

ACC

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'G' POLICY

Feb, 1945 - Sept. 1945

3478
3607

COVER 4

Subject: Neo-Fascist Prisoners, Female, Florence Camp

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
G/6

September 1945

To : Minister for War

Further to conversation on above subject, a conference was held at Florence on 14 September with representatives of MFOUSA POW Command, Colonel Piccinini, Chief of Staff and Lt Col Chianlati, Assistant Chief of Staff, both of Territorial Headquarters No 7 (Florence), Major Van Kirk, MMIA LO, Florence and Colonel Kerr and Lt Col Rose, MMIA, and the following points were agreed:

1. Effective date of transfer of prisoners and camp to Italian War Ministry: 25 September 1945.

2. Troops

Due to the exposed location of the camp (on the Pisa Road in the outskirts of Florence), and the fact that the prisoners are women, Colonel Piccinini stated that Territorial Headquarters No 7 must have assigned for this duty one non-commissioned officer and 18 men of the CC.RR, as ordinary soldiers could not satisfactorily handle the camp. This is agreed, and the CC.RR personnel of the 210 Division is made available for this purpose. The required personnel must be moved by you to Florence to arrive not later than 22 September.

3. Camp Equipment and Property

a. All necessary equipment and property now in use at the camp will be left in place, including US and captured property, the main items being:

1 Truck, Cargo, 6 x 6, US
2 Trailers, Water, US
1 Range, Field, US
Cans, galvanized, US
Water Cans, US
1 Pump, water

3607

September 1945

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- 1 Truck, Cargo, 6 x 6, US
- 2 Trailers, Water, US
- 1 Range, Field, US
- Cans, galvanized, US
- Water Cans, US
- 1 Pump, water

b. A US Detachment, attached to MMIA LO Florence, will take over all property from the POW Command, and will loan the property to the Italian Command. The US Detachment will operate the US truck for hauling water and rations. All US property will be withdrawn as soon as suitable Italian items can be substituted, this substitution being arranged by Major Van Kirk and Territorial Headquarters No 7, and when completed the US Detachment will be withdrawn.

c. The prisoners have sufficient blankets and housekeeping equipment, which will remain.

4. Rations

a. The ration of the prisoners is as follows:

US Army Items

Flour or biscuit	8-4/5 oz
Canned meat	3-3/5 oz
Dry vegetables	1-3/5 oz (P/B/L)
Sugar	1-1/5 oz
Milk powder	1/2 oz
Coffee	4/5 oz
Cheese	1/8 oz

Italian Items

Fresh vegetables	8 oz
Fresh fruit	4 oz
Salt	3/8 oz
Olive Oil	1 oz

About 2,000 calories

b. The US Army portion of the ration will be drawn from US Army sources until 1 December 1945, by Major Van Kirk, on the basis of the strength present in the camp. There will be no charge to the Italian Government for the US Army rations.

c. The Italian portion of the items will be furnished from Italian Army Depots. The baking of bread will be handled by the Italian Army in Florence.

5. Medical Care and Supplies

3606

a. There is a hospital section set up in the camp, with a nurse (POW). Only the most serious cases requiring hospitalization must be sent from the camp. Colonel Piccinini stated that such cases would be sent to civilian hospitals and properly guarded, and this is satisfactory.

b. Medical supplies for the prisoners are from captured German stocks, and a 90-day level will be furnished the camp by the POW Command, where the supplies are available. Any additional supplies needed will be furnished from Italian Army sources.

c. A number of prisoners are now being hospitalized in the US Military hospitals. As soon as possible such prisoners will be returned to the camp, or transferred by the POW Command to Italian civil hospital designated by Territorial Headquarters. Arrangements will be made on the spot by the POW Command, Major Van Kirk and Territorial Headquarters.

6. POL

The POL necessary for the operation of the assigned US motor vehicles and camp equipment will be drawn from Allied

Italian Items

Fresh vegetables	8	oz
Fresh fruit	4	oz
Salt	3/8	oz
Olive Oil	1	oz

About 2,000 calories

b. The US Army portion of the ration will be drawn from US Army sources until 1 December 1945, by Major Van Kirk, on the basis of the strength present in the camp. There will be no charge to the Italian Government for the US Army rations.

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6. POL

The POL necessary for the operation of the assigned US motor vehicles and camp equipment will be drawn from Allied sources until 1 December 1945 by Major Van Kirk, and will not be a charge against JFA Ministry allotments. This does not include motor vehicles or equipment assigned to the Italian Army Units stationed at the camp.

7. US Detachment

a. The US Detachment assigned to the camp will be (1) responsible for US property and operation of US motor vehicles, (2) responsible for securing the necessary US rations and POL.

b. Liaison between the Territorial Headquarters and Camp Commander with Allied Agencies will be handled by Major Van Kirk.

8. Prisoners wanted by the Allies

The Allies reserve the right to demand and receive from the Italian Government any prisoner in the camp, at anytime.

9. Additional Prisoners

Except for those prisoners returned by the POW Command from hospitals, no additional prisoners will be admitted to the camp except those delivered on written orders of MTOUSA POW Command. On 14 September there were 293 female prisoners in the camp.


CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

CPK/lak

cc: CG, MTOUSA (5)
CG, PENBASE (4)
CT, MTOUSA POW COMMAND (4)
HQ, ALCOM (3)
Major Van Kirk
MMIA LO PENBASE (2)

360A

INTERNAL

MA to GOC
Q (3)
SD (3)
A (3)
ST (1)
2691 (1)

MMIA LIAISON OFFICE
PENTAGON
APO 782 U. S. ARMY

6 September 1945

SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of Correspondence

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. (MMIA) Rome

1. Your signal 0-142 of 5 September received and copy passed to Scott.

Ira V. Fordyce
IRA V. FORDYCE
Capt, Infantry
Liaison Officer

Chief of Staff to Sec

MMIA LIAISON OFFICE
G/6
DATE: 11/18/45

✓ X 3602
GPO 2 (1)
GPO 2 (1)
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GPO 2 (1)
GPO 2 (1)

100430

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: CG MTOUSA POW COMMAND

071500 B

TO : MMIA

INFO: CG MTOUSA

MTOUSA POW COMMAND LIAISON OFFICER, G-3 AMO

RESTRICTED

REF : 1803

IMPORTANT

YOUR CABLE C-142 DATED 051600B SEPT RECD (.) WILL
INFORM YOU AT A LATER DATE NUMBER OF ITALIAN PRISONERS
OF WAR AND TIME OF TURN-OVER TO ~~XXXXXX~~ ITALIAN COMMAND (.)
HUTTER, CAPT. ASST G-3

"G" DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/6

ws 08 Sep 45

GSO 1

GSO 2 (C)

GSO 2 (S)

GSO 2 (W)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (C)

GSO 3 (S)

GSO 3 (L)

3601

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785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 1009/39/EO.

5 September 1945

SUBJECT: Responsibility for Mine Clearance.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: G-5 Section.

1. In my 8251/170/EO of 24 May 1945, para 4(b), I recommended that the responsibility for the supervision of the work of the Italian Army in the clearance of land mines should be transferred from the Civil Affairs Section to the Land Forces Sub-Commission. In your AG 091.711/115 SAC-OWT of 10 July 1945, para.7, you stated that the subject was under consideration with a view to the employment of German surrendered or POW personnel. I understand that these are now not available and the responsibility has continued to be borne by units of the Italian Army.

2. By 30 September it is expected that the operational control of the Italian Army and the bulk of the Northern Regions will have been handed back to the Italian Government. As from that date I propose progressively to reduce the responsibilities of the Civil Affairs Section with a view to closing down the Section. Clearly one of the first responsibilities which should be handed over is that of supervision of land mine clearance, and as I have recommended before, this responsibility should in my opinion become that of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission does not alter his previous attitude and feels obliged to refuse to offer to take on any further responsibility. However, as the supervision has been carried on in the past by one Allied officer of the Civil Affairs Section, I do not think that GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission need be unduly alarmed at the extra work involved.

3. I should therefore be glad if instructions could be given to me to make this internal change in the Allied Commission and to GOC, MEIA to accept the additional responsibility.

G/6
R/6/9.

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MEIA)
CA Section

SOE - - -

120

FROM: MEIA
 TO : (FOR ACTION) MESSAGE
 TO : (FOR INFO) MTOUSA
 POW COMMAND, MTOUSA

REFERENCE NUMBER

0-142

115 See 123
124

UNCLASSIFIED (.) FOR MEIA LO PASS TO POW CAMP 337 FOR MEIA LO (.)
 REFERENCE MEIA LETTER 6/6 OF 25 AUGUST (.) FIRST SUBJECT (.)
 TRANSFER OF HOSPITALIZED PRISONERS FROM U S HOSPITALS TO ITALIAN
 HOSPITALS (.) L O WILL ARRANGE WITH POW COMMAND FOR TRANSFER
 AND WITH ITALIAN COMMAND FOR NECESSARY GUARDS CONSIDERING THE
 STATE OF ITALIAN HOSPITALS PISA AND LEGHORN ON READMITTANCE TO
 CAMP IF CONDITION PERMITS (.) SECOND SUBJECT (.) ADDITIONAL
 PRISONERS WILL BE ADMITTED TO CAMP BY THE ITALIAN COMMAND ON
 WRITTEN AUTHORITY OF MTOUSA POW COMMAND SPECIFICALLY SPECIFYING
 CONFIRMATION IN PISA CAMP AT DIRECTION OF POW COMMAND (.) NO
 REPEAT NO ADDITIONAL PRISONERS WILL BE RECEIVED FROM ANY OTHER
 SOURCE (.) ACKNOWLEDGE

PRECEDENCE

C/6

3593

AUTHENTICATION

C. P. MEIA, Colonel

CC: MIN FOR WAR

Major General L. BROWNING CB, OBE, MC.,
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E

3/6 29 Aug. '45.

My dear

Thanks for your IO09/34/EC dated 28 August
which I have read with interest.

I write this to make my position quite clear
and to show that it is not a question of obstinacy on my
part but merely one of over-loading and physical impossibility.

The state of affairs is this. A.Y.H.Q. have
decided that it is in the Allied as well as the Italian
interest to reorganise the Italian Army from top to bottom
fundamentally, in order that a small army of quality shall
replace the huge army of low calibre which existed in the
past.

I have just finished three days discussion with
the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Ward, on the organis-
-ation and training angle. In addition there will be such
matters as reorganisation of the administrative services,
the judicial and penal system etc. The whole business will
be, as General Ward put it, a "herculean" task. He is right,
particularly as A.Y.H.Q. want me to get a move on and get
the business started now, and the fact is that I am trying
to compete despite a continual outflow of trained officers
on demobilisation and an inflow of officers who know nothing
about this specialised game in M.M.I.A. The work under my
existing charter (e.g. cost, accounting, rations etc.) still
continues and the result of the above is that I now have even
more on my plate than I ever had before. The prospect is
staggering.

I therefore cannot alter my previous attitude and
offer to take on a further responsibility.

If you require more personnel for Mine Clearance,
and I can see that this is a big political and economic

My dear

Thanks for your 1009/34/EC dated 26 August which I have read with interest.

I write this to make my position quite clear and to show that it is not a question of obstinacy on my part but merely one of over-loading and physical impossibility.

The state of affairs is this. A.F.H.Q. have decided that it is in the Allied as well as the Italian interest to reorganise the Italian Army from top to bottom fundamentally, in order that a small army of quality shall replace the huge army of low calibre which existed in the past.

I have just finished three days discussion with the Assistant Chief of Staff, General Ward, on the organisation and training angle. In addition there will be such matters as reorganisation of the administrative services, the judicial and penal system etc. The whole business will be, as General Ward put it, a "herculean" task. He is right, particularly as A.F.H.Q. want me to get a move on and get the business started now, and the fact is that I am trying to compete despite a continual outflow of trained officers on demobilisation and an inflow of officers who know nothing about this specialised game in M.M.I.A. The work under my existing charter (e.g. cost, accounting, rations etc.) still continues and the result of the above is that I now have even more on my plate than I ever had before. The prospect is staggering.

I therefore cannot alter my previous attitude and offer to take on a further responsibility.

If you require more personnel for Mine Clearance, and I can see that this is a big political and economic factor, the answer is for you to apply to A.F.H.Q. for more chaps to be put at your disposal for this purpose. Apart from the 3,000 allotted to you, you have had allotted a further 6,000 for the purpose of assisting with repatriation. I understand you are only employing one-third of that number. Obviously, complete military units would be a better proposition than taking officers and WCOs and putting them in charge of newly organised gangs. It is therefore for your consideration as to whether you should not ask A.F.H.Q. for the use of, say two or three Field Companies for Mine Clearance work. These could be balanced against the shortfall in the 6,000

X from the Group

/over

- 2 -

mentioned above which you are not using. It is for A.F.H.Q. to say whether these could be spared or not. At any rate, there is a suggestion.

I have written to you pretty fully as I have to explain my attitude in this matter, and I hope it makes clear why, though I cannot accept any further responsibility, I am quite prepared for the Ministry of War to put troops at your disposal if A.F.H.Q. approve.

Yours

L.B.

Brigadier M.G. LUSH, CB, CBE, MC.,
Executive Commissioner, A.C.

359

PERSONAL.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

116

Ref: 1009/34/EC.

28 August 1945.

My dear General,

I would ask you to read the attached memorandum on mine clearance in Italy. You will agree, I think, that a first class job has been done in spite of many difficulties.

This is an appeal to you to alter your attitude regarding the responsibilities of the Italian Army in this respect. There can be no question in my mind and in the mind of many of the Chief Commissioner's advisers that mine clearance in Italy is a matter for the Italian Army - as is the case in our country. The last paragraphs of the memorandum are in my opinion very cogent.

I propose to advise the Chief Commissioner to raise this matter again and this time I should like your support.

*Yours sincerely**Francis [unclear]*

Major-General L. Browning, CB, OBE, MC,
General Officer Commanding,
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

3595

MSL/JG.

1945
1168

Memorandum to Civil Affairs Section

Subject : Mine Clearance

BACKGROUND

1. Since the entry of the Allies into Italy the problem of Mine Clearance has been dealt with by three agents: (a) MIA, (b) Allied Commission, and (c) the Italian Ministry of War. Originally there was no organisation in AC to deal with this matter but some elements of the Italian Army were used for the clearance of mines. Their work was almost entirely confined to SARDEGNA and CALABRIA. As Italian troops began to be used operationally, this work was discontinued.
2. In July 1944 Allied Commission was allotted two companies of Italian Engineers to work on mine clearance for civilian needs. These Companies have been augmented to four at which number they still stand. It will be appreciated considering the large number of mines laid in this country, (probably running to six millions), that this is a very small number of men to work on this vast problem. Their activities have been almost entirely confined to the essential needs of the civilian population, i.e. clearance of bridge surrounds, water and power lines, towns and villages, railways etc. There remain, however, large areas of agricultural land and other less important public utility installations still to be cleared.
3. The Italian Government have charged the Ministry of War with the responsibility of Mine Clearance in Italy but the Ministry is denied the use of Italian Military personnel other than those mentioned above which are under the direct control of this Commission. In conjunction with Civil Affairs Section, the Ministry of War drew up a scheme for the employment of civilian personnel which is now in operation. MIA provided a nucleus of instructors to initiate the scheme. Some comments on the work of the Italian Military companies and the Italian Civilian organisation are made in the following paragraphs.

MILITARY COMPANIES

- 359
4. The two Companies originally allotted were, in July and August 1944, given the duty, in addition to Mine Clearance work, of instructing two recruit companies in mine clearance. After a short period of six weeks the two original companies were withdrawn, leaving this Commission with the two new Companies. One Company was put to work in the East of Italy and the other one in the West of Italy. While the work of mine clearance from its very nature is slow, these companies may be said in general to have given a good account of themselves in spite of many difficulties. Personnel has been frequently changed, clothing has been difficult to get, they are lacking in transport, and mine detectors were very difficult to obtain and still are.

5. The two Companies have between them lifted or destroyed 439040 mines. These figures have been accepted by the Ministry of War but this Sub Commission considers them to be on the high side. The casualties suffered by the Companies are 36 killed and 73 injured and mutilated. These casualties are due to various factors, i.e. the high sensitivity of mines which have lain a long time, the growth of grass etc. which hides the usual signs of minefields, bad minefield discipline and a degree of recklessness which is inherent in the Italian due to

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5. The two Companies have between them lifted or destroyed 439040 mines. These figures have been accepted by the Ministry of War but this Sub Commission considers them to be on the high side. The casualties suffered by the Companies are 86 killed and 73 injured and mutilated. These casualties are due to various factors, i.e. the high sensitiveness of mines which have lain a long time, the growth of grass etc. which hides the usual signs of minefields, bad minefield discipline and a degree of recklessness which is inherent in the Italian due to familiarity with mines, despite casualties.

6. Two further Companies were later allotted in the Winter of 1944 and the Spring of 1945. The last Company has only just completed its training and has been put to work on last Winter battle line.

CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION

7. The civilian squads set up by the Ministry of War, in spite of great difficulties which included not only lack of equipment, food and first aid, but clothing and housing, have expanded gradually to an approximate number of 1,500 workers. They are continually hampered by lack of transport and are inclined to become demoralised when casualties occur. It can be well understood that men

engaged continuously on this dangerous work are bound to be affected by such disadvantages and their morale will be lowered when they cannot even get transport to take wounded and injured to hospital. It may be added here that the fact that suitable equipment has not been made available is not due to any lack of initiative or hardwork on the part of the officers concerned in this Headquarters who, over a period of some 9 months, have continually pressed for the provision of equipment and transport. Their efforts however have only met with partial success.

8. The civilian mine clearing squads are much less expert than the military but are well paid. The casualties are 96 killed and 75 injured and mutilated. The stage has now been reached when it can no longer be expected that civilians will come forward for this work, and an expansion of the scheme by using civilians is impossible. The costs of using civilian labour are prohibitive.

USE OF GERMAN POWs

9. In agreement with the Acting President of the Allied Commission this Sub Commission made application to AFHQ in June of this year for the use of 10,000 surrendered personnel, with the necessary equipment to be provided from military sources, for mine clearance work. The numbers that it had been found possible to employ among the civilian population and the four companies allotted to this Commission were considered insufficient to make any appreciable headway in clearing up the large number of mines in this country and that only with the addition of a large number of personnel could any substantial progress be made. It was therefore suggested that 10,000 POWs should be put to work and if this ran successfully a larger number might well be employed. After a period of 3 months AFHQ now state that no surrendered personnel can be made available to this Commission for the purpose of Mine Clearance. Further, severe cuts in the equipment to be made available are contemplated.

10. The position is, therefore, precisely as it was three months ago. There are still insufficient personnel at work to really make headway in the clearance of mines, which daily becomes more difficult and dangerous, since the mines which have lain for a considerable time, are more sensitive and more difficult to find. They are taking a daily toll of life in considerable numbers and of all ages. Casualties among the civilian population are estimated to be not less than 5000 killed and 6000 injured and mutilated (these figures are incomplete, full returns not being available).

It might be argued that the work could be carried out by contractors. Experience shows however, that, not only is this an extremely expensive way of doing the work, but it is also extremely difficult to control and supervise, and it is open, owing to the Italian mentality, to a possibility of recurrences of the recent explosion which took place at Viareggio and which resulted in a considerable loss of life.

There can be only one conclusion: namely, that a very much larger and properly administered organisation is required to tackle this immense problem.

11. It is my view that the organisation which should and could tackle this work already exists, - it is the Italian Army, and the matter of mine clearance should be made a high priority responsibility of that Army.

1948
military but are well paid. The casualties are 30,000 military and 10,000 civilians. The stage has now been reached when it can no longer be expected that civilians will come forward for this work, and an expansion of the scheme by using civilians is impossible. The costs of using civilian labour are prohibitive.

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10. The position is, therefore, precisely as it was three months ago. There are still insufficient personnel at work to really make headway in the clearance of mines, which daily becomes more difficult and dangerous, since the mines which have lain for a considerable time, are more sensitive and more difficult to find. They are taking a daily toll of life in considerable numbers and of all ages. Casualties among the civilian population are estimated to be not less than 5000 killed and 6000 injured and mutilated (these figures are incomplete, full returns not being available).

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There can be only one conclusion: namely, that a very much larger and properly administered organisation is required to tackle this immense problem.

11. It is my view that the organisation which should and could tackle this work already exists, - it is the Italian Army, and the matter of mine clearance should be made a high priority responsibility of that Army.

12. This view is upheld by the fact that mine clearance itself is basically a military operation as it can only be satisfactorily done under strict disciplinary conditions, which cannot be established with civilians. Civilians are disinclined to do the work and cannot be got in the numbers required. The technical equipment both for laying and removing mines is essentially military and can only be obtained from military sources.

13. I therefore recommend that the Italian Army not only become immediately responsible for all mine clearance work in Italy, but also that it be given the opportunity and necessary assistance in the way of the supply of equipment to carry out this immense task which involves the removal of an estimated number of over four million mines.

14. There is every advantage in this responsibility being taken by the Military, and, so far as I can see, no disadvantage at all. Military operations

- 3 -

in this country are at an end, ^{and} there must be Italian Military personnel available to do the work, even if they have the secondary role of guard battalions. The problem is a national one and should be treated as such. There are Engineer Combat Units already trained and equipped which should be used for mine clearance.

Further equipment required can be transferred direct through normal military channels from Allied Military sources to the Italian Army. There are available to the Italian Military authorities military schools, buildings etc., for training infantry in this work. It is, in fact, one of the normal functions of any infantryman to lift mines if necessary and I can see no objection to more men being found from infantry to augment the engineer element in the Italian Army for the purpose of mine clearance.

A really first rate performance in tackling this problem by the Italian Army would go far to raise its morale and prestige in the eyes of the general public.

