

acc

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G/3/1

10000/120/5292

G/3/1

HANDOVER ITALIAN ARMY

AUG. 1945 - DEC. 1946

C O P Y

FY 73696

SECRET

H/8470

DEC 12 1000

ROUTINE

AMIR SIGHTED SACRED CITE PHONG
 AGWAR WASHINGTON - INFO - ALCOM ROSS CABINET OFFICES WHITEHALL
 ACTION AGWAR FOR CCS INFO - ALCOM FOR ASAA AND CABINET OFFICES FOR BGS

SECRET

THIS IS MAT 1053 (.) REF TAM 228 OF 17 JULY 1944 (.)

PAPA 1 (.) PURSUANT TO REDUCING COMMITMENTS OF ALLIED SUPPLY ACCOUNTING
 AGENCY WITH VIEW TO ULTIMATE CLOSE OUT THIS HQ BY LETTER DATED 28 OCT 46 (.)
 SUBJECT QUOTE ACCOUNTING RETURNS THROUGH 30 JUNE 1946 BY TAM 228 UNQUOTE
 ADDRESSED TO CCS FOR COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED HAND BACK
 TO THE PROVIDING ARMY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ACCOUNTING FOR SUPPLIES TO
 ITALIAN ARMED FORCES (.) TARGET DATE JAN 1ST 1947 (.)
 REQUEST EARLY REPLY ON THIS SUBJECT BY LETTER

AC DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION/INFO - ASAA

INFO - C. COMMISSIONER
 EX. COMMISSIONER
 ECON SEC
 MEDIA
 AIR F.
 NAVY
 FILE
 SKELTON

SECRET

MATA DUB: "L" -

"O"

"P" -

H/8470

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

25 OCT 1946

9/3/11
A
Q.
SD/98.
SD/203.
SD/204-

FILE : G-3 AFHQ/132

24 October 1946

SUBJECT : AFHQ Directive No. 1

TO : Land Forces Sub Commission AC (MMIA)

Reference your 6/3/1 21 October 1946, subject as above.

1. Letter, this headquarters, G-3 AFHQ/132, 1 September 1946 "US-ITI Troops Assigned To PBS" addressed to you is considered to meet the requirement expressed in your reference letter.
2. Copy of above mentioned letter is attached for ready reference.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

T. S. AIREY,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

E. C. COOPER
E. C. COOPER,
Brigadier, G. S.
AC of S, G-3.

MMIA - 'G'
FILE 6/3/1
DATE Reg 24/10

BGS	
GSO (S)	
Sec 1	
GSO (S)	
Sec 2	
GSO (S)	
Sec 3	
GSO (S)	
Sec 4	
GSO (S)	
Sec 5	
GSO (S)	

OCT 24 1946
150

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
4-3 SECTION

FILE : 0-3 AFHQ/132

1 September 1946.

SUBJECT : US-ITF Troops Assigned to AFHQ.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Comm. F.O. (M.H.I.A.)

Reference your 55/203 dated 21 August 1946.

1. In answer to paragraph 2 of the above quoted letter, the intentions of AFHQ remain unchanged regarding the continuance of US-ITF troops. AFHQ views are contained in the following letters: release of US-ITF Units, Land Forces Sub-Comm. F.O. (M.H.I.A.) 50/201/1, dated 6 June 46, and letter, subject: US-ITF Troops Assigned to AFHQ, dated 13 August 46, from HQ, FHC.

2. ~~US-ITF units which must still be retained are as follows:~~

(a) Pool of Italian L3's	Strength - 30 Officers
(b) 6/A Fls.	Strength - 4 Officers 92 O.N.'s
(c) S/A Fls.	Strength 1 Officer 33 O.N.'s

Grand Total: 35 Officers, 125 O.N.'s

3. Those figures quoted above are the minimum number required by the Allied forces in this theatre but all units will be released when no longer required and as soon as practicable.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORRIS.

T. S. HILLY,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

ORIGINAL:

J. A. WILSON,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

Copied

*50/201/1
11/20/46
FHC*

*50/201/1
11/20/46
FHC*

A 660

Copy also.

SUBJECT: AMHQ Directive No 1

LAND FORCETS CUE COM AG (MMIA)

(489081 Exd 218)

G/3/1

21 Oct 46TO : AMHQ

Re: your AG. 091.711 C(35)-0 dated 2 Nov 45

It has not been found possible to disband entirely US-III and BRU-III tps respectively by Feb 46 and Jun 46 as forecast in the above quoted para.

As at 1 Oct 46 the posn in these categories was as follows:-

Category	WE	Actual Htr
US-III	5,900	5,201
BRU-III	160	119

In view of the present necessity for retaining these tps in spite of the forecast previously given, it is requested that a formal amendment may be issued to your above mentioned letter in order to clarify the posn to the ITALIAN Government.

ARCS/22

Internal

1A'

1G'

27/68

At 4.30 PM
17 Oct
 Major General,
 M. M. I. A.

Reg/21/10...

File 65

41

21 Oct 46

TO : AMEMB

41
 Ref your AG 091.711 G(5D)-O dated 2 Nov 45
 para 3 (a)

It has not been found possible to disband entirely
 US-VII and PR-VII tps respectively by Feb 46 and Jun 46 as forecast
 in the above quoted para.

As at 1 Oct 46 the psn in these categories was as
 follows:-

Category	WE	Actual Str
US-VII	5,900	5,201
PR-VII	160	119

In view of the present necessity for retaining
 these tps in spite of the forecast previously given, it is
 requested that a formal amendment may be issued to your above
 mentioned letter in order to clarify the psn to the EMALIN
 Government.

AFOS/rr

Internal

1A
 1B
 SD/95
 SD/203
 SD/204

Atty General
WAC
 Major General,
 M. H. I. A.

Reg 12/10

HRIA

21

B

1040

C.O. PHENASE

O.229

UNCLASSIFIED

REF YOUR AD J12.1. REFUT OF 17 JUN 46' (.)

REGRET NO SPARE COPIES HELD THIS HQ (.) SUGGEST

YOU APPLY TO AFHQ SINCE THIS DOCUMENT ORIGINATED

FROM THEM

ROUTINE

REF U3

8/3/1

LESTER K. ALBERT Lt. Col.

HEADQUARTERS
PENICULAR BASE SECTION
A/C 782

17 JUN 1946

AG 312.1 RESUR

SUBJECT: Request for Copy of AF HQ Letter.

TO : Commanding Officer
Land Forces Sub Commission
A.C. (LMLA), Rome, APO 794

Request two (2) copies of AF HQ Letter dated 2 November 1945,
File AG 091.711 G (SD)-0, be forwarded this Headquarters. Letter refers
to American and British portion of loan to Italian Army.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Gordon W. Gilliam
GORDON W. GILLIAM
Captain A.C.D.
Assistant Adjutant General

all for info to be sent

MMLA - 'G'	
FILE	G/8/1
DATE	R/20/6.

EGS	
GSO 1 (SD)	
Dep G III	
GSO 1 (SD)	
GSO 1 (I)	
GSO 1 (I)	
GSO 1 (I)	
G II (I)	

Gilliam
Can you fix please.

RECEIVED
2432 8606
19 JUN 1946
GAY

200930

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT : Relations with BRIT 102.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MMIA)

G/3/1

24 Jan 46

To : 4 ELN

Ref your 4/GE/13-19 of 17 Jan to MMIA only.

1. G (Ops), AFHQ, have been asked to issue a Directive to Districts, Areas etc defining the relations between ALLIED and ITALIAN HQs now that entire control of the ITALIAN Army has reverted to the ITALIANS.
2. It is to be hoped that this Directive will emphasise that ALLIED HQ no longer have any rights to order or forbid redeployment of ITALIAN troops or reallocation of ITALIAN accommodation.
3. Pending issue of that Directive G C BEUs will at all times endeavour tactfully to convey the sense of para 2 above to ALLIED Comds and Staff.

A. B. G. G. G.
Lt Col
G3

Copy to: Dist 'B' (Less Serial 4)

Internal : 'A'
'C'

ARC3/13b

SUBJECT: - Relations with British HQ

4 British Liaison Unit

CHP

17 Jan 45

Land Forces Sub Comm AC.,

(M.M.I.A.)

ROME

4/GB/13 - 12

RECEIVED

G.

1. Reference the handover of AMG controlled territory on 31 December 1945.

2. It is noticed that HQ 2 District and 60 Sub-Area do not fully appreciate that General NEGROMI (4 Terr Comd) is now able to deploy and employ his troops as he considers necessary.

3. A good deal of misunderstanding has arisen and unofficially it has been made clear that whatever GOC 2 District and his subordinate commanders wish will be carried out in spite of General NEGROMI.

4. Naturally General NEGROMI has no desire to be at loggerheads with British HQs but his commitments are such that he must now have freedom of action.

5. Will you please give a lead as to what attitude the B.I.U. should adopt.

RGT/VN

Ch. Jones
Major.
for, Lieut Col.
G.S.

Col. GS
GSO 1 (D)
Dad. GS
GSO 11 (D)

FILED

2. It is noticed that HQ 2 District and 30 Day is now fully appreciate that General NICHONI (4 Terr Comd) is now able to deploy and employ his troops as he considers necessary.

3. A good deal of misunderstanding has arisen and unofficially it has been made clear that whatever GOC 2 District and his subordinate commanders wish will be carried out in spite of General NICHONI.

4. Naturally General NICHONI has no desire to be at loggerheads with British HQs but his commitments are such that he must now have freedom of action.

5. Will you please give a lead as to what attitude the B.I.U. should adopt.

RGP/WW

R. J. W.
Major.
for, Lieut Col.
G.S.

Col. GS
GSO I (D)
Dsp. GS
GSO II (S)
GSO II (I)
GSO II (W)
GSO III (S)
GSO III (S-1)
G I)

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SECRET

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : AFHQ
 TO : MMIA
 INFO : ALCOM
 REF : FX 55406

061731 A

RESTRICTED

FROM G(SD) CMF (.) REF YOUR G/3/1 OF 1 DEC (.) REVISED
 STRENGTHS OF 225000 FOR TEN INDEP REGTS AND 12500 FOR
 BRG AND RFTS AGREED

SD DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : G/3/1
 INFO : SD/94

CSO 1 Amr
 CSO 2 (C) _____
 CSO 2 (S) _____
 CSO 2 (V) _____
 CSO 2 (J) _____
 CSO 2 (R) _____
 CSO 2 (G) _____
 CSO 2 (B) _____
 CSO 2 (O) _____

7 Dec 45

G.S.D.

you will no doubt till ✓ seen but
 all activities of G.7 of 8 Nov.

noted
 L. Ra

Subject: Investigation of Internal Security Matter

1000 Bureau and 1000, 1000, (1000)

8/14/41

1000 1000

20 1000

1000

1. para 7 of your letter to 1000 dated 1000 and 1000 the general layout within the total ceiling of 100,000 and para 1000 1000 no alteration to the general layout 1000 will be made 1000 without the consent of 1000.

2. You will remember that my original estimate of 100,000, included into the framework my approval, was made at comparatively short notice and without time to consider and work out details involving a large number of relevant factors.

3. (a) We have now, in consultation with the Ministry of War, completed a preliminary study of the whole position in all its aspects.

(b) The results were sent respectfully closely to my original estimates.

(c) We find that we can follow the "present" estimate exactly amounting to us require only 20,000 (instead of 25,000) personnel for the "Ten Independent Regts" and 12,500 (instead of 10,000) for "Bns and After".

(d) For two differences, you will note, several other things leaving the total ceiling of 100,000 unaltered.

4. I therefore request your advice for this situation, in order that I may put the whole organizational project in detail on paper.

5. I would be grateful for an early reply.

2.13.

1000 1000

1. Your letter to WH-711 (dated 2 Nov 45) specifies the general layout within the total ceiling of 140,000 and para 3 states that the disposition in the general layout will be made with the consent of AFHQ.

2. You will remember that my original estimate of 140,000, included into the franchise was approved, and made of comparatively short notice and without time to examine and work out details involving a large number of relevant factors.

3. (a) As known now, in conjunction with the Ministry of War, completed a preliminary study of the whole question in all its aspects.

(b) The results were not necessarily identical to our original estimate.

(c) We find that we can follow the "franchise" exactly except that we require only 22,500 (instead of 25,000) personnel for the "Ten Independent Regts" and 12,500 (instead of 10,000) for "Tns and Atts".

(d) The two differences, you will note, cancel each other out, leaving the total ceiling of 140,000 unaffected.

4. I therefore request your advice for this alteration, in order that I may put the whole organizational project in detail on paper.

5. I should be grateful for an early reply.

20/10/45

Copy to : Mr. Allied Commission

Internal: WH/14

Major General
18 Nov 45

11/5/46

1388

54

SUBJECT : Handover to Italian Govt. of Allied warlike
stores for Interim Army.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MELA)

— G/3/1 —

2 / Nov 45

TO : AFHQ (G (SD))

Ref AG 091.211 G(SD)/O dated 2 Nov para 12.

May this HQ please now be informed of the detailed arrangement made for handing over to the Italians Allied equipment earmarked for the interim Italian Army, also of the detailed arrangements made for the maintenance of Allied equipment already held by the Italians, pending the transfer to them of adequate spare parts and replacements.

Major-General
Major-General
MELA

6/6/45
6/6/45

Copy to : HQ -- A.C.
2 DISTRICT
3 DISTRICT
Internal: G (Two)
G/7

ARCS/jc.

SECRET

128

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

.....
 : SECRET :
 : Auth: SAC, AF :
 : Initials: *[Signature]* :
 : Date: 17 Nov 1945 :
 :

AG 370.5 MATH-0

17 November 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army Movement.

TO: All Concerned.

Paragraph 2, letter, this headquarters, file and subject as above,
 dated 10 November 1945, is amended as follows:

"2. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army now held in the ITI-ITI Category, together with the Five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI Category, will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government, except as stated in paragraph 5 of the letter cited in paragraph 1, above."

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

M. Frances Aman
 M. FRANCES AMAN
 1st Lt, AGD
 Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - MMEA (ALCOM)	1 - CG, MPOUSA	1 - S&T
5 - GOC, XIII Corps	1 - G-1 (A)	1 - Postal, GHQ
5 - GOC, Number 2 District	1 - Fiscal Director	CMF
5 - GOC, Number 3 District	1 - G-3, MPOUSA	1 - Labour
5 - CG, Peninsular Base Section	2 - G-4 (A)	1 - Claims &
5 - CG, Rome Area Allied Command	1 - TFM (A)	Hirings
5 - British Ministry of Supply	1 - CGS, GHQ CMF	1 - Q (AE)
5 - OFIC	1 - Dep Mil Sec	1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
5 - C-in-C Mediterranean	1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF	1 - RIME
5 - Air HQ RAF, Italy, <i>ASO</i>	1 - Financial Adviser	1 - Q (Mov)
1 - SACS	1 - "A" (Br)	2 - TFM, GHQ CMF
1 - CAO	1 - GHQ 2d Echelon	1 - Civil Affairs,
1 - G-2	1 - Medical, GHQ CMF	GHQ CMF
1 - Signals	1 - Pay, GHQ CMF	60 - MATH, AFHQ
1 - FWE	1 - CS(I), GHQ CMF	2 - AG Records
1 - G-3, AFHQ	10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF	1 - AG M&D
1 - Pet Sec	1 - RE, GHQ CMF	
1 - G-5	1 - Signals, GHQ CMF	
1 - USFOLAD	1 - Log Plans	
1 - ER RES MIN	1 - Q (Maint)	

SECRET

50
G/3/1Translation

Ref. 18347/ord./1

130007

From : SMRE
 To : all terr. HQs

In accordance with MMIA's decision Units and personnel belonging to the ITI-ITI category howsoever employed by the Allies, should be put at the complete disposal of their respective terr. HQs not later than the 15th inst. We beg you to contact Allied Commands in order to release a/m Units and personnel who, if necessary, will be replaced by personnel belonging to the BR-ITI or US-ITI category. You will report eventual difficulties and inform us as soon as possible of what has been done.

Liuzzi.

G DISTRIBUTION :
 ACTION : G/3/1
 INFO : SD/92/3
 A
 Q

2/20/11

G/3/1

G/3/2

G/3/3

G/3/4

G/3/5

G/3/6

G/3/7

G/3/8

49

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : DESTWO

132000A

TO : DIA

CONFIDENTIAL

INFO : GHI GHI-50 BLU-51 BLU-52 DIA
 53 BLU-56 BLU-57A LO NW ITALY
 4 AGRA - 56 AREA-217 AREA-60 SUB AREA

IMMEDIATE

REF : CG/4137

REF YOUR ED/92/3 OF 8 NOV NOT TO ALL (.) PARA 2 A SAYS ALL COMBAT
 GROUPS COME UNDER ITALIAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND ON 15 NOV (.) THIS
 CONTRADICTS PARA 5 C OF A P II Q LETTER AG/091/711/C3Q/0 OF 2 NOV
 WHICH CLEARLY STATES THAT THIS DOES NOT APPLY TO AMG CONTROLLED
 TERRITORY (.) ALL GROUPS ARE IN AMG CONTROLLED TERRITORY AND THEREFORE
 REMAIN UNDER OF COMMAND THIS HQ (.) HAVE ESTABLISHED THIS POINT ALREADY
 IN SIGNALS CG/4116 OF 8 NOV AND CG/4121 OF 9 NOV TO YOU ORDER TO ALL (.)
 REQUEST YOU CORRECT LETTER IF YOU AGREE AS THIS MATTER CAUSING
 CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION

NO DISTRIBUTION

ACTION : ED/92/3

INFO : G/B

G/3/1

jc/

~~SECRET~~

AF 794

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 370.5 M&TN-0

SUBJECT: Italian Army Movement.

TO: All Concerned.

May Bannan
to pass in side lines
has to *5/15/11* *of formal notice*

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, file AG 091.711 G(SD)-0, dated 2 November 1945, subject: "Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government".

2. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army now held in the ITI-ITI Category, together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI Category, will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government.

3. The Italian Government will also assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri on that date.

4. From 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will be responsible for arranging the movement of Italian Army units, personnel and stores except as detailed in paragraph 6. It will place bids for movement on the Allied military authorities only when transportation facilities are directly controlled by those authorities.

5. As regards rail movement, the Italian Government will make arrangements directly with the Italian State Railways for the movement of units, personnel and stores, informing the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA) and Transportation Sub-Commission, Allied Commission, ITALY as required. Such movement will be subject to the provisions of letter, this headquarters, file AG 531 TPN-0, dated 17 October 1945, subject: "Operation and Control of Italian Railways" - eg, the Italian State Railways will at all times give first priority to the movement of Allied military traffic.

6. The Allied military authorities will continue as at present to arrange the movement of personnel and units which remain in the US-ITI or BR-ITI Category and their reinforcements, and of units which are under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. They will also be responsible for movement of stores which are supplied through US or British service channels.

7. Movements Liaison Officer, MMIA will be withdrawn on 15 November 1945. Henceforward, MMIA will deal directly with Allied Force Headquarters on movement matters affecting the Allied military authorities.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

DISTRIBUTION:

(See Reverse Side)

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 370.5 M&IN-O,
 dtd 10 November 45 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - MMIA (ALCOM)
 5 - GOC, XIII Corps
 5 - GOC, Number 2 District
 5 - GOC, Number 3 District
 5 - CG, Peninsular Base Section
 5 - CG, Reno Area Allied Command
 5 - British Ministry of Supply
 5 - OFLC
 5 - C-in-C Mediterranean
 5 - Air HQ RAF, Italy
 1 - SACS
 1 - CAO
 1 - G-2
 1 - Signals
 1 - FWD
 1 - G-3, AFHQ
 1 - Pot Sec
 1 - G-5
 1 - USPOLAD
 1 - BR RES MIN
 1 - CG, MTOUSA
 1 - G-1 (A)
 1 - Fiscal Director
 1 - G-3, MTOUSA
 2 - G-4 (A)
 1 - TPN (A)
 1 - CGS, GHQ CMF
 1 - Dep Mil Sec
 1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF
 1 - Financial Adviser
 1 - "A" (Pr)
 1 - GHQ 2d Echelon
 1 - Medical, GHQ CMF
 1 - Pay, GHQ CMF
 1 - GS(I), GHQ CMF
 10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF
 1 - RE, GHQ CMF
 1 - Signals, GHQ CMF
 1 - Log Plans
 1 - Q (Maint)
 1 - S&T
 1 - Postal, GHQ CMF
 1 - Labour
 1 - Claims & Hirings
 1 - Q (AF)
 1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
 1 - REME
 2 - Q (MOV)
 1 - TPN, GHQ CMF
 1 - Civil Affairs, GHQ CMF
 60 - M&IN, AFHQ
 2 - AG Records
 1 - AG M&D

~~SECRET~~

1394

42
File

OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : MMIA
TO : AFHQ
REF : SD 3043
051500A
UNCLASSIFIED

41
REF YOUR AG 091.711 G (SD) -O OF 2 NOV
REQUEST YOU FWD FURTHER 10 RPT 10 COPIES
THIS HQ

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE
AUTHENTICATED *John Chapp*

G/3/1

5
3/3/1
A
ent. Aff
AC (2)
10
2 (2)
A +
Comm
Sams (6)
D

sb

~~5 copies of Directorate disposed as
below:-
✓ G/3/1 - passed to Col (US) to AC Col
✓ A - retained for typing by Col h/a
Col P
AC (2)~~
6/1/05

SECRET

1396
SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

4. Future of the Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and over-riding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

a. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theater, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

b. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

c. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

a. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

b. The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA). [A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) will shortly be issued.]

III. FUTURE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organization. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(ED)-0,
 dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

a. Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men,
 two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000.

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
 territorial regions on mainland 25,000.

Total 40,000.

b. Mobile Reserves.

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

Total 50,000.

c. Command.

