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ACC 10000|120|4920 G/TRG/1

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10000|120|4920 G/TRG/i POLICY Jacket 1

Mar. 1945 - Nov. 13, 1945

4536
4614

File No. G/Trg/1

Minute Sheet No. One

NO	FROM/TO	REF	DATE	SUBJECT	OTHER REFS.
1	FROM/ DMT	DMT/87/MT	14 Mar 45	Trg Directive	
2	TO/ DMT	G/Trg/1	20 Mar 45	" "	... ①
3	FROM/ DMT	–	–	Amended Draft	
4	FROM/ DMT	DMT/87/MT.1	8 Apr 45	Trg Directive	
5	TO/ DMT	G/Trg/1	12 Apr 45	" " agreed	
6	TO/ DMT	G/Trg/101	10 Apr 45	Directive Agreed	
7	FROM/ AFHQ	AG.353/31 GCT-O	16 Apr 45	Responsibility of Training - Ital Army	
8	TO/ GOC	G/Trg/1	22 Apr 45	Trg Policy	
9	FROM/ MMIA	–	1 Dec 44	Adm Instr No. 18.	
10.	" / MMIA	G/97/1	28. April 45.	Italian Army. Anti Gas policy	
11.	– / HQ 15. Army Group	AG.353.ORG.28	– 45.	Responsibility of Training Ital Army	
12	From / AFHQ	DMT/156/1/MT3	4 May 45	Policy - Trg Establishments CMF	
13	From / AFHQ	F 7104	5 May 45	Ref G/97/1 - Para 3 agreed	10
14.	F Blu and Internal.	G/Trg/1	8 June	Trg conference.	
15	A Branch.	A 014	18 June	Reinforcement Policy	also m 146
16	From DMT.	DMT/88/4/MT1	20 June	Directive - Br Trg Stores & Equipment	Appx "A"
17	To "F" BTLU	G/Trg/1	26 June	Copy of above Directive Apdx "A"	16
18	From 50 B.L.U	G.81	22 June	Signal Ref Trg Policy Responsibility	7
19	To: AFHQ.	G/Trg/1	30 June	Training of Italian Army	11
20	To: 50 BLU.	G/Trg/1	4 July	Training of Italian Army	18
21	To: AFHQ	G/Trg/1	10 July	Trg of Italian Army	19
22	To Min of War	SD/94	10 July	Breakdown of Ceiling	
23	From F BLO TU	AQ/6/068	25 July	Re-Organisation of RTC ICF	
24	To F BLO TU	G/Trg/1	26 July	" " " " "	
25	AFHQ	ASD/922.21	28 July	Trg of the Italian Army	19
26	To Min of War	G/Trg/1	10 Aug	Trg of the Interim Italian Army	
27	To DMT	G/Trg/1	10 Aug	Draft - Trg of Combat Groups.	
28	From DMT	DMT/46/MT3	9 Aug	Tactical Employ of Br Snipers	
				Training of Close Contact	

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8	To GOC	G/TRG/1	22 [illegible]	[illegible]	
9	From MMIA	–	1 Dec 44	Army Instr No. 18.	
10.	" / MMIA	G/97/1	28 April 45.	Italian Army. Auto Gas policy.	
11.	– / HQ 15 Army Group	AG 353 ORG 28	– 45.	Responsibility of Training ITL Army	
12	From / AFHQ	DMT/156/1/MT	4 May 45	Policy – Dry Establishment Cmt	
13	From / AFHQ	F 71104	5 May 45	Ref G/97/1 – Para 3 agreed	10
14.	F Bde and Internal.	G/97/1	8 June	Dry Conference.	
15	4 Branch.	A 0/4	18 June	Reinforcement Policy	1 also in 14b
16	From DMT.	DMT/88/4/MT1	20 June	Directive – Dv Trg Stores & Equipment	9 Appx "A"
17	To "F" BTLU	G/TRG/1	26 June	Copy of above Directive Appx "A"	16
18	From 50 BLU	G.81	22 June.	Signal Ref Trg Policy Responsibility	7
19	To: AFHQ.	G/TRG/1	30 June	Training of Italian Army	11
20	To: 50 BLU.	G/TRG/1	4 July.	Training of Italian Army	18
21	To: AFHQ	G/TRG/1	10 July	Trg of Italian Army.	19
22	To Min of War	SD/94	10 July	Breakdown of Ceiling	
23	From F BLO TU	AQ/6/068	25 July	Re-Organisation of RTC ICF	
24	To F BLO TU	G/TRG/1	26 July	" " " " "	
25	AFHQ	ASD/922.21	28 July	Trg of the Italian Army	19
26	To Min of War	G/TRG/1	10 Aug	Trg of the Interim Italian Army	
27	To DMT	G/TRG/1	10 Aug	Draft – Trg of Combat Groups.	
28	From DMT	DMT/46/MT3	9 Aug	Tactical employ of Bn Snipers	
29	To All BLU's	G/TRG/1	13 Aug	Forwarding copy of above extract	
30	To Min of War	—	13 Aug	" " " "	
31	From DMT	DMT/55/MT1	15 Aug	Trg of Combat Groups.	
32	To AFHQ – G-3 (AMO)	G/TRG/1	16 Aug	" " " "	
33					
34					

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0080

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

221900A

FROM : AFHQ

TO : 2 DISTRICT
MMIA

INFO : 3 DISTRICT

REF : C 30622

UNCLASSIFIED

PARA ONE : RESPONSIBILITIES FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE GRUPPI AS BETWEEN DISTRICTS AND MMIA REQUIRE CLARIFICATION (.)

PARA TWO : UNTIL RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ALL GRUPPI ARE UNDER ALLIED COMMAND AND ARE UNDER OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF TWO DISTRICT (.)

PARA THREE (.) ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING (.) MMIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING OF THE GRUPPI (.) MMIA WILL ENSURE THAT INSTRUCTION ON THESE MATTERS ARE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH TWO DISTRICT WHERE ANY OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE INVOLVED AND WILL ADVISE THE ITALIAN WAR MINISTRY AND TWO DISTRICT OVER ACCOMMODATION TO EFFECT WHERE POSSIBLE CONCENTRATION OF GRUPPI FOR TRAINING (.)

PARA FOUR (.) ADMINISTRATION (.) THE GRUPPI ARE AT PRESENT ADMINISTERED BY TWO DISTRICT UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF MMIA (.) CONDITIONS COVERING ADMINISTRATION OF THE GRUPPI ARE CONTAINED IN AG LETTER 021.7 GCT-0 DATED 16 NOV 44 (.)

PARA FIVE (.) WHEN RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE GRUPPI WILL BE AT THE SOLE DISPOSAL OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT (.) THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MMIA TOWARDS THE ITALIAN ARMY AT THIS STAGE WILL FORM THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE COMMUNICATION

SD DISTRIBUTION : ACTION : SD/39 - FILE G/1 - G/TRG - A - Q (Two)

sb 23 Oct.45

Subject: Training.

52 British Liaison Unit,
CMF.
9 Oct 45.

G/32/239

HQ LEGNANO Gruppo.

Ref this HQ letter G/32/235 dated 1 Oct 45 - para 6.

1. For your information and approval, the points which Training Majors will discuss in their visits to Regt and Bn Conds are :-

(a) Which of the TEWTs or lectures in para 11 would be of value.

(b) The methods used in equivalent British Units to foster morale, turn-out, and general 'toning-up'. In particular, during periods when the lot of the soldier gives ample scope for discontent. It is admitted of course, that the British soldier is much more fortunate than the Italian soldier as regards amenities, canteens, etc; but it must be remembered that he too has many grouses, eg: tours of duty abroad for 4 years away from his family and home: limited home leave only after two and a half years abroad: pay and allowances which are a mere fraction of those earned by his civilian counterpart: many irksome fatigues: the high cost of living for his family at home. In fact, the British soldier has many worries which are identical with those of Italian soldiers, not to mention a variety of political views.

Accordingly it is thought that some of the methods used by British Conds to combat the ill effects of the above may well be of value to Italian Conds, particularly as some of these methods, though seemingly trivial, have proved most effective during five years of war. The main headings are given below.

2. Indirect methods of promoting discipline, smartness and pride of unit.

(a) Drill. (i) Fifteen minutes drill first thing every day by all ORs of guards, picquest etc; incl guards over dumps. (ii) Every day at some definite and suitable hour, all ORs (excl (i) above) but incl all Regt and Bn employed personnel, ie: cooks, MT, sanitation men etc, do the above, and/or ten minutes wpn trg or PT.

(b) Inspections. "What isn't inspected isn't done" is a principle which may well apply to the Italian Army in the same way that it applies to the British Army! Methods for laying out kit for inspections: uniformity of walking-out dress.

(c) Good large unit signs and clean billets. The psycholigical effect of the above on the British soldier is remarkable. It undoubtedly promotes pride of unit and formation and in general seems to breed a real superiority complex in their units, formations, etc.

(d) Games. The improvisation of kit and grounds.

(e) The smart turn-out of all officers and their effect on the men they command.

(f) The little privileges accorded to NCOs to enhance their 'standing' with the men.

(g) The system of fostering a sense of responsibility in NCOs. (The newly promoted British NCO is just as loathe to accept this and give direct orders as is the Italian NCO, but there is no doubt that after a while the British NCO does accept responsibility and command).

(h) Young officer instruction.

[illegible] suitable guard duties, so that men do

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(a) Which of the TSWTs or lectures in para 11 would be of value.

(b) The methods used in equivalent British Units to foster morale, turn-out, and general 'toning-up'. In particular, during periods when the lot of the soldier gives ample scope for discontent. It is admitted of course, that the British soldier is much more fortunate than the Italian soldier as regards amenities, canteens, etc; but it must be remembered that he too has many grouses, eg: tours of duty abroad for 4 years away from his family and home: limited home leave only after two and a half years abroad: pay and allowances which are a mere fraction of those earned by his civilian counterpart: many irksome fatigues: the high cost of living for his family at home. In fact, the British soldier has many worries which are identical with those of Italian soldiers, not to mention a variety of political views.

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(g) The system of fostering a sense of responsibility in NCOs. (The newly promoted British NCO is just as loathe to accept this and give direct orders as is the Italian NCO, but there is no doubt that after a while the British NCO does accept responsibility and command).

(h) Young officer instruction.

(i) The organisation of the inevitable guard duties, so that men do not do very long stretches without periods of relief and trg.

Lieut-Col.
GS.

Copy to: 11 Arty Regt. 51 Engineer Bn) In amplification
68 Inf Regt. 69 (Speciale) Regt.) of para 6 of this HQ letter
HQ Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MMIA)) G/32/235 dated 1 Oct 45.
HQ 2 District (with copy of this HQ letter G/32/235 dated 1 Oct for infm).

0082

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Subject: Training Combat Groups.

52 British Liaison Unit,
CMF.
1 Oct 45.

C/32/255

HQ LEGNANO Gruppo.

1. Information has been received from HQ MMIA to the effect that they have requested the Ministry of War to issue orders immediately for training to commence: the subjects which are to be given priority are named below.

2. MMIA point out in this letter that it is appreciated that since the capitulation of Germany, the Combat Groups, for various reasons, have had little opportunity to train, and therefore in order that the necessary standard be maintained, they consider it essential for training on the lines given to be carried out immediately: this covers individual training only, but at a later date, dependent on the progress made, collective training will be started again.

3. There is no doubt that the LEGNANO Gruppo has done more training than any of the other Groups, but it will still be necessary for the soldiers to undergo a refresher course in the various points of elementary training: ie. to carry out the normal annual individual training prior to recommencing collective training.

4. It is appreciated that a large number of officers and ORs are at present employed on guarding dumps, etc: this number according to your guard return of 21 Sep 45 is 1,782 out of an available total of

	442 officers:	8339 ORs	
less	65 "	1673 "	(Absent, sick, leave, courses, etc)
Total available	377 "	6666 "	(less Regt, Coy, etc, employed).

5. The normal system in the British Army is to relieve all the troops of one or more coys (or smaller sub-units) of all duties and employments for a certain period to concentrate entirely on training, and after a given period to change over with those doing the duties, so that by rotation every man gets a period of training.

6. My GII(Trg) and Trg Major are here to guide the training on British lines: it will be appreciated that there are only these two now to cover this vast area, whereas during preliminary training with the Gruppo there were 7 in a smaller area, as well as a SCRA, SCRE and SCRSigs. With your approval I intend that they visit regimental and bn cmds.

4612

7. The directive lays down that emphasis will be stressed on the following subjects :-

(a) INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
(i) Discipline and smartness.
(ii) Hygiene and Sanitation.
(iii) Drill.
(iv) Physical fitness.

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4. It is appreciated that a large number of officers and ORs are at present employed on guarding camps, etc: this number according to your guard return of 21 Sep 45 is 1,782 out of an available total of

		442 officers:	8339 ORs	
	less	65 "	1673 "	(Absent, sick, leave, courses, etc)
Total available		377 "	6666 "	(Less Hqrt, Coy, etc, employed).

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4612

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(a) INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.
- (i) Discipline and smartness.
- (ii) Hygiene and Sanitation.
- (iii) Drill.
- (iv) Physical fitness.
- (v) Map reading.
- (vi) Weapon Training. Every man must pass the standard laid down for the weapon with which he is armed. Range work should be preceded by a thorough course including TOMTs.
- (vii) Specialist Training. Normally carried out by Arms and Services.
- (viii) Section Training. (Inf only). The object of this individual training is to produce a soldier fit in every respect to take his place in the Section or equivalent sub-unit.

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8. INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES.

Officers and senior NCOs must have a thorough knowledge of Internal Security duties. In addition, all troops must be instructed and practiced. This training will start immediately.

9. M.T.

A very high standard of MT discipline and maintenance is essential. Drill instruction must be continuous. This is best carried out by Gruppi courses.

10. COURSES.

Full use must be made of MTC, IOF courses. Only the best officers and NCOs available should attend in order that real value may be obtained when they return to their units.

11. OFFICER AND NCO TRAINING.

Officer and NCO tactical training will be carried out within units. This training will consist of outdoor and sand-model exercises, lectures and discussions. It is essential that before commencing collective training, officers and NCOs are capable of instructing and commanding their men.

As regards officer training, Training Majors will conduct a limited number of these in unit areas by arrangement with Regt and Bn Comds on any of the following subjects :-

(a) Duties of NCOs: the method of training and developing NCOs - 2 lectures.
(b) How to set and run a scheme - lecture.
(c) Verbal orders - lecture and T.E.W.T.
(d) Machinery of command - sandmodel.

As regards NCO training, sub-units ~~will~~ shall devote 2 afternoons per week to NCO training.

4611

Lieut-Col.
GS.

JSHD/AG.

Copy to: Comd 11 Artillery Regt.

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A very high standard of MT discipline and maintenance is essential. Drill instruction must be continuous. This is best carried out by Gruppi courses.

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Full use must be made of MTC, ICF courses. Only the best officers and NCOs available should attend in order that real value may be obtained when they return to their units.

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4611

Lieut-Col.
GS.

JSHD/NS.

