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Inc 23, 1945 - Aug 1946

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File

SUBJECT : Attached Correspondence

32

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN GENERAL MIL TALK SCHOOLS
(Tel: ROME 49781 Ext. 515)

G/A 18/1183

August 1946

Dear

Col. Medlar

Attached are notes on Infantry Specialist Training, being a summary
of points previously discussed verbally with you.

Yours

G.I.P.

Major G.S.O. II
Tsg. & Ing. Tsg.

TO : Lt. Col. W. Hallam

H.Q.
Land Forces Sub. Comm. A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

1145

SUBJECT: Infantry Specialist Recruit Training.

12 RECRUIT LIAISON UNIT
for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS
(Tel : ROMA 499061 Ext 545)

1. Introduction.

There are three main possibilities for the training of Infantry Specialists:-

- (a) That they be trained at their units by their own Platoon Commander, who would have previously attended a course at Central Military Schools.
- (b) That a specialist recruit divides his time at a C.A.R., receiving first basic training in a rifle company, and after selection as a specialist, being posted to a specialist Company.
- (c) That all specialist training of recruits be carried out at Central Military Schools i.e. the present scheme.

Before dealing in detail with each possibility the fact is stressed that many of the so called specialists in the Inf. Bn. require little specialist knowledge and no more intelligence than the average rifleman.

2. Specialist Training at the Unit.

Allowing for the fact that the Officer and N.C.O.'s have received a course at a Central School advantages and disadvantages might be considered as follows:-

(a) Advantages.

- (i) The platoon acts as a team from the start.
- (ii) Selection of the platoon is made by the Platoon Commander.
- (iii) Specialists Platoons can be kept up to strength by the C.O. who does not have to depend on a centralized system of 2fts.
- (iv) The Training of the Platoon is the Commanders responsibility, and he can blame no one but himself if it is bad.

Commander, who would have previously attended a course at Central Military Schools.

(b) That a specialist recruit divides his time at a C.A.S. receiving first basic training in a rifle company, and after selection as a specialist, being posted to a specialist Company.

(c) That all specialist training of recruits be carried out at Central Military Schools i.e. the present scheme.

Before dealing in detail with each possibility the fact is stressed that many of the so called specialists in the Inf. Bn. require little specialist knowledge and are more intelligent than the average rifleman.

2. Specialist Training at the Unit.

Allowing for the fact that the Officer and N.C.O.'s have received a course at a Central School advantages and disadvantages might be considered as follows:-

(a) Advantages.

- (i) The platoon acts as a team from the start.
- (ii) Selection of the platoon is made by the Platoon Commander.
- (iii) Specialists Platoons can be kept up to strength by the C.O. who does not have to depend on a centralised system of posts.
- (iv) The training of the Platoon is the Commanders responsibility, and he can blame no one but himself if it is bad.

(b) Disadvantages.

- (i) Training may be interrupted by outside requirements, or the training cycle may interfere with individual training.
- (ii) Units may not have the facilities for training. This particularly applies to Pioneers and to a lesser extent Signallers. 1146
- (iii) There is the possibility that there may not be uniformity of method. However, provided that frequent refresher courses are held for instructors at Schools, this is unlikely to be the case. Besides variations produced by the Unit are often the basis of improvements incorporated as amendments in the manual.

3. Special Training at the C.A.B.

(a) Advantages.

- (i) The soldier reaches his Unit in 3 months instead of 5 or 6.
- (ii) Simplification of rail moves.
- (iii) Reasonable numbers for close supervision of training.

(b) Disadvantages.

- (i) A slight increase in establishment required especially if the monthly call-up is not adopted.
- (ii) Pioneer and Signal recruits might not find the facilities as extensive as at Schools.

4. Recruit Specialist Training at Schools.

(a) Advantages.

- (i) Ensures unity of method (in theory at least).
- (ii) In some branches of Training a School can provide facilities that the Unit cannot.

(b) Disadvantages.

- (i) The number of squads necessary to deal with the numbers to be catered for makes co-ordination extremely difficult. Supervision of training by Senior Officers also cannot be very detailed.
- (ii) Difficulty of arranging firing for all with the limited ranges at the disposal of a School.
- (iii) Instruction becomes mechanical and the instructors must have little personal interest in the men.
- (iv) The Commander of the School as a whole has a vast administrative and disciplinary lean thrust upon him from his principle functions.

- (i) A slight increase in establishment required especially if the monthly call-up is not adopted.
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4. Recruit Specialist Training at Schools.

(a) Advantages.

- (i) Ensures unity of method (in theory at least).
- (ii) In some branches of Training a School can provide facilities that the Unit cannot.

(b) Disadvantages.

- (i) The number of squads necessary to deal with the numbers to be catered for makes co-ordination extremely difficult. Supervision of training by Senior Officers also cannot be very detailed.
- (ii) Difficulty of arranging firing for all with the limited ranges at the disposal of a School.
- (iii) Instruction becomes mechanical and the instructors must have little personal interest in the men.
- (iv) The Commander of the School as a whole has a vast administrative and disciplinary loan thrust upon him from his principle functions.
- (v) If recruits were trained elsewhere an increase of establishment could be made to enable Schools to run really efficiently. At present many Schools have only about 75% of the staff required.
- (vi) The presence of recruits cannot but be detrimental to the atmosphere and smooth running of the School. For example the Commander of a School thinks as much of the prevention of incidents as he does of improving the training.
- (vii) The numbers of recruits held limits the number of instructors and leaders that can be trained.

11/3

...../3.

5. Effect of Present Scheme on Infantry School.

(a) The Infantry School Organisation is shown in the M.M.I.A. handbook and it is not intended to go in to details in these notes. It will be seen, however, that the O.C. of the Schools has under his command the Italian equivalent of the following British Schools.

1. The Infantry School.
2. Materaton.
3. S.A.S. Rytto.
4. An O.C.V.U.
5. An I.T.O. (the recruit wing is the nearest equivalent).

(In addition the Commander has certain responsibilities for administration towards the E.S. School). While practically there is, of course, little comparison at least numerically there is some relation.

The Italian Commander, however, has to run his School as a centralized unit, with a staff and transport facilities far smaller proportionately, and as an additional difficulty, what transport there is, is reduced by shortage of petrol & spares.

(b) Accommodation is such that the whole of the proposed Infantry School cannot be housed at CEVANO. At the moment the O.C.V.U. part of the School (Allievi Ufficiali Allievi Sottufficiali) is not yet developed, yet even under present commitments use must be made of MARZINA where most accommodation is in huts and is really intended as a field firing camp.

(c) The Control and supervision of Training in such large numbers is difficult if not impossible. All training is co-ordinated by one office. This is necessary owing to staff shortage, limits of range and training facilities and the lack of decentralization in the Italian Army. The School without the recruits and O.C.V.U. produces about 12 separate programmes a week. To co-ordinate training with existing facilities it is estimated that this must rise to between 35-50 when the School is in full activity.

The difficulties of control cannot be too strongly emphasised as Infantry Training, unlike some of the other arms, does not take place on the square and has little in the classroom. Added to which much of the training involves the firing of live ammunition.

Every day over 2000 soldiers must leave the barracks for training and little transport is available to disperse the training.

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The Italian Commander, however, has to run his School as a centralized unit, with a staff and transport facilities far smaller proportionately, and as an additional difficulty, what transport there is, is reduced by shortage of petrol & spares.

- (b) Accommodation is such that the whole of the proposed Infantry School cannot be housed at UGHALO.
- At the moment the C.O.F.U. part of the School (Allievi Ufficiali Allievi Sottufficiali) is not yet developed, yet even under present commitments use must be made of SANZANA where most accommodation is in huts and is really intended as a field firing camp.
- (c) The Control and supervision of Training in such large numbers is difficult if not impossible. All training is co-ordinated by one office. This is necessary owing to staff shortage, limits of range and training facilities and the lack of decentralization in the Italian Army.
- The School without the recruits and C.O.F.U. produces about 18 separate programmes a week. To co-ordinate training with existing facilities it is estimated that this must rise to between 35-50 when the School is in full activity.
- The difficulties of control cannot be too strongly emphasised as Infantry Training, unlike some of the other arms, does not take place on the square and has little in the classroom. Added to which much of the training involves the firing of live ammunition.
- Every day over 2000 soldiers must leave the barracks for training and little transport is available to disperse the training.
- (d) It should also be remembered that Italian organisation is such that the Colonel has to deal with problems which in the British Army would be dealt with by Junior or even Warrant Officers.
6. Situation of the School to accept the draft due 10th August. 1112
- (e) Instructors in Mortar.

A deficiency exists of 5 officers and 28 M.C.O.'s. against the W.E. which would mean large squads.

...../h.

Instructors Breda.

The School is in the same position as any other unit of the Army in this respect, and no opportunity has been given for internal instruction.

(b) Training equipment.

At the time of writing the recruit wing is practically without equipment, though the Breda's and 35 Jth Mortars have been promised.

The following point is, however, stressed the weapon itself is insufficient for training. There must also be the wireless sets, telephones, carriers, drill ammunition binoculars, compasses etc. These do not exist.

Unless the whole of the equipment requested arrives to the last item, the School would not be able to give as good instruction as does a Unit. Judging from releases even the probability of the arrival of equipment appears remote.

(c) Training facilities.

Since no engineer work has been done to build permanent rifle ranges as requested H.Q. Training will be limited.

(d) Accommodation.

Cookhouses will not be ready for the arrival of recruits.

