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10000|120|5291 G/3 POST TREATY - POST WAR - ITI Army

Sept. 1944 - Dec. 1946

Telephone
Rome 489031 Ext 218

LAND FORCES SUB COM AC (MMLA) CMF

C/5

20 Dec 46

MINISTRY OF WAR

File

Subject:- Parachutists in Relation to the Draft Peace Treaty

1. As a result of a verbal agreement between CMF and LFSC and with the agreement of, AFSC, AC., you were permitted to form a small Experimental Parachutist Training Unit, copies of the War Establishment of which, have been forwarded to this HQ.

Land Forces Sub Commission is only responsible for the fulfilment of the Armistice Terms and its powers of approving the composition of the ITALIAN Army only extend to the Interim Army and will conclude with the Ratification of the Peace Treaty.

After the Peace Treaty is signed the supervision of the Peace Treaty will be in the hand of a body to be set up by the Four Powers under Article 75.

2. Article 52 of the Draft Peace Treaty limits the Post Treaty Army as follows :-

> "Organisation, armament and deployment throughout ITALY to be designed to meet only tasks of internal character, local defence, and anti-aircraft defence"

3. I think therefore that you should clearly understand that although LFSC has approved your inclusion of a Parachutist Training Unit in the Interim Army, you may have to justify the retention of such a unit in the Post Peace Treaty Army, to the supervising body.

NORMAN S. FISKE.
Colonel.
Deputy Commander.

MMH/ell

Copy to : Air Forces Sub Commission, AC.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Shared

(7)

8930

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

FILE : G-3 AFHQ/131/1

4 December 1946

SUBJECT : Provisions of the Draft Peace Treaty Affecting the Italian Armed Forces

TO : See Distribution

1. The draft Peace Treaty with ITALY, agreed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in PARIS on 13 July 1946, imposes certain restrictions on the ITALIAN armed forces.

2. While these restrictions are not final they do affect every day dealings with the ITALIAN Armed Forces and planning for their future.

3. A summary of those provisions of interest is attached at Appendix 'A' for your information.

4. In this summary are interpolated notes on AFHQ interpretation, interim policy etc.

for K. E. [illegible]
Brigadier GS
AG of S, G-3

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3. A summary of those provisions of interest is attached at Appendix 'A' for your information.

4. In this summary are interpolated notes on their interpretation, interim policy etc.

for [illegible] LTCol
E. C. [illegible]
Brigadier GS
AG of S, G-3

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APPENDIX 'A'.

DRAFT PEACE TREATY PROVISIONS AND THEIR EFFECT UPON THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

Part IV. NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR CLAUSES

Section I. DURATION

Article 39:

Until modified by agreement between Allied and Associated Powers and ITALY or after ITALY becomes a member of the UNITED NATIONS:

NOTE: It is assumed that a UNO control committee will be established to enforce the Peace Treaty terms, but note that these provisions are void immediately ITALY is accepted as a member nation of UNO.

Section II. GENERAL LIMITATIONS

Article 40:

Demilitarisation of the FRANCO-ITALIAN frontier.

Article 41:

Demilitarization of the ITALO-JUGOSLAV frontier.

NOTE: While permanent fortifications cannot be erected within a certain distance non-permanent accommodations and installations designed to meet requirements of an internal defense and local defense of the frontiers is permitted. Thus there is no bar to the occupation of the agreed ITALO-JUGOSLAV boundary by the Italian Army.

Article 42:

Demilitarisation of PANTELLERIA, the PELAGIAN ISLANDS (LAMPEDUSA, LAMPIONE and LINOSA) and PIANOSA (in the ADRIATIC).

NOTE: Pantelleria, Lampedusa and Linosa were ordered demilitarized by CCS as a condition to their re-

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Article 42:

Demilitarization of PANTELLERIA, the PELAGIAN ISLANDS (LAMPEDUSA, LAMPIONE and LINOSA) and PIANOSA (in the ADRIATIC).

NOTE: Pantelleria, Lempedusa and Linosa were ordered demilitarized by SCS as a condition to their return to ITALIAN sovereignty. This demilitarisation is currently being effected under supervision of the "Demilitarization Committee" - See G-S AFHQ/131/2 29 July 1946 "Demilitarization of the Fortress Islands".

Article 43:

Demilitarization of SICILY and SARDINIA:

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(Article 43 continued)

Complete in Sardinia within 50 Km of French territorial waters. Remainder of Sardinia and all of Sicily certain specified types of installations to be removed and no expansion permitted. Normal maintenance in these areas is authorized.

NOTE: The French have on several occasions requested SAC to effect demilitarization of Sardinia as was being done in Pantelleria etc. AFHQ policy is that Pantelleria etc were being demilitarized as directed by CCS as condition for their hand back to the Italians. No such directive received as regards Sardinia. It should be noted that, had AFHQ complied with French request, a much greater degree of demilitarization would have been effected than is provided for by the Treaty. See G-5 AFHQ 810.11-3, 15 Sept 46, "Demilitarization of Italian Government Territory".

NOTE: All demilitarization directed to be completed within one year of coming into force of the Treaty.

Article 44:

ITALY not to possess, construct or experiment with:

GUIDED MISSILES

GUNS with range over 30 Km.

Sea mines of non-contact types.

Torpedoes capable of being manned.

Article 45:

Acquisition or manufacture of war material of GERMAN or JAPANESE origin

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Article 44:

ITALY not to possess, construct or experiment with:

GUIDED MISSILES

Guns with range over 30 km.

Sea mines of non-contact types.

Torpedoes capable of being manned.

Article 45:

Acquisition or manufacture of war material of GERMAN or JAPANESE origin or design either from inside or outside ITALY is prohibited.

NOTE: One of German origin has not been permitted to be turned over to the Italians. See AFHQ AGO 8640 643, 1945. However, undoubtedly some one of Italian origin is of German design.

Article 46:

Manufacture or possession, publicly or privately, of war material different

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(Article 46 continued)

in type from, or exceeding in quantity that required by forces permitted in sections III, IV and V is prohibited.

NOTE: It is a known fact that there are large quantities of various types of war material in the hands of dissident elements in ITALY. It is easy for the Treaty to direct that these will not be held, but it seems beyond the Italian government's power to round them up, even though it is to their own best interests.

Section III. LIMITATIONS TO BE IMPOSED ON THE ITALIAN NAVY

Article 47:

Present Italian Navy to be reduced to:

2 - BATTLESHIPS

4 - CRUISERS

4 - FLEET DESTROYERS

16 - TORPEDO BOATS

20 - CORVETTES and

such number of minor war and auxiliary vessels as can be manned and maintained in full commission by a maximum of 25000 officers and men.

Vessels to be retained shall be those named.

Article 48:

Instructions for disposal of excess ships, stores and armaments.

NOTE: As these instructions provide for the turnover of excess war vessels to various members of the UNITED NATIONS it is possible that some effort may be made to scuttle them by their crews.

Article 49:

Instructions for disposal of submarines and non-operational ships.

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Article 49:

Instructions for disposal of submarines and non-operational ships.

Article 50:

Restrictions on construction acquisition employment or experimentation of ships, etc.

NO BATTLESHIPS

NO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SUBMARINES MTB or specialised assault craft. Total standard displacement of the war vessels other than battleships shall not exceed 67,500 tons.

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(Article 10 continued)

No new war vessels before 1 Jan 1950 except to replace any ship accidentally lost.

Terms defined.

Article 11:

Personnel limited to 22,500 all ranks excluding any naval air personnel. Additional for airstrip/ing 4500 for period to be established. Reduction from present strength dated from coming into force of treaty:

to 27,500 within 6 months

to 22,500 " 9 "

No naval training to any personnel other than shore and naval air personnel authorized under Article 16.

Section IV. LIMITATIONS I [illegible] OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

Article 12:

Italian army, including frontier guards, of 185,000 enlisted and overhead and 65,000 carabinieri, either of which may be varied by 10,000 as long as total does not exceed 200,000. Organization, armament and deployment throughout Italy to be designed to meet only tasks of [illegible] internal character, local defense and anti-aircraft defense. No more than 200 tanks, medium and heavy.

Note: Current ceilings as authorized by CCS:

Army 185,000

CARAB 65,000

GOI has authorized a temporarily lowered ceiling for the army of 157,000 and actual strength is about 158,400 (as 01 August). Organization of the Army as now constituted:

6 inf divs (1 a Cavalry)

10 independent territorial units

3 territorial security regiments

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To avoid training to any personnel other than army and naval air personnel authorized under article 84.

Section IV. [illegible]

Article 82:

Italian Army, including frontier Guards, of 185,000 enlisted and overhead and 65,000 Carabinieri, either of which may be varied by 10,000 as long as total does not exceed 200,000. Organization, armament and deployment thereafter shall be designed to meet only tasks of internal character, local defense and anti-aircraft defense. No more than 200 bombs, medium and heavy.

NOTE: Current ceilings as authorized by CCC:

Army 185,000

CCRB 70,000

CCC has authorized a temporarily lowered ceiling for the army of 185,000 and actual strength is about 182,000 (at 21 August). Organization of the army as now constituted:

6 infantry (1 armored)

10 territorial infantry units

3 mountain infantry brigades

NOTE: Any interpretation of the police agency situation (other than CCRB, which is considered part of the Army) to mean the ceiling of the CCRB does not apply and it is the Italian government's decision how they shall be armed.

Article 83:

Excess of Italian Army to be disbanded within 3 months of coming into force of present treaty.

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Article 54:

No other personnel to receive any form of military training as defined.

Section V. LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

Article 55:

Italian Air Force, including any Naval Air arm, limited to:

200 fighter and reconnaissance types

150 transport, air sea rescue, training _____

(school type) and liaison types

350 total which includes reserves

Only fighter and reconnaissance types to be armed.

Organization, armament and redeployment throughout ITALY to be designed to meet only tasks of internal character, local defense of ITALIAN frontiers and defense against enemy air attack.

No aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities.

NOTE: No indication of any plan to establish an air NAVAL arm under this authority.

NOTE: Organization of IAF as approved by SCAC. Jan 297.

4 interceptor sqns

2 Fighter/Bomber Sqns

1 Rec/Recce Sqn

plus necessary supporting and overhead Sqns.

Article 56:

Personnel, including any naval air personnel, limited to 25,000 effectives, including combat, service and overhead. No other personnel to receive any form of military air training as defined.

NOTE: Presently authorized strength 31,000.

Actual strength as of 1 August 1948, 28,855.

Article 57:

Forces to be disbanded within 6 months of coming into force of Peace

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Only fighter and reconnaissance types to be armed.

Organization, armament and redeployment throughout ITALY to be designed to meet only tasks of internal character, local defense of ITALIAN frontiers and defense against enemy air attack.

No aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities.

NOTE: No indication of any plan to establish ~~an~~ NAVAL air arm under this authority.

NOTE: Organization of IAF as approved by CCS. Jan 49Y.

4 interceptor sqns

2 Fighter/Bomber Sqns

1 Tac/Recce Sqn

plus necessary supporting and overhead Sqns.

Article 56:

Personnel, including any naval air personnel, limited to 50,000 effectives, including combat, service and overhead. No other personnel to receive any form of military air training as defined.

NOTE: Presently authorized strength 51,000.

Actual strength as of 1 August 1946, 28,655.

Article 57:

Forces to be disbanded within 3 months of coming into force of Present Treaty.

Section VI. DISPOSAL OF WAR MATERIAL

DEFINITION - ANNEX 5 C

"All arms, ammunition and implements specially designed or adapted for use in war as listed."

Article 58:

Disposal instructions.

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Article 58: continued

Disposal instructions.

SECTION VII. PREVENTION OF GERMAN AND JAPANESE REARMAMENT

Article 59:

Cooperate to prevent.

Article 60:

ITALY will not train technicians (including military or civil aviation personnel) who are or have been nationals of Germany or Japan.

Article 61:

ITALY will not acquire or manufacture civil aircraft of German or Japanese design or which embody major assemblies of German or Japanese manufacture or design.

NOTE: The CCS have authorized civil air lines, private flying and commensurate manufacture of civil aircraft. See FAN 697. There is no limitation affecting these authorizations in the Peace Treaty.

Section VIII. PRISONERS OF WAR

Article ~~62~~ 62 :

Repatriation agreement.

PART V WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES

Article 63:

All to be withdrawn as soon as possible and in any case not later than 90 days from coming into force of present treaty.

Goods cash and credit to be returned to ITALIAN Government.

NOTE: The matter of the withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY within 90 days is now under study.

NOTE: It should be noted that no provisions

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ITALY will not acquire or manufacture civil aircraft of German or Japanese design or which embody major assemblies of German or Japanese manufacture or design.

NOTE: The CCS have authorized civil air lines, private flying and commensurate manufacture of civil aircraft. See FAN 397. There is no limitation affecting these authorizations in the Peace Treaty.

Section VIII. PRISONERS OF WAR

Article ~~###~~ 32 :

Repatriation agreement.

PART V WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED FORCES

Article 33:

All to be withdrawn as soon as possible and in any case not later than 90 days from coming into force of present treaty.

Goods cash and credit to be returned to ITALIAN Government.

NOTE: The matter of the withdrawal of Allied Forces from ITALY within 90 days is now under study.

NOTE: It should be noted that no provisions are included in this treaty as regards the force to occupy and administer the TRIESTE Free Territory nor the function of that force. Planning is going forward on that subject as information becomes available.

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G2C A
Dep Comd. (V) (7)
BGS Murrell
G1 A Q W.P.

TOP SECRET.

COPY OF SIGNAL FROM AFHQ SIGNED SACMED TO AGWAR WASHINGTON FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND CABINET OFFICES, WHITEHALL FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFORMATION TO CIC MED CENTO NAF MED/ETO ALCOM

No. FX 66970 CITE PHOTO

30 MAY 1946

This is NAF 1145.

1. I have examined preliminary copy of the Protocol and the "Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime" received from the War Office LONDON. From this examination it is evident that certain aspects of my powers as Supreme Allied Commander will require clarification when this agreement comes into force.

2. Internal Security and the right to establish Allied Military Government.

(a) Article 2 of the new agreement states that relationship between the 4 Great Powers and ITALY shall be governed by the Armistice of September 3, 1943 "as modified by the present agreement." While the majority of the clauses of the September 3 armistice have been superseded by events the validity of certain others remains in doubt. This is particularly true of paragraph 10.

(b) Under paragraph 10 the rights reserved to Supreme Allied Commander to take any measures for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces including the establishment of Military Government is predicated upon the prosecution of the war. Upon this basis the Italian Government bound itself to take such action as the Supreme Allied Commander might require.

(c) So long as my forces have an operational commitments in ITALY any disturbance affecting the internal security of the country is liable to compromise my ability to fulfil this commitment. Unless therefore the rights reserved by me in paragraph 10 of September 3 Armistice are retained and placed on an unequivocal basis the Allies in ITALY may be placed in a very difficult position should they be required to meet their operational commitments in [illegible]

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(c) So long as my forces have an operational commitments in ITALY any disturbance affecting the internal security of the country is liable to compromise my ability to fulfil this commitment. Unless therefore the rights reserved by me in paragraph 10 of September 3 Armistice are retained and placed on an unequivocal basis the Allies in ITALY may be placed in a very difficult position should they be required to meet their operational commitments in VENEZIA GIULIA.

3. Position of the Italian Armed Forces.

(a) Article 3 of the new Agreement provides for the employment of the Italian Navy and in MAF 1140 I have already asked for further clarification on this point. There is, however, no specific provision in Article 3 for the employment of the Italian Air Force or Army.

/continued.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(b) The Italian Air Force by NAF 663 is under my control and for the reasons given in NAF 1103 I do not consider that it should be returned to the Italian Government at the present time.

(c) When the return of the Italian Army to the Italian Government was effected on 14 November 1945 I reserved the right to reassume at any time control and command of all or part of the Italian Army as I might deem necessary. I considered that in the event of either serious internal disturbances or possible operations in VENEZIA GIULIA that I might require the undisputed right to decide the employment of the Italian Army.

(d) Under the new agreement it would appear that the Italian Government might be in a position to challenge my right to decide the employment of the Italian Army and Air Force. For the reasons already put forward I consider that so long as my operational responsibilities in North East ITALY continue it is most desirable that I should retain the right to command and employ such portions of the Italian Army and Air Force as the situation may require.

4. Status of Allied Military Personnel in ITALY other than BRITISH or UNITED STATES.

There are at present in ITALY several military groups from countries of the United Nations in addition to UNITED STATES and BRITISH forces. Among these groups are YUGOSLAVS, JUGOSLAVS, GREEKS and FRENCH and the Advisory Council for ITALY and RUSSIANS, GREEKS, CZECHS, BELGIAN, DUTCH and DUTCH on Displaced Persons Missions. Presumably many of these groups now enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the UNITED STATES and BRITISH including occupation of requisitioned quarters and lira advances as under TAM 24 of October 1943 and TAM 724 of December 1945. My understanding is that these rights lapse on the abrogation of the additional conditions of Armistice. Neither UNITED STATES nor BRITISH civil [illegible] their respective authorities to provide for needs of

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND NO. 785020

considered that in the event of other [illegible]

possible operations in VENEZIA GIULIA that I might require the undisputed right to decide the employment of the Italian Army.

(d) Under the new agreement it would appear that the Italian Government might be in a position to challenge my right to decide the employment of the Italian Army and Air Force. For the reasons already put forward I consider that so long as my operational responsibilities in North East ITALY continue it is most desirable that I should retain the right to command and employ such portions of the Italian Army and Air Force as the situation may require.

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/continued.

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Government and ITALY and BRITISH Government and ITALY are national in character. Therefore I as SACMED am presumably without authority to furnish quarters, funds or immunities to the groups.

5. In addition therefore to the matters raised in MAP 1140 I request that any instructions you may send me with the Protocol text of the agreement should include

(a) clarification as to which terms of the Armistice on 3 September 1943 remain in force with particular reference to para 10 and its interpretation. (2A and 2C refer).

(b) Guidance as to my future relationship with the Italian armed forces with particular reference to my right to resume command and control of the Italian Army and to continue in control of the Italian air force. (Para 3 above refers).

(c) Information as to responsibilities of either BRITISH or UNITED STATES military authorities or myself as Supreme Allied Commander to furnish funds or immunities to official military groups of other UNITED NATIONS.

Precedence: ROUTINE.

EC 1837.

INFORMATION: EC

INFO : CC
POLAD A
POLAD B
NAVI S/C
ARMI S/C
A.P. S/C

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SECRET

P/328 (1st Draft)

G-3

S E C R E T

14 June 1946

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

A SPECIAL SECTION TO ASSUME THE FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AS REGARDS THE SERVICE SUB-COMMISSIONS.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Subject: Terms of reference.

1. The following terms of reference have been received from the Chief of Staff:

> "You are directed to examine the implications of paragraph IIIa of the 'Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime' and to make appropriate recommendations as to the form the Special Section to be established should take, its chain of command, location and relationship to AFHQ, CMF, MTOUSA and to Allied Naval and Air Headquarters."

2. In accordance with this directive, the attached paper, P/328, has been prepared and is submitted for study.

3. A meeting of the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff for the purpose of discussing this paper is scheduled at 1430 hours, Tuesday, 18 June 1946, and will be held in the G-3 War Room.

4. Will addressees please provide representation.

PERRY McC. SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chairman.

HH/gts

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PERRY McD. SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chairman.

HH/gts

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET
P/328 (1st Draft)

S E C R E T

14 June 1946

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

A SPECIAL SECTION TO ASSUME THE FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AS REGARDS THE SERVICE SUB-COMMISSIONS.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE REGIME :

1. Paragraph III of the subject document is quoted in full below:

"(a) A special Section of Allied Force Headquarters, under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, who will act as Chairman, shall be established to assume control ~~of the~~ functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy, and Air Force Sub-Commissions in the Allied Commission. This Section shall control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces and shall control the production of armaments.

"(b) The employment and disposition of the Italian Navy shall remain as at present under the Command and Control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

"(c) Pending the coming into force of a Treaty of Peace, Allied Military Government shall be continued under the Supreme Commander Mediterranean in VENEZIA GIULIA and in the province of UDINE."

OBJECT :

2. To examine the implications of paragraph III of "Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime," hereinafter referred to as the "New Agreement," and to make appropriate recommendations as to the form the special section to be established should take, its chain of command, location and relation to AFHQ, CMF, MTOUSA, and to Allied Naval and Air Headquarters.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

"(a) A special Section of Allied Force[illegible] under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, who will act as Chairman, shall be established to assume control [illegible] functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy, and Air Force Sub-Commissions in the Allied Commission. This Section shall control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces and shall control the production of armaments.

"(b) The employment and disposition of the Italian Navy shall remain as at present under the Command and Control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

"(c) Pending the coming into force of a Treaty of Peace, Allied Military Government shall be continued under the Supreme Commander Mediterranean in VENEZIA GIULIA and in the province of UDINE."

OBJECT :


2. To examine the implications of paragraph III of "Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime," hereinafter referred to as the "New Agreement," and to make appropriate recommendations as to the form the special section to be established should take, its chain of command, location and relation to AFHQ, CMF, MTOUSA, and to Allied Naval and Air Headquarters.

SECRET

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SECRET

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF ALCOM.



On technical matters each sub-commission is under its own service commander.

4. The Chiefs of Sub-Commissions deal directly with the Italian government ministry appropriate to their service. If coordination with other ministries, or with the government as a whole is required, the case is presented to the Chief Commissioner who then takes the matter up with the head of the Italian government.

NEW ORGANISATION :

5. It is not considered practicable to comply with the exact wording of the directive in that all sections of AFHQ are obviously under the orders of SAC, and it is unnecessary and impractical for SAC to chairman a section of the headquarters of which he is the commander. Nor is it considered practicable to establish a section which would CONTROL the functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces now exercised by the three Service Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission. ~~This is due to the fact that the establishment of policy and the exercise of command must originate with the heads of each of the three services concerned.~~

6. It is believed that the organisational structure and the method of operation of the existing Service Sub-commissions is in general satisfactory, and it is recommended that ~~they not be changed at this time~~.

7. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into one of providing a working organization to coordinate the activities of the Service Sub-

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6. It is believed that the organisational structure and the method of operation of the existing Service Sub-commissions is in general satisfactory, and it is recommended that ~~they not be changed at this time~~.

7. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into one of providing a ~~Staff Section HQ~~ to coordinate the activities of the Service Sub-commissions and to control the production of Italian Armaments. There are the following possible ways in which this might be achieved:

a. Designate one of the existing Chiefs of a Sub-commission as the coordinating head, in addition to his Sub-~~commission~~ duties.

b. Place the Service Sub-commissions under the new civil affairs head who will coordinate

SECRET

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SECRET

their activities by means of a special section of his staff.

c. Create an entirely new Staff Section of AFHQ.

8. The alternative stated in paragraph 5-a above is not recommended. The coordinating head should not be involved in the actual operation of a Sub-commission, but should be free to supervise and coordinate all activities of his organisation.

9. While the alternative stated in paragraph 5-b above has certain definite advantages, such as providing for only one channel between the military and the head of the Italian government, it is not considered to be the best solution. It is not considered to meet with the terms of the directive even though the Sub-commissions would continue to remain operationally answerable to the heads of their respective services.

10. The alternative stated in 5-c above is considered to meet best with the terms of the directive. The Chief of this new Staff Section would be in a position to coordinate the activities of the three Service Sub-commissions with each other, with other sections of AFHQ and with other headquarters of the Allied Armed Forces. He would also be free to deal with the control of armament and the demilitarization program, should one be established.

Under this organisation, the Sub-commissions would continue to operate under the direction of the heads of their respective services, and would continue to deal directly with the appropriate ministries in the Italian government. As it is considered desirable to maintain only one contact with the head of the Italian government, the following procedure could be set up:

a. A matter of interest to a Sub-commission requiring coordination with an Italian government agency with which that Sub-commission does not normally deal, or which requires action by the head of the Italian government, would be referred to the

AT CASERTA

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definite advantages, such as providing for only one channel between the military and the head of the Italian government, it is not considered to be the best solution. It is not considered to meet with the terms of the directive even though the Sub-commissions would continue to remain operationally answerable to the heads of their respective services.

10. The alternative stated in 7-c above is considered to meet best with the terms of the directive. The Chief of this new Staff Section would be in a position to coordinate the activities of the three Service Sub-commissions with each other, with other sections of AFHQ and with other headquarters of the Allied Armed Forces. He would also be free to deal with the control of armament and the demilitarization program, should one be established.

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a. A matter of interest to a Sub-commission requiring coordination with an Italian government agency with which that Sub-commission does not normally deal, or which requires action by the head of the Italian government, would be referred to the Chief of the new Section. AT CASERTA

b. The Chief of the new Section would then refer the matter, complete with all necessary information, to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Section in ROME.

SECRET

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SECRET

c. The Chief of the Civil Affairs Section would take the matter up with the head of the Italian government and report results back to the Chief of the new Section.

d. Matters concerning control of armament or demilitarization would be referred by the Chief of the new Section to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in the same manner.

NOMENCLATURE :

11. The new section should be given a title clearly indicative of its duties. "ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION" (IAFS) has been suggested. The three Service Sub-commissions would then become Sub-sections of IAFS.

LOCATION :

12. In view of the fact that the work of the Sub-sections of IAFS would be almost entirely with the various instrumentalities of the Italian government, all of which are located in ROME, it is considered the logical location for the Sub-sections is in ROME, ~~as at present~~.

13. The Chief, IAFS, and his staff should be located with AFHQ in Caserta. He would thus have ready access to the command echelon of AFHQ and could more readily coordinate with other AFHQ staff sections and other headquarters, British and American.

CHAIN OF COMMAND :

14. Paragraph III of the New Agreement implies that this special section is to be answerable directly to SAC. However, it is believed it should enter the organisational structure on the same level as any general staff section of AFHQ and be subject to control by the Chief of Staff in the same manner as he now controls other staff sections of this headquarters.

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RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER MILITARY ELEMENTS :

15. As a section of AFHQ, IAFS would bear the same relationship to other sections of AFHQ, to CMF, MTOUSA and other Allied naval and military headquarters as do the existing staff sections of AFHQ. However, its Sub-sections should have authority to deal directly with the appropriate elements of the Italian government and with other headquarters of the Allied Forces.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

FUNCTION :

16. IAFS should deal solely with the functions established for it by the New Agreement; i.e. supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy, and Air Forces Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission. It is also directed to control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces and to control the production of armaments. Certain functions now being carried out by the Service Sub-commissions do not lie within a literal interpretation of the terms of the New Agreement. These extraneous functions are listed below:

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION :

Italian PW's.

Police (CCRR).

NAVAL FORCES SUB-COMMISSION :

Salvage of Allied shipping, particularly French.

Shipbuilding and ship-repairing.

Italian Coast Guard, provided one is established.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION :

Civil Aviation.

Aircraft construction.

Whether these extraneous matters should continue to be functions of the Sub-sections of IAFS is a matter for considerable study. It is considered that the Chief, IAFS, should be directed to initiate such a study and to make appropriate recommendations. This should be a part of the directive referred to in paragraph 25 below.

PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NATIONS NOW REPRESENTED IN ALCOM :

17. The French representative on the Allied Commission has informed the Chief Commissioner that his government would insist on stronger French representation in the Allied Commission or any alternative organisation which might be

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NATIONS NOW REPRESENTED IN ALCOM :

17. The French representative on the Allied Commission has informed the Chief Commissioner that his government would insist on stronger French representation in the Allied Commission or any alternative organisation which might be set up. Specifically, he stated that his government would insist on functional participation by French officers in Service Sub-commissions or their successors. It is considered highly desirable that supervision and control of the Italian Armed Forces be retained in the hands of the U.S. and British military. Admission of other nations to equal participation in the Service Sub-commissions is believed to be a matter for determination by the four Foreign Ministers and not for MJPS.

SECRET

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However, a policy recommendation on this matter should be included in the MJPS Report.

CONCLUSIONS :

18. The existing structure of the Service Sub-commissions of Allied Commission should remain unchanged, pending results of the study called for in paragraph 25 below.

19. A staff section of AFHQ to be called "ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTIONS" (IAFS) should be established to assume the functions prescribed by paragraph III of the New Agreement.

20. The Service Sub-commissions, to be known as Land Forces, Naval Forces, and Air Forces Sub-sections of IAFS, should remain as at present in RCME.

21. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should be located with AFHQ in Caserta.

22. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should in all respects be subject to the normal operating procedure of an orthodox staff section.

23. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should be an integrated section with a British Chief and an American Deputy, or vice versa, service immaterial. Its staff should include representatives of each of the three services.

24. Matters requiring coordination with the head of the Italian government will be referred to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer by the Chief, IAFS.

25. The Chief of IAFS, AFHQ, should be initially charged with a study of the present Services Sub-commissions with a view to making recommendations as to any change in their directive, organisation, strength or method of operation that appears to be desirable.

26. Participation in IAFS and its Sub-sections should be limited to the U.S. - U.K.

ACTION RECOMMENDED :

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26. Participation in IAFS and its Sub-sections should be limited to the U.S. - U.K.

ACTION RECOMMENDED :

27. It is proposed, after the meeting of MJPS for the purpose of discussing this draft, to prepare a draft directive on the organisation and operation of IAFS for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval and for publication at the proper time.

SECRET

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Translation

From M.of W.
To M.M.I A.

Ref. 2IO803/II
202 7 I

Date 19/4/46.

Subject General Ideas on the Organisation of the Italian Army.

The President of the Council of Ministers has appointed the Chief of the General Staff to have a memorandum compiled for each arm of the service, which contains the fundamental principles of the organisation desired for the respective services, compiling and presenting them at the same time.

I forward, for information, copy of the plan prepared by this ministry and delivered to the Chief of the General Staff.

DAV

(XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)
illegible.

BGS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO III (SD)	
GSO I (TEG)	
G II (I)	

MMIA - 'G'
FILE G/3
DATE 8/6/5

031700 G/3.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Documents.

LAND FORCES SWPA GCOI,A.C. (MIDS)

G/S

24 Mar 46

TO : MIS A.C. (Attn. Komondo Section)

Ref your 1.dd/ES dated 27 Mar 46.

This HQ G/S dated 30 May 45 may now be downgraded to "Confidential".

(for Major General,
M. M. I. A.

ARGS/sw

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

RECEIVED 28 MAR 1946
2504 (DATE)

G/3.

G.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

Tel. 536

JWD/an

Ref: 1.48/ES

27 March 1946

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Top Secret Documents

TO : Land Forces S/C, (MMIA)

flagged.

Information is requested concerning the possibility of downgrading your Memorandum, reference G/3, dated 30 May 1945 (sic)

FOR THE ACTING VICE PRESIDENT:

JOSEPH W. DUPLER
1st Lt. Inf.
Administration Officer.

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: G/3
DATE: 8/28/3

Col. GS
GSC I (SD) X
Dep. G3
GSO II (SD)
GSO II (I)
GSO II (WE)
GSO III (SO)
GSO III (OPERATIONS)
G (Engr)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

C.O.S.
Col. 'A'
Col. 'Q'
G II (Trg)

Please see attached and initial, and retain one copy.

Lt.-Col.
GS.

28 Aug 45.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

CONFERENCE - Major-General WARD

1. Our actions and proposals generally agreed.

2. Main divergences were:-

(a) speed at which we can put rearrangement into force.
WARD said we should frame complete layout now and get it started, adjusting later.
We can take 140,000 as a basis and "allow a margin" of say 50% to be on the right side whatever happens.
This overcomes security angle.

(b) "arm of the service trg" after P.T.C.

(c) control post-treaty and ranks of W.M.I.A.
W.E. M.M.I.A.

3. Post-treaty lay-out to start to function before first call-up.

4. Standardised army:- I.G. Bde - Field Force Regt.

Examine Combat Gp organisation and redesign - e.g. Sigs and R.E. Then I.G. Bde = ½ Combat Div.

5. Academy - offrs through ranks.

6. Schools - generally OK

7. Alpine Groups.

DISTRIBUTION:

C.O.S.
Col. 'A'
Col. 'Q'
C II (Trg)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

PERSONAL

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
G/3
29 August 1945

Major General A.D. WARD, CB, CBE, DSO.