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters Total 9,000.

d. Administration. Total 31,000.

e. Training and Reinforcements.

Total 10,000.

140,000.

8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) and reported to Allied Force Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA).

10. Administration.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

b. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

c. BRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows:

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian administrative channels.

d. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US service channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning.

a. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

b. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardization of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri:

- (1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorized by Allied Force Headquarters.
- (2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.
- (3) Through the Italian Government import program.

c. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 b above, will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import program, the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11 b, above:

SECRET

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Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
Dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

- (1) Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 c, below.
- (2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures.

d. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import program.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares. All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lend-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organizations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organizations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply.

a. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

b. Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

c. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 1946.

SECRET

SECRET

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

a. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MMIA are rescinded.

b. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 b (2), above.

15. Medical Stores. Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting.

a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in sub-paragraphs b and c below, will apply.

b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

c. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to BRI-ITI and US-ITI units will follow established procedures of the British and US forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through ANLC, will be through MMIA (US Contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

(See Next Page)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.711 G(SD)-0,
 dtd 2 November 45 (Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - Addressee	1 - Ord, GHQ CMF
5 - GOC, XIII Corps	1 - REME
5 - GOC, Number 2 District	1 - Q (MOV)
5 - GOC, Number 3 District	2 - TPN, GHQ CMF
5 - CG, Peninsular Base Section	1 - Civil Affairs, GHQ CMF
5 - CG, Rome Area Allied Command	2 - AG Records
5 - British Ministry of Supply	1 - AG M&D
5 - ANLC	
5 - C-in-C Mediterranean	
5 - Air HQ RAF, Italy	
1 - SACS	
1 - CAO	
1 - G-2	
1 - Signals	
1 - PWB	
1 - G-3, AFHQ	
1 - Pot Sec	
1 - G-5	
1 - USPOLAD	
1 - BR RUS MIN	
1 - CG, MTOUSA	
1 - G-1 (A)	
1 - Surgeon (A)	
1 - Fiscal Director	
1 - G-3, MTOUSA	
1 - Engr (A)	
1 - G-4 (A)	
2 - QM	
1 - Ord (A)	
1 - TPN (A)	
1 - CGS, GHQ CMF	
1 - Dep Mil Sec	
1 - Liaison, GHQ CMF	
1 - Financial Advisor	
1 - "A"	
1 - GHQ 2d Echelon	
1 - Medical, GHQ CMF	
1 - Pay, GHQ CMF	
1 - GS(I), GHQ CMF	
10 - G(SD), GHQ CMF	
1 - RE, GHQ CMF	
1 - Signals, GHQ CMF	
1 - Log Plans	
1 - Q (Maint)	
1 - S&T	
1 - Postal, GHQ CMF	
1 - Labour	
1 - Claims & Hirings	
1 - Q (AE)	

~~SECRET~~

SECRET**SECRET**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

24 Oct 45

HSD/424

Minutes of a Meeting held at AFHQ on Thursday,
25 Oct 45 to discuss the Handover of Italian
Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

Chairman: Brig. J.D.A. ANDERSON

JGS G(SD)

Present. Representatives from the following:

HQ Allied Commission

Land Forces Sub Commission AC (LMLA)

Financial Adviser

Fiscal Director

G-1(A)

G-2

G-3 AFHQ

G-3 MTO

G-4(A)

Log Plans

Q(Maint)

Q(AE)

G-4(Mov & Trn)

G-5

DST

Medical (M)

Ord(A)

Ord(C)

Pet Sec

Ch

Secretary: Major H. MILNES

G(SD)

1. The Chairman opened the Meeting by stating that its object was to finalise the draft of the directive to HQ Allied Commission regarding the handover of the Italian Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.
2. The Meeting then proceeded to consider the draft.
3. Attached is the final proposed directive, as agreed by the Meeting, to be submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval.

SECRET

S. E. MILNES

R/3/1

R/29/10

JP
31 Oct 45RAC
1 Nov

Chairman: Brig. J.D'A. ANDERSON DGS G(SD)

Present. Representatives from the following:

HQ Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission AC (AFMA)
Financial Adviser
Fiscal Director
G-1(A)
G-2
G-3 AFHQ
G-3 MTO
G-4(A)
Log Plans

Q(Maint)
Q(AE)
G-4(Mov & Tr)
G-5
DST
Medical (A)
Ord(A)
Pri()
Pet Sec
Cai

Secretary: Major S.H. MILNES

G(SD)

1. The Chairman opened the Meeting by stating that its object was to finalise the draft of the directive to HQ Allied Commission regarding the handover of the Italian Army and Carabinieri to the Italian Government.

2. The Meeting then proceeded to consider the draft.

3. Attached is the final proposed directive, as agreed by the Meeting, to be submitted to the Chief of Staff for approval.

DISTRIBUTION

HQ Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission
AC (AFMA)
British Ministry of Supply
ANLC
Financial Adviser
Fiscal Director
G-1(A)
'A'

G-2
G-3 AFHQ
G-3 MTO
G-4(A)
Q(M)
Log Plans
Q(Maint)
Q(AE)
G-4(Mov&Tr)

G-5
DST
Ord(A)
Ord()
Medical()
Pet Sec

S.H. MILNES,
Major, G(SD),
Secretary.



SECRETSUBJECT : Handover of Italian Army to Italian GovernmentTO : Headquarters Allied Commission for ItalyCOPY TO : Land Forces Sub Commission, Allied Commission (ALLI).GENERAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organisation, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITI Category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

4. US-ITI and BR-ITI units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied Military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organization, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 units of the Italian Army that are now in the ITI-III category together with the five BR-III combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-III Category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-III and BR-III Units.

A. US-III and BR-III Units less the five BR-III combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied Military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-III personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-III personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied Military authorities, US-III and BR-III personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

B. Administration and maintenance of US-III and BR-III Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10 below.

- 2 -

4. Future of the Carabinieri

Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and overriding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

A. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander when he may direct.

B. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

C. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and SOG Detachment although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

A. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army, and to obtain and transmit to superior

for military security.

5. Reservations.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

2. The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

3. Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 808 CS Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

6. Military Mission.

1. An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army, and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to AFHQ by the Allied Military Mission for decision. The Mission will also be responsible for screening these demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

/s/.....

B. The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIC). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIC) will shortly be issued.

FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation.

During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines:-

A. Local Reserves

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men,
two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000.
Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
territorial regions on mainland 25,000
Total 40,000

B. Mobile Reserves

Five combat groups and supporting Troops

Total 50,000

C. Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters

Total 9,000

D. Administration

Total 31,000

E. Training and Reinforcements

Total 10,000

140,000

7.

ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines:-

A. Local Reserves

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Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten
territorial regions on mainland 25,000
Total 40,000

B. Mobile Reserves

Five combat groups and supporting Troops

Total 50,000

C. Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters

Total 9,000

D. Administration

Total 31,000

E. Training and Reinforcements

Total 10,000

140,000
=====

8. No alteration to the General layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will however be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALFAC) and reported to AFHQ.

/4

9.

Training

The Training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMICA).

10.

Administration

A. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

B. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian Service Channels.

C. DRI-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. DRI-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 rations will be issued to such units through British Service channels, the Italian portion of the ration being furnished in bulk to the DSI by the Italian Government.

D. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US Service Channels.

11.

Maintenance and Provisioning

A. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

B. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources

A. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

D. Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian Service Channels.

C. BRL-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BRL-ITI Army Service Units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 rations will be issued to such units through British Service channels, the Italian portion of the ration being furnished in bulk to the DST by the Italian Government.

D. US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US Service Channels.

11. Maintenance and Provisioning

A. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

E. Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri :-

i. From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorised by AFHQ.

- 5 -

ii. By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in Italy of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.

iii. Through the Italian Government import programme.

C. As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 14 D above, will take time before it becomes fully operative particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import programme the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 14 B above.

i. Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 C below.

ii. Thereafter these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

D. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Co 1 requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares.

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of arm of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from

from the sources set out in paragraph 11 B above.

i. Such requirements may be loaned from US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. In addition certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13 C below.

ii. Thereafter these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

D. With effect from 2400 hrs 14 Nov 45 the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Co, 1 requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import programme.

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares.

All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of these units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of arm of various natures will also be transferred and authorised expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal organisations, disposal to the Italian Government will be effected through the respective US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

/s.....

- 6 -

13. Food Supply.

A. Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above and of the Carabinieri until 30 Nov 45. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British responsibility will not exceed 81,000.

B. Subsistence for the Italian Army including the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 Dec 45. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11 above.

C. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British Military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the ITI-IMI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 46

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

A. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through IMI are rescinded.

B. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores in as authorized in paragraph 11 (b) (ii) above.

15. Medical Stores.

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian Depots or by Italian Units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession

16. Accounting.

A. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Army.

C. The US and British surplus disposal agencies will be requested to give the Italian Government priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British Military authorities. This priority is limited to items not being furnished in the ITI-ITI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending 1 May 46.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment.

a. All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing, individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MIL are rescinded.

B. Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in paragraph 11 (b) (ii) above.

15. Medical Stores.

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian Depots or by Italian Units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting.

a. Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Government from military stocks and accounting procedures in the sub-para (b) and (c) below will apply.

b. Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the ITI-ITI category.

/7

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

HQ 13 Corps
HQ 2 District
HQ 3 District
CG Peninsula Base Section
CG ROME Area Allied Command.
British Ministry of Supply
AMC.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

SACS.		
CNO	Fiscal Director	CM
CGS	DFIC	C (inint)
Dep Mil Sec	C-2	S & T
Liaison	PMB	Det Sec
Financial Adviser	C-3 (AMHQ)	Postal (F)
C-4 (A)	C-3 ETO	Labour
C-5	C (SD)	Claims & Writings
C-6	Engrs	C (AE)
C-7	Signals	Ord ()
C-8	C-4 (A)	Ord (5)
Surgeon (A)	Log Plans	
Surgeon (B)		

HQA

Received from G(SD) Branch MMIA the following document :

GHQ CMF letter HSD/424 of 27 Oct 45

1 Nov 45

James in Brenberg
1st 25 Div
 signed
Supply Div. En Sect.
H60 A.C.

For return 2 Nov 45. *✓ Abs 3/11*
Abs 1/11

Major General L. BROWNING, C.B., O.M.E., M.C.,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
M.B.I.A.,
R.O.M.S.

Ref : G/3/1

17 October, '45.

My dear

Reference your ^{232190/11}222/8/23 dated 12 October, 1945.

I agree to your proposal to hold your conference of senior
Generals in ROME on 29th and 30th October.

I should much like to make a short address to the conference
at the beginning of the proceedings. I would read my address in
Italian!

Would you please let me know the time and date at which I
could come to the conference for this purpose.

Yours

L.B.

APR
22/10

Signor JACINI,
Minister of War.

/ago

Translation

37

From : M of W

ref. 232190/11

24/8/53

to : MIA (Att. Maj. Gen. Langley
Browning G.B., O.B.E.)

12 October 43

Subject: Future Italian Army.

34/1

Further to letter 231451/11 dated 4th inst.

I would like to fix the date of the meeting of the Generals
in command of Territorial Hqs, to examine the questions concerning
the future Italian Army, for the 29th and 30th inst.

With reference to para 3) of a/a letter, I shall be pleased to
know if MIA is in agreement.

SSO 1

SSO 2 (Ops)

SSO 2 (SO)

SSO 2 (SO)

SSO 2 (SO)

SSO 3 (SO)

SSO 3 (SO)

SSO 3 (M)

Jacini

DATE	C/3/1
DATE	R/16/10

D

15/10/53

17 Oct

TRANSLATIONSeen 40'C
5-1(34/1)
Hei

FROM : Ministry of War

To : Major General Bagley Browning, CB, OBE, MC.
Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (LMTA)

Ref : - 221461/11

Date : - 4th October 45

Subject : - Future Army.

Reply to your letter N°G/3/1 dated 1st inst.


1. - Before preparing the plan for the Future Italian Army, I had already thought of consulting with the Territorial Military Commanders and of discussing said plan at a general meeting as I have recently done for the examination of other important questions.
2. - I have sent copy of your letter N°G/3 dated 14th Sept. 45 to all Territorial Military Commanders requesting them to give consideration to the question relating to the organisation of the Future Italian Army and to put forward their comments and recommendations to be studied jointly at this Ministry.
3. - I advised them that this meeting will be held during the third decade of this month. The date will be specified in due course in agreement with you.

(Sgd) The Minister
JACINT

jc/

5/3/1
R.

CR/su.



Ministero della Guerra

CABINETTO

n° 22461/II di prot.
222-8-23

Roma-P.M.3800, 4 Ottobre '45

O G G E T T O : Esercito futuro.-

Al Maggiore Generale LANGLEY BROWNING
GB, CBE, MC Land Forces Sub Commission A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

R O M A

Risposta lettera n. G/3/1 in data 1° corrente.-

- 1 - Avevo già previsto di interpellare, prima di concreta-
re il progetto relativo all'esercito futuro, i Coman-
danti militari territoriali e di discuterne in una riu-
nione generale, come di recente ho fatto per l'esame
di altre importanti questioni.-
- 2 - Ho provveduto a inviare copia della lettera n. G/3 in
data 14 settembre u.s. di codesta Sottocommissione a
tutti i Comandanti militari territoriali, con l'invi-
to a studiare le questioni relative all'ordinamento
del futuro Esercito italiano ed a preparare le loro con-
siderazioni e proposte, da esaminare insieme, presso
questo Ministero.-
- 3 - Ho provveduto che tale riunione sarà effettuata nel-
la terza decade del corrente mese.- La data sarà pre-
cisata tempestivamente, d'intesa con codesta Missione.

TRANSMISSION

1615

buco 5/10

IL MINISTRO

Luciano

Al Maggiore Generale LANGLEY BROWNING
 G2, OBE, MC Land Forces Suo Commission A.C. (M.M.I.A.A.)

R C M A

Risposta lettera n. 3/3/1 in data 1° corrente.-

- 1 - Avevo già previsto di interpellare, prima di cono-
 re il progetto relativo all'esercito futuro, i Coman-
 danti militari territoriali e di discuterne in una riu-
 nione generale, come di recente ho fatto per l'esame
 di altre importanti questioni.-
- 2 - Ho provveduto a inviare copia della lettera n. 3/3 in
 data 14 settembre u.s. di codesta Sottocommissione a
 tutti i Comandanti militari territoriali, con l'invi-
 to a studiare le questioni relative all'ordinamento
 del futuro Esercito italiano ed a preparare le loro con-
 siderazioni e proposte, da esaminare insieme, presso
 questo Ministero.-
- 3 - Ho previsto che tale riunione sarà effettuata nel-
 la terza decade del corrente mese.- La data sarà pre-
 cisata tempestivamente, d'intesa con codesta Missione.

TRANSMISSION

IN

Date 5/10

OUT

Date 9/10

IL MINISTRO

Uscire

1423

LAND FORCES

33

SECRET

P 46670
REF 30/1000A



17/592
SECRET 1/0730A
RTE 200

AND OTHER HUMAN CITE INFO
ALSO HERE

WP

SECRET.

1044

1045

Reference our REF 1044 and REF 1045 reported to you. Informed by combined
chiefs of staff that question of husband Italian territory under urgent considera-
tion on governmental level.



COS *(K)*

7/2 MP

sh. 1000

10 trace of REF 1044

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ACTION : UA 100

INFO : CHIEF COMMISSION
IN COMMISSION (H)
FOCUS (A)
FOCUS (B)
FOCUS (C)
FOCUS (D)
FOCUS (E)
FOCUS (F)
FOCUS (G)
FOCUS (H)

M.M.I.A. 'G'
FILE *2/8/1*
DATE *2/1/10*

SECRET

(K)

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145700

424

RESTRICTED

L-FOZCES

32

EX 15762
REF 261075A

X
G

F/3108
REF 262000A
HURTHIE

ALBANY CITY NEWS

ACTION AGAS WASHINGTON FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MATERIAL FOR UNIT DURING OF
STAFF INFO ALBANY NEWS

9/27

RESTRICTED

This is REF 1073.

1059

1051

Grateful for early reply to my REF 1069 and REF 1071.

In view of fact that Italian Government is aware that handover date was
recommended to be 30 September it is most desirable that some announcement be made
prior to that date.

FILED	9/3/1.
DATE	9/27/9.

HEADQUARTERS
27 SEP 1945
A C

What a hope!
WP

1051
1059

G/3

INFO-ACTION: GA Sec
INFO: Chief Commissioner
Ex Commissioner 2
FOIA (A)
FOIA (B)
Scan Sec
Land Forces
File

- 6501
- 6502 (000)
- 6502 (500)
- 6502 (500)
- 6502 (100)
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Get them will in form GOC
28/9.

RESTRICTED

271010

THE ITALIAN ARMY

File in 6/31 *[Signature]* 22 Sep

1. INTRODUCTION.

This meeting is a sequel to General Browning's recent statement to the War Minister on the future Italian Army. I am speaking as General Browning's staff officer responsible for matters relating to personnel (officers and men) - we call this the Adjutant General's (or "A") branch of our staff. Another day I hope to deal with matters relating to future supply, maintenance and transport organization - we call this the Q.M.G. (or "Q") branch of our staff. These two staff branches (A & Q) when coupled together are known to us as the Administrative Staff.

Unfortunately there is at present no exact parallel between British and Italian administrative staff organizations; I hope that, when your new organization is being settled we may be able to adjust matters so that our staff duties may coincide more nearly with each other. That is a matter which the Chief of the Cabinet might keep in mind.

2. THE ITALIAN ARMY.

As General Browning has said, we have nothing definite regarding the terms of the peace treaty, but we can be certain that both the Allies and the Italian nation agree that the Italian Army, though small in numbers, will have to be of the highest possible quality. This necessitates the enlistment of the best possible type of men who must be well-trained, well equipped, well disciplined, well paid and consequently efficient, contented and reliable, so that the Italian people get good value for their money. It is our duty to make it so.

I shall deal with today's matters under the following heads, making a pause between each for a short discussion on relevant points.

Conditions of service
Officers
Pay
Judicial
Penal
Colours

branch of our staff. These two staff branches (A & Q) were coupled together and known to us as the Administrative Staff.

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I shall deal with today's matters under the following heads, making a pause between each for a short discussion on relevant points.

Conditions of service
Officers
Pay
Medical
Penal
Welfare

3. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE.

We consider the basic and most important factor in the organization of your new army to be the conditions of service, that is to say whether enlistment shall be compulsory for short service or voluntary for long service. In either case of course the command and training cadre would have to be on long service.

- 2 -

3. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE (CONT'D)

General Browning referred to this question in his statement to the War Minister and the Italian Government will of course consider it fully from every possible angle. As you will have to provide the data I would remind you of the following points.

- (a) The number of men required to keep the army up to strength will be small and the annual estimation of the few conscripts required (in relation to the available manpower) would, (even by the ballot system) not be easy.
- (b) The training of a short service army involves the complete retraining of a whole new army each year, resulting in large and costly overheads and inferior standards.
- (c) The administration and organization required to maintain a conscript army with a complete annual turnover would be large and costly.
- (d) The cost of a conscript army, even assuming the soldier's pay to be only 1/6 of that necessary to attract the right type of volunteer would, after taking into account the cost of clothing, accommodation and overheads required for either type, and the maintenance of the larger establishments to deal with conscription, be little (if any) less than that of a professional army of equal effectiveness.
- (e) The efficiency and reliability of a short service army must of necessity compare unfavorably with that of a long service one from every point of view.

You should therefore make a comprehensive and unbiased study

remind you of the following points.

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(e) The efficiency and reliability of a short service army must of necessity compare unfavourably with that of a long service one from every point of view.

You should therefore make a comprehensive and unbiased study of this basic problem, consulting us as much as you wish because of our experience in these matters, so that should your opinions be needed you may be in a position to give them, or alternatively, should a course of action be ordered you may be able to effect it.

The present constitution and conditions of service of the C.C.B.

form a useful guide in this matter.

OFFICIALS.

You have already received the Allied views and I am sure enough

from your own experience to realize that the present system of selection, training appointment, promotion and retirement of officers is suited to modern needs. The position has been summarized in GHA memoranda A 030 of

7 Aug on which your proposals are still awaited. No existing laws, prejudices or personal interests can be allowed to obstruct the reorganization of the present system which endangers the efficiency of the whole future army. I am not sure whose individual responsibility this is but you should get this matter clear at once.

The production of proper, high class officers is vital to any army. Officers are the framework on which the whole army depends.

6. PAY

Quite apart from the standardization of rates of pay for the present forces (in itself a difficult problem) we must examine the probable rates for both a conscript and a volunteer army for the future, so that, whichever is decided on, we can have some idea beforehand of the possible financial effects.

For the volunteer the rates would have to be generous enough to compare favourably with a living wage in civilian life, after taking into account the value of accommodation, clothing, ration, etc., provided free. Our experience shows that pay alone is not the only means of controlling the number of volunteers; conditions of army life, opportunities to learn a trade and guarantees of future civil employment or pension are as important as the actual pay.

6. JOBKILL

Official reforms are long overdue. Present machinery is inadequate and ineffective. Unless crime and indiscipline are dealt with

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6. JUDICIAL

Judicial reforms are long overdue. Present machinery is inadequate and ineffective. Unless crime and indiscipline are dealt with more quickly and justly, discipline cannot be ensured. We have discussed this with the P.M. and submit your proposals. It seems as though some form of ad hoc military courts are wanted in addition to the slowly moving Military Tribunals. No ancient customs or legislative barriers can be allowed to obstruct these necessary reforms. We will all work together to achieve our object but we shall have to act energetically and quickly. In this connection you should take into account the matter of the very large numbers of men

- 4 -

6. JUDICIAL (CONT'D)

both in custody and at large who are denounced for offenses, particularly desertion. The figure of 200,000 has been mentioned to us. Can you possibly try all these? Is it wise politically or even economically to attempt to try and to imprison all these? Is an amnesty necessary? Those are the sort of questions which you should examine and on which you will have to come to a decision.

