C and the base plate will be 9C1.

If the mortar officer is at the OP, the MFC (2 sec comd) will be 9C and the base plate will be 9C1.

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(c) The Platoon with two MFCs.

In this case the platoon of four is made up of Nos.1 and 3 sections: the mortar officer is in the OP and each section commander is acting as MFC.



B - FIRE CONTROL PROCEDURE.

1. In general, normal RT procedure will be used, but the following specific rules should be obeyed as far as possible.

(a) The fire orders for the engagement of any one target should be regarded as a single conversation, unless there is a long pause or an interruption. For the first transmission of the conversation and the first transmission after a long pause or an interruption, one of the longer types of call should be used. For all subsequent transmissions "Hullo" should be omitted, in order to save time, and the shortest type of call used.

(b) The call should only be entirely omitted (as in lesson 3, para 5) when there is no possibility of confusion and WILL NOT be omitted in rotation shooting.

(c) All fire orders received at the Base Plate from a fire controller will be answered back so that the F.C.can hear that they have been correctly received. This will be done in such a way that the sec Cpl can overhear the orders. Similarly reports of "shot" and "bombs gone" will be answered back by the OP operator.

(d) If reception is poor, fire orders may be broken up and passed in a series of shorter transmissions.

2. The Section on a Coy Net.

No.1 section is under command of "C" Coy and is working on "C" Coy's frequency.

Declassified E.O. 12065 section 3-3(b)(4) no. 285020

B - FIRE CONTROL PROCEDURE.

1. In general, normal RT procedure will be used, but the following specific rules should be obeyed as far as possible.

(a) The fire orders for the engagement of any one target should be regarded as a single conversation, unless there is a long pause or an interruption. For the first transmission of the conversation and the first transmission after a long pause or an interruption, one of the longer types of call should be used. For all subsequent transmissions "Hullo" should be omitted, in order to save time, and the shortest type of call used.


(b) The call should only be entirely omitted (as in lesson 3, para 5) when there is no possibility of confusion and WILL NOT be omitted in rotation shooting.

(c) All fire orders received at the Base Plate from a fire controller will be answered back so that the F.C.can hear that they have been correctly received. This will be done in such a way that the sec Cpl can overhear the orders. Similarly reports of "shot" and "bombs gone" will be answered back by the GP operator.

(d) If reception is poor, fire orders may be broken up and passed in a series of shorter transmissions.

2. The Section on a Coy Net.

No.1 section is under command of "C" Coy and is working on "C" Coy's frequency.
The GP set is not in use.



Photographed by the U.S. Army Section 1-68/MHB No. 285020

Remember that:-

(a) Coy H.Q. is control, so ALL messages within the section must be passed as between outstations.

(b) Once the SC has started to control fire, all other traffic must cease.

(c) As they are on a Coy net, to avoid confusion, "9" must be included in all link-signs.

Example:- (Outstation calling Outstation).

Coy H.Q. says.	Sec Comd says	Baseplate says.
	(1) Hullo 9A, message for 9A1. Sec target, chII, No2 ranging 9A and 9A1, over.	
		(2) 9A1, Sec tgt, ChII No.2 ranging, over.
	(3) 9A, 2500, Z lines, Fire, over.	
		(4) 9A1, 2500, Z lines Fire, over.
		(5) 9A1, shot 2, over.
	(6) 9A, shot 2, over.	
	(7) 9A, 2700 fire, over.	
		(8) 9A1, 2700 fire, over.
		(9) 9A1 shot 2, over.
	(10) 9A, shot 2, over.	

In the above example the Coy Comd had previously given permission for the section to pass messages without "offering" them.

If the Coy Comd should insist that the message be "offered", then the procedure is as follows:-

Coy Comd says.	Sec Comd says.	Baseplate says
	(1) Hullo 9A, message for 9A1, 9A and 9A1, over.	
(2) Hullo 9A, send your message, over.		
		(3) 9A1, OK, over.
	(4)9A, Sec tgt, ChII No.2 Ranging over.	
		(5) 9A1, Sec tgt, ChII No.2 Ranging, over.

Finally, it will NOT be practicable to pass fire orders "through" control.

3. The Platoon.

Amended to 1960 Series Pamphlet No. 28020

9A and 9A1, over.

(2) 9A1, Sec tgt, ChII No.2 ranging, over.

(3) 9A, 2500, 2 lines, Fire, over.

(4) 9A1, 2500, 2 lines Fire, over.

(5) 9A1, shot 2, over.

(6) 9A, shot 2, over.

(7) 9A, 2700 fire, over.

(8) 9A1, 2700 fire, over.

(9) 9A1 shot 2, over.

(10) 9A, shot 2, over.

In the above example the Coy Comd had previously given permission for the section to pass messages without "offering" them.


If the Coy Comd should insist that the message be "offered", then the procedure is as follows:-

Coy Comd says.	Sec Comd says.	Baseplate says
	(1) Hullo 9A, message for 9A1, 9A and 9A1, over.	
(2) Hullo 9A, send your message, over.		
		(3) 9A1, OK, over.
	(4) 9A, Sec tgt, ChII No.2 Ranging over.	
		(5) 9A1, Sec tgt, ChII No.2 Ranging, over.

Finally, it will NOT be practicable to pass fire orders "through" control.

3. The Platoon.

Layout as follows:-



Mortar officer is MFC: No. 2 Sec Comd is Senior Sec Comd at static O.P. Remember that since mortars only are involved "9" may be dropped.


Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 285020

Example:- (Control calling to two outstations in succession)

Mortar Officer says	S.S.C. says	Baseplate says.
(1) Hullo C, target 547246, Your control, C, over,		
	(2) Hullo C, wait, out.	
	(3) Hullo C, target not identified, over.	
(4) C, Roger, out to you Hullo C1, my control, P1 target Ch1 Left ranging, C1, over.		
		(5) C1, Wilco, P1 Tgt Ch1, Left ranging, Over.
(6) C1, 1100, 10° R of Z, Fire, over.		
		(7) C1, 110, 10° R of Z, Fire, over,
		(8) C1, shot 4, over.
(9) C1, shot 4, over.		

4. The Platoon.

Layout as follows:-



Example (a):- MFC2 (3 sec comd) controls fire of whole platoon.

P1 comd says.	MFC 2 says.	MF2 says.
	(1) Hullo E, my control, Z, over.	
(2) Hullo E, Wilco, out		
	(3) Hullo, E, message for E1, P1 tgt, CHII No.1 Ranging E and E1, over.	
		(4) E1, P1 tgt CHII No.1 Ranging, over.

Example (b):- ROTATION SHOOTING: used when both MFCs wish to control the fire of their own sections simultaneously on the same frequency. Two MFCs

Infantry Training Pamphlet No. 28020


Fire, over.

(8) C1, shot 4, over.

(9) C1, shot 4, over.

4. The Platoon.

Layout as follows:-



Example (a):- MFC2 (3 sec comd) controls fire of whole platoon.

Pl comd says.	MFC 2 says.	MF2 says.
	(1) Hullo B, my control, B, over.	
(2) Hullo B, Wilco, out		
	(3) Hullo, B, message for B1, Pl tgt, CHII No.1 Ranging 2 and B1, over.	
		(4) B1, Pl tgt CHII No.1 Ranging, over.

Example (b):- ROTATION SHOOTING: used when both MFCs wish to control the fire of their own sections simultaneously on the same frequency. Two MFCs WILL ONLY BE SENT OUT IF THE TRAINING OF THE PLATOON IS VERY GOOD AND THIS METHOD OF SHOOTING HAS BEEN WELL PRACTISED.

The following rules must be obeyed:-

(i) SECTIONS MUST CO-OPERATE, USING THE AIR IN TURN AND AVOIDING A COMPETITIVE SPIRIT.

(ii) The fire orders of one section should be passed while the bombs of the other section are in the air.

(iii) One section will not attempt to pass an order till it has heard the other section report "shot".

(iv) ALL ORDERS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS MUST BE PREFACED BY THE LINK-SIGN OF THE STATION CONCERNED.

Instructions for Infantry Section Leaders No. 11965 285020

Example:-

P1 Comd says.	MFC1 says	MP1(A1) says	MFC2(Z) says	MP2(Z1) says.
(1) Hullo A, Hullo Z, Your control A and Z over.				
	(2) Hullo, A, Wilco, Out.			
				(3) Hullo Z, Wilco out.
	(4) Hullo A, Message for A1, my control Sec tgt Ch 2 No 1 Ranging A and A1, over			
		(5) A1, Wilco, Sec Tgt Ch2 No.1Ranging over.		
	(6) A, 2200 8° R of Z, Fire, Over.			
		(7) A1, 2200 8° R of Z, Fire, over.		
		(8) A1, shot 1, over.		
	(9) A, shot 1, over.			
			(10) Hullo Z, message for Z1, my control, Sec tgt Ch2 No.3. Ranging, Z and Z1, over.	
				(11) Z1 Wilco, Sec Tgt Ch2, No.3 ranging over.
			(12) Z, 1700 8° L of Z, Fire over.	
				(13) Z1, 1700 8° L of Z, Fire, over.
				(14) Z1, shot 3, over.
			(15) Z, shot 3, over.	
	(16) A, 2000 right 4° fire, over.			
		(17) A1, 2000 right 4° fire, over.		
		(18) A1, shot 1, over.		
	(19) A, shot 1, over.			
			(20) Z, 1900 fire, over.	
				(21) Z1, 1900 fire, over.

Public Record Office Acts 1958 Section 3 (4) Form No. 785020

(5) A1, Wilco, Sec tgt Ch2 No.1Ranging over.

(6) A, 2200 8° R of Z, Fire, Over.

(7) A1, 2200 8° R of Z, Fire, over.

(8) A1, shot 1, over.

(9) A, shot 1, over.

(10) Hullo E, message for E1, my control, Sec tgt Ch2 No.3. Ranging, E and E1, over.

(11) E1 Wilco, Sec tgt Ch2, No.3 ranging over.

(12) E, 1700 8° L of Z, Fire over.