7. Effect of Training recruits elsewhere.

1. The decrease of establishment at the Infantry School would not be large. At present instructors have to be taken for duties other than training, and men for maintenance of ground ranges etc, are inadequate. The area and position of the building do not allow the permanent staff to drop below a certain figure and without a detailed study it is considered the staff of the School would require to be 1000 and on a very minimum 500.

In this respect, however, the main reason for breaking away from the centralised training of recruits is to improve the School proper, and the School should not operate hampered by shortage of permanent staff.

8. Conclusion.

1141

It is considered that centralised training for Infantry recruits, specialists is justified if;

- (1) Proper facilities are not available at the Units or C.A.B.
- (2) If the subject is so technical as to require a School rather

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1111

It is considered that centralized training for Infantry recruits, specialists is justified if:

- (1) Proper facilities are not available at the Units or C.A.B.
- (2) If the subject is so technical as to require a School rather than unit standard of instruction.

It is not felt that the Breis or the 3rd Mortar cannot be adequately taught away from the Central School, moreover at present owing to shortage of equipment at the School they could be taught better in many units.

By having recruits at the Infantry School, the instructors courses suffer, and a mediocre standard results.

WLP/mg

W. L. P.
Major J. Staffs
CSC in C. & Inf. Trg.

FILE

Major. W.L. Price. RSM.
12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT for the
ITALIAN CENTRAL MILITARY SCHOOLS.

Ref: C/DO/A.18/1159.

2 July 1946.

(31)

Dear

M.

Just a short line to ask what you want doing about your
caravan. Whilst we are prepared to keep it indefinitely, it does not
appear to be of much use under present circumstances.

I am sorry I was unable to get down to see you, but owing to
the departure of our Colonel it was not possible.

Hoping you are in the best of health.

Yours

W.L.P.

Major, W.M. Davis,
10. British Liaison Unit.
C. M. P.

1110

Major M. M. DAVIS
12 British Liaison Unit
DO

10 July 1946

Dear

Willie

Many thanks for your letter G/DO/A. 18/1159 of 2 July.

I have not forgotten about the trailer. Yes I should like to have it here so am sending a 15 cwt to fetch it away. Would you be good enough to instruct someone to pump up the tyres.

I am sending you 40 training films which have been made available for the Schools by AHS through GHQ G. II Training. These films will be delivered to you by L col JACKSON, the bearer of this DO. Will you please sign the voucher and return it to him. The 15 cwt will remain in ROME over night. Can you put the Italian driver up please.

L col JACKSON will bring the trailer back on Friday 12 July in the afternoon.

Hope your interview went off well at GHQ. No news yet of Aubrey GIBSON but his leave finished on 7 July and he had hoped to fly back so we can expect him any day now.

Yours, *car.*

M. M. J.

Major W. L. PRICE MBE
12 British Liaison Unit
ROME

This has been done

but 1139

FILE 3

Major W.L. Price, RM,

12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools
G. K. F.

G/DO/A.48/1109

15 May 1946

30

Dear

Br.

Thank you very much for the Tactical Notes which have
just been received. They are just what was wanted and will be of
the greatest assistance.

Yours

W.L.P.

To: Brigadier G.E. Thorne, DSO, RM,
Senior Officers School,
Arlington Park,
Devizes, Wilts.

1138

Tel. Arlington 2171

From:- Brigadier G.E. Thubron, DSO, OBE.
Senior Officers' School,
Erlstone Park,
Devizes,
Wilt.

11 May 1946.

Dear *Walter*.

Thank you for your letter.

I am enclosing "Tactical Notes" on the major phases of war which I hope will be of help to you. These are merely issued to our own students to take the place of M.T.P's which are not allowed to be issued.

Moreover they are supposed to be completely up-to-date!

I am glad you are still flourishing. If you come home shortly and are in this part of the world do look me up.

Yours

Gerald Thubron

Major W.L. Price, MBE.
12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.
C. M. P.

1137

FILED

Major W.L. Price, H.Q. Staff.

12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.
(Tel : ROMA 473308)

Ref : G/A.18/4120

23 May 1946

Dear *F.*

On behalf of the Officers of 12 British Liaison Unit, I
would like to thank you for the great assistance given in repairing and
improving our accommodation.

The pace at which the repairs were carried out has been
truly remarkable. Would you please be so kind as to convey our
appreciation to Major MARINELLI and the representative of the Comdo for
their outstanding efforts.

Yours

W.L.P.

General Rosco,
H.Q., Italian Central
Military Schools.

1136

FILE 3

Major W.L. PRICE, R. Staff.

12 British Liaison Unit
Italian Central Military School
(Tel : NOIE 478808)

Ref : G/A.18/1121

23 May 1946

28

Dear

M.

I believe that Colonel GORDON is now on leave. I was invited to come down to visit the C.A.R. during May and said I would about the second week. However, owing to the fact that the Colonel is on tour and that our transport is in the usual broken down condition I do not think it will be possible until he returns. If I can, I will come down with SYD, who will stop with his family in BARI. Anyway I will let you know further.

Our H.Q. is no longer at ORSANO, but at the Palazzo Salvati, just near the Castello S. Angelo.

I hope your family is in the best of health and that you are having a good time.

Yours

W.

Major M.M. DAVIN, DMC,
10 British Liaison Unit,
Terre del Grasso,
BARI.

1135

SUBJECT: - Visits to CAR.

Major M.M. DAVIES,
10 British Liaison Unit,
TORRE DEL GRECO,
Tel : 55802 NAPLES.
DO/

28 May 46

Dear *L.M.*

Many thanks for your letter G/A. 18/1121 dated 23 May 46 which I received only this morning. Colonel GIBSON goes on leave at the end of the week. Let me know in good time when you can come. I suggest a signal as letters take so long. I hope SIVO will come to the CAR too. I am looking forward to seeing you both in the near future. Try and stay a few days and visit some of the beauty spots.

Please give my love to all my old friends. I hear SHORTY is to be married soon - give him my congratulations on his engagement.

Yours,

Love

Frank

Major W.L. PRICE, MSE
North Staffs
12 British Liaison Unit
ROME, C.M.F.

ALL R.O.M.
ALL R.O.M.
SG "A" & "C"
MAINT
STAFF
GRADE

1134

Please give my love to all my old friends. I hear SHORTY is to be married soon - give him my congratulations on his engagement.

MAJOR W.L. PRICE, MBE
North Staffs
12 British Liaison Unit
BONE, C.M.B.

1000

Cond. fracture

AA & QAC
BAL & QAC
SC-HY-B-QC
NADPH
D.L.M.S.
D.H.M.E.
P.P.T.C.
L.A.
L.S.
T.B.
E.O.
M.S.
P.S.O.
JUN 1968

~~31 July 1944~~

200

23
Major W.L. BRIDGES, 1022,

12 British Liaison Unit for the
Italian Central Military Schools.

G. M. F.

Ref: 102/1/1.12/1092

27 April 1946.

Dear Sir:

I have been aided by another officer of this Unit, Major Cassell, to ask your further assistance in the preparation of a school for Italian Liaison Officers. The programme and outline syllabus have been reviewed and will be of the greatest value.

However, it is extremely difficult for a comparatively junior officer to prepare single-handed a first class course for officers up to the rank of Brigadier, as the Italians, though most eager to learn, have few modern tactical ideas. If it would be possible for you to send even a few of the more general lecture notes, it would be of the greatest assistance.

The Italian Army is of course, restricted in armament and while the organization is similar, there are none of the latest weapons and the division is the largest formation usually considered. In view of this, the greatest need would be of notes dealing with general principles rather than those dealing with organization. Unfortunately as the Italians are not Allied, it is not possible to send students, which would be the most satisfactory solution.

Since leaving the Battalion I have been with the Italian Army in a variety of different posts. I came up to see the Battalion at Christmas when it was resting near Vicenza, but of course you had left then.

I would like to apologize for making a Regimental connection for anything on your good nature, and at the same time offer my belated congratulations on the honors and promotions you have gained since I left the Regiment.

Yours

W.L.

1139

Brigadier G.E. THURMAN, 1220, G.M.
Senior Officers School,
Bristol Park,

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Since leaving the Battalion I have been with the Italian Army in a variety of different posts. I came up to see the Battalion at Christmas when it was resting near FARMING, but of course you had left then.

I would like to apologise for using a Regimental convention for praying on your good nature, and at the same time offer my belated congratulations on the honors and promotions you have gained since I left the Regiment.

Yours

Brigadier G.S. THORNTON, DSO, OBE,
Senior Officers School,
Exeter, Devon.
DOWLING, HULLING

100

1132



Cesano di Roma, 14 marzo 1946

Egregio maggiore,

domani nel locale della mensa sottuffi-
ciali della Scuola sarà offerto un rancio speciale
ai militari congedandi della classe 1921. ore 12.30

Interverranno a detto pranzo oltre ad una rappre-
sentanza di ufficiali della Scuola anche il Generale
Ronco, Generale Mattioli ed il capo di Stato Maggiore.

Sarebbe gradito anche l'intervento di V.S.

cordialmente

Col. Mauri

Al Maggiore Price
12° B.L.U. - presso comando
Scuole Centrali Militari
= Cesano di Roma =

File

FILE 25

Major General L. BROWNING, CB. CBE. MC.,
Headquarters,
Military Mission to the Italian Army,
R O M E.