7. PENAL.

Adequate preventive and corrective punishment has been impossible during the past two years for reasons beyond our control; we cannot correct this fault. We have discussed the matter in general terms and agreed in principle on the types of institutions required. It now remains for you to include them in the new organization and ensure that they are given good staffs and proper means to function properly.

8. WELFARE.

From experience gained during the past twelve months you will be able to make a plan for welfare services which are considered essential for a modern army. Here I am to remind you of two things :-

- (a) That "welfare" does not mean primarily the provision of amenities and bodily comforts, but rather an assurance of moral and mental satisfaction without which a soldier cannot be efficient, but to which the physical comforts are an aid.
 - (b) That welfare is primarily the responsibility of every regimental officer assisted and coordinated by such specialist welfare staff and services as are authorized.
- Welfare services need not be costly to be effective, nor need the tendency to associate them with party politics alarm us unduly. You have here an opportunity to make a clean plan untrammelled by previous legis-

7. PERIOD

Adequate preventive and corrective punishment has been imposed during the past two years for reasons beyond our control; we can now correct this fault. We have discussed the matter in general terms and agreed in principle on the types of institutions required. It now remains for you to include them in the new organization and ensure that they are given good staffs and proper means to function properly.

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(b) That welfare is primarily the responsibility of every regimental officer assisted and coordinated by such special welfare staff and services as are authorized.

Welfare services need not be costly to be effective, nor need the tendency to associate them with party politics alone be wholly. You have here an opportunity to make a clean plan untrammelled by previous legislation and of putting it into operation with our full support in such a way as to help very materially in creating this new army of quality.

- 5 -

3. CONCLUSION.

That is the outline of the main problem affecting the personnel of the new army. Our immediate requirements are a study by your staff of these problems on the lines indicated. Memoranda in general terms have been (or shortly will be) given you on each one of these; we want as soon as possible to have your plans ready for consideration or putting into operation where required.

This will entail much work on the part of officers who must be capable of disassociating themselves from the past and of thinking clearly into the future. It will take time and we shall not always agree at first on the methods to be adopted, but if we are quite clear what our objective is, and working together we keep it in mind, we shall succeed.

W.P.
19 Sept 45.

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

TOP SECRET

By Authority of
SACInitials *LM*
Date 6 October 1945

AG 091.711 GCT-0

SUBJECT: ITALIAN Army - Arrangements for handover to ITALIAN Government
and future organization, training and administration.TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission for ITALY
APO 396

1. Reference is made to HAF 1051 and 1059.
2. Attached for information is a copy of reply from Combined Chiefs of Staff, under reference FAN 621 dated 29 September 1945.
3. The points raised in this signal are being incorporated in a directive shortly to be issued. You are requested therefore to reserve your comments until receipt of the directive in draft form. It is requested that you will then forward your comments and subsequently attend a meeting which will be held to finalize the draft.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

EDMOND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General
EDMOND R. SHUGART
Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General1 Incl
FAN 621, dated 29 Sep 45COPY FURNISHED:
EFSC(MIA) w/inclGOC *AD*
Cds *(R)*
AQ *WP*AG. W. B. D. A. H. Q.
31109
943

TOP SECRET

Copy to Land Force Sub-Commission of the AC(MIA)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Filed 22124Z
PRIORITY

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY

AFSC M254/30

INCOMING MESSAGE

BOOK MESSAGE

FROM : AGWAR FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO : AFHQ FOR ALEXANDER INFO TO CABINET OFFICES FOR
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

REF NO THIS MESSAGE: W-71686

29 September 1945.

This is FAN 621.

NAF 1051 and 1059 are references.

1. The Italian Government will be authorized to retain armed forces which are adequate to maintain law and order in areas under its control.

2. Italian Forces which are NOT necessary to maintain law and order but which are essential to aid U.S. or U.K. Forces in the Theater will be returned to civilian status after they are NO longer required by the U.S. or U.K. Forces.

3. Italian Armed Forces required to maintain law and order will be placed under Italian Government control about 30 September 1945 in accordance with your recommendation.

4. The authorized ceiling for the Italian Army will be 140,000. The Army includes local reserves, mobile reserves, Ministry of War, Territorial Region Headquarters, administration and training, and reinforcements. The authorized ceiling for the Carabinieri is 65,000.

5. The Italian Navy and Air Force will continue to be employed in accordance with your recommendations in paragraphs 3 and 4 of NAF 1051. Ceiling of 34,000 for Italian Air Force is approved.

6. NO objection is perceived to establishing temporarily an Allied Police Mission to reorganize and train the Carabinieri. However, specific approval is withheld pending your submission of details as mentioned in paragraph 12D of NAF 1051.

7. Food, clothing, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be furnished in the following priorities:

- (A). From indigenous Italian resources, including captured material (except German weapons) and local manufacture.
- (B). By purchase from appropriate U.S. and U.K. surplus disposal agencies in ITALY, stocks which are available to the disposal agencies.
- (C). through the Italian Government import program.

8. Sale of warlike equipment available to authorized surplus disposal agencies to the Italian Armed Forces of the types and quantities of equipment that are normally used for the internal security purposes, is authorized for

1. The Italian Government will be authorized to maintain law and order in areas under its control which are adequate to maintain law and order in areas under its control.
2. Italian Forces which are NOT necessary to maintain law and order but which are essential to aid U.S. or U.K. Forces in the Theater will be returned to civilian status after they are NO longer required by the U.S. or U.K. Forces.
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 - (C). through the Italian Government import program.
8. Sale of warlike equipment available to authorized surplus disposal agencies to the Italian Armed Forces of the types and quantities of equipment that are normally used for internal security purposes, is authorized for transfer as approved by SACMED or his successors. In the case of lethal British warlike equipment transfer will be made only under military arrangements.

/9. ...

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

9. Requirements that can NOT be met from the sources listed above, should be loaned from U.S. and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 January 1946. Thereafter these items are to be returned on demand or transferred through surplus agencies.

10. You should note that the financial arrangements consequent upon this policy remain to be settled.

11. It is NOT within the scope of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to determine policy with respect to the following points:

(A). The question of priority as between the Italian Army and UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) and the priority given to Italian military requirements in the Italian import program.

(B). The question of giving assurances with respect to the flow of military supplies to ITALY through the civil import program.

12. It is NOT within the scope of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to approve the following points raised in your message, NAF 1059: *6/13*

(A). Paragraph 6A, B and C, namely the question of the specific additional tonnage to be included in the civil import program.

(B). Paragraph 6D(4), the question of meeting tire and tube equipment through the civil import program.

Office

13. You are advised that the U.S. Department of State and the U.K. Foreign/are being sent copies of your NAF 1051 and NAF 1059 with the recommendation that they give prompt consideration to the points in these cables covered in paragraphs 11 and 12 above. *6/13*

NAF 1051 IS EX31519 MC OUT 604 3/8/45 D G/S
NAF 1059 IS EX 37481 MC OUT 6173 22/8/45

ACTION: CAO

INFORMATION:

SACS	G-1	G-1(B)	G-2	G-5
G-4	Q(AE)	Q(MAINT)	MAINT	C/S MTO
G-3	ORD	FET SEC	ON	RLSMIN
USPOLAD				

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NAF 1051 IS FX31519 MC OUT 604 3/8/45 D C/S
NAF 1059 IS FX 37481 MC OUT 6173 22/8/45

ACTION: CAO

INFORMATION:

SACS
G-4
G-3
USPOLAD

G-1
Q(AE)
ORD

G-1(B)
Q(MAINT)
PET SEC

G-2
MATTN
QM

G-5
C/S MTO
RESMIN

PARAPHRASE UNNECESSARY

MC IN 13073 30 Sept 45 TOP SECRET 0639A REF NO W-71688 Jg/T

TOP SECRET

101

101

L. FORCES

Copy No. 7

FA 47457

OCT 051821A

G/177

OCT 060930A

HOYTINE

FREEDOM FIGHTER BACED CITE HMOCT

ACTION CARRIER OFFICES FOR BRITISH C.O.S. INFO BRITISH MARITIME FOR U.S.
JOINT C.O.S., ALCOA

TOP SECRET.

This is MEXCOS 277.

1. In view of the fact that the 2nd Polish Armoured Div which was formed with
2nd Polish Armoured Brigade and 16th Powozka (Infantry) Brigade was not included
in formations listed in para 5 of MEXCOS 272 the following amendment to that para
should be made:

Sub para A. Sub para 5A. Amend to read 1 British Division 1 New Zealand
Division 1 Indian Division 3 Polish Divisions. Total 6 Divisions.

Sub para B. Sub para 5B. Amend to read 1 British Division 3 Polish
Divisions. Total 4 Divisions.

Amended. 6/10.

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (SO)

GSO 2 (W/S)

GSO 2 (I)

GSO 3 (SO)

GSO 3 (SO)

GSO 3 (I)

LIST

Copy No 1 & 2	INFO-ACTION: Ex Commissioner 2
" "	INFO: Chief Commissioner
" "	POLAD (A)
" "	POLAD (B)
" "	CA Sec
" "	L. Screen
" "	File

DATE:

DATE:

6/3/1
7/6/10.

RESTRICTED

Major-General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC
Military Mission to Italian Army,

C. M. F.

1 October, 1945.

Minister of War

Reference my C/3 of 14 Sep, i.e. copy of my address to you and senior Ministry of War officials on Allied views in connection with the future of the Italian Army:-

1. I consider that it is essential that views of senior officers of the Italian Army be obtained on the project, in order that:-

- (a) we get the benefit of the advice of these senior experienced soldiers;
- (b) we get a true cross section of the views of the Italian Army and not only of a limited number of officers in the Ministry of War.

2. The obvious officers to consult, you will agree, are the Territorial Regional Commanders.

3. (a) Please therefore, if you have not already done so, send a translation of my address personally to all the Territorial Regional Commanders, telling them to consider it and be prepared to come to ROME shortly for a general discussion with you on the matter.

(b) The date of this discussion can be fixed when my and your staff have explored the project a little further.

L. Browning

Major-General.

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Proposed Amendments to the Interim Document
to replace existing Armistice Terms

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (LMIA)

G/3/1

29. Sep 48

TO : EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER, A.C.

Ref para I V(a) Proposed Amendments: your ref 2609/EC.

1. General BROWNING would like the words

"retains the right of reassuming command of all or part of
it should he consider this necessary"

inserted so as to be in keeping with the suggested draft
which he has been asked to consider by Chief of Staff AFHQ. AFHQ
draft ref. ASD/925/1.

2. Conversation Col. FIDELITY - Lt. Col. TALBOT 29 Sept refers.

W.P.

Major General
LMIA

WS

Subject: Italian Army -- Arrangements
for handover of control to Italian
Government and future organization,
training and administration.

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.,
(M.A.I.A.) R O M E

0/3

28 Sept. 45.

To : A.F.H.Q.

I return herewith one copy of your first draft of ASD/925/1 on the
handover of the Italian Army, with my suggested alterations in red ink and
explanatory additions. These alterations and additions are self explanatory
except in the following cases :

- (a) Para 2. The date "1st October" is obviously out of the ques-
-tion now, and as some little time must elapse between
receipt of this directive and its implementation, I
have suggested 14 days.
- (b) Para 3. I have deleted the last line and not because it is
incorrect but because I feel it is rather "childing
the lily" and might be misinterpreted by the Italians.
- (c) Para 2. I have deleted the last two lines for the same reason.
- (d) Para 11. As you know, we still await the decision on the armament
(other than personal arms) for the new Army. I there-
-fore think it necessary to include my remarks about
arms and ammunition.
- (e) Para 12. If we can, by means of this short paragraph, avoid
publishing another document (which I believe we can)
I think we should do so.
- (f) Para 13. Similarly I think we should include this short in-
-struction on accounting rather than publishing a separate
document which would otherwise be necessary.

d.f.R.
Major General,
M.A.I.A.

I return herewith one copy of your first draft of ASD/925/1 on the turnover of the Italian Army, with my suggested alterations in red ink and typewritten addition. These alterations and additions are self explanatory except in the following cases:

(a) Para 2.

The date "1st October" is obviously out of the question now, and as some little time must elapse between receipt of this directive and its implementation, I have suggested 14 days.

(b) Para 3.

I have deleted the last line and not because it is incorrect but because I feel it is rather "padding the lid" and might be misunderstood by the Italians.

(c) Para 3.

I have deleted the last two lines for the same reason.

(d) Para 11.

As you know, we still await the decision on the armament (other than personal arms) for the new Army. I therefore think it necessary to include my remarks about arms and ammunition.

(e) Para 12.

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(f) Para 13.

Similarly I think we should include this short instruction on accounting rather than publishing a separate document which would otherwise be necessary.

WE/COO.

d. P.
Major General,
M.H.I.S.

1 FIRST DRAFT

To be cleared by R.C.D. AG

SECRET

ARMED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

24
Sep 45.

MEMO : ASD/325/1.

SUBJECT : ITALIAN ARMY - Arrangements for handover of control to Italian Government and future organization, training and administration.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission for ITALY, ^{AC}for

FROM : Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA).

GENERAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy ^{TO}which is to be used ~~which~~ be adopted towards the Italian Land Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organization, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units. 14 days after date of this letter

With effect from 4 September units of the Italian Army that

are now in the ILL-INT category together with the five BR-INT combat and their support units

groups will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government.

Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-INT and BR-INT Units.

(a) US-INT and BR-INT Units less the five BR-INT combat units referred

to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing

arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities.

Such units will remain under the ^{operational} control command of Allied Force

Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to

ILL. It is estimated that in the case of US-INT personnel, this stage.

2. Transfer of Units. *14 days after date of this letter*
 With effect from 4 October 1945, units of the ITALIAN Army that are now in the US-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat *and their support units* groups will be transferred to the control of the ITALIAN Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI Units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the ~~control~~ ^{operational} command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to

NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this ~~figure~~ ^{stage} will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI units will be offered to the ITALIAN Government. If not required, they will be disbanded; personnel thus released will be available to the ITALIAN Government.

(b) The supply of US-ITI and BR-ITI service units will be the responsibility of the nation concerned except that the Italian Government will make available that portion of the ration now designated as "Italian provided items" as demanded by the nation concerned for the troops maintained. It will be the responsibility of the nation concerned to accept the Italian provided items at Italian base depots, and thereafter distribute and issue such items from US or British Army depots.

-2-

4. Future of Carabinieri.

The Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government in all respects. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the ITALIAN Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

(b) The Italian Government will furnish such information regarding ^{strength,} the organization, training, reliability, movements, administration, real estate, and stocks of materials and equipment concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and

and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required.

INSERT

as to the action to be taken. The Military Mission will be provided by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA). A revised Directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA) will shortly be issued.

FUTURE ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organization.

become operative

During the interim period until the peace treaty with the ITALIAN Army under control of the ITALIAN Government will consist of not more

5. Reservations.

(B) The Italian Government will furnish such information regarding the ^{strength,} organization, training, reliability, movements, administration, real estate, and stocks of materials and equipment concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and

INSERT

and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required.

as to the action to be taken. The Military Mission will be provided by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA) will shortly be issued.

TOTAL ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

becomes operative

7. Organization.

During the interim period until the peace treaty the ITALIAN Army under control of the ITALIAN Government will consist of not more than 110,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines :-

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA. *Independent Regiments* 15,000.
Ten Internal Security Divisions each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland. 25,000.

Total 40,000.

-2-

4. Future of Carabinieri.

The Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government in all respects. Strength will not exceed 55,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the ITALIAN Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

- (a) The Supreme Allied Commander, ~~INTERALLIED~~ Theatre Reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the ITALIAN Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the

- ITALIAN Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct. ^{operational}
- (b) 600 Civil Security Battalion will remain under command of Allied Force Headquarters. *for the time being (as part of the force in para 7 of below)*

6. Military Mission.

An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the ITALIAN Government in the organization, training and administration of the ITALIAN ARMY. ^(insert) The ITALIAN Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission; if it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters for decision as to the action to be taken. The Military Mission will be provided by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALFA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALFA) will shortly be issued.

FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation.

During the interim period until the peace treaty, the ITALIAN Government will consist of not more

become operative

5. Reservations.

- (a) The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the ITALIAN Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the ITALIAN Army to any Allied Commander when he may direct.

(b) 303 Civil Security Battalion will remain under command of Allied Forces Headquarters. *operational*

- (c) 303 Civil Security Battalion will remain under command of Allied Forces Headquarters. *for the time being (as part of the front pair 7 d below)*

6. Military Mission.

An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and

assist the ITALIAN Government in the organization, training and administration

(INSTR)

of the ITALIAN Army. The ITALIAN Government will normally accept

the advice of this Mission; if it should find itself unable to do so,

the matter will be referred to Allied Forces Headquarters for decision

as to the action to be taken. The Military Mission will be provided

by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission

(ALFA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission

of the Allied Commission (ALFA) will shortly be issued.

ARMED ORGANIZATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.7. Organization.

becomes operative

During the interim period until the peace treaty the ITALIAN Army under control of the ITALIAN Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines :-

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA. *Independent Regiments*

15,000.

Ten ~~Internal Security Divisions~~ *Independent Regiments* each of

2,500 men for ten territorial regions

on mainland. 25,000.

Total. . . . 40,000.

(b) <u>Mobile Reserves</u> <i>and supporting troops</i>	
<i>Five combat groups and ~~infantry~~</i>	
<i>Regiment</i>	
Total. . . . 50,000	
(c) <u>Command</u>	
<u>Ministry of War and Territorial</u>	
<u>Region Headquarters</u>	
Total. . . . 9,000	
(d) <u>Administration.</u>	Total. . . . 31,000
(e) <u>Training and Reinforcements.</u>	Total. . . . 10,000
	<u>140,000</u>

3. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the ITALIAN Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will however be worked out by the ITALIAN Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (A.I.A.) ~~will not be subject to the concurrence of Allied Force Headquarters.~~

9. Training

Training policy for the ITALIAN Army outlined in paragraph 7 above will be laid down by the ITALIAN Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (A.I.A.). ~~(It will conform generally with ALLIED training policy and will advise as to its effect on the ITALIAN Army.)~~ *delete.*

10. Administration.

14 days after issue of this order
With effect from ~~1 October 1945~~ the ITALIAN Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the ITALIAN Army *(as in para 7)*

outlined in paragraph 7 above
and Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the ITALIAN Army is self-administered and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

Army

3. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the ITALIAN Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will however be worked out by the ITALIAN Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA), ~~and will not be subject to the concurrence of Allied Force Headquarters.~~

9. Training

Training policy for the ITALIAN Army outlined in paragraph 7 above will be laid down by the ITALIAN Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALIA). ~~(It will conform generally with ALLIED training policy and will adhere to the same in all respects.)~~ *delete.*

10. Administration

14 days after issue of this order
With effect from ~~4 October 1945~~ the ITALIAN Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the ITALIAN Army ~~(as in para 7)~~

on the basis of paragraph 7 above
and Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorized ceiling so that the ITALIAN Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

arms,
11. *A* All vehicles and equipment of BRITISH and UNITED STATES origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the ITALIAN Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri will be retained with these forces and will be handed over to the ITALIAN Government. Six months maintenance parts for *arms,*

vehicles and equipments so provided will also be handed over to the ITALIAN Government. *Appropriate scales of ammunition of various nature will be handed over and maintained from Allied sources.*

12.

SUPPLIES AND MAINTENANCE.*Supplies & maintenance*

(a) The Italian Government will assume responsibility for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Army and the Carabinieri as from the date of transfer of control.

Con. of (1) (i) Those stocks of Allied provided rations on hand in Italian Army depots on the date of transfer of control which have been specifically provided for the ITI-ITI Category will be released to the control of the Italian Government.

(2) (ii) The total quantity of these items released to the Italian Government will be deducted from the quantities to be furnished under the civil import program. The Allied Armies will not furnish any additional items for the ITI-ITI Category from Army stocks unless the Italian Government, having properly expended all items at their disposal, request the issue of, and establish the necessity for such additional items.

~~distributed to units through Italian military distribution channels~~

provided provided Army
 16. (c) Those stocks of rations on hand in Italian depots on the date of transfer of control, which have been especially provided by the Allies for the maintenance of US-ITI and HR-ITI troops, will be returned to the respective US and British Army depots concerned, and the Italian Government will be given credit therefore. *for the value of such stocks returned.*

Allied nations

1453
b. (1) (i) Those stocks of Allied provided rations on hand in Italian Army depots on the date of transfer of control which have been specifically provided for the ITI-ITI Category will be released to the control of the Italian Government.

(2) (ii) The total quantity of these items released to the Italian Government will be deducted from the quantities to be furnished under the civil import program. The Allied Armies will not furnish any additional items for the ITI-ITI Category from Army stocks unless the Italian Government, having properly expended all items at their disposal, request the issue of, and establish the necessity for such additional items.

~~distributed to units through ITI-ITI ed in existing channels~~

b. (c) ^{Army} Those stocks of rations on hand in Italian depots on the date of transfer of control, which have been especially provided by the Allies for the maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI troops, will be returned to the respective US and British Army depots concerned, and the Italian Government will be given credit therefore. ^{for the value of such stocks returned.}

^{Allied nations}
p. (d) As from the date of transfer of control no items of subsistence will be issued by US or British Army depots to any troops in the ITI-ITI Category. All troops in the ITI-ITI Category will draw all items of ^{ration} subsistence, clothing and equipment from ITI-ITI depots only.

