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G POLICY

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OCT. 1945 - AP. 1946

COVER IV

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COPIES

FROM: JGIA
TO: AFHQ

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SECRET
IMMEDIATE

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FOR G3 (.) AT PRESENT MOMENT 1922 AND 1923 CLASS AND PART 1924 AND 1925 CLASSES BEING DEMOBILIZED AND PART 1925 CLASS BEING CALLED UP (.) ON 31ST AUG WHEN THIS PROCESS COMPLETE STR OF ITALIAN ARMY WILL BE 122,500 INCL 42,000 NEWLY JOINED RECRUITS JUST STARTING THEIR REG^{MT} TRG CERVES (.) IN CONSEQUENCE ALL UNITS AND EACS OF ITALIAN ARMY WILL BE ON AVERAGE AT 60 PERCENT STR ONLY BUT UNDERSTAND THAT POLICORE DIVISION IS BEING MAINTAINED AT HIGHER STR AT EXPENSE OF OTHER TNS (.) IN ADDITION SHORTAGE OF SERGEANTS AND TRAINERS AND OVERALL DEFICIENCY OF 25 PERCENT IN RE CAUSES FURTHER REDUCTION IN EFFICIENCY BUT AGAIN POLICORE IS BETTER OFF THAN OTHERS IN THIS RESPECT (.) AHEAD FROM OTHER DIVS REMAINDER OF ITALIAN ARMY NOW IN PROCESS OF RE-EQPT WITH NEW WEAPONS AND SOME MONTHS MUST ELAPSE BEFORE THEY ARE FULLY TRAINED IN AND ACCUSTOMED TO NEW ARMS (.) IN CONCLUSION POLICORE COULD BE MADE UP TO HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY AT SHORT NOTICE OTHER DIVS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BATTLEWORTHY UNLESS CAMOUFLAGED OR UNBIL REINFORCED WITH NEW ENTRY RECRUITS IN THREE MONTHS TIME (.) TERRITORIAL REGIMENTS AND INFANTRY SECURITY BRIGADES NOT CONSIDERED FIT FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN INTERNAL SECURITY AND GUARDS

368

c/s

(sgt) M.W. HOPS
FCS

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

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FOR C3 (.) AT PRESENT MOMENT 1922 AND 1923 CLASS AND PART 1924 AND 1925 CLASSES BEING DEMOBILISED AND PART 1925 CLASS BEING CALLED UP (.) ON 31ST AUG WHEN THIS PROCESS COMPLETE STR OF ITALIAN ARMY WILL BE 122,500 INCL 42,000 NEWLY JOINED RECRUITS JUST STARTING THEIR TRAINING CENTRES (.) IN CONSEQUENCE ALL UNITS AND TACS OF ITALIAN ARMY WILL BE ON AVERAGE AT 60 PERCENT STR ONLY BUT UNDERSTAND THAT POLSKA DIVISION IS BEING MAINTAINED AT HIGHER STR AT EXPENSE OF OTHER TACS (.) IN ADDITION SHORTAGE OF SPECIALISTS AND TRAINING AND OVERALL DEFICIENCY OF 25 PERCENT IN MT CAUSES FURTHER REDUCTION IN EFFICIENCY BUT AGAIN PROBLEM IS BETTER OFF THAN OTHERS IN THIS RESPECT (.) APART FROM COMBAT DIVS REMAINDER OF ITALIAN ARMY NOW IN PROCESS OF RE-EQUIPPING WITH NEW WEAPONS AND SOME MONTHS MUST ELAPSE BEFORE THEY ARE FULLY TRAINED IN AND ACCUSTOMED TO NEW ARMS (.) IN CONCLUSION POLSKA COULD BE MADE UP TO HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY AT SHORT NOTICE OTHER DIVS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BATTLEWORTHY UNLESS CAMOUFLAGED OR UNTIL REINFORCED WITH NEW ENEMY RECRUITS IN THREE MONTHS TIME (.) TERRITORIAL REGIMENTS AND INTERNAL SECURITY BRIGADES NOT CONSIDERED FIT FOR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN INTERNAL SECURITY AND GUARDS

C/6

(sgd) M.H. HOPE
398

Copy made :- ell.

368

Key of 13 Aug 46

SUBJECT: OFFICERS' ARMS

LAND FORCES HQS OOM, A.C. (MILIA)

6/6

9 MAY 46

30

: INTERNAL SECURITY UNIT

Ref your Progress Report No. 6/6 dated 3 May para (iv) Arms and Amm.

This HQ informed the Ministry of War on 21 Feb, in response to a query by them, that any question of Officers carrying personal arms when not on duty with troops was purely one for the MILIA authorities and was no concern of HQ or the ARMS.

Major General,
M. H. I. A.

AMH/ao

0007

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
ATO 394
AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION

RECEIVED 12 APR 1946
7993

PLH/etl

11 April 1946

SUBJECT: I.A.F. Personnel Situation.

TO : Executive Commissioner,
Navy Sub-Commission,
Ground Forces Sub-Commission.

The Italian Air Force at present has a ceiling of 31,000 personnel on the active list. However, by law they are still administering an additional 11,328, according to the best information obtained from the Italian Air Ministry. The 11,328 are being paid either full pay or three-fourths of their regular pay, but receive no rations. Most of the 11,328 are being paid full pay except those who are being sanitized by the authorities to determine whether they belonged to any pro-German organization, Fascists, etc., who get three-fourths pay.

The situation mentioned above will probably exist until a law for the reduction of personnel of all the Italian Armed Forces is passed. It is not expected this law will be considered until after the Peace Treaty, when the future of Italy is clearer, or until after the Constituent.

The Air Ministry, therefore, has its hands tied as far as reducing personnel and improving the position as a whole is concerned. The situation does not appear to be a serious one, and will probably work itself out in time. However, it is believed that some immediate action should be taken to get a law passed which will authorize the Italian Air Ministry to discharge surplus and unwanted personnel.