(13) E1, 1700 8° L of Z, Fire, over.

(14) E1, shot 3, over.

(15) E, shot 3, over.

(16) A, 2000 right 4° fire, over.

(17) A1, 2000 right 4° fire, over.

(18) A1, shot 1, over.

(19) A, shot 1, over.

(20) E, 1900 fire, over.

(21) E1, 1900 fire, over.

(22) E1, shot 3, over.

(23) E, shot 3, over.

(24) A, 2200, 3 rds mortar fire, over.

(25) A1, 2200, 3 rds mortar fire, over.

etc.


NOTE: "Double gone" will NOT be reported during rotation shooting.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(1)(2)(3)(4) By 285220

C - PROCEDURE FOR RELAYED FIRE ORDERS.

1. When conditions for RT are bad, it will not always be possible for the fire controller to pass fire orders direct to the base plate position. In this case orders will be passed through a relay station and the procedure will be a modified form of that shown in lesson 4, para 2.

2. Control passes fire orders to one outstation through another outstation.



Sec Comd: A1 Sec target etc, over.
Baseplate: (no reply)
Sec comd : A3, relay to A1. over.
CP : A3, Wilco, over.
Sec comd : A3, Section target etc, over.
(1) CP : A3 for A1, free Control, Section target, etc, over.
(2) (Pause of 5 seconds)
Baseplate: A1, Section target, etc, over.
(3) CP : A3, OK, over.
Sec Comd : A3, 1700, zero lines, fire over.
CP : A3, 1900, zero lines, fire over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
(4) Sec Comd : A3, stop over.
CP : A3, stop, over.
Sec comd : A3, stop, cancel 1900, 1700 fire, over.
CP : A3, stop, cancel 1900, 1700 fire over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
Baseplate: Stop, cancel 1900, 1700 zero lines, fire over.
CP : A3, OK, over.
Baseplate: A1, shot one, over.
CP : A3, shot one, over.
5. (Pause of 5 seconds)
Sec Comd : A3, shot one, over.
6. CP : A3, OK, over.

NOTES:

(1) Orders from the CP are relayed and answered back simultaneously, saving an extra transmission. The first transmission by the relay station must indicate to the baseplate that relay procedure has started.

(2) This allows the fire controller to say "stop, over" and the relay station to answer him back if the order has been relayed incorrectly.

Reference No. 1945 Section Handbook No. 28020

Sec Cond: A1 Sec target etc, over.
Baseplate: (no reply)
Sec cond : A3, relay to A1. over.
CP : A3, Wilco, over.
Sec cond : A3, Section target etc, over.
(1) CP : A3 for A1, from Control, Section target, etc, over.
(2) (Pause of 5 seconds)
Baseplate: A1, Section target, etc, over.
(3) CP : A3, OK, over.
Sec Cond : A3, 1700, zero lines, fire over.
CP : A3, 1900, zero lines, fire over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
(4) Sec Cond : A3, stop over.
CP : A3, stop, over.
Sec cond : A3, stop, cancel 1900, 1700 fire, over.
CP : A3, stop, cancel 1900, 1700 fire over.
(Pause of 5 seconds)
Baseplate: Stop, cancel 1900, 1700 zero lines, fire over.
CP : A3, OK, over.
Baseplate: A1, shot one, over.
CP : A3, shot one, over.
5. (Pause of 5 seconds)
Sec Cond : A3, shot one, over.
6. CP : A3, OK, over.

NOTES:

(1) Orders from the CP are relayed and answered back simultaneously, saving an extra transmission. The first transmission by the relay station mustindicate to the baseplate that relay procedure has started.

(2) This allows the fire controller to say "stop, over" and the relay station to answer him back if the order has been relayed incorrectly.

(3) The transmission "OK, over"
(a) Tells the baseplate that the order has been answered back correctly.
(b) Tells the Op that his order has reached the baseplate.
(c) Tells the Op that the relay station is ready for the next order.


(4) While the baseplate pauses, the CP says "Stop, over" and the relay station answers back, preventing the baseplate from answering back or acting on a wrong order.

(5) This is to ensure that messages originating at the baseplate can be corrected if necessary.

(6) See (3) above.


Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NARA) By NARA Date 2/5/2020

3. Outstation passes fire orders to control through another outstation.



MPC : Hullo E, my control, E, over.
Hullo E, my control, E, over.
(no reply)
MPC : Hullo E, message for E3. relay to control, over.
CP : E3, Wilco, over.
MPC : E, my control, over.
CP : Hullo E3, message from E, my control, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds).
B.P. : E3, Wilco, over.
CP : E3, OK, over.
MPC : E, P1 tgt, etc, over.
CP : E3, P1 tgt, etc over.
(Pause of 5 seconds).
B.P. : E3, P1 tgt etc, over.
CP : E3, OK, over.

4. Outstation passes fire order to another outstation through control.




MPC : C for C1, P1 tgt, etc, over.
C for C1, P1 tgt, etc, over.
(no reply)
MPC : Hullo C, relay to C1, over.
CP : C, Wilco, over.
MPC : C, P1 tgt, etc, over.
(pause of 5 seconds)
B.P.: C1, P1 tgt, etc over.
CP : C1, OK, over.
MPC : C, 950, etc over.
(pause of 5 seconds).
B.P.: C1, 950, etc, over.
CP : C1, OK, over.
B.P.: C1, shot one, over.

Declassified by the Australian War Memorial under the Archives Act 1983 No. 28020

B.P. : E3, Wilco, over.
CP : E3, OK, over.
MPC : E, P1 tgt, etc, over.
CP : E3, P1 tgt, etc over.
(Pause of 5 seconds).
B.P. : E3, P1 tgt etc, over.
CP : E3, OK, over.

4. Outstation passes fire order to another outstation through control.



MPC : C for C1, P1 tgt, etc, over.
C for C1, P1 tgt, etc, over.
(no reply)
MPC : Hallo C, relay to C1, over.
CP : C, Wilco, over.
MPC : C, P1 tgt, etc, over.
(pause of 5 seconds)
B.P.: C1, P1 tgt, etc over.
CP : C1, OK, over.
MPC : C, 950, etc over.
(pause of 5 seconds).
B.P.: C1, 950, etc, over.
CP : C1, OK, over.
B.P.: C1, shot one, over.
CP : C1, shot one, over.
(Pause of 5 seconds).
MPC : C, shot one, over.
CP : C1, OK, over.

28220

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNBC No. 785020

D

SUBJECT :- 2-in Mortar Training.

'F' BRITISH LIAISON & TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C. I.C.F.

Ref: G/A.1/857.

18 October '45.

Officer i/c Training, RTC.

Herewith suggested method for training in respect of the 2-in Mortar.

W.L. Price

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'F' British Liaison &
Training Unit RTC ICF

WLP/rsw

Internal.
File.

C O - P - I.

APPENDIX "A"

2" MORTAR BATTLE PRACTICE.

The practice is conducted as follows:-

(a) A recce. is made to select target area, and 3 slit trenches dug to approx 400 yards to represent target area. These need only be 12-15" deep.

(b) There are two Cadre N.C.Os. detailed as Instructors, one to test and brief Nos. 1 and 2, the other N.C.O. accompanies the Nos. 1 and 2 after briefing, to ensure safety precautions are carried out. The W.T.O. or Company Officer is in charge.

(c) Some 30 to 50 yards behind the area from which firing is to take place, a model approx. 8' x 4' is dug in the ground, which is a replica of the whole area, this can be done quite easily in 20 minutes.

The Nos. 1 and 2 then arrive in pairs and lie down behind the model. The N.C.O. then, by question and answer, makes No. 1 explain the ground, prominent features, hedge rows, etc. and tells the man that he is going to be exercised with live firing over ground which is similar to this model.

The No. 1 is then given the target and selects an aiming point and withdraws back a few feet where he is out of view of the target. No. 2 is in a position of observation. The instructor gives the order to fire, the N.C.O. then drops a piece of cotton wool on the model to represent where the bomb has landed, after the second bomb, No. 2 has to make the necessary correction, shouting the correction in a loud voice.

The N.C.O. by question and answer, comments on the correction made by No. 2 and to the alteration of the angle of the barrel made by No. 1

The two numbers then change over and are put through a similar test.

(d) The pair are then put through the live firing practice.

(e) The Officer describes a situation to the pair, and they are left to choose their own lines of advance, which is roughly 40°, No. 1 to select his firing position and No. 2 his position of observation.

Other than the N.C.O. watching for safety precautions, they are not interfered with, and engage the target. After firing the requisite number of bombs, Nos. 1 and 2 change positions.

(f) If the live firing practice shows that they still have not fully grasped the procedure, they are re-tested on the model.

The reason for carrying out this method is that there are two real faults which definitely needed clearing up and they are:-

(a) The No. 1 when told by No. 2 down 100, puts the barrel down instead of up.

(b) No. 2, thinking in terms of the barrel and not where the bomb had dropped when making corrections.

This procedure of Battle Practice is a slow one, if done thoroughly, but it is time well spent. The standard of 2" Mortar firing improves enormously.

Public Record Office Reference WO 285/28

be exercised with live firing over ground which is similar to this model.

The No. 1 is then given the target and selects an aiming point and withdraws back a few feet where he is out of view of the target. No. 2 is in a position of observation. The instructor gives the order to fire, the N.C.O. then drops a piece of cotton wool on the model to represent where the bomb has landed, after the second bomb, No. 2 has to make the necessary correction, shouting the correction in a loud voice.

The N.C.O. by question and answer, comments on the correction made by No. 2 and to the alteration of the angle of the barrel made by No. 1

The two members then change over and are put through a similar test.

(d) The pair are then put through the live firing practice.

(e) The Officer describes a situation to the pair, and they are left to choose their own lines of advance, which is roughly 40°, No. 1 to select his firing position and No. 2 his position of observation.

Other than the N.C.O. watching for safety precautions, they are not interfered with, and engage the target. After firing the requisite number of bombs, Nos. 1 and 2 change positions.

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File

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)/NND No. 285020

(7)

SUBJECT :- Training of Recruits.