22 Aug 45

Director
Local Government Sub-Commission

3590

Subject: Nec-Fascist Prisoners, Pisa Camp

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
G/6

August 1945

To : Minister for War (5)

Further to conversation with the Minister for War, a conference was held at the Pisa Camp on 22 August with representatives of CG, MTOUSA and the MTOUSA POW Command, Colonel Viselli of your office, Colonel Marinari, Commanding the Italian 3d Guard Regiment, and Colonel Kerr and Major Selby, MMIA, and the following points were agreed:

1. Effective date of transfer of prisoners and camp to Italian War Ministry control - 28 August 1945

2. Camp Equipment and Property

a. All necessary equipment and property now in use at the camp will be left in place, including US and Allied property and captured property (German and Italian).

b. A detachment of US officers and men, to be attached to MMIA, will take over all such property from the POW Command, and will loan the property to the Italian Command.

c. The property includes:

Semi-permanent buildings
Huts
US motor vehicles
Electrical generators
Water pumps and tanks
Tentage, mess equipment, clothing, etc.
Signal equipment

d. It is planned that such property and equipment can be furnished from Italian Army stocks be substituted for the US Army property, as soon as convenient, in order to reduce the amount of US Army property gradually. For instance, Italian Army telephones can replace US Army telephones. This will be a matter to be arranged mutually on the spot between the US Detachment and the Italian Camp Commander.

3. Rations

a. The ration of the prisoners is as follows:

US Army Items

1950

Spencer

116

See 120

See 122

3583

See 120

Further to conversation with the Minister for War, a conference was held at the Pisa Camp on 22 August with representatives of CG, MTOUSA and the MTOUSA POW Command, Colonel Viselli of your office, Colonel Marinarì, Commanding the Italian 3d Guard Regiment, and Colonel Kerr and Major Selby, MMIA, and the following points were agreed:

1. Effective date of transfer of prisoners and camp to Italian War Ministry control - 28 August 1945

2. Camp Equipment and Property

- a. All necessary equipment and property now in use at the camp will be left in place, including US and Allied property and captured property (German and Italian).
- b. A detachment of US officers and men, to be attached to MMIA, will take over all such property from the POW Command, and will loan the property to the Italian Command.

c. The property includes:

Semi-permanent buildings
Huts
US motor vehicles
Electrical generators
Water pumps and tanks
Tentage, mess equipment, clothing, etc.
Signal equipment

3583

d. It is planned that such property and equipment can be furnished from Italian Army stocks be substituted for the US Army property, as soon as convenient, in order to reduce the amount of US Army property gradually. For instance, Italian Army telephones can replace US Army telephones. This will be a matter to be arranged mutually on the spot between the US Detachment and the Italian Camp Commander.

3. Rations

a. The ration of the prisoners is as follows:

US Army Items

Flour or biscuit	8-4/5 oz	
Canned meat	3-3/5 oz	
Dry vegetables	1-3/5 oz	(P/B/L)
Sugar	1-1/5 oz	
Milk powder	1/2 oz	
Coffee	4/5 oz	
Cheese	1/8 oz	

Italian Items

Fresh vegetables	8 oz
Fresh fruit	4 oz
Salt	3/4 oz
Olive Oil	1 oz

About 2,000 calories

b. The US Army portion of the ration will be drawn from US Army sources until 1 December 1945, by the US Detachment on the basis of the strength present in the camp. There will be no charge to the Italian Government for the US Army rations.

c. The Italian portion of the items will be drawn by the Camp Commander from Italian Army Depots.

d. Colonel Viselli stated that the baking of bread for the camp would be done on contract with civilian bakeries in Pisa. This is satisfactory, or you can transfer an Italian Army bakery to the camp, and utilize the prisoners for labor.

4. Medical care and supplies

a. There is a field hospital in the camp, now staffed by German POW's, who will be removed when the camp is turned over to you.

b. Arrangements have been made to transfer to the camp one Italian hospital just released by PBS, to take over the commitment. This unit will be placed under command of the Italian Camp Commander.

c. Medical supplies for the prisoners are from captured German stocks, and a 90-day level is being built up in the camp where the supplies are available. Any additional supplies needed if necessary from US Army sources.

d. Hospitalization of the prisoners beyond the camp will be in established Italian Army hospitals in the vicinity of the camp.

e. A number of the prisoners are now hospitalized in US military hospitals. As soon as possible such prisoners will be returned to the camp or transferred to Italian Army hospitals by the MTOUSA POW Command.

- US Army sources until 1 December 1945. There will be the basis of the strength present in the camp. US Army rations. no charge to the Italian Government for the US Army rations.
- c. The Italian portion of the items will be drawn by the Camp Commander from Italian Army Depots.
- d. Colonel Viselli stated that the baking of bread for the camp would be done on contract with civilian bakeries in Pisa. This is satisfactory, or you can transfer an Italian Army bakery to the camp, and utilize the prisoners for labor.
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- b. Arrangements have been made to transfer to the camp one Italian hospital just released by PBS, to take over the Italian commitment. This unit will be placed under command of the Italian Camp Commander.
- c. Medical supplies for the prisoners are from captured German stocks, and a 90-day level is being built up in the camp where the supplies are available. Any additional supplies needed will be furnished from Italian Army sources, supplemented if necessary from US Army sources.
- d. Hospitalization of the prisoners beyond the capacity of the field hospital in the camp will be in established Italian Army hospitals in the vicinity of the camp.
- e. A number of the prisoners are now hospitalized in US military hospitals. As soon as possible such prisoners will be returned to the camp or transferred to Italian Army hospitals by the WFOUSA POW Command.
5. POL
- The POL necessary for the operation of assigned motor vehicles and camp equipment will be drawn from Allied sources until 1 December 1945 by the US Detachment and will not be a charge against the War Ministry allotment. This does not include the motor vehicles organically assigned to the Italian Army units in the camp.
6. US Liaison Detachment
- a. A US Liaison Detachment will be attached to the camp. This will be an MMIA unit.
- b. The Liaison Detachment will not command the camp, but will assist the Italian Camp Commander in every way possible.

c. The principal functions of this detachment are:

- (1) Responsibility for all US Army property.
- (2) Securing and turning over to the Camp Commander the necessary US Army rations, POL, spare parts for US Army equipment, etc.
- (3) Liaison for the Camp Commander with Allied agencies, MMIA, etc.
- (4) Training Italian personnel in operation of US Army equipment, electrical generators, water pumps, etc, and assisting in the operation where necessary.

7. Prisoners wanted by the Allies

The Allies reserve the right to demand and receive from the Italian Government any prisoner in the camp, at anytime.

8. Additional prisoners

Except for those prisoners returned by the POW Command from hospitals, no additional prisoners will be admitted to the camp from any source.

9. Troops

a. Presently assigned to the Italian Command is the Hq 3d Guard Regiment and the 508 and 509 Guard Battalions, and a field hospital.

b. It will be necessary to assign additional personnel, such as engineers, electricians, motor mechanics, clerks, commissary, etc, as needed by the Camp Commander. This personnel will be added to the W/E of the Regimental Headquarters, as requested by you. Submit your proposals.

CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AG (MMIA)

CPK/lak

cc: CG, MTOUSA (5)
CG, PBS (4)
CG, MTOUSA POW Command (4)
HQ, ALCOM (3)
MMIA LO, Pisa Camp (6)
MMIA LO, PENBASE
MMIA LO, Florence

INTERNAL

MA to GOC
Q (3)

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Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

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CG, PBS (4)
CG, MTOUSA POW Command (4)
HQ, ALCOM (3)
MMIA LO, Pisa Camp (6)
MMIA LO, PENBASE
MMIA LO, Florence

INTERNAL

MA to GOC
Q (3)
SD (3)
A (3)
ST (1)

Subject: Neo Fascist Prisoners in Pisa Camp under US Control

Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
C/6

8 August 1945

INFO

COPY

Action copy

SD/48/2

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Executive Commissioner, ALCOM (2)

1. Following the conference in your office yesterday, I personally visited the Minister for War regarding the taking over of the Pisa Camp by the Italian Government, and the following points were discussed and action will be taken as indicated:
 - a. The Minister for War will recommend to his Government that he become responsible for the Pisa Camp and the prisoners therein. To secure Government approval will take three to five days.
 - b. The US will furnish until 1 December 1945, items of the ration as shown on inclosure attached hereto under the heading "Allied Items" and the Italian Army will furnish the balance. This ration list was taken from the AFHQ publication.
 - c. The present two ITI-ITI Guard Battalions plus the Third Guard Regimental Headquarters will be assigned by the Allies to the camp and released to the Minister for War for guarding purposes. 358
 - d. The small US liaison detachment will remain at the camp for the time being. This liaison detachment will not command the camp, but will assist in administration until such time as the Italians are thoroughly familiar with the job. The size of this detachment would be agreed when representatives of all concerned visit the camp.
 - e. The disposition of these prisoners will, when the War Ministry takes over, become a matter for decision of the Italian Government. It is fully realized that if the population of the camp decreases, both the Allied and Italian commitment will also decrease.

R/8/8

2. The Minister for War does not desire to assume responsibility for a camp to be established at Modena. He is going to recommend to the Italian Government that the Italian Army furnish two battalions for guarding the camp, but that the Minister for Justice assume the administration of the camp including feeding the prisoners on the civilian prison ration scale. This appears to be the best solution in order not to commit the Italian Army to take over civilian responsibility.

3. As soon as the Italian Government finally acts on the Minister's recommendations, it would be well to have representatives of the War Minister, Minister for Justice, MMIA, Public Safety Sub Commission, POW Command, and AFHQ visit these camps and make arrangements on the ground. During the conference yesterday the offer was made for a plane to come to Rome and pick up the parties concerned, so that the camps could be visited in one day. It is requested that tentative arrangements be made for the plane to be available next Tuesday, 14 August, and I be advised if the plane will be available.


CLAYTON P. KERR, Colonel
for Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AG (MMIA)

CPK/1ak

Incl 1: POW Rations

3584

136
7 August 1945POW RATIONSAllied Items

Flour or biscuit	12 oz
Canned meat	2 oz
Dry vegetables	3 oz (P/B/L)
Sugar	1/2 oz
Milk powder	2/3 oz
Coffee	1/2 oz
Cheese	1/4 oz

Italian Items

Fresh vegetables	8 oz
Fresh fruit	4 oz
Salt	3/8 oz
Olive oil	1 oz

About 2,000 calories

3582

1959

G. File

112

SECRET. & PERSONAL.

Subject : M.M.I.A. Activities.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
C/6.

31 July, 1945.

To : ALL P.L.U. Commanders.
ALL M.M.I.A. Liaison Officers.

Herewith copy of G.O.C's letter, DO/2 of 31 July, to
Chief of Staff and Chief Administrative Officer A.F.H.Q.

This is for your personal information only.

L.M. Ingledew.

Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
M.M.I.A.

3580

/agc

R/31/7

[Handwritten signature]
SECRET & PERSONAL *[Handwritten mark]*

MAJOR GENERAL L. FROWING, CD., OBE., MC
Land Forces Sub-commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

[Handwritten mark] G/6
26 July 45.

[Handwritten mark]
My Dear

Ref our conversation at CASERIA on Tuesday, 24 July, and
your SECRET & PERSONAL letter to me of same date on para 3 of my G/6
of 2 July :-

1. I fully understand the reasons for your decisions and of
course accept them fully.
2. I was merely anxious for the whole matter to be considered
in detail.

Yours

[Handwritten signature: L.P.]

(Major General)

3573

Brig. J. D'A. ANDERSON, D.S.O.
G - 3 (Org)
A.F.H.Q.

[Handwritten signature] 21/7

Secret + Periodic

110
1 → [2/6 copy 50/48/2]
Brigadier J.D'A. ANDERSON,
G-3 (Org) Section,
A.F.H.Q.
C.M.F.

24 Jul 45.

My dear General,

I am writing to you in continuation of the CAO's letter of 19 July on the subject of Italian Intelligence Units. We have referred the proposition that you make in para 3 of your letter of 2 July to G-2 and the gist of their reply is as follows.

The Italian Army Intelligence is fully employed in observing, under control of G-2, the domestic situation in Italy which they consider to be ripe for internal disorder of varying magnitude. The withdrawal of American and British personnel makes G-2 rely more and more on Italian CI personnel.

G-2 further state that they are making full use of the Italian Army Intelligence and in fact are searching for ways and means of reinforcing certain critical sectors in Italy with capable Italian Army Int personnel.

They regret that they cannot agree to the dissolution of Italian Army Intelligence until AFHQ has not further Intelligence or Counter-Intelligence responsibility in Italy.

I know that this runs counter to what you feel but I do not see that we can do any more than refer the matter to G-2 who are the experts and the employers of Italian Army Intelligence.

It was very nice to see you down here the other day and I hope I shall be able to visit you in Rome before long.

I hope you are very well.

Yours

W.A.

Wm Anderson

Major General L. Browning, CB, OBE, MC.,
Military Mission to Italian Army,
C.M.F.

See folio 11

SECRET & PERSONAL

Lt-Col Sir Brian H. Robertson Bt., 106A
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,
C. M. F.

CAO/117

19 July 1945.

My dear Browning

103

I am sorry that I have been some time about replying to your letter G.6 of 2 July.

I note what you say regarding the reductions which you are able to affect without reference to this HQ.

With regard to the Military Academy, I have obtained agreement of all concerned that this should continue in being, and that for the present it should continue to draw Allied rations. There are, however, two stipulations made in this regard:

- (a) That MMIA should carry out an immediate investigation into the organization of the Academy. It appears from the fact that the overheads and the Cadets are almost equal in number that its organization is decidedly top heavy.
 - (b) That the requirements of the Academy should be met to the maximum extent by the Italian Government, and that they should call upon the Allies for as little assistance as possible.
- With regard to Italian Intelligence Units, your previous suggestions for disbandment resulted in the elimination of certain units. G-2 have been asked to go into the matter again and will let you know whether any further disbandments can be made.

*Yours sincerely,
Brian H. Robertson*

Major-General Langley Browning, CB, OBE, MC,
Army Sub Commission,

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Yours sincerely,
Richard H. Johnston

Major-General Langley Browning, CB, OBE, MC,
 Army Sub Commission,
 Allied Commission,
 (MMIA) ROLE.

BHR/emb

6 Please bring in file 6/10 and 6/11
copy to G-2
G-2 (6) collecting info from MMIA 200000
re org. materials, answered 17 24 Feb.

105A

C/10

Ref: 215405/11
232-1-4

Date: 13 July 45

$$\frac{76}{10}$$

2102

$$\frac{76}{10}$$

109

See (107)

109

X ~~MS~~

3573

1872

TRANSLATION

PROJECT FOR THE FORMATION AND PROGRAMME OF WORK FOR THE ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION TO CERILONIA.

A) Tasks

- xxx Reconnaissance of all battlefields on the island
- xxx Gathering, on a large scale, of evidence of the slaughter and atrocities committed on the island, by the German Armed Forces, against Italian Military personnel, after 8 Sept 43, and the seeking and definition of the individuals most responsible for the said slaughter and atrocities;
- xxx Gathering of the mortal remains of Italian military personnel, wherever they may be, with the help, also of information which will be found on the spot;
- xxx With the aim of establishing a possible identification, exhumation of remains already buried through private effort;
- xxx The placing of all mortal remains in one place (locality of "Casa Rossa" and its environs, where took place the shooting of numerous officers or otherwise the S. Tedoro area - to be decided upon on the spot);
- xxx The acquisition, in the name of the Italian State, of the area where the cemetery and crypt will be situated;
- xxx The recovery, from civilians who may be in possession of them, of personal objects belonging to the fallen Italian soldiers, for their subsequent despatch to their families, together with all the information obtainable about the soldiers, hitherto considered "missing".

B) ORGANIZATION.

Complete number of the Mission's components:-

49 Military personnel (Chief of Mission-
1 Colonel)
1 Civilian (Official of the M. of
Foreign Affairs)

105B

found on the spot;

xxx With the aim of establishing a possible identification,

exhumation of remains already buried through private effort;

xxx The placing of all mortal remains in one place (locality

of "Case Rosse" and its environs, where took place the shooting of

numerous officers ~~or~~ otherwise the S. Tedoro area - to be decided

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area where the cemetery and crypt will be situated;

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them, of personal objects belonging to the fallen Italian soldiers,

for their subsequent despatch to their families, together with all the

information obtainable about the soldiers, hitherto considered ³⁵⁷³

"missing".

B) ORGANIZATION.

Complete number of the Mission's components:-

49 Military personnel (Chief of Mission-
1 Colonel)
1 Civilian (Official of the M. of
Foreign Affairs)

The 49 Military personnel are classified as follows:-

7 Officers - 1 N.C.O. - 2 typists - 2 photographers - 8 medical

orderlies - 24 privates for gen. duty - 5 drivers;

Necessary Equipment

2 Lorries 3 ton (Eventually reinforced by local vehicles)

2 ~~Trucks~~ ^{cars}

1 Motor-Cycle

2 Typewriters

Equipment for the Mission's ~~office~~ ^{office (reduced)}

2 Diving Suits (1)

8 Individual masks (1)

8 Pairs of Rubber Gloves

8 Pairs of Rubber Boots

4 Stretchers

Stationery

P.F.O

4 Lengths of Manila Hemp
16 Picks
16 Shovels
4 Saws

400 Kgs. of Nails (2)

Wood for the construction of 3,500 coffins of ~~modified~~ ^{reduced} size (2)

50 Zinc coffins

Wood for the making of 4,000 crosses (2)

Interpreters will be provided by the Mission itself - ~~Four~~ Four of the Officers speak fluent Greek.

Footnote to above scale :-

(1) Required for the reconnaissance of cisterns, from 15 to 20 metres deep, in which have been thrown numerous corpses.

(2) On the Island of Cefalonia, neither wood nor nails are to be found.

C. H. Q. of the MISSION → ARGOSTOLI

xxx

Billeting :-

The Mission will be dependent on the Military

Territorial Command of Bari, which will function as the "assembly and

dispersal point" in Italy. On the island, however, the Mission will depend

on ~~xxx~~ local British Command, which will be detailed, either by MMHA or "Land Forces, Greece".

xxx

Rations :- The necessary rations will have to be issued

(on orders of the MMHA) by the unit on which the Mission will depend during ~~the~~ its stay upon the island. For the period during which the Mission is concentrated at Bari, The necessary rations must be supplied by the Military Territorial Command of that area.

xxx

Funds and Administration:- A fund will be issued to the

Mission, in local currency, to an amount corresponding to the value of Lire. 1,000,000., for which arrangements are being made with the Treasury.

Future necessities which may arise, will come under review and be resolved ~~xxx~~ according to the degree of urgency.

The Mission will establish its own administration for which it will render account to the Military Territorial Command of Bari.

D) PROCEDURE RELATIVE TO THE INVESTIGATIONS, GATHERING OF EVIDENCE AND SIGNATURE OF REPORTS.

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The Mission will establish its own administration for which it will render account to the Military Territorial Command of Bari.

D) PROCEDURE RELATIVE TO THE INVESTIGATIONS, GATHERING OF EVIDENCE AND SIGNATURE OF REPORTS.

xxx In all districts, will be posted, under the supervision of the Mission, a manifesto in Greek, asking all those capable of giving information about the slaughter of Italian soldiers, to present themselves to the H.Q. at Argostoli.

xxx The members of the Mission will interrogate - at the places at which it has been verified that slaughters have occurred - ~~xxxxxx~~ any of the Greek population who might have been witnesses, and who come forward voluntarily to give information.

D Contd.)

xxx The reports will be drawn up as statements of individual persons. The witnesses will narrate how much he knows xxx or how much he has seen, and then will sign a text written by a clerk, under the dictation of a member of the Mission. Every report must be signed by at least two members of the Mission.

E) APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF CASES OF SLAUGHTER WHICH MUST BE INVESTIGATED AND VERIFIED, AND LOCALITIES AT WHICH THE INVESTIGATIONS MUST BE CONDUCTED:-

About a hundred cases at the following localities:-
Troianata, Frengata, Capo Munte, Lakitra, Focota, San Gerasimo, Sant Eufemia, San Teodoro, Caruakata, Farza, Davgata, Curuklata, Diverata, Zona del Pállaro, Diglinata, Fersolata, Procopata, Lixuri, Lurdata, Passo Columi, Zona del Drapano.

F) DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVESTIGATIONS:-

In subsequent order, area by area.

G) DURATION OF THE INVESTIGATIONS AND A FIRST STEP TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A CEMETERY AND CRYPT.

Cannot be stated at present, as it depends upon too many elements unknown until the Mission will have reached the island and have initiated its programme of work. As indicative data, and always subject to change, a period of from 60 to 90 days could be hazarded.

H) ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FOLLOWING UP OF THE RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS

On a basis of information received, and from the proposed documentation by the Mission, the whole question will be referred to the suitable unit for further development of the matter.

3570

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RHF/alm

AP 438

104

4

AG 091.711/115 SAC-O

10 July 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

MAILED
FILE: C/L
DATE: 10/7

1. Reference is made to letter, Allied Commission, file 8251/170/EC, dated 24 May 1945.

2. While it is agreed that the future of the Italian Army must be actively considered, the Allies presently maintain Italian troops on a special ration scale and largely with Allied clothing and equipment, in order that they may perform purely military duties as guards, service and Internal Security units. For this reason it has always been considered that wherever tasks could be performed by civilians, the Italian Army should not be used. This ruling is even more important now that the question of unemployment and unrest in Italy is causing concern.

3. The final decision of the Allied Governments as to the future size of the Italian Army has not yet been received, but it is known that the Italian Government is at present of the opinion that the country would be unable to support more than 140,000 troops for the next few years. Such an army may eventually become the only means by which the Italian Government can defend its frontiers against possible aggression.

