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No. 785020

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INT/209

MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS

3rd Cover

NOV. 1946

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Subject: NOTES ON THE RUSSIAN ARMY

SECRET

GSI GHQ CWF.

7/1/GSI

27 Nov. 46. 100/209

To: Adv Air HQ Italy	(1)
HQ MBIA	(1)
88 US Div	(8)
HQ RAAC	(1)
HQ 86 Area	(2)
HQ Naples Area.	(1)
HQ 218 Sub-Area.	(1)
C.S.D.I.C.	(1)

*Original
done
29/11
1200*

1. Copies of Notes on the Russian Army (as above) are forwarded for information.
2. In the case of 88 U.S. Div. these copies are in addition to those forwarded under this HQ letter LRP/TRG/1 dated 25 Nov. 46.

/IJ

*for: Lt. Col.
General Staff.*

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 88 US Div (5)
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 HQ 218 Sub-Area. (1)
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Opened
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THE RUSSIAN ARMY

SECRET

1. DEVELOPMENT.

When the GERMANS invaded RUSSIA in 1941, the Red Army was modelled on, and similar in organization to, the German Army. The disastrous defeats of the first season's campaigning persuaded the Russians that they must alter radically their organization and develop an army more suited to their national character and capabilities. It became evident that most Russian Commanders and staffs were not able to handle a combined force of all arms, owing to the lack of both general education and of the necessary military and technical background. Accordingly in the winter 1941/2 the Russian Inf Div was reduced from 15,000 men to a compact homogeneous force of 9,500 men and part of its arty withdrawn to the central pool. The Corps were abolished and Tk Divs reduced to Tk Bdes. Meanwhile great attention was paid to intensive training of commanders and staff officers. Vast quantities of equipment, incl two thirds of their gun strength, were lost by the Russians in the first weeks of the German invasion, and it became an imperative necessity to remove the majority of remaining tanks and guns from divisional control and concentrate them for the defence of MOSCOW and Leningrad. This policy proved successful in saving MOSCOW and in the limited counter-offensive that followed, and in it may be traced the origin of GIG pool. As new guns and other heavy weapons were produced in increasing quantities by the factories, only a small proportion was allotted to Div Arty Regts the remainder being forced into independent Bdes and Regts and retained under GIG control. By the end of the war the great majority of heavy weapons were included in the GIG Pool which contained Guards Breachthrough Bde Regts, Arty Divs, M. Destroyer Bdes, 120 mm mortar Bdes, Rocket Projector Divs, SP Arty Regts and Flakthrower Bns. These reservoirs of firepower were allotted to Army Groups in accordance with the overall plan, and concentrated in overwhelming force at decisive points of the front.

Russia's losses in trained inf had also been enormous and there was insufficient time and resources for adequate training of replacements. The quality of inf Divs inevitably suffered, and it was only Russia's vast reserves of manpower that enabled her to surmount this defect. Henceforth the Russian inf was formidable more by virtue of its numbers than of its skill. Tactical doctrine emphasised the importance of courage, endurance and determination in close quarter fighting --- qualities it may be noted which particularly distinguish the Slav peasant --- rather than the value of tactical skill and training. Offensives tended to develop into massed frontal attacks with little attempt at use of ground, defence into massed hand struggles to the last man. To compensate for the inf div's loss of part of its arty, it was given a generous allotment of close range weapons, especially mortars, anti-tank rifles and SMGs. Meanwhile the infantrymen's morale was not neglected: the Soviets learned from the mistakes of the Tsars. The elaborate

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Vast quantities of equipment, incl two thirds of their gun strength, were lost by the Russians in the first week of the German invasion, and it became an imperative necessity to remove the majority of remaining tanks and guns from divisional control and concentrate them for the defence of MOSCOW and LENINGRAD. This policy proved successful in saving MOSCOW and in the limited counter-offensive that followed, and in it way he traced the origin of GQG pool. As new guns and other heavy weapons were produced in increasing quantities by the factories, only a small proportion was allotted to Div Arty Regts the remainder being forced into independent Bdes and Regts and retained under Hq control. By the end of the war the great majority of heavy weapons were included in the GQG pool which contained Guards Breakthrough Bk Regts, Arty Divs, M Destroyer Bn, 120 mm mortar Bns, Rocket Projector Divs, SP Arty Regts and Flame-thrower Bns. These reserves of firepower were allotted to Army Groups in accordance with the overall plan, and concentrated in overwhelming force at decisive points of the front.

