

ACC

10000/120/5195

SD/71/1

10000/120/5195

SD/71/1

CALLS-UP-PLANS

Dec. 1944

cover I

1694
1726

G.O.C.

Future Call-up.

1. Att is suggested letter to AFHQ asking for their agreement to call-up of new class and stating that we are taking urgent action with Ministry of War to have exemption laws altered.
2. Draft is agreed by 2 i/o and AQ.

25 Dec 44.



Lt. Col. G.S.

OK

L.B.

1726

7729C

HYPER CALL-UPS

SD/4/1

<u>Date</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Action Branch</u>
20 May - 14 June	Calabria 1924 - 25 e	7000	G(SD)
15 June - 30 June	Calabria 1924 - 25	7000	G(SD)

ORGANIZATIONAL INTAKE OF PERSONNEL


3 Apr - 9 Apr	ex MD - Maviscolina	500	A
30 Apr - 6 May	ex MD Saviato	500	A
7 May - 13 May	ex MD Trani	500	A
14 May - 20 May X	Sicily volunteers	500	G(SD)
1 May - 7 May	Sicily volunteers	500	G(SD)
3 Apr - 3 May	Patriot Volunteers	500	A
4 May - 7 May	Patriot volunteers	500	A


21 April 45.

DISTRIBUTION:

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 G (3 copies)
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col.

1725

 Lt. Col.
 G. S.



mm

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

Gabinetto

IN

Prot. N° 208190 / II Allegato

Roma 800, 7 aprile 1945

Risposta al disp. del

Dir. Ser. N°

OGGETTO: Operazioni richiami e chiamata alle armi in previsione di una rapida liberazione dell'Italia settentrionale.

Call ups and retraining operations in the event of a rapid liberation of Northern Italy.

LA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION - A.C. - (M.M.I.A.) ROMA

e, per conoscenza:

- ALLO STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO - Uff. Ordin. e Mobil. S E D E
- ALL'UFFICIO COORDINAMENTO S E D E
- ALLA DIREZIONE GENERALE PERSONALE UFFICIALI S E D E
- ALLA DIREZ. GEN. LEVA, SOTTUFFICIALI E TRUPPA S E D E

Seguito foglio n. 13865/Mob. dello S.M.R.E. in data 9.3.1945.-

1°)- Nella eventualità di una rapida liberazione dell'Italia settentrionale, una forte aliquota dei militari attualmente alle armi, aventi residenza nel territorio occupato, verrà ad acquistare, per effetto delle vigenti disposizioni, diritto a congedamento o licenza data.

Tale aliquota è costituita:

- militari delle classi 1913 e più anziane: circa n. 45.000
- militari limitatamente idonei delle classi dal 1914 al 1920 (compresa) : circa n. 1.580

Totale n. 46.580

Alla predetta aliquota occorrerà aggiungere ai fini del congedamento:

- militari cl. 1914 e 1915 (rispettivamente circa 7000 e 3000): circa n. 15.000
- militari limitatamente idonei classi 921 e più giovani: circa n. 700
- ed anche i seguenti con residenza in territorio liberato:
- militari classi 1914 e 1915 (rispettivamente circa 6000 e 5800): circa n. 11.800
- militari limitatamente idonei classi 921 e più giovani: circa n. 2.240

Totale n. 29.740

Totale generale n. 76.320

ISTITUTO NAZIONALE STATO

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

2°)- Inoltre i militari alle armi, con residenza nel territorio ora occupato, che non hanno ancora diritto al congedo, ma da lungo tempo staccati dalle proprie famiglie delle quali non conoscono la sorte - prevedibilmente in circa 55.000 - considereremo legittimo avere subito una licenza e la mancata concessione porterebbe certamente - come dimostrato dall'esperienza - al loro allontanamento arbitrario dai reparti.-

E' perciò necessario predisporre d'urgenza provvedimenti che consentano di far fronte a tale situazione.-

3°)- Occorre quindi poter disporre tempestivamente di:

- circa 80.000 uomini per la sostituzione dei militari da congedare come indicato al n° 1;

- circa 30.000 uomini da immettere nei reparti per consentire l'invio in licenza, in due turni, dei militari con residenza nel territorio ora occupato e di cui al precedente n° 2.- Quei 30.000 u. servirebbero poi, al rientro ai corpi di tutti i licenziandi, per colmare la deficienza esistente nella forza autorizzata per l'Esercito.-

4°)- Si tratta d'incorporare, in tempo, circa 110.000 uomini. ^{172?}

Il programma in atto di chiamate e richiami alle armi non consente minimamente di poter realizzare la suddetta disponibilità di uomini, ma è appena sufficiente a ripianare le deficienze derivanti dalle normali diminuzioni di forza.-

5°)- In conseguenza, allo scopo di evitare:

- di essere sorpresi dagli avvenimenti;

- allontanamenti arbitrari in massa all'atto della liberazione dell'Italia settentrionale,

presento a cotesta M.M.I.A. le seguenti proposte di provvedimenti, da attuare in ordine di precedenza:

a)- stabilire fin da ora che a tutti i militari non congedabili che abbiano la famiglia nel territorio occupato, sarà concessa una licenza speciale di giorni 15 - oltre il viaggio - con assegni, in due turni successivi, appena accessibile località di residenza;

b)- autorizzare il richiamo in servizio degli ufficiali stentamente indispensabili per:

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- b)- autorizzare il richiamo in servizio degli ufficiali strettamente indispensabili per:
- sostituire gli ufficiali aventi diritto a congedo con residenza nel territorio occupato;
 - consentire l'invio in licenza, in due turni, di quelli che non hanno diritto a congedo e che risiedono nel territorio occupato;
- c)- inguadrare subito nel R.Esercito gli idonei (patrioti) che desiderano essere arruolati. Si concede loro un trattamento economico adeguato on-

e rimanere alle armi per almeno tre mesi dopo la liberazione di tutto il territorio ancora occupato. Gettito non prevedibile, ma certamente connesso al trattamento economico che sarà possibile stabilire;

d) - accelerare, nei limiti del possibile, la chiamata alle armi delle reclute classi 1924 (II° scaglione) - 1925 in Calabria - gettito incorporabile previsto (autorizzati da codesta M.M.I.A. 14.000 u.); 16.000

e) - chiamare alle armi, nel più breve tempo possibile, in un solo blocco o al massimo in tre, le reclute classi 1924 (II° scaglione) - 1925 in tutte le rimanenti regioni dell'Italia liberata (Sicilia - Campania - Abruzzi - Lazio - Umbria - Marche - Toscana) e reclute non incorporate in Puglia - Lucania e Molise; gettito incorporabile prevedibile circa: 107.000

f) - richiamo alle armi dei militari classi 1916 e più giovani in Sicilia, Umbria, Marche e Toscana; gettito incorporabile previsto 18.000

Totale..... 172.000

6°) - Nel caso gli arruolamenti volontari e la chiamata delle reclute cessero il gettito previsto è sufficiente per la sostituzione dei Militari da congedare o da inviare in licenza si potrebbe rinunciare al richiamo delle classi dal 1916 al 1923 (precedente n. 5 - lettera f).

