Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

ACC

10000|120| 5295

6/6

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

100001120| 5295 G/6 POLICY

3260
3477

July 1944 - Feb. 1945

COVER 3

according to directives of the Command of Allied Forces.

2) Gather information on the situation and the war in occupied Italy and publicize throughout the country the patriot war as an integral part ~~of the war as an integral part~~ of the war effort of the Nation.

Art 6

The Allied and Foreign Affairs Office shall:

1) carry on relations with the Allied Commission and with the Command of the Allied Forces on all matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of occupied Italy;

2) In conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War and through the medium of the Allied Forces maintain relations with those patriots who, owing to the exigencies of the struggle, are outside the national territory.

Art 7

The present decree shall come into force the day after its publication.

347

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

The Allied and Foreign Affairs Office shall:

1) carry on relations with the Allied Commission and with the Command of the Allied Forces on all matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of occupied Italy;

2) In conjunction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War and through the medium of the Allied Forces maintain relations with those patriots who, owing to the exigencies of the struggle, are outside the national territory.

Art 7

The present decree shall come into force the day after its publication.

347

X I would not like, Right
for now to Read, I make
Talk to Read
I Prepared the Talk above X
Thanks, I can handle this
Let me know if you
Right at this time for
I first letter was Formal
Just Cut it off.

L R

27 Feb

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Land Ltrs Sic 56

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

27 February 1945.

Ref: 4001/155/SC.

SUBJECT: New Deal for ITALY.

TO: Distribution below.

Pending issuance of a detailed directive to members of the Commission the attached copy of an Aide-Memoire communicated to the Italian Government by the Acting President and the Chief Commissioner on 24 February 1945 is sent to you for information and guidance.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Encl.

DISTRIBUTION:

S.C.A.O. Fifth Army
S.C.A.O. Eighth Army
All Regions
Sections
Sub-Commissions
Independent Sub-Commissions
(less Service Sub-Commissions).

3476

M.M.I.A. FILE REF 616 Date Recd 27/2

24th February, 1945

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BY THE ACTING PRESIDENT OF THE CONTENTS OF THE NEW DIRECTIVE ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION.

1. In accordance with the declaration of the President of the United States of AMERICA and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of GREAT BRITAIN, the Allied Governments propose to relax the control of the Italian Government under the Armistice in the matter of day to day administration and only to exercise such control when Allied military interests require.

2. The Political Section of the Allied Commission is being abolished as of 1 March 1945. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will deal with the Chief Commissioner on matters of major policy, and on matters of minor policy and routine business it will address itself to whatever Section (Economic or Civil Affairs) of the Commission may be appropriate to the subject involved. Matters involving the travel of diplomatic and other public officials will hereafter be dealt with on behalf of the Commission by the Office of the Executive Commissioner.

3475

3. The Italian Government will continue, as at present, to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal. The Allied

Commission

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Commission should be kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other Governments. Facilities for the use of secret bags will be granted to the Italian Government for use in correspondence with their diplomatic representatives abroad. Undeposited cypher facilities cannot be allowed for the present.

Insofar as these negotiations have to do with economic and financial matters, the Economic Section and its Finance Sub-Commission should be kept informed of their progress.

It would be convenient if the Italian Government would furnish a periodic summary of all negotiations completed or pending with other Governments.

4. The Allied Commission will limit its dealings with respect to territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government to consultation with and advice to the Ministers of the Italian Government.

5. The advisory functions of the Sub-Commissions of Education, Monuments and Fine Arts, Local Government, Legal and Labour in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government will be performed only when requested by the Italian Government.

3473

6.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

6. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission for decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

Nevertheless the Allied Commission should be informed of proposed decrees some time before their enactment, in order to enable the Chief Commissioner to consult with the Italian Government as to their application to territory under the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government (AMG), and to lay plans for their effective implementation in such territory when appropriate.

7. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain approval of the Allied Commission for Italian appointments, whether to national or local offices, in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except with regard to the attached list (Appendix "A") of positions having military significance. The Italian Government will have the right to alter appointments made previously by AMG authorities.

347

8. The Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government will be withdrawn. As a first step it is intended to abolish by April 1, 1945, the Regional Offices

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Offices of the Allied Commission for Sicilia, Sardegna, Southern and Lazio-Umbria Regions. Representatives of the Allied Commission will, however, be sent into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government when necessary and certain specialist officers with economic functions will remain in such territory for a limited period.

9. It is the desire of the Allies to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. Arrangements will be facilitated for the flow between Italy and the United Nations of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature, and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between Italy and the United Nations.

10. The Allies welcome the decision to hold local elections in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government as soon as may be.

11. The Allied Nations desire to make concessions with regard to Italian prisoners of war now or hereafter held in Italy, other than those captured since the Armistice was signed. Provided that arrangements can be made for the services of such persons to continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to the Supreme Allied Commander, their status as prisoners of war will be terminated.

3469

12.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

12. It is essential that the Italian Government formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible both in order to ensure that maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance.

13. In the joint programme of essential Italian imports, now being prepared by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction and the Economic Section of this Commission, there will be some supplies for which the combined United States-United Kingdom military authorities will assume responsibility for procurement (Category "A") and other supplies for which they will not assume responsibility (Category "B"). A definition of the supplies which fall into Category "A" follows:

(a) Those quantities of agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to military operations, such as, food, fuel, clothing, medical and sanitary supplies.

3468

(b) Those supplies, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph, such as,

fertiliser,

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

fertiliser, raw materials, machinery and equipment.

(c) Those materials essential for the rehabilitation of such of the Italian communication facilities, power systems and transportation facilities as will directly further the Allied military effort.

14. The programme for which the military authorities assume responsibility will be maintained for the duration of combined (United States-United Kingdom) operations in Italy. For this period, and within the limits defined in paragraph 13, Italy will be treated as a whole. The date of the termination of military responsibility will be fixed by the Allied Nations.

15. In addition to the programme of supplies for which the military assume responsibility for procurement (Category "A") the Allied Commission will assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. Such programmes, referred to as Category "B" will be handled under procedures already notified. The purchasing of supplies in Category "B" programmes will be undertaken immediately without reference to the present difficult shipping position in order that the supplies so purchased may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available.

3467

16.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

16. The Allies desire that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by Italian resources and such supplies as it may be possible to import under the terms of paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 above, and subject to the limitation in paragraph 19 below. The sole exception to this principle is to be made in the case of industries involving the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war, which will be rehabilitated only to the extent required by the Supreme Allied Commander in the discharge of his military mission, and to the extent necessary to further the Allied military effort in other theatres. The priority order in which Italian industry will be rehabilitated (after the rehabilitation of industries essential for Allied military purposes) will be determined by the Italian Government, with the assistance and advice of the Allied Commission.

17. The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in Italy, including the imposition and administration of the appropriate financial controls and economic controls, and appropriate utilization of supplies, rests with the Italian Government. In this connection, as in others, the Allied Commission stands ready to advise and assist.

3463

18.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

18. The extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. For the time being, the Italian export programme will necessarily be limited by certain shipping, military, financial and supply factors. The applicability of these factors to individual programmes will be worked out between the Italian Government and the Economic Section of the Allied Commission along the lines already discussed by the Economic Section with the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction.

19. Nothing contained in the above should be taken as constituting a commitment by the Allied Nations with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into Italy must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time by the Allied Nations.

HAROLD MACMILLAN

3464

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A".

List of Italian Government appointments requiring prior approval by the Allied Commission

---

Minister of War

Minister of Marine

Minister of Air

Any other Minister of Armed Forces who may be created

Under Secretary for Telecommunications

Director of Railroads

Director General of Pubblica Sicurezza

Commanding General, CC.RR

Chief of Staff, CC.RR

Commanding General, CC.FF.

Appointments in the Army, Navy, and Air Force in accordance with current practice.

Cook

3163

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1668

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: VICE PRESIDENT, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION,
H.Q. A.C. ROME.
COPY: LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.
COPY: NAVY SUB-COMMISSION.

DATE: 23RD FEBRUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/357/ORG.

SECRET.

With reference to your 4/32 A/CA dated 22nd February 1945, it is confirmed that the views of this Sub-Commission are:

(a) That the posts of Air Minister, Under Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Staff should be subject to the approval of SACMED, through the Allied Commission.

(b) The Heads of Branches in the Italian Air Ministry and Officers Commanding and Chiefs of Staff of the Units Areas (Operational Headquarters) and four Zones, should be subject to the approval of the Allied Commission.

2. In this connection will you please note the new directive which has been issued by Allied Force Headquarters under reference SAC(1)(45)3 dated 16th February. From this it will be seen that it is the intention to interfere to a far less extent than heretofore with the appointment of officers in the Italian Air Force. The directive has, however, not yet become effective as it has not been approved, and it is considered advisable to retain the previsos set forth in paragraph 1 above, pending the final issue of the directive.

W.A.B. Bowell-Buscarlet.

W.A.B. BOWELL-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

16691

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

S E C R E T

Subject:- New deal for ITALY

Land Forces Sub Com., AC
(M.M.I.A.)
G/6
22 Feb 45

H.Q., A.C.
(for Civil Affairs Section)

Ref your 4/32A/CA dated 22 Feb 45:-

1. My views are as stated in para 2 of my G/6 of 6 Feb attached. A copy of this, as you see, has already been sent to A.C.

2. I think that all you have to say is that this new deal makes no alteration in the existing system of supervision/control of the Italian Army.

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

3460

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET 53

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Tel. Ext. 525

Ref:4/32 A/CA.

22 Feb 45.

SUBJECT: New Deal for Italy.

TO: Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Navy Sub-Commission,
Air Forces Sub-Commission.

1 Para 2 (a) of FAN 487, addressed to SACMED by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, states:

"The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine."

2 The Executive Commissioner has asked me to obtain your views and co-ordinate them for submission to the Chief Commissioner on the following:

(a) Down to what level should the appointment of personnel in the three Service Ministries continue to be subject to our approval.

(b) Down to what level should the appointment of Officers be subject to AC's approval.

G.R. UPJOHN, Brig.,
VP CA Section.

3453

MMIA
FILE REF 516.
Date Recd 22/2/

SECRET

SUBJECT: Personnel of Italian Armed Forces of Yugoslav Origin

Land Forces Sub Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
G/6
21 Feb 45

TO : Political Section, Allied Commission

Copy to: Executive Commissioner

1. It was stated at the Executive Commissioner's meeting this morning that :-

(a) Yugoslav Gov't under Marshal TITO had approached U.K. Gov't to order the return to the Yugoslav Army of LIberation, those members of the Italian Army who are of Yugoslav origin.

(b) U.K. Gov't had instructed the Yugoslav Representative in Rome to raise this matter at the next meeting of the Advisory Council i.e. 2 March.

(c) U.K. Gov't had instructed British Ambassador, Sir MAEL CHARLES, to support the request.

2. In connection with the above, I should like to mention that :-

(a) Although these soldiers may have been of Yugoslav origin many years ago, (i.e. before Trieste/Udine region was transferred to Italy) these soldiers are at present time citizens of Italy and as such are liable for service in Italian Army, where they are now absorbed into service units.

(b) Approximately 1000 of these troops have recently been transferred from CORSICA to SOUTHERN FRANCE, where they are performing useful duty as dock labour for the American forces. AFHQ plans to move the remaining 4000 from CORSICA to SOUTHERN FRANCE for similar duty as soon as shipping becomes available.

3. While in no way wishing to go contrary to U.K. Govt's instructions, I suggest that it is inadvisable on military grounds at this juncture to transfer these Italian soldiers to the Yugo-Slav Army of Liberation. The Italian Minister of War holds the same view very strongly on political grounds and this whole question, as you know, has been a very "tender" one with the Italian Gov't.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

1. It was stated at the Executive Commissioner's meeting this morning that :-

(a) Yugoslav Gov't under Marshal TITO had approached U.K. Gov't to order the return to the Yugoslav Army of Liberation, those members of the Italian Army who are of Yugoslav origin.

(b) U.K. Gov't had instructed the Yugoslav Representative in Rome to raise this matter at the next meeting of the Advisory Council i.e. 2 March.

(c) U.K. Gov't had instructed British Ambassador, Sir NOEL CHARLES, to support the request.

2. In connection with the above, I should like to mention that :-

(a) Although these soldiers may have been of Yugoslav origin many years ago, (i.e. before Trieste/Udine region was transferred to Italy) these soldiers are at present time citizens of Italy and as such are liable for service in Italian Army, where they are now absorbed into service units.

(b) Approximately 1000 of these troops have recently been transferred from CORSICA to SOUTHERN FRANCE, where they are performing useful duty as dock labour for the American forces. AFHQ plans to move the remaining 4000 from CORSICA to SOUTHERN FRANCE for similar duty as soon as shipping becomes available.

3. While in no way wishing to go contrary to U.K. Govt's instructions, I suggest that it is inadvisable on military grounds at this juncture to transfer these Italian soldiers to the Yugo-Slav Army of Liberation. The Italian Minister of War holds the same view very strongly on political grounds and this whole question, as you know, has been a very "tender" one with the Italian Gov't.

L. Binney

Major General
F.M.I.A.

Internal:
A/G
SM/152

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

19 February 1945.

Ref: 4001/EC

SUBJECT: New CCS Directive on the Allied Commission.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. It may be of interest to you to know the action which I propose to take as a result of the receipt of FAN 487, communicated to me by the Acting President:

(a) Para 2(A). I am asking the US and British Embassies formally to nominate their representatives who, for many reasons, will require to have an office at this Headquarters. They will bear the same relation to me as POLAD and PERMIN bear to SACMED.

(b) Para 2(B).
(i) I have asked on more than one occasion whether the Italians might be allowed to use the usual cipher and code facilities to their representatives in the countries with which diplomatic relations have been resumed. I have had no answer to this request and I should be glad if this point could be cleared at once. A separate cable has been despatched on this point.

3457

(ii) I shall request the Italian Government to advise me of negotiations with other Governments in which the Italian Government may engage themselves.

(iii) It will be to our advantage and to the advantage of the Italian Government that direct relations should be resumed as soon as possible with the French, Yugoslav and Greek Governments and I shall urge the Italian Government to this end. It is expected that the Allied Embassies will take a similar position.

(c) Para 2(C), states "The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors".

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. It may be of interest to you to know the action which I propose to take as a result of the receipt of FAN 487, communicated to me by the Acting President:

(a) Para 2(A). I am asking the US and British Embassies formally to nominate their representatives who, for many reasons, will require to have an office at this Headquarters. They will bear the same relation to me as POLAD and RESAIN bear to SACMED.

(b) Para 2(B).

(i) I have asked on more than one occasion whether the Italians might be allowed to use the usual cipher and code facilities to their representatives in the countries with which diplomatic relations have been resumed. I have had no answer to this request and I should be glad if this point could be cleared at once. A separate cable has been despatched on this point.

3457

(ii) I shall request the Italian Government to advise me of negotiations with other Governments in which the Italian Government may engage themselves.

(iii) It will be to our advantage and to the advantage of the Italian Government that direct relations should be resumed as soon as possible with the French, Yugoslav and Greek Governments and I shall urge the Italian Government to this end. It is expected that the Allied Embassies will take a similar position.

(c) Para 2(C), states "The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors".

(i) I interpret the words "in the territory" to mean "affecting the territory". Certain Italian decrees may affect Allied Military Government territory and since it is considered desirable to coordinate policy in territory which will be ultimately transferred, I shall cause informal consultations to be continued between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government, particularly in relation to economic decrees.

(ii) I also interpret this clause, read with 1(A), to vest in SACMED the right, when necessary, to exercise control in any decree affecting military needs and the requirements of the campaign.

NARA
FILE REF 616
Date Feb 20 '72

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(d) Para 2(D). The transfer of territory documents (Document "A") will now have to be amended in order to enable the Italian Government to remove officials previously nominated by AMG officials without reference to the Allied Commission. This will be taken up under separate cover. All Service Sub-Commissions desire to retain the right of vetoing military appointments. The technical posts of Directors of Telecommunications and Railroads will be considered as military appointments hitherto.

(e) Para 2(E).

(i) I attach draft directive which will be issued shortly in order to withdraw Allied officers of the Commission from the Islands and Southern Regions. (See Annexure "B").

(ii) It is essential that we should implement this clause to the maximum. There will be great temptation on the part of military formations and services, Italian local authorities and Allied Commission officers to regret the departure of Allied Commission officers and to retain a "small" number which will gradually grow and will lead us to fall between the two stools of (a) control, which necessitates many officers, and (b) decontrol, which should need none. It is essential that military formations and services should be instructed not to ask for the retention of Allied Commission officers but to take their share in some of the difficulties which will have to be faced by Allies and Italians alike as a result of the COS directive. The Allied Commission will be compelled to give up responsibilities and duties which have been of value to the Allied military formations: Allied officers who have been the proper media between Allied military authorities and the Italian local governments will disappear. I would ask that a direction be issued to military formations and services on this and other matters arising out of the directive.

(iii) It may be thought necessary for the military authorities to assume responsibility for any necessary supervision of public utilities of military importance, e.g., railways, power, highways, through their own officers. This would impose an even more rigid military control than that which the present directive instructs us to remove.

(iv) Allied Military Government will continue in NAPLES Commune unless it is your desire that it should be removed. It would, of course, be an advantage to withdraw all officers but I assume that the local military authorities will insist on retention of AMG. AMG Courts in NAPLES will cease.

(v) I submit for consideration the withdrawal, insofar as is possible, of HQ 204 Sub-Area from SICILY and any other Sub-Area Headquarters which are not absolutely essential.

(f) Para 2(F). The implementation of this clause depends upon the repeal or amendment of the "Trading with the Enemy Act" so far as it affects Italy.

3455

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(ii) It is essential that we should implement this clause to the maximum. There will be great temptation on the part of military formations and services, Italian local authorities and Allied Commission officers to regret the departure of Allied Commission officers and to retain a "small" number which will gradually grow and will lead us to fall between the two stools of (a) control, which necessitates many officers, and (b) decontrol, which should need none. It is essential that military formations and services should be instructed not to ask for the retention of Allied Commission officers but to take their share in some of the difficulties which will have to be faced by Allies and Italians alike as a result of the CCS directive. The Allied Commission will be compelled to give up responsibilities and duties which have been of value to the Allied military formations: Allied officers who have been the proper media between Allied military authorities and the Italian local governments will disappear. I would ask that a direction be issued to military formations and services on this and other matters arising out of the directive.

(iii) It may be thought necessary for the military authorities to assume responsibility for any necessary supervision of public utilities of military importance, e.g., railways, power, highways, through their own officers. This would impose an even more rigid military control than that which the present directive instructs us to remove.

(iv) Allied Military Government will continue in NAPLES Commune unless it is your desire that it should be removed. It would, of course, be an advantage to withdraw all officers but I assume that the local military authorities will insist on retention of AMG. AMG Courts in CAIRO will cease.

(v) I submit for consideration the withdrawal, insofar as is possible, of HQ 204 Sub-Area from SICILY and any other Sub-Area Headquarters which are not absolutely essential.

(f) Para 2(F). The implementation of this clause depends upon the repeal or amendment of the "Trading with the Enemy Act" so far as it effects Italy.

(g) Para 2(G). This has already been done and the Italian Government have the matter in hand. It is most probable that local government elections will take place throughout the major portion of liberated Italy in the spring.

(h) Para 2(H). The status of Italian POW in Italy is the subject of a separate memorandum which will be submitted to you.

345

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(i) Para 3(A). I interpret this to mean consultation between Heads of Sections and Directors of Sub-Commissions on the one hand and Ministers and Under-Secretaries on the other.

(j) Para 3(B). This can be carried out but latitude will be necessary in respect of labour and wage matters which affect AMG territory.

(k) Para 3(C). The process of civilianisation is already in hand.

(l) Para 3(D). My Deputy Chief Civil Affairs Officer is already located at a place other than Allied Commission Headquarters. Further separation is not feasible at the moment.

(m) Para 4. It will be necessary to represent to the Italian Government the contents of this and other clauses in the directive. This will be done. I do not propose communicating the last sentence of this paragraph to the Italian Government, since it is not reconcilable with the spirit of the rest of the directive.

(n) Para 5.

(i) The Italian Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction and the Economic Section of the Allied Commission are now preparing a joint programme of essential Italian imports. The Italian Government will be informed of the three categories for which the US/UK military authorities assume responsibility.

(ii) This clause gives a wider interpretation to Category A programme (disease and unrest) than this Commission has yet received. In order to implement it, I propose to resubmit requisitions that have already been rejected and also to submit part of the new joint programme now being worked out with the Italian Government.

3453

(o) Para 6. Similarly this clause has a wider interpretation of the Category B programme and will be considered at the joint discussions.

(p) Para 7(A). This will to some extent modify the work of price control now done by the Allied Commission. It is assumed to be a partial reply to recommendations made by the Anti-Inflation Committee in June 1944.

(q) Para 9. Has been made the subject of a separate telegram.

2. I attach memorandum (Annexure "B") which I propose to transmit to the Italian Government informing them of the terms of the "New Deal" as soon as I am instructed to make public the terms of the new directive.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(m) Para 4. It will be necessary to represent to the Italian Government the contents of this and other clauses in the directive. This will be done. I do not propose communicating the last sentence of this paragraph to the Italian Government, since it is not reconcilable with the spirit of the rest of the directive.

(n) Para 5.

(i) The Italian Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction and the Economic Section of the Allied Commission are now preparing a joint programme of essential Italian imports. The Italian Government will be informed of the three categories for which the US/UK military authorities assume responsibility.

(ii) This clause gives a wider interpretation to Category A programme (disease and unrest) than this Commission has yet received. In order to implement it, I propose to resubmit requisitions that have already been rejected and also to submit part of the new joint programme now being worked out with the Italian Government.

3453

(o) Para 6. Similarly this clause has a wider interpretation of the Category B programme and will be considered at the joint discussions.

(p) Para 7(A). This will to some extent modify the work of price control now done by the Allied Commission. It is assumed to be a partial reply to recommendations made by the Anti-Inflation Committee in June 1944.

(q) Para 9. Has been made the subject of a separate telegram.

2. I attach memorandum (Annexure "D") which I propose to transmit to the Italian Government informing them of the terms of the "New Deal" as soon as I am instructed to make public the terms of the new directive.

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Acting President.
The Hon. Mr. Alexander Kirk, US Ambassador.
Sir Noel Charles, Bt, KCMG, British Ambassador.
VP, Economic Section
VP, Civil Affairs Section.
VP, Establishment Section.
VP, Political Section.
Land Forces Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Navy Sub-Commission
WMD & IPW Sub-Commission
Communications Sub-Commission

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Annexure "A" to 4001/ECL/1
dated 19 February 1945.

2nd DRAFT DIRECTIVE.

S E C R E T.

51/A

WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED COMMISSION OFFICERS
FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY.

1. Para 2(e) of COS telegram FAN 487 transmitting the directive on the "New Deal for Italy" directs that:

"The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it".

2. As a result of this the following action will be taken with regard to Allied Commission functions in SARDINIA, SICILY and SOUTHERN ITALY:

(a) SARDINIA. All Allied officers will be withdrawn with the exception of the officers and staff of the Mining Division who will restrict their functions entirely to advice regarding the out put of the Sardinian coalmines. This will involve the withdrawal of the Regional Commissioner and 10 officers, and the retention of 2 Mining Division Officers.

(b) SICILY. All Allied officers will be withdrawn with the following exceptions:

3452

(i) 2 Finance Officers
(ii) 1 Supply Accountant
(iii) 1 Property Control Officer
} Until 1st April 1945.

(iv) (i), (ii) and (iii) will work under Allied Commission Liaison Officers who will be appointed:

(a) In PALERMO to correlate the functions of the US Navy Base with the Italian authorities.

(b) In CATANIA to correlate the functions of 204 Sub-Area with the Italian authorities

(v) A Transportation

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian [illegible]
for any special tasks when Allied interests require it".

2. As a result of this the following action will be taken with regard to Allied Commission functions in SARDINIA, SICILY and SOUTHERN ITALY:

(a) SARDINIA. All Allied officers will be withdrawn with the exception of the officers and staff of the Mining Division who will restrict their functions entirely to advice regarding the out put of the Sardinian coalmines. This will involve the withdrawal of the Regional Commissioner and 10 officers, and the retention of 2 Mining Division Officers.

(b) SICILY. All Allied officers will be withdrawn with the following exceptions:

3452

(i) 2 Finance Officers
(ii) 1 Supply Accountant
(iii) 1 Property Control Officer
} Until 1st April 1945.

(iv) (i), (ii) and (iii) will work under Allied Commission Liaison Officers who will be appointed:

(a) In PALERMO to correlate the functions of the US Navy Base with the Italian authorities.

(b) In CATANIA to correlate the functions of 204 Sub-Area with the Italian authorities

(v) A Transportation Officer will be attached to the Liaison Officer in CATANIA to regulate rail transport into REGGIO on the mainland.

(vi) The Regional Mining Officer will be assigned to Headquarters, Industry Sub-Commission, and will be despatched to SICILY as occasion demands.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(vii) The 4 Export Officers loaned by the Ministry of Food (British) will be attached to the Commerce Sub-Commission and sent to SICILY as the occasion demands. There numbers will be reduced if possible.

(viii) LAMPEDUSA and PANTELLERIA will remain under Allied Military Government. CAO's will report to the AC Liaison Officer at PALERMO.

(c) SOUTHERN REGION. All officers will be withdrawn with the following exceptions:

(i) ~~Provincial~~ Local Commissioner and staff for Allied Military Government, NAPLES Commune (See Appendix "A"). This officer will also act as AC Liaison Officer in order to correlate the functions of No.3 District, PBS and other military authorities with the Italian authorities in the compartimenti of CAMPANIA and CALABRIA.

(ii) There will also be established an AC Liaison Officer at BARI with the same functions in connection with the compartimenti of APULIA and LUCANIA., together with the Province of CAMPOBASSO. This Liaison Officer and his staff will work with the Sub-Areas operating in this area and the 15th USAAF at FOGGIA. The AC Liaison Officer will have a small staff consisting of:

(a) 5 Representatives of the Economic Section (Transportation Sub-Commission) 3 of whom will work in connection with truck pools and will be withdrawn when truck pools are handed over to the Italian Government.

3450

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(c) SOUTHERN REGION.

following exceptions:

(i) ~~Provincial~~ Local Commissioner and staff for Allied Military Government, NAPLES Commune (See Appendix "A"). This officer will also act as AC Liaison Officer in order to correlate the functions of No.3 District, PBS and other military authorities with the Italian authorities in the compartimenti of CAMPANIA and CALABRIA.

(ii) There will also be established an AC Liaison Officer at BARI with the same functions in connection with the compartimenti of APULIA and LUCANIA, together with the Province of CAMPOBASSO. This Liaison Officer and his staff will work with the Sub-Areas operating in this area and the 15th USAAF at FOGGIA. The AC Liaison Officer will have a small staff consisting of:

3450

(a) 5 Representatives of the Economic Section (Transportation Sub-Commission) 3 of whom will work in connection with truck pools and will be withdrawn when truck pools are handed over to the Italian Government.

(d) LAZIO-UMBRIA REGION. All officers will be withdrawn with the exception of the Provincial Staffs of PERUGIA and TERNI who will continue to administer Allied Military Government in these two Provinces under the command of the Provincial Commissioner, PERUGIA, reporting direct to the Allied Commission.

In addition an Allied Commission Liaison Section will be attached to Rome Area Allied Command consisting of the following:

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(i) 1 Public Safety Officer

(ii) 1 AFA Officer, ROME.

(iii) 1 Supply Accountant.

(iv) 1 Property Control Officer.

3 officers of the Transportation Sub-Commission and 1 officer of the Public Works & Utilities Sub-Commission now operating at the port of CIVITAVECCIA will be retained there under the direct control of the Economic Section. They will be withdrawn before 1st June 1945.

(c) ABRUZZI-MARCHE REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn from the Provinces of AQUILA, PESCARA and CHIETI. Regional HQ will be moved to (?) and will administer Allied Military Government in such Provinces of the compartimento which have not been handed back to the Italian Government. The Regional Commissioner will also act as Liaison Officer with the Sub-Area concerned in the Provinces administered by the Italian Government.

3. The duties of the Allied Commission Liaison Officers retained in Italian Government territory will be to watch over the inter-relation of Allied and Italian interests insofar as the Allied war effort is directly concerned and to assist the Allied military authorities in their relations with the Italian local authorities. They will give advice to the Allied military authorities on any matter pertaining to Italian civil affairs but they will no longer be concerned with the assumption of control or advice or guidance to the Italian authorities. They will be careful not to assume functions which are properly those of the military authorities and must retain their purely advisory capacity. (It may well be that functions hitherto carried out by Allied Commission officers such as supervision of railroads, highways

assumed handed

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

will be withdrawn before 1st June 1945.

(e) ABRUZZI-MARCHE REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn from the Provinces of AQUILA, PESCARA and CHIETI. Regional HQ will be moved to (?) and will administer Allied Military Government in such Provinces of the compartimento which have not been handed back to the Italian Government. The Regional Commissioner will also act as Liaison Officer with the Sub-Area concerned in the Provinces administered by the Italian Government.

3448

3. The duties of the Allied Commission Liaison Officers retained in Italian Government territory will be to watch over the inter-relation of Allied and Italian interests insofar as the Allied war effort is directly concerned and to assist the Allied military authorities in their relations with the Italian local authorities. They will give advice to the Allied military authorities on any matter pertaining to Italian civil affairs but they will no longer be concerned with the assumption of control or advice or guidance to the Italian authorities. They will be careful not to assume functions which are properly those of the military authorities and must retain their purely advisory capacity. (It may well be that functions hitherto carried out by Allied Commission officers such as supervision of railroads, highways and electric power on behalf of the military authorities will have to be ~~exercised~~ assumed by those military authorities) but further directions will follow on this). They will normally confine their activities to the neighbourhood of the Headquarters in which they are located, ie, PALERMO, CATANIA, NAPLES and ROME, but in cases of necessity they will, of course, take cognizance of all matters arising from civil affairs affecting

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Allied interests.

4. They will correspond direct with HQ. Allied Commission under whose authority they will work and to whom they will render regular and frequent reports on their day to day work and on the political, administrative and economic situation in the areas which they cover.

5. All withdrawals indicated above and the establishment of AC Liaison Officers will be completed by 1st March 1945.

Appendix "A".

COMPOSITION OF STAFF FOR ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NAPLES COMMUNE.

Provincial Commissioner	1	B
Executive Officer	1	A
Adjutant	1	A
Provincial Officer	1	B
Commander, Coy "C"	1	A
Civil Affairs Section.		
Legal	3	
Public Health	3	
Public Safety	4	
Economic Section.		
Commerce	2	
Food	1	
Industry	2	(Hemp Control)
Finance	5	
PW & Utilities	2	
Transportation	5	
Communications		

3447

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

DRAFT ONLY.

S E C R E T.

ANNEXURE "B" to 4001/50
dated 19 February 1945.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

My Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September 1944, the United States and United Kingdom Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when Allied military interests require. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in Italy.

2. In the light of this agreed US UK policy, the Allied Commission is taking certain steps and is following certain policies concerning which it is desirable that your Government be informed. These steps are described in the paras below, together with an indication of the new procedures which it is proposed to adopt in working with your Government under the new arrangements.

3. The Political Section of the Allied Commission is being abolished as of February 1945. Your Ministry of Foreign Affairs will thus have no direct counterpart in the Commission. It will deal with the Chief Commissioner on matters of major policy, and on matters of minor policy and routine business it will address itself to the Economic Section or the Civil Affairs Section of the Commission, whichever may be appropriate to the subject involved. Matters involving the travel of diplomatic and other public officials will hereafter be dealt with on behalf of the Commission by the Office of my Executive Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

and the Prime Minister of 26 September 1944, the United States and United Kingdom Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when Allied military interests require. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in Italy.

2. In the light of this agreed US UK policy, the Allied Commission is taking certain steps and is following certain policies concerning which it is desirable that your Government be informed. These steps are described in the paras below, together with an indication of the new procedures which it is proposed to adopt in working with your Government under the new arrangements.

3445

3. The Political Section of the Allied Commission is being abolished as of February 1945. Your Ministry of Foreign Affairs will thus have no direct counterpart in the Commission. It will deal with the Chief Commissioner on matters of major policy, and on matters of minor policy and routine business it will address itself to the Economic Section or the Civil Affairs Section of the Commission, whichever may be appropriate to the subject involved. Matters involving the travel of diplomatic and other public officials will hereafter be dealt with on behalf of the Commission by the Office of my Executive Commissioner.

4. The Italian Government will continue, as at present, to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal. It is necessary, however, that the Allied Commission be kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other Governments.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Insofar as these negotiations have to do with economic and financial matters, this requirement will be met by keeping the Economic Section and its Finance Sub-Commission informed of the progress of such negotiations. On policy matters, this might appropriately be done through the weekly meetings held between the Economic Section and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction, at which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is generally represented.

We may also wish to work out jointly an arrangement for the preparation by the Italian Government of a periodic summary of negotiations completed or pending with other Governments.

5. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission for decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

I should, however, desire to work out with your Government a procedure for ensuring that this Commission is informed of proposed decrees some time before their enactment, in order to enable me to consult with you as to their applicability to territory under the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government (AMG), and to lay plans for their effective implementation in such territory when appropriate.

6. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain approval of the Allied Commission for Italian appointments, whether to national or local offices, in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, except with regard to the attached list (Appendix "1") of positions having military significance.

7. The Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government will be withdrawn as soon as possible. Representatives of the Allied Commission will, however,

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

generally represented.

We may also wish to work out jointly an arrangement for the preparation by the Italian Government of a periodic summary of negotiations completed or pending with other Governments.

5. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission for decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

I should, however, desire to work out with your Government a procedure for ensuring that this Commission is informed of proposed decrees some time before their enactment, in order to enable me to consult with you as to their applicability to territory under the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government (AMG), and to lay plans for their effective implementation in such territory when appropriate.

6. It will no longer be necessary for the Italian Government to obtain approval of the Allied Commission for Italian appointments, whether to national or local offices, in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, except with regard to the attached list (Appendix "A") of positions having military significance.

7. The Allied Commission officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government will be withdrawn as soon as possible. Representatives of the Allied Commission will, however, be sent into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government when it considers such action necessary.

In line with this policy, it is intended to abolish by 1945 the Regional Offices of the Allied Commission for Sicilia, Sardegna, Southern and Lazio-Umbria Regions.

3443

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

for a limited period certain specialist officers on economic functions will remain in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. A list of such specialist officers, and their functions, will be notified to you shortly.

8. It is the desire of the Allies to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit, arrangements will be facilitated for the flow between Italy and the United Nations of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature, and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between Italy and the United Nations.

9. It is the desire of the Allies to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

10. The Allied Nations desire to make concessions with regard to Italian prisoners of war now or hereafter held in Italy, other than those captured since the Armistice was signed. Provided that the Italian Government can give an adequate assurance that the services of such persons will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to the Supreme Allied Commander, their status as prisoners of war will be terminated.

11. The Allied Commission will limit its dealings with respect to territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government to consultation with and advice to the Ministers of the Italian Government.

12. It is our intention that, in respect of Italian Government territory, the advisory functions of the Education, Monuments & Fine Arts, Local Government, Legal and Labour Sub-Commissions should only be performed when requested by your Government.

3441

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit, arrangements will be facilitated for the flow between Italy and the United Nations of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature, and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between Italy and the United Nations.

9. It is the desire of the Allies to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

10. The Allied Nations desire to make concessions with regard to Italian prisoners of war now or hereafter held in Italy, other than those captured since the Armistice was signed. Provided that the Italian Government can give an adequate assurance that the services of such persons will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to the Supreme Allied Commander, their status as prisoners of war will be terminated.

11. The Allied Commission will limit its dealings with respect to 3441 territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government to consultation with and advice to the Ministers of the Italian Government.

12. It is our intention that, in respect of Italian Government territory, the advisory functions of the Education, Monuments & Fine Arts, Local Government, Legal and Labour Sub-Commissions should only be performed when requested by your Government.

13. It is essential that the Italian Government formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible both in order to ensure that maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

14. In the joint programme of essential Italian imports, now being prepared by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction and the Economic Section of this Commission, there will be some supplies for which the combined US-UK military authorities will assume responsibility for procurement (Category "A") and other supplies for which they will not assume responsibility (Category "B"). For your information a definition of the supplies which fall into Category "A" follows:

(a) Those quantities of agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to military operations, such as, food, fuel, clothing, medical and sanitary supplies.

(b) Those supplies, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purpose referred to in this paragraph, such as, fertiliser, raw materials, machinery and equipment. When requisitions are being prepared and considered the time when combined US-UK military responsibility will terminate will not be known. The importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph, therefore, will not be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may not be felt during the period of combined military responsibility. 3433

(c) Those materials essential for the rehabilitation of such of the Italian communication facilities, power systems and transportation facilities as will further the military effort against Germany and Japan.

15. The programme for which the military authorities assume responsibility will be maintained for the duration of combined (US-UK) operations in Italy. For this period, and within the limits defined in para 14, Italy will be treated as a whole. The date of the termination of military responsibility will be fixed by the Allied Nations.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

supplies which fall into Category "A" follows:

(a) Those quantities of agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to military operations, such as, food, fuel, clothing, medical and sanitary supplies.

(b) Those supplies, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purpose referred to in this paragraph, such as, fertiliser, raw materials, machinery and equipment. When requisitions are being prepared and considered the time when combined US-UK military responsibility will terminate will not be known. The importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph, therefore, will not be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may not be felt during the period of combined military responsibility. 3433

(c) Those materials essential for the rehabilitation of such of the Italian communication facilities, power systems and transportation facilities as will further the military effort against Germany and Japan.

15. The programme for which the military authorities assume responsibility will be maintained for the duration of combined (US-UK) operations in Italy. For this period, and within the limits defined in para 14, Italy will be treated as a whole. The date of the termination of military responsibility will be fixed by the Allied Nations.

16. In addition to the programme of supplies for which the military assume responsibility for procurement (Category "A") it will be our intention to assist your Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. Such programmes, which we refer to as Category "B", are to be handled under procedures already notified to you in my letter of . It has been agreed that the purchasing of supplies in Category "B" programmes should immediately be undertaken, without reference to the present difficult shipping position in order that the supplies

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

so purchased may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available.

17. It is the desire of the Allies that industrial rehabilitation in Italy be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by Italian resources and such supplies as it may be possible to import under the terms of Paras 14, 15 and 16 above, and subject to the limitation in para 20 below. The sole exception to this principle is to be made in the case of industries involving the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war, which should be rehabilitated only to the extent required by the Supreme Allied Commander in the discharge of his military mission, and to the extent necessary to further the military effort in other theatres. It is contemplated that the priority order in which Italian industry will be rehabilitated (after the rehabilitation of industries essential for Allied military purposes) will be determined by the Italian Government, with the assistance and advice of the Allied Commission.

18. It is desired to make clear that the prime responsibility for the control of inflation in Italy, including the imposition and administration of the appropriate financial controls and economic controls, and appropriate utilization of supplies, rests with the Italian Government. In this connection, as in others, the Allied Commission stands ready to advise and assist you.

3437

19. The extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. For the time being, the Italian export programme will necessarily be limited by certain shipping, military, financial and supply factors which are controlled by the Allied Governments for purposes connected with the prosecution of the war. The applicability of these factors to individual programmes is to be worked out between your Government and our Economic Section, along the lines already discussed by the Economic Section

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

limitation in para 20 below. The sole exception to this principle is to be made in the case of industries involving the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war, which should be rehabilitated only to the extent required by the Supreme Allied Commander in the discharge of his military mission, and to the extent necessary to further the military effort in other theatres. It is contemplated that the priority order in which Italian industry will be rehabilitated (after the rehabilitation of industries essential for Allied military purposes) will be determined by the Italian Government, with the assistance and advice of the Allied Commission.

18. It is desired to make clear that the prime responsibility for the control of inflation in Italy, including the imposition and administration of the appropriate financial controls and economic controls, and appropriate utilisation of supplies, rests with the Italian Government. In this connection, as in others, the Allied Commission stands ready to advise and assist you.

19. The extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. For the time being, the Italian export programme will necessarily be limited by certain shipping, military, financial and supply factors which are controlled by the Allied Governments for purposes connected with the prosecution of the war. The applicability of these factors to individual programmes is to be worked out between your Government and our Economic Section, along the lines already discussed by the Economic Section with the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Reconstruction.

20. Nothing in this letter should be taken as constituting a commitment by the Allied Nations with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into Italy must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time by the Allied Nations.

3437

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

40/3

ANNEXURE "C" to 4001/EC
dated 19 February 1945.

MEMORANDUM SHOWING SOME OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION WHICH WILL CEASE UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIED COMMISSION OFFICERS FROM ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TERRITORY.

1. Civil Affairs Section.

(a) Advice on maintenance of law and order: organisation of police: stimulation Italian Courts of Law, particularly in dealing with offences against Allied troops.

(b) Distribution of medical supplies: assistance in organisation of civilian hospitals.

(c) Treatment of civilian epidemics and diseases such as typhus, smallpox, diphtheria, etc., except that a team of officers stationed in NAPLES may be available to deal with typhus or malaria in an advisory capacity.

(d) Appointment, transfer, promotion or dismissal of Italian officials.

(e) Italian refugees and partisans.

(f) Derequisitioning of schools, distribution of educational books.

(g) Preservation of monuments and fine arts.

(h) Epuration and defascistization.

(i) Mine Clearance.

(j) Welfare in devastated areas.

3437

2. Economic Section.

(a) Commerce Sub-Commission. Export trade: reprocessing of salvaged clothing and footwear: uncovering of availabilities of local resources.

(b) Industry Sub-Commission. Advice on sugar production: paper production: caustic soda and chlorine: sulphur mining: automobile spare parts: cement and bricks: requisitioning and derequisitioning of factories and industries.

(c) Public Works & Utilities Sub-Commission. All work on military and secondary highways: reconstruction and maintenance of electric power plants and transmission lines.

(d) Food Sub-Commission. Port clearance: checking and reporting

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

police: stimulation in Italian courts of law, particularly in dealing with offences against Allied troops.

(b) Distribution of medical supplies: assistance in organisation of civilian hospitals.

(c) Treatment of civilian epidemics and diseases such as typhus, smallpox, diphtheria, etc., except that a team of officers stationed in NAPLES may be available to deal with typhus or malaria in an advisory capacity.

(d) Appointment, transfer, promotion or dismissal of Italian officials.

(e) Italian refugees and partisans.

(f) Derequisitioning of schools, distribution of educational books.

(g) Preservation of monuments and fine arts.

(h) Epuration and defascistization.

(i) Mine Clearance.

(j) Welfare in devastated areas.

3433

2. Economic Section.

(a) Commerce Sub-Commission. Export trade: reprocessing of salvaged clothing and footwear: uncovering of availabilities of local resources.

(b) Industry Sub-Commission. Advice on sugar production: paper production: caustic soda and chlorine: sulphur mining: automobile spare parts: cement and bricks: requisitioning and derequisitioning of factories and industries.

(c) Public Works & Utilities Sub-Commission. All work on military and secondary highways: reconstruction and maintenance of electric power plants and transmission lines.

(d) Food Sub-Commission. Port clearance: checking and reporting of ship unloadings: movement of supplies to the interior: prevention of pilferage: procurement and movement of local resources to devastated areas.