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- 2 -

While accepting the deterioration in quality of the ordinary infantry, the Russians had been building up a body of line troops for future offensives. Certain infantry divisions which have distinguished themselves, were upgraded to Guard Rifle Divs, given a slightly stronger establishment in men and weapons, and then forwarded given priority of the younger and more intelligent recruits. (It may be noted that Guards Rifle Divs are not the only "guards" units in the Red Army. Guards Rifle Corps, Guards Armies and Guard Cavalry Divs, to name only a few have been identified. In these cases however the title "Guards" appears only to be a little honour and implies no significant alteration in establishment or equipment. Guardsmen receive double the rate of pay of the ordinary infantry, as well as a higher ration scale). At the same time all ideas were grouped, together with infantry and armor, into Rifle Corps and Mechanized Corps. These elite Guards Rifle and Mechanized units were carefully nursed. The ordinary infantry were expected to hold the line for indefinite periods, to break the back of any enemy attack and when the time came, to pursue the enemy for vast distances on foot, living of the land and with little, or no, heavy support; the elite units at the end of each major operation were withdrawn from the line, possibly for several months, to train, rest and refit, then grouped together with the necessary weapons from the GVA Pool into powerful Rifle or Shock Armies and used in overwhelming force in decisive actions in a major offensive or counter attack.

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II. ORGANIZATION

The org of a Russian Rifle Div (i.e., inf div) is set out at Appx 'A'. Here it will suffice to mention the following points.

- (a) In other armies, the Russian Rifle Div is based on the INF section of 9 men. However in a Russian rifle pl, two sees have two IMs each, while the other two have one each.
- (b) The INF is the most common personal weapon in the Russian Army and there are over two thousand in the Rifle Div. The large number of A PK rifles will also be noted.
- (c) Attention is drawn to the preponderance of close range up weapons. While there are only 36 pieces of 81 Arty in the Div, the number of inf guns and med and ht mortars is far higher than in the British Inf Divs. The 81mm mortar two of which are held by each rifle coy, is obsolescent and will probably be scrapped.
- (d) During the war, the 45mm A PK gun was the standard piece. It seems now that the Russians are seeking to substitute this with the 57mm A PK gun in the Rifle Div and with sp 76mm guns in the div A PK bn.
- (e) The rifle div is weak in recon elements. Nothing corresponding to the recon Regt of a British Inf Div exists --- only a weak recon coy in the Rifle Div and a small mtz recon pl in each Rifle Regt. Regt SSG Coy however is also employed for recon.
- (f) Much of the work carried out by the Div Bn is of an improvised nature and lack of bridging equipment does not prevent the Inf from crossing a river on makeshift bns and rafts constructed from local timber logs and even barrels.
- (g) The Rifle Div is in bad luck throughout and contains only 140 motor vehs. The Inf are taught to be independent of their tot and are expected to satisfy their requirements for food and accn of the land, at least in the advance. If necessary, farm carts are pressed into service. This makeshift system has undoubted advantages in the undeveloped wastes of Eastern Europe, where the few roads are impossible to use for several months in the year. Although the overall strength of a Russian Rifle Div is only about half that of a British Inf Div the Russians succeed in economising so drastically on services and supporting tps that the fighting strength of the Russian Rifle Regt is about equivalent to that of a British Bde.

