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CARABINIERI (GEN)

May - 1945 - Aug. 1946

Cover II

SUBJ OF: Arms


LAND FORCES SUB OFF, A.C. (MMA)

(439001 Ext 401) — SD/b7

25 Aug 46TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Owing to their special commitments it is strongly recommended
that CO, RR, detachment of 150 personnel at Naples, have their Sten Guns
replaced by T.S.MG's as soon as possible.

RMC/rr

781

Major General,
H. M. L. A.
for

Copy to: Major C.B. Hayes (CO, RR, - QSO II)

Internal: 101
SD/109/2

ENCL.

25 1630 B

6. BRITISH LIAISON UNIT

SD 2515

UNCLASSIFIED

87

REF YOUR SIGNAL 9/6/3 OR 23 (.)

DO NOT TAKE UP WITH CO GR., AND TELL

INFORM YOU (.) MATTER IS HOWEVER PURELY ITALIAN

AND NO DILATE PRESSURE CAN BE BROUGHT

see folio 87

781

83/47

ROUTINE
G(SD)

A.R.C. GUTHRIE, Lt. Col.

4/26/47

LROF V MBGE NR 24009 IMPORTANT
 FROM G B L U H231630B
 TO MMIA- ROME
 GR -- BT

RECEIVED 25 JUL 1946
 2842 SIGNALS



G 87

BGS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G III	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO III (SD)	
GSO I (TRG)	
G II (L)	

G/6/3 : UNCLASSIFIED .
 ONE COMPANY MOBILE BN CCRR RETAINED IN PESARO ON ORDERS OF
 PREFECT . COMD OFFR SAY UNNECESSARY EMERGENCY OVER .
 PLEASE ARRANGE FOR ORDERS TO BE GIVEN FOC RE-ENTRY AS PREFECT ADAMANT

XO 231630B
 WA OFFR SAYS PSE 231630B
 SENT NR 9 0935B PJRS (AR) TKU K
 RD NBOLO K 9 0940B HTH VA ARK
 NO NOT OUT

See 88
 for reply -

MMIA	G
FILE SD/44	25/7.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION

M. M. I. A.

NOTES ON CC.RR. POSITION IN ITALIAN POLICE SYSTEM

1. MAJOR GENERAL L. BROWNING CB. OBE. MC. has directed that a description of the Italian Police System will be given by this Section to all Officers in Land Forces Sub Commission, AC. (MINIA).

2. TYPES OF POLICE.

BGS	CC.RR.	There are six Police Forces in Italy, namely :
GSO + (S)	Carabinieri	Etablissement: 75,000
Regt G. (1)	Questura (including Railway and Traffic Police)	" 32,405
GSO (S)	Guardia di Finanza	" 31,629
GSO (S)	Forest Guards	" 5,579
GSO (S) G.	Municipal Guards)	According to local needs
G. II (1)	Armed Watchmen)	specially authorised.

3. CARABINIERI (CC.RR.).

The CC.RR. are the largest single Police Unit ; they are the first and oldest Regiment in the Italian Army and have a splendid tradition of which they are intensely proud. An exceptionally high moral standard is required from volunteer recruits to the CC.RR. and enquiries concerning them and their families cover three generations. They are recruited and trained as soldiers. In their training, part is devoted entirely to instruction in Italian law and police powers and procedure, as "Agente di Pubblica Sicurezza" (Policeman), with full police powers. The police duties of the CC.RR. are more comprehensive in those parts of Italy other than large cities and provincial seats as they (CC.RR.) are the only fully authorised police to be found in rural places. Therefore it is upon the CC.RR. that the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests. The general emphasis is that the CC.RR. are soldiers with, e.g. a secondary duty, police functions.

4. For administration and discipline, CC.RR. are exclusively under the control of the War Ministry, operationally from the police aspect, however, they are under the direct control of the Minister of Interior who exercises that direction and control through the Civil Authorities (Prefetti and Sindaci).

5. The Prefect acts for the Ministry of Interior and in his Province he is the supreme authority for the Government,

Establishment: 75,000

GSO I. (S)	Carabinieri
Dep. G. (I)	Questura (including Railway and Traffic Police)
GSO II. (I)	Guardia di Finanza
GSO III. (I)	Forest Guards
GSO IV. (I)	Municipal Guards
GSO V. (I)	Armed Watchmen
G. II. (L)	

3. CARABINIERI (CC.RR.).

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4. For administration and discipline, CC.RR. are exclusively under the control of the War Ministry, operationally from the police aspect, however, they are under the direct control of the Minister of Interior who exercises that direction and control through the Civil Authorities (Prefetti and Sindacci).
5. The Prefect acts for the Ministry of Interior and in his Province he is the supreme authority for the Government, being responsible only to the Ministry of the Interior.
6. The second highest responsible official in each Province is the Questore (the chief of all Police Agencies in the Province). The authority of the Questore includes the operational control of the Carabinieri, and all crimes coming to the notice of the CC.RR. have to be reported by them to the Questore, although CC.RR. are not bound to seek assistance in investigation. If, however, Carabinieri and Questore are jointly

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FILE 50/43

DATE 2/3/57

engaged in police action, the Questure Agent of similar rank takes charge. Much jealousy exist between Questure and Carabinieri.

This local control of the Carabinieri by civil officials is not likely to be removed, as it is based on a well established principle applied in most countries.

7. In exceptional times, local civil control or single national control are dangerous as the Police Forces may be deliberately used to further the interests of one section of the community to the disadvantage of the others. When Police Agencies are not impartial, the public fail to receive that protection to which they are entitled, and which the laws of the land provide.

Civil authorities should therefore administer the Police under their operational control in such a manner that every citizen has confidence in the police to protect him.

8. In many parts of Italy to-day the civil authorities do not possess the essential qualifications and the political interests of the authorities concerned have undoubtedly had a considerable bearing on the correct or incorrect use of the Carabinieri and other Police Agencies. This is particularly true regarding the North of Italy.

9. The 12 "Mobile Battalions" of the Carabinieri (heavily armed with Armoured Cars etc.) have been created primarily to deal with public disorders of such gravity that Carabinieri personnel normally armed could not quell. In the event of serious disturbances arising from political motives, instructions may be given by non-political civil authorities which will - by effecting dispersal - defeat the purpose for which the Mobile Battalions have been created. This fact should always be borne in mind so long as the operational control of the Carabinieri is vested in local civil authorities.

10. Although their standard of efficiency and administration still leaves much to be desired, the Carabinieri can be relied upon to perform their duties impartially, and their tradition and training of the past 133 years as soldiers and policemen is the most valuable asset in the Italian police system. Exhaustive enquiries have failed to reveal that the politics of any CC.RR. personnel affect the manner in which their duties are carried out. Therefore the policy of this HQ is not directed towards any fundamental change in the constitution of the Carabinieri, but to make it function as an efficient, independent

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It is intended to accomplish this by :

- (a) Ensuring that all Carabinieri requirements are provided through Army channels of supply.
- (b) The supply to Carabinieri of sufficient transport, arms ammunition.

- 3 -

- (c) Provision of telephone and wireless communications.
- (d) A revision of terms and conditions of service and intense training in modern police methods.
- (e) The establishment of a Criminal Records Office.
- (f) Raising the morale & efficiency as a result of the above.

11. QUESTURA.

The Questura (Agenti di Pubblico Sicurezza) is a national Police force of civil character depending upon the Ministry of Interior. It is operated on a provincial basis largely in the towns only, the Questore being the Chief Police Officer for each Province. He is responsible to the Prefect only. He is also responsible in theory for co-ordinating all the Police service in his province, but in many instances no such co-ordination exist in practice. On a provincial level the Group Commander of Corbinieri should make daily reports to the Prefect and the Questore, but in practice this is not always carried out.

The force under his command is divided into two smaller sections :

- (a) Regular Agents, who perform all duties in civilian clothes.
- (b) Auxiliary Agents, who wear uniform.

12. In large cities and provincial sects the main responsibility for policing the place is that of the Questure investigation of crime, control of fire-arms, licensing restrictions, control of prostitution, traffic control, etc., is almost entirely the work of the Agents of Public Security, but, as has been pointed out in the section dealing with the Corbinieri, where no Questura exists - i.e. below the provincial sects - all police duties are performed by the CC.RR. with the exception of certain specialist duties which will be detailed later.

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13. On the liberation of the North, several Questori or Senior Officers were killed, many others imprisoned, and the remainder dismissed. The Questura was taken over by partisans, very few, if any having any previous police experience. About 50% of the former Agents of inferior grade were re-instated, provided they were not politically unsatisfactory. Many of these locally appointed officers were conscientious, and law-abiding

citizens, others were not, and the elements they commanded were incompetent. Since that time many of these locally appointed officers have been replaced by professional Questure Agents and the standard of efficiency raised, but many inefficient personnel remain. It will therefore be many years before the Questura's can possibly reach the standard of efficiency which they should possess.

14. There are other branches of "Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza", who perform police duties of a minor character.

These are :

Railway Police.

Traffic Control Police.

Guardie Metropolitane.

the letter existing in Rome, Milan, Palermo
and Naples.

15. The Railway Police and Traffic Control Police are energetic but untrained. Training of those men; however, is taking place, but it is unlikely they will ever be entirely satisfactory, owing to their low standard of education, as ~~u~~ ^o qualification (other than political ones) was at the time of their recruitment during the liberation required of them.

16. Guardie Metropolitane. The Guardie Metropolitane are concerned with local traffic control, conservation of bye laws, and control of markets. These men are ornamental rather than useful. Their continued existence in their present state, is however a nuisance, because they are incapable and/or unwilling to carry out their duties. The Carabinieri and Questure should be empowered to act against offenders, ignore offences which should be dealt with by the Guardie Metropolitane e.g. street trading in rationed goods, etc.

17. Guardia di Finanza. The body has military status, but is not a part of the Italian Army, being dependent on the Ministry of Finance for administration, and upon the Ministry of Interior operationally.

The Guardie di Finanza are, as their name implies, chiefly concerned with the enforcement of taxation laws and the collection of revenues. They work closely with the Carabinieri on frontier control.

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the latter existing in Rome, Milan, Palermo
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The Guardia di Finanze are, as their name implies, chiefly concerned with the enforcement of taxation laws and the collection of revenues. They work closely with the Carabinieri on frontier control. They are highly efficient.

18. **Guardie Forestale.** The Guardie Forestale are dependent upon the Ministry of Agriculture. They too have military status but are not a part of the Italian Army. They are specialists in afforestation and their work is extremely important for the preservation of forests and agriculture land value. They are efficient.

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- 5 -

19. Guardia Municipale. The Guardia Municipale are engaged on a communal basis, under the control of the Sindaco. They are employed as municipal messengers and are supposed to control markets and shops. Broadly speaking, they are completely unimportant in the contribution they make towards the preservation of law and order.

20. Armed Guards. In order to save employing Carabinieri materials, ARHQ has given authority for the Italian War Ministry to use armed Italian civilians on guard duty. These men wear green armbands when on duty and are employed by the Italian Army Territorial Commands. They are armed to a very light scale and can only carry arms when on duty. The number of armed civilian guards so employed varies according to local requirements.