'F' BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref : G/A.1/527.

8 October '45.

H.Q.,
R.T.C., I.C.F.

1. While it is realised that the large number of men passing through the Centre presents a tremendous problem it is felt that some effort should be made at training even if it is only the most elementary.

2. At present the Gruppi are stationed in widely separated sub-units which makes the reception of an untrained body of men extremely difficult. As has been previously remarked, it is essential that the reception arrangements are improved and men are actively engaged on training the moment they arrive.

3. All sub-units should make out a training programme, if it is only for a week.

4. It is realised that shortage of clothing may make many periods out of the question, but a limited programme could be carried out. At present the number of men hanging around doing nothing is far too large. Too many Officers look upon CRS-XII as a Specialist Camp and not as a Training Centre.

This attitude brings the Centre into disrepute.

5. It is appreciated that the sooner the Centre can return to its normal functions the better, but at the moment the Gruppi would far sooner receive a draft of soldiers with some basic training than have a few highly trained specialists.

6. It is thought that some change of attitude is necessary in dealing with these men coming into the Centre and that all Officers and NCOs realise that if only two hours instruction is given it is better than nothing.

7. These men passing through now will return as students in a short time. It is essential that they get a good impression of the Centre now. Besides this, any Officer who carries out training to the best of his ability will be doing the greater service to the Gruppi and the remainder of the Italian Army.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.5 NND No. 785020

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This attitude brings the Centre into disrepute.

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D.L.R.

Major G3C II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'p' British Liaison &
Training Unit MAC HQ.

DLR/raw

Internal.
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25

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6

152(Tk) Signal Training Centre.

Technical Instruction No. 10.

SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE OPERATION SIGNAL STORES.

1. Classification.

In a theatre of war, British signal stores are classified as "controlled" or "uncontrolled".

Controlled stores are those generally required to equip units to operational scales or to carry out work projects. Such stores as cannot be mass-produced e.g. carrier or multi-channel equipment, are inevitably included in this category. Stores temporarily in short supply may be included for a limited period.

The Chief Signal Officer at the supreme allied headquarters is responsible for the control of all signal stores in the theatre. On his staff are officers who forecast theatre requirements on which home production is based, and control the distribution of stores in readiness for present and future operations.

Uncontrolled stores are those in good supply, generally expendable, which require no discrimination between the relative importance of unit demands e.g. "X" cells or wireless receiving valves.

2. Demands.

The unit authority for demanding stores may be either
(a) the Table of War Equipment (A.F. G1098)
or (b) the War Office Equipment Scale
or (c) any special scale authorised by G.H.Q. of the theatre.

N.B. In the case of the Signal School this is given in BNT letter BNT/SS/4/AT1 of 2 Feb 45..

Demands for uncontrolled stores are submitted through R.O.C. channels on A.F. G994.

Demands for controlled stores are submitted by letter to the C.O. of the formation or District in which the unit is situated. C.O.'s generally demand a monthly return of unit deficiencies of controlled stores, so that the relative priority of issue may be decided.

3. Issues.

The R.O.C. is responsible for the distribution of signal equipment to units.

All stores are consigned to the Base Ordnance Depot (B.O.D.) on arrival in the theatre. The B.O.D. holds reserves sufficient to meet [illegible]

Received R.O. Mess Section [illegible] No. 28020

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N.B. In the case of the Signal School this is given in SHAEF letter SHAEF/65/4/SD1 of 2 Feb 45..

Demands for uncontrolled stores are submitted through R.A.O.C. channels on A.F. G394.

Demands for controlled stores are submitted by letter to the C.S.O. of the formation or District in which the unit is situated. C.S.O's generally demand a monthly return of unit deficiencies of controlled stores, so that the relative priority of items may be decided.

3. Issues.

The R.A.O.C. is responsible for the distribution of signal equipment to units.

All stores are consigned to the Base Ordnance Depot (B.O.D.) on arrival in the theatre. The B.O.D. holds reserves sufficient to meet at least one month's wastage without replenishment. Army Ordnance Depots (A.O.D.) receive stores from the B.O.D. into the zone of operations. All tactical formations down to and including Divisions have Ordnance Field Parks (O.F.P.). At the Army O.F.P. 10 days wastage of all stores for the Army is held. O.F.P.'s at lower formations hold 10 days wastage of vital stores only.

To enable urgent demands to be met, it is usual for certain signal stores to be diverted to "Signal Parks" instead of to O.F.P.'s. These Parks are staffed by signals personnel and are controlled directly by C.S.O.'s of formations. They exist at Army Group, Army and Corps levels, and may often furnish divisional detachments where it is required to hold stores well forward for impending operations.

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4. Projects.

There a major engineering work is to be carried out for the benefit of the theatre as a whole, it is customary for the unit or units carrying out the project to receive a specially authorised bulk issue of stores based on exact computation of quantities required. Construction or rehabilitation of long telephone routes or installation of multi-position switchboards are usually classed as "projects".

5. Control.

Control of signal stores at all levels is exercised by the CSO concerned working in consultation with the equivalent staff officer in the Transmission Branch.

6. Maintenance Stores.

The organisation outlined above deals with the supply of complete equipments and essential front-line maintenance stores. All other repairs are carried out by telecommunication personnel of RSME, who obtain spares from the BSD or ASD through RSME channels.

Mobile repair facilities are provided by the "X" detachment and workshop lorry, which is equipped for the inspection and realignment of apparatus and the execution of minor repairs. Items beyond local repair are passed back to the static workshop on which the detachment depends. If this workshop cannot repair the item, it normally hands the unit a "Beyond Local Repair Certificate" (BLR) and returns the equipment to Base Workshops RSME for major repair as and when possible, after which the item is handed back to the BSD for re-issue.

It is not necessary for the unit to await the return of its equipment once the "BLR Certificate" has been obtained. Application must be made to the appropriate source of supply accompanied by the certificate, whereupon a new item will be issued when available.

7. Surplus Stores.

Surplus stores must be returned to the nearest Returned Stores Depot or Signal Park. They must be securely packed, and marked with the designation of the stores and their condition i.e., "serviceable and fit for re-issue", "for repair", "deficient", or other description.

8. Salvage.

The salvage of serviceable components and materials is of great importance to a nation's war economy. All equipment damaged beyond possibility of repair and all unserviceable stores, battle-

Authority E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNSA ltr. 2/5/020

6. Maintenance Stores.

The organisation outlined above deals with the supply of complete equipments and essential first-line maintenance stores. All other repairs are carried out by telecommunication personnel of R2WT, who obtain spares from the BOD or ASD through R2WT channels.

Mobile repair facilities are provided by the "S" detachment and workshop lorry, which is equipped for the inspection and realignment of apparatus and the execution of minor repairs. Items beyond local repair are passed back to the static workshop on which the detachment depends. If this workshop cannot repair the item, it normally hands the unit a "Beyond Local Repair Certificate" (BLR) and returns the equipment to Base Workshops R2WT for major repairs and when possible, after which the item is handed back to the BOD for release.

It is not necessary for the unit to await the return of its equipment once the "BLR Certificate" has been obtained. Application must be made to the appropriate overseas supply accompanied by the certificate, whereupon a new item will be issued when available.

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8. Salvage.

The salvage of serviceable components and materials is of great assistance to a nation's war economy. All equipment damaged beyond possibility of repair and all expended items e.g. batteries, must be returned to the nearest Salvage Depot or Signal Park for disintegration.

9. Technical Vehicles.

Release of technical vehicles is authorised by the "A3" section of the Quartermaster (Q) Branch of the supreme headquarters in the theatre of operations, on the advice of the CSO. The RASC distributes the vehicles to Vehicle Parks from which units collect on receipt of Q(T) authority.

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For Action/For Info.	
G.S.O.I. Sig.	Sec.
Date	File A-1

Major,
S.O., R. Signals.

23 Aug 45.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS No. 785020

Unclassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC NO. 785020

SUBJECT: Infantry Training - General.

(5)

From: BRITISH LIAISON & TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.A.F.
Ref: C/A.1/733
31 August 45.

To: Officer i/c Training,
H.Q.,
R.T.C., I.A.F.

Copy to: G.II Training.

I - Infantry Recruit Training.

(a) The result of eight months training should now be studied and a full and frank opinion of the state of affairs as they really are is given.

This can be ignored or acted upon, but it must be admitted that in many ways the standard of training is lower now than for the past six months, and that items which I refrained from commenting on then cannot now be allowed to pass.

(b) The first essential item must be the first impression of a soldier when he enters this Training Centre, as all men, when they enter the Army, are receptive and impressionable.

Other than the state of the roads, which is outside the scope of Training, and in any case is in hand, his first impressions cannot be favourable. He will see civilian photographers, ice-cream vendors surrounded by a crowd of soldiers in various states of undress. Straight away a bad impression is gained. This would not be allowed outside any Allied Headquarters and I am certain was never permitted in the Italian Army before the war. If these people are essential a properly organised photographer's shop could be set up in the Camp instead of the scruffy individuals one sees at present.

A really smart guard is the first thing the new recruit should see; a guard a credit to the Centre and to the Italian Army. Nobody should be allowed outside the Camp until he is properly dressed.

(c) Again, there appears to be universally a wrong approach to the handling of recruits on joining. Much is talked about "Morale

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NARA, Date 28520

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(c) Again, there appears to be universally a wrong approach to the handling of recruits on joining. Much is talked about "Morale Education" but no recruit is ever trained by talk on high-sounding theories.

The recruit must be got hold of from the moment he arrives and the difference between the life of a soldier and that of a civilian made absolutely clear to him. Discipline is never resented but inefficiency is. Without discipline there can be no efficiency in an army.

There are many things which strike the outsider about the reception of recruits — the struggle at present from the Station to the Regiments, the vast number of men sprawled about the ground outside offices, awaiting documentation. These things impress most unfavourably.

If a party of men arrive they should be met by a properly organised party, smartly dressed and knowing their job. The moment they get off the train they must be marched as a proper party. The first place they are marched to must be to draw eating utensils; then to a meal.