By law, the Italian Air Force is still regarded as having 2,000 planes, and provisions are still worked out on that assumption. Relief of the present situation does not lie with the Italian Air Force but with the Italian Government which should alter the Air Force establishment. This situation is nevertheless likely to continue until after political stability has been restored.

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MMIA-'G'
FILE: *E/6*
DATE: *R/12/4*

WILLIAM L. LEE,
Brigadier General, U.S.
Deputy Director

165

SUBJECT:- Re-organisation - H.Q. Service.

Lord Porosa Sub-Commission A.O.
H.M.I.A.
R O M H

4/6
5 April 1946

TO : The Minister for War

Reference is made to your 208580/II of 27 Mar '46 and my discussion with you on 30 Mar '46.

1. I agree with your proposal that pending a further and wider re-organisation there should be created an Independent Inspectorate General of Motorisation.

2. I agree with the following general principles:-

- (a) there should be no overall increase in personnel.
- (b) suitable personnel already employed on motorization duties in the present Directorate would be made available to serve in the new Inspectorate but that unsuitable or unqualified personnel should be replaced by others brought in from outside.

3. I should be happy if you would appoint a Committee to discuss the details of this proposal in which my staff will be available at any time, to assist.

4. I am sure you will agree with me on the importance of selecting at the earliest possible moment the most suitable officer as the new Inspector General in order that his advice would be available during the planning of the Inspectorate.

I trust you will inform me of your nominee at an early date.

Robert Montgomery
for Major General,
H.M.I.A. 363

Copy to:- "O",
ST,
RHS.

W.S./er

SUBJECT: Allied aircraft for use by Italian services.

LAND FORCES HQ COM, AC (ASIA)

— 6/6 —

5 APR 46

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref your 1032/0/9 dated 25 March 46.

1. The question of procuring Allied aircraft for use by the Italian services has been considered by this HQ in conjunction with Air Forces S/C, bearing in mind the problems of payment, adequate servicing facilities, purchasing of spares etc., and the time spent in negotiations, it is not thought to be a sound policy.

2. For your information, the Italian Air Force is in possession of a number of types of light aircraft, which may be adaptable to observation training. Probably the best type is the I.A. 5, a light, single-engine monoplane which is now in production. Only two aircraft have been completed, and it is understood that Italian Air Ministry intend to purchase them. This HQ is informed by Air Forces S/C that further production of this aircraft would be easy and that you would probably receive the required number more quickly from this source than you would get similar aircraft from ALLIED sources.

3. It is suggested that, if the Italian Army wish to consider these aircraft, they contact the Italian Air Ministry concerning details of purchase, supply etc.

4. Air Forces S/C are however going into the question of obtaining alternatives for you should this prove to be the better course.

5. For your further information I would explain that in Italy practice Army GPs are actually piloted by Army officers who both pilot the aircraft and at the same time observe or control the GPs. The aircraft are however maintained entirely by Air Force personnel. Your suggestion that pilots should be Air Force HQs accompanied by Army observers is directly opposite to this Italy practice which has proved most successful during the recent war. You are invited to consider the respective merits of the two systems.

Copy to : AIR FORCES S/C

Major General, C-5

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref your 1282/Q/S dated 25 March 46.

1. The question of procuring Allied aircraft for use by the Italian services has been considered by this HQ in conjunction with Air Forces S/C. Bearing in mind the problems of payment, adequate servicing facilities, purchasing of spares etc., and the time spent in negotiations, it is not thought to be a sound policy.
2. For your information, the Italian Air Force is in possession of a number of types of light aircraft, which may be adaptable to observation training. Probably the best type is the A.M. 5, a light, single-engine monoplane which is now in production. Only two aircraft have been completed, and it is understood that Italian Air Ministry intend to purchase them. This HQ is informed by Air Forces S/C that further production of this aircraft would be easy and that you would probably receive the required number more quickly from this source than you would get ANIER aircraft from ANIER sources.
3. It is suggested that, if the Italian Army wish to consider these aircraft, they contact the Italian Air Ministry concerning details of purchase, supply etc.
4. Air Forces S/C are however going into the question of obtaining answers for you should this prove to be the better course.
5. For your further information I would explain that in BMT practice Army GPs are actually piloted by Army officers who both pilot the aircraft and at the same time observe or control the guns. The aircraft are however maintained entirely by Air Force personnel. Your suggestion that pilots should be Air Force WOs accompanied by Army observers is directly opposite to this BMT practice which has proved most successful during the recent war. You are invited to consider the respective merits of the two systems.

Copy to : AIR FORCES S/C

Internal: War Diary (Two)

ARG/rs

Argentine
for Major General, C-5
BMTA

TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

REF: 208350/11

TO: General BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC, G.O.C., M.M.I.A. DATE: 27.3.46

SUBJECT: Departments of the M.T. Service,

In reply to letter Q/003 of 3.1.46.

Reg. 16
B/6.

1. - I have closely examined the problem of the reorganisation of the M.T. service and have listened to the opinions of Under Secretary of State Gen. Chatrion, the Army Chief of Staff, the Inspector General of the Artillery Corps, and the Director General of Artillery and Motorisation, on the matter.
2. - Although only a year has passed since the directorates general of artillery and motorisation were combined into one department by Minister Casati, I consider that the detachment of the motorisation service from the artillery directorate general is just and conforms to the requirements of the Army, both because of the importance of the former and to lighten the latter.
3. - From the various possible solutions it is possible to discard immediately those of:
 - a) - retaining the artillery and motorisation directorate general and creating an independent motorisation inspectorate;
 - b) - retain the said directorate general, entrusting the duties of inspectorate of motorisation to that of the artillery.Both these solutions fail to realise that distinction which is the primary reason for the measure and, in substance, constitute compromises.