21. Conclusion. The conditions in which the Carabinieri have been working in the past few years have been extremely difficult. They lost considerable "face" under the Fascists and after the armistice. Nevertheless the material is good, if properly organised and held. The CC.MR. have already made great strides, largely as a result of the policy inaugurated in para 16 above and partly owing to their enhanced prestige and the growing confidence of the public in them. There is no doubt that the general public are tired of disorder and welcome the increased CC.MR. efficiency and success in preserving order. Therefore the first and most hopeful step in Italian police re-organisation must be to put the Carabinieri on their feet.

H. M. Gaskell 77

cc/lur

4 May 46.

Dist:

Executive Comm. (2 copies)
A.C. for Public Safety (2 copies)
Sub Comm.
Lists A.E

H. MIGHAIL, Lt. Col.
CC.F.R. Branch.
LEND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C.
M. M. I. A.

RECEIVED
A 055 23 FEB 1946

Ref: AD/14601/72/PS.

22 February 1946.

Land Forces S/C
31A

R G

SD/47.

A few days ago General Browning spoke to you from an Aide Memoire on the Carabinieri. He subsequently showed me his notes. I felt that he had, naturally, spoken only from the military aspect of their functions and organisation. I therefore instructed the Public Safety Sub-Commission to prepare some notes for you on the civil side of their work which is, of course, controlled, by the Ministry for Interior, and I am sending them herewith. I hope that they may be of value to you.

M. S. LUSH

MMIA
FILE: 32/77
DATE: 25/2/46

H.E. Sir Noel Charles, K.C.M.G.,
British Ambassador,
British Embassy,
Rome.

Col. GS
GSO 1 (CD)
Dep. GS
GSO II (S-1)
GSO II (I)
GSO II (C)
GSO II (M)
GSO II (T)
GSO II (F)
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Copy to: 6 Commissioner.
Land Forces S/C.
Executive Commissioner.

816

22nd February 1946.ADVICE FOR H.E. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.ORGANISATION - CARABINIERI.

1. Although the CC.R. is a unit of the Italian Army and organised as such, it is primarily a Police Force and its members are policemen charged with the duty of preserving the peace. It is for this reason that the CC.R. is under the control of two Ministries, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior. The functions are as follows:

- (a) Ministry of War. Administration, organisation military training, discipline, recruiting, arms and equipment, transport (including horses). Military Police, action under mobilisation orders, supervision of soldiers on leave and release, search for deserters and those escaping from military prisons. The Ministry of War always works in agreement with the Ministry of Interior regarding the distribution and assignment of officers.
 - (b) Ministry of Interior. Maintenance of public order and security, billeting and barracks equipment. The Ministry can order concentration of forces whenever necessary. In matters concerning the strength of the CC.R., or its disposition, the Commanding General, CC.R., must obtain the previous authorisation of the Ministry of Interior, before interesting the Ministry of War in the matter.
2. The number of police in Italy today is less than the number employed before Italy's entry into the war, before its industrial, commercial and economic resources had been destroyed, and before its population was confronted with hunger, homelessness, unemployment and inflation. Before the war, the aggregate number of police engaged in maintaining law and order (excluding Royal Finance Guards) was approximately 207,000 officers and men. Of this number 130,000 were organised into specialised police agencies including:

- a Railway Police.
- b Port Police.
- c Highway or Road Police.
- d Post and Telegraph Police.
- e Frontier Police.
- f Coastal Police.
- g Forest Guards.

772

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- (c) Highway or Road Police.
- (d) Post and Telegraph Police.
- (e) Frontier Police.
- (f) Coastal Police.
- (g) Forest Guards.
- (h) Anti-Aircraft Guards.

These agencies were manned from M.V.S.R. (Black-Shirt Militia), they were fascist organisations, and were all abolished when the Allies occupied Italy. No replacement was made, and as a result, Carabinieri are being used for duty on railways, ports, roads, frontiers, etc., to the detriment of their primary function, the duty of preserving the peace. (The Italian Government has appreciated this situation and has issued Decree creating Railway Police. Men are being enrolled as agents of Public Security under Questore and will be trained as Port and Road Police).

3. The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime. Next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. These functions cannot be performed by police on static guard duty, nor by

-2-

those held in reserve bodies in readiness to put down riots or other disturbances beyond the capacity of the CC.RR. on patrol. The close contact with the public so necessary to the proper performance of police duty is secured by the naming of 4,809 stations throughout the country. The location and importance of the station determines the number of police to be assigned. The extraneous duties which must at present be performed by the CC.RR. militates against the effectiveness of their strength, with the result that the stations throughout the country are not named to their proper strength. The minimum station allotment is usually 5 but this number has had to be reduced. The increase in mobility of a force increases efficiency. However, a reduction in strength in communes, to be replaced by visiting CC.RR. in motor cars or trucks, will inevitably lead to a worsening of public safety conditions. The presence of the CC.RR. resident on the scene frequently prevents crime being committed. Flying squads can only deal with the trouble after it has occurred. Experience at home has shown that with all the many modern aids so valuable and necessary in police work today, the basis of the whole system is the "man on the beat". He cannot be replaced.

4. It is not generally appreciated that the CC.RR. is the only representative of law and order in the towns and communes below provincial level. He is not a village policeman. He is a member of a national police force and is transferred from a city or small town to a commune in the mountains in accordance with the exigencies of his service, The CC.RR. In Rome is of the same type as the CC.RR. in a Sicilian village.
5. Agents of Public Security are concentrated in cities and provincial seats and are not distributed into communes to assist in the duty of preserving order. Guardia Finanza are revenue agents, not police in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is anticipated that an additional 6,000 agents will be trained by April and a further 6,000 by June. This increase in strength should enable a large number of CC.RR. to return to proper police duty. When this occurs, every effort should be made to build up the strength of the force at the station level.

771

FROM: G.H.Q., CC.RR

TO: Ministry of War

SUBJECT: War established strength of the CC.RR Corps.

TRANSLATION
 GSO I (CD) →
 ... G3 →
 ... " GSO
 ... " G1
 GSO II (W)
 G.O. II (C)
 GSO III (O.G.C.)
 G (I.G.)

NAME
ARMY
ERA
CAR
REF:

REF: 209/16 - 1945

DATE: 14.1.46

cc. RR sec. H/m

SD/47

79

As is known, the division of the CC.RR H.Q.s approved by the Allies, allows for a total war establishment strength of 1495 officers and 63,505 NCOs and ORs ; a grand total of 65,000.

The Trieste legion, included in the said division, ~~xxxxxx~~ with 44 officers and 2652 NCOs and ORs, has not been reformed.

Because of M.M.I.A.'s orders the war establishment of the CC.RR Corps has been, therefore, temporarily reduced to 1451 officers and 60,853 NCOs and ORs, a total of 62,304. *Actual s.m. ? 66,000 odd
(Official figures)*

The present conditions of public order and security would, however, deem it necessary that the CC.RR Corps should be able to dispose of at least another 10,000 men over and above the 65,000.

~~xxxxxx~~ a request to this effect, on the 7th. September 1945, ⁷⁷, by the then Prime Minister, Prof. Ferruccio Parri, was forwarded to the Allied Commission.

The request, however, has not been granted.

FILE: 78/47
DATE: 9/1/2

With things as they are and in order to be able to employ at the present time, the largest possible number of carabinieri, I appeal to your Ministry to permit this G.H.Q. retaining in service,

and consequently rationing, the 65,000 men initially laid down instead of the present 62,304.

With this increase this G.H.Q. intends to form another four mobile battalions to be stationed at Bolzano, Verona, Catantaro, and Messina.

Sgd. BRUNETTO BRUNETTI

G.O.C.

O.Danin Cpl.

769

785020

Subject : Increase of CO. in fees £5,000 to 75,000

Land Forces Staff Commission, A.O.C.
(C.M.L.A.)
L O N D O N .

SD/47 31 Jan. 45.

To : H.Q. A.O.C. (for Executive Commissioner).

Reference Signer's de CLOUTIER's D/0 letter to Chief Commissioner
No. 53557/34085.1/1.2.1 dated 26 January on the above subject :

1. I agree re the paramount importance of the CO. in and am you
now, they are being given first priority re clothing, equipment etc.
Also I am not opposed in principle to the increase in the CO. in ceiling
by 10,000 as above, but my feeling has always been that

(a) much more effective use could be made of the 65,000
CO. in by certain re-organisation and prioritisation of
equipment

(b) A.P.H.Q. and the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be
unlikely to accede to the request for increase while
there was difficulty in equipping and arming even
65,000.

2. As regards (a) above, I have not had time yet to examine the
whole problem of the CO. in and put forward any major proposals but,
from a quick preliminary survey by my own CO. in Section, the following
are in hand and are being discussed in principle today with General
MURKIN:

- (a) There appear to be some 3,000 CO. in strength or wasted
employed by either the Italian Government or the Allies.
Steps are being taken to remedy this.
I may mention that the 17,000 "withheld from the service"
mentioned in the 5th paragraph of Annex to CHIEF'S
letter includes sick, those on leave, those used by Allies
or Italian Government on extraordinary duties and include
the 3,000 mentioned above. In any army or formation, sick
and leave personnel are automatically borne by the unit
or whose strength these are on. This however is a point
in favour of CO. MURKIN's "request for an increase on the
ground that the effective strength (i.e., those actually
on duty) is 17,000 less than 65,000.
- (b) The head of my CO. in Section informs me that he thinks that

Reference Signs to G.M.R.T.'s D/O letter to Chief Commissioner No. 58557/24085.1/1.2.1 dated 26 January on the above subject:

1. I agree re the paramount importance of the C.C. R.R. and, as you know, they are being given first priority re clothing, equipment etc. Also I am not opposed in principle to the increase in the C.C. R.R. ceiling by 10,000 as above, but my feeling has always been that

(a) much more effective use could be made of the 65,000 C.C. R.R. by certain re-organization and provision of equipment

(b) A.P.H.Q. and the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be unlikely to accede to the request for increased idle there was difficulty in equipping and arming even 65,000.

2. As regards (a) above, I have not had time yet to examine the whole problem of the C.C. R.R. and put forward any major proposals but, from a quick preliminary survey by my new C.C. R.R. Section, the following numbers:-

?S.A

(a) Were proper to be sent 3,000 C.C. R.R. troops at once to reinforce the Italian Government or the Allies. Steps are being taken to ready this.

I may mention that the 17,000 "Feldtholden over the Service" mentioned in the 5th paragraph of Sir Alexander's letter include sick, those on Leave, those used by A.I.M.S. or Italian Government on emergency duties and include the 3,000 mentioned above. In any army or formation, sick and leave personnel are automatically borne by the unit on whose strength these are on. This however is a point in favour of de Gasperi's request for an increase on the ground that the effective strength (i.e. those actually on duty) is 17,000 less the 65,000.

(b) The head of my C.C. R.R. Section informs me that he thinks that C.C. R.R. units can be re-organized so as to save perhaps some 4,000 men, but this of course would take time to put into effect, and is dependent on provision of transport and signal equipment.