Inoltre, qualora dopo liberata l'Italia Settentrionale si verificasse un'eccedenza di forza rispetto a quella autorizzata, si potrebbero collocare in congedo i militari delle classi 1916 e più giovani a cominciare dai più anziani, in rapporto all'età e alla categoria stessa.

7°) - Per l'attuazione degli anzidetti provvedimenti è indispensabile che codesta M.M.I.A. possa concedere case, vestiario, viveri, mezzi di trasporto ecc., per mettere comandi e reparti in condizioni di accogliere ed inquadrare i volontari, i richiamati e le reclute nonché per poter dare un primo addestramento a queste ultime.

8°) - Non mi nascondo le difficoltà da superare ma - data l'importanza dei problemi da risolvere - ritengo sia indispensabile affrontarle.

La tempestività dei provvedimenti è certamente elemento fon-

SUBJECT: Call-up situation

20

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. SD/71
March 45

TO	:	G.O.C.	ST
		2 1/2	ORD
		3 (S)	MED
		<u>Col. FIDLEY</u>	<u>REGE</u>

Att for your information is Call-up situation as at 1 March.

Lt. Col.
G. S.

1721

Copy to file SD/71/1 ←

SECRETCALLS - UP

DATES	DISTRICT & CLASSIFICATION	TARGET	OBTAINED	PERCENTAGE
1944				
5 Oct - 15 Oct	LAZIO - 1914-24 Classes	14,000	4,000	28.5
25 Oct - 7 Nov	CAMPANIA - 1914-24 Classes	10,000	3,740	37.4
27 Oct - 2 Nov	FOGGIANA - 1914-24 Classes	5,000	200	4.0
1 Dec - 15 Dec	ABRUZZI - 1914-24 Classes	6,000	2,000	33.3
15 Dec - 5 Jan	SICILY - 1922-24 Classes (Phase I)	3,000	To date 11,683	To date 83.4
6 Jan - to date	SICILY - 1914-21 Classes (Phase II)	6,000		
20 Jan - 31 Jan	LAZIO - 1914-24 (Exemptions)	5,000	To date 4,131	To date 82.6
20 Jan - 31 Jan	CAMPANIA - 1914-24 (Exemptions)	6,400	To date 4,639	To date 72.5
1 Feb - 14 Feb	SARDINIA - 1914-24 Classes (Phase I)	10,000	10,000	100.0
10 Feb - 25 Feb	APULIA - (1924(2) - 25 Classes (1919 - 25 Hebrew Classes)	20,000	To date 18,206	To date 91.0

FUTURE CALLS

15 Mar - 31 Mar	SARDINIA - 1924-25 Classes (Phase III)	6,000	1720
1 Apr - 15 Apr	SICILY - 1914-21 Classes (Phase III)	6,000	
1 Apr - 15 Apr	SARDINIA - 1914-24 Classes (Phase II)	10,000	

19

File

FROM: MMIA
TO : (FOR ACTION) MMIA LO SARDINIA

03 14/10 A

SD 2234

SECRET

12A

FOR FOSSETT (.) REFERENCE MMIA LETTER SD/53/1 DATED
18 JANUARY SUBJECT RECALL SARDINIA CLASSES (.) KEEP CONTACT
WITH CMS IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH 4, A, B, AND C (.)
SIGNED SIMMONS (.)

1719

F. L. Simmons

F. L. SIMMONS, Col

SD/71/1

F. L. S.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
SD/53/1
24 January 1945

My dear

- 1. Thank you for your helpful letter 300920/CA of 21 Jan. I am very pleased to note the steps you are taking to improve matters.
- 2. (a) As you say in your para 3, we fully realize the complementary measures required on the Allied side and we are doing our best to implement these.
- (b) To take your para 3 in detail:-

Para 3(a)

All Call-ups are now given 3 weeks notice and in future this will be increased. I understand that this period is adequate.

Para 3(b)

Transport, even for purely Allied needs, is always a problem. My Staff will do all they can to help you.

Para 3(c)

Here again, the Allied needs for accommodation render it difficult to fulfill Call-up requirements, particularly for so short a time. With the new Territorial Lay-out and our efforts to recover Italian Army property, I hope for an improvement.

Para 3(d)

This has already been discussed by my Staff with Gen. SANII.

The difficulties are that:-

- (1) bids for transportation have to be put in far ahead.
- (2) numbers have hitherto not reached expectation and the Allied Movement Branch in consequence have unstable figures to work on and are inclined to restrict transportation accordingly.

1718

17

1718

(a) As you say in your para 3, we fully realize the complementary measures required on the Allied side and we are doing our best to implement these.

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This has already been discussed by my Staff with Gen. SANLI.

The difficulties are that:-

(1) bids for transportation have to be put in far ahead.

(ii) numbers have hitherto not reached expectation and the Allied Movement Branch in consequence have unstable figures to work on and are inclined to restrict transportation accordingly.

However, we will do our best.

Para 3(e)

I agree. Both I and my Staff have continued to press for amelioration of conditions by the Districts concerned. Things are improving, despite difficulties, and all concerned are alive to the necessity for such improvement.

Yours

dB.

(Major General)

H.E. Count CASATI
Minister of War

GCC thru 2 i/c

Notes on att.

1. In reply para 3(a). Agree. All call-ups are now given three weeks notice and in future this will be increased.
2. Ref para 3(b). Tpt is always a sore subject and even with the Allies it is never sufficient. We will do our best especially as we are now getting more Italian Army tpt repaired.
3. Ref para 3(c). One cannot expect spacious premises to be made available, especially for a short time. Added to this, the numbers never come up to expectation.

Now that the Territorial Layout has been approved we are endeavoring to get back all Italian Barracks.