30 January, 1946.

My dear *Price*

As I told you personally at our lunch party the other day, I was so pleased to see that you had been awarded the M.B.E. by His Majesty. You have well earned this honour for all your good and conscientious work at CESANO which I appreciate fully and for which I am very grateful. This is just a short line to tell you of my appreciation of your efforts.

With all good wishes.

Yours *Sincerely*

Langley Browning

Major General.
M.M.I.A.

Major W.L. Price, M.B.E.,
12 B.L.U.,
CESANO.

1131

/ago

1460 27 Feb. 1946 A18

Ref: DC/10/1/1946

A.18.

24

CORANAL L.H. MURRAY, O.B.E.

12 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT for the
Italian Central Military Schools

G. E. F.

1 February 1946.

Dear

With regard to your suggested visit to this Centre next week, will you let me know if the following arrangements fit in with your plans.

TUESDAY:

Arrive CESSANO, 12 H.L.U. Headquarters - 10.30.

Visit Barracks accommodation for Infantry School and drive round the training area.

Discuss proposed location of Carabinieri School.

Visit P.F. School.

These Schools will be under the supervision of Major Price and I suggest it would be a good thing if he personally took you round.

Before lunch I would like you to look at the Workshops and Transport Platoon, and the buildings associated with them.

I suggest I should ask General Romeo and Mattioli and Colonels Malvarini and Sivo, together with their respective Chiefs of Staff, to lunch with us at 12.45. Lunch should be over soon after 2 o'clock, which should enable you to get back to your office by 3 o'clock.

On the following day, WEDNESDAY, I would be glad if you could make it convenient to be at the Central Piazza, MANTOVA, where I will meet you at 09.30. Major Chance, who is in charge of the A.I.V.A. Schools will be there to meet us and will give you a quick survey of what has been done. As you are aware, this School is ultimately moving to the Don B'Arundini barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA.

At 10 o'clock we could visit the Genio Barracks, VERONA, which are shortly being handed over to the Artillery, and I will arrange for the Italian Commander and Major How, R.A., to meet us there.

We can then go to the School of Artillery barracks in BRASOVANO and have a look round the classrooms and equipment. I have told Col. Palmer, the Artillery Commander, that you would like to have an opportunity of talking over his problems with him (he speaks English) and I should imagine you would be free to return to Rome

will you let me know if the following arrangements fit in with your plans.

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On the following day, WEDNESDAY, I would be glad if you could make it convenient to be at the Central Piazza, MARITIMA, where I will meet you at 09.30. Major Chance, who is in charge of the B.I.V.A. Schools will be there to meet us and will give you a quick survey of what has been done. As you are aware, this School is ultimately moving to the Duce D'Abruzzi barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA.

At 10 o'clock we could visit the Denis Barracks, MAROTINO, which are shortly being handed over to the Artillery, and I will arrange for the Italian Commander and Major How, R.A. to meet us there.

We can then go to the School of Artillery barracks in MAROTINO and have a look round the classrooms and equipment. I have told Col. Palma, the Artillery Commander, that you would like to have an opportunity of talking over his problems with him (he speaks English) and I should imagine you would be free to return to Rome by 11.45, which will enable you to get back for lunch.

Later on I would like you to spare the time to visit the Signal School and Motorist School, and R. A. School at GROSSETO, but this might well be postponed for a little time as they are really only in the planning stage at present.

Finally, a visit to CIVITAVECCHIA at a still later date would, I think, be advisable. Will you please let me know if these suggestions meet with your approval.

Brig. M.W. Hope, D.S.O.
Land Forces Sub Comm. AC (MEX)
MEX.

Yours

CCY TO: Major PRICE
Major CHANCE
Major HOW.

A 183

23

106/G(PT)

Lt Col G Cox

G (Training) GHQ, C.M.F.19 Dec 45

Dear Dave

Many thanks for your DO/10/715 dated 11 Dec and your DO/10/747 dated 15 Dec.

I am trying to get a message to you about C.S.M.I. Cameron. As I do all the postings from here I hope O2K won't take any action. Anyway if Cameron is still with you when you receive this please keep him until I issue disposal instructions - I do not want him to go to the PT & Sports Centre.

Regarding your Sports kit, I raised the question at the GRASCE Meeting on 13 Dec, and the official staff ruling is that the Italian Army must get their own sports kit from their own resources, and that British stocks cannot be made available. I'm afraid that I, personally, can do nothing further.

About Instructors, I am quite prepared to leave S.M.I. Maddison and S.I. Verall with you until completion of your post-Christmas course, and we can then review the whole situation in accordance with theatre commitments.

All the other points seem to have been dealt with satisfactorily with the exception of the Boxing Ring on which I shall take no further action unless I hear from you.

Yours *Rich**Colin Cox*

Major M. Davie, D.W.R.,
12 British Liaison Unit
for the Italian Central
Military Schools, C.M.F.

1129

SUBJECT :- Chemical Factory.

'P' BRITISH LIAISON &
TRAINING UNIT ETC IOR.

Ref : C/4-8/323.

7 October '45.

Dear Major M. H. M. M.

While it would appear largely an Italian matter as to who should occupy the Chemical Factory, it would seem to me absolutely essential that the Chemical Factory remain as part of the Centre and not be come an Industrial Factory.

The two reasons are fairly obvious.

- (1) This space is absolutely vital for the machine that will be present at the Infantry School.
- (2) It will be most undesirable to have civilians working next to a Military Centre.

Unless this factory is included I cannot see the Infantry School fitting in to CERSAIO. The matter is of course now on a Minister of War - Minister of Industry level.

If however, you can do anything about it, it will be most opportune. I do not think the Italians have realised this since the Infantry School will be.

1138

While it would appear largely an Italian matter as to who should occupy the Chemical Factory, it would seem to me absolutely essential that the Chemical Factory remain as part of the Centre and not be come an Industrial Factory.

The two reasons are fairly obvious.

- (1) This aspect is absolutely vital for the reasons that will be present at the Infantry School.
- (2) It will be most undesirable to have civilians working next to a Military Centre.

Unless this factory is included I cannot see the Infantry School fitting in to CESSID. The matter is of course now in a Minister of War - Minister of Industry level.

If however, you can do anything about it, it will be most opportune. I do not think the Italians here realize this also the Infantry School will be.

1128

Yours

Law

W. L. Law

Major GSO II,
TRG & Inf TRG,
British Liaison &
Spending Unit RAC IOR.

WLP/row

Internal.
File.

Major NEILAN,
GSO II (TRG) MTA.

File
"P" BRITISH MILITARY AND TRAINING UNIT
R.F.C., I.C.C.

Ref: 6/18/30/315.

4 October '45.

Dear

We have now received a fair supply of bedding and the other items from the transit camp and this extra and useful equipment is a considerable help to the Corps.

21
A/Col LAMBERT and his staff have created a great deal of enthusiasm for R.F.C. at the Centre and their course is an example which we uphold to the Italian staff here to show what can be achieved by British staff. LAMBERT has really achieved a great deal under difficult circumstances and all credit is due to him and his staff for the large amount of hard work and thought they have put into their new school. I should like to say how much this is appreciated here, particularly as he has succeeded in completing a full program and really kept the whole class steady at their tasks, which is an achievement in itself. Anything we can do to help his future I am sure Colonel LAMBERT will really appreciate.

I am leaving shortly for "P" and believe and hope you will call and see how I am finding things. You eventually come out any way.

Kind regards

Yours

1127

Major MURPHY and his staff have created a great deal of enthusiasm for P.I. at the Centre and their course is an example which is upheld to the Italian staff here to show what can be obtained by better work. MURPHY has really achieved a great deal under difficult circumstances and all credit is due to him and his staff for the large amount of hard work and thought they have put into their new school. I should like to say how much this is appreciated here, particularly as he has overcome in completing a full program and really kept the whole class firmly on their toes, which is an achievement in itself. Anything we can do to help his future I am sure Colonel MURPHY will gladly recommend.

I am leaving shortly for V.P. and release and hope you will call and see Don W. and myself when you eventually come our way.

Kind regards.

Yours

1127

WMM

Major OSC II,
Training,
1st British Division &
Training Unit RTO HQ.

WMM/MS

Lieut Col L. GOR.
G-3 R.G. (Int) HQ.
C. N. P.

19 AUG. Recd
240

Major W.L. Medlam

Military Mission to the Italian Army,

C.M.F.

DO/M.

13 August 1945

Subject: Progress Reports.

Dear

Colonel,

1. This H.Q. now controls Training at RTC., ICF.
2. I am told that your Progress Report is forwarded to DMT and to R.A.A.C.
3. At present letters are circulating from all addressees to each other, based on your Report, and it is found that in practice this creates difficult situations. These "crossed letters" (like snowballs) seem to breed and multiply amongst themselves.
4. Will you please forward a copy of your Progress ^{report} Distribution List showing the authorities for inclusion of other HQs.
5. Unless you show anything to the contrary it would appear to be better if the Report came to us only (7 copies) and we forward it to those HQs that we deem necessary.
6. DMT's two latest letters refer!!!

Yours ever

Louis Medlam

Col. L.H. Mackay, O.B.E.

'P' British Liaison and Training Unit,

CESANO.

For Action/For File	
CSC B	RMH
Date	29/8/45

*Read only
Copies to HQ/IA*

1126

P.M.92, li 21 agosto 1945

19

Signor Maggiore,

Gli ufficiali della Scuola di Fanteria ed io La
preghiamo di volerci accordare il piacere di venire a
consumare la cena presso la nostra mensa giovedì 23
corrente, alle ore 20.