(c) I understand that 2,700 allowed for the THREE Legion has not been activated. There seems no reason why this number should not be recruited now and used as a special reinforcement in ITALY.

You will see that the above totals up to 29,700 men, which in due course can be made available to the C.C. R.R., compared with the 10,000 asked for by

R/1/2
/de L'Isert.

785020

- 2 -

to GASHI. Also I am not clear as to where the Italian Government expect to get these extra 10,000. If they intend to recruit discharged CO. IR, presumably they can get them fairly quickly; but if they intend to get them by normal process of selection and training, obviously it would be some time before these extra men would be available.

3. I bring the above to your notice for such action as you may wish to take. There would seem to be no reason why we should not continue to take steps as in para 2 while at the same time making for the entire 10,000 - particularly as the clothing, saving and equipping of the CO. IR is now a thumping force, though the present situation still depends on the provision of the vehicles owned by A.M.H.S. to the Ministry of War, who intend to put them at the disposal of the CO. IR. I understand that you have still not received a reply from de GASSET to your letter in this connection.

A. Arnould

Land Forces Sub Committee, A.C. (m.t.s.)

Capt K. C. P. R. Soc

/350

787

195020

Translation

To President of the Council of Ministers
59557/ 34083.1/1.2.1

Hand lines of 607
1/2 1/2
Rome, 26 January 1946

US
Sec to 18A

Dear Admiral,

Some time ago, the Italian Government asked the Allied Commission to be allowed to raise the number of the Carabinieri from 65 to 75 thousand units. Regarding this proposition, M.M.I.A. considered that the service of the Carabinieri would in fact be improved by bettering their equipment and armament and giving them better means of transport, instead of increasing their number.

The steps suggested by M.M.I.A. would doubtless be most useful; however they cannot make up for the scarcity of the men.

Before the war, with efficient communications and transport means, active industries, a general state of well-being, in short, in normal living conditions, the forces in charge of the various services of public order amounted to 207 thousand men, without counting the Guardia di Finanza.

Of such men, 130 thousand belonged to the militia specialized in the various services (railroad, harbours, road, post and telegraph, frontier, coast and forest militia). Such specialized Corps were suppressed, and the Carabinieri were entrusted with tasks which, in normal times, were carried out by thousands of agents, who, among other things had special competence and outfits.

However, the Carabinieri Corps must now supply not only soldiers for the above mentioned services which are not included among the special duties of the Corps, but also the men that are continually requested by the Allied Army Forces, by various other allied organizations and by numerous organisms of the Italian Government. Thus about 17.000 men are withheld from the service, and to this figure, we must add another 6 thousand carabinieri forming 12 battalions that must be kept as movable reserve.

The remaining force is quite inadequate to carry out the service of local detached commands where where the prevention and repression work of the Carabinieri takes place in very difficult conditions. In the provinces and in isolated places where incidents and riots trouble public order more frequently, police duties are entrusted to the Carabinieri Corps only, for the activity and service of the Public Safety Corps are limited to the towns.

To the problems of a general character regarding the safeguard of public order, and are of vital importance, we must add, in a near future, those which are relative to the organization of the elections. The Italian

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

Distr. Clerk Sec

G-

EC DIST. 29 Jan
ACTION - ~~ED~~ LAND F/C
INFO. CC
RC
LANDFORTS
C A Sec

- 2 -

Government is aware that voting must take place in a regime of utmost freedom and order if the elections are to be the first step towards the concrete reestablishment of a democratic administrative procedure.

This is why I wanted to bring once more to your attention the problem regarding the increasing of the number of the Carabiniers, so that you may efficaciously support the request of the Italian Government with A.F.I., hoping that approval may be granted in time for the new contingent to take up its duties before the beginning of the electoral period.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours,

S. De Gasperi

e/c

765

785020

TELETYPE FORM

SD/47

Ltr. 53/101

75

FROM : NMIA
 TO : ARHQ
 INFO : ALCOM
 REF : 692

DATE/TIME
23 A

ROUTINE/ED

REFERENCE YOUR PK 5357746 POF(.)

DATA HAS TAKEN OVER FROM POLICE SERVICE AND OWNERSHIP OF THIS BUILDING
 YOU OWN AS OWNED IN YOUR AG 014.12 GPO-0 1A POF(.) WHILE ABLE TO
 ARRANGE AND ARRIVED IN DAY TO DAY ADMINISTRATION AND MAINTAIN OF CORP
 FINANCIALS AND PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL STAFF OFFICERS NEEDED FOR THIS DUTY
 IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER SUCCESSFULLY THE COMPLETE REORGANISATION,
 PREPARATION OF DETAILED CHART OF PARTIES, F.O.S., AND INDIVIDUAL TASKS
 ASSIGNED(.)

PROPOSED THEREFORE TO GIVE YOU BY 5 DEC INTERIM REPLY TO PA A 3
 WHICH WOULD BE REFINED ON SAME DATE AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REMAINING
 PERIOD AS RESULT OF LATER DETAILED EXPERT STUDY(.)

WOULD BE GRAZEDUL FOR FAIRLY POSTING THESE POLICE OFFICERS, TWO SECOND
 GRADE STAFF OFFICERS, VIDE YOUR PK 51855 5 NOV (MAP 1086) AND LATER
 SEVEN LEADERS OFFICERS FOR OGRE

C | 3 | 1

GSO 1

GSO 2 (O.P.)

GSO 2 (O.B.)

GSO 2 (W.)

GSO 2 (L.)

GSO 3 (O.D.)

GSO 3 (O.P.O.)

GSO 3 (O.B.O.)

R / Q / 4

PRECEDENCE

AMENDMENT NUMBER

Internal 101

260930

785020

74

50/47

19 November 45

Ref: AG/14634/15

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces

TO: A.M.C. ~~and section.~~

(A) 40/47?

10

With reference to your C.M. 21h. 12 of 7 Oct 45 and in continuation of my letter 636/121/15 of 30 Oct 45.

1. Owing to the recent continuous changes in regard to the numbers and categories of officers remaining with or leaving the Allied Commission it has not been possible to form earlier an estimate of the number of police officers available for duty with MIA.

2. No officers will be available for assignment to MIA before the hand-over of the Northern Regions. After the hand-over to Italian control of the Northern Regions, it is estimated that 10 Police Officers can be made available for assignment outside the Public Safety Sub-commission and MIA territory. At least one of these would be of the rank of Lt. Colonel. Owing to the requirements of Veneto Milia, all officers available will probably be British. If the mission is to be allied, as recommended, arrangements for the provision of US personnel will have to be made.

3. In connection with this matter I want to be satisfied on behalf of the British Home Office that any British Officers assigned to MIA are employed on purely police duty, for which purpose they have been provided to the British Army from the Home Office.

GSO 1

X/s/ Ellery W. Stone 767

GSO 2 (Pm)

ELLERY W. STONE

GSO 2 (SD)

Major General, USA
Chief Commissioner

GSO 2 (M)

X - All X

GSO 2 (U)

GSO 3 (SD)

GSO 3 (U)

Copy to: Land Forces C/O (MIA)

R/21/11

21/11/45

104

S9/47

FROM : ATHQ G(SD) GSI 2 DATE/TIME
TO : MIA GSI 3 161608A
INFO : ALCOM GSI 3
REF : FX 55577 GSI 3 (cont) - CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT IS EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN POLICE FORCES AND INTERIOR ARMY(.)

- (1) IN RESPONSE TO ALCOM REQUEST FOR CITY 3,000 PISTOLS AND 44,000 AUTOMATIC MUSKETS HAVE RECENTLY RELEASED TO YOU 3,000 PISTOLS AND 10,000 MUSKETS FOR CARABINIERI AND HAVE REQUESTED ALCOM TO JUSTIFY FURTHER RELEASE OF MUSKETS AND TO CO-ORDINATE THEIR REPLY TELL YOU(.)
- (2) FORTI USLU TRANSPORT INCLUDING AED CARS HAS BEEN DEMANDED FOR CARABINIERI(.)
- (3) IN ORDER TO ASSESS FAIRLY THESE DEMANDS AND TO BE ABLE TO ESTIMATE OUR POSSIBLE COMMITMENTS REQUEST YOU FORWARD SCORCHET PROPOSED ORDER OF BATTLE OF UNITS BY TYPES AND QUANTITIES FOR CARABINIERI AND ANY OTHER POLICE FORCES FOR WHICH WEAPONS ETC ARE REQUIRED TOGETHER WITH COMPLETE WEAPON AND VEHICLE STAFF TABLES AND APPROXIMATE BULK QUANTITIES OF OTHER MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND STORES REQUIRED(.) ALSO SHOW EXISTING HOLDINGS OF ALL ITEMS DEMANDED AND ITEMS WHICH CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM ITALIAN ARMY RESOURCES(.)
- (4) COMPLETE ORDER OF BATTLE OF UNITS BY TYPES AND QUANTITIES (INCLUDING L OF C UNITS) TOGETHER WITH WEAPONS AND VEHICLE STAFF TABLES AND EXISTING HOLDINGS AND AVAILABILITIES IS ALSO REQUIRED FOR INTERIOR ARMY(.)
- (5) APPRECIATE INFORMATION REQUIRED ABOVE MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE BUT MUST EMPHASISE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AT PRESENT TIME AS PLAN FOR EQUIPMENT OF ITALIAN FORCES AND DISPOSAL POLICY FOR THESE EQUIPMENT EXCLUDING CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND ATTACHMENT

44,000 AUTOMATIC MUSKETS LATE RECENTLY RELEASED TO YOU 3,000 PISTOLS
AND 10,000 MUSKETS FOR CARABINIERI AND HAVE REQUESTED ALCOM TO JUSTIFY
FURTHER RELEASE OF MUSKETS AND TO CO-ORDINATE THEIR REPLY WITH YOU(.)

(2) PREV USLIV TRANSPORT INCLUDING ARMED CARS HAS BEEN DEMANDED
FOR CARABINIERI(.)

(3) IN ORDER TO ASSESS FAIRLY THESE DEMANDS AND TO BE ABLE TO
ESTIMATE OUR POSSIBLE COMMITMENTS REQUEST YOU FORWARD SOONEST PROPOSED
ORDER OF BATTLE OF UNITS BY TYPES AND QUANTITIES FOR CARABINIERI AND ANY
OTHER POLICE FORCES FOR WHICH WEAPONS ETC ARE REQUIRED TOGETHER WITH
COMPLETE WEAPON AND VEHICLE STAFF TABLES AND APPROXIMATE BULK QUANTITIES
OF OTHER MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT AND STORES REQUIRED(.) ALSO SHOW
EXISTING HOLDINGS OF ALL ITEMS DEMANDED AND ITEMS WHICH CAN BE MADE
AVAILABLE FROM ITALIAN ARMY RESOURCES(.)

(4) COMPLETE ORDER OF BATTLE OF UNITS BY TYPES AND QUANTITIES
(INCLUDING L OF C UNITS) TOGETHER WITH WEAPON AND VEHICLE STAFF TABLES
AND EXISTING HOLDINGS AND AVAILABILITIES IS ALSO REQUIRED FOR TERRIM ARST(.)

