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ACC

10000/120/5025

INT/222/1

0680

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

10000/120/5025

INT/222/1

PROVISION OF MIL. INFO ON ITALIAN ARMY -
TO FOREIGN GOVTS

OCT. 1944 - APR. 1946

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

Ref: 631/27/EC.23rd April 1946.SUBJECT: Italian Armed Forces - Requests
for Information.TO : Director,
Navy Sub-Commission
Land Forces Sub-Commission
Air Force Sub-Commission.

1. You will remember that some weeks ago we discussed a draft directive on information on the Italian Armed Forces which could be passed to the French and USSR Representatives of the Allied Commission. Last month I sent an agreed draft to ANIC who have approved the contents but in view of the delicate nature thereof have directed me to convey to the Directors of the Service Sub-Commissions orally this statement of policy and to maintain one written record only in my own files. This is to save embarrassment to the United States and United Kingdom Governments in case the directive should fall into wrong hands.

2. I should be glad, at any time, to show you the directive if you will call in at my office.

M. S. Lush.
Brigadier,
Acting Chief Commissioner.

MML/TC.

TOP SECRET.

RECE

1/4/46

3687

Ref: 631/MC.

30. March 1946.

(28)

SUBJECT: Italian Armed Forces - Requests
for information.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

G. Inv. Lush

1. The question of what to show and what not to show to the French and USSR Representatives on the Commission causes great concern to the Directors of the Service Sub-Commissions. AFHQ and CCS directives are explicit that the Representatives should be given information on all aspects of the work of the Commission. The Chief of Staff, however, in his letter of 8th November 1945 (copy attached), addressed to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), was more restrictive.

2. In an effort to meet the views of all authorities and the desires of the French and USSR Representatives, and to protect the interests of the Italian Armed Forces, the attached draft directive has been prepared.

3. I should be glad to have your concurrence.

For the Chief Commissioner:

M. G. LUSH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

REL/JG.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MMIA) ✓
Navy Sub-Commission
Air Force Sub-Commission } Reference Land Forces
S/C letter INT/222/1
dated 18 Feb 46.

PA TO GOC

DEP COMD

COL A/Q

B.G.S.

GSO I(SD)

GSO I(TAG)

A.A.G.

A.Q.M.G.

GSO II(1)

Please see Folio's 26 and 27,
for information.

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET 27

Ref: 8252/268/EC

4 MAR 1946
2483

2 March 1946

SUBJECT: Information - Italian Army.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (MCLA).

G Int
notes

RECEIVED

Ref your Int/222 dated 16 Jan 46.

Attached is a copy of the reply received from AFHQ.

For the Chief Commissioner,

EJB *John*
Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

*Still not what we want - particularly
to take so. We want Folio 24/1
approved - particularly if
USAR + FRANCE. But ex. com
to write to AFHQ again.*

A.B.

*Folio 24/1 approved with some
modifications by Ex Commissioner will be signed*

On 13 & 14 March 1 sent to us

11 Mar

12 Mar.

AIDV

SECRET

26

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 091.711-1 Italy

26 February 1946

SUBJECT: Information on Italian Army

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
A.P.O. 394

Reference your 8252/255/EC dated 19 January 1946.

1. Dissemination of information concerning the Italian Army to military representatives of members of the United Nations in Italy (other than UK, US, USSR, France) is undesirable for the following reasons:-

a. Dissemination to States potentially hostile to Italy would prejudice Italian National security and our policy of rehabilitating her as a sovereign state.

b. Psychologically it would have a humiliating effect on the Italian Government and public.

c. It would create a potentially dangerous precedent for the release of military information in the case of countries in S.E. Europe governed by Allied Control Commissions, which would in turn cause unnecessary diplomatic difficulties.

2. Therefore information regarding the Italian Army will be restricted to those nations drafting the Peace Treaty with Italy.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:



F. G. A. PARSONS
Brigadier

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

Copy to:

G-3
Br Polad
US Polad

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 8252/263/EC

RECEIVED 19 FEB 1946
1843 10 AM

18 February 1946

SUBJECT: Information - Italian Army.

TO : G-5 Section AFHQ.

It would be appreciated if a reply could be given to 8252/255/EC
dated 19 January 1946 on above subject.

For the Chief Commissioner,

C. R. BRAYBROOKE


Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: ✓ Land Forces S/C (MIA).

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Requests for Information from Allied Nations

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MILIA)

DATE/222/1

18 Feb 46

TO : Executive Commission,
H.Q. Allied Commission.

1. In view of requests that are received from time to time from Allied Nations for information about the Italian Armed Forces, or for permission to visit their units or establishments, it is felt that a common policy is required for the guidance of the three Service sub-commissions.

2. I attach to this letter a draft that has been produced by a committee at which Naval, Land Forces and Air Forces sub-commissions were represented and which has been agreed to by the Chiefs of each sub-commission.

3. If you agree with the provisions of this draft I would be glad if you would issue it as a directive.

4. The policy outlined in this directive would not of course apply to U.S.A. or U.K. and it cannot apply to non-Allied Nations who maintain the normal channels of information direct with the Italian Ministries through their attaches.

MMH/PB

Major-General,
MILIA.

copy to: Chief, Naval sub-commission, A.C.
Director, Air Forces sub-commission, A.C.

18 Feb 46

0688

TO : Executive Commissioner,
H.A. Allied Commission.

1. In view of requests that are received from time to time from Allied nations for information about the Italian Armed Forces, or for permission to visit their units or establishments, it is felt that a common policy is required for the guidance of the three Service Sub-Commissions.
2. I attach to this letter a draft that has been produced by a committee at which Naval, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub-Commissions were represented and which has been agreed to by the Chiefs of each Sub-Commission.
3. If you agree with the provisions of this draft I would be glad if you would issue it as a directive.
4. The policy outlined in this directive would not of course apply to U.S.A. or U.K. and it cannot apply to non-Allied nations who maintain the normal channels of information direct with the Italian Ministries through their attaches.

MMH/PA

D. Brown

Major-General,
NO 1A.

Copy to: Chief, Naval Sub-Commission, A.C.
Director, Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.

SECRET

TOP SECRET

DISSEMINATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES AND ALLIED FORCES
(OTHER THAN U.S.A. AND U.K.)

1. In view of the importance of adopting a common policy in regard to the treatment of requests from ^{(a) The former and USSR refuse in the} ~~ALLIED service~~ ^{AC} representatives for information about the ITALIAN Armed Forces or requests for visits to them, the following notes are issued for the guidance of Navy, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub-Commissions.

2. ^{(b) Information from USSR refuse AC and} ~~CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIED OFFICERS AND ITALIAN SERVICE~~ ^{Refusing to provide} MINISTRIES.

Direct contact between ^(c) ~~(ALLIED officers)~~ and ITALIAN Service Ministries will not be permitted. ALLIED officers wishing to correspond or to have interviews with members of the ministries will do so through the sub-commissions.

where, however, ^(d) ~~(an ALLIED officer)~~ may have to deal continually with a branch of a ministry on account of some special task that he has to undertake under the terms of the armistice the above rule may be waived by the chief of the sub-commission concerned.

3. ^(e) ~~INFORMATION.~~ ^{AC}

(a) Information may be given to ^(f) ~~properly accredited~~ ^{AC} ALLIED service representatives on matters of strength, composition, establishments and armament of ITALIAN armed forces, ~~(except on matters of a top secret nature)~~

(b) Information will not be given on future plans and policies of a secret nature while these are still under discussion, ^(g) ~~which reference is made to the Secret of the S/C Committee.~~

(c) Information ~~(will not be given)~~ on questions of morale, fighting value, personalities of ITALIAN officers, or on the relationships between services or between services and civilian sides of ministries, ^(h) ~~will be confined to generalities and will not be given to the members of the S/C Committee.~~ ⁽ⁱ⁾ ~~In general, the criterion should be that information will only be given to ALLIED officers of a nature that could normally have been acquired through attaché channels, and which has already been furnished to G.~~

Information which has only come into the possession of the sub-commissions through their very close and intimate contacts with the ITALIAN armed forces in carrying out their supervisory and advisory roles will not be disclosed. ^(j) ~~AC~~ ^{(k) Former and USSR refuse}

4. ^(l) ~~VISITS OF (ALLIED OFFICERS) TO UNITS OR ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.~~

Visits by ^(m) ~~(ALLIED service representatives)~~ to Italian service units or establishments may only be made when authorized by the

for the guidance of Navy, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub-Commissions.

2. CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIED OFFICERS AND ITALIAN SERVICE MINISTRIES.

Direct contact between (ALLIED officers) and ITALIAN service ministries will not be permitted. ALLIED officers wishing to correspond or to have interviews with members of the ministries will do so through the sub-commissions.

Where, however, (an ALLIED officer) may have to deal continually with a branch of a ministry on account of some special task that he has to undertake under the terms of the armistice the above rule may be waived by the chief of the sub-commission concerned.

3. INFORMATION.

(a) Information may be given to (properly accredited ALLIED service representatives) on matters of strength, composition, establishments and armament of ITALIAN armed forces, (except on matters of a top secret nature).

(b) Information will not be given on future plans and policies of a secret nature while these are still under discussion, (with reference to the Director of the SFC concerned).

(c) Information (will not be given) on questions of morale, fighting value, personalities of ITALIAN officers, or on the relationships between services or between services and civilian units of ministries, (with reference to the Director of the SFC concerned). (d) In general, the criterion should be that information will only be given to ALLIED officers of a nature that could normally have been acquired through attack channels, and which has already been furnished to A.C.

Information which has only come into the possession of the sub-commissions through their very close and intimate contacts with the ITALIAN armed forces in carrying out their supervisory and advisory roles will not be disclosed.

4. VISITS OF (ALLIED OFFICERS) TO UNITS OR ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.

Visits by (Allied service representatives) to Italian service units or establishments may only be made when authorized by the appropriate service sub-commission. Such authorization will normally only be given in order to allow of the accomplishment of a specific task under the terms of the armistice. If the necessity arises of authorizing visits not within the terms of the last sentence, authorization should only be made (in agreement with) the appropriate ITALIAN ministry, and the visiting officer should be accompanied by a (qualified ex-Italian) representative of the sub-commission concerned.

5. No info regarding the Italian Armed Forces should be given to anyone not att. to AC (including British or American officers assigned to their control); media enquiries should be referred to the relevant sub-commission for a reply.

SECRET

Brigadier N.W. Hope, IMO,
Brigadier GS,
LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC,

(MIA)

RMS

DO/5

Dear

1. My General is very keen to draw up an agreed statement on the lines of the attached draft and to lodge it with the Executive Commission in order to provide a guide as to policy for dealing with requests for information or visits from Allied Service representatives.
2. This policy would not of course apply to USA or UK and it cannot apply to non-Allied nations who maintain the normal channels of information direct with the ALLIED Ministries through their attached.
3. If you agree that such a common policy is both possible and desirable I suggest that the three of us get together and draft a statement on the above lines that will meet the requirements of all Services.
4. Will you please let me know
 - (a) if you agree to the suggestion in Para 1 above and if so,
 - (b) if 10 am on Thursday 14 Feb in my office on 7th Floor of AC building will be convenient for you for the meeting.

Yours *humbly*11 Feb 46

To : Captain S.M. Blackburn, DSO, RM,
NAVAL SUB COM,

To : Wing Comdr W.L. Butler, RAF,
AIR FORCES SUB COM.

Dear

1. Mr General is very keen to draw up an agreed statement on the lines of the attached draft and to lodge it with the Executive Commissioner in order to provide a guide as to policy for dealing with requests for information or visits from ALLIED Service representatives.

2. This policy would not of course apply to USA or UK and it cannot apply to non-ALLIED nations who maintain the normal channels of information direct with the ITALIAN Ministries through their attaches..

3. If you agree that such a common policy is both possible and desirable I suggest that the three of us get together and draft a statement on the above lines that will meet the requirements of all Services.

4. Will you please let me know

- (a) if you agree to the suggestion in Para 1 above and if so,
- (b) if 10 am on Thursday 14 Feb in my office on 7th Floor of AC building will be convenient for you for the meeting.

Yours *humbly*.

// Feb 66

To : Captain S.M. BLAGG, DSO, RH,
NAVAL SUB COM.

To : Wing Comdr W.M. BISHOP, RAF,
AIR FORCES SUB COM.

Copy to: File Int/222/1

DRAFT

SECRET

INFORMATION ON THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
FOR ALLIED POWERS

1. In view of the importance of adopting a common policy in regard to the treatment of requests from ALLIED Service representatives for information about the ITALIAN Armed Forces or requests for visits to them, discussions have taken place between representatives of the Navy, Land Forces and Air Forces Sub Committees and the following policy has been agreed.

2. INFORMATION

- (a) Information may be given to properly accredited ALLIED Service representatives on matters of strength, composition, establishments and armament of ITALIAN armed forces, except on matters of a Top Secret nature.
- (b) Information will not be given on future plans and policy or on matters still under discussion with the ITALIAN Service authorities.
- (c) Information will not be given on questions of moral, fighting value, personalities of ITALIAN Officers or on the relationships between Services or between Service and civilian sides of ministries.
- (d) In general the criterion should be that information will only be given to ALLIED officers of a nature that could normally have been acquired through attache channels.

Information which has only come into the possession of the Sub Committees through their very close and intimate contacts with the ITALIAN Armed Forces in carrying out their supervisory and advisory roles will not be disclosed.

3. CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIED OFFICERS AND ITALIAN SERVICE MINISTRIES.

Direct contact between ALLIED Officers and ITALIAN Service ministries will not be permitted. ALLIED Officers wishing to correspond or to have interviews with members of the ministries will do so through the sub committees.

Where, however, an ALLIED officer may have to

Armed Forces or requests for visits to them, discussions have taken place between representatives of the Navy, Land Forces and Air Forces and the Commission and the following policy has been agreed.

2. INFORMATION

- (a) Information may be given to properly accredited Allied Service representatives on matters of strength, composition, casualties and armament of ITALIAN armed forces, except on matters of a top secret nature.
 - (b) Information will not be given on future plans and policy or on matters still under discussion with the Italian Service authorities.
 - (c) Information will not be given on questions of moral, fighting value, personalities of ITALIAN Officers or on the relationships between Services or between Service and civilian sides of ministries.
 - (d) In general the criterion should be that information will only be given to ALLIED officers of a nature that could normally have been acquired through attache channels.
- Information which has only come into the possession of the Sub Commissions through their very close and intimate contacts with the ITALIAN Armed Forces in carrying out their supervisory and advisory roles will not be disclosed.

3. CONTACT BETWEEN ALLIED OFFICERS AND ITALIAN SERVICE MINISTRIES.

Direct contact between ALLIED Officers and ITALIAN Service ministries will not be permitted. ALLIED Officers wishing to correspond or to have interviews with members of the ministries will do so through the sub commissions.

Where, however, an ALLIED officer may have to deal continuously with a Branch of a ministry on account of some special task that he has to undertake under the terms of the armistice the above rule may be waived.

.....2/

- 2 -

4. VISITS OF ALLIED OFFICERS TO UNITS OF ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE
ITALIAN ARMED FORCES.


Except where necessary in order to carry out specific tasks under the terms of the armistice such visits will be discouraged.

If pressure is brought to bear by ALLIED Governments or their representatives to allow visits to take place such visits will be arranged formally with the appropriate ITALIAN Ministry and will be made available to representatives of all ALLIED Powers who have representatives in ROME.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner



G2 (M-3) X

4 February 1946

22

Ref: 8252/258/EO

SUBJECT: Information - Italian Army.

TO : G-5 Section AFHQ.

G

JUL 20

It would be appreciated if a reply could be given to 8252/255/EO
dated 19 January 1946 on above subject.

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to: ✓ Land Forces S/O (MIA).


→ INT/222/1

Record of Statement to Rep of FRENCH Mil Mission by

GSO I(SD) - 25 Jan 46

21

1. Asked for org of War Ministry. Showed our diagramatic Table of existing layout, but NOT of projected layout after reorganisation.
2. On request, sketched layout by Territorial Regions and Military Districts.
3. Detailed Inf Divs, Ind Regts and L.S. Divs.
4. Visitor showed interest in arty in each type of formation and asked if any med arty were possessed. Said no. Also showed interest in Engrs.
5. Asked for description of trg set-up and if still had BRIF instructors. Explained.
6. Corrected statement by FRENCH Rep that call-up was already under trg. Said due for 1 Apr.
7. Asked how call-up was arranged and if satisfied with material. Said done entirely by ITALIANS and no concern of ours. (Frenchman knew that 40,000 were being called up).
8. Ceiling of 140,000 etc was mentioned but NOT actual strengths in any case.