4.- There remain two solutions:

- either the creation of a motorisation directorate general and an inspectorate of motorisation, entrusting to the first the technical-administrative duties and to the second the duties of study, employment and training natures;
- or combine the above two departments in one single organisation.

Q.003

29-3-46
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5. - I consider that, at least initially and until there is a definite reorganisation of the Army and the central administration, which obviously can only be formed by the Government which is formed from the Constituents, it is necessary to limit ourselves to the formation of an "Inspectorate General" which will combine the duties of Directorate General and Inspectorate.

A similar organisation already exists for the Animal and Veterinary Service.

Both from the political and financial point of view, the measure would be more easily acceptable, not presenting a direct contrast to the Casati organisation.

By adopting the solution shown, we should realise all the practical ends that it is wished to obtain with the separation of the two services, without the inconveniences and obstacles deriving from an excessive multiplication of departments, which could give rise to legitimate diffidence on the part of the political and financial departments of the Government.

6. - I therefore move that we get on with the study of the executive project immediately, in agreement with the S.M.R.E.
7. - Directive principle given for such study : no increase in personnel and the employment, also for the ~~new~~ officers of the new Inspectorate General, of personnel already at disposal.

Sgd. BROSTO


Minister of War

O. Danin Sgt.

*I am sorry about this
about 30
Mar*

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MMIA - 'C'
FILE: <i>9/6</i>
DATE: <i>R/5/4</i>