(5) APPRECIATE INFORMATION REQUIRED ABOVE MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY
AVAILABLE BUT MUST EMPHASISE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS
AT PRESENT TIME AS PLAN FOR EXPLOITATION OF ITALIAN FORCES AND DISPOSAL POLICY
FOR THEATRE EQUIPMENT INCLUDING CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
CAN NOT BE FORMULATED UNTIL STAFF TABLES REQUIRED BY PARAS 3 AND 4 ABOVE
ARE AVAILABLE HERE(.)

(6) GRATUITIF PREPARATION OF REPLY TO PARA 3 ABOVE BE GIVEN
HIGH PRIORITY AND INFORMATION FORWARDED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE AND NOT
HELD PENDING AVAILABILITY OF REPLY TO PARA 4(.)

(7) FOR ALCOM YOUR SIGNALS 4958 OF 08 SEP 8020 OF 03 NOVEMBER
AND ATTHE LETTER G-5 000.5 OF 07 NOVEMBER ALSO REFER(.)

Action Copy:- 9.008

Co J to:- G(SD)
ORD
S.T.

R/14/6

Q100

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : ALCOM

TO : AFHQ

REF : 8020

3 Nov 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED (.)

1. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT CC RR AND OTHER POLICE AGENCIES ARE INADEQUATELY ARMED (.) THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND AMG OFFICERS TESTIFY THAT THEY CANNOT PROPERLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES BECAUSE OF THIS LACK OF ARMS (.)

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM SIGNED STONE
CITE ACEXC PAREN

2. ON 14 SEPTEMBER IN MY AC/14601/II/PS TO G-5 SECTION I REQUESTED THAT 44000 AUTOMATIC MUSKETS AND 3000 PISTOLS BE RELEASED FROM THE BERETTA ARMS FACTORY AT BRESCIA FOR THE CARABINIERI (.) I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED PERMISSION (.)

I AM TOLD BY G-5 IN THEIR G-5: 000.5 13 OCTOBER THAT THE ISSUE OF THESE WEAPONS IS UNDER DISCUSSION (.) I SUBMIT THAT TO REFER OR POSTPONE FURTHER THE ISSUE OF THESE ARMS TO THE POLICE IN THIS COUNTRY IS TO IGNORE THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND ALLIED RESPONSIBILITY IN HELPING THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND I WOULD URGE THAT AN IMMEDIATE AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BE MADE^{GJ}

Copy to : C. Com
Ex. Com
Land Forces S/C.

Ex. Com for CA SEC

343

cc:

Ex. 2 (C) X B. X

Brig.

DUTIES BECAUSE OF THIS LACK OF ARMS (.)

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCON SIGNED STONE
CITE ACEXC PAREN

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IN HELPING THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND
I WOULD URGE THAT AN IMMEDIATE AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BE MADE *gj*

Copy to : C.Com
Ex.Com
Land Forces S/C.

Ex.Com for GA SEC

343

X A.M.
cc: 1 *b. X*
Gen 2 (Ops) *b. X*
Brig. *b. X*
Ex.Com *b. X*
GSO 2 (W.E.) *b. X*
GSO 2 (L.I.) *b. X*
GSO 3 (S.D.) *b. X*
GSO 3 (C.R.A.) *b. X*
GSO 3 (S.D.) *b. X*

SD DISTRIBUTION :
ACTION : SD/47
INFO : Q (Three)

6b

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

G-5 (C)

Land Forces S/C
G-5
COS
G-1
A/C
Col 172
WP
701

Ref: 3636/191/EC.

GSC 2 (C)

2 October 1945.

G-5 (W)

SUBJECT: Transfer of responsibility for CJ.RR to MMIA.

SD/47

G.O. 9 (SO)

GT

TO : Allied Force Headquarters. G-5 (Ordn)

Attn: G-5 Section.

G-5 (C)

B

1. In your telegram P50363 of 25 Oct 45 you refer to your letter G-5. 104.12 of 7 Oct 45 to which I have not yet replied. I read your letter under reference in conjunction with your telegram P5 47521 of 6 Oct 45 on which I commented in my telegram 6834 of 10 Oct 45. I was studying the whole question of the transfer to MMIA of the responsibility for the CJ.RR in conjunction with your letter of 7 Oct 45 when your instructions of 14 Oct 45 arrived (your letter AG 014.12 CBG-O). *SD/47*

2. I have received a letter from GOC, Land Forces S/C (MMIA) in which he states that he had previously informed you that in order to carry out his new duties he would require no less than 20 officers.

3. This matter is under discussion with GOC, Land Forces S/C (MMIA) and you will appreciate that in view of the divergence between the number quoted in your letter of 7 Oct 45 and the demands of GOC Land Forces S/C (MMIA) together with the grave shortage of personnel, a rapid decision is not possible.

4. My first impressions are that the numbers quoted in your letter and requested by GOC Land Forces S/C (MMIA) are extravagant but until Land Forces S/C (MMIA) and Public Safety S/C have worked out a modus operandi it would be premature of me to express a firm agreement. This will be forwarded in due course.

5. In this connection I forward you copy of a communication received from the US Ambassador in which you will note he has been instructed to communicate the State Department's instructions to the Prime Minister on the question of the despatch of an Allied Police Mission to this country. *7*

6. I still hold that it would be better to prosecute the question of an Allied Police Mission as a whole rather than to adopt a plan which deals with only part of the question. I should therefore be glad if this point of view, together with a copy of the Ambassador's letter, could be submitted to SACRED in support of my views which you note in para 3 of your telegram P50363 of 25 Oct.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MMIA)
CA Section.

ELIJAH W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

SD/47
R/2/11

C O P Y.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Rome.
October 18, 1945.

Near Admiral E. W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

Dear Admiral Stone:

With reference to your letter of September 19, 1945 (File No. 3626/149/EC) to C-5 Section, AFHQ, regarding an Allied Police Mission, I have received the views of the Department of State. The Department agrees with you that it is preferable not to impose a Police Mission on the Italians under the Supreme Allied Commander's present authority. It is even reluctant to insist upon its establishment as part of the peace treaty. The Department had hoped that the President of the Council of Ministers would be sufficiently aware of the advantages to democratic government in Italy, through strengthening internal security forces, to accept the responsibility of obtaining the Cabinet's approval of a plan to request the Allied Governments to send such a Mission. The Mission should begin work at once, of course, if the greatest good is to be accomplished.

The Department has instructed me, at my discretion, to inform the President of the Council of Ministers of the position of the United States Government as outlined above. The Department is of the opinion that factors governing the Italian Government's expressed desire for an improved international status are the assurance of free exercise of democratic rights to the Italian people and a clear assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of order.

I intend to communicate the substance of the Department's instructions to Professor Parri at an appropriate opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) A. KIRK.

Alexander Kirk.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFG 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

SD/47. 69

S.

29 Oct 45.

Ref: AG/14634/RS

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces.

TO: AFHQ-G-5 Section.

G.

with reference to your AG: 014.12 GSG-0 of 14 Oct 45.

- 1 Nov 45 has been agreed upon as the date of transfer of responsibilities, in matters connected with the Carabinieri, except their operational functions, from the Public Safety Sub-Commission to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA).

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:


M. Carr Brigadier

M. CARR, Brigadier,
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
MMLA,
Establishment Section.



754



RESTRICTED

RHF/awp

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 014.12 GFG-0

14 October 1945

50/47
G/H/11

SUGJECT: Transfer of Responsibility for the Carabinieri to MMIA

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission,
FOR: MMIA

Copy

A

Folio 11
1. Reference is made to paragraph 24 of letter, this headquarters, AG 091.711/169 GCT-O, dated 16 November 1944, subject, "Command and Administration of Italian Army" and to letter, this headquarters, G-5 014.12, dated 20 July 1945, subject, "Reorganization of Carabinieri and Other Police Forces of Italy".

2. It is believed that the time has now come when the supervisory functions of MMIA should parallel the executive functions of the Italian Ministry of War. It is therefore desired that you cause all matters connected with the training and administration of the Carabinieri which have heretofore been handled by the Public Safety Sub-Commission to be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). This will result in all matters connected with the Carabinieri except their operational functions, which should remain as at present, being placed under the supervision of MMIA.

3. The date of transfer of responsibilities will be mutually agreed between Public Safety Sub-Commission and MMIA and will be reported by you to this headquarters. In any event this date will not be later than 1 November 1945.

4. In matters affecting the instruction of the Carabinieri in purely civil police duties, as distinct from normal military training, MMIA will consult the Public Safety Sub-Commission which will afford such advice and assistance as may be required.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

F. 68. 75;

FILE: <u>50/47</u>	C. W. CHRISTENBERRY		
DATE: <u>17/10</u>	Colonel, AGD Adjutant General		
DISTRIBUTION:	1 - Da Addressee 1 - G(SD) 1 - G-4 (MTOUSA) 1 - Q(AE) 1 - Q(Maint) 1 - G-5 1 - Fin Advisor(Br) 1 - Fis Dir MTOUSA 2 - JA 1 - Dir of Labor 1 - D Prov M Sec 1 - Medical (Br)		
	1 - GM	1 - KME	1 - S & T
	1 - G-4 (M&Tn)	3 - G-4 (M&Tn)	1 - Dep Mil Sec
	1 - AG Records	1 - DPIC	1 - CAO
	10 - Spares (to G-5)	2 - AG Records	2 - AG Records

RESTRICTED

Subject: CC.RR Personnel Attached to Navy and Air Force

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
SD/47

October 1945

To :: Minister for War

1. CC.RR personnel attached to the Navy and Air Force is not a part of the 55,000 ITI-ITI CC.RR, nor of the 10,000 BR-ITI CC.RR, and are not carried on the Order of Battle of these categories.
2. CC.RR personnel attached to the Navy and the Air Force, and under control of those services, is, for purpose of category, ceiling and rations, to be included in the Navy and Air Force ceiling, and rations will be supplied to the Navy and Air Force for this personnel exactly the same as for all assigned Navy and Air Force personnel. It will therefore be necessary that the Order of Battle of the Navy and Air Force include this personnel to secure issue of rations.
3. Any instructions issued by MMIA or you contrary to this letter are therefore revoked.

CPK/lak

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

DISTRIBUTION:

Navy Sub Commission, ALCOM
Air Force Sub Commission, ALCOM
All MMIA LO's

65

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

25 September 1945

AC/14601/21/PS

Dear Sir,

With reference to the Prime Minister's letter of 7th September 1945 addressed to Admiral Stone concerning the increase of Carabinieri strength to 75,000.

I am directed to say that this matter is receiving attention and you will be informed of the result.

G.I. pl. see minute dated 4/08

Yours very truly,

F. J. O.

H. W. H.

H. CARR,
Brigadier,
VC CA Section.

75

GSO 1
GSO 2 (Ops) _____
GSO 2 (SD) _____
GSO 2 (W.) *SD/47*
GSO 2 (S) _____
GSO 2 (SU) _____
GSO 3 (Orbal) _____
GSO 3 (I) _____

The Secretary of
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Rome

PJW/G

Copy to : Chief Commissioner
Executive Commissioner
Land Forces S/C ✓

CJ(S)

In what way will
receiving atten. please?