Cordiali saluti

Leo Col. M. Taurini

=====

Maggiore W.L. PRICE
"P" B.L.T.U. del C.A.C.F.I.C.

S E D E

[Signature]
1125

785020

18
"P" BRITISH PLAINES AND TRAINING UNIT,
A.T.O., I.C.P.

Ref: 0400/A.18/707

20 Aug '45.

Dear

1. Thank you for your letter referring to the RCU's course. We are incorporating your suggestions and I am sure anything extra we can do to help their 'Leadership' problem will pay good dividends as you suggest. Once this School gets established and we find suitable students they should develop well.
2. Some time ago you offered a tank transport ring similar to the one at IYD. - We have been going into this question again and I really do not think it would really be to much advantage at present as we now have about four horses and 25 miles with carts at CHSANO, and tactically they already consider the Mountain Training problems at SIVA. There are also available in most of the Gruppi a number of Alpine Officers who have a good idea of Helo Training which is a source of knowledge if they need it. Thank you for the offer anyway.

3. I saw the Director in MILAN last week and he mentioned the necessity of someone from here going round the Gruppi to discuss our training problems. I explained this to Col. MALLAR here, and he is going round personally in about 10 - 14 days time, so I will prepare a file of our main training difficulties.

4. CHSANO duly arrived and is already well established at SIVA - we are at present trying to find a more suitable new location.

Yours

RMK/rmw

rmw
Major GAO II
Training
"P" BRITISH PLAINES &
TRAINING UNIT A.T.O. I.C.P.

Lt-Col J. HENRI D.S.O.
DET, 15TH, C.M.F.

students they should develop well.

2. Some time ago you offered a tank transport being similar to the ones at INDO. - We have been going into this question again and I really do not think it would really be to such advantage at present as we now have about four horses and 25 mules with carts at GESSANO, and tactically they already consider the Mountain Training problems at SIVA. There are also available in most of the Group a number of Alpine Officers who have a good idea of Mulo Training which is a source of knowledge if they need it. Thank you for the offer anyway.

3. I saw the Director in KILIAN last week and he mentioned the necessity of someone from here going round the Group to discuss our training problems. I explained this to Col MacGILL here, and he is going round personally in about 10 - 14 days time, so I will prepare a file of our main training difficulties.

4. GESSANO duly arrived and is already well established at SIVA - we are at present trying to find a more suitable new location.

Yours

Wm

Major GSO II
Training
THE BRITISH LIAISON &
TRAINING UNIT KTO 107

HSE/rw

1st Col J. HEDDER O.S.O.
DET, AMB, O.M.F.

Internal.

File.

1124

179
DO/DMR/17/1/MT.1
Copy to : DMT/88/MT.1

From : Lt Col J. FIDEL, DSO
D.M.T. A.P.E.C.
C.M.P.

Tel : 16872

9 Aug 45

Dear Henry

I have been through your NCOs Course Syllabus. There is one point I would like to put up for your consideration. The course is very comprehensive and covers a wide field - I feel too wide for present conditions. But I do most emphatically feel - as a CO, not as a Staff Officer - that more attention should be paid to developing leadership. I would suggest a leadership or assault course each week changing over your leaders, would be of immense value, and I should be very disappointed if the Italians don't fall for it.

To make room for it, the following might easily go,

I think :-

1. Practical elementary use of explosives - 2 hours
2. { German A tk and A per mines }
 { Preparation for battle } - 2 hours
3. Neutralisation of enemy mines - 2 hours
4. Reliefs in the field - 2 hours

After all, now that war against a specific enemy is over you can concentrate on the "eternal verities" - discipline, man-management, weapon-handiness, fieldcraft by day and night, physical fitness and leadership.

By a leadership course, I mean neither a race nor a test of physical fitness, but an assault course which tests the average physique adequately, with enough obstacles to present real team problems to the chosen leader, opportunities for tactical movement over obstacles (i.e. rifle group crosses covered by LMG) and a decent shoot at the end (or in the middle).

If you think this is nonsense, I won't mind at all. I do feel that it is worth trying to improve the standard of the Italian NCO, (I have written officially about this as well) and this seems to me a means to do it.

is one point I would like to put up for your consideration. The course is very comprehensive and covers a wide field - I feel too wide for present conditions. But I do most emphatically feel - as a CO, not as a Staff Officer - that more attention should be paid to developing leadership. I would suggest a leadership or assault course each week changing over your leaders, would be of immense value, and I should be very disappointed if the Italians don't fall for it.

I think :-

To make room for it, the following might easily go,

1. Practical elementary use of explosives - 2 hours
2. { German A tk and 4 pers mines }
 { Preparation for battle } - 2 hours
3. Neutralisation of enemy mines - 2 hours
4. Reliefs in the field - 2 hours

After all, now that war against a specific enemy is over you can concentrate on the "eternal verities" - discipline, man-management, weapon-handiness, fieldcraft by day and night, physical fitness and leadership.

By a leadership course, I mean neither a race nor a test of physical fitness, but an assault course which tests the average physique adequately, with enough obstacles to present real team problems to the chosen leader, opportunities for tactical movement over obstacles (i.e. rifle group cross covered by LMG) and a decent shoot at the end (or in the middle).

If you think this is nonsense, I won't mind at all. I do feel that it is worth trying to improve the standard of the Italian NCO, (I have written officially about this as well) and this seems to me a means to do it.

Please show this letter to Colonel MacKay.

Heath Clance has paid looked in a his way to for you.

Major H.W. KING,
'P' RL & TU,
R.T.C., L.C.P., C.M.F.

Yours ever

D.L.P. James Lister

REMARKS :- Attached.

10
1st BRITISH LIAISON &
TRAINING UNIT RUC ICP

Ref: G/A.12/68.

15 Aug '45.

Dear

Please review the quantities in the attached
demand. I consider that those for wire are excessive.

Yours

W. L. H.

Major GWO II
Tsg & Inf Tsg
1st British Liaison &
Training Unit RUC ICP

WLB/rav

For Col SIVO,
RUC ICP.

Internal.

File. ✓

1123

15
"P" BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref: G/DQ/A.12/567.

1st AUG '45.

Dear

Med Lan

It is absolutely agreed that it is desirable to draw NCOs from the Group 1 as suggested in PAR/37/M.1. However, at the moment it is essential that we run a course to meet the needs of Regiments here, as many of the permanent staff have been demobilized and more are due. Again the School itself has just lost 50% of its instructors owing to the same reason. It is therefore essential that one more local course be run before asking for students from the Group 1 who would object if any of the students were retained here.

Yours

WLR/rmw

Internal.

File.
Plant.

WLR
Major GPO II
TTC & Inf Reg
British Liaison &
Training Unit RTO ICF

Regiments here, as many of the permanent staff have been demobilized and more are due. Again the School itself has just lost 50% of its instructors owing to the same reason. It is therefore essential that one more local course be run before asking for students from the Gurpi, who would object if any of the students were retained here.

Yours

WLP/ram

Internal.

File.
Flant.

1069
Major 630 II
Crg & Inf Trg
British Liaison &
Training Unit: HEC 127

1122

FILE 14
P. BRITISH LIAISON AND TRAINING UNIT
R.T.C., I.C.P.

Ref: C/10/A.18/673.

9 August 1945.

Dear

Col. Pedder

At present Major HIBB is on leave for ten days and in his absence I have been opening his correspondence.

Be well, I am sure be most grateful for all the trouble you have taken in securing the additional transport for H.I.V.

The care of transport in the last few weeks has improved a great deal and we will see that every effort is made to keep these vehicles in good condition.

As regards H.Q.s at the Infantry School, up to the present we have not had students from the Grappi, only from this Centre and the Carlibaldi Regiment. The vast number of H.Q.s who are being demobilised has kept the School fully occupied in replacing them but after the present course it is hoped to have students almost entirely from the Grappi.

At present future planning is rather in the air owing to the recent A.P.M. decisions.

However, no fewer than 23 Italian Generals visit the Centre on Saturday, which will ensure that the Italians in any future planning they will do will at least know what they are talking about.

He will, I am sure be most grateful for all the trouble
you have taken in securing the additional transport for SIVA.

The care of transport in the last few weeks has improved
a great deal and we will see that every effort is made to keep these
vehicles in good condition.

As regards NCOs at the Infantry School, up to the present
we have not had students from the Group, only from this Centre and the
Caribaldi Regiment. The vast number of NCOs who are being demobilised
has kept the School fully occupied in replacing them but after the
present course it is hoped to have students almost entirely from the
Group.

At present future planning is rather in the air owing to
the recent AFHQ decisions.

However, no fewer than 25 Italian Generals visit the Centre on
Saturday, which will ensure that the Italians in any future planning they
will do will at least know what they are talking about.

Yours

1121

Major GSO II
HQ & Inf /HQ
1st British Liaison &
Training Unit RMV HQ.

WLP/aw

Lt Col E. FIEDLE, DSO,
INF AFHQ, C.M.F.

CONFIDENTIALDO/EE/17/1/AMFrom: Lt Col J. WHITE, DSO
D.M.T. A.P.M.G.
C.M.F.Ref: 16072

7th August, 1945.

Dear Henry

You have not changed your name or address, have you? I always wonder when I am writing to you.

I have obtained consent from S-3 Ltd to-day to the issue of 10 x 3 banners (Class V). The official response note will follow shortly. I am sorry I could not arrange it more quickly, but it had to be "old bagged" through.