The difference in establishment of the Guards Rifle Div have not sufficient to warrant its description in detail. Suffice it to say that the Guards Rifle

- section of 9 men. However in a Russian rifle pl, two men have two LMGs each, while the other two have one each.
- (14) The SR is the most common personnel weapon in the Russian Army and there are over two thousand in the Rifle Div. The large number of LMG rifles will also be noted.
- (c) Attention is drawn to the preponderance of close range weapons while there are only 36 pieces of 81 Arty in the Div, the number of inf guns and med and heavy mortars is far higher than in the British Inf Div. The 81mm mortar two of which are held by each rifle coy, is obsolescent and will probably be scrapped.
- (d) During the war, the 81mm LMG gun was the standard piece. It seems now that the Russians are seeking to substitute this with the 97mm LMG gun in the Rifle Div and a small med piece pl in each Rifle Bn. 81mm SR Coy however is also employed for peace.
- (e) Much of the work carried out by the Div Bn is in an improvised nature and lack of bridging equipment does not prevent the Red Army from crossing a river on makeshift bns and rafts constructed from local timber logs and even barrels.
- (f) The Rifle Div is horse-drawn throughout and contains only 140 motor vehicles. The Inf are taught to be independent of their transport and are expected to satisfy their requirements for fuel and food of the land, at least in the advance. If necessary, farm carts are pressed into service. This makeshift system has undoubted advantages in the undeveloped wastes of Eastern Europe, where the few roads are impassable owing to mud for several months in the year. Although the overall strength of the Russian Rifle Div is only about half that of a British Inf Div the Russians succeed in economizing so drastically on services and supporting troops that the fighting strength of the Russian Rifle Bn is about equivalent to that of a British Bn.

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The difference in establishment of the Guards Rifle Div have not sufficient to warrant its description in detail. Suffice it to say that the Guards Rifle Div is stronger than the Rifle Div by 1000 men and has a higher fire power, particularly in automatic weapons.

Both the Russian 81 Corps and the Mechanized Corps in spite of their misleading title of "Corps" may be considered as roughly equivalent to a British Army Div. The 81 Corps contains three rifle brigades each of 63 battalions and one motor rifle brigade, and owing to its high proportion of the to inf, it is suitable for use in conjunction with Rifle Divs. The Mechanized Corps is a stronger and more balanced formation, with a total strength of 10,000 men as opposed to the 81 Corps 10,000, and is more suited to operate independently; it contains three motor rifle brigades and one tank brigade, but each of its motor rifle brigades includes some 30 - 40 tanks;

its total strength is therefore about 100 -- equal to that of the AT 3 mm gun and one coaxial MG; it may be remembered that it was on the Russian T34 motorised and are well equipped with supporting weapons incl two 82 mm mortar. It is Soviet practice to include an inf element armed with 82 mm, in each of the these inf rids into battle on the day, one sec to each tk.

The org of the Russian T34 Corps is given at app 11.

It is only necessary to mention one other type of Russian tank - the Guards Breakthrough Tank. These are independent units allotted by GQG to attacks on prepared enemy def lines. They are equipped with twenty-two 82 mm one coaxial and two other MGs, and protected by an average of 100mm of armour on the turret and 50-75mm on the hull and superstructure.

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... of the strength is therefore about 100 --- equal to that of the M-109. Both types of gun are equipped with the "P34/35" medium tank mounting on 55mm gun and are coaxial M2; it may be remembered that it was on the Russian M24 that the Germans modelled their M48 tank. Both types of gun are fully motorised and are well equipped with supporting weapons incl two 81mm mortar. It is Soviet practice to include an inf element armed with 81mm in each tank; these inf ride into battle on the tank, one 81mm to each tank.

The org of the Russian M-109 is given at App. B.

It is only necessary to mention one other type of Russian tank - the Guards breakthrough tank. These are independent units allotted by M24 to Army Groups or Divs, or sometimes placed under command of M-109 for deliberate attacks on prepared enemy def lines. They are equipped with twenty-one 105mm M24 by 4 km - master equipments weighing 50 tons, armed with a 122mm gun, one coaxial and two other 122mm, and protected by an armour of 100mm of armour on the turret and 50-75mm on the hull and superstructure.

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III THE AIR DIVISION

First - hand up-to-date info on Russian tactics is not available. What follows is only a conjectured lay-out of a Russian Rifle Div in defence and is intended to give some indication of the fire which would be brought to bear against an enemy tk and inf attack on a Russian Rifle Bn.