Ministero della Guerra

GABINETTO

N. 1638

N. 208350/II di prot.

Roma, 27 Marzo 1946

OGGETTO : - Organi della motorizzazione. -

AL GENERALE L. BROWNING CB, OBE, MC
Capo L.F.S.C. - A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

~~~~~  
Risposta lettera Q/003 data 3 gennaio u.s. -

- 1.- Ho esaminato ampiamente il problema della riorganizzazione del servizio della motorizzazione ed ho sentito in merito il Sottosegretario di Stato Gen. Chatrian, il Capo di S.M. dell'Esercito, l'Ispettore dell'Arma di artiglieria nonché il direttore generale dell'artiglieria e motorizzazione.
- 2.- Benchè sia passato soltanto un anno da quando le direzioni generali di artiglieria e della motorizzazione vennero riunite in unico ente dal Ministro Casati, tuttavia ritengo giusto e conforme alle esigenze dell'esercito il distacco del servizio motorizzazione dalla direzione generale di artiglieria, sia per l'importanza del primo, sia per alleggerire la seconda.
- 3.- Tra le varie soluzioni possibili scarto senz'altro le due proposte di :
  - a) mantenere la direzione gen. art. e motorizzazione creando un ispettorato della motorizzazione autonomo;
  - b) mantenere la direzione generale stessa, affidando le funzioni di ispettorato della motorizzazione a quello di artiglieria.

Entrambe tali soluzioni non realizzano quella distinzione che è la ragione stessa del provvedimento ed in sostanza co-

O G G E T T O : - Organi della motorizzazione.

AL GENERALE L. BROWNING CB, OBE, MC  
Capo L.F.S.C. - A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

R O M A

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3.- Tra le varie soluzioni possibili scarto senz'altro le due proposte di :

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- b) mantenere la direzione generale stessa, affidando le funzioni di ispettorato della motorizzazione a quello di artiglieria.

Entrambe tali soluzioni non realizzano quella distinzione che è la ragione stessa del provvedimento ed in sostanza costituiscono compromessi.

4.- Restano due soluzioni :

- o creare una direzione gen. della motorizzazione ed un ispettorato della motorizzazione, attribuendo alla prima

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funzioni tecnico-amministrative ed al secondo le funzioni di studio, impiego ed addestramento;

- oppure riunire tutte le suindicate funzioni in un unico organo.

5.- Ritengo che, almeno in un primo tempo e fino alla definitiva riorganizzazione dell'esercito e dell'amministrazione centrale, che evidentemente potranno essere indicati solo dal Governo che uscirà dalla Costituente, occorra limitarsi alla costituzione di un "Ispettorato Generale", che riassume in sé le funzioni della direzione generale e dell'ispettorato.

Un organo analogo esiste già per il servizio ippico e veterinario.

Dal punto di vista sia politico, sia finanziario, il provvedimento sarebbe più facilmente accettabile, non presentando diretto contrasto con la concentrazione Casati.

Con la soluzione indicata si realizzano tutte le finalità pratiche che si volevano conseguire con la separazione dei due servizi, senza gli inconvenienti e gli ostacoli derivanti da una eccessiva moltiplicazione di organi, che potrebbe suscitare legittime diffidenze da parte degli organi politici e finanziari del Governo.

6.- Dispongo, quindi, che si passi senz'altro allo studio del progetto esecutivo, d'intesa con lo S.M.R.E.-

7.- Criterio direttivo dato per tale studio: nessun aumento di personale e utilizzazione, anche per gli Uffici del nuovo ispettorato generale, di personale già a disposizione.

IL MINISTRO

*W. J. ...*

COPY

Major General L. BROWNING, CB, OBE, MC,  
Military Mission Italian Army,

R O M E

Q.003

3 January 1945

My dear

1. Among the many subjects discussed at our meeting on 14 Dec was the Direzione Generale Artiglieria and Motorizzazioni. The need for dividing these two branches into two separate Direzioni Generali, each under its own Director General, has been represented on several occasions during recent months. I have again consulted my staff on this matter and it is considered that for the following reasons this reorganisation should take place without further delay:-

(a) As at present constituted, the Direzione Generale Artiglieria and Motorizzazioni represents predominantly artillery interests. The Director General is an artillery officer, as are most of the staff, and only a minor part of the organisation of the Direzione Generale is directly concerned with motorization matters. This is in inverse proportion to the relative importance of motorization and artillery in the Italian Army of the future. Motor Transport is the life blood of a modern army and without adequate organisation and maintenance of its motor transport the Italian Army cannot function properly.

(b) The present situation of Italian Army transport is further complicated by the diversity of types of vehicles, British, American, Italian and German, and the shortage of many kinds of spare parts. This calls for a degree of planning and management of a very high order.

The number of motor vehicles in the Italian Army is increasing steadily, and with the addition of vehicles to be handed over by the Ministry of Transport in the near future, represents a considerable outlay and a national asset which should not be liable to be wasted by mismanagement or defects of organisation.

(c) The existing organisation of workshops and repairs of Italian Army vehicles is NOT giving the required results because of:

(i) appointments of unsuitable personnel without the necessary technical qualifications or experience;

(ii) insufficient coordination of the many departments of the present Directorate concerned with the maintenance of motor transport.

(a) Road discipline in the Italian Army and maintenance of vehicles are totally inadequate, and represent one of the main causes of wastage and loss of transport. Altogether insufficient

1. Among the many subjects discussed at the meeting was the need to reorganize the Direzione Generale Artiglieria and Motorizzazioni. The need for dividing these two branches into two separate Direzioni Generali, each under its own Director General, has been represented on several occasions during recent months. I have again consulted my staff on this matter and it is considered that for the following reasons this reorganization should take place without further delay:-

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(b) The present situation of Italian Army transport is further complicated by the diversity of types of vehicles, British, American, Italian and German, and the shortage of many kinds of spare parts. This calls for a degree of planning and management of a very high order.

The number of motor vehicles in the Italian Army is increasing steadily, and with the addition of vehicles to be handed over by the Ministry of Transport in the near future, represents a considerable outlay and a national asset which should not be liable to be wasted by mismanagement or defects of organization.

The existing organization of workshops and repairs of Italian Army vehicles is not giving the required results because of:

(c) (i) Appointments of unsuitable personnel without the necessary technical qualifications or experience;

(ii) Insufficient coordination of the many departments of the present Directorate concerned with the maintenance of motor transport.

(d) Road discipline in the Italian Army and maintenance of vehicles are totally inadequate, and represent one of the main sources of wastage and loss of transport. Altogether insufficient attention has been paid to these things despite frequent recommendations by this Headquarters and by the officers of the Mission in the field.