4. Ref para 3(d). Gen SANTI of WM had written a separate letter on this subject. As explained verbally to him.

(a) bids for moves have to be put in for in advance.

(b) nos do NOT reach expectation therefore MOV AFHQ does not treat Italian moves as seriously as it might. However we will watch their interests and do what we can to speed moves up.

5. Ref para 3(e). I thoroughly agree with WM complaint. CRVIETC is good but 3 Dist has NOT taken proper steps to deal with TRAMI and ABRAGOLA. AQ gave them the hammer three weeks ago, our SCME has been in contact with CE of 3 Dist, AFHQ has authorized improvements and I am visiting 3 Dist this week-end. We hope for some results and will leave no stone unturned until we get an improvement.

S.M.G.

3. Ref para 3(c). One cannot expect spacious premises to be made available, especially for a short time. Added to this, the numbers never come up to expectation.

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5. Ref para 3(e). I thoroughly agree with TM complaint. CRVITIC is good but 3 Dist has NOT taken proper steps to deal with TRANI and ABRACOLA. AQ gave them the hammer three weeks ago, our SCFE has been in contact with CE of 3 Dist, AFHQ has authorized improvements and I am visiting 3 Dist this week-end. We hope for some results and will leave no stone unturned until we get an improvement.

24 Jan 45

Lt Col
GS

Agreed
(K) 24 Jan -

TRANSLATION

From The Minister of War Ref 300920/CA
 To Maj Gen Browning Date 21 1 45

Dear General

I quite agree to the contents of your SD/53/1 dated 29 12 44 regarding the problem of the call-up and I have not replied earlier in order to be able to give you more complete information.

1. As regard exemptions the corresponding instrs have already been revised and the right to exemption limited (see letter 207740 dated 31 12 44 ~~and~~ No. 1).

I have most willingly taken into consideration the suggestions you gave me regarding the org of the call-ups.

In this respect the activities carried out by the Military Terr. Hqs of Lazio and Campania as well as the CC RR CHQ are summarized in the incl appx.

2. From a more general point of view and one of greater interest, I have already proposed to the cabinet, who have already approved part of them, a ~~series~~ series of measures - both economic and moral - tending to insure the fulfillment of military duties (incl No. 2)

3. I would call your attention however, to an aspect of the problem which I feel sure you have not missed i.e. to the fact that the call-ups could more successful if aided by complementary measures to be taken by the Allies.

In essence it would be necessary to :

(a) be allowed more time both to prepare and organize and to actually carry out the call-up operation. Too short a time does not allow for an accurate valuation of all the possible practical difficulties and consequently no preventive measures can be taken in good time.

For example, both in Lazio and in Campania it has been ~~impossible~~ possible to issue and affix the posters in time in all the townships (Provinces of Avellino and Benevento, internal zone of Lazio) owing to ~~weather~~ climatological conditions. It can be taken for a fact that the same difficulties will be encountered in order to get the recruits to the dists and in order to send them afterwards to the trg centres.

(b) ~~the~~ granting of means of transport which are at present are absolutely insufficient.

Naples Hq has an absolute ^{need} of 24 medium or heavy lorries, 7 m/cd and 2 cars yet at present all they can avail themselves of is 18 lorries.

(c) Grant of premises, some of them partly occupied by the Allies for example the Regina Margherita barracks in Rome.

(d) a faster drafting of the recruits to units from the camps where (as in Afragola) the recruits remain for long periods without clothing and under very difficult living conditions which obviously have a ~~depressing~~ depressing effect on their morale and on hygiene.

(e) better equipment of the camps also in order to eliminate that depressing effect on the morale of the personnel.

12/2/45
 D
 B

The File

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(b) ~~the granting of~~ means of transport which are at present are absolutely insufficient. ^{used}

Naples Hq has an absolute of 24 medium or heavy lorries, 7 m/cs and 2 cars yet at present all they can avail themselves of is 18 lorries.

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(e) better equipment of the camps also in order to eliminate that depressing effect on the morale of the personnel.

I feel sure, General, that my having put forward to you quite frankly the requirements of the Italian side will meet with your understanding.

I firmly believe that you, like me, will not wish to leave untried any channels that may tend to increase and improve morally and materially the success of the call-up to further the common interests and the fulfillment of duty.

I remain very sincerely yours,

/s/ A. CASATI

Il Ministro della Guerra

Roma, 21 gennaio 1945

A-300 920/c.11.

Caro Generale,

SD
211

condivido quanto è indicato nel suo foglio SD/53/1 del 29.12.44, circa il problema delle chiamate alle armi, al quale ho atteso a rispondere per poterLe dare maggiori dati.

1° - Per quanto riguarda gli esoneri sono state già rivedute le disposizioni relative, e limitati i titoli di diritto (foglio 207740 del 31 dicembre 44, allegato n° 1).

Ho tenuto ben volentieri conto dei suggerimenti che Ella mi ha dato circa l'organizzazione delle chiamate.

Ai fini di queste, l'attività svolta dai comandi militari territoriali del Lazio e della Campania, nonché del Comando Generale dell'Arma dei CC.NR., è sinteticamente riportata nell'appendice allegata. -

2° - In un ordine più generale e di più largo interesse, ho proposto in Consiglio dei Ministri, che già in parte li ha approvati, una serie di provvedimenti - di carattere economico e morale - assicurare l'adempiimento del dovere militare (allegato n° 2).

3° - Desidero, però, richiamare la sua attenzione su un aspetto della questione che non Le sarà, certamente, sfuggito: sul fatto, cioè, che un migliore successo delle chiamate potrebbe essere complementamente favorito da ulteriori provvedimenti della parte alleata.

Essenzialmente, occorrerebbe:

a) - tempi più larghi, sia in fase di preparazione ed organizzazione, sia in fase di attuazione, delle operazioni di chiamata. Tempi troppo ristretti non consentono un accurato vaglio di tutte le possibili difficoltà pratiche e, di conseguenza, la tempestiva predisposizione delle provvidenze necessarie.

Ad esempio, sia nel Lazio, sia in Campania, non è stata possibile la tempestiva distribuzione e l'affissione dei manifesti in ¹⁷⁷⁶ comuni (prov. di Avellino e Benevento; zona interna del Lazio) per le avverse condizioni climatiche. E' da ritenere per certo che le stesse difficoltà si incontreranno per l'affluenza dei richiamati ai distretti e per il successivo avviamento ai centri di addestramento;

b) - concessione di mezzi di trasporto, ora assolutamente insufficienti.