We will assume that 105 NOVOSIBIRSK Rifle Div has been given a four-mile sector of a quiet front to hold, and has been allotted one to of a Rocket Projector Bn (with four 60mm rocket projectors) from the 2nd Pool to assist in carrying out its tasks. (Here it may be noted that in a really quiet sector a Russian Rifle Div could probably hold a much wider front; if it were in a sector where an enemy attack was expected, it would most likely be supported by a more generous allotment of weapons from the CHD Pool). 105 Rifle Div is holding this sector with two Regts ap, 67 Rifle Regt on the left, 68 Rifle Regt on the right, with roughly equal frontages. 69 Rifle Regt and the Div A Tk Bn, equipped with twelve 81mm 76mm A Tk Guns compose the Div reserve.

67 Rifle Regt is holding its sector with all three Bns up and has been allotted one rocket projector section, with two 60mm rocket projectors. The Regt 3MG Coy, Engr Pl and Htd Repce Pl - a total of 140 men - compose the regt reserve. 2 Bn, holding the centre of the regt front, has a frontage of 1100 yds and has been allotted one pl of the regt A Tk Coy (with two 57mm A Tk guns) and one pl of the regt A Tk Rifle Coy (with nine A Tk rifles). It has two coys up and one in reserve. The enemy tk and inf attack is being made in daylight and has as its objective the fo lure held by the two fwd coys of 2 Bn.

Some 6-8000 yds in front of the Russian FDLs would be under fire from the Div Arty, consisting of twenty four 76.2mm fd guns, firing a 13 lb shell, and twelve 122, hows, firing a 48 lb shell. The Russians are reported to make good gunners and their DP would probably be well organised and co-ordinated.

At 5-6000 yds from the FDLs, the attacking enemy would come under fire from the four 76.2mm inf guns, also firing a 13 lb shell, of the Regt 1 Inf Gun Coy. At 4-5000 yds the six 120, mortars of the Regt 1 Mortar Coy would join in, firing 35 lb bombs.

These weapons were considered so effective by the Germans that they made great use of captured ones and later produced an identical mortar of their own.

At 2-3000 yds the defensive fire would be thickened by the two rocket projectors, each firing a salvo of thirty-six 15 lb bombs. The KATYUSHAs, as the rocket projector is nicknamed, is very popular with the Russians and the combination of the whine of its projectiles passing through the air, the trail of fire following each bomb and the prodigious blast of their explosion, no doubt have a highly demoralising effect. The weapon however has one disadvantage: after firing one salvo it takes about ten minutes to reload.

At 2-3000 yds 2 Bn's nine 82mm mortars firing 7 1/2 lb bombs, could open fire and at 2000 yds these could be joined by the eighteen 82mm

most likely be supported by a more generous allotment of weapons from the CMG Pool). 105 Rifle Div is holding this sector with two regts ap, 67 Rifle Regt on the left, 68 Rifle Regt on the right, with roughly equal frontages. 69 Rifle Regt and the Div Artillery, equipped with twelve 82mm A Tk guns compose the Div reserve.

67 Rifle Regt is holding its sector with all three bns up and has been allotted one rocket projector section, with two 80mm rocket projectors. The Regt's SMG Coy, Engr Pl and Std Recce Pl - a total of 180 men - compose the regt's reserve. 2 Bn, holding the centre of the regt's front, has a frontage of 1100 yds and has been allotted one pl of the regt's A Tk Coy (with two 57mm A Tk guns) and one pl of the regt's 82mm Rifle Coy (with nine A Tk rifles). It has two coys up and one in reserve. The enemy tk and inf attack is being made in daylight and has as its objective the feature held by the two and coys of 2 Bn.

Some 6-8000 yds in front of the Russian HLLs would be under fire from the Div Arty, consisting of twenty four 76.2mm fd guns, firing a 15 lb shell, and twelve 122, hows, firing a 48 lb shell. The Russians are reported to make good runners and their DF would probably be well organized and co-ordinated.

At 5-6000 yds from the HLLs, the attacking enemy would come under fire from the four 75, 2mm inf guns, also firing a 15 lb shell, of the Regt's Inf Gun Coy. At 4-5000 yds the six 120, mortars of the Regt's Mortar Coy would join in, firing 35 lb bombs.