The only explanation is that there is nobody of the right standing in the War Ministry who is sufficiently motor transport minded to correct this situation.

/... (e) It is

-2-

- (c) It is my considered opinion that the Motor Transport interests of the Italian Army (and the finances of the Italian Nation) can only be assured by this creation of an independent Direzione Generale della Motorizzazione, with a capable and energetic organizer at its head, to ensure;
- (i) appointment of the right type of personnel with proper technical qualifications and experience for motor transport, Headquarters, workshops and units;
  - (ii) adequate priority of assignment to the Motorizzazioni services of funds, spare parts, machinery, buildings;
  - (iii) reorganization where necessary to secure improved output of workshops, better maintenance etc.
2. It has been represented to me that the undoing of one of the economies sponsored by Count CASATI less than a year ago would NOT be well received by the Government. In point of fact this new proposal can be fully justified for four reasons.
- (i) I consider Count CASATI's decision was perfectly correct at the time and under the circumstances when he made it. But the big increase in the relative importance of Motor Transport during the past twelve months has completely altered the situation;
  - (ii) the fusion of Artillery and Motor Transport Directorates, although excellent in theory as a measure of economy, in practice did NOT work satisfactorily for technical reasons;
  - (iii) the capital investment involved once the army receives its full quota of vehicles, workshops etc. can best be safeguarded by an independent Motor Transport organization
  - (iv) certain economies in both the new directorates could be made to offset any new expenditure.
3. For these reasons, my dear Minister, I must advise you most strongly to undertake this division of responsibilities. I am informed that in addition to a Director General and Direzione Generale di Motorizzazioni you will need to have an Inspector General and Ispettore Generale di Motorizzazioni under S.M.P.E., to take care of certain training and maintenance aspects of this Motor Transport problem.
- Would you please let me know as soon as you have reached a decision so that our respective staff officers can meet to discuss of these proposals.

367

SIR. L. BROWNING.

AVV. FROSIO  
Minister of War

- (i) appointment of the right type of personnel with proper technical qualifications and experience for motor transport, headquarters, workshops and units;
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AVV. BROGIO  
Minister of War

SGD. L. BROWNING.

367 files

From E. of W.

to M.I.A.

MMIA - 'G

FILE: ~~RE~~ E/6

DATE: R/2/4

Transition

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| GSD I (SD)  | X |
| Dep. G3     | X |
| GSD II (SO) | X |
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| GSD II (L)  |   |
| GSD II (M)  |   |
| GSD II (N)  |   |
| GSD II (O)  |   |
| GSD II (P)  |   |
| GSD II (Q)  |   |
| GSD II (R)  |   |
| GSD II (S)  |   |
| GSD II (T)  |   |
| GSD II (U)  |   |
| GSD II (V)  |   |
| GSD II (W)  |   |
| GSD II (X)  |   |
| GSD II (Y)  |   |
| GSD II (Z)  |   |

Ref. I032/0/9

Date 25/3/46.

See Ref 164

Subject Light Aircraft for Air Observation;

1°

It is the intention of this S.M. to purchase 18 "Auster" type aircraft on repayment from the allied authorities, to carry out air observation training in accordance with the procedure in use in the British Army.

This purchase would permit;

- maintaining in training an aliquota of specialised personnel, at present dispersed on various duties.
- experimenting with the particular instructions laid down for this activity in accordance with British rules.

2°

This S.M. has drawn up a program for the employment of the machines on the following lines;

- allocation of a specimen machine to the Mil. Terr. HQs under whose jurisdiction are located infantry divisions.
- reserve of some specimens, held by this S.M. for school training requirements.
- making use of Air Force personnel - who will be temporally granted to the army - for pilots (18 N.C.O.s) maintenance and engine checking (18 tradesmen) and army personnel for all other requirements (observers, radio operators, photographers)

3°

In the event that your mission should take this ~~366~~ into consideration, I ask you to kindly inform me of the approximate release price of each machine, thus we shall have a basis on which for consequent balancing of the budget.

DAK

(XXXXXXXXXXXX)  
illegible.

CONFIDENTIAL

F62599  
MAR. 121849AH/554  
MAR. 130910

OP PRIORITY

APHQ SIGNED SACHED CITE FHGCT  
ALCOM13 MAR 1946  
RECEIVED 1309

RECEIVED

HEADQUARTERS  
13 MAR 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference your letter 8251/502/EC, 15 February.

1. Temporary decrease of interim Italian army to 125000 is authorized. To be accomplished by release of 1921 class simultaneously with March call up.
2. Calculations and projects to continue to be based on 140000.
3. Italian Government should be urged to restore full ceiling strength at soonest practicable date.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION EX COMM 2  
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
ACTION MMIA  
FILE

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Col. GS      |  |
| GSO I (D)    |  |
| Dep. G3      |  |
| GSO II (SD)  |  |
| GSO II (I)   |  |
| GSO II (W)   |  |
| GSO III (SI) |  |
| GSO III (OR) |  |
| G (Trg)      |  |

CONFIDENTIAL

MMIA - 'G'

FILE:

DATE:

0022

CONFIDENTIAL

F62599  
MAR. 121849A

H/554  
MAR. 130910

OF PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED GITE FHGCT  
ALCOM

RECEIVED

13 MAR 1946  
RECEIVED 1309

HEADQUARTERS  
13 MAR 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference your letter 8251/502/EC, 15 February.

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2. Calculations and projects to continue to be based on 140000.
3. Italian Government should be urged to restore full ceiling strength at soonest practicable date.

AC DIST

INFO ACTION EX COMM 2  
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
ACTION MMIA  
FILE

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| Col. GS       |  |
| GSO I (D)     |  |
| Dep. GS       |  |
| GSO II (SD)   |  |
| GSO II (I)    |  |
| GSO II (W)    |  |
| GSO III (SE)  |  |
| GSO III (O&B) |  |
| G (Trg)       |  |

366

Acc. C/6  
Info A  
Q

CONFIDENTIAL

MMIA - 'G'  
FILE:  
DATE:

0023  
SUBJECT : Officers Arms.

159  
LAND FORCES STAFF COM, AG, (MIA)

C/6

21 Feb 46

To : Ministry of War

158  
Reference your 202525/44 dated 15 Feb 46.

An opinion on whether or not ITALIAN officers should carry arms when not on parade with troops is to-day considered to be outside the competence of this Mission.

The matter is one solely for your own decision.

It is much regretted that your original letter dated 30 Nov 45 was mislaid in this HQ, and that you have therefore not received an earlier reply.

*Ant. Smith*  
for Major General.  
M.M.I.A.  
also  
CS

ARCS/1.7

*Ad*  
3667

0024

158A

TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

REF: 202525, 11

TO: M.M.I.A.

DATE: 15.2.46

SUBJECT: Officers arms.

158B

200 159

- 1) - In our 224773/11 of 30th. November 1945, this Cabinet submitted to your Mission the advisability of authorising officers to carry weapons.
- 2) - We should be pleased if your Mission would kindly give us its opinion on the matter.