The ITALIAN Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri as soon as practicable. Pending further instructions the following interim procedure will apply with effect from 1 October 1945 :-

- (a) Allied military authorities will continue to be responsible for the provision of maintenance and equipment for the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri in accordance with policies established for personnel in the ITI-ITI category, except as noted in sub-paragraph (b) below. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of Allied Commission (ALIA) will continue to screen those demands which are met from Allied military stocks and will exercise supervisory control of the use of such materials.
- (b) The ITALIAN Government will be responsible for taking provision action for petrol, oils and lubricants for the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri in its civil import programme. Units of the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri will draw their requirements from ITALIAN Army or civil purps.
- (c) The ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri will draw in bulk from the relative installations supplies and equipment which are provided from Allied military stocks. These supplies will be distributed to units through ITALIAN administrative channels.

Accord provided Army
 B. (c) Those stocks of rations on hand in Italian depots on the date of transfer of control, which have been especially provided by the Allies for the maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI troops, will be returned to the respective US and British Army depots concerned, and the Italian Government will be given credit therefore. *for the value of such stocks returned*

Allied nations

in sub-paragraph (b) below. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of Allied Commission (LILAC) will continue to screen those demands which are met from Allied military stocks and will exercise supervisory control of the use of such materials.

(b) The ITALIAN Government will be responsible for taking provision action for petrol, oils and lubricants for the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri in its civil import programs. Units of the ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri will draw their requirements from ITALIAN Army or civil stocks.

(c) The ITALIAN Army and Carabinieri will draw in bulk from the relative installations supplies and equipment which are provided from Allied military stocks. These supplies will be distributed to units through ITALIAN ~~inter-territorial channels~~.

Revised provided Army
 p. (c) Those stocks of rations on hand in Italian depots on the date of transfer of control, which have been especially provided by the Allies for the maintenance of US-ITI and BR-ITI troops will be returned to the respective US and British Army depots concerned, and the Italian Government will be given credit ~~therefore~~ *for the value of such stocks returned.*

Allied nations
 p. (d) As from the date of transfer of control no items of subsistence will be issued by US or British Army depots to any troops in the ITI-ITI Category. All troops in the ITI-ITI Category will draw all items of ~~subsistence~~ *subsistence*, clothing and equipment from ITI-ITI depots only.

13. ACCOUNTING.

issued to
A. (a) Accounting for Allied Military Supplies furnished the Italian Government in bulk for the ITI-ITI Category will follow present established procedure.

B. (b) Accounting for Allied Military Supplies issued to ER-ITI and US-ITI Units directly from British and US Depots will be as follows :-

(i) (1) ^{Italian} Unit will requisition on usual forms (for rations ST/8's)

(ii) (2) ^{an} Issuing depots will require signature of Italian officer on vouchers.

HQ's concerned (per the end of)
(iii) (3) British and US Army will, once each month, forward to MMIA a consolidated statement covering all issues made during the previous month, together with the supporting vouchers signed by the Italian officers.

(iv) (4) MMIA will secure the signature of the Italian War Ministry on the consolidated statement and hand over the supporting vouchers to the War Ministry. The consolidated statement will then be forwarded to AC Chief Accountant.

C. (c) As from the date of transfer of control to the Italian Government no further accounting for Allied supplies will be performed by MMIA, except to close all accounts up to the date of transfer of control.

EXTERNAL DISSEMINATION

EQ 13 Corps
EQ 2 District
EQ 3 District

(ii) (2) Issuing depots will require signature of Italian officer on vouchers.

(iii) (3) British and US Army will, once each month, forward to MMIA a consolidated statement covering all issues made during the previous month, together with the supporting vouchers signed by the Italian officers.

(iv) (4) MMIA will secure the signature of the Italian War Ministry on the consolidated statement and hand over the supporting vouchers to the War Ministry. The consolidated statement will then be forwarded to AG Chief Accountant.

C.(e) As from the date of transfer of control to the Italian Government no further accounting for Allied supplies will be performed by MMIA, except to close all accounts up to the date of transfer of control.

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

Eq 13 Corps
Eq 2 District
Eq 3 District
CG Peninsula Base Section
CG ROE Area Allied Command.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

SACS	Surgeon(5)	IEE
CAO	Fiscal Director	G-4 (Rev & On)
ACCS(1)	DTC	Tn(2) (2)
Dep Mil Sec	G-2	G-5
Liaison	W	G-4m-G Med
Financial Adviser	G-3 (25)	Hq MED MED I
G-4 (1)	Dr's	CG MEDUSA
G-4 (1)	Signals	US FOLD
Q2E.	G-4 (1)	Roswin
Surgeon(1)	Lo Plans	

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

FILE NO: ASD/925/1

Sept 45

SUBJECT: ITALIAN Army - Arrangements for handover of control to ITALIAN Government and future organisation, training and administration.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission for ITALY for

Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (MELA)

GENERAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the ITALIAN Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the ITALIAN Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the ITALIAN Army to their control and for its future organisation, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units

With effect from 14 days after date of this letter units of the ITALIAN Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units will be transferred to the control of the ITALIAN Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI Units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946.

Units no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI

interim policy to be adopted towards the ITALIAN Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the ITALIAN Government that the following arrangements will be made for the handover of the ITALIAN Army to their control and for its future organisation, training and administration.

HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

2. Transfer of Units
With effect from 14 days after date of this letter units of the

ITALIAN Army that are now in the ITI-ITI category together with the five BR-ITI combat groups and their support units will be transferred to the control of the ITALIAN Government. Allied Commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5 below.

3. Future of US-ITI and BR-ITI Units.

(a) US-ITI and BR-ITI Units less the five BR-ITI combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITI personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITI personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITI and BR-ITI units will be offered to the ITALIAN Government. If not required, they will be disbanded; personnel thus released will be available to the ITALIAN Government.

(b) The supply of US-ITI and BR-ITI service units will be the responsibility of the nation concerned except that the Italian Government will make available that portion of the ration now designated as "Italian provided items" as demanded by the nation concerned for the troops maintained.

It will be the responsibility of the nation concerned to accept the Italian provided items at Italian base depots, and thereafter distribute and issue such items from US or British Army depots.

4. Future of the Carabinieri.

The Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the ITALIAN Government in all respects. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the ITALIAN Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations.

(a) The Supreme Allied Commander, MEDITERRANEAN Theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the ITALIAN Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the ITALIAN Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

(b) The ITALIAN Government will furnish such information regarding the strength, organisation, training, reliability, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of materials and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

(c) 808 Civil Security Battalion will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being (as part of the force in para 7d below).

6. Military Mission.

An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the ITALIAN Government in the organisation, training and administration of the ITALIAN Army and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The ITALIAN Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission; if it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters for decision as to the action to be taken. The Military Mission will be provided by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of

(a) The Supreme Allied Commander, MEDITERRANEAN Theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the ITALIAN Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the ITALIAN Army to any Allied Commander whom he may direct.

(b) The ITALIAN Government will furnish such information regarding the strength, organisation, training, reliability, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of materials and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

(c) 808 Civil Security Battalion will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being (as part of the force in para 7d below).

6. Military Mission.

An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the ITALIAN Government in the organisation, training and administration of the ITALIAN Army and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The ITALIAN Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission; if it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters for decision as to the action to be taken. The Military Mission will be provided by the present Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA) will shortly be issued.

FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organisation.

During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the ITALIAN Army under control of the ITALIAN Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organised on the following lines :-

(a) Local Reserves.

Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men, two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA 15,000

Ten Independent Regiments each of 2,500 men for ten territorial regions on mainland 25,000

TOTAL 40,000.

(b) Mobile Reserves

Five combat groups and supporting troops

TOTAL 50,000

(c) Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters.

TOTAL 9,000

(d) Administration.

TOTAL 31,000

(e) Training and Reinforcements.

TOTAL 10,000

140,000

8. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the ITALIAN Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will however be worked out by the ITALIAN Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMIA).

9. Training

Training policy for the ITALIAN Army outlined in paragraph 7 above will be laid down by the ITALIAN Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (AMIA).

10. Administration.

With effect from 14 days after issue of this order the ITALIAN Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the ITALIAN Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the ITALIAN

(c) Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region Headquarters.	TOTAL 9,000
(d) <u>Administration.</u>	TOTAL 31,000
(e) <u>Training and Reinforcements.</u>	TOTAL 10,000
	<u>140,000</u>

8. No alteration to the general lay-out shown above will be made by the ITALIAN Government without the consent of Allied Force Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will however be worked out by the ITALIAN Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MEMIA).

9. Training

Training policy for the ITALIAN Army outlined in paragraph 7 above will be laid down by the ITALIAN Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MEMIA).

10. Administration.

With effect from 14 days after issue of this order the ITALIAN Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the ITALIAN Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the ITALIAN Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

11. All arms, vehicles and equipment of BRITISH and UNITED STATES origin (including Lend-Lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the ITALIAN Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri will be retained with those forces and will be handed over to the ITALIAN Government. Six months maintenance parts for arms, vehicles and equipments so provided will also be

handed over to the ITALIAN Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various natures will be handed over and maintained from Allied sources.

12. Supplies and Maintenance.

(a) The Italian Government will assume responsibility for the supply and maintenance of the Italian Army and the Carabinieri as from the date of transfer of control.

(b) (i) Those stocks of Allied provided rations on hand in Italian Army depots on the date of transfer of control which have been specifically provided for the ITI-ITI Category will be released to the control of the Italian Government.

(ii) The total quantity of these items released to the Italian Government will be deducted from the quantities to be furnished under the civil import program. The Allied Armies will not furnish any additional items for the ITI-ITI Category from Army stocks unless the Italian Government, having properly expended all items at their disposal, request the issue of, and establish the necessity for such additional items.

(c) Those stocks of Allied provided rations on hand in Italian Army depots on the date of transfer of control which have been specifically provided by the Allies for the US-ITI and BR-ITI Categories, will be returned to the respective U.S. and British Army depots concerned, and the Italian Government will be given credit for the value of such stocks returned.

(d) As from the date of transfer of control no Allied rations will be issued by U.S. or British Army depots to any troops in the ITI-ITI Category. All troops in the ITI-ITI Category will draw all rations, clothing and equipment from ITI-ITI depots only.

13. Accounting.

(a) Accounting for Allied Military Supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the ITI-ITI Category will follow present established

(ii) The total quantity of these items released to the Italian Government will be deducted from the quantities to be furnished under the civil import program. The Allied Armies will not furnish any additional items for the ITI-ITI Category from Army stocks unless the Italian Government, having properly expended all items at their disposal, request the issue of, and establish the necessity for such additional items.

(c) Those stocks of Allied provided rations on hand in Italian Army depots on the date of transfer of control which have been specifically provided by the Allies for the US-ITI and BR-ITI Categories, will be returned to the respective U.S. and British Army depots concerned, and the Italian Government will be given credit for the value of such stocks returned.

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13. Accounting.

(a) Accounting for Allied Military Supplies issued to the Italian Government in bulk for the ITI-ITI Category will follow present established procedure.

(b) Accounting for Allied Military Supplies issued to BR-ITI and

US-ITI Units direct from British and U.S. Depots will be as follows :-

(i) Italian Unit will requisition on the usual forms (for rations ST/8's)

(ii) Allied Issuing depots will require signature of an Italian officer on vouchers.

- 5 -

(iii) British and U.S. H.Q.'s concerned will, at the end of each month, forward to MMIA a consolidated statement covering all issues made during the previous month, together with the supporting vouchers signed by the Italian officers.

(iv) MMIA will secure the signature of the Italian War Ministry on the consolidated statement and hand over the supporting vouchers to the War Ministry. The consolidated statement will then be forwarded to A.C. Chief Accountant.

(c) As from the date of transfer of control to the Italian Government no further accounting for Allied supplies will be performed by MMIA, except to close all accounts up to the date of transfer of control.

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

HQ 13 Corps
 HQ 2 District
 HQ 3 District
 CG Peninsula Base Section
 CG ROME Area Allied Command

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

SACS	Surgeion(B)	QM	REME
CAO	Fiscal Director	Q(Maint)	G-4(Mov & Tr)
ACOS (B)	DPIC	S & T	Tn(B) (2)
Dep Mil Sec	G-2	Pet Sec	G-5
Liaison	PWB	Postal(B)	C-in-C Med
Financial Adviser	G-3 (25)	Labour	HQ RAF MEDME
G-1(A)	Engrs	Claims & Hirings	CG MTOUSA
G-1(B)	Signals	Q(AE)	US POLAD
O2E	G-4(A)	Ord(A)	Resmin
Surgeon(A)	Log Plans	Ord(B)	

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Major General L. Browning, CB, CBE, MC,
Land Forces Sub-Commission,
N.M.I.A.
ROME

18 September 1945

My dear

Your D/O of 15 Sep and our 'phone talk today -

para 1.

Yes - I am sorry not to have SHOOTING, but under the circumstances the answer does seem to be GRAHAM. I have said nothing to the latter and will not do so till we hear if a B.C.S. is authorized by W.O.

para 2.

Herewith a draft paragraph as regards the general terms of handover of the Italian Interim Army. It is the result of a long discussion we had in Executive Commissioner's office last Friday on the possibility of producing a general document to supplant the armistice terms pending the actual Peace Treaty. I hear today that the matter is dropped pro tem, but the para may help you.

I suggest that, when you have got your draft directives made out, you send them to me and M.M.I.A. will examine fully in all aspects. Then either I or a senior staff officer could go to A.F.M.C. to discuss with you, if necessary.

para 3.

I have delivered my address and given Minister of War a copy:-

- (a) for circulation in M. of W. on a high level.
- (b) to get M. of W. thinking and examining on those lines.
- (c) as a basis for my staff to pursue examination of their respective aspects.
- (d) so that there shall be no question of exactly what I said.

The address was well received and, while the M. of W. officers who attended did not commit themselves, they said they agreed with a great deal of what I said.

Those present at my address were:-

LACINI	Minister of War
CADORENA	C. of S.
CHATTIAN	Military under Secretary
LIUZZI	Director Ops, ED and Trg Branches
ROMEO	Deputy C. of S. and Commander
LOMBARDI	Designate of CHSANO
	Chief of Cabinet M. of W.

the answer does seem to be GRAHAM. I have said nothing to the latter and will not do so till we hear if a B.G.S. is authorized by W.O.

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I suggest that, when you have got your draft directives made out, you send them to me and M.M.I.A. will examine fully in all aspects. Then either I or a senior staff officer could go to A.F.H.Q. to discuss with you, if necessary.

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IACINI	Minister of War
CADORENA	C. of S.
CHAZERIAN	Military Under Secretary
LUZZI	Director Ops, SD and its Branches
ROMEO	Deputy C. of S. and Commander designate of CUSANO
LEONARDI	Chief of Cabinet M. of W.

para 4.

I am thrashing out a new W.M. on the lines we discussed on the 'phone today. I'll let you have it as soon as I can, but it is rather a big business to make out in full, and is so important that we should take adequate time to think and work it out. I'll 'phone you p.m. today on the subject generally.

/.....Reference

Reference officers for M.I.A., please see my A324 of 13 Sep to G 1 (Br) A.F.H.S. When you get that list we will know what officers are available here.

Yours

Major General A.D. WARD, CB, CBE, DSO,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Allied Force Headquarters

IV. The Italian Armed Forces

1. a. The Italian Army under the command of the Italian Government will be limited to a force of:-

110,000 troops
65,000 Carabinieri

b. The Supreme Allied Commander shall continue to have the right to employ Italian troops over and above the figures mentioned in sub-para 2. for such purposes as he may consider necessary.

c. The Supreme Allied Commander transfers command of the Italian Army as in sub-para 2 above to the Italian Government but retains the right of control. The existing Military Mission to the Italian Army will be charged with the supervision of the reorganization of the Italian Army and with maintaining in its operational and administrative training.

d. Subject to the functions of the Military Mission to the Italian Army as defined in sub-para 2 above, the Italian Government, in respect of the forces mentioned in sub-para 2 above, will assume full administrative control, and supply responsibility insofar as their resources permit.

e. All Italian armed land forces in excess of the figures mentioned in sub-para 2 and of the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander in sub-para 2 will be disbanded in accordance with the order of the Supreme Allied Commander.

14707
 Lt. Col. G.M. INGLETON,
 Military Mission to Italian Army,
 C. M. F.

19 September 1943

Dear General:

Following on General BROWNING's talk with Minister JACINTI on 14 Sep, it would seem that the undermentioned points require discussion between our respective departments.

1. Organization of Arms of the Service

- (a) What do you think about having a separate Signal and Engineer Corps instead of one Genio Corps? We think it advisable.
- (b) Do you consider that your Artillery Branch should confine itself to Artillery advice, or will it still control the issues of stores as dealt with by the British "Ordnance" Branch? We think the former.
- (c) The AG services are being dealt with by Colonel FIDLEY's department, i.e. how about separate Ordnance, RAE, ST Branches? We do not necessarily think that the British system is right, but now would be a good time to find something in between the present Italian and present British systems.

2. Organization of War Ministry

Depending on the answers to 1 (above) we feel the time has come to consider a possible reorganization of Ministry of War. The old-time system of SMRS and Ministry of War seems too cumbersome and out of date. Without prejudice to what may be the terms of the Peace Treaty as regards Allied requirements, it does seem as if we should get closer together now. Actually this staff procedure much interests me; I would like to examine in detail and put up a proposition for discussion between us.

3. Call-up

Do you agree to the call-up system on the American lines as outlined at the meeting? For purposes of planning accommodation and training I feel we should base our calculations on a figure of say 10,000 on 1 Feb but I know Colonel FIDLEY is going into detailed requirements of intakes with you. Do you agree, and if so would you please submit former details? This of course brings us to the question of sitings of District HQs and Depots near each other and other problems vide paragraphs 4 to 6 below.

4. District HQs/Depots

1. Organization of Arms of the Service

(a) What do you think about having a separate Signal and Engineer Corps instead of one Genio Corps? We think it advisable.

(b) Do you consider that your Artillery Branch should confine itself to Artillery advice, or will it still control the issues of stores as dealt with by the British "ordnance" Branch? We think the former.

(c) The AG services are being dealt with by Colonel FIDLEY's department, i.e. how about separate Ordnance, RMM, ST Branches? We do not necessarily think that the British system is right, but now would be a good time to find something in between the present Italian and present British systems.

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Depending on the answers to 1 (above) we feel the time has come to consider a possible reorganization of Ministry of War. The old-time system of WAR and Ministry of War seems too cumbersome and out of date. Without prejudice to what may be the terms of the Peace Treaty as regards Allied requirements, it does seem as if we should get closer together now. Actually this staff procedure much interests me; I would like to examine in detail and put up a proposition for discussion between us.

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Do you agree to the call-up system on the American lines as outlined at the meeting? For purposes of planning accommodation and training I feel we should base our calculations on a figure of say 10,000 on 1 Pop but I know Colonel FIDLEY is going into detailed requirements of intakes with you. Do you agree, and if so would you please submit former details? This of course brings us to the question of siting of District HQs and Depots near each other and other problems vide paragraphs 4 to 5 below.

4. District HQs/Depots

Personally we feel that they should be near each other to save overheads and to save movement. Major BAUMANN has told us your objections are:-

- (a) Lack of barrack accommodation for Depots near Districts;
- (b) The fact that District HQs are sited in thickly populated areas while Depots are located in the country or in country villages where training facilities are good;
- (c) The fact that even if Districts and Depots were to be next door to each other, practically no overheads could be saved as each unit has such totally different functions.

Are the above really your views and, if so, are there any ways of overcoming the difficulties? What alternative?

Recruit Training

5. Do you agree to the system outlined at the meeting? It looks the most simple and effective under the circumstances and I do hope you will agree. If so, will you please put up WEs for Primary Training Centres (P.T.Cs) and Infantry Training Centres (I.T.Cs) and start looking for accommodation in each Territorial Region. Do you want any help in connection with the accommodation?

6. As you know we already have a plan for training 3,000 instructors at GUSANO which should take care of the first in-flow of reinforcements.

At present to us that this P.T.C./I.T.C. Organization is the first thing to get settled and organized.

7. GUSANO

We have examined the position of the various schools in detail vide our letter G/TRS/12/2 of 13 Sep 45.

I trust you will agree. Where we differ with your official view is chiefly over the question of moving the Artillery School to CIVITAVECCHIA. I hear that the real opposition to the move of this school from MAROCCIANO is because certain officers are so comfortable there. On the other hand, at CIVITAVECCHIA the barracks are near the sea for out-to-sea firing which includes anti-tank and anti-aircraft. At the present moment anti-tank and anti-aircraft troops have to move from MAROCCIANO to CIVITAVECCHIA to fire. In addition, the present British occupants of the CIVITAVECCHIA Barracks (The British School of Artillery) have done a great deal towards repairing the barracks and increasing the amenities of the ranges. So from every point of view it is clear that CIVITAVECCHIA is the best location. In the light of the above, I ask that you will look into this matter personally.

8. COMBAT GROUPS

Could you please hasten reply to our letter SD/39/2 of 11 Sep 45 where we asked for your views on the future WE of the Combat Groups. This will of course include such items as:-

- (a) Whether you require an armoured car battalion;
- (b) Whether you require any Alpine increments;
- (c) Whether you require any readjustment of Artillery.

Please base your reply on British Equipment. That brings us to the important question of the WE of an Infantry Regiment in a Combat Group. We feel that they should definitely be interchangeable with the I.S. Brigade which at the moment is only on an ad hoc temporary basis of HQ and three Guard Battalions. The advantages of interchangeability are of course enormous. If you agree, then SICILY would produce four such regiments from its I.S. Divisions and SARDINIA would produce two. This brings us to the question of nomenclature. Do you fancy

6. As you know we already have a plan for reinforcing the first in-flow of reinforcements. ORGANIZATION should take care of the first in-flow of reinforcements.

It seems to us that this P.I.C./I.T.C. organization is the first thing to get settled and organized.

7. ORGANIZATION

We have examined the position of the various schools in detail vide our letter G/IRG/18/3 of 16 Sep 45.