4. It is known that the Allied Governments are anxious to reduce the ceiling of the Italian Army as soon as military requirements allow. Any troops used in the ways suggested by your letter under reference, would have to be fed and maintained by the United States or United Kingdom on the full Italian Army scale. Such a course would be uneconomical, where this work could be done by civilians.

5. As the training and organization of the future Italian Army will be a considerable task, it is difficult to foresee a time when either MMIA or the Italian Army would be free to take on extensive commitments which could be handled by civilians. 358

6. Italian Prisoners of War. In reply to your specific suggestions:

a. If Italian Prisoners of War on repatriation were considered to be members of the Italian Army from the time of their arrival in Italy until the Italian Army had processed them and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALLtr 1.FHQ AG 091.711/115 SAC-O
10 July 1945 (Cont'd)

arranged for their discharge, it would be necessary to obtain authority from the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the importation and issue of additional Army rations. For this reason it would be preferable that all repatriates should be treated as civilians on arrival. Moreover, very few of the repatriates will be eligible for enlistment into the Italian Army, and the great problem will be in their absorption into civil life.

b. It is agreed that the Italian War Ministry should screen repatriates for suitable material for the Italian Army, and that it will be necessary for the Italian Army Territorial organization to deal with documentation discharges. While the requirements of Internal Security permit, every endeavour will be made to leave the 6,000 Combat Group troops under your command as at present, to assist with repatriation, but as Allied troops are withdrawn you will appreciate that it may be necessary to return these troops to their primary task.

c. As the Territorial organization of the Italian Army is very largely civilianized, it is felt that the Italian staff built up to deal with repatriates can be equally civilian, employing only the minimum assistance from the Italian Army.

d. Transfer of control of the FE Sub-Commission to MMIA will be a matter of domestic arrangement within Headquarters Allied Commission should MMIA pass from under direct operational control of this Headquarters. At present, such a transfer would imply direct control of Italian repatriation by this Headquarters, whereas it is desired that the responsibility should lie as far as possible with the Italian Government. It is preferred that you make no change meantime.

7. Clearance of Land Mines. This subject is now under separate consideration with a view to the employment of German surrendered or prisoner of war personnel. The possibility of releasing to the Italian Government some US-ITI or BR-ITI personnel to guard and to assist in training mine-clearance teams is also being examined.

8. Harvesting. It is understood that you are making alternative arrangements owing to the lack of Italian troops. Should German prisoners of war be employed, an effort will be made to find guards from Italian sources, but reliance should not be placed on this arrangement, as the ration difficulty remains to be solved.

9. In principle, the use of the Italian Army in the Rehabilitation of Italy is supported, but until the Italian Government is able to feed and clothe its own army, such employment would further

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

LET AG OSI.711/115 SAC-O
 10 July 1945 (Cont'd)

Retrain the already difficult Allied food situation. It is therefore requested that every possible use be made of civilian manpower, to enable the Italian Army to be reduced in size as quickly as possible, and trained for the defence of Italian soil.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

Edmund R. Shugart
 EDMUND R. SHUGART
 Colonel, I.C.D.
 Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

- 5 - Addressee
- 1 - COC, Land Forces Sub Commission
- 1 - AG, MML
- 1 - G-1 (A)
- 1 - G-1 (B)
- 3 - G-3 AMO
- 1 - G-3 (ORG-3)
- 1 - G-4 (A)
- 1 - G-4 (B)
- 1 - G-5
- 1 - CAO
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG M&D

3567

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Reduction of III-III Commitment.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
G.6

2 July 45.

My dear

Further to our conversation last Tuesday, 26 Jun regarding the reduction in strength of the Italian Army Administrative personnel, III-III.

1. (a) As I told you, we have been examining this matter and have found that a saving in manpower can be made in several instances. This saving results from (1) Disbandment of units now already in existence and (2) withdrawal of authorization for the formation of new units.

(b) A number of units already in existence were necessary during the period of actual operations (e.g. hospitals) but are not now necessary because of the static conditions existing, and disbandment has been ordered effective 15 July 1945.

(c) A number of units were authorized before the German surrender but not formed. Some of these units are not now necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of the army. The authorization has therefore been cancelled.

(d) I have found it necessary to authorize certain guard companies to take care of the unforeseen commitment to guard Italian dumps and property which was found in the North, and to assemble, inventory, store and repair such property. Also, some small dumps of ammunition must be guarded until properly disposed of in accordance with AFHQ instructions. The personnel for these companies has been kept to a minimum, and, while the commitment is not entirely clear yet, it is hoped that the personnel already authorized will be sufficient and can be gradually reduced. No increase in the III-III ceiling is necessary, as the reductions in Sub-Paras (b) and (c) above will more than offset.

(e) This is all a matter for internal MIA action and consequently has not been referred in detail to AFHQ. However, you may like to know that my action has, so far, resulted in a reduction of the III-III commitment totalling 1309 people.

(f) I would prefer to simply hold this unfilled, and not have the ceiling reduced officially at this time, so that minor adjustments can be made without reference to you. However, I can assure you that detailed examination is continuously being made into the work performed by each member of the Army, and unless the job can be justified fully it will be eliminated promptly by me.

2. (a) There is one unit in the III-III category. However, that

1. (a) As I told you, we have been examining this matter and have found that a saving in manpower can be made in several instances. This saving results from (1) Disbandment of units now already in existence and (2) withdrawal of authorization for the formation of new units.

(b) A number of units already in existence were necessary during the period of actual operations (e.g. hospitals) but are not now necessary because of the static conditions existing, and disbandment has been ordered effective 15 July 1945.

(c) A number of units were authorized before the German surrender but not formed. Some of these units are not now necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of the army. The authorization has therefore been cancelled.

(d) I have found it necessary to authorize certain guard companies to take care of the unformed commitment to guard Italian dumps and property which was found in the North, and to assemble, inventory, store and repair such property. Also, some small dumps of ammunition must be guarded until properly disposed of in accordance with AFHQ instructions. The personnel for these companies has been kept to a minimum, and, while the commitment is not entirely clear yet, it is hoped that the personnel already authorized will be sufficient and can be gradually reduced. No increase in the ITI-ITI ceiling is necessary, as the reductions in Sub-Perna (b) and 300 above will more than offset.

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(f) I would prefer to simply hold this unfilled, and not have the ceiling reduced officially at this time, so that minor adjustments can be made without reference to you. However, I can assure you that detailed examination is continuously being made into the work performed by each member of the Army, and unless the job can be justified fully it will be eliminated promptly by me.

2. (a) There is one unit in the ITI-ITI category, however, that I have not acted upon. This is the Military Academy, total 470, of which 250 are cadets.

(b) This Academy was authorized by General MacFarlane about a year ago, and General Hadden, at that time, confirmed that it should be continued. I do not know the exact reason for General MacFarlane's action, but I think it was political prestige and the idea that any Army requires an Academy for producing "Young Entry".

RJ 3/7 / (c)

2. (c) Applying the policy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Allies would support the Italian Army "for the prosecution of the war", the continuance of this Academy is not now strictly justified as an Allied commitment, and the Italians have stated it cannot continue it without the support of Allied rations.

(d) The war is over for Italy. It can be presumed that Italy will not fight Japan, and, even so, this Academy could not render any great support. A post war Italian Army will need officer replacements of good quality, and much better than those of the old army. There is an over abundance of officers now available, or being repatriated in due course, for any army conceivably to be allowed for post-war, and the effect of the graduates of this Academy will not be felt for years to come. The whole business of producing the right sort of officers for the Italian Army needs a complete overhaul (see para 43 of my DC/2 of 10 April), including the set-up of this Academy. Allied policy is to have a friendly and reasonably strong Italy.

(e) It is known that the elimination of this Academy would be keenly felt by some elements of the Italian Government. First, it would be considered as an indication that the Allies were not interested in the post-war Italian Army; second, that the old Army system was being disapproved by the Allies; and third, that certain political parties could make capital out of its elimination.

(f) In view of the above, I feel that the Academy should be allowed to continue pending clarification or settlement as regards the future of the Italian Army. But, as it is bound up with the issue of U.S. rations beyond what is strictly legal, I would like to have your decision.

3. I recommended the complete disbandment of all Italian Army Intelligence units in my SD/12/2 of 1 June 1945. This was partially approved (AFHQ Letter AG 091.711/073 GHI-C of 14 June 1945), but the IPI-III part of the commitment generally remains. I would suggest further examination of this question, as it seems to us that 350 units are not fully employed on work necessary for the prosecution of the war, and their continuance perpetuates a secret police unit which is incompatible with the principles of democracy.

Yours

d.B.

3/10/45
50/18/2

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Yours

L.B.

Lt. Gen. Sir Brian Robertson, Bt., KCMG, CB, CBE, DSO, MC.
Chief Administrative Officer,
A.F.H.Q.

Copy to : 73D/33/2

/ago

100H

SECRET

Subject: Italian Army Units and Discipline.

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.

(M.M.I.A.)

ROM B.

6/6

14 June, 1945.

My dear Anderson

1. Please forgive my insistence of writing to you on this subject again but I do feel it is very important and I think you may like to have my views.

2. The older class of the Italian Army are getting restive owing to their retention in the army and because they have been under arms for 7 or 8 years. I fear mass desertions unless we do something about it. As far as I can make out we have nearly enough bodies on hand as replacements for demobilising all those above the 1914 class. But we should not stop there. We should get rid of the 1915, 1916 etc. classes progressively. We cannot institute a call up because:

- (a) The North has not yet settled enough for this.
- (b) The South will be disgruntled if we did not do it in the North.
- (c) If we did a call up we might find a large income (e.g. US-ITI's) coming to us which would make the call up unnecessary.
- (d) We want to economise as much as possible in clothing, boots etc. with which of course any new call up would have to be provided from our meagre stocks.

3563

3. Therefore the demobilisation of the 1914, 1915 etc. classes depends on our "income" from existing army personnel, as we get these handed over to us, the soldiers of military age therein can be put into units and older men be demobilised correspondingly.

4. We know of certain sources of "income" e.g. surplus US-ITI's, Cooperators etc. But there is a further large field in the shape of BRIT service units no longer required. I attach to this letter a statement of the command of transport companies and the Pioneer Companies under command of 8th Army, 5th Army (Pr Incr) and of 1 District. I cannot

1. Please forgive my insistence of writing to you on this subject again but I do feel it is very important and I think you may like to have my views.

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3583

3. Therefore the demobilisation of the 1914, 1915 etc. classes depends on our "income" from existing army personnel, as we get these handed over to us, the soldiers of military age therein can be put into units and older men be demobilised correspondingly.

4. We know of certain sources of "income" e.g. surplus US-IT's, Cooperators etc. But there is a further large field in the shape of BRIT service units no longer required. I attach to this letter a statement of the pack transport companies and the Pioneer Companies under command of 8th Army, 5th Army (Br Incr) and of 1 District. I cannot believe that 1 District for instance can require the service of 50 Pioneer Companies total 10,000 men. In fact this idea was bourn out when a couple of my officers went North the other day and reported to me on return that the Pioneer Companies between Florence and Bologna "did not seem over busy".

5. I know how difficult it is for formations such as 1 District or 8th Army to make a forecast of what Italian Units they will no longer need. But I feel sure that, if

/really

- 2 -

really pressed, they could make such an estimate which would give M.M.I.A. something to work on.

6. Apart from all the above it is such a frightful waste of British rations to have all these Italian units eating their heads off and doing little to justify the issue of rations to them. The BRITISH situation and the matter of the AOSTA Valley appears well on the way towards solution. The Americans are rapidly crystallizing out their policy. They have re-arranged their US III'S and are rapidly demobilizing the older classes above 1914. I understand that they also have some 15,000 Italian soldiers of military age ready to hand over to M.M.I.A. as soon as M.P.O.U.M.A. gives the word. I know you have asked British formations to state what units will become surplus but I gather that they have given you no idea as yet. Nevertheless I feel that they should be able to give you this information now. All they have got to do is to put down on one side or a piece of paper what the potential or actual tasks of their formations are and on the other what troops they require to carry out those tasks. A little matter of sub-traction would then show what Italian units they do not want. They will of course, human nature being what it is, try to say that they want them all. But, as I say, I cannot believe this can be justified and if you tell formations to send you with their forecast or appreciation their reasons why they need the units that they say they need you will be able to analyse this and see whether these are really necessary or not.

3561

7. One other point. I hear yesterday from Col. Kern that the Americans are asking G.C.S. to cut the US-III'S in half whereas the British are asking for an increase in BRIT'S. This was only information he got on the phone so it may not be correct. But it rather shattered me. We have never yet completely filled the BR-III ceiling with program units even when the war was on. Now the war is over and 8th Army are going into AUSTRIA and presumably British forces in Italy are being reduced. Yet we need more BRIT'S to deal with this much lesser commitment! I cannot understand it. I do not know whether this is some "share" of G.3 (Foreign). At any rate certainly this is the first I have heard of it.

8. I fear the above is somewhat disconnected but I dictated it as it came into my head. At any rate

- 2 -

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3561
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8. I fear the above is somewhat disconnected but I stated it as it came into my head. At any rate what are passing

2501

NOTES

8. I fear the above is somewhat disconnected but I have just dictated it as it came into my head. At any rate it will give you some lines of thought that are passing through my mind. We in W.M.I.A. at this moment are in a very difficult position because we have not the least idea as regards what is to be the immediate or the later future of the Italian Army and so cannot plan anything. I do not want to find myself in the position at some future date of being told to do something, not being able to do it and

/then

- 3 -

then being blamed for not having looked ahead and legislated for a solution!

9. I am sending this down personally to you by Colonel PINSLEY. I deliberately write this to you D.O. as I do not want to make a song and dance about it. This is only to give you a brief statement of certain angles that I see from my point of view.

Yours

L.B.

70

P.S. For ease of review, the following bear on what I have mentioned above :--
M.W.I.A. letter G/6 dated 10 April
A.F.H.Q. signal PX.76219 dated 15 May.

3553

78

Brigadier J. d'A. ANDERSON, D.S.O.,
G3 (Org),
A.F.H.Q.

PACK TRANSPORT COMPANIES UNDER COMMAND OF : Encl. to MMIA letter
g/6 dated 14 June 4

12
15
16
17

ONE DISTRICT

FIFTH ARMY (BR INCR)

EIGHTH ARMY

NO. COYS	ACTUAL STRENGTH	NO. COYS	ACTUAL STRENGTH
Offrs	ORs Total	Offrs	ORs Total

NIL	-	-	-
	FIVE	66	2521
	(Strength includes 21 Pk Tpt	2587	
	Group H.Q.)		
	EIGHT	107	3890
	(Strength includes 252 & 253		3997
	Pk Tpt Gp Hqs)		

PIONEER COMPANIES UNDER COMMAND OF :-

EIGHTH ARMY

FIFTH ARMY (BR INCR)

ONE DISTRICT

NO. COYS	ACTUAL STRENGTH	NO. COYS	ACTUAL STRENGTH
Offrs	ORs Total	Offrs	ORs Total

THIRTY- SEVEN	257	7255	7512	THIRTY- THREE	190	6486	6676
				FIFTY	353	9733	10086

(All strengths include Regimental and Battalion Hqs)

Order of Battle as at 8 June.
Strengths as at 1 June.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
 APO 394
 Office of the Executive Commissioner
 ++++++

Ref: 212/EC.

12 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Directives on Policy Matters.

TO : Vice President,
 Civil Affairs Section,
 Economic Section,
 Establishment Section.
 Director,
 Navy Sub-Commission,
 Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA).
 Air Force Sub-Commission,
 Communications Sub-Com.
 WMD & IFW Sub-Com
 Public Relations Branch.

1. The Chief Commissioner has noticed a tendency to depart from the principles laid down in Office Memorandum No.17 of 13th October 1944 by which directions on policy must be signed by the Vice President of the Section, the Executive Commissioner, or the Chief Commissioner. He considers that it is most important, having regard particularly to the difficult situation in the North where administration and economics are inextricably inter-woven with politics, that coordination at Headquarters should be effected and that directives on policy should be discussed either at the Executive Commissioner's conferences or at Vice Presidents' meetings before despatch. In the majority of cases directives should be prepared for his signature.

2. Will you please bring this to the notice of Heads of Commissions.

MSL/JG.

1 H.A.G.H. X
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 2 ()
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 2 ()
 2 ()
 2 ()
 2 ()
 2 ()
 2 ()

MSL
 Brigadier,
 Executive Commissioner.

MMIA - C
FILE: 12/6.
DATE: 12/6.

131730.

DD FORM

11 June 1945

TO : Regional Commissioners,
 Lombardy Region,
 Veneto Region,
 Liguria Region.

SD 6/6
 12/6.

In the interim period before Phase II comes into operation, I am sending Colonel Fickel, Deputy Executive Commissioner, as my representative to interpret the policy of the Allied Commission to the Commanding Generals of 5th Army and IV Corps, and to assist them in every way possible in connection with the coordination of civil affairs in the Army Area.

We will work in close contact with the Regional Commissioners but the channels of communication will be from the Allied Commission direct to Regional Commissioners and vice versa, with copies to 5th Army and IV Corps.

Until Phase II is established, AGOs in North Italy will be in the same position as AGOs 5th and 13th Armies; that is to say, they will be under the military command of the Commanding Generals, 5th and 13th Armies and will receive their functional directions from the Allied Commission through the channels of communication set forth in the preceding paragraph.

/s/ ELBERT A. OTTUM
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief Commissioner

Copy to: AGAO, 5th Army
 AGAO, 13th Corps
 Exec. Comm.
 SA Sec.
 Exec. Sec.
 AGAO, 5th Army
 AGAO, 13th Corps
 AG, Emilia Region
 AG, Venetia Region
 Director, Air Forces 5/0
 Director, Land Forces 5/0
 Chief, Naval 5/0
 Communications 5/0
 AGO & I/O 5/0

MMIA - 'C'
FILE 6/6
DATE 12/6

355-REP
 2-12 (SO)
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 2-12 (SO)
 2-12 (SO)

121700

HEADQUARTERS ARMED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

SUBJECT: ABE Policy - Northern Italy.

TO :	DDAO, 12th Army Group.				
	SDAO, AFS 5th Army.				
	SCAO, AFG 8th Army.				
	Regional Commissioner,				
		11	11	11	11
			11	11	11
			11	11	11
			11	11	11
			11	11	11

(2)	EMILIA REGION.
(10)	PIEMONTE REGION.
(10)	LOMBARDIA REGION.
(25)	VENETIAN REGION.
(45)	EMILIA REGION.
(93)	TOSCANA REGION.
(72)	
(49)	
(42)	

1. I think it may be helpful to explain the policy of the Allied Commission with regard to Allied Military Governments in newly liberated (Northern) Italy in the light of the conditions which we are finding at present.

2. While it is still the intention of the Government to set up Allied Military Government in the whole of Northern Italy, the application of Government must be regulated in accordance with circumstances.

3. The outstanding successes of the Germans in increasing terms from Nazis and fascists, the good administration, according to initial reports, set up by the GIM's, the execution of Mussolini and many of his accomplices, and the surrender, in some cases to the patriots, of a great bulk of the German forces, make a review of our policy necessary.

4. The greatest delegation possible should be made to the Italian authorities who will, in many cases, be members of the C.I.P.C. At the same time every effort should be made to impress upon the people and the authorities that Allied Military Government is the temporary forerunner of the Italian Government, and that Allied Military Government is working in the closest cooperation with that Government at the Headquarters of the Commission.

5. We may well be approaching in Northern Italy a state of affairs somewhat similar to what was found in France, and it should be our endeavour to help the Italians to make of their own administrative entity, and to allow them to take over the management of their own affairs as early as possible.

6. The conditions at present prevailing, both political and economic, indicate the probability of a rapid transition from Allied Military Government to Italian Government.

in great

1983

2. While it is still the intention of the Government in the whole of North America, to set up Allied Military Government in accordance with circumstances, application of Government must be regulated in accordance with their

3. The outstanding successes of the patriotic in liberating their application or Government. terms from Nazis and fascists, the good administration, according to initial reports, set up by the Gm's, the execution of Mussolini and many of his accomplices, and the surrender, in some cases to the patriots, of a great bulk of the German forces, make a review of our policy necessary.

333

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to Italian Government.

7. The implementation of this policy will not be easy. The greatest risk, the greatest menace will be necessary. We should all remember that it is for the Italians to determine their own destiny, and that military government in circumstances prevailing now is necessary only for the protection of Allied troops and installations. A light rain with a firm hand should be the order of the day.

8. Above all, we must remember that it is our duty to administer rather than to intervene in the political nature of Italy.

MILITARY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

FILE: 6/2

-2-

Copy to:

External.
 US Ambassador
 British Ambassador
 US Poland
 British Reunion
 G-5 Africa
 No. 1 District
 No. 2 District
 PDS
 Umbria-Maryone Region

Internal.
 Acting President
 Pol Adv (1)
 Pol Adv (2)
 VP, Economic Sec
 VP, CI Sec
 VP, Ret Sec
 Navy Sub-Com
 Army Forces Sub-Com (MIA)
 Air Force Sub-Com
 Communications Sub-Com
 WFO & IPW Sub-Com
 S.A. Branch
 Title
 Pilot
 Spare (10)

FROM: AIR FORCES COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.F. C.N.F. (A.L.S.)
COM: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, M.C. A.C.
COPY: M.A.A.F. ✓

DATE: 100 APR, 1945.

REF: AFAC/INT/10.

SITUATION IN PARTISAN ITALY AS IT APPEARS TO THE ITALIAN
AIR FORCE.

CONFIDENTIAL.

1. With reference to my letter of even reference dated 23rd May, GENERAL DI R.A. GILBERTINI came to see me on 30th May 1945 to discuss conditions in the North of Italy.

