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SD/47

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May -194

10000/120/5167

SD/47

CARABINIERI (GEN)

MAY -1945 - AUG 1946

Cover II

BUREAU OF: ARMY

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MILIA)

(489081 Ext 401)

SD/47

25 Aug 46

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Owing to their special commitments it is strongly recommended that CO. RR. detachment of 150 personnel at Naples, have their Sten Guns replaced by T.S.M.'s as soon as possible.

RWC/zt

781
H. H. I. A.

Major General,
H. H. I. A.

Copy to: Major C.B. Hayes (CO. RR. - 830 II)

Internal: 101
SI/109/2

88.

ZOLA

25 1630 B

6 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT

3D 2913

UNCLASSIFIED

REF YOUR SIGNAL 8/6/ 3 OF 23 (.)

CC SEC THIS HQ WILL TAKE UP WITH CC GRM, AND WILL

INFORM YOU (.) MATTER IS HOWEVER PURELY ITALIAN

AND NO GREAT PRESSURE CAN BE BROUGHT

see folio 87

78)

83/47

ROUTINE

G(3D)

A.A.C. SOUTHERN, Lt. Col.

LROF V MBGE NR 24009 IMPORTANT

FROM 6 B L U H231630B
 TO MMIA- ROME
 GR -- BT

RECEIVED 25 JUL 1946
 2842

G/6/3 : UNCLASSIFIED .

ONE COMPANY MOBILE BN CCRR RETAINED IN PESARA ON ORDERS OF
 PREFECT . COMD OFFR SAY UNNECESSARY EMCEGENCY OVER .
 PLEASE ARRANGE FOR ORDERS TO BE GIVEN FOR RE-ENTRY AS PREFECT ADAMANT

XO 231630B
 WA OFFR SAYS PSE
 SENT NR 9 0935B PJRS (AR) TKU K
 RD NBOLO K 9 0940B HTH VA ARK
 NO NOT OUTST

87

BGN	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G III	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO III (SD)	
GSO I (TRG)	
G II (L)	

MMIA 2200
 FILED SD/44
 DATE 25/7.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSIONM. M. I. A.NOTES ON CC.RR. POSITION IN ITALIAN POLICE SYSTEM

1. MAJOR GENERAL L. BROWNING CB.OBE.MC. has directed that a description of the Italian Police System will be given by this Section to all Officers in Land Forces Sub Commission.A.C.(MMIA).

2. TYPES OF POLICE.

BGS	There are six Police Forces in Italy, namely :	
GSO I (SB)	Carabinieri	Establishment: 75,000
Dep G II	Questura (including Railway and Traffic Police)	
GSO II (SB)	Guardia di Finanza	32,405
GSO II (I)	Forest Guards	31,629
GSO III (SB)	Municipal Guards)	5,579
GSO I (HBG)	Armed Watchmen)	
G II (B)		According to local needs specially authorised.

3. CARABINIERI (CC.RR.).

The CC.RR. are the largest single Police Unit; they are the first and oldest Regiment in the Italian Army and have a splendid tradition of which they are intensely proud. An exceptionally high moral standard is required from volunteer recruits to the CC.RR. and enquiries concerning them and their families cover three generations. They are recruited and trained as soldiers. In their training, part is devoted entirely to instruction in Italian law and police powers and procedure, as every Carabinieri, in addition to being a soldier, is also an "Agente di Pubblica Sicurezza" (Policeman), with full police powers. The police duties of the CC.RR. are more comprehensive in those parts of Italy other than large cities and provincial seats as they (CC.RR.) are the only fully authorised police to be found in rural places. Therefore it is upon the CC.RR. that the chief responsibility for the maintenance of law and order rests. The general emphasis is that the CC.RR. are soldiers with, as a secondary duty, police functions.

4. For administration and discipline, CC.RR. are exclusively under the control of the War Ministry, operationally from the police aspect, however, they are under the direct control of the Minister of Interior who exercises that direction and control through the Civil Authorities (Prefetti and Sindaci).
5. The Prefect acts for the Ministry of Interior and in his Province he is the supreme authority for the Government.

GSO-1 (SU)	Carabinieri	Establishment: 75,000
Dep G II	Questura (including Railway and Traffic Police)	" 32,405
GSO II (SU)	Guardia di Finanza	" 31,629
GSO II (I)	Forest Guards	" 5,579
GSO III (SU)	Municipal Guards	According to local needs
GSO I (SU)	Armed Watchmen	specially authorized.
G II (G)		

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5. The Prefect acts for the Ministry of Interior and in his Province he is the supreme authority for the Government, being responsible only to the Ministry of the Interior.