I trust you will agree. There is no difference with your official view is chiefly over the question of moving the Artillery School to CIVITAVECCHIA. I hear that the real opposition to the move of this school from MARITIMO is because certain officers are so comfortable there. On the other hand, at CIVITAVECCHIA the barracks are near the sea for out-to-sea firing which includes anti-tank and anti-aircraft. At the present moment anti-tank and anti-aircraft troops have to move from MARITIMO to CIVITAVECCHIA to fire. In addition, the present British occupants of the CIVITAVECCHIA Barracks (the British School of Artillery) have done a great deal towards repairing the barracks and increasing the amenities of the ranges. So from every point of view it is clear that CIVITAVECCHIA is the best location. In the light of the above, I ask that you will look into this matter personally.

8. COMBAT GROUPS

Could you please hasten reply to our letter SD/32/2 of 11 Sep 45 where we asked for your views on the future of the Combat Groups. This will of course include such items as:-

- (a) Whether you require an armoured car battalion;
- (b) Whether you require any Alpine increments;
- (c) Whether you require any readjustment of Artillery.

Please base your reply on British Equipment. That brings us to the important question of the use of an Infantry Regiment in a Combat Group. We feel that they should definitely be interchangeable with the I.S. Brigade which at the moment is only on an ad hoc temporary use of HQ and three Guard Battalions. The advantages of interchangeability are of course enormous. If you agree, then SICILY would produce four such regiments from its I.S. Divisions and Sardinia would produce two. This brings us to the question of nomenclature. Do you favour the terms "Italian Division", "Friuli Division", "Bari Independent Regiment" etc?

9. Territorial Lay-out

You were going to let us have a reply to our letter SD/34/2 of 29 Aug 45 asking for further details on the Territorial lay-out. I think it would be wise for you to keep about 1,000 up your sleeve as unallotted. What do you think?

- 3 -

10. Conclusion

When you have had time to think about the above points I would like to come across and have a talk over it all. I feel that the sooner we get down to fundamentals now the better. I suggest our first meeting about the middle of next week.

I need hardly repeat that all our proposals are dictated by what we feel necessary in Italy's own interest. I must also add that AFHQ (with whom as you know, General BROWNING discussed this whole matter fully) want to know at regular intervals the progress towards our arriving at an agreed solution and consider the matter as urgent.

I hope you have enjoyed your few days break in the country.

Yours sincerely,

A. M. F. F. F. F. F.

Brig. Gen. G. L. LUZZI
Generale Addetto
SMI

W3

18

SECRET

SUBJECT: Proposed amendments to the Interim
Document to replace existing Armistice Terms

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AG (MIA)

6/5/1

17 Sep 45

TO : Executive Commissioner,
Allied Commission.

Reference our meeting p.m. Friday in your office
and the proposed amendments made out and sent to us thereafter:-

1. Para IV - sub-para (c) new -
In second line after "Italian Government" add "but
retains the right of control".

We agreed on this. Presumably the omission was a
clerical error. Otherwise we have no power.

2. Para IV - sub-para (a) new -
For the third and fourth lines substitute:-
"the Italian Government, in respect of the forces
mentioned in sub-para (a) above, will assume full
administrative control, and supply responsibility
insofar as their resources permit."

We must put it this way so as to follow up NAF 1059
of 22 Aug and otherwise we would be giving a false
picture in the document.

2. B.

Major-General,
MIA.

2608/EC

WPA Inspection

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE EIGHTH DOCUMENT TO BELGIANAUSTRIAN AMENDMENTPreamble

3rd line insert "on behalf of United Nations" after "Mediterranean theatre". The balance of preamble agreed.

Para I agreedPara II

Para (1) permitative line to read "it will continue to exercise its present functions to the minimum extent" etc.

Para 2. This paragraph to read "In order to facilitate the normal development of Italian economic life, the Allied Commission will have the following economic functions".

sub-para (a), (b), (c), (d) all agreed.

Para (3). First sentence to read "It is the intention of the United Nations that" etc. "Article III 6" in second line to read "Article III 7".

Para III. Heading to read "Italian aid to United Nations".

Para (1) (a) to read "The Italian Government and people will do all in their power to aid the interests of the United Nations".

Sub-para (b) agreed.

Paras (2) and (3) agreed.

Para 4 3rd line to read "and defences, equipment, stocks, material, and any other" etc.

Paras 5, 6, 7, 8 agreed

Para 9 to read "where shall be full commercial intercourse and dealings with and for the benefit of any foreign country subject to the authorization of the Supreme Allied Commander".

Para I agreedPara II

Para (1) penultimate line to read "it will continue to exercise its present functions to the minimum extent" etc.

Para 2. This paragraph to read "In order to facilitate the normal development of Italian economic life, the Allied Commission will have the following economic functions".

sub-para (a), (b), (c), (d) all agreed.

Para (3). First sentence to read "It is the intention of the United Nations that" etc. "Article III 6" in second line to read "Article III 7".

Para III. Heading to read "Italian aid to United Nations".

Para (1) (a) to read "The Italian Government and people will do all in their power to aid the interests of the United Nations".

Sub-para (b) agreed.

Paras (2) and (3) agreed.

Para 4 3rd line to read "and defence, equipment, stocks, materials, and any other" etc.

Paras 5, 6, 7, 8 agreed

Para 9 to read "There shall be full commercial intercourse and dealings with and for the benefit of any foreign country subject to the authorization of the Supreme Allied Commander".

Para 10 agreed

Para 11 3rd line "Allied Forces" needs definition. ? to include A.S.C.F., Trieste etc.

Paras 12, 13 and 14 agreed.

Para IV

Para 1 (a) and (b) agreed
Sub-para (c) to read "The Supreme Allied Commander transfers command of the Italian Army as in sub-para (a) above to the Italian Government. The existing Military Mission to the Italian Army will be charged with the supervision of the reorganization of the Italian Army and with assisting in its operational and administrative training".

Sub-para (d) to be substituted by "Subject to the functions of the Military Mission to the Italian Army as defined in sub-para (c) above, the Italian Government will assume full administrative and supply responsibility of the forces mentioned in sub-para (a) above."

Add sub-para (e) "All Italian armed land forces in excess of the figures mentioned in sub-para (a) and of the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander in sub-para (b) will be disbanded in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander".

Paras 2 and 3 agreed

Para 4. Delete first sentence "Such fortifications.....destroyed".

Para V

Paras 1, 2, 3 agreed

Para 4 to read "The Italian Government signal and postal communications will not be subject to Allied control or censorship. Unless military necessity as determined by the Supreme Allied Commander demands it, civilian communications within Italian territory and external communications will not be subject to Allied control or censorship".

Para 5. Last sentence to read "The Italian Government undertakes to submit the institutional question to the Italian people" etc.

Para VI

Para 1 agreed

Para 2. Clause to begin "The rights of the United Nations".

Para 3 agreed

Para 4 last sentence to read "The Italian Government recognises the obligation to make restitution or reparation to the United Nations for the full cost of the Allied occupation of Italy and the Italian campaigns, including all expenses and costs arising from the maintenance of Allied troops in territory which has been returned to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government".

Para 5 agreed

Para 6 (a) After the word "representatives" insert "and organisations".
Note. General McKinley suggests an additional sub-para to read "The term 'Allied Commission' in the present agreement includes any other authority which the United Nations may designate to take over all or part of its functions".

Paras 7 and 8 agreed.

QUESTIONS

THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES

1. (a) The Italian Army will be limited to a force of:-
- 140,000 troops
65,000 Carabinieri
- (b) The Supreme Allied Commander shall continue to have the right to employ Italian troops over and above the figures mentioned in sub-para (a) for such purposes as he may consider necessary.
- (c) The Supreme Allied Commander delegates command of the Italian Army as in sub-para (a) above to the Italian Government, but retains the right of (vote and of re-assumption of) control, should he consider this necessary. To this end, the Italian Government will keep the Supreme Allied Commander fully informed of the military situation and their intentions for dealing with this.
- (d) Subject to the proviso in sub-para (c) above, the Italian Government will assume full administrative and supply responsibility of the forces mentioned in sub-para (a) above. The extent of any material assistance to the Italian Government will be as decided by the respective Allied Governments acting in concert.
- (e) All Italian Armed Land Forces in excess of the figures mentioned in sub-para (a) and the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander in sub-para (b) will be disbanded in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

The country including
Mission to the Indian
will be charged with the
Empire & the
& the 1st & 2nd
in the
the

US ~~Foreign~~

~~24th Nov 1892~~
24th Nov 1892

NAF
FAV 1059 revised

(b) The Supreme Allied Commander shall continue to have the right to employ Italian troops over and above the figures mentioned in sub-para (a) for such purposes as he may consider necessary.

(c) The Supreme Allied Commander delegates command of the Italian Army as in sub-para (a) above to the Italian Government, but retains the right of (veto-end-of-reassumption-of) control, should he consider this necessary. To this end, the Italian Government will keep the Supreme Allied Commander fully informed of the military situation and their intentions for dealing with this.

Subject to the proviso in sub-para (c) above, the Italian Government will assume full administrative and supply responsibility of the forces mentioned in sub-para (a) above. The extent of any material assistance to the Italian Government will be as decided by the respective Allied Governments acting in concert.

(e) All Italian Armed Land Forces in excess of the figures mentioned in sub-para (a) and the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander in sub-para (b) will be disbanded in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

The existing limitations
imposed by the Italian Govt
will be changed with the
supervision of the Supreme
Allied Commander.

NAF

FAW 1059 11/10/44

Postwar arrangements

US Govt

11/10/44

21/11/44

9/12/44

not agreed

TOP SECRET.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Extract Copy No 3

EXTRACTS FROM

INTERIM AGREEMENT TO REGULATE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC TRAFFIC

XXXXXX

II. Allied Aid to Italy.

1. The Allied Commission, established in order to enforce and execute the provisions of the Agreement on 29 September 1943, will in future under the orders and general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander concern itself primarily with the provision of assistance and advice to the Italian Government. It will exercise its ^{functions to present} functions of control ^{only} to the minimum extent necessary to ensure the proper implementation of the present agreement.
2. In order to facilitate the normal development of Italian economic life, the Economic Section of the Allied Commission will have the following ^{Economic} functions:
 - a. to facilitate the transfer of Italian import and export trade to normal commercial channels and practices as rapidly as possible.
 - b. to aid the Italian Government in planning imports into Italy, in processing such imports from the Allied Governments, and in fostering Italian export trade.
 - c. to assist UNRRA, (Italy), or any other non-Italian relief or welfare agency which may require information or assistance, upon its request or that of the Italian Government.
 - d. to assist in the solution by the Italian Government of any economic problem brought to its attention by the Italian Government, and to make such recommendations to the Italian and/or Allied Governments as the case may require.
3. It is the intention of the United States and ^{the} British Governments that, subject to the provisions of Article III ^{of the} of the present Agreement, which refer to the matter of war criminals, Italian prisoners of war under their jurisdiction

2. in order to facilitate the maintenance of life, the economic section of the Allied Commission will have the following functions:-

- b. to aid the Italian Government in planning imports into Italy, in processing such imports from the Allied Governments, and in fostering Italian

c. to assist UNRRA, (Italy), or any other non-Italian relief or welfare agency which may require information or assistance, upon its request or that of export trade.

5. to assist in the solution by the Italian Government of any economic problem brought to its attention by the Italian Government, and to make such

recommendations to the Indian community that:

3. It is the intention of the U.S.A. of the present Agreement, which refer subject to the provisions of Article III¹/₂ of the present Agreement, which refer to the matter of war criminals, Italian prisoners of war under their jurisdiction will be liberated from that status or repatriated as expeditiously as transportation facilities permit.

U.S.S.R.?

III. Italian aid to the Allies.

1. 2.
Italian Government and people

United States of America

Given by the Supreme Allied Commander,

Ad. 100

- 2 -

b. Italian Government shall take all necessary measures to ensure law and order in those parts of Italy under their control, and shall ensure that there is no disturbance to work by, or passage of, Allied forces in the said areas, and also shall ensure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this present agreement.

XXXXX

6. The Italian Government will cooperate with the Governments of the United Nations in facilitating the return to their homes of all displaced and stateless persons in, from or through Italy, and similar cooperation shall be afforded to the Italian Government by the United Nations. The Italian Government will be prepared to take over responsibility for the repatriation, movement and care of displaced and stateless persons in Italy, should the Supreme Allied Commander decide that these functions can no longer be performed by the Allied Forces.

7. The Italian Government will cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes, whatever their nationality.

8. Such Italian merchant shipping and other craft as are required by the Supreme Allied Commander for use in the interests of the United Nations, will be made available, wherever they may be, to the Supreme Allied Commander. They will be handed over in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the Italian Government at such places and for such purposes and periods as the Allied Authorities may prescribe. In accordance with any directions issued by the Supreme Allied Commander, the Italian Government will exercise any outstanding options to purchase or re-acquire, or to resume control of, Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war, and the above provisions will apply to such vessels.

9. ^{for} There shall be no commercial intercourse, or dealings, with or for the benefit of any foreign country, ^{under the authority of the Supreme Allied} ~~except under authorisation of the Supreme Allied~~

afforded to the Italian Government by the United States will be prepared to take over responsibility for the repatriation, movement and care of displaced and stateless persons in Italy, should the Supreme Allied Commander decide that these functions can no longer be performed by the Allied forces.

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9. ^{There shall be no commercial intercourse, or dealings, with or for the benefit of any foreign country, except under authorization of the Supreme Allied Commander.} ¹²²

10. The Italian Government will establish and maintain an effective foreign exchange control agency for the purpose of implementing the international economic objectives of the United Nations Governments and to assure the most effective use of Italy's foreign exchange resources. The Italian Government will work out, in consultation with the appropriate United Nations diplomatic missions in Rome, measures ...

- 3 -

measures to be adopted in support of the international economic objectives of the United Nations.

11. The Italian Government recognizes that it has been and is the issuing authority for the Allied Military Lira now in circulation in Italy or which may hereafter be expended by the Allied Forces in Italy. The Italian Government will continue to make available to the Allied Forces in Italy such Lira currency or credit as they may need, and recognizes the right of the Allied Forces to hold and use Allied Military Lira as may be necessary to supplement such Lira currency or credit.

12. The Italian Government recognizes its obligation to make payment for the supplies imported into Italy by the Allied Forces for the use and benefit of the Italian Government or people, and for all services rendered by, and supplies, materials, facilities and installations furnished or installed by the Allied Forces to or for the benefit of the Italian Government or people.

13. Except as directed or authorized by the United Nations the manufacture, production and construction of, research and experimentation upon, war material and its import, export and transit are prohibited. The Italian Government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

14. The Italian Government will make available to the Allied Authorities such Italian war material or such war material of any country lately at war with the United Nations now or to come into their possession as may be required. Such war material as is not required by the Allied Authorities, nor is permitted to be retained by the Italian Government for the equipping or maintenance of their armed forces, shall be kept in a proper state of preservation pending its ultimate disposal as will be prescribed by the United Nations.

IV. The Italian Armed Forces.

1. a. The Italian Army ~~shall be the command of the Italian Government~~ will be limited to a force of:-

facilities and installations in
government or people.

its import, and its import by the United States from foreign materials.

14. The Italian Government will
such war material of any country lately at war as
Such war material as
is required.

by the United Nations.
~~... will be~~
 ... forced.

5

limited to a force of:-

CA. 000 Combinatori

b. The supplies listed above the figures mentioned in paragraph 1 are Italian troops over and above the figures mentioned in paragraph 1. These supplies are for the maintenance of the Italian troops and supply.

purposes as he may consider proper. The Italian Government will assume full and complete responsibility...

1000

- 4 -

responsibility of the forces mentioned in subpara 2 above.

(1) All Italian Armed Land Forces in excess of the figures mentioned in subpara 2 and the requirements of the Supreme Allied Commander in subpara 2 will be disbanded in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Italian Navy including naval aircraft will continue to be controlled by the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. The Italian Air Force and all civil aviation will continue to remain under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

4. Such fortifications and military installations as the Supreme Allied Commander may direct shall be destroyed. No new fortifications or military installations shall be constructed and no new armaments or other defenses added to existing fortifications without permission of the Supreme Allied Commander.

V. Political Status of Italy.

1. All territory restored to Italian jurisdiction will be administered by the Italian Government free of control by the Allied Forces except as set forth in this agreement or in case of military necessity or when assistance or advice may be requested by the Italian Government. The right however is reserved to the Supreme Allied Commander to establish total or partial Allied military control over any area in Italy if he considers that the military situation renders such a step necessary.

2. Italian diplomatic relations with other states will be solely within the competence of the Government of Italy.

3. The Italian Government will continue to carry out the programme of defascistization.

4. Italian Government signal and postal communications will not be subject to Allied control or censorship. Civilian communications within Italian territory will be subject to Allied control and censorship only in cases of military necessity as determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. All external civilian communications will be subject to Allied control and censorship to such extent as may be required.

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5. The Italian Government recognises as likewise binding upon it, the Allied pledge to the Italian people that they may determine their own form of government. To ensure the fullest possible expression of the wishes of the Italian people on this important question, the Italian Government undertakes to submit it to the Italian people in the form of a plebiscite or a national referendum, notwithstanding

/previous...

previous Italian legislation to the contrary.

VI. Limitations of this Agreement.

1. This agreement is entirely without prejudice to the rights of the Allied Forces to continue to occupy any Italian territory now governed by Allied Military Government or otherwise under Allied control, and to continue in the use and possession of all property and facilities now under requisition or otherwise under Allied control. It is the intention of the United States and British Governments to retain such property and facilities to Italian control as expeditiously as possible consistent with military requirements.

2. The Allied rights under the terms of this agreement will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs.

3. It is not intended in this agreement to dispose of any question or predetermine any controversy which may arise respecting the ultimate disposition of any territory heretofore Italian, nor to adjudge upon any matter relating to any boundary which may hereafter be in dispute. All such questions and any questions relating to sovereignty are for disposition by and between the United Nations and the Italian Government.

4. Nothing in this document is to be construed as constituting a final settlement of or impairing the full rights of the Allied Forces and of the United Nations to reparations from the Italian Government for war damage suffered by them at the hands of the Italian people or Government or settlement by the Italian Government for the full cost of Allied occupation of Italy. The Italian Government recognizes the obligation to make restitution or reparation to the United Nations for the full cost of the Allied occupation of Italy and the Italian campaign.

5. In the event of the Italian Government's failure to observe or comply with any of the terms contained in this agreement, the Supreme Allied Commander reserves the right to take such action, including the reimposition of restrictions and

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5. In the event of the Italian Government's failure to observe or comply with any of the terms contained in this agreement, the Supreme Allied Commander reserves the right to take such action, including the reimposition of restrictions and control and the use of armed force, as he deems necessary.

6. a. The term "Supreme Allied Commander" in the present agreement includes the Allied Commission and each other officers and representatives as the

Supreme Allied Commander may designate.

b. The term "United Nations" in the present agreement includes the (Allied (?)) Supreme Allied Commander, the Control Commission and any other authority which the

/United ...

- 6 -

United Nations may designate.

6. The term "war material" in the present agreement denotes all material specified in such lists or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the Supreme Allied Commander.

7. The present instrument shall enter into force at once. It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangement or until the voting into force of the peace treaty with Italy.

8. The present agreement is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic and in the case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the Supreme Allied Commander shall be final.

RESTRICTED

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
ROME

6/3

14 September 1945

Address by G.O.C., M.M.I.A. to give an
outline of Allied views and intentions
as regards the future organization and
training of the ITALIAN ARMY.

1. Creation of existing Italian Army.

- (a) The existing Italian Army represents an ad hoc build-up to suit immediate Allied war needs and dependent on factors such as supply, time available, the development of the war etc.
- (b) It bore little relation to what ITALY will need as a post-treaty army. Yet we always had one eye on the future and tried to develop an organization which would fit post-war without detracting from the immediate war effort.
- (c) The result is that now we already have an organization which can be and is being changed into a shape which will pro tem produce an army to meet Italian needs during the interim period until the Peace Treaty is signed.
- (d) We have the Ministry of War, the Territorial H.Q.'s organization, the Gruppi, 3 I.S. Divs, the Services, CESAMO, etc - and we are now planning to expand Territorial H.Q. from 2,000 to 7,000 and creating 10 I.S. Bdes.
- (e) The immediate object of the Allies is to create this Italian Army and raise its quality and efficiency.

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2. Peace Treaty Terms.

I do not know what these will be. That is a matter for the Allied Governments and is not yet settled. So do NOT think that I can tell you anything about this to-day. I want to make that quite clear. I don't know.

3. Post-treaty set-up.

(a) The post-treaty Italian Army will depend on the size, composition and armament authorized by the Allies, and on the matter of conscription or a long service army (much on the British model).

/... (b)

-2-

3. (Contd.)

- (b) Nevertheless, we have got to think ahead in anticipation and try to design a proper framework which will suit an army of any size that ITALY is likely to be allowed.
- (c) ITALY, undoubtedly, in any event, will only be able to afford a small army, and I know as soldiers that you will agree with me that it is far better for her to have a small army of high quality than a large army of low quality. So that simplifies our problem.

4. Discussions with A.F.H.Q.

- (a) I have been having discussion with A.F.H.Q. and other Allied authorities on this whole matter and I have called you together today to explain in broad outline what are the present Allied ideas and intentions subject to approval by higher authority. After I have explained this in outline, our respective staffs can examine the problem and its implications in greater detail.
- (b) We have proceeded on the assumptions that :
- (i) owing to war and the circumstances under which it was born, the existing Italian Army requires complete reorganization throughout.
 - (ii) the Allies are prepared and determined to assist in this reconstruction and I have no doubt that ITALY will welcome this.
 - (iii) the future Italian Army must be brought right up to date and purged of all the inefficiencies and out of date procedure which existed under the Fascist Regime.
 - (iv) quality not quantity is to be the keynote.

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(c) The Italian Army proved in the post-armistice war that it had advanced a long way since the chaos of early 1944, but there is still a very long way to go yet.