(e) Labour Sub-Commission. Prevention of strikes and labour unrest: wages.

(f) Finance Sub-Commission. Intervention where the Italian Government fail to make financial provision for essential services, many of which affect military interests.

(g) Transportation Sub-Commission. Coordination of civilian traffic with military traffic: clearance of rail wagons: movements work.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Land Forces Sub Com., MC
(M.M.I.A.)

G/6
17 Feb 45

My Dear

1. You will have received Chief Commissioner A.C's letter G251/73/CAS of 16 Feb by now.

2. As I understand your AC091.112/C73 SCF-C of 25 Oct 44, on M.M.I.A. business I deal direct with A.F.H.Q., informing Chief Commissioner,

on Land Forces Sub-commission business I deal with Chief Commissioner.

3. Para 2 of my G/6 of 6 Feb was on M.M.I.A. business, so I put my views direct to you.

Para 3 of that letter was on Sub-commission business, so I informed you of what I was doing with A.C. on it.

4. I therefore do not see that I did wrong in addressing my G/6 of 6 Feb to you, particularly as I sent a copy to H.Q., A.C.

5. My American Second-in-Command agrees with me as regards the above, the U.S.A. being equally concerned in the business.

Yours Sincerely

(Major General)

Lt Gen Sir John HARDING, KCB., CBE., DSO., MC.
Chief of Staff
A.F.H.Q.

(Copy to: C.A.C., A.F.H.Q.)

3433

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 8251/73/COS.

16 February 1945

SUBJECT: CCS Directive FAN 487.

TO : GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).

1. I was surprised to find from your G/G of 6 February that you had addressed your observations on FAN 487, so far as it concerned the Land Forces Sub-Commission, directly to the Chief of Staff and Chief Administrative Officer at A.F.H.Q., without consultation with myself. As I have pointed out before it is important that, on matters of policy affecting the Commission and the Italian Government, the Allied Commission should address itself to SACMED with one voice.

2. I fully realise that you have responsibilities with regard to the Italian Army on which you receive operational and administrative instructions direct from A.F.H.Q. But on matters of policy, particularly when operations are not concerned, you, as Director of the Land Forces Sub-Commission, should advise me as Chief Commissioner of your views in order that in my turn I may represent to SACMED, the President of the Commission, the views and recommendations of the Commission as a whole. Your letter should have been addressed to me.

I drew up a ltr
No action
hb
17 Feb

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q.
Chief Administrative Officer, A.F.H.Q.

17001

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Navy Subdivision, Allied Commission, APO 394

SECRET
Subdivision

NAC/1690
14 February 1945

To: Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Subject: Allied Commission - New Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff on

Enclosures: (a) Copy minute secret directive FAN 487 undated.
(b) Copy Land Forces Sub-Commission Secret File No. C/M of 6 February 1945.
(c) Copy Air Forces Sub-Commission Secret ltr A35C 314/000 of 8 February 1945.

1. Enclosure (a) contains a new directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Allied Commission to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. The primary objective of the directive is to relax control over the Italian Government under the Armistice and Surrender Instrument. The rights of the United Nations thereunder will be held in reserve and only such control exercised as the military needs may require. The new directive, therefore, relates primarily to political, administrative, economic and financial considerations, rather than to military matters.

2. The Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. and the Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. submitted comments on the new directive in enclosures (b) and (c). It is not considered that the new directive will necessitate any considerable modification of the present arrangements by which the Italian Navy is administered and controlled by the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through the Vice Officer Liaison, Italy, and by the Navy Sub-Commission, A.C. under the provisions of the Aviation Terms, the Cunningham - de Courten Agreement and Combined Chiefs' of Staff Format Directive CCS 515/1 of 19 March 1944.

3. The following comments are submitted with reference to the respective paragraphs in enclosure (A):

2(a) This paragraph relates to appointments in Italian Government Territory only. It is considered essential that control over appointments and removals from office of Italian Navy personnel should be maintained irrespective of Italian government jurisdiction over the territory involved while no change in power over appointments is stated, it is fully implied in Article 22 of the Armistice Terms, Paragraph 2 of the Cunningham Agreement and paragraphs 7 and 8 of CCS 515/1 of 19 March 1944.

NIN 3131

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/1696
14 February 1945

Subject: Allied Commission - New Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff on.

- -

The present practice is for the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through the Flag Officer Liaison Italy, instead of the Navy Sub-Commission, A.C., to approve the appointment of all Italian Flag Officers and Commanders of important independent units. It is considered that this practice should continue.

7(b) As indicated in Navy Sub-Commission, A.C. secret letter NSC/1505 of 16 January 1945, a policy has been established which will permit the maximum utilization of Italian Navy maritime plants for the economic rehabilitation of Italy, provided the efficiency of the Italian Navy is not impaired and the facilities are not required in the interest of the Allied war effort.

4. The above comments with respect to the new directive on the Allied Commission are submitted for your information and such action as you may require.

R. M. KIRCLI,
Commodore, U. S. Navy,
Deputy Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.

Copy to:
AFHQ - less encl.(A).
CIBDC-AFHQ. - less encl.(A)
ComSTH FLEET
Hq. AC. " " less enclosures.
FOTALI, ROME "
LAND FORCES SC.AC. "
AIR FORCES SC.AC. "

3423

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET Landforces :sl/c
230 4T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET
By Authority of
G.A.C.H.Q.
[illegible]
Date 13 February 1945

AG LIB-O

SUBJECT: Request for Publication

TO : Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army
FOR: Army Sub-Commission

1. Reference your cable O-693, dated 12 Februery 1945.

2. Attached are three (3) copies of letter, this headquarters, file AG 091.112/079 GCT-O, dated 25 October 1945, subject: "Status and Functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA)".

3. Please acknowledge receipt. Acked 15/2

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Jack Carter
JACK CARTER
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl:
as above

(1 copy in spare)

1 copy to GOC
1 " " 2 i/c
for permt file

3427 14 Feb

HEADQUARTERS
15 FEB 1945
G

G-1-41-25

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

MESSAGE FORM

Date Time
12 2030 A

FROM : M M I A

TO : A F H Q

0 - 695

RESTRICTED

PLEASE FORWARD URGENTLY THREE COPIES OF YOUR LETTER AG 691 POINT 112/079 GCT-O DATED 25 OCTOBER 1944 SUBJECT STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION (MMIA)

See AF

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED for Major.

3426

1704

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
COPY TO: NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.
" " LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 8TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/318/ORG. SECRET.

With reference to the new Directive FAN.487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I wish to make the following remarks from the point of view of this Sub-Commission.

2. It is considered that it is most important that this Sub-Commission retains the right of general supervision within the Italian Air Ministry and Air Force, and in particular the right of veto and the supervision of appointments, promotions and dismissals, particularly of senior officers.

3. The most important part of our directive is the organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force Operational Squadrons, which are working in active aid of the Allied war effort.

4. Unfortunately there is still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Air Force, from the Air Ministry downwards, and not only is the closest supervision necessary, but it is usually necessary to give an order and see that it is carried out.

5. A certain number of Italian aircraft remain in service, and to maintain these a few civilian firms are still employed in the overhaul of engines and airframes. If our operational effort is to be sustained, we must continue to employ these.

W.A.B. Bowen-Buscarlet

W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

3427

SECRET

Subject: Italian Army

Land Forces Sub Com AC.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. G/6

6 Feb 45

AFHQ for Chief of Staff.
" Chief Administrative Officer.

Reference new directive FAN 487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I have the following observations to make :-

1. Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MMIA) has two separate functions and methods of procedure in its capacity of :-
   (a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AC.
   (b) M.M.I.A.

See your AG.091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 1944.

2. (a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give as much responsibility as possible to the Italian Army in order to :-

   (i) Save Allied manpower.
   (ii) Raise Italian morale.
   (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pack Tpt Coys.

(b) (i) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, from the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of fanaticism and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for MMIA to order something to be done; in many cases we have to tell the Italians how to do it and watch to see that it is done

(ii) Unless we retain the right of veto and "Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals ...of Italian Army personnel" of all ranks (see para 4(c) of your AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 Nov 44) I consider that we cannot effectively control the Italian Army

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

AMIQ for Chief of MMLA.
" Chief Administrative Officer.

Reference new directive FAN 487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I have the following observations to make :-

1. Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MMLA) has two separate functions and methods of procedure in its capacity of :-
   (a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AC.
   (b) M.M.I.A.

See your AG.091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 1944.

2. (a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give as much responsibility as possible to the Italian Army in order to :-

   (i) Save Allied manpower.
   (ii) Raise Italian morale.
   (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pack Tpt Coys.

(b) (i) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, from the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of nepotism and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for MMLA to order something to be done; in many cases we have to tell the Italians how to do it and watch to see that it is done.

(ii) Unless we retain the right of veto and "Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals ...of Italian Army personnel" of all ranks (see para 4(c) of your AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 Nov 44) I consider that we cannot effectively control the Italian Army and that the result will be a lessening of the direct Italian Military aid to the Allied war effort. The same applies as regards the efficient working of the supply side.

(iii) I therefore recommend that NO change be made in your AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 Nov 44. "Command and Administration of the Italian Army"; or of your AG 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 44.

(c) The above is in particular reference to para 2(d) of Fan 487.

.....2/

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

3. The other main aspects of FAM 467 with which my Sub-Commission is concerned are :-

para 2(h) I have already submitted to AC my views as to the future status of "cooperators" - see P.W. Sub-Commission AC file 1PW/36.

As minute on AC file, copy of this submitted on file 12/131

para 7(b) I am working in cooperation with Industry & Commerce Sub-Commission AC over this. Briefly, the Italian Army has enough stocks to maintain the service units and Internal Security Divisions working for the Allies. The Combat Groups are armed and equipped with British Equipment. Depending on such factors as the possibility and advisability of importing material, machinery etc, to restart factories "to further the military effort in other theatres"; the urgent necessity to turn production into civil rehabilitation channels; the part war set up and formation of the Italian Army etc, - there appears to be no need to apply Italian industrial facilities to the production of lethal munitions of war.

A Brownlie

Major General
(M.I.5.A.)

3421

Copy to: HQ AC
" Naval Sub-Commission A.C.
" Air Force Sub-Commission A.C

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET.
and URGENT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Ref: 4001/CCS.

5 February 1945.

SUBJECT: New Directive from CCS on the Allied Commission.

TO : VP, CA Sec
VP, Pol Sec (2)
VP, Econ Sec
VP, Est Sec
Director, Comms Sub-Com.
" WMD & IPW Sub-Com.

1. Attached is copy of the new directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff addressed to the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Chief Commissioner will discuss the implications of this directive with you at 1600 hours, Tuesday, 6 February, and directs that you should study it in the meantime.

3. The terms of the directive are to be considered as SECRET and should not be referred to publicly in any way. The CCS are at present considering a simultaneous announcement in the United States, United Kingdom and Italy.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MSL/JC.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner.
Land Forces Sub-Com (M/HA) } Not required to attend
Air Force Sub-Com } meeting.
Navy Sub-Com. }

COPY.

SECRET.

WP 15/2.

NEW DIRECTIVE FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE ALLIED COMMISSION.

FAN 487.

Following is Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September, 1944, the US and UK Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in ITALY.

In the light of this agreed US-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

POLITICAL SECTION.

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the US and UK Ambassadors in ROME. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activites of the Allied Commission.

(b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.

(c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.

(d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ident and the Prime Minister of [illegible]
Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Govern-
ment under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise
such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the
Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights
under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve
in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding
military needs and the requirements of the campaign in ITALY.

In the light of this agreed US-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

POLITICAL SECTION.

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the US and UK Ambassadors in ROME. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activites of the Allied Commission.

(b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.

(c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.

(d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine.

(e) The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(f) The US and UK Governments have agreed that the Italian Government will be advised that it is the Allied desire to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit you will facilitate any arrangements for the flow of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature between ITALY and the United Nations and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between ITALY and the United Nations.

(g) The US and UK Governments have agreed that in accordance with the terms of the MOSCOW declaration it is desirable to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and you should be guided accordingly.

(h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in ITALY other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be terminated by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION.

3. The internal organisation of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganisation of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:

(a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.

(b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government and should NOT be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

(c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianised to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).

(d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located at places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

ECONOMIC SECTION.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

and you should be guided accordingly.

(h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in ITALY other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be terminated by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION.

3. The internal organisation of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganisation of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:

(a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.

(b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government and should NOT be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.

(c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianised to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).

(d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located at places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

ECONOMIC SECTION.

4. It is necessary that the maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured. The Italian Government should be advised that to this end and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance it must formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible. In the event that these conditions are NOT met the Allied authorities will NOT hesitate to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures.

5. For the duration of combined operations, the combined US-UK military authorities will be responsible for providing:

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(a) Those quantities of food, fuel, clothing, medical, sanitary and other agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to such operations.

(b) Those supplies such as fertilizer, raw materials, machinery and equipment, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph. As the time when combined military responsibility will terminate will NOT be known when requisitions are being prepared and considered, the importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph will NOT be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may NOT be felt during the period of combined military responsibility.

(c) Those supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against GERMANY and JAPAN.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and ITALY must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will NOT be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the UNITED STATES and British Governments. The UNITED STATES and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

341

7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of Paragraph 4 of NAF 778 are answered as follows:

(a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in ITALY, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Govern-

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(c) Those supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against GERMANY and JAPAN.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and ITALY must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will NOT be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the UNITED STATES and British Governments. The UNITED STATES and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

3/1

7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of Paragraph 4 of NAF 778 are answered as follows:

(a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in ITALY, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Government.

(b) It is desired that industrial rehabilitation in ITALY be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by the Italian resources and such supplies as you may be authorised to import, consistent with the discharge by you of your military mission, with the exception that industries for the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war shall be rehabilitated only to the extent required by you in discharge of your military mission and as will further the military effort in other theatres. Except

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

for those industries the rehabilitation of which is essential to the discharge of your military mission and in furtherance of the military effort in other Theatres, which rehabilitation should be given first priority, industries other than those excluded by the preceding sentence will be given such precedence in rehabilitation as may be determined by the Italian Government.

(c) The extent of your responsibility with respect to the importation of supplies into ITALY is defined in Paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof. Except as is so defined, you have NO responsibility for the importation of supplies into ITALY.

(d) Within the limitation of available shipping and subject to military considerations as determined by you, the extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. The appropriate civilian agencies of the British and American Governments are currently considering methods by which the Italian Government may be assisted in these respects and as soon as decisions in this connection are reached, you will be advised with respect thereto.

8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into ITALY must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.

FINANCIAL SECTION.

9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Land Forces

Ext. 376 HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION MBT/eh
APO 394
TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION

AC TN MEMORANDUM)
) 19 January 1945
NUMBER 1)

RE-ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, AC

1. With effect from the date of this memorandum, the Transportation Sub-Commission, AC, will be composed of a Director, Deputy Director, Planning Staff, and five Divisions - Administration, Movements, Rail, Road, and Port and Warehouse. Their duties are set out in the following paragraphs. It is emphasized, however, that the duties are in all cases within the general framework of the Transportation Sub-Commission's responsibility and subject to any changes in policy that may be laid down by higher authority.

2. The Planning Staff will be responsible for all forward planning on transportation questions; it will advise and work closely with the Priorities Board (see Executive Order Number 4) and with the Movements Division.

3. The Administration Division will cover all internal administration, keeping of personnel records, assignments and transfers of personnel and central secretarial work. Its Accounting Branch will be responsible for accounting for all stores handled at AC warehouses, keeping records, etc. Its Statistical Branch will keep records of all movements by rail, road, sea and other means.

4. The Movements Division will ensure that the policy laid down by the Priorities Board is carried out; it will determine, in accordance with the bids made to it, what traffic is to be carried by rail, road, sea, including coastal, inland water transport, or other means, and how best this work can be coordinated with military movements; for this purpose it will have Rail, Road and Shipping Branches. The Movements Division will make out and circulate programs and be responsible for seeing that they are fulfilled or for notifying those concerned of changes of program. The Movements Division will not, however, be responsible for the technical aspect of the carrying agency's work which is the concern of the Rail, Road, and Port and Warehouse Divisions referred to below, and of the Shipping Sub-Commission.

5. The Rail Division will be responsible for the technical aspect of the Italian Railways' work, for advising the Movements Division what can be carried by rail, of any changes in capacity, and for seeing that the program laid down is carried out in the best way possible. It will also plan and assist with the repair and reconstruction of all rail facilities including track, locomotives, rolling stock, stations, buildings, etc. It will work in close contact with the DMRS and the Italian State Railways.

6. The Road Division will be responsible for technical ques-

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Director, Planning Staff, and five divisions - Administration, Movements, Rail, Road, and Port and Warehouse. Their duties are set out in the following paragraphs. It is emphasized, however, that the duties are in all cases within the general framework of the Transportation Sub-Commission's responsibility and subject to any changes in policy that may be laid down by higher authority.

2. The Planning Staff will be responsible for all forward planning on transportation questions; it will advise and work closely with the Priorities Board (see Executive Order Number 4) and with the Movements Division.

3. The Administration Division will cover all internal administration, keeping of personnel records, assignments and transfers of personnel and central secretarial work. Its Accounting Branch will be responsible for accounting for all stores handled at AC warehouses, keeping records, etc. Its Statistical Branch will keep records of all movements by rail, road, sea and other means.

4. The Movements Division will ensure that the policy laid down by the Priorities Board is carried out; it will determine, in accordance with the bids made to it, what traffic is to be carried by rail, road, sea, including coastal, inland water transport, or other means, and how best this work can be coordinated with military movements; for this purpose it will have Rail, Road and Shipping Branches. The Movements Division will make out and circulate programs and be responsible for seeing that they are fulfilled or for notifying those concerned of changes of program. The Movements Division will not, however, be responsible for the technical aspect of the carrying agency's work which is the concern of the Rail, Road, and Port and Warehouse Divisions referred to below, and of the Shipping Sub-Commission.

341

5. The Rail Division will be responsible for the technical aspect of the Italian Railways' work, for advising the Movements Division what can be carried by rail, of any changes in capacity, and for seeing that the program laid down is carried out in the best way possible. It will also plan and assist with the repair and reconstruction of all rail facilities including track, locomotives, rolling stock, stations, buildings, etc. It will work in close contact with the DMRS and the Italian State Railways.

6. The Road Division will be responsible for technical questions on all operation by road, for advising the Movements Division what can be carried by road, of any changes in capacity, and for seeing that the program laid down is carried out in the best way possible. It will also plan and assist with the repair and provision of road vehicles. It will be responsible for the raising of new road transport units. It will assist and render technical advice to the Italian road organizations.

7. The Port and Warehouse Division will be responsible for the technical aspect of port, warehouse and inland and coastal water

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

transport work and for seeing that all installations are worked in the best way possible. Its responsibilities for warehouses will extend only to those warehouses which are used as incidental to transportation, e.g., at ports and at certain limited points in the interior. The Port and Warehouse Division will advise the Movements Division of port capacities for loading and discharging ships, and of any changes in capacity. It will plan and assist with the repair and construction of all facilities at ports, warehouses, and in connection with coastal and inland water transport. The division will work in close contact with the Shipping Sub-Commission.

8. When rail, road, port, shipping and other facilities are controlled by a military formation, the Movements Division will request an allotment of capacity from the competent military authority.

By command of Rear Admiral STONE:

MERRITT H. TAYLOR
Director
Transportation Sub-Commission

DISTRIBUTION "A"

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Land Forces S.C (MMIA) 40-

G/6

Ref: 212/COS

17 January 1945.

SUBJECT: Coordination with Political Section.

TO : Civil Affairs Section.
Economic Section.
Establishment Section.
Independent Sub-Commissions.
PRO.

G R 18/1 18/1

1. With the growingactivity of the Committees of National Liberation in Kesselring's Italy, the political aspect of problems at this HQ is daily assuming more and more importance. Many matters which, in the past, were not referred to Political Section because it was thought that they were non-political would now, if reviewed again, most definitely require political consideration. Indeed almost every important problem at this HQ has now some political aspect.

2. I would be glad if Sections would, in future, in considering every problem give thought to whether there is a political implication. If there is, the question should be referred to Political Section for their comments before it is put up to a higher level. The letter or signal which finally issues on this question should also be copied to them. I shall be glad if you will bring this matter to the notice of your officers.

Brigadier,
Chiefof Staff.
(Absent on duty)

Copy to: Political Section.

K

20/1

3417

1720

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

39

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394.
Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 222/—/CCS. Inter Office Memo. G/6 17 January 1945.

Subject: Coordination with Land Forces Sub Commission (LFSA).

To: Civil Affairs Section (G)
Land Forces Sub Commission (LFSA)

1. All communications to ACC and 15 Army Group relating to relations, Organization and Italian prisoners of war will be coordinated with Land Forces Sub Commission (LFSA) before despatch, and will issue from the Allied Commission.

2. Such communications will not issue from Land Forces Sub Commission (LFSA), nor from any other Sub Commission or Branch.

3. Civil Affairs Section will be responsible for coordinating all internal and Commission matters between Land Forces Sub Commission (LFSA), Patrolia Branch, Public Safety Sub Commission and any other interested Sub Commissions.

4. In the event of failure to reach agreement the matter will be referred to the Chief of Staff.

E Tabb Wray
Lt Colonel,
Chief of Staff.
(Drafted by Chief of Staff)

Copies to: G-5 Section AFHQ
Political Section
Economic Section
War Materials Disposal and Italian PW Sub Commission.

SD Distn
A/C — G/6
S/G/19
SD/28
A/G
Cere

K
20 Jan

341.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Office Routine File 38

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref. 219/5 /COS. 8 January 1945

SUBJECT: Information for the Acting President.

TO : DCOS, CA Section
DCOS, Econ Section
DCOS, Est Section
VP, Political Section
GOC, Land Forces Sub Com.
Director, Communications Sub Com.
P. R. O.
Rep., UNRRA.
Rep., IGCR.
Director, WMD & IDW Sub Com.

1. Reference 219/4/COS dated 6 Jan 45.

2. Sections and Sub Commissions concerned will submit their statements IN DUPLICATE.

[illegible]
[illegible] Officer,
[illegible]

3410

Copy to: Acting President.
Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 219/4/COS.

6 January 1945.

SUBJECT; Information for the Acting President.

TO : DCOS, CA Section
DCOS, Econ Section
DCOS, Est Section
VP, Political Section,
GOC, Land Forces Sub-Com.
Director, Communications Sub-Com.
F.R.O.
Rep., UNRRA.
Rep., IGCR.
Director, WMD & PW Sub-Com.

1. The Acting President is anxious to acquaint himself on some of the more important items of the Commission's work. Some of these are defined on the accompanying list together with the Section or Independent Sub-Commission responsible and the office or officers who should, subject to agreement of Heads of Sections, present the information.

2. Heads of Sections and Independent Sub-Commissions will furnish to Chief of Staff by 9th January a short statement (not exceeding 500 words) on each subject, giving the salient facts and figures and will be ready to discuss at a personal interview with Mr. Macmillan on or after 10th January. The object of these interviews is two-fold: (a) to bring the Acting President up to date on the various subjects: (b) to afford the Acting President an opportunity of renewing his acquaintance with the officers and officials of the Sections and Sub-Commissions concerned.

3. The Acting President will wish to be informed of future progress in these matters and Heads of Sections and Independent Sub-Commissions will furnish further information thereon to Chief of Staff from time to time.

340

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Acting President.
Chief Commissioner.

	Subject.	Section or Sub-Commission.	Officer Concerned.
1.	Food: (a) Generally, but especially the question of the 300 grams ration. (b) Distribution.	Economic Sec. Food Sub-Com.	Col.Densmore (A) Col.Legg (B)
2.	Status of Italian Prisoners of War in ITALY.	Political Sec. WD & IDW Sub-Com	Mr.Hopkinson (B) Mr.Schott (A) Lt.Col.Campbell (B)
3.	Epuration.	Civil Affairs Sec	Brig.Upjohn (B)
4.	Housing. Repair of damaged houses and living conditions of the people	Public Works & Utilities Sub-Com	Lt.Col.Jenny (A) Lt.Col.Craig (B)
5.	Roads & Bridges. What progress the Italians are making.	Public Works & Utilities Sub-Com	Lt.Col.Jenny (A) Lt.Col.Rhodes (B)
6.	Transport. (Carrandini is said to have been promised 500 trucks in England). Motor tyres and bicycle tyres.	Transportation Sub-Commission.	Mr.Taylor (A) Col.Thomas (B)
7.	Industrial reconstruction. For instance, what is happening to the Galito hydro-electric plant?	Industry Sub-Com Public Works & Utilities Sub-Com	Mr.Vaughan (A) Lt.Col.Jenny (A)
8.	Local Elections.	Local Government Sub-Commission.	Col.Spicer (B)
9.	Carabinieri. Their clothing, equipment and status.	Public Safety Sub-Commission.	Col.Chapman (A)
10.	C.I.P. and control of oil in Italy.	Economic Sec. Commerce Sub-Com.	Mr.Cleveland (A) Maj.Brereton (B)
11.	The Lira Account.	Finance Sub-Com	Col.Craifftey-Smith (B) Comd.[illegible] (A)
12.	Land Reform - especially in Southern Italy and Sicily.	Agriculture Sub-Commission	Mr.Allbaugh (A)
13.	Statement of facts about, and of the limiting factors in Italian rearmament	Land Forces Sub-Commission.	Major-General Browning (B)
14.	Civilianisation: (a) Progress in obtaining American civilians (b) Progress in obtaining British civilians	Establishment Section.	Col.Fiske (A) Lt.Col.Jones (B)
15.	Italian Minister for Occupied Territories	Civil Affairs Sec	Brig.Upjohn (B)

340

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

3.	Equitation.	
4.	Housing. Repair of damaged houses and living conditions of the people	Public Works & Utilities Sub-Com	Lt.Col.Craig (B)
5.	Roads & Bridges. What progress the Italians are making.	Public Works & Utilities Sub-Com	Lt.Col.Jenny (A) Lt.Col.Rhodes (B)
6.	Transport. (Carrandini is said to have been promised 500 trucks in England). Motor tyres and bicycle tyres.	Transportation Sub-Commission.	Mr.Taylor (A) Col.Thomas (B)
7.	Industrial reconstruction. For instance, what is happening to the Gelito hydro-electric plant?	Industry Sub-Com Public Works & Utilities Sub-Com	Mr.Vaughan (A) Lt.Col.Jenny (A)
8.	Local Elections.	Local Government Sub-Commission.	Col.Spicer (B)
9.	Carabinieri. Their clothing, equipment and status.	Public Safety Sub-Commission.	Col.Shapman (A)
10.	C.I.P. and control of oil in Italy.	Economic Sec. Commerce Sub-Com.	Mr.Cleveland (A) Maj.Broreton (B)
11.	The Lira Account.	Finance Sub-Com	Col.Graffitey-Smith (B) Comd Hedges (A)
12.	Land Reform - especially in Southern Italy and Sicily.	Agriculture Sub-Commission	Mr.Allbaugh (A)
13.	Statement of facts about, and of the limiting factors in Italian rearmament	Land Forces Sub-Commission.	Major-General Browning (B)
14.	Civilianisation: (a) Progress in obtaining American civilians (b) Progress in obtaining British civilians	Establishment Section.	Col.Fiske (A) Lt.Col.Jones (B)
15.	Italian Minister for Occupied Territory.	Civil Affairs Sec	Brig.Upjohn (B)
16.	Question of enlistment into Italian Army of patriots who cross the line. Patriot policy generally.	Land Forces Sub-Commission. Civil Affairs Sec	Col.Kerr (A) Lt.Col.Craig (B)
17.	Displaced Persons UNRRA IGCR	Displaced Persons UNRRA IGCR	Col.Findley (B) Mr.Keeny (A) Sir Clifford Heathcote Smith(B)

3405

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

	Subject.	Section or Sub-Commission	Officer Concerned
18.	Communications.	Communications Sub-Commission	Col.Henderson (B)
19.	Public Relations.	Public Relations Branch.	Maj.Fielden (B) Maj.Bergin (A)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1780

36

On file

(K) 46.

D

SECRET

Copy No. 29

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

Ref: 4001/COS.

5 January 1945.

Attached is a copy of a paper, "Allied Policy towards Italy", which I wrote and circulated to various Government Departments in London as a basis for my discussions with them during my visit to England a few weeks ago.

The paper was designed only as a preliminary essay and for consumption in London. It must be read in that light. Nevertheless I think that some of my American and British colleagues at Allied Force Headquarters and the Allied Commission will be interested to see it.

3407

H.MACMILLAN,
The Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean.
Acting President
Allied Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFO 394

Ref: 4001/C05.

5 January 1945.

Attached is a copy of a paper, "Allied Policy towards Italy", which I wrote and circulated to various Government Departments in London as a basis for my discussions with them during my visit to England a few weeks ago.

The paper was designed only as a preliminary essay and for consumption in London. It must be read in that light. Nevertheless I think that some of my American and British colleagues at Allied Force Headquarters and the Allied Commission will be interested to see it.

3407

H.MACMILLAN,
The Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean.
Acting President
Allied Commission.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET. SECRET.

27 Nov 44

ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY.

Note by the Resident Minister, Central Mediterranean.

PART ONE.

Introductory.

I

Italy, like Gaul, is at present divided into three parts:

(1) Kesselring's Italy, population approximately 21 million, covering about three-eighths of the country.

(2) Liberated Italy, under Allied Military Government. This covers about one-eighth of the country; population about 5 million.

(3) Liberated Italy with Sicily and Sardinia under the Italian Government. This covers about one-half of the country; population about 19 million.

The functions of the Allied Commission extend over these three territories. It must plan forward for Kesselring's Italy. It must plan currently for, and administer, Allied Military Government Italy, both in respect of present needs and in anticipation of restoring the territory to the Italians. It must plan and advise in respect of Italian Government Italy.

Any attempt to place these functions under separate authorities would be unworkable. Indeed, in the latter part of 1943 experience proved this to be the case, and the remedial measures then taken met with general approval.

It is not always recognised that for the greater part of the work of the Commission, with the exception of the Political Section (for which I am making separate proposals) concerns the first two of these territories. Moreover, the advisory duties will tend to decrease for Italian Government territory; although participation in planning of imports, both consumption and capital goods, must necessarily continue. Some degree of inspection must also be maintained in order to secure the maximum use of their own facilities by the Italian Government. This is the normal practice of screening authorities (such as the Middle East Supply Centre, North African Joint Economic Board and other similar bodies) which have operated under the general guidance of the Combined Authorities in Washington.

340

This situation presents an exceedingly difficult administrative problem. Any reorganisation of the functions and composition of the Allied Commission in order to carry out the new policy towards Italy must have regard to these overriding facts or disaster will ensue.

II

Apart from the psychological difficulty inherent in maintaining

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

(2) Liberated Italy, under Allied Military Government. This covers about one-eighth of the country; population about 5 million.

(3) Liberated Italy with Sicily and Sardinia under the Italian Government. This covers about one-half of the country; population about 19 million.

The functions of the Allied Commission extend over these three territories. It must plan forward for Kesselring's Italy. It must plan currently for, and administer, Allied Military Government Italy, both in respect of present needs and in anticipation of restoring the territory to the Italians. It must plan and advise in respect of Italian Government Italy.

Any attempt to place these functions under separate authorities would be unworkable. Indeed, in the latter part of 1943 experience proved this to be the case, and the remedial measures then taken met with general approval.

It is not always recognised that for the greater part of the work of the Commission, with the exception of the Political Section (for which I am making separate proposals) concerns the first two of these territories. Moreover, the advisory duties will tend to decrease for Italian Government territory; although participation in planning of imports, both consumption and capital goods, must necessarily continue. Some degree of inspection must also be maintained in order to secure the maximum use of their own facilities by the Italian Government. This is the normal practice of screening authorities (such as the Middle East Supply Centre, North African Joint Economic Board and other similar bodies) which have operated under the general guidance of the Combined Authorities in Washington.

340

This situation presents an exceedingly difficult administrative problem. Any reorganisation of the functions and composition of the Allied Commission in order to carry out the new policy towards Italy must have regard to these overriding facts or disaster will ensue.

II

Apart from the psychological difficulty inherent in maintaining Allied Military Government in a part of the liberated area while allowing the Italian Government to administer the rest, there has been a duality in Allied policy to Italy ever since the signing of the Armistice was followed by the doctrine of co-belligerency. Sometimes we have stood upon one leg - the strict enforcement of Armistice terms upon a defeated enemy; sometimes upon the other - friendship and assistance to a co-belligerent whose relations with us are becoming more and more those of an Ally.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

We must now, I think take the line that the recent formal change of name from Allied Control Commission to Allied Commission has a real meaning. It should be our purpose only to exercise control where our military needs require it. Whenever possible the function of the Commission should be that of a mission of experts offering advice. If our advice is not accepted, we must shrug our shoulders and allow affairs to take their course. Only in this way can we bring a sense of reality and responsibility to the Italian authorities.

We should now inform the Italian Government that while we propose to hold absolutely to all our rights under the Armistice, and do not intend to discuss any settlement of purely post-war problems (for instance, territorial and colonial arrangements), yet, subject to the overriding military needs for the conduct of the campaign, we shall hold these rights largely in reserve. We shall make the transfer of authority to the Italian Government as great a reality as possible. In consultation with them we shall provide, if they require it, expert advice on such questions as justice, education, fine arts, and the like. If they prefer to do without these experts in their territory, we shall raise no objection. In the more important sphere of finance, labour regulation and wage negotiation, we should strongly urge them to listen to our views, although the principle would be that the final decision would rest with them. Indeed in every matter which is within the competence of the Italians to do for themselves, that is, regulation of their own internal political and economic life, we shall play the role of advisers, except to the extent that the military authorities require to control specific functions or to take over particular properties.

There are, however, two stern warnings which we should not hesitate to give. First, insofar as the scale of Allied imports depends upon the efficiency or otherwise of home production, we must make it clear that we shall have regard to the degree of Italian self-help - within the physical possibilities of their present situation - in fixing the standard of our help to them. Secondly, we must insist on the maintenance of law and order. If security is threatened, in a way to impede or imperil our military operations, we should not hesitate to reimpose military government either in whole or in part. Subject to these provisos, our handing over of control to the Italian Government in their territory should be far reaching and sincere.

PART TWO.

Muting the middle "C".

(The Allied Control Commission has been renamed the Allied Commission).

There are certain specific changes which I recommend in pursuance of this policy. I have discussed them informally with the Chief Commissioner and some of the more important officials of the Commission and we have reached a broad measure of agreement.

I

I propose that the Political section of the Commission be abolished.

This Section, which is managed by an American and British Vice-President of equal rank, belongs to the early post-[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

reality as possible. In [illegible]
require it, expert advice on such questions as [illegible]
and the like. If they prefer to do without these experts in their territory,
we shall raise no objection. In the more important sphere of finance, labour
regulation and wage negotiation, we should strongly urge them to listen to our
views, although the principle would be that the final decision would rest with
them. Indeed in every matter which is within the competence of the Italians
to do for themselves, that is, in relation of their own internal political and
economic life, we shall play the role of advisers, except to the extent that
the military authorities require to control specific functions or to take over
particular properties.

There are, however, two stern warnings which we should not hesitate to give. First, insofar as the scale of Allied imports depends upon the efficiency or otherwise of home production, we must make it clear that we shall have regard to the degree of Italian self-help - within the physical possibilities of their present situation - in fixing the standard of our help to them. Secondly, we must insist on the maintenance of law and order. If security is threatened, in a way to impede or imperil our military operations, we should not hesitate to reimpose military government either in whole or in part. Subject to these provisos, our handing over of control to the Italian Government in their territory should be for reaching and sincere.

PART TWO.

Muting the Middle "C".

(The Allied Control Commission has been renamed the Allied Commission).

There are certain specific changes which I recommend in pursuance of this policy. I have discussed them informally with the Chief Commissioner and some of the more important officials of the Commission and we have reached a broad measure of agreement.

I

I propose that the Political section of the Commission be abolished.

This Section, which is managed by an American and British Vice-President of equal rank, belongs to the early post-Armistice period. Then Italian sovereignty was little more than a fiction, resting upon an aged and exiled King, with his little retinue of insignificant courtiers and an impotent if gallant Marshal - huddled in a mediaeval castle in Brindisi, itself the most distant point in Italy which fugitives can reach.

Since that time policy has developed. The Italians have received in Rome an American and a British Ambassador. They are sending their Ambassadors in return to Washington and London. Although there is some fine distinction (in the British, not the American case) between the pre-war and the post-Armistice relations, the ordinary public, not appreciative of the niceties

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

of the Protocol, do not easily differentiate between a diplomatic representative with the personal rank of Ambassador and a "right-down regular royal" Ambassador, old style.

Moreover, the Italians are now themselves in direct relations with United Nations and neutral Powers. Interchange of Ambassadors and Ministers is going on at an ever increasing pace, the Latin republics of South America being particularly prominent in this diplomatic pilgrimage to Rome.

In theory all formal communications between the representatives of other Powers and the Italian Government should pass through the Commission, there being no objection to informal and unofficial contacts. This has not applied to Russia; and the United States and British representatives have now notified the Commission of the resumption of direct relations between their Governments and the Italian Government. It would seem, therefore, that to maintain in theory a rule which was never in practice enforced or even capable of being enforced, would be useless and even ludicrous. I propose that we should confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal, and at the same time tell them that they will be expected to keep us generally informed on any negotiations in which they may be engaged.

Similarly, in theory all Italian communications to their representatives abroad are made through the Allied Commission. They are either sent in a cypher of which we hold the key or in Allied cyphers. Copies "en clair" are sent to the Political Section. In the case however of Russia, messages are sent through Soviet cyphers, no copy being sent to the Commission.

The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council has proposed that the Italian representative in Moscow be given his own cypher. It seems difficult to refuse this request. The question of the provision of independent cyphers for the Italian representatives in London and Washington has been raised by the Italians. It has been referred by the Commission to Allied Headquarters and by them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

I propose that this request should be granted.

I propose that this privilege should be extended to their representatives in other countries.

3407

The original insistence upon the communication of copies of telegrams to the Political Section was based partly on considerations of military security. But members of the Advisory Council (including Greece, France, and Yugoslavia) have cypher facilities; so has the Brazilian Chargé d'affaires. It is true that other United Nations and neutral representatives accredited to the Quirinal have no facilities; but the representatives of the same Powers at the Vatican have them.

Thus, so far as military news coming out of Italy is concerned, we are already trying to block the channel with a sieve. Another leak or two are of little consequence.

If these concessions are made, there is no need for the Political

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

In theory all formal communications between the representatives of other Powers and the Italian Government should pass through the Commission, there being no objection to informal and unofficial contacts. This has not applied to Russia; and the United States and British representatives have now notified the Commission of the resumption of direct relations between their Governments and the Italian Government. It would seem, therefore, that to maintain in theory a rule which was never in practice enforced or even capable of being enforced, would be useless and even ludicrous. I propose that we should confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal, and at the same time tell them that they will be expected to keep us generally informed on any negotiations in which they may be engaged.

Similarly, in theory all Italian communications to their representatives abroad are made through the Allied Commission. They are either sent in a cypher of which we hold the key or in Allied cyphers. Copies "en clair" are sent to the Political Section. In the case however of Russia, messages are sent through Soviet cyphers, no copy being sent to the Commission.

The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council has proposed that the Italian representative in Moscow be given his own cypher. It seems difficult to refuse this request. The question of the provision of independent cyphers for the Italian representatives in London and Washington has been raised by the Italians. It has been referred by the Commission to Allied Headquarters and by them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

I propose that this request should be granted.

I propose that this privilege should be extended to their representatives in other countries.

3402

The original insistence upon the communication of copies of telegrams to the Political Section was based partly on considerations of military security. But members of the Advisory Council (including Greece, France, and Yugoslavia) have cypher facilities; so has the Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires. It is true that other United Nations and neutral representatives accredited to the Quirinal have no facilities; but the representatives of the same Powers at the Vatican have them.

Thus, so far as military news coming out of Italy is concerned, we are already trying to block the channel with a sieve. Another hole or two are of little consequence.

If these concessions are made, there is no need for the Political Section as such to continue. The function of giving political advice to the Commission can be undertaken by the British and American Embassies. In order to effect this, I have worked out a plan (details of which are given in Appendix A 1) with the British and American Ambassadors in Rome and it has their approval. I propose that it should be put into effect forthwith.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

II

I propose that we surrender the control over Italian legislation in Italian territory.

In point of fact, nothing in the Armistice terms gives the Commission any right to be consulted on all decrees of the Italian Government. In practice, a large proportion of decrees proposed are sent for study and advice by the appropriate Sub-Commission. Sometimes, as in the case of a recent decree raising wage rates, the Council of Ministers approved the decree without prior and detailed approval from the Commission. (I am bound to observe that in this instance my sympathies were with the Italian Government, who as sometimes happens with Governments, could not withstand powerful political pressure fortified only by the theoretical arguments of civil servants and statisticians.) The formal claim to approve decrees is difficult to enforce - as has been proved - since the only remedy would involve the removal of the Minister or the fall of the Ministry. It is wiser, in the new conditions, to rely on moral persuasion and even, when required, pressure; and to develop a normal habit of consultation on matters, particularly economic, when our joint interests are involved or when action taken in Italian Italy must, in fact, be followed in Allied Italy. The formal renunciation of this right to approve decrees, would certainly be welcomed by the Italians.

III

Similarly, I propose that the control of Italian appointments in Italian Italy be modified or surrendered.

Again, it is doubtful whether we have a right to this control under the Armistice terms. But shortly after the first transfer of territory (11th February, 1944) there was an exchange of letters between General Mason MacFarlane and Marshal Badoglio. In effect, by these letters it was agreed that all appointments to the Government and all senior appointments by the Government would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. I attach in Appendix B.i. a list of offices finally agreed to be subject to this control, so far as the Civil Affairs Section is concerned. It will be seen that it goes down to the Mayors and Town Clerks of towns of 15,000 inhabitants. Appendix B.ii. gives a similar list affecting the Economic Section.

The Italian Government has recently requested that the position be revised. They have submitted a very short list of offices to which this right should apply. It includes Ministers and Under Secretaries of the Government, the heads of the fighting services and so forth (Appendix B.iii).

So far as the approval of officials in Appendices B.i. and B.ii. is concerned, I take it that the chief object was to secure "defascistication" rather than to guarantee efficiency. Indeed, after a country has been for a generation under a Fascist regime, these two purposes may well be contradictory rather than complimentary. While the right of approval has certainly helped to achieve the first purpose, I think it is no longer necessary. Public opinion does not need stimulating on this issue. On the contrary, epuration in Italy (as in other countries) may be pushed dangerously far.

In practice, Italian nominations are approved almost as a matter of course.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

with Governments, could not withstand powerful political pressure fortified only by the theoretical arguments of civil servants and statisticians.) The formal claim to approve decrees is difficult to enforce - as has been proved - since the only remedy would involve the removal of the Minister or the fall of the Ministry. It is wiser, in the new conditions, to rely on moral persuasion and even, when required, censure; and to develop a normal habit of consultation on matters, particularly economic, when our joint interests are involved or when action taken in Italian Italy must, in fact, be followed in Allied Italy. The formal renunciation of this right to approve decrees, would certainly be welcomed by the Italians.