6. The second highest responsible Official in each Province is the Questore (the chief of all Police Agencies in the Province). The authority of the Questore includes the operational control of the Carabinieri, and all crimes coming to the notice of the CC.RR. have to be reported by them to the Questore, although CC.RR. are not bound to seek assistance in investigation. If, however, Carabinieri and Questore are jointly

MMIA - 'G'
FILE 50/47
DATE R/13/5

engaged in police action, the Questura Agent of similar rank takes charge. Much jealousy exist between Questura and Carabinieri.

This local control of the Carabinieri by civil officials is not likely to be removed, as it is based on a well established principle applied in most countries.

7. In exceptional times, local civil control or single national control are dangerous as the Police Forces may be deliberately used to further the interests of one section of the community to the disadvantage of the others. When Police Agencies are not impartial, the public fail to receive that protection to which they are entitled, and which the laws of the land provide.

Civil authorities should therefore administer the Police under their operational control in such a manner that every citizen has confidence in the police to protect him.

8. In many parts of Italy to-day the civil authorities do not possess the essential qualifications and the political interests of the authorities concerned have undoubtedly had a considerable bearing on the correct or incorrect use of the Carabinieri and other Police Agencies. This is particularly true regarding the North of Italy.

9. The 12 "Mobile Battalions" of the Carabinieri (heavily armed with Armoured Cars etc.) have been created primarily to deal with public disorders of such gravity that Carabinieri personnel normally armed could not quell.

In the event of serious disturbances arising from political motives, instructions may be given by non-impartial civil authorities which will - by effecting dispersal - defeat the purpose for which the Mobile Battalions have been created. This fact should always be borne in mind so long as the operational control of the Carabinieri is vested in local civil authorities.

10. Although their standard of efficiency and administration still leaves much to be desired, the Carabinieri can be relied upon to perform their duties impartially, and their tradition and training of the past 133 years as soldiers and policemen is the most valuable asset in the Italian police system. Exhaustive enquiries have failed to reveal that the politics of any CC.RR. personnel affect the manner in which their duties are carried out. Therefore the policy of this HQ is not directed towards any fundamental change in the constitution of the Carabinieri, but to make it function as an efficient, independent

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It is intended to accomplish this by :

- (a) Ensuring that all Carabinieri requirements are provided through Army channels of supply.
- (b) The supply to Carabinieri of sufficient transport, arms ammunition.

- 3 -

- (c) Provision of telephone and wireless communications.
- (d) A revision of terms and conditions of service and intense training in modern police methods.
- (e) The establishment of a Criminal Records Office.
- (f) Raising the morale & efficiency as a result of the above.

11. QUESTURA.

The Questura (Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza) is a national Police Force of civil character depending upon the Ministry of Interior. It is operated on a provincial basis largely in the towns only, the Questore being the Chief Police Officer for each Province. He is responsible to the Prefect only. He is also responsible in theory for co-ordinating all the Police service in his province, but in many instances no such co-ordination exist in practice. On a provincial level the Group Commander of Carabinieri should make daily reports to the Prefect and the Questore, but in practice this is not always carried out.

The force under his command is divided into two smaller sections :

- (a) Regular Agents, who perform all duties in civilian clothes. 276
- (b) Auxiliary Agents, who wear uniform.

12. In large cities and provincial seats the main responsibility for policing the place is that of the Questura investigation of crime, control of fire-arms, licensing restrictions, control of prostitution, traffic control, etc., but, as has been pointed out, in the section dealing with the Carabinieri, where no Questura exists - i.e. below the provincial seats - all police duties are performed by the CC.AR. with the exception of certain specialist duties which will be detailed later.

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(a) Regular Agents, who perform all duties in civilian clothes.

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12. In large cities and provincial seats the main responsibility for policing the place is that of the Questura investigation of crime, control of fire-arms, licensing restrictions, control of prostitution, traffic control, etc., is almost entirely the work of the Agents of Public Security, but, as has been pointed out in the section dealing with the Carabinieri, where no Questura exists - i.e. below the provincial seats - all police duties are performed by the CC.RR. with the exception of certain specialist duties which will be detailed later.

13. On the liberation of the North, several Questori or Senior Officers were killed, many others imprisoned, and the remainder dismissed.

The Questura was taken over by partisan elements, very few, if any having any previous police experience. About 50% of the former Agents of inferior grade were re-instated, provided they were not politically unsatisfactory. Many of these locally appointed officers were conscientious, and law - abiding

- 5 -

19. Guardia Municipale. The Guardia Municipale are engaged on a communal basis, under the control of the Sindaco. They are employed as municipal messengers and are supposed to control markets and shops. Broadly speaking, they are completely unimportant in the contribution they make towards the preservation of law and order.