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At 2-3000 yds 2 Bn's nine 82mm mortars firing 7 1/2 lb bombs, could open fire and at 2000 yds these could be joined by the eighteen 82mm mortars of the two adjacent bns. At about 2000 yds the MG DF might start and 2 Bn's twelve MGs probably supported by some of the 100 DF of the bns on either flank, could fire across the bn front, each at the rate of 500 rds a minute.

It is unlikely that A Tk fire would be opened at a range of more than 500 yds. When the enemy tks came within this range they might be engaged by two 57mm A Tk guns and two 45mm A Tk guns: it is estimated that the former gun would penetrate about 90mm (3 1/2 ins) of homogeneous armour at 30 degrees at this range, and the latter about 72mm (2.8 ins).

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At 2-300 yds the 18 PMs of each bn coy would join in. But the attack would have their earliest task when they finally reached the Russian positions. Here their inf would be met by concentrated 82mm fire and their tanks by fire from up to eighteen 14.5mm AT rifles. The Russians lay much stress on the importance of holding a tank rifle fire till the enemy tank is within 10 yds and of disabling it by concentrated close range fire or grenades.

If the enemy succeeded in gaining their objective, the Russians could launch an immediate counter attack in the coy str - that is, with the res coy of 2 bn and the regt res (2nd Coy, 2nd Pl and 2nd Pl). If these failed the Div Comd might decide to make a deliberate counter attack within the next 24 hrs with the divisional res - 59 Rifle Regt with under command the twelve SP 76mm AT tanks (these guns penetrate 115 mm (4.3ins) of armour at 300 yds) and perhaps up to 34 T-34s, for even on quiet sectors of the front it is Russian practice to hold the reserves under army comd 40 - 50 miles behind the front. This attack would be supported by the div arty, by the tp of four rocket projectors, and by the combined mortars and inf guns of 67 and 82 mm, aided by those of 50 Regt - a maximum of twelve 76.2mm inf guns, eighteen 120 mortars and fifty-four 82mm mortars.

If this deliberate counter attack failed it is unlikely that the Russians would attempt another one. In 1944/5 the Russians surrendered large areas to the attacking Germans with apparent equanimity, and eventually launched a counter offensive in great strength against the base of the German penetration.

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(a) General

Russian tactics in the pursuit have in the past been conditioned by the inadequacy of the air network in Eastern Europe. In most areas, since the few who are no better than cart tracks and became completely incapable to get out to and in Spring and autumn, inf on foot can advance at a better pace than motorized troops. The employment of a Mechanized Corps in the pursuit such as is described below, must therefore be considered a rarity. Even when the pursuit was carried out by air dives, the Russians often experienced difficulty in ensuring that the Dive or arms kept up. Suvorov was laid on the importance of inf relying on their own weapons and continuing the pace of the advance without waiting for their sp weapons. Suvorov's maxim, "On, on" the head cannot wait for the tail, was widely repeated and approved. Supply problems were eased by the infantry's habit of living off the country.

(b) Mach Corps in the Pursuit

If the Russians were advancing on a road fit for armour and if it is to be expected that they would employ a Mech Corps. Each Rifle Bde advancing on one or might expect the following allotment of Corps sq weapons :-

Two bus stop is party rest (10 to 5000 rupees)

7/27/2014 10:40 AM

Three Six-Inch Destroyer Regt (Twelve 7.2mm tower & the guns)

One bn, Corps Mortar Regt (Fifteen 120mm mortars)

One to Rocket Projectors (Four rocket salvo projectors)

The Mech Rifle like sand night then make the following diagram on the
 tps under his sand :

Recess Element

Recco City, Inc.
Koch Rifle Dds

Advance Guard
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{and C-11 (10 and 05)} \\ \text{and Recce-11 (5 and 05) carrying} \\ \text{and Recce-11 (2 and 05) carrying} \end{array} \right. \text{vshs}$$

There is not much more

MC-007 (9, 11, 13)

Not Riffa Da

Aik Gun Coy (Form 57)

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(b) Mech Corps in the Pursuit

If the Russians were advancing on a road fit for armour and if it is to
be expected that they would employ a Mech Corps. Mech Rifle Bde advancing
on one rd might expect the following allotment of Corps sp weapons :-