III

Similarly, I propose that the control of Italian appointments in Italian Italy be modified or surrendered.

Again, it is doubtful whether we have a right to this control under the Armistice terms. But shortly after the first transfer of territory (11th February, 1944) there was an exchange of letters between General Mason MacFarlane and Marshal Badoglio. In effect, by these letters it was agreed that all appointments to the Government and all senior appointments by the Government would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. I attach in Appendix B.i. a list of offices finally agreed to be subject to this control, so far as the Civil Affairs Section is concerned. It will be seen that it goes down to the Mayors and Town Clerks of towns of 15,000 inhabitants. Appendix B.ii. gives a similar list affecting the Economic Section.

The Italian Government has recently requested that the position be revised. They have submitted a very short list of offices to which this right should apply. It includes Ministers and Under Secretaries of the Government, the heads of the fighting services and so forth (Appendix B.iii).

So far as the approval of officials in Appendices B.i. and B.ii. is concerned, I take it that the chief object was to secure "defascistication" rather than to guarantee efficiency. Indeed, after a country has been for a generation under a Fascist regime, these two purposes may well be contradictory rather than complimentary. While the right of approval has certainly helped to achieve the first purpose, I think it is no longer necessary. Public opinion does not need stimulating on this issue. On the contrary, epuration in Italy (as in other countries) may be pushed dangerously far.

In practice, Italian nominations are approved almost as a matter of course.

I propose that our control over all the appointments in Appendices B.i and B.ii be surrendered forthwith.

About the list submitted by the Italians themselves I am not so sure, but my inclination would be to surrender this formal right also, and rely on Allied influence and authority only. I feel this all the more as the legal right only rests on this exchange of letters between the General and the Marshal. Although the undertaking given in these letters (Appendix B.iv) is no doubt one of those inherited by the Bonomi Government from its predecessor, yet (unlike the

-4-

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

short and long Armistice terms which were read and accepted by every member of the new Government) these letters - either by mischance or contrivance - were overlooked.

I therefore urge that we waive the right of approval altogether - with one exception.

A short list should be spread of Service chiefs - to include Chiefs of staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. In their case it would perhaps be wiser to ask that the approval should be obtained of the Supreme Allied Commander or the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

If this recommendation is approved, certain consequential changes will have to be made in the legal documents of transfer of successive provinces from Military Government to Italian Government, since it has been the practice to include in these a clause preventing the removal of any Italians appointed by Military Government authority to posts within the territories concerned.

This is a mere formality.

IV

I propose that local officers of the Allied Commission should be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy.

One of the features of the control which is most apparent to and therefore to some extent resented by the Italians is the presence of local allied officers in all the regions handed back to Italian control. Since, in many cases, these are the same officers who were functioning during the period of military government, the change from "direct" to "indirect rule" is correspondingly obscured.

The Commission itself, under the two main Sections of General Administration and Economic Affairs, is organised into some twenty Sub-Commissions, corresponding to the various Italian Ministries. In the regions are Regional officers, with specialists from one or other of these Sub-Commissions to assist them. Although a very drastic reduction has taken place recently in the total so employed, this only strengthens the argument for their total elimination. They are now insufficient to govern, but sufficient to interfere. And their presence tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of the Italians themselves.

3403

For instance, during the recent riots at Palermo, it was the Italian prefect who was responsible for calling out the troops, which he did somewhat precipitately. He had a Regional Commissioner who was powerless either to act or restrain action. Also the very presence of a Regional Commissioner in Italian administered territory allowed the Italians to pursue the congenial plan of throwing upon us - in the public opinion of the world - a responsibility which belongs to themselves.

It is true that there must be local contacts between the Allied Military and Naval authorities in Italian governed Italy, especially in places where there are still Allied installations. But this function could well be performed by Liaison Officers attached to the various Military Area and District Commanders. Where matters were incapable of local adjustment or when technical advice was required (for instance, on transportation and public utilities)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

If this recommendation is approved, certain consequential changes will have to be made in the legal documents of transfer of successive provinces from Military Government to Italian Government, since it has been the practice to include in these a clause preventing the removal of any Italians appointed by Military Government authority to posts within the territories concerned.

This is a mere formality.

IV

I propose that local officers of the Allied Commission should be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy.

One of the features of the control which is most apparent to and therefore to some extent resented by the Italians is the presence of local Allied officers in all the regions handed back to Italian control. Since, in many cases, these are the same officers who were functioning during the period of military government, the change from "direct" to "indirect rule" is correspondingly obscured.

The Commission itself, under the two main Sections of General Administration and Economic Affairs, is organised into some twenty Sub-Commissions, corresponding to the various Italian Ministries. In the regions are Regional officers, with specialists from one or other of these Sub-Commissions to assist them. Although a very drastic reduction has taken place recently in the total so employed, this only strengthens the argument for their total elimination. They are now insufficient to govern, but sufficient to interfere. And their presence tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of the Italians themselves.

3403

For instance, during the recent riots at Palermo, it was the Italian prefect who was responsible for calling out the troops, which he did somewhat precipitately. We had a Regional Commissioner who was powerless either to act or restrain action. And the very presence of a Regional Commissioner in Italian administered territory allowed the Italians to pursue the convenient plan of throwing upon us - in the public opinion of the world - a responsibility which belongs to themselves.

It is true that there must be local contacts between the Allied Military and Naval authorities in Italian governed Italy, especially in places where there are still Allied installations. But this function could well be performed by Liaison Officers attached to the various Military Area and District Commanders. Where matters were incapable of local adjustment or when technical advice was required (for instance, on transportation and public utilities) special "trouble shooters" could be summoned from the Commission at Rome or, at the request of the Italians, specialist officers made available to them for special duties.

The general view of the senior members of the Allied Commission favours complete withdrawal. The Political Advisers (in the shape of representatives of the Embassies) feel that it is of considerable psychological value. Allied Force Headquarters would have to agree in detail the system of Liaison officers from the point of view of District and Area Commanders - but I do not anticipate any difficulty in devising a workable plan.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Undoubtedly, the more the contacts and, where necessary, pressure - between the Allies and the Italian Government can be confined to the centre and at a high level, the better relations will be. Italian Ministers resent the appearance rather than the reality of control. And the withdrawal of officers from the field would enormously enhance the prestige of the Government.

The officers made available - probably some 150 if we begin with Southern Italy and the islands - could be used in the general pool. Some could strengthen H.Q. and replace some of whom we would wish to be rid; others would be most valuable for the Northern Regions; those surplus or least competent could be spared altogether.

V

Certain central, as well as local, functions of the Allied Commission in Italian Government Italy should be abandoned altogether.

There are a number of functions of sub-commissions organised to carry them out which can well be surrendered. This does not, I regret, mean that any of these sub-commissions can be liquidated. They must remain for the work in Allied Italy and to prepare the work in Kesselring's Italy. Such are, in the administrative field, Monuments and Fine Arts, Education, Local Government. In the economic field, arrangements are already being made to hand over to the Italians (subject only to inspection) the distribution of food and other supplies in Italian territory.

Here again, this proposal is approved by the leading officers of the Commission.

VI

Changes in the Commission itself have been suggested as likely to emphasise the sincerity of the new policy embodied in recent statements of the President and the Prime Minister. "Demilitarisation" has been put forward on this as well as other grounds, and will be discussed in a later section of this paper. In view of the arguments advanced in the introduction, and the importance of the military government aspect of the Commission's work, there is a very definite limit to what can be achieved by this method. But, in general, both by the issue of a new and clear directive and by a re-statement publicly and with great precision of Allied policy towards Italy, the whole conception of the Commission's new purpose and functions in Italian territory can be made effective. We are to be advisers, not controllers; elder brothers to our wayward and errant juniors.

All Italians are children. They are naughty - very naughty, sometimes vicious children. But all are children. They must be treated kindly but firmly. In any case, we can take from their ancient literature as our guide a sentiment which we have often thought the peculiar tradition of the Anglo-Saxon race - "Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos".

To the Italians both parts of this sentence might apply. They were intolerably puffed up; they have been wholly defeated. Justice should now be tempered with mercy.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

would be most valuable for the Northern Region, could be spared altogether.

could be spared altogether.

V

Certain central, as well as local, functions of the Allied Commission in Italian Government Italy should be abandoned altogether.

There are a number of functions of sub-commissions organised to carry them out which can well be surrendered. This does not, I regret, mean that any of these sub-commissions can be liquidated. They must remain for the work in Allied Italy and to prepare the work in Kesselring's Italy. Such are, in the administrative field, Monuments and Fine Arts, Education, Local Government. In the economic field, arrangements are already being made to hand over to the Italians (subject only to inspection) the distribution of food and other supplies in Italian territory.

Here again, this proposal is approved by the leading officers of the Commission.

VI

Changes in the Commission itself have been suggested as likely to emphasise the sincerity of the new policy embodied in recent statements of the President and the Prime Minister. "Demilitarisation" has been put forward on this as well as other grounds, and will be discussed in a later section of this paper. In view of the arguments advanced in the introduction, and the importance of the military government aspect of the Commission's work, there is a very definite limit to what can be achieved by this method. But, in general, both by the issue of a new and clear directive and by a re-statement publicly and with great precision of Allied policy towards Italy, the whole conception of the Commission's new purpose and functions in Italian territory can be made effective. We are to be advisers, not controllers; elder brothers to our work and errant juniors.

All Italians are children. They are naughty - very naughty, sometimes vicious children. But all are children. They must be treated kindly but firmly. In any case, we can take from their ancient literature an our guide a sentiment which we have often thought the peculiar tradition of the Anglo-Saxon race - "Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos".

To the Italians both parts of this sentence might apply. They were intolerably puffed up; they have been wholly defeated. Justice should now be tempered with mercy.

PART THREE

Allied Commission: Composition and Structure.

I

The introductory paragraphs of this paper explained the three-fold character of the Italian problem. This reflects itself in the somewhat complicated composition of the Commission itself. It has to serve needs arising out of past, present and future military operations. This should influence the approach to the question of demilitarisation, which is being recommended in certain quarters in London and in similar circles in Washington.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

I cannot believe that those who propose rapid or wholesale demilitarisation have understood that three-quarters of the effort of the Commission is necessarily concentrated on those parts of Italy occupied or about to be occupied by Allied armies - that is, what I have called, Allied Italy and Kesselring's Italy.

In Allied Military Government territory it is really quite impracticable for the organisation to function except with officers in uniform. This will apply until the final stages of the operation. When the enemy have been driven from all Italian territory and when the first shock has been taken by the A.M.G. organisation in the rear of our advancing armies, all Italy (except perhaps certain disputed provinces, such as Venezia Giulia), will in due course be returned to Italian control. The Commission can then be almost wholly demilitarised because its sole function will then be to give expert advice to the Italians and to protect our long-term interests under the Armistice.

If the plan for withdrawing local representatives of the Commission as a whole or by stages from Italian Government Italy is adopted, it will automatically reduce the number of military officers employed, or make them available elsewhere. It will also, however, eliminate altogether the one sphere, that is in the regions of Italian-controlled territory, where total "civilianisation" might have been practicable.

If it is agreed that the three Italies must be treated as a whole - and this has not been challenged by anyone who has seriously studied the problem on the spot - then the great majority of the officers of the Commission must be in uniform. The simplest examples of the indissoluble character of the Italian problem emphasises the impracticability of any but the most gradual demilitarisation. Oil from Apulia must be moved into the communs of Naples or the Province of Grosseto; so must wheat from Macerata Province (which is a surplus area) be moved into Italian Government Italy further south. How can any plan be made of rehabilitation of power or productive resources, which does not take into account existing conditions in the two liberated Italies and make some calculation of probable needs in enemy occupied Italy?

"Demilitarisation" is only possible in the Headquarters of the Commission, not in the field. In Headquarters this is already being done to a considerable extent. There are 49 Americans although only 2 British civilians of officer status in the two Key sections, Economic and Civil Affairs. More are being asked for. Brigadier Lush - Chief of Staff - has been occupied for many in London with obtaining additional British civilians for important posts. and there is no objection, in principle, to a further extension. But there are limiting factors to this process. Certain positions, for technical reasons, must be held by military officers. For instance, Allied Military Courts which are set up in different parts of the country, including Italian Government territory, must be manned by military officers since their only sanction is military. It has been found necessary to use these courts as the only effective way of preventing thieving and pilferage of Allied property.

It is very important to allow some degree of flexibility. It is desirable to send officers from Headquarters in Rome into the field and vice versa. Since officials in the field in A.M.G. territory must be in uniform, this consideration clearly limits the extent to which civilians should be introduced to Headquarters. In effect, they should be confined to certain posts - mainly

3402

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

been taken by the A.M.G. organisation in the rear of our advancing troops, all Italy (except perhaps certain disputed provinces, such as Venezia Giulia), will in due course be returned to Italian control. The Commission can then be almost wholly demilitarized because its sole function will then be to give expert advice to the Italians and to protect our long-term interests under the Armistice.

If the plan for withdrawing local representatives of the Commission as a whole or by stages from Italian Government Italy is adopted, it will automatically reduce the number of military officers employed, or make them available elsewhere. It will also, however, eliminate altogether the one sphere, that is in the regions of Italian-controlled territory, where total "civilianisation" might have been practicable.

If it is agreed that the three Italies must be treated as a whole - and this has not been challenged by anyone who has seriously studied the problem on the spot - then the great majority of the officers of the Commission must be in uniform. The simplest example of the indissoluble character of the Italian problem emphasises the impracticability of any but the most gradual demilitarisation. Oil from Apulia must be moved into the communs of Naples or the Province of Grosseto; so must wheat from Macerata Province (which is a surplus area) be moved into Italian Government Italy further south. How can any plan be made of rehabilitation of power or productive resources, which does not take into account existing conditions in the two liberated Italies and make some calculation of probable needs in enemy occupied Italy?

"Demilitarisation" is only possible in the Headquarters of the Commission, not in the field. In Headquarters this is already being done to a considerable extent. There are 49 American although only 2 British civilians of officer status in the two key sections, Economic and Civil Affairs. More are being asked for. Brigadier Lush - Chief of Staff - has been occupied lately in London with obtaining additional British civilians for important posts. And there is no objection, in principle, to a further extension. But there are limiting factors to this process. Certain positions, for technical reasons, must be held by military officers. For instance, Allied Military Courts which are set up in different parts of the country, including Italian Government territory, must be manned by military officers since their only sanction is military. It has been found necessary to use these courts as the only effective way of preventing thieving and pilferage of Allied property.

It is very important to allow some degree of flexibility. It is desirable to send officers from Headquarters in Rome into the field and vice versa. Since officials in the field in A.M.G. territory must be in uniform, this consideration clearly limits the extent to which civilians should be introduced to Headquarters. In effect, they should be confined to certain posts - mainly senior posts at Headquarters - particularly on the economic side. It may be urged that certain officials - for instance in the Monuments and Fine Arts Sub-Commission in the field might be civilians. Just the opposite is the case. The only hope of doing that early work of salvage on which so much depends is the prestige enabling a soldier to get some materials and labour out of the military at a time when they are naturally preoccupied with the battle. Many a Simone Martini or Giotto has been saved by timely attention - a little roofing or shoring up a frescoed wall. The Professor in battledress masquerading as a Colonel may succeed; in cap and gown (or even flannels) he would scarcely reach the scene of action.

3402

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

II

Apart from the question of "demilitarisation" which has so exercised the War Department and the War Office (somewhat strangely, since in our citizen armies so many of the soldiers are but disguised civilians) the chief trouble of the Commission has been absenteeism. For a long period, there has been no Chief Commissioner, and for many months, the Vice President of the Economic Section absented himself. His successor functioned for a few weeks and then returned home. (It may perhaps be worth observing that civilians absent themselves without leave more freely than soldiers). If we are to have any chance of orderly progress, this must cease. There must be introduced a more serious attitude in London and Washington towards appointments to high places. The principle by which the right of appointment to particular posts has been regarded as vested (like an advowson) in one or other Government, is vicious. After due consideration I will suggest some necessary changes in the higher ranks. After that, I trust the promotion and discipline within the body will be left to the Chief Commissioner.

The morale of the Commission has been seriously shaken by these vacillations and uncertainties. And there has been a feeling that their work has been misunderstood and unfairly criticized.

I think that all is now set for a new phase, and I shall make every endeavour (with the help of the Chief Commissioner) to restore and revivify the organisation as a team, loyal both to itself and its duties.

PART FOUR.

The Economic Problem.

I. INTRODUCTORY

It is unnecessary to emphasise the serious situation in which present day Italy finds herself from the economic point of view. Even before the war, in spite of all the effort towards self-sufficiency made by the Fascist regime, the financial and economic position was radically unsound. Budgetary figures were faked or at least distorted to conceal the real facts.

The problem of whether the Italian Peninsula can be made a "going concern" is age-long. Without coal or iron, Italy is not a naturally strong unit. The development of hydro-electric power has to some extent in the last twenty years replaced the necessity for coal imports. But the hydro-electric power of Southern Italy has been greatly reduced; that of Central Italy has almost wholly gone; that of Northern Italy is threatened with total destruction.

Before the war the balance of payments, since imports of all kinds, including wheat and oil, were necessary, could only be kept stable by four means. First, a certain range of exports, chiefly of high-class manufactured goods and some agricultural products; second, tourist traffic; third, emigration; fourth, shipping earnings. The first and last have disappeared. The second has been replaced by a particularly unremunerative form of tourist - the Allied armies - who up to now at least have spent in Italy not dollars or sterling, but A.M.G. lire popularly known under the expressive soubriquet of "phoney dough". Emigration alone has continued in the shape of many hundreds of thousands of

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

as vested (like an advowson) in the [illegible]. consideration I will suggest some necessary changes in the higher [illegible] that, I trust the promotion and discipline within the body will be left to the Chief Commissioner.

The morale of the Commission has been seriously shaken by these vacillations and uncertainties. And there has been a feeling that their work has been misunderstood and unfairly criticised.

I think that all is now set for a new phase, and I shall make every endeavour (with the help of the Chief Commissioner) to restore and revivify the organisation as a team, loyal both to itself and its duties.

PART FOUR.

The Economic Problem.

I. INTRODUCTORY

It is unnecessary to emphasise the serious situation in which present day Italy finds herself from the economic point of view. Even before the war, in spite of all the effort towards self-sufficiency made by the Fascist regime, the financial and economic position was radically unsound. Budgetary figures were faked or at least distorted to conceal the real facts.

The problem of whether the Italian Peninsula can be made a "going concern" is age-long. Without coal or iron, Italy is not a naturally strong unit. The development of hydro-electric power has to some extent in the last twenty years replaced the necessity for coal imports. But the hydro-electric power of Southern Italy has been greatly reduced; that of Central Italy has almost wholly gone; that of Northern Italy is threatened with total destruction.

Before the war the balance of payments, since imports of all kinds, including wheat and oil, were necessary, could only be kept stable by four means. First, a certain range of exports, chiefly of high-class manufactured goods and some agricultural products; second, tourist traffic; third, emigration; fourth, shipping earnings. The first and last have disappeared. The second has been replaced by a particularly unremunerative form of tourist - the Allied armies - who up to now at least have spent in Italy not dollars or sterling, but A.M.G. lire popularly known under the expressive sobriquet of "phoney dough". Emigration alone has continued on the shops of many hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners who are being maintained abroad. At the same time, apart from the destruction of power and machinery, large quantities of poultry (in Southern Italy 85 per cent), sheep and cattle (in Southern Italy 60-70 per cent), horses, mules and oxen have been carried off by the Germans. Where they have been spared, by the retreating, they have been freely requisitioned by the liberating armies. Very substantial quantities of vegetables and meat running into some hundreds of thousands of tons have been purchased locally by the Allied Quarter-masters. In addition to these traditional exactions modern invasions add a new factor to injury to a country which mediaeval technique at least avoided. Not only is property taken from the inhabitants, but it is paid for by a vast inflation of currency threatening the stability alike of savings and earnings. Considering the fact that the Italian financial position is quite desperate, it is a very remarkable tribute to the saving habits of the people and their confidence in established authority that a runaway inflation on the Greek model has so far been avoided.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND NO. 785020

In addition to all these disasters, the transport and communication system of liberated Italy has been largely destroyed. In Kesselring's Italy it is being daily demolished by the efforts of the Mediterranean Air Force. Railways, bridges, culverts, rolling stock, motor transport, have suffered from Allied and enemy destruction alike. To the extent that these facilities have been replaced they are primarily reserved for military requirements.

All this, of course, is the well deserved punishment for the guilt of their rulers which the Italian people must bear. But none the less these are facts in the situation which cannot be overlooked by their liberators.

In these circumstances, nothing could have kept liberated Italy in existence except a high level of imports of civilian needs hitherto financed, requisitioned and shipped by the Allied Military authorities. According to the President's statement of 4th October, 1944, these had to that date amounted to 2,300,000 long tons of civilian supplies of which 1,107,000 were food products.

II

THE IMPORT PROBLEM

These civilian imports into both sections of liberated Italy have up to now been regarded as a legitimate war expenditure and carried on the military budgets. Their scale has been regulated by the so-called "disease and unrest" formula; that is to say, the Supreme Allied Commander has been required to certify that his requisitions in this field are necessary in order to prevent the outbreak of either one or the other in a manner likely to incommode military operations.

It is believed that the War Department has recently reached the conclusion that even on this scale there was no justification for carrying such expenditure in respect of "Southern Italy" on their budget. This is quite illogical. As already stated, Italy must be treated as a whole. Products must be moved from surplus to deficiency areas without regard to the exact geographical line dividing Allied Controlled Italy from Italian controlled Italy. Moreover, the lines of communication still to some extent traverse the latter territory. It is for this reason that the Commune of Naples is still kept under military government although geographically in a transferred area. In any case, whether these supplies are carried upon a military budget or not, they must be introduced into the country at the expense of the American and British tax-payer. Since they must be requisitioned as a military priority, called forward by military authorities and shipped by the military, it would seem more satisfactory that they should continue to be dealt with on the military account. It is not likely essential from a practical point of view if we are to obtain delivery.

3401

It is desirable, therefore, that imports of consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be inserted by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs in Italy. Moreover, since some continuity of planning is necessary for efficiency, they should be so provided as long as Italy is a theatre of or base for military operations and for a period of say six months thereafter. In addition, the scale of these should be regulated by a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula, and this for two reasons. First, because another year of shortage has greatly increased the needs of the people; second, because it is equitable that having regard to the fact that many Italians are actively engaged in military, air and naval operations in support

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

THE IMPORT PROBLEM.

These civilian imports into both sections of liberated Italy have up to now been regarded as a legitimate war expenditure and carried on the military budgets. Their scale has been regulated by the so-called "disease and unrest" formula; that is to say, the Supreme Allied Commander has been required to certify that his requisitions in this field are necessary in order to prevent the outbreak of either one or the other in a manner likely to encompass military operations.

It is believed that the War Department has recently reached the conclusion that even on this scale there was no justification for carrying such expenditure in respect of "Southern Italy" on their budget. This is quite illogical. As already stated, Italy must be treated as a whole. Products must be moved from surplus to deficiency areas without regard to the exact geographical line dividing Allied Controlled Italy from Italian controlled Italy. Moreover, the lines of communication still to some extent traverse the latter territory. It is for this reason that the Comzone of Naples is still kept under military government although geographically in a transferred area. In any case, whether these supplies are carried upon a military budget or not, they must be introduced into the country at the expense of the American and British tax-payer. Since they must be requisitioned as a military priority, called forward by military authorities and shipped by the military, it would seem more satisfactory that they should continue to be dealt with on the military account. It is essential from a practical point of view if we are to obtain delivery.

It is desirable, therefore, that imports of consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs in Italy. Moreover, since some continuity of planning is necessary for efficiency, they should be so provided as long as Italy is a theatre of or base for military operations and for a period of say six months thereafter. In addition, the scale of these should be regulated by a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula, and this for two reasons. First, because another year of shortage has greatly increased the need of the people; second, because it is equitable that having regard to the fact that many Italians are actively engaged in military, air and naval operations in support of our arms, a standard of life for the civilian population, many of them dependants of the fighting men, should be regulated at a somewhat higher level than that suitable to a conquered but non-cooperative nation. The degree of increase cannot be represented by a fixed percentage. Account must be taken of each requirement. Imports of food must be such as to allow a daily ration of 300 grammes throughout the whole of the liberated areas and planning to allow such a ration when reconquering Italy is freed. At present General Allen, by an act of wise statesmanship, has increased the ration south of the Garigliano from 200 to 300 grammes a day. It is true that his main purpose was to assist in the "cmessing" or grain collection and reduce the pressure on wages by breaking the black market. This experiment was remarkably successful in both its primary objects. But a second motive was a desire to raise standards to something nearer what doctors tell us

3402

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

constitute the necessities of life. (It is interesting to note that the Swedish Red Cross has never provided less than a ration of 390 grammes per day for the population of Athens, with 440 grammes per day for heavy workers). General Wilson in his telegrams, stimulated by the statements of the President and the Prime Minister, has made several appeals for authority to extend the 300 gramme ration north of the Gurigliano line covering all Allied Italy. This is partly for humanitarian and partly for military reasons, since the condition of Rome, where the ration is 200 grammes a day, and of such towns as Florence and Siena has caused great anxiety on security grounds to the military authorities. His telegram LAO 763 of 19th October (See Appendix C) summarises his arguments which were presented in earlier messages. So far, no reply has been received. Similarly, boots and clothing must be proportionately increased; trucks for civilian transport must be made available, together with tyres, tubes, and spare parts. In the President's Declaration of 4th October, 1,700 additional trucks were promised. None has arrived, nor has any indication yet been received from Washington, as to the date when they may be expected. The supplementary declaration referred to temporary power facilities to furnish electricity. These have been on order for nine months. We know that they are actually in existence, but again their destination is wrapped in mystery and silence.

The normal requisitioning of civilian supplies on military account framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula is essential. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be willing to provide their share of the cost on the agreed percentage according to the over-all agreement with the United States Government.

In addition to supplies on this account, the declarations by the Heads of the two Governments have led us to believe that further deliveries would be made available to meet the needs not only of the present but of the immediate future. These were to be provided, so far as the United States were concerned, by various sources of finance outside military responsibility, such as value of the American troops pay in Italy, remittances from American citizens to Italy, and various other items. It was not clear what the total would be. Various calculations have been made ranging from 150 to 250 million dollars. In any event, I trust that His Majesty's Government will contribute a percentage of whatever the sum may prove to be in the usual proportion.

Nevertheless, in spite of every effort by General Wilson to get some indication from Washington of how the declarations made in September and October are to be translated into reality, so far no reply of any kind has been received - except of a negative and dilatory character. On the assumption, however, that this is merely due to the long technical procedure of the C.C.S. and C.C.A.C., General Wilson has given instructions for planning to proceed. These are set out in MAC 810 of 1st November (Appendix D). MAC 1 of 9th November, which was sent during my absence in Athens, in attempting to elaborate the plan, departed from its essential principle. It should be withdrawn. A programme of industrial first-aid is being drawn up to range somewhere within the figures believed likely to be available - 150 million to 200 million dollars. This is being drawn up for the immediate needs of Southern and Central Italy and making some allowance for the future requirements of Northern Italy. A preliminary detailed programme has already been sent to the C.C.A.C. through the hands of two of their visiting members on 21st October. All that remains is to secure official approval. Meanwhile some doubt, which I can hardly believe to be well based, has crept into the more sceptical minds on the Commission. It is suggested that the new sources (troop pay, remittances, etc) are [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

and spare parts. In the President's Declaration of 4th October, 1,700 additional trucks were promised. None has arrived, nor has any indication yet been received from Washington, as to the date when they may be expected. The same Declaration referred to temporary power facilities to furnish electricity. These have been on order for nine months. We know that they are actually in existence, but again their destination is wrapped in mystery and silence.

The normal requisitioning of civilian supplies on military account framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula is essential. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be willing to provide their share of the cost on the agreed percentage according to the over-all agreement with the United States Government.

In addition to supplies on this account, the declarations by the Heads of the two Governments have led us to believe that further deliveries would be made available to meet the needs not only of the present but of the immediate future. These were to be provided, so far as the United States were concerned, by various sources of finance outside military responsibility, such as value of the American troops pay in Italy, remittances from American citizens to Italy, and various other items. It was not clear what the total would be. Various calculations have been made ranging from 150 to 250 million dollars. In any event, I trust that His Majesty's Government will contribute a percentage of whatever the sum may prove to be in the usual proportion.

Nevertheless, in spite of every effort by General Wilson to get some indication from Washington of how the declarations made in September and October are to be translated into reality, so far no reply of any kind has been received - except of a negative and dilatory character. On the assumption, however, that this is merely due to the long techdical procedure of the C.C.S. and C.C.A.C., General Wilson has given instructions for planning to proceed. These are set out in "Z" 810 of 1st November (Appendix D). MOO 1 of 9th November, which was sent during my absence in Athens, in attempting to elaborate the plan, departed from its essential principle. It should be withdrawn. A programme of industrial first-aid is being drawn up to range somewhere within the figures believed likely to be available - 150 million to 200 million dollars. This is being drawn up for the immediate needs of Southern and Central Italy and making some allowance for the future requirements of Northern Italy. A preliminary detailed programme has already been sent to the C.C.A.C. through the hands of two of their visiting members on 21st October. All that remains is to secure official approval. Meanwhile some doubt, which I can hardly believe to be well based, has crept into the more sceptical minds on the Commission. It is suggested that the new sources (troop pay, remittances, etc) are to be in substitution not in addition to, the present expenditure for normal civilian needs; in other words, that these sources of income must be used not to introduce any form of rehabilitation of transport and power, but to provide the barest necessities of life - food and clothing, which are at present carried on the military budget. Should this prove to be the case, the standard of life of the Italian people would fall to a figure which would be hardly possible to calculate. In any event, it is absolutely essential that the position should be cleared up.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

III

GENERAL.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the task of those who have to plan for the needs of the Italian people is no easy one. It reminds one of those ingenious puzzles that torture young or old who fall beneath their spell, where it is necessary to entice four carefully balls in a small cardboard box to fall into their respective or appropriate holes. They may easily be done at once, three often, but the whole four present a formidable test of patience and determination. In this case the four balls are availability of supply, finance, shipping and port acceptability. It has seldom been possible to obtain clearance on all these at once. Yet without some near miracle of concurrent agreement, reasonable planning for the future becomes impossible. Of course it may be urged that there is no reason to worry ourselves unduly about the unhappy position in which the Italians find themselves. Their disasters are their own fault. But this policy, harsh though it might be, would at least have been practicable had it not been for the recent decision formally made on behalf of the two Allied Governments. To turn now from the path of generosity there marked out is unthinkable. In addition, this more lenient mood seems to me greatly in the interests of the world in general. Whatever may be the post-war policy towards Germany, we have accepted Italy into a position different from that of a beaten enemy; we have invented and, to some extent, benefitted by the doctrine of co-belligerency; and, from the longer aspect, prosperity like peace is indivisible. The problems that face Italy are serious enough. When we reach the North we shall find large working class populations in Turin and Milan. It will test all our efforts to keep them alive. They will be the first large urban populations in our care situated inland and not upon the seaboard. To bring them food without railways or trucks will present a formidable problem to Allied Military Government. At present, slaves although they may be of German occupation, the factories are running and the people are largely employed. When they are "liberated" the power will probably be destroyed, the factories largely dismantled, the machine tools wrecked or taken to Germany, and the raw materials not available. It will need all the patience, courage and devotion that British and American administrators can give if we are to preserve Italy and her 45 millions of people from collapse into despair, anarchy and revolution. To fail to make the effort because of our grievances against Italy, however justified, may be to have won the war and lost the peace.

3:00

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section J-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX A i

Political Section of the Allied Commission

Proposed Memorandum of Arrangements to be agreed between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government arising out of the establishment of American and British Embassies in Rome, and Italian Representatives in Washington and London.

I

The Political Section of the Allied Commission (formerly Allied Control Commission), which has hitherto consisted of two Joint Vice Presidents, one American and one British, will be abolished.

In its place, the United States and British Embassies have agreed to make available such facilities as the Commission may require.

The functions of the Advisory Council for Italy will of course remain as laid down in the Moscow Agreement.

II

In order to make this plan effective the following arrangements will be made :

(a) Frequent personal meetings between the Chief Commissioner, the United States Ambassador, and the British Ambassador will continue as heretofore.

(b) In addition, the United States and British Ambassadors will each nominate a senior member of their staff to give political advice to the Chief Commissioner and to the various sections of the Commission on day to day business as it arises. Suitable accommodation will be made available for them at the Offices of the Commission. They will each have an assistant and a small joint secretariat will be established in order to ensure the necessary co-ordination. All papers affecting political problems will be passed to them and their concurrence sought where necessary by the various sections. They will have the title of Political Adviser and be regarded as in every sense members of the Commission.

18th November, 1944.

H.M.

3393

APPENDIX A ii

The technical officers of the Embassies in Rome, that is, the Commercial Counsellor, the Labour Attache and the Press Attache, find themselves in a somewhat difficult position since many of the functions that they would normally perform are in fact carried out by the Allied Commission; and information which they would normally hope to obtain from the Italian Government is only really obtainable from the Commission or some of the Sections of Allied Force Headquarters. On the analogy of the arrangements I have proposed for the Political side described in Appendix A i in my paper, I would propose the following arrangements, and would do my best to secure their general support if acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

(1) Economic Section

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 78502

will be abolished.

In its place, the United States and British Embassies have agreed to make available such facilities as the Commission may require.

The functions of the Advisory Council for Italy will of course remain as laid down in the Moscow Agreement.

II

In order to make this plan effective the following arrangements will be made :

(a) Frequent personal meetings between the Chief Commissioner, the United States Ambassador, and the British Ambassador will continue as heretofore.

(b) In addition, the United States and British Ambassadors will each nominate a senior member of their staff to give political advice to the Chief Commissioner and to the various sections of the Commission on day to day business as it arises. Suitable accommodation will be made available for them at the Offices of the Commission. They will each have an assistant and a small joint secretariat will be established in order to ensure the necessary co-ordination. All papers affecting political problems will be passed to them and their concurrence sought where necessary by the various sections. They will have the title of Political Adviser and be regarded as in every sense members of the Commission.

H.M.

18th November, 1944.

3393

APPENDIX A ii

The technical officers of the Embassies in Rome, that is, the Commercial Counsellor, the Labour Attache and the Press Attache, find themselves in a somewhat difficult position since many of the functions that they would normally perform are in fact carried out by the Allied Commission; and information which they would normally hope to obtain from the Italian Government is only really obtainable from the Commission or some of the Sections of Allied Force Headquarters. On the analogy of the arrangements I have proposed for the Political side described in Appendix A i in my paper, I would propose the following arrangements, and would do my best to secure their general support if acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

(1) Economic Section

I propose that the Economic Section (for which I have to find a suitable American and British head) should have attached to it as advisers the American and British Commercial Counsellors. They would not act in an executive capacity, but would be in a position not dissimilar from that of Directors on the Board of a Company. This would give Mr. Nosworthy a regularised position in the Commission, give him a room there, and allow him to see papers, etc. From my conversations with him, this is what he would like.

(2) Labour Attache.

I would propose that Mr. Brayne become (as has already been suggested by the Commission) head of the Labour Sub-Commission while retaining his position at the

British/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NNDC NO. 785020

British Embassy. This proposal was generally agreed, but has now been turned down by London - I understand by the Ministry of Labour. While I quite appreciate the Minister's feeling that the Labour Attache has really important work to do and should be free to accomplish it, I think it should be put to the Minister of Labour that he would be able to do this much more effectively by taking on the additional functions of head of the Labour Sub-Commission than placed as he is now. As head of the Sub-Commission he will be able to have contacts both with the Government and with the Trades Union leaders and play the role which I think Mr. Bevin wishes him to play of assisting to rebuild Italian labour on a properly organized trade union basis. When the Commission withers away, he will continue in his post as Labour Attache with great experience behind him and with great influence. If he merely remains in a detached position he cannot achieve very much; and I am sure it would be to the interests of those purposes which the Minister of Labour has at heart if he were allowed to accept the post of head of the Labour Sub-Commission while of course retaining his position as Labour Attache to the Embassy.

(3) Press Attache.

I am proposing a reorganisation of the Press work in Italian Government Italy and Allied Government Italy. At present P.W.B. is the integrated organ for propaganda under the direct control of A.F.H.Q. The Allied Commission also has a Public Relations Officer and the whole mechanism of propaganda. The relations between these two have never been very happy or a very clear line of demarcation drawn as to their functions. I should like them to be amalgamated so far as liberated Italy is concerned(both Italian and A.M.G. territory) and operate directly under the Commission. P.W.B. should, I think, retain its functions in respect of Kesselring's Italy where propaganda is a direct instrument of military operations and directed not so much to the Italians as to the Germans. If this reorganisation takes place, I suggest that the Press Officers of the Embassies should be brought in either into the structure of executive control or in an advisory capacity so as to make a proper coordination of effort. On the American side this would present no difficulties. O.W.I. officers would be made available to the Commission. In the case of the British side, a certain number of P.W.B. officers will have to be seconded to the Commission. I am not sure what financial arrangements will have to be made. If they are Army officers on the Mediterranean War Establishment no trouble arises; if they are not, some special arrangements will have to be made. It is clear also that the joint publicity operations of the Commission will be divided into (a) telling the Italians about the American and British war effort, and in particular the work of the Allied Commission; (b) telling foreign correspondents about the work of the Allied Commission. There will be some purely British and purely American propaganda which the British Press Attache and the American Press Attache will have to handle separately. Nevertheless, under the present physical conditions they would be wise to get as much as they can done through the integrated machine, and if they are diplomatic and ingenious they should have no difficulty in this. At any rate this plan must assist and cannot injure the possibility of putting over British propaganda either jointly with the Americans or separately as our own effort.

These proposals have in view -

(a) To prevent the growth of any divergence between the Allied Commission and A.F.H.Q. and the Embassies.

(b) To utilize to the best advantage the very efficient technical officers which the Embassies can provide.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

his post as Labour Attache with great experience [illegible]. If he merely remains in a detached position he cannot achieve very much; and I am sure it would be to the interests of those purposes which the Minister of Labour has at heart if he were allowed to accept the post of head of the Labour Sub-Commission while of course retaining his position as Labour Attache to the Embassy.

(3) Press Attache.

I am proposing a reorganisation of the Press work in Italian Government Italy and Allied Government Italy. At present P.W.B. is the integrated organ for propaganda under the direct control of A.F.H.Q. The Allied Commission also has a Public Relations Officer and the whole mechanism of propaganda. The relations between these two have never been very happy or a very clear line of demarcation drawn as to their functions. I should like them to be amalgamated so far as Liberated Italy is concerned(both Italian and A.M.G. territory) and operate directly under the Commission. P.W.B. should, I think, retain its functions in respect of Kesselring's Italy where propaganda is a direct instrument of military operations and directed not so much to the Italians as to the Germans. If this reorganisation takes place, I suggest that the Press Officers of the Embassies should be brought in either into the structure of executive control or in an advisory capacity so as to make a proper coordination of effort. On the American side this would present no difficulties. O.W.I. officers would be made available to the Commission. In the case of the British side, a certain number of P.W.B. officers will have to be seconded to the Commission. I am not sure what financial arrangements will have to be made. If they are Army officers on the Mediterranean War Establishment no trouble arises; if they are not, some special arrangements will have to be made. It is clear also that the joint publicity operations of the Commission will be divided into (a) telling the Italians about the American and British war effort, and in particular the work of the Allied Commission; (b) telling foreign correspondents about the work of the Allied Commission. There will be some purely British and purely American propaganda which the British Press Attache and the American Press Attache will have to handle separately. Nevertheless, under the present physical conditions they would be wise to get as much as they can done through the integrated machine, and if they are diplomatic and ingenious they should have no difficulty in this. At any rate this plan must assist and cannot injure the possibility of putting over British propaganda either jointly with the Americans or separately as our own effort.

These proposals have in view -

(a) To prevent the growth of any divergence between the Allied Commission and A.F.H.Q. and the Embassies.

(b) To utilise to the best advantage the very efficient technical officers which the Embassies can provide.

(c) To give these officers an opportunity of acquiring experience and influence and thereby strengthen their position when the time comes for the Commission to end.

30th November, 1944.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX B i

Civil Affairs Section's Appointments

LEGAL

First Presidents of Courts of Appeal
Consellors of Cassation and Appeal
Procuratori Generali
Sostituti di Procuratori Generali
Presidenti di Tribunali
Procuratori del Re

Primo Pretori (of towns of pop.50,000)

PUBLIC SAFETY

Legion Commanders CC.RR
Legion Commanders Guardia di Finanza
Questori Public Security Service
Regional Directors Prison Service
Commandants (and upwards) Fire Service

PUBLIC HEALTH

Chief Medical Officer at Ministry of Interior

INTERIOR

Prefects
Vice Prefects
Vice Prefect Inspectors
Consiglieri Primo Grado
Consiglieri Secondo Grado
First Secretary to Prefect
Special Secretary
Director of Religious Affairs
Sindaci) of communes of
Town Clerk) pop.15,000

EDUCATION

Rectors
Professors (titular)
Presidi of Faculties
Academy Inspectors of schools (local and centralised)
Heads of Divisions in Ministry of Education
Provveditori
Presidi of Schools
Inspectors of Schools
University Lecturers

3397

APPENDIX B ii

Economic Section's Appointments

SUBJECT:- Level at which Appointment of Italian Officials should be approved by Allied Commission.

FINANCE: All appointments down to the level of Grade 4., Commissari, Direttori Generali, Segretaria Generale of banks; insurance companies and other finance institutions clothed with public interest. Other appointments which the Italian Government may believe to be of interest to the Commission.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES: Appointments down to Grade 5 (Ispettore Generale del Genio Civile, Capo Compartimento etc.)

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY: Heads and Deputies of Direzione Generale, titular and

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Director of Religious Affairs
Sindaci) of communes of
Town Clerk) pop.15,000

PUBLIC SAFETY

Legion Commanders CC.RR
Legion Commanders Guardia di Finanza
Questori Public Security Service
Regional Directors Prison Service
Commandants (and upwards) Fire Service

EDUCATION

Rectors
Professors (titular)
Presidi of Faculties
Academy Inspecters of schools (local and centralised)
Heads of Divisions in Ministry of Education
Provveditori
Presidi of Schools
Inspectors of Schools
University Lecturers

PUBLIC HEALTH

Chief Medical Officer at Ministry of Interior

APPENDIX B ii

Economic Section's Appointments

SUBJECT:- Level at which Appointment of Italian Officials should be approved by Allied Commission.

FINANCE: All appointments down to the level of Grade 4., Commissari, Direttori Generali, Segretaria Generale of banks; insurance companies and other finance institutions clothed with public interest. Other appointments which the Italian Government may believe to be of interest to the Commission.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES: Appointments down to Grade 5 (Ispettore Generale del Genio Civile, Capo Compartimento etc.)

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY: Heads and Deputies of Direzione Generale, titular and managing directors of industrial or parastatal institutions. Vice Commissarios of important companies.

LABOUR: Commissioners of National Insurance Agencies and other national agencies formerly linked into the Fascist cooperative structures concerned with such labour matters as welfare, assistance, protection and safety of workers. Appointments to the position of Regional and Provincial labour Director.