20. Armed Guards. In order to save employing Carabinieri or Italian Army Units on guard duty at dumps of captured enemy materials, AFHQ has given authority for the Italian War Ministry to use armed Italian civilians on guard duty. These men wear green arm bands when on duty and are employed by the Italian Army Territorial Commands. They are armed to a very light scale and can only carry arms when on duty. The number of armed civilian guards so employed varies according to local requirements.

21. Conclusion. The conditions in which the Carabinieri have been working in the past few years have been extremely difficult. They lost considerable "face" under the Fascists and after the armistice. Nevertheless the material is good, if properly organised and held. The CC.RR. have already made great strides, largely as a result of the policy inaugurated as in para 16 above and partly owing to their enhanced prestige and the growing confidence of the public in them. There is no doubt that the general public are tired of disorder and welcome the increased CC.RR. efficiency and success in preserving order. Therefore the first and most hopeful step in Italian police re-organisation must be to put the Carabinieri on their feet.

SI/lur

4 May 46.

Dist:

Executive Comm. (2 copies)
A.C. for Public Safety (2 copies)
Sub Comm.
Lists A.E

H. MIGHALL, Lt. Col.

CC.RR. Branch.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION.A.C.

M. M. I. A.

Mighall 77

RECEIVED
1055 23 FEB 1946

Ref: AG/14601/72/PS.

22 February 1946.

R G

SD/47.

A few days ago General Browning spoke to you from an Aide Memoire on the Carabinieri. He subsequently showed me his notes. I felt that he had, naturally, spoken only from the military aspect of their functions and organisation. I therefore instructed the Public Safety Sub-Commission to prepare some notes for you on the civil side of their work which is, of course, controlled, by the Ministry for Interior, and I am sending them herewith. I hope that they may be of value to you.

M. S. LUSH

MMIA.
FILE: SD/47
DATE: 25/2/46

H.E. Sir Noel Charles, K.C.M.G.,
British Ambassador,
British Embassy,
ROME.

Col. G3
GSO I (CD)
Dep. G3
GSO II (S-1)
GSO II (I)
GSO II (S-2)
GSO II (S-3)
GSO
G (11a)

CCRR

BSL/JG.

Copy to: *G. Commissioner.*
Land Forces S/G.
Executive Commissioner.

816
22nd February 1946.

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR H.E. THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

ORGANISATION - CARABINIERI.

1. Although the CC.RR. is a unit of the Italian Army and organised as such, it is primarily a Police Force and its members are policemen charged with the duty of preserving the peace. It is for this reason that the CC.RR. is under the control of two Ministries, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Interior. The functions are as follows:

(a) Ministry of War. Administration, organisation military training, discipline, recruiting, arms and equipment, transport (including horses). Military Police, action under mobilization orders, supervision of soldiers on leave and release, searched for deserters and those escaping from military prisons. The Ministry of War always works in agreement with the Ministry of Interior regarding the distribution and assignment of officers.

(b) Ministry of Interior. Maintenance of public order and security, billeting and barracks equipment. The Ministry can order concentration of forces whenever necessary. In matters concerning the strength of the CC.RR., or its disposition, the Commanding General, CC.RR. must obtain the previous authorisation of the Ministry of Interior before interesting the Ministry of War in the matter.

2. The number of police in Italy today is less than the number employed before Italy's entry into the war, before its industrial, commercial and economic resources had been destroyed, and before its population was confronted with hunger, homelessness, unemployment and inflation. Before the war, the aggregate number of police engaged in maintaining law and order (excluding Royal Finance Guards) was approximately 207,000 officers and men. Of this number 130,000 were organised into specialised police agencies including:

- (a) Railway Police.
- (b) Port Police.
- (c) Highway or Road Police.
- (d) Post and Telegraph Police.
- (e) Frontier Police.
- (f) Coastal Police.
- (g) Forest Guards.
- (h) Judicial Police.

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- (d) Post and Telegraph Police.
- (e) Frontier Police.
- (f) Coastal Police.
- (g) Forest Guards.
- (h) Anti-Aircraft Guards.

These agencies were manned from M.V.S.M. (Black-Shirt Militia), they were Fascist organizations, and were all abolished when the Allies occupied Italy. No replacement was made, and as a result, Carabinieri are being used for duty on railways, ports, roads, frontiers, etc., to the detriment of their primary function, the duty of preserving the peace. (The Italian Government has appreciated this situation and has issued Decrees creating Railway Police. Men are being enrolled as agents of Public Security under Questore and will be trained as Port and Road Police).