1. Reference discussions during your visit to M.M.I.A. 27-29 Aug 45, herewith -

(a) Additions to your Memo of points discussed - which you agreed to

(b) the requirements we agreed were necessary

(c) suggested W.E. for future M.M.I.A. plus increment necessary to complete our task under present charter.

2. I shall be glad to send members of my staff to discuss at A.F.H.Q. the draft directives when made out by you and the W.E. as in 1 (c).

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/ar

(Copy to Brig. Gen. EBERLE)

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
G/3
29 August 1945

Suggested additions to Memo on discussion WARD-BROWAING 27 AUG 45.

para 1 (a)

Add at end "from both the Allied and the Italian point of view".

add para 1 (e)

"Politically it is a complete break with the past and a demonstration of progressive development. A long service "career" army tends to place the army above politics and with its increased discipline and efficiency becomes an example and a stabilising influence".

para 1 - last para

add after "conscription" in fourth line - "and it is doubtful in consequence whether the extra cost is in fact very great".

add at end - "The long service army is strongly recommended to be adopted and laid down as a clause of the Peace Treaty".

para 2 First para - add at end - "Alternatively, in view of the relatively small numbers involved and the advantages of concentration of training, other arms arm of the service training might well be done at a wing of their respective schools".

Second para - add at end - "The complete turn over to a voluntary system will require examination in order to:-

(a) produce an even intake and outflow from the start
(b) not overload the training organization all at once
(c) achieve, during the forming period, the "fair balance" mentioned above
(d) complete the army with volunteers at the earliest date.

para 4 Add at end - "The organization of possible future Alpine Groups to be examined to see whether the Gruppi on their basic organization could not fulfil the function of mountain frontier defence with an Alpine increment e.g. mule companies".

para 6 line 14 - after "experience" add "and prestige".

second para - line 2 - before "B.L.U's" insert "existing".

second para - line 5 - for "it is possible -------- Centres" read "The most suitable arrangement would be for the B.L.U's with the Independent Regiments to combine that function with that of advisors to the Regional Training Centres and liaison with Regional Territorial H.Q.".

Add at end - new sub-para - "As it is envisaged that the above arrangements would continue for some time after the Peace Treaty, it should be made quite clear to the Italians in the Peace Treaty that they are to accept the advice and design for their post-treaty army as considered necessary by the Allies through M.M.I.A.".

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/ar

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
G/3
29 August 1945

REQUIRED

1. A DIRECTIVE specifying the status and functions of A.F.H.Q., District and Area HQ's, Allied formations and establishments, A.C. and M.M.I.A. vis à vis the Italian Government and Army when the "Interim Army" is handed over to Italian control on 30 SEP - in substitution of the existing directive "Command and Administration of the Italian Army", AG 091.711 GOT-O of 16 NOV and AFHQ Operation Memorandum 78 of 22 JUL.

2. (a) A DIRECTIVE to MMIA stating the general policy to be worked to:-

(i) for the immediate future up to the peace-treaty, including degree of control

(ii) for after the peace-treaty, including degree of control.

(b) This directive to include in particular guidance on:-

(i) Training policy and lay-out now for the interim army

(ii) Training policy and lay-out for the post-treaty army

(iii) The steps by which (i) should merge into (ii)

(iv) Whether methods should be based on a long service or a conscripted army

(v) The extent to which MMIA is authorised to discuss these matters with Italian Ministry of War in order that their reactions and suggestions may be obtained and details worked out as soon as possible in advance.

3. Approval of a W.E. for MMIA post-treaty, together with an increment for existing needs in connection with BR-ITI and US-ITI.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Memorandum 78 of 22 JUL.

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Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/ar

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SUBJECT:- Conversion of the Italian Army to a peace-time basis.

TOP SECRET

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.
M.M.I.A. ROME.
G/3
25 August 1945
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

M E M O R A N D U M

1. THE BACKGROUND

Since the Armistice with ITALY an ad hoc Italian Army was created to meet immediate Allied needs for the war in ITALY.

Factors:-

(a) human material was not of the highest order even of Italians. Best types were P.W. or in the more virile North.
(b) limitations of supply (rations, equipment, clothing).
(c) time factor in creation.
(d) defeat - after being under arms for years - war weariness - low prestige.
(e) service units (and even combat groups) a heterogeneous emergency collection from all sources and arms.
(f) lack of power and facilities to enforce discipline and law and order generally.

etc.

2. THE PROBLEM.

To design and produce a small, efficient contented post treaty army on the right lines and with the right ideas, using as much of the existing material as is suitable.

3. START OF THE CONVERSION.

While subordinating everything to the immediate war effort until the German surrender, we have nevertheless always kept one eye on the future and designed developments to that end without detraction from the war effort.

As an indication of steps already taken:-

(a) Ministry of War organized and established in old H.Q. in ROME.
(b) Territorial Organization with Districts and Depots established.
(c) organization of administrative services with improved systems of procedure, e.g. M.T. repair organization; supply procedure; salvage, repair of clothes, boots.
(d) I.S. Divs on new W.E. in SICILY and SARDINIA
(e) removal (over 150 generals) and proper selection of officers for appointments.
(f) institution of Welfare arrangements and campaign to raise morale.
(g) concentration of training establishments at CESANO on British lines.
(h) Study and tentative plans for revision of personal services (legal, penal, pay etc.)

The result is that there will be an easier transition to the "Interim Army" and from that to the "Post-treaty" army than would otherwise have been the case.

4. PRESENT PERIOD.

In my G/3 of 25 July I outlined in greater detail than above the developments in the Italian Army to date. I explained that during the present period (PHASE "B" i.e. until we hand over control of the 140,000 "Interim Army" to the Italians, subject of course to general control by S.A.C. through MMIA) the organizational aspect of the Italian Army is paramount. Apart from the necessity of reduction in

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(b) time factor in creation.
(c) defeat - after being under arms for years - war weariness - low prestige.
(d) service units (and even combat groups) a heterogeneous emergency collection from all sources and arms.
(e) lack of power and facilities to enforce discipline and law and order generally.
(f) etc.

2. THE PROBLEM.
To design and produce a small, efficient contented post treaty army on the right lines and with the right ideas, using as much of the existing material as is suitable.

3. START OF THE CONVERSION.
While subordinating everything to the immediate war effort until the German surrender, we have nevertheless always kept one eye on the future and designed developments to that end without detraction from the war effort.

As an indication of steps already taken:-
(a) Ministry of War organized and established in old H.Q. in ROME.
(b) Territorial Organization with Districts and Depots established.
(c) organization of administrative services with improved systems of procedure, e.g. M.T. repair organization; supply procedure; salvage, repair of clothes, boots.
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5. FUTURE PLANNING.
(a) A great deal has already been, and is being done, vide para 3. Further developments depend mainly on:-
(i) authorization by C.C.S. for our proposals re "Interim Army" to be put fully into effect.

/.....We are

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We are already working to this end organizationally by constituting those parts (e.g. I.S. Bdes) of the Interim Army which have not existed hitherto. I anticipate little difficulty over this transition.

(ii) decision and announcement of the conditions of service, size, composition and armament permissible under the Peace Treaty.

It is obvious that on this depends, for instance, immediate reduction and the annual inflow of officers necessary, the training establishments and the nature of technical training required, the detailed lay-out and organization of the Army etc. Morover, until this has been worked out in more detail suitable locations for e.g. Military Academy, Staff College etc. cannot be finally decided on and proper repairs and facilities put in hand to suit.

(iii) the question as to whether the army is to be maintained on a conscript or long service basis (as is the British Army).

In the draft Peace Treaty this decision is left to the Italians. I understand that while the War Ministry are in favour of the latter, the Italian Government consider the former essential on the grounds of expense. Vide attached Appendix "A", I am very doubtful if a small long service army is much, if at all, more expensive than a conscript one of equal effectiveness.

This raises the question as to whether we should not insist in the Peace Treaty on a long service army. For security (non-aggression) reasons a long service army is more desirable from the Allied point of view, as it obviates the passing of large numbers through the Army machine yearly and thus prevents the creation over a period of years of a large hidden reserve of military power as happened in GERMANY after the 1914-18 War. Morover, the smaller size of the future army is being fixed by the Allies at a figure such as to permit of and indeed ensure an adequately large and effective army. Within the ceiling proposed, a long service army should be adequate, but it is doubtful if a conscript short service army would be, owing to the higher overheads and the reduced average effectiveness per man.

The two systems affect the problem of organisation, layout, training etc. radically and diversely. Once the initial Army was trained, a long service army would obviously require much less of a "training complement" than in the case of a conscript army where the whole army less the permanent cadre would have to be enlisted, trained ab initio and discharged annually.

In any event, if conscription is permitted, it should be on American lines i.e. general registration and public ballot for call up on the basis of a personal number allotted to each man. Call ups would be made monthly with due warning. This would stagger the inflow, ease the training and transportation problem, avoid large outflows all at once, assist national economy by taking the same % from each area and obviate favouritism and nepotism.

(iv) Clarification of the object of this new Army.

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(iv) Clarification of the object of this new Army.

It will be used as a moral force to restore confidence in and respect for authority, for Internal Security, and for deterring and resisting aggression. This will entail I.S. Bdes, Alpine Divisions or Groups for the Northern frontiers, Combat Divisions (perhaps on the lines of existing Gruppi) for "flat ground mechanized warfare" elsewhere in ITALY if needs be.

Basically a man can be trained as an all round soldier up to a point, but specialized organization and trg will be needed for Alpine or Combat Division troops.

This is being examined and will have to be decided before we can make a general or a detailed over-all plan.

(v) the fact that before the Army as a whole can be trained, the instructors for that Army must be trained.

This is in progress now but is affected by the loss of many instructors now and in the immediate future on demobilization.

/.....(b) The points

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(b) The points I wish to make, as regards the above, are that:-

(i) we must formulate the big plan for the post-treaty army before we get down to detail.

(ii) that big plan depends on factors and decisions not yet known or clarified.

(iii) though the Italian Army continues to make progress in the required direction, full and detailed future planning will take time to be decided on and put into effect, particularly as most changes will involve alterations in Italian Law. We must therefore continue on the present basis, while striving by temporary means to increase efficiency to the utmost.

(iv) the outcome must be arranged after discussion with the Italians so as to suit their inherent character and potentialities, bearing in mind the recent background and state of affairs from which the new Italian Army will gradually arise.

(v) we cannot discuss TOP SECRET post-treaty planning with the Italians at this stage.

6. STEPS TO BE TAKEN NOW.

Despite my remarks in para 5, a great deal can be done and is being done now to improve matters. The main lines of progress lie as follows:-

(a) ORGANIZATION OF THE INTERIM ARMY.

Most of the formations or elements exist already, having been anticipated in the war build-up. The two main elements requiring attention are the constitution of the ten I.S. Bdes. and the increase in W.E. of the Territorial H.Q. organization. As is known, a start has already been made with the former, the plan is formulated and progress will depend on the rate of release of US-ITI and BR-ITI Guard Battalions. As regards the latter we are now examining M of W proposals for the increased Territorial layout. The remaining elements are all organized and functioning reasonably efficiently.

A directive will be necessary specifying the status and responsibilities of the M of W and this Interim Army vis a vis A.F.H.Q., Districts etc. We have asked for and await terms of reference from G (Ops) AFHQ and will then write the draft directive for your approval and issue in substitution of the existing Directive "Command and Administration of the Italian Army".

(b) OFFICERS

We have for some time been discussing with M of W the whole problem of officers in the post-treaty army. This is and for some time will be as much an "A" as a Training matter. There will be too many officers (including P.W.) on the strength for the smaller army of the future. New intake will take time to produce and will be in such small numbers as not to affect the immediate future.

A summary of the main lines of action being examined was given in my A.030 of 7 Aug. I may say that a considerable purge of officers of all ranks (including over 150 generals) has been continuously taking place over the last 1½ years under MMLA direction. All generals have been classified and a start is now being made with lower ranks down to Major inclusive. When the requisite numbers, by ranks and arms of officers in the post-treaty army are known, it will then be possible rapidly to retire the lowest classifications.

(c) NEW INTAKE OF OFFICERS.

LECCE Military Academy produces young officers. It is under investigation and will be the subject of a seperate report. It requires overhaul and is bound up with the whole system and numbers of intake of officers in future.

Future intake will come from young men and rankers. Both (as for "Y" cadets at SANDHURST) should do the same course. LECCE is a temporary

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Future intake will come from young men and rankers. Both (as for "Y" cadets at SANDHURST) should do the same course. LECCE is a temporary location, too small and too far away. I envisage a new Academy elsewhere, possibly at SPOLETTO near ROME, with LECCE acting as a stop gap till the new location is prepared. This however, cannot be done till we know how many new intake there will be to maintain the even annual, requisite inflow. An examination however is being made into the general set-up necessary i.e. duration of course, nature of syllabus, distribution to arms etc.

(d) CESANO TRAINING CENTRE.

Originally CESANO was constituted as the "Combat reinforcement training centre" for the Combat Groups, involving a limited number of personnel. Service units personnel were trained locally with the unit.

In the future however all army personnel will have to be trained. It would be impossible, in my opinion, to pass every single recruit through

/..... CESANO

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CESANO - particularly if it is a conscript army with an annual turnover of (say) 150,000. Control and standardization of basic or primary training at 90 dispersed Depots would not be efficient. The answer therefore is the institution of a limited number of "Primary Training Centres" to which the recruit would go after being outfitted at the Depot. The number of such centres must depend on whether the long-service or conscription system was adopted. For transportation administrative, competitive and territorial connection reasons, it would be convenient to have one P.T.C. per Territorial Region fed from the Depots in that Region. With conscription the size of each P.T.C. would depend on the total civil population (and so of the young men to be called up), but this presents no difficulty as the P.T.C. organization could be standardized on the "brick" principle. With a voluntary long service army, all P.T.C's could be uniform. Control of basic or primary training would be under M of W through the Territorial Commander, as in ENGLAND. Recruits, after (say) a one months primary training course at the P.T.C. (where Personnel selection for the various arms would be done) would complete his training in his unit, except for specialists who would complete their training by courses at CESANO. Thus CESANO, would be the centre for:-

(i) higher training of recruits in special cases.
(ii) training of specialists.
(iii) training of instructors for P.T.C's, units etc.
(iv) post academy training of officer new intake.
(v) courses and refresher courses for officers of all ranks.

Concentration and standardization of training under the direct orders of and close to the M of W would thus be ensured at CESANO. For diagram shewing recruit movement and training see App. "D".

I have been pressing the M of W strongly to get a move on in the rehabilitation of CESANO barracks. The delay has been due to finance, the difficulty of obtaining materials and placing contracts and the matter of the removal of the mustard gas factory plant in situ there. However, a great deal has already been done and further contracts have been placed.

For the moment, CESANO is of necessity also being used as an overflow transit camp as well.

The organization of CESANO is inevitably in a "state of transition". Courses of all natures are being held to meed needs as they arise. But the future organization will be such as to cater for (i) to (v) above. A larger training staff than necessary exists which will be available for distribution as instructors to P.T.C's for primary training of the recruit.

The whole is supervised by a B.L.O. under a Lt.Col. (local Col.) One point I must stress is that training must be on all-British or all-American lines. A compromise would be impossible.

(e) SUPPLEMENTARY TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS.

In addition to a Military Academy, a Staff College will in due course have to be instituted. This problem will now be tackled. It has not been urgent hitherto.

(f) MISCELLANEOUS.

Apart from all the above, we have asked M of W to examine and revise, inter alia:-

(i) their military judicial system. A start was made in the shape of Military Tribunals with Combat Groups, for speed. The trouble is partly that the system is antiquated and cumbersome and partly the

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(ii) the establishment of proper penal establishments on lines already under discussion with M of W

(iii) reorganization of military police. This depends from the much bigger question of the reorganization of the C.C.R.R., for which the aid of a British or American police mission has been requested.

(iv) standardization of pay, allowances and conditions of service. This in turn depends largely on the matter of a long service or conscript army, though some rearrangement can be done now. Territorial Commanders are now studying a draft new decree.

.....(v). Welfare

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(v) Welfare services. These did not exist before 1942. We have organized them now but whether the Italians will be willing to afford the expense post-treaty is open to question

(vi) their publicity arrangements. This has grown with the institution of the newspaper "LA PATRIA" but it remains to make the Nation army conscious.

(g) REORGANIZATION OF MMIA W.E.

(i) When drafting App. "B" and "C" of my G/3 of 25 Jul, I understood that it was necessary to reduce MMIA W.E. considerably pari passu with the reduction of Allied Commitments in ITALY and control of the Italian Army. Since then signals have been sent to W.O. by AFHQ demanding the retention of a MMIA "of high quality". I therefore submit a fresh W.E. for a post-treaty MMIA as Appendix "C" herewith.

(ii) The function of MMIA, as I see it, will be mainly high-level planning and advice. The executive detail must be left to the M of W, partly because we could never control it and partly because they will be running their Army and must be taught to stand on their own feet without the direct "spoon-feeding" control by and reliance on the Allies through MMIA. The majority of the work of MMIA at first will be to assist in producing the "big plan" on a Minister of War/ C.G.S. level. Nevertheless the implementing of that plan will have to be watched, not only at the M of W but also at Territorial H.Q's, formations, units and training establishments.

The W.E. must thus include at H.Q. the central staff together with training inspectors of all arms (who also act as technical advisors) and peripatetic L.O's who visit H.Q's, formations and units to see how the whole machine is functioning and report. I visualize the inspectors replacing the BLU's but with a roving vice a static function.

It must be remembered that (unlike what I understand to be the case in GREECE) much of this Italian Military machine has already been organized by us on Allied lines and is functioning well. Moreover, as I have said, we have a conversion problem, not a start from zero. The latter occurred early in 1944.

I consider two full Colonels ("G" and "A/Q") necessary, with adequate experience and ability to plan big.

I have not specified which officers should be British and which American [illegible] in attached preliminary rough W.E. If it were all British I see no reason to have a Deputy Commander who would merely be another cog in the chain. It would be more efficient for me to deal direct with my two senior staff officers, the Senior of whom would act for me in my absence. But with an Anglo-American staff it is obviously right and proper that I should have an American as Deputy Commander.

With all ITALY as MMIA's domain, mobility is a factor and a generous allotment of M.T. is essential.

I may add that I discussed all the training aspect with D.M.T. at the War Office who was in general agreement. He is prepared to fly out to us at any moment any of his officers to advise on any particular aspect of training.

7. CONCLUSION.

(a) The present period is a state of flux in which no major plans for the post-treaty army can be developed owing to lack of knowledge of essential factors on which the main plan for the post-treaty army must be based.

(b) Reorganization to create the Interim army is being proceeded with as fast as Italian machinery and disbandment of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units permit.

(c) M of W to press on with their exploration and plans for dealing with the officer situation and miscellaneous aspects.

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(c) M of W to press on with their exploration and plans for dealing with the officer situation and miscellaneous aspects.

(d) The question of a long service versus a conscript Italian Army to receive urgent consideration and be decided as a term of the Peace Treaty.

(e) The design and syllabus for a new Military Academy to be examined and a general project committed to paper.

(f) The matter of a Staff College to be examined.

(b) The present system and use of CESANO to be continued until the system shewn in App. "D" and para 6 (d) is established when CESANO undertakes functions as in 6 (d). Meanwhile a tentative project to suit to be made out for the future organization and lay-out at CESANO.

7. (b) Final MMIA

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(h) Final MMIA W.E. to be made out and passed to AFHQ for W.O. approval. Wasting down to that W.E. to be done as soon as possible at MMIA discretion depending on the institution of Interim Army, the rate of reduction of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units and the date of signing the Peace Treaty with ITALY.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/ar

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T O P S E C R E T

APPENDIX 'A' to MMLA 6/3 dated 16 Aug.

FUTURE ITALIAN ARMY

Proposed Conditions of Service.

1. The object of this paper is to examine in outline the possible conditions of service for officers and men of the new Italian Army and their effect on the size and relative efficiency of the force which, for the sake of argument is taken as 200,000 (including a permanent cadre of 50,000). Because of its effect on all other considerations this decision should be made before any other questions can be properly considered.

2. Courses open lie between :-

(a) a short service conscript army, or

(b) a long service voluntary army.

The length of service and the extent to which both conscripts and volunteers (professionals) should be incorporated in the same army are, within certain limits, variable (see para 4).

3. Length of service is limited :-

(a) In the conscript army by the relation between the strength of the army and the annual availability of manpower (i.e. birth rate). In the present case, where a large population is available to maintain only a small army it is necessary to call men up for as short a period as possible. From the viewpoint of military efficiency, it may be assumed that 12 months is the absolute minimum, and from the national point of view, 18 months can be considered the maximum. As, however, even 18 months would mean that to produce 100,000 annually only 40% of the available manpower would be called up, the method of selection might be invidious and the resulting bad feeling would be so undesirable that it can safely be assumed that 12 months service should be the maximum. Conscript service should therefore be for ONE year.

(b) In the voluntary army only by the amenability of old age and the economic demands of the individual. It may therefore be taken as a minimum of SIX years extendable under

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-iency of the force which, for the same [illegible] as 200,000 (including a permanent cadre of 50,000). Decision of its effect on all other considerations this decision should be made before any other questions can be properly considered.

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3. Length of service is limited :-

(a) In the conscript army by the relation between the strength of the army and the annual availability of manpower (i.e. birth rate). In the present case, where a large population is available to maintain only a small army it is necessary to call men up for as short a period as possible. From the viewpoint of military efficiency, it may be assumed that 12 months is the absolute minimum, and from the national point of view, 18 months can be considered the maximum. As, however, even 18 months would mean that to produce 100,000 annually only 40% of the available manpower would be called up, the method of selection might be invidious and the resulting bad feeling would be so undesirable that it can safely be assumed that 18 months service should be the maximum. Conscript service should therefore be for ONE year.

(b) In the voluntary army only by the unsuitability of old age and the economic demands of the individual. It may therefore be taken as a minimum of SIX years extendable under terms to be decided.

4. A Long Service Cadre of professional officers, NCOs, instructors and certain tradesmen will in any case be necessary and it might be desirable to expand this and cut down the number of conscripts, but there is a limiting minimum number (say 150,000) below which it is impracticable to ensure an equitable call up. It is considered therefore that the professional cadre could not exceed 50,000.

5. The Relative Efficiency between a conscript army and a professional one must be considered from the mathematical and

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psychological points of view.

(a) Mathematically. A conscript force of 150,000 serving for 12 months necessitates the "turning over" of the whole force annually. The ineffective period of each individual varies with this rule, but, allowing 2 weeks for enlistment, preliminaries and moves, 4 weeks basic training, and from 4 to 18 (average 11) weeks specialist and higher training, and 5 weeks other absence, gives a total of 22/52 (i.e. 40%) ineffective. This reduces the effective strength at any time to ~~85,000~~. 97,500
A long service army would similarly be 22/312 (7%) ineffective leaving (without considering the accumulating higher standard in subsequent years) an effective strength of ~~142,000~~. 139,500

(b) Psychologically, the superiority (especially for "duties in aid of the civil power") of a long service well disciplined and well trained body of professionals over a force of conscripts only slightly removed from civilian life and hoping shortly to return to it, needs no further emphasis.

6. Relative Strengths on a purely quantity (as opposed to quality) basis required for an effective force of 150,000 would be :-

short service, overall ~~210,000~~ 250,000) with a further considerable adjustment in
long service, overall ~~157,000~~ 181,000) Administrative services and overheads.

7. The Relative Cost has been referred to as an obstacle to the institution of a small long service army, on the grounds that the rates of pay required to offer a living wage acceptable to the right type of man are beyond the means of the Treasury.

No official figures or facts are as yet available to support this theory, and it is not yet possible to consider all the financial aspects, but the following estimate, which is liable to correction in detail, is intended to show that, in principle, the financial objection may not be as great as it seems.

The daily cost per man might be somewhat as follows :-

	Conscript	Volunteer
Rations (and ammunition)	50	50
Clothing (and personal equipment)	15	15
Accommodations (and fuel and light)	10	10

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(b) Psychologically, the superiority (especially for "duties in aid of the civil power") of a long service well disciplined and well trained body of professionals over a force of conscripts only slightly removed from civilian life and hoping shortly to return to it, needs no further emphasis.

6. Relative Strengths on a purely quantity (as opposed to quality) basis require for an effective force of I50,000 would be :-

short service, overall ~~210,000~~) with a further considerable adjustment in Administrative services and overheads.

long service, overall ~~157,000~~)

7. The Relative Cost has been referred to as an obstacle to the institution of a small long service army, on the grounds that the rates of pay required to offer a living wage scale to the right type of man are beyond the means of the Treasury.

No official figures or facts are as yet available to support this theory, and it is not yet possible to consider all the financial aspects, but the following estimate, which is liable to correction in detail, is intended to show that, in principle, the financial objection may not be as great as it seems.

The daily cost per man might be somewhat as follows :-

	Conscript	Volunteer
Rations (and ammunition)	50	50
Clothing (and personal equipment)	I5	I5
Accommodations (and fuel and light)	I0	I0
Overheads (Med, tpt, welfare, etc)	5	5
Pay.....	30	I00
ESTIMATED DAILY COST =	I00	I70

Conscript Army of say ~~210,000~~.....~~£~~I,000,000

Long Service Army of say I57,000.....~~£~~6,500,000

/over

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It is for consideration whether this additional £5 on the bill for the pay and maintenance of each soldier would not be more than offset by the foregoing and following advantages:-

8. Additional factors in favour of a long service army which might reduce or outweight the slight extra cost are as follows :-

(a) Reliability. So great would be the advantage with the long service force that a considerable reduction in strength (over and above the comparative figures given above) could and should be accepted.

(b) Maintenance. The annual turnover (reduced by 1/6) the reduction in reserves, spares and overheads produce a cumulative saving.

(c) National feeling. The removal of conscription and the inauguration of a new system would, if properly handled, be a tremendous tonic to the nation and go a long way towards removing one at least of the possible uses to which the force might have to be put, besides removing a relic of the fascist regime.

9. The Carabinieri. A system on suitable long service lines has always been in existence and might well be used as a model from which to design the rest of the army.

10. Recommendation. That as soon as "security" allows, the whole problem be examined with the Italian Government and that the Allies insist, for their own purposes as well as those of Italy, that the Future Italian Army be a voluntary, long-service one.

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MEMORANDUM

Appendix 'B' to MMIA G/3 dated [illegible] Aug. '45.

SUBJECT:- Italian Army Judicial System.

1. The Italian Army, which has been cooperating with the Allies since Sept 1943 has been handicapped by an inadequate judicial and penal organisation. This has had an adverse effect on discipline and morale which is going from bad to worse now that the war is over.

2. The Italian Army, about to be reorganised and returned to the control of the Italian Government, will be a comparatively small one, and will therefore have to be of the highest quality. It is therefore essential to have a thoroughly efficient method of dealing with acts of indiscipline and crime.

3. The present system comprises :-

(a) summary awards by commanding officers for acts of indiscipline.

(b) trial by permanent and static Military Tribunals for "crimes".

4. The powers of commanding officers seem to be fairly adequate, if properly used and in any case, any inadequacy in this matter is probably capable of being made good within the framework of existing law.

5. The Military Tribunals, on the other hand seem to be quite incapable of coping with the situation. It takes months to bring a man to justice on even the simplest charges, prisons are all overflowing with men awaiting trial, thousands, although denounced, cannot even be arrested because of the waiting list. Even when sentences are awarded they are generally inadequately carried out.

6. It would be comparatively simple to improve matters if the Military Tribunals served only the Army, instead of all three services and certain civilians as well. For this reason it seems [illegible] should be considered by the Italian Government

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1. The Italian Army, which has been co[illegible] Allies since Sept 1943 has been handicapped by an inadequate judicial and penal organisation. This has had an adverse effect on discipline and morale which is going from bad to worse now that the war is over.

2. The Italian Army, about to be reorganised and returned to the control of the Italian Government, will be a comparatively small one, and will therefore have to be of the highest quality. It is therefore essential to have a thoroughly efficient method of dealing with acts of indiscipline and crime.

3. The present system comprises :-

(a) summary awards by commanding officers for acts of indiscipline.

(b) trial by permanent and ad-hoc Military Tribunals for "crimes".

4. The powers of commanding officers seem to be fairly adequate, if properly used and in any case, any inadequacy in this matter is probably capable of being made good within the framework of existing law.

5. The Military Tribunals, on the other hand seem to be quite incapable of coping with the situation. It takes months to bring a man to justice on even the simplest charges, prisons are all overflowing with men awaiting trial, thousands, although denounced, cannot even be arrested because of the waiting list. Even when sentences are awarded they are generally inadequately carried out.

6. It would be comparatively simple to improve matters if the Military Tribunals served only the Army, instead of all three services and certain civilians as well. For this reason it seems that the question should be considered by the Italian Government in consulting with the Legal Sub Commission, A.C. from the general legal points of view, and particularly in regard to the following proposals.

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7. From the army point of view, there appears to be three alternatives :-

(a) to try to improve the present Military Tribunal machinery and make it work,

(b) to abolish the Military Tribunals and replace them by Courts Martial or some other ad hoc courts,

(c) to retain the Tribunals for complicated cases or those involving other than Army personnel or property, and to institute ad hoc courts (martial) for the trial of army personnel accused of certain specified forms of crime.

8. The institution of ad hoc courts within the army would be a comparatively easy matter and would involve only

(a) Education of Officers in Military Law

(b) Provision of a nucleus of legal officers as "judge advocates" to advise and assist members of courts and those responsible for the preparation and confirmation of cases.

It would ensure the prompt, and economical handling of the majority of criminal charges and tend to improve the quality of officers by bringing them into closer contact with their men.

9. These proposals are now being studied by the Italian "Procuratore Militare Generale" who realises that something must be done and appears to view the idea not unfavourably. The Italian Army authorities are also studying the matter.

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
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M. M. I. A.

PRELIMINARY PROPOSED ROUGH LAY-OUT

(Not specified which officers should be British or American)



LIAISON OFFICERS.

S.O. 1st grade - 2
S.O. 2nd grade - 4

INSPECTING OFFICERS

GSO II (RAC)	GSO II (RA)	GSO II (Inf.)	SO II (RE)	SO II (R.Sigs)	DADST	DADMS	DADOS	DADME	DADV & RS
					Capt. RASC		O.C. (Capt)	Captain R.E.M.E.	


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Appendix 'C' to
MMIA G/3 dated

M. M. I. A.

PRELIMINARY PROPOSED ROUGH LAY-OUT

(Not specified which officers should be British or American)



INSPECTING OFFICERS

II GSO II (RA) GSO II (Inf.) SO II (RE) SC II (R.Sigs) DADST DADMS DADOS DADME DADW & RS

Capt. RASC

O.C. (Capt)

Captain R.E.M.E.

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Camp Commandant (Captain)
M.T.O. (Lieut.)

Effective Date

Restricted

MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY.

Preliminary proposed approx War Establishment

(Not specified which Officers should be American or British)

Amdt No. Date		
Officers	49	
O.Rs.	119	
Civilians		
Total	168	
M.Cs.	3	
Vehicles	39	
Trailers	-	

(i) Personnel

Detail	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFF. Class1	Sgts	Sergeants Staff	Corporals	Lance Corporals	Privates	Civilians	Totals	
Commander (Major General)	1								1	
Military assistant (Captain)	1								1	
Clerk, general duties, R.A.S.C.					1				1	
STAFF										
General Staff Branch										
Colonel G.S.	1								1	
Training										
General Staff Officer grade 1	1								1	
General Staff Officer grade 2	3								3	
General Staff Officer grade 3	3								3	
Staff Duties and Intelligence										
General Staff Officer grade 1	1								1	
General Staff Officer grade 2	2								2	
General Staff Officer grade 3	2								2	
Clerks General duties R.A.S.C.			1	2	2	4	3	12	24	
Liaison										
General Staff Officer grade 1	2								2	
General Staff Officer grade 2	4								4	
Clerks, General duties R.A.S.C.(a)					1	1	2	4	8	
Branch of the ADJUTANT and QUARTER MASTER GENERAL										
Colonel A/Q	1								1	
Assistant Adjutant General	1								1	
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	3								3	
Staff Capts "A"	3								3	

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Detail	OFFICERS	Off. Class 1	WARRANT OFF. Class 1	Sgts Staff	Sergeants	Corporals	Lance Corporals	Privates	Civilians	Totals
Commander (Major General)	1									1
Military assistant (Captain)	1									1
Clerk, general duties, R.A.S.C.						1				1
STAFF										
General Staff Branch										
Colonel G.S.	1									1
Training										
General Staff Officer grade 1	1									1
General Staff Officer grade 2	3									3
General Staff Officer grade 3										
Staff Duties and Intelligence										
General Staff Officer grade 1	1									1
General Staff Officer grade 2	2									2
General Staff Officer grade 3	2			1	2	2	4	3	12	24
Clerks General duties R.A.S.C.										
Liaison										
General Staff Officer grade 1	2									2
General Staff Officer grade 2	4					1	1	2	4	8
Clerks, General duties R.A.S.C. (a)										
Branch of the ADJUTANT and QUARTER MASTER GENERAL										
Colonel A/Q	1									1
Assistant Adjutant General	1									1
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	3									3
Staff Capts "A"	3									3
Assistant Quarter Master General	1									1
Deputy Assistant Q-M General	2									2
Staff Capt "Q"	2									2
Clerks, General duties, R.A.S.C.			1	1	2	2	4	2	12	24
INSPECTING STAFF										
General Staff Officer 1st grade (RAC)	1									1
General Staff Officer 2 grade (RA)	1									1
General Staff Officer 2 grade (Inf)	1									1
S.O.R.E. 1	1									1
S.O.R.Sigs 1	1									1

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RESTRICTED

MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

Proposed War Establishment Sheet No. 2.