Comando di Napoli ha strettamente bisogno di 24 automezzi medi o pesanti, 7 motociclette, 2 autovetture, mentre può disporre solo di 18 autocarri;

c) - concessione di stabili, alcuni dei quali limitatamente sfruttati dagli alleati; ad es.: Caserma Regina Margherita in Roma.

d) - più pronto smistamento dei richiamati ai corpi di destinazione, dai campi, dove (come Afragola) i richiamati rimangono per lunghi periodi, in crisi di vestizione e in condizioni difficilissime di sistemazione, con ovvi riflessi negativi di ordine morale ed anche sa-

/...

nitario.

e) - migliorie nell'attrezzatura e nelle dotazioni dei campi, appunto allo scopo di eliminare ogni effetto deprimente sul morale del personale.

Sono sicuro, Sig. Generale, che l'averle esposto con franchezza le necessità della parte italiana sarà accolto da lei con comprensione.

Credo che anche lei, come me, non vorrà lasciare nulla di intentato di quanto può favorire la piena attuazione di ogni possibile provvedimento per rendere maggiormente redditizio, moralmente e materialmente, il rendimento delle chiamate, ai fini del comune interesse e dovere.

F. B. ...
Masah

RECEIVED
1951

COPY
SIGNAL

1/15/54
14

FROM: AFHQ
TO : MMIA

Ref: F87354

DATE TIME: 162035

SECRET

SUBJECT IS CLOTHING FOR BR-ITIS.

(F87354 ACTION TO MMIA SIGNED SACRED OTTE PHONE.)

OUR F83717 OF 12 AND YOUR LETTER AQ/15 OF 9 JAN REFER.

1. YOU ARE NOW RECEIVING 95,000 DARK GREEN HD. ORD (B) NOW INSTRUCTED TO HAND OVER TO YOU 25,000 DARK GREEN GREATCOATS. SPECIAL PROVISION ACTION BEING TAKEN TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO YOU QUANTITIES OTHER ITEMS LISTED UNDER COL (D) OF PARA 2 YOUR ABOVE QUOTED LETTER. ANTICIPATE THESE AVAILABLE NOT LATER THAN MID FEB.
2. YOU CAN THEREFORE PROCEED WITH CALL UP TO LIMIT OF BR-ITI ORDERING. THIS CANCELS PARA 1 OUR ABOVE QUOTED SIGNAL AND CONFIRMS TELEPHONE CONVERSATION OF 17.

1715

2/OS
Q/AE
GSD
PLOAT
Action with A/Q on AQ/15 of 9 Jan.

1717

24
8/64

STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO ORDINAMENTO E MOBILITAZIONE
- Sezione Mobilitazione -

SEGRETO

N° 11235 /Mob. di prot. — P.M.3800, li 17 gennaio 1945

OGGETTO : deflusso dei richiamati dai centri di reclutamento.



ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

R O M A

e, per conoscenza:

AL MINISTERO GUERRA - Gabinetto - Ufficio C.A. -
(rif.f°n°100197/I in data 5 corr.)

P.M.3800

Uno dei maggiori inconvenienti verificatisi nelle recenti operazioni di richiamo, é dovuto alla lunga sosta dei richiamati presso i centri di reclutamento e presso i campi di raccolta. Ciò provoca molte inadempienze di carattere disciplinare ed assenze arbitrarie.

Allo scopo di eliminare per quanto possibile tale inconveniente, si ravvisa l'opportunità che il deflusso dei richiamati per gli enti di destinazione avvenga il più rapidamente possibile.

Si rappresenta quanto sopra, per quelle disposizioni che codesta M.M.I.A. vorrà compiacersi di impartire ai dipendenti organi di trasporto specialmente in vista dei prossimi richiami.-



IL GENERALE ADDETTO
(Alessandro Santi)

A. Santi

(12A)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Calls-up to Italian Army.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(L.F.I.A.)

SD/53/1
18 JAN 45

TO : Chief of Staff,
HQ, A.C.

14
15th Air Division for
some information

Reference your 3630/COS of 15 Jan 45.

1. Attached please find schedule of projected calls-up.

J. M. England
Major General
L.F.I.A.
H. J. H.?

Copy to: D Ccs, CA Section

SD/50

See file 19

DA
20 Jan

128

Projected Calls - BY JAN/FEB/MAR

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Class</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Accommodation</u>
1	SICILY	1914-24	January	8,000	Direct to (a) Leon ordered for (b) CESANO for Combat
2	ROME & LAZIO	1914-24 (exemptions)	28 Jan - 31 Jan	5,000	1,000 ex VITERBO to CESANO for 4,000 ex rest of region to ASTER
3	CAMPANIA	1914-24 (exemptions)	20 Jan - 31 Jan	6,000	1,000 to ITI-ITI Units 5,000 to AFRACOLA
4	APULIA	1924/25	February	20,000	6,000 US-ITI to ASTRONI, w/E sal G.O.C. 212 Div in NAPLES for good 6,000 BR-ITI to ORVIETO covered will by then have moved to FOSSO 6,000 Combat to CESANO. Improve 2,000 ITI-ITI to ITI Barracks, F
5	SARDINIA	1914-24	February	10,000	3,000 US-ITI to ASTRONI 1,800 BR-ITI to AFRACOLA 1,200 BR-ITI to AREZZO (against 3,000 Combat to CESANO 1,000 ITI-ITI to PROSINONE
6	SARDINIA	1914-24	March	10,000	Allocation not yet made.
7	SARDINIA	1924-25	March	6,400	Allocation not yet made.
8	CALABRIA	1924-24	March	16,000	Allocation not yet made.

Projected Calls - up JAN/FEB/MAR

<u>Class</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Accommodation</u>
914-24	January	8,000	Direct to (a) Leon ordered for volunteer programs, 1st priority (b) CESANO for Combat, 2nd priority
914-24 (reptions)	20 Jan - 31 Jan	5,000	1,000 ex VITERBO to CESANO for combat. 4,000 ex rest of region to ASTRONI for PBS
914-24 (reptions)	20 Jan - 31 Jan	6,000	1,000 to ITI-ITI Units 5,000 to AFRAGCLA
924/25	February	20,000	6,000 US-ITI to ASTRONI, W/E making arrangement direct with G.O.C. 212 Div in NAPLES for good accommodation. 6,000 BR-ITI to CRIVICO covered accommodation. Volunteer Coys will by then have moved to FOSSOMBRONE. 6,000 Combat to CESANO. Improvements being made rapidly. 2,000 ITI-ITI to ITI Barracks, FROSINONE.
914-24	February	10,000	3,000 US-ITI to ASTRONI 1,800 BR-ITI to AFRAGCLA 1,200 BR-ITI to AREZZO (against volunteer programs) 3,000 Combat to CESANO 1,000 ITI-ITI to FROSINONE
914-24	March	10,000	Allocation not yet made.
924-25	March	6,400	Allocation not yet made.
924-24	March	16,000	Allocation not yet made.