Copy to: Comd 11 Artillery Regt.
Comd 51 Engineer Bn.
Comd 68 Inf Regt.
Comd 69 (Speciale) Regt.
HQ Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MMIA)
(ref your G/Trg/1 dated 11 Sep 45). folio 40

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0087

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Translation G/TRS/1. 142

COPY

Ref No. 2673/R/4
Date: Sept. 25, 1945

From: Ministry of War
To: Territorial Military Commands of
Genoa, Turin, Milan, Bolzano,
Udine, Bologna
MMIA for information

Subject: Training of men and cadres of combat groups.

1. MMIA pointed out that after the capitulation of Germany combat groups have remained in a difficult position insofar as the development and completion of their training is concerned.
In order not to lose the ground gained so far, it will be necessary to resume training activities. This is necessary also because of the need to train reinforcements with little or rudimentary training, and to complete, perfect and bring up to date the technical and professional preparation of the cadres and men.
For the time being, training will have to be limited to objectives which are more to be realized.

2. To this end I order:
a) that there be prepared a well-ordered

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plan of instruction based upon the program outlined in the enclosure.

b) that there be provided a 3 month period of development (for your guidance: the subsequent group training will be started in accordance with the progress achieved)

c) that there be started immediately the theoretical and practical instruction of the internal security service.

3. Please let me know on November 15th and December 31st next how the time was actually spent and what results were achieved.

Signed: R. Cadorna
Chief of Staff

Wally

0089

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H3/DC

COPIA

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO

UFFICIO OPERAZIONI E ADDESTRAMENTO

SEZIONE ADDESTRAMENTO

G (Mg)

N. 2573/R/4 di prot. Add. 23 P. N. 3900, li 25 settembre 1945

Allegati: 1.

OGGETTO: Addestramento delle unità e dei quadri dei gruppi di combattimento.

AI COMANDI MILITARI TERRITORIALI DI GENOVA - TORINO
MILANO - BOLZANO - UDINE - BOLOGNA — LORO SEDI

e, per conoscenza:

ALLIED FORCES SUB COMMISSION - A.C. (M.M.I.A.) — ROMA

1) Lo M.M.I.A. ha rilevato che dopo la capitolazione della Germania i Gruppi di Combattimento si sono trovati in condizioni difficili per sviluppare e perfezionare il loro addestramento.

Allo scopo di mantenere il livello raggiunto è necessario riprendere l'attività addestrativa. Ciò è imposto anche dalla necessità di istruire i complementi con preparazione nulla o improvvisata, e di completare, perfezionare, aggiornare la preparazione tecnico-professionale dei militari e dei quadri.

L'addestramento dovrà essere per ora limitato a quanto è sicuramente realizzabile.

2) A tale scopo dispongo:

a) sia compilato un piano organico di istruzione sulla base del programma sommario di cui in allegato;

b) sia previsto un periodo di sviluppo di mesi tre (dato orientativo: il successivo addestramento collettivo verrà iniziato in dipendenza dei progressi fatti);

c) sia dato immediato inizio alle istruzioni teorico-pratiche del servizio di sicurezza interna.

3) Prego farmi conoscere il 15 novembre ed il 31 dicembre 4608 l'impiego effettivo del tempo ed i risultati raggiunti.

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
f.to: M. Cadorna

P. C. C.
IL COLONNELLO CAPO UFFICIO
(A. Quercia)

TRANSMISSION

IN { Time 12.30 / Date 26/9

OUT { Time 16.30 / Date 27/9

0090

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER, LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



0091

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

PROGRAMMA SCHEMATICO DI ADDESTRAMENTO DEI GRUPPI DI COMBATTIMENTO PER IL TRIMESTRE OT

TIPO DI ADDE= STRAMENTO	S C O P O	ISTRU
Addestramento individuale	Formare soldati capaci di compiere bene il servizio nell'ambito della squadra e reparti corrispondenti. Dare ad ognuno la sicura conoscenza pratica delle armi e dei mezzi che per la sua funzione specifica deve impiegare.	
Addestramento al servizio di sicurezza interno	Impartire a tutti i militari l'istruzione teorica e pratica per l'adempimento dei servizi di sicurezza interna.	Gli ufficiali e i s re la procedura che torità militari e d le singole attribuz zio per la tutela d
Addestramento al tiro	Addestrare tutti i militari al tiro col fucile, col moschetto automatico, col fucile mitragliatore ed al lancio di bombe a mano. L'addestramento al tiro con la pistola e le altre armi portatili deve essere, invece, riservato ai militari armati di tali armi.	I tiri alla distanz dere quelli a dista che l'apice dell'ad tiro in poligoni a
Addestramento automobilistico	Far raggiungere ai militari conduttori o comunque addetti a mezzi motorizzati un elevato grado di addestramento su discipline del movimento, manutenzione degli automotomezzi, guida. La scuola guida e manutenzione dovranno avere carattere continuativo.	Previdenze da a zero.
Addestramento di specializzazione	Si svolge presso le Scuole del Centro addestramento di Cesano. Soltanto i migliori elementi - siano essi ufficiali, sottufficiali o truppa - dovranno essere prescelti ed inviati ai corsi, di guisa che - una volta rientrati ai corpi - essi rappresentino elementi di effettivo valore.	

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Allegato al f. 2673/R/4 del 25/9/45

PI DI ADDESTRAMENTO PER I TRIMESTRE OTTOBRE - NOVEMBRE - DICEMBRE 1945

	ISTRUZIONI PARTICOLARI	PUBBLICAZIONI ALLEATE DA CONSULTARE
servizio nell'am. Dare ad ognuno nei mezzi che per		
eorica e pratica interna.	Gli ufficiali e i sottufficiali dovranno conoscere la procedura che regola i rapporti tra le autorità militari e quelle di pubblica sicurezza e le singole attribuzioni e competenze nel servizio per la tutela dell'ordine pubblico.	
ile, col moschet al lancio di bom tola e le al= serbato ai milita	I tiri alla distanza di 30 metri dovranno precedere quelli a distanze maggiori. Tener presente che l'apice dell'addestramento individuale è il tiro in poligoni all'aperto.	Addestramento Armi portatili - Vol. I: - Addestramento armi - Fascicolo 1. - Lezioni di tiro al poligono (guerra). Fasc. 18. - Applicazione del fuoco. Fascicolo 2
munque addetti destramento su ti automotomezzi, avere carattere	Precauzioni da adottarsi con temperatura sotto zero.	
strumento di Ce= essi ufficiali, rescelti ed invia rati ai corpi - lore.		
[illegible]	[illegible]	Addestramento della fanta=

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Addestramento al tiro	Addestrare tutti i militari al tiro col fucile, col moschetto automatico, col fucile mitragliatore ed al lancio di bombe a mano. L'addestramento al tiro con la pistola e le altre armi portatili deve essere, invece, riservato ai militari armati di tali armi.	I tiri alla distanz dere quelli a distan che l'avice dell'ad tiro in poligoni al
Addestramento automobilistico	Per raggiungere ai militari conduttori o comunque addetti a mezzi motorizzati un elevato grado di addestramento su disciplina del movimento, manutenzione degli automotomezzi, guida. La scuola guida e manutenzione dovranno avere carattere continuativo.	Providenze da ad zero.
Addestramento di specializzazione	Si svolge presso le Scuole del Centro addestramento di Cesano. Soltanto i migliori elementi - siano essi ufficiali, sottufficiali o truppa - dovranno essere prescelti ed inviati ai corsi, di guisa che - una volta rientrati ai corpi - essi rappresentino elementi di effettivo valore.	
Addestramento tattico dei quadri ufficiali e sottufficiali	Perfezionare o aggiornare la capacità dei comandanti di vario grado all'impiego tattico dei reparti, per averli bene addestrati e pronti all'inizio dell'addestramento collettivo. Deve essere svolto mediante esercitazioni sia esterne sia interne sul plastico di sabbia o sulla carta e comportare adeguate discussioni degli argomenti da esaminare, in modo da coinvolgere tutti i partecipanti ad adottare decisioni ragionate. Sia messa in evidenza la necessità e il valore dell'organizzazione in tutte le manifestazioni del combattimento moderno.	Cooperazione fanter l'impiego tattico d Designazione dei pu mediante reticolato data 15 agosto 1945 tate mediante retic gnazione dei punti) Cooperazione fanter Cooperazione aviazi Cooperazione aviazi

0094

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

...ile, col moschet= ...al lancio di bom= ...pistola e le al= ...servato ai milit=	I tiri alla distanza di 30 metri dovranno prece= dere quelli a distanze maggiori. Tener presente che l'anica dell'addestramento individuale è il tiro in poligoni all'aperto.	Addestramento Armi porta= tili - Vol. I: - Addestramento armi - Fa= scicolo 1. - Lezioni di tiro al poli= gono (guerra). Fasc. 18. - Applicazione del fuoco. Fascicolo 2.
...omunque ediatti ...estramento su ...i automotomezzi, ...avere carattere	Precauzioni da adottarsi con temperatura sotto zero.	
...strumento di Ce= ...essi ufficiali, ...rescelti ed inviati ...rati ai corpi - ...alore.		
...comandanti di Da= ...per aperti bene ...mento colletti= ...ni sia esterne ...carta e compor= ...da esaminare, in ...ottare decisioni ...valore dell'or= ...combattimento	Cooperazione fanteria-artiglieria e cenni sul= l'impiego tattico del gruppo di artiglieria. Designazione dei punti sulle carte quadrettate mediante reticolato chilometrico (circ. 2000 data 15 agosto 1945 - Uso delle carte quadret= tate mediante reticolato chilometrico - Desi= gnazione dei punti). Cooperazione fanteria-carri. Cooperazione aviazione-carri. Cooperazione aviazione-fanteria.	Addestramento della fante= ria - Parte VIII: - Sfruttamento del terreno - Addestramento al combat= timento - Impiego tattico della squadra e del plotone.

4606

SUBJECT: Training. - Combat Groups.

(40)

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) ROME.
G/Trg/1.

11 Sept 45.

TO: 2 DISTRICT
50 B.L.U.
51 B.L.U.
52 B.L.U.
53 B.L.U.
56 B.L.U.

Reference attached copy of Instruction to Ministry of War.

1. Due to release, leave and other factors training has been virtually non existant since the German capitulation.

2. It is necessary however to proceed with Training in order to maintain standards and efficiency.

3. This directive deals with the Training that will be carried out forthwith.

4. Individual training will be carried out initially, and then, dependent on progress made, collective training will be the subject of a further directive.

5. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING.

The following are emphasised:-

(a) Discipline and smartness with particular stress on the attitude towards authority, and the relationship between officers and men.

(b) Hygiene and Sanitation.

(c) Drill.

(d) Physical Fitness.

(e) Map Reading.

(f) Weapon Training.

Every man must pass the standard laid down for the weapon with which he is armed. Range work should be proceded by a thorough course including TOETs.

(g) Specialist Training.

4605

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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(e) Map Reading.

4605

(f) Weapon Training.

Every man must pass the standard laid down for the weapon with which he is armed. Range work should be proceded by a thorough course including TOETs.

(g) Specialist Training.

Normally carried out by Arms and Services.

(h) Section Training. (Inf. only.)

The object of this individual training is to produce a soldier fit in every respect to take his place in the Section or equivalent sub unit.

To Sheet...../2.

0096

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6. INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES.

Officers and senior NCOs must have a thorough knowledge of Internal Security duties. In addition, all troops must be instructed and practiced. This training will start immediately.

7. M.T.

A very high standard of MT discipline and maintenance is essential. D & M instruction must be continuous. This is best carried out by Gruppi courses.

8. COURSES.

Full use must be made of RTC, ICF courses. Only the best officers and NCOs available should attend in order that real value may be obtained when they return to their units.

9. OFFICER AND NCO TRAINING.

Officer and NCO tactical training will be carried out within units. This training will consist of outdoor and sand-model exercises, lectures and discussions. It is essential that before commencing collective training, officers and NCOs are capable of instructing and commanding their men.

10. A.F.H.Q. has agreed to this letter and requests 2 District to render all assistance possible to enable this training to be carried out.

Signed Major
for, Major General
M. M. I.

4604

fjd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

0098

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY/TRANSLATION

From : Ministry of War.

To : M.M.I.A.

Date : 24 Aug 45.

Ref : 2432/L/5

Subject : New Organisation of the C.A.C.F.I.C. - Use of CIVITAVECCHIA BARRACKS.

With reference to the proposals sent to M.M.I.A. by "F" B.L.T.U. with letter AQ/6/1068 dated 25 Jul 45, this S.M.R.E. proposes to use the barracks at Civitavecchia as follows :

Barracks on the Aurelia route : 2nd Infantry Reinforcement Training Regt.

The premises that this regiment will evacuate at Cesano will be occupied by the regiment which at present is tented at Trevignano.

Duca D'Aosta Barracks :

Engineers Corps Regiment and School.
The availability of the premises existing in this barracks will consent a thorough organisation of the school rooms and teaching material. The firing range of the Engineers Corps (which were the seat of the Central School of the Engineers Corps since 1940) will facilitate practical training for all the corps.
This S.M.R.E. thinks that it is not advisable to transfer 152 Arty Regt to s/m barracks, because, since a permanent set up is to be given to the schools, it is necessary to consider primarily the availability of a fully suitable firing range. Civitavecchia firing range has a restricted availability of firing lines and can not be employed for all the arms that should be used. Bracciano area instead is more suitable, because we can use the firing ranges of the old Arty school (which function from 1894 to 1915 and from 1920 to 1923) and is considerably better because ~~we can use the firing range~~ it has a greater number of firing lines and can be usefully employed for all the arms to be used.

46303

It is also to be borne in mind that Bracciano area is thinly populated and this would faciliate evacuation, whilst at Civitavecchia there are plants that obstruct the normal Arty training.

Therefore Brachiano area should be reserved entirely for 152 Arty Regt.

Duca degli Abruzzi Barracks :

Infantry and specialists corps school.
The premises that will be evacuated at Cesano will give a better accommodation to 2 Infantry Regiments.

(Sgd) Giorgio Liuzzi

0099

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

36

Subject: Accommodation.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) RCHB.
G/Trg/1.

6 Sept 45.

To: 'F' British Liaison and Trg Unit, CESAIRO.

1. Attached is copy of a letter from the Ministry of War.

2. The ideas expressed do not fit in with our ideas - May we please be furnished with your comments.

Major General
M. M. I. A.

Internal:
"G"

4602

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G1-

The civil authorities have already objected to Allied Artillery firing towards the range specified at Bracciano and we asked AFHQ to stop the firing at the request of MW. How did they manage to get it at themselves. Can we guarantee that such artillery? Please discuss.

4601

0101

Declassified F.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

35

Translation

From: Ministry of War
To: MMIA

Ref. No. 2432/L/5
Date: August 24, 1945

Subject: New organization of "C.A.C.F.i.C" - Utilization of Civitavecchia barracks.

With reference to the recommendations forwarded to you by "F" B.L.T.U. with letter A 9/6/1068 dated July 25TH last, this S.M. recommends that the Civitavecchia barracks be utilized as follows:

Volume 23
G/100/1

- Via Aurelia Barracks:
  2nd Infantry Reinforcements Training Regiment.
  The premises which this regiment will vacate at Casano will be occupied by the ~~[illegible]~~ regiment now located at Trevignano.