AGRICULTURE: Chiefs of Ministerial Bureaus such as Bonifica and Upsea, Compartimento officials of the rank of Agricultural Inspectors and Consorzio Agrario officials.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TRANSPORTATION: Director of Mercantile Marine, Principal Inspector of the General Inspectorate of civil motorisation and transportation concessions. Director General of the Italian State Railways.

SHIPPING: Commissarios of the four subsidized Italian steamship companies, "Italia", "Adriatica", "Tirrenia" and "Oriens", formerly "Lloyd Triestino".

FOOD: Direttore Generale dell'Alimentazione and the Head of the Ufficio Nazionale dell-Approvigionamento e Distribuzione Alimentare.

APPENDIX B iii

Italian Government's Proposed List

Ministri e Sottosegretari di Stato
Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale dell-Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Marina
Capo di Stato Maggiore Aviazione
Principali Rappresentanti diplomatici
Alto Commissario per l'Epurazione
Vice Alti Commissari per l'Epurazione
Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza
Commandante Generale dei Carabinieri

Added Suggestions:-

High Commissioners for Sicily and Sardinia.

APPENDIX B iv

Ref: CC/E/134/000.1

10th March, 1944.

Recent events over certain appointments have shown that it is clearly desirable for us to have a mutually satisfactory arrangement to prevent misunderstandings and subsequent difficulties which it is in all our interests to avoid. I would suggest, therefore, that it should be agreed that you will let me know before any appointment to the Government is actually announced. Equally, I should be glad if you will impress upon all the members of your Government that they should, in turn, consult the appropriate authorities in the Allied Control Commission before making any senior appointments in their own departments either at the seat of the Italian Government or in those provinces under Italian jurisdiction. As they already enjoy close and friendly relations with the Sub-Commission with whom they work, this should be an easy matter to arrange. It is clear that each minister must be strictly accountable for all appointments in his department and the arrangement which I propose should be to their interests in carrying out the work which we are doing together.

I should be glad if you will let me know whether you are in full agreement with the proposals made in this letter. If so, I will give the necessary instructions to

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX B iii

Italian Government's Proposed List

Ministri e Sottosegretari di Stato
Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale dell'Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Marina
Capo di Stato Maggiore Aviazione
Principali Rappresentanti diplomatici
Alto Commissario per l'Epurazione
Vice Alti Commissari per l'Epurazione
Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza
Commandante Generale dei Carabinieri

Added Suggestions:-

High Commissioners for Sicily and Sardinia.

APPENDIX B iv

10th March, 1944.

Ref: CC/P/134/000.1

Recent events over certain appointments have shown that it is clearly desirable for us to have a mutually satisfactory arrangement to prevent misunderstandings and subsequent difficulties which it is in all our interests to avoid. I would suggest, therefore, that it should be agreed that you will let me know before any appointment to the Government is actually announced. Equally, I should be glad if you will impress upon all the members of your Government that they should, in turn, consult the appropriate authorities in the Allied Control Commission before making any senior appointments in their own departments either at the seat of the Italian Government or in those provinces under Italian jurisdiction. As they already enjoy close and friendly relations with the Sub-Commission with whom they work, this should be an easy matter to arrange. It is clear that each minister must be strictly accountable for all appointments in his department and the arrangement which I propose should be to their interests in carrying out the work which we are doing together.

I should be glad if you will let me know whether you are in full agreement with the proposals made in this letter. If so, I will give the necessary instructions to the various heads of Sections and Sub-Commissions of the Allied Control Commission as soon as you confirm that members of your government have been notified of our agreement.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner.

H.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio
Capo del Governo.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

Salerno, 13th March, 1944.

Dear General,

After having worked with me for quite some time, you know that it is my absolute decision to proceed in any matter in full accord with the Allied Control Commission over which you preside.

With regard to this, at next Thursday's Council of Ministers, I shall give definite orders to the effect that no government appointment be made without previous agreement with the Commission.

I hope that the same feelings prevail with the Control Commission toward us, so that it might be possible to come, in common agreement, to a revision of certain positions given to certain persons in the provinces recently turned over to the Italian Government, and which render nearly impossible a normal functioning of government.

With cordial greetings,

/s/ BADOGLIO.

To General Noel Mason MacFarlane,
Chief of the Allied Control Commission,
Naples.

APPENDIX C

L.C 763 of 19th October, 1944.

Reference C.L 852, L.C 736.

Subject is Bread Ration for Italy.

1. Recent public announcements, which have been given wide circulation in Italy by the press, are interpreted by me to mean that the policy is to provide a 300 gram bread ration immediately; this ration to be nation wide on liberation of the North.

2. Confirmation is requested that my understanding in paragraph 1 is correct and that you wish me to implement this policy.

3396

3. This policy cannot be implemented without increased imports since the import program authorized for the months of November and December is below the monthly scale of imports indicated in paragraph 4 of my letter of 24th September. From a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean Theatre might be jeopardised if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

4. If I am to establish a 300 gram bread ration, there are 2 alternatives:

a. Step up monthly shipments to the level required to produce total imports of 1,500,000 tons during the harvest year. This would mean a monthly program based on all Italy estimated at 165,000 tons from January through June 1945, or beginning December if possible.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

With cordial greetings,

/s/ BADOGLIO.

To General Noel Mason MacFarlane,
Chief of the Allied Control Commission,
Naples.

APPENDIX C

LAC 763 of 19th October, 1944.

Reference CAL 852, LAC 736.

Subject is Bread Ration for Italy.

1. Recent public announcements, which have been given wide circulation in Italy by the press, are interpreted by me to mean that the policy is to provide a 300 gramm bread ration immediately; this ration to be nation wide on liberation of the North.

2. Confirmation is requested that my understanding in paragraph 1 is correct and that you wish me to implement this policy.

3. This policy cannot be implemented without increased imports since the import program authorized for the months of November and December is below the monthly scale of imports indicated in paragraph 4 of my letter of 24th September. From a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean Theatre might be jeopardized if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

4. If I am to establish a 300 gram bread ration, there are 2 alternatives:

a. Step up monthly shipments to the level required to produce total imports of 1,500,000 tons during the harvest year. This would mean a monthly program based on all Italy estimated at 165,000 tons from January through June 1945, or beginning December if possible.

b. Use existing stocks, together with imports under the existing program. The effect of this plan would be to exhaust the amassed grain by 1st March assuming inland transport not a limiting factor. I can only undertake this procedure under an absolute guarantee that stocks so used will be replaced in full to permit continuance of the 300 gram ration until the next harvest season. Without such guarantee I can see nothing but trouble ahead.

5. I recommend the first alternative. However even if approved, I would be unable to announce such a plan prior to the approval of a shipping program to meet it.

6. Your instructions are requested. In the meantime and in any event ACC will step up its efforts to realize maximum local production, particularly in products which may be substituted for wheat, and will continue to tighten up the administration of cereals wherever possible.

3395

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX D

NAF 810 of 1st November, 1944.

Civilian supplies for Italy is subject.

In view of the public statements of the President and the Prime Minister, I am proposing to take the following steps.

1. I am arranging for all current requisitions for basic civilian supplies to be reviewed on two assumptions:

First, that they will be provided and financed as heretofore;

Secondly, that they would be framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula.

2. In addition and in conformity with the joint statement of 26th September and the President's statement of 10th October, I have instructed the Allied Commission to draw up a programme of industrial first-aid. This will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

3. I am assuming that the necessary finance for (1) will be provided so long as Italy is a Theatre of or Base for Military Operations and for a period of 6 months thereafter.

4. For planning purposes for (2) I am assuming an expenditure commensurate with the sources of new finance outside military responsibility mentioned in the President's statement, to be spent over a period of 12 months.

I hope this will meet with your approval as I am convinced that this is the right course to pursue.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS, MADE IN THE NOTE BY THE RESIDENT MINISTER, CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN, ENTITLED "ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY".

1. That the Political Section of the Allied Commission be abolished. (Page

2. That the Allied Commission confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal. (Page 3).

3. That Italian representatives abroad be given their own cyphers. (Page 3).

4. That the Allied Commission surrender its control over Italian legislation in Italian territory. (Page 4).

5. That the right of approval by the Allied Commission of all Italian appointments in Italian Italy be surrendered except in regard to the appointments of Service Chiefs to include Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. (Page 4).

6. That local officers of the Allied Commission be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy. (Page 5).

7. That the functions of certain sub-commissions in respect of Italian Government Italy be abandoned by the Allied Commission. (Page 6).

8. That "demilitarization" is only possible at Headquarters, Allied Commission, and not in the field. (At Headquarters there are a number of limiting factors.) (Page 6).

9. That consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs, and that these imports should be maintained as long as Italy is a theatre of base for military operations and for a period of six months thereafter, and that the "disease and unrest" formula should be more liberally interpreted for this purpose. (Page 9).

10. That an additional programme for industrial first-aid be approved, to be financed, so far as the American side goes, from the sources of new finance mentioned in the President's statement of 10th October; His Majesty's Government to contribute a percentage of whatever sum may prove to be in the usual proportion. (Page 10).

27th NOVEMBER, 1944.

339

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

2. That the Allied Commission confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal. (Page 3).

3. That Italian representatives abroad be given their own cyphers. (Page 3).

4. That the Allied Commission surrender its control over Italian legislation in Italian territory. (Page 4).

5. That the right of approval by the Allied Commission of all Italian appointments in Italian Italy be surrendered except in regard to the appointments of Service Chiefs to include Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. (Page 4).

6. That local officers of the Allied Commission be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy. (Page 5).

7. That the functions of certain sub-commissions in respect of Italian Government Italy be abandoned by the Allied Commission. (Page 6).

8. That "demilitarization" is only possible at Headquarters, Allied Commission, and not in the field. (At Headquarters there are a number of limiting factors.) (Page 6).

9. That consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs and that these imports should be maintained as long as Italy is a theatre of base for military operations and for a period of six months thereafter, and that the "disease and unrest" formula should be more liberally interpreted for this purpose. (Page 9).

3391

10. That an additional programme for industrial first-aid be approved, to be financed, so far as the American side goes, from the sources of new finance mentioned in the President's statement of 10th October; His Majesty's Government to contribute a percentage of whatever sum may prove to be in the usual proportion. (Page 10).

27th NOVEMBER, 1944.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

DISTRIBUTION:

	Copy No.
Col. J.H.Lascelles, Secretary, SACMED's Conferences	1 - 14 (for List "A")
Sir Noel Charles, H.M.Ambassador	15 - 16
Hon. Alexander Kirk, U.S.Ambassador	17 - 18
G-5 AFHQ	19
Chief Commissioner	20
Chief of Staff	21
VP Civil Affairs Section	22
VP Economic Section	23
VP Political Section (B)	24
VP Political Section (A)	25
VP Establishment Section	26
Navy Sub-Commission	27
Air Forces Sub-Commission	28
Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMGOT)	29
Spares	30 - 35

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

1763

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET 35

SUBJECT: Draft Decree - Powers of Ministry of Occupied Italy.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) —
G/6
31 December 1944

TO : H.Q. A.C.

Ref your AC/9/7/AG dated 29 Dec.

1. I am unable to comment as to whether it is necessary to have a "Ministry of Occupied ITALY" at all.

2. (a) From the military point of view I feel that there may be overlapping and duplication between the Director General of Military Affairs and the Minister of War.

(b) Also, the Minister of War is very closely concerned with the Patriot question.

3. I feel that the Decree should take account of this and that it should be specifically stated in the decree that the Director General of Military Affairs will keep the Minister of War fully informed of all his (the D.G. of M.A.) activities and work in the closest collaboration with the Minister of War.

3393

Major General
M.M.I.A.

P.S. The above remarks also apply to the revised decree forwarded under your 9/22A/CA dated 31 Dec, just received.

1764

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

6/6 34

9

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Tel. Ext.: 608.

31 Dec 44

Ref: 9/221/CA

SUBJECT: Draft Decree - Powers of Ministry of Occupied Italy.

TO: Political Section.
Economic Section (2).
Land Forces Sub-Commission.
Public Health Sub-Commission.

3413

1 Reference this Section letter AC/9/7/LO dated 29 Dec 44 to which was attached a draft decree as to the powers of the new Ministry of Occupied Italy. It is confirmed that the decree that was forwarded to you has now been superseded by another draft which is attached hereto.

2 It would be appreciated if you will forward any comments which you may have on the new decree to this Section for collation by 1200 hrs Wednesday 3 Jan 45.

R.R. CRIPPS, Col.,
Chief CA Section.

Copy to: Legal Sub-Commission.

447

ART. 8

The Ministry for occupied Italy shall provide for the functioning of its own services by civil and military personnel assigned to it from other government Departments and by temporary personnel employed in accordance with the provisions set out in AMG No. 100 of 4 February 1937 and subsequent amendments.

The tables of the personnel who can be assigned to it from other government Departments and those of the personnel who can be employed with a temporary status will be approved by a decree of the Minister for occupied Italy after consultation with the Minister for the Treasury.

3390

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Tel: 608

Ref. AC/9/7/LG

29th December, 1944.

SUBJECT: Draft Decree - Powers of Ministry of Occupied Italy.

TO : Political Section.
Land Forces Sub-Commission.
Economic Section.
Public Health Sub-Commission.
Legal Sub-Commission.

1. Attached is a draft Decree as to the powers of the new Ministry of Occupied Italy.

2. In order that this Section may coordinate the comments of all Sections and Sub-Commissions for submission to the Chief Commissioner would you please forward any remarks you may have to make concerning the proposed Decree to this office by 1200 hrs. on Monday, 1st January.

R.R. CRIPPS, Col.
CSO CA Section.

3383

Encl: Draft Decree.
(Economic Section 2 copies)

HUMBERT OF SAVOY

PRINCE OF PIEDMONT

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OF THE REALM

By virtue of the authority delegated to Us;

Having seen Art. 1, No.3 of the Law of the 31st January 1936, No.100;

Having seen the Lieutenancy Decree of the December 1944, No.

which establishes the Ministry for Occupied Italy;

Having seen the Royal Decree-Law of the 30th October 1943, No.2/B and its successive modifications;

Having seen the Lieutenancy Decree-Law of the 25th June 1944, No.151;

Having heard the Council of Ministers

On the proposal of the President of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, Secretary of State and Minister of the Interior, in accord with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Treasury, War, Marine, Air, and Industry Commerce and Labour;

We have Decreed and We Decree

Art. 1.

The Ministry of Occupied Italy established by Lieutenancy Decree provides, in respect of occupied Italian territory, for the protection of the national interests and for the intensification of the struggle against the German invaders and against the Fascists who collaborate with them.

After the liberation and until the administration of the liberated territory passes to the Italian Government, the Ministry maintains the contacts with the Allied military administration for the solution of the problems inherent in the passage of powers from the Committees of National Liberation, in the demobilisation of Patriots and in the resumption of civilian life.

3383

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

which establishes the Ministry for Occupied Italy;

Having seen the Royal Decree-Law of the 30th October 1943, No.2/B and its successive modifications;

Having seen the Lieutenancy Decree-Law of the 25th June 1944, No.151;

Having heard the Council of Ministers

On the proposal of the President of the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, Secretary of State and Minister of the Interior, in accord with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Treasury, War, Marine, Air, and Industry Commerce and Labour;

We have Decreed and We Decree

Art. 1.

The Ministry of Occupied Italy established by Lieutenancy Decree provides, in respect of occupied Italian territory, for the protection of the national interests and for the intensification of the struggle against the German invaders and against the Fascists who collaborate with them.

After the liberation and until the administration of the liberated territory passes to the Italian Government, the Ministry maintains the contacts with the Allied military administration for the solution of the problems inherent in the passage of powers from the Committees of National Liberation, in the demobilisation of Patriots and in the resumption of civilian life.

Art. 2.

In the Ministry of Occupied Italy are established the following offices:-

(1) General Direction of Political Affairs.

(2) General Direction of Military Affairs.

(3) General Direction of Economic Affairs.

(4) General Direction of Relief.

(5) General Office for Relations with Allied Authority.

338

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

Art. 3.

The Direction General of Political Affairs:

(1) maintains the relations between the Government and the Committees of National Liberation constituted in the invaded territories, co-ordinating their action;

(2) directs and co-ordinates the clandestine political action carried out in the occupied territories and the resistance of the population against the invader;

(3) collects all facts possible as to the conduct of Italians in relation to the invader, whether for the purpose of the historical documentation of the subject or for the purpose of future rewards or punishments;

(4) prepares, in agreement with the Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy, the plans for the politico-administrative re-ordering of the liberated zones.

Art. 4.

The Direction General of Military Affairs, in accordance with the directives of the Allied Command:

(1) assures the carrying out of the relations with the volunteers of liberty operating in occupied Italy;

(2) provides for the organisation and intensification of the partisan struggle against the Germans;

(3) collects all the facts relative to the action carried out by the Patriots.

3384

Art. 5.

The Direction General of Economic Affairs:

(a) inquires into the facts regarding the financial, monetary and economic situation of occupied territories;

(b) inquires into the facts regarding war damage in territories not yet

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

their action;

(2) directs and co-ordinates the clandestine political action carried out in the occupied territories and the resistance of the population against the invader;

(3) collects all facts possible as to the conduct of Italians in relation to the invader, whether for the purpose of the historical documentation of the subject or for the purpose of future rewards or punishments;

(4) prepares, in agreement with the Committee of National Liberation of Upper Italy, the plans for the politico-administrative re-ordering of the liberated zones.

Art. 4.

The Direction General of Military Affairs, in accordance with the directives of the Allied Command:

(1) assures the carrying out of the relations with the volunteers of liberty operating in occupied Italy;

(2) provides for the organisation and intensification of the partisan struggle against the Germans;

(3) collects all the facts relative to the action carried out by the Patriots.

Art. 5.

The Direction General of Economic Affairs:

(a) inquires into the facts regarding the financial, monetary and economic situation of occupied territories;

(b) inquires into the facts regarding war damage in territories not yet liberated, destruction and removals effected by the enemy and displacement and deportations of workmen;

(c) ascertains the presumable state and trend of agricultural cultivation in the aforesaid territories, the degree of productivity of various branches of industry, the availability of labour, the situation of transport, the efficiency of commercial services, banking and insurance, and also the estimated availability of stocks of all kinds;

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(d) takes part in the elaboration of financial, economic and technical plans for the re-establishment of the economic life of the said territories, from the moment of their liberation.

Art. 6.

The Direction General of Relief:

(1) collaborates with Allied Authority in collecting the Patriots of the zones newly liberated and others who pass the lines, supplying them with every form of material and moral assistance;

(2) provides for every form of material and moral assistance to all Patriots and their families;

(3) provides aid for the families of the victims of German or Fascist barbarism;

(4) provides for every possible form of assistance, moral and material, for Italians living in invaded territories and for their relatives living in liberated Italy and for the exchange of news between them.

Art. 7.

The Office for Relations with Allied Authority (Foreign Relations) in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: -338-

(a) takes charge of the relation with the Allied Commission and the Allied Military Authorities in respect of everything concerning matters within the competence of the Ministry of Occupied Italy;

(b) maintains contact with the Italian Committees of National Liberation in Switzerland and France;

(c) Concerns itself with problems relating to political and military refugees in France, Switzerland and Yugoslavia;

(d) provides, according to the rules and customs of international law, for the care of Patriots captured by the enemy or forced, as a result of operations of war, to cross the borders of other states.

Art. 8.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND NO. 785020

every form of material and moral assistance;

(2) provides for every form of material and moral assistance to all Patriots and their families;

(3) provides aid for the families of the victims of German or Fascist barbarism;

(4) provides for every possible form of assistance, moral and material, for Italians living in invaded territories and for their relatives living in liberated Italy and for the exchange of news between them.

Art. 7.

The Office for Relations with Allied Authority (Foreign Relations) in agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

3383

(a) takes charge of the relation with the Allied Commission and the Allied Military Authorities in respect of everything concerning matters within the competence of the Ministry of Occupied Italy;

(b) maintains contact with the Italian Committees of National Liberation in Switzerland and France;

(c) Concerns itself with problems relating to political and military refugees in France, Switzerland and Yugoslavia;

(d) provides, according to the rules and customs of international law, for the care of Patriots captured by the enemy or forced, as a result of operations of war, to cross the borders of other states.

Art. 8.

The Ministry of Occupied Italy provides for the functioning of its own services by means of civil and military personnel directed from other State Administrations and by means of temporary staff engaged according to the rules of the Royal Decree-Law of the 4th February 1937, No. 100 and successive modifications.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

The schedules of personnel who may be directed and of those who may be engaged as temporary shall be approved by decree of the Minister of Occupied Italy in accord with the Minister of the Treasury.

Art. 9.

The present Decree shall come into force the day after that of its publication.

We order, to all whom it may concern, to observe the present Decree and to cause it to be observed as a law of the State.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1774

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

1

RESTRICTED 33

Informal Routing Slip

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

FILE: GCT-

DATE 29 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Discussion with Services.

NO.	FROM	TO	DATE
1.	G-3 Plans	Land Forces Sub-Commission. For information G-3 Secy.	29 Dec 1944

Reference your ACA/LFD/X8 dated 24 December 44.

1. Announcement was made of the establishment of your Sub-Commission together with temporary office location and telephone number in AFHQ Staff Memorandum No. 122 dated 27 December 44. Sections were requested to include your Sub-Commission on all distribution of documents, cables, etc.

2. This announcement therefore authorizes you to deal directly with any Sections within AFHQ.

G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.
G-3 Plans

CER/jk

2688

3381

RESTRICTED

G-3 REGISTRY

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

32

FROM HQ AFCM PERSONL FRM STONE
[redacted] MSGNE EMBASSY/MOSCOW

29 Dec.

TO AFHQ FOR SACMED US POLAD
BRITISH RESMIN

CONFIDENTIAL

S 406

General LUIGI CHATRIAN has been appointed undersecretary of state for war vice General CAVIGLIA

cgl

DISTR
Sir Noel Charles
Hon Alexander Kirk
Land Forces Sub Com
Chief of Staff
Political Section
CC Files

SD DISTR:

G
S/S
I
SD/50
Fleet

3381

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

4

AJH3

S-406 29 DEC 44 G INTEGRITY

29/12

CONFIDENTIAL FD

WITH THE APPROVAL OF MINOF AND GENERAL BOWRING

PAIRM TO AFPO FOR SACMED CMA UNCLE SUGA. FOLAD AND BRITISH RESIDENT FORM HQ ALGOM

PERSONAL FROM STONE PAIRM

CHEMICAL LUIGI CHATELAIN HAS BEEN APPOINTED UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR VICE

GENERAL CAILLA

DISTRIBUTION:
Sir Noel Charles
Hon. Alexander Kirk
Land Forces Sub-Com.
Chief of Staff
Political Section
CC Files

SD Distr

G
AQ
I
SD/SO
Flow

5 copies

3373

Chief Commissioner

222

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral
Chief Commissioner

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

Tel: 735

25 December 1944.

Ref: 547/14/COS

SUBJECT: San Marino.

TO : Civil Affairs Section
Economic Section
Establishment Section
Political Section
P.R.O.
Land Forces Sub-Commission (SHIA)
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Navy Sub-Commission
Communications Sub-Commission.

1. All files and correspondence in connection with the SAN MARINO Republic have now been handed over to EMILIA REGION. All further communications dealing with the Republic will be sent to HQ EMILIA Region and not to AMG EIGHTH Army.

2. It will be understood that this instruction applies to correspondence previously sent to AMG EIGHTH Army on this subject and not to communications needing attention by AC Hq.

Chief Staff Officer,
to the Chief of Staff.

3377

Copy to: SCAO EIGHTH Army.
R.C. EMILIA Region.

30

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT:- Allied Commission and Allied Military Government.

3 District
Ext 8
62/G

21 Dec 44.

52 Area
54 Area
56 Area
94 Sub Area
201 Sub Area
204 Sub Area
208 Sub Area
209 Sub Area
210 Sub Area
List 'A'

C/6 R3/c

23/12

ROME Area (G3-Br)
ALCOM
HQ Southern Region ALCOM
HQ LAZIO Region "
HQ ABRUZZI/MARCHE Region "
HQ SICILIA Region "
HQ SARDINIA Region "
MMIA
MMIA LO Att 3 Dist.

1. The following is forwarded for your infm and guidance concerning org, functions and relations with the Allied Commission:

Reference.

GENERAL

2. Designation. W.e.f.1 Nov 44 Allied Control Commission will be known as Allied Commission (ALCOM). — AFHQ Adm Memo No.45 of 1 Nov.

FUNCTIONS

3. The broad functions of the ALCOM are to implement the terms of the Armistice; to ensure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to requirements of United Nations; to execute the function of AMG in occupied Italy and to be the organisation through which all relations with the Italian Government are conducted.

4. Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA). Status and functions of MMIA are in accordance with Appx 'A' attached — AFHQ AG 3375 091 112/079 GOT.O.

BOUNDARIES

5.
(a) Territory under Italian Government Jurisdiction.
(i) All provinces SOUTH of the northern boundaries of VITERBO, RIETI, TERAMO with exception of Commune of NAPLES. Within Provinces of VITERBO and FOGGIA civilian movement is restricted.
(ii) SICILY and SARDINIA.

(b) Territory under AMG Jurisdiction.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

ALCOM
HQ Southern Region ALCOM
HQ LAZIO Region "
HQ ABRUZZI/MARCHE Region "
HQ SICILIA Region "
HQ SARDINIA Region "
MMLA
MMLA LO Att 3 Dist.

1. The following is forwarded for your infm and guidance concerning org, functions and relations with the Allied Commission:

Reference.

GENERAL

2. Designation. W.e.f. 1 Nov 44 Allied Control Commission will be known as Allied Commission (ALCOM). AFHQ Adm Memo No.45 of 1 Nov.

FUNCTIONS

3. The broad functions of the ALCOM are to implement the terms of the Armistice; to ensure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to requirements of United Nations; to execute the function of AMG in occupied Italy and to be the organisation through which all relations with the Italian Government are conducted.

4. Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMLA). Status and functions of MMLA are in accordance with Appx 'A' attached AFHQ AG 091 112/079 GCT.O.

3375

BOUNDARIES

5.
(a) Territory under Italian Government Jurisdiction.
(i) All provinces SOUTH of the northern boundaries of VITERBO, RIETI, TERAMO with exception of Commune of NAPLES. Within Provinces of VITERBO and FOGGIA civilian movement is restricted.
(ii) SICILY and SARDINIA.

(b) Territory under AMG Jurisdiction.
(i) All liberated territory NORTH of northern boundaries of VITERBO, RIETI and TERAMO.
(ii) The Commune of NAPLES (which includes Port and City of NAPLES).

(c) Amendments will be circulated when changes are made in these boundaries.

PTO/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ORGANIZATION

6. (a) Mr Harold McMILLAN, British Resident Minister is Acting President of the Allied Commission and the authority in whose name AMG is conducted.

(b) Organisation of HQ ALCOM is in accordance with Appx 'B' att.

CHANNELS OF COMN

7. Policy.

(a) Matters of higher policy will be referred by Area/Sub Areas to HQ 3 District who will deal direct with the HQ ALCOM.

(b) Matters of local policy will be referred by Area/Sub Areas direct to ALCOM Region HQ concerned.

8. Matters of Detail.

Area/Sub Areas will deal direct with local Provincial Commissioner (PCs), in Southern Region, Zone Commissioner, or with appropriate Region HQ as circumstances demand. Units may deal direct with local PCs over minor details, but communications with Region HQs will NOT be made below the level of Sub Areas.

9. Matters relating to the Italian Army.

In accordance with Appx 'A', para 4.

10. Other than under emergency conditions, all matters which Area/Sub Areas wish to take up with the Italian administration will be conducted through ALCOM channels. Where Allied Commission is NOT represented, Town Majors will assist.

LIAISON

11. Area etc Comds will maintain closest possible liaison with ALCOM officers on all questions which jointly involve military and civil interests.

W Parks
Lt-Col,
GS.
(C.F. PARKS).

CFP/DD.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 7850220

Appx 'A' to 3 Dist letter
62/G of 21 Dec 44.

3078

STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION
OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION (MMIA)

INFORMATION

1. It is not generally appreciated that MMIA is part of the ALLIED COMMISSION, and that its full and correct title is "LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION of the ALLIED COMMISSION (MMIA)".

2. Functions of MMIA are two-fold, namely:-

(a) Sub-Commission business:- To implement terms of armistice, particularly with relation to demilitarization and demobilization. The Allied Commission, on such Italian Army matters as concern it, deals with the Italian Government THROUGH MMIA.

(b) Military Mission business:- The direction of the armed forces of the Italian Government in accordance with the policies of the United Nations.

3. It is appreciated that HQ 3 District and formations under its comd are only likely to deal with MMIA concerning military mission business which includes the following:-

(a) Organisation and supply matters generally in relation to Italian Army personnel.
(b) Personnel ceilings
(c) Organisation of units and formations
    (1) Combat
    (2) Service units for support of combat troops both Italian and Allied
    (3) Miscellaneous units for internal security and related duties.
(d) Direction of Italian manpower to meet Allied requirements
(e) Training of personnel for employment in above roles
(f) Provision and holding of rfts
(g) Equipment of Italian Army personnel to meet Allied requirements
(h) Arrangements for, and supervision of, holding, distribution, and accountancy arising from the execution of the above functions.

3373

CHANNELS OF REPORT AND COMN

4. The channel for Military Mission business referred to at para 3 above is AFHQ THROUGH 3 District, when matters of policy are concerned. For all purely routine and local matters, MMIA may be approached direct through the LO's attached to formation HQs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

2. Functions of MMLA are two-fold, namely:-

(a) Sub-Commission business:- To implement terms of armistice, particularly with relation to demilitarization and demobilization. The Allied Commission, on such Italian Army matters as concern it, deals with the Italian Government THROUGH MMLA.

(b) Military Mission business:- The direction of the armed forces of the Italian Government in accordance with the policies of the United Nations.

3. It is appreciated that HQ 3 District and formations under its comd are only likely to deal with MMLA concerning military mission business which includes the following:-

(a) Organisation and supply matters generally in relation to Italian Army personnel.

(b) Personnel ceilings

(c) Organisation of units and formations

(1) Combat
(2) Service units for support of combat troops both Italian and Allied
(3) Miscellaneous units for internal security and related duties.

(d) Direction of Italian manpower to meet Allied requirements

(e) Training of personnel for employment in above roles

(f) Provision and holding of rfts

(g) Equipment of Italian Army personnel to meet Allied requirements

(h) Arrangements for, and supervision of, holding, distribution, and accountancy arising from the execution of the above functions.

CHANNELS OF REPORT AND COMN

4. The channel for Military Mission business referred to at para 3 above is AFHQ THROUGH 3 District, when matters of policy are concerned. For all purely routine and local matters, MMLA may be approached direct through the LO's attached to formation HQs.

3373

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDX NO. 785020

178 37

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020



1784

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Appx 'B' to 3 Dist letter 62/G of 2[illegible] Dec 44.

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

DEPUTY CHIEF COMMISSIONER

CHIEF OF STAFF - VICE PRES.

+ DEP. CHIEF OF STAFF - VICE PRES.

Chief of Staff
ce President -
Affairs Section

aced Persons and
riation Sub-Comm.
tion Sub-Comm.
Sub-Comm.
Govt Sub-Comm.
ents, Fine Arts
chives Sub-Comm.
ots Branch
ealth Sub-Comm.
Safety Sub-Comm.

Deputy Chief of Staff
and Vice President -
Economic Section

Agriculture Sub-Comm.
Commerce Sub-Commission
Finance Sub-Commission
Food Sub-Commission
Industry Sub-Commission
Labour Sub-Commission
Public Works & Utilities
Sub-Commission
Shipping Sub-Commission
Transportation Sub-Comm.

Deputy Chief Civil
Affairs Officer
HQ. 15 Army Group.

Regions: Army AMG's

+ Deputy Chief of Staff
and Vice President -
Estab. Section

Navy Sub-Commission
Army Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Comm.
Communications Sub-Com.
War Materials Disposal
& IPOW Sub-Comm.
Pub. Relations Branch

TRANSLATION

ROME, 9 January 1945

PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS **TO ALL MINISTRIES.**

Ref. 23515/16644/19.11

Subject: Instructions on contacts with the Allied Commission.

Ref. circular No. 18665/16644/19.11 dated 9 Nov. 1944.

Contrary to what was ordered with the above circular, their Excellencies the Ministers continue to submit for the President's signature letters requesting the action of the Chief of the Allied Commission on questions of a technical or secondary nature which come under the specific jurisdiction of the individual Ministries or the corresponding Allied Sub Commissions.

It is needless for me to point out once again the serious inconveniences that such a procedure creates, as reported also by the Commission itself; it causes delay and confusion in the treatment of various matters and nullifies the importance and significance of the Government's action which should be reserved for political questions and for those of primary importance.

In order to eliminate any possible misunderstanding, I hereby order that from now on the action of the President of the Council be requested by the Ministers only for questions of a political character which are of particular importance to the Government, and in those cases in which, providing always they are not of secondary importance or involving mere details, it is intended to initiate the re-examination of decisions already adopted by the competent Allied Sub Commissions. In such cases a copy of every letter shall be sent to the Cabinet of the Presidency of the Council.

In every other case the Italian authorities must deal directly with the Sub Commissions, notifying or consulting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on questions of a political nature which arise in our relations with the Allies.

3369

I beg Your Excellencies to communicate these instructions to all the offices of your respective Departments seeing to it that they are adhered to promptly and unfailingly.

Kindly acknowledge.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

S/ BONOMI

Reproduction and Distribution by Chief of Staff

212/86/COS. 12 January 1945

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Contrary to what was ordered with the above circular, their Excellencies the Ministers continue to submit for the President's signature letters requesting the action of the Chief of the Allied Commission on questions of a technical or secondary nature which come under the specific jurisdiction of the individual Ministries or the corresponding Allied Sub Commissions.

It is needless for me to point out once again the serious inconveniences that such a procedure creates, as reported also by the Commission itself; it causes delay and confusion in the treatment of various matters and nullifies the importance and significance of the Government's action which should be reserved for political questions and for those of primary importance.

In order to eliminate any possible misunderstanding, I hereby order that from now on the action of the President of the Council be requested by the Ministers only for questions of a political character which are of particular importance to the Government, and in those cases in which, providing always they are not of secondary importance or involving mere details, it is intended to initiate the re-examination of decisions already adopted by the competent Allied Sub Commissions. In such cases a copy of every letter shall be sent to the Cabinet of the Presidency of the Council.

In every other case the Italian authorities must deal directly with the Sub Commissions, notifying or consulting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on questions of a political nature which arise in our relations with the Allies.

I beg Your Excellencies to communicate these instructions to all the offices of your respective Departments seeing to it that they are adhered to promptly and unfailingly.

Kindly acknowledge.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

S/ BONOMI

Reproduction and Distribution by Chief of Staff

212/68/COS. 12 January 1945

Civil Affairs Section	(12)
Economic Section	(15)
Establishment Section	(3)
Political Section	(2)
Navy S/C	(3)
Land Forces S/C (MMLA)	(6)
Air Forces S/C	(3)
Communications S/C	(2)
WAD & PWB S/C	(2)
P.R. Branch	(2)

3360

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND NO. 785020

1787

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

SUBJECT: Command and Administration of Italian Army.

LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION
A.C. (M. M. I. A.) R O M E
AG/8
19 November 1944

1. AFHQ letter AG 091.711/169 GCT-O dated 18 November 1944 is forwarded herewith.

2. Please acknowledge receipt.

F. J. Noakes

F. J. NOAKES, Col.
for Major General.
M. M. I. A.

FJN/lc

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 24 - A/Q File
25 - "G"
26 - Comd.
27 - 2 IC
28 - Col. Fidsley
29 - DA & QMG
30 - ADST
31 - Lt. Col. Shipley
32 - Major Rose
33 - Major Hargie
34 - MMIA LO, Naples
35 - MMIA LO, 54 Area
36 - Major Van Kirk, 5 Army
37 - Capt. Bird, Br. Incr. 5 Army
38 - MMIA LO, 8 Army
39 - MMIA LO, AGC Sardinia
40 - MMIA LO, HQ Sicily Region, A.C.
41 - MMIA LO, 3 District
42 - MMIA LO, 1 District
43 - Held by A/Q as spare

3363

1788

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

16 November 1944.

The following message is addressed to all members of the Allied Commission both at Headquarters and in the field:

In accordance with the announcement made by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, General Wilson has delegated to me his functions as President of the Allied Commission. I am fully conscious of the great responsibility placed upon me. I can only hope to discharge it if I have, as I am sure will be the case, your full support. It is indeed fortunate for me that Commodore Stone is now definitely appointed Chief Commissioner. He will be a worthy successor to General Mason-MacFarlane who won the confidence and respect of us all.

It is now nearly two years since I have been associated first under the leadership of General Eisenhower and then under that of General Wilson with an integrated enterprise unique in the history of military alliances. The Allied Commission in Italy, like the Allied armies, can only succeed if it is based upon mutual confidence and co-operation. Being by birth half American and half Scot I can at least claim an inherited instinct towards that end.

In accordance with my instructions, and as part of the task especially entrusted to me in connection with the new measures devised to meet the economic and other problems of Italy, I am leaving in a few days for London and Washington. I regret, therefore, that I shall have to delay the personal contact with the members of the Commission which I hope to be able to make at a later date.

Meanwhile I would like to send a message of greeting to all of the members of the Commission and to say how proud I am to be associated with a body whose splendid work both in the forward and in the rear areas will, I am sure, be recognized by history as a notable achievement of which our countrymen both in the United States and Great Britain have reason to be proud.

HAROLD MACMILLAN

3367

1789

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

25

AP41

RHF/amt

S E C R E T
Auth: SAC, MT
Initials: OK
16 November 1944

16

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.711/169 GCT-O

16 November 1944

SUBJECT: Command and Administration of Italian Army.

TO : All Concerned.

6/6

1944.

1. This instruction governs the relationships between the Allied Armies and the Italian Army in regard to Command and Administration, and is divided into the following sections:

Section I - Allied Control of the Italian Army.

Section II - General Organization and Administration of the Italian Army.

Section III - Italian Army Units Maintained by the US and the British.

Section IV - Italian Army Units Maintained Internationally.

Note - No part of this Instruction applies to Italian Cooperators (ex Prisoners of War) or Italian POW Service Units under US control.

Section I - Allied Control of the Italian Army

2. GENERAL. The Italian Army is at the disposal of this headquarters for the performance of such tasks as may be allotted from time to time.

3. CONTROL. Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Commission (AMIA) under command of this headquarters.

4. AMIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR:

a. Transmission and interpretation of Allied orders and requirements to the appropriate Italian Military Authority.

b. Supervision of administration and supply of the Italian Army as laid down in letters, this headquarters, AG 400/105 D-O dated 22 September 1944 and AG 400/031 GDS-O dated 6 October 1944.

c. Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline and drafts (call ups) of Italian Army personnel.

d. Liaison between employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War.

e. Representation of the views of the Italian Military Authorities to this headquarters.

See 30/91. 70 11

U.S. SECRET
Equals British MOST SECRET
SECRET

1790

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

5. FORMATION OF NEW UNITS. The formation of new units or the reorganization of existing units of the Italian Army by Italian Military Authorities, or by Allied formations is prohibited except as authorized by this headquarters.

6. EMPLOYMENT:

a. Allied formations will employ only those effective units or individuals of the Italian Army who are specifically assigned or attached to them. Allied formations will employ and maintain only those persons who are properly enrolled into the present Italian Army. Persons who were members of the former Italian Army are civilians until they are enrolled or drafted through the proper present Italian military procedure.

b. An effective member of the Italian Armed Forces is defined as "one who is a bona fide member of the Italian Armed Forces, either officers, non-commissioned officers or other ranks, duly enrolled or enlisted therein, and subject to the laws of war and the Geneva Convention and borne on the rolls of the Ministry concerned, and actually performing the duty to which assigned as shown on the official strength returns of the Ministry concerned."

Section II - General Organization of the Italian Army

7. ORGANIZATION. The Italian Army is divided into categories as follows:

a. Troops maintained Internationally (short title ITI-ITI) including:

(1) Troops for the administration of the Italian Army itself.

(2) Troops engaged on Internal Security, guard battalions, etc (all of which are subject to assignment under Allied Command as organized).

b. Troops maintained by the British (short title BR-ITI) either diluted or complete units.

c. Troops maintained by the US . (short title US-ITI).

8. ADMINISTRATION.

a. In principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible to this headquarters through MMLA for the Administration of all categories, except as specified otherwise herein.

b. Italian Administrative Headquarters for the Administration of ITI-ITI troops are provided from the administrative troops under Italian Command.

c. Italian Administrative Headquarters for US-ITI and BRI-ITI troops are provided from personnel assigned organically as a part of such category. These headquarters are under US and British Command respectively.

d. The general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War, the personnel for which is obtained [redacted] ITI-ITI administrative troops.

[redacted]. SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

1792

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

9. COMMAND.

a. Allied Commanders are given power of Command over such Italian formations or units as are placed under their jurisdiction. As far as circumstances permit, orders will be transmitted through the appropriate Italian Army Channels of Command.

b. Allied Commanders under whose command Italian Units or individuals have been placed have authority to suspend temporarily any Italian Officer for cause at any time. Should such suspension be made, the next officer in the Italian Channel of Command will succeed pro-tem the officer suspended, until a suitable successor is appointed by the Italian Military authorities. The suspended officer will be directed to report to the next Superior Italian Headquarters. The Allied Commander will forward to MMIA at the time of suspension, a full statement of facts in the case so as to form the basis for action to be taken by the Ministry of War and this headquarters.

c. All personnel of the Italian Army will be subject to Italian Military Law, which will be administered by Italian Officers in accordance with the Italian code. Where there is no Italian officer competent, under the Italian code, to deal with the offence in the unit concerned, the offender will be sent to the nearest Italian Authority competent to act. When the offender is a member of a unit under Allied Command, the Allied Commander will be informed of the action taken. In cases where the Allied Commander considers the action taken was unsatisfactory, or the punishment insufficient, the Allied Commander will submit a statement of facts to MMIA for such additional action as is indicated.

d. Where Italian troops are under Allied Command, relevant Allied Commanders will demand removal and replacement of unsuitable Italian officers up to and including Lt Colonels, by the appropriate Italian Commanders concerned. If the action taken by the Italian Authority is unsatisfactory, the Allied Commander will report through normal Allied Channels to the Army, District or Base Section Commander under whose Command the Italian Army unit has been placed. The Army, District or Base Section Commander will refer the matter to the Senior Italian Authority under his command. If, after this reference, satisfactory action is not taken, details of the case, together with the recommendations of the Allied Army, District or Base Section Commander, will be sent to MMIA for action with the Minister of War. In the case of officers above the rank of Lt Colonel, a full report will be made by the appropriate Allied Commander to MMIA who will take necessary action with the Minister of War. In all cases where the Allied Commander considers that the Italian officer should be eliminated from the service, regardless of the action taken by the Italian Authorities in accordance with the demand of the Allied Commander, a full report should be sent to MMIA, to ensure that the officer concerned will receive such disciplinary action as is warranted by the facts in the case.

331

10. ARREST.

a. Allied Military Authorities are given power to arrest and hold in temporary custody Italians subject to Military Law alleged to be guilty of any offence punishable by Italian Law, pending investigation and handing over the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

offender for trial by the Italian Authorities. This power will be exercised in the same manner as for the arrest of Allied personnel.