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)/NARA NO. 285020

The vast amount of men seen hanging about outside offices is bewildering in the extreme. It is presumed that most men come with some sort of documents and particulars.

A Sergeant can collect the particulars and consolidate them into a roll, handing this into the office. If this is not practical then a proper waiting room should be provided with benches or forms, next to the office where documentation takes place. It is absolutely essential to avoid the present system, where a heap of men litter the ground. Particularly is it undesirable to have this crowd outside the Regimental Headquarters.

The reception part is the most vital part of a man's training and it must be studied again and again to attempt to cut down the time between the man's arrival and the moment he is clothed.

II - Permanent Staff.

It must be all too apparent that our permanent staff leaves much to be desired in our Training Regiments. Only about 10% even approach the standard required. I have previously written about officers and NCOs of the permanent staff being dressed a little differently from the rest - the carrying, for example, of swagger sticks, the blanco-ing of belts. At present it is true that many are dressed differently from the men, but usually only because the recruits are properly dressed and the officers not. To say that smartness and military discipline is poor is an under statement.

I would suggest that it is absolutely necessary to make changes in the permanent staff or to at least make a terrific drive. As a very general observation I have noticed that the only officers and N.C.Os. who appear to have the right idea are :

(a) Artillery.
(b) Cavalry.
(c) Grenadiers.
(d) Special Corps Officers.

Let us see a much higher percentage of these in our permanent staff.

It is also absolutely essential that the permanent staff is kept up to strength so that officers are not overworked to the extent of getting stale. This applies particularly to junior officers. It is essential that, even allowing for leave and sickness, there are sufficient permanent staff to keep the ratio around the 1 : 5 figure.

III - Centralisation.

It is absolutely essential that, at a Training Centre, a very rigid routine be followed and that the training be uniform throughout. However, it is equally important that the junior commander be left to run his own show. The platoon commander must be told what he has to do in great detail, but he must be left to do it and judged by results. At present nobody under the rank of Major does anything, or, it appears, is allowed to do

Restricted P.R. 12051 Series 1-100/2000 No. 285020

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IV - N.C.Os.

The more efficient training of N.C.Os. is not enough. The N.C.O. must have some advantage to compensate for his extra work and efficiency, particularly members of the permanent staff.

(a) Promotion must be reasonably rapid.

(b) An N.C.O. class must be formed and officers must change their attitude towards N.C.Os.

They should be provided with separate messes, be allowed out on pass later than the ordinary soldier, etc. If privileges are granted those who have them will ensure that others keep strictly within the regulations. It is essential that the recruit be treated strictly - therefore the N.C.O. must be capable and keen.

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With two exceptions, the Marechalls here are useless. This is after all the Senior N.C.O's rank and in the same way as the Colonel sets the standard for the Officers, in the same way must the Marechalls do the same for the N.C.Os. Recently I saw a Marechalls who must be at least 60 and should have retired long ago. This is not the type of N.C.O that is wanted. The German Warrant Officer, or for that matter any other army Warrant Officer is a man of the greatest importance. The day when an Officer could personally control a battle finished at Waterloo.

V - Courses of Instruction for Permanent Staff.

Per Recruit Training it is essential that every Officer from the Regimental Commander downwards attends either the Weapon Training or the Tactical Course at SIVA.

Under no circumstances should Officers and N.C.Os be sent from the Permanent Staff on 3-in Mortar or 6 Pounder courses merely to make up the number of vacancies. A small reserve is necessary in the Centre to replace wastages at Schools, but these should not be held in the permanent staff of Regiments.

At present undoubtedly, there is a very sound grievance in the Regiments that half their Instructors are wasted by being away on perfectly useless courses from a Regimental point of view.

On the other hand is must be admitted that little effort is made to carefully select students in the majority of cases. If the English system of having a large number of courses is to be followed so must Commanders be prepared to have Junior Ranks commanding occasionally, Units larger than they do usually. At present Commanders hesitate to allow Senior Officers to go on courses for fear that Junior Officers will be incapable of Commanding. This is most wrong as little damage can be done in time of peace and it provides an excellent training for the Junior Officer. It must be considered a rule that all Officers and N.C.Os are capable in an emergency of doing the job of their immediate superior. If they cannot they should not hold their rank.

VI - Offices.

There is undoubtedly a tendency for all to stop in the office too much. This is common to all armies and in many formations rules are made that no Officer, except say the Adjutant and Quartermaster will step in his office between certain hours. This was tried by FORCE Group when under training, with great success.

If there is not a rule of this nature the amount of Instructors on training falls rapidly below the required numbers.

VII - Methods of Training.

Either British methods can be accepted in full or at least with only minor modifications. The essentials in training are :-

(a) That the instruction be properly prepared. This means working after parade hours.

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(a) That the instruction be properly prepared. This means working after parade hours.

(b) That the training be presented in a way which is interesting and does get over to the men.

(c) That Officers organize training but in the large majority of periods the N.C.O instructs.

It must be admitted that while No. 1 Regiment is not bad, No. 2 Regiment, except when the instruction is on a Regimental level, is very poor. The exception is probably the San Marco, who are also fairly good.

Even in No. 1 Regiment the junior instructors must continually be striving to improve their lessons from the interest point of view; but probably the worst fault is the allowing of faults to go unchecked. If a mortarman puts his bomb in back to front, this item would not be allowed to happen again, but in small items equally important faults are allowed to pass.

In the second Regiment, while I have seen quite good Tactical training, & training in barracks is just so bad that it is impossible to know where to start to criticise. Unless some effort is made to stop the 'harangue' type of training by an Officer to about a hundred men, this Regiment will never produce a good recruit.

...../20

Public Record Office W.O. 169/ Section 1-169/ No. 785/20

The reasons for this, I am convinced, are two :

(a) A lack of interest in training.

(b) A lack of supervision on behalf of Senior Officers.

If there is interest on the part of officers in training, there is little need of supervision, but at present it is extremely obvious that no interest is paid whatsoever by certain officers in the training. It must be pointed out that the task of the British Officer here is to assist in teaching our methods of training. We have no command and can only suggest. At present, to suggest improvements is impossible as there is literally no training. Unless there is a basis of organisation, discipline and a desire to learn, it is a waste of time to be here.

The basis of enthusiasm is knowledge of a subject. The more one learns the keener one gets therefore it is essential that all officers attend suitable courses and study manuals.

If there is no interest there must be strict supervision and if necessary changes. This should and must come from an Italian side. If a British Officer recommends that an Officer is inefficient it creates a bad feeling, there is it obvious that this must be the duties of the Italian Staff.

If then training will reach an average standard, a few suggestions and a little encouragement can make it really good. The basis that will start this by having the Officers Training within the Regiments.

It is as easy for one Officer to speak to 30 Officers as it is to speak to 2. Regimental Commanders and Training Officers must collect their Officers and Instruct them.

In evry British Brigade or Battalion at least once a week the Commanding Officer puts over his views and his methods, sometimes just to Officers and sometimes to N.C.Os as well. Not only does this happen in the Brigade and Battalion but in the Division and Army.

If a Commander, say of a Regiment, speaks merely to his Battalion Commanders, by the time his orders reach the men at least 75% will be lost. In the same way Junior Commanders must hold regular conferences and instructional periods. The more Senior Officers can "put over" training to the Juniors, the more will they realise the important part they have to play.

At the moment I feel that the Junior Officers taking a period feel that they are more interested in getting the men away from barracks than actually doing training.

VIII - Preparation of Work.

This is at present the worst side of training. Unless Officers are allowed adequate time and made to prepare work, training will be bad.

At present if an Officer has no men to train he is made to do some other job, usually quite useless, to fill in his time.

Officers should be set tasks consistant with their tasks on the establishment.

Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3(E)/NNDB no. 785020

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Officers should be set tasks consistant with their tasks on the establishment. For example, Instructors should be made to produce their plans for lessons in the way suggested in Methods of Instruction.

VIIII - Thoroughness in Training.

There is a mistaken idea that the Italian soldier learns quicker than the British and that the various lessons are too slow and too boring. This is nonsense, and is merely because the instruction is bad. It is also said in British Units that lessons are slow, but only where the instruction is bad. As soon as anybody says this, check their lesson with the pamphlet and check their instruction. It will nearly always be found to be bad. If the instruction was of a high level we could accept this criticism. It is not and the results produced at present are poor. This is through lack of method and lack of attention to the little details that make the difference between good and bad instruction.

19

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The GOOD Instructor is always pressed for time in his lessons and has not a minute to spare.

In the same way a lot of nonsense is talked that various things will bore the soldier, and will annoy him. While the majority of training can be made interesting, there are certain things that are hard work, that are boring but which are essential for a soldier to learn and to do.

The sooner Officers get it into their heads that a soldier does things whether he likes it or not, and without talking, the better.

Training is 75% pleasure but 25% hard work. If you cannot make a soldier do an unpleasant thing in peace, you will not in war. When the instruction and discipline is good, then discuss National Characteristics

X - Training in Schools.

Is better out of all proportions to training in the Regiments but suffers at present from poor students, therefore it is essential that we put our basic training in order and thus ensure that :

(a) The Officers and N.C.Os go back to a Regiment where they have a fair opportunity of passing on their knowledge.

(b) That students from Regiments are of a better quality.

It is also essential that the changing of policy of Schools should be kept to the minimum, that the standard of the individual lesson be raised rather than the conception of the course altered.

Tactical training is on the whole satisfactory, but I would stress more use of Wireless Sets either for directors of exercises to control enemy etc but also for the students to use as much as possible.

A false impression is often given of how much a Commander can move around in an attack if he has a wireless. The importance of all Officers being able to control artillery fire cannot be overstressed. All Officers must be able to talk on a Wireless Set as easily as a telephone. They must send information back. Therefore periods for Officers and Section N.C.Os on wireless procedure, control of fire, and the passing back of information must be included.

Too much time cannot be spent on location of the enemy. In several courses "Crack and Thump" is taught, but so must be the submission of shelling and morter reports.

Further attention should paid to night work. With the advent of peace a large proportion of Night Training has been discontinued.