3. The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime. Next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed. These functions cannot be performed by police on static guard duty, nor by

-2-

those held in reserve bodies in readiness to put down riots or other disturbances beyond the capacity of the CC.RR. on patrol. The close contact with the public so necessary to the proper performance of police duty is secured by the naming of 4,809 stations throughout the country. The location and importance of the station determines the number of police to be assigned. The extraneous duties which must at present be performed by the CC.RR. militates against the effectiveness of their strength, with the result that the stations throughout the country are not named to their proper strength. The minimum station allotment is usually 5 but this number has had to be reduced. The increase in mobility of a force increases efficiency. However, a reduction in strength in communes, to be replaced by visiting CC.RR. in motor cars or trucks, will inevitably lead to a worsening of public safety conditions. The presence of the CC.RR. resident on the scene frequently prevents crime being committed. Flying squads can only deal with the trouble after it has occurred. Experience at home has shown that with all the many modern aids so valuable and necessary in police work today, the basis of the whole system is the "man on the beat". He cannot be replaced.

4. It is not generally appreciated that the CC.RR. is the only representative of law and order in the towns and communes below provincial level. He is not a village policeman. He is a member of a national police force and is transferred from a city or small town to a commune in the mountains in accordance with the exigencies of his service. The CC.RR. in Rome is of the same type as the CC.RR. in a Sicilian village.

5. Agents of Public Security are concentrated in cities and provincial seats and are not distributed into communes to assist in the duty of preserving order. Guardia Finanza are revenue agents, not police in the generally accepted sense of the term. It is anticipated that an additional 6,000 agents will be trained by April and a further 6,000 by June. This increase in strength should enable a large number of CC.RR. to return to proper police duty. When this occurs, every effort should be made to build up the strength of the force at the station level.

771

and consequently rationing, the 65,000 men initially laid down instead of the present 62,304.

With this increase this G.H.Q. intends to form another four mobile battalions to be stationed at Bolzano, Verona, Catantaro, and Messina.

Sgd. BRUNETTO BRUNETTI

G.O.C.

G. Danin Cpl.

769

de GAUMONT. Also I am not clear as to where the Italian Government expect to get these extra 10,000. If they intend to recall discharged OC,RR, presumably they can get them fairly quickly; but if they intend to get them by normal process of selection and training, obviously it would be some time before these extra men would be available.

3. I bring the above to your notice for such action as you may wish to take. There would seem to be no reason why we should not continue to take steps as in para 2 while at the same time making for the extra 10,000 - particularly as the clothing, arming and equipping of the OC,RR is now gathering force, though the transport situation still depends on the provision of the vehicles owned by A.A.A.A. to the Ministry of War, who intend to put them at the disposal of the OC,RR. I understand that you have still not received a reply from de GAUMONT to your letter in this connection.

d. Browning

Major General,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (MIL).

Copy to C.A.R.R. Sec

/ago

787

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

58557/ 34083.1/1.2.1

Rome, 26 January 1946

Dear Admiral,

Some time ago, the Italian Government asked the Allied Commission to be allowed to raise the number of the Carabinieri from 65 to 75 thousand units. Regarding this proposition, M.M.I.A. considered that the service of the Carabinieri would in fact be improved by bettering their equipment and armament and giving them better means of transport, instead of increasing their number.

The steps suggested by M.M.I.A. would doubtless be most useful; however they cannot make up for the scarcity of the men.

Before the war, with efficient communications and transport means, active industries, a general state of well-being, in short, in normal living conditions, the forces in charge of the various services of public order amounted to 207 thousand men, without counting the Guardia di Finanza.

Of such men, 130 thousand belonged to the militia specialized in the various services (railroad, harbors, road, post and telegraph, frontier, coast and forest militia). Such specialized Corps were suppressed, and the Carabinieri were entrusted with tasks which, in normal times, were carried out by thousands of agents, who, among other things had special competence and outfits.

However, the Carabinieri Corps must now supply not only soldiers for the above mentioned services which are not included among the special duties of the Corps, but also the men that are continually requested by the Allied Army Forces, by various other allied organizations and by numerous organisms of the Italian Government. Thus about 17,000 men are withheld from the service, and to this figure, we must add another 6 thousand carabinieri forming 12 battalions that must be kept as movable reserve.

The remaining force is quite inadequate to carry out the service of local detached commands where where the prevention and repression work of the Carabinieri takes place in very difficult conditions. In the provinces and in isolated places where incidents and riots trouble public order more frequently, police duties are entrusted to the Carabinieri Corps only, for the activity and service of the Public Safety Corps are limited to the towns.

To the problems of a general character regarding the safeguard of public order, and are of vital importance, we must add, in a near future, those which are relative to the organization of the elections. The Italian

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EC DIST - 29 Jan

ACTION - EAC LAND FSC

INFO - CC

- RC

- LAND FORCES

C A Sec

- 2 -

Government is aware that voting must take place in a regime of utmost freedom and order if the elections are to be the first step towards the concrete reestablishment of a democratic administration procedure.