- Duca D'Aosta Barracks:
  Regiment and Engineers School.
  The premises available at those barracks will make possible a thorough rearrangement of classrooms and school equipment, while the existence of the engineers' shooting range, formerly the seat of the central engineers School up to 1940, will facilitate the practical training of all specialties.
  This S.M. is of the opinion that it is not

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advisable to transfer to said barracks the 152nd Artillery Regiment since, a permanent set-up being planned for the schools, it is necessary to attach foremost importance to the availability of a fully suitable shooting range. The Civitavecchia range has a limited capacity and does not make it possible to utilize the available ammo at its full range. The Bracciano area, on the other hand, is well suited for that purpose: it can utilize the ranges formerly belonging to the old artillery school (which operated from 1894 to 1915 and from 1920 to 1923) and offers substantially better possibilities: especially a larger number of firing lanes and a possibility of utilizing the length of such lanes in relation to the range of the ammo. It is, furthermore, to be borne in mind that the Bracciano area has a less dense population and a smaller number of isolated buildings, which would facilitate evacuation operations, while at Civitavecchia there are installations which hamper [redacted] normal [redacted] artillery target practice.

Consequently, the Bracciano area would be reserved in its entirety for the 152nd Artillery regiment.

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– Duca degli Abruzzi Barracks.

Infantry and Specialists' school.

The premises which will be vacated at Cesano

(over)

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will serve to provide better accommodation for the two infantry regiments.

Signed: G. Linzi
General

Well

TO/do

(G/Tra)

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO

UFFICIO OPERAZIONI E ADDESTRAMENTO

SEZIONE ADDESTRAMENTO

TRANSLATION

Time 10.00

N. 2432/I/5 di prot. Add. P.M. 3800, li 21 agosto 1945 Date 4/9

OGGETTO: Nuovo ordinamento del C.A.C.F.I.C - Utilizzazione delle caserme di Civitavecchia.

00. 130

59

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION - A.C. (M.M.I.A)

ROMA

58

In relazione alle proposte inoltrate a codesta M.M.I.A. dal "F" B.L.T.U. con lettera AQ/6/1068 in data 25 luglio u.s., questo Stato Maggiore propone la seguente utilizzazione delle caserme di Civitavecchia:

- Caserma della via Aurelia:

  2° reggimento addestramento complementi fanteria.
  I locali che questo reggimento lascierà liberi a Cesano, saranno occupati dal reggimento attendato ora a Trevignano.

- Caserma Duca d'Aosta:

  Reggimento e scuola del genio.
  La disponibilità dei locali esistenti in tale caserma consentirà una radicale sistemazione delle aule e dei complessi didattici, mentre la esistenza del poligono del genio, già sede della scuola centrale del genio fino al 1940, agevolerà lo svolgimento delle esercitazioni pratiche per tutte le specialità.

  Questo S.M. é dell'avviso che non convenga trasferire in detta caserma il 152° reggimento artiglieria, poiché, trattandosi di dare alle scuole un assetto permanente, é necessario porre in primo piano la questione della disponibilità di un poligono di tiro pienamente idoneo. Il poligono di Civitavecchia ha limitate disponibilità di linee di tiro e non permette la utilizzazione delle gittate consentite dai materiali. Per contro il territorio di Bracciano si presta bene a tale scopo: può utilizzare i poligoni già appartenenti all'antica scuola di artiglieria (che funzionò dal 1894 al 1915 e dal 1920 al 1923) e presenta condizioni notevolmente migliori: soprattutto maggior numero di linee di tiro e possibilità di sfruttare la lunghezza delle linee stesse in relazione alle gittate dei

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OGGETTO: Nuovo ordinamento del [illegible]
re di Civitavecchia.

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ALLIED LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION - A.C. (M.M.I.A)

ROMA

58

In relazione alle proposte inoltrate a codesta M.M.I.A. dal "F" B.I.T.U. con lettera AQ/6/1068 in data 25 luglio u.s., questo Stato Maggiore propone la seguente utilizzazione delle caserme di Civitavecchia:

- Caserma della via Aurelia:

  2° reggimento addestramento complementi fanteria.
  I locali che questo reggimento lascierà liberi a Cesano, saranno occupati dal reggimento attendato ora a Trevignano.

- Caserma Duca d'Aosta:

  Reggimento e scuola del genio.
  La disponibilità dei locali esistenti in tale caserma consentirà una radicale sistemazione delle aule e dei complessi didattici, mentre la esistenza del poligono del genio, già sede della scuola centrale del genio fino al 1940, agevolerà lo svolgimento delle esercitazioni pratiche per tutte le specialità.

Questo S.M. é dell'avviso che non convenga trasferire in detta caserma il 152° reggimento artiglieria, poiché, trattandosi di dare alle scuole un assetto permanente, é necessario porre in primo piano la questione della disponibilità di un poligono di tiro pienamente idoneo. Il poligono di Civitavecchia ha limitate disponibilità di linee di tiro e non permette la utilizzazione delle gittate consentite dai materiali. Per contro il territorio di Bracciano si presta bene a tale scopo: può utilizzare i poligoni già appartenenti all'antica scuola di artiglieria (che funzionò dal 1894 al 1915 e dal 1920 al 1923) e presenta condizioni notevolmente migliori: soprattutto maggior numero di linee di tiro e possibilità di sfruttare la lunghezza delle linee stesse in relazione alle gittate dei materiali. E' poi da considerare che la zona di Bracciano ha una mi

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nore densità di popolazione e di casolari sparsi, ciò che facilite=
rebbe le operazioni di sgombero, mentre a Civitavecchia vi sono im
pianti che ostacolano il normale svolgimento delle esercitazioni a
proietto.

Conseguentemente, la località di Bracciano verrebbe riservata integralmente al 152° reggimento artiglieria.

- Caserma Duca degli Abruzzi:
Scuola di fanteria e specialisti.
I locali che saranno lasciati liberi a Cesano serviranno a dare mi=
gliore sistemazione ai due reggimenti di fanteria.

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
f/to G.Liuzzi

P. C. C.
IL COLONNELLO CAPO UFFICIO
(A.Quercia)

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12

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA SEGRETO
STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
Ufficio Ordinamento e Mobilitazione

N.21620/Mob.di prot. P.M.3800,li 25 agosto 45
All.2
OGGETTO: Reclutamento e addestramento dell'Esercito italiano di transizione.

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (MMIA) ROMA
e, per conoscenza:
AL GABINETTO SEDE
ALL'UFFICIO COORDINAMENTO SEDE

(Risposta fg. G/Trg/1 del 10/8/45) 26

A) ADDESTRAMENTO DEGLI ALLIEVI UFFICIALI IN S.P.E.

- Armi combattenti e automobilismo: risulta dal grafico allegato 1;
- servizi: di sanità, commissariato, amministrazione, chimico, veterinario: reclutamento dal personale civile laureato e diplomato - previo concorso - accertamento delle attitudini e breve corso di addestramento per dare le indispensabili cognizioni dell'organizzazione militare.

B) ADDESTRAMENTO DEGLI UFFICIALI E SOTTUFFICIALI

Da effettuarsi esclusivamente presso le scuole del centro addestramento di Cesano, mediante corsi:

- per la formazione degli istruttori delle varie armi e servizi;
- di perfezionamento per comandanti di plotone, compagnia e batteria, battaglione e gruppo, reggimento;
- di aggiornamento su mezzi e procedimenti nuovi e particolari, per la preparazione dei quadri a determinate esigenze;

(Oltre a tali corsi il centro di Cesano provvederà alla formazione dei graduati e degli specializzati di cui alla lettera C) capo IV che segue)

Per l'abilitazione degli ufficiali alle funzioni di S.M. si svolgerebbero dei corsi presso la scuola di guerra, da ricostituire.

TRANSLATION

Date 5.45

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C) ADDESTRAMENTO DELLE RECLUTE

Concordo con codesta MMIA nell'attribuire valore basilare alla realizzazione di un addestramento unico nell'indirizzo e nei procedimenti.

Per conseguire tali finalità esprimo il mio pensiero e formulo proposte in merito ai termini base nei quali il problema viene posto da codesta MMIA stessa:

a) - per il reclutamento:
- ferma di un anno
- contingente annuo di 120.000 giovani
- chiamata mensile a scaglioni di 10.000 reclute.

b) - Per l'addestramento:
- 1 mese presso il Centro di Cesano
- 11 mesi presso i reparti.

I° - Ferma.

Ritengo che la permanenza alle armi per 12 mesi consenta:
- di svolgere un completo ciclo addestrativo individuale e di reparto;
- di avere unità efficienti.

II° - Contingente annuo (120.000 u.)

Va considerato in rapporto:

- all'obbligo generale e personale al servizio militare che è alla base dei doveri del cittadino italiano;
- al gettito medio di uomini validi che una classe può dare.

Dato che tutti i cittadini validi debbono prestare il servizio militare e tenuto conto che una classe può fornire in media circa 250.000 giovani, la riduzione a 120.000 è tale che il principio della coscrizione ne risulta infirmato.
Infatti, per larghissime che possano essere le esenzioni contemporaneamente applicate e riferite ad ogni ammissibile motivo: particolare situazione di famiglia, speciali provvedimenti a favore dell'agricoltura e dell'industria, frequenza di corsi di studi medi e universitari, prestazione di particolari servizi di pubblico interesse, ecc. ecc., appare assai difficile e forse impossibile esentare 130.000 giovani senza creare profonde sperequazioni tra cittadini soggetti allo stesso dovere.
Ne' i criteri per le esenzioni potranno rimanere costanti, perchè non tutte le classi daranno un gettito uguale.
In passato il problema fu risolto, in funzione della forza

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bilanciata, con l'adozione di ferme ridotte rispetto a quella ordinaria.
L'argomento richiederà perciò ulteriore trattazione non tanto per l'esercito di transizione quanto per quello definitivo.

III - Chiamata mensile a scaglioni di 10.000 reclute.

Va considerata nei riflessi:

- delle operazioni di reclutamento e di congedamento;
- dello svolgimento del ciclo addestrativo con unicità di indirizzo e di procedimenti.

a) - Il sistema comporta ogni anno:

- 12 chiamate
- 12 congedamenti;

quindi, praticamente, continuità di movimenti: partenza dai Comuni, affluenza ai distretti e rapida defluenza per i centri di addestramento, breve sosta in questi, proseguimento per i reparti nei quali alle affluenze mensili corrisponde il congedamento di un dodicesimo della forza che, a sua volta, produce conseguenti operazioni presso i distretti, sempre impegnati nelle incessanti chiamate mensili.
Il meccanismo appare complesso e anche complicato.

La ripartizione del personale tra le varie armi e servizi, anche a causa delle molte specializzazioni, deve tener conto dei requisiti dei singoli (requisiti fisici, professione o mestiere, ecc.).
E perchè la ripartizione numerica possa risultare in armonia con quella qualitativa occorre che, di massima, essa venga definita inizialmente dai distretti stessi.
Inoltre, la composizione degli scaglioni mensili non può essere ottenuta attraverso il sorteggio riferito agli appartenenti all'intera classe, ma occorre sia attuato in ogni distretto sui singoli blocchi di giovani annualmente predesignati per le varie armi.
Congegno anche questo non semplice e che dovendo funzionare ininterrottamente ed a tempi serrati, non offre garanzia pratica di regolarità.
Non ritengo che esso sia realizzabile nell'attuale fase di riorganizzazione dei distretti - necessariamente lenta e laboriosa - a causa della situazione, della perdita della documentazione di base e della insufficienza dei mezzi.

b) - Circa lo svolgimento del programma addestrativo con

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unicità di indirizzo e di sistema, sarebbe certamente utile poter accentrare l'istruzione individuale.
Peraltro, al vantaggio di sole 4 settimane di addestramento centralizzato si contrappongono i seguenti inconvenienti:

- svolgimento di 12 cicli addestrativi, sfasati appena di 1 mese l'uno dall'altro;
- mai una sosta, sia pure breve, nell'attività dei 4 reggimenti previsti, cosicchè si dovrebbe contare su un rilevante numero di istruttori;
- enormi difficoltà pratiche di sviluppo dell'ulteriore addestramento presso i reparti. Infatti, se l'addestramento di reparto (cosidetto "avanzato") si esaurisse in un mese - il che è assurdo - il problema troverebbe ancora una soluzione; ma poichè occorrono alcuni mesi, si dovrebbero svolgere contemporaneamente tanti programmi quanti sono i mesi di durata del ciclo addestrativo.
  Quali ne sarebbero i riflessi inevitabili sull'addestramento di reparto e di insieme è agevole intendere: i reparti diventerebbero soltanto altrettante scuole con numerose sezioni cessando perciò di essere anche unità d'impiego della massa dei propri effettivi.
  Occorrerebbe inoltre poter disporre sempre di ufficiali, sottufficiali e graduati in quantità notevolmente superiore a quelle necessarie per un normale inquadramento.

Tutto sommato, l'indubbio vantaggio di 4 settimane di addestramento iniziale centralizzato viene annullato dalle numerose, evidenti ed inevitabili difficoltà pratiche.
Esso è invece possibile e maggiormente interessa per gli specializzati.
Per la massa, la necessaria unità di indirizzo e di procedimenti è realizzabile assicurando che gli istruttori dei reparti siano tutti formati dalla stessa scuola di Cesano.

IV - Il ciclo addestrativo completo che consente una solida preparazione dei reparti ritengo comporti 6 mesi di lavoro e pertanto sono convinto che sia preferibile, sotto ogni riguardo, adottare quì in Italia il sistema di 2 chiamate all'anno: una verso la fine dell'inverno (marzo) l'altra verso la fine dell'estate (settembre).

Riassumo così il mio pensiero:

- istruzione delle reclute presso i corpi;
- sfruttamento dell'organizzazione centrale di Cesano opportunamente ampliata ed integrata:
  - per formare, preparare ed assegnare ai corpi gli istrut

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tori (ufficiali, sottufficiali e graduati) e gli specializzati;

- per addestrare gran parte delle reclute dei reparti del genio (artieri e collegamenti) e dei trasporti (autieri) dato il carattere di specializzazione di tale personale e il funzionamento di esso in piccoli reparti che troverebbero difficoltà a svolgere un completo ciclo addestrativo.

Lo schema sommario di tale piano di reclutamento e addestramento è riportato nel grafico allegato 2.

La soluzione che si prospetta non è scevra di svantaggi: essa presenta, infatti, tutti gli inevitabili inconvenienti comuni ai tipi di ordinamento nei quali la ferma è eguale od inferiore ad un anno. Ma è da considerare che un problema di ordinamento, nei limiti dati, non trova una soluzione ideale e deve pertanto tendere alla ricerca della soluzione meno svantaggiosa.

D) ADDESTRAMENTO DI REPARTO

E' infine mia convinzione che alla migliore preparazione del piccolo esercito italiano potrà in futuro concorrere assai efficacemente la creazione di vasti campi di istruzione adeguatamente attrezzati, nei quali sia possibile centralizzare l'addestramento nella sua fase conclusiva: quella cioè delle esercitazioni di singoli reparti e di insieme, in cooperazione fra le varie armi.

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE

4593

0112

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Po/ax

TELEGRAMMA URGENTE

COMILITER	BARI	(TEL.)
ITALGRUPPO FOLGORE	P.M.146	(MEIA)
ITALCENTRO	CESANO	(TEL.)
802 CAMPO AFFLUENZA COMPLEMENTI	ORVIETO	(PONO)

Stamaggiore Mobilitazione n.21530/mob (.)
Est diretto Italcentro Cesano et 802 campo affluenza complementi ORVIETO per conoscenza Comiliter Bari et Italgruppo FOLGORE (.)