A method of guiding patrols by wireless was sent out from this H.Q. The Signals alone have tried it, the Infantry who do the patrols have not. As increasingly modern battle takes place at night, so night training must be stepped up.

Day patrolling must also not be neglected as against a retreating enemy in broken country the day patrol with wireless communication with gunners can often achieve really effective results.

The [illegible] must be made hard so that a sense of achievement

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS No. 285020

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N.C.O training in Schools must be made hard so that a sense of achievement is gained. Exercise must be set so that the N.C.O's powers of leadership are brought out under difficult condition. For this, more assault course training must be included, not of the simple kind as in the Regiments, but with formidable obstacles such as may be met in action - streams, cliffs etc, and with live ammunition being fired over the heads of the students.

Night training and the type of training refered to in the manual as 18 battle discipline must be stressed.

A most exciting form of training is the night gapping of minefields where a proportion of the mines have been booby trapped to small charges and where the enemy is waiting to fire at the slightest noise. The successful night gapping of a minefield is one which requires the maximum skill, leadership and control.

...../6.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC 10. 28520

XI. - One final point. There is a belief that the Atom Bomb has rendered obsolete all other forms of military science and that the present training is useless.

Whilst it is my own opinion that this is complete rubbish and that it will be as effective in a defensive application as in the attack, it must not be allowed to depress the students into thinking they are wasting their time, and particularly in the disturbed conditions after the war the small scale operations against disaffected elements, and the many forms of employments that an army had before the war will continue for some time to come viz: Riots in North Africa, troubles in Syria.

D.L. Pace

Major G3O II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'P' British Liaison &
Training Unit NYC 107.

WLP/rsw

Internal.

File.
Plest.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402(5) NN 285020

W.L. Pace

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg.
'P' British Liaison &
Training Unit KDG IGF.

WLP/rsw

Internal.

File.
Plest.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(NDC) By 285020

FILE

SUBJECT: Infantry Training - General.

(7)

'F' BRITISH LIAISON & TRADING UNIT
H.Q.G., I.G.F.

Ref: G/A.1/733

31 August 45.

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This can be ignored or acted upon, but it must be admitted that in many ways the standard of training is lower now than for the past six months, and that items which I refrained from commenting on then cannot now be allowed to pass.

(b) The first essential item must be the first impression of a soldier when he enters this Training Centre, as all men, when they enter the Army, are receptive and impressionable.

Other than the state of the roads, which is outside the scope of Training, and in any case is in hand, his first impressions cannot be favourable. He will see civilian photographers, ice-cream vendors surrounded by a crowd of soldiers in various states of undress. Straight away a bad impression is gained. This would not be allowed outside any Allied Headquarters and I am certain was never permitted in the Italian Army before the war. If these people are essential a properly organised photographer's shop could be set up in the Camp instead of the scruffy individuals one sees at present.

A really smart guard is the first thing the new recruit should see; a guard a credit to the Centre and to the Italian Army. Nobody should be allowed outside the Camp until he is properly dressed.

(c) Again, there appears to be universally a wrong approach to the handling of recruits on joining. Much is talked about "Morale Education" but no recruit is ever trained by talk on high-sounding theories.

The recruit must be got hold of from the moment he arrives and the difference between the life of a soldier and that of a civilian made absolutely clear to him. Discipline is never resented but inefficiency is. Without discipline there can be no efficiency in an army.

There are many things which strike the outsider about the reception of recruits — the struggle at present from the Station to the Regiments, the vast number of men sprawled about the ground outside offices, awaiting documentation. These things impress most unfavourably.

If a party of men arrive they should be met by a properly organised party, smartly dressed and knowing their job. The moment they get off the train they must be marched as a proper party. The first place they are marched to must be to draw eating utensils; then to a meal.

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-103/NARS No. 285020

the vast amount of men seen hanging about outside offices is bewildering in the extreme. It is proposed that most men come with some sort of documents and particulars.

A Sergeant can collect the particulars and consolidate them into a roll, handing this into the office. If this is not practical then a proper waiting room should be provided with benches or forms, next to the office where documentation takes place. It is absolutely essential to avoid the present system, where a heap of men litter the ground. Particularly is it undesirable to have this crowd outside the Regimental Headquarters.

The reception part is the most vital part of a man's training and it must be studied again and again to attempt to cut down the time between the man's arrival and the moment he is clothed.

II - Permanent Staff.

It must be all too apparent that our permanent staff leaves much to be desired in our Training Regiments. Only about 10% even approach the standard required. I have previously written about officers and NCOs of the permanent staff being dressed a little differently from the men - the carrying, for example, of swagger sticks, the blancoing of belts. At present it is true that they are dressed differently from the men, but usually only because the recruits are properly dressed and the officers not. To say that smartness and military discipline is poor is an under statement.

I would suggest that it is absolutely necessary to make changes in the permanent staff or to at least make a terrific drive. As a very personal observation I have noticed that the only officers and N.C.Os. who appear to have the right idea are :

(a) Artillery.
(b) Cavalry.
(c) Grenadiers.
(d) Special Corps Officers.

Let us see a much higher percentage of these in our permanent staff.

It is also absolutely essential that the permanent staff is kept up to strength so that officers are not overworked to the extent of getting stale. This applies particularly to junior officers. It is essential that, even allowing for leave and sickness, there are sufficient permanent staff to keep the ratio around the 1:5 figure.

III - Centralisation.

It is absolutely essential that, at a Training Centre, a very rigid routine be followed and that the training be uniform throughout. However, it is equally important that the junior commander be left to run his own show. The platoon commander must be told what he has to do in great detail, but he must be left to do it and judged by results. At present nobody under the rank of Major does anything, or, it appears, is allowed to do anything.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)/NNSA no. 285220

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IV - N.C.Os.

The more efficient training of N.C.Os. is not enough. The N.C.O. must have some advantage to compensate for his extra work and efficiency, particularly members of the permanent staff. 15

(a) Promotion must be reasonably rapid.

(b) An N.C.O. class must be formed and officers must change their attitude towards N.C.Os.

They should be provided with separate messes, be allowed out on pass later than the ordinary soldier, etc. If privileges are granted those who have them will ensure that others keep strictly within the regulations. It is essential that the recruit be treated similarly - therefore the N.C.O. must be capable and keen.

...../3.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)/NNSC No. 28020

With two exceptions, the Marechalls here are useless. This is after all the Senior N.C.O's rank and in the same way as the Colonel sets the standard for the Officers, in the same way must the Marechalls do the same for the N.C.Os. Recently I saw a Marechalls who must be at least 60 and should have retired long ago. This is not the type of N.C.O that is wanted. The German Warrant Officer, or for that matter any other army Warrant Officer is a man of the greatest importance. The day when an Officer could personally control a battle finished at Waterloo.

V - Courses of Instruction for Permanent Staff.

For Recruit Training it is essential that every Officer from the Regimental Commander downwards attends either the Weapon Training or the Tactical Course at SIVA.

Under no circumstances should Officers and N.C.Os be sent from the Permanent Staff on 3-in Mortar or 6 Pounder courses merely to make up the number of vacancies. A small reserve is necessary in the Centre to replace wastages at Schools, but these should not be held in the permanent staff of Regiments.

At present undoubtedly, there is a very sound grievance in the Regiments that half their Instructors are wasted by being away on perfectly useless courses from a Regimental point of view.

On the other hand is must be admitted that little effort is made to carefully select students in the majority of cases. If the English system of having a large number of courses is to be followed so must Commanders be prepared to have Junior Ranks commanding occasionally, Units larger than they do usually. At present Commanders hesitate to allow Senior Officers to go on courses for fear that Junior Officers will be incapable of Commanding. This is most wrong as little damage can be done in time of peace and it provides an excellent training for the Junior Officer. It must be considered a rule that all Officers and N.C.Os are capable in an emergency of doing the job of their immediate superior. If they cannot they should not hold their rank.

VI - Offices.

There is undoubtedly a tendency for all to stop in the office too much. This is common to all armies and in many formations rules are made that no Officer, except say the Adjutant and Quartermaster will stop in his office between certain hours. This was tried by FORCEX Group when under training, with great success.

If there is not a rule of this nature the amount of Instructors on training falls rapidly below the required numbers.

VII - Methods of Training.

Either British methods can be accepted in full or at least with only minor modifications. The essentials in training are :-

(a) That the instruction be properly prepared. This means working after parade hours.

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(b) That the training be presented in a way which is interesting and does get over to the men.

(c) That Officers organise training but in the large majority of periods the N.C.O instructs.

It must be admitted that while No. 1 Regiment is not bad, No. 2 Regiment, except when the instruction is on a Regimental level, is very poor. The exception is probably the San Marco, who are also fairly good.

Even in No. 1 Regiment the junior instructors must continually be striving to improve their lessons from the interest point of view; but probably the worst fault is the allowing of faults to go unchecked. If a sortermen puts his bomb in back to front, this item would not be allowed to happen again, but in small items equally important faults are allowed to pass.

In the second Regiment, while I have seen quite good Tactical training, t training in barracks is just so bad that it is impossible to know where to start to criticise. Unless some effort is made to stop the 'harangue' type of training by an Officer to about a hundred men, this Regiment will never produce a good recruit.

...../4.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)/NNDB No. 785020

The reasons for this, I am convinced, are two :

(a) A lack of interest in training.

(b) A lack of supervision on behalf of Senior Officers.

If there is interest on the part of officers in training, there is little need of supervision, but at present it is extremely obvious that no interest is paid whatsoever by certain officers in the training. It must be pointed out that the task of the British Officer here is to assist in teaching our methods of training. We have no command and can only suggest. At present, to suggest improvements is impossible as there is literally no training. Unless there is a basis of organisation, discipline and a desire to learn, is a waste of time to be here.

The basis of enthusiasm is knowledge of a subject. The more one learns the keener one gets therefore it is essential that all officers attend suitable courses and study manuals.

If there is no interest there must be strict supervision and if necessary changes. This should and must come from an Italian side. If a British Officer recommends that an Officer is inefficient it creates a bad feeling, there is it obvious that this must be the duties of the Italian Staff.