(i) Personnel (continued)

Detail	Officers	W.O. I	W.O. II	Staff Sjts	Sergeants	Corporals	Lance-Cpls	Privates	Total	Civilians
INSPECTING STAFF Contd.										
D.A.D.S.T. Capt. R.A.S.C.	1								1	
D.A.D.M.S.	1								1	
Ord. Officer (Capt)	1								1	
D.A.D.M.E.	1								1	
Capt. R.E.M.E.	1								1	
D.A.D. V. and R's.	1								1	
Clerks General Duties					1	7	1	3	12	
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF										
Camp Commandant (Capt)	1								1	
M.T.O. (Lieut)	1								1	
C.Q.M.S.				1					1	
Discipline N.C.O.					1				1	
Clerks, General Duties, RASC						1		1	2	
Tpt. N.C.O's					1	2			3	
Drivers i/c					1			3	4	11
Driver Mechs.						2	2		4	
Veh. Mechs.					1				1	
Batmen Drivers								6	6	9
Batmen								5	5	7
Sanitary dutymen								1	1	
Mess orderlies					1	1			2	5
Orderlies							1	3	4	
Interpreters					1	3	1		5	
Total 33 Military Mission	49	1	2	5	12	26	12	50	157	32
Attached.										
R.Sigs								2	2	
Despatch riders					1	3			4	
Operators cipher										

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	Officers	W.O.I	W.O.II	Staff Sgts	Sergeants	Corporals	Lance Corporals	Privates	Total	Civilians
INSPECTING STAFF Contd.										
D.A.D.S.T. Capt. R.A.S.C.	1								1	
D.A.D.M.S.	1								1	
Ord. Officer (Capt)	1								1	
D.A.D.M.E.	1								1	
Capt. R.E.M.E.	1								1	
D.A.D. V. and R's.	1								1	
Clerks General Duties					1	7	1	3	12	
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF										
Camp Commandant (Capt)	1								1	
M.T.O. (Lieut)	1								1	
C.Q.M.S.				1					1	
Discipline N.C.O.					1				1	
Clerks, General Duties, RASC						1		1	2	
Tpt. N.C.O's					1	2			3	
Drivers i/c					1			3	4	11
Driver Mechs.						2	2		4	
Veh. Mechs.					1				1	
Batmen Drivers								6	6	2
Batmen								5	5	7
Sanitary dutymen								1	1	
Mess orderlies					1	1			2	5
Orderlies							1	3	4	
Interpreters					1	3	1		5	
Total 33 Military Mission	49	1	2	5	12	26	12	50	157	32
Attached.										
R.Sigs										
Despatch riders								2	2	
Operators cipher					1	3			4	
A.C.C.										
Cooks						1		4	5	1
Total 33 Military Mission including attached	49	1	2	5	13	30	12	56	168	33

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RESTRICTED

MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

Proposed War Establishment Sheet No. 3

(ii) Transport

Motor Cycles	3
Cars 6 str. 4 x 2	1
Cars 4 x 2 heavy utility	34
Tracks 15 cwt 4 x 2, G.S.	4
Total vehicles less motor-cycles.	39

NOTES.

(a) To undertake clerical duties, when necessary, for Inspecting Staff.

This establishment will NOT be implemented without AFHQ authority.


NOTE:- The number of vehicles is based on the fact that in due course :-
(a) M.M.I.A. will be on its own in ITALY
(b) replacement facilities will be slow
(c) a large proportion of the Staff will be on tour at the same time.

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Appendix "B" to MMIA G/3
dated 25 August 1945

RECRUIT MOVEMENT AND TRAINING



CCFI INCOMING SIGNAL

PRIORITY

Date - Time of Origin

22 Aug 1830 B

FROM SIGNED ALEXANDER

TO (FOR ACTION) AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF
AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO(FOR INFORMATION) AIRCOM, NAMLA

Ref No. FX 37481 CTFE FHCAO

TOP SECRET

This is NAF 1059 and is further to NAF 1051.

ONE. At the present time supplies and equipment for the Italian Army are provided largely from US and BRITISH Military sources. Also the Italian Army is dependent partly on Allied Administrative and Supply Services in Italy for its administration though under current policy this dependence is progressively decreasing.

TWO. Italian Army of 140,000. If operational control of the Italian Army of 140,000 is vested in the Italian Government it is desirable that the Maximum degree of administrative control should be assumed by them at the same time. In any event the Italian Government should assume full administrative and supply responsibility as early as practicable, in order to relieve Allied Military resources of the commitment. Also if the Italian Government undertakes this responsibility while Allied Resources still remain in the theatre the means will be available to remedy any serious difficulty which may arise.during the early stages of the Italian Government's responsibility.

THREE. The proposed Army of 140,000 includes a due proportion of Administrative troops. Allowing for the use by the Italian Army of civilian operated facilities such as railways, workshops, etc, this Army can be made self supporting in respect of administrative services and from the end of September need not be dependent on administrative assistance from Allied Units for its logistical support.

FOUR. CARABINIERI of 65,000. The administration and supply of the 65,000 Carabinieri is already largely the responsibility of the Italian Government which the exercise through the ITI-ITI administrative organisation of the Italian Army. The basic elements of the Carabinieri ration are however a US and BRITISH Military provision and some small assistance is provided by the US and BRITISH in respect of clothing. It is at present proposed subject to such alteration as may be approved as a result of the investigation of the Allied Police Mission referred to in para 7 of NAF 1051 that the Carabinieri should continue to be administered by the Italian Army.

FIVE. Provision of maintenance and equipment for Army and Carabinieri of total strength 205,000. Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment should be furnished as follows :-A. From indigenous Italian Resources including captured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be procured in the Italian

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FIVE. Provision of maintenance and equipment for Army and Carabinieri of total strength 205,000. Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment should be furnished as follows :-A. From indigenous Italian Resources including captured material and local manufacture. Raw materials for this purpose should be procured in the Italian Government import programme. B. By purchase from Military stocks in Italy which have been declared surplus by the US or BRITISH disposals organisations. It is considered that the Italian Government, in respect of items required for the Italian Army, should be accorded an equal priority with UNRRA in the procurement of these supplies. C. Items not obtainable as in A and B above should be procured as finished products in the Italian Government import programme. D. As the prevention of disorders in Italy will largely depend on the efficient functioning of the Italian Army and Carabinieri it is essential that there should be no breakdowns in their administration caused by shortages or uncertainties in the arrival of their maintenance requirements. These requirements should, therefore, be accorded the necessary degree of priority by the furnishing agencies. To distinguish

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these requirements from those destined for the civil population they should be procured by separate indent in the Italian Government import programme.

SIX. Recommendations regarding the main items of supply for the Army and Carabinieri are as follows: A. Rations. Allowing for the full use of indigenous supplies the following annual tonnages will have to be imported in addition to the import requirements for the civil population: FLOUR 35070 - Dried Vegetables 4680 - Sugar 2340 - Pepper 12 - Coffee 1170. B. PETROL. Petrol requirements will be included in the Italian National programme with effect from October programming for January requirements. C. Clothing. Requirements of raw materials to enable an initial issue and one years maintenance to be provided for the Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 65,000 are as follows : Shoddy 2100 metric tons, cotton - 320 metric tons, virgin wool - 3080 metric tons, leather finished - 750 metric tons. It is considered that the above quantities can be allocated from the present planned import programme provided this programme is met. D. Equipment. Following General Policy is proposed: (1) All vehicles and equipment of British and US origin (including Lend-Lease) now in possession of the Italian Combat Forces (GRUPPI and certain other units) should be retained with these forces and handed over to the Italian Government in accordance with procedure to be established. In respect of US equipment in possession of British ITI Combat Units this has already been recommended in MTOUSA Signal to Joint Chiefs of Staff F 92580 dated 13 June 45. It is proposed to hand over at the same time 6 months maintenance parts for vehicles and equipments supplied from Allied Military sources. (2) Requirements for non warlike equipments should be provided in accordance with para 5 above. It is proposed to place all non warlike stores including such items as are at present an Allied Military supply responsibility, in this category as soon as is practicable. (3) Owing to the present inability of the Italian Government to manufacture warlike items, requirements should continue for some time to be provided from Allied sources. (4) Maintenance requirements for tyres and tubes for all vehicles, or raw materials for their manufacture, should be included on the Italian Government import programme. The situation regarding tyres and tubes is critical and supply on these items, or the necessary raw materials, must be forthcoming if the Italian Army is to function without Allied assistance.

SEVEN. The above proposals place the provisioning and maintenance and equipment for the Italian Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 65,000 in channels similar to those used in respect of the provisioning for the Italian Civil economy. They are only feasible if the latter provision is functioning efficiently and an adequate and steady flow of supplies to Italy can be assured. Concern has been expressed on this matter in para two of MAF 1051 and in MAF 1054.

EIGHT. When the transfer of Operational and Administrative control takes place the administrative functions of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army in respect of the Italian Army of 140,000 will be largely of an advisory and liaison nature. They will however

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of raw materials to enable an initial issue and one years maintenance to be provided for the Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 65,000 are as follows : Shoddy 2100 metric tons, cotton - 320 metric tons, virgin wool - 3080 metric tons, leather finished - 750 metric tons. It is considered that the above quantities can be allocated from the present planned import programme provided this programme is met. D. Equipment. Following General Policy is proposed: (1) All vehicles and equipment of British and US origin (including Lend-Lease) now in possession of the Italian Combat Forces (GRUPPI and certain other units) should be retained with these forces and handed over to the Italian Government in accordance with procedure to be established. In respect of US equipment in possession of British ITI Combat Units this has already been recommended in MTOUSA Signal to Joint Chiefs of Staff F 92580 dated 15 June 45. It is proposed to hand over at the same time 6 months maintenance parts for vehicles and equipments supplied from Allied Military sources. (2) Requirements for non warlike equipments should be provided in accordance with para 5 above. It is proposed to place all non warlike stores including such items as are at present an Allied Military supply responsibility, in this category as soon as is practicable. (3) Owing to the present inability of the Italian Government to manufacture warlike items, requirements should continue for some time to be provided from Allied sources. (4) Maintenance requirements for tyres and tubes for all vehicles, or raw materials for their manufacture, should be included on the Italian Government import programme. The situation regarding tyres and tubes is critical and supply on these items, or the necessary raw materials, must be forthcoming if the Italian Army is to function without Allied assistance.

SEVEN. The above proposals place the provisioning and maintenance and equipment for the Italian Army of 140,000 and the Carabinieri of 65,000 in channels similar to those used in respect of the provisioning for the Italian Civil economy. They are only feasible if the latter provision is functioning efficiently and an adequate and steady flow of supplies to Italy can be assured. Concern has been expressed on this matter in para two of NAF 1051 and in NAF 1054.

EIGHT. When the transfer of Operational and Administrative control takes place the administrative functions of the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army in respect of the Italian Army of 140,000 will be largely of an advisory and liaison nature. They will however continue to screen those demands which continue to be met from Allied Military stocks and exercise supervisory control of the use of such materials.

NINE. Summary of recommendations is as follows: A. It is proposed, subject to the proviso in sub para C below, to transfer administrative control of the Italian Army of 140,000 and of the

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65,000 Carabinieri to the Italian Government at the same time as the transfer of operational control takes place. B. If the supply policy outlined in para 5 and 6 of this Cable is approved it is proposed that the Italian Government should provision on their own account, commencing with their programme to be submitted in October, for all supplies, P.O.L, clothing and equipment (including raw materials for the local production of same) which cannot be procured locally. Furnishing agencies should take into account declared surpluses of British and US Military stocks in the theatre and include them in the allocation of sources from which the Italian Government programme is to be met. C. Until requirements submitted in the Italian Government import programme can be made available to the Italian Government and a steady flow of these requirements has been established the US and British must continue to meet from US and British military stocks such requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri as cannot be provided from Italian Government sources. The transfer of present Allied Military responsibility for providing maintenance and equipment items will be of necessity be gradual and will take place by items of supply depending on the time required to establish a pipeline of supply in respect of the various items. In the case of warlike equipment it is appreciated that responsibility for its provision may have to remain a military commitment for a considerable time. Requirements of items which continue to be provided from Military stocks will be screened, as at present, by the Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army which will exercise such supervision as is necessary to ensure that they are economically used.

TEN. In the case of those diminishing Italian forces who continue to be employed in relief of US and British manpower (para 5 of NAT 1051 refers) it is proposed to make no change in existing provisioning arrangements.

ELEVEN. It is requested that the Policy outlined above be approved. In the meantime necessary preparations are being made here to facilitate the handover of Administrative Control of the Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

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Subject : Future of Italian Army.

SECRET

Land Forces Sub-commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File → 23 G/3 July 45

MEMORANDUM

OBJECT.

1. The object of this memorandum is to consider developments in the Italian Army since the Armistice in Sept. 1943 and possibilities for the future.

PHASES.

2. (a) The creation of a new Italian Army started in real earnest early in 1944 under the orders of S.A.C. and direction of M.M.I.A.

(b) Developments since then can conveniently be divided into four phases:-

PHASE "A" - upto the German surrender.

PHASE "B" - from then up to the creation of an "Interim" organization pending the signing of a Peace Treaty.

PHASE "C" - from then up to the signing of the Peace Treaty.

PHASE "D" - the post-treaty period in future.

3. PHASE "A"

(a) Developments during Phase "A" are past history and need not be considered in detail. But certain aspects should be noted as they bear on subsequent developments.

(b) By May 1945, the Italian Army had reached an authorized strength of some 300,000 composed of -

- a combat force(5 Gruppi and reinforcements) - ~~67,500~~ 62,700
- ITI - ITIs(personnel required for the Italian internal administration, plus certain other units such as Guard Battalions carried in this category) - 69,000 (excl CC.RR)
- BR - ITIs(service units required to assist British formations) - ~~93,000~~ 97,800
- US - ITIs(service units required to assist American formations) - 83,500

NOTE:- CC.RR was 55,000, recently increased to 65,000.

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NOTE:- CC.RR was 55,000, recently increased to 65,000.

(c) Supply responsibility was divided as follows:-

- Basic rations (1)

US - ITIs and ITI - ITIs - U.S.A.
Combat Force and BR - ITIs - U.K.

The Italians provided the remainder of the rations from their own resources.

Medical

For all categories(except field supplies for US-ITI) - U.K.

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Clothing and Boots

Combat force(British B.D.) - U.K.
ITI - ITIs(Italian uniform in stock or renovated or dyed green Allied B.D.) - ITALY assisted by the Allies
BR - ITIs(dyed green B.D.) - U.K. and U.S.A.
US - ITIs(dyed green Allied uniform) - U.K. and U.S.A.

Arms

Combat force - U.K.
Remainder - ITALY

Equipment generally

Combat force - U.K.
Remainder - ITALY(assisted by the Allies)

(d) A Territorial H.Q.: organization had been set up to extend the authority of the Italian Ministry of War over all ITALY in due course. Italian service units were organized into Administrative Divisions under the command of Allied Armies and Districts.

(e) A training organization had been set up at CESANO to train Combat reinforcements. Reinforcement depots for service units had also been organized. Their main purpose was to organize "bodies" available but basic trg and discipline were installed as far as time permitted. Specialist trg was the responsibility of the receiving formations through vacancies in certain schools were given to BR - ITIs, viz Sigs School, FRANCOVILLA engineering School CAPUA etc.

(f) This whole phase was conditioned by the TIME factor. Italian troops were required urgently. It was thus impossible to eradicate all the many fundamental weaknesses in the Italian Army in the time available. Instead, the maximum use was made of the [illegible] material available in order that it should yield the greatest possible(though by no means 100 % by Allied standards)dividend. For that reason, for example, the organization and training of the Combat Force was a compromise between a tactical organization which the Italians were used to working on and an organization suitable for the use of the British weapons and equipment provided. In this phase "the best was the Enemy of the good". Nevertheless, though the Italian Army has a long way to go by Allied standards, the level of efficiency has increased considerably and reasonably satisfactorily, particularly considering the fact that it started from zero at the Armistice in Sept. 1943 and that, on the whole, the best troops were either P.W. er in the more virile North.

4. PHASE "B"

(a) With the German surrender, the organizational aspect of the Italian Army became paramount. Trg continued at the same tempo, but as AFHQ reduced the rft holding for combat tps from 25% to 5% it was possible and desirable to concentrate all BR-ITI trg(both combat and service units) at CESANO. When the planning for this took place we of course had one eye on the requirements for Phase "C" and Phase "D". Phase "B" represents a period of [illegible] strength. Service units, BR-ITI and US-ITI, are [illegible]. The older classes are being [illegible] in numbers and partly as a [illegible] being "run down"

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Clothing and Boots

Combat force(British B.D.)	- U.K.
ITI - ITIs(Italian uniform in stock or renovated or dyed green Allied B.D.)	ITALY assisted by the Allies
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Combat force - U.K.
Remainder - ITALY(assisted by the Allies)

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(f) This whole phase was conditioned by the TIME factor. Italian troops were required urgently. It was thus impossible to eradicate all the many fundamental weaknesses in the Italian Army in the time available. Instead, the maximum use was made of the human material available in order that it should yield the greatest possible(though by no means 100 % by Allied standards)dividend. For that reason, for example, the organization and training of the Combat Force was a compromise between a tactical organization which the Italians were used to working on and an organization suitable for the use of the British weapons and equipment provided. In this phase "the best was the Enemy of the good". Nevertheless, though the Italian Army has a long way to go by Allied standards, the level of efficiency has increased considerably and reasonably satisfactorily, particularly considering the fact that it started from zero at the Armistice in Sept. 1943 and that, on the whole, the best troops were either P.W. or in the more virile North.

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4. PHASE "B"

(a)Cent'd. From all the above it will be clear that, although trg still continues and some foundation has been laid for Phase "B", the result of this Phase "B" trg can only have limited effect. The whole situation is too fluid to admit of anything else. Moreover, the permissible size, composition and armament of the army of Phase "D" is not yet known, and without this no comprehensive plan can be produced. A note on the existing training set-up is attached at Appx "A".

(b) The Chief Commissioner, A.C. envisaged handing over Italian territory complete to the Italian Government on 1 Sep 45. To enable the latter to carry out their functions it was considered necessary for it to have its own army at its own disposal, subject to safeguards for Allied interests and general control by S.A.C. My appreciation of the numbers (140,000 excl CC.RR 65,000) and composition was forwarded to AFHQ under A.C. letter 8251/180/EC of 7 Jun. In addition to the 140,000 there will be a reduced number of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units, continuously decreasing. The administrative implications of this proposal are under discussion at AFHQ but it would seem that:-

(i) ITALY can maintain this 205,000 (incl 65,000 CC.RR) only with assistance from the Allies.

(ii) the Allies should continue to maintain their respective service units.

(iii) the figure of 205,000 should be within easily adjustable distance of the post-treaty figure.

If so and when authorised and implemented, a further big step will have been taken in the transition from a war to a peace footing. Even if it is decided to await the peace-treaty decisions, it will be of advantage to work to the proposal (particularly on Internal Security grounds) and thus sort out the Italian Army into a suitable general organisation which is likely to differ little from that which may be permitted under the Peace Treaty.

5. PHASE "C"

This will constist of a continued re-adjustment of organisation, administration and numbers, which is now happening in Phase "D".

6. PHASE "D"

(a) Once the size, composition and armament of the Italian Army of the future is made known, a fundamental and sweeping reorganisation will be necessary. This will require careful study (much of which has already been done) as it will have to be a long-term policy, involving big questions necessitating inter alia alterations in Italian law and procedure. It cannot be rushed. It cannot be based entirely on British or American ideas, but must take into account Italian susceptibilities and inherent differences of Italian character, mentality and ability.

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(b) Amongst the main problems to be solved will be those of:-

(i) selection and training of officers and NCO's.

(ii) the matter of a conscript or long service army.

(iii) overhaul of the administrative system.

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6. PHASE "D"

(b) (Cont'd)

(iv) redesign of the legal and disciplinary system.

(v) re-organisation of training to meet the needs, the numbers and the equipment of the army permitted.

(vi) examination of all establishments and unit organisation. For example, if the Gruppi are to exist to deter and resist aggression, from without, they will have to be reorganised to be able function on ITALY's mountainous frontiers. Etc, Etc.

It is obvious, as I have said, that such vast changes must be planned with care and to suit inherent Italian character and potentialities; that they will take years to implement and bear fruit; and that they will need sympatheticAllied assistance and guidance.
The point I wish to stress is that the comprehensive plan for Phase "D" can NOT be made until the terms of the Peace Treaty are made known, though, as I say, we have anticipated and already made progress in the required and anticipated direction.

7. POSITION AND STATUS OF THE ITALIAN ARMY vis-a-vis THE ALLIES

(a) This in Phases "A" and "B" is quite clear and remains as in the various Directives issued by AFHQ.

(b) In Phase "C", a new Directive will be necessary, so as to make clear the new situation whereby:-

(i) the Italians control fully their 205,000 (incl 65,000 CC.RR) subject to over-riding general control and power of veto of S.A.C.

(ii) the Italians administer the BR-ITI and ITI-ITI service units, though detailed control is still maintained by S.A.C. through MMIA.

(iii) Districts still continue to control the British troops in their areas, as well as the use of BR-ITI service units.

(iv) the requirements of the U.S.A. and A.C. are met and safe-guarded.

(c) In Phase "D", the Italians presumably will have complete control of their army, subject to the terms of the Peace Treaty and the assist-ance and guidance of MMIA under S.A.C., who would also be responsible that the terms of the Peace Treaty were carried out.

8. M.M.I.A.

(a) In Phases "A" and "B" the existing W.E. and functions of MMIA

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aggression, from without, they will have to be reorganised to be able
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8. M.M.I.A.

(a) During Phases "A" and "B" the existing W.E. and functions of MMIA should remain unaltered.

(b) In Phase "C", with the considerably reduced commitment as regards the 140,000, MMIA could be reduced by about 45% - see Appx "B".

(c) In Phase "D", the functions of MMIA will become those of inspection, advice and guidance (mainly on the higher level) and could then be reduced in W.E. by about a further 40% - see Appx "C".

(d) On all counts, I consider it essential that MMIA should throughout remain an integrated Anglo-American HQ.

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8. M.M.I.A. (Cont'd)

(e) I consider that :-

(i) a reduced BLU will be necessary with combat groups only until the end of Phase "C"; that BLU's should be considered as outposts of MMIA on the one hand and as the operational link between Districts and Combat Groups on the other (recommendations as regards size of reduced BLU are being sent to AFHQ shortly).

(ii) All Italian Army training should come under MMIA (see my proposal to this effect in my G/Trg/1 dated 30 Jun), "training increment" with BLU's being absorbed into and becoming part of the BLU.

(iii) The "F" BL & TU at CESANO be directly under MMIA and considered as the MMIA Training staff, though located for convenience and efficiency at CESANO; the GSO II(Training) at HQ MMIA being the staff-officer of GSO I(SD), Operations and Training, at HQ MMIA.

9. CONCLUSION

The above gives my general views of the whole picture as I see it. My American 2nd in command is in complete agreement. The implementation depends on decisions in connection with Phases "C" and "D". I have written this memorandum so as to put my ideas before you for your decision and to shew the developments I foresee as advisable so as to ensure continuity in the simplest way and the maximum gradual development of a new and efficient Italian Army.

L. Browning

Major General
GOC MMIA

ADC/EJC

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APPENDIX "A" TO MMIA LETTER
C/3 DATED 23 JUL 1945

NOTES ON TRG OF ITALIAN ARMY

PHASE A

1. During this phase of the covering memorandum (i.e. up 'till 8 May 45) the Trg Commitment was as under:-

(a) Rft Trg Centre I.C.F. CESANO

For training and holding rfts for Combat Gps. Ceiling 13,000.

(b) Base Rft Depots (BR-ITI)

For varying numbers of Service Unit personnel. Capacity 4,000 to 6,000 each. Located at:-

802	ORVIETO	Remaining as Reorganization Centre
803	RAVISCANINA ex AVRACOLA	Closing w.e.f. August 45.
804	TRANI	Closed w.e.f. July 45.

(c) Specialist Schools

M.T. School	BARI (POLIGNANO)	Closed w.e.f. June 45.
Signals School	FRANCAVILLA	Closed in May. Transferred to CESANO.
Engineer School	CAPUA	Closed w.e.f. June 45.

2. The training arrangements to handle the above were:-

	Lt. Col.	Major	Capt	Sub	
(a) CESANO					
"F" HQ	1	4	1		
Trg Incr		5	2		
RA Trg Team	1	1	3	1	
(b) MMIA	1	2	2		
	3	12	8	1	Total 24

(c) Trg Increments at HQ I.C. Gps.

1 GII(Trg) and (normally) 6 Majors.

PHASE B

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(a) Rft Trg Centre I.C.F. CESANO

For training and holding rfts for Combat Gps. Ceiling 13,000.

(b) Base Rft Depots (ER-ITT)

For varying numbers of Service Unit personnel. Capacity 4,000 to 6,000 each. Located at:-

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	3	12	8	1 Total 24

(c) Trg Increments at HQ I.C. Cps.

1 CII(Trg) and (normally) 6 Majors.

PHASE B

3. During this phase, owing to the overall reduction of the Italian Army and consequently of personnel to be trained, a concentration at CESANO was [illegible] commitment then was, (and still is) as under:-

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(a) RTC ICF CESANO

For all Combat Tps and Service Tps. Ceiling reduced by AFHQ from 13,000 to 7,500 (excl Staffs)(Rft holding reduced from 25% to 5%).

(b) Depots as in para 1(b) above have been or are being disbanded. The exception is 802 BRD at ORVIETO, which is retained as a Reorganization Centre.

(c) Specialist Schools as in para 1(c) above have been closed and are concentrated at CESANO.

4. In view of:-

(a) The reduced commitment (vide para 3(a) above).

(b) The abolition of the BRD's (vide para 1(b) above) and the consequent concentration of all Trg at CESANO (vide para 3(c) above).

AFHQ considered that an economy in British Trg Staff could and should be effected. MMLA agreed and as a result the following arrangements were proposed by MMLA and agreed to by AFHQ:-

	Lt. Col. (Local Col)	Majors	Capt	Sub
(i) HL & TU	1	10	5	1
(ii) HQ MMLA		1 GII(Trg)		
	1	11	5	1
				TOTAL 18

(iii) Br Trg Increments attached HLU of Combat Gps, to remain pro tem. DMT has recommended their withdrawal, and the matter is being discussed at this moment.

5. (a) It should be noted that since all the Trg is now done at RTC ICF the HL & TU attached to RTC now takes the place of the former large Trg Staff at HQ MMLA.

(b) MMLA is but 15 miles from the RTC and almost daily exchanges of visits, correspondence, and phone calls takes place. The importance and advantage of the having the HL & TU on the spot at CESANO cannot be over emphasised.

(c) The Liaison Unit side of the HL & TU is in charge of both "A" and "Q" Branch matters, and deals with forwarding of rfts and supply of equipment, the whole of this and the Trg (TU side) being under one Senior Officer.

(d) The Training meetings held at MMLA are attended by all Branches of the Staffs of HL & TU and MMLA and also G-1 of DMT Office.

Minutes are circulated and action taken is reported at next

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(b) The abolition of the ERD's (vide para 3(c) above). quent concentration of all Trg at CESANO (vide para 3(c) above).

AFHQ considered that an economy in British Trg Staff could and should be effected. MMLA agreed and as a result the following arrangements were proposed by MMLA and agreed to by AFHQ:-

	Lt. Col. (Local Col)	Majors	Capt	Sub
(i) HL & TU	1	10	5	1
(ii) HQ MMLA		1 GII(Trg)		
	1	11	5	1
				TOTAL 18

(iii) Br Trg Increments attached HLU of Combat Gps, to remain pro tem. DMT has recommended their withdrawal, and the matter is being discussed at this moment.

5. (a) It should be noted that since all the Trg is now done at RTC ICF the HL & TU attached to RTC now takes the place of the former large Trg Staff at HQ MMLA.

(b) MMLA is but 15 miles from the RTC and almost daily exchanges of visits, correspondence, and phone calls takes place. The importance and advantage of the having the HL & TU on the spot at CESANO cannot be over emphasised.

(c) The Liaison Unit side of the HL & TU is in charge of both "A" and "Q" Branch matters, and deals with forwarding of rfts and supply of equipment, the whole of this and the Trg (TU side) being under one Senior Officer.

(d) The Training meetings held at MMLA are attended by all Branches of the Staffs of HL & TU and MMLA and also G-1 of DMT Office.

Minutes are circulated and action taken is reported at next meeting.

6. The org of the RTC is shown in Appx "A1"; a list of schools is shown at Appx "A2", and a list of courses run is shown at Appx "A3".

PHASE C

7. (a) The Trg Commitment during this phase will be smaller since the Italian Army is to undergo a reduction from 313,000 to a proposed figure of 140,000.

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(b) The Trg arrangements at present in force have however been designed to be easily convertible to the probable needs of Phase C, and in due course (as far as can be foreseen) to the most suitable lay-out for Phase D as well.

8. MILITARY ACADEMY (LECCE)


(a) This was sanctioned by the Allies and organized by the Italians during 1944 on pre-war lines. This was inevitable as it was not possible at that time to undertake a fundamental reorganization on an Allied basis. Moreover the output was very small compared with the 15,000 add. officers authorised and available for Allied needs. The policy has been for the cadets to receive their basis and initial technical training at the Military Academy, the more advanced training being given in Italian units such as Combat Groups or specialist Schools such as CESANO.

(b) This Academy, like other parts of the Italian Army, will have to be fundamentally reorganised. Minor improvements have already been made and the whole problem is under examination at this moment by MMIA in conjunction with IMT. But as its training and output by arms, largely depends on the size, composition and armament to be authorised under the Peace Treaty and not yet known, it will be necessary to await this information so as to make only one major change on to the post-treaty basis

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R T C - I C F



NOTE: 1.


Where numbers
are too small to warr
courses are arranged

i.e. Courses for amm
-cal Storemen and Gen
have been arranged at
PONTECAGNO.

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R T C - I C F

Appx A1 to MMIA letter
G/3 dated 23 JUL 1945



NOTE: 1.

Where numbers requiring special courses are too small to warrant a School at CESANO, courses are arranged at Br Establishment.

i.e. Courses for ammunition Storement, Technical Storemen and General R.A.O.C. procedure have been arranged at R.A.O.C. Trg Depot PONTECAGNO.