25 Jan 46.
Lt Col
GSFile

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 8252/255/EC

RECEIVED 21 JAN 46
659

19 January 1946

SUBJECT: Information - Italian Army

TO : AFHQ,
Attention: G-5 Section

INT/222/1

1. Accredited military representatives attached to embassies of various United Nations in Italy (other than US, UK, Russia and France) have been requesting information from AFHQ relative to the Italian Army, such requests including details which would normally not be made public by a sovereign power, and which the Italians would very probably not give to foreign powers in normal times.

2. Request that instructions be given as to the method of handling such requests for information.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C.

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

for

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CONFIDENTIALSubject: Information - Italian Army.LAND FOREIGN SUB COMMISSION AC,
(MIA)
Int/222 ←16 Jan 46To : AFHQ
Through Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission.62 (INT) ARR

1. Accredited military representatives attached to embassies of various United Nations in Italy (other than US, UK, Russia and France) have been requesting information from MIA relative to the Italian Army, such requests including details which would normally not be made public by a sovereign power, and which the Italians would very probably not give to foreign powers in normal times.
2. Request that instructions be given as to the method of handling such requests for information.

A. B.Major General.
E.M.I.A.

CPH/LTB

Transferred from Int/222.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 9010/105/SC

9. December 1945.

SUBJECT: Data for French Government on Naval Matters.

TO : French Representative to the Allied Commission.

1. The French Representative to the Allied Commission was informed in my letter 9010/60/SC of 17 October 1945 that the subject data should be obtained from the Italian Ministry of Marine through diplomatic channels. In view of the comments contained in your letter 2702 of 23 October 1945, the proper procedure for obtaining such information has been reviewed. As the Allied Commission is the organ through which the policy of the United Nations toward the Italian Government is communicated and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled, it has now been determined that the subject data should be obtained through the Allied Commission. Furthermore, requests are now being received from other governments for similar data which make it essential to co-ordinate all requests to the Italian Ministry of Marine. Will you therefore please cancel my letter 9010/60/SC of 17 October 1945 and withdraw your request direct to the Italian Ministry of Marine. The necessary data will then be obtained by the Navy Sub-Commission, AC.

2. With reference to the list of questions submitted in your letter of 6 September 1945, the Italian Ministry of Marine is being requested to furnish certain data in connection with questions 1 and 2, relating to the "Accords LAVAL-KAUFFMANN" and the "Accords of Nevers". The Senior Civil Affairs Officer, Venezia Giulia will be requested to furnish information concerning question 7 with respect to the four tankers at Monfalcone Shipyards.

3. It will be difficult to obtain the additional data required by the list of questions on account of the general nature of the information desired. To assist in obtaining these data, it is requested that the French Representative to the Allied Commission furnish the following information with reference to the numbered questions:

- (1) Furnish the Allied Commission with a copy of the document known as the "Accords LAVAL-KAUFFMANN" and a list of the names of the vessels included in the 634,685 tons of French shipping seized by the Axis Powers, of which 400,000 tons is alleged to have been transferred to Italian flag.

Ref: 9010/205/AC

December 1945.

SUBJECT: Data for French Government on Naval Matters.

-
- (2) Furnish the Allied Commission with a copy of the "Accords of Revers", which acknowledged the requisitioning by Axis Powers in September 1942 of foreign shipping in French ports, together with a list of the vessels seized, indicating which vessels are known to have been transferred to Italian Flag and which vessels are alleged to have been transferred to Italian Flag.
- (3) Furnish the Allied Commission with a list of French vessels which were freighted (chartered) by the Italian Government during the years 1941/1943.

With reference to the two tugs, "Raoul Venture" and "Michele Venture", the Italian Ministry of Marine has previously furnished the following information, which is quoted herewith:

"The Tugs "RAOUL VENTURE" and "MICHELE VENTURE", chartered by the Italian Government, were handed over to Italian Authorities at Mentone on 5th April 1941 and the names were changed to "Costante" and "Valente", respectively.

In regard to same the only details available are as follows:

Tug "Costante" (ex-"Raoul Venture"):-

At 8th Sept. '43 she was at Pola. No further information to hand.

Tug "Valente" (ex-"Michele Venture"):-

On 22nd April '43 at 1130 she was fired upon by an Allied Submarine off Cape Vaticano. Badly damaged and on fire she made for Barbarici Point and sank in 12 - 14 mts. two miles off shore, Brg. 1300 from Cape Vaticano Signal Station."

- (4) & (5) Questions 4 and 5 relate to river barges, tugs, yachts, pleasure boats and floating material in French ports seized by the Axis Powers. It is stated that a list can be provided of these ships. Upon receipt of this information, an endeavor will be made to obtain information concerning these vessels.
- (6) No reply can be given to the general request for information concerning French goods and cargoes by the Italian Government unless specific information can be furnished.
- (7) No additional data required.

4. Prior to the Allied Commission requesting data from the Italian Ministry of Marine, confirmation would be appreciated that the request through diplomatic channels has been withdrawn. It is requested that future requests for similar data be forwarded direct to the Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC, Air Forces Sub-Commission, AC, or Navy Sub-Commission, AC, as may be appropriate.

M. S. LUCH

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Copy to:
Land Forces S/C
Air Forces S/C
Navy S/C

M. A. to.

G. C. C.

Sir,

For information
of G. O. C. please.

J. J. J. J. J.

20/11

Land Forces

d/B

Col A/D. w/P
for info m.

SECRET

AC DIST

BO to Chief Comm

L. Commun 2

C. A Sec

L. Forces S/K

AP 798

SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

.....
 : SECRET :
 :Auth: SAC, [initials] :
 :Initials: [initials] :
 :Date: 16 Nov 1945 :
 :.....:

AG 250.1 GBI-0

16 November 1945

SUBJECT: Policy Towards Yugoslavs.

TO: All Concerned.

1. Disposal instructions have already been issued in respect of deserters from the Armed Forces of the present Yugoslav Government. These instructions relate to the disposal of other Yugoslav nationals found in ITALY and in the area of VENEZIA GIULIA occupied by XIII Corps (hereinafter referred to as Zone "A").
2. Yugoslavs who are now located in ITALY and Zone "A" of VENEZIA GIULIA may be divided into the following two categories:
 - a. Supporters of the TITO regime.
 - b. Dissidents and opponents of the TITO regime.
3. The only TITO organizations which are legally established in ITALY and Zone "A" of VENEZIA GIULIA are the Yugoslav Delegation of the Advisory Council to ITALY, of which an official list is attached at Appendix "A"; a Yugoslav Military Mission attached to XIII Corps; and a Yugoslav detachment of 2,000 men under the command of that headquarters.
4. All Yugoslav citizens who are supporters of TITO and who do not belong to any of the organizations referred to in paragraph 3 above, and who are in the future located in ITALY, except in Zone "A" of VENEZIA GIULIA, should be detained. CI Staffs are being given special instructions regarding the investigation and disposal of such detainees. (This is not to conflict with standing instructions of XIII Corps).
5. Yugoslav dissidents and opponents of the TITO regime, with the exception of Ustasi and leaders and officials of the former Serb and Croat Quisling regimes, are at present to be allowed to live at large in ITALY or Zone "A" of VENEZIA GIULIA.
6. Yugoslav dissidents and opponents of the TITO regime are on no account to be handed over to representatives of the present Yugoslav Government without instructions from this headquarters.

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 250.1 GBI-O,
dtd 16 November 45 (Cont'd)

7. Ustasi and leaders and officials of the former Serb and Croat quisling regimes should be arrested. This headquarters will be informed of their arrest and arrangements will be made for them to be sent to a PW or internment camp.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

Edmund R. Shugart
EDMUND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGO
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Appendix "A"

DISTRIBUTION:

"B"

- 5 - HQ BTA
- 1 - SACS
- 1 - CG, MTOUSA
- 1 - USPOLAD
- 1 - BR RES MIN
- 1 - G-2
- 1 - G-5
- 5 - HQ LF Greece

SECRET

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APPENDIX "A" to AFHQ
ltr, AG 250.1 GBI-O,
dtd 16 November 45

Dr. Joseph SMODLAKA, Ambassador, Yugoslav Representative and wife, Mrs. Antonia
Dr. Sloven SMODLAKA, Deputy Delegate and wife, Mrs. Zori and daughter, Lillian

Mr. Dudolph Janhuba, Secretary, with wife, Mrs. Hilda and son Bozo.
Mrs. Arsen Milstovic, Secretary.
Mr. Radisav Raspopovic, Secretary.
Mr. Niko Jaksa, Secretary.
Mr. Nikola Mandic, Secretary.