If then training will reach an average standard, a few suggestions and a little encouragement can make it really good. The basis that will start this by having the Officers Training within the Regiments.

It is as easy for one Officer to speak to 30 Officers as it is to speak to 2. Regimental Commanders and Training Officers must collect their Officers and Instruct them.

In evry British Brigade or Battalion at least once a week the Commanding Officer puts over his views and his methods, sometimes just to Officers and sometimes to N.C.Os as well. Not only does this happen in the Brigade and Battalion but in the Division and Army.

If a Commander, say of a Regiment, speaks merely to his Battalion Commanders, by the time his orders reach the men at least 75% will be lost. In the same way Junior Commanders must hold regular conferences and instructional periods. The more Senior Officers can "put over" training to the Juniors, the more will they realise the important part they have to play.

At the moment I feel that the Junior Officers taking a period feel that they are more interested in getting the men away from barracks than actually doing training.

VIII - Preparation of Work.

This is at present the worst side of training. Unless Officers are allowed adequate time and made to prepare work, training will be bad.

At present if an Officer has no men to train he is made to do some other job, usually quite useless, to fill in his time.

Officers should be set tasks consistent with their tasks on the establishment.

Declassified E.O. 11951 Section 3(4)(b)(III) By NARS Date 2850220

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Officers should be set tasks consistant with their tasks on the establishment. For example, Instructors should be made to produce their plans for lessons in the way suggested in Methods of Instruction.

VIIII - Thoroughness in Training.

13

There is a mistaken idea that the Italian soldier learns quicker than the British and that the various lessons are too slow and too boring. This is nonsense, and is merely because the instruction is bad. It is also said in British Units that lessons are slow, but only where the instruction is bad. As soon as anybody says this, check their lesson with the pamphlet and check their instruction. It will nearly always be found to be bad. If the instruction was of a high level we could accept this criticism. It is not and the results produced at present are poor. This is through lack of method and lack of attention to the little details that make the difference between good and bad instruction.

...../5.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NNDS No. 785020

The GOC Instructor is always pressed for time in his lesson and has not a minute to spare.

In the same way a lot of nonsense is talked that various things will bore the soldier, and will annoy him. While the majority of training can be made interesting, there are certain things that are hard work, that are boring but which are essential for a soldier to learn and to do.

The sooner Officers get it into their heads that a soldier does things whether he likes it or not, and without talking, the better.

Training is 75% pleasure but 25% hard work. If you cannot make a soldier do an unpleasant thing in peace, you will not in war. When the instruction and discipline is good, then discuss National Characteristics

I - Training in Schools.

Is better out of all proportions to training in the Regiments but suffers at present from poor students, therefore it is essential that we put our basic training in order and thus ensure that :

(a) The Officers and N.C.Os go back to a Regiment where they have a fair opportunity of passing on their knowledge.

(b) That students from Regiments are of a better quality.

It is also essential that the changing of policy of Schools should be kept to the minimum, that the standard of the individual lessons be raised rather than the conception of the course altered.

Tactical training is on the whole satisfactory, but I would stress more use of Wireless Sets either for directors of smoke/dises to control enemy etc but also for the students to use as much as possible.

A false impression is often given of how much a Commander can move around in an attack if he has a wireless. The importance of all Officers being able to control artillery fire cannot be overstressed. All Officers must be able to talk on a Wireless Set as easily as a telephone. They must send information back. Therefore periods for Officers and Section N.C.Os on wireless procedure, control of fire, and the passing back of information must be included.

Too much time cannot be spent on location of the enemy. In several courses "Crock and Thump" is taught, but so must be the submission of shelling and mortar reports.

Further attention should paid to night work. With the advent of peace a large proportion of Night Training has been discontinued.

A method of guiding patrols by wireless was sent out from this H.Q. The Signals alone have tried it, the Infantry who do the patrols have not. As increasingly modern battle takes place at night, so night training must be stepped up.

Day patrolling must also not be neglected as against a retreating enemy in broken country the day patrol with wireless communication with gunners can often achieve really effective results.

Declassified E.O. 11652 Section 3-403/5(B)(3) No. 285220

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Day patrolling must also not be neglected as against a retreating enemy in broken country the day patrol with wireless communication with gunners can often achieve really effective results.

N.C.O training in Schools must be made hard so that a sense of achievement is gained. Exercise must be set so that the N.C.O's powers of leadership are brought out under difficult condition. For this, more assault course training must be included, not of the simple kind as in the Regiments, but with formidable obstacles such as may be met in action - streams, cliffs etc, and with live ammunition being fired over the heads of the students.

Night training and the type of training refered to in the manual as battle discipline must be stressed.

A most exciting form of training is the night gapping of minefields where a proportion of the mines have been booby trapped to small charges and where the enemy is waiting to fire at the slightest noise. The successful night gapping of a minefield is one which requires the maximum skill, leadership and control.

...../6.

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.4(b)(3)(C) No. 285030

XI. - One final point. There is a belief that the Atom Bomb has rendered obsolete all other forms of military science and that the present training is useless.

Whilst it is my own opinion that this is complete rubbish and that it will be as effective in a defensive application as in the attack, it must not be allowed to depress the students into thinking they are wasting their time, and particularly in the disturbed conditions after the war the small scale operations against disaffected elements, and the many forms of employments that an army had before the war will continue for some time to come viz Riots in North Africa, troubles in Syria.

D.L. Price

Major GSO II,
Trg & Inf Trg,
'p' British Liaison &
Training Unit ACC 109.

WLP/rwe

Internal.

File. ✓
Plot.

285020

D.L. Pnr

Major G2O II,
Trg & Inf Trg.
'F' British Liaison &
Training Unit KTO ICP.

GJP/rsw

Internal.

File. ✓
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Unclassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

14 AUG Recd
27 K.

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Subject: Medical Interest of Middle Ages.

Land Forces with Commissions, A.C.s
(M. M. T. A.)

13 Aug 45.

Nos 30 B.3.4.M.
31 B.4.M.
32 B.M.C.
33 B.M.
34 B.M.
*35 B.M. & R.H.,

(1 copy ea. 3 for Congress)

(3 copies ea. 2 for WD, AGF.)

The enclosed extract from Military Medical Letter No.13 published by G.H.Q., India received by this H. from U.K.T. is forwarded to you with the above distribution.

for Major General
i/c A.

WO/A.G.

AA & QMG
DAA & QMG
SC "A" & "Q"
DADOS
DMDS
DADMS

For Information

Subsidy
Inf
RA
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RCS
PRO

14-8-1945 PRO

Seen by: DMS
Subsidy
Inf. DLI
R.A.
R.E.
R.C.S.
Pro

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3078.
TR4

Verbiage!!

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Sheet 1. ENCLOSURE 2

217

(3)

122(Tt) Signal Training Centre
Technical Instruction No. 2

THE WINDOM AERIAL.

1. Theory

The Windom Aerial consists of a half - wave horizontal radiator energised by a single wire feeder, designed to give optimum radiation on the frequency for which it is designed.

The feeder is tapped at a point on the horizontal portion at which its characteristic impedance is equal to that of the feeder i.e. approx. 70 ohms. If the tapping point is correctly chosen, energy will pass from the feeder to the radiator at the same rate as the transmitter supplies it to the feeder. Hence there will be no reflection of unconsumed energy back along the feeder i.e. the feeder will contain no "standing waves" and will therefore not radiate.


The length of the feeder is not important, but it should not be an exact number of quarter waves long at the resonant frequency of the radiator, otherwise adjustment may be difficult.

It must leave the aerial at right - angles for a distance of at least one third of the aerial length, and should contain no sharp bends.

2. Adjustment.

The transmitter to be used is first tuned by means of a dummy aerial. The Windom aerial is then ~~mounted~~ connected at a point on the final tuned circuit of the transmitter at which the feeder draws the rated output.

Two or more meters or bulbs are connected across various points in the feeder, and the aerial tapping point is then adjusted until all meters read the same or all the bulbs give an equal glow. The system is now ready for operation. During the process of adjusting the tap it may be necessary to retune slightly the transmitter ~~which~~ output circuit.



Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3.4(b)(NND) No. 785020

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
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Values of L and D for the band 2 - 8 MC/S may be estimated from the graph given at Appx. "A".

3. Employment with Army Sets.

In using this aerial with the No.11 set, the choice of an aerial tap presents no difficulty as a switch is already provided for this purpose. With the No.19 set the aerial may be connected to the terminal in the rear of the wavemeter. It will generally be found that the aerial upsets the calibration of the Power Amplifier tuning condenser, but this is of no importance except at frequencies near the end of the scale when it may be difficult to tune for maximum output.


to sheet 4.....

Declassified D.D. 1954 Section 3-403/NSC no. 285020

4. [redacted] - End fed aerial.

The "Minden" is essentially a one - frequency aerial, but a variation has been developed to allow working on two frequencies.

This is done by making the feeder to such a length that feeder and long horizontal portion work as a single end - fed aerial on the second frequency, thus :-



At the second frequency the portion "L" becomes becomes an odd length out of resonance.

J.H. Simmons
Major,
D.D. R.Signals.

JHS/ZAS

26 July '45.

Distribution :-

D.D. 15(It) Signal Training Centre
W/T Section Station & Training Unit, MHOW, C.I.
D.D. R.Signals, WAR A
File.

AA & QMG
DAA & QMG

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.3(b)(6) By NARA Date 2/25/2020

At the second frequency the portion "L" becomes because so old length out of resonance.

Major,
A.A. & Q.M.G.

July/Tag

26 July '43.

Distribution:-

O.C. 15th (It) Signal Training Centre
HQ 8th British Signal Training Unit, R.A.F.,
A.A. & Q.M.G., HQ.A
File.