Sostituzione in corso tra reggimento S.MARCO et reggimento GARIBALDI richiede approntamento personale specializzato per seguenti elementi dei quali GARIBALDI non dispone (,) scopo disimpegnare personale specializzato marina del rgt. S.MARCO (:) autocarreggio (,) plotone teleradio (,) officina mobile leggera (, Seguito accordi MEIA (,) Italcentro Cesano provveda urgenza approntamento personale cui sopra (,) da fare affluire Bolzano dal 1° settembre prossimo in poi Tenere corrente questo Stamaggiore del procedere approntamento et avviamento Bolzano (.) 802 campo affluenza ORVIETO trasferisca subito CESANO circa 60 autieri segnalati telefonicamente disponibili et possibilmente una aliquota degli altri specializzati occorrenti come segue (:) 30 meccanici automobilisti (; 44 marconisti (;) 8 radiomontatori (;) 2 elettricisti manutenzione carica accumulatori (;) 16 telegrafisti (;) 2 apparecchiatori telefonici (;) 6 centralinisti (;) 6 addetti cifra (;) 1 sottufficiale capo operaio montatore (;) 3 meccanici montatori (;) 1 saldatore (.) Segnalare avviamento at Cesano (.)
Stamaggiore mobilitazione (.)

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
Ufficio Ordinamento e Mobilitazione
^^^^^^^^^^^^

n.21531/Mob. di prot. P.M.3800, li 25 agosto'45

AL COMANDO DIVISIONE "PICENO" (C.A.C.F.I.C.) P.M. 92
AL COMANDO 802 CAMPO AFFLUENZA COMPLEMENTI ORVIETO
e, per conoscenza, 4592
LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (MEIA) ROMA
AL COMANDO MILITARE TERRITORIALE DI BARI BARI
ALLA DIREZIONE LEVA SOTTUFFICIALI E TRUPPA SEDE
ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE ARTIGL. E MOTORIZZAZIONE SEDE
ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE GENIO SEDE
AL COMANDO GRUPPO COMBATTIMENTO "FOLGORE" P.M. 146

.....a conferma telescritto sopriportato.-

d'ordine
IL COLONNELLO CAPO UFFICIO
(P. Piacentini)

TRANSLATION
IN
Date
Time
OUT

20 agosto 1945

Allegato al foglio SMRE 21620/Mob del 1/8/945

Piano di addestramento degli allievi ufficiali in s. p. e.



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

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0115

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

GII Trg to See in Returns.

(32)

SUBJECT: Training of Combat Groups

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

C/Trg/1

16 Aug 45

TO : G-3 (AMO) AFHQ

1. It is desired to send the attached instruction on trg of Combat Gps to Ministry of War, as was done in the case of Internal Security Bdes.

Henney & Wax Sent to AFHQ

2. The letter has been agreed by D&T.

3. Will you please say if you agree to publication with special ref to para 13.

S.M.J. Lt-Col

Major General
MMIA

WS

4590

0116

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(31)

G (Trg)

SUBJECT : Training of Combat Groups.

D.M.T. A.F.H.Q. C.M.F.

Tel : 16872

DMT/55/MT1

15 Aug 45

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(MMA).

Ref your G/Trg/1 dated 10 Aug 45, and conversation MEDLAM - FEDDIE.

It is agreed that the trg directive for combat groups should include reference to other arms, but that the draft attached to the a/q letter should be sent out as Part I, subject to the modifications outlined in this HQ letter DMT/87/MT1 dated 11 Aug 45.

See 32/

S.N. SHOESMITH,
Brigadier,
D.M.T.

4589

0117

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

30

Subject: Tactical Employment of Battalion Snipers.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) ROME.
G/Trg/1.

13 Aug 45.

To: Ministry of War.

1. The enclosed extract (2 copies) from Infantry Liaison Letter No. 18 is forwarded for your information.

2. It is suggested that it may be translated and issued to all formations.

Major General
MMIA.

WJM/fjd

4586

0118

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

29

Subject: Tactical employment of battalion snipers.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M. M. T. A.)
ROME.
G/Trg/1.

13 AUG 45.

TO: 50 M.I.U.)
51 M.I.U.)
52 M.I.U.) (1 copy and 3 for Gruppen)
55 M.I.U.)
56 M.I.U.)
TPI M.I. & M.I., CMLCO. (3 copies and 2 for PRO, FCO.)

The enclosed extract from Infantry Training Letter No.16 published by (SE), India, received by this H. from L.F.M.T. is forwarded to you with the above distribution.

for Major General
M.I.6.

MI/SIG

0119 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

28

SUBJECT : Tactical Employment of Bn Snipers.

D.M.T. A.F.H.Q. C.M.F.

Tel : 16950

DMT/46/MT3

9 Aug 45

HQ British Troops Austria	(50)
HQ 13 Corps	(50)
HQ Land Forces GREECE	(20)
HQ 2 N.Z. Div	(15)
HQ Land Forces Sub Commission (for Gruppis)	
A.C. (MMIA)	(30)

G

The enclosed extract from Infantry Liaison letter No 18 published by GHQ India, is forwarded for information.

~~Pers Gruppis (Mov)~~

M [illegible] 5 (5) 2

ALU (1) for Trieste (3) 3 for Gruppis 4

RTC 3 for ALU (2) for ITC

MMIA (1)

(1) 23 C

for Maintenance Capt.

for S.N. SHOOSMITH,
Brigadier,
D.M.T.

4586

0120

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF BATTALION SNIPERS

The Battalion Snipers are a small body of most highly trained specialists, hand-picked and difficult to replace.

They should never be employed on patrol work, and should never be linked to a fighting patrol.

They should always be given worthwhile missions based on full information. The primary business of making contact with the enemy and obtaining the preliminary information is the work of patrols and not snipers, except in emergency situations.

Normally snipers should not be used at night, except in strong moonlight. What they achieve by day in the way of obtaining information and inflicting casualties is by night the work of offensive bombing parties, or raiding parties, or harassing fire.

If the sniper's main task is to work by day, when he can best use his primary weapon, the rifle, he must be adept in the use of cover to conceal his movement. If the terrain is open, movement may not be possible, so that he may have to lie up for considerable periods. Almost always the sniper must be in position in his area by first light and will often not leave the area until night has fallen. It follows that he must be an expert mover in darkness and proficient in the use of landmarks, the 'feel' of the terrain in the dark, in compass work, and in the use of the stars; and he must be able to eat hard tack, and do with the minimum of water.

From the time trainees are gathered together, the snipers should be 'mated'. This should be most carefully done. They will, at the outset, be working in pairs, the usual method being that one acts as observer whilst the other is the shot. In each pair each sniper must be equally capable of carrying out each role. Mutual confidence between the two is essential. 'Ill-assorted' pairs must be broken up if the mating was at fault.

The pairs should be constant, but every man should have a reserve 'mate'. The pairs do all work together including range classification where the mate acts as 'observer-coach' to the firer and vice versa.

Until the snipers reach the veteran stage they should be used in pairs. This initially will lead to confidence in the 'lone-killer game'. Later the veteran sniper may prefer to act alone, thus cutting down the risk of detection by half. Whenever a sniper volunteers to act singly he should be allowed to do so.

4585

By working in pairs, the scope of the battalion snipers is strictly limited, emphasising two points - they must be used only on worthwhile missions, and they may not be able to cover the whole mission of a sniper's screen. This is where the section sniper must relieve the burden on the battalion snipers.

Between missions, the battalion snipers should have preferential

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Between missions, the battalion snipers should have preferential treatment. They must not live in F.D.Ls and should be as much in 'rest' areas as possible. They should get good rations, be well equipped as regards clothing, especially canvas shoes; and should have every facility given them to select the same batches of ammunition, to get some firing in to keep rifles zeroed and eye and hand attuned; and to keep physically and mentally hard and tough. They should be one and all bosom-pals of the

/....Intelligence

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Intelligence Section, getting Sitreps and the latest activities of patrols and F.D.L. activities. They should have every opportunity given them for reconnaissance both on the ground before they go on a mission, and from all O.Ps. The N.C.O. should be in the confidence of the Commanding Officer, the Adjutant and the Intelligence Officer and "persona grata" with every company and platoon commander.

There are two main uses for the battalion snipers. They are totally different.

The first main mission is to obtain mastery over some particular area. Mastery means a reign of sniping terror so instituted that movement by the enemy by day becomes an impossibility. In this mission, the sniper should calculate all risks and should accept none. He works for his opportunity, and kills without being killed. He makes certain of his opportunity by good observation and deduction, and he makes certain of his kill before taking his shot. Everything is cool and calculated. It may take a considerable time before the upper hand is obtained.

If the jungle is not too thick, but otherwise if good cover is available, the above mission may best be carried out by mobile snipers - they are not tied down to hides, but rather by good use of cover and patient observation, they flit from view-point to view-point, much the same as a king-fisher does. They go on searching for their opportunities. Once the prey is spotted, the stalk and the working into position is the next step, and then the kill is made. In the mobile way of working it is always best to fade-out immediately after the kill, although it may be a good plan to keep the area of the kill still under observation, possibly by the 'mate'. Many times, especially when there is enemy activity in the sniping area, one of the 'pair' will work for position to make the kill, whilst the 'mate' watches the 'back door' or in other words watches the right, left and rear of the killer's line of advance and is ready to engage any enemy appearing there, or call his mate off by pre-arranged signal. Pairs must never move abreast, but always in depth one behind and to a flank of the other.

It is generally advisable to move one at a time and always by bounds. The rear mate can and should move up to the other so that by signals or whisper, the next bound or plan is always common knowledge between the two.

Deception and deceit should always be uppermost in mind in the mobile mission, and the principles of the double-bluff well known, and used.

The normal reserve of fire-power for the mobile game of sniping is the hand grenade either A.P., or, on occasion, smoke.

4584

For the mobile mission, the sniper-pair should be given plenty of 'elbow-room' for manoeuvre. The pairs should be thin on the ground and it follows that in enclosed country such a sniper screen cannot be expected

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/.....A corollary

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A corollary to this is that snipers should not carry out 'relief on the ground'. This ties them down too much. To avoid reliefs getting in each other's way it may be necessary for the new relief to enter the sniping area at one-compass point and the old to leave the area at the opposite compass point. The disadvantage of course is that the old relief cannot pass on the latest information. But it does mean that all the snipers are keeping out of each others way. If they are also out of the way of the fighting and standing patrols, they can thus work on the slogan that "all movement is enemy movement".

To avoid gaps in any 'stranglehold' being created, the overlapping of the time factor is important. As an example the following is given :-

In front of a Jap platoon bunker position on a ridge one pair of snipers are to be in position from first light till dusk. The following instructions are issued :-

"1st pair into position of observation at X on West edge of area of sniping by 0515 hours. Leave East edge of area of sniping not before 1400 hours and not later than 1500 hours.

2nd pair into position of observation at X on West edge of area of sniping not before 1300 hours, not later than 1400 hours."

Here both pairs might be on the ground any time between 1300 hours and 1500 hours, but would for certain both be on the ground at 1400 hours, although separated as far between as the East and West edges of the area of sniping.

The use of the battalion snipers in the mobile role or in gaining the upper hand in a 'no man's land' usually means that they are briefed to carry out the mission 'without accepting casualties'. But there is another use for the snipers which is a very different kettle of fish where the briefing takes the form of the inclusion of the words 'at all costs'.

Either in attack - and generally the attack will be of the fast moving variety of encirclement, sealing off, and infiltration - or in the offensive - defensive - e.g., the holding of a road-block behind the enemy's main force, - a plan may be made which succeeds in general, but in which some slight loop-hole exists which must be closed. These loop-holes are generally difficult to close, or troops may not be available without gravely diminishing the offensive reserve.

Here the highly trained snipers come into their own, for it may well be in their power greatly to consummate the success of the whole operation, or greatly to aid in it. Two examples of recent operations illustrate the principles of using the snipers and showing how the 'at all costs' risk must be accepted.

4583

1st EXAMPLE

Enemy 'Butai'

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

/...In

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In this example, one battalion attacked the bunkered 'butai' from A and B, one other company closed in from C after the Bn attack was held up but had started the stranglehold. Two more platoons were despatched to D and E to complete the encirclement. The gap between B and C was a piece of extremely steep and difficult jungle. The only watering point possible was at X within mortar range from the 'butai'. To close the gap B - C would have used up at least another platoon, which could not be spared. The four sniper pairs of another battalion were ordered to prevent the Japs drawing water at X 'at all costs' for 12 hours. Two Japs were sniped and killed trying to reach X and no further efforts were made by the enemy. We had no casualties. The terrain was unknown and unreconnoitred to the snipers when they set out. Time was the essence of the plan. Risks were taken. The 'butai' did not further interfere with our general plan.

2nd EXAMPLE



In this example, M Battalion secured a road block at MS O. Enemy tanks and infantry invested the block from the North and West. Enemy reinforcements moved up in considerable strength from South. We expected our tanks to break through from the North and link up with us at MS O. To delay the enemy moving up from the South to the greatest possible extent was therefore vital to the plan.

M Battalion at the road block established a snipers' screen about 3 miles South of their main position. A mile to the rear of the screen, another screen from rifle companies, consisting of fighting patrols, was also established. 4582

The snipers were ordered to disrupt any enemy advancing from MS 5 where the best part of an enemy battalion had already debussed. They were ordered to do so 'at all costs', but when no more was possible to fall back through the standing patrols and return to the road-block base. The snipers hold back the enemy for at least 36 hours, the patrols with the aid of

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

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/... This

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This hold-up undoubtedly shook the enemy's morale badly, and he never succeeded in breaking the road block. Booby traps laid by the successive lines on giving up areas also helped the delaying tactics.

Battalion snipers as a rule should be under the command of the unit commanding officer. They should seldom, if ever, be delegated to the command of a company commander, but the latter can always ask for help if by any chance the enemy have snipers causing a serious situation to our own troops and who have not been successfully dealt with by the company commander's own efforts.

Occasionally, however, battalion snipers may be Briefed for a brigade plan in order to obtain a full 'tie-in'.

An example of this, also from recent operations, shows not only this principle, but how the two methods - the 'do not accept casualties' and the 'at all costs' missions - were combined in the one sniper operation.

3rd EXAMPLE



- 4581

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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An example of this, also from recent operations, shows not only this principle, but how the two methods - the 'do not accept casualties' and the 'at all costs' missions - were combined in the one sniper operation.

3rd EXAMPLE



- 4581

Here the sniper screen not accepting casualties to themselves dominated the 'no man's land' on the two possible sides. The enemy were not allowed to work or move by day. Sniper successes - certainties 30 killed, probable killed or wounded 20, own casualties Nil.

/...At X

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At X, doubt arose as to whether the enemy in the bunkered position were obtaining their water supply here. A close sniper screen was detailed to prevent the enemy drawing water here 'at all costs'.

In this example, the snipers were working in a 'no man's land' of 250 yards on the flank and 750 yards opposite our own forward base. But at the same time other snipers were working to the East 5 miles out from base.

When snipers are set the task of working to obtain domination of the battlefield, the commanding officer must not be impatient of success. It is fatal to rush the snipers.