MMI	30/47
FILE:	
DATE: 2/2/45	

Translation

10/10/49

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior
n. 34203

Rely. 135

64

LAND FORCES SEC

Rome, 7 September 1945

SD/47.

Dear Admiral,

AP WP PG

1 as you know, my Government wishes to handle with the necessary firmness the problem of public order in Italy, fully to reestablish respect for the law.

2 The CC.RR. Corps, whose collaboration is able and trustworthy, is one of our best instruments to reach this aim.

3 However, considering the numerous duties entrusted to it, the organization of the Corps is still insufficient, so that I must draw your kind attention on the advisability of granting a further increase of the CC.RR. corps, to reach 75 thousand units.

4 On this subject, I must inform you that from the present force of 62.000 units (besides the Trieste Legion) 1760 officers included must be deducted.

5 Of the remaining 61.450 men, we must not consider 17.700 enlisted men who are not available and cannot be made available, for part of them is on leave, part is attached to special services, part is being detained with the legions of the Veneto by the express wish of the Allied Authorities.

6 The result is that 42.940 men are available; this figure is inferior to the already insufficient number required for the 1300 CC.RR. stations, which ought to amount to 44.670 units. It seems obvious that the number of men of the stations cannot be further reduced, for it is sometimes of two elements only, while on the other hand we must form 12 mobile battalions, amounting up a whole to 7 thousand units.

7 I trust that this short report will show how urgent it is to increase the Corps in number; during the last few days, the War Department sent an official request to the Commission.

8 However, the wished-for reinforcement of the CC.RR. Corps depends not only on the increase of the number of the Carabiniers, but also on the improvement of their armament.

9 You already know, my dear Admiral, the particular importance of this problem. Unfortunately, the present armament of the Carabiniers is entirely inadequate considering the situation and the requirements. It is enough to say that personal equipment has remained what it was half a century ago, i.e. a rifle, mod. 1891, and a pistol which some of the men don't even have. Such a situation cannot but have a fatal effect on the morale and spirit of the Carabiniers who are often obliged to face, in conditions of obvious inferiority, gangs of delinquents more

Admiral Alfonso N. Stone
Chief Commissioner

MMIA - 'C'
FILE: 647
DATE: R. 11-9

- 2 -

numerous than themselves, and equipped with portable weapons and bombs.

(1) I therefore trust in your kind interest about this matter. In particular, I beg you to intervene personally, so that kind consideration may be given to the proposals made by the Comando Generale of the Corps, to obtain that the carabinieri be allotted 14,000 automatic rifles 'mitra' and 3000 pistols at present in the Beretta weapon factory, at Gardone val di Trompia; up to now, the Land Forces Sub-commission hasn't granted this request for it stated that such arms must be considered as war booty.

(2) I thank you, my dear Admiral, for taking this matter in consideration; considering its importance, it deserves to be dealt with without delay.

Yours sincerely,

S. Repuccio Parri

trans. e/c

753

REC LIST - II SEP 45

ACTION: CASE

INFO: CHIEF COMM

EXEC COMM

LAND FORCES SC.

634

COPY

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. ROME.
TO : M.M.I.A. (By hand to Lt. Col. Tommy T. Rose)
DATE: 7th September, 1945
REF : AFSC/671/3/EQ

C.O.R.R. employed with Italian Air Force
in Sardinia.

Confirming conversation of this afternoon, the C.O.R.R. employed with the Italian Air Force in Sardinia is established at 95 personnel, the present strength being about 70. These are included within the Italian Air Force ceiling and should therefore be rationed as BRIT-ITIs:

2. It would be appreciated if arrangements could be made for this to be done by signal if possible as the matter is urgent.

Sgd. B.C. Dennis, F/Lt.
B.C. DENNIS, F/LT.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Copy to: Italian Air Ministry. (Confirms telephone conversation with Col. Adrover).

752

62

MESSAGE FORM

FROM : M M I A

25 1540 .B.

TO : COMINCH PALERMO FOR MMTA LO

INFO : PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION HQ ALCOM (BY HAND)

ST/972

UNCLASSIFIED (.) SUBJECT RATIONS FOR CC.RR. SICILY (.) PALERMO LEGION CC.RR.
 MAY DRAW RATIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR ADMIN INST
 12 DATED 12 OCT 44 PROVIDED UNITS SHOWN AND AUTHORIZED AT STRENGTHS
 CURRENT ORBAT (.) SEE PARA A GMA APPENDIX B GMA ADMIN INST 12 WHEREBY
 DIVISION ~~ONE~~ REGIMENT GMA ETC MAY DRAW

G-1
 C-1 ()
 G-2 () X /2 X
 G-3 ()
 G-4 ()
 G-5 ()
 G-6 ()
 G-7 ()
 G-8 ()

751

MMTA -
FILE: 84147
DATE: 112578

(ST/247)

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

INTERNAL:- 'Q' / 'G'

K. Robert Nelson Major Lt. Col.
 AUTHENTICATION

281148

61

Subject: Carabinieri Order of Battle

LAND FORCES SUB COMM AC (MMIA)

SD/47/2

4 Aug 45

TO : MMIA LO SARDINIA
 " " SICILY
 " " 13 Corps
 " " 1 District
 " " 2 District w Italy.
 " " 3 District
 " " Pensouth
 " " 54 Area
 " c/o Florence City Command APO 782

showed by
SD/47/

Herewith Order of Battle of Carabinieri units (total strength 65,000) which supersedes Order of Battle forwarded under cover of SD/44/2 dated 24 May 45.

Of the above, the Florence Bde (10,000) is held against BR-ITI a/c and 1865 is held against the military commitment.

Full details of the military CC.RR. can be found in this HQ Order of Battle No 2/11 for July 45.

T W Cheyne M.A.Q
 Major General
 M.M.I.A.

Copy to:

Q 1

750

R/2/8

B
59.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

24 July 1945

AC/14601/61/PS

SUBJECT : Recruiting of CG.RR

TO : G-5 Section AFHQ

56 8D/47

1. Reference our letter of even number dated 11 July 45 giving recruiting figures for the period ending 30 June 45.

2. The following recruiting has taken place during the period 1 July to 15 July 1945 :-

<u>Reg. CG.RR</u>	<u>Aux. CG.RR</u>	<u>Total</u>
443	-	443

3. In addition to the above mentioned, the following were recovered from newly liberated territory :-

<u>R.G.O's</u>	<u>O.R's</u>	<u>Total</u>
89	287	376

these men are being screened and rehabilitated and will be absorbed into the Force in due course.

4. The following have been repatriated :-

	<u>Off.</u>	<u>R.G.O's</u>	<u>O.R's</u>	<u>Total</u>
GSO 2 (W)	X	1	88	110
GSO 2 (W)				139

GSO 6 (O) _____

GSO 3 (S)

GSO 3 (Ordn)

GSO 3 (I)

MMIA - C

F/E: 50/47

D: 25/7

Copy :- M.H.I.A. (for info)

D.S. Bingham Jr. 1/61
✓ G.R. U/JOHN Brig
VP OA Sec
New for D. Bingham

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Orbat.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (NMIA)

SD/47 ✓

18 July 55

TO : CC.IRR. Comm. Gen.,
Vittorio Emanuele,
Via Lemanio, ROME.

It would be appreciated if this HQ might be supplied with 12 copies of the CC.IRR. location and strength Statement recently forwarded by you to Public Safety Sub Commission.

P/1
18/8

E.M.J.

748

Lt. Col.
GS.

2433 57

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

AC/14601/61/PS

11 July 1945

SUBJECT : Recruiting of CCRR
TO : G-5 Section A.F.H.Q.

~~11 SD/47~~

1. Reference our letter of even number dated 27 June 1945 giving recruiting figures for the period ending 15 June 1945.

2. The following recruiting has taken place during the period 15 June to 30 June 1945:-

<u>Reg. CCRR</u>	<u>Aux. CCRR</u>	<u>Total</u>
17	2	19

3. In addition to the above mentioned, the following were recovered from newly liberated territory:-

<u>N.C.O.'s</u>	<u>O.R.'s</u>	<u>Total</u>
309	695	1004

these men are being screened and rehabilitated and will be absorbed into the Force in due course.

4. The following have been repatriated:-

<u>Off.</u>	<u>NGO's</u>	<u>OR's</u>	<u>Total</u>
1	16	61	78

For the Chief Commissioner,

G. D. Bonham Carter
G. R. UPJOHN Brig
VP CA Sec

Copy :- M.M.I.A. (for Info) ✓

See To 58

M.M.I.A.-C
FILE No/47
DATE 17

A to see
Q to do
P to file
R to file
S to file
T to file
U to file
V to file
W to file
X to file
Y to file
Z to file

620 1
630 2 (M)
630 2 (G)
630 2 (W)
630 2 (L)
630 2 (D)
630 2 (R)
630 2 (U)

6

MANUSCRIPT ALIED COUNCIL
Copy of the Office Commissioner

Ref: 24601/23/76

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I have received your letter of the 6 July 76 and am glad to be able to tell you that authority was granted on 1 July 76 to reduce the maximum number of Carabinieri to 65,000 and this has been duly communicated to the Minister of War.

With regard to the remainder of your letter I am reluctant to remove from the North any of the County Groups but part of the Garibaldi Regiment has already been moved to the Sicily Area. I appreciate your desire that there should be additional battalions of troops in the South of ITALY and I am able to inform you that the whole question of 716, the numbers and distribution of Royal Internal Security Troops all over Italy is now under consideration at ANCO. I hope to be able to give you the final Marshall's decision shortly.

Meanwhile I have given instructions for the postponement of the remainder of the Garibaldi Regiment to the Sicily area.

Very truly yours,

Enrico T. Gatti,
Treasurer

I have received your letter of the 6 July 45 and am glad to be able to tell you that authority was granted on 1 July 45 to raise the maximum number of Carabinieri to 65,000 and this has been duly communicated to the Minister of War.

With regard to the remainder of your letter I am reluctant to remove from the North any of the Combat Groups but part of the Garibaldi Regiment has already been moved to the Bari Area. I appreciate your desire that there should be additional battalions of troops in the South of Italy and I can only inform you that the whole question of ^{7/16} the numbers and distribution of Italian Internal Security Troops still over Italy is now under consideration at AFHQ. I hope to be able to give you the Field Marshal's decision shortly.

Meanwhile I have given instructions for the postponement of the remainder of the Garibaldi Regiment to the Bari area.

Very truly yours,

MILIT. V. STORI,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
Chief Commissioner.

