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
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INT/206/6 MONTHLY REPORTS - 6 BLU

Dec. 1945

202
205

Subject ; Monthly Routine Intelligence Summary.



G/2g/135
15/12

6 British Liaison Unit.

c/o 217 Area.

Tel : Vicksburg 119.

Ref : ~~11/12~~

12 Dec 45.

To : Land Forces Sub Comm. A. C.
H.Q. M.L.I.A. TOME.

1. Herewith No. 6 B.L.U. Monthly Intelligence Summary No.1.
2. Please acknowledge on substitute AF A16 below.

(K)

PDHP/jc
C.M.F.

G.S.O. II.
6 B.L.U.

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requested G/7 of 16 Nov 45
by ~~11/12~~

Wickham

12/12

17/12

15/12
G.S.O.

CONFIDENTIAL.

6 EPITISH LIAISON UNIT.

MONTHLY ROUTINE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 18

1. GENERAL REMARKS.

In view of the fact that the author of this summary has been only six days in the area of 6 Folgore Territorial Command, the report is of a necessarily limited character. It is hoped, however, that appreciation of this fact will not detract from the emphasis laid on the condition of the C.C.P.P. in this area;

2. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

The information contained in this report has been gained from the following sources :-

- (a) Commander & Staff, 6 Bol. Terr. Cmd.
- (b) Commander & Staff, 217 Area.
- (c) Commander Bologna Legion C.C.P.P.
- (d) Commander & Staff, 417 F.S. Section.

3. GENERAL IMPRESSION.

It is immediately noticeable that a state of careful watchfulness exists amongst the heads of Brit & Ital military orgs. in the command. It is generally felt that the C.C.P.P. in the command are not organised or equipped to meet the threat presented by the operation of gangs of armed terrorists in the area.

NOTE. At Appendix 'A' is attached a Statistical Note of the present state of the Carabinieri, to be read in conjunction with this para. & *see following.*

4. GAGGIA MOUNTANA INCIDENT.

This incident took place some time ago & has probably been heard of by all readers of this Summary. However a report of it is here included as representative of the problem facing the under equipped Carabinieri. At Gaggia Montana, a village in the province of Bologna, map ref L5517, on the evening of the 16th Nov 1945, a gang of some 40 - 50 terrorists made a raid. They held up the small post of 1 N.C.O. & 4 Carabinieri & systematically looted the village - remaining in it some six hours. During this time the bank was robbed of 150,000 lire, and many houses were entered and things of value removed from them. (NOTE. A similar incident to this, took place at SAVINIO

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5. MORALE OF CARABINIERE.

The carabinieri are split up into 330 posts each of from five to ten men in strength. Such posts cannot defend themselves against attack by groups of terrorists as large as the one referred to under para 4. If attacked they cannot depend for help on mobile patrols since there are none immediately

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available (see Appendix 'A' & state of Mobile Bn. transport for reasons). Their only communication, telephone, is subject to sabotage by terrorists. Consequently the carabinieri feel dominated generally it cannot be said that morale is high in the country posts.

6. CIVILIAN MORALE.

I have not had the opportunity to study this in detail or to make contacts and gain my own impressions. Reports, however from the four sources mentioned in this summary are that civilian morale is generally low amongst that section of the population that is not engaged in exploiting the lack of power in the hands of the police and C.C.T.R.. This for the reason that they cannot rely on the effective intervention of the police to prevent their being subject to terrorism.

7. SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS.

No concrete evidence is forthcoming at this level that the activities of terrorist gangs are being encouraged by any political party or organisation.

8. MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

There is however, that there is in existence a military organisation of the Communist party, centred on Bologna. Reports of its organisation are detailed; reports of its strength are vague; all are treated with reserve by 417 Field Security Section, in the absence of concrete evidence of their activity functioning, & efficiently enough to produce a military threat.

9. MORALE OF MILITARY UNITS.

Again under this heading, I have not had the opportunity to make the necessary visits & form my own impressions. It has been reported to me by HQ. 6 Territorial Command as satisfactory.

10. CONCLUSION.

It is felt by the commanders to whom I have spoken that there is no reason to believe there will be any improvement in morale in the carabinieri until they are organised & equipped to meet the existing menace of terrorists gangs. With improvements in the state of the carabinieri and a rise in their morale a corresponding rise can be expected in the civil population.

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6 E.L.U. MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

APPENDIX 'A'.

C.C.R.P. Groups, nos of inhabitants & sizes of areas controlled & covered by them, with vehicles available to them for this task.

C.C.R.P. GROUP.	NO. OF INHABITANTS.	AREA SQ. KILOM.	NO. OF VEHICLES.
BOLOGNA) (INTERNAL)	714,705	2,702.43	2 TRUCKS
BOLOGNA) (EXTERNAL)			4 VANS or <i>Cars</i> TRUCKS.
MODENA	467,555	2,699.95	2 TRUCKS 6 VANS or CARS
REGGIO			
EMILIA	375,288	2,291.34	1 TRUCK 2 VANS or CARS
FERRARA	381,299	2,628.49	2 TRUCKS 5 VANS or CARS 2 VANS or CARS NO TRUCKS.
RAVENNA	279,127	1,860.52	
FORLI	444,528	2,909.95	2 TRUCKS 3 VANS or CARS
MOBILE BR.			2 TRUCKS 1 VAN or CAR.
H.C.			1 TRUCK 2 VANS or CARS.

NOTE.

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The total of 58 officers and 3,252 OM's are divided between 330 independent posts.

The vehicles available are barely sufficient for maintenance of these posts.

At least 30 more vehicles are required immediately to enable the Carabinieri to organise mobile patrols, to plan & carry out raids, & to maintain a small reserve of vehicles in the hands of the mobile br with which to counter terrorist raids.

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