This will, I think, be the last release of such a nature you will ever get, or so they say to be understood. Will you do your damndest to put as reliable chains as possible onto them and prevent them going into circulation as much as possible? Make Colonel GUERRE personally responsible!

No pickings from the 15th yet - I will let you know. I have just caught sight of some of Lush's just produced by him. I don't think I shall read it all!

Yours, Col

James Peddie

Major H.W. KIPP,
P. M. and TV,
R.T.O., H.P., C.M.F.

1120

DO/DE/17/1/51

From Lt Col J. REDIE, DSO
D.M.T. A.P.H.Q.
C.M.F.

Tel : 16872

4th August 1945.

Dear

Gen.

Thank you very much for the programme of the MCOs course which I have not yet had time to study closely. Anyway it gives me the necessary ammunition if I have to answer any more questions. It seems to me at first glance to be what is required. Are you getting any students from Gruppi on these MCO courses?

I am having trouble with getting the release of your 10 - 12 x 3 tanners. It is now on a Brigadiers' level. The trouble, of course, is that there are a lot of vehicles at OSSANO, and a lot off the road, and Q(13) are not anxious to throw more away to be knocked to atoms, even although they are Class V. I have, however, stressed the importance of them from a training point of view. I am not too optimistic.

You will know that a signal has been sent to get CHANCE on the way.

Yours *over*

James Redie.

Thank you very much for the programs of the NCOs courses which I have not yet had time to study closely. Anyway it gives me the necessary ammunition if I have to answer any more questions. It seems to me at first glance to be what is required. Are you getting any students from Gruppi on these NCO courses?

I am having trouble with getting the release of your 10 - 12 x 3 banners. It is now on a Brigadiers' level. The trouble, of course, is that there are a lot of vehicles at CESANO, and a lot off the road, and Q(AS) are not anxious to throw more away to be knocked to atoms, even although they are Class V. I have, however, stressed the importance of them from a training point of view. I am not too optimistic.

You will know that a signal has been sent to get CHANCE on the way.

Yours ever

James Reddie

1114

Major H. E. KING.
'P' EL & TU, I.C.F.,
R.T.C., C.M.F.

SUBJECT :- PT School RTO ICF.

'P' British Liaison and

Training Unit RTO ICF.

Ref G/DQ/A.18/670

4 August 45.

Dear

I was sorry to miss your phone call last Sunday but was cooling off in the sea.

Everything appears to be going well to start the PT School and as a target date I have given "Assemble 25th, Course starts 27th.

MADDISON is off to the American Centre as arranged and will return by the 18th in time to start the course. We are still short of the syllabus and if you could send it in an outline of what you think, I will arrange for the final details in cooperation with the Italian PT Officer and send you a copy.

I am just off on 10 days (long Delayed) leave up to the North. Price is looking after things in my absent, and shall be back in time for the opening of the School.

I heard from Sam WALLACE a few days ago, he sends his regards.

Yours

HCK/gdj.

Lieut-Col G. OCK,
OI PT DIST.

Major GSO II
'P' British Liaison and
Training Unit RTO ICF.

285020

SUBJECT:- Notes on Reduction of Staff 2,

Officer i/c TRJ, HQ ICF
(For Colonel SIVO)

Commandant,
The British Liaison and
Training Unit, RTO, IGP
Major KING, Foresters.

1. As is probable in the next few days there will be a considerable reduction in the number of permanent staff, reducing this centre to the absolute minimum it is essential that the greatest care be taken that the essential people are retained and that every legitimate manipulation of figures is made to ensure that every man who can be retained is retained.

As it affects Infantry Training alone, the following are absolutely essential:-

- (1) The authorized Training Staff.
- (11) Additional men not allowed on the establishment but essential for the maintenance of training equipment such as guards and carriers.
- (111) Maintenance Staff, i.e. Cooks, etc.
- (1v) Armourers under training.
2. The following ~~cannot~~ be considered essential, but must be wangled by every possible legitimate means:-
- (a) Men in Regimental Bands. Only one band is necessary.
- (b) Men in charge of mules.
- (c) Regimental Police.
- (d) Demonstration Company.
- (e) Range makers, target makers, etc, groundmen.

3. The following is briefly the way I would suggest economies be made with reference to para 1 above.

- (1) The revision of TRAVELING.

THE BRITISH LIAISON AND
TRAINING UNIT, KRG IOP

Ref: C/DO/A.13/422

10 July 1945

Chlorine

19.2 ~~6.8~~ 6.18

reduction in the number of permanent staff, reducing this entire to the absolute minimum it is essential that the greatest care be taken that the essential people are retained and that every legitimate manipulation of figures is made to ensure that every man who can be retained is retained.

As it affects Infantry Training alone, the following are absolutely essential:-

- (i) The authorized Training Staff.
- (ii) Additional men not allowed on the establishment but essential for the maintenance of training equipment such as guards and carriers.
- (iii) Maintenance Staff, i.e. Cocks, etc.
- (iv) Armourers under training.

2. The following cannot be considered essential, but must be included by every possible legitimate means:-

- (a) Men in Regimental Bands. Only one band is necessary.
- (b) Men in charge of mules.
- (c) Regimental Police.
- (d) Demonstration Company.
- (e) Range makers, target makers, etc, groundmen.

3. The following is briefly the way I would suggest economies be made with reference to para 1 above.

- (1) The position of TRAVIANGHO.

Under no possible circumstances can we possibly justify the continuation of TRAVIANGHO if it means one single man who is essential here is lost.

TRAVIANGHO serves at present -

- (a) The duties of collection and documentation of ¹¹¹residents.
 - (b) A form of penal settlement.
 - (c) A rest camp for men about to go in Cangedo.
- taking each of these in turn -

I/.....

I. If clothing is done by each Regiment (Arty, Engineers) and some of the rest centre atmosphere of THEVICHANO was replaced, a couple of days for sorting out would be quite sufficient. It is agreed this sorting out is essential but it is considered that THEVICHANO is too far away and far too large at present.

It is submitted that there would be a vast saving of man-power if THORNDIKE came here. The problem here is where to put them.

It must be agreed that the Misto En is a waste of time, they neither spin nor do they toil. If every man in the Misto were posted to the Crupyd, no great hardship would be felt. This would leave the Misto tentage free and with a little of the THEVINGNO tentage, would be quite adequate to become the reception centre.

II. The penal aspect of TRINCHANO can be solved by the pointing away to the Grupp.

III. The rest camp for the Otago men is solved by having ~~THEIR~~ ~~THEIR~~ ~~THEIR~~ here and making them do the odd jobs, fatigues and guards until such time as they return to civilian life.

Thus by the simple means of disbanding the Misto we have a ready supply of labour here at CUNESCO. The decision to do this is, of course, not mine, but to me it has tremendous advantages without any disadvantages. The staff required to run the place is minute in the extreme as nothing but documentation is attempted and there is the pool of labour as specified previously.

No increase to establishment is required as the staff is already allowed for in the Misto Bn.

Any man who normally would go to the Kinto Inn would be posted direct to the Group 1. This does not matter as he sees no training worth speaking of here at present.

The packing away of the Misto at present gives us 300 possible reinforcements at least. The disbandment of THEVIER 280 about 800 men. At the same time we have the permanent staff still left to run the new reception unit. Surely this has unlimited possibilities.

We are only asked to produce numbers, post away officers, HCOs etc. no matter how aged they be.

(11) The men required to maintain runs, carriers, etc., as in para 1.

the paramount staff? we can safely touch for this is only;

II. The penal aspect of TREVIGNANO can be solved by the posting away to the Group.

III. The rest camp for the Congolese men is solved by having TREVIGNANO here and making them do the odd jobs, fatigues and guards until such time as they return to civilian life.

Thus by the simple means of disbanding the Misto we have a ready supply of labour here at UNYMA. The decision to do this is, of course, not mine, but to me it has tremendous advantages without any disadvantages. The staff required to run the place is minute in the extreme as nothing but documentation is attempted and there is the pool of labour as specified previously.

No increase to establishment is required as the staff is already allowed for in the Misto Bn.

Any man who normally would go to the Misto Bn would be posted direct to the Group. This does not matter as he does no training worth speaking of here at present.

The posting away of the Misto at present gives us 300 possible reinforcements at least. The disbandment of TREVIGNANO about 800 men. At the same time we have the permanent staff still left to run the new reception unit. Surely this has unlimited possibilities.

We are only asked to produce numbers, post away officers, NCOs etc, no matter how aged they be.

(11) The men required to maintain guns, carriers, etc., as in para 1.

The permanent staff we can safely touch for this is only 3 officers and 6 NCOs, clearly inadequate. The minimum maintenance figure is one driver to two carriers, plus a workshop personnel of 4 - 6 people. These must be kept.

The means of doing this are -

- (a) By disbanding a Regiment and saving of permanent staff. This is obviously completely unsatisfactory.
- (b) By the hope that the leave, congested, hospital figures, which are constantly changing will defy even the most careful check of figures. This can undoubtedly be done. If in a permanent staff of over 2,500 - 40 men be held, then I would be very surprised.

At any rate these men MUST be held. If for one cannot go through the troubles of forming the carriers again.

(111)/.....

(111) Maintenance Staff, as in para 1. (441)

Reinforcements can and must be effected by centralisation. At present there are three cookhouses for troops in No. 2 Regiment with only about 1,000 men in the Regiment. Company storemen are unnecessary. By rigid centralisation of administration each Regiment could save nearly 100 men.