- Two tps SP rd arty regt (10 SP 82mm guns)
- Two tps SP mod arty regt (10 SP 122mm guns)
- Three tps Mk Destroyer Regt (Twelve 76.2mm towed Lk guns)
- One bn, Corps Mortar Regt (Eighteen 120mm mortars)
- One ty Rocket Projectors (Four rocket salvo projectors)

The Mech Rifle Bde Comd might then make the following disposal of the
tps under his comd :

Reece Element

Reece Coy of
Mech Rifle Bde

- { 1st Bn (10 Lk and 03) vehs
- { 1st Bn (5 Lk) to carrying//
- { 1st Bn (2 Lk) to carrying vehs

Advance Guard

Mot Rifle Bn

- { Three Mot rifle coys
- { MG Coy (9 MGs)
- { 4 Lk Gun Coy (Four 57mm Lk guns)
- { Mortar Coy (Six 82mm mortars)
- { 4 Lk Rifle Coy (13 Lk rifles)

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(c) Inf Div in the Pursuit.

On parts of the front where no need exists, the pursuit would be carried out by inf divs. The first task to make contact with the enemy would probably be the Div Recon Coy (of 74 men), the Recon Bn and Recon Pls (each of 12 horsemen) and the Recon Sq Coy (each of 100 men armed with SMGs). Once contact has been made, numerous inf patrols, of between eight and 21 strength, would probe the enemy line in search of gaps or weak points. Once a weak point had been found, an attack in maximum strength - probably by two rifle regts - would be launched on a narrow front. This attack might be badly co-ordinated and unsupported by arty or tanks; the aim would be to 'bounce' the enemy line by a speedy show of force, rather than to wait and lay on a well organized attack; if the Div arty had been unable to keep up the pace of the advance, the attack would be supported by mortars and perhaps rocket projectors only.

If these div attacks failed to penetrate the enemy line at any point, the Russians would probably wait a few days until the Div arty and tanks were available, and would then launch a well co-ordinated attack with tanks. It may be noted that none of this, since they are to heavy for the normal Russian div or military brigade, are virtually precluded from taking part in pursuit.

Once the enemy line has been penetrated, the Russians exploit with the greatest boldness and energy, with the, if available and cavalry. Cavalry are employed not in the attack, but to pass through when a gap has been made in the enemy line and seize some important centre of communications 50 miles in the enemy's rear, bypassing opposition on the way. In the vast needless stretches of Southern Russia they are particularly well adapted to this task. Whenever possible they are accompanied by the tank and self-propelled guns. The Russians however are well aware of, and particularly sensitive to, their cavalry's vulnerability to air attack.

IV. THE COMBAT AND COORDINATE DIV IN THE ACTION

The info is available of the actual grouping and tactics employed by the Red Army in its massive offensive of the last two years of the war. What follows is an attempt to deduce from our knowledge of Russian organization and principles how a specimen attacking force might be grouped for a major attack on a prepared enemy defense line.

We will assume that a Shock Army has been formed to attack a certain sector of the enemy front. This Shock Army comprises 26 ATILINERD AK Corps, 15 and 21 Mechanized Corps, and 4, 5, and 92 AKs Rifle Divs, and has been allotted from the GIK Pool one Breakthrough Army Div, four Cds Breakthrough Tk Regts, two 1st Gun Regts and 17. 9th Mortar Regts (which are equipped with rocket projectors).

26 AK Corps with under command 44 Cds Rifle Div, two Cds Breakthrough Tk Regts and one SF Army Regt, is attacking a frontage of 2000 yds. It has divided this frontage between two roughly equal task forces. The attacking two have been concentrated over a period of weeks with the greatest secrecy in woods behind the Russian lines, and every care has been taken to ensure that the enemy do not suspect that they are engaged by anything more than the ordinary Rifle Div which has held this sector of the front for the past five months. If the enemy knows who covered by a minefield this would be gaped by an enemy task force - possibly a specialist highly trained unit from the GIK Pool - on the night D-1/2. For the preliminary barrage, all by mortars, rocket projectors and arty (incl inf guns) in the way would be prepared together under the Army Arty Comd; this barrage therefore would be fired by 24 by guns, 256 med guns, 220 ft and inf guns, 2. rocket projectors and 24.6 120mm mortars.