Mr. Ivan Antunac, Economic Counselor, with wife, Mrs. Zornka and son Goran.
Mr. Mihaljovic Bruno, Economic Secretary with wife and 2 children.

Mr. Andrija Stiparovic, Attache for Commercial Marine, with wife.
Mrs. Blanka and 2 sons, Zvonimir and Igor.

CLERICAL STAFF

Mr. Novica Jovanovic.
Mr. Sime Sario.
Mr. Josip Engel.
Mrs. Mandic Marica.

Miss Gombos Klara
Miss Slajmer Tathans
Mr. Vaso Jovanovic with wife,
Mrs. Olga.

AUXILIARY STAFF

Vracar Jovo
Dvizac Milan
Cezovic Salko
Troha Zdenko
Popovic Maks
Sinkovic Milos
Djurdevic Stefanija
Matak Jristina
Rajko Jelotic

Ajdak Franjo
Ljuncvic Dracko
Peric Milivoje
Masanovic Drago
Pijevic Branko
Josanovic Joso
Flajban Tereza
Cotic Vidica
Zivota Paunovic

Borilazic Ivan
Moracamin Milorad
Petrovic Slavko
Dine Acimov
Obradovic Veljko
Favlin Herman
Ivin Marija
Ivan Petrovic
Starc Vlado

SECRET

FILE NOTE.TOP SECRET

TS/INT/122

(Copy to File A/010/3)

1. A.F.H.Q. directive AG 091.711 G(SD)-O dated 2 Nov 45 ("Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government") was marked SECRET.
2. We got Chief Commissioner's approval to our G/7 of 8 Nov (Directive No. 1) which informed the War Ministry re the A.F.H.Q. directive. That was also marked SECRET.
3. C.C. saw and approved JACINI'S and my speeches at the dinner on 16 Nov. These were quoted in the Press and obviously this matter can no longer be kept SECRET.
4.
 - (a) I asked C.C. for guidance as to what we were to say to the Press or the French or Russians, if asked.
 - (b) C.C. directed that we could admit that, in accordance with the instructions of C.C.S., w.e.f. 2400 hours 14 Nov:-
 - (i) Administrative control of the Italian Army had been handed back to the Italian Government.
 - (ii) Operational control *also* -- within the territory handed over.
 - (iii) this was of course still subject to the rights and powers of the Allied Commission (through "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.") which is still the authoritative body set up under the Armistice terms.
 - (iv) "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C." will continue to advise the War Ministry on matters relating to the Italian Army.
 - (v) In general the whole business should not be minimized or emphasised, but be considered as merely a normal evolution of the well known Allied policy to hand over more and more to the Italians.

19 November 1945.*A. Browning*Major General,
M.M.I.A.

(Copy to Chief Commissioner, ALLIED COMMISSION.)

60C Explained above & emphasised that we derived our authority from & were part of A.C. at the morning conference on 17 Nov.

FILE NOTE.TOP SECRET

10.

1. We should have sent G/5 of 24 Oct. through Chief Commissioner. However, I have apologized to C.C. and all is well from that angle.
2. C.C.'s view is that Chief of Staff, A.P.H.Q. cannot override the orders of C.C.S. as sent to C.C. by Chief of Staff, A.P.H.Q. in his letter of 26 Jan. 1944. This aspect is being represented.
3. Therefore, we will not refuse to give information to the French and Russians. We will continue to tell them everything within the broad terms of Maj. Gen. WARD'S interview at Folio 12/1 and 12/2.
4. We must avoid giving the French and Russians the impression that:-
 - (a) we are holding anything back
 - (b) we are forbidden to tell them about certain things.
5. As hitherto, information will be given only by Col. KERR, Col. PIDSLEY or myself.
6. All officers are to be told about para 5 again, so as to make quite sure that the distribution of information, as above, is canalized both in our own interests and those of recipients.

L. Browning.

Major General, ISMA.17 November 1945.

FILE NOTE

TS/INT/122

10

104

1. We should have sent 6/3 of 24 Oct. through Chief Commissioner. However, I have apologized to C.C. & all is well, from that angle.

2. C.C.'s view is that Chief of Staff ~~ASST~~ cannot override the orders of C.C. as sent to C.C. by Chief of Staff ~~ASST~~ in his letter of 26 Jan 1944. This aspect is being represented.

3. Therefore, we will not refuse to give 'information' to the French & Russians. We will continue to tell them everything we will within the broad terms of May. - thing within the broad terms of May.

Gen. Ward's interview at Tokyo 12/2 and 12/2.

We must avoid giving the French & Russians the impression that:-

14. Russians holding anything back
(a) we are forbidden to tell them
(b) we are certain things about

5. As witherto, information will be given only by Col. KERR, Col. PIDS-LEW or myself.

6. All officers are to be told about para 5 again, so as to make quite sure that the distribution of information, as above, is correct. ~~1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100~~

3

This letter of 26 Jan 1954, was, as
is being represented -
Therefore, we will not refuse to give
information to the French & Russians.
We will continue to tell them every-
thing within the broad terms of day.
- thing within the broad terms of day.

Gen. Ward's interview at 10:12
and 12:12.

4. We must avoid giving the French &
Russians the impression that
as we are holding anything back
(b) we are forbidden to tell them
about certain things.

5. As hitherto, information will be
given only by Col Keller, Col. P.D.S.
- let or myself.

6. All officers are to be told about
para 5 again, so as to make
quite sure that the distribution
of information, as above, is car-
ried out in our own in-
terests & those of recipients.

L.B.

17 Nov 54

TOP SECRET

Land Forces Sub-commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

TS/INT/122

17 November 1945.

Chief Commissioner,
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.

1. I wrote a letter (G/5 of 24 Oct 45) to A.F.H.Q. asking for guidance as to the tone I should adopt when giving information to the French and Russian Governments on the Italian Army.

2. I received a reply (SAC's - 601 of 8 Nov), of which a copy was sent to you.

3. The instructions in this reply go beyond the guidance I asked for in my letter of 24 Oct. and would appear to conflict with the Directive issued by the C.C.S. to you through the Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q., in his letter of 26 Jan. 1944.

4. I should have sent my letter of 24 Oct. through you in the first place and regret the mistake. I therefore now put the whole correspondence and question before you for such action as you may consider necessary.

cc/IB

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

SACS-601

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff

8 November 1945

SUBJECT: Information on the Italian Army to be Given to
Foreign Governments.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Reference your letter of 24 October, subject as
above.

1. It is not felt that any further information regarding the Italian Army other than that already made public should be given to foreign governments at the present time. The previous directives on this matter, to which you refer, should therefore be regarded as cancelled.

2. The Chief of Staff recently gave an interview with a press correspondent who was given considerable information regarding the Italian Army. A copy of the account of this interview, which has already been published, is attached as it may be of assistance to you in indicating the line which should be taken in dealing with such inquiries as you may receive.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

A. D. Ward
A. D. WARD,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

Incl:

As Stated.

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Copies to: Br REISMAN
US POLAD

G.O.C. To comply with above I suggest that if approached we say "how that the Army has been handed over to the Italian Govt etc. etc. as above." *SP*
14 Nov.

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T-1558

COPY

TOP SECRET

Interview with Maj. General A.D. Ward.

Caserta - Major General A.D. Ward, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Chief of Staff, AFHQ, and Chief of the General Staff of General Headquarters, Central Mediterranean Forces, stated in an interview with Reuters that the Allies hope to hand over complete control of the whole Italian army to the Italian government simultaneously with the return of the northern provinces.

General Ward said: "We are most anxious that control of the new Italian army should be handed back to the Italian government at the earliest possible date and that this army should be a highly trained body of men."

"The actual strength of the Italian army will, of course, be laid down in the Peace Treaty but at the moment the strength of what we call the 'interim' army is about 140,000 men in addition to which there is a force of 65,000 Carabinieri. This 'interim' army is almost entirely infantry. There are a certain number of armoured cars but there are no armoured divisions."

"The Italian army is mostly in the north in areas still under Allied control and the men are therefore still under the Allies. They are employed on guard duty round food dumps, captured enemy material and vehicles and similar work but they are now being relieved so that they can undergo a period of specialised training. We hope that with the return of the northern provinces to the Italian government we will be in a position to hand over also an army of well trained men."