Professor Ferruccio Pavan,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

GSC 1

GSC 2 (P)

GSC 2 (SD)

GSC 2 (W-3)

GSC 2 (L)

GSC 3 (SD)

GSC 3 (W-3)

GSC 3 (L)

GSC 3 (M)

GSC 3 (H)

FILE

Date:

ABO \$ 10

CONFIDENTIAL

SSA

SUBJECT:- Authorised OCRR - SARDINIA

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AG (MMIA)

SD/47

11 Jul 45

MMIA LO SARDINIA

1. Further to this HQ signal SD2639 of 11 Jul on the above subject.

2. Att Appx "A" shows bilingual breakdown of the CAGLIARI Legion totalling 5108 all ranks.

3. Military CGRR in SARDINIA totalling 18 all ranks are as shown below :

91 Detachment CGRR CAGLIARI, strength	15 OR's
CGRR Detachment SASSARI, strength	3 OR's
TOTAL	18 OR's

ABC

7/5
Major General
M M I A

Internal : A
C (Two)

ppx "A" to MIA letter
SD/47 dated 11 July 45

BREAKDOWN - AUTHORISED CORPS - SARDINIA

Ser. No. d'or- dine	Unit	Reparto	Location di locazione	Strength			
				Forza Organica Offr. OR's Total	Uff. Sot. Totale	Uff. Sot. Totale	Uff. Sot. Totale
71	CAGLIARI Legion H. Coy	Leg. CAGLIARI: Comp Cdo. CAGLIARI	"	3	90	98	
72	" Group Internal	Gruppo " Interno "	"	1	-	1	
73	" Coy Internal	Compagnia CAGLIARI Int.	"	1	268	269	
74	" Coy External	" " Est.	"	3	191	194	
75	" Group External	Gruppo CAGLIARI Esterno "	"	1	-	1	
76	IGLESIAS Coy	Compagnia IGLESIAS	IGLESIAS	3	264	267	
77	ORISTANO Coy	" GRISIANO	ORISTANO	3	224	227	
78	SASSARI Group	Gruppo SASSARI	SASSARI	3	-	1	
79	SASSARI Coy	Compagnia SASSARI	SASSARI	3	216	219	
80	ALCHERI Coy	" ALCHERI	ALCHERI	3	116	119	
81	TEMPIO Coy	" TEMPIO	TEMPIO	3	154	157	
82	OZILINI Coy	" OZILINI	OZILINI	2	162	164	
83	MURO Group	Gruppo MURO	MURO	2	-	1	
84	MURO Coy Internal	Compagnia MURO Int.	MURO	2	200	202	
85	MURO Coy External	" " Est.	MURO	3	213	216	
86	BITTI Coy	" BITTI	BITTI	2	169	171	
87	LAMUSI Coy	" LAMUSI	LAMUSI	3	220	223	
88	Mobile Pl: Ord Platoon	Pls. Mobile: Plot Cdo. CAGLIARI	CAGLIARI	5	40	45	
89	Motorcycle Coy	Compagnie Motociclisti "	"	5	115	120	
90	1st Motorised Coy	1 Comp. Motorizzata	"	5	101	106	
91	2nd "	"	"	5	101	106	
92	3rd "	"	"	5	101	106	
93	Armoured Car Coy	Compagnia Autoblindo	"	5	90	95	

	Coy	Internal	External	Gruppo CAGLIARI Esterno	"	Leg.						
75	"	Group External		Compagnia IGLESIAS	IGLESIAS		1	-	1	3	191	194
76	IGLESIAS Coy			Compagnia IGLESIAS	IGLESIAS		3	264	267			
77	CRISTIANO Coy	"		CRISTIANO	CRIST. MC		3	224	227			
78	SASSARI Group			Gruppo SASSARI	SASSARI		1	-	1			
79	SASSARI Coy			Compagnia SASSARI	SASSARI		3	216	219			
80	LICHERO Coy	"		ALCHERO	ALCHERO		3	116	119			
81	TRAPPIO Coy	"		TRAPPIO	TRAPPIO		3	154	157			
82	OGLIERI Coy	"		OGLIERI	OGLIERI		2	162	164			
83	NUORO Group			Gruppo NUORO	NUORO		1	-	1			
84	NUORO Coy Internal			Compagnia NUORO Int.	NUORO		2	200	202			
85	NUORO Coy External	"	"	" Est.	"		NUORO	3	213	215		
86	BITTI Coy	"		BITTI	BITTI		2	169	171			
87	LANTUZZI Coy	"		LANTUZZI	LANTUZZI		3	220	223			
88	Mobile Bn: 0cmd Platoon			Btg. Mobile: Plot Cdo.	CAGLIARI		5	40	45			
89	Motorcycle Coy			Compagnie Motociclisti	"		5	115	120			
90	1st Motorised Coy			1 Comp. Motorizzata	"		5	101	106			
91	2nd "	"	"	2 "	"		5	101	106			
92	3rd "	"	"	3 "	"		5	101	106			
93	Armoured Car Coy			Compagnia Autoblindo	"		5	90	95			
				Total Legione CAGLIARI (Total CAGLIARI Legion)			75	3035	3108			

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FROM : MIA DATE
TO : LO SARDINTA 11 16/01 TIME
REF : SD2839 CONFIDENTIAL

FURTHER TO MIA LETTER V1/7B-1 OF 17 JUN. (*) AUTHORISED
ME/TO STRENGTH OF OCRR IN S A R D I N I A IS NOW 3108
ALL RANKS PLUS 18 MILITARY OCRR (*)DETAILED BREAKDOWN
FOLLOWS BY LETTER

PRECEDENCE

AUTHENTICATED

INTERNAL

A

Q (Three)

FILE : SD/47 ✓

H-CL

710

Subject : CCRR.

App. A in folio 47
App. C in folio 30
B in folio 30

~~REF ID: A1 & CONFIDENTIAL~~

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.

(M.M.I.A.)

R O M E,

SD/47

5467

July 45.

My dear Anderson

1. I feel I must write and say a word about the latest A.C. efforts to foist on M.M.I.A. the whole running of the CCRR.

2. As you know this has been turned down more than once by A.F.H.Q. Appendix A hereto gives the latest A.F.H.Q. refusal. Yet, despite this, A.C. sent to A.F.H.Q. the letter at Appendix B.

3. The draft of the letter at Appendix B was sent to me by A.C. and I commented as at Appendix C hereto. The result was para. 5 of the draft was modified somewhat but A.C. took no notice of my protest that M.M.I.A. has more than enough on its plate already. In fact in the official letter to A.F.H.Q. at Appendix B A.C. say in para. 6 "I see no reasons why Land Forces Sub Commission (M.M.I.A.) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the A.F.H.Q. letter herein referred to". Moreover you will note that A.C. are trying to press their case yet again on "dialectics of words"!

4. It really is an extraordinary business this continued refusal by A.C. to accept that A.F.H.Q. order and the complete refusal of A.C. to understand that their proposal has been continuously turned down because M.M.I.A. has quite enough to do already.

5. A future aspect strikes me and this is that if we are going to hand over all Italy and the Italian Army to the Italians in the near future it would be madness to try and transfer the CCRR responsibility to M.M.I.A. just before handover.

6. Anyway I know I can rely on you to fight our battle and ensure that things are left as they are.

This is just for you personally and no one else, as "ammunition".

Yours

L.B.

Brigadier J.D.A. Anderson, D.S.O.,
G-3 (Org),
A.F.H.Q.

/Aon

785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

SD/47

53

Tel: 489081-365

AC/14601/21/PS

4 July 1945

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Strength.

TO : Land Forces S/C (MMIA)
Atten: Lt. Col. Howard.

1. Reference your SD/1 dated 1st July 1945.

2. Attached is a copy of Carabinieri order of Battle on a ceiling of 65,000. It has been prepared in the same form as your Order of Battle for CO.RR as 1st May 1945. Company strengths have been varied, and the only additional items are the 12 mobile battalions which will be formed to deal with the present Public Safety conditions in Italy.

3. It will be noted that the Florence Brigade has been adjusted to 10,000 (see page 8).

4. Owing to the present political situation in Venezia Giulia, and in accordance with directive from AFHQ, no Italian Police Services as such will be used in that area. Accordingly the Trieste Legion will not be implemented. Legion strength is 2696. (See Pages 17 and 24). Strength of force as from 1st July 1945 will be 62,304.

5. Your cooperation in arranging this increase of strength is very much appreciated.

747

Frank Wilson Wile
JOHN W. CHAPMAN
Colonel, J.A.G.D.
Director.

GSO 1
GSO 2 (S)
GSO 2 (S)
GSO 2 (S)
GSO 2 (S)
GSO 3 (S)
GSO 3 (S)
GSO 3 (S)

FJW/pl

MMI	
FILE:	80/47
DATE:	8/7

785020

GSO 1

GSO 2 (CPO)

GSO 2 (SD)

GSO 2 (W)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (SD)

GSO 3 (W)

GSO 3 (L)

GSO 3 (RORBU)

GSO 3 (U)

TRADITIONALLY ARMED COMMISSION

Civil Affairs Section

ABO 304

or

ABO/14501/21/PB

(K)

SD/47 4 July 2045

SUBJEC: Strength of Gerulaisari.

TO: National Commissioners, Battalion, District Element, Headquarters and Guards Division, (Army) (Sect.)

Regional Commissioners, Civil Affairs, Divisional Reserve and Access Committee (for information)

1. Attached for your information and action is an Order of Battle for Gerulaisari on a 60,000 ceiling. Will you please recruit recruited G.A.R., into the regular force up to the strengths shown. Recruits will be issued as from 1st July, 1945, and clothing and arms will be collected as soon as possible.

2. Owing to special circumstances the Legion of Veterans will not be implemented.

3. This order of battle replaces all previous details of G.A.R. strengths, and care must be taken to ensure that all men on detached duty are considered in the new totals above. For example 33,000, on Frontier Control will figure in the ceiling of the Local Legion. Failure to give effect to this would result in over-recruiting.

4. It is appreciated that transport is not yet available for the militia battalions shown. However, the G.A.R. should be recruited and enlisted on ordinary duty pending the allocation of transport.

5. It will not be necessary to supply information as to the number of G.A.R. recruited into each company. The provincial column of this notice contains the 3,000 recruits

LIMA:

FILE: SD/47

DATE: 4/7

S2C

to satisfy ourselfs. The increase of 20,000 has been
assured by turning the Florence Brigade on a 3000-721
ratio. This brigade has been reduced to nearly 30,000
men, and will be sustained and supplied from British Resources.

6. Will you please reply?

- (a) Number of regular battalions in your
region transferred from the South,
(including frontier districts).
- (b) Number of mechanized battalions now
arranged into the regular rifle in your
region to reach the allotment on a
50,000 setting.

7. Any region having a surplus or deficit of
20,000, or the loss of 60,000 will inform this Headquarters
in order that transfers can be arranged.

By command of Your Minister friend

A. H. Bingham Jr. 1/61

Capt. R. M. B. Bingham
V.P. GA 38004

Copy to General Forces 9/3 (1961)
Less Order & Battle.

739

head forces sub
HQ

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

G (SD) SD/47/2

Tel: 473427

31

30 June 1945

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the CC.RR. and other Police Forces.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters, APO 512,
(Attention : G-5 Section.)