11. LEAVE.

a. If the military situation permits, privilege leave may be given to Italian Army personnel for a period of seven days, exclusive of travelling time, not more than once in six months. The movement, on leave, of personnel, between the mainland and SICILY and SARDINIA will be governed by current regulations.

b. Compassionate leave may be given in proper cases by a superior Italian Military Authority, Colonel or above, for fourteen days exclusive of travelling time, with the concurrence of the Allied Commander concerned, if applicable.

c. Not more than five percent of a unit may be away on privilege and/or compassionate leave at one time. Absenteeism due to previous leave draft will count against the five percent until such time as absentees have rejoined or been struck off strength and reinforcements provided.

d. Agricultural or special leave will be the subject of special orders from time to time.

e. Allied Commanders may, at their discretion, suspend the granting of leave to members of Italian Army units under their command, for operational or other reasons.

f. Italian Army personnel on leave are not entitled to rations from Army sources during the period of absence.

12. APPOINTMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS.

a. The Italian Minister of War is responsible for the appointment of Officers, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed from time to time by this headquarters.

b. Assignment of officers is a function of the Minister of War. In units employed under Allied Command, officers will not be relieved by the Minister of War until a suitable replacement has reported for duty and no transfer or reliefs generally will be effected without prior notification to the Allied Commander concerned.

13. ABSENTEES.

a. Personnel absent without leave over 30 days will be struck off the authorized strength of the Italian Army.

b. Personnel who have been struck off the authorized strength of the Italian Army will, when apprehended, be subject to such disciplinary action as the Italian Army considers appropriate, but during trial and sentence will not be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army. When such personnel are again available for duty as effectives, the personnel will pass through a replacement center for reassignment.

SECRET
Secret

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

14. PERSONNEL UNDERGOING IMPRISONMENT OR DETENTION.

a. Italian Army personnel sentenced to imprisonment or detention, or confined awaiting trial, are, for periods under 30 days, confined in unit cells, and are retained on the strength of the unit.

b. Italian Army personnel who are absent from their unit awaiting trial for over 30 days, or who are sentenced to detention for over 30 days, will be struck off the authorized strength of the Italian Army, and will be confined in Civil prisons. On release from the Civil prison, if they remain eligible for service in the Army, such personnel will be sent to a replacement center for reassignment. Such personnel will not be reincorporated in the old unit unless assigned thereto through the replacement center. During the period of confinement in civil prisons, such personnel will not be rationed from Army sources.

c. Effective Army personnel will not be employed in the operation of Civil prisons, camps or detention centers, for the confinement of personnel for periods in excess of 30 days.

15. ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. No member of the Italian Army will be paid any salary, wages or emoluments from Allied sources as an addition to his pay from the Italian Government.

16. WELFARE.

a. Welfare will be the responsibility of the Italian Government.

b. Issues, sales, or gifts of Post Exchange or NAAFI supplies from Allied sources to Italian troops under Allied command is prohibited except as authorized specially by this headquarters.

17. HOSPITALIZATION.

a. Personnel undergoing treatment in hospitals or convalescent camps will be carried by their units as "sick in hospital" for periods up to 30 days inclusive.

b. Personnel remaining in hospital or convalescent camps over 30 days will be transferred to the rolls and carried on the strength of the replacement center. Separate instructions will be issued to cover Combat Groups. 336

c. Personnel remaining in hospital or convalescent camps over 60 days will be struck off the authorized ceiling of the Italian Army, and will be transferred to Civil hospitals operated by the Italian Government, thereafter being issued no rations from Army stocks.

d. The Italian Government will be responsible for organizing and operating civilian hospitals and convalescent camps to care for personnel who require hospitalization in excess of 60 days.

e. Personnel who have been struck off the authorized strength of the Army as a result of being in hospital over 60 days will [redacted] called to duty with

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

the Army, if physically qualified, upon discharge from the Civil hospital. Recall will be effected through the normal recall channels and reassignment will be through the replacement center.

f. The figure of 60 days may be reduced by orders of this headquarters if it is found by experience that an excessive number of sick is being carried on the rolls of the replacement center.

18. REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS: The system and organization for the provision of replacement personnel will be as follows:

a. Recruits will be called up by the Ministry of War at the direction of MMIA.

b. Recruits will report to "Call-up Centers", the staffs of which will be ITI-ITI personnel.

c. Separate base replacement depots will be set up for US-ITI's, BR-ITI's and ITI-ITI's respectively. MMIA will be responsible for arranging delivery of recruits and personnel available from other sources to the depots and for their maintenance prior to arrival. Thereafter, the nationality concerned will be responsible for the maintenance and training of replacement personnel and distribution to units.

d. The responsibility for establishment, and maintenance of staffs of base replacement depots is as follows:

(1) For US-ITI - CG MTOUSA
(2) For BR-ITI - AFHQ (British Element)
(3) For ITI-ITI - The Italian War Ministry

e. The replacements held on the rolls of replacement depots will not exceed the authorized number in each instance.

f. On the first of each month MMIA will forecast to this headquarters the output of types of personnel from Call-up Centers and other sources of personnel during the succeeding month and furnish any other information required to enable this headquarters to apportion the required quota between the US-ITI, BR-ITI and ITI-ITI, Replacement Depots. The distribution in specific Replacement Depots of the nationality concerned will be in accordance with the requirements of CG MTOUSA for US-ITI's, this headquarters for BR-ITI's, War Ministry for ITI-ITI's.

g. MMIA will authorize call-up of personnel on the basis of demands at f above.

Section III - Italian Army Units Maintained By The US and British. (US-ITI's and BR-ITI's)

19. PROVISION OF UNITS:

a. The entire resources of personnel of the Italian Army are at the disposal of this headquarters, which allots Italian [redacted]ts and personnel to the various categories.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

20. ORGANIZATION.

a. Units or sub-units maintained by the British (BR-ITI's) are or will be organized on TEs to be decided by this headquarters.

b. Units serving and maintained by the US. (US-ITI's) are or will be organized on provisional TOs as decided by the Base Section, Army or similar headquarters.

c. MMLA will be informed of any changes in organization or WE/TO of units.

21. REPLACEMENTS.

a. The holding of replacements for Service Units, exclusive of Combat Groups, is limited to 5% of the total authorized service units maintained by the Allies.

22. FINANCES.

a. Wherever possible the Italian Government will be responsible for the payment of Italian Army personnel and for meeting such other expenses as are necessary.

b. Wherever due to local conditions, it is NOT practicable for payment to be made by the Italian Government, the following emergency measures are authorized:

(1) Units serving under British Command:

(a) Italian units will draw bulk advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier.

(b) In diluted units the senior Italian officer will draw advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier. Such amounts will not appear in the Imprest accounts of the British units concerned.

(c) All advances will be in bulk sum.

(d) A list of authorized units will be supplied by this headquarters to the Command Paymaster, Number 8 Command Pay Office, CMF. In the case of diluted units the British Commanding Officer will nominate the Italian officer to whom payment should be made.

(2) Units maintained by the US:

Finances will be subject to special instructions issued by CG MTOUSA.

1791

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Section IV - Italian Army Units Maintained Internationally

23. ORGANIZATION. These units are divided into three categories:

a. Internal Security formations whose principal functions are:

(1) Acting as a force to support the civil power.

(2) Providing guards for Allied installations and Vital Points.

(3) Special duties under Allied Command (e.g for AC, etc)

b. Administrative depots and services. The size, location and organization of the units are determined by the Italian Military Authorities under the direction of MAA.

c. Para-Military personnel, ie, Carabinieri, the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration.

24. COMMAND. Except for Carabinieri and units allotted or attached to Allied formations for Internal Security or guard duties, these formations and units are under command of the Italian Military Authorities. If a state of emergency arises (such as the intervention of the enemy in the area concerned) these troops will come under command of the Allied Headquarters in whose area they are located. The Carabinieri (CC.RR) except those units within Army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police organization under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri and directed by the Public Safety Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

25. RELATIONS WITH ALLIED COMMANDERS. Local Allied Headquarters in whose area these units are located will be responsible for allotment of accommodation. Units will be subject to Allied orders on administration, which concern them as a result of their presence in the area, eg, curfew and road movement.

26. RESCISSION OF PREVIOUS PAPERS. Pending the rescission of documents already issued which are in conflict with this instruction, this instruction will govern.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. ROBERTS, C.
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
(See next page)

1798

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

DISTRIBUTION:

20 - HQ AAI
20 - Land Forces Sub-Commission Allied Commission (MMIA)
10 - Eighth Army
10 - Fifth Army
10 - Number 1 District
10 - Number 2 District
10 - Number 3 District
10 - PENBASE
10 - CG MTOUSA
5 - Rome Area
1 - No 50 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 51 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 52 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 53 Br Liaison Unit
1 - No 54 Br Liaison Unit
5 - Ho Allied Commission
2 - C-in-C Med
2 - Ho MAAF
2 - G-1 (B)
2 - G-1 (MTOUSA)
2 - G-2
2 - G-3 (Ops)
2 - G-3 (Org-B)
2 - G-3 (Org-A)
2 - G-4 (A)
2 - G-4 (B)
2 - G-5
1 - AA & CD
1 - CWS
1 - Director of Works
1 - Engineer
1 - Financial Adviser (Br)
1 - Fis Dir MTOUSA
2 - JAG
2 - Director of Labor
2 - Medical (Br)
1 - D Prov M Sec
1 - QM
1 - REME
1 - S & T
2 - Q (Maint)
2 - Q (AE)
1 - Signals
1 - G-4 (M & Tn)
1 - Tn (A)
1 - Tn (B)
1 - Dep Mil Sec
5 - O2E CMF
1 - DPIC
1 - CAO
1 - Welfare (Br)
1 - 8 Command Pay Office
30 - Spares (to G-3 (Org) Foreign)
2 - AG Records
1 - M & D

3353

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

AP893

RHF/wp

:::::::::::::::::::::
: S E C R E T :
:Auth: SAC, MT :
:Initials: :
:Date: 30 October 44 :
:::::::::::::::::::::

14

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

30 October 1944

AG 091.711/169 GCT-O

SUBJECT: Transfer From AAI to AFHQ of Responsibility for Control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

TO : All Concerned.

1. OBJECT:

The object of this letter is to define the changes in the responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI as the result of the handing over to AFHQ by AAI of the control of Italian Army Manpower and Organization.

2. DATE OF HANDOVER:

AFHQ will assume the responsibilities set out in the following paragraphs with effect from 1 NOVEMBER 1944.

3. CEILING OF THE ITALIAN ARMY:

AFHQ will decide the distribution of personnel to categories within the ceiling laid down from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. PROVISION OF PERSONNEL:

a. Through the agency of the Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA), The Allied Commission, AFHQ will undertake the provision of personnel to meet the Allied requirements within the categories of the ceiling.

b. The present proportionate distribution, i.e:

	Specialist Personnel	Non-Specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3)	
Combat Groups	1/3)	2/3

will continue in force until amended by AFHQ, and the personnel made available will be allotted between US and British in these proportions.

c. AFHQ will take over control of Priority List 8 - British Requirements of Italian Army personnel for Service Units, and Priority List 7 - Priority of shipment of personnel and units from SARDINIA to ITALY.

5. FORMATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will undertake the formation of all units [redacted] the issue of the relevant Formation Orders, for all units to be formed [redacted] Italian Army personnel to operate under Allied Command.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

6. WAR ESTABLISHMENTS:

AFHQ will publish War Establishments for British controlled units where necessary, but AAI is authorized to publish or amend and implement War Establishments for British controlled units peculiar to the Operational Zone.

7. ALLOCATION OF UNITS:

AFHQ will allot units as between the Operational Zone and L of C Area.

8. TRAINING OF ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS:

AFHQ, being responsible for training facilities and equipment of Combat Groups, will supervise the training of these formations.

By command of General WILSON:

H. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

5 - HQ AAI
5 - The Allied Commission
5 - Land Forces Sub-Commission (LFSCIA)
2 - Number 1 District
2 - Number 2 District
2 - Number 3 District
2 - PBS
2 - COMZONE NATOUSA
2 - RAAC
2 - MAAF
1 - C/S NATO
1 - SGS
1 - G-1(A)
3 - G-1(B)
1 - G-2
10 - G-3
1 - G-4(A)
1 - G-4(B)
2 - G-4(M & Tn)
1 - G-5
1 - CAO
1 - Q(AE)
1 - Q(Maint)
1 - REME
1 - QM
1 - Ord (B)
1 - Ord (A)
1 - S & T
1 - Engrs
2 - Medical
1 - Signals
1 - Provost
1 - CWS
1 - O2E, CMF
1 - AA & CD
1 - Director of Labour
1 - Financial Adviser
1 - Fiscal Director
11 - Spares (G-3)
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M & D

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

[redacted] SECRET

AP 848

/vmg

8

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

: S E C R E T :
:Auth: SACMED :
:Initials :
: 25 October 1944 :

25 October 1944

AG 091.112/079 OCT-O

SUBJECT: Status and Functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA)

TO : All Concerned

1. OBJECT

a. To establish the functions of, and channels of communication for, the operation of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA).

b. To clarify apparent misunderstanding as to the operation and functions of this organization.

2. HISTORY OF THE SUB-COMMISSION

a. Upon the conclusion of an Armistice with the Italians, and to relieve the Allied Army Staffs of extra work arising from this Armistice, a Mission was established, known as the Italian Military Mission, and subsequently as the Military Mission to the Italian Army, to act as the liaison between the Allied and Italian Armies, and to supervise the implementation of the Armistice Terms. Its duties consisted chiefly of demilitarization and demobilization, and organization of the remaining Italian land forces under the terms contained in the Armistice.

b. Subsequently, the Italians were accepted by the Allies as co-belligerents, and the functions of the MMIA logically increased to include such duties as organization of personnel, training, equipping, maintenance and supply matters generally for the Italian Land Forces.

c. Consequent on the decision to include a Land Forces Sub-Commission within the Allied Commission, it was decided that the MMIA should be constituted as the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

d. When the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that an agency be established to control the provision of supplies to the Italian Armed Forces, this duty was given to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MMIA), whose staff was augmented to carry out the new commitment.

[redacted] SECRET
SECRET

3-30-104

1802

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

3. PRESENT FUNCTIONS AS ESTABLISHED. From the above history, it is seen that the functions of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSCAC) are twofold, namely:

a. Sub-Commission business: The primary concern of the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSCAC), so far as its sub-commission business is concerned is to implement the terms of the armistice, particularly with relation to demilitarization and demobilization. It is the vehicle by which the Allied Commission deals with the Italian Government on such Italian Army matters as concern it. For these purposes the Land Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSCAC) was constituted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and requires the authority of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for any alteration in its functions.

b. Military Mission business: Consequent upon the grant of status of co-belligerency to the Italian nation, it became necessary to provide an organization to direct the armed forces of the Italian Government in accordance with the policies of the United Nations. To achieve economy in personnel and continuity of action, the duties which would otherwise have been undertaken by a special military mission set up for this purpose were assigned to the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSCAC). The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSCAC) will in its capacity as a Military Mission normally deal directly with the military authorities (see paragraph 6).

4. DESIGNATION OF MISSION: To avoid confusion that has been prevalent in the past, the title to be used for correspondence concerning the Land Force Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission, either in its capacity as a sub-commission of the Allied Commission or in its capacity as a Military Mission to the Italian Army, will in future be Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSCAC).

5. CHANNELS OF REPORT AND COMMUNICATION. For Sub-Commission business referred to at paragraph 3 a above, the channel of communication will be the usual one for Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission.

6. The channel for Military Mission business referred to at paragraph 3 b above is Allied Force Headquarters. This business includes the following:

a. Organization and supply matters generally in relation to Italian Army personnel.

b. Personnel ceilings.

c. Organizations of units and formations for:

f 8 0 3

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

U.S. SECRET
SECRET
Equals BRITISH MOST SECRET

(1) Combat.

(2) Service units for support of combat troops both Italian and Allied.

(3) Miscellaneous units for internal security and related duties, both under direct Allied military control and under the Italian Government as directed by Allied Commission.

d. The direction of Italian Army manpower to meet Allied requirements.

e. The training of personnel for employment in the above roles.

f. The provision and holding of reinforcements (replacements).

g. The equipment of Italian Army personnel to meet Allied requirements.

h. Arrangements for, and supervision of, holding, distribution, and accountancy arising from the execution of the above functions.

7. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSA) is authorized to maintain direct liaison with Allied Armies in Italy in order to effect such modifications in the arrangements for which they are responsible under paragraph 6 above, as are operationally desirable and can be undertaken without conflict with policies set by Allied Force Headquarters.

8. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (LFSA) is responsible for keeping the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, informed of all relevant business undertaken in its capacity as a military mission to the Italian Army.

9. Pending the rescission of documents already issued which are in conflict with this instruction, this instruction will govern.

By command of General WILSON:

3353

M. V. ROBERTS,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
See Reverse Side

U.S. SECRET
SECRET
Equals BRITISH MOST SECRET

T 8 0 4

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - Hq A.I
2 - AC
2 - Lnd Forces Sub-Com (MTA)
2 - Hq 1 Dist
2 - Hq 2 Dist
2 - Hq 3 Dist
2 - PBS
2 - COMZONE, NATO
1 - C/S NATO
1 - SGS
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-2
10 - G-3
2 - G-4 (A)
2 - G-4 (B)
2 - G-5
1 - CAO
1 - Q(AE)
1 - Q(Maint)
1 - REE
1 - Engr
1 - Surg
1 - S & T
1 - Ord (A)
1 - Ord (B)
1 - QM
1 - Signals
1 - CWS
1 - Provost
1 - Director of Labor
1 - Director of Works
1 - AA & CD
1 - G-4 (I&Tn)
2 - AG Records
16 - Spares (G-3 (Org) Foreign)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

73

SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FILEOT 73

1605/50/46/G(SD1)

25 Oct 44

SUBJECT:- Italian Army

AFHQ (10)

Reference HBD/424 of 5 Jun 44 and this HQ 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul 44.

1. A Meeting was held at this HQ on 23 Oct 44 to examine AMIA draft instruction on the Command and Administration of the Italian Army, submitted with their letter reference A/36 dated 17 Sep 44. A copy of the Minutes of the Meeting is attached.

2. It is recommended that the draft at Appendix 'A' to the Minutes of the Meeting be approved.

3. The Meeting also approved the draft of a proposed letter on the transfer from AAI to AFHQ of the responsibility for control of Italian Army manpower and organisation.

4. It is recommended that the draft letter at Appendix 'B' to the Minutes of the Meeting be approved and published.

K.W. McClure,
Lt Col for
General,
Commander in Chief.

3357

Copy to:- AMIA
AA to CAO
DCGS
DCAO
A
Q

SECRET

80
22

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FILPOT 75

1805/50/46/G(SD1)

25 Oct 44

Minutes of a Meeting on the Command and Administration of the Italian Army held at 1430 hrs 25 Oct 44 at HQ AAI.

Chairman	Lt Col	McQueen	G(SD)
Present	Brig-General	Hamblen	DCAO
	Col	Glasgow	G(SD)(US)
	Col	Pidsley	MAL
	Col	Welch	A
	Lt Col	Careless	G(SD)
	Lt Col	Ingledew	ACAL
	Lt Col	Jones	Q
	Lt Col	Noakes	MAL
	Maj	Friedberg	G(SD)(US)
	Maj	Morgen	G(SD)
	Capt	Graham	G(SD)

1. The draft instruction on the Command and Administration of the Italian Army submitted by MAL to AFHQ with MAL letter A/40 of 17 Sep 44, was examined and amended. It was agreed that the draft instruction as amended and attached to these minutes at Appendix 'A' should be submitted to AFHQ for final approval and publication.

2. The draft of a proposed letter on the transfer from AAI to AFHQ of responsibility for control of Italian Army manpower and organisation was examined and approved. It was agreed that the letter, attached at Appendix 'B' to these minutes be forwarded to AFHQ for approval and publication. 3350

Major, GS.
(Secretary).

Distribution:- MAL (5)
AA to CAC
DCGS
DCAO
A
Q

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix 'A' to 1605/50/46/G(SD1)
dated 25 Oct 44

DRAFT

COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION OF ITALIAN ARMY

1. This instruction governs the relationships between the Allied Armies and the Italian Army in regard to Command and Administration, and is divided into the following parts :-

Part I - Allied Control of the Italian Army.

Part II - General organisation and administration of the Italian Army.

Part III - Italian Army Units maintained by the US and the British.

Part IV - Italian Army Units maintained Internationally.

Note - No part of this Instruction applies to Italian Cooperators (ex Prisoners of War).

PART I - ALLIED CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

2. GENERAL. The Italian Army is at the disposal of AFHQ for the performance of such tasks as may be allotted from time to time.

3. CONTROL. Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Military Mission Italian Army (MMIA), a section of AFHQ.

4. MMIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR:

a. Transmission and interpretation of Allied orders and requirements to the appropriate Italian Military Authority.

3343

b. Supervision of administration and supply of the Italian Army as laid down in AFHQ Adm Memo No_____

c. Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline and drafts (call-ups) of Italian Army personnel.

d. Liaison between employing Allied formations and the SMRE and Ministry of War.

e. Representation of the views of the Italian Military Authorities to AFHQ

5. The organisation of new units or the reorganisation of existing units of the Italian Army by Italian Military Authorities, or by Allied formations is prohibited except as authorised by AFHQ.

[illegible] these effective units or individuals

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Part II - General [illegible]

Part III - Italian Army Units maintained by the US and the British.

Part IV - Italian Army Units maintained Internationally.

Note - No part of this Instruction applies to Italian Cooperators (ex Prisoners of War).

PART I - ALLIED CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

2. GENERAL. The Italian Army is at the disposal of AFHQ for the performance of such tasks as may be allotted from time to time.

3. CONTROL. Control of the Italian Army is exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander through the Military Mission Italian Army (MMIA), a section of AFHQ.

4. MMIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR:

a. Transmission and interpretation of Allied orders and requirements to the appropriate Italian Military Authority.

3343

b. Supervision of administration and supply of the Italian Army as laid down in AFHQ A/A Memo No._____

c. Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals, discipline and drafts (call-ups) of Italian Army personnel.

d. Liaison between employing Allied formations and the SMME and Ministry of War.

e. Representation of the views of the Italian Military Authorities to AFHQ

5. The organisation of new units or the reorganisation of existing units of the Italian Army by Italian Military Authorities, or by Allied formations is prohibited except as authorised by AFHQ.

6. a. Allied formations will employ only those effective units or individuals of the Italian Army who are specifically assigned or attached to them. Allied formations will employ and maintain only those persons who are properly enrolled into the present Italian Army. Persons who were members of the former Italian Army are civilians until they are enrolled or drafted through the proper present Italian military procedure.

...../2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

b. An effective member of the Italian Armed Forces is defined as "one who is a bona-fide member of the Italian Armed Forces, either Officers, non-commissioned officers or other ranks, duly enrolled or enlisted therein, and subject to the laws of war and the Geneva Convention and borne on the rolls of the Ministry concerned, and actually performing the duty to which assigned as shown on the official strength returns of the Ministry concerned".

PART II - GENERAL ORGANISATION OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

7. ORGANISATION. The Italian Army is divided into categories as follows :-

a. Troops maintained Internationally (short title ITI-ITI) including:

(1) Troops for the administration of the Italian Army itself.

(2) Troops performing an international function such as Internal Security troops, guard battalions, etc, (all of which are subject to assignment under Allied Command as organised).

b. Troops maintained by the British (short title BR-ITI) either diluted or complete units.

c. Troops maintained by the U.S. (short title US-ITI).

8. ADMINISTRATION

a. In principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible to AFHQ, through AMMA, for the Administration of all categories, except as specified otherwise herein.

b. Italian Administrative Headquarters for the Administration of ITI-ITI troops are provided from the administrative troops under Italian Command.

c. Italian Administrative Headquarters for US-ITI and BR-ITI troops are provided from personnel assigned organically as a part of such category. These Headquarters are under Allied Command.

d. The general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War, the personnel for which is obtained from ITI-ITI administrative

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

7. ORGANISATION. The Italian Army is divided into categories as follows :-

a. Troops maintained Internationally (short title ITI-ITI) including:

(1) Troops for the administration of the Italian Army itself.

(2) Troops performing an international function such as Internal Security troops, guard battalions, etc, (all of which are subject to assignment under Allied Command as organised).

b. Troops maintained by the British (short title BR-ITI) either diluted or complete units.

c. Troops maintained by the U.S. (short title US-ITI).

8. ADMINISTRATION

a. In principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible to AFHQ, through AMMA, for the Administration of all categories, except as specified otherwise herein.

b. Italian Administrative Headquarters for the Administration of ITI-ITI troops are provided from the administrative troops under Italian Command.

c. Italian Administrative Headquarters for US-ITI and BR-ITI troops are provided from personnel assigned organically as a part of such category. These Headquarters are under Allied Command.

d. The general administration of the Italian Army is vested in the Ministry for War, the personnel for which is obtained from ITI-ITI's administrative troops.

9. COMMAND.

a. All Allied Commanders are given power of Command over Italian formations or units which may be placed under Allied Command. As far as circumstances permit, orders will be transmitted through the appropriate Italian Army Channels of Command.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

b. Allied Commanders under whose command Italian Units or individuals have been placed have authority to suspend temporarily any Italian Officer for cause at any time. Should such suspension be made, the next Officer in the Italian Channel of Command will succed pro-tem the Officer suspended, until a suitable successor is appointed by the Italian Military authorities. The suspended Officer will be directed to report to the next Superior Italian Headquarters. The Allied Commander will forward to MMLA. at the time of suspension, a full statement of facts in the case so as to form the basis for action to be taken by the Ministry of War and AFHQ.

c. All personnel of the Italian Army will be subject to Italian Military Law, which will be administered by Italian Officers in accordance with the Italian code. Where there is no Italian Officer competent, under the Italian code, to deal with the offence in the unit concerned, the offender will be sent to the nearest Italian Authority competent to act. When the offender is a member of a unit under Allied Command, the Allied Commander will be informed of the action taken. In cases where the Allied Commander considers the action taken was unsatisfactory, or the punishment insufficient, the Allied Commander will submit a statement of facts to MMLA for such additional action as is indicated.

d. Where Italian troops are under Allied Command, relevant Allied Commanders will demand removal and replacement of unsuitable Italian Officers up to and including L3347, by the appropriate Italian Commander concerned. If the action taken by the Italian Authority is unsatisfactory, the Allied Commander will report through normal Allied Channels to the Army, District or Base Section Commander under whose Command the Italian Army unit has been placed. The Army, District or Base Section Commander will refer the matter to the Senior Italian Authority under his command. If, after this reference, satisfactory action is not taken, details of the case, together with the recommendations of the Allied Army, District or Base Section Commander, will be sent to MMLA for action with the Minister of War. In the case of Officers above the rank of Lt Col a full report will be made by the appropriate Allied Commander to MMLA

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

c. All personnel of the Italian Army will be subject to Italian Military Law, which will be administered by Italian Officers in accordance with the Italian code. Where there is no Italian Officer competent, under the Italian code, to deal with the offence in the unit concerned, the offender will be sent to the nearest Italian authority competent to act. When the offender is a member of a unit under Allied Command, the Allied Commander will be informed of the action taken. In cases where the Allied Commander considers the action taken was unsatisfactory, or the punishment insufficient, the Allied Commander will submit a statement of facts to MMLA for such additional action as is indicated.

d. Where Italian troops are under Allied Command, relevant Allied Commanders will demand removal and replacement of unsuitable Italian Officers up to and including L3347 by the appropriate Italian Commander concerned. If the action taken by the Italian Authority is unsatisfactory, the Allied Commander will report through normal Allied Channels to the Army, District or Base Section Commander under whose Command the Italian Army unit has been placed. The Army, District or Base Section Commander will refer the matter to the Senior Italian Authority under his command. If, after this reference, satisfactory action is not taken, details of the case, together with the recommendations of the Allied Army, District or Base Section Commander, will be sent to MMLA for action with the Minister of War. In the case of Officers above the rank of Lt Col, a full report will be made by the appropriate Allied Commander to MMLA who will take necessary action with the Minister of War. In all cases where the Allied Commander considers that the Italian Officer should be eliminated from the service, regardless of the action taken by the Italian Authorities in accordance with the demand of the Allied Commander, a full report should be sent to MMLA.

.....(4)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

10. ARREST.

a. Allied Military Authorities are given power to arrest and hold in temporary custody Italians subject to Military Law, alleged to be guilty of any offence punishable by Italian Law, pending investigation and handing over the offender for trial by the Italian Authorities. This power will be exercised in the same manner as for the arrest of Allied personnel.

11. LEAVE

a. If the military situation permits, privilege leave may be given to Italian Army personnel for a period of seven days, exclusive of travelling time, not more than once in six months. The movement, on leave, of personnel, between the mainland and SICILY and SARDINIA will be governed by current regulations.

b. Compassionate leave may be given in proper cases by a superior Italian Military Authority, Colonel or above, for fourteen days exclusive of travelling time, with the concurrence of the Allied Commander concerned, if applicable.

c. Not more than five percent of a unit may be away on privelege and/or compassionate leave at one time.

d. Agricultural or special leave will be the subject of special orders from time to time.

e. Allied Commanders may, at their discretion, suspend the granting of leave to members of Italian Army units under their command, for operational or other reasons.

f. Italian Army personnel on leave are not entitled to rations from Army sources during the period of absence.

12. APPOINTMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS

a. The Italian Minister of War is responsible for the appointment of Officers, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed from time to time by

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

punishable by Italian Law, pending [illegible] for trial by the Italian Authorities. This power will be exercised in the same manner as for the arrest of Allied personnel.

11. LEAVE

a. If the military situation permits, privilege leave may be given to Italian Army personnel for a period of seven days, exclusive of travelling time, not more than once in six months. The movement, on leave, of personnel, between the mainland and SICILY and SARDINIA will be governed by current regulations.

b. Compassionate leave may be given in proper cases by a superior Italian Military Authority, Colonel or above, for fourteen days exclusive of travelling time, with the concurrence of the Allied Commander concerned, if applicable.

c. Not more than five percent of a unit may be away on privelege and/or compassionate leave at one time.

d. Agricultural or special leave will be the subject of special orders from time to time.

e. Allied Commanders may, at their discretion, suspend the granting of leave to members of Italian Army units under their command, for operational or other reasons.

f. Italian Army personnel on leave are not entitled to rations from Army sources during the period of absence.

12. APPOINTMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS

a. The Italian Minister of War is responsible for the appointment of Officers, subject to such restrictions as may be imposed from time to time by AFHQ.

b. Assignment of officers is a function of the Minister of War. In units employed under Allied Command, officers will not be relieved by the Minister of War until a suitable replacement has reported for duty and no transfers or reliefs generally will be effected without prior notification to the Allied Commander concerned.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

13. ABSENTEES

a. Personnel absent without leave over 30 days will be struck off the authorised strength of the Italian Army.

b. Personnel who have been struck off the authorised strength of the Italian Army will, when apprehended, be subject to such disciplinary action as the Italian Army considers appropriate, but during trial and sentence will not be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army. When such personnel are again available for duty as effectives, the personnel will pass through a replacement centre for reassignment.

14. PERSONNEL UNDERGOING IMPRISONMENT OR DETENTION

a. Italian Army personnel sentenced to imprisonment or detention, or confined awaiting trial, are, for periods under 30 days, confined in unit cells, and are retained on the strength of the unit.

b. Italian Army personnel who are absent from their unit awaiting trial for over 30 days, or who are sentenced to detention for over 30 days, will be struck off the authorised strength of the Italian Army, and will be confined in Civil prisons. On release from the Civil prison, if they remain eligible for service in the Army, such personnel will be sent to a replacement centre for reassignment. Such personnel will not be reincorporated in the old unit unless assigned thereto through the replacement centre. During the period of confinement in civil prisons, such personnel will not be rationed from Army sources.

334

c. Effective Army personnel will not be employed in the operation of Civil prisons, camps or detention centres, for the confinement of personnel for periods in excess of 30 days.

15. ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION

No member of the Italian Army will be paid any salary, wages or emoluments from Allied sources as an addition to his pay from the Italian Government.

16. [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

available for duty as effectives, the personnel will pass through a replacement centre for reassignment.

14. PERSONNEL UNDERGOING IMPRISONMENT OR DETENTION

a. Italian Army personnel sentenced to imprisonment or detention, or confined awaiting trial, are, for periods under 30 days, confined in unit cells, and are retained on the strength of the unit.

b. Italian Army personnel who are absent from their unit awaiting trial for over 30 days, or who are sentenced to detention for over 30 days, will be struck off the authorised strength of the Italian Army, and will be confined in Civil prisons. On release from the Civil prison, if they remain eligible for service in the Army, such personnel will be sent to a replacement centre for reassignment. Such personnel will not be reincorporated in the old unit unless assigned thereto through the replacement centre. During the period of confinement in civil prisons, such personnel will not be rationed from Army sources.

3346

c. Effective Army personnel will not be employed in the operation of Civil prisons, camps or detention centres, for the confinement of personnel for periods in excess of 30 days.

15. ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION

No member of the Italian Army will be paid any salary, wages or emoluments from Allied sources as an addition to his pay from the Italian Government.

16. WELFARE

a. Welfare will be the responsibility of the Italian Government.

b. Issues, sales, or gifts of Post Exchange or NAAFI supplies from Allied sources to Italian troops under Allied command is prohibited except as authorised specially by AFHQ.

17. HOSPITALIZATION

a. Personnel undergoing treatment in hospitals or convalescent camps will be carried by their units as "sick in hospital" for periods up to 30 days inclusive.

.....(5)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

b. Personnel remaining in hospital or convalescent camps over 30 days will be transferred to the rolls and carried on the strength of the replacement centre. Separate instructions will be issued to cover Combat Groups.

c. Personnel remaining in hospital or convalescent camps over 60 days will be struck off the authorised ceiling of the Italian Army, and will be transferred to Civil hospitals operated by the Italian Government, thereafter being issued no rations from Army stocks.

d. The Italian Government will be responsible for organising and operating civilian hospitals and convalescent camps to care for personnel who require hospitalization in excess of 60 days.

e. Personnel who have been struck off the authorised strength of the Army as a result of being in hospital over 60 days will be recalled to duty with the Army, if physically qualified, upon discharge from the Civil hospital. Recall will be effected through the normal recall channels and reassignment will be through the replacement centre.

f. The figure of 60 days may be reduced by orders of AFHQ if it is found by experience that an excessive number of sick is being carried on the rolls of the replacement centre.

18 REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS

The system and organisation for the provision of replacement personnel will be as follows :-

a. Recruits will be called up by the Ministry of War at the direction of MMIA.

b. Recruits will report to "Call-up Centres", the staffs of which will be ITI-ITI personnel.

c. Separate base replacement depots will be set up for US-ITI's, ER-ITI's and ITI-ITI's respectively. MMIA will be responsible for arranging delivery

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

being issued no rations from Army stocks.

d. The Italian Government will be responsible for organising and operating civilian hospitals and convalescent camps to care for personnel who require hospitalization in excess of 60 days.

e. Personnel who have been struck off the authorised strength of the Army as a result of being in hospital over 60 days will be recalled to duty with the Army, if physically qualified, upon discharge from the Civil hospital. Recall will be effected through the normal recall channels and reassignment will be through the replacement centre.

f. The figure of 60 days may be reduced by orders of AFHQ if it is found by experience that an excessive number of sick is being carried on the rolls of the replacement centre.

18 REINFORCEMENTS AND REPLACEMENTS

The system and organisation for the provision of replacement personnel will be as follows :-

a. Recruits will be called up by the Ministry of War at the direction of MMIA.

b. Recruits will report to "Call-up Centres", the staffs of which will be ITI-ITI personnel.

c. Separate base replacement depots will be set up for US-ITI's, BR-ITI's and ITI-ITI's respectively. MMIA will be responsible for arranging delivery of recruits and personnel available from other sources to the depots and for their maintenance prior to arrival. Thereafter, the nationality concerned will be responsible for the maintenance and training of replacement personnel and distribution to units.

d. The responsibility for establishment of and maintenance of staffs of base replacement depots is as follows :

(i) For US-ITI - CG NATOUSA

(ii) For BR-ITI - AFHQ

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(iii) For ITI-ITI - The Italian War Ministry

e. The replacements held on the rolls of replacement depots will not exceed the authorised number in each instance.

f. On the first of each month MMIA will forecast to AFHQ the output of types of personnel from Call-up Centres and other sources of personnel during the succeeding month and furnish any other information required to enable AFHQ to apportion the required quota between the US-ITI, BR-ITI and ITI-ITI Replacement Depots. The distribution to specific Replacement Depots of the nationality concerned will be in accordance with the requirements of CG MATOUSA for US-ITIs, AFHQ for BR-ITIs , War Ministry for ITI-ITIs.

g. MMIA will authorise call-up of personnel on the basis of demands at (f) above.

PART III - ITALIAN ARMY UNITS MAINTAINED BY THE US & BRITISH
(US-ITIS and BR-ITIS)

19. PROVISION OF UNITS

a. The entire resources of personnel of the Italian Army are at the disposal of AFHQ, which allots Italian Army Units and personnel to the various categories.

20. ORGANISATION

3345

a. Units or sub-units maintained by the British (BR-ITIs) are or will be organised on WEs to be decided by AFHQ.

b. Units serving and maintained by the U.S. (US-ITIs) are or will be organised on provisional TOs as decided by Base Section, Army or similar Headquarters.

c. MMIA will be informed of any changes in organisation or WE/TO of units.

21. REPLACEMENTS

a. The holding of replacements for Service Units, exclusive of Combat Groups, is limited to 5% of the total authorised [illegible] maintained by

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Replacement Depots. The distribution to specific Replacement Depots of the nationality concerned will be in accordance with the requirements of CG NATOUSA for US-ITIs, AFHQ for BR-ITIs , War Ministry for ITI-ITIs.

g. MMIA will authorise call-up of personnel on the basis of demands at (f) above.

PART III - ITALIAN ARMY UNITS MAINTAINED BY THE US OR BRITISH
(US-ITIS and BR-ITIS)

19. PROVISION OF UNITS

a. The entire resources of personnel of the Italian Army are at the disposal of AFHQ, which allots Italian Army Units and personnel to the various categories.

3345

20. ORGANISATION

a. Units or sub-units maintained by the British (BR-ITIs) are or will be organised on WEs to be decided by AFHQ.

b. Units serving and maintained by the U.S. (US-ITIs) are or will be organised on provisional TOs as decided by Base Section, Army or similar Headquarters.

c. MMIA will be informed of any changes in organisation or WE/TC of units.

21. REPLACEMENTS

a. The holding of replacements for Service Units, exclusive of Combat Groups, is limited to 5% of the total authorised service units maintained by the Allies.

22. FINANCES

a. Wherever possible the Italian Government will be responsible for the payment of Italian Army personnel and for meeting such other expenses as are necessary.

b. Wherever, due to local conditions, it is NOT practicable for payment to be made by the Italian Government, the following emergency measures are authorised.

Units serving under British Command

(i) Italian units will draw bulk advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(ii) In diluted units the senior Italian Officer will draw advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier. Such amounts will not appear in the imprest accounts of the British units concerned.

(iii) All advances will be in bulk sum.

(iv) A list of authorised units will be supplied by AFHQ to the Command Paymaster No 6 Command Pay Office CMF. In the cases of diluted units the British Commanding Officer will nominate the Italian Officer to whom payment should be made.

Units Maintained by the US.

(v) Finances will be subject to special instructions issued by CG NATOUSA.

23 ORGANISATION

PART IV - ITALIAN ARMY UNITS MAINTAINED INTERNATIONALLY

These units are divided into three categories:

a. Internal Security formations whose principle functions are:

(i) acting as a force to support the civil power.

(ii) providing guards for Allied installations and Vital Points.

(iii) special duties under Allied Command (eg. for ACC, etc).

b. Administrative depots and services.

c. Para-military personnel, i.e. Carabinieri, the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration.

24 COMMAND

Except for Carabinieri and units allotted or attached to Allied formations Internal security or for/gd duties, these formations and units are under command of the Italian Military Authorities. If a state of emergency arises (such as the intervention of the enemy in the area concerned) these tps will come under comd of the Allied Headquarters in whose area they are located. The Carabinieri (CC.RR) except those units within Army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police [illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

whom payment should be made.

Units Maintained by the US.

(v) Finances will be subject to special instructions issued by CC NAFOUSA.

PART IV - ITALIAN ARM. UNITS MAINTAINED INTERNATIONALLY

23 ORGANISATION

These units are divided into three categories:

a. Internal Security formations whose principle functions are:

(i) acting as a force to support the civil power.

(ii) providing gds for Allied installations and Vital Points.

(iii) special duties under Allied Command (eg. for ACO, etc).

b. Administrative depots and services.

The size, location and organisation of these units are determined by the Italian Military Authorities under the direction of MMLA.

c. Para-military personnel, i.e. Carabinieri, the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration.

24 COMMAND

Except for Carabinieri and units allotted or attached to Allied formations internal security or
for/ si duties, these formations and units are under command of the Italian Military Authorities. If a state of emergency arises (such as the intervention of the enemy in the area concerned) these tps will come under comd of the Allied Headquarters in whose area they are located. The Carabinieri (CC.RR) except those units within Army formations in the role of Military Police, are a civil police organisation under the command of the Commanding General of the Carabinieri and directed by the Public Safety Sub Commission, ACC.

25 RELATIONS WITH ALLIED COMMANDERS

Allied Headquarters in whose area these units are located will be responsible

.....(9)

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 78502

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

for allotment of accommodation. Units will be subject to Allied orders on administration, which concern them as a result of their presence in the area e.g. curfew and road movement.

D R A F T

S E C R E T

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Appendix 'B' to
1605/50/46/G(SD1)
dated 2[illegible] Oct 44

SUBJECT:- Transfer from AAI to AFHQ of responsibility for control of Italian Army Manpower and Organisation

1. Object

The object of this letter is to define the changes in the responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI as the result of the handing over to AFHQ by AAI of the control of Italian Army Manpower and Organisation.

2. Date of handover

AFHQ will assume the responsibilities set out in the following paras with effect from 31 Oct 44.

3. Ceiling of the Italian Army

AFHQ will decide the distribution of personnel to categories within the ceiling laid down from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Provision of personnel

(a) Through the agency of AMLA, AFHQ will undertake the provision of personnel to meet the Allied requirements within 3341 categories of the ceiling.

(b) The present proportionate distribution i.e. :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-Specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3)	2/3
Combat Gps	1/3)	

will continue in force until amended by AFHQ, and the personnel made available will be allotted between US and British in these proportions.

(c) AFHQ will take control of Italian British

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

The object of this letter is to define the changes in the responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI as the result of the handing over to AFHQ by AAI of the control of Italian Army manpower and Organisation.

2. Date of handover

AFHQ will assume the responsibilities set out in the following paras with effect from 31 Oct 44.

3. Ceiling of the Italian Army

AFHQ will decide the distribution of personnel to categories within the ceiling laid down from time to time by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. Provision of personnel

(a) Through the agency of AAI., AFHQ will undertake the provision of personnel to meet the Allied requirements within the categories of the ceiling.

(b) The present proportionate distribution i.e. :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-Specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	2/3
Combat Gps	1/3	

will continue in force until amended by AFHQ, and the personnel made available will be allotted between US and British in these proportions.