APPENDIX "A" TO ADMIN LETTER
G/33 DATED 23 JUL 1945

LIST OF SCHOOLS

1. **Infantry School** (For Junior NCO Students from RTC)

Pl Tac Courses
Pioneer Courses
A/Tk Courses
3" Mortar Courses
Shipers Courses
Carrier Courses

2. **Infantry Specialist Trg School** (For Specialist personnel from RTC)

Anti Tk Courses
Carrier Courses
3" Mortar Courses
Mines Courses
P.T. Courses
Hygiene Courses

3. **Mechanics School**

Armourers and Gun Fitters Wing
Motor Mechanics Wing
Driver Mechanics Wing

4. **Driving and Maintenance School**

5. **Provost School**

Artillery School

Signals School

Engineer School

6. **All Arms Instructors School**

This school is run for instructors from fmns outside the RTC. It is not therefore strictly a part of the RTC but it is convenient that it should be administered by RTC and supervised by Commander BL & TU.

ws

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section J-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A3" TO
G/3 DATED 23

SCHEDULE OF COURSES AT RTC ICF - CESANO

ITALIAN SIGNALS SCHOOL

	NAME OF COURSE	MAX NO. OF STUDENTS	AT PRESENT UNDER TRAINING	DURATION OF COURSE	BRIEF SYLLAB
(a)	Operators Wireless Course	60	22	17 Weeks	Operating procedure, E & M Wi instruments 9, 19, 22 sets, fe tenance, batteries and chargi Exercises.
(b)	Operators Line Course	40	25	13 Weeks	Operating procedure, E & M el Instruments - Testing, practi tenance. Exercises.
	" " " (Inf)	40			
	" " " (Arty)	20			
(c)	Switchboard Operators Course	20	28	4 Weeks	E & M - Telephones, indicator Instruments. Telephones DV a board UC 10 Line. F and F. Security. Operating - Scheme
	" " " (Inf)	10	3		
	" " " (Arty)	10			
(d)	Short Course for Linemen	30 - 40	7	4 Weeks	E & M - Elementary principles phones, Fullerphones, Switchb Superimposing Units, cable la ing and maintenance.
(e)	Instrument Mechanics Course	20	16	17 Weeks	Knowledge of Training Manuals and testing - wireless and li work with tools.
(f)	Electrician Signal Course	5 - 10	5	8 Weeks	Knowledge of Manuals applicab E & M. Electrical Testing an ments. Telephones. Manipula Engine. Map reading.

1945

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A3" TO MMIA LETTER
G/3 DATED 23 JUL 1945

SCHEDULE OF COURSES AT RTC ICF - CESANO

ITALIAN SIGNALS SCHOOL

	MAX NO. OF STUDENTS	AT PRESENT UNDER TRAINING	DURATION OF COURSE	BRIEF SYLLABUS
urse	60	22	17 Weeks	Operating procedure, E & M Wireless theory, wireless instruments 9, 19, 22 sets, fault-finding and maintenance, batteries and charging. Exercises. Periodical Testing
(Inf) (Arty)	40 40 20	25	13 Weeks	Operating procedure, E & M elementary principles. Instruments - Testing, practical testing and maintenance. Exercises. Periodical Testing.
Course " (Inf) " (Arty)	20 10 10	28 3	4 Weeks	E & M - Telephones, indicators and switchboards. Instruments. Telephones DV and F and Line. Switchboard UC 10 Line. F and F. Procedure. Signal Security. Operating - Schemes and phonograms.
men	30 - 40	7	4 Weeks	E & M - Elementary principles. Instruments - Telephones, Fullerphones, Switchboards. Test Set. Superimposing Units, cable laying drill. Line Testing and maintenance.
Course	20	16	17 Weeks	Knowledge of Training Manuals, E & M. Instruments and testing - wireless and line. Practical bench work with tools.
urse	5 - 10	5	8 Weeks	Knowledge of Manuals applicable to manuals in use. E & M. Electrical Testing and measuring instruments. Telephones. Manipulative work. Charging Engine. Map reading.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

ITALIAN SIGNALS SCHOOL RTC ICF (Continued)

Name of Course	Max No of Students	At present under Training	Duration of Course	Brief Syllabus
(g) Regimental Operators Course (Arty)	40	33	13 Weeks	E & M. Operating, procedure R/T and W/T. Instruments - setting up and operating, te nance. Telephones and Fullerphones. Lam W/T sets 19, 22, 11 and 21. Wavemeters. maintenance of batteries, line laying.
(h) Regimental Operators Course (Inf)	40	28	13 Weeks	E & M. Operating, procedure R/T and Sign Sigs security. Instruments L/T and W/T, Fullerphones. 10 line and superposing un and 48. Test set. Line laying. Excerci
(i) DRs Course	25	17	4 Weeks	DR duties. Maintenance of MC. Map readi duties. Telephones. (men who claim to have had previous MC ex selected for this Course)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

ITALIAN SIGNALS SCHOOL RIC ICF (Continued)

ax o of tudents	At present under Training	Duration of Course	Brief Syllabus
40	33	13 Weeks	E & M. Operating, procedure R/T and W/T. Signal Security. Instruments - setting up and operating, tests and maintenance. Telephones and Fullerphones. Lamp and test set, port. W/T sets 19, 22, 11 and 21. Wavemeters. Charging and maintenance of batteries, line laying.
40	28	13 Weeks	E & M. Operating, procedure R/T and Signal Office duties. Sigs security. Instruments L/T and W/T, telephones and Fullerphones. 10 line and superposing units. W/T set 18 and 48. Test set. Line laying. Excercices.
25	17	4 Weeks	DR duties. Maintenance of MC. Map reading. Linesman duties. Telephones. (men who claim to have had previous MC experience are selected for this Course)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

ENGINEER TRAINING

Subject	Duration of Course	Outline of Syllabus
(a) Fieldworks	3 Weeks	Care of tools, knots and lashings, levelling, sandbag w constructing trenches, drainage, revetment, blocks and derricks, and sheers, wire fencing, Somerfield Tracking Jeep Tracks, use of local Timber for tracks. Water sup of compressor.
(b) Bridging	3 Weeks	Elementary Bailey - day and night, short span RSJ impr cribs, construction of timber tresles.
(c) Mine Warfare	2 Weeks	Course on Brit explosives, methods of initiating charge charges, unexploded bombs, mines Allied and Enemy, layi ding discarded mines, use of prodders and detectors, ga minefield gapping drill and recce, road clearing drill,
	This course also for Infantry Pioneer Instructors.	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ENGINEER TRAINING

Duration of Course	Outline of Syllabus
3 Weeks	Care of tools, knots and lashings, levelling, sandbag walling, Fd Geometry constructing trenches, drainage, revetment, blocks and tackles, anchorages, derricks, and sheers, wire fencing, Somerfield Tracking, construction of Jeep Tracks, use of local Timber for tracks. Water supply equipment, use of compressor.
3 Weeks	Elementary Bailey - day and night, short span RSJ improvised br, use of br cribs, construction of timber tresles.
2 Weeks	Course on Brit explosives, methods of initiating charges, Beehives, mine charges, unexploded bombs, mines Allied and Enemy, laying mines and recording discarded mines, use of prodders and detectors, gap marking equipment, minefield gapping drill and recce, road clearing drill, booby traps.

This course also for Infantry Pioneer Instructors.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Appendix
dated 2

PROVOST SCHOOL, RTC ICF

Name of Course	Number on Course		Duration of Course	Brief Syllabus and Star
	Offrs	NCOs		
Pro course for CC.RR of Pro sections Italian Combat Groups.	5	50	5 Weeks	For CC.RR Drill, PT, Mapreading, pro duties in use and practice) veh classification veh staging and parking, rd discipli of move during br, the functions of For Full Ranks and Officers. The above, together with adv instr o control of PW, cam and parking of ve notes on discipline.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

PROVOST SCHOOL, RTC ICF

Number on Course		Duration of Course	Brief Syllabus and Standard
Offrs	NCOs		
5	50	5 Weeks	For CC.RR Drill, PT, Mapreading, pro duties in the Fd, MT trg, TC, (eqpt, use and practice) veh classifications, method of tfc circuits, veh staging and parking, rd disciplines and org, and control of move during br, the functions of CC.RR withinbthe Group. For Full Ranks and Officers. The above, together with adv instr on treatment, duties and control of PW, cam and parking of vehs in the fd, div mov, adv notes on discipline.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ITALIAN SCHOOL (MECHANICS) RTC ICF

Name of Course	Duration of Course	Brief Syllabus of course and
(a) Vehicle Mechanics	6 Weeks	Test of mech aptitudem theory of IC and CI engines, rep to eqpt of this unit, test and adjust alignment, diagno and execute simple improvised repairs, care and maint o Class III
(b) Driver Mechanics	4 Weeks	Must be a driver. Test of mech aptitude, theory of IC practical knowledge of gear bnx, transfer box, steering practical fault-finding, read mech drawings, maint cloc execute running repairs. Class II
(c) Gun Fitters	6 Weeks	Must have previous engr wksp experience. Tested to wor simple sketches mark accurately, correct method of usin simple soldering operations. (2 weeks) Must have working knowledge of 6,17 or 25 pr or 40 mm to breach mechanisms, buffer and recuperator systems, traversing gears and associated stores. (4 weeks) Class III
(d) Armourers	2 Weeks	Must have a good wksp experience. Principles of and r 38 pistols, Bren 2-in Mortar, 3-in Mortar, PIAT and Th Class III
(e) Maintenance of Universal and LLoyd Carriers	1 Week	Maint and adjustment of UNIVERSAL and LLOYD carriers.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

ITALIAN SCHOOL (MECHANICS) RTC ICF

Duration of Course	Brief Syllabus of course and standard
6 Weeks	Test of mech aptitudem theory of IC and CI engines, repairs and adjustments to eqpt of this unit, test and adjust alignment, diagnose electrical faults and execute simple improvised repairs, care and maint of accumulatrs. Class III
4 Weeks	Must be a driver. Test of mech aptitude, theory of IC and CI engines, practical knowledge of gear box, transfer box, steering and differential practical fault-finding, read mech drawings, maint electrical system, execute running repairs. Class II
6 Weeks	Must have previous engr wksp experience. Tested to work to .002-in read simple sketches mark accurately, correct method of using and sharpening tools, simple soldering operations. (2 weeks) Must have working knowledge of 6,17 or 25 pr or 40 mm guns. Do minor repairs to breach mechanisms, buffer and recuperator systems, sighting elevating and traversing gears and associated stores. (4 weeks) Class III
2 Weeks	Must have a good wksp experience. Principles of and repairs to .303 rifles. 38 pistols, Bren 2-in Mortar, 3-in Mortar, PIAT and Thompson gun. Class III
1 Week	Maint and adjustment of UNIVERSAL and LLOYD carriers.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A3" TO MMIA LET
G/3 DATED 23 JUL 1945

DRIVING AND MECHANICS SCHOOL

COURSE	NUMBER ATTENDING COURSE	DURATION 4 WEEKS	OUTLINE OF SYLLABUS
(a) D & M Students	300	1 Week	Drivers responsibilities, explanation of task sy engine, detail of tasks 1 to 7. Driving instruc
		1 Week	Details of task 8 to 16 AB 406. Driving instru
		2 Weeks	Tasks 1 to 8. Tasks 9 to 16. Faultfinding running repairs, repairs a driver work tickets. AB 412, discipline on the road, special instructions for military vehicles, roa downs, towing vehicles, recovery of vehicles fr ground etc, system of supply of petrol and oil, vehicle for complete inspection, camouflage, co convoy discipline, convoy platoon commanders du duties, convoy signals - air attacks, anti-gas skidding means, fitting of anti skid chains, pr taken when temperature is below zero, troop car carrying convoys, carrying of ammunition, explo mables, use of fire extinguishers, fire precaut vehicle repair service, day and night convoy co

The programme is based on the British Task system of maintenance, explaining the task in detail and finally supervisio carrying out the task. The course is divided into four platoons, two of the platoons doing practical work and the oth explanation. The organisation of the school allows for four to five pupils to each training vehicle and driver instru

WS

1202

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A3" TO MMIA LETTER
C/3 DATED 23 JUL 1945 (Cont'd)

DRIVING AND MECHANICS SCHOOL

MBER ATTENDING COURSE	DURATION 4 WEEKS	OUTLINE OF SYLLABUS
300	1 Week	Drivers responsibilities, explanation of task system, four stroke engine, detail of tasks 1 to 7. Driving instruction.
	1 Week	Details of task 8 to 16 AB 406. Driving instruction.
	2 Weeks	Tasks 1 to 8. Tasks 9 to 16. Faultfinding running repairs, repairs a driver must not effect, work tickets. AB 412, discipline on the road, movement rules, special instructions for military vehicles, road accidents, breakdowns, towing vehicles, recovery of vehicles from ditches, soft ground etc, system of supply of petrol and oil, preparation of vehicle for complete inspection, camouflage, convoy control and convoy discipline, convoy platoon commanders duties, drivers duties, convoy signals - air attacks, anti-gas defence, anti skidding means, fitting of anti skid chains, precautions to be taken when temperature is below zero, troop carrying and load carrying convoys, carrying of ammunition, explosives and inflammables, use of fire extinguishers, fire precautions, system of vehicle repair service, day and night convoy exercises.

tish Task system of maintenance, explaining the task in detail and finally supervision of the driver
is divided into four platoons, two of the platoons doing practical work and the other two theoretical
the school allows for four to five pupils to each training vehicle and driver instructor.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A3" TO MMLA G/3 DATED 23 JUL

ITALIAN ALL ARMS INSTRUCTORS SCHOOL

NAME OF COURSE	CAPACITY Offrs	CAPACITY NCOs	DURATION	BRIEF SYLLABUS AND STANDARD
TACTICAL WING				
(a) Senior Officers	15		3 Weeks	To train Senior Officers in the tactical handli supporting arms and to consider the problems of and to consider the training of a Battalion.
(b) Coy Commanders	20		3 Weeks	To train Officers in the tactical handling of with supporting arms.
(c) Junior Leaders	36		3 Weeks	To train Junior Officers in the tactical handl conditions of Battle. To give them a sound ba their own platoons.
WEAPON TRAINING WING				
(a) Platoon weapons	20	20	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the technical and tact platoon weapons.
(b) 3-in Mortar	10	10	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the technical and tact 3-in Mortar.
(c) 6 pr Anti tank Gun	10	10	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the technical and tact 6 pr A/Tk Gun.
(d) Snipers	10	10	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the art of sniping and training snipers in their own units.
ADMINISTRATION WING				
(a) General Administration	20	20	3 Weeks	To train Officers in Unit Administration under war including:-
(b) Hygiene	10	10	3 Weeks	Unit Hygiene
(c) Man Management	15		12 Days	Two courses during each SIVA session. First later Senior Officers. To train Officers in management and to enable them to act as Unit subject. A small manual has been produced by translated and will be the basis of the cours

1204

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ITALIAN ALL ARMS INSTRUCTORS SCHOOL

APPENDIX "A3" TO MMIA LETTER G/3 DATED 23 JUL 1945 (Cont'd)

CAPACITY Offrs	CAPACITY NCOs	DURATION	BRIEF SYLLABUS AND STANDARD
15		3 Weeks	To train Senior Officers in the tactical handling of a Battalion with supporting arms and to consider the problems of a Brigade Commander and to consider the training of a Battalion.
20		3 Weeks	To train Officers in the tactical handling of an Infantry Company with supporting arms.
36		3 Weeks	To train Junior Officers in the tactical handling of a platoon under conditions of Battle. To give them a sound basis on which to train their own platoons.
20	20	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the technical and tactical handling of the platoon weapons.
10	10	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the technical and tactical handling of the 3-in Mortar.
10	10	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the technical and tactical handling of the 6 pr A/Tk Gun.
10	10	3 Weeks	To train instructors in the art of sniping and to be capable of training snipers in their own units.
20	20	3 Weeks	To train Officers in Unit Administration under all conditions of war including:-
10	10	3 Weeks	Unit Hygiene
15		12 Days	Two courses during each SIVA session. First of Junior Officers, later Senior Officers. To train Officers in all Branches of man management and to enable them to act as Unit instructors in this subject. A small manual has been produced by MMIA, is being translated and will be the basis of the course.

1205


Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Suggested WE for PHASE "C"

Appendix "B" to
letter G/3 dated

GOC - Maj Gen
MA - Capt

C of S - Col (US)



SCRE II

SCR SIGS II

Medical	Adm Staff	S & T	Ordnance	REME.
DADMS	Capt or Lieut(BR)	ADST	DADOS	DADME
S.C. "Med"	Capt (US)	DADS	Capt (US)	SCREME
		DADT	Lieut (US)	
		S.C. "ST"		
		S.C. "ST"		
		S.C. "ST"		

"G" Liaison

	(Br)	(US)
GSC I(L)	1	3
GSC II(L)	4	4
GSO III(L)	5	-

"F" liar cat with MMI

Fiv Com

COMPARATIVE TABLE

	At Present		PHASE "C"		PHASE "D"		% reduction from present WE to PHASE "C" WE		% reduction from PHASE "C" WE to PHASE "D" WE	
	(BR)	(US)	(BR)	(US)	(BR)	(US)	(BR)	(US)	(BR)	(US)
Officers	67	25	42	12	23	9	42%	46%	41%	35%
OR/EM	174	72	91	40	60	26				
Italians	27	-	18	-	10	-				
Total	268	97	151	52	93	35				

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

"C"

Appendix "B" to MIA
letter G/3 dated 23 July 45.

GCC - Maj Gen
MA - Capt

C of S - Col (US)

A.A.G.

Asst G1(US)

Int)

DAAG(O)

S.C. "A"

DAAG(P)

S.C. "A"

A.Q.M.G.

DAQMG

S.C. "Q"

Asst G4(US)

S.C. "Q"

AQMG/Asst G4(US)

S.C. "Q"

Medical

DADMS
S.C. "Med"

Adm Staff

Capt or Lieut(BR)
Capt (US)

S & T

ADST
DADS
DADT
S.C. "ST"
S.C. "ST"
S.C. "ST"

Ordnance

DADOS
Capt (US)
Lieut (US)

REME.

DADME
SCHEME

"F" BL and TU incl large trg staff located at CESANO. Deals with all branches of MMIA staff.

Five BLUs attached Combat Groups


E "C"	PHASE "D"		% reduction from present WE to PHASE "C" WE		% reduction from PHASE "C" WE to PHASE "D" WE	
(US)	(BR)	(US)	(BR)	(US)	(BR)	(US)
12	23	9	42%	46%	41%	35%
40	60	26				
-	10	-				
52	93	35				

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Appendix "C" to MM
letter G/3 dated 23

Suggest WE for PHASE "D"

GOC - Maj Gen(possibly Brig later, when
MA - Capt foundations have been laid)



"F

COMPARATIVE TABLE


	At Present (BR)	At Present (US)	PHASE "C" (BR)	PHASE "C" (US)	PHASE "D" (BR)	PHASE "D" (US)	% reduction from present WE to PHASE "C" WE (BR)	% reduction from present WE to PHASE "C" WE (US)	% reduction fr to PHASE "D" W (BR)	% reduction fr to PHASE "D" W (US)
Officers	67	25	42	12	23	9				
EM/ORs	174	72	91	40	60	26				
Italians	27	-	18	-	10	-				
Total	268	97	151	52	93	35	42%	46%	41%	

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

for PHASE "D"

Appendix "C" to MM
letter G/3 dated 23 July 45.

GOC - Maj Gen(possibly Brig later, when
MA - Capt foundations have been laid)



LE

PHASE "C" (BR)	PHASE "C" (US)	PHASE "D" (BR)	PHASE "D" (US)
42	12	23	9
91	40	60	26
18	-	10	-
151	52	93	35

% reduction from present WE to PHASE "C" WE

(BR)	(US)
42%	46%

% reduction from PHASE "C" to PHASE "D" WE.

(BR)	(US)
41%	35%

1209

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512 U.S. ARMY

Major General T. S. AIREY

GBI/DO/176/45

14 July 1945

Dear Lampson,

Thank you for your G/3 of 12 July and for taking so much trouble about LEVESI. The matter seems to be pretty well fixed up now and I think Allan Arnold will be happy again!

Do come and stay with us when you are down this way. We still live on the top of the hill which is not quite so hot as the rest of this place.

Yours ever

Terence Airey

LB
F.O.
14 July

Major General L. BROWNING, C.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

TOP SECRET

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

G/3

12 July 45.

Dear

1. I have been asked by the British Political Adviser to A.C. to discuss with the Italian War Ministry the situation of the Italian Assistant Military Attache in ANKARA, arising out of Allan Arnold's letter of 22 May to you, of which I have a copy.

2. The Italian War Minister has been told confidentially in general terms that LEVESI has not been cooperating and has readily agreed to take the necessary action to have Lt.Col LEVESI recalled immediately. Appendix 'A' is a copy of the warning order from the War Ministry to LEVESI himself; Appendix 'B' is a request from the War Ministry to the Italian Foreign Office to arrange for his return as soon as possible, since it lies with the latter Ministry to give the executive instructions.

3. By a recent decision of the Italian Government, for reasons of economy, the Italian Armed Services are intended to be represented in future at most capitals by a single attache. ANKARA is one of these, and the representative there is to be the Naval Attache. This is the reason why there is no mention of a replacement for LEVESI and why it is a perfectly natural thing to do to withdraw LEVESI, apart from his anti-British attitude.

4. You will see from both appendices that LEVESI is being instructed to hand over his responsibilities to the Naval representative, and that separate instructions regarding Air Force matters, which LEVESI appears to have been handling as well, will be given to him by the Air Force Ministry.

5. I don't know whether the new situation - i.e. no Military Attache at all - is desirable or not from our point of view. But that is a political matter, and outside my sphere. The main thing is that action has been taken quite naturally and the offending "limb" will soon be removed.

Yours

L.B.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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Yours

L.B.

Major General T.S. AIREY,
Office of the Chief of Staff G-2,
A.P.O. 512, U.S. ARMY.

Copy to : Political Adviser, A.C.

/dgo

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Appendix 'A'

TRANSLATION

FROM : M. O. V. Signal No. 215 217/11

TO : Mil Attache at Ankara.

This Ministry has order your immediate return and that of all the personnel of the Military Office under your command as acting Military Attache. You are requested to hand over urgently to the Naval Attache who will carry out duties as Mil now assigned to you.

As regards functions as Air Attache which has been assigned to you instructions will be sent to you direct by Authorities concerned.

Signed : Col. TONDAULT.

/Copy

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Appendix 'B'

TRANSLATION

FROM : M. O. W.

TO : M.O.FA.
M.O.M.
M.O.A.

Ref : 215218/11
Date : 11/7/45.

Subject : Office of the Military Attache at ANKARA.

This Ministry pending any decision which may be taken by the Presidency of the Council in respect of the Military Attache's to the Diplomatic Representatives abroad, has decided to recall the Acting Military Attache - Lt.Col. LÜTFİ - to the Embassy at Ankara as well as all the personnel of the Military Office under his control.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is therefore requested to kindly arrange for the return of said personnel at their earliest possible convenience.

Lt.Col. LÜTFİ will be requested directly by this Ministry to hand over to the Naval Attache at Ankara who will have to be provided with the necessary credentials as Military Attache in addition to being Naval Attache. As regards the Naval Attache's credentials as Air Attache the Air Ministry is requested to kindly contact the Naval Authorities direct.

The Chief of the Cabinet.

/dgc

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

305/4

Major General Langley Browning.
The Director,
Land Forces Sub-Commission.

Subject: Assistant Military Attaché, Angora.

I attach a copy of a personal letter from the British military Attaché at Angora to Major General T.J. Airey.

General Airey has approached the office of the President minister at Caserta and asked whether there is anything that the British authorities can do to accelerate the appointment of a new Italian Military Attaché at Angora who is to replace Levanti. In view of the policy of the Foreign Office and the State Department on Italian service Attachés, the first half of this request may be rather difficult but it might be possible to approach the Italian Government for a replacement for Levanti which in the circumstances seems to be eminently desirable.

Mr Hopkinson would be grateful if you would speak to the Chief of Staff of the Italian Army pointing out that Levanti has not been collaborating with his British colleague and on the contrary seems to be in the hands of the Soviet Military Attaché and that it might therefore be desirable that he should be recalled at an early date.

A.K. Maffrey
Lieut. General (RE)

5.VII.45

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

127.

COPY

British Embassy,
ANKARA.

CONFIDENTIAL

22nd May, 1943

My dear Terence,

I feel that I ought to report that I am somewhat perturbed at the recent attitude of the Italian Assistant Military Attaché here, Lieut-Colonel Levesi.

2. Levesi was originally Assistant Military Attaché in Istanbul whose particular job was secret service work. During the tenure of office of Colonel ZAVATTARI, the late Military Attaché, Levesi worked hard and the information he obtained was incorporated in Zavattari's reports which, you will probably remember, were on the whole good and useful.

3. Last December, Cavattari, after an imperial row with his Ambassador, was recalled to Italy and a new Italian Military Attaché has been in process of coming ever since that date. In the meantime, Levesi has been carrying on.

4. For the first ten weeks or so he co-operated with me perfectly loyally and continued to bring me any information which he picked up. Latterly, however, he has not been near me and is becoming a complete "stooge" of the Russian Military Attaché and his Assistant.

5. It has also come to my ears from sources which I think are quite sure that he is indulging in a certain amount of pro-Russian propaganda. For instance, after the Turks received the denunciation of the Turko-Russian Treaty of Friendship Levesi spread the rumour that the Turks wished to come to heel at once and open discussions with the Russians but that they had been prevented from so doing by British pressure. This, as you know, is a complete lie. Furthermore, he is telling the line amongst his colleagues that the only sensible thing for the Turks to do is to get together at once with the Russians and come to a sensible understanding because, if they count on British support, they are leaning on a broken reed since the British will certainly leave them in the lurch.

6. Levesi is quite a pleasant individual to meet, but excessively smooth and from my fairly intimate knowledge of Italians since I was a child, absolutely untrustworthy. Personally, therefore, I feel that the sooner the new Italian Military Attaché is posted here the better and the sooner after his arrival that Levesi can be returned to Italy the more profitable it will be for both British and Turkish interests.

Yours ever,
(Sgd) Allen Arnold.

Major-General T.N. Airey,
Office of the Chief of Staff G-2,
AFO 512, US Army.

Copy to HM War Office.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Copy #1

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

CWW/sc

MEMORANDUM

9 June 1945

Subject: Relaxation of Control of the Italian Army

To : The Commanding General
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)

1. (a) Reference is made to your memorandum 30 May 1945, from which the following is quoted:

> "13(d) An examination by AC in conjunction with the Italian Government as to the extent to which the Italian Economy can support the authorized 'interim force' on 1 Sep (and thereafter) in order to ascertain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies and equipment, excluding armaments."

(b) Further reference is made to letter of the Chief Commissioner 7 June 1945, from which the following is quoted:

> "3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum."

2. In order that the Economic Section may carry out the instructions from Admiral Stone, it is requested that Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) furnish this section with a statement of the supply requirements for the "interim force". It is suggested that this statement of supply requirements (exclusive of armament) on a quarterly basis provide for a minimum strength of 140,000 and a maximum of 313,000, both figures exclusive of (CCRR).

Sent by POC
RAC 9/6

E. B. McKINLEY
Brigadier General USA
Deputy Vice President

TOP SECRET

Answered in TS/CC/3 16/6/45. MM

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner.

Ref: 8251/180/EC. 7. June 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. With reference to my letter of 24 May 1945, 8251/170/EC, I have now received a memorandum on this subject from GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), a copy of which I enclose.

2. I am in general agreement with this memorandum and make the following recommendations:

(a) That the strength of the Italian Army, excluding such troops which may be required by the Allies, and excluding CC.RR, should be 140,000 until it has been decided at the Peace Conference what the final strength should be.

(b) That complete administrative control of the "interim Army" (as in para (a) above) be handed over to the Italian Government on 1 September 1945, subject to the Allied right of:

(i) re-assuming control in the event of disturbances to the detriment of Allied interests;

(ii) having priority for the accommodation, requisition, rail and port facilities, and

(iii) receiving full and advance information of consultations on Italian Army projects and plans.

(c) That a forecast be made of the number of Italian troops required by the Allies on 1st September and thereafter until so long as the Allies retain troops in Italy.

(d) That AFHQ accept responsibility for supplying Italian troops working for them as in (c) above.

Your early consideration of the above recommendations is requested.

3. In the meantime I will instruct Economic Section to make an examination as recommended in para 13(d) of General Browning's memorandum.

See tag.

ELLERY W. STONE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

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See top

EMERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ (2) (with copy of relevant correspondence).
Land Forces Sub-Com (MMLA)
CA Sec -do-
Econ Sec (For action in accordance with para 3 above).
WaD & IPW Sub-Com
File
Float
Spare (3)

X A. Branch note. I don't think we can seriously hope to achieve the hand over by 1 Sep - i.e. 12 weeks. WP 8 June

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

Subject:- Relaxation of control of the Italian Army

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

G/3
30 May 45

H.Q., Allied Commission
(for Executive Commissioner)

Ref you 8251/AC of 20 May:-

1. As ordered by Chief Commissioner, I discussed the above with the Minister of War personally(see my DO/2 of 21 May to the Minister, copy to you).

Appendix "A" to attached memorandum shows the outcome.

2. In the memorandum itself I have outlined the salient factors of the problem and a possible solution, as I see it.

3. I must mention that, inevitably, decision from C.C.S. take much time(up to 60 days or more) to come through. If this occurs in this case, there will not be time by 1 Sep for the Italians to implement the plan authorized, without considerable rush and confusion. Therefore, if my plan is accepted, it would seem that A.F.H.Q. would have to authorise a temporary plan pending decision by C.C.S. or the general lines on which the problem should be tackled or further explored pro tem; or alternatively press for a very early reply from C.C.S.

4. The Minister of War tells me that he would have liked further time(i.e. till Saturday 2 June) to discuss all this with Gen. CADORNA. But, in view of the time factor and the nebulous state of the problem at present, I have told the Minister that I am forwarding his general views now and that, if he wishes, he can send Gen. CADORNA's suggestions later.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

cc/

(Encl. 2 copies of Memorandum and Appendix "A".)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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Major General,
M.M.I.A.

cc/

(Encl. 2 copies of Memorandum and Appendix "A".)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

Subject:- Relaxation of Control of the Italian Army

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
G/S
30 May 45.

PREAMBLE

1. Chief Commissioner, A.C. envisages the handing over of all ITALY to the Italian Government in due course, tentative date being 1 Sep 45. In order that the Italian Government may then be able to fulfil its functions, it is to be assumed that it must control its own Army.

OBJECT

2. The object of this Memorandum is to examine to what extent and how the control of the Italian Army maybe handed over, subject to the Allied interests involved.

FACTORS

3. Ceiling. The whole problem is conditioned by the ceiling of 313,000(excl. CC.RR) authorized by the C.C.S. which in turn is dependent on world wide supply availability. Presumably this ceiling is not to be increased and may even be reduced in view of world wide shortage of supplies.

4. Peace Treaty. The Peace Treaty will define the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army. But the Peace Treaty may not be worked out and signed for many months. We therefore have to consider the organisation and distribution of an "interim force" which the Italian Government may control and which would be adjusted and merged in due course into the Army authorized by the Peace Treaty.

5. Interim Force. This falls into two broad subdivisions:-

(a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfil its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied man-power,

(b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a

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(a) the part which the Italian Government requires to fulfil its functions, exclusive of service units required by the Allies to save Allied man-power,

(b) the service units referred to in (a). These will be a variable and constantly decreasing figure.

6. Capacity for self-support.

(a) The Italian Army is NOT at present capable of supporting itself. Basic rations are provided by the Allies. Clothing and boots are supplied largely by the Allies, either in the form of new articles or worn items which are renovated by the repair organization set-up.

2/.....

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6. (a)(cont'd) The Italians have relatively small stocks of arms and equipment; this is particularly evident in the Combat Groups which are equipped throughout by the British.

(b) There are, therefore, two aspects of this:-

(i) what steps can the Italians take by 1 Sep(and thereafter)to make their Army self-supporting ?

(ii) what will or can the Allies provide or leave with the Italians to make up the deficiency ?

On this will depend the size and composition of the Interim Force. It is also bound up with the Peace Treaty matter as to whether the Italians shall maintain any armament industry or whether they shall be dependent on the Allies for such armaments as are necessary.

7. Type of Control.

(a) The administration of the Italian Army is carried out by the central plan and procedure produced by the Ministry of War, under Allied direction(through M.M.I.A.) and depending(see para 6) on the supplies made available by the Allies. Administratively therefore it would be impracticable to hand over to the Italians complete Administrative Control or responsibility for their own supply or part of their Army, while the Allies retained such functions for the remainder. This would result in complications such as separate supply depots, a different ration scale for the two parts and difficulties in allotment of personnel; officers removed for delinquency or inefficiency from the Allied part could be transferred to the Italian part, comparison would be drawn by the troops between the two parts etc. etc. In fact the actual working of two parallel yet different systems within the same army is a possibility and a compli-

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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(b) (i) There are two types of general control as regards the Army as a whole viz. operational and administrative.