"At the moment the greater part of the Italian army is armed with Allied weapons - that is particularly true of the troops in the north - but we are aiming at standardisation of arms and this question has not yet been settled."

"British and American occupational forces will remain in this theatre - stationed in Venezia Giulia - until the whole question as to the future of that area has been finally settled. The actual occupational troops, consisting of one British and one American division, will remain in Venezia Giulia but we shall probably maintain a reserve force elsewhere in Italy."

"The present strength of the UK personnel of the British Army in Italy is about 230,000 but this total is being reduced. In addition there are New Zealanders, South Africans and Indians all of whom are waiting to be shipped home. The British occupational force will be drawn entirely from UK personnel."

"Incidentally, the Supreme Allied Commander reserves the right to recall part or all of the Italian army under Allied control should he consider it necessary".

General Ward said that great care was being taken in the appointment of senior Italian officers to exclude the possibility of Fascist elements attempting to gain control.

"We keep very close contact with the Italian government over questions of

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- 1 -

TOP SECRET

17/2

this sort", he said, "and very great care is taken in investigating the background of senior Italian officers before they are appointed. In this way we hope to eradicate any fascist elements which may still remain among the junior grades".

General Ward said that if the Italian government asked the Allies to provide additional help during the election period the request would be judged on its merits before any decision was reached.

"We wish the Allied forces to remain strictly aloof from anything which could be possible construed as taking part in political activities", declared General Ward. "But if the situation became so out of hand - a situation which I do not anticipate - that the Italian government came to us for help we would probably grant it."

"British and American troops, during the elections, will continue to guard Allied property and should an emergency suddenly arise the local commanders will deal with it".

Replying to a question regarding the possible reorganization of the Italian police under Allied guidance, General Ward said that up to the present there had been no such request from the Italian government.

"We have no plans at all for any such scheme at present", he said. "Naturally, the request would have to come from the Italian government but I can assure you that if such a request did come it would receive very sympathetic consideration". - Reuter.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

11.

CAR.

Russians are coming at 1600 per information
on the new Siberian Army.

How are our intentions? S.P.

9 NOV.

1. Breakdown of 140000 ✓
2. Actual State (ORDAN) see DEBAT ✓
3. In addition BR-1715 205-175 ✓
4. Whole in a state of upheaval because ✓
of BR-177 & US-1715 million ✓
5. Mission conducted by staff ✓
depending on order received from HPHA ✓
6. Temporary without preparation ✓
7. Corresponding representation of ✓
Chambers (see above) ✓
8. External situation of nations, ✓
clothing etc - which they can ✓
with demonstrating ✓

0714

Item no over instructions.

W.P.

9 Nov

1. Breakdown of 140000 ✓
2. A total state (redon) in ORBAT ✓
3. T. addition BR-1715 + 1715 ✓
4. Whole in state of plan because ✓
✓ BR 171 + 1715 + 1715
5. Missions completed ✓
depending on order received for AFNR
6. Temporary without proposed ✓
7. Corresponding cooperation ✓
Thurday (less acc)
8. Current details of actions, ✓
clothing etc - which they are ✓
Thursdays with diminishing ✓
help from us.

No question of changes in information ✓
✓ 10 Nov

APG File in info to Russian file

W.P.
9 Nov

7277(M.I.I.m.).

No.12.

The Expedition,

Warrington,

London, S.W.1.

/ Nov 1st, 1943.

RE: RUSSIA.

Sir,

I am directed to inform you that the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 23rd October, 1943, approved the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Paper JIS (45) 223 (C) of 13th October, 1943, a copy of which is attached for your information for guidance.

It is understood that the American Army has adopted a similar policy in regard to its relations with the Russians.

As only one copy of the J.I.C. paper is being circulated to Service Attachés, Military Attachés in those capitals in which there are also British Naval and Air Attachés, will arrange to inform them of the policy promulgated herewith.

I am,

Sir, Your obedient servant,


 Director of Military Intelligence.

Re: The Commanders,

British Military Mission to Berlin.
 British Military Mission to Belgium.
 British Military Mission to Moscow.

(Through HQ, D.A.C.R., who are requested to pass, unless these missions have already been informed).

British Military Mission to Bulgaria.
 A.C.G. PHILADELPHIA (British Element).
 British Military Mission to Germany.
 British Military Mission to the Netherlands.
 British Military Mission to Portugal.
 British Military Mission to Italy.
 British Military Mission to Norway.
 A.C.G. BOSTON. (British Delegation).
 British Military Mission.

Military Attachés, Ankara, Belgrade, Buenos Aires, China, Mexico City, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago,

51.

I am directed to inform you that the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 24th October, 1955, approved the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee report JIS (45) 221 (3) of 21st October, 1955, a copy of which is attached for your information and guidance.

It is understood that the Air Force may have adopted a similar policy in regard to its relations with the Russians.

As only one copy of the J.I.S. report is being circulated to Service Attaches, Military Attaches in those capitals in which there are also British Naval and Air Attaches, will arrange to inform them of the policy suggested herewith.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Robert G. G. G.

Director of Military Intelligence.

To : The Commandant.

British Military Mission to Moscow. } (Through HQ. M.A. C.R., who are
British Military Mission to Berlin. } requested to pass, unless these
British Military Mission to Frankfurt. } missions have already been
British Military Mission to Munich. } informed).

British Military Mission to H.C.R.M.

A.C.O. MILITARY (British Element).

British Military Mission to Berlin.

British Military Mission to the Netherlands.

British Military Mission to Rome.

British Military Mission to Paris.

British Military Mission to Moscow.

British Military Mission to Moscow.

A.C.O. ROMAN. (British Delegation).

34 Military Mission.

Military Attache, Berlin.

Military Attache, Moscow.

Military Attache, Moscow.

Military Attache, Moscow.

J.I.S.C. Paper No. 102.

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.

It is issued for the personal use of

TOP SECRET

Copy No.

102

Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

J.I.C. (45) 299 (3) (FINAL)

18TH OCTOBER, 1945

CHIEFS OF STAFF COM ITTEL

JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE

RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

1. In May, 1945, we gave our recommendations on the attitude which our Service Authorities, Commanders and Missions should adopt in any negotiations with the Russian Service Authorities. In this report we have revised the views expressed in our former report so as to conform to the change in circumstances which has taken place since it was written.
2. We exclude any discussion of questions of high policy. We consider mainly the type of negotiation hitherto carried on - i.e. the exchange of military intelligence, technical information and the grant of facilities. Our recommendations do not apply primarily to the diplomatic and administrative matters which represent much of the liaison work of members of the Control Commissions: nevertheless the analysis below and our recommendations provide a background against which such matters may be reviewed.
3. We assume that the policy of His Majesty's Government is to achieve the maximum collaboration with Russia, compatible with our own vital interests. Our relations with the Russians in military, naval and air matters must be governed by this overriding consideration, in view of the importance of achieving the greatest collaboration with the Russians in the political organisation of Europe, in the work of the Allied Control Commissions, in our relations with Russia in the Far East.
4. Our relations with Russia during the war were governed by the necessity for maintaining Russia's war effort against Germany at the highest possible level. In addition to sending Russia vast supplies, our policy was to volunteer intelligence and facilities of every kind which could help Russia to defeat the

RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANSReport by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee

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4. Our relations with Russia during the war were governed by the necessity for maintaining Russia's war effort against Germany at the highest possible level. In addition to sending Russia vast supplies, our policy was to volunteer intelligence and facilities of every kind which could help Russia to defeat the common enemy. This won us very little co-operation from the Russians; the existing policy did not allow us to bargain for a quid pro quo and the main result of our generosity was that our prestige suffered.

+ J.I.C. (45) 163 (0) (Revised Final)

0720

5. With the end of the war, conciliation is no longer essential and we can afford to be more tough.

Characteristics of the Russians as Negotiators

6. Suspicion. The Russians throughout the war showed the utmost suspicion in their dealings with us on the Staff Mission level. The causes of this suspicion are complex. It is rooted in the traditional suspicion of Russian Governments for all foreigners. There still exists a strong isolationist and anti-foreign clique inside the Political Bureau of the Communist Party. The Russians have not forgotten Britain's intervention in Russia after the last war, nor the General anti-Bolshevik propaganda and many Government statements over the last twenty years before Russia became our ally in this war. They have an exaggerated fear of the British Intelligence Service and this fear is increased by the large numbers of people we have sent to Moscow and elsewhere in Russia and Russian-occupied areas. They are aware of the existence of a good deal of anti-Russian talk and feeling in certain British circles and particularly among our allies. For a long time the Russians suspected the good faith of our intentions to open a second front; and when this suspicion was dispelled, a new suspicion was soon born, under the influence of German propaganda, that the Anglo-Americans would negotiate a separate peace with Germany in the West. Against this background the Russians regard with suspicion many of the requests we make of them. This applies particularly to requests made for facilities in technical matters, where owing to the fact that there may be no immediate counterpart in Russia to the purposes for which we require such facilities, they are unwilling to credit our explanations, and proceed to search for some sinister motive.