The sniper is a human being - he should be a very good one. When he is put on a mission, whatever it is - 'all in' or 'all out' as the phase may be - those who handle and brief him should remember that he is being put at a tension higher than his fellow soldiers the moment he leaves the base. It is a lone game. He is not one of the crowd. There are difficulties and dangers which he faces unaided to a degree greater than any other member of the battalion. The commanding officer who expects immediate success and success every time is the commanding officer who will destroy the fighting morale of his unit, including his battalion snipers, sooner or later. A sniper, especially if he is buying his experience, and is unescorted by the veteran of the modern battlefield, who is prepared to 'try, try, and try again' is one of the 'unknown and unsung' heroes, and this must be duly appreciated.

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0131

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

27

Subject: Training of Combat Troops.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M. M. I. A.) ROME.
G/Trg/1.

10 Aug 45.

To: D.M.T. c/o 56 Area.

1. Attached is a draft of an instruction which we wish to issue to the Ministry of War.

2. Will you please say if you agree to the draft in this form.

3. If not, will you please correct our draft in order that we may issue it.

K

Major General
MMIA.

WTX/GIG

Subject:- Training of Combat Groups

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(F. N. I. A.) ROME.
G/Trg/1.

Ministry of War

Aug 45.

1. At the time of the German capitulation in ITALY all five Combat Groups had reached a good state of training.

2. That state was achieved and maintained by constant hard work and training.

3. Since the capitulation the Combat Groups have been variously employed, mainly on Guard duties and have done little or no training.

4. The Combat Groups still have a task to perform and they must therefore keep up their standards, even though the necessary training will have to be accomplished whilst employed on Guard duties.

5. It is therefore necessary to consider immediately the training possible under present conditions:-

(a) Individual training can well be carried out despite the dispersion from which units suffer. Section NCOs and platoon officers can run this training even in detached posts.

(b) Elementary collective training at the section level.

(c) Study by officers and NCOs of the next stage i.e. platoon training.

6. Individual training comprises training in:-

(a) Discipline

(b) Personal hygiene

(c) Close order drill

(d) Weapon training

7. High standards of achievement must be set and insisted on:-

(a) Discipline. Attitude towards authority. Willing obedience of orders. Respect for officers and NCOs. Smart turnout and equipment. Clean uniforms, boots and equipment.

(b) Personal hygiene. A clean body free from dirt, lice, sores and infection. Socks and underwear clean and free from sweat. Latrine conscious.

(c) Close order drill. Foot drill. Marching. Turning. Saluting. Arms drill. Sentry drill.

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3. Since the capitulation the Combat Groups have been [illegible] mainly on Guard duties and have done little or no training.

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(b) Personal hygiene. A clean body free from dirt, lice, sores and infection. Socks and underwear clean and free from sweat. Latrine conscious.

(c) Close order drill. Foot drill. Marching. Turning. Saluting. Arms drill. Sentry drill.

(d) Weapon training. Attention is invited to the booklet "Addestramento Armi Portatili", Volume I, Pamphlet No. I, Chapter II,
Section 3 - Principles of Instruction
" 5 - Tests of elementary training
" 6 - Preparation of programmes
" 7 - Syllabi for Weapon Training courses.

Range Work. Pamphlet No. 18 gives details of range courses.

It is likely that most of the target shooting may have to be done on 30 yard ranges, but wherever possible longer ranges should be used for firing advanced practices.

4578

...../2 Pillar

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Rifles. It is recommended that every endeavour should be made to fire all practices detailed in Appendix II and practices Nos. 1 and 2 of Appendix III. Note particularly the standards required for each practice in Appendix II and for the two practices in Appendix III. The second class shot is the lowest standard allowed.

L.M.G. (Appendix IV) Practices 1, 2 and 3.

Pistol. (Appendix VIII) Part 1 and 2 should be fired by personnel armed with this weapon. Note the qualifying standard.

Machine Carbines. (Appendix XII) All practices should be fired.

Targets. (Appendix XII) Gives details of suitable targets.

8. Section training comprises:-

(a) Individual Fieldcraft and movement by day and by night.

(b) Camouflage, personal concealment.

(c) Observation training.

(d) Use of cover, from view, from fire.

(e) Field signals.

(f) Movement and selection of routes.

(g) The individual and Section stalk.

9. Study by officers and NCOs must keep ahead of the succeeding stage of training. That is to say that during individual training study groups must be organised to read and discuss what it will be necessary to know in order successfully to run Section training. During Section training study must be on problems at the platoon level.

10. The pamphlet "Addestramento della Fanteria", PART VIII 1944, is the text book for tactics and must be studied to assure successful training at the various levels including platoon training.

11. You will now issue orders to Combat Groups for individual and Section training to commence, and for the necessary preparatory study to be done in preparation for platoon and company training at a later stage.

12. A.F.H.Q. has agreed to this letter and will instruct allied employing formations to give every assistance possible to Combat Groups.

4577

Major General

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8. Section training comprises:-

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Major General
IGILA.

fjd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(26)

SUBJECT: Training of Interim Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

G/Trg/1

16

Aug 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. It is considered that the training of the Interim Army will fall under three headings:

(a) Training of Cadets;

(b) Training of officers and NCOs of the Regular Army Cadre which will form the future instructors;

(c) Training of replacements for yearly wastage.

2. In order that training as in 1(a) may be planned, please submit your proposals in detail.

3. With regard to training as in 1(b), it is considered that the present layout of schools at CESANO and BRACCIANO and S.I.V.A. at MANZIANA are an adequate basis on which to expand. You are requested to forward your plans, including list of schools, number to be trained in each, and staff required.

The students trained in these schools will be on temporary duty from the unit to which they are regularly assigned.

4. (a) The large training problem is the training of intakes vide para 1(c).

(b) A figure of 10,000 has been set aside for trainees. It is particularly desirable that their training should be concentrated in centres near ROME, for which the remaining barracks in the CESANO-CIVITAVECCHIA area will be of use.

(c) The training of 10,000 recruits per month, in basic individual training only, will provide 120,000 per year. The basic training period must not exceed four weeks, at the end of which time the soldier is assigned to a regular unit. Here he becomes a working member of the team and receives further training in his duties.

4576

(d) It is emphasised that central standardised training, under competent instructors, is essential if recruits are to become soldiers capable of being efficient members of their teams. No other method will give standardised basic instruction.

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(a) Training of Cadets;

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4576

(d) It is emphasised that central standardised training, under competent instructors, is essential if recruits are to become soldiers capable of being efficient members of their teams. No other method will give standardised basic instruction.

(e) It is estimated that four training regiments will be necessary. The Officers, NCOs and administrative staff of these being permanently assigned, while the trainees remain with the regiment for one month only after which they are classified and sent to permanent assignments. This system will provide a sufficient number of new men with a minimum of staff.

(f) With these principles in mind, submit your recommendations to include numbers permanently assigned to the regiments and locations for the regiments.

(K)

Major-General,
G.S.I.

fd

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

25

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

28 Jul 45.

FILE NO : ASD/922.2.

SUBJECT : Trg of the ITALIAN Army.

TO : MMIA.

19

Reference your G/Trg/1 of 21 Jul and previous letters on this subject. Delay in answering is regretted.

As you know important conversations have been and are taking place between General BROWNING and General WARD. At the moment therefore it is regretted that it is not possible to give a definite answer to your question.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER.

W.D. MORGAN,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

JD'AA/vj/ORG-B.

This refers to our request that Gpn be put under our wires as soon as released by Hunns. It seems to end the correspondence.

GOC to see.

CONFIDENTIAL

4575

P/1543

24

SUBJECT: Reorganisation - RTC, ICF.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M. M. I. A.) ROME.

Ref: G/Trg/1.

26 July 45.

TO: "F" British Liaison and Training Unit.

INTRODUCTION

This letter is divided into four parts:-

Part I - Preamble.
Part II Para by para comment (where comment is needed) on your letters and memos.
Part III Statement by Arms of length of training required.
Part IV Outline layout of main units suggested by MMIA.

PART I - Preamble.

1. The object of this letter is to enable "F" BL and TU to plan in detail the organisation required and the WE necessary to train intakes for the reinforcement of the Italian Army pending the declaration of a final policy by AFHQ.

2. With regard to para 7 of AQ/6/1009 of 18 July 45. In view of:-

(a) The urgency for concluding the reorganisation
(b) The time involved in calling a conference
(c) The fact that agreement in principle has been reached

it is not thought necessary to call the meeting you suggest since this letter will answer all your questions.

3. You are required to produce your plan for training such rfts as may be posted to you to fill the necessities of the forecast by MMIA (to which reference is made in PART II, para 10 below).

4. The proposals made by you in the correspondence under reference are agreed in principle and to a very great extent in detail.

5. AFHQ are pressing for final details of the reorganised WE and organisation. You are therefore requested to forward your completed plan and projected WE by 1800 hrs 29 July.

PART II. - Comments on relevant correspondence - AQ/6/976 of 11 July, addenda to Memo.

1. Your paras 1 and 2.

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PART II. - Comments on relevant correspondence - AQ/6/976 of 11 July, addenda to Memo. - 4574

1. Your paras 1 and 2.

See PART II, para 10 below for our views on throughput. The system detailed therein will rule out the need for the pool of recruits surplus to WE.

2. Your paras 3 and 4.

See PART III para 1 below for details of basic and advanced trg periods.

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3. Your para 6.

See reply to question 6(a) in your questionnaire. Gruppi must undertake their share of further training.

4. Your para 7.

See reply to question 7 inyour questionnaire.

5. Your para 8.

See reply to question 8 in your questionnaire. This is a long standing custom of the Italian Service and it is thought that for morale reasons the customs should be allowed to continue. Basic training can still be organised in one centre - see our PART IV, for plan.

6. Your para 9.

A H.Q. for this Regt is not considered necessary.

7. Your para 10.

See replies to question 10 in your questionnaire. A Pioneer is an unskilled labourer. Italian Pioneers with some military background and training are easier to mould into their final form than those without it - it is therefore necessary to give them the agreed six weeks of basic training, but there is no need to consider advanced training, which will be given them when they join their units.

8. Your para 11.

The Gunner total does seem small, but the Corps of Arty is small. It comprises only Div Arty, has no gun bigger than 25 pdr and no H.A.A.

9. Your para 12.

A change of location and officers would be an advantage at the end of the basic training period. See our PART IV, para 2.

AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

- 4573

10. This letter is agreed throughout. The following comment is made on balancing of input and output:-

(a) MMLA will provide a forecast of output needs by Arm of Service. This forecast will show the number of rfts required for each Arm and the date on which they are needed in units. It will in every case forecast far enough ahead to allow for the determined training period

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See reply to question 7 inyour questionnaire.

5. Your para 8.

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AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

- 4573

10. This letter is agreed throughout. The following comment is made on balancing of input and output:-

(a) MMIA will provide a forecast of output needs by Arm of Service. This forecast will show the number of rfts required for each Arm and the date on which they are needed in units. It will in every case forecast far enough ahead to allow for the determined training period to be completed.

(b) Bearing in mind the agreed period needed to train each Arm it will be MMIA duty to post into CESANO rfts to fill their needs at any future date. "P" BL and TU will receive copies of the forecast.

(c) Thus we may eliminate from plans any question of holding untrained or trained rfts at either input or output of your machine.

To Sheet.....3/

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Appendix 'A' to AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

11. Your figures and ratios are agreed with the following modifications:-

(a) The twelve weeks advanced training for Rly and Dock Engineers should be straightforward Genio training. Bridge Building etc.

(b) The advanced training with Sappers envisaged for Pioneers will be dispensed with. Basic training only.

(c) Since Rly and Dock Engineers need Sapper training during their advanced period they could do the programme envisaged by you for Pioneers.

(d) Advanced training for S & T should be twelve weeks.

(e) With regard to Wkshops personnel it is fully appreciated that their training on a grand scale would need one year. For the purposes of this interim phase however we need envisage training only the lower grades of Wksp personnel.

Vehicle Mech is the highest grade MT tradesman to be aimed at.

Fitters Gun and Armourers Courses as at present constituted are adequate.

Appendix 'B' to AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

12. No comment required here as other notes cover the subject matter.

Appendix 'C' to AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

13. (a) It is thought that additional accommodation will be necessary, and this H.Q is issuing you a separate order to effect this. It is thought that the DUCA degli ABRUZZI Barracks will be available at CIVITAVECCHIA.

(b) It is suggested therefore:-

(i) the buildings occupied by No. 1 Regt to house the projected new Inf Basic Training Regt.

(ii) the buildings occupied by No.2 Regt to house the projected new Other Arms Basic Training Regt.

(iii) the AURELIA Barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA to house the new Inf Adv Training Regt.

(iv) the DUCA degli ABRUZZI Barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA to house the Inf and Inf Special Schools.

(v) the arrangements at present in force to continue for the Other Arms Adv Training.

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Appendix 'D' to AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

14. Reference your paras 1, 2, 3 and 4. Agreed, with modifications to figures introduced by Pioneers and Rly Engineers.

Enclosure No. 2 to AQ/1009 of 18 July.

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for Pioneers.

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(e) With regard to Wkshops personnel it is fully appreciated that their training on a grand scale would need one year. For the purposes of this interim phase however we need envisage training only the lower grades of Wksp personnel.

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4572

Appendix 'D' to AQ/6/976 of 11 July.

14. Reference your paras 1, 2, 3 and 4. Agreed, with modifications to figures introduced by Pioneers and Rly Engineers.

Enclosure No. 2 to AQ/1009 of 18 July.

15. This will be answered by 'A' Branch MMLA.

To Sheet.....4/

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

16. Replies to Enclosure No. 4 to 'F' BL & TU letter AQ/6/1009 of 18 July.

AGENDA FOR PROPOSED MMIA MEETING.

(1)	(a)	Yes
	(b)	No
	(c)	Not applicable
(2)	(a)	No
	(b)	Not applicable
(3)	(a)	Six weeks is adequate
	(b)	Periods indicated are adequate
(4)	(a)	All agreed but no advanced training for Pioneers
	(b)	Recommendations are made in this reply
(5)		No, but take into account the new accommodation offered
(6)	(a)	Yes. Anything over and above (4) (a) above
	(b)	CESANO, then Gruppi. See (6) (a) above
(7)		No
(8)		Yes. Italian Service custom. Agreed that basic training better done centrally but under own Branch of Service. See MMIA outline PART IV, para 1. Accommodation schedule will have to be altered to meet needs of MMIA outline.
(9)		No
(10)	(a) and (b)	Unskilled labour
	(c)	Basic only
	(d)	Six weeks basic
	(e)	Yes
(11)		See remarks in PART II, para(10)above.
(12)		Recommend the change. See PART II, para (9) above.
(13)		No

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(c) Not applicable

(2) (a) No

(b) Not applicable

(3) (a) Six weeks is adequate

(b) Periods indicated are adequate

(4) (a) All agreed but no advanced training for Pioneers

(b) Recommendations are made in this reply

(5) No, but take into account the new accommodation offered

(6) (a) Yes. Anything over and above (4) (a) above

(b) CESANO, then Gruppi. See (6) (a) above

(7) No

(8) Yes. Italian Service custom. Agreed that basic training better done centrally but under own Branch of Service. See MMLA outline PART IV, para 1. Accommodation schedule will have to be altered to meet needs of MMLA outline.

(9) No

(10) (a) and (b) Unskilled labour

(c) Basic only

(d) Six weeks basic

(e) Yes

(11) See remarks in PART II, para(10)above.