ITI

CITI

SECRET

AFHQ Ltr, AG 091.711/051 GCT-0
 dtd 14 January 1945 (Cont'd)

5. Reinforcements for Combat Groups are also shown at a higher figure than there are immediate prospects of clothing and equipping but it will be noted that the present large deficiency in Combat Troops could be greatly reduced, and possibly eliminated, by further sacrifice of Service Troops.

6. It is likely that the three months under review will be the worst of the year, and that later the wastage will decrease with the coming of fine weather.

7. The future policy regarding BR-ITI troops is under review, but you are requested to forward comments on the figures shown, as soon as possible.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

Jack Carter
 JACK CARTER,
 Captain, AGD,
 Asst Adjutant General.

1 Incl
 Appendix "A"

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Addressee
- 5 - CG 15th Army Group
- 1 - DMT
- 3 - G-1 (B)
- 5 - G-3 Org-Foreign
- 1 - G-3 Org B
- 2 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - Q(Maint)
- 1 - Q(AE)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - Engr (B)
- 1 - Sig (B)
- 1 - DST
- 1 - Surg (B)
- 1 - Ord (B)
- 1 - REME
- 1 - DPM (B)
- 2 - D Lab
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M & D

SECRET

118

STATEMENT OF ITALIAN ARMY PERSONNEL AT 12 JAN 45, for JAN, 1945

Sub-Category	IR - ITIs			EXISTING UNITS					NEW UNITS	
	Coiling	Auth. Strength	Actual Strength	Monthly Last-are	Current Deficiency	Deficiency end Jan	Deficiency end Feb	Deficiency end Mar	25% in Feb	*25% in Mar
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)
SERVICE Tps										
5th Army (Brct Inc)			(13,174)	1,350						
8th Army			(10,979)	1,100						
1 District			(13,145)	1,300						
3 District			(17,345)	1,000						
Existing Pack Coys			()	700						
New Pack Coys			()	1,000						
New Trg. Centre	93,000	64,136	()	100	9,106	15,736	22,266	28,536		
Reinforcements	4,550	4,650	()		1,650	1,650	3,300	4,650		
TOTAL-Service Tps	97,550	68,786	54,950	8,550	13,836	20,386	29,936	33,186	3,500	7,000
									26,936	33,186
									30,436	40,186

* Add for balance of Combat Rfts, Not within Combat ceiling

Private deal

COMBAT Tps										
COMBAT GROUPS	45,000	45,000	43,000	4,000	4,000	6,000	10,000	14,000		
AUXILIARY UNITS	3,000	5,441	3,534	500	1,907	2,427	2,907	3,407		
COMBAT Rfts	9,000	6,519			6,519	6,519	6,519	6,519		
TOTAL-Combat Tps	57,000	57,000	46,534	4,500	12,466	14,926	19,426	23,926		

SOURCE	Members	Cumulative Total
(1)	(m)	(n)
IRI		
BRIGATA	2,000	
MILIA-LUCIFIA	6,000	20,400

SECRET

10

12 1900 A

FROM ABHQ signed SAC CITE FHGCT
TO MMIA

FX 83717

SECRET

(12 30000)

5

Italian call ups are reference (*) ONE (*) Total availability
of clothing January and February will be 17000 sets on basis of 6000
per month for BR-ITIS and 2500 per month for US-ITIS (*) TWO (*)
Recommend that full programme Appx "A" your SD/53/1 of 27 Dec be put into
operation (*) This will allow for selection of fit men and rejection
of those not considered suitable (*) THREE (*) Letter follows
showing overall manpower state for January/February/March (*) FOUR
(*) Reference your cable SD1948 of 17 1200A (December) Understood your
firm estimate of availability from SARDINIA call-up will not exceed
6000 per month (*) Shipping is available and you are requested to
proceed (*) FIVE (*) Emphasised that final figures for enlistments
should not exceed 17000 in period January/February to any large extent
(*) Rigorous standards should be maintained to ensure the intake of
fit men only

SD Distn
SD/53/1
AQ
Q(AE)
Mov
SD/50
Float

5/2
A/C

R/M

See also 14
211A

1709

SECRET

SECRET

410 Land Forces
171900C/1866
January, 1945

SD

L R K B
FRM AFHQ
ACTION MIA

14/1

N55/14

83717

ITALIAN CALL DASH UPS ARE REFERENCE X ONE X TOTAL AVAILABILITY OF CLOTHING JANUARY
 AND FEBRUARY WILL BE ONE SEVEN ~~ONE~~ ZERO ZERO ZERO SETS ON BASIS OF SIX ~~ONE~~ ZERO ZERO
 ZERO PER MONTH FOR BR DASH ITIS AND TWO ~~ONE~~ FIVE ZERO ZERO PER MONTH FOR US DASH ITIS X
 SIGNED SAC CITE FRGCT X TWO X RECOMMEND THAT FULL PROGRAMME APPENDIX ABIE YOUR SUGAR
 DOG SLANT FIVE THREE SLANT ONE OF TWO SEVEN DECEMBER BE PUT INTO OPERATION X THIS WILL
 ALLOW FOR SELECTION OF FIT MEN AND REJECTION OF THOSE NOT CONSIDERED SUITABLE X THREE X
 LETTER FOLLOWS SHOWING OVERALL MANPOWER STATE FOR JANUARY DASH FEBRUARY DASH MARCH X
 FOUR X REFERENCE/CABLE SUGAR DOG ONE NINE FOUR EIGHT OF ONE SEVEN ONE TWO ZERO ZERO
 ABIE PAREN DECEMBER PAREN UNDERSTOOD/FIRM ESTIMATE OF AVAILABILITY FROM SARDINIA CALL
 DASH UP WILL NOT EXCEED SIX ~~ONE~~ ZERO ZERO ZERO PER MONTH X SHIPPING IS AVAILABLE AND
 YOU ARE REQUESTED TO PROCEED X FIVE X EMPHASIZED THAT FINAL FIGURES FOR ENLISTMENTS
 SHOULD NOT EXCEED ONE SEVEN ~~ONE~~ ZERO ZERO ZERO IN PERIOD JANUARY DASH FEBRUARY TO ANY
 LARGE EXTENT X RIGOROUS STANDARDS SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO ENSURE THE INTAKE OF FIT
 MEN ONLY

HEADQUARTERS
 14 JAN 1945
 A C.