(d) We appreciate that the full reconstruction will take time, but we must make a start now and go all out NOW to put a proper Italian Army on its feet. I know I can rely on your cooperation in this.

/.....(e)

-3-

4. (contd.)

(e) I am now going to outline to you the Allied views on general organization and training.

5. Conscription versus a long service voluntary army.

(a) With a small army, with key-note quality, there is no doubt in my mind that a long service army is far the best in every way for ITALY and I believe you thoroughly agree with me.

(b) Some aspects of this are :-

(i) Modern training takes months. Unless the army is trained, it is no use. Therefore, with a conscript army, you have to have large training staffs to train the whole call-up authorized each year. During early training men are away from their units. The result is that the size of the effective part of the army is small and unable to fulfil its function.

(ii) With a conscript army of one year's service, you have to turn over and train 100% of the call-up each year; but with a long service army of 5 years minimum, only 20% which eases the training commitment and thus enlarges the "effective" part of the army.

(iii) A long service army would be a complete break with the past, which (though I am not a politician) seems to me to be an excellent thing politically and for army prestige.

(c) There are, of course, many other aspects which you realize as well as I do. The argument against long service is the COST. But I doubt if really the cost is very much greater. The main increase is the extra pay for volunteers. But you will find

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(c) There are, of course, many other aspects which you realize as well as I do. The argument against long service is the COST. But I doubt if really the cost is very much greater. The main increase is the extra pay for volunteers. But you will have to pay a conscript a living wage in future, higher than in the past - and I doubt if you would have to pay the volunteer much more. We are getting many volunteers today, though perhaps these are not drawn from the best types available.

/....(d)

-4-

5. (contd.)

- (d) In any event, I will tell my staff to examine the question with you and get your views. Personally, I think it far better to have a small long service, dependable army of high quality than a larger, less stable, conscript army of the same cost.
- (e) The CCRR give us a guide as to how a voluntary, long service army could be put into effect i.e. system, conditions of service, etc.

6. Call-up

- (a) If conscription continues to be the form of producing men for the army, I want you to examine the American system of call-up. (EXPLAIN)
- (b) It has worked excellently; is completely fair; and takes away an even % of men from each part of the country, thus assisting national economy.
- (c) I feel myself that it is the system ITALY needs and superior to your present methods.
- (d) It would make monthly call-ups possible, thus easing the strain on the training organizations and enabling that to be adjusted to meet a continuous and even flow of recruits.

7. Inflow and training of recruits.

- (a) This DIAGRAM (on blackboard) gives an outline of how we envisage recruits being taken into the Army, trained and delivered to units. (EXPLAIN DIAGRAM ATTACHED).

- (b) We have based the design so that :-

- (i) it can fit either the voluntary or the conscription army.

The matter is merely one of degree of size of the training

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- (ii) an even flow of recruits can be dealt with and all training organizations are full simultaneously, thus reducing training overheads and maintaining the effective strength of the army.

- (iii) the recruit gets a thorough grounding before he goes to his unit. This enables the C.O. of the unit to concentrate on collective training.

/.....(iv)

7. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

- (iv) the higher training establishments (except Military Academy at MODENA and Staff College in ROME) are planned to be concentrated round ROME, with obvious advantages of supervision and control by the Ministry of War; and are also concentrated by arms, which means economy of equipment.
- (v) collection and initial training of recruits is **by** Regions, thus preserving Territorial association and avoiding waste of time and transport in travelling.
- (vi) it is a system which we can start putting into force as soon as we get permission from higher authority.
- (vii) incidentally troops under training at CESANO are a potential valuable I.S. reserve centrally located.
- (c) In many ways it is a complete break with the past, but it will undoubtedly be a more efficient machine for the purpose and the country round CESANO is ideal for training. Sentiment of using former artillery barracks at TURIN, for instance, must give way to efficiency. You remember the sentence in the Bible about "putting new wine into old bottles" ! We have nevertheless tried to make the best compromise possible.
- (d) (i) We have CESANO and BRACCIANO Schools already in being. We looked ahead and have secured further accommodation at CIVITAVECCHIA.
- (ii) Now we must go ahead with planning and organizing the P.T.C's and I.T.C's, as well as adjusting CESANO and the other schools nearby.
- (iii) We must decide quickly on the barracks and locations of the P.T.C's and I.T.C's which should be alongside each other.

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If the most suitable site in any place is occupied by the Allies, I will see if that can be freed for you.

- (iv) We must get the District H.Q's and Depots organized and functioning. The Depot (in our system) would have a

/.....dual

-6-

7. (contd.)

(a) (contd.)

(iv) (contd.)

dual role of an outfitting H.Q. and a Regimental Depot. I feel that District H.Q.'s and Depots should be merged to save overheads, movement and accommodation. I should like this examined in detail.

(v) We must get the CESANO and other nearby schools properly fitted up with suitable accommodation, roads etc. I am glad to see improvement there as regards this BUT WE MUST get the gas plant completely removed. We cannot have a civilian business in CESANO. It must be purely military - the shrine of the Italian Army, which in time will become a "show-piece" !

(vi) The great difficulty I see is on what figures are we to base the accommodation necessary? You need twice as much for a turnover of 200,000 as you do for 100,000. We don't know what the Peace Treaty will say. The turnover of recruits (and thus size of training staff) will be different for conscription to long service. But we have one advantage i.e. that we will start in a small way and increase gradually. So, even if we make a mistake we can alter it. I think we had better work backwards from a total figure of (say) 140,000 for the Interim Army plus 50%, i.e. about 200,000 or so on a conscript basis. That is the only figure I can think of to work on, and we can adjust up or down from that later - though I must repeat that it is a pure guess as I do NOT know what the Peace Treaty figures will be or whether it will be conscription or voluntary service.

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(e) We must also now train instructors for P.T.C's and I.T.C's, and in fact get everything ready as soon as possible to take on the first big call-up. We can "live on our fat" from BR-ITI's and US-ITI's and local volunteers, we estimate, till December. By that time we anticipate having demobilized down to the 1919 class inclusive. It looks as

/....if we

-7-

7. (contd.)

(e) (contd.)

if we will want a call-up in January, so all must be ready before Xmas - say 15 December. There is not too much time. We must hurry, hurry, hurry.

8.

Officers.

(a) We agree to your having the military academy at MODENA. This raises the whole question of provision of officers on which any army basically depends. We have already started with the grading and removal of existing officers down to Major inclusive. That is one aspect - sorting out and keeping the best officers you have, and rehabilitating P.W. officers that you keep, by a course at GESANO.

(b) (i) The other angle is the provision and training of new entry into the Army. I would like you to examine now the question as to whether All "new entry" should not do 6 months in the ranks first before going as cadets to the Military Academy. The British and all the Dominion troops do this and it has been an unqualified success and invaluable to the officer later on, as he then understands how his men live in the Army.

(ii) Frankly, we feel that your whole basis of officer training academic and not human or personal enough. We feel that the relationship between officer and man is not what it should be in a democratic world and to get the best team work. We feel your course for cadets is much too long.

(iii) I would like you to examine the whole business in the light of what we have found so beneficial in the Allied Armies.

(iv) Till MODENA is ready and with the requisite instructors, we shall have to continue temporarily with LECCE - though here again the forthcoming courses should be modernized and adjust-

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(iv) Till MOENA is ready and with the requisite instructors, we shall have to continue temporarily with LECCE - though here again the forthcoming courses should be modernized and adjusted.

(v) As I say, the officer question is vital. No out of date tradition or procedure must stand in the way of producing the right type of modern army officer worthy of ITALY and which

/...she

-8-

8. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(v) (contd.)

she needs so badly. We must start to build now for posterity and the word "Impossible" does not exist in my Dictionary !

9. Staff College.

This is not of such urgency but we want your views on this.

10. Standardization.

(a) Frankly, we feel that one of your troubles is the lack of standardization in your army organization. You have so many different types of units, all on different war establishments. An army cannot be really efficient thus. It complicates everything (training, reinforcements, supply - everything) and SIMPLICITY is a major element in military efficiency.

(b) (i) Till now, we have had I.S. Divs and Bdes on a different W.E. to the Gruppi. That could not be helped. But now we must plan to get on to a standard Infantry organization.

(ii) I have told my staff to examine with you as to whether the hastily-put-together Gruppo organization is correct. We will then adjust it and put I.S. Divs and Bdes on a similar organization. A gruppo Regiment is about the same strength as an I.S. Bde. We will call these converted I.S. Bdes "Independent Regiments". They need not have the same full scale of equipment but should be inter-changeable with Gruppo Regiments.

(iii) These "Independent Regiments", (similarly to all formations, units and establishments in a Territorial Region) will be

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(iii) These "Independent Regiments", (similarly to all formations, units and establishments in a Territorial Region) will be under the command and supervision of the Territorial Regional Commander.

(iv) CESANO, BRACCIANO and CIVITAVECCHIA Schools would be the exception. These should be controlled by one General under orders of the Ministry of War.

(v) M. of W. would lay down the standard syllabus for P.T.O's

/.... I.T.O's

-9-

10. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(v) (contd.)

and I.T.C's, thus ensuring standardization of training. But

the Territorial Commander would supervise and issue all orders.

- (vi) The whole lay-out, as you see, is a SIMPLE one, with decentralization to the Territorial Commanders combined with central control by the M. of W.

- (vii) One last aspect of standardization is the matter of "Alpine Groups". We query whether these need a separate organization and W.E. to the Gruppi. The Gruppi (and all British and American Divisions) fought in the mountains of ITALY perfectly effectively with the aid of "Alpine increments" e.g. mule companies, etc. The same should apply as regards "Alpine Groups" based on the fundamental Gruppo organization. We thus would have a uniform training for all recruits, who could then do their specialized or higher training in their units.

11.

Services.

- (a) Pari passu with plans for all the reorganization I have mentioned

must be plans for the reorganization of the services and the

M. of W. to correspond.

- (b) We think, for instance, that you must have a separate signal corps, a separate R.E.M.E. corps divorced from all other services, a separate Training Directorate which will have a very big task.

- (c) I would like you to examine this also with my staff.

12.

Conclusion.

I want to emphasize that...

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- (c) I would like you to examine this also with my staff.

12. Conclusion.


I want to emphasize that what I have said is subject to confirmation by higher authority. It is intended to be the best forecast I can make for us to plan now and thus take time by the forelock.


L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

LB/ar

FLOW AND TRAINING OF RECRUITS



FLOW AND TRAINING OF RECRUITS6 WeeksTravelling Time
NOT specifiedPeriod needed by
Unit C.O. for
selection of
SpecialistsTravelling Time
NOT specifiedVarious periods
required to train in
different Subjects

SECRET

Land Forces Sub-Com, AG (MIA)

TS/Q/3

13 Sep 45

My dear

1. Your ESD/81/3 of 8 Sep and your subsequent phone call as to whether MIA considers the scale sufficient to train on.

2. My reactions are that:-

- (a) as Gruppi have their full complement now and "wasting down" will take time, the AMHQ order can possibly stand pro tem.
- (b) the reduced scale as per Appendix 'A' of ESD/81/3 of 8 Sep might be sufficient for training if each Gruppo was reasonably concentrated, which it is not.
- (c) the equipment required for training is affected by the dispersion of units, which varies considerably (even perhaps from month to month) and is a District matter at present and will be an Italian matter later.
- (d) The matter of operational efficiency affects the matter even more than training. If the Gruppi are to be the "hard core" for resisting possible external aggression and frontier defence as well as a reserve for I.S., the Allies will have to keep them equipped until the Italians can produce their own munitions industry. If this is allowed. A mixture of British and Italian weapons would destroy efficiency in the Gruppi and complicate everything beyond measure.
- (e) The whole question is bound up with a decision on the highest level on the points raised in my TS/Q/3 of 11 Sep - which, in turn, affect the reorganisation and training programs which Maj-Gen WARD and I envisage as the correct ones for the Italian Army of the future and which we are now starting to plan for in advance.

Yours

1. Your MSD/81/3 of 8 Sep and your subsequent phone call as to whether MIA considers the scale sufficient to train on.

2. My reactions are that:-

- (a) as Gruppi have their full complement now and "wasting down" will take time, the AFHQ order can possibly stand pro tem.
- (b) the reduced scale as per Appendix 'A' of MSD/81/3 of 8 Sep might be sufficient for training if each Gruppo was reasonably concentrated, which it is not.
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Yours

dB-

Brigadier J. D'A. ANTERSON, DSO
G-3 (Org),
Allied Force Headquarters, C.M.F.

P.S. I presume Maj-Gen NEYDEMAN will comment on your order, particularly from the operational angle.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (BRITISH)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS.

ACS/29

SECRET

To :- Commander,
Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.),
Rome.

7 Sep 45

9/3/11

The Supreme Allied Commander has approved the lines on which you are to recommend the reorganisation of the Italian Army to the Italian War Ministry as set out in the notes on the discussion which took place on 27 August 1945 between Commander M.M.I.A., Assistant Chief of Staff (British) and Assistant Chief of Staff G-3. He also approves the proposed address by Commander M.M.I.A. to the War Ministry explaining the lines on which this reorganisation should be carried out.

LOS
G-1
Col M/R W.P.

d.B.
10 Sep

A.D. WARD,
Major-General,
Assistant Chief of Staff (British).

TOP SECRET

L. FORETS g/c

Copy No 7

(12)

EX 40927
SEPT 4/1652BR/6542
SEPT 5/1115B

PRIORITY

FREEDOM SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE HROOF

AMEMB FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF INFO: BRITISH WASHINGTON FOR US JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF ALCOM**TOP SECRET.**

This is MEDCOS 272. Reference your COMSEC 236.

1. My views regarding the forces to be retained in ITALY were set out in HAFS 1019 and 1030. In these signals I recommended that;

A. An Allied corps of 2 divisions should be retained in VENEZIA GIULIA until the peace settlement.

B. One infantry division and 1 Armoured regiment should be retained in ITALY as a mobile reserve.

2. The above estimate was based on the assumptions that;

A. Almost the whole of ITALY would be returned to the Italian Government by about 30 September.

B. The Italian Government would be given sufficient armed forces to enable them to exercise a reasonable degree of control.

C. Owing to transport and other limitations there would in fact be considerable Allied forces available in ITALY during the period of handing over to the Italian Government and for some time thereafter.

3. My recommendation regarding the date for handing over of the whole of ITALY less certain special areas to the Italian Government were contained in HAF 1069.

4. My recommendations regarding the Armed forces required by the Italian Government to enable them to assume effective responsibility for territory returned to them were sent

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE 2

TOP SECRET

EX 40927

in MARB 1051 and 1059 and provided for an "interim" Italian Army of 140000 which will include 10 internal security brigades 5 combat groups and 1 independent regiment.

5. As far as can be foreseen at present and apart from a corps of 2 divisions in VENETIA-GIULIA the following Allied formations will probably be available in ITALY for internal security;

- A. until end October; 1 British division 1 N. Z. division 1 Polish division
 3. ② Polish divisions. total ⑤⁶ divisions. (Amended by Freedom Signal. FX. 47457. 7 5 Oct. 45. Am.) F. 28.
 B. until end December 1 British division ② Polish divisions. total ③⁴ divisions

6. There is no doubt that the morale of the Italian army is still low desertion high and discontent over question of pay and demobilization prevalent. All possible steps are being taken to improve this state of affairs but it will take time and if my recommendations regarding dates for handing over to Italian government are accepted the critical transitional period will take place while maximum number of Allied troops remain in the country.

7. political complications connected with the use of Polish troops for internal security are fully appreciated but I consider if serious disorders take place we should be prepared to use Polish rather than keep further Allied troops in ITALY.

8. serious internal disorder is not likely while forces shown in para 5 remain in ITALY. In any case these forces with those of Italian government should be adequate to deal with any situation likely to arise. From New Year onwards until final effective settlement I consider forces shown in para 1 together with a rehabilitated (interim) Italian Army should be adequate.

9. I would add that Admiral STONE's memorandum 001001 of 23 June was considered

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

CONTINUATION PAGE 3

EX 40927

on an Allied basis at this HQ and covering letter 27 July was signed by General MONARNEY in his capacity acting as Supreme Allied Commander during my absence

DIST

Copy No 1 & 2 INFO-ACTION : EX C COMMISSIONER

"	"	3	INFO : CHIEF COMMISSION
"	"	4	POLAD (A)
"	"	5	POLAD (B)
"	"	6	CA SEC
"	"	7	LAND FORCES
"	"	8	FILE

TOP SECRET

1518

GOE
C/S
A. WP

11A

Gr

Ref: 8251/299/30.

8 September 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am now able to answer your letter of 1 August 1945, number 567, regarding the increase in the interim strength of the Italian Army.

The Supreme Allied Commander, bearing in mind the tasks which the Italian Army is likely to be called upon to perform and taking into account the resources of the Italian Government and their ability to train and maintain an Army, is unable to accept a figure of more than 140,000.

I must, therefore, inform you that at this time, it is not possible to increase the interim strength of the Italian Army above 140,000. This figure includes, of course, an approved total of 65,000 OC.M.

GSO 1 _____
GSO 2 (Ops) _____
GSO 2 (SO) _____
GSO 2 (NA) _____
GSO 2 (L) _____
GSO 3 (SO) _____
GSO 3 (C/M) _____
GSO 3 (I) _____

Yours very truly,

[S] Henry W. Stone

HENRY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA)

MMIA - G
FILE: G/3/1
DATE: 8/18/9.

G/3/1

C O P YS E C R E T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 091.711-1 (Italy)

4 September 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army. *QA*

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.

Ref your 8251/273/EC of 16 August 1945.

1. The question of the size of the Italian army was most carefully investigated and considered by this Headquarters before the despatch of NAF 1051 of 3 August 45 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommending a figure of 140,000 personnel for the Italian army together with a further 65,000 for the Carabinieri.

2. Bearing in mind the tasks which the Italian army were likely to be called upon to perform and taking into account the resources of the Italian Government and their ability to train and maintain an army, the Supreme Allied Commander was unable to accept a figure of more than 140,000.

3. It is not therefore proposed to recommend any further increase at this time.

4. You are authorised to convey such of the above information to the Italian Government as you deem necessary.

HA

/s/ A. L. HAMLEN
/t/ A. L. HAMLEN
Brigadier General, GSC
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

E.C. DISTRIBUTION - 8 Sep 45Land Forces S/C (MMIA)S E C R E T

'G' POINTS FOR G.O.C.

UP TO 20 AUG 45

1. The last fortnight has been one of re-org and preparation for re-org.

RE-ORG OF 140,000

2. Please see File G/3/1 which we have opened exclusively for detailed handover of 140,000. We are awaiting a reply from Ministry of War on the subject of increase of Terr HQ (Folio 8) from 2000 to 7000, but we have formed a plan (agreed AFHQ) for handover of first batch gd bns as nucleus of I.S. Bdes (Folio 8A of file SD/56/2).

Files
G/3/1 and
SD/56/2
herewith

TRG OF 140,000

3. (a) Letter sent to Ministry of War to make more efficient the gd bns (Folio 6A of G/Trg/28).
(b) Letter sent to AFHQ prior to despatch to Ministry of War on proposed trg of Combat Divs (G/Trg/1 of 16 Aug, Folio 27A).
(c) We await reply from Ministry of War to our letter G/Trg/1 of 10 Aug on trg at CESANO. This is an important letter: Ministry of War promised reply on Tuesday 21 Aug. (Folio 26).

File
G/Trg/28
herewith

File
G/Trg/1
herewith

SAN MARCO/GARIBALDI

4. Move has begun, and exchange will be fully effected by 3-9 Sep.
Our letter G/Trg/26 of 14 Aug to F BL & TU and 53 BLJ makes provision for trg of GARIBALDI in Br weapons.

File
SD/43/1
separately

FRIULI/FOLGORE

5. Have sent narrative in to you separately on this. (See File SD/45). AFHQ, on Fifth Army advice, decided against the exchange. A.C. staged a come-back which has been squashed by AFHQ. Therefore no move at present between these two groups.

File
SD/45
separately

GEN. NARES

TRG OF 140,000

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G/Trg/28
herewith

File
G/Trg/1
herewith

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separately

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File
SD/46
separately

GEN. NARES

6. I paid a short visit to N. ITALY in your absence to explain to Dists and LOS the background of handover of 140,000. I think this was extremely beneficial - for instance, 2 Dist did not know that Combat Divs were included in the new Interim Army. Report is sent in separately (File G/33). You may care to discuss para 7.

File
G/33
herewith

...../2

- 2 -

GEN. WARD

7. Gen. WARD phoned me. He is planning to visit you about Mon 27 Aug. On your behalf, I said this would be convenient. The ball is now with him.

B.L.U. W.E.

8. B.L.U.s att Combat Divs are now on reduced W.E. (Folio 38, file SD/39/2).

M.M.I.A. W.E.

9. File sent in separately. (SD/101).

1 DISTRICT

10. 1 Dist territory is divided into 2 Dist and 3 Dist w.e.f. 20 Aug and 31 Aug. Bdy is marked on your map, also posn of Combat Div Hqs. (File G/1, folio 107).

20 Aug 45.

G(SD),
M M I A.



Lt.-Col.
GS.

1523

SECRET

G.O.C. on return
QA

Ref: 8251/273/23.

G.

16 August 1945

Cob S

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

G

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

see 11B.

AMP

1. At SACRED's Conference of 2nd August I gave notice that the Italian Prime Minister had declared his intention to request an increase of 20,000 in the size of the interim Italian Army, bringing the total to 140,000.
2. I have now received his official request which I attach.
3. Although there appears to be some difference in the aims of the Prime Minister and his Minister of War as to the disposal and functions of these extra troops, I recommend that the proposal be given sympathetic consideration particularly as the total number is still considerably less than the strength of the Italian Army as proposed in the British draft treaty proposals.
4. As in any case imports of food, etc., into Italy will have to be increased to meet the needs of the interim army of 140,000, the additional strength will make no appreciable difference in this respect.