AA & QMG
DAA & QMG
SC "A" & "Q"
DADOT
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
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Lt Col Bramah

For Action/For Info.
GSO1 | [illegible]
DATE 28/7/43 FILE A2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NSC Dir. 28 May 72



APPENDIX "A"
TO
152 (It) Signal Trg Centre
Technical Instruction
No 9

Prepared and Drawn by

Intercepted R.O. 12043 Section 3-403/1955 No. 28022

14 Inf Bde

52

SECRET

15(Ir) Mixed Training Centre

Technical Instruction No. 6

Procedure for Establishing Wireless Communication.

1. The control station will invariably initiate the establishment of a wireless group. At the appointed starting time ("S" time) it will transmit a "CQ" call to the group for a period of 3 minutes followed by a netting signal for 1 minute, then end transmission.

2. If outstations are receiving this transmission, they will reply in order; and further working will proceed on instructions from control.

3. If the initial transmission is not received, the senior outstation will call control at S + 5 mins. for a period of 3 mins. If receiving this, control will answer R AR.

4. At S + 10 mins. the next senior outstation will transmit in the same way, and other outstations at S + 15 mins. etc., until all have called.

5. If by this time communication has not been established, control will repeat the initial "CQ" call at the next five minute point after the final ~~outstation~~ outstation has transmitted. i.e. if there are two outstations they should reply at S + 5 and S + 10 mins. and control will repeat "CQ" at S + 15 mins.

6. If not all stations report into the net, control will listen for missing station(s) at its (their) appointed calling times, unless this interferes with the passing of traffic.

7. If communication is not established after three calls as above, a new frequency will be tried, in a pre - notified order. If there are two outstations, this will therefore be at S + 45 mins. There is no reason why the original frequency should not be tried again later by prior arrangement.

8. The change from night to day frequencies and vice versa must be taken into account. If out of communication, stations will change at a pre - determined time, otherwise they will call

6

Declassified E.O. 13526 Section 3.4(b)(iii) NND 28522

reply in order, and further working will proceed on instructions from control.

3. If the initial transmission is not received, the senior outstation will call control at S + 5 mins. for a period of 3 mins. If receiving this, control will answer R AR.

4. At S + 10 mins. the next senior outstation will transmit in the same way, and other outstations at S + 15 mins. etc., until all have called.

5. If by this time communication has not been established, control will repeat the initial "CQ" call at the next five minute point after the final outstation has transmitted. i.e. if there are two outstations they should reply at S + 5 and S + 10 mins, and control will repeat "CQ" at S + 15 mins.

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
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FTS/EAS

11 July '45

Major,
S.O. R.Signals.



Distribution:-
G.O.C. 1st(It)Signal Training Centre
*yr M. & TW, HTC,ICF.
S.O. R.Signals, MEFA.
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2261

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(2)

SUBJECT: Small Arms School Bulletin.

D.M.T. A.F.H.Q.
C.M.F.

Z/11/320

MTS/32/A/TI

19 Jul 45.

[illegible] Army (3)
HQ Infantry
DTI c/o MEIA
HQ RAC
HQ Polish Base
HQ RED
34 Special Training Barracks

Herewith copy of S.A.S. (Platoon Weapons) Monthly Bulletin No 16 for your information.

GS(I) Sec
File A.1

2498
TRAINING

for [illegible]
S.A.S. [illegible]
Brigadier.
D.M.T.

SMALL ARMS SCHOOL (F. HOOK WEAPONS)

MONTHLY BULLETIN No. 16

JUNE, 1945

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. Diagrams - Instructional Wall. Attention is directed to A.C.I. 643/45.

2. Transfers - Small Arms School Corps. Attention is directed to A.C.I. 643/45.

3. Small Arms School Corps. For some time it has been evident that the comparatively small numbers of personnel in the Corps did not suffice to enable it to afford the assistance which might be expected of it as a means of directly influencing weapon training in the Army as a whole. Indeed the Corps are able to do little more than to staff the Small Arms Schools in the UK, and to furnish a few travelling teams, while Small Arms or Weapon Training Schools in Overseas Commands or Theatres, where unit instructors were trained, received no direct physical assistance from it.

In consequence, it has now been decided to augment the strength of the Corps, partly by increasing the numbers of those transferred to it, but more largely by arranging for the secondment to it for 5 years or so of a number of NCOs who will eventually return to their units. By this means it is hoped that a number of overseas Schools and Establishments will be able to benefit from the presence on their staff of WOs and NCOs possessing the expert knowledge and qualifications of the S.A.S. Corps, while at the same time the S.A.S. Corps will benefit by its personnel being able to do duty in the majority of overseas commands and theatres, so bringing them into closer touch with the realities of weapon usage by troops. Dominion HQs and Overseas Commands have been asked to give the approximate number of S.A.S. Corps personnel they would wish to employ under the above conditions.

(I.B. No. 22).

4. Amendments - Small Arms Training, Vol. I. Attention is drawn to A.C.Is. 637/45 and 700/45.

5. Rings - Training. Attention is drawn to A.C.I. 673/45.

6. Fastenings on S.A.A. Boxes. As a result of adverse reports from all theatres that lids were coming off S.A.A. boxes, it has been decided that packages where certain types of fastenings are used which incorporate the use of string, will be fastened in future by wire instead of string.

In the case of wooden boxes where toggles or swing clamps are used, wire will be used in future to fasten toggle to toggle passing underneath the box, and swing clamps to swing clamps longitudinally on the lid of the box, omitting the existing split pins. To open such boxes, it will be necessary to break the wire.

(M. of S. Notes May 45).

7. Thunderflash Mk. 8. Designs have now been cleared of the new type of

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owing weapon training in the Army as a whole. Indeed the Corps are able to do little more than to staff the Small Arms Schools in the UK, and to furnish a few travelling teams, while Small Arms or Weapon Training Schools in Overseas Commands or Theatres, where unit instructors were trained, received no direct physical assistance from it.

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(M. of S. Notes May 45).

7. Thunderflash Mk. 8. Designs have now been cleared of the new type of thunderflash, Mark 8, which was developed to overcome the prematures which had occurred with earlier marks. In the new design the delay unit consists of a length of Bickford fuse and it also gives a louder report than any of the old types. The design has been accepted by the General Staff and future production will be to this new design. A waterproof package has also been approved to hold these new thunderflashes; this consists of a sealed tin plate liner holding 25 thunderflashes, 2 of the liners contained in an outer steel box M.104.

(M. of S. Notes May 45).

8. 7.92 Dark Ignition Tracer. The Ordnance Board investigation continues with the alternative composition produced by Messrs. I.C.I. This is of academic interest as there is no projected production of this type, and a design has already been approved for future use if required. This item will be deleted.

(M. of S. Notes May 45).

P.I.O.

Authorised for issue to Press on 28/5/20

9. Flare, Trip Wire, Mk. 1. Particulars of this flare were notified in Technical Ammunition Letter No. 54.

The following instructions are issued in connection with the teaching of the trip flare at this School:-

The trip flare equipment consists of the following components -
Two pickets.
One spring arm complete with spring and wire clamp.
Spool of wire 60 feet long.
Flare pot.

NOTE: The operations must be performed in the order given.

(a) Decide where and how the flare and trip wire is to be located.
(b) Insert one picket at each end of the selected position, the pickets to have the side prongs inwards. They must be driven into the ground to the full depth of the side prong.
(c) Place the spring arm on that picket selected to carry the flare pot, pass it over the main post of the picket and push down until it is locked against rotation by the side arm.
(d) Take the wire spool and remove the adhesive tape. Pass the looked end of the wire round that picket which is not carrying the flare pot. Pay out the wire to the flare picket and pass the wire round the clamp on the spring arm.
(e) Place the flare pot on the picket. (Note the flare pot slides on between the main post, and side arm can only fit in one way).
(f) Unscrew the wing nut under the flare pot and insert the tight wire into the jaws of the flare clamp. Screw the wing nut up tight.
(g) Remove the safety pin from the spring link.
(h) Remove the safety pin from the flare pot.

NOTE: If the ground slopes, the pickets must be driven in at right angles to the level of the ground.

10. Notes from Theatres of War. The following extracts from War Office letter AI2/60 dated 28 May 45 are notified for information:-

(a) Care of weapons must be stressed in training. New American carbines need a good deal of care. Suggests reinforcements receive instruction in this weapon.
(b) The Jap soldier is over-rated. The Imperial Guard are good but the irregulars are badly trained, inefficient and careless. Jap snipers appear good and are troublesome but this is mainly because they sight on to a particular point where movement may be expected and fire when anybody does appear.
(c) Weapon training and grenade training to be stressed for all ranks.
(d) Some of our officers carried SUBMACHINE GUNS, and never had any trouble with that weapon.
(e) P.I.A.T. and Mortar training should receive more attention before personnel are sent to join units, particularly they should be given more firing practice. Too many soldiers are afraid of these weapons when getting firing practice or in action.
(f) Reinforcements in many cases had NEVER fired the P.I.A.T. [illegible] mortar.
(g) Troops [illegible]

Authorised to issue under Section 9. 285020

ground to the full depth of the side prong.

(c) Place the spring arm on that picket selected to carry the flare pot, pass it over the main post of the picket and push down until it is locked against rotation by the side arm.

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(d) Some of our officers carried SCHMEISSERS, and never had any trouble with that weapon.

(e) P.I.A.T. and mortar training should receive more attention before personnel are sent to join units, particularly they should be given more firing practice. Too many soldiers are afraid of these weapons when getting firing practice or in action.

(f) Reinforcements in many cases had NEVER fired the P.I.A.T. or mortar.

(g) Targets indicated to aircraft by means of 2" Mortar smoke.

(h) Jap makes full use of weapons, grenades, etc. captured from us.

(i) Strict fire control and fire discipline necessary at night. Rule NO FIRING AT NIGHT; use the bayonet or grenade.

(j) After battle Jap will collect his dead and casualties at all costs. Watch for it.

(k) Jap very noisy in the attack; gives his orders loudly, all to our advantage.

(l) Jap Officers and Jap NCOs always conspicuous. Pick them off, the rest are not dangerous without leaders. Given the tools our troops can easily finish the Jap.

(m) Great attention should be paid on training to instinctive carrying out of "immediate action" in the dark. Applies to all automatic weapons. Had experience of trouble owing to lack to ability to do this.