1708

SECRET

PRIORITY

G-3 (Org) Foreign DMR/mac

G-1(A), G-1(B), G-3,
 G-4(A), G-4(B), G-4(M&Tn)
 Q(AB), Qrd(B), Q(Maint),

DANIEL NOCE,
 Major General, GSC.,

199

SM/53/1

31 15/5

MBIA

APHA

15 ARMY GROUP

1 DISTRICT

AQ 2483

RESTRICTED

DESIGNS CALL UP TO TAKE PLACE IN MARCHE AND UMBRIA AREA STARTING 20 JAN (*)
 REQUEST YOU CONFIRM INSTANT THAT ITALIANS ON BARRACKS AT FOLLOWING DIST
 HQ ARE AVAILABLE (*) THEY WILL RECEIVE APPROX ONE THOUSAND MEN EACH WEF
 THAT DATE (*) ORVITO CIA PERUGIA CIA SPOLTO CIA MACERATA CIA ASSISI
 VIGANO (*) ROMA LETTER APPROVING IMPLEMENTATION DATE HQS WITH APPE
 APPROVAL IS HQS 23/6/12 OF 26 1950 (*) IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION DATE
 MUST BE 23/6/12

27158


AFfiled say " Hold your orders

- of Point " 2/1/44 B.

Internal to
Tel Col Meschiers.

Quayser - Col Quince } 31/12
 A1 - Col Sheldon } report

1707


 2 JAN 1945

IMMEDIATE

@ 41

[Handwritten signature]

PERSONAL

SUBJECT: Call-up of Classes

file

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.A.I.A.)

SD/55/1
Dec 24

see for Dec 15

Dear

R/S

- 1. I write to you on a matter about which I am very much disturbed.
- 2. As you know, the availability figures from recent Call-ups have been extremely disappointing and, as previously pointed out, the Allied programme is being seriously prejudiced.

Hereunder are some figures:-

District	Target	Available
ROME & LAZIO	14,000	3,700
ABRUZZI	6,000	2,000
SICILY (Phase 1)	8,000	1,600

27000

- 3. I attach as an Appendix some points in connection with the Call-up itself which were produced as a result of previous experience and which are intended to be helpful. I realise of course that sometimes short notice is given and also that the large amount of tpt you require is not forthcoming, but I do feel that the whole Call-up system from your point of view needs radical re-organisation and much more "punch".
- 4. In addition to the "local" publicity mentioned as item 4 in the Appendix I feel that you should consider publicity on a "national" basis. Possibly the new territorial lay-out organisation authorised recently under ref TS/G/12 will help you to "spread the gospel". It is clear, unfortunately, from the results achieved, that there are still a large number of Italians who are not "pulling their weight" with the Allies and who are either deliberately or indifferently evading their responsibilities. As such, publicity is needed to make them realise their duty.
- 5. The most important factor, as I see it, in the immediate future, is for you to alter your very lenient exemption laws. With that end in view I wrote to you on 21 Nov under ref SD/39 and sent a reminder on 15 Dec and I must now insist that very drastic and urgent action be taken. You will see from the figures in para 2 above that at the present time we are not even maintaining the wastage of the army, let alone contributing to the Allied programme.

A further factor in welfare, coupled with your new newspaper pro-

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		2700

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6. A further factor is welfare, coupled with your new newspaper project, and of course there are several other contributing suggestions.
7. You are working very hard on producing a scheme for training and passing on reinforcements, but this will be of no avail unless we get the reinforcements. These we must have. The men are there, plenty of them; many lounging about doing nothing and the subject of comment by all and sundry. I cannot tell AFHQ that I cannot get men when they can see manpower all round them. I therefore must request that you take a very strong line with General BARNARDI and your Staff, and General ORLANDO and the CC RR, so that evasion or inefficient arrangements are not tolerated and so that we get the men.

- 2 -

7. I shall be seeing you at 1630 hours on Saturday 30 Dec about this and other matters. Meanwhile, my dear Minister, I send you this for reflection. The Italian Army, you will agree, must continue to add to the reputation it has been creating progressively since the Armistice and must not fall down on a mere matter of manpower.

Yours

d.B.

(Major General)

E.F. Count CASATI
Minister for War

27/15

52/1
 APPENDIX to MMTA letter
 SD/52/1 of Dec 14

NOTES ON CALL-UP CRG

1. A concrete over-all plan should be worked out by War Ministry in conjunction with C.C. of the Call-up Region in question.
2. A detailed plan of collecting points for personnel should be worked out by C.C. of the Call-up Region in conjunction with C.C. of each Centre, the Military Dist HQ and C.C. local CG Ek. This should include:-
 - (a) Calling up notices well in advance.
 - (b) Tpt to be used to maximum extent to collect personnel i.e. visit furthestmost villages first. It may not be practical to adhere rigidly to local provincial and/or military boundaries.
 - (c) If tpt is not sufficient (and it never is), tpt should be borrowed from local units (i.e. SARMUDA and D' AOSTA Divs if in SICILY) and either borrowed from civilians for the short period of the call-up or requisitioned.
 - (d) Tpt should only be used for collecting personnel and not for other unauthorized purposes. This calls for strict discipline on the part of the Sub-Centres.
 - (e) Method of notifying personnel in advance when tpt will arrive at a particular locality. See that the tpt is as punctual as possible.
 - (f) Send tpt a second time i.e., later in the Call-up period, but only if time and tpt permit. Reinforcements should not rely on this.
 - (g) See that all adm arrangements are in working order i.e., rations properly distributed and accounted for, blankets, mess equip etc issued in accordance with instructions received from higher authority.
3. CC RR should be strong and determined and should be made to feel part of the Call-up organization. CC RR should immediately commence the apprehension of those who did NOT present themselves on the first day as this will have a good moral effect on the later days of the Call-up.
4. Propaganda for the Call-up should be spread through:-
 - (a) Political Parties
 - (b) Church
 - (c) CC RR