This is why I wanted to bring once more to your attention the problem regarding the increasing of the number of the Carabinieri, so that you may efficaciously support the request of the Italian Government with A.F.H.Q., hoping that approval may be granted in time for the new contingent to take up its duties before the beginning of the electoral period.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours,

A. De Gasperi

e/c

765

MESSAGE FORM

SD/47
Apr 23/101.

75

FROM : MEXIA
TO : AMHQ
INFO : AICOM
REF : .692

DATE/TIME
23 A

RESTRICTED

REFERENCE YOUR PX 535716 NOV(.)

MEXIA HAS TAKEN OVER FROM PUBLIC SAFETY SUB CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OURS AS ORDERED BY YOUR AG 014.12 GSO-0 1A OCT(.) WHILE ABLE TO ASSIST AND ADVISE IN DAY TO DAY ADMINISTRATION AND MAINTENANCE OF CONTINUING ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL STAFF OFFICERS NEEDED FOR THIS DUTY IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO UNDERTAKE SUCCESSFULLY THE COMPLETE REORGANIZATION, PREPARATION OF DETAILED ORDER OF BATTLE, V.B.S. AND EQUIPMENT TABLES REQUIRED(.)

PROPOSE THEREFORE TO GIVE YOU BY 3 DEC INTERIM REPORT TO PARA 3 WHICH WOULD BE REVISED ON SAFE SIDE AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO REVISIONS NEEDED AS RESULT OF LATER DETAILED EXPERT STUDY(.)

WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR EARLY POSTING THREE POLICE OFFICERS, TWO SECOND GRADE STAFF OFFICERS, VIDE YOUR PX 51855 5 NOV (NAP 1056) AND LATER SEVEN LIAISON OFFICERS FOR OURS

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (SB)

GSO 2 (W-)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (SB)

GSO 3 (W-)

PREPARED BY

AUTHENTICATION

Internal: 'G'

6/3/1
78
APR 23/101

Ref: AG/14634/75

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces

TO: AFHQ, C-5 Section.

With reference to your C-5: 214.12 of 7 Oct 45 and in continuation of my letter 4636/194/52 of 30 Oct 45.

1. Owing to the recent continuous changes in regard to the numbers and categories of officers remaining with or leaving the Allied Commission it has not been possible to form earlier an estimate of the number of police officers available for duty with MIA.

2. No officers will be available for assignment to MIA before the hand-over of the Northern Regions. After the hand-back to Italian control of the Northern Regions, it is estimated that 10 Police Officers can be made available for assignment outside the Public Safety Sub-Commission and AGS territory. At least one of these would be of the rank of Lt. Colonel. Owing to the requirements of Venezia Giulia, all officers available will probably be British. If the mission is to be Allied, as recommended, arrangements for the provision of US personnel will have to be made.

3. In connection with this matter I must be satisfied on behalf of the British Home Office that any British Officers assigned to MIA are employed on purely police duty, for which purpose they have been provided to the British Army Area the Home Office.

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (Sec)

GSO 2 (Viz)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (Sec)

GSO 3 (GrSec)

GSO 5 (I)

X *W. Stone* 763

WILFRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Copy to: Lord Porous C/O (MIA)

R/24/11

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : ALCOM
TO : AFHQ
REF : 8020

3 Nov 45

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED (.)

1. IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT CC RR AND OTHER POLICE AGENCIES ARE INADEQUATELY ARMED (.) THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND AMG OFFICERS TESTIFY THAT THEY CANNOT PROPERLY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES BECAUSE OF THIS LACK OF ARMS (.)

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF FROM HQ ALCOM SIGNED STONE

CITE ACEXC PAREN

2. ON 14 SEPTEMBER IN MY AC/14601/II/PS TO G-5 SECTION I REQUESTED THAT 44000 AUTOMATIC MUSKETS AND 3000 PISTOLS BE RELEASED FROM THE BERETTA ARMS FACTORY AT BRESCIA FOR THE CARABINIERI (.) I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED PERMISSION (.) I AM TOLD BY G-5 IN THEIR G-5: 000.5 13 OCTOBER THAT THE ISSUE OF THESE WEAPONS IS UNDER DISCUSSION (.) I SUBMIT THAT TO REFER OR POSTPONE FURTHER THE ISSUE OF THESE ARMS TO THE POLICE IN THIS COUNTRY IS TO IGNORE THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION OF LAW AND ORDER AND ALLIED RESPONSIBILITY IN HELPING THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND I WOULD URGE THAT AN IMMEDIATE AFFIRMATIVE DECISION BE MADE

Copy to : C.Com
Ex.Com
Land Forces S/C.

Ex.Com for CA SEC

343

Brig.