Each of the two task forces, attacking on a front of 1000 yds, might carry out the attack in three waves, the composition of each being as follows:

1st Wave

One Cds Breakthrough Tk Regt

2nd Wave

Two Cds Rifle Divs
Two Tk Regts
Two 1st Gun Regts

21 JOURNAL ENEMY by the

Fighting Strength 1500 men
42 1546
Night of 7.2pm 1 Tk Regt

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in red, for exploitation and consolidation, the Tk Corps Comd would have -

One Tk Regt

organization and principles how a specimen attacking force might be grouped for a major attack on a prepared enemy defence line.

We will assume that a Shock Army has been formed to attack a certain sector of the enemy front. This Shock Army comprises 26 GRENADERS at Corps, 15 and 21 Mechanized Corps, and 4 and 92 Old Rifle Divs, and has been allotted from the GVO Pool one Breakthrough Artillery Div, four Old Rifle Divs, two Artillery Divs and 17 Old Mortar Regts (which are equipped with rocket projectors).

25 Old Corps with under command 44 Old Rifle Div, two Old Breakthrough Artillery Divs and one SP Artillery Regt, is attacking a frontage of 2000 yds. It has divided this frontage between two roughly equal tank forces. The attacking tanks have been concentrated over a period of weeks with the greatest secrecy in woods behind the Russian lines, and every one has been taken to ensure that the enemy do not suspect that they are opposed by anything more than the ordinary Rifle Div which has held this sector of the front for the past five months. If the enemy bases were covered by a minefield this would be gaped by an enemy tank force - possibly a specialist highly trained unit from the GVO Pool - on the night D-4/5. For the preliminary barrage, all the mortars, rocket projectors and Artillery (incl. inf. guns) in the Army would be grouped together under the Artillery Div; this barrage therefore would be fired by 24 Artillery Divs, 256 mortars, 220 inf. guns, 64 rocket projectors and 246 120mm mortars.

Each of the two tank forces, attacking on a front of 1000 yds, might carry out the attack in three waves, the composition of each being as follows:

1st Wave

One Old Breakthrough Artillery Regt

2nd Wave

- Two Old Rifle Divs
- Two Artillery Divs
- Two Artillery Divs

21 JUNE 50. LHM by the

Estimated Strength 1500 men
42 154s
Eight 75.2mm Artillery Guns

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in res. for exploitation and consolidation, the Artillery Corps Command would have -

- One Artillery Div
- One Artillery Div
- One Old Rifle Div
- One Old Rifle Div
- One Destroyer Regt (24 x 75.2mm Artillery Guns, not)
- Two SP Artillery Divs (20 SP Artillery Guns and 20 SP Artillery Guns)

- 10 -

Th. Can

Two tps SP fl arty

One Th, Th Destroyed Regt

Coy of 21st Mortar Bn

Coy of Corps Mortar Bn

Tp Rocket Projectors

10 25mm

10 SP 85mm guns

Four 76.2mm towed 1. Th guns

Six 82mm mortars

Six 120mm mortars

Four rocket projectors

Main Body

Two Hot Rifle Bn

Mech Rifle Bde HQ

Bde Sp Armd

Th Regt less one sqn

Two tps SP med arty

Two Tps Th Destroyer Regt

Corps Mortar Bn, less one coy

(Mortar Bn, less one coy (6x82mm mortars
2x120mm mortars))
(Arty Bn (12 x 76.2mm fl guns))
(1 Th Rifle Coy (27 x Th Rifles)
SMB Coy (94 mm, 88 S&Ws))

31 T34s

(Ten SP 122mm gun)

(Eight 76.2mm 1. Th guns)

(Twelve 120mm mortars)

ORG OF A RIFLED DIV

DIV HQ

Recce Coy (74 men) Rifle Regt (2433 men) Rifle Regt Rifle Regt Arty Regt MMG Regt Engr Bn A Tk Bn
 (280 men)
 36 A Tk guns
 12 x 45mm A Tk
 or
 12 x S.U. 7
 Arty Bn Arty Bn Arty Bn
 (each Bn — 8 x 76.2 mm rd guns
 4 x 122 mm hows