(12) Recommend the change. See PART II, para (9) above.

(13) No

PART III TRAINING PERIODS REQUIRED

	Basic	Adv
Infantry	6 weeks	6 weeks
Arty	6 "	12 "
Sappers	6 "	12 "
Rly & Dock Engrs	6 "	12 "
Signals	6 "	12 "
S & T	6 "	12 "
Wksps	6 "	12 "
Ord	6 "	Adv trg at Units
Med	6 "	Adv trg at Units
Pioneers	6 "	Adv trg at Units

To Sheet....5/

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

PART IV - OUTLINE PLAN

1. (a) This H.Q. considers it most desirable that:-

(i) Recruits be given a change of air, snenery and officers on completion of their basic training.

(ii) Both basic training regiments should be accommodated in the same area. This would mean an economy of basic training stores, demonstrations, 30 yd ranges etc.

(iii) In order to provide ample room for advanced exercises etc, advanced training regiments should not be situated too close together.

(b) In view of (a) (i), (ii) and (iii) above, it appears that only practical solution would be to put both the basic training regiments at CESANO proper, the Advanced Training Regiment (Inf) at CIVITAVECCHIA.
The Advanced Training Regiment (Other Arms) would remain at BRACCIANO.

2. This layout raises the point of schools:-

(a) The Infantry Specialist School and the Infantry School should be with the Advanced Training Regiment. It is thought that this changeover can be accomplished expeditiously if extra accommodation is made available.

(b) This H.Q. will initiate the necessary action with R.A.A.C. and "F" BL and TU to make available the DUCA degli ABRUZZI Barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA.

for Major General
MMIA.

Distribution:
Copy to: 56 Area for D.M.T.

Internal: 'A'
'Q'(Two)

fjd

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765020

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'Q'(Two)

4570

fjd

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765020

SUBJECT: Re-organisation of the P.T.C., I.C.F.

23

File now

'F' BRITISH LIAISON & TRAINING UNIT
P.T.C., I.C.F.

Ref: AQ/6/1060

25 July 1945.

To: H.Q.
Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C. (MMIA).

Copy to: D.M.T., A.F.H.Q. (To MMIA for onward transmission)

1. Reference is made to this Unit's AQ/6/1009 of 18 July 45 and enclosures.

2. The proposals discussed in this and previous memoranda were considered by the Director and were agreed in principle and, to a very great extent, in detail.

3. The following modifications, based on a more complete knowledge of the facts and requirements, were laid down by the Director :

(a) A conference was unnecessary as the Director himself, in consultation with his staff, was prepared, and in fact has given, a definite answer to all the queries raised.

(b) Pioneers are unskilled labour; they require only basic training for a period of six weeks, at the expiration of which they are available for posting where they are required and where they will receive such advanced training as is necessary. Hence there is no need for an Advanced Training Pioneer Battalion.

(c) The period of basic training is agreed at six weeks for all arms and the ratios suggested in AQ/6/976, Appendix 'A', are accepted, with the exception that Advanced Training of S. & T. personnel will be increased to twelve weeks. After the period of advanced training at CESANO, reinforcements to Combat Groups will receive further advanced (collective) training with the Gruppi.

(d) No leave will be granted throughout the period of training at CESANO.

(e) Recruits will be drafted to the Arm of the Service in which they will serve immediately on joining the Centre. In view of D.M.T's emphasis on effective screening, 'F' B.L. & T.U. will organise a screening system to ensure that recruits enter the Arm of the Service for which they are best suited.

(f) The proposed layout of Regiments to locations will be altered to enable all basic training to be conducted at CESANO and Advanced Training at CIVITAVECCHIA or BRACCIANO.

(g) No Regimental Headquarters for Other Arms Advanced Training Battalions (themselves so organised as to be miniature Regimental H.Q's with full Colonels in command), is required and hence this will be dispensed with.

4569

(h) The allotment of recruits to the Artillery Arm is considered adequate.

(i) 'A' Branch, M.M.I.A. will evolve a system whereby only sufficient reinforce-

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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4563

(h) The allotment of recruits to the Artillery Arm is considered adequate.

(i) 'A' Branch, M.M.I.A. will evolve a system whereby only sufficient reinforcements required to meet the demand at the end of the full, agreed training period will be posted to CESANO. This will eliminate the necessity for a Reception Regiment or a Reinforcement Holding Regiment to contain personnel surplus to the authorised War Establishment. If the system works smoothly there will be none.

(j) Railway and Dock Engineers will receive advanced training at BRACCIANO, identical with, and for the same period as, that given to normal Sappers.

(k) Only the lower grades of Workshop personnel will be trained and hence the period allotted (twelve weeks) is considered to be adequate. Vehicle Mechanics are the highest grade M.T. tradesmen to be aimed at. Fitters Gun and Armourers Courses, as at present constituted, are adequate.

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(m) The Director's reasons for introducing these changes are given in Part IV of M.M.I.A. 'G' Training letter

(n) As advanced training of Infantry will take place at CIVITAVECCHIA, it is necessary to move the Infantry School and the Infantry Specialist School (together with the P.T. School), to CIVITAVECCHIA and for this purpose the barracks formerly occupied by the American G.T. Company will be requisitioned and the Schools transferred to them. The buildings formerly utilised by these Schools can be usefully employed for screening new intake or for basic training classrooms.

4. As a result of these instructions, some comparatively minor modifications are essential to the data given in Appendix 'B' of AQ/6/976 and to the layout suggested in Appendices 'C' and 'D' of the same memorandum.

5. These modifications are :-

(a) Pioneers require no advanced training.
Hence, all Pioneers must be included in one or other of the two Basic Training Regiments. This affords an opportunity of equalising their strengths and utilising a common War Establishment for both Regiments. There are 1,500 Pioneers to be considered. The training in both Basic Regiments is identical and therefore 220 can be accommodated in No.1 Infantry Basic Training Regiment and 1,280 in No.3 Other Arms Basic Training Regiment.

(b) The increase in the period of Advanced Training for S. & T. personnel from 6 to 12 weeks alters the ratio from 1 : 1 to 1 : 2. Hence, out of the total of 450, 150 will be undergoing basic training while 300 will be doing advanced training.

(c) Railway and Dock Operators were previously regarded as carrying out their advanced training elsewhere than in CESANO. It is now agreed that they shall receive normal advanced Sapper training. The ratio of basic to advanced is 1 : 2 and the total 300, so that 100 will be in the Basic Other Arms Regiment and 200 in the Advanced Other Arms Unit.

6. Hence it is possible to re-write Appendix 'B', incorporating these revisions. This revised appendix is given at Appendix 'A' to this letter. It will be noted that provision has still been made for 1,200 students from the Gruppi to be accommodated in Advanced Training Regiments at CIVITAVECCHIA and BRACCIANO. (300 Pioneer Gruppi students formerly included are now omitted). It seems unnecessary to revise the sumary as the data given is self-evident.

7. It is thus possible to amend Appendix 'C' of AQ/6/976 and this amendment is given at Appendix 'B' to this letter.

8. The final set up of the whole Centre is shown in the diagram at Appendix 'C'.

9. The British Liaison and Training Unit War Establishment committee will assemble forthwith. It will comprise :

Major H.W. King and Major A.M.G. Gelardi.
One Major from the Arm under discussion.
Gen Col. H. Sive representing R.T.C., I.C.E.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

basic training establishments.

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Major H.W. King and Major A.M.G. Gelardi.
One Major from the Arm under discussion.
Ten.Col. U. Sivo, representing R.T.C., I.C.F.

They will prepare new War Establishments for the following :

Nos. 1 and 3 Basic Training Regiments.
No. 2 Advanced Infantry Training Regiment.

...../3.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

and they will revise, as necessary, the War Establishments for :-

No.1 Artillery Battalion.
No.2 Sapper Battalion.
No.3 Signallers Battalion.
No.4 Servizi Battalion (formerly "Misto" Battalion)

The utmost speed is essential, but clarity and accuracy must NOT be sacrificed. The final War Establishments recommended, though preserving the maximum economy of man power, must cover every requirement of the purposes for which they are intended. All factors discussed in previous Memoranda will be taken into account.

On conclusion of these tasks the Committee will review the whole question of the SIVA Schools, in the light of a possible move to SANTA SEVERA, where ideal accommodation has been found.

In view of the division of the duties of 'F' British Liaison & Training Unit, a revision of the War Establishment to meet the new locations and the responsibilities involved may be required. The Committee will submit their recommendations in due course.

Colonel.
Commander.
'F' British Liaison & Trg.Unit RTC ICF.

LHM/ah.

Internal.

Commander.
Major King.
Major Gelardi.
Float (2)
File.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

APPENDIX 'A' To 'F' BL & TU letter
AQ/6/1068 dtd. 25 July 45

(Revision of Appendix 'B' to AQ/6/976)

LOCATION OF ALL TROOPS,-RECRUITS AND STUDENTS, IN CESANO DISTRICT, WHEN THE CENTRE IS IN FULL OPERATION.

TOTAL OF RECRUITS - 7,500 TOTAL STUDENTS EX GRUPPI - ~~1,500~~ 1,200

Arm and total number of Recruits.	Ration, Basic to Advanced Training.	No. of recruits on basic training	No. of Recruits on Advanced Trg.	No. of Students on Advanced Trg.	Total No. on Advanced Trg. in CESANO District
Infantry (3,750)	1 : 1	1,875	1,875	750	2,625
Proportion of Pioneers.	Basic only.	220	nil	nil	nil
Artillery (375)	1 : 2	125	250	75	325
Genio Sappers (450)	1 : 2	150	300	150	450
Railway & Dock Operators (300)	1 : 2	100	200	nil	200
Signallers. (225)	1 : 2	75	150	45	195
S. & T. (450)	1 : 2	150	300	120	420
Ordnance. (150)	1 : 1	75	75++	nil	nil
Workshops (150)	1 : 2	50	100	60	160
Medical (150)	1 : 1	75	75++	nil	nil
Proportion of Pioneers.	Basic only.	1,280	nil	nil	nil
		4,175	3,175 (Cesano)	1,200	4,375
			150 (elsewhere)		4566
			3,325		

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Number of Recruits.	Ratio of Advanced Training.	On Basic training	Recruits on Advanced Trg.	Students on Advanced Trg.	On Advanced Trg. in CESANO District
Infantry (3,750)	1 : 1	1,875	1,875	750	2,625
Proportion of Pioneers.	Basic only.	220	nil	nil	nil
Artillery (375)	1 : 2	125	250	75	325
Genio Sappers (450)	1 : 2	150	300	150	450
Railway & Dock Operators (300)	1 : 2	100	200	nil	200
Signallers. (225)	1 : 2	75	150	45	195
S. & T. (450)	1 : 2	150	300	120	420
Ordnance. (150)	1 : 1	75	75++	nil	nil
Workshops (150)	1 : 2	50	100	60	160
Medical (150)	1 : 1	75	75++	nil	nil
Proportion of Pioneers.	Basic only.	1,280	nil	nil	nil
		4,175	3,175 (Cesano)	1,200	4,375
			150 (elsewhere)		4566
			3,325		

++These recruits receive their advanced training at their own Depots.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

APPENDIX 'B' To 'F' BL & TU letter
AQ/6/1068 d.25 July 45

(Revision of Appendix 'C' to AQ/6/976).

CO-ORDINATION OF TRAINING FACILITIES REQUIRED WITH AVAILABLE ACCOMMODATION.

Dealing first with Basic Training we have a total of 4,175 (say 4,200) recruits to be trained.

Facilities exist at CESANO to accommodate this number and for convenience they should be divided into two equal Regiments.

The buildings occupied by the present No.2 Regiment (the 'Comb') will accommodate the new No.1 Infantry Basic Training Regiment, with an actual, maximum strength (including their proportion of Pioneers) of 2,100.

The buildings occupied by the present No.1 Regiment will just accommodate the new No.3 Other Arms Basic Training Regiment with an actual, maximum strength of 2,100 (including their proportion of Pioneers).

This deals with all Basic Training.

The new No.2 Advanced Infantry Training Regiment, with a strength of 2,625, can be accommodated at the AURELIA Barracks, CIVITAVECCHIA, although some proportion of this Regiment will be attached to the Infantry School and Infantry Specialists School in the G.T. Barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA. Hence, there is ample accommodation for the whole of this Regiment.

There remains the Advanced Training of Other Arms. The total to be trained, inclusive of vacancies for 1,200 students from Gruppi, is (4,375 - 2,625) 1,750. There will be no Regimental Headquarters and the following table gives their location.

Arm.	Location.	Maximum capacity.	Requirements.	Remarks.
Artillery	BRACCIANO	600	325	It is hoped to transfer the whole Artillery School in due course to the R.A.T.D. barracks at CIVITAVECCHIA, but this cannot happen before October.
Genio. Sappers	BRACCIANO	300	450	This raises a serious problem of accommodation, which will be overcome when the Artillery can move to CIVITAVECCHIA. It is suggested that as a purely temporary measure the Sappers and Railway & Dock Operators commitment should be halved. When the Artillery moves the Signallers can move to the Artillery Barracks in BRACCIANO and the Genio Barracks will then meet all requirements
Rly & Dock Operators	do.		200	
			650	
Signallers	do.	300	195	
S. & T.	D. & M. School CESANO.	360	420	Here agin some small additional accommodation will be required to meet capacity, but given a little time, which is available, such accommodation can be found.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

The buildings occupied by the present No.2 Regiment (the Cens) will just accommodate the new No.1 Infantry Basic Training Regiment, with an actual, maximum strength (including their proportion of Pioneers) of 2,100.

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			650	
Signallers	do.	300	195	
S. & T.	D. & M. School CESANO.	360	420	Here agin some small additional accommodation will be required to meet capacity, but given a little time, which is available, such accommodation can be found.
Ordnance & Workshops	E. & M. School. CESANO.	240	160	No comment.
Medical	NIL			
			1,750	

- 4365

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 765020

0158

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020



NOTE: The whole position at MANZIANA requires revision and this will be the next problem to be dealt with. It is NOT covered in any way in this letter.

0159

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

APPENDIX 'C' To 'F' BL & TU let
AQ/6/1068 d.25/7/4



SUMMARY.

2,100	
2,100	
2,625	
325	
650	
195	
580	
8,575	
150	Elsewhere.
8,725	i.e.
7,500	Recruits
1,200	Gruppi.
25	surplus.
8,725	

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0160

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

21

SUBJECT: Training of Italian Army

Land Forces Sub-Com, AC (MMIA)

G/Trg/1

10 Jul 45

A.F.H.Q.

Folio 19

It is requested that a reply now be given please to this HQ letter G/Trg/1 dated 30 Jun 45, subject as above.

Major-General,
MMIA.

fd.

Internal: File 3D/1

0161

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

20

SUBJECT: Training of Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

G/Trg/1

4 Jul 45.

TO : O.C.,
50 B.L.U.

18

Reference your signal G 81 dated 22 Jun 45.

Attached hereto is a copy of a letter sent to AFHQ on 30 Jun on the subject of the training of the Italian Army.

Major-General,
MMIA.

Copy to : File SD/1

4562

0162

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

SUBJECT: Training of Italian Army

19

Land Forces Sub Com. AC (MMIA)

G/Trg/1

30 June 45

TO : AFHQ

1. Your letter AG353/131 GCT-O of 10 April lays down the policy for control and supervision of training of the Italian Army.