SEC 1

SEC 2 (Cms)

SEC 2 (S)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

G-5

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COPY.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

700.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
Rome.
October 18, 1945.Rear Admiral E. W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

Dear Admiral Stone:

With reference to your letter of September 19, 1945 (File No. 3626/149/EC) to G-5 Section, AFH, regarding an Allied Police Mission, I have received the views of the Department of State. The Department agrees with you that it is preferable not to impose a Police Mission on the Italians under the Supreme Allied Commander's present authority. It is even reluctant to insist upon its establishment as part of the peace treaty. The Department had hoped that the President of the Council of Ministers would be sufficiently aware of the advantages to democratic government in Italy, through strengthening internal security forces, to accept the responsibility of obtaining the Cabinet's approval of a plan to request the Allied Governments to send such a Mission. The Mission should begin work at once, of course, if the greatest good is to be accomplished.

The Department has instructed me, at my discretion, to inform the President of the Council of Ministers of the position of the United States Government as outlined above. The Department is of the opinion that factors governing the Italian Government's expressed desire for an improved international status are the assurance of free exercise of democratic rights to the Italian people and a clear assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of order.

I intend to communicate the substance of the Department's instructions to Professor Parri at an appropriate opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) A. KIRK.

Alexander Kirk.

759

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

50/47. 69
SP

Ref: AG/14634/RS

29 Oct 45.

SUBJECT: Reformation of Police Forces.

TO: AFHQ- G-5 Section.

G.

With reference to your AG: 014.12 GSC-0 of 14 Oct 45.

1. 1 Nov 45 has been agreed upon as the date of transfer of responsibilities, in matters connected with the Carabinieri, except their operational functions, from the Public Safety Sub-Commission to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MILA).

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:


M Carr Brigadier

M. CARR, Brigadier,
Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner,
Executive Commissioner,
MILA,
Establishment Section.

1-101 X ~~101~~ X
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1-104 X
1-105 X
1-106 X
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1-108 X
1-109 X
1-110 X

758



- 2 -

numerous than themselves, and equipped with portable weapons and bombs.

10 I therefore trust in your kind interest about this matter. In particular, I beg you to intervene personally, so that kind consideration may be given to the proposals made by the Comando Generale of the Corps, to obtain that the carabinieri be allotted 14,000 automatic rifles and 3000 pistols at present in the Beretta weapon factory, at Gardone val di Trompia; up to now, the Land Forces Sub-commission hasn't granted this request for it stated that such arms must be considered as war booty.

11 I thank you, my dear Admiral, for taking this matter in consideration; considering its importance, it deserves to be dealt with without delay.

Yours sincerely,

S. Ferruccio Parri

trans. e/c

753

LEC LIST- 11 SEP 45

ACTION: C A SEC

INFO: CHIEF COMAR

EXEC COMAR

LAND FORCES SC

MESSAGE FORM

FROM : M M I A

TO : COMMOB PALERMO FOR MMIA LO

INFO : PUBLIC SAFETY SUB COMMISSION HQ ALCON (BY HAND)

25 1540 .B.

ST/972

UNCLASSIFIED (.) SUBJECT RATIONS FOR CC.RR. SICILY (.) PALERMO LEGION CC.RR.
 MAY DRAW RATIONS FOR SUBORDINATE UNITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR ADMIN INST
 12 DATED 12 OCT 44. PROVIDED UNITS SHOWN AND AUTHORIZED AT STRENGTHS
 CURRENT ORBAT (.) SEE PARA A CMA APPENDIX B CMA ADMIN INST 12 WHEREBY
 DIVISION ~~CMA~~ REGIMENT CMA ETC MAY DRAW

MMIA -
FILE: 92/47
DATE: 1/25/8

G30 1
 G30 2 (X) 12 X
 G30 3 (X)
 G30 4 (X)
 G30 5 (X)
 G30 6 (X)
 G30 7 (X)
 G30 8 (X)
 G30 9 (X)
 G30 10 (X)

751

(ST/247)

INTERNAL: 'Q'

PRESIDENCE

IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATION

K. Robert Nelson Major Lt. Col.

251648

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

24 July 1945

AC/14601/61/PS

SUBJECT : Recruiting of CC.RR

TO : G-5 Section AFHQ

1. Reference our letter of even number dated 11 July 45 giving recruiting figures for the period ending 30 June 45.

2. The following recruiting has taken place during the period 1 July to 15 July 1945 :-

<u>Reg. CC.RR</u>	<u>Aux. CC.RR</u>	<u>Total</u>
443	-	443

3. In addition to the above mentioned, the following were recovered from newly liberated territory :-

<u>R.C.O's</u>	<u>G.R's</u>	<u>Total</u>
89	287	376

749

these men are being screened and rehabilitated and will be absorbed into the Force in due course.