(ii) Operational control of their Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA is a function of the Italians, no Allied troops being present in these limited areas surrounded by water.

5/.....

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7. (b) (ii)(Cont'd) The matter of operational control is more complex on the Mainland, where large numbers of Allied troops will remain for a long time to come and where Allied interests are more concerned and more affected in the event of disorder.

(iii) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Operational Control under these circumstances

secondly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain, if such Operational Control is handed over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strengths, the three ITI categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficients etc.(see AG.091.711/163 GCT-C dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

(v) A decision will therefore be necessary:-

firstly, as to whether the Allies(particularly in view of para 6(a) above) are prepared to hand over Administrative Control under the circumstances. This would involve an immediate examination of the point mentioned in 6(b) and would necessitate bulk allotments of rations, clothing and boots by the Allies to the Italians for the latter's control and distribution in detail.

secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control, or only the latter.

thirdly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain if such Administrative Control is handed over.

(c) In any event, it seems clear that no matter what degree of

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

over.

(iv) Administrative Control by the Allies, through M.M.I.A., is at present complete and detailed, including the organizational aspect of strengths, the three ITI categories, approval of promotions, removal of inefficients etc.(see AG.091.711/169 GCT-O dated 16 Nov 44 "Command and Administration of the Italian Army").

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secondly, as to whether the Allies are prepared to hand over Administrative as well as Operational Control, or only the latter.

thirdly, as to what rights of information and advice or powers of veto the Allies will retain if such Administrative Control is handed over.

7. (c) In any event, it seems clear that no matter what degree of relaxation of control is granted, the Allies must retain the power to ensure that ITALY carries out the terms of the Peace Treaty without evasion.

8. Phasing.

(a) If the reasoning outlined in para 7 is accepted and decisions are in the affirmative, it follows that either operational control or administrative control or both must be handed over complete on a given date. That is the only phasing possible.

6/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

8. (b) The date or dates depend on:-

(i) the speed with which the Peace Treaty is signed. If this is before 1 Sep., presumably the hand over takes place then, subject to safeguards such as continuing the existence of Italian service units so long as the Allies require the assistance of these.

(ii) the speed with which the necessary decisions can be given and the plan thus worked out, particularly as regards the supply aspect.

(iii) the internal conditions in ITALY and the general international situation on her frontiers e.g. TRIESTE, BOLZANO and AOSTA.

(iv) the extent to which the hand over is kept simple and on broad lines.

(c) In general, I consider that the earlier the hand over takes place, the better. It would give the Italians longer and more experience to set their military house in order while the Allies "hold the ring" in ITALY. Moreover it would be a gesture of trust and would conduce towards the atmosphere of a "friendly ITALY" which is so desirable and which may not be easy if the Italians consider the terms of the Peace Treaty to be severe. Despite the fact that removal of Allied control will undoubtedly result in a loss of Italian military efficiency and of value for supplies rendered, we should accept this. ITALY has got to make a start on her own sometime and, within reason, the sooner the better.

For these reasons and also on the grounds of SIMPLICITY, the hand over of complete operational and administrative control(subject to safeguards) on a definite date seems the correct answer.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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For these reasons and also on the grounds of SIMPLICITY, the hand over of complete operational and administrative control(subject to safeguards) on a definite date seems the correct answer.

9. Position of Allied H.Q's and troops

(a) (i) Assuming hand over of complete operational and administrative control, Allied H.Q's and troops would become "free priority tenants" - a self-controlled organization super-imposed on the self-controlled ITALIAN State.

(ii) The Allied right of reassuming control in the event of disturbances to Allied interests; of priority use of accomodation, requisition and rail and port facilities; of receiving full and

5/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND NO. 785020

9. (a) (ii)(Cont'd) advance information and consultation on Italian projects; and finally of veto; would be safeguarded in the hand over.

(iii) The Ministry of War would work through its Territorial Regional H.Q's. Allied Armies, Districts and Base Sections would work in conjunction with these Regional H.Q's; Ministry of War with A.F.H.Q., through M.M.I.A.

(b) Assuming hand over of operational control only, the Italian forces authorized for this(Combat Groups, I.S. Divs., Guard Bns.) would operate similarly to the CC.RR under the War Ministry through Territorial Regional H.Q's, Allied H.Q's being consulted beforehand.

(c) For efficient and economical effort to ensure Allied priority it would seem that Movement Control should still be retained by the Allies, the Italians bidding for what they require in this respect on a national(not military alone)basis.

10. <u>German P.W.</u>

The respective functions of the Italian Government and the Allies as regards these would need to be specified.

11. <u>Patriots.</u>

The pre-requisite of any plan must be a solution of the difficulties between the C.L.N.A.I. and the existing Italian Government, with, as a corollary, the complete patriot military organization being made subservient to the official Italian War Ministry.

12. <u>Position of M.M.I.A.</u>

(a) Should the hand over of operational control only be permitted, M.M.I.A. will still require its full staff, as its duties will remain virtually unchanged.

(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, M.M.I.A. can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, infor[illegible]

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would operate similarly to the CC.RR under the War Ministry through Territorial Regional H.Q's, Allied H.Q's being consulted beforehand.

(c) For efficient and economical effort to ensure Allied priority it would seem that Movement Control should still be retained by the Allies, the Italians bidding for what they require in this respect on a national(not military alone)basis.

10. German P.W.

The respective functions of the Italian Government and the Allies as regards these would need to be specified.

11. Patriots.

The pre-requisite of any plan must be a solution of the difficulties between the C.L.N.A.I. and the existing Italian Government, with, as a corollary, the complete patriot military organization being made subservient to the official Italian War Ministry.

12. Position of M.M.I.A.

(a) Should the hand over of operational control only be permitted, M.M.I.A. will still require its full staff, as its duties will remain virtually unchanged.

(b) Should the hand over of administrative control be permitted as well, M.M.I.A. can be reduced to a liaison, advisory, information and inspecting staff, in order to ensure that nothing contrary to Allied interests occurs until the Peace Treaty and that after signature of the latter its terms are faithfully observed by ITALY.

PLAN.

13. Bearing in mind the Preamble, the Object and the above Factors, I suggest the following Plan:-

6/.....

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13. (a) Complete operational and administrative control to be handed over(subject to safeguards) on 1 Sep. 45, except for Movement Control which will be retained by the Allies.

(b) "Interim Force" to be authorized as at Appendix "A" - to be replaced by the "Peace Treaty Army" when known.

(c) A forecast of Italian Service Units required by the Allies on 1 Sep.(and thereafter) to be obtained by A.F.H.Q. from Armies, Districts and Base Sections. Meanwhile these units can be progressively reduced when no longer necessary.

(d) An examination by A.C. in conjunction with the Italian Government as to the extent to which the Italian Economy can support the authorized "interim force" on 1 Sep.(and thereafter) in order to ascertain what the Allies should provide in the way of supplies and equipment, excluding armaments.

(e) A decision on the question of armaments.

(f) Acceptance by the Allies of the liability to supply the service units working for them.

(g) The functions and position of Allied H.Q's and troops and of M.M.I.A. in the new set-up, to be defined - M.M.I.A. establishment, bearing in mind post-war duties, to be redesigned.

N O T E.

I have specified 1 Sep. 45 as the hand over date, as requested by Chief Commissioner, A.C. I do not know whether the necessary decisions or the economic examination necessary can be made in time to work out the detailed plan and implement it by 1 Sep. I would stress that very early decisions will be necessary, so that a comprehensive directive may be issued by A.F.H.Q., allowing adequate time to work out all details and inform all concerned, without rush.

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L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

cc/

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TOP SECRET

App. dix "A" to MMIA
Memorandum G/3 dated
30 May 45

1. The desiderata as regards composition of the "Interim Force" to be at the disposal of the Italian Government in order that it may carry out its functions are:-

(a) control machinery

(b) administrative and training organization

(c) forces for internal security and the maintenance of law and order internally.

2. The following represents a possible "interim force" which would meet Italian needs pro tem with the present disturbed state of the country and difficulties of transportation:-

(a)	control	
	S.M.G. and M. of W.	2,000
	Territorial Regional H'q's,	
	Districts and Depots	7,000
(b)	administration and training	
	services	31,000
	trg and reinfts	10,000
(c)	troops	
	five combat gps and GARIBALDI Regt.	50,000
	SICILY(as now) two I.S. Divs.	10,000
	SARDINIA(as now) one I.S. Div.	5,000
	ten I.S. Bdes(one per Terr. Region excl. SICILY)	25,000
		140,000

This presupposes the presence of Allied troops as an indirect influence as regards Internal Security. Round figures only are quoted as a detailed study has not yet been made. It does NOT include Service Units

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	ten I.S. Bdes(one per Terr. Region excl. SICILY)	25,000
		140,000

This presupposes the presence of Allied troops as an indirect influence as regards Internal Security. Round figures only are quoted as a detailed study has not yet been made. It does NOT include Service Units working for the Allies, NOR 65,000 CC.RR which A.C. consider necessary.

cc/

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TRANSLATION

TOP SECRET

REF: 211999/11

DATE: 29 May 45

FROM: War Ministry

TO : M.M.I.A.

SUBJECT:- Transition Army

Reference to letter DO/2 dated 21st May, in the enclosed report I have given a very rough outline of the set-up of the "Transition Army". The study consists chiefly of an approximate strength check-up rather than a true and proper study of organisation which would have entailed a greater delay and a deeper study.

The summary enclosed will be submitted within the next few days to the Chief of Staff of the Army who, owing to his present residence, has not yet been consulted. I will therefore hasten to submit further details to M.M.I.A. as soon as I have had an opportunity of talking the matter over with General Cadorna.

Sgd. A. CASATI

The Minister.

Memorandum for [redacted].O.C. TOP SECRET

Subject:- Transition Army

As a consequence of termination of hostilities and in relation to the present internal situation of the Country, the following is an appreciation of the organisation of an Italian Army capable of confronting the following duties:-

- protection of frontiers against minor agressions,
- internal security.

Owing to the transitionary character of the organization it has been thought convenient to keep to the present organization, implemented solely with indispensable units which could be easily obtained from reduction in the present use of auxilliary tps.

A. Central HQ Organization

As at present:-

- S.M.G.
- Ministry of War(including "I" office and other units under command M. of W. of a contingent character).

Strength: 2,000

B. Military Terr. Organization

As at present:-

- Military territorial HQ's
- Districts
- Depots

with indispensable potentialities, because, especially the depots, can re-assume duties now taken on by Collection centres.

Strength: 7,000

C. Troops

(i) For protection of frontiers against minor agressions.

Owing to the characteristics of our frontiers, it is considered necessary to have, apart from the Combat Gps, "LEGNANO", "FOLGORE", "CREMONA","FRIULI",

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organization, implemented solely with indispensable units which could be easily obtained from reduction in the present use of auxilliary tps.

A. Central HQ Organization

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- Ministry of War(including "I" office and other units under command M. of W. of a contingent character).

Strength: 2,000

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As at present:-

- Military territorial HQ's
- Districts
- Depots

with indispensable potentialities, because, especially the depots, can re-assume duties now taken on by Collection centres.

Strength: 7,000

C. Troops

(i) For protection of frontiers against minor agressions.

Owing to the characteristics of our frontiers, it is considered necessary to have, apart from the Combat Gps, "LEGNANO", "FOLGORE", "CREMONA","FRIULI", "MANTOVA" and "GARIBALDI" Regt, at least 2 Alpini Gps.

Strength: 65,000

(ii) Internal Security

In as far as the internal political situation of the country might give rise to trouble in Public order, the presence of the Allies allows the following to be considered sufficient for the time being:-

- keep the present 3 Int. Sec. Divs.(Sabauda, Aosta and Calabria)for SICILY and SARDINIA requirements;

2/.....

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- assign to each of th 10 Terr. HQ's on the Mainland, 1 Terr. Bde(approx 2,500 strong) for the requirements of each region.

Strength: 40,000

(iii)Training Organization

For the present requirements, the following can continue to look after all arms of the service:-

- Military Academy(trg of regular officers)
- Cesano Trg Centre(offrs, OR's and specialists for varied courses)

Strength: 10,000

Total strength of Troops:- 124,000

D. Services Organization

Covering units and services establishments:- Medical, Artillery, Motorization, Engineers, Supplies and Admin, Veterinary, Railway tpt, Survey and Legal Br etc.

Strength: 20,000

Summing up: after having deducted units required by Allies and to which priority must always be given, a minimum total of 144,000 men will be required.

It is quite possible that some minor alterations may become necessary in the figures given as guidance for individual units.

These can be decided upon when studying the detail after acceptance of the General plan now outlined.

E. Supplies

It is not considered possible, for the time being or for some time to come, for the Country to provide, with its own resources and present imports from abroad, for the maintenance of the Army unless the Allies allow for the direct purchase on foreign markets.

Italian Admin can only provide the following items at present:-

oil, wine, greens, preserves, salt, fruit, tobacco, firewood, straw and forage.

As regards clothing and equipment, not ...ing on possibil...

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Total strength of Troops:- 124,000

D. Services Organization

Covering units and services establishments:-

Medical, Artillery, Motorization, Engineers, Supplies and Admin, Veterinary, Railway tpt, Survey and Legal Dr etc.

Strength: 20,000

Summing up: after having deducted units required by Allies and to which priority must always be given, a minimum total of 144,000 men will be required.

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Italian Admin can only provide the following items at present:-

oil, wine, greens, preserves, salt, fruit, tobacco, firewood, straw and forage.

As regards clothing and equipment, not counting on possibilities of recovery in N. Italy, yet to be ascertained, the requirements of the Army cannot be estimated to be met before 6 months.

No difficulties appear to exist with regard to armament and amn and animal traction.

As regards mechanical traction, it is not possible to state as yet whether It. Admin. will be able to meet at least part of the requirements.

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1. INTRODUCTION.

Following points are of doubtful value as any plan put up to AFHQ must assume the correctness of HERON 88 in its entirety. I disagree completely with the AFHQ answer on

(a) Colonies.
(b) Size of Army. I believe that the reestablishment of Italy in Africa is the best step that could be taken towards the next war and that an Army of 225,000 in addition to 35,000 Armed Finance Guards and Armed Forestry Guards is 55,000 too large. Too large for political, military and national economy, the latter reason causing a further burden on Allied food, clothing and fuel which already are NOT sufficient for our own people.

2. FINAL STRENGTH.

CC.RR	65,000	
COMBAT FORCE	60,000	Incl armour, Med. Arty etc.
I. SECURITY	40,000	Apart from Sicily the I.S. Divs are NOT needed to the degree sometimes held. Note that there are 98,000 Armed CC.RR, GOFF and Forestry Gds!
ADM. etc.	70,000	To fill even this total all civilians would be replaced by Military and there would still be a "hidden reserve" in this total.
	170,000	

3. INTERIM PERIOD.

(a) Wef, say 1 Sep, complete control is handed back to ITI Government less Service Tps under Allied comd.

(b) Service Tps - Op Comd. Service tps remain under operational comd of using Ally.

(c) Service Tps Maintenance. Service Units are fed and clothed under existing arrangements by the Allies, as Units are not required they are disbanded and absorbed into other units or discharged according to age group etc.

(d) Clothing and Equipment. All clothing and equipment now in possession of ITIS is handed over less that in 205, 210, 212, 209, 227, 230, 228, 231 Divs, Depot 3 and GIORDANO which can maintain the Service Tps while under Allied comd.

Allies to maintain the Aga Divs in clothing and making grants to ITI Government for balance of Army as decided necessary.

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(e) Rations. Food for Adm Divs is provided by Allied Military on present scale for Adm Strengths only. Food for remainder is handled by AC to ITI Government on AFHQ/AC/MFAASA adjustment.

(f) Control. MMIA, smaller, with full power to inspect and watch Allied interests in all ways.

4. AFTER PEACE TREATY.

(a) Complete ITI control, any Service units still helping Allies clear out will be under Allies for work only.

(b) MMIA reverting to a Military Mission in its proper sense.

23 May 45

Ch.

(Churchill)

28 May
2nd

SECRET

M E M O R A N D U M 'A' BRANCH

SUBJECT: Relaxation of Control - Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION
A.C. (M. M. I. A.) R O M E

24 May 1945

Reference your G6 dated 21 May 1945.

1. Agreed with main questions to be answered by AFHQ.

2. Consider that when the Italian Government is made paramount in Italy it must have an adequate Armed Force under its own control.

3. Suggest that by way of safeguard in case circumstances arise over which the Italian Government show signs of losing control, the over-all organisational control of Italian Army should be with the Allies, who thus retain the power of alloting temporarily Italian Units to Allied Commanders for a specific role.

4. Request that clear line be drawn between:

(a) the past Wartime Italian Army

(b) the present 'Interim' Italian Army

(c) the future Post War ~~Wartime~~ Italian Army

5. Consider that during the 'Interim' period the Italian Army should revert to one category, so as to eliminate the present impossible situation of trying to maintain three distinct Armies in one.

6. As the manpower resources from:

(a) the present Italian Army
(b) Co-operators
(c) Patriots
(d) returned P.O.W.
(e) other volunteers

appear to be more than adequate for our needs, the most careful consideration must be given beforehand to the type to be enlisted, so as to make certain of getting the best quality.

7. If the Post War Army is to be on a voluntary basis we should begin enlisting an 'Interim' Army on the same conditions.

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paramount in Italy it must ha...
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appear to be more than adequate for our needs, the most careful consideration must be given beforehand to the type to be enlisted, so as to make certain of getting the best quality.

7. If the Post War Army is to be on a voluntary basis we should begin enlisting an 'Interim' Army on the same conditions.

8. Standard rates of pay for the 'Interim' Army should be decided now so as to eliminate the farcical situation which we have had in the past.

9. Before handing over control, the 'law' under which no encouragement by way of advancement can be given for good work, and no adequate deterrant by way of 'demotion', or corrective punishment for bad work can be awarded, must be rectified.

disciplin

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10. Lastly, on all counts it is considered that the former practice of the 'tail wagging the dog' should be eliminated right away.

WP
2.

Major General,
A.A.G., I. A.

I agree with all this. But I think this should be done by the Italians after we have handed over the Plate operations under control of Tac HQ. Till then we carry on as at present. We should have plenty of time to work out this plan for take over on 1 Sep.

RB
24 May

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 783020

TOP SECRET

G(Ops+SD).

AFHQ

Italian War Ministry (responsible for Op and Adm control of Italian ITI-ITI Army)

Territorial HQs

Italian ITI-ITI Army size to be decided but to include:-

I.S. Divs
Combat Gps
War Ministry
Trg Est
Services for above
Estimate 150,000
plus CC BR

(a) Italian Govt responsible for Operational Control of ITALY to AFHQ w.e.f. ? 1 Sep. Dists would therefore only be responsible to AFHQ administratively

(b) Italian M of W to apply to Allied Mov for rail moves.

(c) Fmns and units to pass to under comd this ITI-ITI Army with present holdings of Allied equipment and clothing.

(d) Rations to be issued en bloc and distributed by M of W. Allied rations to be reduced on a timed percentage basis.

Dist HQs

BR-ITI Service Tps To be reduced to nil as soon as possible

(a) Adm through Adm Div HQ as at present.

(b) Entirely a BR/US responsibility as regards work, clothing, rations.

(c) As these units are not required they either become absorbed into ITI-ITI ceiling against WE or be disbanded.

Base Sec HQ

US-ITI Service Tps May be replaced by German P.W.

WS

2 B
26 May

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SECRET

616

Subject:- Relaxation of control, Italian Army. 21 May 45.

1. From conversation with Brig LUSH. I gather that the "high ups" are thinking of handing over all ITALY to the Italian Government as soon as possible and that, as a corollary to this, the Italian Government must be given control over its own army to carry out its task of running ITALY. The opinion is that the Government cannot assume responsibility without this.

2. If this is so, we must think now we can do it, bearing in mind the supply aspect, the fact that we will still need service units for some time etc. etc.

3. As a result, I have tried to crystalize the main factors on which AFHQ must give decisions before we can plan and take action.
I attach these herewith.

4. Please consider these and let me have your written comments (shortly!) by May 24 evening.

5. Then I think we might have a round table conference of us 5 on the matter.

6. Meanwhile LUSH is producing a memorandum to me on the subject and between us we may be able to put a letter to AFHQ (through AC) guiding AFHQ on the lines we think they should be thinking and deciding.

L. Brownrigg

Maj. General.

Col. Kerr.
" Noakes.
" Pidsley
Lt.Col. Ingledew.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control, Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

~~G/6~~ G/3

21 May 1945

The following appear to be the main questions to be answered to enable a plan to be made to convert the Italian Army to a peace-treaty basis under its own control:-

1. Will all ITALY be handed back to the Italians before the Peace Treaty or after?

2. When all ITALY is handed back to the Italian Govt:-

(a) Is the Italian Army to be simultaneously handed back complete? If so:-

(i) What army including CC RR will the Italians be permitted to keep for their own use as an interim measure pending the Peace Treaty?

(ii) What service units will be required by the Allies, in addition to (i)?

(iii) What will be the set-up and position of AFHQ, 15 Army Gp, 5 Army, 8 Army, Districts, Base Sections and Allied Tps? A.C.? MMIA?

(iv) What material assistance (food, clothing, etc.) will the Allies be prepared to hand over to the Italians in bulk for their own control in detail as regards 2(a)(i) and 2(a)(ii)?

(v) What will be the policy as regards Allied Equipment

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(i) What army including CC RR will the Italians be permitted to keep for their own use as an interim measure pending the Peace Treaty?

(ii) What service units will be required by the Allies, in addition to (i)?

(iii) What will be the set-up and position of AFHQ, 15 Army Gp, 5 Army, 8 Army, Districts, Base Sections and Allied Tps? A.C.? MMLA?

(iv) What material assistance (food, clothing, etc.) will the Allies be prepared to hand over to the Italians in bulk for their own control in detail as regards 2(a)(i) and 2(a)(ii)?

(v) What will be the policy as regards Allied Equipment now in possession of the Italians?

(vi) What reservations as regards control will be laid down, so that the Allies will retain the efficient use of Service Units; will be able to prevent an increase beyond the ceiling authorised and generally ensure that the Italians do what we require; and will continue to be provided with the Service Units they require?

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(vii) Service Units will be disbanded as the Allies have no further need for them, material assistance for this category being ~~rendered~~ reduced proportionately.

The "interim force" as in 2(a)(i) will be converted on to the treaty basis as soon as the latter is signed.

A reduced MMIA, with full authority to demand information and inspect, will watch all Italian military action and arrangements, safeguarding Allied interests and advising the Italians where necessary.

Is the above agreed?

OR

(b) Will the Allies retain administrative control while handing over operational control as regards I.S. and Frontier Defence? If so, the following questions require answer.

(i) As in 2(a)(i)

(ii) As in 2(a)(ii)

(iii) As in 2(a)(iii)

(iv) Will the existing administrative procedure remain? E.g. accounting for rations in detail; HR-ITI, US-ITI, ITI-ITI Categories, etc.

(v) As in 2(a)(v)

(vi) As in first two Sub-paras of 2(a)(vii) MMIA will remain on existing W.E. with existing functions. Is the above agreed?

(c) Administratively it is not possible to hand over part of the Army completely to the Italians, while retaining control of the remainder, e.g. Service Units. Control must be relaxed either in toto or in certain aspects as regards the Army as a whole. The

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the Italians where necessary.

Is the above agreed?

(b) Will the Allies retain administrative control while handing over operational control as regards I.S. and Frontier Defence? OR

If so, the following questions require answer.

(i) As in 2(a)(i)

(ii) As in 2(a)(ii)

(iii) As in 2(a)(iii)

(iv) Will the existing administrative procedure remain? E.g. accounting for rations in detail; BR-ITI, US-ITI, ITI-ITI Categories, etc.

(v) As in 2(a)(v)

(vi) As in first two Sub-paras of 2(a)(vii) MMIA will remain on existing W.E. with existing functions. Is the above agreed?

(c) Administratively it is not possible to hand over part of the Army completely to the Italians, while retaining control of the remainder, e.g. Service Units. Control must be relaxed either in toto or in certain aspects as regards the Army as a whole. The simplest and only efficient method is to hand over operational and administrative control completely on a definite date. Is the above agreed? If so, what date?

3. What will be the size, composition, armament and conditions of service of the Italian Army under the Peace Treaty?

R. Browning

(Major General)

WS

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Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
F O W B.
DO/2

2/ May, 1945.

My dear

1. While there is as yet no indication of what the eventual role, composition and strength of the Italian Army are to be, and while we are not at liberty to discuss this question, I have been considering the matter of the "interim army"; that is from the present time until the peace terms are made known.

2. It is not easy to find the answer to this problem in which there are so many unknown factors, but it would help me to have your personal opinion, based on the following premises:-

(a) You should assume that the role of the Interim Italian Army is that of internal security, frontier protection from minor aggression, assistance in the rehabilitation of Italy and that it should be complete with the necessary administrative, maintenance and training organisation.

(b) You should not include any service troops which the Allies might require for their own maintenance or for guarding Prisoners of War. These will probably be required for some time in decreasing numbers and I will obtain my own data for them from other sources.

(c) As any decisions by higher authority would be influenced by the supply problem, your estimate of the extent to which the forces as in 2(a) could be self supporting, possibly by phases, (and consequently of the bulk requirements from Allied sources) would be of value.

3. As this is a problem of some complexity, I think it would help if we discussed it together as soon as you have made your preliminary broad examination and before you give a more definite answer. I therefore propose a meeting on Thursday evening the 24 May at 1700 hours. Will you please inform me if this is agreeable to you.

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matter of the "interim army"; that is from the present time until the peace terms are made known.

2. It is not easy to find the answer to this problem in which there are so many unknown factors, but it would help me to have your personal opinion, based on the following premises:-

(a) You should assume that the role of the Interim Italian Army is that of internal security, frontier protection from minor aggression, assistance in the rehabilitation of Italy and that it should be complete with the necessary administrative, maintenance and training organisation.

(b) You should not include any service troops which the Allies might require for their own maintenance or for guarding Prisoners of War. These will probably be required for some time in decreasing numbers and I will obtain my own data for them from other sources.

(c) As any decisions by higher authority would be influenced by the supply problem, your estimate of the extent to which the forces as in 2(a) could be self supporting, possibly by purchase, (and consequently of the bulk requirements from Allied sources) would be of value.

3. As this is a problem of some complexity, I think it would help if we discussed it together as soon as you have made your preliminary broad examination and before you give a more definite answer. I therefore propose a meeting on Thursday evening the 24 May at 1700 hours. Will you please inform me if this is agreeable to you.

Yours

A. B.

The Minister of War.

Copy to / A.C. As a result of my conversation with Executive Commissioner on 19 May I attach a copy of a letter I have to-day sent to the Minister of War, as desired by Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

1253

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 8251/EC.

20 May 1945.

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of Italian Army.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

1. Your memo G/6 of 2 April 1945 was written while hostilities were in process. We should clearly now make a new approach to the problem and put forward definite proposals as required by the Chief of Staff, AFHQ, in his letter of 28th February.

2. The final composition of the Italian Army, in common with the other fighting services, will be decided if and when a Peace Treaty is made between the Allies and Italy. Consideration of this will take many months but this delay should not deflect us from carrying out the policy of the Allied Governments to hand over control of Italy to the Italian Government progressively and rapidly.

3. The situation in the North and the general state of affairs in Italy predict the wisdom of expediting the turn over of civil administration, and I am recommending as a provisional date that we should make plans to do so by September 1st. Events and developments may prove my appreciation wrong but I wish all Sections of the Commission to work to this end.

4. The control of its Army is essential to any Government and, with certain provisos which will safeguard Allied military interests, such control could and should, in my opinion, be given to the Italian Army. Many difficulties of administration will have to be overcome: but we should examine these without delay and this Commission should submit plans to meet them.

5. We should, as I view the problem as a layman, approach the matter as follows.

6. Once Phase II has been reached in N.Italy the combat groups of the Italian Army will presumably pass from the command of the 5th and 8th Armies and their disposal must be considered.

7. Immediate consultation should take place between yourself and AFHQ, at G-3(Org) level, and yourself and the Minister for War, with regard to the location of these groups, having regard to the overall requirements of Italy and the Allied Armies in Italy. We should then recommend that these combat groups be placed under the Ministry for War who would put them under the command of the Regional military administrations which you have already distributed throughout Italy, always with the provision that they would be at the disposal of the Allied Military Commanders if needed.

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8. A simultaneous review of the location of the security battalions should also be made and these also should pass to the command of the Italian Regional commander with the same proviso.

9. The employment of large numbers of German POW will, it is hoped, release a similar number of Italian service units now working for and under the command of the Allied forces. It is a matter for immediate consideration as to how many of these service units will be required for the Italian Army and the Minister of War will presumably submit proposals.

10. With regard to maintenance of the Army, I fully realise that it is far from self-supporting and that many administrative difficulties will have to be overcome if control is handed over to the Italians. But we should adopt the policy of decontrol as early as possible and in this respect I do not agree with your recommendation that the date of the hand-over of control should be that of the signing of the Peace Treaty. We must make plans for the interim stage when the Italian Government is in control of this country but is not yet legally at peace with the Allies, just as we are doing with the other activities of the Italian Government.

11. I realise that much of the action suggested above may have already been taken by you, but from now onwards I think that the Allied Commission should take the initiative in its proposals for the composition, location and employment of the Italian Army, remembering that now that hostilities have ceased, military necessity should become military convenience and that the Commission must lay before AFHQ the needs, as we see them, of the Italian Government which, as I have said above, cannot function properly as a Government unless it has some control over its national army.

12. I shall be glad if you will forward your proposals to me as soon as possible.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

D 20242

SECRET

30 April, 1945.

Future of Italian Army.

ASD/925.1

1. G-3 G-1(A) G-1(E)A.1. } 30 Apr
G-3(Ops) G-3(Plans)
G-4(Plans) G-4 (A) Q.M. } COPY No 3
Log Plans Q(Maint) Q(AE) } Copy No 4
G-5 US POLAD Brit Res Min
(joint addressees please pass in turn).

1. The attached draft appreciation of the future of the Italian Army has been prepared with the following objects:-

(a) To determine the views of staff sections of this HQ.

(b) To provide Land Forces Sub Commission with a general background against which they can study the detailed problems involved.

(c) To prepare a cable for consideration by the Chief of Staff, for despatch to the Combined Chiefs of Staff asking for guidance on the future of the Italian Army.

2. It would be appreciated if you would give urgent consideration to the subject, forwarding comments through the joint addressees shown above as soon as possible.

JAMES P. SMITH,
Lieut. Colonel, G.S.C.
Executive Officer,
for
Major General, GSC.,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

JPS/mac/Org-A

100

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G-3(Ops) }
G-3(Plans) }

— G-4(Plans) } COPY
G-4 (A) } No 3
Q.M. }

Log Plans } Copy
Q(Maint) } No 4
Q(AE) }

G-5)
US POLAD)
Brit Mss Mln)

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Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

JHQ/smc/Org-A

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SECRET

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D R A F T

SECRET

S E C R E T

APPRECIATION : FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

I OBJECT

To draft a plan for the future of the Italian Army after cessation of hostilities.

II FACTORS:

1. Command

(a) The Italian Army is at present entirely at the disposal of the Allies. This HQ controls the War Ministry and the Italian General Staff HQ through the agency of MMIA, and a large proportion of units through Armies, Districts Liaison Units, and Cadres. General supervision of troops under Italian operational command is maintained through MMIA/Cs.

(b) The control exercised by the Allies is so entwined with the Italian command that no sudden withdrawal of Allied control would be possible.

2. Administration.

(a) Italian administrative services exist to a limited extent. Pay, discipline, records, clothing, and food, are dealt with through the Italian staffs and Services, which are small and partly civilianised. So much of the ration and clothing control is directed by Allied Staffs that the Italians do not at present have a complete scale of administrative personnel and units.

(b) Present Italian administrative services and staffs would have to be re-organised and supplemented where necessary from Italian staffs and units now under Allied command.

3. Clothing and Equipment.

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(b) Present Italian administrative services and staffs would have to be re-organised and supplemented where necessary from Italian staffs and units now under Allied command.