(c) AFHQ will take over control of Priority List 8 - British requirements of Italian Army personnel for Service Units and Priority List 7 - Priority of shipment of personnel and units from SARDINIA to ITALY.

5. Formation of units

AFHQ will undertake the formation of all units and the issue of the relevant Formation Orders.

2/.....

334

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

6. War Establishments

AFHQ will publish War Establishments for British controlled units where necessary but AAI are authorised to publish or amend and implement War Establishments for British controlled units peculiar to the Operational Zone.

7. Allocation of Units

AFHQ will allot units as between the Operational Zone and L of C Area.

8. Italian Combat Gps

cro HE-ITI's

(a) During formation, Groups will be

(i) under command of the Italian General Staff, subject to the supervision of MMIA under the general direction of AAI.

(ii) equipped by AFHQ.

(iii) trained under supervision AFHQ

(b) After completion of organization and equipment, Groups will pass to under command of C-in-C AAI.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reg.

182430

L R C F L L A E A A A L E L L S A L A A E I E 2 1 3 0 M 6 R 9/6

MAIN AAI. 2 DISTHREE. 3 DISTHREE EAST. 4 DISTONE. 5 MAIN.

1. UNTIL AFHQ ASSUMES ITS FULL RESPONSIBILITIES IN RELATION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE FOR THE CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF ITALIAN UNITS AND PERSONNEL SIGNED SACMED CITE FHQT.

2. A.A.I. WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN PRIORITY LIST 7 AND CONTROL THE DISPOSAL OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL ARRIVING FROM SARDINIA.

3. ACTING ON THE REQUESTS RECEIVED FROM AAI AND MAIN AFHQ WILL ORDER THE MOVEMENT OF ALL ITALIAN UNITS AND PERSONNEL WITHIN THE L OF C AREA EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF THOSE UNITS UNDER COMMAND 3 DIST WHO WILL BE MOVED UNDER ORDERS 3 DIST

CO ORDINATED WITH : M.G. TM.

ROUTINE

DANIEL HUGH,
Major General, G.S.C.

SECRET

SUBJECT:- The Responsibilities of AAI for the organisation of the Italian Army.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel: FILPOT 23

1605/50/46/G(SD1)

2 Oct 44

General organisation of the Italian Army

1. The attached Memorandum (1605/50/46/G(SD1) of 10 Sep 44) was submitted to AFHQ in order to clarify the relative responsibilities of AFHQ and AAI wef 10 Sep for organisation and control of Italian Army manpower. The recommendations at para 24 have been accepted by AFHQ.

2. While the mechanism of staff control of Italian Army manpower remains with AAI, it will be necessary for AFHQ to take executive action on arrangements which must be made in the L of C Area. Service units on British account, on completion of formation, are at the disposal of AFHQ. AAI, nevertheless, has an interest in these units since they may be allotted to the Operational Zone or relieve units in the L of C Area. Branches and Services therefore are requested to continue their interest in the Services unit programme and to keep their opposite numbers at AFHQ and the MMIA fully informed of previous plans and proposed changes as a result of unforeseen developments in the operational situation.

The Combat Groups

3. Attached are the recommendations of AAI to AFHQ on the status of and responsibilities for the Groups (1605/50/57/G(SD1) of 2 Oct).

4. C in C considers that the Groups are potentially of considerable operational importance. Every effort will be made to ensure that the Groups are completed according to Schedule.

5. Branches and Services will keep in close touch with the progress of training and organisation of the units of the Groups through the appropriate branches and Services of MMIA and the relevant trg organisations of the IAM.

6. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to M.I.. 3338

K.W.M. Gluer
for
Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:-

MS — Postal — Information

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 78502-0

ctions at para 24 have been accepted.

2. While the mechanism of staff control of Italian Army manpower remains with AAI, it will be necessary for AFHQ to take executive action on arrangements which must be made in the L of C Area. Service units on British account, on completion of formation, are at the disposal of AFHQ. AAI, nevertheless, has an interest in these units since they may be allotted to the Operational Zone or relieve units in the L of C Area. Branches and Services therefore are requested to continue their interest in the Service units pro-grams and to keep their opposite numbers at AFHQ and the MAIA fully informed of previous plans and proposed changes as a result of unforeseen developments in the operational situation.

The Combat Groups

3. Attached are the recommendations of AAI to AFHQ on the status of and responsibilities for the Groups (1605/50/57/G(SD1) of 2 Oct).

4. G in C considers that the Groups are potentially of considerable operational importance. Every effort will be made to ensure that the Groups are completed according to Schedule.

5. Branches and Services will keep in close touch with the progress of training and organisation of the units of the Groups through the appropriate branches and Services of MAIA and the relevant trg organisations of the BLM.

6. Copies of this memorandum have been forwarded to AAI.

3333

K W McClure
Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:-

MS
G(Ops)
GSI(a)
GSI(b)
G(Trg)
A
Q
Q(AE)
Q(Mov)
Tn
G-4
RA
RE
Z
Svy

Postl
ST
Catering
Prints
Med
Ord
REME
Labour
Pay
V & R
Pro
Welfare
HQ PAO
HQ Inf
DMT (3)

Information

MA to CGS
DCGS
MA to CAS
ACO Liaison

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FILPOT 23

1605/50/46/G(SD1)

19 Sep 44

Memorandum on the transfer from AAI to AFHQ of responsibility for control of Italian Army Manpower and Organisation.

Object of this Memorandum

Policy for the transfer of responsibility for organisation and manpower control of the Italian Army is stated in AFHQ letter AG 091.112/079 GCT-O of 10 Sep. The object of this Memorandum is to recapitulate the current policy and procedure followed by AAI and to make recommendations on the passing of responsibility to AFHQ.

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to meet US, British, Combat and International requirements.

1. AAI policy is that :-

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	2/3
Combat Gps	1/3	

Mechanism for implementation of programme

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MMIA in the proportions at para 1(b) above.

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MMIA to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List 8).

(c) MMIA are responsible for :-

(i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British are met.

(ii) informing AAI of the priority in which personnel are to be shipped from CANDIAN.

(iii) assessing the effective strengths of units.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

control of the Italian Army is stated in AFHQ letter AG 091.112/079 GOT-O of 10 Sep. The object of this Memorandum is to recapitulate the current policy and procedure followed by A.I and to make recommendations on the passing of responsibility to AFHQ.

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to meet US, British, Combat and International requirements.

1. A.I policy is that :-

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3)	
Combat Gps	1/3)	2/3

Mechanism for implementation of programme

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MMIA in the proportions at para 1(b) above. 3336

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MMIA to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List 8).

(c) MMIA are responsible for :-

(i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British are met.

(ii) informing A.I of the priority in which personnel are to be shipped from S/JDMMIA.

(iii) assessing the effective strengths of units.

Organisation of British Combat and Service units

3. The state of British Service units and the programme for the completion of the British ceiling are shown in the following documents (attached to this Memo).

Minutes of a Meeting - 1605/50/66/G(SD1) of 5 Sep.
Revised Agenda of a Meeting - 1605/50/66/G(SD1) of 3 Sep.
with
Appx 'A' - Revised State of Italian Army Service units under British Cmd
Appx 'B' - Programme for provision of personnel to meet deficiencies.

...../Sheet 2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

4. The programme is of considerable complexity. Radical changes at short notice can only lead to delay, confusion and dislocation of the Italian administrative machinery.

WE's of units under British comd

5. All Italian Army service and combat units under British comd are or will be organised on WE's approved by WEC AAI.

Formation orders for units under British comd

6. Formation orders are issued by 'A' Branch AAI. The procedure is governed by the following principles :-

(a) where the source of manpower is under comd a District or Army, the District or Army is responsible for supervision of formation in conjunction with Italian Adm HQ allotted to the District or Army.

(b) In other cases, MMIA is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. MMIA distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.

8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft adm instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Apnx 'A' to 1605/50/63/G(SD1) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.

10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that during an interim period responsibility for Italian Army organisation and manpower will be divided between AFHQ and AAI as follows :-

(a) AFHQ to be responsible for

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNEC NO. 785020

vision of formation in conjunction with [illegible] allotted to the District or Army.

(b) In other cases, MMIA is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. MMIA distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.

8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft adm instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Appx 'A' to 1605/50/63/G(SD1) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.

10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that during an interim period responsibility for Italian Army organisation and manpower will be divided between AFHQ and AAI as follows :-

(a) AFHQ to be responsible for

(i) all questions of organisation of service units

(ii) establishing priorities between combat and service units.

(b) AAI to be responsible for organisation of combat units.

In view of the complexities of the Italian Army manpower situation such a division of responsibility is not practicable.

12. It is recommended that either

(a) AFHQ take over complete control of Italian Army manpower and organisation as soon as possible.

...../Sheet 3.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

or

(b) AAI continue to provide the mechanism of staff control under the general direction of AFHQ until the appropriate staff section of AFHQ is fully informed as to the complex background of the present state of the Italian Army.

13. Immediate assumption of complete control by AFHQ would require from AFHQ decisions on questions of detail without knowledge of past history.

14. If it is decided that the mechanism of staff control is to remain temporarily with AAI, then it is recommended that the following procedure should be adopted during the interim period.

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

15. On all questions of manpower and organisation AFHQ should deal with MMIA through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportionate allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG NATOUSA.

Shipments from SARDINIA

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) MMIA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on info supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the L of C Area.

333

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

15. On all questions of manpower and organisation AFHQ should deal with MMIA through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportionate allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted by US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG NATOUSA.

Shipments from SARDMIA

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted by British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) MMIA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on info supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the L of C Area.

Organisation of units under British Cmd

20. WE's would be approved by WEC AAI.

Rifts for British units

21. Would be distributed by MMIA between units in accordance with priorities decided by G1 AFHQ in consultation with 'A' Branch AAI.

Ceiling

22. The distribution of personnel to categories would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

...../Sheet 4.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

AFHQ Reps

23. Representatives of G-3 AFHQ should be attached to HQ AAI as soon as possible.

Conclusion

24. It is recommended that:-

(a) the current policy described at Part I should continue until the reorganisation of the Italian Army is completed

(b) During the interim period before AFHQ assume complete control, the procedure at paras 15 - 23 should be adopted.

Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:- G-3 (Org) AFHQ (10 Copies)
DCAC
DAG
DQMG

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

18

SUBJECT: Responsibility of M.M.I.A.

Military Mission Italian Army
ROME.

O/6
12 Oct. 44.

Chief of Staff, A.C.C.

Ref your minute on page 7 dated 10 Oct: -

1. (a) From an analysis, it has been found that 97% of the work of MMIA is purely military, with little or no repercussion or effect on the civil control of ITALY by A.C.C. proper. On this basis, MMIA should logically be direct under A.F.H.Q. now (A.A.I. hitherto).

(b) Nevertheless, as you say, the A.F.H.Q. Directive of 28 Sep retains MMIA under the authority of the Chief Commissioner A.C.C. This, I understand, is necessary as MMIA owes its legal existence to the setting up of A.C.C. at the MOSCOW conference - despite the fact that MMIA was an independent military mission to the Italian Army previously.

2. (a) In order to: -

(i) overcome the above anomaly.

(ii) implement practically the functions and work of MMIA

(iii) prevent burdening A.C.C. proper with matters which are not its real concern and which in most cases it knows nothing about.

(iv) avoid unnecessary paper and delays.

It was ruled earlier this year by Generals ALEXANDER and MACFARLANE that MMIA would deal direct with A.A.I. on military matters, consulting with A.C.C. on subjects where civil considerations were involved.

(b) This arrangement has worked very well and must continue, except that in purely military matters MMIA now has to deal direct with A.F.H.Q. and A.A.I.

3333

3. Another complication exists in the fact that part of the work of MMIA comes direct under CASERTA through A.A.I. I refer to the aspect of the American supply organisation.

4. As regards MMIA being "responsible for the civil aspect" -

I agree that MMIA must take civil considerations into account, but I do not feel that MMIA is "responsible for the civil aspect." It is the duty of MMIA to carry out the military orders of A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q., and to represent to them the military pros and cons of any subject which has a civil as well as a military aspect. The decision then rests with A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1. (a) MMIA is purely military, [illegible] on the civil control of ITALY by A.C.C. proper. [illegible] MMIA should logically be direct under A.F.H.Q. not (A.A.I. hitherto).

(b) Nevertheless, as you say, the A.F. .C. Directive of 28 Sep retains MMIA under the authority of the Chief Commissioner A.C.C. This, I understand, is necessary as MMIA owes its legal existence to the setting up of A.C.C. at the MOSCOW conference - despite the fact that MMIA was an independent military mission to the Italian Army previously.

2. (a) In order tot -

(i) overcome the above anomaly.

(ii) implement practically the functions and work of MMIA

(iii) prevent burdening A.C.C. proper with matters which are not its real concern and which in most cases it knows nothing about.

(iv) avoid unnecessary paper and delays.

it was ruled earlier this year by Generals ALEXANDER and MACFARLANE that MMIA would deal direct with A.A.I. on military matters, consulting with A.C.C. on subjects where civil considerations were involved.

(b) This arrangement has worked very well and must continue, except that in purely military matters MMIA now has to deal direct with A.F.H.Q. and A.A.I.

3333

3. Another complication exists in the fact that part of the work of MMIA comes direct under MATOUSA through A.A.I. I refer to the aspect of the American supply organisation.

4. As regards MMIA being "responsible for the civil aspect" -

I agree that MMIA must take civil considerations into account, but I do not feel that MMIA is "responsible for the civil aspect." It is the duty of MMIA to carry out the military orders of A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q., and to represent to them the military pros and cons of any subject which has a civil as well as a military aspect. The decision then rests with A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q.

In my opinion, no other arrangement is possible, as, on occasions, the civil aspect and wishes of A.C.C. run directly counter to the military aspect and even to the MMIA charter or the orders issued to MMIA by A.A.I. or A.F.H.Q. direct.

5. (a) As you will know, the whole position and status of MMIA is very difficult and peculiar. We really have 4 masters - A.C.C., A.A.I., A.F.H.Q. and MATOUSA (through A.A.I.).

(b) I consider it is quite impossible to state categorically in words what is the exact position and responsibility of MMIA in all the multifarious and diverse aspects of its work.

Sheet 2/..

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

5. (Contd.)

(c). The whole business (like the British Constitution and other illogical British organisations - which do work) must exist and carry on on a basis of common sense, goodwill and cooperation.

6. As I see it, that is the situation - which remains unchanged from what has been in practice for months past, except that NMIA now has an additional direct master in A.F.H.Q. !

L. Browning

tvs.LB.

Major General.
MEIA.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section J-402/NNDC No. 785020

GCC Army Sub-Commission.

1. The points raised in my Page 1 to which you replied on Page 6, will be referred to AFHQ in order that direction may be obtained.

2. I notice in para 6 of your memorandum that you state that MMIA are responsible for the military aspect of the Italian Army, ACC for the civil aspect. This would infer that there is a distinction between MMIA and the Army Sub-Commission. You will notice that para 13(a) of AFHQ directive AG 323/035 GCT-O dated 28 September lays down that the Army Sub-Commission (MMIA) is included in the ACC and that its status in the current organisation of the Commission will remain unchanged. It would therefore seem that while as MMIA your Sub-Commission is responsible for the military aspect, it also is responsible for the civilian aspect as the Army Sub-Commission under the authority of the Chief Commissioner.

3. I feel there may have been some misunderstanding on this point in the past and I should like to have your agreement.

N.S.L.

Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

10.Oct.44.
NSL/JG

3331

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

174

EMS/dfe

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

10 October 1944

A/CC 321-1

S/G 6 9
12 10

MEMORANDUM TO: Naval Sub-Commission
Army Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Commission

1. For your information, SACMED has requested specific directives from Combined Chiefs of Staff as to what changes if any are to be made in the functions and organization of ACC, the possibility of which was suggested in the joint communique of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

2. Until such directives are received, there will be no change in either the name or functions of this Commission.

ELLIOTT W. STONE
Commodore
Acting Chief Commissioner

333

3

1842

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
CMF
Office of the Chief of Staff

SECRET

REF : 501/4/008.

7 October 44.

SUBJECT : Anglo-American Declaration - ACC Policy.

TO : Political Section
Civil Affairs Section
Economic Section
Establishment Section
Navy Sub-Commission
Army Sub-Commission
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Communications Sub-Commission
War Materials Disposal & IPCW Sub-Com.
Public Relations Branch
Adv. HQ. ACC.

1. Attached for your information is copy of the reply received from AFHQ to an enquiry from the Acting Chief Commissioner concerning the policy to be followed by ACC following the recent Joint Anglo-American declaration.

Lieutenant Radulovic
for Brigadier.
Chief of Staff.

323

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING MESSAGE

ACTION ACC

110/04

PRIORITY

CITE FHGEG

AFHQ SIGNED SACMED

F 34211

OCT 041711A

SECRET. Instructions are being sought from combined Chiefs of Staff on action to be taken arising out of joint Anglo-American declaration and on points raised by you. Refer your S347 of 28 Sept. We are asking for oppor-tunity to comment on any contemplated change in light of experience of AFHQ and ACC. Pending receipt of instructions ACC will make no change in title and take no action on the basis of the declaration.

3323

OCT 050830A

SECRET

Subject:- Role of Italian Army in the rehabilitation of ITALY

69
13

Military Mission Italian Army
R O M E

G/G
6 Oct 44

Chief of Staff, A.C.C.

The whole thing boils down to this:-

1. We have a ceiling of 313,000(latest AFHQ proposals to CCS) which is subdivided into categories for employment e.g. Combat, I.S., Service Units etc. with the object of directly aiding the war effort.

2. The 313,000 are not enough to do all the military tasks required.

3. Any allotment out of the 313,000 for ACC tasks must therefore be at the expense of some purely military task.

4. Thus, allotment must be a matter of priorities; and AFHQ, after discussion with ACC, must decide as to whether and which ACC "rehabilitation" demands outweigh military demands on the 313,000 personnel available.

5. Americans and British at AFHQ will have to agree as to whether it is legitimate to use Italian Army personnel on ACC tasks, because:-

(a) The issue of food, clothing and boots is dependant on strict orders from CCS at WASHINGTON that such personnel must be engaged on "effective" duties.

(b) It will be necessary to decide which "classification" any personnel allotted for "rehabilitation" work is to come from. The state of affairs now is that the British are responsible for the maintenance of Italian personnel working solely for them (BR - ITIs), the USA for their own Italian personnel(US - ITIs) and AMGOT for the Italian personnel working on an Allied basis (ITI - ITIs).

332

Italian personnel allotted for ACC "rehabilitation" purposes will have to be classified as ITI - ITIs and if taken from BR- ITIs or US - ITIs will have to be transferred to the ITI - ITI classification. This will raise supply and shipment difficulties, unless the British and American staff at AFHQ agree to put an equal number of BR - ITIs and US - ITIS at the disposal of ACC for "rehabilitation" purposes.

6. AMGOT are responsible for

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

The whole thing boils down to this:-

1. We have a ceiling of 315,000(latest AFHQ proposals to COS) which is subdivided into categories for employment e.g. Combat, L.S., Service Units etc. with the object of directly aiding the war effort.

2. The 315,000 are not enough to do all the military tasks required.

3. Any allotment out of the 315,000 for ACC tasks must therefore be at the expense of some purely military task.

4. Thus, allotment must be a matter of priorities; and AFHQ, after discussion with MMIA, must decide as to whether and which ACC "rehabilitation" demands outweigh military demands on the 315,000 personnel available.

5. Americans and British at AFHQ will have to agree as to whether it is legitimate to use Italian Army personnel on ACC tasks, because:-

(a) The issue of food, clothing and boots is dependant on strict orders from COS at WASHINGTON that such personnel must be engaged on "effective" duties.

(b) It will be necessary to decide which "classification" any personnel allotted for "rehabilitation" work is to come from. The state of affairs now is that the British are responsible for the maintenance of Italian personnel working solely for them (BR - ITIs), the USA for their own Italian personnel(US - ITIs) and MMIA for the Italian personnel working on an Allied basis (ITI - ITIs).

Italian personnel allotted for ACC "rehabilitation" purposes will have to be classified as ITI - ITIs and if taken from BR- ITIs or US - ITIs will have to be transferred to the ITI - ITI classification. This will raise supply and shipment difficulties, unless the British and American staff at AFHQ agree to put an equal number of BR - ITIs and US - ITIs at the disposal of ACC for "rehabilitation" purposes.

6. MMIA are responsible for the military aspect of the Italian Army, ACC for the civil aspect. MMIA executes the orders of higher authority, who should weigh and adjudge on the relative merits of the civil and military aspects, where these conflict.

L.B.

Major General
M.M.I.A

c

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1846

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

G 6 (14)
4 10

Ref: 8251/1/CCS.

2nd October 1944.

SUBJECT: Role of the Italian Army in the rehabilitation of Italy.

TO : C.C.C., Army Sub-Commission.

1. The Acting Chief Commissioner has asked me to discuss with you the question of the use of the Italian Army in its relations to Italy as a whole with the object of ensuring that it can play its part in the rehabilitation of the country and whether such employment can be reconciled with its use by AAI and AFHQ for purely military reasons.

2. It is fully realised that the primary object of re-organising the Italian Army is to use it in aid of the Allied war effort in this country. At the same time it would seem that it must perform a certain role as part of the Italian nation. Can we reconcile its function as part of the Allied forces in this country with this secondary objective?

3. You have already been approached by the Civil Affairs Section with regard to the employment of an Italian battalion in Rome. From recent correspondence you will have seen the views of the Acting Chief Commissioner on the close relation the location of internal security divisions has on public order. You are aware that the services of units of the Army have been requested for the urgent business of clearing mines, particularly in agricultural areas. You will also have had requests for the employment of troops to assist the Italian Government in repatriation.

4. Other problems which have arisen are the responsibility of the Italian Army in repatriation of demobilised Italian soldiers and Italian POW and the care of sick and wounded POW after landing in this country.

3323

5. It would seem that the time has come when a definition is needed as to the responsibilities of the Italian Army with regard to all the points mentioned above for there is a conflict of views.

6. Would you give me the opportunity of discussing these matters at an early date.

M.S. Lush
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MSL/JC.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

SECRET

Tel:- FILPOT 73

1605/50/46/G(SD1)

27 Sep 44

SUBJECT:- Control of Italian Army Manpower

Army Sub Commission, ACC.

1. Two copies of a "Memorandum on the transfer from AAI to AFHQ of responsibility for control of Italian Army Manpower and Organisation", reference 1605/50/46/G(SD1) dated 19 Sep 44, are attached hereto for information.

2. AFHQ have agreed to the recommendations at para 24 of the above Memorandum.

Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

Fin 6/6.. 42A

COPY TRANSLATION

From: Ministry of War
To: Maj. Gen. L.Browning

Ref 501403/GA
Date - 19. 9. 44

6/6
Fin

Subject: Strength of the It. Army in ratio to situation of the country.

1. In recent times certain facts have taken place, the extreme gravity of which should be brought to the notice of responsible authorities. These facts are not so serious in themselves as they are due to the effect they may have in the future on the peacefulness of Italian life and on the possibilities of development of the labour programme, authorised by the Allies.

I will quote the following :-

The increase in absenteeism from the Army.

The difficulty in recruiting either conscripts or patriots.

The difficulty in recovering It. W.D. property within the limits authorised by the Allies.

The difficulty in supervising, administrating or controlling ~~strength~~ personnel in the reserve or unemployed.

The fact that it is materially impossible for the Mil. or civilian authorities to use coercive methods in order to uphold their own responsibilities where all persuasive methods have been used and have failed. This impotence is made evident by the ease with which men desert their units and culminates in the regrettable incident of the 17th inst at the High Court of Justice, incident which might lead to the dangerous belief that the constituted authority is insufficiently endowed with power.

What proportions similar incidents may develop when Northern Italy is liberated cannot even be estimated.

2. In my opinion the symptons of the evil are serious to such an extent that measures used up to date are no longer sufficient to control them and that it is essential to seek the deep roots of the cause in order to avoid more serious effects.

3329

Hence that I should appeal to you, as Director of MAIA, and explain to you what, in my opinion, are the roots of the evil in order to find the remedy, in the name of that solidarity which exists between our Nations, solidarity which is continuously and tangibly proved and which the highest Authority have recently solemly affirmed.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section J-402/NNDC NO. 785020

responsible authorities. These facts are [illegible]
themselves as they are due to the effect they may have in
the future on the peacefulness of Italian life and on the
possibilities of development of the labour programme,
authorised by the Allies.

I will quote the following :-

The increase in absenteeism from the Army.

The difficulty in recruiting either conscripts or patriots.

The difficulty in recovering It. W.D. property within
the limits authorised by the Allies.

The difficulty in supervising, administrating or controlling
personnel ~~strength~~ in the reserve or unemployed.

The fact that it is materially impossible for the Mil. or
civilian authorities to use coercive methods in order to uphold
their own responsibilities where all persuasive methods have
been used and have failed. This impotence is made evident
by the case with which men desert their units and culminates
in the regrettable incident of the 17th inst at the High Court
of Justice, incident which might lead to the dangerous belief
that the constituted authority is insufficiently endowed with
power.

What proportions similar incidents may develop when
Northern Italy is liberated cannot even be estimated.

2. In my opinion the symptons of the evil are serious [illegible]
such an extent that measures used up to date are no longer
sufficient to control them and that it is essential to seek
the deep roots of the causes in order to avoid more serious
effects.

Hence that I should appeal to you, as Director of SACIA,
and explain to you what, in my opinion, are the roots of the
evil in order to find the remedy, in the name of that solidarity
which exists between our Nations, soldierity which is
continuously and tangibly proved and which the highest authority
have recently solemly affirmed.

The report I give hereunder must be considered merely
as a research work to find the most advisable way of overcoming
the present difficulties and I shall be only too grateful for
any practical suggestions made which may lead to a solution
in the common interest.

3. Observation of symptoms and the experience acquired
during 3 months as Minister of War, point out to me, as chief
causes of the evil, insufficient organisation and lack of
available personnel for organization.

3322

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

4. I believe that, should it be possible to create, immediately following the operating and advancing Allied troops, an Italian territorial organisation capable of taking care of, not only the military in which they are directly concerned, but also the population, these people overcome by the anxiety of waiting, and suddenly finding a Government conscious of their sufferings, they would look toward the Italian and Allied authorities with greater faith and would be less inclined to feel the temptation to by-pass the law which is often consequence of the hard times through our Country is now living.

As FLORENCE, ANCONA, LIVORNO, officers cannot be paid, patriots wishing to fight cannot be promptly enlisted into the Army, those subject to military duties, abandoned to their devices, acquire the erroneous idea that they have become free from such duties.

How different the situation would be if Regional Commands could function from the first instant under a General of suitable rank to impose himself upon all and to re-establish the interrupted line of duties, and if in districts and depots to which the population is accustomed, they found a reception and help in their wishes and in their obligations.

The organisation would have to create these units in advance with its own personnel and with essential means, to be replaced, it is to be well understood, by local resources in the same way as the C.C.R.R. do it in newly conquered areas. Only with advanced creation is it possible to obtain that immediate effect the need for which I have endeavoured to make clear.

5. Facts have daily proved that lack of personnel is to be found in the following 3 branches of the organisation -

(a) Admin. force.
(b) Internal Security forces.
(c) The C.C.R.R.

3320

(a) I admit that it would have been advisable to employ civilian personnel in the districts, depots and territorial services a long time ago. We have started on this road but efficient functioning of the new system will take some time. In order to rapidly proceed with recruiting operations, I must point out the need for the recruiting centre strength, already approved, to be increased and for these centres to be backed by the districts.

The total extra personnel required will be about 20,000 men, including recovery personnel.

(b) The Internal Security strength at present allowed is 5 divs of 5000 men each already employed in the Islands.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

At FLORENCE, ANCONA, LIVORNO, officers cannot be paid, patriots wishing to fight cannot be promptly enlisted into the Army, those subject to military duties, abandoned to their devices, acquire the ~~an~~ erroneous idea that they have become free from such duties.

How different the situation would be if Regional Commands could function from the first instant under a General of suitable rank to impose himself upon all and to re-establish the interrupted line of duties, and if in districts and depots to which the population is accustomed, they found a reception and help in their wishes and in their obligations.

The organisation would have to create these units in advance with its own personnel and with essential means, to be replaced, it is to be well understood, by local resources in the same way as the CC.RR. do it in newly conquered areas. Only with advanced preparation is it possible to obtain that immediate effect the need for which I have endeavoured to make clear.

5. Facts have daily proved that lack of personnel is to be found in the following 3 branches of the organisation -

(a) Admin. force.
(b) Internal Security forces.
(c) The CC.RR.

3320

(a) I admit that it would have been advisable to employ civilian personnel in the districts, depots and territorial services a long time ago. We have started on this road but efficient functioning of the new system will take some time. In order to rapidly proceed with recruiting operations, I must point out the need for the recruiting centre strength, already approved, to be increased and for these centres to be backed by the districts.

The total extra personnel required will be about 20,000 men, including recovery personnel.

(b) The Internal Security strength at present allowed is 3 Divs of 5000 men each already employed in the Islands. For the whole of liberated Italy or the part about to be liberated we have not a single man available. This, at present, warehouses and barracks must remain without guards, police strength cannot be increased, military have no restraining force against absenteeism, and Regional Commanders cannot be held responsible for anything.

~~The~~ I think the problem must be faced that it is necessary to allot one internal security Div. to each region which would mean another 4 Divs for liberated Italy and at

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

least a further 4 Divs for Northern Italy,when combat groups cannot be used.

(c) The C.C.RR strength is today about 42,000 men. The inadequacy of this strength is proved by the fact that the Italian Government is unable to pursue deserters and those failing to report on being called up in order to take action which would serve as a healthy example, it is unable to suppress delinquency in SICILY and the greater cities, including ROME. The Government is also unable to cope with Allied requests for CCRR to be held in reserve for Northern Italy.

In normal times the CCRR strength reached about 65,000 men, a figure which certainly does not seem to be excessive for all Italy in times which are far from normal.

Nevertheless I do not consider it wise to reduce the figure below 60,000 men.

6. From all the above it can be seen that the strength to be left at the disposal of the Italian Government, in addition to the 6 Combat Groups would have to be immediately increased by 50,000 men.

What has rendered the problem of strength difficult to solve up to now has been the rationing system which is complex and which sacrifices a basic problem to a matter of accountancy form.

It would be much simpler and more practical if Allied Administration delivered to Italy the agreed number of rations (at present 364,000) and left the It. M of W to distribute them in accordance with basic principles stipulated by the Allies.

7. The persistent worsening process which is taking place under our very eyes and the wish, undoubtedly shared by you, to stop this process has lead me to point out to you frankly the true situation in Italy.

3313

I have been encouraged in my decision to be quite frank by the gravity of the situation and by your frequent invitations to express my points of view in order that we might discuss them.

Yes O.K.

I feel confident that you will be prepared to examine this point of view in the light of the sincere friendship towards Italy of which you have given such ample proofs in the fulfillment of the delicate duties with which you have been entrusted.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Allied requests for CCRA to be held in reserve for Northern Italy.

In normal times the CCRA strength reached about 65,000 men, a figure which certainly does not seem to be excessive for all Italy in times which are far from normal.

Nevertheless I do not consider it wise to reduce the figure below 60,000 men.

6. From all the above it can be seen that the strength to be left at the disposal of the Italian Government, in addition to the 6 Combat Groups would have to be immediately increased by 60,000 men.

What has rendered the problem of strength difficult to solve up to now has been the rationing system which is complex and which sacrifices a basic problem to a matter of accountancy form.

It would be much simpler and more practical if Allied Administration delivered to Italy the agreed number of rations (at present 364,000) and left the It. G of F to distribute them in accordance with basic principles stipulated by the Allies.

7. The persistent worsening process which is taking place under our very eyes and the wish, undoubtedly shared by you, to stop this process has lead me to point out to you frankly the true situation in Italy.

3318

I have been encouraged in my decision to be quite frank by the gravity of the situation and by your frequent invitations to express my points of view in order that we might discuss them.

I feel confident that you will be prepared to examine this point of view in the light of the sincere friendship towards Italy of which you have given such ample proofs in the fulfillment of the delicate duties with which you have been entrusted.

The Minister

A. CASATI

File. No reply needed. Spoke to Casati today & explained to him all the above

2B
4 Oct 44

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

Hq ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Memorandum on the transfer from AAI to AFHQ of responsibility for control of Italian Army Manpower and Organisation.

Tel:- FILPOT 23

1605/50/46/G(SD1)

19 Sep 44

Object of this Memorandum

Policy for the transfer of responsibility for organisation and manpower control of the Italian Army is stated in AFHQ letter AG 091.112/C79 GCT-O of 10 Sep. The object of this Memorandum is to recapitulate the current policy and procedure followed by AAI and to make recommendations on the passing of responsibility to AFHQ.

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to meet US, British, Combat and International requirements.

1. AAI policy is that :-

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	2/3
Combat Gps	1/3	

Mechanism for implementation of programme

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MMIA in the proportions at para 1(b) above.

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MMIA to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List S).

(c) MMIA are responsible for :-

(i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British are met.

(ii) informing AAI of the priority in which personnel are to be shipped from SARDINIA.

(iii) assessing the effective strengths of units.

3317

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

of 10 Sep. The object of this Memorandum is to recapitulate the current policy and procedure followed by AAI and to make recommendations on the passing of responsibility to AFHQ.

PART I - CURRENT POLICY AND PROCEDURE

Provision of personnel to meet US, British, Combat and International requirements.

1. AAI policy is that :-

(a) Allotments of specialist and non-specialist personnel available to meet requirements are made on a proportionate basis between US and British.

(b) The present proportionate allotments are :-

	Specialist Personnel	Non-specialist Personnel
US	1/3	1/3
British	1/3	2/3
Combat Gps	1/3	

Mechanism for implementation of programme

2. (a) Allocation of personnel is made between US and British by MMIA in the proportions at para 1(b) above.

3317

(b) Personnel allotted to the British are applied by MMIA to meet the requirements of a programme (Priority List S).

(c) MMIA are responsible for :-

(i) deciding the sources from which personnel required by US and British are met.

(ii) informing AAI of the priority in which personnel are to be shipped from SARDINIA.

(iii) assessing the effective strengths of units.

Organisation of British Combat and Service units

3. The state of British Service units and the programme for the completion of the British ceiling are shown in the following documents (attached to this Memo).

Minutes of a Meeting - 1605/50/66/G(SD1) of 5 Sep.
Revised Agenda of a Meeting - 1605/50/65/G(SD1) of 3 Sep.
with
Appx 'A' - Revised State of Italian Army Service units under British Comd
Appx 'B' - Programme for provision of personnel to meet deficiencies.

...../Sheet 2.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

4. The programme is of considerable complexity. Radical changes at short notice can only lead to delay, confusion and dislocation of the Italian administrative machinery.

WE's of units under British comd

5. All Italian Army service and combat units under British comd are or will be organised on WE's approved by MEC AAI.

Formation orders for units under British comd

6. Formation orders are issued by 'A' Branch AAI. The procedure is governed by the following principles :-

(a) where the source of manpower is under comd a District or Army, the District or Army is responsible for supervision of formation in conjunction with Italian Adm HQ allotted to the District or Army.

(b) In other cases, MMIA is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. MMIA distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.

8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft adm instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Appx 'A' to 1605/50/63/G(SD1) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.

10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

3316

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that during an interim period responsibility for Italian Army organisation and manpower will be divided between AFHQ and AAI as follows :-

(a) AFHQ to be responsible for

(i) all questions of organisation of service units

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(a) Where the scale of ... or Army, the District or Army is responsible for supervision of formation in conjunction with Italian Adm HQ allotted to the District or Army.

(b) In other cases, MMIA is responsible for supervision of formations.

Rfts

7. Rfts are distributed between US and British as part of the proportionate allotments in para 1(b) above. MMIA distribute rfts for British units in accordance with instructions issued by 'A' Branch AAI.

8. No organised system for the distribution of rfts has yet been established. The recommendations of AAI were embodied in the draft adm instr attached to 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul which will now require modification as a result of the introduction of national and international categories in FAN 387 and FAN 391.

Breakdown of the ceiling

9. The current breakdown is in Appx 'A' to 1605/50/63/G(SD1) of 22 Aug. It is understood that additions have since been made to US allotment and that AA & CD are virtually no longer required.

10. A final working ceiling is essential as a basis for planning and for the economical distribution of manpower.

3316

PART II - THE HANDOVER TO AFHQ

The AFHQ letter of 10 Sep

11. Paras 2 and 3 state that during an interim period responsibility for Italian Army organisation and manpower will be divided between AFHQ and AAI as follows :-

(a) AFHQ to be responsible for

(i) all questions of organisation of service units

(ii) establishing priorities between combat and service units.

(b) AAI to be responsible for organisation of combat units.

In view of the complexities of the Italian Army manpower situation such a division of responsibility is not practicable.

12. It is recommended that either

(a) AFHQ take over complete control of Italian Army manpower and organisation as soon as possible.

...../Sheet 3.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

or

(b) AAI continue to provide the mechanism of staff control under the general direction of AFHQ until the appropriate staff section of AFHQ is fully informed as to the complex background of the present state of the Italian Army.

13. Immediate assumption of complete control by AFHQ would require from AFHQ decisions on questions of detail without knowledge of past history.

14. If it is decided that the mechanism of staff control is to remain temporarily with AAI, then it is recommended that the following procedure should be adopted during the interim period.

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

15. On all questions of manpower and organisation AFHQ should deal with [illegible]IA through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportionate allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or CG NATOUSA.

Shipments from S/ADINI.

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) [illegible]IA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

331

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on info supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the L of C

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC HQ. 785020

Channels between AFHQ and AAI

15. On all questions of manpower and organisation AFHQ should deal with MMIA through AAI.

Allotment between US and British

16. Any necessary revision of the proportionate allotment between US and British would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to US

17. Would be decided by AFHQ or SC N.TOUSA.

Shipments from SARDINIA

18. Priority List 7 would be maintained by AAI.

Disposal of personnel allotted to British

19. (a) Subject to the general direction of AFHQ priorities between service and combat units would be decided by AAI.

(b) MMIA would distribute personnel for Service units in accordance with Priority List 8 which would be maintained by AAI. AFHQ would inform AAI of any alterations required in priorities. AAI would advise AFHQ of the effects of such alterations.

331

(c) Formation orders for :-

(i) Service units would be issued by AFHQ on info supplied by AAI.

(ii) Combat units would be issued by AAI.

(d) After completion of formation, AFHQ would decide the allotment of Service units between the Operational Zone and the L of C Area.

Organisation of units under British comd

20. WE's would be approved by WEC AAI.

Mfts for British units

21. Would be distributed by MMIA between units in accordance with priorities decided by G1 AFHQ in consultation with 'A' Branch AAI.

Ceiling

22. The distribution of personnel to categories would be decided by AFHQ in consultation with AAI.

...../Sheet 4.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1860

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

AFHQ Reps

23. Representatives of G-3 AFHQ should be attached to HQ AAI as soon as possible.

Conclusion

24. It is recommended that:-

(a) the current policy described at Part I should continue until the reorganisation of the Italian Army is completed

(b) During the interim period before AFHQ assume complete control, the procedure at paras 15 - 23 should be adopted.

Brigadier,
G(SD & T).

DISTRIBUTION:- G-3 (Org) AFHQ (10 Copies)
DCAO
DAG
DQMG

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

AMG/AFO

26 September 1944

N/CC 321

Subject: AMGIA - Land Forces Sub-Commission, Allied Control Commission

To: Supreme Allied Commander - Mediterranean, AFHQ, APO 512

1. Reference is made to AFHQ letter AG 091.112/679 OCT-G of 20 September, subject: "Organization - Military Mission to the Italian Army".

2. Para 10 of AFHQ letter AG 091.711-1 (Italian) OCT-AGO, CONFIRED, subject: "Disposal of Italian Army", dated 10 Feb 44, reads as follows:

"10. The Military Mission with the Italian Army (AMGIA) becomes the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission. The Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission is designated as the agency for receiving and implementing, in accordance with the terms of this directive, all demands from Allied Central Mediterranean Force for Italian Army units and resources. The senior member of the Land Forces Sub-Commission is designated as a member of the Allied Control Commission and will act as its representative with Allied Central Mediterranean Force."

3. Based on statement of Major General Lewis (G-4 AFHQ) in a conference held with Lieut. General Clark, Chief Administrative Officer AFHQ and myself at this headquarters on September 14th, it is understood that the first two sentences of para 10 of the 2nd reference letter, quoted above, remain unchanged. It is recommended that the last sentence of para 10 of the 2nd reference letter be cancelled, since decision has been taken that the Chief Commissioner will assign another officer as his representative at Headquarters AAI.

331

ELBERT W. STONE
Captain, USMS
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: Executive Commissioner
~~Land Forces~~ Sub-Com.
Army.

Hq. A.C.C. Sec'y Gen.
DISPATCHED
16 Sept 1500
AD.
ISIRC

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

AP 44 RHF/bar

SECRET
Auth: SAC, MT
Initials: /
10 September 1944

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091.112/079 GCT-O 10 September 1944

SUBJECT: Organization - Military Mission Italian Army.

TO : All Concerned.

1. In order to conform to the policy of administrative reorganization in Italy, MMIA will come under the command of Allied Force Headquarters, effective 10 September 1944.

2. a. It is the intention that Allied Force Headquarters will eventually take over the responsibility for implementing the plans for the organization of the Italian Army drawn up by AAI/NATOUSA.

b. For the present, and until further orders, HQ AAI will continue to deal directly with HQ MMIA regarding the organization of combatant formations and units, subject to general directions issued by Allied Force Headquarters.

3. In order that American and British requirements for administrative or service personnel generally may be coordinated, all questions regarding the organization of service units will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters for approval.

4. a. Decisions regarding priorities as between combat and service troops will be decided by Allied Force Headquarters, after consultation with HQ AAI.

b. In order to assist in the implementation of the plans of HQ AAI, representatives from G-3, Allied Force Headquarters, will be attached to HQ AAI until further orders.

5. For matters pertaining to supply and administration of the Italian Military Forces, MMIA will maintain two liaison officers (one U.S. and one British) with Allied Force Headquarters.

6. All existing directives, letters of instruction and communications of a similar nature from this headquarters or HQ AAI, relative to establishment, operation and procedure of MMIA will remain effective until amended or rescinded.

7. Separate instructions will be issued defining:

a. The procedure to be adopted under the new Supply Plan.

b. The subjects on which MMIA will deal directly with HQ AAI.

By command of General WILSON:

R. H. CHRISTIE,
Colonel, AGD,
Acting Adjutant General.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 091.112/079 GCT-O,
dtd 10 September 1944, (cont'd).

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - HQ AAI
2 - Hq Allied Control Commission
2 - MMLA
2 - Rome Allied Area Command
2 - Hq 2 District
2 - Hq 3 District
2 - PBS
1 - C/S, NATO
1 - SGS, AF
1 - G-1 (A)
1 - G-1 (B)
1 - G-2
3 - G-3
1 - G-4
1 - G-4 (B)
1 - G-5
1 - CAO
1 - Q(AE)
1 - Q Maint
1 - REME
1 - Engr
1 - Ord
1 - QM
1 - Surg
1 - Sig
1 - CWS
2 - AG Records
1 - AG M&D

Conference at AAI on 8 Sep on transfer of M.M.I.A. to A.F.H.Q.