- 3) - We enclose a copy of the above mentioned letter in case the original did not reach you.

Sgd. LOMBARDI

Col.

C. Danin Cpl.

- Col. GS
- GSO I (CD)
- Dep. G3
- GSO II (S3)
- GSO II (I)
- GSO II (S3)
- GSO II (S3)
- GSO II (S3)
- GSO II (S3)
- G (reg)

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~~20/2/46~~ 3663

20/2/46  
RJ

201130

|      |        |
|------|--------|
| FILE | RC/b   |
| DATE | R/20/2 |

## TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

REF: 224773/11

TO: M.W.I.A.

DATE: 30.11.45

SUBJECT: Officers arms.

With the transfer of the Italian Army to the control of the Italian Government it would be my intention to authorise all officers to move about armed.

This measure appears to be particularly advisable, over and above than for reasons of personal defense - greatly increased in the present time when many individuals, especially criminals, are carrying weapons - also to uphold the prestige of rank and uniform in addition to permitting the officer to intervene efficaciously - as is his duty - in case of disorders caused by assault, arrogance, or other ill advised acts.

The measure in question finds confirmation, moreover, in the statement made on the matter on the 20th. October, at a meeting held at the Genoa Military Territorial H.Q., by Capt. COTTON - English MMIA LO- in referring to instructions received on the matter from Higher Allied Authorities.

Before, however, forwarding to the Military Territorial Commands the necessary instructions, I should like to know the opinion of your Mission on the matter.

Sgd. JACINI

WarbMinister.

C. Danin Cpl.

DATE 157

REPORT

MEMORANDUM, MILITARY COMMISSION  
A.F.O. 32  
Office of the Chief Commissioner

February 1946

Ref :  
Subject : Strength of Italian Army.  
TO : ASSISTANT FORCE ESTABLISHMENTS.

9/6.  
1/4

1. Annex 7 and 8 of your Directive AS 091.711 (G(2)) dated 2 Nov 45 ("Transfer of Italian Army to Italian Government") specifies the coding of the Italian Italian Army, by categories.

2. When the strength figures of the Italian Army (incl. BRITISH and U.S.-MVS) as at 1 Jan. 1946, became known, the question of the classification of further classes was again considered and Lord Forbes Sub-Committee, A.C. (M.I.A.) letter A.247 dated 30 Jan was sent to the Minister of the War.

His reply is attached as Appendix "A" and from it can be seen that he :-

- (a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 140,000, but
- (b) states that owing to financial stringency and the necessity, under the circumstances, of immobilizing the 1921 Class period passed with the D.O. 1921, it is proposed to let the strength of the Army drop temporarily to about 125,000.

Taking everything into account, I recommend that :-

- (a) our calculations and proposals as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 140,000;
- (b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength to about 125,000, as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 2 (b);
- (c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the strength of the Army and the capacity (as in 40,000) of the D.O. 1921 to train new recruits.

I should be glad of your early approval in order that the necessary instructions may be issued by the War Ministry for the mobilization of the 1921 class in ample time to ensure smooth action.

366

be-... as at 1 Jan, become known, the... further classes are again considered and Lord Porters 300-Commission, L.O. (A.S.I.A.) letter A.217 dated 30 Jan was sent to the Minister of War - see Appendix "A".

3. This reply is attached as Appendix "B" and from 50 can be seen that the :-

(a) agrees that the Italian Army should be kept, as far as possible, up to the figure of 142,000, but  
(b) states that owing to financial stringency and the anti-ability, under the circumstances, of abolishing the 1921 Class part men with the Call-up next month, he is prepared to let the strength of the Army drop temporarily to about 125,000.

Having everything into account, I recommend that :-

- (a) our calculations and projects as regards all aspects of the Army continue to be based on the establishment figure of 142,000;  
(b) we accept a temporary reduction in strength to about 125,000, as stated by the Minister - the 1921 Class being released as in 2 (b);  
(c) the 1922 and 1923 Classes be released at some future date, depending on the strength of the Army and the capacity (some 40,000) of the C.A.S.'s to train new recruits.

5. I should be glad of your early approval in order that the necessary instructions may be issued by the War Ministry for the despatch of the 1921 class in ample time to ensure smooth action.

3667

12/6

WILLIAM A. HUGHES.  
Deputy Assistant, D.M.S.  
Chief Commissioner.

The above DRAFT submitted to Executive Commissioner, L.O. on file  
B251/MC on 5th. February 1946.

W.P.  
C.R.

0028

155

SUBJECT : Relations between Civil and Military Authorities.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AG (SMIA)

→ C/6

1 Feb 46

*Amel*

To : 2 BLU

154

Ref your G.I dated 25 Jan 46 subject as above.

1. SMIA letter G/92 dated 1 Feb 46 covers the relations between civil and military authorities, which is in the process of being sent to all BLUs.
2. For your information, Terr Comdres will be informed through proper channels.

G/92

Lester R Albert.  
1st Col Inf.  
ASST C-3 SMIA.

LRA/130

3653

154 A  
Subject:- Relations between Civil and Military Authorities.

2 BLU,  
GENOVA.  
Tel: 56575  
G 1  
25 Jan 46.

30 JAN 1945

Land Forces Sub Commission, AC (MMIA), Rome.

G/c.

1. Gen Frattini prior to his departure to assume a new appointment, discussed with this HQ the relations that existed between the Prefect of Genoa and Territorial HQ.

2. It appears that the Prefect has been issuing direct orders to Territorial HQ, as can be seen in attached Appendices.

3. As the Italian Authorities are now entirely responsible for the internal security duties of this province it is essential that perfect harmony be maintained between the civil and military authorities concerned.

4. It would be appreciated therefore if this HQ could be advised as to the degree of authority ~~invested~~ invested in a Prefect as this matter is causing embarrassment to all concerned.

850 II (SD) please advise of this.

File 155

Major  
J. B. J.

1. Gen Frattini prior to his departure to assume a new appointment, discussed with this HQ the relations that existed between the Prefect of Genoa and Territorial HQ.

2. It appears that the Prefect has been issuing direct orders to Territorial HQ, as can be seen in attached Appendices.

3. As the Italian Authorities are now entirely responsible for the internal security duties of this province it is essential that perfect harmony be maintained between the civil and military authorities concerned.

4. It would be appreciated therefore if this HQ could be advised as to the degree of authority invested in a Prefect as this matter is causing embarrassment to all concerned.

*GSO II (SD)*

*Have taken care of this.*  
*PLA*

*File 155*

*W. J. Gully*  
Major  
3073

FPD/gc

|            |                                     |
|------------|-------------------------------------|
| Col. GS    | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO I (D)  | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Det. G     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO II (G) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO II (I) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO II (S) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO II (M) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO II (C) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| G (12)     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