7. Centralisation of Control. The organization of the Soviet State, the historical development of present-day Russia and the very limited number of high grade administrators available, have resulted in the centralisation in Moscow of the control of all matters affecting relations with the outside world, and this extends to questions which to our eyes would appear far too trivial for such central control. There is no prospect of this situation changing in the near future. The result is either that our requests are never put up to a level capable of granting them or, if they are so referred, to increase the degree of irritation in high quarters in Moscow caused by constant reference to them of matters which appear to be only of subordinate interest.

8. Security. The level of security in military matters, and especially in all questions where contact with foreigners is involved, has always been extremely high in the Soviet Union. The strict discipline imposed on Russian negotiators, the virtually complete absence of latitude allowed them by their standing orders and the universal supervision of the N.K.V.D.

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8. Security. The level of security in military matters, and especially in all questions where contact with foreigners is involved, has always been extremely high in the Soviet Union. The strict discipline imposed on Russian negotiators, the virtually complete absence of latitude allowed them by their standing orders and the universal supervision of the M.K.V.D. make them take a uniformly negative attitude in all discussions, except when expressly authorised from Moscow. Moreover, the Russians were obviously prepared to take us into their confidence only so far as their immediate war effort would benefit they are probably more reluctant than any other foreign power to disclose even to their Allies the secrets of their armed forces. In addition, Russian security is designed to prevent the political and social infection of their armed forces and people which they consider might result from widespread collaboration in detailed matters at low levels.

9. Hard Bargaining. The Russians' method of negotiation is to drive in every way the hardest possible bargain. They take up at the outset a completely uncompromising attitude, and even go so far at times as to create an artificial attitude of suilenness hoping that their opponents will lose the first round in an effort to buy peace-will. They gradually bargain concession against counter-concession, often without regard to the very different nature or implications of the questions involved. By and large they only meet our requests if they are satisfied that it is to their own interest to do so, or if it is only by doing so that they can secure for themselves something which they regard as being of still greater importance to them. It is most unlikely that the Russians will change their methods in this respect. In pursuing this policy, the Russians were greatly assisted by the fact that, throughout the war, we volunteered much for which they would otherwise have had to ask. This generosity is something so novel to them that it has probably given them further cause for suspicion and has increased their intemperance by accustoming them to receiving advantages without having to give a quid pro quo. Moreover, the Russians' ability to co-ordinate their bargaining is strengthened by the discipline of their officials, who are not given either to loose talk or to taking decisions on their own responsibility even on minor matters.

10. The Multiple or Indirect Approach. The Russians are likely to continue their tactics of asking for the same thing at different levels, in different quarters and through other foreign governments and intermediaries should they fail to obtain their requirements by direct negotiations.

11. Prestige. The Russians are proud of their achievements, and feel that they bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered the heaviest casualties. At the same time they are self-conscious about their lack of experience in dealing with foreigners and are sensitive to their shortcomings in such respects as the organisation and discipline of the Red Army after over four years of war. Moreover, they are naturally anxious to maintain abroad an impression of the greatest possible strength. Their sensitivity has a policy both to requests for such things as technical facilities - which they are not always sufficiently organised to grant - and for travelling facilities in Russian-controlled territory. They build up any official visits by foreign missions or representatives into ceremonial affairs on the most lavish scale. They would refuse to permit such a visit altogether, purely on prestige grounds, rather than allow one to be conducted on what they would consider an inadequate scale. They expect their own visits to be conducted on the same scale and are offended at any failure to accord them the exaggerated courtesy which they consider due to their rank and importance.

Recent Developments

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Recent Developments

12. With the end of the war, political factors have an even greater effect upon the attitude of the Russian military authorities.

13. Relations between the Russians and the British and Americans have recently deteriorated at all levels for the following major reasons:-

- (a) Russian insistence, in the face of British and American opposition, on treating Eastern Europe as their exclusive sphere of influence regardless of the interests of their Allies.

- (b) Disagreement over the interpretation of the Crimea and Potsdam agreements.
- (c) Russian sense of inferiority engendered by the Anglo-American development of the atomic bomb.
- (d) Russian resentment at finding the British and Americans co-ordinating their policy in matters in dispute with the U.S.S.R.
- (e) Great Britain's refusal and American reluctance to afford on terms satisfactory to Russia large long term credits to assist her rehabilitation, when she feels that they are still deeply indebted to her.

14. These developments, whose influence have been most plainly discernible in connection with the Polish question and the questions of facilities for Allied Commissions in S.E. Europe, have been accompanied by a deliberate tightening of party discipline and a greater intransigence in all negotiations.

Our Present Bargaining Position

15. Our own bargaining position with Russia has been strengthened as a result of the following factors:-

- (a) We alone share with Canada and the U.S.A. the secrets of the use of atomic energy for war purposes.
- (b) Whereas Russia may now be expected to show greater interest in obtaining from us technical information in order to approach more closely the technical level of the U.S.A. and ourselves, there is little information in this category that we require from her.
- (c) We can afford to withhold information and facilities which she requires until we obtain reciprocal treatment.
- (d) Russia still hopes to satisfy a large proportion of her requirements for machinery and capital equipment for reconstruction and development from Germany, from the British and U.S. zones of occupation in Germany.
- (e) Moreover, Russia wants large long-term credits from America and ourselves to speed up further her reconstruction and development.

(d) Russian resentment at finding the British and Americans co-ordinating their policy in matters in dispute with the U.S. S.R.

(e) Great Britain's refusal and American reluctance to afford on terms satisfactory to Russia large long term credits to assist her rehabilitation, when she feels that they are still deeply indebted to her.

14. These developments, whose influence have been most plainly discernible in connection with the Polish question and the questions of facilities for Allied Commissions in S.E. Europe, have been accompanied by a deliberate tightening of party discipline and a greater intransigence in all negotiations.

Our Present Bargaining Position

15. Our own bargaining position with Russia has been strengthened as a result of the following factors:-

(a) We alone share with Canada and the U.S.A. the secrets of the use of atomic energy for war purposes.

(b) Whereas Russia may now be expected to show greater interest in obtaining from us technical information in order to approach more closely the technical level of the U.S.A. and ourselves, there is little information in this category that we require from her.

(c) We can afford to withhold information and facilities which she requires until we obtain reciprocal treatment.

(d) Russia still hopes to satisfy a large proportion of her requirements for machinery and capital equipment for reconstruction and development from Germany, from the British and U.S. zones of occupation in Germany.

(e) Moreover, Russia wants large long-term credits from America and ourselves to speed up further her reconstruction and development.

16. On the other hand, the whole strategic and political basis of our relations with Russia suffers from three fundamental weaknesses:-

(a) Strategically the Soviet Union is relatively invulnerable, whereas we are vulnerable in areas, such as the Middle East.

(b) Russia can embarrass us by hostile propaganda in the Middle East, India and elsewhere throughout the world and by intransigent action in Eastern Europe. She is also in a position to disturb our relations with China by action in Manchuria and Korea.

- (c) Internal political factors probably give Russia an initial advantage over the Democracies whose Governments cannot ignore parliamentary and press criticism, or the force of public opinion.

Principle of Reciprocity

17. Since we are likely to find ourselves confronted with a continued refusal to make concessions in technical matters at least until the general political atmosphere improves, effective pressure can only be applied on the strict principle of reciprocity. This is likely to be specially effective in question in which the connection is sufficiently direct for the application of this principle to be clear.
18. At the same time little advantage can be expected from a policy of retaliation when this takes the form of withholding concessions already promised and thus casting doubt upon our good faith as negotiators. It is far better, since one of our main purposes is to remove the causes of Soviet suspicion, never to make a concession at all, rather than to appear to make it first and later to withhold it. The only effective means of using reciprocity is by driving as hard a bargain as possible when requests are first received from the Russians.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. The following recommendations are designed to increase our strength in negotiations with the Russians about Service matters and derive from the foregoing analysis of the characteristics of the Russians as negotiators, of recent developments in Anglo-Russian relations and of our present bargaining position. They apply mainly to the type of negotiations hitherto carried on, i.e. the exchange of military intelligence, technical information, and the grant of facilities. It is not within our province to say to what extent they apply to the more diplomatic and administrative type of matters.-

- (a) Nothing should be given to the Russians gratuitously. No Russian request should normally be granted unless some request of ours to which we attach importance is granted in connection with it. Conversely we should not continue to press minor requests of our own unless we are prepared ourselves to grant a *quid pro quo*.