Ref. HSD/421 dated 2 Sep. para 5(b)

and HSD/421 dated 4 Sep. para 9.

POINTS:

1. Disagree 5(b)(iii) -

There is no "Land Sub Commission, ACC". Hitherto MMIA has dealt direct with AAI on all matters, consulting ACC only on political and civil aspects.

Policy should be that MMIA works under direct orders of AFHQ who lay down the broad policy and give decisions. Within that framework MMIA deals, as now, direct with AAI on the execution of that policy, consulting ACC as necessary.

Any new matters of policy will be settled by MMIA examining the problem with AAI and MMIA then putting up the proposal(with recommendations)for AFHQ decision.

Navy and Air are NOT under ACC. Nor should MMIA be. We do not want 3 masters.

Also not in accordance with AFHQ letter "Organisation for Supply of effective Italian troops", decided on after conference with MMIA reps. at AFHQ recently.

3303

2. As regards MMIA Echelons and Liaison Officers at AFHQ

The fundamental factors are that:-

(a) MMIA is a complete and comprehensive organisation dealing with all aspects of the Italian Army eg. organisation, rations, clothing, medical supplies, new combat groups etc.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND NO. 785020

direct with AAI on all matters, consulting ACC only on political and civil aspects.

Policy should be that MMIA works under direct orders of AFHQ who lay down the broad policy and give decisions. Within that frame-work MMIA deals, as now, direct with AAI on the execution of that policy, consulting ACC as necessary.

Any new matters of policy will be settled by MMIA examining the problem with AAI and MMIA then putting up the proposal(with re-commendations)for AFHQ decision.

Navy and Air are NOT under ACC. Nor should MMIA be. We do not want 2 masters.

Also not in accordance with AFHQ letter "Organisation for Supply of effective Italian troops", decided on after conference with MMIA reps. at AFHQ recently.

3308

2. <u>As regards MMIA Echelons and Liaison Officers at AFHQ</u>

The fundamental factors are that:-

(a) MMIA is a complete and comprehensive organisation dealing with all aspects of the Italian Army eg. organisation, rations, clothing, medical supplies, new combat groups etc.

(b) Its work is the implementing of orders by higher authority and thus entails an immense amount of detailed day to day work with Ministry of War and S.M.R.E.
It must therefore be located in ROME alongside the latter.

(c) Conditions and the state of affairs are always changing. L.O's have to be brought back at intervals to get up to date.

(d) In fact, MMIA is a staff which cannot be split. One cannot have have a forward and a rear echelon(as in the case of AAI or a fighting Division)for executive work.

Sheet 2/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

2. (e) Also one does not want to duplicate staffs and to have two sets of people doing the same job, with all the confusion and waste of effort that involves.

(f) Therefore it is a matter of liaison NOT executive echelons.

(g) Proposed that the liaison or staff section at AFHQ be:-

1 officer and clerk Br.

1 " " " USA.

2 cars

2 drivers

and at HQ, AAI(Rear Echelon):- if necessary, which I think it is NOT

1 officer and clerk Br.

1 car

1 driver.

(h) Not necessary to have an American officer at HQ, AAI as the American aspect of administration of PBS and 5 Army will be dealt with by NATOUSA direct.

(i) Above all adequately covered by the draft AFHQ letter "Organisation for Supply of effective Italian troops". I would prefer this heading to be "Transfer of MMIA to AFHQ"(as in the staff paper)because it covers all aspects and not supply only.
In this, the title is "MMIA" and no mention of MMIA being under ACC.

3306

(j) Combat Groups

For the present, the special executive MMIA staff at MMIA for this must remain with MMIA in ROME.
Later, when the Combat Groups are organised and in the line, this staff should move to HQ, AAI Rear or Advanced, as required.

3. As regards channels for demanding Italian military for increments

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

2 cars

2 drivers

and at HQ, AAI(Rear Echelon):- if necessary, which I think it is not

1 officer and clerk Br.

1 car

1 driver.

(h) Not necessary to have an American officer at HQ, AAI as the American aspect of administration of FBS and 5 Army will be dealt with by NATOUSA direct.

(i) Above all adequately covered by the draft AFHQ letter "Organisation for Supply of effective Italian troops". I would prefer this heading to be "Transfer of MMIA to AFHQ"(as in the staff paper)because it covers all aspects and not supply only. In this, the title is "MMIA" and no mention of MMIA being under ACC.

3306

(j) Combat Groups

For the present, the special executive MMIA staff at MMIA for this must remain with MMIA in ROME.

Later, when the Combat Groups are organised and in the line, this staff should move to HQ, AAI Rear or Advanced, as required.

3. As regards channels for demanding Italian military for increments and other purposes.

(a) The "programme" is not yet complete, nor has the Italian Army been properly sorted out by categories within the ceiling.

We are still short of about 4000 American and 31000 British ITI's for the "programme".

We still have over 20000 ITI's to be brought over from SARDINIA.

Sheet 3/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

3. (b) Therefore, let everything continue as now, within the general policy laid down or decided on from time to time by AFHQ, till all this is sorted out.

(c) When reinforcement depots of the 4 types(Br. US, Int, and Combat) are organised and the whole Italian Army is in shape, then reinforcement depots demand their reinforcements from MMIA who arrange with S.M.R.E. to provide.

4. (a) To clarify all this business on the new basis, MMIA will rewrite HSD/424, discuss with AAI and submit to AFHQ for approval.

(b) We have not had the time to do this yet or examine the implications in detail.

(c) I would prefer not to discuss the details of this to-day before we have examined these implications.

(d) I suggest that we should NOT try to be too categorical at this stage. The existing procedure can still continue in accordance with existing directives etc.
All that the change over really means(as far as MMIA is concerned) is that MMIA deals direct with AFHQ instead of through AAI, while AAI deals through MMIA with AFHQ.

330

L.B.

Major General.

3 Sec 44

LB/cc

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

W 9533/63727P 490M (Pads of 100) 5/43 MP 110428 51 6736

ARMY FORM C 2136 (Large) MESSAGE FORM Register No. 1

Srl. No.	Priority	Transmission Instructions
14/6	N/.	CIPHER SECRET

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

FROM (A) AFHQ — Originator — Date-Time of Origin. 05 1947D — Office Date Stamp 131

For Action.

FILE REF. 6/6 67 D

TO MAIN AAI

(W) For Information (INFO)

MMIA

Message Instructions. GR

Originator's No FX 92576

SECRET.

CITE FHGCT signed SACMED.

Ref. para 5 (H) of HSD/421 of 2nd Sept minutes meeting 30th Aug and para 9 of HSD/421 of 4th Sept ⊙

Grateful if representatives your HQ and MMIA could attend meeting here earliest to discuss following matters and any others which may arise in connection with hand over of MMIA ⊙ A ⊙ Composition Powers Duties Three Echelons ⊙ B ⊙ Liason officers at AFHQ ⊙ C ⊙ Channels for demanding Italian military for

3307

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

TO MAIN AAI

(W) For Information (INFO)

MMIA

Message Instructions. CR

Originator's No
FX92516

SECRET

CITE FHBCT signed SACMED

Ref. para 5 (H) of HSD/421 of 2nd Sept minutes meeting 30th Aug and para 9 of HSD/421 of 4th Sept O

Grateful if representatives your HQ and MMIA could attend meeting here earliest to discuss following matters and any others which may arise in connection with hand over of MMIA O A O Composition Powers Duties Three Echelons O B O Liason officers at AFHQ O C O Channels for demanding Italian military for increments and other purposes O

Please signal convenient date and time and we will confirm

3302

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except WIRELESS.

Signed

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Signed J Bowman Lt

Originator's Instructions. Degree of Priority.

M I.

Time Date

TOR 0519 4 B

Time Cleared

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the A. G. of S., G-4

27 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief Administrative Officer.

SUBJECT : Transfer of MMIA from AAI to AFHQ.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The CO/S, in FAN 338 of 26 February 1944, directed that an agency be established in Italy under AFHQ control, to be charged with the authority and responsibility for handling the problem of requirements, issues and record keeping of supply for the Italian Military Forces. (Tab A).

2. In AFHQ letter, AF 400-1 (Italian)G-4 of 21 April, subject, "Organization for Supply of Effective Italian Troops", to C-in-C AAI, it was directed that:

a. The Army Sub-Commission (MMIA) of the Allied Control Commission will be the responsible agency for effective Italian troops.

b. The Army Sub-Commission will operate directly under control of Hq AAI on all supply matters. (Tab B).

3. AAI Adm. Instruction No. 24 of 30 May, subject, "Issue of Allied Supplies and Stores to Italian Armed Forces", gave instructions to MMIA relative to its responsibilities and methods of procedure. (Tab C).

4. MMIA Adm. Instructions No. 3 of 4 June 1944, constitute a S.O.P. for their operation. (Tab D).

5. AFHQ Adm. Instruction No. 5, c.s., as amended, and AFHQ letter AG 400-1 (Italy)GAB-AGA, of 9 January 1944, to AOC, subject, "Supply Organization - Italian Military", are documents, still effective in part, for MMIA operation. These were published prior to receipt of FAN 338 and governed the procedure of the Army Sub-Commission, AOC, with relation to the Italian Military Forces.

3302

II. PROPOSAL

1. AFHQ letter AGO/421 of 22 August 1944, subject, "Administration", proposes changes in direct responsibility for administration from AAI to AFHQ. This includes transfer of MMIA to AFHQ direct control.

III. REQUIREMENTS

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1. The CCS, in [illegible] to be established in Italy under AFHQ control, [illegible] authority and responsibility for handling the problem of requirements, issues and record keeping of supply for the Italian Military Forces. (Tab A).

2. In AFHQ letter, AG 400-1 (Italian)S-O of 21 April, subject, "Organization for Supply of Effective Italian Troops", to [illegible] AAI, it was directed that:

   a. The Army Sub-Commission (ASCIA) of the Allied Control Commission will be the responsible agency for effective Italian troops.

   b. The Army Sub-Commission will operate directly under control of AC AAI on all supply matters. (Tab B).

3. AAI Adm. Instruction No. 24 of 20 May, subject, "Issue of Allied Supplies and Stores to Italian Armed Forces", gave instructions to ASCIA relative to its responsibilities and methods of procedure. (Tab C).

4. ASCIA Adm. Instruction No. 3 of 4 June 1944, constitute a S.O.P. for their operation. (Tab D).

5. AFHQ Adm. Instruction No. 5, t.e., as amended, and AFHQ letter AG 400-1 (Italy)GS-AGM, of 9 January 1944, to AGO, subject, "Supply Organization - Italian Military", are documents, still effective in part, for ASCIA operation. These were published prior to receipt of FAN 338 and governed the procedure of the Army Sub-Commission, AGO, with relation to the Italian Military Forces.

3301

II. GENERAL

1. AFHQ letter AGO/421 of 22 August 1944, subject, "Administration", proposes changes in direct responsibility for administration from AAI to AFHQ. This includes transfer of ASCIA to AFHQ direct control.

III. REQUIREMENTS

1. Involved under II are:

   a. Relief of ASCIA from assignment to AAI and assignment to AFHQ.

   b. The establishment of a small special staff section on Italian military affairs at AFHQ.

   c. The direction that certain pertinent instructions published by both AFHQ and AAI for the operation of ASCIA remain in force as pertaining to AFHQ until such time as revised or republished by AFHQ.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That an AFHQ letter, as shown at Tab F, be published. This letter has been coordinated with representatives of NEIA.

CARTER B. MAGRUDER
Brig. Gen., G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-4

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

August 1944

SUBJECT: Organization for Supply of Affective Italian Troops.

TO : All Concerned.

1. To conform to the policy of administrative reorganization in Italy, Military Mission to Italian Army (MMIA) is relieved from assignment to Allied Armies in Italy (AAI), and will come under the direct orders of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) as of _____ date. In order to continue close coordination with AAI, MMIA will maintain an advanced echelon at Hq AAI.

2. MMIA will continue its headquarters in ROME in order to maintain the necessary close coordination with the Italian Ministry of War, and S.M.R.E.

3. MMIA will furnish a Special Staff Section at AFHQ. Initially, this section will consist of one (1) staff officer, U. S., and one (1) staff officer, British, together with necessary enlisted clerical personnel. The duties of this section shall be primarily to represent MMIA at AFHQ, through liaison between the two headquarters and to advise on matters pertaining to the supply and administration of Italian Military Forces.

4. All existing directives, letters of instruction, and communications of a similar nature from this headquarters or AAI, relative to establishment, operation and procedure of MMIA, will remain effective until amended or rescinded. In all such documents, "AFHQ" will be substituted for 3297

5. In all documents described in Para. 4 above, where "Army Sub-Commission, ACC" is used to describe the military mission to the Italian Army, "MMIA" will be substituted therefor. The official designation of this mission shall be "Military Mission to Italian Army".

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Military Mission to Italian Army (MMIA) is relieved from assignment to Allied Armies in Italy (AAI), and will come under the direct orders of Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) as of _____ date. In order to continue close coordination with AAI, MMIA will maintain an advanced echelon at Hq AAI.

2. MMIA will continue its headquarters in ROME in order to maintain the necessary close coordination with the Italian Ministry of War, and S.H.A.E.F.

3. MMIA will furnish a Special Staff Section at AFHQ. Initially, this section will consist of one (1) staff officer, U. S., and one (1) staff officer, British, together with necessary enlisted clerical personnel. The duties of this section shall be primarily to represent MMIA at AFHQ, through liaison between the two headquarters and to advise on matters pertaining to the supply and administration of Italian Military Forces.

4. All existing directives, letters of instruction, and communications of a similar nature from this headquarters or AAI, relative to establishment, operation and procedure of MMIA, will remain effective until amended or rescinded. In all such documents, "AFHQ" will be substituted for "AAI". 3297

5. In all documents described in Para. 4 above, where "Army Sub-Commission, ACC" is used to describe the military mission to the Italian Army, "MMIA" will be substituted therefor. The official designation of this mission shall be "Military Mission to Italian Army".

By command of General WILSON:

Concurrence: G-4(B) _____

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION:

AAI	5
MMIA	10
SCS NATOUSA	5
ACC	2
Rome Area Command	2
G-1 (A)	2
G-1 (B)	2
G-2	2
G-3	2
G-4 (A)	2
G-4 (B)	2
G-5	2
Hq Comd't.	2
Q(AB)	2
Ordnance	2
Q(Maint)	2
QM	2
Surgeon (A)	2
Surgeon (B)	2
Signal Officer (A)	2
Signal Officer (B)	2
Pet. Sec.	2
Coal Section (QM)	2
Engineer	2
D.W.	2
District #1	2
" #2	2
" #3	2
P.B.S.	2
COSBASE	2
NCRSS	2
Adriatic Depot	2
Allied Garrison Comdr. Sardinia	2
M.P.S.	2

3297

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

D H & R
21 Aug

TOP SECRET

Copy No ..1....

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FILPOT 73

1605/50/63/G(SDL)

21 Aug 44

SUBJECT:- Draft Minutes of Meeting on CCS Proposals regarding Italian Armed Forces.

	Copy No
MMIA	1
DCAO	2
DAG	3
DQMG	4
Copy to:- Q(AE)	5
File	6

1. Draft Minutes of the Meeting held this morning at 0930 hrs, to consider the CCS proposals for the maintenance of the Italian Armed Forces on a national and international basis, are attached.

2. The draft Minutes will be considered immediately after the 0830 hrs conference in the Adm War Room on 22 Aug.

3. ACK.

3293

for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

Copy No .....

MINUTES OF A MEETING ON COS PROPOSALS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES ON A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL BASIS, HELD AT HQ A/F AT 0930 HRS ON 28 AUG 44

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FELPOT 73

1605/50/63/G(SD)

Aug 44

Chairman

Brigadier COOPER G(SD)

Present

General HARDING DCOS

Brigadier RITCHIE DDMO

Colonel JONES G(AS)

Colonel KERR MMIA

Colonel PINSLEY MMIA

Colonel NELSON A

Lt-Col McSWEEN G(SD)

Lt-Col HOARES MMIA

Major BARNES AFHQ

Major H ROSS G(SD)

Major WARREN MMIA

Captain GRAHAM G(SD)

Captain PASCALL G(AE) 3295

1. At the suggestion of the Chairman the meeting proceeded to discuss the interpretation to be placed on certain points raised in

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Chairman

Brigadier COOPER — G(SD)

Present

General	HAMLEN	DCAS
Brigadier	RITCHIE	D/DMO
Colonel	JONES	G(AL)
Colonel	KERR	MMIA
Colonel	FIDLER	MMIA
Colonel	WELCH	A
Lt-Col	McQUEEN	G(SD)
Lt-Col	NOAKES	MMIA
Major	BARNES	AFHQ
Major	S. REAN	G(SD)
Major	TAYLOR	MMIA
Captain	GRAHAM	G(SD)
Captain	PASCALL	G(AS)

3293

- -

1. ~~At the suggestion of the Chairman~~ the meeting proceeded to discuss the interpretation to be placed on certain points raised in the following signals between COS, AFHQ and the War Office:-

FAN 720

FAN 357

~~WARMISS~~ 67523

FAN 331

The following decisions were reached:-

(a)/.....

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(a) That the COS proposals were that with effect from a date still to be laid down the Italian Army employed by the Allies will be split into three categories, namely:-

(i) personnel serving US exclusively

(ii) personnel serving British exclusively

(iii) personnel serving both Allies and therefore employed "internationally".

(b) That as a result of 1 (a) above the supply of categories 1 (a) (i) and (ii) becomes the sole responsibility of the US and British respectively and that the supply of category 1 (a) (iii) is continued as before under the terms of FAM 338.

(c) That the term "supply" in FAM 338 is taken to cover the provision of all items of ept, rations, clothing, medical stores etc.

(d) Reference para 2 of FAM 337, it is assumed that the term "US origin" applies only to articles which are supplied through US War Department channels.

2. The meeting approved the breakdown of the ceiling of the Italian Army attached at Appendix 'A'.

(a) It was considered that, in view of the need for issuing personal arms and ept to rfts, immediately after arrival at rft depots, it will be necessary to provide leeking for rfts in each category. The allotment of rfts to each of the three categories will be made by AAI.

(b) It was agreed that in order to keep units up to [illegible] 3293 strength the following rft ceilings would be necessary :-

(i) For combat [illegible] 10%

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

employed "internationally".

(b) That as a result of 1 (a) above the supply of categories 1 (a) (i) and (ii) become the sole responsibility of the US and British respectively and that the supply of category 1 (a) (iii) is continued as before under the terms of FAM 333.

(c) That the term "supply" in FAM 331 is taken to cover the provision of all items of eqpt, rations, clothing, medical stores etc.

(d) Reference para 2 of FAM 337, it is assumed that the term "US origin" applies only to articles which are supplied through US War Department channels.

2. The meeting approved the breakdown of the ceiling of the Italian Army attached at Appendix 'A'.

(a) It was considered that, in view of the need for issuing personal arms and eqpt to rfts, immediately after arrival at rft depots, it will be necessary to provide backing for rfts in each category. The allotment of rfts to each of the three categories will be made by AAI.

(b) It was agreed that in order to keep units up to [redacted] 3293 strength the following rft ceilings would be necessary :-

(i) For combat gps..... 10%

(ii) For all other units .. 5%

This counts in effect to a reconsideration of the recommendations made to AFHQ in this Hq SD 1112 of 17 Aug that an overall rft ceiling of 10% would be required.

(c) The figure of 27,000 for Italian Adm Installations would provide sufficient depots and overheads for the adm of all the Italian Armed Forces under the terms of FAM 333.

As/..... 3

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

As a result of detailed examination of the problem it will be possible to reduce Italian AA but in view of the additional loads imposed on the US and British AA installations certain increases will be required as AA basing in the US and British ceilings.

(d) The figure of 14,400 provides for eighteen guard bns which will be employed on Allied installations and vulnerable points. The distribution of these bns will vary from time to time according to the movement of installations and reassessment of the threat to vital points, and it is therefore considered that in view of the need for flexibility these bns should be an international commitment.

(e) In view of the decision that the Italian Combat Gps will be equipped from British sources it was agreed that the Combat Gps should be included in the British ceiling. If such gps were employed under US command their supply and maintenance would remain a British responsibility.

(f) The meeting considered the fact that a small proportion of the Carabinieri is employed in a military role. It was decided however that all Carabinieri should be an international commitment.

3. Principles and system of Administration.

(a) It is essential that ALL categories of the Italian Army should be subject to a common standard treatment, and that discipline and AG matters should be the responsibility of the Italian Army authorities as at present. The acceptance of this principle implies a standard ration scale and standard scales of personal equipment and clothing. The principle of command and administration set out in 1605/50/19/G(SM) dated 6 July would continue to apply to the Italian Army. 329

(b) The meeting noted the last two sentences of para 5 of FAN 387 and it was decided that :-

(i) A common scale applicable to all categories would be essential

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

movement of installations and reassessment of the threat to vital points, and it is therefore considered that in view of the need for flexibility these has should be an international commitment.

(e) In view of the decision that the Italian Combat Gps will be equipped from British sources it was agreed that the Combat Gps should be included in the British ceiling. If such gps were employed under US cond their supply and maintenance would remain a British responsibility.

(f) The meeting considered the fact that a small proportion of the Carabinieri is employed in a military role, it was decided however that all Carabinieri should be an international commitment.

3. Principles and means of administration

(a) It is essential that ALL categories of the Italian Army should be subject to a common standard treatment, and that discipline and AG matters should be the responsibility of the Italian Army authorities as at present. The acceptance of this principle implies a standard ration scale and standard scales of personal equipment and clothing. The principle of command and administration set out in 1605/50/19/G(SD1) dated 6 July would continue to apply to the Italian Army.

329

(b) The meeting noted the last two sentences of para 5 of FAN 337 and it was decided that :-

(i) A common scale applicable to all categories would be essential

(ii) Recommendations on this scale would be submitted seperately

(c) Items in FAN 336 should be issued as a first priority to the international category, any balance would then be

available/..... 4

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 735020

available for the national categories.

4. All items of Italian equipment will be distributed by MAIA under the direction of AAI. A committee composed of representatives of G(AS) - Chairman, G-4 and G(SS) will be set up to establish the policy and allocation of equipment.

5. The status of MAIA remains unchanged in view of the continued application of FM 33S to the international category but as the result of the decrease in the extent of their accounting responsibilities, reduction in staffs should be possible.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Draft

TOP SECRET

Appendix 'A' to 1605/30/63/G(SM)
dated 21 Aug 44

BREAKDOWN OF CEILING OF ITALIAN ARMY

Units under US Cond

FBS	50000	
Fifth Army	12000	
SARDINIA	9000	
CORSICA	5000	
RPCs	3950	
		82950

Units under British Cond

Service Units	93000	
Combat Groups	57000	
RPCs	10950	
		160950

International Commitment

Italian Air Installations	27000	
AA & CD	9000	
ASW	3000	
GS Bns	24400	
SRS	1500	
Two divs in SICILY	10000	
One div in SARDINIA	5000	
Internal Security Tps	4800	
Cavalrimen	35000	
RPCs	6450	135450
		378750

328

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

SARDINIA	9000	
CORSICA	5000	
HQTs	3950	
		62950

Units under British Cond

Service Units	99000	
Combat Groups	57000	
HQTs	10350	
		160350

International Squadrons

Italian Adm Installations	27000	
AA & CD	9000	
MG	3000	
Cd Bns	14400	
MPs	1500	
Two divs in SICILY	10000	
One div in SARDINIA	5000	
Internal Security Tps	4200	
Quartermaster	22000	
HQTs	6450	135450
Total		378750

328

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

ACTION

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT:- Conference on Italian Army

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.

Tel: PILOT 73.

1605/50/63/G(SD1)

20 Aug 44

MMLA (3)
DCAO
DAG
DQMG

Copy to:- MA to CGS
MA to CAO
A
Q
Q (AF)

Ref this HQ 1605/50/63/G(SD1) of even date.

The meeting will be held at 0930 hrs, Monday, 21 Aug, NOT at 1100 hrs as previously stated.

for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of General Staff.

3283

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

MESSAGE FORM

FROM: MAIN

Date/Time 1[illegible] B

TO - ACTION: AMHQ

INFO:

Originator's Numbers: SD 1293

SECRET (.) ref my 1605/50/19/G(SD1) of 6 Jul (.) request following amdts be made (.) FIRST (.) para 12 (b) SECOND LINE after Allied Military Police insert quote or allied counter intelligence agencies in the case of security arrests unquote (.) SECOND (.) para 13 (a) add quote NO leave will be granted to places in the army areas unquote (.) THIRD (.) para 27 delete number 3 dated 19 Mar 44 and insert number 24 dated 20 May 44

(1) Amendments done ABC 2/9 (2) [illegible]

PRIORITY

328

Copy to: CAO DCAO A Q(AE) MMIA (LEQUIRE) 1605/50/19
DCOS GSI (B) Q Q(Mov) Adv MMIA

TRANSLATION.

From: SMRE

To : MMIA

Ref: 4890/Mob

Date 27 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Reduction of Strength of Italian Army

During yesterday's meeting MMIA have put forward the problem of the reduction of the strength of the Italian Army purely on the basis of study and co-operation, taking into consideration the most difficult circumstances, in order to examine the problem from all angles endeavouring to discover the consequences that might be derived from any possible solution. Consequently the following information and suggestions are merely speculative and do not bind this SMRE to the acceptance of solutionswhich may be beyond its competence.

The schedule (as per enclosure 1) and the suggestion made by General BROWNING during the above-mentioned meeting are under study.

STUDY OF THE SCHEDULE

1. This SMRE surmises that the reduction of rations suggested is to be applied proportionally to the three Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) as otherwise the Army would find itself under unjust and penalised circumstances .

If, on the other hand, such reduction is not meant to be applied proportionall to the three Armed Forces it is requested that this suggestion be taken into consideration thus amending the figures shown.

2. This SMRE understands that the programme suggested, with the reductions it entails, is applicable only to the Mainland and as far as the line PISA-RIMINI. Otherwise, that is to say, should it be applicable to the whole of ITALY, including the PADANA Region, said programme and particularly the strength stipulated for the Internal Security Divisions (51,000 men) which Divisionsappear to bear practically the whole brunt of the reduction, would be absolutely inadequate to cover the general requirements of the Country.

3. This SMRE maintain that it would be essential for the Internal Security Divisionseven allowing for the other figures to be granted a greater strength, at least 30,000 men up/the line PISA-RIMINI, reserving the stipulation in due course of the minimum Internal Security Troops requirements for the PO valley.

It would be greatly appreciated if MMIA would kindly examine this problem which may be considered to be of grave importance to the Internal situation of ITALY, specially during the very difficult period which no doubt the country will be called upon to endure.

The increase of these 30,000 men in addition to better ensuring the Internal Security would do a great deal towards the solution of the problem of demobilisation and reorganisation of individual units and of transport, which, according to the figure of enclosure 1 and in view of preesent availability of transport would otherwise be complicated.

4. C.I.L.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

The schedule (as per enclosure 1) and the suggestion made by [illegible] BROWNING during the above-mentioned meeting are under study.

STUDY OF THE SCHEDULE

1. This SMRE surmises that the reduction of rations suggested is to be applied proportionally to the three Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) as otherwise the Army would find itself under unjust and penalised circumstances.

If, on the other hand, such reduction is not meant to be applied proportionall to the three Armed Forces it is requested that this suggestion be taken into consideration thus amending the figures shown.

2. This SMRE understands that the programme suggested, with the reductions it entails, is applicable only to the Mainland and as far as the line PISA-RIMINI. Otherwise, that is to say, should it be applicable to the whole of ITALY, including the PADANA Region, said programme and particularly the strength stipulated for the Internal Security Divisions (51,000 men) which Divisionsappear to bear practically the whole brunt of the reduction, would be absolutely inadequate to cover the general requirements of the Country.

3. This SMRE maintain that it would be essential for the Internal Security Divisionseven allowing for the other figures to be granted a greater strength, at least 30,000 men up/the line PISA-RIMINI, reserving the stipulation in due course of the minimum Internal Security Troops requirements for the PO valley.

/to

It would be greatly appreciated if MMIA would kindly examine this problem which may be considered to be of grave importance to the Internal situation of ITALY, specially during the very difficult period which no doubt the country will be called upon to endure.

The increase of these 30,000 men in addition to better ensuring the Internal Security would do a great deal towards the solution of the problem of demobilisation and reorganisation of individual units and of transport, which, according to the figure of enclosure 1 and in view of preesent availability of transport would otherwise be complicated.

4. C.I.L.

No observation to be made regarding the first column (14,000 men). As regards the second column (25,000 men) we would point out that 2 Bns which form part of the C.I.L. (1,900 men in total) belong to the Navy and not the Army. These 1,900 men should be included in the Navy programme and not in the programme of the Army. The strength of the C.I.L. as far as it concerns the Army would thus be reduced to 23,100 man.

5. ITALIAN FORCES FOR THE ALLIES

The reduction in this case is only of 6,000 men out of a total of 180,000. This SMRE does not wish to meddle in matters regarding the use of units in the interests of Allied operations. It is only, therefore, from a co-operative point of view that we suggest whether it would not be convenient to further reduce this strength to the advantage, as indicated above, of an increase in the number of men allotted to the Internal Security Divisions.

Sheet 2/..

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

5. (Contd)

It is furthermore pointed out that there are forever pending the problems of the Italian tps in CORSICA and those required for AA & CDs which are not included in MMIAs programme (174,000 men) but which are nevertheless employed to the advantage of the Allies. In order to help this SHAEF they might on the other hand have been included in the programme of the 174,000 men.

6. ITALIAN ADMINISTRATION

The reduction of 5,870 men is very considerable bearing in mind that even now we are struggling to organise this administration particularly as regards Districts and Depots bearing in midn new territory now liberated.

Nevertheless everything possible will be done to reduce the strength of the administration to the reqired figures.

EXECUTION OF PROGRAMME

1. According to the study made by MMIA the programme could be carried out by the 31st of July and, bearing in mind that/the demobilisation of the 1913 Class and those of previous years it will be necessary to demobilise 50,000 men approx (belonging to Districts, south of the Line PISA-RIMINI), the problem might be solved with a certain ease provided all the tps were on the Mainland.

Instead of this the problem becomes complicated by the scarcity of transport from SARDINIA and the fact that should the present rate of tpt from SARDINIA to the Mainland continue it is to be foreseen, as mentioned by MMIA, that on the 31st of July there will still remain in SARDINIA about 91,000 men of which at least 61,000 will have to be transferred to the Mainland in due course.

Bearing in mind the suggestons supplied by MMIA the position on thr 31st of July will be as follows:

SARDINIA

Internal Security	10,000 men.
Labour for Allies	20,000 men.
To be tptd to Mainland	61,000 men.

SICILY

Internal Security	10,000 men.

MAINLAND

For the Allies	154,000 men
C.I.L.	25,000 men
Admin	10,000 men
TOTAL	290,000 men.

From the above figures it can be seen that as at July 31st we would not

328

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

EXECUTION OF PROGRAMME

1. According to the study made by MMIA the programme could be carried out by the /for 31st of July and, bearing in mind that/the demobilisation of the 1913 Class and those of previous years it will be necessary to demobilise 50,000 men approx (belonging to Districts, south of the Line PISA-RIMINI), the problem might be solved with a certain ease provided all the tps were on the Mainland.

Instead of this the problem becomes complicated by the scarcity of transport from SARDINIA and the fact that should the present rate of tpt from SARDINIA to the Mainland continue it is to be foreseen, as mentioned by MMIA, that on the 31st of July there will still remain in SARDINIA about 91,000 men of which at least 61,000 will have to be transferred to the Mainland in due course.

Bearing in mind the suggestons supplied by MMIA the position on the 31st of July will be as follows:

SARDINIA

Internal Security	10,000 men.
Labour for Allies	20,000 men.
To be tptd to Mainland	61,000 men.

SICILY

Internal Security	10,000 men.

328

MAINLAND

For the Allies	154,000 men
C.I.L.	25,000 men
Admin	10,000 men
TOTAL	290,000 men.

From the above figures it can be seen that as at July 31st we would not have a single man left on the Mainland for Internal Security. Not only this, but in order to carry out the programme by the 31st July it would be necessary to eliminate and disband the existing Divisions ("FRIULI" and "LEGNANO") organised discipline and train in order to later form again new units on the basis of progressive arrivals from SARDINIA, new units which would not be trained would be lacking in unity and consequently far less efficient.

We would like to add that at first only the men on the Mainland would be demobilised whilst men of the same Classes stationed in SARDINIA would continue under arms thus leading to discontent, confusion and disorder.

And then it would be absolutely impossible to meet the requirements of the administration during a period of intense work due to movements, demobilisation, with only 10,000 men instead of the 40,000 allowed by the reduced programme of the Allies.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

EXECUTION OF PROGRAMME (Contd.)

1. (Contd.)

It is furthermore deemed the duty of this SMRE to point out that the carrying out of the reduction programme during such a short period of time is absolutely hypothetical bearing in mind the present state and needs of tpt within the Mainland.

In fact to complete the reorganisation desired on the Mainland with the present capacity of tpt at least 5 months would be required.

It is evident that the problem is essentially based on tpt conditions from SARDINIA and the only solution left to this SMRE would be to request, provided this did not interfere with the more important requirements of the Allies;

- and intensification and a speeding up of tpt from SARDINIA.
- the carrying out of the programme at less speed, to be completed at the earliest by the 30th of September,

thus simplifying a problem which otherwise is most serious and practically lacking a solution.

2. To further complicate the problem there exists a MMIA instruction (AQ/17 dated 20th June) which absolutely forbids the movement of a single man of the strength at the disposal of the Allies without his substitute having previously arrived at his post of duty.

This SMRE can see one way of facilitating the solution of this complicated problem and therefore suggests that it be left free to debobilise the men belonging to the Classes up to 1913 (calculated at about 50,000), domiciledsouth of the line PISA-RIMINI, whether they belong to the tps at the disposal of the Italian Army or whether they belong to the tps at the disposal of the Allies, substituting them after the 31st July as and when the tpt bring the scheduled Divisions to the Mainland from SARDINIA.

If the Allied authorities allow the temporary reduction of the Italian Force at their disposal at the same time as the Force at the disposal of this SMRE was equally reduced only the period necessary to effect the tpt from SARDINIA, then the solution of the problem placed before this SMRE would be greatly facilitated. It is maintained that the maximum sacrifice - to be reduced day by day - to which the labour strength at the disposal of the Allies would be subjected would affect about 10,000 men.

328

3. If on the other hand the Allied CHQ did not grant this smallest of concessions this SMRE would not only be forced to disband the "PICENO" and "MANTOVA" Divisions as previously pointed out, but the men from these units would not even be sufficient to cover the temporary reduction of the strength at the disposal of the Allies. Not a single Internal Security Divisions would be left at the disposal of this SMRE for the vast territory from CALABRIA to the PISA-RIMINI line at a time and during a period which would doubtless be difficult and dangerous for any Government under the special circumstances now prevailing in the country.

4. In the worst of cases that is to say if thebtotal strength of the Internal Security Divisions is reduced to 51,000 men, instead of forming 5 Divisions with a [illegible] provided in the said programme, this SMRE proposes

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

not interfere with the more important [illegible]

- and intensification and a speeding up of tpt from SARDINIA.

- the carrying out of the programme at less speed, to be completed at the earliest by the 30th of September,

thus simplifying a problem which otherwise is most serious and practically lacking a solution.

2. — To further complicate the problem there exists a MMIA instruction (AQ/17 dated 20th June) which absolutely forbids the movement of a single man of the strength at the disposal of the Allies without his substitute having previously arrived at his post of duty.

— This SMRE can see one way of facilitating the solution of this complicated problem and therefore suggests that it be left free to debobilise the men belonging to the Classes up to 1913 (calculated at about 50,000), domiciledsouth of the line PISA-RIMINI, whether they belong to the tps at the disposal of the Italian Army or whether they belong to the tps at the disposal of the Allies, substituting them after the 31st July as and when the tpt bring the scheduled Divisions to the Mainland from SARDINIA.

If the Allied authorities allow the temporary reduction of the Italian Force at their disposal at the same time as the Force at the disposal of this SMRE was equally reduced only the period necessary to effect the tpt from SARDINIA, then the solution of the problem placed before this SMRE would be greatly facilitated. It is maintained that the maximum sacrifice - to be reduced day by day - to which the labour strength at the disposal of the Allies would be subjected would affect about 10,000 men.

328 -

3. If on the other hand the Allied CHQ did not grant this smallest of concessions this SMRE would not only be forced to disband the "PICENO" and "MANTOVA" Divisions as previously pointed out, but the men from these units would not even be sufficient to cover the temporary reduction of the strength at the disposal of the Allies. Not a single Internal Security Division would be left at the disposal of this SMRE for the vast territory from CALABRIA to the PISA-RIMINI line at a time and during a period which would doubtless be difficult and dangerous for any Government under the special circumstances now prevailing in the country.

4. In the worst of cases that is to say if thebtotal strength of the Internal Security Divisions is reduced to 51,000 men, instead of forming 5 Divisions with a strength of 10,000 men each as scheduled in the said programme, this SMRE proposes the formation of 10 Divisions with a strength of 5,000 men each. This would have the evident advantage of having a mass of 50,000 men better split and more easily detachable to cover the National territory. It is understood that HQs and staffs required for the organisation of the 10 Divs of 5,000 men would not increase the total strength indicated but would be within the number allowed for men and rations.

This SMRE would study in due course the most practical use of this strength reducing to a minimum Internal Security tps in essentially agricultural provinces in order to use them to advantage in other districts of the Mainland or SICILY where Internal Security is a source of greater worry.

5. As far as priority of tpt from SARDINIA to the Mainland is concerned hereunder in order of priority is a list made out bearing in mind present circumstances

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

- demobilised men of classes up to 1913.
- "CREMONA" Division
- "FRIULI" "
- "GRANATIERI" "
- "BARI" "
- 226th. Div.
- "CALABRIA" "
- 204th. Div.

SUMMING UP

(a) The requested increase of 30,000 men for the Internal Security Divisions would modify enclosure 1 as shown in enclosure 2.

(b) Bearing in mind that at the present speed of tpt 5 months would be required to tpt the 61,000 men previously referred from Sardinia to the Mainland it would be necessary to:

(i) accelerate to a maximum tpt from SARDINIA

(ii) grant an extension of 2 months on the time allowed to complete the reduction in order to thus reduce the period of strain both of the tps at the disposal of the Allies and of those at the disposal of this SMRE. This not only bearing in mind the Internal Security requirements of the country but also bearing in mind the brilliant rythm developed by warring operations in ITALY.

(c) Men of the Classes up to 1913 would be demobilised even if forming part of the tps at the disposal of the Allies and would be substituted only as and when tpt brought in the men from SARDINIA.

(d) Strength of adm personnel not to be reduced below a total of 40,000 (it is to be borne in mind that the medical organisation alone requires about 9,000 men).

(e) Should the speed of tpt not be accelerated and should the period during which the reductions are to take place not be extended (i.e. up to Sept 30th), this SMRE would be forced to disband the "PICENO" and "MANTOVA" Divs now organised and trained, in order to re-form them with personnel of all kinds to the detriment of the efficiency of the units, and delay availability of same. Furthermore during 5 months we would be deprived of even the most essential means of ensuring the Internal Security of the country.

(f) Should the strength allow for the Internal Security Divs remain at 51,000 men, 10 Divs of 5,000 men each to be formed instead of 5 Divs of 10,000 men each.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 78502

SUMMING UP

(a) The requested increase of 30,000 men for the Internal Security Divisions would modify enclosure 1 as shown in enclosure 2.

(b) Bearing in mind that at the present speed of tpt 5 months would be required to tpt the 61,000 men previously referred from Sardinia to the Mainland it would be necessary to:

(i) accelerate to a maximum tpt from SARDINIA

(ii) grant an extension of 2 months on the time allowed to complete the reduction in order to thus reduce the period of strain both of the tps at the disposal of the Allies and of those at the disposal of this SMRE. This not only bearing in mind the Internal Security requirements of the country but also bearing in mind the brilliant rythm developed by warring operations in ITALY.

(c) Men of the Classes up to 1913 would be demobilised even if forming part of the tps at the disposal of the Allies and would be substituted only as and when tpt brought in the men from SARDINIA.

(d) Strength of adm personnel not to be reduced below a total of 40,000 (it is to be borne in mind that the medical organisation alone requires about 9,000 men).

(e) Should the speed of tpt not be accelerated and should the period during which the reductions are to take place not be extended (i.e. up to Sept 30th), this SMRE would be forced to disband the "PICENO" and "MANTOVA" Divs now organised and trained, in order to re-form them with personnel of all kinds to the detriment of the efficiency of the units, and delay availability of same. Furthermore during 5 months we would be deprived of even the most essential means of ensuring the Internal Security of the country.

(f) Should the strength allow for the Internal Security Divs remain at 51,000 men, 10 Divs of 5,000 men each to be formed instead of 5 Divs of 10,000 men each.

(g) This SMRE, well aware of the fact that MMIA has already thoroughly examined the problem and has consequently been able to grasp the difficulties it presents, is confident that the MMIA will be willing to kindly meet the SMRE's [illegible] may facilitating, as usual the problems which the latter must face in times so difficult for ITALY politically, economically and from a military point of view.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF
(Sgd) P. Borgondi.

translated: S/S Juan
tpd: tvs.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 1-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ENCLOSURE 1

ESTIMATE AND SYNTHETIC STUDY OF THE REDUCTION OF 50,000 MEn OF THE STRENGTH SCHEDULED FOR THE ITALIAN ARMY AS SUGGESTED BY M.M.I.A.

Employment	AAI Proposal	Under 50,000 reduction
C.I.L.	14,000	25,000
For Allies	180,000	174,000
Italian adm	45,870	27,000 plus 13,000
Internal Security Divs	101,200	51,000
T O T A L S(	341,170	290,000

In order to complete reduction by July 31st:

Foreseen strength of tps in SARDINIA as at July 31st 91,000

To remain in SARDINIA:

Internal Security Divs	10,000	
Labour for Allies	20,000	
		30,000
To be tpd elsewhere	61,000	61,000

In order to avoid exceeding the rations allowed it is necessary to tpt 61,000 men to the Mainland.

The following temporary reductions until the 61,000 men have been tptd from SARDINIA (at the present speed 5 months) are suggested:

- Internal Security Divs excluding SARDINIA and SICILY	31,000
- Reinforcements to Italian Military adm	13,000
- Reduction to Italian Military adm	17,000
	61,000

10,000 remain on the Mainland for Italian adm

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

ENCLOSURE 2

SCHEDULE SUGGESTED FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN ARMY.

Employment	AAI Proposal	Proposal with Reduction.
C.I.L.	14,000	23,100 (1)
For Allies	180,000	174,000 (2)
Italian adm	47,870	27,000 plus 13,000
Internal Security Div.	101,200	80,000
TOTALS	341,170	317,100

(1) Plus 1,900 counted against the Navy.

(2) Including AA & CD Bns in CORSICA

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

1899

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

c/ox

STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO
Ufficio Ordinamento e Mobilitazione
Sezione Mobilitazione

n° 4870/mob di prot. P.M.151,li 27 giugno 1944

OGGETTO: Riduzione forza assegnata all'Esercito Italiano.-

ALLEGATI: 2

ALLA A. S. C.