(42B)

1. Reference is made to your G-5 O14.12 of 11 May, 1945,
and to my 3626/BC of 19 May, 1945. (42A)

2. Since writing my letter of 19 May, I have had occasion to make further study of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 OCT-O of 16 November 1944, and I am now firmly convinced that under the provisions of that letter the responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA) in regard to the CC.RR. do parallel the responsibilities of the Italian Ministry of War insofar as control, supervision, administration and supply are concerned. I, therefore, request that a critical study be made in order to clarify the situation which has developed over the past several months in regard to responsibility for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the CC.RR.

(42B)

3. In your letter G-5 O14.12 of 11 May, 1945, it stated that "MIA responsibility for their (the CC.RR.) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army." In this connection I invite your attention, first, to the fact that MIA admit their responsibility for the feeding, clothing and equipping of the CC.RR., (letter A.018 of 11 April, 1945, copy sent to you as enclosure to our letter 3626/BC of 14 April, 1945), and, second, to para. 4b of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 OCT-O of 16 November, 1944, wherein it is stated that MIA will be responsible for supervision of administration.

GSO 1

GSO 2 (C)

GSO 2 (S)

GSO 2 (W)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (S)

GSO 3 (W)

MIA - 'G'	
SD/47/2	
DATE	1/7

7/6.

and supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.RR. being Italian Army units, inasmuch as they were specifically included under the CCS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 4 May, 1945, it is stated that "NMIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.RR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ Letter A3 091, 711/169 COT-0 of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on NMIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the SNRE and Ministry of War. Para. 6a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through NMIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 6b provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.RR.) are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri.". The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (NMIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri are a civil police organization directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission.". Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of the Carabinieri as police. 737

5. The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of NMIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in an unsatisfactory

795020

level of supply of all kinds of equipment as compared with line troops of the Italian Army. Also this has caused the development of a fallacious opinion that, because Carabinieri are used as police, Public Safety Sub-Commission, which controls nothing in the way of supplies and equipment, is responsible for everything relating to Carabinieri. This situation has contributed materially to the ineffectiveness of the Carabinieri and the reports I am now receiving from my Public Safety officers in the north all testify to the very poor impression created in the minds of the public in all parts of the territory recently liberated by reason of the poor turn out of the Carabinieri sent North.

6. The internal security situation in Italy is far from satisfactory and threatens to become worse due in part to taking Carabinieri from the south to assist in the policing of the north. Now that combat operations have ceased, I feel that every aid and assistance possible should be given to strengthen, not only the Carabinieri, but also other Italian Police agencies. I see no reasons why Land Forces Sub-Commission (NMTA) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the APHQ letter herein referred to.

7. For the reasons herein expressed and as a matter of urgency, I request that serious and prompt consideration be given to this matter.

T/S ELLERY W. STONE

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

736

Copy to :

Land Forces S/C (NMTA). ✓

785020

Subject : Order of Battle - CARABINIERI

S E C R E TCopy No 46

LAND FORCES SUB COM AO (MIA)

SD/41/2

14 May 45

TO : All Concerned

G/50/47

Order of Battle of Carabinieri units is attached
herewith.It is requested that receipt be forwarded on form
given below.Major General
(M.M.I.A.)DISTRIBUTION

AHQ	Copy No
	1-6-
Public Safety	
Sub Com AC	7-11
MMIA LO SARDINIA	12
MMIA LO SICILY	13
MMIA LO Eighth Army	14
MMIA LO Fifth Army	15
MMIA LO Fifth Army (Br Incr)	16
MMIA LO 1 District	17
MMIA LO 2 District	18
MMIA LO 3 District	19
MMIA LO Penzouth	20
MMIA LO 54 Area	21
MMIA LO FLORENCE	22

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

G	Copy 735
A	23
O	24
War Diary	25
File SD/41/2	25-?
File SD/92/1	26
File SD/94/7	29
Spares	30
	31-5

488

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

AG/14501/21/PS

June 1945

SUBJECT : Carabinieri Strength.

TO : AFHQ G-5.

(S) 4-NT

1. Reference your G-5: 091.711-1 dated 17 June 45.

2. Our letter of even number dated 11 June stated that northern legions were 7,500 below their 55,000 ceiling allotment. As the ceiling of 55,000 was reached some months ago, it follows that the legions of the south are 7,500 above their 55,000 ceiling allotment. Accordingly, no surplus rations are being drawn.

3. The liberation of the north necessitated the transfer of about 17,500 carabinieri from the south of Italy in order that the strength of 55,000 should be evenly allotted to legions throughout the country. 6,000 were transferred as a spearhead, followed by a second wave of 4,000. At this point the Italian Government protested strongly to the Chief Commissioner against any further withdrawals of carabinieri from the south, and they were stopped. As no increase of carabinieri ration strength was possible, it was then decided to recuperate those Carabinieri found working as Patriots, and to employ them in the north as special Police, drawing civil Police rations.

4. MMIA receive a fortnightly return of strength from the Carabinieri and are well aware that the force has been up to ceiling strength for some time.

5. Basic WE/TG's for the organization of the carabinieri on a 65,000 ceiling have been supplied to MMIA by the Carabinieri and the particulars are being discussed.

DATA
FILE
L

21/6/25

- 1 -



HMX X KDN X

GSO 2 ()
GSO 2 ()
GSO 2 ()
GSO 3 () X
GSO 3 () X

405

6. The details of the various units into which the 3000 carabinieri have been recruited will be forwarded to you when received from Regional Commissioners in the north.

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. D. Konkanapha 1/1
for G. R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP JA Section.

Copy to : AFHQ AG Dept
15 Army Group
WMA (your SD/17 of 28 May and
15 June refer).

To 46-

To. 33

?3?

LAND FORCES 47

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section

APO 512

SD Deck

SD ←

A

Q

G-5: 014.12

14 June 1945

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of the CG.RR and other
Police Forces of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 594.

1. Reference is made to your 3626/EB of 19 May.

2. G-3 this Headquarters state that it is necessary that the full attention of MMIA should continue to be devoted for the time being to the military effectiveness of the Italian Army. G-3 further state however, that it is possible that this requirement may be reduced in importance in a few months time, when consideration might be given to modification of the present policy.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

21/c

SIR. Plain language.

Public safety keep their jobs. No action? /s/ T. B. JACKMAN.

19 June

H.H.

X H.H. X

T. B. JACKMAN
Lt. Colonel.

(R)

73?

No action
Parliament
will accept
accord
defeat!

E.C. DISTRIBUTION - 18 June 45Land Forces S/C (MMIA)
C.A. Section

L.B.

23 June

181615

50/47
18/6

SUBJECT: Increase of CC.RR Strength

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMA).

SD / 47

Jun 45

TO : Public Safety Sub-Comm, A.C.

Copy : Civil Affairs Sec, A.C.

83

33

1. Confirming conversation Lt-Col Wilson - Lt-Col Ingledew, it was agreed that your AC/14601/21/PS of 11 Jun does not actually answer MMA letter SD/47 of 28 May. A reply to SD/47 of 28 May is therefore still awaited.

2. It is suggested that the personnel composing the 3,000 ceiling in question be organised into small pls which can thereby be conveniently added to any Legion you desire.

See to. 48A

L.M. M.G.
Major-General,
MMA,

fa

85/6.

Headquarters Allied Commission letter AC/14634/PS dated June 45.
Addressed to Allied Force Headquarters(G-5) sent to GCC for concurrence.
Below are GOC's remarks:-

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of the CC ER and
Other Police Forces

File: SD/47

H.Q. A.C. (for Executive Commissioner)

1. Noted.
2. The views of Land Forces Sub Commission (MILIA) remain as in our A.Q.S of 11 Apr and are in agreement with AFHQ letter G-5 Q4.12 of 11 May, which clearly stated the INTENTION of AFHQ in this matter.
3. While I do not wish to argue on the dialectics of words in your proposed letter, I must take exception to your para 5 therein. MILIA has been totally unable to obtain correct and up-to-date inventories of CCR stocks from Public Safety Sub Commission. Such statements as have been produced have been spasmodic and incorrect. Without knowledge of what stocks CC ER had on hand, MILIA (as the independent supply agency specifically charged with correct and economical distribution) could not of course blindly meet all requests which might well not be necessary. Nevertheless CCR have been treated on a footing of absolute equality as regards quality and quantity (subject to remarks as above) with the Italian Army.
4. Lastly, I would mention that in your proposed letter you ignore that I have frequently represented in this and other cases where you desire to transfer responsibility that MILIA has more than enough on its plate without being saddled with further tasks - an aspect which AFHQ agreed with when turning down your application to transfer P.W. responsibility to MILIA.

785020

D.13

D.12

H.Q. A.G. (for Executive Commissioner)

1. Noted.
2. The views of Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA) remain as in our A.Q.S of 11 Apr and are in agreement with AFHQ letter G-5 Q14.12 of 11 May, which clearly stated the INTENTION of AFHQ in this matter.
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A.B.
R 126

Major-General
MIA

12 June 45

44

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Public Safety Sub-Commission
APO 394

AC/14601/21/PS

SD 147
2011 439087-369
11/16 8 June 1945

SUBJECT : Carabinieri - strength.

TO

AFHQ, D-5.

F 32

F 38

1. Reference your O-5:09:711-1 Italy dated 26 May 1945 and AC/091.711/115 GPO-O dated 25 May 1945.

2. The initial transfer of 3,000 ceiling spaces from UK Italian Army commitment to Carabinieri will not necessitate the formation of new units. At present the northern legions are 7,500 below their 55,000 ceiling. Accordingly the 3,000 carabinieri will be used partially to activate existing units up to their establishment on a 55,000 ceiling.

3. The 3,000 carabinieri have been allotted to regions where large numbers of recuperated carabinieri await being recruited into the authorized establishment. Particulars are as shown below:

Lombardia	1,500
Emilia	500
Pimonte	500
Venezia	<u>500</u>
Total	<u>3,000</u>

4. Information as to the actual units into which these men are being recruited is being obtained from the regional Commissioners in the north and you will be kept advised.

5. An order of Battle for Carabinieri on a 65,000 ceiling is being prepared and after consultation with Land Forces Sub-Commission (MFIA) will be submitted to you during the coming week.

50/47

146

FILE

DATE

- 1 -

6. For your information it is mentioned that about 8,000 carabinieri have already reported for duty in the Regions of Venetia, Lombardia, Liguria and Emilia. They are being employed as special police wearing an AG armband and drawing civilian police scale rations and pay. Their employment is proving most difficult in view of the variation in rations and clothing between these men and the regular carabinieri from the south. The recuperated men are mostly Patriots and considerable discontent is caused by the differences in treatment received by them and the regular carabinieri transferred from the south.

7. It is strongly urged that the transfer of further manpower ceiling spaces be arranged as soon as possible.

For the Chief Commissioners:

A. N. Bingham 5/61
A. G. R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP C A Section,


Copy to - AFHQ AG Dept.
- 15 Army Group
- MEIA (your SD/47 dated 20 May refers) ✓

F-33

728

// COPY //

Ref: 3626/EC



19 May 1945

Action
Copy on 47
Rec'd file 50/47 (old copy)

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the CC.RR and other Police Forces of Italy.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512
(Attention: G-5 Section)

1. Reference is made to your G-5 014.12 of 11 May 1945.


2. The point which you raise in your para 2 is noted- namely that MMIA responsibility for the administration of the CC.RR is specifically limited to the supply of rations.