2. It is thought that conditions have now changed to such an extent as to warrant the reconsideration of this policy.

3. The letter under reference lays down that MMIA controls (under general direction of DMT) the training of Italian Units not under command of 15 Army Gp. 15 Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian fms as for formations of other nationalities under command.

4. This arrangement was necessary whilst Italian Tps were being trained for and actually engaged in battle.

5. The cessation of hostilities however, makes it probable that all Italian formations will be trained and maintained for an internal security role.

6. Should this premise be in accordance with AFHQ policy on the future role of the Italian Army it is suggested that MMIA should be made responsible for direction of training of all Italian formations as these are released from control of 8 and 5 Army or 15 Army Group.

7. If this is agreed, I suggest that it might be advisable to inform all concerned accordingly.

G T Lee

L. Browning

tvs

Major General
MMIA.

G/Trg DIST:

Copy to: SD/1

4562

0163

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

18

FROM: 50 HLU

22 NFT B

TO : ALLIED COMMISSION
LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION (MMIA) ROME

RESTRICTED

REF : G 81

IMPORTANT

REF YOUR D O / H DATED 17 (.) TRAINING POLICY. SURELY RESPONSIBILITIES SET OUT IN A F H Q A G 353/131 GCT-O DATED 16 APR 45 APPLIED TO A PERIOD WHEN G R U P P I WERE ENGAGED AND EXPECTING TO CONTINUE TO BE ENGAGED IN ACTIVE HOSTILITIES AGAINST ENEMY (.) SITUATION IS OBVIOUSLY COMPLETELY CHANGED SINCE 9 MAY (.) A L L I E S NO LONGER REQUIRE G R U P P I FOR IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS BUT UNLESS ALL GOOD WORK OF TRAINING TEAMS AND B L U S AND ALL MODERN METHODS INSTILLED INTO I T A L I A N ARMY ARE TO GO FOR NOTHING CONTINUED TRAINING BY B R I T I S H TRAINING TEAMS IS ESSENTIAL (.) AT PRESENT I T A L I A N S REFUSE TO DO ANY TRAINING ON A VARIETY OF EXCUSES APART FROM COMPLETE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAKING UP TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON HOW TO GUARD DUMPS (.) AS LONG TERM EFFICIENCY OF I T A L I A N ARMY IS INVOLVED CONSIDER MATTER ONE FOR IMMEDIATE DIRECTIVE BY M M I A IN CONJUNCTION WITH A F H Q

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/Trg/1

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: G/291
DATE 25 JUN 1945

ws 25 June 1945

4560

0164

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

17

SUBJECT: Directive - British Training Stores and Equipment

Land Forces Sub Com. AC (MMIA)

G/Trg/1

26. June 45

TO : 'G' DEFU

Attached is Appendix 'A' to DEF letter, DEF/SG/4/MMI of 20 Jun 45 on responsibilities for British training stores and equipment loaned to Allied and Italian training centres is forwarded for your compliance.

for Major General
MMIA.

tvu

G Trg DEFU:

G MMIA
CDSC.

4559

16

SUBJECT: Directive - British Training Stores and Equipment.

D.M.T. A.F.H.Q.
C.M.F.

Tel: 11667

DMT/88/4/MT1

20 Jun 45.

G/Trg
23/6

HQ 2 Polish Corps { 5 copies of Appx 'A' }
BMM to GREECE { 5 " " " " }
HQ M.M.I.A. { 5 " " " " }

Copy to:
G-3(Org-4)AFHQ
G-3 AMG AFHQ
Q (AE) AFHQ
Ord AFHQ
Liaison Sec AFHQ
HQ 26 BLU att . 2 Polish Corps

The attached directive at Appendix 'A' on responsibilities for British training stores and equipment issued to Allied and Italian training centres is forwarded for your compliance.

MMIA-'G'
FILE: 9/Gen/1
DATE 23 JUN 45

S.N. SHOOSMITH
Brig.,
D.M.T.

Copies of Appx 'A' Send to - 4558
'Z' Bde.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Bde to Gr. Scs ( )
HQ M.M.I.A. (5 " " " ")

Copy to:
G-3(Org-4)AFHQ
G-3 AMO AFHQ
Q (AL) AFHQ
Ord AFHQ
Liaison Sec AFHQ
HQ 26 BLU att . 2 Polish Corps

The attached directive at Appendix 'A' on responsibilities for British training stores and equipment issued to Allied and Italian training centres is forwarded for your compliance.

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: 9/1a/1
DATE 23 JUN 45

S.N. SHOOSMITH
Brig.,
D.M.T.

Copies of Appx 'A' sent to:- 4558
7 Bde.
Q
Circ (Mmm)
on 26 June 45.
(See folio 17)

G11

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

Appendix 'A' to DMT/88/4/[illegible]
dated 20 Jun 45

DIRECTIVE - BRITISH TRAINING STORES AND EQUIPMENT

ISSUED TO ALLIED AND ITALIAN TRAINING CENTRES

1. The purpose of this directive is to define the responsibilities for training stores and equipment issued to Allied or Italian Armies.

2. Allied and Italian Commandants of training centres are responsible for the correct accounting, safeguarding and maintenance of training stores and equipment issued to them from British sources in accordance with existing directives.

3. British Liaison Units are responsible for the following:-

(a) Advice on the initial distribution of stores and equipment between different wings, units etc, of training establishments.

(b) Instruction, organisation and supervision of Allied or Italian personnel in correct accounting procedure for stores with which they are concerned.

(c) Advice and instruction, where necessary, in the correct methods of carrying out regular maintenance of training stores and equipment.

(d) Supervision of the introduction of a system, by the Allied or Italian personnel concerned, for the issuing of training stores and/or equipment from stores against signature and returning them to store immediately after use.

- 4557

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

0168

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

14

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT:- Trg Conference

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/Trg/4

8 Jun 45

TO :- "1" BLD
A
Q
IGE
X
PT
MED
ORD
MAE

1. There will be a trg conference in the Conference Room Hq MMIA, PORTE, at 1500 hrs Tues 12 Jun 45.

2. The object of the conference is

(a) to co-ordinate the trg of the Italian Army through MMIA.

(b) to maintain interest in trg and to make such plans for the future as present limited knowledge of "futures" will permit.

3. Will you please be represented. Agenda is att herewith. Additional points for inclusion should reach this office by 1200 hrs 11 Jun.

Lt Col
GS

Copy to : DMT c/o 86 Area

A.1. I will attend. BF. Terms of reference laid down by AFHQ giving MMIA Trg responsibilities.

WP 4556
8 Jun

0109

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

RESTRICTED

A G E N D A

for

Trg Conference to be held Conference Room HQ MMIA
1500 hrs 12 Jun 45

1. Trg procedure (MMIA - DMT).
2. Trg and holding rfts for interim Italian Army (7,500 ceiling at CESANO).
3. Method of allotment of vacancies on courses.
4. Trg equipment, (a) procedure for obtaining.
   (b) responsibility for holding.
   (c) accounting.
5. Steps taken to popularise RTC CESANO in the eyes of Combat Cps.
6. Accommodation RTC CESANO. Future policy.
7. British trg instructors surplus to new WEs.
8. Adm trg and man-management trg.
9. GARIBALDI Regt.
10. Truck dvrs A.C.

0170

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

13

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: AFHQ SICILY HACMED CITE MGCT

051813 B

TO : MMIA

RESTRICTED

REF : F 71104

10

YOUR G/97/1 OF 28 APR (.)

PARA 3 AGREED (.) INSTRUCTIONS BEING ISSUED

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action Copy: G/97/1
G (Trg)
A
Q (2)

GT Mpll
GT bu

MMIA
MAY 4554

SUBJECT : Policy Regarding Training Establishments CMF.

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

DMT/156/1/MT.2

4 May '45.

TO : All Concerned.

1. This letter sets out the policy to be adopted in CMF regarding training establishments.

WAR OFFICE POLICY.

2. War Office have stated that their policy with regard to the training establishment requirements of CMF after the defeat of GERMANY is broadly as follows :-

(a) An allotment of vacancies at UK schools of instruction will be made to CMF. One advantage of this procedure is that it will enable personnel sent on courses to UK to be given leave in UK.

(b) CMF training establishments will be disbanded on a phased time-table subject to any special requirements and commitments within CMF.

(c) At a later stage instructors from UK and/or SEAC will be posted to MIDDLE EAST schools, which will then be in a position to cater for All Arms. Some allotment to this theatre may then be made from MIDDLE EAST Schools.

AFHQ POLICY.

3. The following factors have been taken into consideration in the formulation of the policy regarding the future of training establishments in this theatre :-

(a) The implications of the War Office policy.

(b) The special commitments and requirements of certain Arms and Services.

(c) The need for the utmost economy in manpower in the theatre.

(d) The very considerable dislocation which will arise in all formations and units resulting from "sorting", release scheme, movement ex ITALY, duties in connection with the occupational role of formations and units, etc.

(e) The movement of personnel attending courses.

(f) The present location of CMF training establishments, and the [illegible] factors involved before they could be moved and established

4553

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

establishments.

WAR OFFICE POLICY.

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(c) The need for the utmost economy in manpower in the theatre.

(d) The very considerable dislocation which will arise in all formations and units resulting from "sorting", release scheme, movement ex ITALY, duties in connection with the occupational role of formations and units, etc.

(e) The movement of personnel attending courses.

4553

(f) The present location of CMF training establishments, and the time factor involved before they could be moved and established in closer proximity to the Army of occupation.

THE PLAN.

4. It has been decided therefore, that the policy will be to close down all schools of instruction under AFHQ control on a phased timetable, having regard to the factors in para 3 above, as follows

.....2

MMIA - 6 MAY
FILE: G/tng/1
- 6 MAY 1945

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

(a) Stage 1.

The CMTC (less PT and Mechanics Schools) will be disbanded, and a number of All Arms wings at other schools will be closed.

(b) Stage 2.

The disbandment of the majority of the remaining schools as and when they are no longer required by the Arms of the Service concerned.

STAGE 1.

5. (a) CMTC

(i) Courses at the following CMTC schools will cease with effect from the dates shown :-

Tactical School	12 May
Administration School	12 May
Weapon Training School	12 May
Chemical Warfare School	17 May
Hygiene School	2 Jun

(ii) The PT School will move to Northern ITALY as soon as a suitable location has been found. It is intended to enlarge considerably the scope and capacity of this school.

(iii) The Mechanics School at the CMTC will continue to run courses for driver mechanics and vehicle mechanics. Courses for Regimental officers and NCOs will cease with effect from 10 May.
The final decision regarding the future of this school is still under consideration.

(iv) It is suggested that the most practical method of providing instruction in such subjects as Cookery, Unit Hygiene and Administration, is for units and/or formations to run local courses as found necessary and desirable.

(b) All Arms courses at other schools.

The following courses will be discontinued with effect from the dates shown.

(i) S.M.E. Mine Warfare courses) Camouflage courses) Rafting courses) 10 May

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

The disbandment of the majority of the remaining schools as and when they are no longer required by the Arms or the Service concerned.

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(i) Courses at the following CMTC schools will cease with effect from the dates shown :-

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Administration School	12 May
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Hygiene School	2 Jun

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The final decision regarding the future of this school is still under consideration.

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(b) All Arms courses at other schools.

The following courses will be discontinued with effect from the dates shown.

(i) S.M.E. Mine Warfare courses)
Camouflage courses)
Rafting courses) 10 May

4552

(ii) School of Signals.

RSI (Infantry) courses	23 June
RSI (driver operators) courses	16 June
RSI (Indian) courses	30 June

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(c) Allied Armies.

The training of the GREEK and ITALIAN Armies will continue as at present planned. Vacancies for GREEK and ITALIAN personnel at BRITISH Schools of instruction will be available as long as those schools remain open.

STAGE 2.

6. Schools other than those mentioned in para 5 above will remain open during the immediate post hostilities period in order to deal with vocational, technical and specialist training. These schools will close down as soon as they are no longer serving a useful purpose.

FINAL STAGE.

7. The final position in the theatre will thus be as follows :-

(a) One or two theatre schools i.e. P.T. School and possibly School of Cookery and E & M.E. School will remain to serve the BRITISH Army of occupation in ITALY and AUSTRIA.

(b) Vacancies for CMF personnel will be allotted at Schools in U.K.

(c) At a later date vacancies may be available for CMF personnel at MIDDLE EAST schools.

TRAINING DEPOTS.

8. It has been decided as a matter of theatre policy ultimately to establish a General Base Depot in place of existing Corps Trg depots.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER :

A.D.WARD,
Major General G.S.,
A.C of S (Br).,
for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of Staff.

455

0175
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dated 4 May 45.

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HQ Indian Inf Specialist School	1
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- 4550

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0177

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

9-26-45

CONFIDENTIAL

MMIA-'G'
FILE: G/Dig/1
DATE: 28 APR 45

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

AG 353-ORG 26 April 1945

SUBJECT: Responsibility of Training--Italian Army

TO: Main Headquarters, Eighth Army, CMF
Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464, U.S. Army

1. The inclosed copy of letter, AFHQ, subject as above, dated 16 April 1945, file AG 353/131 GCT-O, is forwarded for your information.

2. In connection with paragraph 4, above mentioned letter, the Commanding General, Fifth Army and the General Officer Commanding, Eighth Army will have the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations and service units under command as for formations and units of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority or questions of general training policy will be referred to this Headquarters.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL CLARK:

1 Incl
Cy ltr AFHQ
16 Apr 45

W. J. HARRINGTON
Captain, AGD
Asst Adj General

Copies Furnished:
MMIA w/incl
DMT "

4549

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COPY

JC/lja

AP 577

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFO 512

AG 353/131 GCT-O

16 April 1945

SUBJECT: Responsibility of Training - Italian Army

TO: All Concerned

1. OBJECT The object of this instruction is to define the responsibility for the training of the Italian Army, less those troops maintained by US authorities (US - ITIS).

2. DMT, AFHQ Director of Military Training, Allied Force Headquarters will direct training in accordance with the policy laid down by SAC.

3. MMIA MMIA will control, and supervise the training of the Italian Army in accordance with the policy laid down by AFHQ, under the general direction of DMT. MMIA will be responsible for the following duties:

a. the transmission of Allied instructions to the Italian War Ministry in proper form.

b. advice and assistance to Italian War Ministry in the organization of training.

c. representation where necessary of Italian War Ministry's views to AFHQ.

d. supervision of training in Italian units and establishments, except those under command 15th Army Group, by the following means:

(1) through British Liaison units or training staffs where they exist.

(2) with the assistance of British administrative cadres where they exist; part of whose duties will therefore be the control of training.

(3) by direct contact with the Italian staff where no British staff exists.

e. the control and supervision of training of BRI-ITA service troops.

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4. 15th ARMY GROUP 15th Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations and service units under command as for formations and units of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority will be referred

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COPY

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by 15th Army Group direct to HQ MMIA. Any question of general training policy will be referred direct to AFHQ.

5. Specialist Training BR-ITI Service Troops. In view of the deficiencies of tradesmen in service units, MMIA will insure that adequate provision is made for the trade training of service troops subsequent to their basic training at the base depots.

6. LIST. COMDS. District, Area and Sub-Area commanders will not be responsible for the training of Italian troops (except insofar as local adm assistance can be provided) unless specifically ordered by AFHQ. They will, however, be prepared to assist MMIA in the training of service troops insofar as is possible.