L E Q U I L E

Codesta A.S.C. nella riunione di ieri ha prospettato un problema di riduzione della forza dell'Esercito italiano a puro titolo di studio e di collaborazione, considerando la più difficile delle ipotesi, allo scopo di esaminarlo sotto tutti i suoi aspetti e di mettere in luce le conseguenze che deriverebbero dalla sua applicazione.- Le considerazioni che seguono hanno pertanto un puro valore di studio e non impegnano questo S.M. nella accettazione di soluzioni che esorbitano dalla sua competenza.-

Si hanno a base dello studio lo specchio di cui all'allegato 1) ed i suggerimenti forniti dal Generale Browning nella riunione anzidetta.-

ESAME DELLO SPECCHIO

1°)= Questo S.M. deve supporre che la riduzione di razioni prevista sia applicata in parti proporzionali alle tre Forze Armate: Esercito, Marina ed Aviazione, senza di che solo l'Esercito verrebbe a trovarsi in condizioni di disparità e sofferenza.-
Qualora, per evenienza, tale riduzione non fosse stata applicata proporzionalmente anche alle altre Forze Armate, si pregherebbe di voler prendere in considerazione la proposta di cui sopra, che verrebbe a modificare i dati provisti.-

3277

../..

1900

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

2°)= Questo S.M. deve intendere che il programma previsto, con le riduzioni che attualmente vengono apportate, interessi il continente solo fino alla linea Pisa-Rimini.- In caso diverso, e cioè se esso si riferisse al territorio di tutta l'Italia, compresa la regione padana, il programma di cui trattasi ed in particolar modo la forza prevista per le divisioni di sicurezza interna (51.000 uomini), alle quali viene addossata praticamente tutta la riduzione, sarebbe assolutamente insufficiente ai bisogni generali del Paese.-

3°)= Questo S.M. riterrebbe indispensabile che per le divisioni di sicurezza interna, ferme restando le altre cifre, fosse concesso un maggior numero di forza, valutabile ad almeno 30.000 uomini fino alla linea Pisa-Rimini, salvo a segnalare a suo tempo il fabbisogno minimo di truppe di sicurezza interna per la Valle del Po.- Si sarà grati a codesta A.S.C. se vorrà esaminare questo problema che può assumere un carattere di gravissima importanza nella situazione interna dell'Italia, specie nel periodo difficile che senza dubbio il Paese sarà chiamato ad attraversare.-
L'aumento di questi 30.000 uomini oltre a garantire meglio la sicurezza interna faciliterebbe enormemente anche la soluzione del meccanismo di congedamenti e riordinamenti delle singole unità e dei trasporti, che, stando ai calcoli dell'allegato 1) e all'attuale disponibilità dei mezzi di trasporto, si presenta oltremodo complesso.-

4°)= C. I. L.
Nulla ad osservare per la prima colonna (14.000 uomini).- Per quanto riguarda la seconda colonna (25.000 uomini) si fa rilevare che 2 battaglioni facenti parte del CIL, (in totale 1.900 uomini) non appartengono al R.Esercito, bensì alla R.Marina.- Questi 1.900 uomini dovrebbero essere fatti gravare sul programma della R.Marina e non sul programma del R.Esercito.- La forza del CIL per quan

3275

..//..

1901

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

to riguarda l'Esercito, verrebbe così ridotta a 23.100 uomini.-

5°)= Forza italiana per gli AA.

La riduzione apportata sul totale di 180.000 uomini è di soli 6.000 uomini.- Questo S.M. non vuole intromettersi in questioni di impiego di reparti che interessano le operazioni degli Alleati.- Solo a titolo di collaborazione prospetta se non si riterrebbe conveniente di apportare una ulteriore riduzione a questa forza, a vantaggio, come si è detto più sopra, dell'aumento del numero degli uomini assegnati alle divisioni di sicurezza interna.-

Si fa inoltre presente che restano sempre da risolvere i problemi delle truppe italiane in Corsica e della difesa c.a. e costiera che non gravano sul programma dell'A.S.C. (174.000 uomini) ma che sono comunque impiegate a vantaggio degli AA.- Allo scopo di agevolare questo S.M. potrebbe essere invece fatta rientrare nel programma dei 174.000 uomini.-

6°)= Amministrazione italiana:

La riduzione apportata di 5.870 uomini è notevole in quanto già oggi si stenta ad organizzare questa amministrazione specie per ciò che concerne distretti e depositi in considerazione del nuovo territorio già ora liberato.-

Tuttavia si farebbe il possibile per ridurre alla forza voluta gli organi dell'amministrazione.-

ESECUZIONE DEL PROGRAMMA

1°)= Secondo lo studio fatto da codesta A.S.C. il programma dovrebbe essere attuato entro il 31 luglio, e, tenuto conto che col congedamento degli uomini delle classi 1913 e più anziane si verrebbe a congedare circa un 50.000 uomini (appartenenti ai distretti a sud della linea Pisa-Rimini), il problema sarebbe risolvibile

3275

../..

1902

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

con una certa facilità qualora tutte le truppe si trovassero in continente.-

Il problema viene invece reso assolutamente difficile tenendo conto della scarsità dei trasporti dalla Sardegna e del fatto che, continuando il ritmo attuale del trasporto dalla Sardegna in continente, è da prevedere, come indica codesta A.S.C., che restino in Sardegna alla data del 31 luglio circa 91.000 uomini, di cui almeno 61.000 da trasportare successivamente in continente.-

Se si tiene conto dei suggerimenti forniti da codesta A.S.C. al 31 luglio avremo:

- Sardegna:	sicurezza interna	10.000	uomini
	lavoratori per AA.	20.000	"
	da trasportare in continente	61.000	"
- Sicilia:	sicurezza interna	10.000	"
- Continente:	per alleati	154.000	"
	C.I.L.	25.000	"
	amministrazione	10.000	"
	totale	290.000	uomini

Dalle cifre di cui sopra si deduce che alla data 31 luglio in continente non resterebbe neanche un uomo per le divisioni di sicurezza interna, non solo, ma che per attuare il programma entro il 31 luglio si dovrebbe eliminare e sciogliere le divisioni ora esistenti ("Piceno" e "Mantova") organizzate, disciplinate ed addestrate, per ricostituire, successivamente agli arrivi progressivi dalla Sardegna, delle nuove unità raccogliticce e pertanto non addestrate, non amalgamate, certamente molto meno efficienti.-

Si aggiunga che dovrebbero in primo tempo essere congedati soltanto degli uomini già in continente, mentre resterebbero alle armi uomini delle stesse classi dislocati in Sardegna, ingenerando malcontento, confusione e disordine.-

3274

../..

1903 -

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

E' poi assolutamente impossibile sopperire alle necessità della amministrazione in periodo di intenso lavoro per movimenti, congedamenti, con soli 10.000 uomini in luogo dei 40.000 previsti dal programma ridotto degli Alleati.-

E' inoltre dovere di questo S.M. prospettare che l'attuazione del programma di riduzione in così breve lasso di tempo è del tutto ipotetica con lo stato e le necessità attuali dei trasporti nell'interno del continente.-

Infine per raggiungere la sistemazione voluta in continente occorrerebbero, coll'attuale ritmo dei trasporti, ben 5 mesi.-

Come si vede il problema è essenzialmente basato su una questione di trasporti dalla Sardegna ed a questo S.M. non resterebbe che invocare, sempre che ciò sia possibile nei superiori bisogni degli AA.:

- una intensificazione ed un acceleramento dei trasporti dalla Sardegna,
- una attuazione del programma a più lento sviluppo, almeno alla data del 30 settembre,

onde agevolare e semplificare un problema che altrimenti si presenta gravissimo e pressochè insolubile.-

2°)= A complicare il problema esiste una disposizione di codesta A.S.C. (foglio n° AG/17 del 20 giugno) colla quale si fa divieto assoluto di muovere un solo uomo dalle forze a disposizione degli AA. se non è giunto in posto il sostitutore.-

Questo S.M. vede una via per agevolare la soluzione del complicato problema.- E pertanto suggerisce che questo S.M. sia lasciato libero di congedare gli uomini appartenenti alle classi 1913 e più anziane (che si computano a circa 50.000), aventi domicilio a sud della linea Pisa-Rimini, sia che essi appartengano alle truppe a disposizione dell'Esercito Italiano, sia che essi appartengano alle truppe a disposizione degli AA., sostituendoli solo

3273

../..

1904

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

successivamente al 31 luglio, di mano in mano che i trasporti portino dalla Sardegna in continente le divisioni previste.-
Se le autorità alleate consentiranno che per il solo periodo necessario ai trasporti dalla Sardegna, sia temporaneamente alquanto ridotta la forza italiana a loro disposizione contemporaneamente a quella a disposizione di questo S.M., la soluzione del problema sottoposto a questo S.M. risulterà di gran lunga facilitata.-
Si ritiene che il sacrificio massimo - da scalarsi giorno per giorno - cui sarebbe sottoposta la forza dei lavoratori a disposizione degli alleati si aggirerebbe sui 40.000 uomini.-

3°)= Qualora il Quartier Generale Alleato non consentisse questo minimo di richieste, non solo questo S.M. si troverebbe costretto a sciogliere le divisioni "Piceno" e "Mantova" come si è accennato più sopra, ma gli uomini provenienti da queste unità non sarebbero neppure sufficienti a sopperire alla riduzione temporanea di forza a disposizione degli AA.- Non resterebbe a disposizione di questo S.M. nessuna divisione di sicurezza interna, per tutto il vasto territorio della Calabria fino alla linea Pisa-Rimini, in un periodo di tempo senza dubbio difficile e pericoloso per ogni Governo, nelle speciali condizioni del Paese.-

4°)= Tenuto conto dell'ipotesi peggiore che la forza delle divisioni di sicurezza interna sia ridotta a 51.000 uomini, anzichè costituire 5 divisioni della forza di 10.000 uomini previste dal precedente programma, questo S.M. propone di costituire 10 divisioni della forza di 5.000 uomini.- Ciò nell'evidente convenienza di avere una massa di 50.000 uomini meglio snodata e più facilmente ripartibile sul territorio nazionale.- E' inteso che i comandi e gli S.M. necessari a questa organizzazione di 10 divisioni di 5.000 uomini non andrebbero in aumento del totale della forza su indicata, ma entrerebbero nel numero previsto degli

3272

..//..

1905

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 785020

uomini e delle razioni.-

Questo S.M. si riserverebbe inoltre di studiare la più logica dislocazione di queste forze, riducendo al minimo le truppe di sicurezza interna nelle provincie essenzialmente agricole, onde utilizzarle a vantaggio di altre regioni del continente o della Sicilia di maggiori preoccupazioni per la sicurezza interna.-

5°)= Per quanto concerne infine la priorità dei trasporti dalla Sardegna in continente si indicano qui di seguito progressivamente gli elementi che si ritiene opportuno trasportare, considerandoli nella attuale composizione:

- congedandi classe 1913 e più anziane
- divisione "Cremona"
- divisione "Friuli"
- divisione "Granatieri"
- divisione "Bari"
- 226^ divisione
- divisione "Calabria"
- 204^ divisione.-

IN SINTESI

A)= L'aumento di forza richiesto di 30.000 uomini per le divisioni di sicurezza interna verrebbe a modificare lo specchio di cui all'allegato 1) come indicato all'allegato 2).-

B)= In considerazione che col ritmo dei trasporti attuali occorrerebbero 5 mesi per trasportare dalla Sardegna in continente i 51.000 uomini previsti, si domanderebbe:

1°)- di accelerare al massimo i trasporti dalla Sardegna;

2°)- di concedere un maggior lasso di tempo di 2 mesi per completare l'organizzazione prevista così da ridurre il periodo di crisi sia per le truppe a disposizione

3271

1906

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

degli alleati, sia per quelle a disposizione di questo S.M.- Ciò non solo in relazione alle necessità imposte dalla sicurezza interna del Paese, ma anche in relazione al ritmo brillante assunto dalle operazioni belliche in Italia.-

C)= Poter congedare gli uomini delle classi 1913 e più anziane sostituendo anche presso le truppe a disposizione degli alleati i congedati di mano in mano che i trasporti assicurino l'arrivo degli uomini dalla Sardegna.-

D)= Non ridurre la forza per l'amministrazione a meno di 40.000 uomini complessivamente (si tenga conto che la sola organizzazione sanitaria richiede circa 9.000 uomini).-

E)= Ove non si accelerasse il ritmo dei trasporti dalla Sardegna e non si consentisse di attuare le riduzioni previste in maggior lasso di tempo (e cioè fino al 30 settembre), questo S.M. si vedrebbe costretto a sciogliere le divisioni "Piceno" e "Mantova", ora già organizzate ed affiatate, per ricostituirle con personale raccogliticcio a tutto scapito della efficienza delle unità stesse, e della prontezza della disponibilità di esse.- Sarà inoltre per circa 5 mesi privo di qualsiasi elemento indispensabile alla sicurezza interna del Paese.-

F)= Qualora la forza assegnata alle divisioni di sicurezza interna restasi di 51.000 uomini, costituire 10 divisioni di 5.000 uomini anzichè 5 di 10.000 uomini.-

G)= Questo S.M., conscio che codesta A.S.C. ha già esaminato a fondo il problema, e che pertanto si è resa conto delle difficoltà in esso insite, confida che essa vorrà venire benevolmente

3270

..//..

1967

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

incontro a questo S.M., agevolando come sempre i problemi che esso deve affrontare in questo momento così difficile per l'Italia, politicamente, economicamente, militarmente.-

S. Rd. M. E. UFF. ORD. e RIS.

IL CAPO DI S.M.
- P. Berardi -

1908

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ALLEGATO 1

CALCOLO ED ESAME SINTETICO DELLA RIDUZIONE DI 50.000 UOMINI ALLA FORZA PREVISTA PER L'ESERCITO ITALIANO PRESENTATO DALLA A.S.C.

Categoria	A.A.I. proposte	Proposte con riduzione 50.000
C. I. I.	14.000	25.000
Per alleati	180.000	174.000
Amministrazione italiana	45.870	27.000 + 13.000
Divisioni sicurezza interna	101.200	51.000
TOTALE	341.170	290.000

Per effettuare la riduzione entro il 31 luglio:

Esistenza prevista truppe in Sardegna al 31.7 91.000

Da restare in Sardegna:

- divisioni sicurezza interna 10.000
- lavoratori per alleati 20.000 30.000

61.000

Restano da trasportare altrove

Per evitare eccedenze sulle razioni fissate occorre trasportare in continente 61.000 uomini.-

Si suggeriscono le seguenti riduzioni temporanee fino a trasporto effettuato dei 61.000 uomini esuberanti in Sardegna (al ritmo attuale 5 mesi)

- divisioni sicurezza interna esclusa Sardegna e Sicilia 31.000
- rinforzo all'amministrazione mil.italiana 13.000
- riduzione all'amministrazione mil.italiana 17.000

61.000

Restano per A.I. in continente: 10.000.=

S. M. 326 UFF. OP.

1909

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

ALLEGATO 2

SPECCHIO PROPOSTE DELLA RIDUZIONE DELLA FORZA DELL'ESERCITO ITALIANO

Categoria	Proposte A. A. I.	Proposte con riduzione
C.I.L.	14.000	23.100 (1)
Per alleati	180.000	174.000 (2)
Amministrazione italiana	47.870	27.000 + 13.000
Divisioni sicurezza interna	101.200	80.000
TOTALE	341.170	317.100

(1) - Più 1.900 conteggiati a carico R.M.

(2) - Incluse truppe difesa contraerea e costiera in Corsica.-

3267

SUBJECT: Command and Administration of the Italian Army

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY
1605/50/19/G(SD1)

6 Jul 44.

AFHQ (10)

1. Ref HSD/424 of 5 Jun, a meeting was held at HQ AAI on 30 Jun to consider the contents of a draft instruction on the command and administration of the Italian Army. A copy of the minutes of the meeting is attached.

2. The draft instruction agreed by the meeting defines a common procedure for the treatment of the Italian Army. For the most part (except for the reinforcement system) both U.S. and British formations are at present following the principles of this procedure.

3. It is recommended that the draft at Appendix "A" to the Minutes of the Meeting be approved. AAI will then issue to Armies, Base Section, District and similar headquarters for implementation.

General,
Commander in Chief.

Copy to: CAO
DCGS
DCAO
GSI (b)
A
Q
Q (AE)
Q (Mov)
MMLA
Adv AAI

C o C

1. The HSD/424 cover Platino e/e Allied
2. The previous HSD/424 was
more practical & is Folio 14
in "Final Policy"
3. Para 14 is not of 326
[illegible] AAI

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

administration of the Italian Army. A copy of the minutes of the meeting is attached.

2. The draft instruction agreed by the meeting defines a common procedure for the treatment of the Italian Army. For the most part (except for the reinforcement system) both U.S. and British formations are at present following the principles of this procedure.

3. It is recommended that the draft at Appendix "A" to the Minutes of the Meeting be approved. AAI will then issue to Armies, Base Section, District and similar headquarters for implementation.

General,
Commander in Chief.

Copy to: CAO — Q
DCGS — Q (AE)
DCAO — Q (Mov)
G3I (b) — MMLA
A — Adv M IA

pee folio 23 1/3

G.O.C.

1. This H50/424 covers Platoon a/c Allies
2. The previous H50/424 was
more particularly as is Folio 14
in "Final Policy".
3. Para 14 is not as 3267
put over the subject in AAI
Our previous written instructions
was AP/2 of 03 June.
2/c, FALP.

G.O.C.,
Issue 7

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

CONFIDENTIAL

1605/50/46/G(SD1)
6 Jul 44

Minutes of a Meeting on the Command and Administration of Italian Army held at 1430 hrs 30 Jun 44 in Room 335 HQ Main AAI.

Present:-

Brig STATTNER	BGS (SD & T)(Chairman)
Brig-General HASBLUK	DCAO
Col FIDSLEY	MMLA
Col WELCH	A
Lt-Col HAMPTON	MMLA
Lt-Col McLEAN	Q
Lt-Col McQUEEN	G(SD) (Secretary)
Major DARTON	Q(AE)
Major FRIEDBERG	G(SD)(US)
Capt FETCH	Q(Mov)
Capt GRAHAM	G(SD)

The draft instruction at Appendix 'A' to the Agenda (1605/50/36/G(SD1) of 27 Jun) was examined and amended. It was agreed that the draft Instruction as amended and attached to these minutes should be submitted to AFHQ.

K McQueen

Lt-Col, GS,
(Secretary)

DISTRIBUTION:- CAO
DCGS
DCAO
GSI(b)
A
Q
Q(AE)
Q(Mov)
MMLA
Adv MMLA

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Appendix 'A' to 1505/50/A6/G(SD1)
dated 6 Jul 44

COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION OF ITALIAN ARMY
FORMATIONS & UNITS

1. This Instruction governs the relationships between Allied and Italian Army formations on questions of command and administration.

The Instruction is divided into the following parts:-

PART I - General Organisation of Italian Army and relationship with Allied Command.

PART II - Organisation and Command of Italian Army units under command of the Italian Military Authorities.

PART III - Command, organisation and administration of Italian Army units serving under Allied command excluding CIL.

PART IV - Command, organisation and administration of CIL.

PART V - Supply, maintenance and hospitalisation of Italian Army.

Note:- No part of this Instruction applies to Italian Cooperators (ex Prisoners of War).

PART I - General Organisation of Italian Army, administration and relationship with Allied Command.

General

2. The Italian Army is at the disposal of AAI for the performance of such tasks as may be allotted from time to time.

Command and Administration

3. For the purposes of command and administration Italian Army formations and units may be divided into the following categories :-

(a) Service units or sub units working directly under Allied command.

(b) The CIL

(c) Formations and units under Italian command.

In principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible to AAI through the Army Sub Commission (MMIA) for the administration of all three categories. The administrative procedure which applies to each category is set out in Parts II, III, IV and V of this instruction.

Army Sub Commission (MMIA)

4. MMIA will be responsible for:-

(a) transmission and interpretation of Allied requirements to the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC No. 785020

PART III - Command, organisation and administration of [illegible] units serving under Allied command excluding CIL.

PART IV - Command, organisation and administration of CIL.

PART V - Supply, maintenance and hospitalisation of Italian Army.

Note:- No part of this Instruction applies to Italian Cooperators (ex Prisoners of War).

PART I - General Organisation of Italian Army, administration and relationship with Allied Command.

General

2. The Italian Army is at the disposal of AAI for the performance of such tasks as may be allotted from time to time.

Command and Administration

3. For the purposes of command and administration Italian Army formations and units may be divided into the following categories :-

(a) Service units or sub units working directly under Allied command.

(b) The CIL

(c) Formations and units under Italian command.

In principle the Italian Military Authorities are responsible to AAI through the Army Sub Commission (MMIA) for the administration of all three categories. The administrative procedure which applies to each category is set out in Parts II, III, IV and V of this instruction.

Army Sub Commission (MMIA)

4. MMIA will be responsible for:- 326

(a) transmission and interpretation of Allied requirements to the appropriate Italian Military Authority.

(b) supervision of administration of Italian Army as laid down in AAI Adm Instruction No 24 dated 20 May 44.

(c) representation of the views of the Italian Military Authorities to AAI.

Relationship of Allied formations with Italian Army

5. In the area of each major Allied Headquarters an Italian administrative headquarters has been set up which is responsible:-

(a) to the appropriate Italian Military Authority for such aspects of command and administration of Italian troops in the area/.... 2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

area as are reserved to it.

(b) to the appropriate Allied Headquarters on all questions arising from the presence of Italian Army troops in the area and from the fact that certain of them are under Allied command.

An MMLA Liaison officer is or will shortly be assigned to each administrative headquarters.

PART II - Organisation and command of Italian Army units under command of the Italian Military Authorities.

Organisation

6. These units are divided into three categories :-

(a) Internal security formations whose principal functions are:-

(i) acting as a force to support the civil power

(ii) providing gds for Allied installations and Vital Points.

(b) Administrative depots and services

The size, numbers and organisation of these units are determined by the Italian Military Authorities under the direction of MMLA.

(c) Para-military personnel i.e. Carabinieri, Guardia Finanza, the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration.

Command

7. Except for Carabinieri and bns allotted to Allied formations for gd duties, these formations and units are under command of the Italian Military Authorities. If a state of emergency arises (such as the intervention of the enemy in the area concerned) these bns will come under comd of the Allied Headquarters in whose area they are located.

Relations with Allied commanders

8. Allied Headquarters in whose area these units are located will be responsible for allotment of accommodation. Units will be subject to orders which concern them as a result of their presence in the area e.g. curfew and road movement.

PART III - Command, organisation and administration of Italian Army units serving under Allied command excluding CIL.

Provision of Units

9. The entire resources of personnel of the Italian Army with the exception of units in CORSICA are at the disposal of AAI. HQ AAI through the MMLA allots Italian Army units and personnel to Allied Headquarters.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDS NO. 785020

Organisation

6. These units are divided into three categories :-

(a) Internal security formations whose principal functions are:-

(i) acting as a force to support the civil power

(ii) providing gds for Allied installations and Vital Points.

(b) Administrative depots and services

The size, numbers and organisation of these units are determined by the Italian Military Authorities under the direction of MMIA.

(c) Para-military personnel i.e. Carabinieri, Guardia Finanza, the majority of whom are subordinate to the civil administration.

Command

7. Except for Carabinieri and bns allotted to Allied formations for gd duties, these formations and units are under command of the Italian Military Authorities. If a state of emergency arises (such as the intervention of the enemy in the area concerned) these tps will come under comd of the Allied Headquarters in whose area they are located.

Relations with Allied commanders

8. Allied Headquarters in whose area these units are located will be responsible for allotment of accommodation. Units will be subject to orders which concern them as a result of their presence in the area e.g. curfew and road movement.

PART III - Command, organisation and administration of Italian Army units serving under Allied command excluding CIL.

Provision of Units

9. The entire resources of personnel of the Italian Army with the exception of units in CORSICA are at the disposal of AAI. HQ AAI through the MMIA allots Italian Army units and personnel to Allied Headquarters.

10. Organisation

(a) Units or sub-units serving under British Command are organised on WEs as decided by AAI.

(b) Units serving under US Command are or will be organised on provisional TOs as decided by Base Section, Army or similar Headquarters. AAI will be informed of any changes made in organisation or TOs of units.

11. Command and Punishment

(a) All Allied commanders are given power of command over Italian formations or units which may be placed under Allied comd. As far

as/....3

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

as circumstances permit, orders will be carried out through the appropriate Italian channels of comd.

(b) All personnel of the Italian Army will be subject to Italian Military Law which will be administered by Italian officers in accordance with the Italian code. Where there is no Italian officer competent to deal with an offence in the unit concerned, the offender will be sent to the nearest Italian authority competent to act. Allied commanders will be informed of the action taken, cases of inaction or inadequate action being reported to the higher Allied authority.

(c) Demands for disciplinary action or the removal and replacement of unsuitable Italian officers up to and incl Lt-Cols will be made in the first place by the relevant Allied commander to the Italian commander concerned. If the action taken by the Italian authority is unsatisfactory, the Allied commander will report through normal Allied channels to the Army, independent Corps, Base Section, Allied Garrison, or District HQ, who will refer the matter to the Italian Army Administrative HQ concerned. If, after this reference, satisfactory action is not taken, details of the case will be sent to the Army Sub-Commission who will give the necessary instructions to the appropriate Italian Military Headquarters.

12. Arrest

(a) Allied military authorities are given power to arrest and hold in custody Italians alleged to be guilty of any offence punishable by Italian Law, pending investigation and handing over the offender for trial by the Italian authorities.

AAI SD 1295 11 12/7

(b) Italian personnel will not be arrested by Allied personnel other than Allied Military Police except in the event of the alleged commission of a serious crime or in the event of grave disorder. (The term "Allied Military Police" includes the Provost organisation of the Allied Navy, Army and Air Forces).

13. Leave

(a) If the military situation permits, leave may be given to Italian Army personnel for a period of seven days, exclusive of travelling time, not more than once in six months. Under present circumstances, Italian Army personnel will not be given leave to places more than 200 miles from the location of their unit. Personnel in SICILY or SARDINIA will not be granted leave to visit places outside those Islands. Similarly, personnel on the Mainland may not proceed on leave to places outside the Mainland.

AAI SD 1295 11 12/7

(b) Compassionate leave may be given in proper cases by a superior Italian Military Authority Colonel or above for fourteen days exclusive of travelling time.

(c) Not more than five per cent of a unit may be away on privilege or compassionate leave at one time.

(d) Agricultural leave will be the subject of special orders from time to time.

14. Appointment of Officers

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

is unsatisfactory, the Allied commander will report through normal Allied channels to the Army, independent Corps, Base Section, Allied Garrison, or District HQ, who will refer the matter to the Italian Army Administrative HQ concerned. If, after this reference, satisfactory action is not taken, details of the case will be sent to the Army Sub-Commission who will give the necessary instructions to the appropriate Italian Military Headquarters.

12. Arrest

(a) Allied military authorities are given power to arrest and hold in custody Italians alleged to be guilty of any offence punishable by Italian Law, pending investigation and handing over the offender for trial by the Italian authorities.

AAI SB 1295 11 12/7

(b) Italian personnel will not be arrested by Allied personnel other than Allied Military Police except in the event of the alleged commission of a serious crime or in the event of grave disorder. (The term "Allied Military Police" includes the Provost organisation of the Allied Navy, Army and Air Forces).

13. Leave

AAI SB 1295 7 12/7

(a) If the military situation permits, leave may be given to Italian Army personnel for a period of seven days, exclusive of travelling time, not more than once in six months. Under present circumstances, Italian Army personnel will not be given leave to places more than 200 miles from the location of their unit. Personnel in SICILY or SARDINIA will not be granted leave to visit places outside these Islands. Similarly, personnel on the Mainland may not proceed on leave to places outside the Mainland.

(b) Compassionate leave may be given in proper cases by a superior Italian Military Authority Colonel or above for fourteen days exclusive of travelling time.

(c) Not more than five per cent of a unit may be away on privilege or compassionate leave at one time.

(d) Agricultural leave will be the subject of special orders from time to time.

14. Appointment of Officers

The Italian Army authorities are responsible for the appointment and posting of all Italian Army officers subject to such restrictions as may be imposed from time to time.

15. Reinforcement/Replacement Personnel Reinforcement Depot

For the purpose of reinforcing formations and units employed directly under Allied command a Central Reinforcement Depot will be established in an area to be determined later. This Depot will be organised to hold a maximum of five percent of service units.

The/..... 4

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

The Depot will be supervised by an Allied staff under the direction of MMLA. The executive staff will be found by the Italian Army.

The Allied staff will be responsible :-

(a) for demanding from AAI replacement personnel to maintain the holding authorised by AAI. AAI will issue to MMLA instructions for the provision of these personnel.

(b) for ensuring that demands for reinforcements from units are met in accordance with priorities as laid down by AAI, and that suitable personnel are provided to meet demands.

(c) for ensuring that adequate arrangements are made for the training of reinforcements, particularly in regard to specialist personnel.

(d) for providing AAI with statistical information on the state of units reinforced by the depot.

16. Reinforcement demands and documentation

Procedure for demanding reinforcements will be as follows :-

(a) Service units or sub units under Allied command

Demands to make good deficiencies in units will be despatched weekly and made up to 12 noon each Saturday, on a proforma to be issued later. The proforma will be sent to :-

(i) Central Reinforcement Depot

(ii) MMLA

(iii) G2E MNAF, in the case of units under British command only.

(b) Diluted British Units

In certain cases both British and Italian Army personnel are included on the same WE. For the purpose of this sub para units thus organised are "diluted units". Such units will not make reinforcement demands as stated at sub para (a). Instead the procedure will be as follows :-

(i) Units will render AFs W.3008 and W.3009 showing WE and strength of British and Italian personnel separately, in accordance with procedure laid down in the Unit Guide to Documentation. AFs W.3008 and W.3009 will be sent :-

Original to G2E MNAF

Copy to Rfts CMF or Adv Sec Rfts concerned

Copy to MMLA

Copy to Original War Diary

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(c) for ensuring that adequate arrangements are made for the training of reinforcements, particularly in regard to specialist personnel.

(d) for providing AAI with statistical information on the state of units reinforced by the depot.

16. Reinforcement demands and documentation

Procedure for demanding reinforcements will be as follows :-

(a) Service units or sub units under Allied command

Demands to make good deficiencies in units will be despatched weekly and made up to 12 noon each Saturday, on a proforma to be issued later. The proforma will be sent to :-

(i) Central Reinforcement Depot

(ii) MMLA

(iii) O2E BNAF, in the case of units under British command only.

(b) Diluted British Units

In certain cases both British and Italian Army personnel are included on the same WE. For the purpose of this sub para units thus organised are "diluted units". Such units will not make reinforcement demands as stated at sub para (a). Instead the procedure will be as follows :-

(i) Units will render AFs W.3008 and W.3009 showing WE and strength of British and Italian personnel separately, in accordance with procedure laid down in the Unit Guide to Documentation. AFs W.3008 and W.3009 will be sent :-

Original to O2E BNAF

Copy to Rfts CMF or Adv Sec Rfts concerned

Copy to MMLA

Copy to Original War Diary

Copy to file

Rfts CMF or Adv Rfts Sec concerned will demand on the Central Reinforcement Depot.

(ii) Nominal rolls will be rendered to O2E BNAF in respect of Italian Army personnel either filling vacancies within WE or attached surplus showing :-

(a) Number, rank and name

(b) Arm of Service

Civil/..... 5

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

(c) Civil trade and Army trade

(d) Whether within WE or attached in excess

(iii) Casualties affecting such Italian Army personnel will be reported to G2E PWAF in exactly the same manner as for British personnel. The same army forms will be used with the exception that AFs W.3012 A, B and C series will be used for both officers and ORs instead of AFs W.3010 and W.3011 series.

(c) Similarly all British units to which Italian Army personnel are attached in excess of WE will render AFs W.3008 and W.3009, W.3012 and nominal rolls as stated at sub-para (b) (i) (ii) and (iii) above.

17. Hospitalised Personnel

A patient will remain on the strength of his unit for 30 days while in hospital. After 30 days he will be struck off the strength of the Italian Army, cease to be maintained within the Armed Forces ceiling and become an Italian civil liability. He will then be automatically replaced by a reinforcement demanded as outlined above.

18. Absentees

Personnel absent without leave will be struck off the strength of the Italian Army after 30 days and be replaced by a reinforcement. Personnel so struck off strength may, when apprehended, be subject to such disciplinary action as the Italian Army consider appropriate, but will NOT be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army as laid down by the COS.

19. Personnel undergoing imprisonment or detention

Personnel who are sentenced to periods of imprisonment or similar punishment or are awaiting trial so as to render them ineffective, will be struck off strength after 30 days and will cease to be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army as laid down by the COS.

20. Finances

(a) Whenever possible the Italian Government will be responsible for the payment of Italian Army personnel and for meeting such other expenses as are necessary.

(b) Where (a) is impracticable the procedure will be as follows:-

Units serving under British command

(i) Italian units will draw bulk advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier.

(ii) In diluted units the senior Italian officer will draw moneys from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier. Such amounts will not appear in the imprest accounts of the British units concerned.

326

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

and nominal rolls as stated

17. Hospitalised Personnel

A patient will remain on the strength of his unit for 30 days while in hospital. After 30 days he will be struck off the strength of the Italian Army, cease to be maintained within the Armed Forces ceiling and become an Italian civil liability. He will then be automatically replaced by a reinforcement demanded as outlined above.

18. Absentees

Personnel absent without leave will be struck off the strength of the Italian Army after 30 days and be replaced by a reinforcement. Personnel so struck off strength may, when apprehended, be subject to such disciplinary action as the Italian Army consider appropriate, but will NOT be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army as laid down by the CCS.

19. Personnel undergoing imprisonment or detention

Personnel who are sentenced to periods of imprisonment or similar punishment or are awaiting trial so as to render them ineffective, will be struck off strength after 30 days and will cease to be maintained or rationed within the ceiling of the Italian Army as laid down by the CCS.

20. Finances

(a) Whenever possible the Italian Government will be responsible for the payment of Italian Army personnel and for meeting such other expenses as are necessary.

(b) Where (a) is impracticable the procedure will be as follows:-

Units serving under British command

(i) Italian units will draw bulk advances from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier.

(ii) In diluted units the senior Italian officer will draw moneys from the nearest British Field or Area Cashier. Such amounts will not appear in the imprest accounts of the British units concerned.

326

(iii) All advances will be in a bulk sum.

(iv) A list of authorised units will be supplied by AAI to the Command Paymaster No 8 Command Pay Office CMF. In the case of diluted units the British Commanding Officer will nominate the Italian officer to whom payment should be made.

Units directly under US Control

(v) Finances will be subject to special instructions issued by OG NATOUSA.

21/..... 6

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

21. Welfare

Welfare will be the responsibility entirely of the Italian Government. Allied commanders may assist in the welfare of Italian units under command provided welfare of Allied troops does not suffer. Limited allotment of amenities may be made by British formations to Italian troops serving under them at their discretion. No Post Exchange, Welfare stores or Special Service equipment will be issued without approval by CG NATOUSA.

PART IV - Command, organisation and administration of the CIL

22. Organisation

The CIL is a combat formation similar in organisation to an Allied division. It is organised on Italian WEs in accordance with the requirements of AAI.

23. Command, Discipline, Leave, Welfare.

(a) The CIL is placed under the operational command of an Allied Headquarters for combat duties.

(b) The provisions of paras 11, 12, 13, 14 and 21 apply to the CIL.

24. Administration and Maintenance

(a) The Italian Military Authorities are responsible for the administration of the CIL and as far as is practicable for its maintenance.

(b) Equipment is provided from Italian sources and will only be supplemented by such items from Allied stocks as are necessary for the accomplishment of the task allotted to the formation. As long as the CIL is a British responsibility, issues of important items will not be made from British stocks without authority from AAI. If the CIL becomes an American responsibility equipment and vehicles will be issued in accordance with the instructions of CG NATOUSA.

(c) Separate and detailed instructions have been issued on administration of CIL. See AAI Adm Instructions No 3 dated 19 Mar 44 and No 24 dated 20 May 44

(d) CIL Reinforcements

A forward holding of five per cent in respect of CIL will be established. Replacement demands will be made through staff channels to HQ AAI.

PART V - Supply, Maintenance and Hospitalisation of Italian Army

25. The Ceiling

An effective ceiling of manpower has been authorised by the Allies for the Italian Army. The Allies have undertaken to maintain this number of personnel on certain scales of clothing, equipment and rations.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

The CIL is a combat formation similar in organisation to an Allied division. It is organised on Italian WEs in accordance with the requirements of AAI.

23. Command, Discipline, Leave, Welfare.

(a) The CIL is placed under the operational command of an Allied Headquarters for combat duties.

(b) The provisions of paras 11, 12, 13, 14 and 21 apply to the CIL.

24. Administration and Maintenance

(a) The Italian Military Authorities are responsible for the administration of the CIL and as far as is practicable for its maintenance.

(b) Equipment is provided from Italian sources and will only be supplemented by such items from Allied stocks as are necessary for the accomplishment of the task allotted to the formation. As long as the CIL is a British responsibility, issues of important items will not be made from British stocks without authority from AAI. If the CIL becomes an American responsibility equipment and vehicles will be issued in accordance with the instructions of CG NATOUSA.

(c) Separate and detailed instructions have been issued on administration of CIL. See AAI Adm Instructions No 3 dated 19 Mar 44 and No 24 dated 20 May 44

(d) CIL Reinforcements

A forward holding of five per cent in respect of CIL will be established. Replacement demands will be made through staff channels to HQ AAI.

PART V - Supply, Maintenance and Hospitalisation of Italian Army

25. The Ceiling

An effective ceiling of manpower has been authorised by the Allies for the Italian Army. The Allies have undertaken to maintain this number of personnel on certain scales of clothing, equipment and rations.

26. System of Maintenance

Except where stated otherwise below, items from Allied resources are handed over to the SMRE in bulk for distribution to Italian troops through Italian channels. META is responsible for the supervision of issues and the proper application of supplies.

27. Rations

See AAI Adm Instruction No 3 dated 19 Mar 44.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

28. POL

Italian units (and units diluted with Italians) serving the Allies in Army areas or elsewhere, and which form a permanent part of the Allied Order of Battle will be supplied as if they were Allied units through the normal Allied maintenance system. All other issues of POL to the Italian Army will be as laid down in AFHQ Administrative Memorandum No 11 dated 28 Feb 44.

29. Coal

Italian units serving with US or British forces will be supplied through Base Section or similar headquarters and ST this headquarters respectively.

30. Postal

See HQ AAI (Adm Dch) 2020/3/Q2 of 2 Apr.

31. Clothing and Equipment

See AAI Adm Instruction No 24 dated 20 May 44.

Pending the receipt of full and final instructions from AFHQ, clothing and equipment will only be issued from Allied stocks to units covered by Parts III and IV of this instruction. The Italian Military Authorities will be responsible for the provision of all other clothing and equipment required.

32. Medical

(a) Italian military sick (including Carabinieri) will be treated in Italian hospitals.

(b) Italian Base Depots of Medical Stores will be responsible for the provision of medical supplies to the Italian Forces and for supplying Italian military medical units which are accepting cases from formations/units to which this instruction applies.

(c) Italian Military Authorities will be responsible for the disposal of patients discharged as unfit for further military service and for the rehabilitation of all others.

33. Hospital Diets

These items will be supplied from Italian sources wherever possible. Failing this they will be provided from Allied stocks direct to Italian Depots. Detailed distribution will be under the supervision of MCIL.

3261

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

TRANSLATION No 552

Art 1

The Ministry of occupied Italy, instituted by DL..... shall provide, as regards the occupied Italian territory, through the medium of and in collaboration with the Allied Commission and the Command of the Allied Forces, for the intensification of the fight and the defense of national interests against the German invaders and the fascists who collaborate with them.

During enemy occupation the Ministry, through the medium of the Command of the Allied Forces, shall maintain liaison between the Government and the CLNAI which is entrusted with the representation of the Government in the fight against the enemy, and shall provide for the complete restoration of civil and political life in the occupied regions.

After the liberation of the national territory and before the restoration of the said territory to the Italian administration, the Ministry shall cooperate and collaborate with the Allied Commission and with the other Departments of the State to solve all the problems concerning the re-organization of civil life and the position of the patriots.

Art. 2

The following offices shall be instituted in the Ministry of Occupied Italy:

General Affairs Office
Relief Office
Press and Propaganda Office
Allied and Foreign Affairs Office

Art 3

Through the medium of and in collaboration with the Allied Commission and the Command of the Allied Forces, the General Affairs Office shall:

1) maintain relations between the Government and the Committees of National Liberation constituted in the occupied regions with the object of safeguarding national unity and organise the full restoration of civil and political life in the invaded territory;
2) make inquiries into the economic, financial and monetary situation in the occupied regions in order to draw up economic, financial and technical plans for the re-institution and resumption of the economic life in the said regions.
3) follow the activity of volunteers in their fight against the Germans and the fascists also for the purpose of proposing, in conjunction with the Minister of War, the bestowal of awards for valor and such measures that may be eventually deemed necessary;
4) supervise, through a special liaison office with the Ministry of War, the enlistment of patriots in the armed forces of the State.

Art 4

326

The Relief Office shall:

1) prepare, in conjunction with the Allied Commission, plans for giving material and moral assistance to patriot groups of whatever origin or character, and to the population of the occupied regions after their liberation.
2) [illegible] in all the regions at present under the Allied Military Com[illegible]

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NND No. 785020

which is embodied in the enemy, and shall provide for the complete restoration of life in the occupied regions.

After the liberation of the national territory and before the restoration of the said territory to the Italian administration, the Ministry shall cooperate and collaborate with the Allied Commission and with the other Departments of the State to solve all the problems concerning the re-organization of civil life and the position of the patriots.

Art. 2

The following offices shall be instituted in the Ministry of Occupied Italy:

General Affairs Office
Relief Office
Press and Propaganda Office
Allied and Foreign Affairs Office

Art 3

Through the medium of and in collaboration with the Allied Commission and the Command of the Allied Forces, the General Affairs Office shall:

1) maintain relations between the Government and the Committees of National Liberation constituted in the occupied regions with the object of safeguarding national unity and organise the full restoration of civil and political life in the invaded territory;
2) make inquiries into the economic, financial and monetary situation in the occupied regions in order to draw up economic, financial and technical plans for the re-institution and resumption of the economic life in the said regions.
3) follow the activity of volunteers in their fight against the Germans and the fascists also for the purpose of proposing, in conjunction with the Minister of War, the bestowal of awards for valor and such measures that may be eventually deemed necessary;
4) supervise, through a special liaison office with the Ministry of War, the enlistment of patriots in the armed forces of the State.

Art 4

326

The Relief Office shall:

1) prepare, in conjunction with the Allied Commission, plans for giving material and moral assistance to patriot groups of whatever origin or character, and to the population of the occupied regions after their liberation.
2) Provide, in all the regions at present under the Allied Military Government and in the areas that will be liberated by the Allied Forces, for the setting up and execution of plans to give every material and moral assistance to the afore mentioned patriot groups and to the population of the said liberated areas, in conjunction with and through such channels that will be established by the Allied Commission.

Art 5

The Press and Propaganda Office shall:

1) Contribute to the propaganda for the war of liberation in occupied Italy

1928
Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNRC NO. 735020

1929