3. Clothing and Equipment.

(a) The bulk of clothing and equipment held by the Italian Army is of Allied origin, issued either as repaired, salvage or as new material. The Italians have not been permitted to re-establish [redacted] arms factories. Stocks of Italian weapons and ammunition in Southern Italy are low. The state of Northern stocks and production centres is unknown.

.....(b)/

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(b) An immediate survey of stocks and manufacturing resources throughout Italy will have to be made to determine the possibility of transferring the responsibility for equipment and clothing on to the Italian Government.

4. Supplies.

(a) The Italian Army is at present supplied from both Allied and Italian sources. The imported ration scale for the Army is higher than the civilian scales. The Allied imports will have to continue, at least to civilian scales, while Allied troops remain in Italy. The quantity of army rations which the CCS are prepared to supply determines the present size of the Italian Army.

(b) Where parts of the Army pass from Allied control, the special import scale might be withdrawn and the civilian scale substituted so that the necessity for a separate supply accounting system would disappear. The Army might still require a higher ration scale than the civil population, but the additional rations would have to be found by the Italian Government, thus limiting any desire for a large clandestine army.

5. Organisation.

(a) The general organisation of the Italian Army is shown at Appendix 'A'. The Territorial organisation, the Internal Security Divisions, and the Italian administrative services are largely independent of Allied control except through liaison officers. The combat troops are at present serving directly under Allied command in the liberation of Northern Italy. The service units are serving under Allied command as an essential part of the L of C backing for the Armies. Carabinieri are part of the civil police organisation, at present controlled by the Public Safety Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission.

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(b) The territorial organisation and part of the Italian administrative services could be removed entirely from Allied responsibility now. The three Internal

.....Security/

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Security divisions could be handed over to the Italian Government except for such units as have been placed under Allied operational command for guard duties. The Carabinieri at a later stage might be handed over to the Italian Government, and such action might be taken now in regions where there are no Allied Troops. Release of combat and service units would have to be phased gradually as the Allied requirements diminished.

6. Commitments

(a) Present commitments include operations, internal security, L of C services, including labour and guards. Future commitments may include a contribution to any international armed force guards for prisoners of war, a mobile security force, limited coastal and AA defence, such labour and construction units as may be required for reconstruction of communications, and also civil police duties, this last being performed by Carabinieri.

(b) The operational commitment will be eliminated shortly, thus freeing the combat groups for such international or mobile security duties as may be considered necessary by the Allies. Coastal and AA defence can be undertaken by the present internal security divisions expanded at the expense of service units. The future overseas commitment of the Italian Government is unknown.

7. Political.

(a) The total contribution in blood made by the Italian Army since the armistice is small, but the activities of partisans have undoubtedly affected very considerably the course of operations in the North. The work of the service units has been essential but desertion has been of a very high rate causing heavy wastage of Allied resources.

(b) It is suggested that the Italian people should be permitted the right to operate a small army, within such limitations as are necessary for Allied security.

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.....III-COURSES OPEN/

SECRET

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SECRET

III COURSES OPEN

1. To accept the contention that at no foreseeable time will it be possible for the Italian Army to be self supporting.

2. To accept AMIA's recent suggestion that the Italian Army should be handed back to the Italian Government en bloc at a given date.

3. To hand over control of the Italian Army in a phased programme over a stated period after cessation of hostilities in Europe.

IV PLAN

COURSE 3 - Phased programme for handing back the Italian Army to the Italian Government.

1. Phases

(a) In the first phase, the Internal Security Divisions in SICILY and SARDINIA less such units as are under Allied operational command, also the Territorial organisation, and a proportion of the Italian administrative units, would be released from Allied control and placed on the civilian import ration scale, supplemented as required by the Italian Government.

(b) In the second phase, US-ITI and BR-ITI service units would be released gradually to strengthen the Italian administrative organisation and to take over repair of communications and devastated areas under Italian command. Units released would pass on to the civilian import ration scale.

(c) In the third and final phase, operational troops will be released to the Italian Government, and such service troops as are not required in (b) above will be disbanded and demobilised. Carabinieri will revert to Italian Government command. The whole Italian Army will receive only civilian impor rations.

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2. Command.

(a) Phase I

Allied control will remain unchanged. Units which are struck off the strength of the manpower ceiling are already under Italian operational command. MMIA will continue to exercise general supervision and will supply liaison officers to coordinate Italian activities with Allied requirements.

(b) Phase II

MMIA will cease to control the War Ministry and will act as advisers only. Allied Liaison Units and Cadres will be withdrawn wherever possible.

(c) Phase III

All direct Allied control will be withdrawn. MMIA will become an Allied Military Liaison Mission to the Italian Government, and will be directly under the command of the Allied Commission.

3. Administration.

(a) Phase I

[redacted]

Allied Commission will assume responsibility for supply of rations for the portions of the Italian Army released to the Italian government.

(b) Phase II

Italian administrative machinery will be established to take over the organisation and administration of the whole Italian Army. Allied Commission will accept responsibility for rationing further troops transferred to Italian control.

(c) Phase III

The supply and accounting section of MMIA will be dissolved and the Italian Government will take over full administrative responsibility for the Italian Army. Allied Commission will be wholly responsible for issue of civilian rations to Italian Army.

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(b) Phase II

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4. Clothing and Equipment.

(a) Phase I

The Italian Government will assume full responsibility for clothing and equipment of units released to them. Remainder of the Army will be maintained from US and British resources.

(b) Phase II

Italian manufacturing resources will be exploited to the full under arrangements of the Allied Commission to produce clothing and equipment for the whole Italian Army. Units released to the Italian Government will hand in to Allied depots all personal arms and unit equipment, excluding vehicles.

(c) Phase III

Italian troops other than combat units will complete transfers of equipment as in phase II. Combat troops will retain a reduced scale of British equipment for a period of six months, during which time Italian weapons will be substituted. All stocks of allied clothing earmarked for the Italian Army will be handed over to the Italian Government and further maintenance will cease.

5. Organisation

(a) Phase I

(i) Handover of troops

The Italian Government will take over responsibility for training equipment and reinforcement of all troops passing to their command and control. The camp at FROSINONE will be used for reinforcement of Guard Battalions only. The War Ministry will continue to provide AMIA with details of the order of battle of troops passing to their control and will supply all necessary information as to strengths, equipment and locations.

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(ii) Operational Troops

Combat Groups will be re-allotted for internal security duties in Northern Italy and for guarding prisoners of war. Suggested allocation might be:-

Security -	HQ 2 Dist	-	One Group
	PBS	-	One Group
	15 Army Group	-	One Group
PW Guards	AFHQ	-	Two Groups

Training of all other troops for combatant duties will cease. Garibaldi Regiment and 1 Guard Regiment will be used for PW guard and Internal Security duties. Formation of Patriot Recce Battalions will NOT proceed. MAIELLA Patriot Battalion and other patriot bands will be disbanded, after suitable recognition of their services.

(iii) Reinforcement Training Centres

The reinforcement holding at CCRAMC Combat Force Reinforcement Training Centre will be reduced to 7,800, for which the present staff is designed. Training will be based on a future role of internal security and PW guards. The holding of reinforcements at Base Reinforcement Depots will remain unchanged and efforts will be made to complete the service unit programme.

(b) Phase II

(i) Administrative Organisation

One or more of the Italian Administrative Division Headquarters will be transferred to full Italian Command to assist in organisation of Italian Administrative Services. MMIA will assist in the setting up of a full maintenance organisation for the Italian Army.

This HQ will decide on a programme for release of Italian service units for return to the Italian Government. Units released will be re-

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PW Guards Army

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This HQ will decide on a programme for release of Italian service units for return to the Italian Government. Units released will be reorganised to supplement existing Italian Army administrative arrangements as required.

(ii) Operational Troops.

Two combat Groups engaged on Internal Security will pass to operational command of the Italian War Ministry for duties to be specified by the Allies in Northern Italy. These troops will continue on full army ration scale.

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(ii) Reinforcement Training Centres

At the end of Phase II, all Base Rft Depots will be closed down. The camp at CESANO will retain a holding of 7,800 rfts for all BR-ITI and US-ITI units.

(iii) Military Mission

MMIA will be reorganised as an Allied Military Liaison Mission. See Appendix 'B'

(c) Phase III

(i) Italian Troops

The Italian War Ministry will continue to provide an order of battle of all Italian Army troops less such guard battaliens and L of C units as are required to remain under Allied Command, giving strengths and locations for scutiny by the Allied Military Liaison Mission.

(ii) Allied Units and Cadres.

All Allied units and cadres will be withdrawn from the Italian Army. The Allied Military Liaison Mission will pass to under command Allied Commission, and will be withdrawn with that headquarters.

(iii) Ceilings.

The Italian Government will presumably be called upon to guarantee the restriction of the strength of Italian armed forces to a figure to be decided in the Peace Treaty. The recommended organisation and strength of such a force are shown at Appendix 'C' attached. The Allies would reserve the right to demand any service they require of the Italian Armed Forces while they remain in Italy.

6. Timings.

(a) Phase I

The provisions of phase I would be put into effect as soon as authority is received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Phase II

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6. Timings.

(a) Phase I

The provisions of phase I would be put into effect as soon as authority is received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Phase II

It should be possible to complete Phase II within three months after the cessatio of hostilities.

(c) Phase III


Phase III would be completed by the date when it is decided to discontinue the Allied L of C into AUSTRIA, or withdraw occupying troops from ITALY, whichever time is later.


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
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MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.








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PRESENT ORGANISATION - ITALIAN ARMY



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Supreme Command
150

War Ministry
744

General Staff HQ
362

A.F.H.Q

M.M.I.A

FIFTH ARMY

F.B.S

EIGHTH ARMY

TERR HQ
11-PALERMO
80

TERR HQ
120

Dists Depots

Dists Depots

Military Tribunals
250

I. A. I.
860

Veterinary Services
572

INTERNAL SECURITY
RFT TRG CENTRE
5100


A.F.S.C

STAFF

MANTOVA
Control Centre
900

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APPENDIX 'A'
to AFHQ letter ASD/925.1
dated 30 April, 1945




Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

PROPOSED COMPOSITION OF ALLIED MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO ITALIAN ARMY

Appendix
Date

Total Officers
British - 26
American - 12




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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

OF ALLIED MILITARY LIAISON MISSION TO ITALIAN ARMY

Appendix 'B' to ASD/925.1
Dated 30 Apr 45




Total officers
British - 26
American - 12

1280

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

PROPOSED ORGANISATION FOR POST - HOSTILITIES ITALIAN ARMY

Appendix
D




Total Incl CCRR

* Temporary commitments

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ON POST - HOSTILITIES: ITALIAN ARMY



1,000
500
2,000
5,000
5,000
30,000

Total 55,000
100,000

Total Incl CORPS 50,000
150,000

Remarks

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

D.O.

PERSONAL

TOP SECRET

Brig. J. G. Nicholson
G-3 Plans, AFHQ. CMF
12 May 1945.

Dear General,

Attached is a copy of the planning level signal we sent off to LONDON on the subject of the future Italian Army. I think we have managed to cover most of the important points.

Again many thanks for taking so much trouble in coming down to advise and help us.

Yours Sincerely

John Nicholson

Major General Langley Browning, CB, CBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

To see over

Col KERR
" RIDSLEY
" NORRIS
Lt Col INGLEDEW
" CURTIES (RAMC)

We should keep all Mss fortnightly
to ourselves - not to be communicated to anyone

AB 14 May

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COPY

FROM: AFHQ

TO : TROOPERS

TOP SECRET

OP PRIORITY

HERON 82 in reply to QUAIL 96 for Thompson from Nicholson. Following are MJPS views:

1. Agree generally with military policy you propose in your para 2. Suggest however that

a. Last sentence para 2a might be better worded "Further she should not be so weak as to be unable to defend her frontiers against minor aggression by her neighbors". Present indications are that minor aggression on both Jugoslav and French frontiers is probable. Too early yet to forecast situation on Austrian frontier but history indicates this also potentially troublesome area.

b. If you accept a above suggest second sentence para 2b might read "During this period estimated about 5 years Italian armed forces should be restricted to those necessary to preserve internal security and with ultimate Allied backing to safeguard her frontiers". Feel that your present wording places main responsibility on Allies so that we might get involved in minor frontier incidents and might even have to keep forces in ITALY to meet obligations.

c. Your para 2c. Consider it unnecessary and perhaps unwise now to define restrictions which will not be removed at end of five years. Agree ITALY should then be given opportunity to state case for removal all restrictions but suggest that at this stage we should reserve absolute right to act as we consider desirable according to ITALY's conduct in meantime and circumstances then obtaining.

2. Regarding general form of treaty our impression is that terms appear so severe that they will prevent any hope of achieving our primary object of establishing an ITALY friendly to Allies and looking towards Western EUROPE for support. See your para 2a. When ITALY surrendered she gave Allies blank check to impose such final peace terms as we wished. She was, however, given to understand that final terms would depend on her conduct and cooperation in meantime and her efforts to work her passage home. She has undoubtedly cooperated as fully as possible and without the military effort she has given Allies since her surrender the present successful campaign in Northern ITALY could not have been conducted. Italians know all this and will consider themselves betrayed if we impose such peace terms as would have been applied had ITALY resisted us to the utmost and to the end. Perfide albion.

3. We refer particularly to surrender of all colonies. It looks at present as if ITALY will lose VENEZIA GIULIA and she will not take this kindly. Loss of all colonies might well prove final straw. We know what capital GERMANY made of this after last war. On other hand, if in fact we succeed in establishing a friendly ITALY and in restricting her armed forces as we intend, her retention of such areas as TRIPOLITANIA, ERITREA and Italian SOMALILAND can hardly menace any Anglo-American interests. In any case, we can reserve such Allied rights as we require in these areas.

4. Moreover by imposing such terms on ITALY as only a completely vanquished nation might expect after unconditional surrender, great scope will be given to Italian Communists to turn on present government for their failure to secure something [illegible]. There are already indications of this sort of reaction over VENEZIA GIULIA.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

b. If you accept a above suggest second sentence para 2b might read "During this period estimated about 5 years Italian armed forces should be restricted to those necessary to preserve internal security and with ultimate Allied backing to safeguard her frontiers". Feel that your present wording places main responsibility on Allies so that we might get involved in minor frontier incidents and might even have to keep forces in ITALY to meet obligations.

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4. Moreover by imposing such terms on ITALY as only a completely vanquished nation might expect after unconditional surrender, great scope will be given to Italian Communists to turn on present government for their failure to secure something better. There are already indications of this sort of reaction over VENEZIA GIULIA. A Red ITALY cannot be to Allied advantage.

5. We realize that three preceeding paras deal with political considerations but feel these observations justified in view of important bearing these factors will have on our military policy and strategic interests.

6. Following refer to similarly lettered sub-paras of your para 3.

a. Present Carabinieri ceiling is 65,000. This was also pre-war figure and is what Italians now want. Consider that reduction by 10,000 is immaterial and

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will only cause resentment. Recommend therefore that Carabinieri ceiling should be 65,000. Preliminary examination leads to conclusion that if role of Italian army is that suggested in para 1a and b above ceiling should be 200,000 to 225,000.

b. Voluntary long service basis. This important and based on ceiling recommended in a above.

c. Army should be balanced force with proper proportion tanks and heavy artillery in accordance with its defensive role. Main purpose of Italian army should be to deter aggression by neighboring states. In these days an army lacking tanks and heavy artillery will not deter anyone.

d. Agree all fortifications and military installations in Metropolitan ITALY should be retained. Some troops will have to be stationed in SICILY and SARDINIA for internal security reasons (well armed brigands now operating in SICILY) and it is therefore impracticable to destroy all military installations in these islands. We consider that no new fortifications should be constructed and that armament and equipment of existing coast defenses should be restricted to such as is necessary to protect naval ports and anchorages.

e. This is key to whole problem. Strongly urge that manufacture of armaments and warlike stores and equipment should be absolutely prohibited except as required under your para 4a. Agree that import and export of war materials be rigidly controlled by Allies and that in addition ITALY should obtain all arms, warlike stores and equipment from Allied sources.

f. Agreed.

g. None.

7. Reference para 6a above. Presume it is appreciated that reduction Italian land forces from present figure of over 300,000 can not be effected immediately. We are obtaining much assistance from these forces and they should be reduced progressively as suits us.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

Ref TROOPERS signal 91917 MO 5
MMI Notes for Conference at
CASERTA on 11 May 45

SUBJECT: Post-War Italian Army.

3. (a) 65000 CCRR (as now and pre-war)
Army (very rough cocksby)

Fighting Force	(5 Combat Groups (Non-div tps ((armd cars, med. arty, etc. (to produce a balanced force (to deter or resist agression)	45000 15000
Internal Security	(10 I. S. Divs ((incl. 1 SARDINIA and 2 SICILY) (Necessary during post-war chaos (and to back up CCRR who are now (of low reliability	50000
Control	(Ministry of War) (Trg. Ests.) (Territorial Admin. orgn) ((Regional Hq's, depots, etc))	15000
Administration	(Services	100,000
	Total	225,000

(b) Voluntary ~~of~~ cf GERMANY post 1914-18 war.

(c) Limitation rather than prohibition - to produce balanced defensive force control by Allies supplying warlike equipt.

(d) Depends on decision re Italian fleet - removal of weapons and military installations renders destruction of fortifications unnecessary - if above may be necessary for us in the future, control by removal of vital parts.

(e) Yes - Allies should control by providing Italians with Allied war material - tap can be turned on or off at will - helps Italian economy and our own.

(f) Yes.

(g) (i) Removal of all colonies? Not the way to have "a friendly ITALY". What credit have they been given for valuable assistance since Armistice? Terms as severe as if Italians had not helped us or had even fought against us till now. "Warning passage"?

(ii) Change over to post-war ceiling dependent on assistance the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

	(10 I. S. Divs		
	((incl. 1 SARDINIA and 2 SICILY)		50000
Internal	(Necessary during post-war chaos		
Security	(and to back up CCRR who are now		
	(of low reliability		
	(Ministry of War	)	
	(Trg. Ests.	)	
Control	(Territorial Admin. orgn	)	15000
	((Regional Hq's, depots, etc)	)	
Adminis-	(		
tration	(Services		100,000
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(e) Yes - Allies should control by providing Italians with Allied war material - tap can be turned on or off at will - helps Italian economy and our own.

(f) Yes.

(g) (i) Removal of <u>all</u> colonies? Not the way to have "a friendly ITALY". What credit have they been given for valuable assistance since Armistice? Terms as severe as if Italians had not helped us or had even fought against us till now. "Warning passage"?

(ii) Change over to post-war ceiling dependent on assistance the Allies require from Italian Army during re-deployment of Allied Forces. So must be gradual and permitted to exceed post-war ceiling which caters for Italian ~~needs~~ only.

(iii) Unless Italian people reasonably contented with terms imposed, political tendency will be to swing to Communism (already best organized party) and look East instead of West.

L. B.

M.M.I.A.

11 May 45

TOP SECRET

T-846

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

TOP SECRET

Ref TROOPERS signal 91917 NO 5
MMI Notes for Conference at
CASERTA on 11 May 45

SUBJECT: Post-War Italian Army.

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Control	(Ministry of War) (Trg. Estc.) (Territorial Admin. orgn) ((Regional Hq's, depots, etc))	15000
Administration	(Services	100,000
	Total	225,000

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

	(10 I. S. Divs		
	((incl. 1 SARDINIA and 2 SICILY)		50000
Internal	(Necessary during post-war chaos		
Security	(and to back up CCRR who are now		
	(of low reliability		
	(Ministry of War	)	
	(Trg. Ests.	)	
Control	(Territorial Admin. orgn	)	15000
	((Regional Hq's, depots, etc)	)	
Adminis-	(		
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L. B.

M.M.I.A.

11 May 45

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

MJPS/66

:::::::::::::::::
:TOP SECRET
:Auth: SAC
:Initials: TBT
:10 May 45
:Copy No. 16
:::::::::::::::::

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

10 May 1945

FUTURE OF THE ITALIAN ARMY
Cover Note by Secretary

There will be a meeting of the MJPS at 1500 hours on Thursday, 10 May to discuss the reply to be made to the attached planning level cable.

J. B. TRIMMER
Major
Secretary

DISTRIBUTION
List B less G-4 Mov & Tn
plus G-3 Ops
G-3 Org (A)
G-5
US Polad
Br Res Min

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

FROM: TROOPERS TOP SECRET

TO : AFEQ Ref. No. 91917 MO 5

Quail 96.

For NICHOLSON from THOMPSON.

Following is Planning Level Cable after discussion with BIRCH:

1. Final Peach Treaty with ITALY now under urgent consideration. Foreign Office have asked Chiefs of Staff for Heads of Military clauses on assumption that ITALY will be required to give up all her overseas possessions.

2. Following military policy proposed on Planning Level:

   a. In view ITALY's position across our communications, important she should NOT again come under control hostile power. Strategic interests, therefore, require she should remain on friendly terms with us and should be encouraged to look to Western EUROPE for support. Further, she should NOT be so weak that she would fall easy prey to hostile power.

   b. We cannot risk trouble from ITALY during years immediately following defeat of GERMANY when our resources will be employed in war with JAPAN, in EUROPE, and elsewhere. During this period, estimated about 5 years, Italian Armed Forces should be restricted to those necessary to preserve internal security and assist Allies to safeguard her frontiers. In addition, Allies will require certain rights and facilities during this period in connection with occupation of AUSTRIA, assistance against JAPAN, etc.

   c. At conclusion of 5 year period, ITALY should be allowed to state her case for removal of all restrictions except:

      (1) SICILY and SARDINIA to be permanently demilitarized.

      (2) Permanent prohibition on construction or experiments for V weapons.

      (3) Permanent prohibition on employment or training of German or Japanese technicians.

3. Would be grateful for your comments on following points regarding limitations to be imposed on Italian Army for period 5 years after defeat of GERMANY:

   a. Suggested maximum size of Italian Army 150,000 troops, 55,000 Carabinieri.

   b. Should Army be on conscription or voluntary basis?

   c. Should there be prohibition on certain types of equipment, e.g., tanks and heavy artillery?

   d. Do you agree all fortifications and military installations SICILY and SARDINIA be destroyed but remainder in metropolitan ITALY can be retained?

   e. Suggest prohibition [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

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   c. Should there be prohibition on certain types of equipment, e.g., tanks and heavy artillery?

   d. Do you agree all fortifications and military installations SICILY and SARDINIA be destroyed but remainder in metropolitan ITALY can be retained?

   e. Suggest manufacture, import and export of war material be rigidly controlled by Allies.

   f. Italian or Allied war material in excess of that permitted for authorized Armed Forces to be placed at disposal of Allies.

   g. Any further points you consider should be included.

4. Following assumptions are being made:

   a. Italian assistance in war against JAPAN to be limited to production of war materials and making available such dockyard and other facilities including use of her Marcantile Marine as Allies need.

TOP SECRET

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b. During 5 year post war period, ITALY will NOT be required to provide forces for World Organization.

5. Have NOT included Naval or Air points since these are being handled by Admiralty and Air Ministry who are in general agreement with policy outlined in para 2a and b above.

6. As Foreign Office require proposals from Chiefs of Staff early next week, shall be grateful for reply by 10 May at latest.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

1294

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

URGENT.

RECEIPT FORM.

2/41 5 6 ex.

Army Form A16
(Pads of 100).

To be completed and returned immediately in a single unregistered envelope to { Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (M.M.L.A.)

I hereby acknowledge the receipt of the undermentioned :—

Ref. No.	No. of copies	Copy Numbers	Distribution
G/6	2	—	HQ A.C. for Chief Commissioner.
Jap secret.			

Signed F.W. Stevens
Address Maj A.C.

Date Apr. 1945.

REMARKS.

Note : The title of a Secret or Confidential Document must not be written on this Form.

W1. 51076/524. 12,000 Pads. 4/42. C.P.Ltd. 51-4666.

1295

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army TOP SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: C/6
2 April 45.

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission
(For Chief Commissioner)(2).

1. Ref your letter 6251/AC of 28 Mar and our conversation the same day, herewith two copies of a Memorandum giving my views on the whole subject.

2. (a) I have already sent you copies of the letters referred to in my Memorandum viz T5/G/12 of 4 Oct and 26 Dec 44 and T8/G/11 of 11 Oct 44.

(b) I also sent Brig. LUSH copies of same which he wanted for Mr. MACMILLAN on 6 Jan 45.

R. 18.

Major General
M.M.I.A.

two.

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army.

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No: G/6
2 April 45.

---

1. GENERAL

(a) Plans have been laid in accordance with the policy of the "new deal" for ITALY progressively to hand over control of ITALY to the ITALIAN Government.

(b) Nevertheless, in order to continue to obtain the max-imum value from the Italian Army and its resources in aid of the Allied War Effort, the Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q. in a letter dated 28 Feb directed that temporarily there would be no change in control as regards this aspect i.e. that the "status and functions of the Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C. (M.M.I.A.)" A.F.H.Q. letter A.C. 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 44 and the system of "Command and Administration of the Ital-ian Army" A.F.H.Q. letter A.C. 091.711/169 of 16 Nov 44, would remain unchanged.

2. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to examine how Allied control of the Italian Army can in due course be relaxed and eventually handed over to the Italian Government.

3. FACTORS

(a) Transition Phases

There are three phases to be considered. The first, which exists at present, is complete Allied control. The third will be the establishment of the Italian Army under its own control on its post-war footing. Between the first and third phase lies the Second, which is the subject of this memorandum and specific plans for which cannot be made until further information on dec-isions re the third phase is available.

(b) Italian Army Territorial Organisation

(i) Whatever the size and composition of the post-war Italian Army may be, an Administrative military organisation by areas covering all ITALY must be a component part. This is equally necessary now, in order that the Italian military authorities may sort out, administer and control their army(including ex-soldiers) military installations etc. both in liberated territory and North of the GOTHIC LINE as the remainder of ITALY is progressively liberated.

TS/G/2 of 4 Oct 44

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

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(ii) My proposals for this were set out in my TS/G/12 of 4 Oct 44, were agreed to by A.F.H.Q. and were implemented in my TS/G/12 of 26 Dec 44.

(iii) To this extent the stage is set.

(c) Post-war Italian Army

At the request of Brig. NICHOLSON G-3(Plans) A.F.H.Q. I wrote a memorandum TS/G/11 of 11 Oct 44 on this matter. This showed that definite conclusions or proposals were impossible for me to state, as these depend on high policy decisions by the Allied Governments.

contd. sheet 2/..

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

3. FACTORS (Contd)

(c) Post-war Italian Army (Contd)

The memorandum, however, outlined the main factors that would have to be considered. This whole matter, I understand is now under active consideration by the C.C.S. at WASHINGTON.

(d) Allied assistance in maintenance of the Italian Army.

(i) The Italian Army is far from self supporting. The greater part of its rations, clothing, boots etc. is sup-plied by the Allies. In order to ensure correct and efficient distribution, an independent inter-Allied agency was set up by the C.C.S. under their FAN 338 of 26 Feb 44. M.M.I.A. is that agency and responsibility is on the "Country of ownership" basis, American or British. Control of the Italian Army must thus continue while FAN 338 is in force.

(ii) It is a matter of high policy as to whether the Allies would be prepared to hand over to the Italians con-trol of the Italian Army, while still providing the latter with the essential means to exist. Moreover, if the Allies were prepared to do so, it would be possible for the Italians (by e.g. a reduction in the ration scale) to main-tain a larger army than the 313,000 authorised. This would obviously be undesirable, particularly as I do not envisage the Italians being allowed by the Peace Treaty an Army as big as 313,000.

(iii) Certain administrative difficulties would have to be overcome. For instance it takes some 60 days after issue of supplies before full information becomes available to M.M.I.A. to complete its accounting procedure and correctly charge the Italians with the amounts owed to the British and American Governments. It would be possible to hand over the surplus supplies in depots in bulk on a given date, but we should have to insist on accurate returns for supp-lies issued up to that date and M.M.I.A. would have to continue its work for those 60 days.

(iv) The Italian Army is also very largely dependent on the Allies for all major items of fighting equipment such as M.T., guns, mortars, carriers etc. No Italian factories are producing these. It is a matter of high Allied policy as to whether the Italians shall be permitted to manufac-ture these or to what extent the Allies would provide, if desirable.

(e) Date of hand-over of control of the Italian Army

(i) The Italian military authorities already possess a large measure of internal autonomy, subject to the orders or veto of S.A.C. through M.M.I.A. The policy throughout has been to [illegible]

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(c) Date of hand-over of control of the Italian Army

(i) The Italian military authorities already possess a large measure of internal autonomy, subject to the orders or veto of S.A.C. through M.M.I.A. The policy throughout has been to try and make them stand on their own feet. They are being ridden more and more on the snaffle and less and less on the curb. Looked at in this way, virtual relax-ation of control is thus already in progress. I consider that this state of affairs should continue until we hand over complete control officially on a given date; nor do I think that the Italians would object to this.

(ii) An Army is an entity with all its components inter-related. I do not see that we can relax control of one part while controlling the rest. Let us avoid further complications in an already complicated situation and have a clear-cut transfer of control on a given date, perhaps that of signing the Peace Treaty.

contd. sheet 3/...

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3. (Contd)

(f) Position of A.M.L.A.

(i) The Allies will lay down certain terms in the Peace Treaty as regards the post-war size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army. It will therefore presumably be necessary to have an Allied Disarmament Commission to ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty are carried out. It appears logical that, with their special experience and knowledge, the Service Sub Commissions A.C., should become this Disarmament Commission in a reorganised form. This form might be that of one Commission with 3 branches (Navy, Army, Air), the head being responsible to S.A.C. initially and in due course perhaps to the U.S. and British Governments through their respective Ambassadors in ROME.

(ii) Though acting as a Disarmament Commission, the Allied (or British, if it is decided to leave ITALY to British control) personnel could also perform the functions of Military Attaché, while at the same time giving such advice and help to the Italians as they might require.

(iii) If however a Disarmament Commission for co-belligerent ITALY is not considered necessary or desirable, I think it should be made mandatory on the Italians to accept an Allied Military Mission with carte blanche to go anywhere and obtain any information necessary. Only thus could the Allies ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty were implemented.

4. CONCLUSION

From all the above, I submit that: -

(a) the present system of "benevolent control" is not irksome to the Italians, is working well and should continue.

(b) control cannot be relaxed gradually. It must be clear-cut on a given date under definite conditions, which are a matter of high Allied policy to decide.

(c) control should be continued at any rate until the situation is clearer after the cessation of hostilities in ITALY (which is likely to coincide with cessation in EUROPE) and perhaps till the signing of the Peace Treaty.

(d) the major factor on which any plans for transfer of control must be based is a decision on the size, composition and armament of the post-war Italian Army.

(e) even when control is transferred, some kind of Allied organisation (either in the shape of a Disarmament Commission or an accredited Mission to the Italian Army with wide powers of search) will be necessary to ensure that the terms of the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

S.A.C. initially and in due course perhaps [illegible] British Governments through their respective Ambassadors in ROME.

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(e) even when control is transferred, some kind of Allied organisation (either in the shape of a Disarmament Commission or an accredited Mission to the Italian Army with wide powers of search) will be necessary to ensure that the terms of the Peace Treaty are implemented.

L. Browning

Major General
M.M.I.A.

trs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

D.O.

TOP SECRET
and
PERSONAL

Brig. J. G. Nicholson
G-3 Plans, AFHQ, CMF
11 April 1945

Dear General,

Please refer to your TS/G/11 of 9 March. I apologise most sincerely for not answering this before. We had considerable difficulty in tracing what had actually happened in the matter, and as a result of my being away from here on a visit to London in the middle of March, the whole thing was lost sight of.

However the story appears to be that a Commander McGovern, US Navy, visited CASERTA in early March as an OSS representative of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had no authority to discuss the future of the Italian Army. He left Italy on 6 March for PARIS and WASHINGTON and is unlikely to return.

As far as I know, we are not considering the problem of the post-war Italian Army in detail here. I am sure that if and when this is done, it will be done through you.

Again my apologies for so long a delay in answering your letter.

Yours Sincerely

John Nicholson

Major General Langley Browning CB, CBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

6/3
18 Apr.

My dear

Many thanks for your DO of 11 Apr.
I quite understand & was not the least hurt! Thank you for writing

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what had actually happened in the matter, and [illegible] from here on a visit to London in the middle of March, the whole thing was lost sight of.