- (b) This policy can only be implemented if, in cases where reciprocity cannot be obtained locally, all our own and all Russian requests are co-ordinated in London and a system is

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- (b) This policy can only be implemented if, in cases where reciprocity cannot be obtained locally, all our own and all Russian requests are co-ordinated in London and a system is developed here for deciding the priority of our own requests in relation to the number and type of Russian requests available at any one time for exploitation. We should accept the delay inherent in this system, which in any case will be no greater than the delay we encounter on the Russian side owing to their centralization of control.
- (c) The reply of all British officers to Russian requests should be so far as possible standardized, to the effect that the matter must be referred to higher authority.

- (d) It should be our aim to let the Russians know exactly where they stand in their dealings with us. This means that we should take longer to make up our minds but should always hold to our decision once we have given it unless completely new circumstances supervene. We should make it plain that we are taking a leaf out of the Russian book and should insist on strict reciprocity. Thus by our firmness we would increase their respect for us as negotiators.
- (e) The issues on which we are prepared to be really tough should be very carefully selected. When taking up such a stand, we should make certain that it is about something on which, given the Russian set-up, it is reasonable for them to give way; that we attach great importance to the issue, and are prepared to explain why, with some hope of our motive being understood. We should always base our requests on considerations of vital interest. This applies particularly to technical matters which the Russians may not at first understand.
- (f) We should where possible avoid making requests which would put the Russians in the position of having to expose any short-comings of their own.
- (g) In dealing with the Russian officers and officials it is important to treat them with strict cordiality, even more than friendliness.
- (h) It is also extremely important that officers who have to deal with the Russians, should be very carefully selected. They should also be of at least equal rank to the Soviet officers with whom they will have to deal. For specific subjects of major importance a special visit by a high ranking officer would be likely to achieve more than an attache.
20. If the above recommendations are approved by the Chiefs of Staff it is further recommended that copies of this report should be sent to C.-in-C., B.A.C.R., Officer Commanding British Troops in Austria, C.-in-C., B.P.F., British Staff Section, Tokyo, C.-in-C., Middle East, C.-in-C., Mediterranean, Heads of Military Missions in Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Italy and all Service attaches in countries where Russia is also diplomatically represented.

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- (f) We should where possible avoid making requests which would put the Russians in the position of having to expose any short-comings of their own.
- (g) In dealing with the Russian officers and officials it is important to treat them with strict formality, even more than friendliness.
- (h) It is also extremely important that officers who have to deal with the Russians, should be very carefully selected. They should also be of at least equal rank to the Soviet officers with whom they will have to deal. For specific subjects of major importance a special visit by a high ranking officer would be likely to achieve more than an attache.

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(Signed) F.W. de GUINGAND
T.V. BIRCHST
I.M.R. CAMPBELL (For D.N.I.)
R. ALLEN.

Offices of the Cabinet and
Minister of Defence, S.W.1.

18TH OCTOBER, 1945.

TOP SECRET.

24
10.

Subject : Information on the Italian Army
to be given to Foreign Governments.

AFCE
22/10

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

G/5 *Leone* 24 Oct. 45.

To : A.F.H.Q. (for Chief of Staff).

5

4

1. The French and Russian representatives, particularly the latter, have recently noticeably increased their demands for information on the above. A.F.H.Q. telegram F.57882 dated 25 Nov 44 and A.C. letter 516/70/CSS dated 27 Nov 44, authorised me to give full information to the above.

2. As, however, it is so easy unwittingly to create either an exaggerated or a depreciated impression of the power, competence and worth of the Italian Army without in any way trying to mislead, I should like to know which of the above alternatives you wish me to adopt as being in keeping with the higher policy of the British and American Governments; or alternatively which of these impressions it is more important to avoid.

3. May I have an early reply?

d. Brown

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

/ago

G.O.C.

- 209
- File on 6/5*
1. The Russian Representatives have recently increased their activities noticeably. They come to me two or three times a week, with requests for all sorts of information, generally in amplification of MMIA Confidential Monthly Reports on activities.
 2. Acting on instructions, I try to give them straightforward information on all accomplished facts, i.e., the truth and nothing but the truth, and try to keep this as far as possible along the dead centre line.
 3. As, however, it is so easy unwittingly to create either an exaggerated or a depreciated impression of the power, competence and worth of the Italian Army without in any way trying to mislead, I should like to know which of these alternatives would be the more in keeping with higher policy; or perhaps it might be better to say, which of these impressions is it the more important to avoid.
 4. I feel that if direction on such general lines were given to all concerned, together with a statement of any matters which it is considered should not be discussed on a low level, a good deal of mistrust and misunderstanding might be avoided.
 5. Information on the same lines would also be appreciated in respect of the French delegation.

W.P.
W.L.A.R.

23 Oct

G.(S.O.).

C.O.S. *seen*

Have you any comments? W.P.
Agree in policy seems essential. As we to "book" in
"down" to Italian Army? W.P. sent.

G.C.C.

File. 8

1. The Russian Representatives have recently increased their activities noticeably. They come to us two or three times a week, with requests for all sorts of information, generally in amplification of ISIA Confidential Monthly Reports or activities.
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5. Information on the same lines would also be appreciated in respect of the French delegation.

To G

C.O.S

for records 23 Oct.

WP

MS
SECRET.

13/14

7

Ref: 516/88/COS.20 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Russian & French Representatives of A.C.

R22
12TO) Navy Sub-Commission.
Attn: Commodore Palmer.

As agreed in our conversation of this afternoon, I enclose herewith copies of relevant correspondence regarding the supply of information to the Russian and French representatives on the work of the Allied Commission.

MBL/JG.

MS Luck
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to: L.F. Sub-Com. } For info....with copies of
Air Force Sub-Com } correspondence concerned.

(K)

COPY.US SECRET EQUALS BRITISH SECRET. ~~SECRET~~
7/1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Office of the Chief of Staff.

26 January 1944.

SUBJECT: Credentials for Soviet Member, Allied Control Commission.

TO : Lieut. General Mason MacFarlane, Deputy President,
Allied Control Commission.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the appointment of a Soviet member of the Allied Control Commission for Italy. The Advisory Council for Italy have unanimously recorded themselves in favor of the participation of a Soviet representative in the work of the Commission and recommend to the Allied Commander-in-Chief that such participation be accepted.
2. The functions of the Soviet member will be consultative. You will accord him access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work and he will have the right to make suggestions to the Deputy President of the Commission.
3. Major General Nestor Solodovnik has been nominated as the Soviet Member, Allied Control Commission. He is hereby accredited to the Allied Control Commission as Soviet Member and is authorized to proceed to Italy in execution of his duties.

By command of GENERAL WILSON.

(Sgd) J.A.H. GANNELL, OB, DSO, MC,
Lieut. General,
Chief of Staff.

C O P Y.

S E C R E T.

27/E
7/2

TO : ACTION ACC
FROM : AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED

F 31452

PRIORITY

SEP 281410A

CITE: FHGEG

SECRET. INSTRUCTIONS NOW RECEIVED FROM CCS THAT SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ATTACH 8 STAFF OFFICERS TO ACC AS PERSONAL ASSISTANTS TO SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMMISSION IN ADDITION TO HIS AIDE-DE-CAMP IS APPROVED. REF OUR F 86080 OF 26 AUG. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT YOU SHOULD REPORT HERE IF THEY ATTEMPT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WORK OF THE SUBCOMMISSIONS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OBSERVING THEIR WORK.

DETAILS OF THE ASSIGNMENTS OF THE OFFICERS WILL BE REPORTED HERE IN ORDER THAT CCS MAY BE INFORMED.

THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN THE PREVIOUS CABLE AS TO THE REQUESTING OF ADDITIONAL VILLAS STAYS AND SPECIAL TRANSPORT CANNOT BE AUTHORIZED FOR THIS GROUP.