It is essential, however, to bear in mind that the CC.RR are Italian Army personnel more than historically; they are actually an integral part of the Italian Army, depending from the Ministry of War for their organization, supply, training and discipline.

It was with the knowledge of this fact and with understanding of the Italian organization that the committee which sat to consider the reorganization of the CC.RR made their report.

3. This Headquarters'letter 3626/EC of 14 April sought assurance that "placing corresponding responsibilities [i.e., corresponding to those of the Italian Ministry of War whose counterpart in this Commission MMIA is] on the Public Safety Sub Commission and Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA) would not be inconsistent with any directives that have been issued to Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA) and, in particular, AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 November 1944.

4. It is now my recommendation, should these proposed new responsibilities not be covered by existing directives to Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA) or be in conflict with them, that it be considered whether these directives should not be changed.



ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc: Exec Comm'r, AC
Land Forces Sub-Comm (MMIA) AC
Civil Affairs Sec, AC

jw

C O P Y

42 B

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

TBJ/irf

G-5 Section

APO 512

G-5 ; 014.12

11 May 45

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of the Carabinieri and other Police Forces of Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394.

Form b,
File A/018

1. Reference is made to your 3626/EC of 14 April.

2. While historically the CC RR are Army personnel, they are used as civil police and MMIA responsibility for their administration is specifically limited to seeing that they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army. MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their organisation, supervision or use, and no extension of MMIA responsibility in this connection is contemplated.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 726

T.B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel.

INFO COPY

Action copy at para 26, first page SD/47.

Seen by:
GOC
COS
Col 'A'
G-1

14601/1 A 44 P
SD/44 - b.d.
SD/44

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
AFHQ S 94

Tel : 489081 - 365

MAY 1945.

AG/14601/3/P.S

SUBJECT : Recruiting of Garabiniieri
in N. Italy - Pay.

TO : AFHQ., A.C. Dept.

Rodney L. Safford

1. Reference your AG 014.12/051 GOT-O dated 22 May
45 addressed to Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

2. Your original letter of even number dated 21st
April 45 was passed to this section and a reply was forwarded
to you on AG/14601/3/P.S dated 10 May 45, a copy of which is
attached for your information.

for the Chief Commissioner :

SDO 1 X

SDO 2 (Op)

SDO 2 (S)

SDO 2 (W)

SDO 2 (L)

SDO 3 (SD)

SDO 3 (Ordn)

SDO 3 (I)

MMIA 'C'

FILE: SD/447

DATE: 4/6

Copy to Land Forces S/O
(MMIA).

SDO 1 -----
SDO 2 (Op) (S)
SDO 2 (S) (S)
SDO 2 (W) (S)
SDO 2 (L) (S)
SDO 3 (SD) (S)
SDO 3 (Ordn) (S)
SDO 3 (I) (S)

G.R. W. JOHN, Brig.
VP CA SDO.

Rodney L. Safford

Notes - Retained on
SD/44 as 'A' copy of
AFHQ letter of 21 April
passed to public safety.
ABR 2/6

1. Inf		
A. 2*		
A. 3*		
Med		
W. etc.		
P.		

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

6/18
Tel : 489081 - 365

10 May 1945

AC/14601/3/PS

SUBJECT : Recruiting of Carabinieri
in N. Italy - Pay.

TO : AFHQ., A.G. Dept.

8
GLO COVGR

1. Reference AG 014.12/051 GCT-O dated 21 April 1945.
2. Attached for your information as Appendix A, is a copy of a directive issued by Finance Sub-Commission giving instructions for payment of Carabinieri employed above the authorized ceiling.

For the Chief Commissioner :

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP CA Sec.

72!

COPY

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB COMMISSION
Tel. 478604

13232/F

2 May, 1945

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Reali - Northern Italy.

TO : Regional Commissioner, Emilia Region (for R.F.O.)

"	"	Liguria	"	"	"
"	"	Lombardia	"	"	"
"	"	Piemonte	"	"	"
"	"	Venezia	"	"	"

S.C.A.O. A.M.G. 5th Army (for SFO)

S.C.A.O. A.M.G. 8th Army (" ")

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have ruled that the strength of subject organization may not exceed 55,000. This limit has been reached.

2. It is intended to enlist qualified personnel found in the North of Italy, but this can only be done after the dismissal of an equal number of auxiliaries in Southern Italy. The process will, of necessity, require time to complete.

a. During this interval the men will be engaged in A.M.G. work but cannot be paid or rationed as CC.RR.

3. The selected personnel to be enlisted into the CC.RR. 723 in the North of Italy will be regarded as auxiliary public security agents, and the expenditures for their pay will be a charge on the budget of the Ministry of the Interior.

4. The financing of this expenditure will be by credits established in favor of the Prefect of each province.

a. The Prefect should be instructed to submit a request on modello S.B.5 at the earliest possible moment.

By Command of Rear Admiral STONE.

Joint Director,
Finance Sub-Commission.

E O'C/cl

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TBJ/1rr

G-5: 091.711-1 Italy

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: Carabinieri- Strength

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
APO 394

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the Carabinieri ceiling may be increased from 55,000 to 65,000 at the expense of the UK Italian Army commitment.
2. An initial transfer of 3000 ceiling spaces has been ordered with effect from 20 May 1945.
3. G-3 point out that as the 10,000 carabinieri to be enlisted under the above arrangement will be BR-ITIS they will have to be organized on War Establishments submitted by you through MMIA for the approval of the War Establishments Committee this Headquarters.
4. It is requested accordingly that War Establishment proposals be submitted as soon as possible in accordance with AFHQ letter 210/Org-3 of 14 March 1945. 722
5. G-3 point out that no equipment can be made available until units are properly organized on to approved War Establishments.

6 A/S 091.711/45-GCR-0-25 May 6 you also refer.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5:

5/10/45 32
T. B. JACKMAN,
Lt. Colonel

Copy to:

G-3 Ord your ASD/922.2/7 refers

Original handed to
Public Safety SubCom for
action on 1 Jun 45 C.R.
Con Col

INFO COPY
ONLY

SD/47 37

CONFIDENTIAL

9267
MAY NFT

E/2415
MAY 26/0930B
OP PRIORITY

5 ARMY G-5 SECTION OTTE OUR F 194
AFHQ, HQ ALCOM ROME, 15 ARMY GROUP

CONFIDENTIAL.

Ref number 1474 from IV CORPS.

Request that answer be sent to this HQ.

M/C NOTE:

No record of IV CORPS cable 1474

Copies made for: PATRIOTS BR(INFO-ACTION)
LAND FORCES (2) (INFO)
PUB SAFETY "

See E/2307, E/2414, E/2432, E/2564

DIST

ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER (2)
CA SECTION
ECON SEC
ESTAB SEC

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
FILE (2)
FLOAT

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT:- Increase of CO. RR Strength

SECRET

Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MIA)

SD/47
28 May 45

Public Safety Sub Comm AC

1. A copy of AFHQ letter AG OGI.MIIS GCT-O dated 25 May is attached.

2. Reference para 3 please submit to us as soon as possible a list of units to fill the 3000 available manpower spaces and the proposed uses on which these units are required to be organised.

gsh MA to GOC
Copy - 2 i/c
A (Two)
Q(Two)
Org B

Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MIA)
720

Col - Said March with Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MIA) in this room at Headquarters Italian Pub Ward 1000 to receive training in existing location of full strength. It has been arranged that 1500 men have been allotted from HQ and HQO's who will be given the task of filling up the remaining 1500 men in place.

COPY

ALIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AFHQ ST2

AG OGI.MIIS GCT-O

SUBJECT:- Increase in Carabinieri

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission AG 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA)

1. Application has been received from your headquarters for an increase in the manpower ceiling of the carabinieri from 55,000 to 65,000. It has been decided that this increase will be found from the present United Kingdom commitment of 160,500, as and when vacancies occur within that category.

2. An initial transfer of 3,000 manpower spaces made available by cancellation of formation of Patriot Recon Battalions is authorised with effect from 20 May 1945.

3. Personnel will be equipped and clothed from Italian resources as far as possible, supplemented where necessary from British stocks. Equipment will be issued to those units only which are organised on the War Establishment submitted through MIA and approved by this Headquarters. Instructions to this effect are being issued to your headquarters.

4. Rations will be charged to British account.

5. Release of further manpower ceiling spaces will be notified from time to time.

(33)

720

Land Forces Sub Com AC (T.A.)

MA to GOC

Copy - 2 1/c
A (Two)
Q(Two)
Org B

5000 - 100,000 - PULL SPACES
 100 - 5000 - 10000 - PULL SPACES
 IN THIS FORM AS DETERMINED INDIVIDUALLY
 BY THE COMMANDER OF THE HOSPITALS
 1500 WITH HEAD QUARTERS
 AND WHARF HOSPITALS
 WHO WILL ADVISE
 HOW MANY SPACES
COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APC 512

25 MAY 1945

SUBJECT:- Increase in Carabinieri.

TO: Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission KPC 394
FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA)

1. Application has been received from your headquarters for an increase in the manpower ceiling of the carabinieri from 55,000 to 65,000. It has been decided that this increase will be found from the present United Kingdom commitment of 160,500, as and when vacancies occur within that category.
 2. An initial transfer of 3,000 manpower spaces made available by cancellation of formation of Patriot Rocca Battalions is authorized with effect from 20 May 1945.
 3. Personnel will be equipped and clothed from Italian resources as far as possible, supplemented where necessary from British stocks. Equipment will be issued to those units only which are organised on to New Establishments submitted through MIA and approved by this Headquarters. Instructions to this effect are being issued to your headquarters.
 4. Rations will be charged to British account.
 5. Release of further manpower ceiling spaces will be notified from time to time.
- BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALLENDE:

(sgd) EDWARD R. SHUGART Colonel AGD
Asst Adjutant General

RESTRICTED

JC/awm

Land forces 32

1317

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/115 GCT-O

25 May 1945

SUBJECT: Increase in Carabinieri

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (MMIA) ✓

SD/47

28/5

719

1. Application has been received from your headquarters for an increase in the manpower ceiling of the carabinieri from 55,000 to 65,000. It has been decided that this increase will be found from the present United Kingdom commitment of 160,500, as and when vacancies occur within that category.

2. An initial transfer of 3,000 manpower spaces made available by cancellation of formation of Patriot Recce Battalions is authorized with effect from 20 May 1945.

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4. Rations will be charged to British account. *Why?*

5. Release of further manpower ceiling spaces will be notified from time to time.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

GSO 1 X

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (GD)

GSO 2 (WS)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (SB)

GSO 3 (O.C.D.)

GSO 3 (H)

Edmund R. Shugart
 EDMUND R. SHUGART
 Colonel, AGD
 Asst Adjutant General

 SD Disk
 A/C SD/47
 Info A

MMIA - 'G'

FILE: SD/47

DATE:

RESTRICTED

281445