2705

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- (f) Send tpt a second time i.e., later in the Call-up period, but only if time and tpt permit. Reinforcements should not rely on this.
- (g) See that all adm arrangements are in working order i.e., rations properly distributed and accounted for, blankets, mess equip etc issued in accordance with instructions received from higher authority.
3. CG HR should be strong and determined and should be made to feel part of the Call-up organization. CG HR should immediately commence the apprehension of those who did NOT present themselves on the first day as this will have a good moral effect on the later days of the Call-up.
4. Propaganda for the Call-up should be spread through:-
- (a) Political Parties
 - (b) Church
 - (c) CG HR
 - (d) Military Channels.
5. C.C. Call-up Region and/or his senior Staff Offrs should personally visit outlying districts to see that orders are being properly executed.
6. C.C. Call-up Region, the Call-up increment staff, and the entire organization should be impressed with the importance of enrolling the agreed upon number of personnel and they, themselves, should be made to feel that they are not doing a good job if they fail to produce the target number.

2705

2/35

- 2 -

7. A visit from a senior offr of Ministry of War should be made at least once during a Call-up period to give encouragement to the team and to urge to greater efforts if the results, up to the time of the visit, appear to fall short on requirements.

2/10/52

File 6

MEMO

29 1630

AFHQ

R¹⁰₁₂

SD 2080

CONFIDENTIAL

Request you alter footnote at Appx "A" to letter SD/83/1 of 27 Dec as follows (.) for 20000 by 31 Jan read 20000 by 28 Feb and for 10,000 by 31 Mar read 10,000 more by 31 Mar

2701

SD/80 (2)

M. J. England
J. C. C.

CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Call-up Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
 (M.M.I.A.)
 File No. SD/55/1 —
 27 Dec 44

TO : A/AG

*5/2
6/2 R²*

Further to my signal SD 1948 of 17 Dec copy of which is attd for easy reference.

1. The method of maintaining the Italian Army in strength has not been good lately and the Minister for War is personally examining alterations in the exemption laws with the object of fulfilling Allied demands.
2. Attd at Appx "A" is a chart showing Italian Army Call-up situation. Recently the limiting factor has been the lack of equipment. It is however understood that sufficient equipment is available to equip 10,000 per month for the next four or five months.
3. The last column on the chart shows a recommendation for calling up the latter half of the 1924 class and the 1925 class complete, the figures of which are the difference between actual receipts or anticipated receipts and the monthly figure of 10,000 personnel.
4. Will you please say if you agree when I will take strong measures with the Ministry of War to see that the figures are adhered to.
5. Will you please notify me when the equipment situation is likely to improve so that steps may be taken to increase the manpower to the authorized ceilings.

270.3

270.3

see folio 10

L. Brown

Major General
 M. M. I. A.

Copy to: A/AG

(5/1)

APPENDIX "A" to MMIA letter
SD/ES/1 of 27 Dec 44

ITALIAN PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

Month	Target	Received	Anticipated	Proposed call-up of 1924/25 Class
<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/>				
1944				
Nov	6000 ex ABRUZZI	2000		8000
Dec	8000 ex SICILY	1500		8500
1945				
Jan	12000 ex SICILY		8000	2000
Feb	10000 ex SARDINIA		6000	4000
Mar	10000 ex SARDINIA		6000	4000
				<hr style="width: 100px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: 0;"/>
				26,500

say 20,000 by 31 Jan 1945

say 10,000 by 31 Mar

2702

COPY

FROM: MMIA

TO : AFHQ

171200A

SD 1948

SECRET

MMIA recommends recall to the colours of 1914
to 1924 classes ex SARDINIA as follows (.)
10,000 in early Feb (.) 10,000 in early March (.)
Do you agree and can movement be arranged

A2
Mov (2)
SD/BO (2)

WB

2701

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT:- Calling up of Classes

Land Forces Sub Com A.C.
(MMIA)
SH/SS/1

17 Dec 44

R17
12

Ministry of War

Copy to:- AQ MMIA

Will you please recommend a plan, based on the present call-up system, for a call-up of the latter half of 1924 class and the whole of the 1925 class. It is not proposed at this stage to demobilise any of the older classes at present with the colours.

ABC

[Handwritten signature] SH-cl

Major General
MMIA

2769

3
File
SECRET

LAND FORCES SUPPLY, A.C.
(U.S.I.A.) SD/57/1) 等
13 Dec 44

SUBJECT: Future call-ups.

TO : Ministry of War.

1. Following are some suggestions, based upon observation of previous call-ups, which are passed to you for your consideration as a basis to improve the operation of future call-ups:

A. A detailed plan of "collecting points for personnel" should be prepared by each Military District HQ and an exact time table determined for each "collecting point" considerably in advance of the actual starting day of the call-up period. The CC, MR, in charge of the station at the collecting point should receive, a considerable number of days in advance, notice of the day on which trucks will arrive for the inmates, specifying the name of the towns that are to report to that collecting point. This will give the CC, MR, sufficient time to advise the men called up that they are to report on a particular day. In this manner, the entire district could be well covered even though the transportation facilities be rather scarce. Such a system should start at the very beginning of the call-up period so as to allow sufficient time for an eventually necessary second or even third trip to large collecting points.

B. The Military District HQ Commanders should be informed that they are empowered to requisition, if necessary, civilian trucks for the duration of the call-up periods and that they are empowered to contract with private truck owners of some of the more distant towns for the transportation of inmates to their HQs.

C. The Commanding General of the CC, MR, should require all stations, from the smallest to the largest, to exert their individual and collective efforts in assuring that those men who are to be called up are informed, and that their movements be somewhat controlled. The CC, MR, should spread active propaganda in favor of the call-up and arrest anyone inciting the men not to present themselves. Also make necessary arrests of the men who do not respond to the call in sufficient time to save the others and

1694

1. Following are some suggestions, based upon observation of previous call-ups, which are passed to you for your consideration as a basis to improve the operation of future call-ups:
 - A. A detailed plan of "collecting points for personnel" should be prepared by each Military Dist HQ and an exact time table determined for each "collecting point" considerably in advance of the actual starting day of the call-up period. The CC.RR, in charge of the station at the collecting point should receive, a considerable number of days in advance, notice of the day on which trucks will arrive for the inductees, specifying the name of the towns that are to report to that collecting point. This will give the CC.RR, sufficient time to advise the men called up that they are to report on a particular day. In this manner, the entire district could be well covered even though the transportation facilities be rather scarce. Such a system should start at the very beginning of the call-up period so as to allow sufficient time for an eventually necessary second or even third trip to large collecting points.
 - B. The Military District HQ Commanders should be informed that they are empowered to requisition, if necessary, civilian trucks for the duration of the call-up periods and that they are empowered to contract with private truck owners of some of the more distant towns for the transportation of inductees to their HQs.
 - C. The Commanding General of the CC.RR, should require all stations, from the smallest to the largest, to exert their individual and collective efforts in assuring that those men who are to be called up are informed, and that their movements be somewhat controlled. The CC.RR, should spread active propaganda in favor of the call-up and arrest anyone inciting the men not to present themselves. Also make necessary arrests of the men who do not respond to the call in sufficient time to warn the others and thereby cause them to report before the end of the call-up period. In all instances the CC.RR, should display determination and strength.