2. GENERAL DI R.A. began by saying that the situation, vis-a-vis the Partisans in the North, had eased considerably. When he first arrived in Milan the Partisans were in sole control, and service personnel from the South were regarded as interlopers and their orders carried no weight. However, by establishing good personal relations with GENERALI GAZZINI and SALA, and by explaining the general situation to them to their satisfaction, he gradually prevailed upon them to accept his (and therefore R.A.'s) authority. Orders were thus issued to ex-I.A.F. personnel by GENERAL DI R.A. through the Partisans, and were accordingly obeyed.

3. GENERAL DI R.A. explained that one of the main difficulties of the whole position in the beginning lay in the fact that he represented the Regia (Royal) Aeronautica, which in the North seemed too much of the House of Savoy - and, therefore, of fascism, which the Partisans maintained the heavily supported - and because of the delinquency of the situation, he had to go very slowly. His uniform, bearing the Royal crown, he put aside in favour of civilian dress; the number plates of the cars, which had previously read "M.A." he changed for "A.I." (Aeronautica Italiana) in order not to offend the susceptibilities of the highly inflamed anti-fascist Partisans. Gradually, however, he changed his position easing, and as political tension relaxed, so he once again changed his uniform, and ordered his subordinate officers to do likewise; and he further more replaced the "M.A." number plates on the cars.

4. In his early days in Milan, he was constantly surrounded by about a dozen Partisan officers whom he could not persuade to keep out of his office, and who, by their constant criticism and glibness and their everlasting explanations, requests and questions, gave him no peace or time to get down to the serious job of organising the central command, which he had been sent up to do. Gradually, however, through GENERAL SALA and GENERAL GAZZINI, he managed to persuade the other Partisan officers to leave him in peace, and something approaching normal working conditions was eventually established.

5. At this stage, GENERAL DI R.A. only had one I.A.F. Officer from the South;

SITUATION IN NORTH ITALY AS IT APPROACHES THE END
AIR FORCE

1. With reference to my letter of even reference dated 23rd May, GUSMANE DI D.A. GUSMANE DI D.V. came to see me on 30th May 1945 to discuss conditions in the North of Italy.

2. GUSMANE DI D.V. began by saying that the situation, viz. the position in the North, had eased considerably. When he first arrived in Milan the Partisans were in sole control, and service personnel from the South were regarded as intruders and their orders overtaken by weight. However, by establishing good personal relations with GUSMANE DI D.A. and SALA, and by explaining the general situation to them to their satisfaction, he gradually prevailed upon them to accept his (and therefore GUSMANE DI D.V.'s) authority. Orders were then issued to ex-L.I.I., personnel by GUSMANE DI D.V. through the Partisans, and were accordingly obeyed.

3. GUSMANE DI D.V. explained that one of the main difficulties of the whole position in the beginning lay in the fact that he represented the Regia (Royal) Armada, which in the North seemed too much of the House of Savoy - and, therefore, of fascism, which the Northerners maintained the Northerners supported - and because of the delicacy of the situation, he had to go very slowly. His uniform, bearing the Royal crown, he put aside in favour of civilian dress; the number plates of the cars, which had previously read "M.A." he changed for "A.I." (Automobile Italia) in order not to offend the susceptibility of the highly inflamed anti-fascist Partisans. Gradually, however, 335 found his position easing, and as political tension relaxed, so he once again donned his uniform, and ordered his subordinate officers to do likewise; and he further more replaced the "M.A." number plates on the cars.

4. In his early days in Milan, he was constantly surrounded by about a dozen Partisan officers whom he could not persuade to keep out of his office, and who, by their constant coming and going and their overbearing explanations, requests and questions, gave him no peace or time to get down to the serious job of organizing the central command, which he had been sent up to do. Gradually, however, through GUSMANE DI D.A. and GUSMANE DI D.V., he managed to persuade the other Partisan officers to leave him in peace, and something approaching normal working conditions was eventually established.

5. At this stage, GUSMANE DI D.V. only had one L.I.I. Officer from the South (GUSMANE DI D.V.) apart from the 3 L.I.I. Officers, and his first preoccupation was to set up a small body of staff officers whom he could trust to serve him (and GUSMANE DI D.V.) faithfully in helping him to organize his central command. For this purpose, the L.I.I. Officers turned themselves into a small screening commission to make enquiries into the more recent activities of the ex-L.I.I. Partisan Officers who presented themselves to GUSMANE DI D.V. (as a large number of them did.) These were sorted out, and the "bad hats" were either handed over to the Allies, incarcerated, or sent home according to their degrees of collaboration with the Germans, whilst the best available of the remainder were co-opted onto GUSMANE DI D.V.'s staff on a temporary basis, to remain there until they are properly discredited by the official screening body which will be set up in the North in due course.

6. GUSMANE DI D.V. said nothing to the test, understanding and support he had received from the A.F.C. Officers in Milan, and said he felt confident

MMIA

FILE: G/6

DATE: 4/6

Continued/2,.....

0609 30

now that the I.A.F. in the North would obey his orders. He had "retired" GENERAL MIA, whose usefulness was now at an end, but wanted to keep COLONEL SACCHI for a little longer. With the dissolving of the Partisans (due to be complete within 24 hours at the time of the interview,) and the imminent transfer of GENERAL CADORE to ROM as C.G.S. of the Italian Army, GENERAL MUFFI felt that the Partisans' teeth were drawn. He also instilled the arrest of MUFFI by the Allies as a considerable factor in the minds of all the Northerners, it having already reminded them that control of the North was definitely in Allied hands, which in turn had added prestige to MUFFI's and therefore to his - position. GENERAL MUFFI - his opposite number in the Italian Army - felt the same way. MUFFI stated that if the ROM Government could resolve its difficulties with the political parties of the North, everything henceforth would be plain sailing.

7. MUFFI stated that he now felt sure of his authority within his 1st Z.A.F. Headquarters, but that his authority inevitably decreased in direct ratio to the distance away of his more remote dependencies. He was satisfied that these units were willing to his Allied directive, but expressed a desire to be able to visit them more easily, in order to keep a firmer hand on them. A.C.C. A.F.S.C. therefore agreed to his request to have a Caproni Mi. or CZ.1007 assigned to him from the South, but pointed out that the supply of petrol was going to be a severe limiting factor in this use. MUFFI said he understood, but was willing to accept the limitation.

8. A.C.C. A.F.S.C. told MUFFI that in view of the happier relationship between the I.A.F. and the Partisans now existing, he (MUFFI) should be put into temporary Command of the I.A.F. in all North Italy, with jurisdiction over both I and II SAG's, and should be given the title of "Comando Generale dell'Aeronautica nell'Italia Settentrionale". (General Commanding the Italian Air Force in Northern Italy.) If advisable, the word "Regia" could be introduced at a later date. This appointment has now been confirmed with the Italian C.A.F. The appointment of GENERAL CADORE to II SAS had previously been cancelled.

9. The above renders further action on paras 6 to 8 of my letter AFSC/ITA/10 of the 23rd May unnecessary. Paras 9 and 10 of that letter are being dealt with separately.

L.P. 355
Ind.

I.E. MIDDLE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

94

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL.

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE ERECT
TO : MMIA
INFO: REAR EIGHTH ARMY
REF : FX 83991

291540 B

RESTRICTED

YOUR O/101 OF 28 (*)

NO CHANGES YET (*) WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED

G DISTRIBUTION:

Action copy: G/6

Info : A
Q (two)

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (SD)

GSO 2 (WE)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (SD)

GSO 3 (Orbat)

GSO 3 (H)

jv 30 May 45.

3550

SUBJECT: Italian Army Personnel

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AG (AMIA)

A.F.H.Q. for G-3(OTG)

29 May 45
0/5

1. It is understood that you will shortly have for disposal up to 30,000 US-ITIs which will become available according to age and not as formed units.

2. The future disposal of this personnel depends on the one hand on your plans for the size and role of the future Italian Army and whether the units are for the present to be kept up to full strength, and on the other hand the rate at which other sources of manpower are likely to become available such as:

- (a) transfer of cooperators in ITALY into the Army;
- (b) personnel and/or units thrown off by Eighth and Fifth Armies;
- (c) patriots absorbed ex North;
- (d) repatriated PW ex U.S.A. and later ex other countries.

3. It is not possible to accept any further I.S. Divs or ad Bns into the ITI-ITI category as this is full, but a certain number of rfts are needed.

4. In the absence of information vide para 2 I recommend as an interim device disposal of US-ITIs in the following order of priority:

- (a) 10,000 as replacements for demobilizable personnel vide AMIA letter A/C17 of 7 Apr 45, especially for 205 Div (working for US Air Force) if it is desired to maintain 205 Div at its present authorised ceiling of 5,500 Army personnel and 6,500 Air Force personnel;

- (b) 10,000 as HR-ITI rfts;

- (c) 4,000 for units still to be formed on HR-ITI Priority List 6;

- (d) 3,000 as ITI-ITI rfts;

- (e) 3,000 as US-ITI rfts for remaining US-ITI units;

- (f) any further personnel to bring HR-ITI and US-ITI units

SECRET

as formed units.

2. The future disposal of this personnel depends on the one hand on your plans for the size and role of the future Italian Army and whether the units are for the present to be kept up to NK strength, and on the other hand the rate at which other sources of manpower are likely to become available such as:

- (a) transfer of cooperators in ITALY into the Army;
- (b) personnel and/or units thrown off by Eighth and Fifth Armies;
- (c) patriots absorbed ex North;
- (d) repatriated PW ex U.S.A. and later ex other countries.

3. It is not possible to accept any further I.S. Divs or Gd Ems into the IPI-ITI category as this is full, but a certain number of rfts are needed.

4. In the absence of information vide para 2 I recommend as an interim device disposal of US-ITIs in the following order of priority:

- (a) 10,000 as replacements for demobilizable personnel vide LIA letter A/O19 of 7 Apr 45, especially for 205 Div (working for US Air Force) if it is desired to maintain 205 Div at its present authorized ceiling of 5,500 Army personnel and 6,500 Air Force personnel;
- (b) 10,000 as IPI-ITI rfts;
- (c) 4,000 for units still to be formed on IPI-ITI Priority List B;
- (d) 3,000 as IPI-ITI rfts;
- (e) 3,000 as US-ITI rfts for remaining US-ITI units;
- (f) any further personnel to bring IPI-ITI and US-ITI units (incl new cooperator units) and IPI-ITI units up to NK (if required) providing personnel vide para 2 are not forthcoming.

5. It is stressed that the above involves a huge turnover of personnel and immense 'Tug', 'A', 'C' and MOW implications.

...../2

6. I have stated my views on the undesirability of using military personnel for harvesting, especially at this eleventh hour. If, however, you are willing to allow the 50,000 Italian over-age personnel to be demobilized without replacements - and thus accept an operational loss of strength ranging in some cases up to 60% of the unit - then it might be possible to dispatch a proportion of ex-US-III personnel to FOGLIA for harvesting. As this personnel proceeds as "civilians on temporary leave" and not in formed units, and as harvesting is not always popular with those who are forced into it, let alone the legal implications involved, this method of gathering the harvest is still not recommended.

7. In this connection please see PWB Bulletin No 69 of 24 May (pages 8 and 9) where it is reported that there are at the moment (presumably in Southern Italy only) 58,000 males unemployed, and that a large number are trying to enroll for the 15,000 labourers required for CNYLON. It is stated that the majority of these personnel are in urgent need of a job and are prepared to take on one at almost any price.

rd

Major-General,
MIA.

(Sd) L.B.

Internal : 'A'
'Q'

3543

OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM: MMIA

Date Time

TO : AFHQ

28 105 B

INFO: REAR 8 ARMY FOR MMIA LO

REF :O/IC1

CONFIDENTIAL

REF YOUR PX 76219 OF 13 MAY (.)

WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION
ON DISPOSAL OF ITALIAN UNITSSee 94
see 97

PRECEDENCE

Important

AUTHENTICATED

Spd SMI

Copy to: A

2

File: G/6

Jv 28 May 45

3547

Bf 4 days.

R 2/5

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
15TH ARMY GROUP
APO 777

SECRET
By Auth of
CG, 15TH AG
Intls: ~~Intls~~
DATE: 5/26/45

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: Occupation of Northwest Italy.

TO: See Distribution.

1. Attached is copy of the minutes of a conference held at this Headquarters on 24 May 1945 on "The Occupation of Northwest Italy".
2. It is requested that action, where indicated in these minutes, be taken without further instructions.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCCREERY:

OFFICIAL:


RALPH E. TATE
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-4A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of StaffDISTRIBUTION:External:

AFHQ (25)
MTOUSA (20)
Fifth Army (20)
Fifth Army (Brit. Increment) (10)
IV US Corps (5)
2 District CP (6)
Fwd 2 District (2)
PBS (10)
Mov NW Italy (1)
Allied Commission (10)
MMIA (5)
MRS (5)

Internal:

C/S
D.C. of S., (Br)
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4

(25)
(20)
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(6)
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(5)

Action: 5/6 ←
3540
A

Info

Spa: 1

X

X

X

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MCCREERY:

PAID BY BANK

A. M. GRUENTHER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

External:

AFHQ	(25)
WFOUSA	(20)
Fifth Army	(20)
Fifth Army (Brit. Increment)	(10)
IV US Corps	(5)
2 District CP	(6)
Fwd 2 District	(2)
PBS	(10)
Mov NW Italy	(1)
Allied Commission	(10)
MMAA	(5)
MRS	(5)

Internal:

C/S	(1)
D.C. of S., (Br)	(1)
G-1	(1)
G-2	(1)
G-3	(5)
G-4	(5)
Q	(10)
A	(4)
Mov.	(1)
Ingr	(2)
Signal Section	(4)
AG Records	(5)

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NAME: A. "G"
 FIVE: 6516
 DATE: 29/1

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80-26-515

SECRET.

MINUTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ 15 ARMY GROUP ON 24 MAY 45 ON
OCCUPATION OF NW ITALY.

1. PRESENT:-

Presiding - Brig-Gen R.H. Tate, AC of S G-4, 15 Army Group.

ATHQ - Colonel R.E. Rathbone, G-3(Org)
Colonel J.M. Mitchell, G-5
Lt.Col. B. Boyd, G-4(A).

15 Army Group

Brig C.D. Packard, DC of S(Er)
Brig W.H.D. Ritchie, DA & QMG.
Brig E.T. Godfrey-Paussett, CE.
Colonel P.D. Miller, G-3(Ops)
Colonel C.S. D'Oree, G-4
Colonel N.W. Monfort, G-5
Colonel C.H.K. Smith, DMS.
Lt.Col. W.J. McConnell, G-3(Plans)
Lt.Col. F.K. Eberhard, G-4(Plans)
Lt.Col. C.J.F. Mackay, AQMG.
Lt.Col. D.H. Cameron, SO RE.1
Major E.H. Jennings, G-3(SD)
Major E.C. Scott, DAAG.
Major C.H. Fetch, DAQMG(Mbv)
Major W.B. Watkeys, Signal Section
Capt J.E. Painour, G-1.

Fifth Army - Colonel E.M. Clarke, G-4
Colonel A.E. Sutherland, G-5
Lt.Col. D.M. Annand, AQMG(Er Incr).

IV US Corps - Colonel A.T. Lacey, G-4

PBS - Colonel E.T. Foster, G-4

2 District - Lt.Col. Sir M.J. Mordaunt, Et. GSO.1
Lt.Col. C.A. Chadwick-Healey, AQMG.

Mov, NW Italy - Colonel G. Coaker
Major D.W. Greenway

Allied Commission Brigadier M.S. Lush

GENERAL.

2. Brig-Gen Tate explained that the object of the conference was to examine the existing position in NW ITALY and to determine what steps had been or could be taken to facilitate the handover of responsibilities for NW ITALY by Fifth Army to 2 District and Allied Commission, i.e. to implement Phase 2 of the Occupation as defined in 15 Army Group Administrative Directive No.1 dated

354

15 Army Group

Lt.Col. E. Boyd, G-4(A).

Brig C.D. Packard, DG of S(Br)
 Brig W.H.D. Ritchie, IA & QMG.
 Brig B.T. Godfrey-Faussett, CE.
 Colonel P.D. Miller, G-3(Cps)
 Colonel C.S.D'Orsa, G-4
 Colonel N.W. Mansford, G-5
 Colonel C.H.K. Smith, DMS.
 Lt.Col. W.J. McConnell, G-3(Plans)
 Lt.Col. F.K. Eberhard, G-4(Plans)
 Lt.Col. G.J.F. Mackay, AQMG.
 Lt.Col. D.H. Cameron, SO RE.1
 Major E.H. Jennings, G-3(SD)
 Major B.C. Scott, DAG.
 Major C.H. Fitch, IAQMG(Mov)
 Major W.B. Watkeys, Signal Section
 Capt J.E. Palmour, G-1.

Fifth Army

- Colonel E.H. Clarke, G-4
 Colonel A.E. Sutherland, G-5
 Lt.Col. D.M. Annand, AQMG(Br Incr).

IV US Corps

- Colonel A.T. Lacey, G-4

PBS

- Colonel E.T. Foster, G-4

2 District

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Mov, NW Italy

- Colonel G. Coaker
 Major E.W. Greenway

Allied Commission Brigadier M.S. LushGENERAL.

2. Brig-Gen Tate explained that the object of the conference was to examine the existing position in NW ITALY and to determine what steps had been or could be taken to facilitate the handover of responsibilities for NW ITALY by Fifth Army to 2 District and Allied Commission, i.e. to implement Phase 2 of the Occupation as defined in 15 Army Group Administrative Directive No.1 dated 15 Feb 45, when the French situation is clarified sufficiently for an operation point of view to enable such handover to take place.

PRESENT POSITION.3. (a) Surrendered Forces.

Fifth Army stated that these were being evacuated to Concentration Areas as quickly as possible, and that the task should be completed within ten days, except for those in hospitals.

(b) Captured Material.

This has been collected into dumps by Fifth Army, and location

354

lists have been made. Cataloguing was, however, not yet complete. It was pointed out to 2 District that dealing with captured material would represent a considerable commitment when they assumed responsibility, and they agreed to examine the problem, liaise with Fifth Army, and submit comments to AFHQ for any extra staff, etc., which they considered they might require. It was agreed that AFHQ should be asked to hold a conference on this subject at an early date at HQ 15 Army Group to clarify outstanding points.

ACTION:- 2 District
AFHQ.

(c) Partisans.

The intention of CC Fifth Army was to complete disarming of partisans by 7 June 45. Difficulties might, however, be expected over disarming partisans operating near the Franco-Italian frontier, so long as the present situation existed.

(d) Requirement of Operational Troops.

G-3, 15 Army Group, stated it was considered that two full operational divisions in addition to security troops were required so long as the Franco-Italian frontier situation was tense. The 6 SA Armoured Division was a wasting asset, and no other British Troops were likely to be available so long as the Yugoslav situation remained critical.

(e) Allied Commission.

Brigadier Dush stated that Regional HQs were now in position and functioning under Fifth Army control. Phase 2, under which it would assume responsibility for civil administration, could, therefore, be implemented without much difficulty. He confirmed that IC were prepared to face the extra transport commitment, 15 Army transport was withdrawn, provided all AG transport now operating under Fifth Army was returned to AG control.

The main problems still to be solved were:-

- (i) The Franco-Italian frontier situation
- (ii) Disarming of Partisans
- (iii) Unemployment - The solution of this lay in the provision of raw materials, particularly coal, which was now under investigation at AFHQ.

(f) 2 District.

HQ 2 District was still settling in, moving in units and installations and not really functioning except for 57 Area in CAVOA. Their Engineers and Signals were, however, lending assistance to IV Corps. 2 District stated that they considered they would be ready to take over Phase 2

(c) Partisans.

The intention of OG Fifth Army was to complete disarming of partisans by 7 June 45. Difficulties met it, however, be expected over disarming partisans operating near the Franco-Italian frontier, so long as the present situation existed.

(d) Requirement of Operational Troops.

G-3, 15 Army Group, stated it was considered that two full operational divisions in addition to security troops were required so long as the Franco-Italian frontier situation was tense. The 6 SA Armoured Division were a vast asset, and no other British Troops were likely to be available so long as the Jugoslav situation remained critical.

(e) Allied Commission.

Brigadier Lush stated that Regional HQs were now in position and functioning under Fifth Army control. Phase 2, under which 1st would assume responsibility for civil administration, could, therefore, be implemented without much difficulty. He concluded that 40 were prepared to face the extra transport commitment, if Army transport was withdrawn; provided all 40 transport now operating under Fifth Army was returned to AD control.

The main problems still to be solved were:-

(i) The Franco-Italian frontier situation

- (ii) Disarming of Partisans
- (iii) Unemployment - The solution of this lay in the provision of raw materials, particularly steel, which was now under investigation at ENHQ.

(2) 2 District.

HQ 2 District was still settling in, moving in units and installations and not really functioning except for 57 Area in GENOA. Their Engineers and Signals were, however, lending assistance to IV Corps. 2 District stated that they considered they would be ready to take over Phase 2 responsibilities by 10 June 45, provided the necessary signal communications could be made available to them as the principal HQ. This would, of course, mean the return of any signal units they now had operating with IV Corps. OG 15 Army Group pointed out that some Fifth Army Engineer units would in any case have to be left under 2 District to complete certain outstanding tasks such as bridging.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE 2 OF THE OCCUPATION.

(a) Problem

Brig-Gen Tito said the problem was to consider now in the

light of the foregoing remarks:-

- (i) Was implementation of Phase 2 possible at an early date?
- or (ii) Was partial implementation, whereby 2 District and AG took over responsibility for certain eastern areas of NW ITALY, a practical proposition?

(b) Total Implementation of Phase 2.

Fifth Army stated that the CG felt very strongly that so long as he was responsible for law and order in any territory he must be completely in command. The completion of the responsibilities in para. 3(a) and (b) above would not necessarily enable Fifth Army to relinquish their control over NW ITALY. The Franco-Italian Frontier situation was not yet settled, and Fifth Army could only relinquish control if responsibility for this was assumed by AFHQ. 2 District was not organized for possible active operations, nor could they administer US Troops. It was concluded, therefore, that until these problems were solved there could be no total implementation of Phase 2.