|       |       |
|-------|-------|
| FILE: | DATE: |
|-------|-------|

1548  
COPY/TRANSLATION

APP 'A'

PREFETTURA DI GENOVA

10 Jan 46

Divisione Gab. prot. n° 1075 P.S.

Subject:- Very urgent phonogram

To :- 2 Comando Militare Territoriale - GENOVA -  
-----

Ref this office phonogram of even reference dated 8 Jan. Please arrange that wef 2000 hrs today, until further orders, the number of men on gd duties at MARASSI prison be increased to 100 ORs and 1 offr.

(sd) ?  
for Prefetto

-----  
PREFETTURA DI GENOVA

Divisione Gab. prot. 1075 P.S.

Subject:- Very urgent phonogram

To :- 2 Comando Militare Territoriale - GENOVA -  
-----

Ref this office phonogram of even ref and yesterday's date. Please arrange that, until further orders, the number of men on gd duties at MARASSI prison be reduced to 50 ORs.

(sd) ?  
for Prefetto 3657

COPY/TRANSLATION

APP 'B'

RESTRICTED

COMANDO MILITAREVTERITORIALE DI GENOVA(II)  
S.M. Uff. Op. Add. Ordinamento e Mobilitazione  
- Sezione I<sup>a</sup> Op. e Add.

n°01/158/op.di prot.

Subject: Request for tps for gd duties.

To : The Prefetto - GENOVA -

Ref your phonograms 1075 PS dated 10 and 11 Jan. 46, both over signature "for the Prefetto".

1. In accordance with instrs received from War Ministry (....) this HQ may only comply with requests made by Prefetti for the allocation of It Army personnel for internal security requirements on its own decision and responsibility and only in cases of exceptional importance, that is, when the authys primarily responsible for internal security have exhausted all their reverses of civil police and CRR and the situation threatens to deteriorate beyond control.

2. In the case under review this HQ decided that the above conditions were prevailing and allocated tps as requested, leaving them on gd for a few days. This HQ will now review the situation and decide whether or not the tps may now be withdrawn.

3. The tone of the correspondence under discussion as well as the wording used appears to stress a measure of subordination of this HQ to your Prefettura.

Apart from the fact that Territ. Commands are in no way subordinate to local civil authys it is assumed that the person responsible for drafting the a/m comms was unaware of the standing of Territ. Commands of which there only eleven in the whole of Italy and which have in every respect, taken over the duties of the erstwhile Corps district HQs, Defence HQs and Zone HQs. Each Territorial Commands' jurisdiction extends over several provinces.

Will you please ensure that your employees are made aware of the above.

4. Lastly, please note that any future requests for tps for maint of law and order will be authorized or rejected by this HQ and on its decision alone.

Ref your phonograms 1075 PS dated 10 and 11 Jan. 46, both over signature "for the Prefetto".

1. In accordance with instrs received from War Ministry (....) this HQ may only comply with requests made by Prefetti for the allocation of It Army personnel for internal security requirements on its own decision and responsibility and only in cases of exceptional importance, that is, when the authys primarily responsible for internal security have exhausted all their reverses of civil police and CRR and the situation threatens to deteriorate beyond control.

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Will you please ensure that your employees are <sup>made</sup> aware of the above.

4. Lastly, please note that any future requests for tps for maint of law and order will be authorized or rejected by this HQ and on its decision alone.

(Sd) Gen E. Frattini

COPY/TRANSLATION

App' C'

10 Jan 46

Prefetto of GENOVA

Nº 184 GAB.

Subject:- Masonry School for repatriates.

To :- Gen FRATTINI  
GOC 2 Comando Militare Territoriale.

I asked the firm of ANSAIDO-SIAC to place at my disposal a shed to be used as a school of masonry for repatriates and ex-partisans.

The school is due to commence work immediately and will fulfill an urgent need which is particularly felt amongst this class of people.

ANSALDO have informed me that the shed they could have released for the purpose is occupied by a small number of tps.

Will you please issue immediate instrs for the release of the shed for the a/m purpose, having regard to the social and political aspects of the matter.

Please inform me of your decision.

(Sd)

?

PREFETTO

3653

COPY/TRANSLATION

App 'D'

16 Jan 46

COMANDO MILITARE TERRITORIALE DI GENOVA (II)  
Uff. Territoriale - Affari Vari

N. 09/254 di, prot. ord.

Subject:- Masonry School for repatriates.

To :- The PREFETTO - GENOVA - (ref your 184/Gab dated 10 Jan 46).

1. Further to what has often been verbally comm to the Chief of GABINETTO of your Prefettura.

a. It is not a small number of tps who are accommodated in the ANSALDO-SIAC buildings but, since Sept 45 and upon orders of the Allies, 3 GT Coy, which comprises some 250 men and 300 vehs.

b. Unconnected with the request you now make for the release of the accn, this HQ has for some time been attempting to have the a/m unit moved elsewhere.

c. Only on 9 Jan 46 did this HQ receive authy from the Allies for the move of 3 GT Coy to another locn.

d. Orders for the move will be issued as soon as the new locn is evacuated by the Allied units at present in occupation and when engr works are complete. This should be during the present month.

2. This HQ has in the past made every possible attempt to hand back accn asked for either by the local authys or by private individuals. For these buildings occupied by tps under command this HQ before 31 Dec 45 release has already been effected. For properties occupied by tps who up to that date were under command Allied authys but who were subsequently under command this HQ, the necessary measures are being taken. All past and proposed returns of properties are carried out at the expense of the comfort of the tps who have as a result to be accommodated in the few remaining government-owned buildings.

3. Leaving aside the contents of the above paras it is not

1. Further to what has often been verbally comn to the Chief of GABINETTO of your Prefettura.

- a. It is not a small number of tps who are accomodated in the ANSALDO-SIAC buildings but, since Sept 45 and upon orders of the Allies, 3 GT Coy, which comprises some 250 men and 300 vehs.
- b. Unconnected with the request you now make for the release of the accn, this HQ has for some time been attempting to have the a/m unit moved elsewhere.
- c. Only on 9 Jan 46 did this HQ receive authy from the Allies for the move of 3 GT Coy to another locn.
- d. Orders for the move will be issued as soon as the new locn is evacuated by the Allied units at present in occupation and when engr works are complete. This should be during the present month.

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3. Leaving aside the contents of the above paras it is not possible to ignore the tone in which your letter under ref is written.

This, in effect, constitutes a direct and peremptory order. Since no instrs have been received by this HQ to the effect that it is in any way subordinate to you, it is not considered possible to accept your a/q letter which is herewith returned att.

(Sd) Gen E. FRATTINI

0037

785020

SUBJECT: Reorganisation - Interim Italian Army.

02

*Italian Reorganisation*

*by C/Gen. M. M. M.*

LAND FORCES SUP COM, A.C. (SIA)

*C/Gen.*

*//*

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