COPY.TOP SECRET.243
7/3HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of StaffRef: 516/70/COS.27 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Giving of Military Information to the Russians
and French regarding the Italian Army.

TO : CCG, Land Forces Sub-Commission.

1. You were good enough to let me see Major-General Airey's letter to you of 7 November, Ref: GHI/DO/45/44, in which he asked you to refrain from passing to either the Russian or French members of the Allied Commission information about the Italian Army.

2. I have discussed this matter with the Chief Commissioner who asks me to say that by direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, in a letter of 26 January, directed the Chief Commissioner to accord to the Russian member access to information on all aspects of the Commission's work. In the Chief Commissioner's opinion the re-organisation of the Italian Army is properly part of the Allied Commission's work and information on this subject should be supplied both to the Russian and French members.

3. The Chief Commissioner would be very glad, therefore, if you would make arrangements to do so.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Major-General Airey.

(Sgd) M.S. LUSH.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MSL/JG.

G.O.C.

Information French/Russians.

Ref our conversation
do you want to add
anything to F 18²? I
don't think it really necessary.

No. I think not. *S.M.D.*
30 Nov.
D.B.
Gr. 107

6

PERSONALTOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Giving of Military Information the Russians
and French regarding the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A. C.
(M.M.I.A.)

TS/G/4

28 Nov 44

TO : Chief of Staff, A.C.

R28
11

My dear

folio 17
Your 516/70/COS of 27 Nov.

1. I have just received the following from AIREY :-

"No objection to telling Russian Mission details
of co-belligerent Italian Army. French can be
given same information."

That makes everything quite clear.

2. I have not said a word to the Russian mission that I
might NOT be able to tell them all they wanted.

3. But I did go to the French mission. However, I had a
long talk with DE SIEVIN (at ZIROLI's Thanksgiving party.!) the
other evening and explained my position - most amicably. Actually
I told DE SIEVIN in broad outline all he wanted to know. He was
quite happy. Yesterday, I sent my CSC I to see the French mission
and tell them that we were now officially permitted to tell them
all they want to know. No Frenchman was "at Home", but I will let
them know as soon as they are "IN".!

Yours

28

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

TOP SECRET.

Personal

25

Ref: 516/70/COS.

27 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Giving of Military Information to the Russians
and French regarding the Italian Army.

R 28
"

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission.

My dear General,

1/2

1. You were good enough to let me see Major-General Airey's letter to you of 7 November, Ref: GBI/20/45/44, in which he asked you to refrain from passing to either the Russian or French members of the Allied Commission information about the Italian Army.

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3. The Chief Commissioner would be very glad, therefore, if you would make arrangements to do so.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to Major-General Airey.

Yours sincerely
Maurice Tull.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MSL/JG.

A.B.

Copy to: Major-General Airey,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ.

FROM AFHQ G2 from AIREY WILSON CITE FHGBI 251554A
 TO MIA For Gen BROWNING
 F 57882

No objection to telling Russian Mission details of
 cobelligerent Italian Army (.) French can be given
 same information.

ROUTINE

G.O.C.

el:

Let all officers
know

Any instructions please?

[Signature]
 26 Nov

Go see the French
 mission & tell them
 we above. Actually we
 told Gen. De Liron a
 lot personally already.
[Signature] 27 Nov

TOP SECRET
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

Z 3.

MSG Center No :

N127/25

Classification :

TOP SECRET

Precedence :

ROUTINE

From :

AFHQ

To :

MMIA (GEN BROWNING)

TS/G/4.

26/11

R20/11

Date Time Rec'd : 252320

Date Time Sent : 251554A

Reference NR : F-57882

Cite : FHGBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO ——— OBJECTION TO TELLING RUSSIAN MISSION DETAILS OF

COBELLIGERENT ITALIAN ARMY (•) PAREN/FOR ——— MMIAH ——— FOR

GENERAL BROWNING FROM ——— G2 ——— FROM AIREY ——— SIGNED E

F. 57882.

WILSON CITE FHGBI ———

PAREN (P) FRENCH CAN BE GIVEN SAME INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET B2.

SUBJECT: Giving of Military Information to the
Russians and French regards the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

TS/S/L
14 Nov 44

TO : All Officers M.M.I.A.

1. The attached letter from Major General ARBY, Intelligence, AFHQ is for information.
2. The instructions contained therein will be strictly observed by all concerned.
3. Attached also is a letter sent to the French, which gives officers M.M.I.A. a guide as to what to say, if approached. It will be best for any officer M.M.I.A. to take this line while being friendly and polite, and to say that requests for information (except on the broadest lines) puts us in a difficult position and that therefore we would be grateful if such requests were not pressed.

D. Brown
Major General
M.M.I.A.

C O P Y
-----Land Forces Sub Com., A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)TS/G/4
14 Nov 44

To:- OFFICE OF THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE
(att. Lt. de NOUE)
H.Q., ALLIED COMMISSION.

Ref your memorandum dated 21 October requesting information
about the new Italian Combat Groups.

1. Instructions have been received by this Sub-Commission that LONDON and WASHINGTON will control the passing of Military Information and that requests for information should be taken up by the French Mission accredited to the Allies at those centres.
2. This Sub-Commission is merely Executive and does not decide policy. It will thus be realised that it is not in a position to give information and it is requested that you will forward your questions through the channels mentioned in para 1 above.
3. Meanwhile, as you will have doubtless seen from the Press, the intention is to form a number(not yet fixed)of Italian Combat Groups armed with Allied Equipment to take part in operations for the liberation of ITALY.

(Sgd) S.M. INGLEDEW.

Lt Col
GSO. I
Land Forces Sub Com., A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

Chief of Staff,
A.C.

1/1
Ref phone conversation, will you please view
Folio ^{1/2} ~~1~~, and return file to this office under secret
cover.

22 Nov 44

L. M. Ingledew
Lt. Col.
G.S.

28/4

1/2
d.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512 U.S. ARMY

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

DBI/20/45/44

7th November 44

My dear *Browning*,

1. I am so sorry not to have answered your DC/E of the 24th October 44 before, but I have been away in the Middle East and have only just returned.

2. The question of passing information to the RUSSIANS has always been a difficult one owing to the almost total lack of information which 30 MISSION is given in MOSCOW. It has therefore been ruled that LONDON and WASHINGTON should control the passing of information, which they do on a quid pro basis. It is also necessary that we should avoid putting the WAR OFFICE and WAR DEPARTMENT into a difficult position, which might happen if the SOVIET MISSION were to confront them with information which they had obtained in ITALY and which had been withheld by LONDON and WASHINGTON.

3. The policy therefore is to give only the broadest possible information to the RUSSIANS and to tell them that anything else must be taken up between the respective G overnments through the accredited Missions. However, there may be some justification in their asking for information about the ITALIAN Army as, although they are not a Military Mission accredited to S.A.C. and therefore entitled to be kept in the picture, they are Military technical advisers to the SOVIET representative on the Advisory Council and therefore presumably entitled to know something about the ITALIAN Army. I am therefore asking LONDON by signal if we may give them information on the ITALIAN Army. Until I get a reply I should be most grateful if you would only give broad information and not let them make any "irregular" contacts with your staff with a view to getting detailed information.

4. I think it would be wise to treat the FRENCH in the same way until I hear from LONDON.

5. I am sorry to have been so verbose, but I thought it wise to give you the whole background. I hope to get up to ROME soon and will drop in and talk to you about it if I may.

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Y ours

Frederic Ainslie

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, CBE, MC.,
Military Mission Italian Army,
ROME

COPYPERSONAL.CONFIDENTIAL.

1/3

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

DO/2

24 Oct. 44.

My dear Airey,

I have received the attached from General DE SIEVIN the French Representative at A.C.C. Yesterday the Russians came to see me asking for information about the Italian Army.

I told the Russians a good deal in broad outline and they asked me to nominate Officers in my H.Q. to whom they could apply for details. Would you let me know what is to be my policy in all this business? Am I to give the Russians full and frank information? If they ask for exact figures presumably I must give these as we must theoretically trust our Allies completely.

Have the French any right to demand information about the Italian Army and to what extent am I to give this?

Those are the sort of things that I am not clear on and I should be grateful if you would put me wise.

I shall be staying with you I hope for the night of Friday the 27th and perhaps we could discuss this then.

Au Revoir,

Yours

(Sgd) Langley Browning.

Major General T.C. AIREY, O.B.E.,
D.M.I.,
A.F.H.Q.

Original on DO/2.

0749