(c) Partial Implementation of Phase 2.

After discussion it was agreed for the reasons given below that partial implementation was also impracticable:-

- (i) IV Corps I of C would have to continue to run through any area handed over to 2 District.
- (ii) Signals facilities were insufficient to cope with two major Hqs in NW ITALY, both operating at the same time.
- (iii) Dual control, whereby IV Corps retained operational command and 2 District assumed certain administrative responsibilities was not considered practicable.
- (iv) Similarly, it was not considered that Regional Commissioners could be put under direct command of Allied Commission so long as Fifth Army were responsible for the territory. It was, however, recommended that AG set up an Advanced Echelon in ITALY, which would co-ordinate Regional activities through Fifth Army and with whom Fifth Army could deal as one entity.

ACTION:- AFFHQ
Command Section.

(d) Future Requirement of Operational Troops.

2 District stated they considered at least the equivalent

3542

completion of the 10-50-50 plan. The Franco-Italian frontier situation was not yet settled, and Fifth Army could only relinquish control of responsibility for this was assumed by AFHQ. 2 Distr it was not organized for possible active operation; nor could they administer US troops. It was concluded, therefore, that until these problems were solved there could be no total implementation of Phase 2.

(c) Partial Implementation of Phase 2.

After discussion it was agreed for the reasons given below that partial implementation was also impracticable:-

(i) IV Corps L of C would have to continue to run through any area handed over to 2 District.

(ii) Signals facilities were insufficient to cope with two major HQs in NW ITALY, both operating at the same time.

(iii) Dual control, whereby IV Corps retained operational command and 2 District assumed certain administrative responsibilities was not considered practicable.

(iv) Similarly, it was not considered that Regional Commissioners could be put under direct command of Allied Commission so long as Fifth Army were responsible for the territory. It was, however, recommended that HQ set up an Advanced Echelon in ITALY, which would co-ordinate Regional activities through Fifth Army and with whom Fifth Army could deal as one entity.

ACTION:- Allied Commission.

(d) Future Requirement of Operational Troops.

2 District stated they considered at least the equivalent of one division and one brigade would always be wanted to watch the French frontier, even if the French were withdrawn behind it, and it was doubtful if Italian troops were suitable for this task. The gradual departure of the 6 SA Armoured Division, and the continued requirement of all available British troops for NW ITALY, might mean the retention of one US Division for some time. AFHQ was asked to consider this matter and state their policy.

ACTION:- AFHQ.

3542

4

(e) Redeployment of US Troops.

2 District asked what speed US Troops were likely to be withdrawn on implementation of Phase 2. Brig-Gen Tate stated this would depend on redeployment and training schedules still under consideration.

215 SUB-AREA.

3. In reply to a question by AFHQ, 2 District stated that in Phase 2 they would like 215 Sub-Area to remain at PIACENZA to run the roadhead, at any rate until CHUON was fully opened.

LOCAL INDUSTRIES - NW ITALY.

6. FBG asked what would be the position in Phase 2 of certain contractors which they were now placing on behalf of AFHQ, and by agreement with Fifth Army, with local industries in NW ITALY. Brig-Gen Tate stated they must take this up with AFHQ, so that allocation could be confirmed by the Industrial Planning Board and 2 District informed.

ACTION: - FBG.

SUBJECT: Italian tps - VENEZIA GIULIA

CONFIDENTIAL

Land Forces Sub Comm. AC,
(M.M.I.A.), R O M E.

Liaison Officer,
Land Forces Sub Comm. AC,
(M.M.I.A.),
c/o Rear Hq, Eighth Army.

MM/106
25 May 45

1. The attached copy of a DO reply MM/106 dated 25 May to Maj MONICO, 56 BLU is forwarded for action.
2. I cannot stress sufficiently the fact that there is an absolute ban on any but a minimum of specially authorised Italian tps u/c Eighth Army crossing the Security Control Line.
3. For a general picture of conditions in VENEZIA GIULIA and TRIESTE, see CECIL and SYLVIA SPRIGGE's despatches to LONDON papers and PWB Monitoring reports - if anything, they understate the facts.

GSO 1 X
GSO 2 (Ops) X REC X
GSO 2 (SO)
GSO 2 (L) X X
GSO 3 (SO) X X
GSO 3 (Orbat)
GSO 3 (P) X

MMIA-G
FILE: C/b
DATE: 29/5

B. G. Lawton Hunt
Major,
MMIA LO, Rear Eighth Army
354

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT:- Italian tps - VENEZIA GIULIA

Lisison Officer,
Land Forces Sub Comm. AG,
(M.M.I.A.).
c/o Rear HQ, Eighth Army.

MM/106

25 May 45

Dear

Ref your AG 8 dated 23 May.

1. There is no change in the political situation here as we see it at our level, and there is no likelihood whatever of any but specially authorized Italian tps already under command Eighth Army being admitted into the Province, and they only for actual work in limited areas.
2. I have tried to make the posn clear to MMIA; but perhaps ROME is so far away that when I say we now carry arms at Rear Army (for the first time in history) and that there are Jugoslavs in UDINE town itself who have reserved a house for Marshal TITO, I am still not believed.
3. There are still many pockets of Jugoslav irregulars in the area although a general movement to the East of R. 130N29 seems to be in progress. TITO has infiltrated his own men into the GARIBOLDINI Band of patriots here and it is hard to know who is who.
4. You will understand that the posn is extremely tricky and that if incidents occur in this hotly disputed area before publication of the final policy and outcome of the latest ALEXANDER - TITO meeting, the fat may be properly in the fire.
5. You can rely on me to ensure that Army lift the present ban at the earliest possible moment; I have not exaggerated the seriousness of the posn as anyone who has been here will tell you.

Yours

Dear

Re: your AG 8 dated 23 May.

1. There is no change in the political situation here as we see it at our level, and there is no likelihood whatever of any but specially authorized Italian troops already under good British Army being admitted into the Province, and they only for actual work in limited areas.
2. I have tried to make the poem clear to MMIA; but perhaps ROME is so far away that when I say we now carry arms at Rear Army (for the first time in history) and that there are Jugoslavs in UDINE town itself who have reserved a house for Marshal TITO, I am still not believed!
3. There are still many pockets of Jugoslav irregulars in the area although a general movement to the East of R. ISONZO seems to be in progress. TITO has infiltrated his own men into the GARIBOLDINI Band of Patriots here and it is hard to know who is who.
4. You will understand that the poem is extremely tricky and that if incidents occur in this hotly disputed area before publication of the final policy and outcome of the late AG ALEXANDER - TITO meeting, the poem may be properly in the fire.
5. You can rely on me to ensure that Army lift the present ban at the earliest possible moment: I have not exaggerated the seriousness of the poem as anyone who has been here will tell you.

Yours

Major J. Monico,
MMIA IC,
56 B.L.U., C.M.F.

MMIA - 'G'

FILE: 6/6

6/6 129/5

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 8251/170/EC.

24 May 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organization and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (AMIA).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organized, disciplined units and a military organization distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps has enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organization to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.

4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organization for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the Army which has been dealt with by

cc:1

cc:2

cc:3

cc:4

cc:5

Attention: Chief of Staff.

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organization and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSC).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Politically it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organized, disciplined units and a military organization distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the north in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps has enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organization to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.

4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to the front:

(a) Italian Prisoners of War. The reception and welfare of Italian POW from all parts of the world and especially from Germany and Austria and the whole organization for dealing with this problem. This is a responsibility of the Army in any normal country. In fact, the Ministry of War has appointed a High Commissioner to deal with it in this country. The machinery of the Army should be put into full operation to deal with this difficult subject. Hitherto, on the Allied side the matter has been dealt with by that part of the War Material Division known as the Italian POW Division. This Division should now be taken over by the Land Forces Sub-Commission forthwith and the whole problem dealt with by that Sub-Commission which normally deals with the Ministry of War.

(b) Clearance of Land Mines. It is submitted that immediate steps should be taken to employ all engineering units of the Italian Army for this purpose. Some of them must already be provided with apparatus: more can probably be obtained, even on loan from Allied troops. The employment of the Army

-2-

for this vital matter in the rehabilitation of agriculture would earn the gratitude of a vast number of the population who are now prevented from following their normal vocations and would increase the local production of food.

Hitherto, this matter has been handled by a Division of the Civil Affairs Section, who, with assistance from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, have achieved remarkable results. It is clearly, I submit, a function which should now be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

Areas to be cleared and priorities to be given could be decided by the Italian Government and, if necessary, by the Allied Military Government.

- (c) Harvest. In line with most Continental countries which practise conscription, it has been the custom in this country to release during harvest time a large number of troops either on agricultural leave or on temporary duty to assist in the harvest. There are many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organised than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in PUGLIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

5. I recommend, therefore, that the reception and welfare of Italian POW and the clearance of land mines should be undertaken by the Italian Army under the Italian supervision of the Ministry for War and under the Allied supervision of its counterpart in the Allied Commission of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. I also recommend that the customary release of Italian service personnel for the harvest be approved.

6. There will be other fields in which I shall make recommendations for the employment of the Italian Army from time to time. It will need a reorientation in the ideas of the Ministry of War and a broadening of the directives of the Land Forces Sub-Commission. It may need adjustment in the method of administration and the provision of food. But it is essential for the sake of the Army as well as for the rehabilitation of this country that we encourage the Italian Government to use the manpower they have at their direct command in the services of their country now no longer at war.

7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (ALIA). Unfortunately this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Commissioner's reply. I am in full agreement with the latter. The Land Forces Sub-Commission is an integral part of the Allied Commission and it must share with the other Sub-Commissions of this Commission the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation to which we have committed ourselves in this country. We must shift the balance from ALIA and its completely military chain of command and outlook to the Land Forces Sub-Commission, the counterpart of the Ministry for War.

333

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7. I had hoped to be able to add that these recommendations had the concurrence of the GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMFL). Unfortunately this is not so. I attach a letter written by him and my Executive Commissioner's reply. I am in full agreement with the latter. The Land Forces Sub-Commission is an integral part of the Allied Commission and it must share with the other Sub-Commissions of this Commission the work of reconstruction and rehabilitation to which we have committed ourselves in this country. We must shift the balance from LMFL and its completely military chain of command and outlook to the Land Forces Sub-Commission, the counterpart of the Ministry for War in the Italian Government.
8. I feel sure that you will welcome in this respect recommendations from this Commission as to the future of the Italian Army and their dispositions. If the Italian Army is to become part of the Italian nation we must detach them from their operational Allied commanders as rapidly as

-3-

possible and bring them, under the Ministry of War, more into the Italian picture as an instrument of the Italian Government rather than of the Allied command. I am requesting GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission to submit recommendations in implementation of this principle which, of course, will make the Land Forces Sub-Commission for more a part of the Allied Commission.

Walter W. Stone

WALTER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5 ALHQ (2) } With copies of relevant
Acting President } correspondence.
Chief Commissioner }
Land Forces Sub-Com (ALHQ) (2)
CA Sec
Room Sec
WD & IP, Sub-Com
File
Fleet
Syres (3)

3537

FROM: ALL FORMER HIGH COMMISSIONER,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: HEADQUARTERS, M.A.A.P. C.M.F. (A.I.S.S.)
COPY: CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. A.C. B. 2(L)
COPY: M.N.J.S.

DATE: 2ND MAY, 1945.

REF: AFPO/TEL/10.

MILIA.

6/6
26/5

SITUATION IN NORTHERN ITALY AS IT AFFECTS THE ITALIAN
AIR FORCE.

On the 22nd May the Chief of Air Staff in the Italian Air Ministry
(GENERAL S. ALBANI) came to see me at his own request. As a result of the
conversation we had, the following report is submitted for information and
action.

2. The situation in PAVIA and TURIN is satisfactory ("under control").
3. GENERAL GASTALDI, who has been unemployed since his repatriation as pris-
oner of war in 1918, is being sent to PAVIA in charge of the Italian Air Force
in 2.A.A.F. II. He is not an ideal man for the job, but he is the best that the
Italian Air Ministry can produce at the moment, and will probably be relieved
as soon as another more suitable General is available (probably from the North.)
4. At TURIN there is an ex Italian Air Force GENERAL DIAMO who is said to be
a good officer and has been playing a leading part with the Partisans in that
district. He is prepared to comply with directives from the Italian Air
Ministry, although he is having some difficulty with GENERAL VENTURI who is the
Senior Italian Army Officer there, and who appears to be rather too big for his
boots.
5. The situation at MILAN is, however, not so good, but it is expected that
the difficulties will be overcome. There is a tendency at MILAN for the
Partisan Italian Air Force Officers to attempt to form their own Northern Italian
Non-Monarchist Air Force which is facilitated as there is, as yet, no machinery
to re-engage ex Officers and other ranks who either never joined the Republican
Air Force or who have since been in Partisan formations. It is, therefore,
important that these personnel shall be taken into the Regia Aeronautica expedi-
tiously; it is recommended that the Italian Air Ministry be authorized to
re-engage these people and to re-adjust their total 'ceiling' numerical strength
as nearly simultaneously as practicable by dismissing an equivalent number of
personnel in the South. It is necessary to obtain the services of these
Partisans within the I.A.F. as soon as possible in order that material can be
more easily found and thereafter well-guarded against theft or hiding.
6. The danger of the formation of a separate Air Force in the North is
accentuated because the Government in Rome is not yet recognised by the C.I.M's
of the North, and as the Partisan Officers in the North are not yet recognised by the C.I.M's

On the 22nd May the Chief of Air Staff in the Italian Air Ministry (General M. AROSIO) came to see me at his own request. As a result of the conversation we had, the following report is submitted for information and action.

2. The situation in ROMA and TURIN is satisfactory ("assez bon").

3. General GASPARI, who has been unemployed since his repatriation as prisoner of war in 1918, is being sent to ROMA in charge of the Italian Air Force in 1944. He is not an ideal man for the job, but he is the best that the Italian Air Ministry can produce at the moment, and will probably be relieved as soon as another more suitable General is available (probably from the North.)

4. At present there is an Ex Italian Air Force General TUNO who is said to be a good officer and has been playing a leading part with the Partisans in that district. He is prepared to comply with directives from the Italian Air Ministry, although he is having some difficulty with General TUNO who is the Senior Italian Army Officer there, and who appears to be rather too big for his boots.

5. The situation at MILAN is, however, not so good, but it is expected that the difficulties will be overcome. There is a tendency at MILAN for the Ex Partisan Italian Air Force officers to attempt to form their own Northern Italian Non-Monarchist Air Force which is facilitated as there is, as yet, no machinery to re-engage Ex officers and other ranks who either never joined the Republican Air Force or who have since been in Partisan formations. It is, therefore, important that these personnel shall be taken into the Regular Air Force as soon as possible. It is recommended that the Italian Air Ministry be authorized to re-engage these people and to re-adjust their total 'ceiling' numerical strength as nearly simultaneously as practicable by discharging an equivalent number of personnel in the South. It is necessary to obtain the services of these Partisans within the I.A.F. as soon as possible in order that material can be more easily found and thereafter un-guaranteed against theft or hiding.

6. The danger of the formation of a separate Air Force in the North is accentuated because the Government in ROMA is not yet recognized by the G.L.N.'s of the North, and as the Partisan officers in the North take their instructions from the G.L.N.'s, they are, in MILAN, refusing to take directions from ROMA; in other words the G.L.N. has no authority in the MILAN area - for example, to appoint Senior Officers which would, under the terms of the Armistice, have to be approved by this Sub-Commission.

7. General RIVI, who is reputed to be a good officer, has gone from ROMA to MILAN to take charge of the I.A.F. Partisan in North West Italy (2nd I.). I gather that he is finding that he has temporarily to side with the Senior Partisan Ex I.A.F. officers, in order to gain their confidence with a view to bettering the position vis-a-vis the Air Ministry in ROMA. It seems that some of the Partisans in MILAN are, in fact, not Patriots but anti-Communists, and the worst offender is said to be Colonel SANCHI who was on the Reserve of Officers list, together with General SALA who is, however, said to be an honest Patriot. A third officer comes into the story, namely General MACCHI who in the most senior and is reputed to be a good officer. It is the intention of General ALDORE to get rid of Colonel SACCHI as soon as possible.

Continued/2...

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12. The correct solution to this problem at MILAN is for the C.I.N.'s of the North to recognize the Government in ROM. It is believed that this matter is not acute in the Italian Army because GENERAL CADORNA is in Command and is willing to comply with instructions from Allied Authorities, whereas the C.I.N.'s seem to be reluctant to do so. It may be necessary for the Allied Authorities at a high level to force the hands of the C.I.N.'s in this matter, but it appears preferable that the matter be settled by the Italians themselves; GENERAL ALDORE CAT is willing to communicate, or to see, his friend GENERAL CADORNA and to explain to him that it is his job to organize the Italian Air Force, which he would do without prejudice to politics, e.g. the status of the Monarchy vis-a-vis the Republic; the name Regia Aeronautica itself implies a Monarchist Regime but could be altered if and when required. It may not, however, be policy for GENERAL ALDORE CAT himself to go North as there is a danger of compromising his position. This is not intended to imply that he would be personally embarrassed, in view of his non-political past and his service record, but he might find the position embarrassing vis-a-vis the C.I.N.'s who might well question his authority. On balance it would seem that it would be better for GENERAL ALDORE CAT to work out the solution himself, rather than for the Allied Authorities to intervene. I recommend that the first alternative be effected, though it may be advisable for some action with the C.I.N.'s to be taken by the Allies to strengthen GENERAL CADORNA's hand.

9. Mr Republican Air Force personnel present something of a problem as it seems that they are walking about asking what the I.A.F. is going to do with them, and most of them hold Partisan identity cards. Those who are not Partisan, the Italian Air Ministry intends to dismiss, but a policy ruling will have to be given by this Sub-Commission as regards those who hold Partisan identity cards; your advice in this respect is sought.

10. The factories in the North present another problem and it is the Italian Air Ministry's wish to pay the firms which were non-Fascist in order to keep them going and to keep the workers from such distressing conditions as would lead them to give trouble; at present it is believed that these firms are living on Bank credits. So far as is known to the C.A.S., this matter has not been brought to the notice of the Allied Commission by the Italian Government in 1945.

L. R. B. 2537

L. R. BODLE,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

SECRET

LAND FORCES 81 5/6

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET

By Authority:

SAC

Dials

17 May 1945

NO 091.711/173 007-0

G (SD)
18/5

SUBJECT: Employment of Italian Troops Outside ITALY

TO:

Commanding General, Fifth Army, APO 464

Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782

1. Reference is made to MMIA letter, File G/6 dated 10 April 1945, copy attached.

2. The following general policy has been established regarding the employment of Italian troops outside Italy:

a. Restraint will be observed in the use of Italian troops in VENETIA AREA.

b. The following exceptions to the above policy will be authorized:

(1) Use of TRIESTE by Italian naval vessels and employment of Italian Military personnel at that port.

(2) Such other employment of Italian Military personnel in the immediate area of the Allied Zone of Communication into Austria as for military reasons, might be unavoidable.

3. Where Italian Army personnel are no longer required by employing headquarters, disposal instructions will be issued by this headquarters on receipt of details.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

1 Incl

MMIA Ltr, G/6 dtd 10 Apr 45

R. H. PERCE

Major, AGO

Asst Adjutant General

Copy Forwarded

Chief of Communications, Allied Commission
Land Forces Sub Commission AC (MMIA)

G-1 (A)

G-1 (B)

G-3 (Org) Foreign

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (G) 3537

GSO 2 (A)

GSO 2 (C)

GSO 2 (ST)

GSO 3 (G)

MMIA

G/6

17/5

SECRET

Land Forces Sub Commission AC (MMIA)

Land Forces Sub Commission AC (MMIA)

~~SECRET~~ ~~DRAFT ONLY~~

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APQ 354
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 8251/ /SC

WP May 1945,

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

*Draft submitted to
COC by Brig HUSM
on 16 May 45.*

1. The creation of the Italian Army, its organization and development, and its conduct both on the lines of communication at the base ports and in the combat zone, are, I submit, a tribute not only to the troops and the military commanders themselves but especially to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSC).

2. Hitherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy. They have played a great part in the liberation of their country.

3. I submit that now hostilities have ceased we should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergencies, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition under the Peace Treaty, be employed to help in the rehabilitation of their country. Positionally it is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organized, disciplined units and a military organization distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy. The partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the North and in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly

2018

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2. Witherto, the Italian Army has been rightly employed as an integral part of the Allied Armies in Italy.
3. I submit that our hostilities have ceased to should consider their employment in a new role. They must, of course, be used for purposes of defence and for the maintenance, in emergency, of internal security. But they can, especially in the transitional period between the present time and their final composition of their country. It is most important that the Italian Army should take its part in the reconstruction of Italy. From the practical point of view we have a number of organized, disciplined units and a military organization distributed throughout the country which we must use to help Italy, the partisans have done magnificent work in the liberation of the North and in the maintenance of administrative and economic life in the newly liberated areas. The Italian Army has done no less though perhaps enjoyed not so much publicity and it should, and must, take advantage of its organization to show that it is an Italian Army created for the benefit of Italy.
4. Three practical uses to which parts of the Italian Army can contribute come immediately to mind:

GSO 1

GSO 2 (S)

GSO 2 (S)

GSO 3 (S)

GSO 3 (S)

GSO 3 (S)

GSO 3 (S)

DATE	18/5
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G/6

18/5

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(b) Clearance of Land Mines. It is submitted that immediate steps should be taken to employ all engineering units of the Italian Army for this purpose. Some of them must already be provided with apparatus: more can probably be obtained, even on loan from Allied troops. The employment of the Army for this vital matter in the rehabilitation of agriculture would earn the gratitude of a vast number of the population who are now prevented from following their normal vocations and would increase the local production of food.