1698

.. 2 ..

D. It would be helpful if wider publicity be given the call-ups and all political parties cooperate to induce the men to report. Perhaps the party leaders in the Government could themselves issue a statement to their subordinate political headquarters.

E. You should ensure that proper distribution is made of the rations and clothing sent to the call-up area.

2. The above suggestions will, it is hoped, with your further implementation make for increased efficiency of future call-ups.

S.M.F. Jr. Col

Major General
M. M. I. A.

Copy to: War Diary (2)

SUBJECT: Recommendation for future Italian
Call-Ups based on Abruzzi experience.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION
M. M. I. A. (A.C.)
R O M E
9 December 1944

TO : Colonel Kerr and G-2.

1. The Military District Headquarters are not located in the geographic center of the military district. Using the military district of Teramo as an example, it is found that its jurisdiction extends to localities that are as much as 80 kilometers from Teramo, but only 10 or 15 kms from Sulmona or Chieti, two other Military District Hqs. This means making extremely bad use of the means of transportation at hand, which are quite meager and should be utilized on an equitable basis. It is noticed that similar situations arise in Sicily to even greater proportions in the cases of the Palermo and Messina Districts which will be obliged to go almost into the cities of Crive and Caltanissette to move the inductees, although the latter two are also Military District Hqs.

2. A detailed plan of "collecting points" should be prepared by each Military District Hdqrs and an exact time table determined for each "collecting point" considerably in advance of the actual starting day of the call-up period. The Carabinieri in charge of the station at the collecting point will receive, a considerable number of days in advance, notice of the day on which trucks will arrive for the inductees, specifying the name of the towns that are to report to that collecting point. This will give him and his men sufficient time to advise the men called up that they are to report on a particular day. In this manner the entire district will be well covered even though the transportation facilities are considerably scarce. Such a system should start at the very beginning of the call-up period so as to allow sufficient time for an eventually necessary second and third trip to large collecting points.

3. The Military District Headquarters Commanders should be informed that they are empowered to requisition, if necessary, civilian trucks for the duration of the call-up periods to perform garrison duties, and that they are empowered to contract with private truck owners of some of the more distant towns for the transportation of inductees to their headquarters. 1607

4. The Commanding General of all the Carabinieri should request all stations, from the smallest to the biggest, to exert their individual and collective efforts in assuring that those who are called up are informed, that their movements be some-

what controlled and that they spread active propaganda in favor of this call-up and arrest anyone inciting the men not to present themselves. Eventually make necessary arrests of the men who do not respond to the call in sufficient time to throw a scare into the others and cause them to report before the end of the call-up period. In all instances show determination and strength.

5. It would be helpful if active propaganda could officially be made by the political parties, from the highest level possible, namely the party leaders in the Government. The leaders of the smaller localities require leadership and guidance as attested to by the following excerpt of a letter obtained from a comment sheet prepared by the Civil Censorship Officer (American) in charge of the Aquila Station, whom I contacted to get information reference the local opinion: "Please tell me what conduct I must observe with regard to the call to arms. All the party representatives and I have been requested by the Colonel commanding the Military District to display an active and convincing propaganda among the youngsters recalled to arms. Therefore, it is necessary that we should have a line of conduct that should be even and uniform according to the suggestions given by the Party's direction. Therefore, we await rather anxiously your instruction on the subject." The above excerpt was taken from a letter written by the Republican Party representative in Sulmona to his chief in Aquila. Other excerpts concerning the same subject can be obtained from the Civil Censorship Group in Rome.

6. The Church can also be requested to conduct an active propaganda with respect to "call-up" question, requesting the youth to obey their Government.

HENRY J. PACINI, Capt. 1696
M.M.I.A. Liaison Officer

Notes for Lt. Col. HOWARD *with* SICILY
on SICILY Call-up.

SD/49
 13 Dec 44

1. Have the ITIS really got a plan?

Suggest this include :-

- (a) Notices well in advance.
- (b) tpt used to max to call in personnel (Min of War state 32 vehicles available). If tpt not sufficient, then borrow from local units for short time and/or requisition locally.
- (c) Method of notifying personnel in advance when tpt will arrive at any locality.
- (d) Send tpt a second time - i.e. later in month if time and tpt permit.
- (e) Tpt must only be used for conveying personnel and NOT for other unauthorised purposes.
- (f) CC.NR. must be strong and determined.

2. Please visit some of the outlying stations and see that what the Italian HQ says is being done is, in fact, being carried out.

3. Call-up was put fwd to before Christmas at Gen BARIOTTI's special request - so I look to him to get the whole 2,000 promised by 24 Dec.

4. Propoganda for call-up to be spread through

- (a) political parties
- (b) church
- (c) CC.NR.
- (d) military channels.

1695

5. Sufficient rations have been sent to SICILY. Have these been properly distributed to all centres?

6. Sufficient blankets and mess equip have been sent to SICILY. Mess equipment accompanies all personnel but blankets do NOT *leave the camp.*

7. ITIS to make temp allocation of dists to facilitate collection of personnel.

8. Rail movement has been bid for as under

2,000 19 Dec
 4,100 22 Dec
 1,900 25 Dec

- 2 -

8. (CLINT)

Please see that trains are definitely filled but inform W.M.I.A. in advance if this NOT possible.

9. W.M.I.A. to be notified of figures by Maj. LONG, WMA IA SICILY well in advance.

10. Plan should be made now for Jan call-up in SICILY. Has this been made and is it satisfactory?

11. In what other ways could W.M.I.A. assist?



Lt. Col.
CS

16y