When fresh reinforcements come, all the unskilled jobs can be done by the recruits, where expansion is necessary. Under no possible circumstances is it necessary to have 500 officers and men when there are 100 men to train. By closing up, nearly all unskilled men can be dispensed with and only the skilled training and administration staff of officers, NCOs, clerks, etc, maintained, with the minimum amount of staff.

As will be clear, it is officers who are the burden on establishments as they require separate messes, extra batmen, etc. It is essential that no officer is kept here as in a Transit Camp.

(iv) Armourers, as in para 1. (44)

These are allowed for in the establishment, but the Training Branch must watch that Regimental do not post them away in preference to an officers batman.

Reference paragraph 2 above. This deals with the absolute essentials. Those listed in the second category are in no way less essential. No man save petrol and transport, targets and ranges are an essential part of the Centre, a band is of the greatest value for morale, etc. These are skilled men and irreplaceable. How are we to deal with these?

(a) The band (Ref para 2(a))

As has been said, one only is essential, take the best bandman from each and make certain that the Maresciallo i/c 2 Regiment band is in posted away. Then make a rule that the batman of officers will be a bandman. The band can thus still function in a limited way. Later the bandman can be replaced by other soldiers when the confusion and shooting dies down and normal peace and quiet returns again.

(b) Demonstration Companies (Ref para 2(b))

Change these over with those on guard at RMSE. Post the men on guard at RMSE away. These guards will finish soon and the companies return. If not they may be relieved when things return to normal.

As will be clear, it is officers who are the burden on establishments as they require separate messes, extra batmen, etc. It is essential that no officer is kept here as in a Transit Camp.

(iv) Armourers in para 1.(iv)

These are allowed for in the establishment, but the Training Branch must watch that Regimental do not post them away in preference to an officer's batman.

Reference paragraph 2 above. This deals with the absolute essentials. Those listed in the second category are in no way essential. The main save (control and transport, targets and ranges are an essential part of the Centre, a band in of the greatest value for morale, etc. These are skilled men and irreplaceable. How are we to deal with these?

(a) The Band (Ref para 2(a))

As has been said, one only is essential, take the best bandman from each and make certain that the Marstonville 1/c 2 Regiment band is in posted army. Then make a rule that the batman of officers will be a bandman. The band can thus still function in a limited way. Later the bandman can be replaced by other soldiers when the confusion and shouting dies down and normal peace and quiet reigns again.

(b) Demonstration Companies (Ref para 2(b))

Change these over with them on guard at RMAE. Post the men on guard at RMAE away. These guards will finish soon and the companies return. If not they may be relieved when things return to normal.

(c) Target and Range Staffs (Ref para 2(c))

Concentrate these divisionally and undertake all target and carpentry work. Without bias for the schools. With the least of sampling it should be simple to cover these. Do not forget that the congested man would be here to help.

(d) Men in charge of Mules (Ref para 2(d))

These must be watched, either by filling on jobs on the establishment, filling temporary establishments not at present filled -

i.e. (1) The Field Hygiene Section is under establishment.

(2) The H and M School is under establishment.

Agenda/.....

- 4 -

Again it is felt that the only way is now to post a lot of men, in a few months time all will be back to normal.

(e) Regimental Police (Ref para 2(c))

It will be obvious that the fantastic number of men required for guards must be reduced. The Division is now faced with the prospect of having no men for guards at all. This is excellent. It is obvious also that some of the HQ departments will have to clean their areas and make their garden without using recruits - again excellent. While the Carabinieri are available even so, a certain number of men for guards will be necessary. I suggest a number of men must be retained for Police.

I would also suggest -

- (i) The watchman and his dog for guarding ammunition and other stores.
- (ii) More use of locks and keys and wire.
- (iii) Patrols of Police rather than fixed guards.
- (iv) The removal of all shoes from 90% of vehicles to prevent unnecessary use of transport.
- (v) A keener interest by the many officers and men who have nothing to do.

5. CONCLUSION

The blow which appears to be upon us at first sight appears a disaster. On the other hand it presents a golden opportunity.

The essential point is that it be controlled. If haphazard posting is done then disaster will result, but with the use of brains a controlled posting will rid us of dead weight and the appalling waste of men as at present.

It is essential that the Training Branch runs this outflow, not the services who are only interested usually in personnel comfort.

Regiments must be consulted but controlled men for men.

The following should be borne in mind.

- (i) An armorer is probably as valuable as a senior officer.
- (ii) Economy is always effected by centralisation.

- (i) The watchman and his dog for guarding ammunition and other stores.
- (ii) More use of lookouts and dogs and wire.
- (iii) Patrols of Police rather than fixed guards.
- (iv) The removal of all wheels from 50% of vehicles to prevent unnecessary use of transport.
- (v) A lesser interest by the many officers and men who have nothing to do.

5. CONCLUSION

The blow which appears to be upon us at first sight appears a disaster. On the other hand it presents a golden opportunity.

The essential point is that it be controlled. If haphazard posting is done then disaster will result, but with the use of brains a controlled posting will rid us of dead weight and the appalling waste of men as at present.

It is essential that the Training Branch runs this outflow, not the services who are only interested usually in personnel comfort.

Regiments must be consulted but controlled man for man.

The following should be borne in mind.

- (i) An armorer is probably as valuable as a senior officer.
- (ii) Economy is always affected by centralization.

This letter is only written for the Infantry side here, but if I find that anybody I have mentioned in this letter is posted anywhere I consider should not be, my confidence in your training staff will be easily renewed.

WLP/aej

Internal
File

Major GSO.II
Treg & Inf Brg
etc
etc
etc

'7' British Liaison and Training Unit,

B.L.P.

See App. 100

Training side to 4/12/44

phoned phoned

SUBJECT: Notes on Reduction of Staff

Officer 1/o Regt, HQ IIP
(For Colonel HVO)

Colonel,
1st British Division and
Training Unit, HQ, IIP
Major HQ, Portswear.

1st British Division and
Training Unit, HQ IIP

Ref: C/10/4, 10/322

18 July 1945

1. As is probable in the next few days there will be a considerable reduction in the number of permanent staff, reducing this centre to the absolute minimum it is essential that the greatest care be taken that the essential people are retained and that every legitimate manipulation of figures is made to ensure that every man who can be retained is retained.

As it affects Infantry Training alone, the following are absolutely essential:-

- (1) The authorized Training Staff.
- (2) Additional men not allowed on the establishment but essential for the maintenance of training equipment such as guards and carriers.
- (3) Maintenance Staff, i.e. Cooks, etc.
- (4) Armourers under training.
2. The following cannot be considered essential, but must be managled by every possible legitimate means:-
 - (a) Men in Regimental Band. Only one band is necessary.
 - (b) Men in charge of mail.
 - (c) Regimental Police.
 - (d) Demonstration Company.
 - (e) Range expert, target makers, etc., groundmen.

3. The following is briefly the way I would suggest exercises be made with reference to para 1 above.

(1) The position of the training

absolute minimum it is essential that the greatest care be taken that the essential people are retained and that every legitimate requisition of equipment is made to ensure that every man who can be retained is retained.

As it affects Infantry Training alone, the following are absolutely essential:-

- (i) The militarised Training Staff.
- (ii) Additional men not allowed on the establishment but essential for the maintenance of training equipment such as guards and couriers.
- (iii) Maintenance Staff, i.e. Cooks, etc.
- (iv) Armourers under training.

2. The following cannot be considered essential, but must be weighed by every possible legitimate means:-

- (a) Men in Regimental Service. Only one band is necessary.
- (b) Men in charge of mules.
- (c) Regimental Police.
- (d) Demonstration Company.
- (e) Range expert, target makers, etc, gunners.

3. The following is briefly the way I would suggest accounts be made with reference to para 1 above.

(1) The position of THE REGIMENT.

Under no possible circumstances can we possibly justify the continuation of THE REGIMENT if it means one single man who is essential here is lost.

THE REGIMENT serves at present -

- (a) The duties of collection and documentation of reports.
- (b) A form of parcel post.
- (c) A rest camp for men about to go in Operation.

Taking each of these in turn -

1/.....

1. If clothing is done by each Regiment (Army, Engineers) and some of the rest centre atmosphere of TRENCHARD was replaced, a couple of days for sorting out would be quite sufficient. It is agreed this sorting out is essential but it is considered that TRENCHARD is too far away and for too large at present.

It is admitted that there would be a vast saving of man-power if TRENCHARD came here. The problem here is where to put them.

It must be agreed that the Misto En is a waste of time, they neither gain nor do they toll. If every man in the Misto were posted to the Grapd, no great hardship would be felt. This would leave the Misto barracks free and with a little of the TRENCHARD barracks, would be quite adequate to become the reception centre.

17. The real aspect of TRENCHARD can be solved by the posting away to the Grapd.

18. The real aspect for the Grapd men is solved by having TRENCHARD here and making them do the odd jobs, fatigues and garris until such time as they return to civilian life.

19. The simple means of dissolving the Misto we have a ready supply of labour here at TRENCHARD. The decision to do this is, of course, not mine, but to me it has tremendous advantages without any disadvantages. The staff required to run the place is minute in the extreme as nothing but documentation is absorbed and there is the pool of labour as specified previously.

20. Increase to establishment is required as the staff is already allowed for in the Misto En.

21. Any man who normally would go to the Misto En would be posted direct to the Grapd. This does not matter as he does no training worth speaking of here at present.