(n) The German Schneider pouches were better for carrying Sten Mags. Just a little extra length which made a difference.

To Page 3.

Authorised for issue under Regulations No. 28620

SECTION II - RIFLE.

11. Rifle No. 5 - Backsights. Rifles No. 5 at present in production, are being fitted with either the Mk.1 or Mk. 2 backsight. The Mk. 1 sight is similar to the Mk.1 sight of the No. 4 rifle and machined from the solid with adjustment of the slide by means of a worm screw. The Mk. 2 sight is made from a steel pressing with adjustment by means of a spring catch or lever on the right side.

It is understood that from May 45 onwards, all No. 5 rifles coming from production, will be fitted with Mk. 1 sights, but that Mk. 2 sights will have to be issued as spares from a period of six months beyond that date.

(I.B. No. 22).

12. Rifles No. 4 Mk. 1* - Loss of Extractor Springs. Reports were received from West Africa of excessive loss of extractor springs in No. 4 Mk. 1* rifles. This was caused by removing the bolt from the rifle in an incorrect manner, i.e. only partially rotating the bolt head instead of turning it through 90° as is necessary with a Mk. 1* rifle No. 4. This incorrect method of removing the bolt causes the bolt head to foul the right underside of the bridge charger guide, and permission was given to 82 (W.A.) Div. to modify the bridge charger guide, allowing the bolt head a clear sweep to the rear (Liaison Notes of May 45, refer).

One further complaint of losses of extractor springs was received from W.T.S.F.F. in 21 A.G.

As further losses have not been reported, and as it has not been found possible to introduce a suitable method of carrying out this modification by unit armourers, the modification will not be adopted. Drawings have, however, been amended should there be any future production of this rifle.

(M. of S. Notes May 45).

13. Rifles No. 1 and No. 4 - Strengthening of Stocks, fore-end in India. In order to eliminate the splitting of fore-ends in front of the trigger guard, India fits a wood screw transversely in front of the trigger guard seating.

This modification will not be performed in U.K. as it is not considered necessary, as cases of splitting have not been reported and production is now turning over to the No. 5 rifle with which splitting is unlikely to occur at this point, the fore-end being shorter and the position of the bend being nearer to the magazine.

(M. of S Notes May 45).

14. Rifle No. 4 - Fabricated Trigger Guards. Various types of fabricated trigger guards were approved to help production during the period following Dunkirk. These trigger guards have not proved entirely satisfactory as they are liable to distort, thereby affecting trigger pull. These fabricated trigger guards have been declared obsolescent, and any future production will be made from the solid. It is pointed out that only trigger guards made from the solid are permitted in manufacture of the No. 5 rifle.

(M. of S. Notes, May 45).

SECTION III - BREN L.M.G.

Publication e.g. Small Arms Notes 1-45/MISC No. 285020

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(M. of S. Notes, May 45).

SECTION III - BREN L.M.G.

15. Barrel Wear. Attention is directed to A.C.I. 663/45 which amends A.C.I. 405/45.

SECTION IV - 2" MORTAR

16. 2" Mortar Smoke Bombs. Reference was made in Infantry Bulletin No. 21 para. 477(b) and Appendix 'C' to a new design of 2" Mortar Smoke Bomb having an increased delay. Now that the war in Europe is over, it is doubtful, in view of the large stocks of existing 2" Mortar Smoke Bombs, whether the new design of bomb will be introduced into the service during this war.

(I.B. No. 22).

P.T.O.

Authorised by the Army Council Instruction No. 285020

SECTION V - P.I.A.T.

17. P.I.A.T. - H.P. Bomb. The General Staff have given their decision that they do not propose to introduce the P.I.A.T. H.P. bomb into the Service at this stage. They state that the policy is that the P.I.A.T. will gradually be replaced by the rifle launcher in the Far Eastern Theatre, and that rifle grenade No. 87 H.P. will then be used.

(M. of S. Notes May 45).

SECTION VI - MACHINE CARBINE.

18. Thompson M.C. - Proposal to solder two magazines together. A proposal was recently put forward by an Infantry Formation for the soldering together of two Thompson M.C. magazines. The magazines were to be placed back to back and so fixed that one magazine could be placed in the weapon while the second magazine, ready loaded, was, with its mouth downwards, ready to be placed in the weapon when the first magazine was expended. The underlying idea was that two magazines ready loaded would actually be available on the weapon.

Weapon Technical Staff Field Force, on hearing of this proposal, informed the Formation that this method was not considered satisfactory for several reasons, namely:-

(a) The grave possibility of malfunctioning, due to ingress of dirt into the magazine held in the reserve position.
(b) Danger of distorting the magazine.
(c) Removal of the rust prevention coating from the surface of the magazine by the use of flux during the soldering operation, which would render the magazine more liable to deterioration from rust.

This proposal has been carefully considered by our Technical Advisers in the Ministry of Supply who are in entire agreement with W.T.S.F.F. This proposal will not, therefore, be adopted.

(I.B. No. 22).

19. Sten Mk. 5 - Sling Mk. 3 - Buckplate Mk. 2. Improved webbing sling with two hooks for the Sten Mk. 5 has been accepted by the General Staff and approved for issue in the future with all Mk. 5 Stens coming off production.

The plate cover has been re-designed with a small attachment at 10 o'clock on the back of the plate for the hook on the sling. This plate cover has also been approved as the plate cover Mk. 2, and will be issued with all Sten Mk. 5 equipments, which are packed for issue to the Airborne Forces and which contain the new sling Mk. 3.

(M. of S Notes May 45).

SECTION VII - GRENADES

N I L.

SECTION VIII - SNIPING

20. Sniping Equipments.

(a) User Opinion. During the past year much effort has been devoted to the problem of improving the sniper's equipment, and it is encouraging

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(a) User Opinion. During the past year much effort has been devoted to the problem of improving the sniper's equipment, and it is encouraging to note from a recent report received from the Weapon Training Staff Field Force (Mediterranean Area), C.M.F., that this equipment is popular with the user. The following extracts have been taken from this report:-

(i) The equipment, as a whole, is very popular. No adverse criticism has been heard or received.
(ii) Most units are now very definitely interested in sniping, and a full use is made of the available rifles.
(iii) Most Commanding Officers and Company Commanders realise the importance of sniping, and most units have a pool of reserve snipers.
(iv) The equipment is generally in good condition and well looked after, each man taking a pride in keeping his rifle and telescope in the best possible condition. To Page 5.

Confidential S.D. 1945 Section 1-4/5/6 No. 285020

(r) The best compliment which could be paid to our snipers came from a German prisoner. He stated that in his Company they had suffered six casualties from our snipers in less than a week, and on account of this, no movement was permitted in the forward company area by day.

(b) Flash Eliminator. Trials with a sample flash eliminator for the No. 4 rifle, were carried out by Small Arms School recently. A sniping equipment was used in the trials, and the results were satisfactory. Accuracy was not affected, but the effect on M.P.I. was considerable. The M.P.I. dropped and there was also a lateral displacement. Changes of M.P.I. were not constant, and for this reason and others it was recommended that if a requirement existed for a flash eliminator it should be made an integral part of the barrel. The method of securing the sample under trial was by a hinged clip fitting over the bayonet lugs and secured by a butterfly nut.

It has now been decided that the fitting of a flash eliminator will only be considered for the new sniping rifle now under development.

(a) Overall Cover. This cover was developed to replace the existing ...3065 Covers Short Rifle, Snipers Rifle which is too short for the No.4 Rifle. It has no provision for a sling and is not watertight, nor will it accommodate the rifle when the telescope is fitted. The new cover weighs approximately 2½ lbs. By folding the flap and fastening the securing strap the cover can be completely sealed and in that condition will float for approximately half an hour. The cover is padded internally to afford protection for the sniping telescope when fitted to the rifle and gives satisfactory protection against moderate rough usage. A broad carrying sling is provided.

The general opinion is that, if a cover of this type is a requirement, then the cover developed is the answer but the requirement needs confirmation. One school of thought feels that the Sniper, particularly in the Far East, will wish to avoid all unnecessary weight and encumbrance and provided he has complete protection for his telescope when required, a cover for the equipment as a whole would soon be dumped.

(I.B. No. 22).

21. Optical Instruments - "Blooming" of Lenses. "Blooming" - the coating of lens surfaces of optical instruments with a fluoride compound to increase light transmission - is now generally accepted as being desirable for the majority of instruments. Accordingly the trade is being asked to bloom the lenses of No. 32 telescopes and No. 2 binoculars. Preparations for blooming No. 32 telescopes are in hand, but facilities for treating the binoculars will not be available until early 1946.

The advantage of bloomed lenses makes itself apparent in poor light, e.g. dawn and dusk, when the instrument can be used efficiently long after a non-treated instrument has ceased to be useful.

(M. of S Notes May ...).

Declassified E.O. 12958 Section 3.3(b)(1)(6) No. 285020

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(M. of S Notes May 45).

22. No. 32 Telescope Mk. 1. The arrangements made for modifying No. 1 instruments in order to bring them up-to-date and in line with the Mk. 2, have been cancelled. The Mk. 1 instrument will, therefore, in due course be declared obsolescent.

(M. of S Notes May 45).

SECTION IX - BAYONET.

N I L.

Hisley Camp,
Brookwood, Surrey.
5 Jul 45.

J Hamer
Colonel,
Comdt. Small Arms School (Platoon Weapons).

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[redacted] No. 1

O.C. "G" Trg: Unit to Italian army C.M.F.

Return Address:-
"G" (SD).

Subject:- War Diaries.

ORIGINAL Date 3.0.4.1945

Reference G.R.O. 387/1945.

War Diaries for the mth under your command have not been received by this H.Q. as follows:-

ORIGINAL March, April & May 1945

DUPLICATE March & April '45

Please forward immediately.

For Action/~~For Info~~	
G.S.O.II	
	G.H.Q.
Date 16/7/45	From A.1

(O.F.ATKINS)
Brigadier,
D.A.G.,
G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon.

1595