Htd Recce Pl (12 horsemen) Engr Pl (20 men) Sn Bn Bn MMG Coy (100 men 100 MGs) A Tk Rifle Coy (27 A Tk Rifles) Inf Gen Coy (4 x 76mm inf guns) A Tk Coy (6 x 45mm A Tk or 6 x 57mm A Tk

Rifle Coy Rifle Coy Rifle Coy MMG Coy Mortar Coy A Tk Rifle Pl A Tk tp
 (9 MMGs) (9 x 82mm mortars) (9 A Tk Rifles) (2 x 45mm A Tk guns)

Rifle Pl Rifle Pl Rifle Pl Mortar Pl MG Sec
 (2 x 50mm mortars) (1 MG)

Sec (9 men) Sec Sec Sec
 (Each 2 MGs) (Each 1 MG)

DIVAL WEAPONS

12 x 122mm hows
 24 x 76.2mm rd guns
 12 x 76mm inf guns
 21 x 120mm mortars
 83 x 82mm mortars
 56 x 50mm mortars
 48 x 45mm OR (18 x 4
 A Tk guns (18 x 5
 16 x 12.7mm AAGs (12 x 6
 494 MGs

ORG OF A RIFLED DIV

Appx "A"

DIV HQ

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Regt (men)	Rifle Regt	Rifle Regt	Arty Regt	LANG Regt	Engr Bn	A Tk Bn	Sigs Bn	Services
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Arty Bn	Arty Bn	Arty Bn	(28) men 36 A Tk guns 12 x 45mm A Tk guns or 12 x S.U. 76 SP guns
(each Bn — 8 x 76.2 mm fd guns 4 x 122 mm hows)			

Engr Pl (20 men)	Bn	Bn	Bn	MG Coy (100 men 100 MGs)	A Tk Rifle Coy (27 A Tk Rifles)	Inf Gun Coy (4 x 76mm inf guns)	A Tk Coy (6 x 45mm A Tk guns or 6 x 57mm A Tk guns)	Hy mortar Coy (7 x 120mm mortars)
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Coy	Rifle Coy	MG Coy (9 MGs)	Mortar Coy (9 x 82mm mortars)	A Tk Rifle Pl (9 A Tk Rifles)	A Tk tp (2 x 45mm A Tk guns)
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Pl	Rifle Pl	Mortar Pl (2 x 50mm mortars)	MG Sec (1 MG)
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
Sec	Sec	Sec
	(Each 1 MG)	

TOTAL WEAPONS

12 x 122mm hows	
24 x 76.2mm fd guns	
12 x 76mm inf guns	
21 x 120mm mortars	
83 x 82mm mortars	
56 x 50mm mortars	
48 x 45 mm A Tk guns	(18 x 45mm A Tk guns)
18 x 12.7mm AAMGs	(18 x 57mm A Tk guns)
494 MGs	(12 x SU 76 SP guns)
	111 MGs
	2110 MGs
	312 A Tk rifles

ORG 446 P A T K CORPS

CORPS HQ



WEAPONS AND

198 T34 tks
 40 SP guns
 12 x 76.2mm fd gun
 42 x 120 mm mortar
 8 Rocket projec
 24 x 37mm AA guns
 24 x 76mm A Tk gun
 24 x 45mm A Tk gun


Total Strengths (approx)
 10,500 all ranks

- NOTES (1) The Corps is fully mot throughout.
 (2) The org of the HQ Bn is not known, but it is presumed that the
 bn is used for recon.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE CORPS

Appx 'B'

CORPS HQ



WEAPONS AND EQUIP

198 T34 tks
 40 SP guns
 12 x 76.2mm fd guns
 42 x 120 mm mortars
 8 Rocket projectors eqpts
 24 x 37mm AA guns
 24 x 76mm A Tk guns
 24 x 55mm A Tk guns

Total Strengths (approx) :
 10,500 all ranks

Corps is fully mot throughout.
 Org of the HC En is not known, but it is presumed that the
 used for recon.

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