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Again my apologies for so long a delay in answering your letter.

Yours Sincerely

John Nicholson

Major General Langley Browning CB, CBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

6/3
10 Apr.

My dear

Many thanks for your DO of 10 Apr. I quite understand & fear not the least hurt! Thanks for writing & explaining the position

Yours

L.A.

Sent

Brig. Nicholson.

19 Apr (

TOP SECRET

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SUBJECT: Post War Italian Army.

TOP SECRET

&

PERSONAL

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
TS/G/11
7 March 1945.

My Dear

While we were accompanying Prince UMBERTO on an inspection of the LEGNANO Group last Wednesday, General INFANTE started talking about the post-war Italian Army. He said that there was an American Captain William MacGOVERN from the Combined Chiefs of Staff WASHINGTON who was over here at CASERTA dealing with that problem and that he (INFANTE) was going down to see MacGOVERN about it.

INFANTE also murmured that he thought that ITALY required another 6 Combat Groups !

I pass the above on to you for what it is worth. INFANTE may have been trying merely to draw us. On the other hand he may be going to CASERTA as he says. I have heard nothing about MacGOVERN's visit or whether it is really a fact that you are considering the problem of the post-war Italian Army in detail.

I think however that it is a little dangerous to have INFANTE rushing about talking of these matters, apparently without consulting the Minister of War and certainly telling M.M.I.A. nothing about what he proposes. So I thought I ought to write this letter to you just to put you wise.

I hope you are well,

Yours

L B

Major General.

Brigadier J.G. NICHOLSON, D.S.O.
G3 (Plans)

1304

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

While we were accompanying Prince UMBERTO on an inspection of the LEGNANO Group last Wednesday, General INFANTE started talking about the post-war Italian Army. He said that there was an American Captain William MacGOVERN from the Combined Chiefs of Staff WASHINGTON who was over here at CASERTA dealing with that problem and that he (INFANTE) was going down to see MacGOVERN about it.

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I hope you are well,

Yours

L.B.

Major General.

Brigadier J.C. NICHOLSON, D.S.O.
G-3 (Plans)
A.F.H.Q.

R10/3.

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1306

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

Subject:- M.M.I.A. - Future Planning.

Land Forces Sub Comd., AC.
(M.M.I.A.)
TS/G/13
7 Jan 45

A.F.H.Q. for G-5(Org)

1. In addition to daily routine duties under my present charter, it is now becoming necessary to plan ahead for eventualities during the concluding phases of the war in ITALY and for the post-hostilities period. These problems, which require constant liaison with outside authorities and other post-war planning staffs cannot adequately be dealt with by M.M.I.A. Staff as at present organised or allowed me by A.F.H.Q.

2. To ease the burden on my staff I have been doing a great deal of this myself, but cannot continue to do so without detriment to other commitments. I consider I need a small post-war planning section, proportionately comparable to those at other Headquarters, whose principle problems would be:-

(a) Future liaison and relationship with Italian Military authorities.

(b) Post-war organisation and strength of Italian Army.

(c) Contemplated changes in administration and status of the Italian Army.

(d) Repatriation of Italian Prisoners of War from all over the world. (See also 3(c)Below).

These include a multitude of associated details which should be studied now but with which I am quite unable to deal.

3. (a) This section should stand in relation to the rest of my staff in much the same way as the ad hoc Special Section has stood over the organisation of the Combat Groups, which arrangement has worked extremely well.

(b) I should like it to be composed of regular officers who already have a knowledge of these matters and who are less likely to be affected by demobilisation.

If approved, I would particularly like to have:-

Colonel FINELLY - who is completely au courant with M.M.I.A. organisation, procedure and problems; and who has organised the Italian Combat Groups.

Major GRIMSON - who similarly has a full knowledge of the working of M.M.I.A. from A/A aspect.

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This would ensure continuity. When the time came to impliment their plans, the staff would become executive and continue as part of whatever post-war establishment M.M.I.A. is to have when M.M.I.A. is transformed, presumably, into a Disarmament Commission.

(c) By taking over the P.W. Section of A.C.(as already proposed by the Chief Comissioner) and other officers loaned to me by A.C. there need hardly be any overall increase in personnel.

4. I request approval in principle so that I can:-

(a) Begin tentative reorganisation on the lines suggested.

(b) Make formal application for a W.E.

and thus anticipate future possibilities relieving my present staff of functions not strictly within their orbit and with which they have not the time to deal.

5. I have discussed this with H.Q. Allied Commission who are in entire agreement with me.

L. B.

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

TOP SECRET

11.

Subject:- Italian Post-War Re-armament

Land Forces Sub Com., AC
(M.M.I.L.A.)

TS/G/11
6 Jan 45

My Dear

1. You have asked me to send you some notes on the above for the President A.C.

2. I think I cannot do better than by:-

(a) Enclosing copy of my TS/G/12 of 4 Oct and TS/G/11 of 11 Oct, which gives my appreciation on the whole subject, as far as I am able to judge, with the limited knowledge of Cabinet intentions at my disposal.

(b) Referring you to your unnumbered letter of 7 Dec 44 from Economic Section.

3. I have told M. of W. to make a census of all armament factories, Italian weapons available etc. I hope to have the answer by about the first week in February, when we will have a clearer picture of the existing state of affairs.

4. I go on tour to-morrow, Sunday 7 Jan and will be back on Friday evening 12 Jan.

Yours

(Major General)

Brigadier M. Lush, CB., CBE., MC.
Chief of Staff
Allied Commission

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10

TOP SECRET

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. TS/G/11
28 Nov 44

G3 (org), AFHQ
(Personal attention G I)

Attached herewith are copies of correspondence forwarded on instructions received by phone from Lt. Col. INGLEDEW on 28 Nov.

W.O. II
Chief Clerk .
(M. M. I. A.)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

Brig. J. G. Nicholson
G-3 Section, AFHQ
18 October 1944

Dear General

I got back to AFHQ yesterday and enclose herewith a copy of the letter I have sent home to Brigadier Curtis at the War Office. I hope it meets the points you made and you will see that I have added an appropriate suggestion at the end.
I would like to take this opportunity of thanking you once again for all of your help over this matter and for your very kind hospitality to me while I was in Rome.

Yrs. Sincerely
John Nicholson

Major Gen. L. Browning, C.B, C.B.E, M.C.
Military Mission Italian Army
Hq, Allied Control Commission
APO 394

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Brig. J. G. Nicholson
G-3 Section, AFHQ
18 October 1944.

Dear

1. Reference your DO letter MO 1/3M/2970 of 5 September enclosing a Note on the information you wanted in connection with your report on the limitations which should be imposed on the Italian armed forces in a preliminary peace treaty.

2. I passed your note on to General Browning, Director of the Military Mission to the Italian Army (which is part of the Allied Control Commission) and I forward herewith:

   a. His reply (Tab A).

   b. MMIA Letter TS/G/12 of 4 October 44 (Tab B).

   c. MMIA Memo TS/G/11 of 11 October 44 (Tab C).

   d. DO Letter TS/G/11 of 13 October 44 (Tab D).

3. The memo at Tab C which General Browning has very kindly prepared on his views regarding the post war Italian army is, I realize, outside the terms of reference given in para 3 of your Note. But as General Browning explained to me in a conversation which I had with him, it is hardly possible to consider what should be done now with the Italian armed forces until one has some idea of what the eventual picture is to be. The whole problem really comprises three phases. The first - which is nearing its end - is a phase in which it has been our aim to make the maximum use of Italian resources in the prosecution of the war against Germany. The third phase is the establishment of the Italian armed forces on their post war footing. Between these two phases there is one of transition and it is on this that we are about to enter and which forms the problem which you are trying to solve. I feel myself that the over-riding consideration in this second phase is to ensure that the decisions taken and arrangements made are such as will result in a smooth change-over from the first to the third phase. This will hardly be achieved by imposing on the Italians at this juncture such terms as take no account of what the future of the Italian armed forces is likely to be.

4. Reference para 4 of General Browning's letter at Tab A. There is at present no new construction of Italian merchant ships or war ships because there are no facilities for such construction in those Italian ports now in our occupation. I do not know whether any plans have been formulated for restricting construction in the future, but if they have been, they would have been discussed between the Admiralty and C-in-C Med and I suggest that you approach the Admiralty on the matter.

5. I know you will appreciate that this letter and attached correspondence is on a purely unofficial and planning level, and does not necessarily represent official AFHQ views. I suggest, if I may, that if there is any further information you require you might care to write DO direct to General Browning or it might perhaps be better if he paid a visit home to talk to you.

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Brigadier F. C. Curtis
Room 225A
The War Office, Whitehall,
London, S.W. 1

Copy to:
Major Gen. L. Browning, C.B, C.B.E, M.C.
Military Mission Italian Army
HQ, Allied Control Commission
APO 394

TOP SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

7.

TOP SECRET

Subject:- Post War Italian Army

Military Mission Italian Army
R O M E

TS/G/11
13 Oct 44

Dear

Ref para 5 of my D/O letter TS/G/11 of 11 Oct.

1. I have now been able to obtain from the Ministry of War and Ministry of Marine the details of Italian C.D. guns and ammunition which you require. Return is as at 1 Sep 44.

2. Herewith -

Appx 1 to 6 - Italian naval guns in liberated ITALY and SARDINIA.

Appx 7 - Italian naval ammunition in SARDINIA.

Appx 8 to 13 - Italian naval guns in enemy occupied ITALY as at Sep 43. ELBA and PIOMBINO are included as they have been liberated since this return was made up. Confirmed guns still in position.

Appx 14 - Summary of Appx 1 to 6, 8 to 13.

Appx 15 - Army Coast Defence guns and ammunition.

Yours L.B.

Brigadier J.C. NICHOLSON
G-3, Plans.
A.F.H.Q.
C.M.F.

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Appx 1

TARANTO

76/40	90/53	100/47	102/35	120/40	152/45	203/45	305/42
53	41	14	18	8	14	4	3

Appx 2

BRINDISI

76/40	90/53	102/35	120/40	152/40	152/45	381/40
40	6	2	2	4	6	4

Appx 3

GALLIPOLI

76/40	120/40
4	2

Appx 4

NAPOLI

76/40	90/53
4	22

Appx 5

MADDALENA

76/40	90/53	102/35	102/45	120/45	152/40	152/50	203/45	305/17
29	12	17	3	4	11	4	4	8

Appx 6

CAGLIARI

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76/40	90/53	102/35	120/40	152/40	152/45	381/40
40	6	2	2	4	6	4

Appx 3

GALLIPOLI

76/40	120/40
4	2

Appx 4

NAPOLI

76/40	90/53
4	22

Appx 5

MADDALENA

76/40	90/53	102/35	102/45	120/45	152/40	152/50	203/45	305/17
29	12	17	3	4	11	4	4	8

Appx 6

CAGLIARI

76/40	90/53	102/35	120/40	152/50
20	16	26	2	12

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Appx 7

Ammunition at SILIQUA
and CAPETZURO

76/40	-	2,945
90/53	-	2,348
102/35	-	4,971
120/40	-	9,699
152/50	-	2,256

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APPENDIX 8

VENEZIA

76/40	100/47	120/40	152/32	152/40	305/50	381/40
91	14	8	6	12	6	2

APPENDIX 9

ELBA & PIOMBINO

76/40	102/35	152/35
22	15	11

APPENDIX 10

LA SPEZIA

76/40	90/53	100/47	102/35	120/50	152/45	152/50	305/17
45	30	4	16	4	8	12	8

POLA

APPENDIX 11

66/39	66/47	76/40	90/42	100/47	149/37	152/40	190/39
4	16	4	8	4	22	2	2

APPENDIX 12

ALTO TIRRENO

76/40	102/35	120/35	152/50
12	12	1	3

APPENDIX 13

ALTO ADRIATICO

76/40	152/45
12	6

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APPENDIX 14

SUMMARY OF APPENDICES 1 to 6, 8 to 13

TYPE	ITALY	SARDINIA
381/40	6	-
305/50	6	-
305/42	3	-
305/17	16	-
203/45	8	-
190/39	2	-
152/50	19	12
152/45	34	-
152/40	29	-
152/35	11	-
152/32	6	-
149/37	22	-
120/50	4	-
120/45	4	-
120/40	20	2
120/35	1	-
102/45	3	-
102/35	80	26
100/47	36	-
90/53	111	16
90/42	8	-
76/40	361	20
66/47	15	-
66/39	4	-

Each gun has approx 200 rds of amn with it.

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305/17	16	-
203/45	8	-
190/39	2	-
152/50	19	12
152/45	34	-
152/40	29	-
152/35	11	-
152/32	6	-
149/37	22	-
120/50	4	-
120/45	4	-
120/40	20	2
120/35	1	-
102/45	3	-
102/35	80	25
100/47	36	-
90/53	111	16
90/42	8	-
76/40	361	20
66/47	16	-
66/39	4	-

Each gun has approx 200 rds of amn with it.

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APPENDIX 15

MILITARY COAST DEFENCE GUNS

NAPLES

90/53	75/46
8	4

SARDINIA

120/45	152/40	120/40
5	6	2

SICILY

90/53
40

AMMUNITION

90/53	1200 rds on Mainland 550 rds in SARDINIA
120/45	12000 rds in SARDINIA
75/46	1,980 rds on Mainland 17000 rds in SARDINIA

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TOP SECRET

Military Mission Italian Army
R O M E

TS/G/11
13 Oct 44

Dear

1. Reference what we were discussing yesterday evening, the attached will interest you, I think.

2. TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct shews the organisation I think we ought to establish, or rather authorise, now with one eye on the present and the other on the future. With such an organisation the transition from war to peace will be much simplified.

3. TS/G/11 dated 11 Oct shews my ideas on possibilities for the post-war Italian Army.

4. I have, of course, discussed none of the above yet with the Italian authorities.

Yours L.P.

His Excellency,
Sir Noel Charles, K.C.M.G., M.C.
British Embassy,
ROME

TOP SECRET

Subject:- Post War Italian Army

Military Mission Italian Army
R O M E

TS/G/11
11 Oct 44

Dear Nicholson

Ref your D/O letter of 25 Sep on the post war Italian Army:-

1. Your para 5.

Carabinieri are the Police(though part of the Army) and Guardia Finanza are Customs people. They are NOT really part of the Land Forces i.e. Army proper.

2. Your para 8.

I don't know. I believe it is lease-land but we can always just tell the Italians to hand back the equipment to us.

3. Your para 9.

No plans, as we have never been given any policy or requests for our views.

The only limitation so far is the ceiling of 319,000 for the Army which we are working to, demobilising all the rest in this country. G3(Org)AFHQ can give you full details of this - which are also shewn in Appendix "A" of attached MMIA letter TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct.

4. Your para 10.

I suggest you ask Naval Sub Commission, ACC.

5. Your Para 11.

A list of Italian C.D. guns and ammunition will be sent you as soon as we can get this from Ministry of War and Ministry of Marine.

Again, no plans for "dealing with fortifications". We are not a DISARMAMENT Commission yet !

6. Your para 12.

The Italians have very little(bar rifles)of their own fighting equipment left. I think they will "play" reasonably honestly over the peace terms. They realise their interests are bound up with ours and have co-operated. I think they will continue to do so.

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7. Your para 13.

I attach a memorandum and a copy of MMIA letter TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct, which gives you the state of affairs and what I feel about the future.

8. I'd suggest that having read all the attached and got into the picture you come and talk to me. It is so hard to put these things on paper when all is so nebulous, there is no policy and one is groping in the dark without any knowledge of what the "high-ups" are thinking.

Yours

Brig J.C. NICHOLSON
G3 - Plans, AFHQ.

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TOP SECRET

4.

Subject:- POST WAR ITALIAN ARMY

Military Mission Italian Army
R O M E

MS/G/11
11 Oct 44

MEMORANDUM

1. GENERAL

The peace establishment of the Italian Army must depend on the Allied peace terms, including such matters as :-

(a)the status of ITALY post-war - ally or co-belligerent - and the part the Allies will expect her to play in the post-war world.

(b)the matter of whether ITALY is to retain any colonies or dependencies.

(c)the size of the other continental armies e.g. FRANCE and YUGO - SLAVIA.

etc.

The decision therefore is a matter of high Allied policy, beyond the purview of MMIA.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

Nevertheless, it may be assumed that the Italian Army in peace should be:-

(a)small enough to be controllable by the Allies, who will on economic grounds wish to reduce their own armies to the minimum.

(b)small enough not to be an undue economic burden on impoverished ITALY.

(c)small enough NOT to be object of suspicion in EUROPE.

(d)large enough to maintain internal law and order, as the backbone of authority.

(e)large enough to defend its frontiers, but without power of aggression.

(f)capable of expansion(if or when required by the Allies)into a more formidable Army to fight on the side of the Allies in any future War.

3. FACTORS

On these assumptions, the following factors should be taken into account :-

(a)ITALY is very war weary. The people are tired of soldiering and service in the Army is poorly paid. Conscription is a recognised procedure for getting a cheap Army. On the other hand, conscription (as with GERMANY after 1918), with its short colour service, would afford a means to ITALY to build up a large trained reserve or potential

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(b)the matter of whether ITALY is to retain any colonies or dependencies.

(c)the size of the other continental armies e.g. FRANCE and YUGO - SLAVIA.

etc.

The decision therefore is a matter of high Allied policy, beyond the purview of SHAEF.

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(a)ITALY is very war weary. The people are tired of soldiering and service in the Army is poorly paid. Conscription is a recognised procedure for getting a cheap Army. On the other hand, conscription (as with GERMANY after 1918), with its short colour service, would afford a means to ITALY to build up a large trained reserve or potential army, while still on paper only maintaining a small army in being.

For control, therefore, it would seem that the Allies should insist on a long service Army, the corollary to which is that it should be created by voluntary recruitment with better terms of service and pay so as to attract suitable personnel.

Moreover, a small voluntary army, even though more expensive per man should cost far less in toto than the vast conscripted army of pre-1939. It should also be easier to eliminate politics from the long service army and make it "above party"; the long service officer or man has more to lose and more time to be educated on non-party lines than the conscript, who is virtually a civilian in uniform for a short period.

Sheet 2/.....

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In view of the above, a change from time honoured conscription to a long-service voluntary Italian Army would need to be indicated.

Furthermore large conscript armies or the machinery of conscription are potential breeding grounds for world wars; whereas the expansion of a small long-service voluntary army into a large one for use with or against the Allies in any future war would present much greater difficulty than a peace time conscript army, thus lessening the danger to world peace.

The decision as to which type of army ITALY shall have post war thus depends largely on the trust that can be put in ITALY'S good faith and willingness to co-operate with the Allies in the future.

(b) Irrespective of any decision given as regards 3(a), we may examine how large the post war ITALIAN Army should be.

The CARABINIERI are the senior regiment in the Army, but they have police rather than military functions in peace. They are the primary bulwark of law and order.

It has been suggested that the CARABINIERI might be abolished as being inefficient and useless. If this were done, some form of "metropolitan" or local police force would have to replace the CARABINIERI; otherwise the Army proper would have to be brought into direct contact with the civil population to maintain law and order and carry out many non-military functions. This latter is obviously inadvisable, apart from the very great break with existing tradition and procedure.

It seems therefore that the CARABINIERI must remain. In view of the inevitably disturbed state of the country post war, its strength should not be less than the pre-war one of 65,000 initially, though by reorganisation of distribution, duties etc. this number might well be reduced.

(c) The Army proper will require a Regular Territorial (in the sense of territory or area, not to be confused with the non-Regular British TA) Administrative as well as a Fighting Organisation. The former is necessary for administration and must be capable of continuing to function if and when the Fighting element is engaged. The latter must be the minimum necessary to guard the more vulnerable parts of ITALY, including the ISLANDS, assuming that ITALY'S colonies are reft from her. The lay-out of the Territorial Administrative organisation should fit both peace and war needs.

(d) The pre-1939 Territorial organisation consisted of Territorial HQ's administering a region, Districts and Depots. The functions of these are shewn in para 2 of Appx "B" of WILA letter WO/8/12 dated 4 Oct, attached hereto. From this it would seem that, in the final peace lay-out, Districts could be reduced both in number and size, their functions being taken over by Depots. Depots would then, as in ENGLAND, become the home, the focus and the record offices of the various regiments, and the number of Depots authorised would be in relation to the number of Regiments in the post war Army. Initially, however, when peace comes, all Districts will have to be kept in being to deal with demobilisation during the transition period. A reduced number of District HQ will be necessary in peace, so as to continue functioning in war when (see

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Pre-1939 there were 13 Territorial HQ's. After discussion with the Italian Minister of War, a proposal has been put to higher authority (see attached TD/G/12 dated 4 Oct)to organise ITALY forthwith into 12 Territorial Regions, 36 Districts and 90 Depots, in anticipation of the complete liberation of ITALY. If approved this should be the basis of the post war lay-out in order to ensure a smooth change-over from war to peace.

Sheet/3.....

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(e) As regards the post war Fighting organization, the crucial areas seem to be the Northern boundary, the ISLAMIC, and ROME the focus and seat of all activity.

It will be unnecessary and uneconomical to maintain modern war fighting Divisions for Internal Security to back up the CARABINIERI. The Fighting organization could thus consist of Combat Divisions and Internal Security Divisions, each on separate establishments to fit their particular tasks. Internal Security Divisions could be rapidly expanded into Combat Divisions in the event of war, or act as the Reserve for the Combat Divisions.

(f) To prevent evasion of the peace terms(see first sub para of 3(a) above)Allied control could be exercised with the minimum of effort by forbidding the existence of any Italian munitions industry and by arming the Italians solely with British equipment out of the enormous stocks which will be available for years post war. The advantages of this strategically and from the point of view of control are obvious.

Moreover, we are at present engaged in creating 6 Italian Combat Groups(each 9,000 strong)armed with 3 British Divisions worth of equipment. It would be merely a simple extention of this to arm the whole Italian Army with British equipment and put all future Combat Divisions (Groups)on to the same standard basis. These 6 Combat Groups have defensive but not great offensive power. No Corps Troops or heavy artillery or tanks are permitted. This also would be in conformity with a policy of limiting the possible offensive(aggression)power of ITALY and hence her dependent on us.

The establishment of a Combat Group is given at Appendix "A".

As a war potential, Combat Groups should be organised into Corps, with a Corps HQ and war 2nd and 3rd line services in peace.

(g) As regards the Internal Security Divisions proposed, here again we are organising the 3 I.S. Divisions authorised on a special establishment, each 5,000 strong - see Appendix "B".

This could be the peace establishment also.

(h) In addition to the Territorial organisation of Territorial HQ's, Districts and Depots, and the Fighting organisation of Corps HQ, Combat Groups and I.S. Divisions, certain other organisations will naturally be needed, such as:-

Ministry of War
S.I.M.(Intelligence Organisation)
State Maggiore Generale - the peace time advisory body to the Government on military matters.

Training establishments
Services(medical, supply, arsenals etc)
C.D. and A.A.
etc.

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forbidding the existence of any Italian Warships larger than [illegible]
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The establishment of a Combat Group is given at Appendix "J".

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(g) As regards the Internal Security Divisions proposed, here again we are organising the 3 I.S. Divisions authorised on a special establishment, each 5,000 strong - see Appendix "H".

This could be the peace establishment also.

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Ministry of War
S.I.M. (Intelligence Organisation)
Stato Maggiore Generale - the peace time advisory body to the Government on military matters.

Training establishments
Services (medical, supply, arsenals etc)
C.R. and A.A.
etc.

4. PLAN FOR ITALIAN PEACETIME ARMY

In view of all the above, as a pure "cockaby" (because, vide para 1, I am not in a position to do more than guess):-

(a) The establishment of the peace-time Italian Army might be (all ranks):-

Ministry of War, S.M.G., S.I.M.	2,500
Training Establishments	4,000
Services	12,300
C.R. & A.A.	20,000

Sheet 4/.....

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5 Corps HQ's	1,000
12 Combat Groups	108,000
Corps Services(War 2nd & 3rd Line) for 12 Combat Groups	6,000
9 I.C. Divisions	45,000
12 Territorial HQ's and Regions	1,800
30 District HQ's and Districts	900
90 Depots	4,500
TOTAL	206,000

For details see Appendix "C" and Map in TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct attached.

(b) In PEACE, Corps HQ would command all the Army organisations in its Corps Area(comprising 2 or 3 Territorial Regions)under Ministry of War.

In WAR, command of the Territorial Administrative organisation and Internal Security Divisions would pass to Territorial HQ's directly under Ministry of War, leaving the Fighting Corps free for battle.

L. Browning

Major General,
Director, MMLA.


NOTE:- I have NOT, of course, discussed this subject with the Italian Military Authorities, so the figures given in para 4(a) are purely arbitrary.


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
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MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.







Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SUMMARY

PERSONNEL, ARMS AND MOTOR TRANSPORT.

of

AN ITALIAN COMBAT GROUP

Appx 'A' to TS/G/11 dat

	Officers.	O.Rs.	25-pdr.	17-pdr.	40 mm.	6-pdr	3" mortar.	2" mortar.	L.M.G.	2IAT.	M/Cycles.	Cars.	Ambulances.	Trucks G.S. 15-cwt.	" Specialist 15-cwt.	" Water 15-cwt.	Lorries 3-ton G.S.	Lorries spec. heavy.	Trailers.	Trailers (Ammo)
GROUP H.Q.	23	113									10	7		4	3	1	3			
ARTY REGTL H.Q.	11	74								4	5	4		6	3	1	5			
25 pdr B.H.Q.	7	71							2	2	5	3		1	2	1	1			
2 troops (Each)	4	84	4						2	2	1	1		2	2					
4 Batteries (Each)	15	239	8						6	6	7	5		5	6	1	7		16	
TOTAL FLD Artillery	60	956	32						24	24	28	20		20	24	4	28		64	
17 pdr B.H.Q.	5	44							2	4	4	4		3		1	2		1	
2 troops (Each)	2	64		4					2			1		2			2			
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 17 pdr.	9	172		8					6	4	4	6		7		1	6		1	
40 mm B.H.Q.	5	41							2	4	5	2		2		1	3			
2 Troops (Each)	4	95			6				2		5	2		1		1	3			
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 40 mm	13	231			12				6	4	15	6		4	1	2	9			
TOTAL 1 ARTILLERY REGT	93	1433	32	8	12				36	36	52	36		37	28	6	42		65	
H.Q. Infantry Regt.	15	101								2	10	4		11	1	1	12		2	
TOTAL MORTAR COY	3	95					8		6		3	1		4						
TOTAL A. TK. GUN COY	6	162				12			2	1	6	1		10						
Inf Bn H.Q.	10	115							6	2	9	2		6			8			
TOTAL Support Coy.	6	162				2	4	14	16	6	6	1		8			3			
3 Rifle Coys (Each)	5	155						3	14	4	2			3						
TOTAL Inf Battalion (3)	31	742				2	4	23	64	20	21	3		23		1	11			
TOTAL INF REGT	117	2584				18	20	69	200	63	82	15		94	1	4	45		2	
TOTAL 2 INF REGTS	234	5168				36	40	138	400	126	164	30		188	2	8	90		4	
H.Q. Engineer Bn.	6	16							2	3	1	1		2			1			
2 Field Companies (Each)	5	227							12	5	12	2		5	7	1	10		3	
Signals Coy.	7	327						2	8	5	35			16	24		17		2	
TOTAL ENGINEER Bn	23	797						2	34	18	60	5		28	38	2	38		8	
TOTAL SUPPLY COY	13	294							20	20	26	12		5			109			
Medical Section.	14	237									5	6	18			2	15	1	2	
2 Field Hospitals (Each)	6	44										1					4			
TOTAL MEDICAL SERVICES.	26	325									5	8	18			2	23	1	2	
ORDNANCE FIELD PARK.	4	69							4		5	4		4		1	12	17		

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	23	113									10	7		4	3	1	3						1
	11	74								4	5	4		6	3	1	5						
	7	71							2	2	5	3		1	2	1	1						
	4	64	4						2	2	1	1		2	2	1					6		1
	15	239	8						6	6	7	5		5	6	1	1		16		12		3
ory	60	256	32						24	24	28	20		20	24	4	4		64		48		12
	5	44							2	4	4	4		3	2	1	1		1		4	1	
	2	64		4					2	2	1	1		1	1	1	1			1	4	1	
x 17 pdr.	9	172		8					6	4	4	6		7	6	2	2		1		8	1	
	5	41							2	4	5	2		2	1	1	1						
	4	95			6				2	2	5	2		1		1	1				6		
x 40 mm	13	231			12				6	4	15	6		4	1	2	2				12		
RY REGT	93	1433	32	8	12				36	36	52	36		37	28	8	48		65	1	69	3	12
	15	101								2	10	4		11	1	1	12		2				
Y	3	95					8		6		3	1		4							9		
N COY	6	162				12			2	1	6	1		10							26		
	10	115							6	2	9	2		6			8			1			3
py.	6	162				2	4	14	16	6	6	1		8			3					22	
	5	155						3	14	4	2			3								1	
lion (3)	31	742				2	4	23	64	20	21	3		23		1	11			1		25	3
	117	2584				18	20	69	200	63	82	15		94	1	4	45		2	3		110	9
TS	234	5168				36	40	138	400	126	164	30		188	2	8	90		4	6		220	18
	6	16							2	3	1	1		2			1						2
h)	5	227							12	5	12	2		5	7	1	10		3				
	7	327						2	8	5	35			16	24		17		2	1			
Bn	23	797						2	34	18	60	5		28	38	2	38		8	1			2
Y	13	294							20	20	26	12		5			109			4			
	14	237									5	6	18			2	15	1	2				
h)	6	44										1					4						
ERVICES.	26	325									5	8	18			2	23	1	2				
	4	69							4		5	4		4		1	12	17					

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TOTAL Support Coy.		5	155						2	14	4	2		2											
3 Rifle Coys (Each)	(3)	31	742				2	4	23	64	20	21	3		23		1	11							
TOTAL Inf Battalion		117	2584				18	20	69	200	63	82	15		94		1	4	45						
TOTAL INF REGT		234	5168				36	40	138	400	126	164	30		188		2	8	90						
TOTAL 2 INF REGTS																									
H.Q. Engineer Bn.		6	16							2	3	1	1		2			1							
2 Field Companies (Each)		5	227							12	5	12	2		5	7	1	10	3						
Signals Coy.		7	327						2	8	5	35			16	24		17	2						
TOTAL ENGINEER Bn		23	797						2	34	18	60	5		28	38	2	38	8						
TOTAL SUPPLY COY		13	294							20	20	26	12		5			109							
Medical Section.		14	237									5	6	18			2	15	1	2					
2 Field Hospitals (Each)		6	44										1					4							
TOTAL MEDICAL SERVICES.		26	325									5	8	18			2	23	1	2					
ORDNANCE FIELD PARK.		4	69							4		5	4		4		1	12	17						
Mechanical Engineers Workshop		6	68							4		5	3		11	2	1	13	16	5					
6 L.A.Ds. (Each)			12									2			1				1						
Mechanical Engineers Pl (For Supply Coy)		1	39							2	1	2	1		2			1	8						
TOTAL MECH ENGINEERS		7	279							6	1	19	4		19	2	1	14	30	5					
TOTAL 1 COMBAT GROUP (less CC.RR).		428	478	32	8	12	36	40	140	500	201	341	106	18	265	73	23	337	56	76					
2 Provost Sections (CC.RR)		4	100							2		28	2		6			2							

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| | | |

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B" to
NMIA letter TS/G/11
dated 11 Oct 44

INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

ORGANIZATION

1 Division HQ
2 Brigade HQs
4 Inf Regiments
1 Engineer and Signal Bn
1 Medical Unit
1 Supply and Ordnance Unit
1 M.T. Unit

Div HQ(HQ and Staff)(excluding CC,MP)		100
2 Brigade HQs(HQ and HQ Platoons)each	25	50
Infantry Regiment(HQ and HQ Platoon)	34	
2 Inf Pns(HQ and HQ Pl 44 x 2)	88	
4 Rifle Co(124 x 4)	496	
2 Bdge Co(150 x 2)	300	
1 Regt Sp Co(6 MG and 6 Mortars)	170	
	1083	
Total 4 Inf Regts		4332
Engineer and Signal Bn HQ	15	
Engr Company	146	
Signal Company	162	
	323	323
Medical Unit		75
Supply and Ordnance Unit		25
M.T. Unit		75
Total		5000

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TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C" to
PWIA letter PS/O/11
dated 11 Oct 44

Peace Distribution of Italian Army

Serial	Territorial Region	Combat Group	U.S. Div.	Corps HQ.
1.	UDINE	one	one	one
2.	BOLZANO	one	one	
3.	MILANO	one	one	one
4.	BOLOGNA	one	one	
5.	TORINO	one	one	one
6.	GENOVA	one	one	
7.	FIRENZE	one		
8.	ROMA	one	one	one
9.	SARDINIA	one		
10.	NAPOLI	one	one	one
11.	BARI	one		
12.	SICILY	one	one	
	T O T A L	twelve	nine	five

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3.