/s/ Elmer W. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USMC
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

(K)

AP
22 Aug

FILED
6/3
DATE 8/5

8-830

(COPY)

Translation.

The President of the Council of Ministers.

567

Rome, 1-8-1945

To confirm the verbal request already made to you, I express the opinion that the effectives of the transition army granted to Italy by the Allies ought to be increased of two large units.

As I have already told you verbally, this request is chiefly made because of the requirements of public order especially during the next elections and the electoral campaign which will take place before them.

The units which are at present available do not appear to be sufficient to have them scattered as they should in all the provinces of the Peninsula.

I beg you, my dear Admiral, to support this request; thanking you in advance, I remain,

Yours very truly,

s. Ferruccio Parri.

Admiral Henry W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

P.S. The Minister of War agrees and thinks that an increase of the regular effectives is still to be wished for; he does not consider it advisable to employ the army for the maintenance of public order. I agree with him, but I think that in our conditions, an increase of the available military forces is an important and supplementary element of security, especially if it is possible to free the army from the ancient classes and make it homogeneous.

Of course, instead of two large supplementary units, it would be better to dispose of a number of carabinieri if not equivalent, at least important.

s. Ferruccio Parri.

Extract from
MAJOR BAUMANN'S LIAISON LOG

5-11 AUG 1945

GEN. RONCO
 GEN. LIUZZI
 COL. PIACENTINI

1. Accompanied G-1 to SMRE (6 Aug) for meeting on "Interim" Army:

(a) G-1 stated that the immediate future of the Italian Army had been under consideration at AFHQ, as a result of which certain proposals had now been put fwd to the CCS at Washington.

The proposed ceiling and strength of the main categories were mentioned. At the same time, it was made very clear that the entire project was only in the examination stage, that no decision had been taken, nor were any decisions to be implied by this announcement.

(b) Nevertheless G-1 considered that the time had now come for SMRE to make a study of certain aspects of the proposals and submit their observations. It was agreed that SMRE would reply as soon as possible on the following form headings.

(i) General observations on the whole project;

(ii) Proposed variations (if any) to WE's of Combat Cps, incl the provision, if required, of Armd car Units, and the conversion of one or more Crappi to Alpine personnel with consequent provision of auxiliary units.

(iii) Reorganization and increase of Territorial Org from 2,000 to 7,000 all ranks. This info to be by main headings only, and NOT to incl WE's for the present.

(iv) Proposed source of Territorial Bde HQs and the missing 1st Bns. G-1 had outlined his proposals for converting existing 2d Bns and Coys to Territorial Bdes, with an apparent deficiency at this moment of six coys.

(c) SMRE reaction to above was wholly favourable, with the single exception of the proposed exclusion of Arty from Territorial Bdes and I.S. Divs. Grounds of objections were:-

(i) For quelling civil disturbances, tps armed with small arms and automatic weapons only would have no advantage over the civil population, which is abundantly equipped with weapons of this kind. The Arty is rated by SMRE to have very considerable moral value for maintaining law and order.

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(ii) Proposed variations (if any) to WE's of Combat Gps, incl the provision, if required, of Arm car Units, and the conversion of one or more Gruppi to Alpini personnel with consequent provision of auxiliary units.

(iii) Reorganization and increase of Territorial Org from 2,000 to 7,000 all ranks. This info to be by main headings only, and NOT to incl WE's for the present.

(iv) Proposed source of Territorial Bde HQs and the missing 12 Bns. G-1 had outlined his proposals for converting existing 24 Bns and Coys to Territorial Bdes, with an apparent deficiency at this moment of six coys.

(c) SMRE reaction to above was wholly favourable, with the single exception of the proposed exclusion of Arty from Territorial Bdes and I.S. Divs. Grounds of objections were:-

(i) For dwelling civil disturbances, tps armed with small arms and automatic weapons only would have no advantage over the civil population, which is abundantly equipped with weapons of this kind. The Arty is noted by SMRE to have very considerable moral value for maintaining law and order.

(ii) It could leave the Italian Army with only the Combat Gp Arty as a trg medium for this branch of the service, which is proportionately very small for the size of the Army. They say they would also be faced with the necessity of converting large number of regular Arty Officers and NCOs to other purposes.

SMRE will submit their observations and proposals in writing

Banner closed reply 11 Aug (checked)
Sally closed reply 16 Aug (checked)
MMA letter 52/86/2 of 16 Aug 1947

SECRET

'G' Branch,

M.M.I.A.

File: G/3/1 ←

9 AUG 45

TO: Col 'A'

Col 'Q'

INFO: Chief of Staff

1. The attached notes written by Lt. Col. Egerton are an excellent running commentary on the informal meeting we had with GSOs 1 of BLUs at HQ MIA 6 Aug.

2. Will you please say if there are any inaccuracies you would like to correct.

3. I think we will just retain these notes as a record and not issue to the BLUs in the form of minutes. Do you agree?

fd


Lt. Col.,
G.S.

SECRET

A meeting was held on 6 Aug 45 at which the following were present:-

Col. Fidsley	50 B.L.U.
Col. Noakes	51 B.L.U.
Lt.Col. Ingledew.	52 B.L.U.
Lt.Col. Ngerton.	53 B.L.U.
Lt.Col. Southby	
Major Hatch	
Lt.Col. Douglas	
Lt.Col. Taylor	

.....

Lt. Col. Ingledew explained that in addition to the authorised ceiling of 65,000 CC RR, a strong Police mission was being requested.

Future (Interim) Italian Army was being planned as follows:-

Local Army Reserve for I.S.

Present I.S. Divs SICILY and SARDINIA
10 I.S. Bdes (under Terr. Hqs)

15,000
25,000

Mobile Res

Present Combat Groups (under M of W
op control)

50,000

Command and Adm

(2000 M of W; 7000 Terr Hqs)

9,000

Services

(incl approx 6000 tail units for Mob Res)

31,000

Tre and Rfts (CEBRANO)

10,000

TOTAL

140,000

It had been recommended that this Army pass to the Italian Government on or about 1 Oct 45 when Italian territory passes to Italian Government.

Lt.Col. Southby 50 B.L.U.
 Major Hatch 51 B.L.U.
 Lt.Col. Douglas 52 B.L.U.
 Lt.Col. Taylor 53 B.L.U.

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Mobile Res

Present Combat Groups (under M of W op control)	50,000
--	--------

Command and Adm

	9,000
--	-------

(2000 M of W; 7000 Terr Hqs)

Services

	21,000
--	--------

(incl approx 6000 tail units for Mob Res)

Tre and Rfta (CESANO)

	10,000
--	--------

TOTAL.	140,000
--------	---------

It had been recommended that this Army pass to the Italian Government on or about 1 Oct 45 when Italian territory passes to Italian Government.

Of the personnel required to form the I.S. Bdes there were at present:-

22	ITT-ITT Cd Bns
5	HR-ITT Cd Bns
12	(6 Cd Coy's)
12	to be formed
<u>30</u>	

One Guard Bn would be placed at the disposal of each Territorial Hq as soon as possible.

GSOs 1 of B.L.U.s were then asked to raise any points on the above.

52 B.L.U. said that most of the important points on how his Group would react to new role had been mentioned in Gen. UTILIS letter.

50 B.L.U. said the question of call-ups and discharge was what was worrying the men. There were too many idle young men in the North. Recommended discharge of 3 classes as soon as possible.

53 B.L.U. said that there were in addition to the older groups a fair number of undesirables to be got rid of.

Lt. Col. Ingledew asked whether any changes in the organization of the Combat Group were recommended in view of new role.

52 B.L.U. said certain minor alterations were desirable, e.g. 2nd in command of battalions were necessary. More rifles and fewer automatics were required in the event of quelling disturbances. There was general assent.

Lt. Col. Ingledew asked whether Tanks or Armcd Cars should be included.

50 B.L.U. thought Armcd cars would be useful but not tanks.

53 B.L.U. agreed and suggested the further addition of some scout cars.

52 B.L.U. mentioned the calming effect of armcd cars in MILAN.

50 B.L.U. suggested an Armcd Squ be formed.

Col Pidsley said that he thought that two groups of armcd cars could be included in place of the A.Tk Gp.

53 B.L.U. said central control would be necessary if there were two Groups.

Col Pidsley suggested that there might be 3 groups; one in each Inf Regt and one in the Arty Regt, in place of the A.Tk guns (both 17-pr and 6-pr). 10 or 12 cars in each group.

There was general agreement.

Lt. Col. Ingledew then explained the future function of the B.L.U. It would be more of a liaison mission than a liaison unit, but would not liaise between the combat gp and Terr. Hqs.

50 B.L.U. asked whether the Gruppi were going to continue guard duties on dumps.

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50 B.L.U. asked whether the Groups were going to continue guard duties on dumps.

Lt. Col. Ingledew replied that they would function on I.S. duties, and that training would be their main job. The guarding of V.P.s, dumps etc would primarily be the role of I.S. Bdes.

50 B.L.U. said in that case B.L.U.s must have a definite authority to insist on training being carried out.

Lt. Col. Ingledew said that the future W.M. of the B.L.U. had been reconsidered at A.F.H.Q. and certain small additions made. B.L.U.s had been asked for their views and Districts had also

commented. HAILA supported 2 District's views. The retention of the signals with B.L.U.s, however, had not been agreed to.

50 B.L.U. pointed out that the signal cancelling the meeting had not arrived, simply because it went through Italian channels, hence the reason for their presence today.

Col. Fidsley said that the only signals available to the B.L.U.s would be Italian.

(A voice : God help us !)

51 B.L.U. said that there would be many occasions when signals would have to be sent to British commands by the B.L.U. and some of these signals would be confidential ones.

It was pointed out that the B.L.U. will not be under British operational HQ: it is a detached advisory formation. In case of a real emergency an officer would have to go to District by car.

50 B.L.U. asked what the proposed W.E. was.

Lt. Col. Ingledew replied:-

<u>Officers:</u>	GSO 1	1
	Training Majors	2
	GSO 3	1
	DAQMG	1
	Staff Capt	1
	Capt BME	1
	Capt S & T	1
	Capt Ctd	1
		<u>1</u>

Other ranks: Total of 15, made up as follows:-
 4 clerks, 1 BOWO, 1 BAOC 1 BME clerk, 1 ST clerk,
 1 Sgt, 1 L/Cpl, 1 Batman, 3 Batmen drivers, 1 cook.
 Plus the addition of:-
 2 Sgt interpreters, 1 Sigs Sgt, 2 Tel-operators,
 1 Ration Cpl.

53 B.L.U. asked whether District would have any control over the B.L.U.

Lt. Col. Ingledew: Not envisaged, except domestic control.

Col. Fidsley then explained the demobilisation and Pft programme. He said the manpower situation was in a muddle. Since March attempts had been made to impress on AMHQ the necessity for some definite plan. This has not yet been published. Meanwhile, the 1914 class had nearly all been discharged. The 1915 class

51 B.I.U. said that there would be signals would have to be sent to British commands by the B.I.U. and some of these signals would be confidential ones.

It was pointed out that the B.I.U. will not be under British operational HQ: it is a detached advisory formation. In case of a real emergency an officer would have to go to District by car.

50 B.I.U. asked what the proposed W.I. was.

Lt. Col. Ingledew replied:-

<u>Officers:</u>	GSO 1	1
	Training Majors	2
	GSO 3	1
	DAAG	1
	Staff Capt	1
	Capt RMC	1
	Capt S & T	1
	Capt Ord	1
		<u>8</u>

Other ranks: Total of 15, made up as follows:-
 4 clerks, 1 BOMB, 1 RAC 1 MMS clerk, 1 ST clerk,
 1 Sgt, 1 L/Opl, 1 Batman, 3 Batmen drivers, 1 cook.
 Plus the addition of:-
 2 Sgt interpreters, 1 Sigs Sgt, 2 tel-operators,
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The call-up policy was unsettled. Some provinces have had a call-up, some have not - our policy was to avoid a call-up if possible, instead we were trying to maintain a balance between men demobilised and men who became rfts through dispensing with MR-III units. The more rfts thus obtained, the more men could be discharged. The present source of income was from US-ITIs and co-operators. As to all this, the policy of CESANO has changed - the rft policy is in a state of flux, therefore men are going to Adm Diva from CESANO untrained.

1-5-34

Leave. By now all liberation leave men should have had leave. A new leave roster is under consideration. It will be recommended that 10% of any unit is away for 10 days at a time, which will work out to leave twice a year. Movements are working out a train service and it is proposed to run this from BRINDISI - BARI - NAPLES - ROMA - BOLOGNA. The continued use of railways will help to cut down travel time.

53 B.L.U. pointed out that unit transport was still being used illegally - it is well known that Combat Gp transport is seen all over ITALY.

Col. Pidsley asked whether Combat Gps knew which men were volunteers and consequently entitled to discharge after three months service.

(52 B.L.U.

(51 B.L.U. both thought NO.

Col. Pidsley said that the Italian documentation system had evidently broken down.

51 B.L.U. said that there was certainly some doubt in cases of men who arrived from Rft Depots. The Gruppo's own enlistments were fairly clear.

It was reported that a standard rate of pay was being aimed at, but that the Italian Treasury was in a bad way.

52 B.L.U. mentioned the fact that civilian labourers were paid more than army tradesmen although working together at the same job.

50 B.L.U. said that the Training Majors must be given definite authority to train tradesmen.

52 B.L.U. mentioned the case of two armurers who had never been classified as tradesmen owing to the Gruppo's procrastination.

Lt. Col. Ingledew said that the Training Branch at MIA would probably be resuscitated in the near future.

Col. Nockes mentioned the following 'Q' points:-

Food. Will all go to Italian depots in bulk and from them to Italian D.I.Ds.

Clothing and Equipment. No change. AFHQ will continue to clothe the Combat Gps.

51 B.L.U. said that the Ordnance WG would have to remain as at present, and not be reduced - control of GPs would have to continue. Gruppi run out of spares and neglect to indent.

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Asked whether I.S. Divs would wear green battle dress Col. Noakes replied yes, the Italian Govt will be responsible for them, as with the I.S. Bdes. The Government were just starting to produce Italian uniforms.

Col Pidsley asked whether Combat Gps would eventually wear Italian uniforms.

Col. Noakes estimated that would take at least 18 months.

51 B.L.U. said that unless we controlled the Ordnance side we would suffer. Col Noakes will take up.

- 5 -

Col. Fidsley said a decision must be made as to how far Allied methods are to be insisted on. 'A' is nearly entirely Italian method, 'C' Allied method at present.

Lt. Col. Ingledew in reply to a question said that the B.L.U. will definitely maintain a grip as regards training of the Combat Groups, especially in the early days of the interim army.

Col. Noakes said that after August MAJFI sups would cease for Combat Groups.

Col. Fidsley suggested that the term "Combat Group" might now be changed to "Division". There was general agreement.

53 B.L.U. said that the suggested change-over of locations between FLORES and TRIULI was politically a big mistake.

Lt. Col. Ingledew said that the Ministry of War had very strongly recommended it. MAJFI referred the matter to A.C. who have referred it to A.F.H.Q.

The meeting then terminated.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

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SAC (45) 2nd Meeting
4th August 1945

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COPY NO

45

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S
CONFERENCE HELD IN THE G-3 WAR ROOM AT 1030 HOURS ON
THURSDAY 2ND AUGUST 1945

PRESENT :-

Field Marshal Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander,
Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre

Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice Admiral N. Glasford,
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters

Air Marshal Sir A. Guy Garrod,
Commander-in-Chief, RAF, MEDAE

Major General J.M. Bevans,
Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, Mediterranean Theatre

Major General Lyman L. Lennitzer,
Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander

Major General A.C. Duff,
Acting Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ

The Honourable Alexander C. Kirk,
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. Philip Broad, representing
British Resident Minister

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier General G.S. Smith, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

General Joseph T. McNarney,
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
Admiral Sir John H.D. Cunningham,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Brigadier General G.L. Eberle,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier General A.L. Hamblen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Major General L. Browning,
Director, Military Mission Italian Army

Brigadier General J.A. Mollison,
Commanding General Designate, U.S. Army Air Forces,
Mediterranean Theatre

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:-

B-1025

Brigadier M.S. Lush,
Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission

Brigadier D.P. Yates,
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

Mr. C. Offie,
Deputy U.S. Political Adviser

Colonel J.E. Bastion, Jr.,
Secretary to Supreme Allied Commander

SECRETARIES:-

Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Sweetman
Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(SAC 45 1st Meeting)

THE CONFERENCE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 26th July 1945.

2. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AND FUTURE OF AFHQ

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

MAJOR GENERAL LEHMERTZ reported that the Chief of Staff had taken with him to ENGLAND, for the consideration of the War Office, a proposal for the War Establishment of a British Headquarters parallel to MTOUSA.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

3. REDUCTION OF BRITISH NAVAL PORT PARTIES IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 5)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that a second meeting had been held between representatives of the Naval and Army staffs and the Merchant Shipping authorities for the purpose of further examining the provision of civil signal facilities after the withdrawal of the Naval Port Parties. There were two main difficulties which must be overcome in order to achieve the transfer of responsibilities. Firstly, the existing censorship restrictions must be reduced so as to permit the use of civil facilities in regard to the movement of shipping. Secondly, civil land lines in ITALY and GREECE were below the pre-war standard and he understood that 90% of available civil communication facilities were now requisitioned for military purposes.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to examine:

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THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER directed the Deputy Chief of Staff to examine:

- (a) the possibility of reducing or removing present censorship restrictions on the use of civil land lines.
- (b) the feasibility of releasing for civilian use, certain lines now reserved for military traffic and to report accordingly.

4. AMALGAMATION OF THE ROYAL JUGOSLAV NAVY WITH THE PARTISAN NAVY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 6)

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM reported that slightly more than 50% of the

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

B-1025

non-commissioned personnel of the Royal Yugoslav Navy/had elected to return to JUGOSLAVIA and to become members of the amalgamated Yugoslav Navy. He had no report of the number of officers who had so elected. Generally speaking, the arrangements for the amalgamation were proceeding satisfactorily.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above report.

5. ITALIAN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION - SPEECH BY SIGNOR NENNI

(Previous reference S.C 45 1st Meeting, Minute 8)

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that, in accordance with the directions given at the last conference, he had called on the Italian Prime Minister, and informed him that Signor Nenni's recent speech in MILAN was a violation of his oath as an Italian Minister, and such conduct was not likely to induce confidence in the Italian Government on the part of the United States and British Governments. The Prime Minister had readily agreed and had undertaken to express this view to Signor Nenni. The Chief Commissioner added that he had taken the opportunity at the same time of expressing similar concern regarding an unconfirmed report of a speech along the same lines made by Signor Togliatti, the Minister of Justice.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note, with approval, of the above report.

6. ITALIAN CLAIMS IN REGARD TO VENEZIA GIULIA

(Previous reference S.C 45 1st Meeting, Minute 9)

MAJOR GENERAL LEHNITZER reported that the approved reply to the letter from the Italian Foreign Minister, in which the latter had made certain claims regarding the Italian population of coastal areas of ISTRIA, had recently been despatched by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander stated that the welfare of the Italian population of the Yugoslav occupied area of VENEZIA GIULIA was causing anxiety to the Italian Government. Signor Parri had informed him that it was the Italian intention to request that the International Red Cross be allowed to investigate reports of atrocities committed in the area. It was Admiral Stone's view that the Allied Military authorities should endorse such a request if it were formally made.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) stated that it was his policy that military negotiations with the Yugoslavs in regard to VENEZIA GIULIA should not be reopened and that any queries in regard to the situation in the Yugoslav occupied area should be raised through diplomatic channels.
- (b) directed that the Italian request for facilities to be

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- (b) directed that the Italian request for facilities to be allowed to the International Red Cross should, if forwarded formally, be endorsed on his behalf.

7. REORGANISATION OF RAF COMMAND IN ITALY

(Previous reference SAC 45 1st Meeting, Minute 11)

AIR MARSHAL GARROD reported that he had agreed with Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, that the Headquarters formerly known as the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force should be called Mediterranean Coastal Air Force for the present. The name of the Air Headquarters remaining in ITALY would be

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

B-1025

reexamined when the time came for Headquarters R.A.F. MEDIE to move to CAIRO.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

Approved the above arrangements.

8. INTERIM POLICY FOR FUTURE OF ITALIAN ARMED FORCES
(J.S. Study No. P/306 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper examining the requirements for Italian armed forces in the interim period until the peace conference, and recommending that the Italian Army should be organized as a force of 140,000 men plus 65,000 Carabinieri, that the present arrangements in respect of the Italian Navy should not be changed and that a separate investigation should be carried out in regard to the Italian Air Force. The paper further attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting approval of this policy.

MR. KIRK expressed the view that everything possible should be done to develop the Italian Army, as the future preservation of law and order would depend largely on the development of that force. In relation to this, the development of the Carabinieri was less important, as the Italian people had greater respect for the Army than the Carabinieri.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, referring to the current policy that the province of Bolzano should remain under Allied Military Government indefinitely, stated that after careful consideration, he had now recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be requested to approve the return of this province to the Italian Government on September 30th. He requested therefore that the draft signal now under discussion should be worded so as to avoid prejudicing this decision. He also thought that the statement in the draft signal, to the effect that the Carabinieri were corrupt and inefficient, was too strong. With regard to the size of the interim Italian Army, Signor PIRRI had informed him that it was the intention of the Italian Government to request an increase of 20,000, making a total of 160,000. He had suggested to the Italian Prime Minister that he discuss this matter with the Ministry of War, after which, if it were still believed desirable the Government could make a definite recommendation to the Allied authorities.