4. The following have been repatriated :-

	<u>Off.</u>	<u>H.C.O's</u>	<u>G.R's</u>	<u>Total</u>
GSO 1				
GSO 2 (a) X	1	28	110	139
GSO 2 (b)				
GSO 2 (c)				
GSO 2 (d)				
GSO 3 (a)				
GSO 3 (b)				
GSO 3 (c)				
GSO 3 (d)				

For the Chief Commissioner,

MMIA-C

FILE: 50/47

25/7

Copy :- M.H.I.A. (for info)

G.R. UPJOHN Brig
VP CA Sec

D. A. Benham last 1/6/1

Notes for 1/1/2/2/2/2

58

SUBJECT: Carabinieri Orbat.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MHA)

SD/L7 ✓

18 July 55

TO : CC.RR. Comm. Gen.,
Vittorio Emanuele,
Via Legnano, ROME.

It would be appreciated if this HQ might be supplied with 12 copies of the CC.RR. location and strength Statement recently forwarded by you to Public Safety Sub Commission.

Rf
18/7

[Signature]

748

Lt. Col.
GS.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

AO/14601/61/PS

11 July 1945

SUBJECT : Recruiting of CCRB
TO : G-5 Section A.F.H.Q.

1. Reference our letter of even number dated 27 June 1945 giving recruiting figures for the period ending 15 June 1945.

2. The following recruiting has taken place during the period 15 June to 30 June 1945:-

<u>Reg. CCRB</u>	<u>Aux. CCRB</u>	<u>Total</u>
17	2	19

3. In addition to the above mentioned, the following were recovered from newly liberated territory:-

<u>N.C.O.'s</u>	<u>O.R.'s</u>	<u>Total</u>
309	695	1004

these men are being screened and rehabilitated and will be absorbed into the Force in due course.

4. The following have been repatriated:-

<u>Off.</u>	<u>NCO's</u>	<u>OR's</u>	<u>Total</u>
1	15	61	78

For the Chief Commissioner,

G.R. UPJOHN Brig
VP CA Sec

Copy :- M.M.I.A. (for Info) ✓

MMIA-G
FILE 50/47
DATE 1/5

GSD 1

GSD 2 (W)

GSD 2 (SD)

GSD 2 (W)

GSD 2 (L)

GSD 2 (SD)

GSD 3 (W)

GSD 3 (L)

I have received your letter of the 6 July 45 and am glad to be able to tell you that authority was granted on 1 July 45 to raise the maximum number of Carabinieri to 65,000 and this has been duly communicated to the Minister of War.

With regard to the remainder of your letter I am reluctant to remove from the North any of the Combat Groups but part of the Garibaldi Regiment has already been moved to the Bari Area. I appreciate your desire that there should be additional battalions of troops in the South of Italy and I am able to inform you that the whole question of the numbers and distribution of Italian Internal Security Troops all over Italy is now under consideration at ARHQ. I hope to be able to give you the Field Marshal's decision shortly.

Meanwhile I have given instructions for the postponement of the remainder of the Garibaldi Regiment to the Bari area.

Very truly yours,

Professor Ferruccio Parrino,
The President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
Rome.

ALLEN W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

GSC 1
GSC 2 (CPS)
GSC 2 (SD)
GSC 2 (W3)
GSC 2 (L)
GSC 2 (SD)
GSC 2 (O&A)
GSC 2 (I)

MMIA - 10	
FILE	DATE
10/1/45	10/1/45

CONFIDENTIAL

SSA

SUBJECT:- Authorized CORR - SARDINIA

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AG (MMIA)

30/47

11 Jul 45

MMIA LO SARDINIA

1. Further to this HQ signal SD2839 of 11 Jul on the above subject.
2. Att Appx "A" shows bilingual breakdown of the CAGLIARI Legion totalling 3108 all ranks.
3. Military CORR in SARDINIA totalling 18 all ranks are as shown below :

91 Detachment CORR CAGLIARI, strength	15 OR's
CORR Detachment SASSARI, strength	3 OR's
TOTAL	18 OR's

ABC

S.M.F. Dr. cl

7:5

Major General
MMIAInternal : A
(Two)

Land Forces Sub
 HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
 Office of the Chief Commissioner
 APO 394

G(SD) SD/47/2
 3/7
 Tel: 478427

30 June 1945

AC/14634/TS

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the CC.RR. and other Police Forces.

TO : Allied Forces Headquarters, APO 512,
 (Attention : G-3 Section.)

1. Reference is made to your G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, and to my 3626/EC of 19 May, 1945.

2. Since writing my letter of 19 May, I have had occasion to make further study of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 OCT-O of 16 November 1944, and I am now firmly convinced that under the provisions of that letter the responsibilities of Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) in regard to the CC.RR. do parallel the responsibilities of the Italian Ministry of War insofar as control, supervision, administration and supply are concerned. I, therefore, request that a critical study be made in order to clarify the situation which has developed over the past several months in regard to responsibility for training, feeding, clothing and equipping the CC.RR.