3531

Hitherto, this matter has been handled by a Division of the Civil Affairs Section who, with great assistance from the Land Forces Sub-Commission, have achieved remarkable results. It is clearly, I submit, a function which should now be transferred to the Land Forces Sub-Commission.

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353-
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many practical advantages in using troops rather than civilian labour, particularly when the latter are urgently needed by the Allied military authorities. Their transportation, their accommodation, their general administration, can be far better organized than would be the case if civilian labour was employed. It is therefore recommended most warmly that the request of the Ministry of Agriculture and Labour for the provision of 10,000 men to assist in the harvest in PUGLIA area should be made without delay. This has been the subject of a separate telegram.

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MARSHAL V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

3530

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COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: AFHQ Sgd SACRED CITE FEGCT

152129 B

TO : 15 A CP
5 ARMY BRIT INCR
MAIN 8 ARMY
DISTONE
DISTWO
DISTTHREE
ALCOM

SECRET

See 9/
See 97

INFO: REAR 8 ARMY
RMIA

IMMEDIATE

REF : FX 76219

77

Ref. 100.

MY AG 091.711/173 GCT=0 OF 02 (.)

ADDRESSEES WILL REPORT EARLIEST TO THIS H Q

STATING DISPOSAL ARRANGEMENTS ALL I T A L I A N

ARMY PERSONNEL AFFECTED BY PARA 3 REF LETTER (.)

WHERE ADDRESSEES WISH TO DISPOSE WITH I T A L I A N

UNITS OR INDIVIDUALS ALTOGETHER DISPOSAL WILL BE

ARRANGED BY THIS H Q

3/17/5

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action Copy: G/6
A
Q

GSO 1 X 3523 X
GSO 2 (Ops)
GSO 2 (SD) X
GSO 2 (WE)
GSO 2 (L)
GSO 2 (SD)
GSO 3 (Orbat)
GSO 3 (I)

14v 16 May 45

1

2
I arranged
for AFHQ to send out

16 May
to clear the air.

G.I. I can see no action
here by us. AFHQ will no
doubt sustain primarily any
increments concerned. Do you wish
W/M improved? B 16/5-

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

Ref: 501/76/EC.

SUBJECT: AMI Policy - Northern Italy.

TO : DOCAO, 15th Army Group.
SCAO, AMB 5th Army.
SCAO, AMB 8th Army.
Regional Commissioner, LIGURIA Region. (2)
" " " " " (10)
" " " " " (10)
" " " " " (23)
" " " " " (43)
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1st May 1945.

GSO 1 X
GSO 2 (Ops) _____
GSO 2 (SO) _____
GSO 2 (WA) _____
GSO 2 (L) _____
GSO 3 (SO) _____
GSO 3 (OSM) _____
GSO 3 (U) _____

1. I think it may be helpful to explain the policy of the Allied Commission with regard to Allied Military Government in newly liberated (Northern) Italy in the light of the conditions which we are finding at present.
2. While it is still the intention of the Supreme Allied Commander to set up Allied Military Government in the whole of Northern Italy, the application of Government must be regulated in accordance with circumstances.
3. The outstanding successes of the patriots in liberating their towns from Nazis and Fascists, the good administration, according to initial reports, set up by the GIN's, the execution of Mussolini and many of his accomplices, and the surrender, in some cases to the patriots, of a great bulk of the German forces, make a review of our policy necessary.
4. The greatest delegation possible should be made to the Italian authorities who will, in many cases, be members of the GIN's. At the same time every effort should be made to impress upon the people and the authorities that Allied Military Government is the temporary forerunner of the Italian Government, and that Allied Military Government is working in the closest cooperation with that Government at the Headquarters of this Commission.
5. We may well be approaching in Northern Italy a state of affairs somewhat similar to what was found in France, and it should be our endeavour to help the Italians to make of Italy one administrative entity, and to allow them to take over the management of their own affairs as early as possible.
6. The conditions at present prevailing, both political and economic, indicate the probability of a rapid transition from Allied Military Government to Italian Government.
7. The implementation of this policy will not be easy. The greatest tact, the greatest patience will be necessary. We should all remember that it is for the Italians to determine their own destiny, and that military

9527

Regional Commissions:					
"	"	PiEMONTE Region.	(45)		Q20 3 (20)
"	"	LOMBARDIA Region.	(55)		Q20 3 (20a)
"	"	VENETIE Region.	(75)		
"	"	EMILIA Region.	(45)		Q20 3 (4)
"	"	TOSCANA Region.	(45)		

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6. The conditions at present prevailing, both political and economic, indicate the probability of a rapid transition from Allied Military Government to Italian Government.

7. The implementation of this policy will not be easy. The greatest patience will be necessary. The greatest tact, the greatest patience will be necessary. We should all remember that it is for the Italians to determine their own destiny, and that military government in circumstances prevailing now is necessary only for the protection of Allied troops and installations. A light rein with a firm hand should be the order of the day.

3. Above all, we must remember that it is our duty to administer rather than to intervene in the political future of Italy.

Bl. Winter

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USAR
Chief Commissioner

MMIA AG
FILE: 6/6
DATE: 25/8

Copy to:

External:
 US Ambassador
 British Ambassador
 US Polai
 British Remain
 G-5 AFHQ
 No. 1 District
 No. 2 District
 PES
 Umbria-Marche Region

Internal:
 Acting President
 Pol Adv (1)
 Pol Adv (5)
 VP, Economic Sec
 VP, CI Sec
 VP, Est Sec
 Navy Sub-Com
 Land Forces sub-Com (MIL)
 Air Force Sub-Com
 Communications Sub-Com
 WED & IAW Sub-Com
 P.R. Branch
 Mile
 Allost
 Spare (10)

300

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army
and Carabinieri

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/6

May 45

TO : HQ ALLIED COMMISSION
(for EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER)

Ref your 3606/77/EC of 27 April, herewith suggested reply
for paras 3 - 6.

d. Browning
Major General
MMIA

WS

3525

20291

My dear

75B

In reply to paras 3, 4, 5, and 6 of your letter No. 347 dated 25 April 1945:-

1. I realize the force of your arguments and I can assure you that your views are well known and have been fully represented to higher authority by me and my staff, who have been in very close touch with the War Ministry on these matters. But I must point out that:-

- (a) All the relative decisions on these matters were given by AFHQ under the direction of the combined Chiefs of Staff at WASHINGTON with a view to obtaining the maximum aid to the War Effort.
- (b) The CCS have weighed all the world wide (not Italian only) factors in coming to their decisions.
- (c) A major factor influencing their decisions has undoubtedly been that of available supplies, of which, as you know, there is a world wide shortage.

2. With the above in mind, I comment on the individual paragraph of your letter in more detail.

(a) Your para 3

The military personnel of Districts are all officers, varying from 12 (Class I Districts) to 4 (Class IV Districts). The civilian personnel working under their supervision vary similarly from 120 to 42. It was not considered possible to authorize more military personnel and it was agreed between the Ministry of War and MMIA that with such a military and civilian staff the task could be carried out.

(b) Your para 4

It has been ruled that the shortage of supplies prevents the categories you mention being considered and supplied

My dear

758

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(b) Your para 4

It has been ruled that the shortage of supplies prevents the categories you mention being considered and supplied

- 2 -

as soldiers. Here again it is a matter of what is possible. "Travelling soldiers" on duty take full rations for the whole period. As a concession those going on leave are permitted 2 days rations to help them on their journey.

(c) Your para 5

The Allied War Effort must come first. Every effort has been made to avoid using military buildings.

(d) Your para 6

Here again, the ruling must be observed that only those soldiers who are part of the existing Italian Army authorized by the Allies and who are "in fact effective" can be supplied and considered as such.

3. I need hardly say that the liberation of all ITALY will present new problems which will need to be solved within the bounds of practical possibility.

I can assure your Excellency that everything possible has been and will continue to be done to provide for legitimate Italian interests.

Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

H.E. Signor BONOMI
President of the Council of Ministers

3522

WS

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

30 April 1945.

Ref: 212/02.

MEMO TO: VP, OA Section
VP, Economic Section
VP, Establishment Section.

1. I am sure that Vice Presidents will appreciate that operations being now in progress, the SCAG's of Areas and Regional Commissioners with their staffs are faced with urgent operational matters in the newly occupied territory.

2. The Allied Commission can greatly assist forward AG's in two ways:

(a) By refraining from sending to them any correspondence except that of the most urgent nature. Regional Commissioners will have little time to read long directives and instructions which, in any case, should have been forwarded to them in the planning period. If instructions now have to be sent, let them be concise and short.

(b) By prohibiting the visits of officers to the newly occupied Regions, except on the most urgent matters or unless called for by the SCAG's or Regional Commissioners themselves.

3. We should have planned sufficiently well to make such visits unnecessary in the initial stages. We must leave it to the Regional Commissioners and SCAG's to send us the necessary information rather than send troops of officers who will only hamper the AG staff in their difficult initial work.

4. Vice Presidents will, therefore, ensure:

(a) That directives and instructions of any length or consequence are submitted to them for signature before despatch, and should call for the minimum of paper work (no long questionnaires).

(b) That written communications are restricted to the minimum.

(c) That no officer or civilian official visits the forward areas without their personal approval.

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (SD)

GSO 2 (W)

GSO 2 (V)

GSO 3 (SD)

GSO 3 (Ordt)

GSO 3 (I)

MM A

FILE:

DATE:

-2-

5. Vice President, Establishment Section will report to the Executive Commissioner daily the number of officers sent from Headquarters to the forward Regions.

W. H. Stone

W. H. Stone
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Land Forces Sub-Com
Air Force Sub-Com
Navy Sub-Com
Communications Sub-Com
WMD & IPW Sub-Com
P.R. Branch.
Chief Commissioner
File 801/30,
File
Float

351

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel: 735

27 April 1945.

Ref: 3606/77/EG.

SUBJECT: Organization of Italian Army and Carabinieri.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

1. Attached hereto is translation of letter from Prime Minister No.347 dated 25 April 1945, together with its enclosure from the Minister of War, and copy of the acknowledgement.
2. Will you please prepare a reply to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 * for signature by the Chief Commissioner.

action copy re CRR increase
on 22/94/7

G. Horden
for Chief Staff Officer,
to Executive Commissioner.

2 1/2
* of the enclosure

Incl:
as above

GSO 1 X _____
GSO 2 (Ops) _____
GSO 2 (SD) _____
GSO 2 (WE) _____
GSO 2 (L) _____
GSO 3 (SD) _____
GSO 3 (Orbat) _____
GSO 3 (I) _____

3517

"MIA-G"	
FILE:	6/6
DATE:	R28/4

728

Ref/3506/20.

April 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister :

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 347 dated 25 April 1945 on the subject of the strength of the Carabinieri and kindred matters.

The points raised in the War Minister's letter which you enclosed call for examination by more than one Sub-Commission. Consideration is now being given to these matters and I will write to you again as soon as possible.

Yours very truly,

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome.

Copy to : Land Forces Sub-Comm. (MMIA)
Civil Affairs Section.

3516

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers

347

Rome, 25 April 1945

My dear Admiral,

the maintenance of public order represents one of the most important problems for the interior safety of the State.

I therefore take the liberty of drawing your attention on the enclosed memorandum of the Minister of War and especially on paras 1 and 2 of the said memorandum.

The urgency to increase the numeric number of the carabinieri is quite obvious. North Italy having to be garrisoned with about 10 thousand carabinieri, it is natural that the C Corps should have to be increased of identical forces.

Thus, request n. 2 is particularly important. We haven't enough safety troops, in Rome especially. Here, there is one battalion only, which, employed in guard service, can dispose of a few score of men only.

I trust that you, an old and trusted friend of Italy, will speak in favour of our request to the Allied Commission in which you have such an important situation.

Yours very truly,

e. I. Bonomi

Admiral Gallery n. 3, one
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
Rome

EE DISTRIBUTION - 27 Apr 45

Action : C 4 Section

Info : Chief Comar

Exec Comar

Land 351 S/C

e.g.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

Liaison Office

Rome, 23 April 1945

To : His Ex. the President of the Council of Ministers

R O M E

SUBJECT : Military questions requiring urgent solution.

I expand to your excellency, to have them forwarded to the allies, some of the main questions of a military character which require an urgent solution:

1) - INCREASE OF 10,000 CARABINIERI.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.F.R.L. is of 35,000 men (of whom 1,865 are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the Kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 groupments) it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 65 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the interregional mobile ones.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, no army troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions for interior safety (Calabria, Aosta, Sabauda Divisions - 15 thousand men) are stationed in Sicily and Sardinia (only 800 men in Calabria to watch the plants).

It would be necessary to dispose of safety troops on the continent also, and particularly in the capital. To obtain this, the contingent which, for this category, is at present fixed to 15 thousand men, would have to be adequately increased by A.F.R.L., and above all, the formation of a safety division in Rome would have to be authorized.

Action
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on
5/9/47

SUBJECT : Military questions requiring urgent solution.

I expand to your excellency, to have them forwarded to the allies, some of the main questions of a military character which require an urgent solution.

1) - INCREASE OF 15,000 CARABINIERES.

The force of the corps at present allowed by A.F.H. is of 99,000 men (of whom 1,805 are employed out of the corps in military commands or organizations).

To face the military police requirements of the regions which are being liberated and dispose of the necessary mobile police forces in the Kingdom (12 battalions arranged in 4 groups) it is necessary and urgent to bring the organization to 65 thousand men.

Without the required regulation, when the North will be liberated, the carabinieri scattered all over the Kingdom will be very scarce for the requirements of local security, and quite insufficient for the interregional mobile ones.

This is particularly serious because of the impossibility to dispose of safety troops on the whole continent.

2) - SAFETY TROOPS IN THE CAPITAL.

On the continent, except for the royal carabinieri, no army troops are available for interior safety. The three divisions for interior safety ('Calabria', 'Aosta', 'Savona' Divisions - 15 thousand men) are stationed in Sicily and Sardinia (only 300 men in Calabria to watch the plants).

It would be necessary to dispose of safety troops on the continent also, and particularly in the capital. To obtain this, the contingent which, for this category, is at present fixed to 10 thousand men, would have to be adequately increased by A.F.H., and above all, the formation of a safety division in ^{Lazio} ~~Italy~~ would have to be authorized.

3) - GREATER CONSISTENCY OF THE TERRITORIAL MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The organs of the territorial, district and depot military commands fixed by A.F.H. are inadequate for the numerous, delicate and urgent functions which the said organs have to fulfil.

For instance, the districts can have an average of five men, only; the organization is completed with civilian personnel exclusively; in such conditions, all these organs cannot function well.

It must be remembered that many districts are also centres of mobilization for the units and are therefore burdened with the work which

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2/9/47

Sufficiency
not men

- 2 -

such a function implies.

A.F.H.C. would have to increase adequately the number of the personnel of the central and periphery administration which is at present fixed to 27 thousand men (1st category).

4) - MILITARY RATIONS

The allied control organs allot foodstuff rations according to the authorized force and won't admit derogations for any motive whatever.

There are however, special situations which would require derogations, for instance:

- in favour of repatriated prisoners or interned soldiers, or soldiers who come back from other States, as long as they haven't been discharged;

- in favour of sick or wounded soldiers who stay over 60 days in hospital (from the 61st day on, they get civilian rations);

- in favour of travelling soldiers (those who start on a journey according to allied orders are only allowed to take two days rations, while the journey - because of the means of communications - often lasts several days);

and soldiers called under arms

in favour of draftees, for the day on which they present themselves to the districts (army rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);

- etc.

- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the Allies and treated as such. The system must be revised: the motives are obvious and come from humanitarian considerations and from an understanding of reality; they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE EXEMPTS.

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftees adequately would have a good moral effect on the Country and for the Government.

It would also make it possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary ³⁵⁴ draftees from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called under arms during the first period of their training.

Only the allied side can solve this problem and leave at our disposal the necessary minimum of military buildings.

6) - REPATRIATION ELEMENTS 'GUMBO' & 'RACINA' ELEMENTS EMPLOYED IN GOVET AS AUXILIARIES.

The troops of these two divisions, stationed in the Elean Islands at the time of

There are however, special situations which would require derogations, for instance:

- in favour of repatriated prisoners or interned soldiers, or soldiers who come back from other States, as long as they haven't been discharged;
- in favour of sick or wounded soldiers who stay over 60 days in hospital (from the 61st day on, they get civilian rations);
- in favour of travelling soldiers (those who start on a journey according to allied orders are only allowed to take two days rations, while the journey - because of the means of communications - often lasts several days);
- and soldiers called under arms and soldiers in favour of draftees, for the day on which they present themselves to the districts (army rations are only given to those who have been incorporated);

- etc.

- In the cases we have mentioned, the soldiers are considered as civilians by the Allies and treated as such. The system must be revised: the motives are obvious and come from humanitarian considerations and from an understanding of reality; they do not need to be explained.

5) - AVAILABLE BILLIARDS.

It would be necessary to dispose of a larger number of military buildings. To be able to receive and house the draftees adequately would have a good moral effect on the Country and for the Government.

It would also make it possible to separate - as it is obviously necessary 354 - draftees from senior soldiers and soldiers who have been called under arms during the first period of their training.

Only the allied side can solve this problem and leave at our disposal the necessary minimum of military buildings.

6) - REPATRIATION ELEMENTS 'CUNEO' & 'REGINA' ELEMENTS EMPLOYED IN AGPT AS AUXILIARIES.

The troops of these two divisions, stationed in the Aegean islands at the time of the armistice, did hard fighting against the Germans ever since September 9th, 1943, at the side of the Allies for the defence of these islands (the 'Cuneo' alone had about 400 dead and wounded in these actions). Overnumbered by the enemy, instead of surrendering, in agreement with the allied authorities, they reached Egypt through Turkey and Palestine; they were not allowed to carry on their fight against the Germans in other sectors and are being employed as auxiliary units in the dependence of the local English commands.

But, after having been at first considered as 'cobelligerents', the soldiers of the 'Cuneo' and of the 'Regina' (about 6500) were then to all effects placed by the British commands in the category of 'co-operating prisoners', though there had been nothing to cause such action to be taken.

- 3 -

It is necessary to :

- revoke this regulation, placing again these troops in the 'recalcitrant' category.

- repatriate them without delay.

I have expounded all these facts, for I know of your Excellency's wish to reconstruct the army, and I am sure you will intervene in favour of the solution of the above mentioned questions which are all of a fundamental and moral interest.

THE MINISTER

S. Casati

e.c.

3512

SECRET

SUBJECT: Policy - Italian Army.Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(A.I.A.)

File No: C/6

10 April 45.

TO : AFHQ (2)
through A.C. (1 copy for retention)

I wish to raise the question of the employment of Italian Forces outside ITALY.

1. The immediate problem concerns EIGHTH Army.
2. (a) Today, four Italian Combat Gps (approx 10,000 each) are committed. The fifth moves into the operational area in the next few days.

Presumably these Groups will remain in ITALY for internal security.

- (b) This Combat Force has an authorized strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11,250.

There are in addition: -

- (1) The proposed force of five patriot reeve battalions - totaling 2,500.

- (ii) The proposed CARBACDI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaign - which might well prove a steady-ing influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,500.

44,000 Service Troops in the national categories BR-ITI and US-ITI are also employed in the Army Areas and are directly under command of the Army concerned.

- (a) 27,000 of these are BR-ITI.

- (i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer Companies (6,700 personnel).

- (ii) 16,000 are now under command FIFTH Army (Br Lncr), 10,564 of these are authorized for labour.

- (iii) There are 14 BR-ITI Peck Transport Companies serving in the Army Areas - each 500 strong - a total of 7,000 mulesters.

- (b) The remaining 17,000 are US-ITI and are under command FIFTH

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Presumably these Groups will remain in ITALY for internal security.

- (b) This Combat Force has an authorized strength of 50,000 plus a reinforcement holding of 11,250.

There are in addition:

- (1) The proposed force of five patriot reconnaissance battalions - totaling 2,500.

- (1i) The proposed CARABINIERI Regt - veterans of the YUGOSLAVIA Campaign - which might well prove a steady-aiding influence in ITALY - suggested ceiling 2,000.

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- (a) 27,000 of these are BR-ITTI.

- (i) 11,000 serve EIGHTH Army - including 31 Pioneer Companies (6,700 personnel).

- (ii) 16,000 are now under command FIFTH Army (Br Iner), 10,566 of these are authorized for labour.

- (iii) There are 12 BR-ITTI Pack Transport Companies serving in the Army Areas - each 500 strong - a total of 7,000 Muleteers.

- (b) The remaining 17,000 are BR-ITTI and are under command FIFTH Army. The Engineer Combat Group for example has an authorized strength of 1362. There are 15 Pack Transport Companies each on a T/O of 400 all ranks, a total of 6,000 Italian soldiers.

R 10/4

...2/..

3511

- 2 -

- (c) There are in addition a proportion of hospitals and administrative stations some of which are in the III-III Category. These however, except for the Guard Bus, are under command of the Army for local administration only.
4. I do not know how the Army would be affected operationally if the Italian Service Troops did not accompany it across the border into AUSTRIA.
5. The international aspect is of importance. If Italian Forces, combatants, cross the border and assist in conquering and occupying enemy territory a political handle might be given to the Italian Government. If it is essential that Italian manpower be made available to the Allies outside Italian borders it may be considered desirable to take the risk of greater demands being made by ITALY at the Peace Treaty, the general outline of which may of course have already been arranged.
6. (a) The size and composition of the Italian Army after the war is a further factor. The date by which the new Army is to be implemented is the governing factor, and whether Italian Soldiers could remain operating outside ITALY at that time.
- (b) Control of the Army will no doubt be handed over to the Italian Government again, but the question remains whether we or ITALY should maintain a large number of Italian Soldiers outside the country - perhaps for some time.
7. As this matter is imminent I would greatly appreciate an early answer.