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that he agreed with the military recommendations of the proposed signal but he considered that the last paragraph of the signal should be revised so as to recapitulate the points on which the Supreme Allied Commander was requesting decisions.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM expressed himself as being in agreement with the paragraph of the draft signal referring to the size and employment of the Italian Navy. He believed, however, that the signal should include a recommendation regarding the need for a strong Allied Military Mission to the Italian Army.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER expressed concern regarding the maintenance of supply for the civil population of Italy. The future arrangements for the provision of such supplies had not yet been agreed and any cessation would add most gravely to the difficulty of maintaining law and order. He agreed with Admiral STONE's remark concerning the Carabinieri. He also agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in regard to the importance of the task of Italy. The main difficulty with the Ital-

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pect of the Italian Navy should not be changed and that a separate investigation should be carried out in regard to the Italian Air Force. The paper further attached a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff requesting approval of this policy.

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MR. MARSHALL GALLAND considered that the paragraphs of the signal pertaining to the size and composition of the Italian Air Force should be revised to state that the existing ceiling of 34,000 should be maintained.

TOP SECRET

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In reply to a query by the Supreme Allied Commander he stated that the Italian Air Force was at present providing useful internal air communications and also providing manpower for service duties.

MAJOR GENERAL DUFF reported that a separate meeting was being held that afternoon to determine administrative responsibilities in regard to the Italian Army and that separate recommendations would be submitted on this matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER :

(a) Instructed the Deputy Chief of Staff to revise the draft signal to the Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated under JPS Study No. P/306 (Final) in accordance with the above discussion, and to submit the revised draft to him for his approval*.

(b) Directed that Commanding General, AF/ATO and AOC-in-C RAF Medway should :

- (1) Cause a further investigation to be made regarding the strength, within the agreed ceiling, at which it was desirable to retain the Italian Air Force until the Peace Treaty
- (2) in conjunction with the Chief Administrative Officer, examine what responsibilities in regard to the administration of the Italian Air Force can legitimately be transferred to the Italian Government

and report accordingly.

9. ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

(JPS Study P/309 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which attached draft Naval, Military and Air clauses of the Peace Treaty with ITALY (on which Field Marshal Alexander had been requested to comment in his capacity as British Commander-in-Chief) together with a study by the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff putting forward recommendations in regard to these comments.

MAJOR GENERAL LERNITZER pointed out that while the Supreme Allied Commander had been asked to comment on the whole report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, only the draft clauses of the actual Peace Treaty which had been forwarded for detailed comment were the Naval, Military and Air clauses. These could only be read in the light of the political background set out in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, but the draft political clauses of the Peace Treaty had not been forwarded for comment.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the political and military clauses were inter-linked. Comment on the latter could only be made on the assumption that the political clauses would include the removal of all Italian

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ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM considered that the political and military clauses were inter-linked. Comment on the latter could only be made on the assumption that the political clauses would include the removal of all Italian overseas possessions as indicated in the political background given in the report of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff. Any retention of such overseas territories would have a major effect on the Italian requirements for Naval, Military and Air Forces. He did not agree with the contention of the Joint Planning Staff that there was difficulty in reconciling the objective of establishing ITALY as a useful and prosperous European state not under Soviet influence with the objective of compelling ITALY to give up all pretence to be a great power and proving to her that aggression did not pay.

AIR MARSHAL GARROD suggested that the Supreme Allied Commander's

* - Dispatched as MAF 1051 (MC OUT 604) of 3 August 1944

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

B-1025

It is clear that his detailed comments were entirely based on the assumption at para 4 of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff paper.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, while agreeing that detailed comments must be based on this political background, said that he would like to make certain political comments in general terms. He considered that the size of the Italian Armed Forces should be governed by three major considerations. The first was that, for ITALY's own sake, they must be limited to a size which the country could maintain in an efficient state. They must, therefore, in any event be small. Secondly, they must be large enough to maintain internal security and to defend the country against her neighbors, particularly JUGOSLAVIA. Thirdly, they must not be strong enough to offer ITALY any prospect of attacking those neighbors or threatening the interests of the principal allied powers.

GENERAL MONTAGNEY considered that the wording of the clauses which gave rights equal to the principal allied powers (U. K., U.S., U.S.S.R., FRANCE) was most unfortunate as at present drafted. The Russians had already showed a habit of interpreting treaties to suit their own ends, and the present draft could be read to allow them to station troops in ITALY and to demand all types of military facilities there, subject in certain respects to a nominal declaration of war against J.P.M. This was a most dangerous situation wholly at variance with the political object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that he completely disagreed with the recommendation of the Joint Planning Staff that the limitations of military installations in SARDINIA and SICILY should be reviewed in 1950. The implication of such a clause would be that they would be removed after that date. Installations in these islands would always threaten British imperial communications at a vital point, and he felt strongly that the LONDON draft, whereby these limitations would be permanent, should not be altered. In regard to the Italian Navy, he pointed out that it was the only one of the three Italian armed services which had maintained a good esprit-de-corps. It was therefore important that, while the Navy must be reduced, this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian prestige unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships to RUSSIA would, for example, have a most unfortunate effect. He believed, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed that thinking people in ITALY realised that the financial strain involved would in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. Finally, he thought that the timing of the signature of the proposed treaty required careful consideration. It would appear much less harsh to the Italians if the terms became known after the considerably more severe terms, which were expected to be imposed on GERMANY, had been published.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that if it was necessary to have places such as SICILY and SARDINIA demilitarised, then permanent demilitarisation must be effected. However, he agreed with the Joint Planning Staff that there was a danger that if the terms imposed were too harsh, ITALY would become a "Balkanist" rather than a Western European country. He considered that in the long run this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the danger of ITALY being slightly too strong and be able to threaten communications through the Mediterranean.

MR. KIRK thought that the draft clauses were unfortunate in that they tried to put into a permanent Peace Treaty with ITALY, arrangements which were only required for the interim period while allied forces were

GENERAL MCNERNEY considered that the wording of the clauses which gave rights equal to the principal Allied powers (U. K., U.S., U.S.S.R., FRANCE) was most unfortunate as at present drafted. The Russians had already showed a habit of interpreting treaties to suit their own ends, and the present draft could be read to allow them to station troops in ITALY and to demand all types of military facilities there, subject in certain respects to a nominal declaration of war against JAPAN. This was a most dangerous situation wholly at variance with the political object of preventing ITALY falling under Soviet influence.

ADIRAL CUMMINGS said that he completely disagreed with the recommendation of the Joint Planning Staff that the limitations of military installations in SARDINIA and SICILY should be reviewed in 1950. The implication of such a clause would be that they would be removed after that date. Installations in these islands would always threaten British imperial communications at a vital point, and he felt strongly that the LONDON draft, whereby these limitations would be permanent, should not be altered. In regard to the Italian Navy, he pointed out that it was the only one of the three Italian armed services which had maintained a good spirit-de-corps. It was therefore important that, while the Navy must be reduced, this should not be done in such a way as to injure Italian prestige unnecessarily. Any transfer of battleships to RUSSIA would, for example, have a most unfortunate effect. He believed, and the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, agreed that thinking people in ITALY realised that the financial strain involved would in any case prevent them from keeping battleships in commission. Finally, he thought that the timing of the signature of the proposed treaty required careful consideration. It would appear much less harsh to the Italians if the terms became known after the considerably more severe terms, which were expected to be imposed on GERMANY, had been published.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER agreed with the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean that if it was necessary to have places such as SICILY and SARDINIA demilitarised, then permanent demilitarisation must be effected. However, he agreed with the Joint Planning Staff that there was a danger that if the terms imposed were too harsh, ITALY would become a "Balkanist" rather than a Western European country. He considered that in the long run this would be a greater disaster to British interests than the danger of ITALY being slightly too strong and be able to threaten communications through the Mediterranean.

MR. KIRK thought that the draft clauses were unfortunate in that they tried to put into a permanent Peace Treaty with ITALY, arrangements which were only required for the interim period while Allied forces were stationed in the country and up to the conclusion of the Japanese war. He doubted whether any final Peace Treaty with ITALY was in fact, urgently required. What was necessary was a gradual relaxation of Allied control and for that purpose an interim "modus vivendi" was urgently needed.

MR. BROAD, in reply to a question by the Supreme Allied Commander as to from what source was pressure being applied to conclude a Peace Treaty with ITALY in the near future, said that he understood that it was the desire of the UNITED STATES State Department that such a treaty should be concluded at an early date. He believed the British Foreign Office

TOP SECRET

B-1025

were also coming round to this view. He remarked however, that decisions taken at POTSDAM would probably affect the matter.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Deferred action in regard to commenting on the British Chiefs of Staff's proposal for the Peace Treaty with ITALY until he had considered the matter further.

10. FUTURAL POLICY TOWARDS ITALY
(Previous reference Paper No. SAC (45) 7)

THE CONFERENCE took note of a letter, which had been dispatched over the signature of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, to the Combined and British Chiefs of Staff, forwarding to them copies of a memorandum by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission in regard to future policy towards ITALY.

DISTRIBUTION

NORMAL Plus

Director M.I. - 1 copy
Spares - 1 extra copy

EXTRACT:

Chief Signals Officer - Minute 3 - 1 Copy.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, G.S.
SECRETARY.

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

MSG Center No

SECRET

Classification

Precedence

From

To

IMMEDIATE

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED

5 ARMY DISTONE DISTWO DISTTHREE 13 CORPS
INFO ALCOM MMIA MTOUSA PW COMMAND.

Date Time Rec'd

Date Time Sent

Reference NR

Cite

051404B

FX32362

FUGCT

ONE. IT HAS BEEN DECIDED THAT WHEN ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF ITALY LESS VENEZIA GIULIA AND OTHER SPECIAL AREAS CERTAIN FORCES WILL HAVE TO BE HANDED OVER TO THEM AT SAME TIME TO ENABLE THEM TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN AREAS FOR WHICH THEY WILL BE RESPONSIBLE. THIS HANDOVER WILL TAKE PLACE BY 30 SEPTEMBER. AT PRESENT AUTHORITY OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT RESTS ON PRESENCE OF ALLIED TROOPS. IT IS OBVIOUSLY IN ALLIED INTERESTS THAT ITALIAN ARMED FORCES HANDED BACK TO CONTROL OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE AS EFFICIENT AS POSSIBLE SO THAT ALLIED INTERVENTION IS NO LONGER NEEDED.

TWO. PART OF PROPOSED FORCE OF 140000 TO BE HANDED BACK CONSISTS OF TEN INTERNAL SECURITY BRIGADES (ONE FOR EACH REGION OF MAINLAND). OWING TO IMPRACTICABILITY OF FORMING NEW ITALIAN UNITS AND DESIRABILITY FOR MAINTAINING SUCH ESPRIT DE CORPS AS EXISTS THE BULK OF THESE BRIGADES MUST BE PROVIDED BY THE 27 ITALIAN GUARD BATTALIONS NOW EMPLOYED BY THE ALLIES.

THREE. IT IS PROPOSED THEREFORE TO RELEASE INITIALLY ITALIAN GUARD BATTALIONS AS UNDER BY 15 AUGUST. IN VIEW OF THEIR FUTURE ROLE THE BEST AVAILABLE MUST BE SELECTED: 5 ARMY ONE, DISTONE TWO DISTWO ONE DISTTHREE ONE 13 CORPS TWO.

FOUR. IT IS ALSO PROPOSED TO RELEASE THE REMAINING GUARD BNS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER AND AT LATEST BY 30 SEPTEMBER. PLANS FOR PROGRESSIVE

MMIA

SIGNALS

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5.A

QVR 7 SD

N134/5

QVR 6-7

Deal with on 12/56/2

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
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(5) 8

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To : _____Date/Time Rec'd : _____
Date/Time Sent : _____
Reference NR : _____
Cite : _____

RELEASE MUST THEREFORE BE PREPARED NOW.

FIVE. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THIS HEADQUARTERS WILL VISIT ADDRESSEES NOT BEFORE 7 AUGUST TO DISCUSS THE EFFECT OF THE ABOVE PROPOSALS AND IN PARTICULAR (A) THE PRESENT EMPLOYMENT OF GUARD BATTALIONS (B) HOW COMMITMENTS CAN BE CUT DOWN (C) THE SUGGESTED PROGRAM FOR PROGRESSIVE RELEASE. (D) WHAT TROOPS IF ANY WILL BE REQUIRED TO REPLACE ITALIAN GUARD BATTALIONS WHEN RELEASED

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Departments or Headquarters or re-transmitted even in Cipher without being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.T.P. need not be paraphrased).

SECRET

1553

785020

ALCOB

Originator's No.

EX 30355

SECRET

100 c/r FHGCT

Ref. HQ signal NAF 1051 of 3 August 45

One you will proceed as a matter of urgency

with the organization of the ITALIAN army in

terms of para 8 of the above signal. In particular

it is will include the formation of TEN individual

security brigades to assist in this HQ as to

investigation is being made by HQ of ITALIAN gov

availability and date of release of ITALIAN gov

long had employed by Allied Forces

Two existing arrangements regarding the

maintenance of the ITALIAN army will

at present remain unchanged

Originator's Instructions.

Degree of Priority.

IMMEDIATE

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except

WIRELESS.

Signed.

061000

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Time Cleared		

1554

PAGE TWO

RAAC MESSAGE FORM MC1079

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FROM (A) DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
030001B

TO (FOR ACTION)

TO (FOR INFORMATION)

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(REF. No) FX 31519 CITE FHDSC

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

TOP SECRET

B. THE AUTHORITY OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AT PRESENT LARGELY RESTS ON THE PRESENCE OF ALLIED TROOPS WHICH ARE BEING STEADILY REDUCED. IF WE ARE TO AVOID HAVING TO INTERFERE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER IN ITALY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT MUST BE GIVEN ADEQUATE FORCES WHOSE EFFICIENCY MUST BE INCREASED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

3. ITALIAN NAVY.

THE PROPOSAL TO TURN OVER FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON THE SIZE AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN NAVY. FURTHER, THE ITALIAN NAVY IS EMPLOYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CCS PAPER 515/1 OF 19 MARCH 1944. THIS ARRANGEMENT SHOULD CONTINUE. MEASURES ARE ALREADY IN FORCE WHEREBY THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF MARINE HAS A LARGE SAY IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF SMALL ITALIAN WARSHIPS AFTER OBTAINING THE APPROVAL OF THE APPROPRIATE ALLIED NAVAL AUTHORITIES.

4. ITALIAN AIR FORCE.

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PAGE 3

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MC NR 1079

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(SECURITY
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THERE WILL FOR SOME TIME BE A NEED FOR THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE TO ASSIST THE ALLIED FORCES. IT IS AT PRESENT PROVIDING USEFUL INTERNAL AIR COMMUNICATIONS AND IT ALSO PROVIDES MANPOWER FOR SERVICE DUTIES. THE TURN OVER OF FURTHER TERRITORY TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT A MAJOR CONSIDERATION IN REGARD TO THE SIZE AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE AND IT IS THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THE PRESENT AGREED CEILING OF 34000 BE RETAINED. THE STRENGTH WITHIN THIS CEILING IS, HOWEVER, BEING KEPT UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW.

5. ALLIED REQUIREMENTS FOR ITALIAN ARMY UNITS.

IN ORDER TO SAVE ALLIED MANPOWER THERE WILL FOR SOME TIME CONTINUE TO BE AN ALLIED REQUIREMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT IN ITALY OF CERTAIN ITALIAN ARMY UNITS. THESE REQUIREMENTS AMOUNT TO:-

A. 106000 BRITIS IN SERVICE UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF BRITISH ARMY. THIS WILL BE REDUCED TO 59000 BY END OF SEPTEMBER WITH FURTHER REDUCTION THEREAFTER.

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B. 83000 USITIS IN SERVICE UNITS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES ARMY. THIS WILL BE REDUCED TO 30000 BY END OF AUGUST WITH FURTHER REDUCTION THEREAFTER.

C. 18000 ITI-ITIS IN GUARD UNITS ON ALLIED INSTALLATIONS AND IN OTHER MISCELLANEOUS UNITS. THESE WILL GRADUALLY BE REDUCED AS DUMPS AND INSTALLATIONS ARE EATEN UP OR CLOSED DOWN.

6. REQUIREMENTS OF ITALIAN GOVERNMENT FOR LAND FORCES.

THE ARMED FORCES WHICH IT IS CONSIDERED WILL BE REQUIRED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF METROPOLITAN ITALY, LESS THE SPECIAL AREAS REMAINING UNDER AMG, ARE STATED AT PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 BELOW. THESE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER CAN BE SUMMARISED AS:-

A. AN EFFICIENT AND ADEQUATE POLICE FORCE DEPLOYED OVER THE WHOLE COUNTRY.

B. LOCAL ARMY RESERVES IN EACH TERRITORIAL REGION IN ORDER TO BACK UP THE POLICE FORCE IN QUELLING LOCAL DISTURBANCES.

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C. A GENERAL ARMY RESERVE STRATEGICALLY LOCATED IN ORDER TO UNDERTAKE SUPPRESSION OF MAJOR UPRISINGS.

D. COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY.

7. THE PRESENT ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CARABINIERI IS 65000. THIS FORCE IS INEFFICIENT BY ALLIED STANDARDS. IT IS NOT HOWEVER CONSIDERED THAT ANY OVERALL ALTERATION TO ITS ESTABLISHMENT IS NECESSARY. THE REMEDY LIES IN INCREASING ITS EFFICIENCY RATHER THAN ITS NUMBERS. FOR THE PURPOSE AN ALLIED POLICE MISSION SHOULD BE PROVIDED URGENTLY TO REORGANIZE AND TRAIN THE CARABINIERI.

8. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED AN ARMY OF 140000 MADE UP AS FOLLOWS:-

TYPE OF TROOPS	STRENGTH	REMARKS
LOCAL RESERVES	40000	ORGANIZED INTO 10 INTERNAL SECURITY BRIGADES EACH OF 2500 MEN FOR 10 TERRITORIAL REGIONS ON MAINLAND AND 2 IS DIVS IN SICILY AND 1 IN SARDINIA EACH OF 5000 MEN.

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PAGE 6

RAAC MESSAGE FORM 1079

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TYPE OF TROOPS	STRENGTH	REMARKS
MOBILE RESERVES	50000	5 COMBAT GRPS AND GARIBALDI REGT
COMMAND	9000	MIN OF WAR AND TERRITORIAL REGION
ADMINISTRATION	31000	HQS.
TRAINING AND REINFORCEMENTS	10000	NONE

TOTAL 140000

9. THE ITALIAN ARMY HAS NEVER BEEN AN EFFECTIVE FORCE BUT AS IN THE CASE OF THE CARABINIERI WE SHOULD RELY ON INCREASING THE EFFICIENCY OF A SMALL FORCE WHICH CAN BE MAINTAINED BY THE ITALIANS THEMSELVES RATHER THAN ALLOW THEM A LARGER INTERIM ARMY. THE EXISTING ALLIED MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY MUST THEREFORE BE STRENGTHENED IN QUALITY AND CHARGED WITH SUPERVISING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY AND ASSISTING IN ITS OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRAINING.

10. OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE FORCE IN PARA 8 SHOULD BE ASSUMED BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AT THE

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RAAC MESSAGE FORM 1079

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TIME THE REMAINING NORTHERN PROVINCES LESS SPECIAL AREA ARE HANDED OVER, I.E. BY 30 SEPTEMBER.

11. ADMINISTRATION.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FORCES TO BE HANDED OVER TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE COMMUNICATION.

12. I URGENTLY REQUEST THAT YOU APPROVE:-

A. THE POLICY IN PARA 2 B.

B. MY PROPOSALS REGARDING THE ITALIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE IN PARAS 3 AND 4.

C. MY PROPOSAL TO HAND OVER CONTROL OF AN ARMY OF 140000 MEN ORGANIZED AS IN PARA 8 TO THE ITALIAN GOVT ABOUT 30 SEPT.

D. THE PROVISION OF AN ALLIED POLICE MISSION AS INDICATED IN PARA 7 AND DETAILS IN REGARD TO WHICH WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE SIGNAL

13. IN VIEW OF THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER AND OF

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THE FACT THAT MY PROPOSALS REGARDING THE INTERIM ITALIAN ARMY ARE WELL WITHIN THE CEILING AT PRESENT AUTHORIZED, I AM PROCEEDING TO REORGANIZE THIS ARMY FORTHWITH ON THE LINES OF PARA 8. THE HANDOVER OF THIS FORCE TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILL OF COURSE AWAIT YOUR APPROVAL.

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MC 1079

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DATE-TIME IN ORDER

FROM (A) SIGNED ALEXANDER

030001B

TO (FOR ACTION) AGWAR FOR CCS AND AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO (FOR INFORMATION) ALCOM AND MIA

(REF. No.) FX 31519 CITE FNDSC

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) TOPSEC

TOP SECRET

THIS IS NAF 1051

1. I HAVE HAD UNDER CONSIDERATION THE INTERIM POLICY WHICH, PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT BY THE PEACE TREATY, SHOULD BE ADOPTED TOWARDS THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE LIGHT OF OUR INTENTION TO HAND OVER TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BY 30 SEPTEMBER RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF ALL ITALY LESS VENEZIA GIULIA AND ANY OTHER SPECIAL AREAS WHICH MAY BE RETAINED UNDER AMG.

2. INTERNAL SITUATION IN ITALY.

A. WITH A POOR HARVEST AND A GENERAL SHORTAGE OF RAW MATERIALS, ESPECIALLY COAL, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ITALY IS DETERIORATING AND THE POSITION IS NOT LIKELY TO IMPROVE. THIS WILL CAUSE LABOUR DISTURBANCE AND INTERNAL UNREST WHICH IS ALREADY BEGINNING. SUCH UNREST WOULD BE AGGRAVATED BY FAILURE TO INTRODUCE ADEQUATE CIVIL SUPPLIES INTO ITALY, AND IN THIS CONNECTION THE EXISTING UNCERTAINTY REGARDING FUTURE PROCUREMENT OF SUCH SUPPLIES IS CAUSING ME GRAVE CONCERN.

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