SUBJECT: Allied Occuration of Northern ITALY. TOP SECRET

Military Mission Italian Army.
ROME.

T.S./G/12.
4 October 44.

H.Q. AAI (2)

1. GENERAL.

I have been shewn by A.C.C. the C-in-C's letter, MA/536 dated 11 Sep and your 16/1/G(Ops) dated 6 Sep on the above subject, which is intimately bound up with the future disposition of the Italian Army when Northern Italy is occupied.

2. ASPECTS.

There are, from the Italian Army point of view, 3 main aspects: -

(a) provision of "Italian troops for internal security duties in support of A.M.G."

(b) control and action in respect of Italian soldiers and military property discovered as we advance.

(c) change over from the present military set-up to the future lay-out as authori[illegible] by the Allies under the peace terms.

3. AS REGARDS 2(a) - SEE APPENDIX "A".

The only sources from which Italian troops can be made available are:-

(a) Existing I.S. Divs.

There are three of these - SABAUDA, AOSTA and CALABRIA each 5000 strong. A.C.C. require SABAUDA and AOSTA complete for SICILY. They also ask for 2 further bns from CALABRIA Div for CALABRIA and 1 other bn from CALABRIA Div for ROME. Virtually no troops from existing I.S. Divs would thus be available for Northern ITALY.

(b) Guard Battalions.

18 these are in use for guarding Allied installations and a

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4 October 44.

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(b) Guard Battalions.

18 these are in use for guarding Allied installations and a further 4 are projected, to be formed out of the "4100 Internal Security troops" (see 5(f) of Appendix "A")
It is not known whether these can be spared and in any event it would be advisable to have properly organised formations rather than a collection of individual battalions

(c) Service Units under Allied Command.

Presumably these with P.B.S., Fifth Army and British Command cannot be cut. These also are not organised or of the quality to undertake I.S. duties.

contd/sheet 2.

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(c) Contd.

Service Units under Allied Command (Contd)

"Allied Garrison CORSICA" are mainly of Yugo-Slav origin. "Allied Garrison SARDINIA 9000" have been used for work with the U.S. Air Corps. With the departure of the latter, the figure of 9000 can be reduced considerably. But these are "U.S. ITIS" and at the disposal of the U.S. for labour etc duties; and they are not organised or of the quality to undertake I.S. duties.
No troops from this source are thus available.

(d) Combat Groups.

These are being organised as fighting formations and will not be ready

FRIULI Group	before		15 Nov
CREMONA	"	"	1 Dec
LEGNANO	"	"	1 Jan
FOLGORE	"	"	1 Jan
MANTOVA	"	"	15 Jan
PICENO	"	"	15 Jan

(e) Italian administration 27,000 cannot be cut and is in fact below what is really necessary. Nor can the figures for A.C.C. 3000, SIM 1500 and reinforcements etc. 18400 be reduced.

It therefore appears that NO Italian troops will be available "for internal security duties in support of A.M.G." when Northern ITALY is liberated, without calling on one or more Combat Groups.

4. AS REGARDS 2 (b) and (c)

(a) These two aspects are intimately connected.

(b) Both on military and political grounds, immediately on liberation of territory as we advance and for all ITALY post-war, it will be essential to assume control of the (probably) large numbers of Italian officers and men who will be found in the North. The existing Italian military authority (which will also be the future backbone of ITALY) must be given facilities to assume this control and establish their authority. Without these facilities, I foresee chaos in the Army sphere and a deplorable breeding ground for disaffection, to the detriment of the Allied war effort and the post-war stability of ITALY. Without the creation of Italian military authority, Patriot organisations of diverse political creeds and enmities will hold away in their respective areas - a state of affairs which must be avoided at all costs.

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These are being organised as fighting formations and will not be ready

FRIULI Group	before		15 Nov
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FOLGORE	"	"	
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PISTOIA	"	"	

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(c) On the above basis, I attach (at Appendix "B") an appreciation of what I consider is the minimum necessary to re-establish Italian military authority over all ITALY. The military Territorial H.Qs and the areas under their jurisdiction are designed on a military basis. It is not possible to draw these boundaries so that they fit Allied A.C.C. Regions or Allied Military Districts. Moreover, the boundaries of these latter are liable to change. This should cause no real difficulty and should be accepted, so that the Italian lay-out may continue on into the Peace without change.

contd/. Sheet 3.

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(c) Contd.

It can be seen that by the allocation of 695 additional personnel, an Italian military organisation covering all ITALY can be achieved even though on an attenuated basis. I strongly recommend that this be authorised forthwith, so that M of W can lay their plans NOW. A matter to be decided is where these additional 695 personnel are to come from, presumably within the ceiling of 313,000. This personnel must be "INTERNATIONAL ITIS". I recommend (See Appendix "C") that they be taken out of the figure of "I.S. Tps 4100" even at the expense of one guard battalion (see para 3(b) above.). I consider that these 695 personnel are definitely "effective" in all senses of the word for the issue of rations, in that they will contribute materially to the war effort by the results they should produce. They will also be contributing to Internal Security and can thus legitimately be taken from the 4100. In any event, the approval for their use as a military and political necessity should NOT be dependent on any legal interpretation of whether they are or are not "in fact effe-ctive."

(d) I would ask that the PLAN proposed in Appendix "B" be approved as a whole, without lengthy discussion of details. TIME is a major factor. Action is needed NOW for the area North of NAPLES up to the Combat Line, and within a few weeks the problem of the rest of Northern ITALY may be upon us, with nothing settled. I wish to give the Italian M of W a definite, comprehensive plan NOW, so that they can work out the details and prepare to implement what I consider is a vital military and political necessity.

This whole business is presumably ultimately a matter for decision by A.F.H.Q. But, as the C-in-C is so vitally concerned, I send this letter to you (copy to A.F.H.Q.) in order that you may consider my proposals and min your recommendations thereon to A.F.H.Q.

L. Browning

tvs. LB. Major General.
M.M.I.A.

copy to: G.3 (Org)(Br) A.F.H.Q. 2
H.Q. ACC 2

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TOP SECRET

Appendix "A" to MMLA letter, TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct 44.

ITALIAN ARMY.

LATEST A.F.H.Q. PROPOSALS.

1.	Italian Administrative Installations	27,000
2.	Combat Groups	57,000
3.	Service Units under Allied Command	
	(a) P.B.S.	52,000
	(b) FIFTH Army	12,000
	(c) Allied Garrison, SARDINIA	9,000
	(d) Allied Garrison, CORSICA	5,000
	(e) British Command	93,000
4.	A.A.& C.D.	600
5.	Internal Security troops, including	
	(a) A.C.C.	3,000
	(b) 18 Guard Battalions (800)	14,400
	(c) S.I.M.	1,500
	(d) 2 Divs SICILY (SASSARI & AOSTA)	10,000
	(e) 1 Div SARDINIA (CALABRIA)	5,000
	(f) Internal Security troops	4,100
6.	Reinforcements, sick in hospital, not assigned to units, and unassigned personnel, including Liaison Officers, Interpreters, etc.	25,400
7.	C.C.RR, including C.C.RR assigned to Military formations	55,000
		368,000

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TOP SECRET

Appendix "B" to MMIA letter
TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct 44.

Appreciation of the Situation on 1 Oct 44 in respect of Territorial H.Q.s, Districts and Depots of the Italian Army.

OBJECT.

1. To examine the necessity, or otherwise, for establishing Territorial HQs, Districts and Depots of the Italian Army to cover the whole of ITALY, including the ISLANDS.

FACTORS.

2. Functions of Territorial HQs , Districts and Depots.

(a) Territorial HQs.

(i) represent authority of War Ministry and General Staff throughout area of responsibility

(ii) adm and discipline of all Italian tps in the area including troops under Allied operational command

(iii) responsibility for safe custody and accounting of all Italian military stores

(iv) staff includes representatives of services who are responsible for organisation of services in the area

(v) Organisation and operation of Districts, Depots, hospitals and other military establishments.

(vi) Supervision and organisation of call-up and demobilisation

(vii) Liaison with local Allied HQs and civilian authorities.

(b) Districts constitute the documentation and administration centres through which the citizen enters or leavesthe Army. Essential functions are: -

(i) machinery of conscription and calling-up of classes

(ii) demobilisation and recall of reserves

(iii) assistance to families of men killed, wounded or taken prisoner

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1. To examine the necessity, or otherwise, for the Territorial HQs, Districts and Depots of the Italian Army to cover the whole of ITALY, including the ISLANDS.

FACTORS.

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(i) machinery of conscription and calling-up of classes

(ii) demobilisation and recall of reserves

(iii) assistance to families of men killed, wounded or taken prisoner

(iv) payments of allowances to dependents of officers and ORs

(v) records of junior reserve officers

(vi) settlements of claims and complaints for NCOs and ORs.

(c) Depots are the homes and record centres of Italian Regiments. Their functions include: -

(i) Soldiers record while he is with the Army

contd/...

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FACTORS (Contd)

2. (c) Depots (Contd)

(ii) clothing and arming the soldier when he is first called up; vice versa on demobilisation

(iii) forming personnel into units when required, including units for Allies

(iv) records of all arms and equipment issued to units

(v) holding stocks of clothing, unit and personal equipment etc

(vi) regimental administration and records

3. Existing approved organisations for ROME and South of NAPLES.

6 Territorial HQs - ROME, CAMPANIA, APULIA, CALABRIA, SICILY, SARDINIA - est. each 150	.....	total 900
17 Districts est. each 10	.....	" 170
22 Depots est. each 10	.....	" 220
		Total 1290

4. Pre-war organisation North of NAPLES.

7 Territorial HQs - PIEDMONT, LIGURIA, LOMBARDY, VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, VENETO, EMILIA, TOSCANA

70 Districts

218 Depots

5. Development of existing organisation

(a) The existing organisation shown in para 3 was instituted to control the large number of Italian troops in South Italy (which had not yet been organised into service and other units under Allied command) and to carry out the functions

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using units for Allies

(iv) records of all arms and equipment issued to units

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70 Districts

218 Depots

5. Development of existing organisation

(a) The existing organisation shewn in para 3 was instituted to control the large number of Italian troops in South Italy (which had not yet been organised into service and other units under Allied command) and to carry out the functions shewn in para 2.

(b) For economy and to save manpower within the ceiling a considerable contraction has taken place within the last few months and further reduction is possible.

(c) The area South of NAPLES is thus a going concern, where M of W has facilities to exercise its authorised and necessary functions.

6. Conditions North of NAPLES.

(a) Here the only Italian troops are under Allied command (except for personnel in ROME) and no call-up was necessary as the strength of the army was more than ample. For these reasons and to economise in manpower owing to reduction in

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6. Conditions North of NAPLES (Contd)

(a) (Contd)

- ceiling, the policy was adopted of refusing the set-up of any H.Q. or Depot which was not directly related to the existing Army and its present functions.

(b) This policy is still in force, with the result that the area North of NAPLES up to Combat Line has become a "No-Mans-Land" with no direct control by M of W, to the detriment to the latter's authority and ability to carry out its function as in para 2.

7. Civilian personnel to replace Military.

(a) Normal war-time clerical staffs amount to about 50 men for each District and Depot. Trained civilians to replace these are not immediately available in any number. Salaries for such civilians (who are not issued with rations) must be adequate to meet the cost of living and represent a big expenditure by M of W in a direction where previously the cost was small. The Italian Treasury is inevitably being "sticky" - for example, in refusing to pay pensions as well as salary to retired Army personnel employed as civilians on this work.

(b) Nevertheless, M of W accepts the principle of replacement by civilians, but is faced with the major problem of making a sudden change and training civilians in the work on a very big scale.

(c) It follows that any new HQs or Depots set-up North of NAPLES must have at any rate a nucleus of trained military personnel.

8. Prestige and authority of Italian Military Authorities.

Allied policy throughout has been to establish this. We have set our face against any "private armies" or usurping of control by Patriots or pseudo-military organisations with a political bias. Italian military authority cannot be confined to one part of ITALY; in due course, as we advance, it should be extended as soon as possible to cover all ITALY. This will have important psychological and political effects, in that this authority will be demonstrated to have the backing of the Allies, control will be re-assumed over the military personnel discovered as we advance, pensions and pay and records will be put on a proper footing - in fact the Italian military authority will visibly be doing its proper job. All this will tend to lessen the Internal Security problem and reduce danger of disaffection, thus directly aiding the Allied war effort.

9. Post-war considerations.

(a) The primary task is to concentrate all efforts on winning the war. Yet, with the complete liberation of ITALY in sight,

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9. Post-war considerations.

(a) The primary task is to concentrate all efforts on winning the war. Yet, with the complete liberation of ITALY in sight, the creation as far as possible of a state of affairs whereby a smooth change-over from existing to post-war organisation in accordance with the peace-terms imposed by the Allies, becomes a factor of importance.

(b) Problems of great magnitude will need solution, perhaps very soon - e.g.

(i) the demobilisation or absorption into the regular Army of troops evacuated from the BALKANS, and GREECE; and later of P of W from all over the world.

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9. Post-war considerations. 9(Contd)

(b) (Contd)

(ii) the reorganisation and concentration (to fit the post-war establishment of the Army authorised under the peace terms) of Territorial HQs, Districts and Depots.

(c) Unless facilities are authorised to the Italian Army to compete with such problems, no orderly change over will be possible and chaos will be inevitable.

(d) In this connection, the recent agreement between President ROOSEVELT and Mr. CHURCHILL that Italy is to bear a larger and more independant part in the Allied Councils, postulates the authorisation of more generous freedom of action for Italians than hitherto.

(e) To sum up, the function and status of the Army of a Continental power like ITALY demands that, in the present state of affairs, the Allies shall now give the Italian Army facilities - setting its house in order so as to re-establish its authority, carry out its functions, obviate disaffection or even anarchy, and comply with the peace terms.

COURSES OPEN.

10. The only possible course is to extend the Italian military organisation, to cover all Italy in due course.

PLAN (See attached sketch map.)

11. (a) to authorise eleven Territorial HQs, each with an establishment of 100 military personnel. Existing CALABRIA and CAMPANIA HQs to be amalgamated. SARDINIA HQ to be disbanded in view of the few Italian troops that will shortly be left there. SARDINIA to be treated as a District of the new CAMPANIA HQ, the latter providing a small HQ to take charge.

(b) to authorise 87 Districts, each with an establishment of 5 military personnel.

(c) to authorise 90 Depots, each with an establishment of 5 military personnel. The reduction from 240 to 90 Depots will be made by concentrating the work of 3 pre-war Depots into 1. To enable the surplus Depots to be closed down, records and stores to be transferred etc, W of W to take over all Depots initially and close down the surplus within one month.

(d) in order to implement 11 (a), (b) and (c) above, to provide (see attached) an additional 695 personnel from some source within the ceiling - this, it is suggested, to come from the "4100 Internal Security Troops" under A.F.H.Qs latest proposals to C.C.S.

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TOP SECRET

Appx "B" to MMIA letter
TS/G/12 dated 4 Oct 44.

TERRITORIAL HQs, DISTRICS AND DEPOTS of the ITALIAN ARMY.

Summary of requirements of mil personnel to implement plan.

Type of mil est	present org ROME and SOUTH of NAPLES.	Proposed plan for the whole of ITALY (incl the Islands)	Part of the increase in personnel to be found by reduction of present establishments. The following additional personnel is requ'd
Territorial HQs	6 HQs Each 150 personnel = 900	11 HQs Each 100 personnel = 1100	200
District HQs	17 Districts Each 10 personnel = 170	87 Districts Each 5 personnel = 435	265

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
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District HQs	17 Districts Each 10 personnel = 170	87 Districts Each 5 personnel = 435	265
Depot HQs	22 Depots each 10 personnel = 220	90 Depots each 5 personnel = 450	230
TOTALS	1290	1985	695


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
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SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.







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Appendix "B" to MMIA let

ITALIAN MILITARY TER

Bolzano

Udine

Milano

Torino

Bologna

Genova

Firenze

Roma


Napoli

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
Appendix "B" to MMIA letter dated October 4. 1944

ITALIAN MILITARY TERRITORIAL H.Q's.




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TOP SECRET

Appendix "C" to
MMIA letter, TS/G
dated 4 Oct 4

DISTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN ARMY FOR SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY

BRITISH ITIS.		U.S. ITIS.		INTERNATIONAL ITIS	
Service Units	93,000	P.B.S.	53,000	Italian Adm) Installations)	27,000
Reinfts (5%)	4,800	Fifth Army	12,000	A.A. & C.D.	600
Combat Gps	57,000	Allied Garrison) SARDINIA)	9,000	A.C.C.	3,000
Reinfts (10%)	5,700	Allied Garrison) CORSICA)	5,000	18 Guard Bns	12,400
		Reinfts (5%)	4,500	S.I.M.	1,500
				2 Divs SICILY	10,000
				1 Div SARDINIA	5,000
				I.S. Troops	4,100
				Reinfts (5%)	3,400
TOTAL	160,500	TOTAL	83,500	TOTAL	69,000

GRAND TOTAL 313,000 (excl C.C.R.R. 55,000)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

TOP SECRET

Appendix "C" to
MMIA letter, TS/G/1
dated 4 Oct 44.

DISTRIBUTION OF ITALIAN ARMY FOR SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITY

	U.S. ITIS.		INTERNATIONAL ITIS	
	P.B.S.	53,000	Italian Adm) Installations)	27,000
	Fifth Army	12,000	A.M. & C.D.	600
	Allied Garrison) SARDINIA)	9,000	A.C.C.	3,000
	Allied Garrison) CORSICA)	5,000	18 Guard Bns	14,400
	Reinfts (5%)	4,500	S.I.M.	1,500
			2 Divs SICILY	10,000
			1 Div SARDINIA	5,000
			U.S. Troops	4,100
			Reinfts (5%)	3,400
	TOTAL	83,500	TOTAL	69,000

GRAND TOTAL 313,000 (excl C.C.R.R. 55,000)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

APPENDIX "B" to
MMLA letter TS/6/11
dated -- Oct 49

INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

ORGANISATION

1 Division HQ
2 Brigade HQs
4 Inf Regiments
1 Engineer and Signal Bn
1 Medical Unit
1 Supply and Ordnance Unit
1 M.T. Unit


		100
Div HQs(HQ and Staff)(excluding CC.RR)	25	50
2 Brigade HQs(HQ and HQ Platoons)each	34	
Infantry Regiment(HQ and HQ Platoon)	88	
2 Inf Bns(HQ and HQ Pl 44 x 2)	496	
4 Rifle Co(124 x 4)	300	
2 Sigs Co(150 x 2)	170	
1 Regt Sp Co(6 MG and 6 Mortars)		
	1088	
		4352
Total 4 Inf Regts		
	15	
Engineer and Signal Bn HQ	146	
Engr Company	162	
Signal Company		
	323	323
		75
Medical Unit		25
Supply and Ordnance Unit		75
M.T. Unit		
		5000


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
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S U M M A R Y

PERSONNEL, ARMS and MOTOR TRANSPORT.

of

AN ITALIAN COMBAT GROUP

Appendix
Letter 75
-- 0.C

	Officers.	O.Rs.	25-pdr.	17-pdr.	40 mm.	6-pdr.	3" mortar.	2" mortar.	L.M.G.	FIAT.	M/Cycles.	Cars.	Ambulances.	Trucks G.S. 15cwt.	" Specialist 15cwts.	" Water 15cwt.	Lorries 3-ton G.S.	Lorries spec. heavy.	Trailers.
GROUP H.Q.	23	113									10	7		4	3	1	3		
ARTY REGTL H.Q.	11	74								4	5	4		6	3	1	5		
25 pdr B.H.Q.	7	71							2	2	5	3		1	2	1	7		
2 troops (Each)	4	84	4						2	2	1	1		2	2				8
4 batteries (Each)	15	239	8						6	6	7	5		5	6	1	7		16
TOTAL FLD Artillery	60	956	32						24	24	28	20		20	24	4	28		64
17 pdr B.H.Q.	5	44							2	4	4	4		3		1	2		1
2 troops (Each)	2	64		4					2			1		2			2		
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 17 pdr.	9	172		8					6	4	4	6		7		1	6		1
40 mm B.H.Q.	5	41							2	4	5	2		2	1		3		
2 Troops (Each)	4	95			6				2		5	2		1		1	3		
TOTAL 1 BATTERY x 40 mm	13	231			12				6	4	15	6		4	1	2	9		
TOTAL 1 ARTILLERY REGT	93	1433	32	8	12				36	36	52	36		37	28	8	48		65
H.Q. Infantry Regt.	15	101								2	10	4		11	1	1	12		2
TOTAL MORTAR COY	3	95					8		6		3	1		4					
TOTAL A. TK. GUN COY	6	162				12			2	1	6	1		10					
Inf Bn H.Q.	10	115							6	2	9	2		6			8		
TOTAL support Coy	6	162					8	4	14	16	6	6	1				3		
3 Rifle Coys (Each)	5	155							3	14	4	2							
TOTAL Inf Battalion (3)																			
TOTAL INF REGT	117					12	20	69				82	15	94	1	4	45		
TOTAL 2 INF REGTS	234					36	40	138	400	126	164	30		188	2	8	90		
H.Q. Engineer Bn.	6	16								3	1	1		2			1		
2 Field Companies (Each)	5	227							12	5	12	2		5	7	1	10	3	
Signals Coy.	7	327						2	8	5	35			16	24		17	2	
TOTAL ENGINEER Bn	23	727						2	34	18	60	5		28	38	2	38	8	
TOTAL SUPPLY COY	13	282							20	20	26	12		5			109		
Medical Section.	14	237									5	6	16			2	15	1	
2 Field Hospitals (Each)	6	44										1					4		
TOTAL MEDICAL SECTIONS.	26	325									5	8	18			2	23	1	
ORDNANCE FIELD PARK.	4	69							4		5	4		4		1	12	17	

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S U M M A R Y

PERSONNEL, ARMS and MOTOR TRANSPORT.

of

AN ITALIAN COMBAT GROUP

TOP SECRET

Appendix "A" to HMIA Letter 75/6/pn dated Oct 40.

	Officers.	O.Rs.	25-pdr.	17-pdr.	40 mm.	6-pdr.	3" mortar.	2" mortar.	L.M.G.	PIAT.	M/Cycles.	Cars.	Ambulances.	Trucks G.S. 15cwt.	" Specialist 15cwt.	" Water 15cwts.	*Lorries 3-ton G.S.	Lorries spec. heavy.	Trailers.	Trailers, water.	Tractors.	Carriers.	Recce Vehicles.
	23	113									10	7		4	3	1	3						1
	11	74									4	5	4	6	3	1	5						
	7	71								2	2	5	3	1	2	1	7						1
	4	84	4							2	2	1	1	2	2				8		6		1
)	15	239	8							6	6	7	5	5	6	1	7		16		12		3
Artillery	60	956	32							24	24	28	20	20	24	4	28		64		48		12
	5	44								2	4	4	4	3		1	2		1		1	1	
	2	64		4						2			1	2			2				4	1	
TTERY x 17 pdr.	9	172		8						6	4	4	6	7		1	6		1		9	3	
	5	41								2	4	5	2	2	1		3			1			
	4	95			6					2		5	2	1		1	3				6		
TTERY x 40 mm	13	231			12					6	4	15	6	4	1	2	9				12		
TILLERY REGT	93	1433	32	8	12					36	36	52	36	37	28	8	48		65	1	69	3	12
t.	15	101								2	10	4	11	1	1	12			2				
AR COY	3	95				8			6		3	1	4									9	
K. GUN COY	6	162					12		2	1	6	1	10									26	
	10	115							6	2	9	2	6				8			1			3
t Coy.	6	162				2	4	14	16	6	6	1	3				3					22	
	5	155						3	14	4	2		3									1	
ttalion (3)	31	642				2	4	23	64	28	21	3	23			1	11			1		25	3
GT	117	2 4				12	20	69	200	68	82	15	94	1	4		45		2	3		110	9
RegTS	234	5168				36	40	138	400	126	164	30	188	2	8		90		4	6		220	18
	6	16								3	1	1	2				1						
(Each)	5	227							12	5	12	2	5	7	1		10	3					2
	7	327						2	8	5	35		16	24			17	2		1			
Mc Pn	23	797						2	34	18	60	5	28	38	2		38	8		1			2
COY	13	254							20	20	26	12	5				109			4			
	14	237									5	6	15			2	15	1	2				
(Each)	6	44										1					4						
L SERVICES.	26	325									5	8	18			2	23	1	2				
	4	64							4		5	4	4			1	12	17					

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TOTAL INF REGT	117	2[illegible]4				13	20	69	[illegible]	63	82	15		94	1	4	45		2
TOTAL 2 INF REGTS	234	468				36	40	138	400	126	164	30		188	2	8	90		4
H.Q. Engineer Bn.	6	16								3	1	1		2			1		
2 Field Companies (Each)	5	227							72	5	12	2		5	7	1	10	3	
Signals Coy.	7	327						2	8	5	35			16	24		17	2	
TOTAL ENGINEER Bn	23	727						2	34	18	60	5		28	38	2	38	8	
TOTAL SUPPLY COY	13	324							20	20	26	12		5			109		
Medical Section.	14	237									5	6	18			2	15	1	2
2 Field Hospitals (Each)	6	44										1					4		
TOTAL MEDICAL SERVICES.	26	325									5	8	18			2	23	1	2
ORDNANCE FIELD PARK.	4	60							4		5	4		4		1	12	17	
Mechanical Engineers Workshop	6	16							4		5	3		11	2	1	13	16	8
6 L/T Ds (Each)		12									2			1				1	
Engineer Tool Issuing Platoon (For Supply Coy)	1	39							2	1	2	1		2			1	8	
TOTAL MECH ENGINEERS	7	279							6	1	19	4		19	2	1	14	30	8
TOTAL 1 COMBAT GROUP (Less CC.RR)	428	8[illegible]8	32	8	32	36	40	140	500	201	341	106	18	285	73	23	337	56	76
2 Provost Sections (CC.RR)		4700							2		28	2		6			2		

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F	117	234				13	20	69	[illegible]	[illegible]	82	15		94	1	4	45		2	3		110	9
GTS	234	516				36	70	138	400	126	164	30		188	2	8	90		4	6		220	18
	6	16								3	1	1		2			1						
Each)	5	227							12	5	12	2		5	7	1	10	3					2
	7	327						2	8	5	35			[illegible]	24		17	2		1			
R Fn	23	797						2	34	18	60	5		28	38	2	38	8		1			2
COY	13	282							20	20	26	12		5			109			4			
	14	237									5	6	10				15	1	2				
Each)	6	44										1					4						
SERVICES.	26	225									5	8	18			2	23	1	2				
	4	69							4		5	4		4		1	12	17					
Workshop	6	16							4		5	3		1	2	1	13	16	5		2		
Each)		12									2			1				1			1		
ntoon (For Supply Coy)	4	39							2	1	2	1		2			1	8		1			
CH.JEEPS	7	279							9	1	19	4		19	2	1	14	30	2	1	8		
T GROUP CC. RR)	428	2478	32	8	72	36	40	140	500	201	343	106	18	285	73	23	337	56	76	13	77	223	33

(CC. RR) 4100 2 28 2 6 2

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TOP SECRET

2

From: J.G. NICHOLSON
Brigadier, G.S.
G-3 Plans.
AFHQ, CMF.

25 Sept. 1944

Dear General,

I enclose a paper which was given to me on a recent visit to LONDON by Brig. Curtis of the Post Hostilities Planning Staff, dealing with the limitation of the Italian Armed Forces.

I understand from G-5 here that you can probably help in this matter, and I am accordingly sending the paper on to you to look into. I hope to be in ROME about Wednesday or Thursday, the 27th & 28th, and will pay you a visit to discuss the whole question, if this is convenient.

Yours Sincerely

J.G. Nicholson

Maj. Gen. L. Browning, CG, OBE, MC
Army Sub Commission (MMIA)
HQ - ACC - APO 394

G1

Pl. find out urgently all you can & phone it.
I'll see Nicholson when he comes.
Keep up & find out if & when he is coming.

L.B.
10-ct

COPY

COPY

TOP SECRET

NOTE FOR BRIGADIER NICHOLSON, AFHQ

1. PHP have been instructed by the Chiefs of Staff to submit a report dealing with the limitations which should be imposed on Italian Armed Forces in a preliminary Peace Treaty, should such a treaty be negotiated.

2. The Period covered by the Report is only that between the end of the war in Europe and the signing of the final Peace Treaty, after the defeat of Japan.

3. The restrictions, which it is proposed should be included in the Preliminary Treaty, do not therefore take into consideration any forces which Italy would require to have to take her share of any burden imposed on her under any World Security Organization which might be set up.

4. It is the intention of the Foreign Office to take advantage of a Preliminary Treaty to give us the opportunity of securing the acceptance of the more harsh of our Terms, at a time when Italy is least able to resist them. We must therefore state our maximum requirements - some of these may well be reduced in the Final Settlement by which time it will be possible to take into consideration factors which cannot, at present, be assessed.

5. From a cursory examination of the problem, it appears to use that, during this period, Italy would require land forces only for internal Security -

i.e. Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia Finasiza,

and no air force and no navy.

6. On the other hand there are political considerations which will have to be taken into account, such as the Prime Minister's statement, that the Italians

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

war in Europe and the signing of the final Peace Treaty, after the defeat of Japan.

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5. From a cursory examination of the problem, it appears to use that, during this period, Italy would require land forces only for internal Security -

i.e. Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia
Finasiza,

and no air force and no navy.

6. On the other hand there are political considerations which will have to be taken into account, such as the Prime Minister's statement, that the Italians could earn a remission of their sentence by their assistance to the United Nations - our final settlement with Italy would depend on her efforts in "working her passage home"; our need for Italian labour, as opposed to armed forces in the war against Japan, etc.

7. Arrangements are now being made to equip three Italian divisions for service under General Wilson, while certain squadrons of the I.A.F. are now being equipped with American aircraft, and others may shortly receive British types.

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8. It is not known (as far as I can find out at the War Office) that any special conditions have been made regarding the demobilization and return of the equipment, when we no longer require the services of the Italians against the Germans.

9. It would be of great assistance to PHP if you could discover, from the Control Commission, what plans (if any) they have in mind for the disarming and demobilization of the Italian Forces (including Naval and Air) some of which we understand are under Allied control, while others are under Italian control. We would appreciate the latest figures of these forces with breakdown, showing Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia Finanziza separately.

10. What plans, if any, have been formulated for restricting the construction of Italian merchant ships or warships?

11. We shall have to consider the restrictions to be imposed on Italian coastal and Frontier defences. It is understood, from C.A.7, that the Germans either destroyed the coastal defences or removed the guns, etc. Is this correct? If not, have essential parts of guns been removed by the Control Commission? Have the Control Commission any plan for dealing with any frontier fortifications which the Germans may not be able to destroy, e.g. those seized by Italian patriots?

12. Politically, there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even equipping them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?

13. Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organization will have to

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Control Commission, what plans (if any) they have in mind for the disarming and demobilization of the Italian Forces (including Naval and Air) some of which we understand are under Allied control, while others are under Italian control. We would appreciate the latest figures of these forces with breakdown, showing Carabinieri Territoriale and Guardia Finaaiza separately.

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12. Politically, there are obvious difficulties in disarming Italians after making use of their forces, and even equipping them, but do the Control Commission foresee any practical difficulties in carrying this out?

13. Temporarily, at any rate, the United Nations must be responsible for the administration and internal security of the disputed frontier areas, but, ultimately, when the frontiers have been decided on the Italians will have to undertake this task. If they are to do this some skeleton organization will have to be left in addition to the Carabinieri, etc., as suggested in parahraph 5 above. Have the Control Commission any ideas on this subject?

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