2 *Browning*
Major General
M. H. I. A.

WB

3510

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : HQ ALCOM CITE ACSOC SIGNED STONE
 TO : AFHQ FOR CHIEF OF STAFF
 REF : 5000

07

SECRET

IMPORTANT

ITALIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAS APPROVED DRAFT DECREE RESTRICTING THE DUTIES OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF (FORMERLY COMANDO SUPREMO) TO ITS PREPAR FUNCTIONS OF CONSULTATION AND ADVICE TO THE PRIME MINISTER ON TECHNICAL MATTERS AFFECTING TWO OR MORE OF THE THREE ARMED FORCES (*) IT WILL BE HEADED BY A GENERAL OR LIEUTENANT GENERAL OR EQUIVALENT GRADE OF THE NAVY OR AIRFORCE (*) IN EFFECT THE DECREE LEGALIZES THE PRESENT STATUS QUO OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF AS IT WAS WORKED OUT BY ME IN AUGUST 1944 WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF COMMANDING GENERAL AAI (*) THE NEW DECREE IS PERSONALLY FAVOURED BY EACH OF THE SERVICE MINISTERS AND BY THE HEADS OF MY SERVICE SUBCOMMISSIONS AND ACCORDINGLY I HAVE NOTIFIED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THERE IS NO ALLIED OBJECTION TO THE PASSAGE OF THIS DECREE (*)

PARA TWO (*) THE ELIMINATION OF THE GRADE OF MARSHAL AS HEAD OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF MEANS THE REMOVAL OF MARSHAL MESSE ITS PRESENT HEAD (*) IT IS PROPOSED TO APPOINT GENERAL TREZZANI AS HEAD (*) HE IS PERSONALLY ACCEPTABLE TO EACH OF THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS AND BY THE HEADS OF MY SUBCOMMISSIONS AND I RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORISE ME TO APPROVE HIS SELECTION

copy to: Executive Comm'r
 Land Forces S/C
 Air Forces S/C
 Naval S/C

SD DISTRIBUTION:

DECREE (*)

PARA TWO (*) THE ELIMINATION OF THE GRADE OF MARSHAL AS HEAD OF THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF MEANS THE REMOVAL OF MARSHAL MESSE ITS PRESENT HEAD (*) IT IS PROPOSED TO APPOINT GENERAL TREZZANI AS HEAD (*) HE IS PERSONALLY ACCEPTABLE TO EACH OF THE THREE SERVICE MINISTERS AND BY THE HEADS OF MY SUBCOMMISSIONS AND I RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORISE ME TO APPROVE HIS SELECTION

W. L. C. 10/10/40

copy to: Executive Comm'r
Land Forces S/C
Air Forces S/C
Naval S/C

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action copy; G/6 A SD/33

9 April 1968

File
SUBJECT: Relaxation of control of the Italian Army

TOP SECRET *68*

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.L.I.A.)

File No: G/6

2 April 45.

TO : H.Q. Allied Commission
(For Chief Commissioner) (2).

File

1. Ref your letter 8251/20 of 28 Mar and our conversation the same day, herewith two copies of a Memorandum giving my views on the whole subject.

2. (a) I have already sent you copies of the letters referred to in my Memorandum via TS/G/12 of 4 Oct and 26 Dec 44 and TS/G/11 of 11 Oct 44.
- (b) I also sent Brig. LUSH copies of same which he wanted for Mr. WAGHILLAN on 6 Jan 45.

tvs.

L.B.
Major General
M.L.I.A.

2 Copies of memorandum
held under lock & key by
Chief Clerk.

3508

R.F.

2/4.

~~SECRET~~

31

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AP 441

RHF/jom

.....
: ~~SECRET~~ :
: Auth: SAG/TH :
: Initials: *[initials]* :
: 1 April 1945 :
: :

AG 091.711/033 GCT-0

1 April 1945

4350

SUBJECT: Command and Administration - PICENO Italian Combat Force Rft
Training Centre

TO : President, Allied Commission
FCM: Land Forces Sub Commission, MMIA *(2)(31-32)*
Commanding General, Rome Area Allied Command
Officer Commanding, "F" British Liaison Unit
Officer Commanding, 10th Training Team RA
Officer Commanding, "G" British Training Unit
Officer Commanding, "H" British Training Increment.

60

See
SD/45/1
6/6 (A/C)

Letter this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 24 March 1945, is amended as follows:

a. The last sentence of paragraph c is deleted and the following substituted therefor:

"The Land Forces Sub Commission, AG (MMIA) will channel all demands for non-controlled training stores through Area Headquarters. Demands for Staff-Controlled training equipment will be forwarded to DMT, AFHQ".

b. The title of the first unit listed in Appendix "A" should read "PICENO", not "PINCENO".

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:



R.H. Freese
R. H. FRESE
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

MMIA 'G'	
FILE:	<i>G/6.</i>
DATE:	<i>4/4</i>

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - Ea Addressee	1 - G-3 (Ops)	1 - DST
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1 - Hq 5th Army, Br Incr.	1 - G-3 (Org-P)	1 - Ord (B)
1 - Hq Eighth Army	1 - G-3 (Org) Foreign	1 - EMS (B)
1 - Hq No 1 District	1 - G-4 (B)	1 - PM (B)
1 - Hq No 2 District	1 - G-4 (M & Tn)	1 - Postal (B)
1 - Hq No 3 District	1 - Q(Maint)	2 - AG Records
1 - DMT	1 - Q(IE)	1 - AG M & D
1 - G-1 (B)	1 - Fld Arty	
1 - G-2 (B)	1 - Engr (B)	
1 - Sigs (B)	1 - Hq Inf	

3507

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

66

1 April 1945

MEMORANDUM: for GOC

I agree with Colonel Pidsley's Pars. 1, 3, and 4.

I do not agree with Colonel Ingledew's Par 5 which would have to be substituted for your Par. 4 (b). However, Colonel Ingledew's Par 5 does outline a system of relaxation of control which it might be well to consider, but I do not think that this sequence of relaxation should appear in your document at this time.

T. K. ...
Colonel

3505

64
TOP SECRET

GSO I's comments on draft letter TS/G/11 as at 31 March 45.

1. To anyone NOT acquainted with M.M.I.A's activities (like Chief Commissioner A.C.) I feel that the second sentence in para 3(a) "The first phase which exists at present is complete Allied control" would appear to be contradicted by para 4(a) "the transition from Allied to Italian control is already in progress".
2. I submit that no control of the Italian Army is at present being relaxed. In fact appointments of officers are being tightened and each day further items of equipment are being placed on the list which requires Allied authority for release.
3. I submit that no control should be relaxed until the war in EUROPE ceases(end of phase 1).
4. We MUST by then know the size and mission of the post-war Italian Army.
5. Next we enter phase II, and, depending on the answer to para 4 above I recommend we could relax control in order of priority as follows:-
 - (a) relax Allied control of training
 - (b) relax Allied control of appointments of officers
 - (c) relax Allied control of Category I(ITI-ITI own Adm)but maintain a ceiling limitation
 - (d) demobilize as many of US-ITI and BR-ITI service troops as possible
 - (e) hand-over control and disposition of guards ³⁵⁰ to Italian Ministry of War
 - (f) transfer Combat Groups(or such of them as will remain)to control of Italian Ministry of War in same way as para 5(e) above.
6. Next we enter Phase III when control of rations should be relinquished maintaining a much reduced ceiling limitation, which, within a stipulated period should gradually be reduced

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- (e) hand-over control and disposition of guards to Italian Ministry of War
- (f) transfer Combat Groups (or such of them as will remain) to control of Italian Ministry of War in same way as para 5(e) above.

6. Next we enter Phase III when control of rations should be relinquished maintaining a much reduced ceiling limitation, which, within a stipulated period should gradually be reduced until the Italian Army must be self supporting.

31 Mar 45

A. M. F. F. F. F. F.

Lieut Colonel,
General Staff.

2053

785020

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

ERS/HJP

63

28 March 1945

Dear General —

I should be grateful if upon your return you would have a word with me on the subject of the attached letter.

Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Major General L. Browning
GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission
Allied Commission

218

3503

SECRET

EN3/n3p

62

8251/EC

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Italian Army

TO : Allied Force Headquarters, APO 512.
(Attention: Chief of Staff)

47

WP

1. Reference is made to your letter of 28 February and this Headquarter's reply--8251/100/EC of 11 March.

2. In view of the possible cessation of hostilities in Italy in the near future I am taking steps to have re-examined the decision contained in this Headquarters reply--8251/100/EC of 11 March, and will shortly communicate to you further on this subject.

53

55

W. Stone

MILERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissionercc: G-5 AFHQ
GOC Land Forces S/G, AG
Exec Comm, AG

see 60

3502

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

27 March 1945

Ref: 4001/163/EC

SUBJECT: Relations with Italian Government.

TO : VP, Economic Section (15)
VP, Civil Affairs Section (10)
Director, Communications Sub-Commission
Director, War Material Disposal &
Italian PW Sub-Commission

1. Vice Presidents will impress upon the Directors of their Sub-Commissions, and Directors of Independent Sub-Commissions upon their officers, the necessity of implementing the policy of the CCS directive defining the new relations of the Allied Commission with the Italian Government, especially with respect to the following paragraph:

"The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels."

2. Experience during the last six months has shown that whereas officers in the field have been careful to avoid executive action or speech with officials of the Provincial governments, there has been a tendency at HQ for officers in the Sub-Commissions to forget that the dropping of the "G" from A.C.C. was intended to convert the relations between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government to those of adviser (and provider of supplies) on the one hand and of a sovereign government on the other. I have heard reports of discussions and conferences which lead me to think that more forceful measures than advice have been used to persuade - if indeed not to compel - the Italian Government to accept the views of the Allied Commission and come into line. In some instances these measures have been taken by subordinate officers of Sub-Commissions speaking perhaps to subordinate officials of the Italian Government. But the effect has been the same - and is unfortunate. The Italians presume that every member of the Commission speaks with the authority of the Chief Commissioner and they suffer, in their estimation, from a multiplicity of masters, and the application of conflicting policies of "advice" and "control".

3. In future, therefore, Vice Presidents and Directors of Sub-Commissions will ensure that such formal advice as it may be necessary to convey to the Italian Government is given by Vice Presidents or their Deputies or by Directors of Sub-Commissions, to Ministers or Under-Secretaries. At lower levels officers should refrain from giving formal advice and should restrict their functions to verbal consultation and discussion, expressing informally and unofficially any advice which they may feel should be given and would have the complete approval of their Director or Vice President. Generally speaking, in all their dealings with members of the Italian Government on matters affecting Italian Government territory, officers must act with diplomacy and tact rather than as mentors or

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MMIA - 'G'
FILE: 6/6
DATE: 2/3

W. H. Stone

ELMER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copies to: Acting President
Political Advisers (2)
VP Establishment Section
Navy Sub-Commission
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Public Relations Branch

SECRET**SECRET**

31

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 091 711/033 GCT-0

AF 365

RHE/ab

3590

: : : : : : : :
 : **SECRET** :
 : AUTH: SAC, AFHQ :
 : Initials: [initials] :
 : Date: 24 Mar 45 :
 : : : : : : : :
 : 24 March 1945 :

SUBJECT: Control and Administration PICENO Italian Combat Force Rft Trg Centre

TO: President, Allied Commission
 For: Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA)
 Commanding General, Rome Area Allied Command
 Officer-in-Charge, 'F' British Liaison Unit
 Officer-in-Charge, 10th Training Team R
 Officer-in-Charge, 'G' British Training Unit
 Officer-in-Charge, 'H' British Training Increment

Command administration of the PICENO Italian Combat Force Rft Training Centre at CESANO will be as follows:

a. All British and Italian units of the PICENO Italian Combat Force reinforcement Training Centre, as in the Order of Battle at Appendix 'A' attached, will be under operational command of this headquarters. In case of operational emergency, the Area Headquarters, at present Headquarters Rome Area Allied Command, may call on such Italian troops as 'F' British Liaison Unit Commander can be made available without prejudice to the immediate requirements of Italian Combat Groups.

b. For training, organization, rft policy and movement, this headquarters will deal with the British Liaison Unit through Land Forces Sub-Commission AC(MIA). Control of British units within the Training Centre will be exercised by OC British Liaison Unit. 'G' British Training Unit will deal direct with Land Forces Sub-Commission AC(MIA) only on training matters for Service units other than those of the Combat Force.

c. All units on the Order of Battle at Appendix 'A' will be under full administrative command of the Area Headquarters Rome Area Allied Command, through 'F' BLU except as in paragraph d below. The British Liaison Unit will deal with the Area Headquarters on matters of accommodation and movement except where training policy is involved. The Land Forces Sub-Commission AC(MIA) will channel all demands for training equipment through the Area Headquarters.

Through Area H.Q. for non-controlled training stores
 training equipment will be forwarded to D.M.T. AFHQ.

SECRET**SECRET**

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Ltr AFHQ, file AG 091.711/033 GCT-O, dtd 24 Mar 45 (cont'd).

d. All Italian Units in Appendix 'A' will deal direct with SMRE, under supervision Land Forces Sub-Commission AC(MMIA), in all purely Italian administrative matters. Paragraph 8 of letter, this headquarters, file AG 091.711/169 GCT-O, Subject: "Command and Administration of Italian Army", dated 16 November 1944 refers.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

R. H. Frese
R. H. FRESE
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Appendix 'A'

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - Ea addressee	1 - Q(Maint)
1 - Hq 15 Army Group	1 - Q(AE)
1 - Hq Fifth Army Brit Incr	1 - Fld Arty Sec
1 - Hq Eighth Army	1 - Engr(B)
1 - Hq 1 Dist	1 - Sig(B)
1 - Hq 2 Dist	1 - HQ(Inf)
1 - Hq 3 Dist	1 - DST
1 - DMT	1 - Med(B)
1 - G-1(B)	1 - ORD(B)
1 - G-2(B)	1 - EME(B)
1 - G-3(OPS)	1 - PM(B)
1 - G-3 (TRG)	1 - Postal (B)
1 - G-3 (Org-B)	2 - AG Records
1 - G-3 (Org)Foreign	1 - AG M & D
1 - G-4(B)	
1 - G-4(M&tn)	

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Appendix 'A' to AFHQ letter AG 091.711/033 GCT-0
 Dated 24 March 1945

PICENO Italian Combat Force Rft Trg Centro
ORDER OF BATTLE

PICENO.

HQ ~~Piceno~~ Italian Combat Force Rft Trg Centro
 'F' British Liaison Unit
 'H' British Training Increment
 152 Italian Increment to BLU
 152 Italian Ration and POL Depot
 152 Italian Clothing Store
 152 Italian Fd Hyc Soc
 1500 Italian Independent Amb Pl
 152 Italian Moch Engr Pl
 152 Italian LAD
 HQ 152 Italian Provost Coy (Carabinieri)
 155 Italian Provost Soc (Duty)
 319 Italian Provost Soc (Training)
 198 Italian Provost Soc (Holding)
 HQ 1 Italian Reception Regt.
 HQ 1 Italian Reception Bn.
 HQ 2 Italian Reception Bn
 HQ 3 Italian Reception Bn
 HQ 2 Italian Inf Rfts Regt
 HQ 1 Italian Inf Rfts Bn
 HQ 2 Italian Inf Rfts Bn
 HQ 3 Italian Inf Rfts Bn
 HQ 3 Italian Composite Rft Regt
 4 Italian Arty Rfts Depot
 152 Italian Arty School
 HQ 6 Italian Mixed Rfts Bn
 HQ 5 Italian Engr Rft Bn
 152 Italian Fd Engineering School
 152 Italian Combat Force Signal Trg Centro
 HQ 6 Italian Moch Engrs Rft Coy
 HQ 152 Italian Trg Schools
 152 Italian Inf School
 152 Italian Instructors School, All Arms
 152 Italian Driving & Maint School (temp 2 GT Coy)
 152 Italian Mechanics School

Attached

319 Italian Fd Bakery
 83 Italian Fd Hospital
 10 British Training Team RA
 'G' British Trg Unit

3497

SECRET**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 6501/EC.

21 March 1945.

Subject: Allied Commission Relations with
Representatives of United Nations.

To: V.P., Economic Section (10)
V.P., Civil Affairs Section (10)
Director, Navy Sub Commission
Director, Land Forces Sub Commission (ISIA)
Director, Air Forces Sub Commission
Director, Communications Sub Commission
Director, War Materials Disposal & Italian PW Sub Commission.

1. With the abolition of the Political Section, the Italian Government has become responsible for conducting its own political relations with the United Nations as well as, of course, with the neutral powers which have never ceased to be represented diplomatically in Rome. This was not only the logical result of the disappearance of the machinery through which the Allied Commission acted in some degree as the mouthpiece of the Italian Government in its foreign relations but was also intended to be a further step forward in the establishment of normal conditions in the international sphere.

2. It presents few difficulties in the case of powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union which have already established full diplomatic relations, or the United Kingdom and France which are now in direct relations with the Italian Government. In the case, however, of countries of the United Nations which have no diplomatic relations with Italy and which have either only established Consulates-General, such as Belgium and Holland, or whose representation in Italy is limited to membership of the Advisory Council, such as Yugoslavia and Greece, the matter is not so simple.

3. While the intention is, so far as possible, to make the Italian Government on the one hand and the foreign powers concerned on the other hand stand on their own feet, there may be questions on which, owing to absence of diplomatic or direct relations or the lack of goodwill on the part of one of the parties, it is difficult to reach a settlement. In such cases it is suggested that the Allied Commission, as the agent of the powers which signed the Armistice on behalf of the United Nations, should not only keep itself informed of any negotiations which may present problems, but should also exercise its influence both on behalf of the foreign representatives concerned and on behalf of the Italian Government when difficulties arise between negotiators. Accordingly, Sub-Commissions should be prepared, as heretofore, to exercise their good offices in assisting diplomatic representatives of the United Nations Governments in their dealings with the Italian authorities, but only in the circumstances set forth above.

To:

V.P., Economic Section (10)
 V.P., Civil Affairs Section (10)
 Director, Navy Sub Commission
 Director, Land Forces Sub Commission (LSTIA)
 Director, Air Forces Sub Commission
 Director, Communications Sub Commission
 Director, War Materials Disposal & Italian PW Sub Commission.

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Copy to: Political Adviser (A)
 Political Adviser (Br.)
 PRO.
 Liaison Division

FILE: 6/6
 DATE: 22/3.

NORMAN E. FISKE,
 Colonel,
 Acting Executive Commissioner.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

+++++

Ref: 6501/EC.

Subject: Abolition of Political Section.

To:

VP Establishments Section
 VP Economic Section
 VP Civil Affairs Section
 Navy Sub Commission
 Land Forces Sub Commission (MCLA)
 Air Forces Sub Commission
 Communications Sub Commission
 War Materials Disposal & Italian PW Sub Commission
 Public Relations Branch
 Message Centre

16 March 1945.

1. On the abolition of the Political Section on 1 March 1945, the duty of furnishing advice on political matters for the Commission devolved upon the British and American Embassies. To give effect to this, the Embassies have agreed to make available certain members of their staffs to sit in the offices of the Commission, who will be known as Political Advisers, British and American.

2. The British Embassy will be represented by Mr. H.L.d'A. HOPKINSON (Minister) and Mr. A. HALFORD (Second Secretary); the U.S. Embassy, for the time being, will be represented by Mr. W.C. DOWLING (Second Secretary).

3. The Political Advisers are not members of the Commission and will not keep Commission archives. They do, however, require to be kept fully informed on all important matters with a political angle dealt with in the Commission, and will require copies in duplicate of correspondence dealing with such matters for the archives of the two Embassies. When political advice is required, it should be asked for in a Minute on a properly constituted file, as laid down in Office Memorandum No.18 dated 24 October 1944.

4. The Message Centre will note that no correspondence will be sent to the Political Advisers either for action or information, except such correspondence as is specifically addressed to them. Correspondence, which was previously routed to the Political Section from the Message Centre, will in future be sent to one of the Sections, Independent Sub Commissions or the Liaison Division.

Subject: Abolition of Political Section.

To: VP Establishments Section
 VP Economic Section
 VP Civil Affairs Section
 Navy Sub Commission
 Land Forces Sub Commission (MMA)
 Air Forces Sub Commission
 Communications Sub Commission
 War Materials Disposal & Italian PW Sub Commission
 Public Relations Branch
 Message Centre


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Copy to: Political Adviser (Br.)
 Political Adviser (A)
 SO to CC
 Liaison Division



MSL
 Brigadier,
 Executive Commissioner.

56
9/4
NOTES ON MEETING HQ MMIA ROME 1200 hrs 12 MARCH 45

(Following S.A.C. visit to BTC CESAMO)

1.

PRESENT : Major General BROUNING, (GOC, MMIA)
Brig SHORRICK and Lt Col RATES (IMT)
Brig ANDERSON and Maj BARNES (G3 Org)
Col FIDELAY and Lt COLINLEDER (MMIA)

2.

M.I.'s (TRAINING)

- (a) All officers, men and vehicles of B.T.U. at CESAMO will be kept by D.M.I. for transfer to Trg branch MMIA when W.E. is approved.
- (b) D.M.I. will try to find a good S.B.O. I (Trg) for MMIA and attach until posting is authorized by W.E.
- (c) Agreed that, pending amalgamation or disbanding of trg increments and B.U.'s, each trg increment would work under orders of its O i/c B.U.
- (d) D.M.I. will try and send a S.B.O. II (trg) to "P" B.U. from those surplus to Combat Groups and notify MMIA his name.
- (e) Special Section MMIA will take care of training matters till S.B.O. I (Trg) arrives.