3. In your letter G-5 014.12 of 11 May, 1945, it stated that "MMIA responsibility for their (the CC.RR.) administration is specifically limited to seeing they are supplied with rations similar to the Italian Army." In this connection I invite your attention, first, to the fact that MMIA admit their responsibility for the feeding, clothing and equipping of the CC.RR., (letter A.018 of 11 April, 1945, copy sent to you as enclosure to our letter 3626/EC of 14 April, 1945), and, second, to para. 4b of AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 OCT-O of 16 November, 1944, wherein it is stated that MMIA will be responsible for supervision of administration

MMIA - 'G' -1-
 N/A: 50/47/2
 DATE: 1/7

650 1

650 2 (Cm)

650 2 (SD)

650 2 (W)

650 2 (L)

650 3 (SD)

650 3 (Cm)

and supply of the Italian Army. At this point may I say that there is no question about the CC.RR. being Italian Army units, inasmuch as they were specifically included under the COS authority to re-establish the Italian Army and are specifically included in the list of Italian Army units maintained internationally as set out in the AFHQ letter above referred to.

4. Also in your letter of 4 May, 1945, it is stated that "MMIA are not charged with responsibility for their (CC.RR.) organization, supervision or use". May I invite your attention to several paragraphs of AFHQ letter AG 091. 711/169 GCI-O of 16 November, 1944, which would seem to be not in accord with the statement just quoted. Para. 3 of the letter provides that "Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission." Para. 4 specifically places a number of responsibilities on MMIA including supervision of administration and supply, supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline, and liaison between the employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War. Para. 5a provides that "in principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible through MMIA for the Administration of all categories". Para 5b provides that "the general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War." Para. 24, in part, provides that "The Carabinieri (CC.RR.) are under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri.". The Commanding General is a general of the Italian Army who is responsible to the Ministry for War. Thus is developed the chain of command, supervision, administration and control all exercised through the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA). The only mention of any other responsibility is also in para. 24, wherein it is stated "The Carabinieri are a civil police organization directed by Public Safety Sub-Commission.". Thus the responsibility of Public Safety Sub-Commission is specifically limited to directing the operational use of the Carabinieri as police. 737

5. The failure to recognize and clarify the full responsibilities of MMIA in regard to Carabinieri within the existing provisions of the AFHQ letter has resulted in an unsatisfactory

level of supply of all kinds of equipment as compared with line troops of the Italian Army. Also this has caused the development of a fallacious opinion that, because Carabinieri are used as police, Public Safety Sub-Commission, which controls nothing in the way of supplies and equipment, is responsible for everything relating to Carabinieri. This situation has contributed materially to the ineffectiveness of the Carabinieri and the reports I am now receiving from my Public Safety officers in the north all testify to the very poor impression created in the minds of the public in all parts of the territory recently liberated by reason of the poor turn out of the Carabinieri sent North.

6. The internal security situation in Italy is far from satisfactory and threatens to become worse due in part to taking Carabinieri from the south to assist in the policing of the north. Now that combat operations have ceased, I feel that every aid and assistance possible should be given to strengthen, not only the Carabinieri, but also other Italian Police agencies. I see no reasons why Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) should not perform the same functions for Carabinieri that have been performed for other Italian Army units under the provisions of the AFHQ letter herein referred to.

7. For the reasons herein expressed and as a matter of urgency, I request that serious and prompt consideration be given to this matter.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

736

Copy to :
Land Forces S/C (MMIA). ✓

6. The details of the various units into which the 3000 carabinieri have been recruited will be forwarded to you when received from Regional Commissioners in the north.

For the Chief Commissioner:

J. S. Konstantin 1.10.1
for G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.
VP SA Section.

Copy to : AFHQ AG Dept
15 Army Group
MMIA (your SD/47 of 28 May and
15 June refer).

70.46.

70.33

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737

SUBJECT: Increase of CC.RR Strength

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA).

SD / 47

15 Jun 45

TO : Public Safety Sub-Comm, A.C.

Copy : Civil Affairs Sec, A.C.

33

33

1. Confirming conversation Lt-Col Wilson - Lt-Col Ingledew, it was agreed that your AC/14601/21/PS of 11 Jun does not actually answer MMIA letter SD/47 of 28 May. A reply to SD/47 of 28 May is therefore still awaited.

2. It is suggested that the personnel composing the 3,000 ceiling in question be organised into small pls which can thereby be conveniently added to any Legion you desire.

See to. 48A

Major-General,

fa

R 15/6.