7. ITALIAN AUTHORITIES. The implementation of training schemes, the provision, allocation and training of instructors will be the responsibility of the Italian War Ministry under the supervision of MMIA as in paragraph 3 above.

8. US - ITIS. Where the training of US-ITIS requires coordination with the Italian War Ministry, this will be done through MMIA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

/s/ Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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Subject : Trg Polic.

G/trg/1

To : G O C
From : GSO I Trg.

22 April 45

1. Specialist Trg at Depots : should this be arranged?

2. Gas Trg for Combat tps : should this be pressed forward?

---

1. (a) At RAVISCANIA, TRANI and ORVIETO very little trg at all takes place.

(b) AFHQ Directive lays down (para 5) "DRMA will insure that adequate provision is made for the trade trg of service tps subsequent to their basic trg at the base depots".

(c) Without setting up other organisations there can be no trade testing after leaving the depots and before being drafted to units. Therefore it would appear that such training must be done at the depots.

(d) Q(AG) state that the necessary eqpt could be made available.

(e) Specialist trg would be at the expence of basic trg (at present only 4 weeks and very necessary).

(f) Instructors would be required which would probably mean another claim on CESMO.

Query : Should steps be taken now to institute trade trg at depots?

2. (a) Gruppi have anti-gas eqpt on their G 1098 but don't know how to use it.

(b) A course has been run for them at CMTC which "has not completely attained its object in that it has not produced 25 first class Italian gas instructors." (CMTC report).

(c) DMT's propo[illegible] for a Gas trg team (1 Offr and 2 Sgt Instructors) was approved by the WE Committee here and forwarded to AMG on 12 April. No answer yet.

(d) From the unsuitable type of students sent by Gruppi to CMTC gas course it does not appear that Italian senior offrs are convinced of the necessity for gas trg. Without their wholehearted backing it is doubtful if such a small trg team could have much effect. Therefore a directive on a high level would be required.

Query : Is it the policy to press gas trg now?

16

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16

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Query : Is it the policy to press gas trg now?

rw

Lt Col
GS

4543

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0182

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MMIA - G1/Dig

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512
DATE: 9 APR 1945

G/Dig/1

LiFO Rets S/C

JC/lja.
AP 577

5702

AG 353/131 (CT-)

16 April 1945

SUBJECT: Responsibility of Training - Italian Army

TO: All Concerned

G (Dig)

18/4

1. OBJECT The object of this instruction is to define the responsibility for the training of the Italian Army, less those troops maintained by US authorities (US - TATS).

2. DMT, AFHQ Director of Military Training, Allied Force Headquarters will direct training in accordance with the policy laid down by SAC.

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a. the transmission of Allied instructions to the Italian War Ministry in proper form.

b. advice and assistance to Italian War Ministry in the organization of training.

c. representation where necessary of Italian War Ministry's views to AFHQ.

d. supervision of training in Italian units and establishments, except those under command 15th Army Group, by the following means:

(1) through British Liaison units or training staffs where they exist.

(2) with the assistance of British administrative cadres where they exist; part of whose duties will therefore be the control of training.

(3) by direct contact with the Italian staff where no British staff exists.

4545

e. the control and supervision of training of BRI-ITI Service troops.

4. 15th ARMY GROUP 15th Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations and service units under command as for formations and units of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority will be referred by 15th Army Group direct to HQ MMIA. Any question of general training policy will be referred direct to AFHQ.

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0183

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5. Specialist Training BR-ITI Service Troops. In view of the deficiencies of tradesmen in service units, MMIA will insure that adequate provision is made for the trade training of service troops subsequent to their basic training at the base depots.

6. DIST. COMDS. District, Area and Sub-Area commanders will not be responsible for the training of Italian troops (except insofar as local adm assistance can be provided) unless specifically ordered by AFHQ. They will, however, be prepared to assist MMIA in the training of service troops insofar as is possible.

7. ITALIAN AUTHORITIES. The implementation of training schemes, the provision, allocation and training of instructors will be the responsibility of the Italian War Ministry under the supervision of MMIA as in paragraph 3 above.

8. US - ITIS. Where the training of US-ITIS requires coordination with the Italian War Ministry, this will be done through MMIA.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

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SUBJECT : Training Directive

CONFIDENTIAL

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

G/Trg/1

TO : DMT, AFHQ.

12 Apr 45

Reference your DMT/87/MT.1 dated 8 Apr 45. Signal G/Trg/101 dated 10 Apr 45 refers.

I concur with the Directive - "Responsibility of Training Italian Army".

Major General
M.M.I.A.

/jtl

drafted by GOC

4544

0185

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115

SUBJECT: Training Directive

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CMF

Tel: 11667

DMT/87/MT1

8 Apr 45.

G. Trg
151

HQ M.M.I.A.

The enclosed draft Directive - Responsibility of Training Italian Army - has been agreed by all concerned at AFHQ.

Will you please forward your concurrence on receipt of which it will be issued.

Please treat as URGENT.

Brig.,
D.M.T.

Ref DMT/prole

I concur with a direction - Responsibility

4543

Major

3

APPENDIX 'A' TO DMT/87/MTM AMENDED DRAFT C O N F I D E N T I A L
Date 24 Mar 45.

RESPONSIBILITY OF TRAINING - ITALIAN ARMY.

1. OBJECT.

The object of this instruction is to define the responsibility for the training of the Italian Army, less those troops maintained by US authorities (US - ITIS).

2. D.M.T.

DMT will direct training in accordance with the policy laid down by SAC.

3. M.M.I.A.

MMIA will control, and supervise the training of the Italian Army in accordance with the policy laid down by AFHQ under the general direction of DMT.

MMIA will be responsible for the following duties:-

(a) the transmission of Allied instructions to the Italian War Ministry in proper form.

(b) advice and assistance to Italian War Ministry in the organisation of training.

(c) representation where necessary of Italian War Ministry's views to AFHQ.

(d) supervision of training in Italian units and establishments, except those under command 15 Army Group, by the following means:-

(i) through British Liaison units or training staffs where they exist.

(ii) with the assistance of British administrative cadres where they exist; part of whose duties will therefore be the control of training.

(iii) by direct contact with the Italian staff where no British staff exists.

(e) the control and supervision of training of BR-ITI Service troops.

4. 15 ARMY GROUP.

15 Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations and service units under command as for formations and units of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority will be referred by 15 Army Group direct to HQ MMIA. Any question of general training policy will be referred direct to AFHQ.

5. Specialist Training BR - ITI Service Troops.

In view of the deficiencies of tradesmen in Service Units, MMIA will ensure that adequate provision is made for the trade training of Service Troops subsequent to their basic training at the Base Depots.

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2. D.M.T.

DMT will direct training in accordance with the policy laid down by SAC.

3. M.M.I.A.

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(c) representation where necessary of Italian War Ministry's views to AFHQ.

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(ii) with the assistance of British administrative cadres where they exist; part of whose duties will therefore be the control of training.

(iii) by direct contact with the Italian staff where no British staff exists.

(e) the control and supervision of training of BR-ITI Service troops.

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15 Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations and service units under command as for formations and units of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority will be referred by 15 Army Group direct to HQ MMIA. Any question of general training policy will be referred direct to AFHQ. 4542 add

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6. DIST. COMDS.

District, Area and Sub-area commanders will not be responsible for the training of Italian troops (except in so far as local adm assistance can be provided) unless specifically ordered by AFHQ. They will however be prepared to assist MMIA in the training of Service Troops in so far as is possible. and

0187

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

7. ITALIAN AUTHORITIES.

The implementation of training schemes, the provision, allocation and training of instructors will be the responsibility of the Italian War Ministry under the supervision of MMIA as in para 3 above.

8. US - ITIS.

Where the training of US - ITIS requires co-ordination with the Italian War Ministry this will be done through MMIA.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

0189

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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SUBJECT: Training Directive.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
C/Trg/1
20 March 45

TO : D. .T. (3 copies)

Copy to: AFHQ for G-3 (Org)

1. The draft training directive for the Italian Army forwarded for comment in your D/T/87/ATI is agreed in principle, but it is considered that certain additional points should be included.

2. This is particularly the case in respect of the responsibility of 15 Army Group and the Districts. In the latter case I particularly wish para 6 to stand so as to cater for special cases such as Guard Battalions.

3. If you agree will you pass to AFHQ for approval and issue.

R. Brownrigg
Major General
M.M.I.A.

S/G/29/33

ok

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RESPONSIBILITY OF TRAINING - ITALIAN ARMY

1. OBJECT The object of this instruction is to define the responsibility for the training of the Italian Army, less those troops maintained by U.S. authorities (US-ITIS).

2. POLICY Training policy will be laid down by S.A.C. and made known by the issue of training directives.

3. D.M.T. D.M.T. will direct training in accordance with the policy laid down by S.A.C.

4. M.M.I.A. M.M.I.A. will control, and supervise the training of the Italian Army in accordance with the policy laid down by A.F.H.Q. under the general direction of D.M.T.

M.M.I.A. will be responsible for the following duties :-

(a) the transmission of Allied instructions to the Italian War Ministry in proper form.

(b) advice and assistance to Italian War Ministry in the organisation of training.

(c) representation where necessary of Italian War Ministry's views to A.F.H.Q.

(d) supervision of training in Italian units and establishments, except those under command 15 Army Group, by the following means :-

i. through British Liaison units or training staffs where they exist.
ii. with the assistance of British administrative cadres where they exist; part of whose duties will therefore be the control of training.
iii. by direct contact with the Italian staff where no British staff exists.

5. 15 ARMY GROUP. 15 Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations under command as for formations of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority will be referred by 15 Army Group direct to HQ M.M.I.A.

6. DIST. COMDS. District, Area and Sub-area commanders will not normally be responsible for the training of Italian troops (except in so far as local adm assistance can be provided) unless specifically ordered by AFHQ.

7. ITALIAN AUTHORITIES. The implementation of training schemes, the provision, allocation and training of instructors will be the responsibility of the Italian War Ministry under the supervision of M.M.I.A. as in para 4 above.

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(a) the transmission of Allied instructions to the Italian War Ministry in proper form.

(b) advice and assistance to Italian War Ministry in the organisation of training.

(c) representation where necessary of Italian War Ministry's views to A.F.H.Q.

(d) supervision of training in Italian units and establishments, except those under command 15 Army Group, by the following means :-

i. through British Liaison units or training staffs where they exist.
ii. with the assistance of British administrative cadres where they exist; part of whose duties will therefore be the control of training.
iii. by direct contact with the Italian staff where no British staff exists.

5. 15 ARMY GROUP. 15 Army Group has the same responsibility for the training of Italian formations under command as for formations of other national armies under command. Any matters necessitating reference to higher Italian military authority will be referred by 15 Army Group direct to HQ M.M.I.A.

6. DIST. COMDS. District, Area and Sub-area commanders will not normally be responsible for the training of Italian troops (except in so far as local adm assistance can be provided) unless specifically ordered by AFHQ.

7. ITALIAN AUTHORITIES. The implementation of training schemes, the provision, allocation and training of instructors will be the responsibility of the Italian War Ministry under the supervision of M.M.I.A. as in para 4 above.

8. US-ITAS. The training of Italian troops administered by U.S. authorities will be a U.S. responsibility, subject to any necessary coordination with War Ministry through M.M.I.A.

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SECRET

20

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

L. FORCES & C 2
2550 (J)

AP 230

13 March 1945

SUBJECT: Training of Italians in Gas Warfare - Directive.

6/TRG/3
~~S/S~~
Q

TO : 15 Army Group
56 B.L.U.
Italian Reinforcement Trg Centre, CESANO,
MMIA (for onward transmission to SMRE).

(5)(20-24)

1. Italian personnel of the Combat Groups and the Rft Trg Centre Italian Combat Force will be trained in defense against gas warfare to the standard required for British soldiers as outlined in "Gas Training, 1942" Section 2 para 1. This training will be included in the normal training programmes of all ranks.

2. The scale of personal anti-gas equipment will be as shown at Appendix 'A'.

3. (a) A special course is being organised at the Chemical Warfare School CHTC to train the necessary instructors.

(b) Personnel to attend this course will be drawn from Combat Groups and the Reinforcement Training Centre ICF.

(c) The number of vacancies allotted to each Combat Group and the Rft Trg Centre will be forwarded later together with joining instructions.

(d) A small trg team consisting of one officer and two senior NCOs is being formed and will be available to Combat Groups w.e.f. a date to be announced later.

4. On return to their units the Instructors trained at the CHTC will organise cadres of Junior leaders who will be trained to give unit instruction.

5. All respirators will be tested in a gas chamber as soon as possible after issue.

6. Extracts from "Gas Training 1942" are being translated and will be issued, when available, to all instructors.

By Command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER

spoke Barnes about obvious errors in above
he will put it right WP

W. D. MORGAN
Lieut.-Gen.,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: CW Section, AFHQ
D.M.T.
5 each addressee

M.M.I.A	R 15/3
FILE REF	10-Trg/6
Date Recd	14/3/45

SECRET

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Appendix 'A'

PERSONAL ANTI-GAS EQUIPMENT

The following personal anti-gas equipment must be carried by the man or in the vehicle in which he usually travels. It should accompany him if he becomes a casualty.

Respirator, complete	1
Ointment, (No3 or 5), 2 oz tin	1
Eyeshields	6
Cape	1
Cotton waste, oz	1
Detectors, gas, ground, pads of 25 (Officers and NCOs only)	1

0194

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SUBJECT: Training Directive

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CMF

Tel: 11667

DMT/87/MT1

14 Mar 45.

HQ M.M.I.A.

Reference meeting at MMIA on 12 Mar 45.

see alternative directive WP 18/3

1. Attached is a draft of the Training Directive defining the responsibilities of MMIA and DMT.

2. Will you please comment and return as soon as possible.

J. Brig.,
D.M.T.

NEOW/ho

MMIA
FILE: G/Trg/1
DATE: 17/3/45

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

110a

DRAFT

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Training (Italian Army)

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CMF

Tel:11667

DMT/87/MT1

14 Mar 45.

All Concerned

General

1. The object of this instruction is to define the division of responsibility for the training of BR-ITI forces as between DMT and MMIA.

2. MMIA will assume the responsibility for the training of all BR-ITI forces in CMF under the direction of DMT, CMF w.e.f. .... Mar 45.

DMT Responsibility

3. DMT will direct the training of all BR-ITI forces in accordance with the policy as indicated by the Chief of Staff AFHQ. This policy will be made known to MMIA by the issue of training directives as and when necessary.

MMIA Responsibility

4. MMIA will assume direct control of training of all BR-ITI forces in accordance with policy as laid down by DMT.

5. MMIA will be responsible for the following duties:-

A. To advise and assist the Italian Inspector General of Training to organize training at the Italian Rft Depots, Centres and Schools.

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B. It will control the British Training Increments to Depots, Centres and Schools and ensure training is carried out on the

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5. MMIA will be responsible for the following duties:-

A. To advise and assist the Italian Inspector General of Training to organize training at the Italian Rft Depots, Centres and Schools.

4536

It will control the British Training Increments to Depots, Centres and Schools and ensure training is carried out on the lines laid down by DMT.

B. To control the Training Increments with the Combat Groups when they are NOT under command 15 Army Group.

Brig.,
D.M.T.

NEOW/he

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

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