The posting away of the Misto at present gives us 300 personnel requirements at least. The disbandment of TRENCHARD about 500 men. At the same time we have the permanent staff still left to run the new reception unit. Surely this has unlimited possibilities.

We are only asked to produce numbers, post every officer, NCOs etc, no matter how aged they be.

(21) The men required to maintain the TRENCHARD, etc. 4 in the area 1,

II. The total support of TRANSMERNO can be solved by the posting away to the Guepda.

III. The most easy for the Guepda men is solved by having TRANSMERNO have and making them do the odd jobs, fatigues and givings until such time as they return to civilian life.

Thus by the simple means of disbursing the Misto we have a ready supply of labor here at GUEPDA. The solution to do this is, of course, not mine, but to me it has tremendous advantages without any disadvantages. The staff required to run the place is minute in the extreme as nothing but concentration is attempted and there is the pool of labor as specified previously.

No increase to establishment is required as the staff is already allowed for in the Misto Rn.

Any man who normally would go to the Misto Rn would be posted direct to the Guepda. This does not matter as he has no training worth speaking of here at present.

The posting away of the Misto at present gives us 300 possible reinforcements at least. The disbandment of TRANSMERNO about 800 men. At the same time we have the permanent staff still left to run the new reception unit. Surely this has unlimited possibilities.

We are only asked to produce numbers, not any officers, NCOs etc., no matter how aged they be.

(41) The men required to maintain men, carriers, etc. as per para 1.

The permanent staff we can safely touch for this is only 3 officers and 6 NCOs, clearly inadequate. The minimum maintenance figure is one driver to two carriers, plus a workshop personnel of 4 - 6 people. These must be kept.

The means of doing this are -

(a) By disbanding a Regiment and saving of permanent staff. This is obviously completely unsatisfactory.

(b) By the hope that the leave, exchange, hospital figures, which are constantly changing will defy even the most careful check of figures. This can immediately be done. If in a permanent staff of over 2,500 - 40 men be held, then I would be very surprised.

At any rate these men MUST be held. I for one cannot go through the troubles of forming the carriers again.

(41)/.....

(111) Maintenance Staff, as in para 1, (111)

Provision can and must be effected by centralization. At present there are three cookhouses for troops in No. 2 Regiment with only about 1,000 men in the Regiment. Company kitchens are unnecessary. By rigid centralization of administration each Regiment could save nearly 100 men.

When fresh reinforcements come, all the unskilled jobs can be done by the recruits, where expansion is necessary. Under no possible circumstances is it necessary to have 500 officers and men when there are no men to train. By closing up, nearly all unskilled men can be dispensed with and only the skilled training and administration staff of officers, NCOs, clerks, etc, maintained, with the minimum amount of staff.

As will be clear, it is officers who have the burden on establishments as they require separate messes, extra baggage, etc. It is essential that no officer is kept here as in a Transit Camp.

(iv) Summary as in para 1, (iv)

These are allowed for in the establishment, but the Training Branch must watch that Regiments do not post them away in preference to an officers billet.

4. Reference paragraph 2 above. This deals with the absolute essentials. Those listed in the second category are in no way less essential. The railways have petrol and transport, targets and weapons are an essential part of the Centre, a band is of the greatest value for morale, etc. These are skilled men and irreplaceable. How are we to deal with them?

(a) The band (Ref para 2(a))

As has been said, one only is essential, take the best musician from each and make certain that the band is 1/2 of 2 Regiment band is posted away. Then make a rule that the bottom of officers will be a bandman. The band can thus still function in a limited way. Later the bandman can be replaced by other soldiers when the confusion and shouting dies down and normal peace and quiet reign again.

(b) Administration Corporation (Ref para 2(b))

1111

Change these over with them on guard at RMR. Post the men on guard at RMR. These guards will finish soon and the companies return. If not they may be relieved when things return to normal.

As will be seen, it is officers who are the burden on establishments as they require separate messes, extra bedding, etc. It is essential that no officer is kept here as in a transient camp.

(iv) Personnel in para 1.(iv)

These are allowed for in the establishment, but the Training Branch must watch that Regiments do not post them away in preference to an officers' mess.

Reference paragraph 2 above. This deals with the absolute essentials. Those listed in the second category are in no way less essential. The messes above petrol and transport, targets and ranges are an essential part of the Centre, a head is of the greatest value for morale, etc. These are skilled men and irreplaceable. How are we to deal with them?

(a) The Band (Ref para 2(a))

As has been said, one only is essential, take the best bandman from each and make certain that the Musicians 1/2 2 Regiment band is posted away. Then make a rule that the bottom of officers will be a bandman. The band can then still function in a limited way. Later the bandman can be replaced by other soldiers when the confusion and shouting dies down and normal peace and quiet returns again.

(b) Dispersed Companies (Ref para 2(b))

1111

Change them over with them on guard at night. Post the men on guard at night away. These guards will finish soon and the companies return. If not they may be relieved and things return to normal.

(c) Target and Range Staffs (Ref para 2(c))

Constitute these divisionally and undertake all target and company work. Without men for the schools. With the least of men, it should be able to cover these. Do not forget that the original men would be here to help.

(d) Men in charge of messes (Ref para 2(d))

These must be untrained, either by filling in jobs on the establishment, filling temporary establishments not at present filled.

4.0. (1) The Field Hygiene Section is under establishment.

(1.1) The H and M School is under establishment.

4/5/47/.....

Again it is felt that the only way is now to post a lot of men, in a few months time all will be back to normal.

(c) Background Police (Ref. para 2(c))

It will be obvious that the fantastic number of men required for guards must be reduced. The Division is now faced with the prospect of having no men for guards at all. This is excellent. It is obvious also that some of the HQ departments will have to close their eyes and make their garden without using recruits - again excellent. While the Carabinieri are available even so, a certain number of men for guards will be necessary. I suggest a number of men must be retained for Police.

I would also suggest -

- (1) The watchman and his dog for guarding ammunition and other stores
- (11) More use of locks and keys and wires
- (111) Controls of Police rather than fixed guards.
- (111) The removal of all vehicles from 90% of vehicles to prevent unnecessary use of transport.
- (V) A greater interest by the many officers and men who have nothing to do

5. CONCLUSION

The blow which appears to be upon us at first sight appears a disaster. On the other hand it presents a golden opportunity.

The essential point is that it be controlled. If headquarters is done then disaster will result, but with the use of having a controlled posting will fill us of hard weight and the appalling waste of men as at present.

It is essential that the Training Board runs this outflow, not the survivors who are only interested usually in personal comfort.

Regiments must be consulted but controlled men for men.

The following should be borne in mind. 1111

- (1) An officer is probably as valuable as a senior officer.
- (11) Economy is always affected by centralisation.

- (3) The watchman and his dog for guarding munitions and other stores
- (11) Make use of locks and keys and wires
- (111) Controls of Police rather than fixed guards
- (12) The removal of all vehicles from 90% of vehicles to prevent unnecessary use of transport.
- (v) A heavier interest by the many officers and men who have nothing to do.

5. CONCLUSION

The blow which appears to be upon us at first sight appears a disaster. On the other hand it presents a golden opportunity.

The essential point is that it be controlled. If haphazard porting is given then disaster will result, but with the use of levelling a controlled porting will rid us of dead weight and the appalling waste of men as at present.

It is essential that the Training Branch run this outfit, not the survivors who are only interested usually in personal comfort.

Regiments must be consulted but controlled men for men.

The following should be borne in mind. 11111

- (1) An answer is probably as valuable as a senior officer.
- (11) Economy is always effected by centralization.

This letter is only written for the Infantry side here, but if I find that anybody I have mentioned in this letter is posted away who I consider should not be, my confidence in your training staff will be sadly reduced.

W L R

WLP/453

Major C30.11
Treg & Inf Reg
1st British Infantry and Training Unit,
RUC INF

Internal
File

SUBJECT :- Carriers.

'F' British Liaison and Training Unit
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref G/A.18/574

7 July '45.

Dear

I called for a report on the Carriers you complained of and send you a copy of this herewith.

Before taking this matter any further I think you should find out what your Platoon Commander is doing. I will discuss the subject in further detail early next week when I come to discuss "School of Administration".

Yours

Major GSO II
Training
'F' British Liaison and Training Unit.

WKK/raw

Internal.

File.

Maj Huntington
SIVA Adm Annex Luster School.

1109

SUBJECT :- Report on SIVA Carriers.

'P' British Liaison and Training Unit
R.T.C., I.C.E.

Ref G/G.2/565

5 July '45.

Major PRICE, GSO II (Infantry).

Carriers Universal and Mortar Class II & V
Carriers Lloyd Class II

1. The allotment of the vehicles to the three platoons was done by Capt SUMMERS. The vehicles were sorted out into the various platoons by the Italians themselves, and this was all done before I arrived at the Centre. When I arrived here, out of 50 vehicles there were only about six runners, the remainder being off the road due to bad maintenance and bad driving, SIVA carrier Platoon Commander being the worst offender.

2. Knowing that SIVA vehicles were wanted urgently for the success of the Weapon Training Courses, I took a personal interest in getting them back on the road again, in which I got no co-operation from the Platoon Officer. Every vehicle sent to SIVA was overhauled and put into going order by myself and the British Staff and I personally tested each carrier before it left the Centre. As for showing any favour in the allotment of the vehicles, I have already pointed out that the Italians sorted them.