3. REPATRIATION OF ITALIAN P.W. OFFICERS from U.S. for duty with B.U. having been agreed in principle by S.A.C., MMIA will send names, numbers and conditions to G 3 (Org) soonest. AFHQ will request repatriation by AIR (S.A.C. offered to ask 3 of 5 personally if necessary).

4. S.A.C. having agreed to examine application for local rank of Colonel for O i/c "P" B.U., MMIA to submit recommendation.

5. S.A.C. having supported the request for extra battle dress or denim for rfts at B.T.U. G3 (Org) will take up the question of a pool of 20,000 suits and notify MMIA result.

6. G3 (Org) will take up at AFHQ S.A.C.'s decision to re-examine Italian Army ration scale.

7. MMIA strong recommendations for division of responsibilities of P.W.I. were considered and have been submitted to AFHQ in writing.

8. AFHQ awaits views of 13 Army Group before giving a ruling on MMIA proposals for the formation of Patriot rescue units. It was agreed that the main object of this scheme was "to take the heat out of the problem," and that the organization should achieve that object, which has as much a political as a military flavour.

9. G3 (Org) was asked to ensure that MMIA was kept informed of any discussions on post war Italian Army matters.

10. G3 (Org) agreed to ensure that the GSO II (Liaison) appointment which W.E. proposed to transfer from B.U. to "P" B.U. as B.U.-GSO referred only to the person of Major O.L. BUI and NOT to the appointment on the W.E. of B.U., which was still required.

379

- (b) D.M.T. will try to find a good C.S.O. I (trg) for MMIA and attach until posting is authorized by U.S.
- (c) Agreed that, pending amalgamation or disbanding of trg increments and BLU's, each trg increment would work under orders of its O i/c BLU.
- (d) D.M.T. will try and send a C.S.O. II (trg) to "P" BLU from those surplus to Combat Groups and notify MMIA his name.
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7. MMIA strong recommendations for division of responsibilities of S.A.O. QUERINO were considered and have been submitted to AFHQ in writing. 349

8. AFHQ awaits views of 15 Army Group before giving a ruling on MMIA proposals for the formation of patriot peace units. It was agreed that the main object of this scheme was "to take the heat out of the problem," and that the organization should achieve that object, which has as much a political as a military flavour.

9. G 2 (Org) was asked to ensure that MMIA was kept informed of any discussions on post war Italian Army matters.

10. G 3 (Org) agreed to ensure that the G 30 II (liaison) appointment which S.A.O. proposed to transfer from MMIA to "P" BLU as S.A.O. referred only to the person of Major Calabbi and NOT to the appointment on the S.A.O. of MMIA, which was still required.

11. G 3 (Org) will define the new trg responsibilities of MMIA in relation to D.M.T. D.M.T. will initiate action in this respect.

12. Man management courses being organized by MMIA will be in line with similar courses at CMTC and KTC. Action MMIA to produce definite proposals for AFHQ to issue.

13. G 3 (Org) was asked to let MMIA have the revised "priority list" as soon as possible.

COPIES TO: G 3 (Org)

D.M.T.

INT: MMIA.

5/6 ←

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 8251/100/30.11 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Italian Army.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

1. The contents of your letter of 28 February have been considered both by Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group, GOC, Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMA) and myself.

2. At this stage it is not considered possible to formulate any progressive steps by which control should be handed back to the Italian military authorities. In order to obtain the maximum aid to the war effort by the Italian Army, it is necessary to retain the existing control until, at any rate, hostilities in Italy cease and the question of a postwar military organisation can be examined.

For the Chief Commissioner.

M. S. LUSH

MSL/JC.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.Copy to: G-5, AFHQ
GOC, Land Forces S/C (MMA)MMA
FILED
Date Recd17
3
G/6.
11

603492

462

SECRETSubject: Control of Italian ArmyLand Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)
Rome
C/S
8 March 1945To : Hq Allied Commission for Executive CommissionerReference your 8251/EC dated 6 March and CGS AFHQ
letter to Chief Commissioner, subject Italian
Army, dated 28 February, paragraphs 4 and 5

1. While at Florence recently, I discussed the above-mentioned letter from CGS AFHQ with General Gruenther, Chief of Staff, 15th Army Group, and we agreed that there should be no change in the existing methods as regards control and administration of the Italian Army. We also considered that it was not possible, at this stage, to formulate any "progressive steps by which control should be handed back to the Italian military authorities as and when the operational situation permits". In order to obtain the maximum aid to the war effort by the Italian Army, it is necessary to retain the existing complete control until, at any rate, hostilities in Italy cease and the question of the post-war military set-up begins to arise.

LB/lak

Major General
Land Forces
Sub Commission, AC (MMIA)

3491

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 7002/98/EC.

7 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of AC Officers from Italian Government Territory.

TO :

EC, Sicily Region	(10)
EC, Southern Region.	(10)
EC, Sardinia Region	(5)
EC, Lazio-Umbria Region.	(10)
EC, Abruzzi-Marche Region.	(5)
Civil Affairs Section.	(10)
Economic Section.	(14)
Establishment Section.	(3)

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in their telegram FAM 487 of 31 January 1945 transmitting the New Deal for Italy, directed that:

"The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it."

2. As a result of this the following action will be taken with regard to Allied Commission functions in SARDINIA, SICILY and SOUTHERN ITALY:

- (a) SARDINIA. All Allied officers will be withdrawn with the exception of the officers and staff of the Mining Division who will restrict their functions entirely to advice regarding the output of the Sardinian coalmines, and shipping and working of the ports in connection with the output of coal.

- (b) SICILY. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn except:

- (i) Allied Commission Liaison Officer at PALERMO.
(ii) Allied Commission Liaison Officer at CATANIA.
(iii) CAO, LAMPEDUSA.
(iv) CAO, PANTELLERIA.
(v) Certain technical officers.

- (c) SOUTHERN REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be

3490
 3/12/45

53
 API / LAND FORCES

416

2/10/45
 CAPWP

ACH

PPR

TO :
 (10) Sicily Region.
 (10) PC, Southern Region.
 (5) EC, Sardinia Region.
 (10) EC, Lazio-Umbria Region.
 (5) EC, Abruzzi-Marche Region.
 (10) Civil Affairs Section.
 (14) Economic Section.
 (3) Establishment Section.

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- (i) Allied Commission Liaison Officer at PALERMO.
 (ii) Allied Commission Liaison Officer at CATANIA.
 (iii) CAO, LAMPEDUS.
 (iv) CAO, PANTELLERIA.
 (v) Certain technical officers.

(c) SOUTHERN REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn except:

- (i) Provincial Staff for NAPLES Commune in which Allied Military Government will continue.
 (ii) Allied Commission Liaison Officer at ROME.
 (iii) Certain technical officers.

MMIA	8.6.
FILE REF	
Date Recd	

- 2 -

- (a) LAZIO-UMBRIA REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn from Regional HQ and the Provinces of LAZIO with the exception of:
- (i) Allied Commission Liaison Officer (Public Safety) with Rome Allied Area Command.
 - (ii) Certain technical officers.
- The Provinces of UMBRIA (TERNI and PERUGIA) will continue under Allied Military Government; the Provincial staffs will remain and will pass to command of Regional HQ, MARCHE-UMBRIA (formerly ABRUZZI-MARCHE) Region.
- (e) ABRUZZI-MARCHE REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn from the Provinces of ABRUZZI (TERAMO, AQUIA, PESCARA, CHIETI), with the exception of the Transportation Officer (Truck pool) at AQUIA. The Provinces of the MARCHE (AScoli, MACERATA, ANCONA, PESARO) will remain under Allied Military Government with Provincial staffs. The Region, which in future will be known as MARCHE-UMBRIA Region, will absorb the Provinces of PERUGIA and TERNI, under Allied Military Government, with their Provincial staffs. The Regional Commissioner will also act as Allied Commission Liaison Officer for the Provinces of ABRUZZI.

Details of officers to be retained will be found in Appendix "A".

3. Duties of the Allied Commission Liaison Officers in Italian Government territory will be to watch over the Allied and Italian interests in furtherance of the Allied war effort, and to assist the Allied authorities in their relations with Italian local authorities. They will give advice to the Allied military authorities on any matter pertaining to Italian civil affairs, but will no longer be concerned with the assumption of advice or guidance to the Italian authorities. Neither will they assume functions which are properly those of military authorities. Personnel will normally confine their activities to the neighborhood of the HQ in which they are located, but in cases of necessity they will of course deal with all matters arising from civil affairs affecting Allied interests within the Regional boundaries.
4. Regional Commissioners will take steps to complete these moves by 1 April 1945. Further instructions will be issued by the Establishment Section.

Brigadier,
Executive Committee.

Encl: Appendix "A".

- (e) ABRUZZI-MARCHE REGION. All Allied Commission officers will be withdrawn from the Provinces of ABRUZZI (TERAMO, AQUILA, PESCARA, CHIENTI), with the exception of a Transportation Officer (Truck pool.) at AQUILA. The Provinces of the MARCHE (AScoli, MCERETA, ANCONA, PESARO) will remain under Allied Military Government with Provincial staffs. The Region, which in future will be known as MARCHE-UMBRI Region, will absorb the Provinces of PERUGIA and TERNI, under Allied Military Government, with their Provincial staffs. The Regional Commissioner will also act as Allied Commission Liaison Officer for the Provinces of ABRUZZI.

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4. Regional Commissioners will take steps to complete these moves by 1 April 1945. Further instructions will be issued by the Establishment Section.

Handwritten: *Brigadier,*
Executive Commissioner.

Encl: Appendix "A".

Copy to:

PA to Acting President
G-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters.
Navy Sub-Commission
Land Forces Sub-Commission (LFLA)
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Office of the Political Advisors
Communications Sub-Commission
WD & POW Sub-Commission
Public Relations Branch
DCCAO, 15 Army Group

APPENDIX "A".OFFICERS TO BE LEFT IN ITALIAN CONQUERED TERRITORY AFTER 1 APRIL 1945.

<u>Region.</u>	<u>Officers.</u>
<u>SARDINIA</u>	2 Mining
<u>SICILY</u>	1 Liaison 1 Liaison 1 Civil Affairs 1 Civil Affairs 1 Supply Accountant 1 Property Control 1 Transportation
	) to be withdrawn) about 1 May 1945
<u>SOUTHERN</u>	1 Transportation 1 Transportation 1 Local Commissioner 1 Executive Officer 1 Adjutant 1 Provincial Officer 1 Commander G.V. "O". 3 Legal 3 Public Health 4 Public Safety 2 Commerce 1 Food 2 Industry 5 Finance
	(2 to be withdrawn about 1 May 1945)
	2 Public Works & Utilities 5 Transportation 1 Liaison 1 Asst. Liaison (Food) 7 Transportation 1 Public Safety 3 Finance 1 Transportation 2 Transportation 1 Public Works & Utilities
<u>Lazio-UMBRIA - Rome</u>	1 Public Safety 3 Finance 1 Transportation 2 Transportation 1 Public Works & Utilities
	3489) to be) withdrawn about 1 June 1945.
<u>ABRUZZI-MARCHE - Aquila</u>	1 Transportation.

1141

1	Transportation
1	Transportation
1	Local Commissioner
1	Executive Officer
1	Adjutant
1	Provincial Officer
1	Commander C.M. 'C'.

4. Transp stat. m.

Five truck pool transportation officers will be withdrawn as soon as the vehicles are handed over to the Italian Government, and transportation officers will be withdrawn

Of the total number of 61 left in the South, it will be noted

2073

Tel Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LWS/el

G/6.

Ref. #251/EC

6 March 45

SUBJECT: Italian Army


TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommittee (MMIA)

1. Reference AFHQ Chief of Staff letter, subject as above, dated 28 February, directed to the Chief Commissioner, copy of which was passed to your office on March 5.

2. Your attention is particularly invited to paragraph 4 thereof, and it is desired that your recommendations in regard to this matter be submitted to the Executive Commissioner as soon as possible.

W. Starns
Chief Staff Officer
To Executive Commissioner

3483



FROM:

WMA

TO: (FOR ACTION)

FIFTH ARMY

05 24/30

A

SD 2397

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FOR ENIA SO (..) DATED TO GENERAL BRANCHING (..) CONCERN YOU DISCLOSE
 WITH CO 15TH ARMY GROUP. ABOVE LETTER SIGNED BY CHIEF OF STAFF
 DATED 28 FEBRUARY SUBJECT ITALIAN ARMY ADDRESSED TO CHIEF
 COMMISSIONER ALCON COPY OF WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO 15TH ARMY
 GROUP

5. m. n.

Third message

to San Kich

RET?

PRIORITY

Important

AUTHENTICATION

E. A. GORD, Col

3487

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref. 8251/61/EO

1 March 45

SUBJECT: Personnel of Italian Armed Forces of Yugoslav Origin
TO : GOC, Land Forces Subcommittee, (MMIA)

1. Reference your letter, file G/6, dated 21 Feb 45, subject as above, your apprehension in this matter is fully appreciated. The subject will be brought up at the March 2 meeting of the Advisory Council where it is included in the agenda as "Yugoslavs actually in units stationed on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to join the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia."

2. The Political Section has advised me that the stand of both the British and American representatives at this meeting will be one of delay. Actually the question, when it is presented, will be approached from the British and American standpoint as primarily one of military significance and accordingly it will be recommended that it be referred to SACMED on that basis. In other words, it is not anticipated that any positive action will be promoted by either representative.

M.M.I.A.	R 2/3
FILE REF	616
Date Recd	2/3/45

17.5.45
Brigadier, 318
Executive Commissioner.

Copy to Political Section

Incl: Memorandum to Executive Commissioner
summarising above subject.

S E C R E T

SECRET

Tele Ext 341

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

LWS/el

Ref. 8251/82/EC

1 March 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Executive Commissioner

SUBJECT : Personnel of Italian Armed Forces of Yugoslav Origin

Summary of this problem as requested in your minute 80 is presented below:

1. Originally Marshal Tito at AFHQ conferences held in August 45 expressed hope that Italians of Croat and Slovene origin serving in the Italian Army in Sardinia and Sicily be permitted to volunteer for service with the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.
2. The problem was accordingly taken up by G-5, AFHQ, and on 25 August, Allied Commission was directed to refer the question to the Advisory Council for Guidance. Prior to such reference the Chief Commissioner discussed the matter with both Sir Noel Charles and Mr. Alexander Kirk who raised doubts as to the propriety of the Council making any recommendation to the Supreme Allied Commander. It was felt the question was not so much legal as military, the principal point at issue being the effect such recruitment might have on the fighting qualities of the Italian Army, Navy, and Air Force.
3. The Chief Commissioner then requested (2 Sept 44) permission from AFHQ to take the matter up with Admiral Morgan, General Browning and Air Force Marshal Boven-Bascariet and that the official viewpoint of the Italian Government should be obtained. G-5 replied that it had no objection to this request but at the same time urged that the question be put at once before the Advisory Council. In addition G-5 stated that the disposition of the Yugoslav members of the Italian armed forces in Corsica was being considered at AFHQ and would be accordingly brought up at SACMEX's political meeting for discussion in accordance with Mr. Harold Gaccia's recommendation.
4. Accordingly, the Chief Commissioner referred the problem to the Service subcommittees and in addition requested advice from the Legal Subcommittee as to the status of the Italian law concerning such action.
5. The Legal Subcommittee advised that there were four main difficulties connected with such volunteer service:
 - a. Members of the Italian armed forces volunteering for service in a foreign force would be liable to be charged with desertion, etc., under the Military Penal Code (Articles 143 to 152).

348

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348

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SECRET

MMIA	R 13
FILE REF	56
Date Recd	23/8

b. If he is not serving with Italian armed forces and is subject to call-up he would be liable to punishment for failure to report under articles 151 and 152 of the Code.

c. The national would lose his rights of Italian citizenship.

d. The recruiting agency would be liable to punishment under article 248 of the Penal Code, if such action was without governmental approval.

Thus the Legal Subcommittee recommended that the Italian Government in order to overcome these difficulties should take the following steps:

a. that the Ministries of War, Marine, and/or Air should grant these nationals permanent leave;

b. the Minister of the Interior should refrain from giving to the nationals concerned an intimation to abandon and might be asked to give a formal letter approving the enlistment;

c. the President of the Council of Ministers should grant an approval to the recruiting agency.

6. Reply of Air Forces Subcommittee -- The Air officer commanding stated that he felt it might be an attempt to influence the return to the Croats and Slovenes of the provinces taken over by Italy after the last war (thus influencing peace conference action) and regarded the matter quite serious from that standpoint.

7. On 20 September, G-5, AFHQ, notified Allied Commission that the Supreme Allied Commander had directed that the matter be held in suspense and that no further action be taken for the present.

8. Since this date no further direct communications have been received by this Headquarters on the subject other than the question as presented on the agenda for the March 2 meeting of the Advisory Council. It appears as #3 on the agenda: 3/8

"Yugoslav actually in units stationed on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to join the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia."

9. Mr. Holford of the Political Section advises that both the British and American representatives will approach the matter as primarily one of military significance and accordingly it will be recommended that it be referred to SACMED on that basis. In other words, it is not anticipated that any positive action will be promoted by either representative. In fact, Political Section's latest information is that the UK Government has instructed the British Resident Minister to take up the question with General Alexander, thus, in effect, countering UK's previous instructions to the British Ambassador to support the request.

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7. On 20 September, 9-5, ARHQ, notified Allied Commission that the Supreme Allied Commander had directed that the matter be held in suspense and that no further action be taken for the present.

8. Since this date no further direct communications have been received by this Headquarters on the subject other than the question as presented on the agenda for the March 2 meeting of the Advisory Council. It appears as if 318

"Yugoslav actually in units stationed on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to join the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia."

9. Mr. Halford of the Political Section advises that both the British and American representatives will approach the matter as primarily one of military significance and accordingly it will be recommended that it be referred to SACMAD on that basis. In other words, it is not anticipated that any positive action will be promoted by either representative. In fact, Political Section's latest information is that the UK Government has instructed the British Resident Minister to take up the question with General Alexander, thus, in effect, countermending UK's previous instructions to the British Ambassador to support the request.

10. The attached letter is prepared for your signature as a reply to General Browning's letter. (Has been seen by Mr. Halford).

Chief Staff Officer
To the Executive Commissioner

3481

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission ASD 394

G/LB
4/3
WSC/1605

23 February 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Civil Affairs Section, Hq. AC.
Subject: Italian Navy Personnel - Appointments and removal of.

1. In reply to your letter L/324/CA of 22 February 1945, the distinction in paragraph 2a and 2b between the appointment "of personnel in the three service Ministries" and the appointment of "officers", respectively, is not clear. Likewise the distinction between "our approval" and "AC's approval" is subject to interpretation.

2. The views of the Navy Sub-Commission, AC with respect to appointment of officers were expressed in Navy Sub-Commission letter WSC/1656 of 14 February 1945, copy to Headquarters, AC. The policy of the Navy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in this premise is stated in Allied Force Headquarters letter 05; OSI.1 Italy, of 2 February 1945, a copy of which was forwarded to the Navy Sub-Commission, AC by Headquarters, AC letter 2810/10/AC of 21 February 1945.

3. In review, appointments and removals from office of Italian Navy personnel should be controlled as follows:

(a) By the Allied Commission:

The appointment and removal of all Italian Navy Cabinet officials and high ranking civilians, with the concurrence of Allied Force Headquarters and CINC-MED, when required.

(b) By the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

The appointment and removal of all Italian Navy officers of the rank of Captain and above.

4. No comment has been made in previous correspondence relative to the appointment and removal of officers and officials of the Italian Mercantile Marine, which is under the Italian Ministry of Marine. While the Italian Mercantile Marine is under the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in accordance with the Cunningham - de Courten Agreement, it is operated primarily by the Mediterranean Shipping Board through the Italian agency, SOFMA. The right should be reserved to the Allied Commission or the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as may be necessary to exercise control over the appointment to and removal from office of officers and officials attached to the Italian Mercantile Marine in important positions.

Copy to:
Land Force SC AC.
Air Force SC AC.

C. L. WAGNER
DEAN ADAM
Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, AC.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Italian Army. (31)

TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, APO 394.

Reference letter, Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C. (MMIA),
File No. 6/6, dated 6 February 1945, Subject: Italian Army.

1. The primary consideration in the formation of policy in respect of the Italian Army in the past has been that of ensuring its employment to the fullest extent in the furtherance of the War effort. This object still remains of paramount importance and it is considered that any attempt to alter the present organization of the Italian land forces or the system whereby they are controlled at this stage would, by reducing the effectiveness of the Italian effort, adversely affect the achievement of the object in view. Consequently no changes can be accepted while the War against Germany continues except by agreement with Commanding General, 15th Army Group. (24)

2. It is therefore temporarily agreed in accordance with para 2(b)(iii) that no change be made in the following documents:

- (i) AG 091.112/079 GCT-0 of 25 October 1944,
"Status and Functions of the Land Forces
Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission
(MMIA)."
- (ii) AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 November 1944,
"Command and Administration of the Italian
Army."

3. Although no specific mention of the Italian Army is made in PAN 487, it will obviously be desirable at some future date to apply the same principles of transfer of responsibility to the Italian Army as are stipulated for the Italian Government as a whole.

4. It is therefore necessary to consider what steps shall in the future be taken to place progressively increasing responsibility upon the Italian Military authorities. In order that the question may

3473

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be fully reviewed, you are directed to have this matter carefully examined, and to report at an early date the progressive steps by which you recommend control should be handed back to the Italian Military authorities as and when the operational situation permits.

5. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to Commanding General, 15th Army Group who is responsible for the operational efficiency of the Italian troops under his command, and with whom you should consult in connection with the examination of this subject to ensure that any recommendations which you may submit are compatible with his operational requirements.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

JOHN HARDING,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:
CG, 15th Army Group

2083

3478

SECRET