3. I would like to point out that the Lloyd Carriers which were sent to SIVA were the same as the new ones (Class II) which are in the park at present, when they were handed to the Platoon Officer, including tools to Training Scale. The seven good Lloyd Carriers are only in their present condition because I have been able to exercise control over them since the day they arrived. The reason that the new Lloyd Carriers are still at this Centre is that it was only this School which was deficient, all the others having been made up before I arrived.

4. I realise that the situation with regard to tools is bad for the simple reason they were not taken care of when they arrived here. I have had great trouble in getting permission to replace these tools but have in fact been able to place an indent with DADOS and as soon as I receive the tools all Carriers will be made up to Training Scale as far as possible.

5 July '45.

Major PRICE, GSO II (Infantry).

Carriers Universal and Mortar Class II & V
Carriers Lloyd Class II

1. The allotment of the vehicles to the three platoons was done by Capt SCOTT. The vehicles were sorted out into the various platoons by the Italians themselves, and this was all done before I arrived at the Centre. When I arrived here, out of 50 vehicles there were only about six runners, the remainder being off the road due to bad maintenance and bad driving, SIVA carrier Platoon Commander being the worst offender.

2. Knowing that SIVA vehicles were wanted urgently for the success of the Weapon Training Courses, I took a personal interest in getting them back on the road again, in which I got no co-operation from the Platoon Officer. Every vehicle sent to SIVA was overhauled and put into going order by myself and the British Staff and I personally tested each carrier before it left the Centre. As for showing any favour in the allotment of the vehicles, I have already pointed out that the Italians sorted them.

3. I would like to point out that the Lloyd Carriers which were sent to SIVA were the same as the new ones (Class II) which are in the park at present, when they were handed to the Platoon Officer, including tools to Training Scale. The seven good Lloyd Carriers are only in their present condition because I have been able to exercise control over them since the day they arrived. The reason that the new Lloyd Carriers are still at this Centre is that it was only this School which was deficient, all the others having been made up before I arrived.

4. I realize that the situation with regard to tools is bad for the simple reason they were not taken care of when they arrived here. I have had great trouble in getting permission to replace these tools but have in fact been able to place an indent with DADOS and as soon as I receive the tools all Carriers will be made up to Training Scale as far as possible.

1108

JS/rmw.

(Signed) J. SMITH Lieut.
i/c Carrier Section, RVN IGP.

- 5 JUL Recd
(6)

SUBJECT: - Carriers

'F' British Liaison and
Training Unit, RTC ICP

✓ Major KING, Foresters.
GSO.II (Training)

Ref: G/G.2/563

5 July 1945

1. It is to be noted from BTU/B1/150 that the original distribution of carriers and Lloyds was made by Capt G.R. SEXTON on 17 March 1945. At that time it will be observed that there was a deficiency of 7 Lloyds. SIVA and Infantry School were made up to the Establishment, the deficiency being borne here at GKSANO. The vehicles remained in Platoons with their own officer responsible.
2. As you are well aware SIVA has constantly demanded its carriers once training started.
3. On the 22 May I ordered complete priority of maintenance and attention to SIVA carriers, and for vehicles to be sent to MANZIANA as soon as they were ready. The majority of the vehicles had already left when the other Lloyds came. These might well have been worse than those previously received. They would still have gone to the same people, i.e. those units entitled to Lloyds and not in possession of them.
4. Of the Lloyds received before the new lot it will be found that they compare more than favourably with those of the Infantry School and SIVA's carriers with those of the remainder.
5. It is agreed that tools for the Lloyds are better here than at MANZIANA, because with the other vehicles being here less time and now being properly controlled the tools have not yet got lost. For carriers they are exactly proportional. All tool deficiencies are on indent.
6. As Major HUNTINGDON rightly points out it is a stupid policy to send bad vehicles to MANZIANA as they only return here for repair. An attached report from Lieut SMITH will show, the condition of vehicles when despatched was not unsatisfactory.
7. It cannot, however, be too strongly pointed out that had SIVA shown some interest in its vehicles when they arrived the troubles would have been, for them at least, obviated. As it is, to make remarks as to unfair discrimination about the people to whom they should give thanks that they have any tracked vehicles at all, to me savours of the worst of taste.

WLF/asj

Internal
File

For Action/For Inform.	
GSO II Trg.	
Date	File G2

W. Price
Major GSO.II
Trg & Inf Trg.
'F' British Liaison and
Training Unit, RTC ICP

-1 JUL Recd

Major J.A.G. Gribble
O i.c. GARIBALDI INF REGT.
VITERBO.

JUNE 29th 1945.

Major H. King
"F" British Liaison and Training Unit
RTC...ICF.

Cesano—

Dear Henry

Still no news of when we are likely to push off, tho I think it will be in the next day or three. I met Geoffry Holmann in Rome yesterday and he asked to be remembered to you. He is resident M.O. at MMIA, so maybe you will be able to get in and see him sometime.

No sign of Daily papers yet, so I wonder if you could jog the Orderly Room again as it is eleven days since we had one here, and I have to rely on all news from the outside world from them.

Yours aye,

John Gribble

In the Field

For Action/For Info.	
G.S.C. I	1106
Date 10/7/45	File Do

Sgt. Jones -
Follow this up
1106

Henry

99
(4 July Recd)

Major W.L. MENLAM
Land Forces Sub Com. AC (ADTA)

DO/M

24 June 1945.

Delinquency in Joining Courses at CS&NO

Dear Henry,

Brian WEBB CARTER has written saying he would be glad to hear of any specific cases by CS&NOHA of non-arrival or tardy arrival for your Courses. If you can furnish this information I will pass it on as he intends to take disciplinary action if offenders can be pin-pointed.

This should have a good future effect on joining.

Yours ever

Louis Menlam.

Major H.W. KING,
'F' BLTU.
RTO IOP
CMF

hm

1105

(5)

SUBJECT :- Physical Training School - CESAHO.

Personal.

'F' British Liaison and Training Unit.
R.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref C/A.18/530

28 Jun 45.

Dear

1. Many thanks for your letter of the 26 June, also for the various signals which have arrived, keeping us fully informed about SMI MANHISEN.
2. OSMI COLLIER is leaving forthwith as instructed in your signal, received this morning. We are sorry to lose him as he has done most excellent work and has a happy knack of getting on well with the Italians here.
3. Since you were up here I have discussed the proposed P and RT School with WHEELER at MIA and for some unknown reason they seem to think there should be difficulty in opening a School, whereas the whole thing is quite clear to us here, and although there may be a short delay in accommodation problems, I am quite sure the arrangements we discussed will go through very well.
4. Col MAXWELL and everyone here is keen on the project and as soon as MANHISEN arrives and we have discussed possibilities, I will immediately drop you a line and perhaps we could meet again.
5. With regards to Sports Equipment, I do not think MIA can do much apart from "Vaulting Horses" but if we could contact the civilian organisation C.O.N.I., I suggest this is done direct and not through MIA.
6. A suitable Italian Officer has been selected here to run the School when it is formed.

Kind regards.

Yours

1. Many thanks for your letter of the 26 June, also for the various signals which have arrived, keeping us fully informed about SGI MADHUSON.

2. CSM CULLEN is leaving forthwith as instructed in your signal, received this morning. We are sorry to lose him as he has done most excellent work and has a happy knack of getting on well with the Italians here.

3. Since you were up here I have discussed the proposed P and IT School with MEXMAN at MIA and for some unknown reason they seem to think there should be difficulty in opening a school, whereas the whole thing is quite clear to us here, and although there may be a short delay in accommodation problems, I am quite sure the arrangements we discussed will go through very well.

4. Col MACKAY and everyone here is keen on the project and anxious as MADHUSON arrives and we have discussed possibilities, I will immediately drop you a line and perhaps we could meet again.

5. With regards to Sports Equipment, I do not think MIA can do much (apart from "Vaulting Horses") but if we could contact the civilian organization C.O.N.I., I suggest this is more direct and not through MIA.

6. A suitable Italian Officer has been selected here to run the School when it is formed.

Kind regards.

Yours

WHE/rwr

Lieut-Col G. OUX,
c/o IEC, C.M.F.

Internal.
File. ✓

Major GSOI II
'F' British Liaison & Training Unit.

27 JUN Recd

+2.

Major J.A.G. Gribble.

O i/c GARIBALDI INF REGT.

VITERBO.

JUNE 24th 45.

Dear Henry.

No doubt you will have received the signal from MMIA (SD/36/2 dated 22.6.45.) giving you a pretty fair idea of our future activities; there is still no real news when we are liable to fold our bivvies and fade into the night tho, ~~who~~, that will probably be in the next day or three. Do come up and stay with us if you feel like a change in the next day or two as we are allways willing to have you and there hasnt been a real party for some time now.

Do you think that you could ask "Q" to send some Water Steralizing Tablets up to us pronto, as we have run completely out of them. Could you also gyp up the Orderly Room Staff as regards Newspapers as they have forgotten them for the last five days or so and there is no other way of hearing of the Big Wide World,

Yours aye,

John Gribble

Date	28 Jun 45
File No	90
For Action/For Info	

1103

SUBJECT :- 35mm Film Projector.

'P' British Liaison and Training Unit,
RFO IOP.

Ref G/DQ/316

23 June 45.

Major MNDLAN,
LAID FORCES SUB COM AD (MIA).

Dear

Herewith letter I have received from Col SEVO
with reference to 35 mm Film Projector Equipment for your
information.

Yours,

HMK/raw.

Internal.

File.

Major
GSO II Training,
'P' British Liaison and Training Unit.

1102

0992