*150*

Ref your 220702/11 dated 31 Dec 45.

Recruiting and Training on a Regional and National Basis

Paragraph 1 of the a/a letter together with SUP Letter 26563/105/1 of 18 Dec 45 makes the position quite clear and I agree with you entirely in the notion which you propose to adopt.

Commissioners of Regular Army Officers

- (a) I have given careful consideration to your proposals for a 4 years course of study and have had many and interesting discussions with various Senior Italian Officers and officials on the subject and I am still not convinced of the necessity for, or the desirability of such a long course.
- (b) I agree with your proposals for an initial course of 2 years after which the cadets would receive their commissions and be posted to the corps of their respective branches, for at least a year so as to develop leadership.

- (c) I consider that subsequent to this the education of the Junior Officer should be largely a practical one acquired, while serving in his unit, under the responsibility of his own Commanding Officer.

It will, of course, be necessary for him to attend certain specific courses from time to time at the appropriate army schools but these courses would not require to be of two years duration nor need they be confined to fourth and fifth years of his service.

- (d) As it will be three years before our officers will be ready to start attending post commission courses and as at present, it is not possible to foresee exactly what the layout of the various army schools will be, I would suggest that there is no need at this stage to attempt to fix the details of post commissioned instruction of the Junior Officer.

- (e) It is however essential, in my opinion, so to arrange the programme of study of the cadet during his two year course at the Military Academy, as to fit him in every way to take his place in the Army as a responsible and competent Junior Officer even the moment he receives his commission. By experience of the results of an 18 months cadet course at the Royal Military College of Sandhurst convinces me that this can be done.

Ref your 228792/VI dated 31 Dec 45.

Recruitment and Training on a Regional and National Basis

Paragraph 1 of the a/a letter together with SCS letter 26563/490/VI of 18 Dec 45 makes the position quite clear and I agree with you entirely in the conclusion which you propose to adopt.

Commissions of Regular Army Officers

- (a) I have given careful consideration to your proposals for a 4 years course of study and have had many and interesting discussions with various Senior Indian Officers and officials on the subject and I am still not convinced of the necessity for, or the desirability of such a long course.
- (b) I agree with your proposals for an initial course of 2 years after which the cadets would receive their commissions and be posted to the corps of their respective branches, for at least a year so as to develop leadership.
- (c) I consider that subsequent to this the education of the junior officer should be largely a practical one acquired, while serving in his unit, under the responsibility of his own commanding officer.
- It will, of course, be necessary for him to attend certain specific courses from time to time at the appropriate army schools but these courses would not require to be of two years duration nor need they be confined to four or fifth years of his service.
- (4) As it will be three years before new officers will be ready to start attending post commission courses and as at present, it is not possible to increase exactly what the level of the various army schools will <sup>365</sup> be at this stage, I would suggest that there is no need at this stage to attempt to fix the details of post commission instruction of the Junior Officer.
- (e) It is however essential, in my opinion, so to arrange the program of study of the cadet during his two year course at the Military Academy, as to fit him in every way to take his place in the army as a responsible and competent Junior Officer from the moment he receives his commission. My experience of the results of an 18 month cadet course at the Royal Military College of Sandhurst convinces me that this can be done.

Copy: 4  
9

13

2.12

Major General,  
M. E. I. A.



2) - The post...

2) - The post... already been mentioned directly to you  
26563/40/I dated December 18th See minutes 1, 2 and 3 + P. 70

b) - In particular;  
Recruits of class 1924 (2nd and 3rd 6-monthly period)

Recruits of class 1924 (2nd and 3rd 6-monthly period)

will be drafted to the training centres having a regional character (3600 vacancies).  
within the limits of the capacity of said centres (3600 vacancies).  
Any possible surplus over and above the capacity of the center of the  
a military territorial U.S. will be drafted to the center of the  
neighbouring military territorial U.S.'s in proportion to the available  
vacancies of each one.

Surpluses from the military territorial U.S.'s of Naples  
and Salerno will be drafted to the Bari military territorial U.S.  
Training Center, since this training centre will have no recruits  
from its own region, Puglia not being included in the call-up.

Later drafting to corps will be carried out according to  
the schedule attached to the C/M letter of the S.M.R. 364 U.S.  
which has been made out bearing in mind the policy of obtaining,  
within possibilities, units having a regional character.

2) - Commissioning of Army Regular Army officers:

To complete the commissioning of regular army officers  
a period of study is required of stated duration of not less than  
4 years, a period considered as the essential minimum, in order to  
acquire basic military principles and the specialised knowledge  
of the branch of the service.

This period of study would be split up as follows:

1) - 2 year at the military academy;

1st year : common to all branches of the service;

2nd year: with separate program for each branch of the service.

The 2 years would include:

• 18 months of actual theoretical study and practical

050800

advanced training;

- 4 months field training;

- 2 months leave;

II)- 2 years at the advanced training school of the branch of the service to complete the professional preparation and the specialist training of the officers.

III)- at the end of the courses at the Academy the cadets, appointed 2nd Lts, would not attend immediately the advanced training school; but would be sent to the corps of their respective branch of the service, in order to carry out there at least one year of service during this year the young officers would assume the command of a platoon or a section in order to become practised in regimental life, as associate with the troops, become acquainted with the requirements of a soldier, mould their character to the degree fitting their rank as an officer. This training having been completed they will be in the best condition for the necessary completion of their formation at the advanced training school of the individual branches of the service.

O. Danin Col

(Ed) Brosio L. of W.

*Bo. Trng. School*  
*Col. Danin*  
*3643*  
*37 June 40*  
*S. Brosio*

CONFIDENTIAL.URGENT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Office of the Executive Commissioner  
\*\*\*\*\*

Ref: 2608/EC.7 December 1945.

SUBJECT: Revision of Armistice Terms.

TO : A/VP, Economic Section  
A/VP, Civil Affairs Section.  
Dir, Navy Sub-Com.  
Dir, Land Forces Sub-Com (PMLE)  
Dir, Air Forces Sub-Com.  
Dir, Communications S/C.  
Chief Financial Adviser.  
Chief Legal Adviser.

1. I should be grateful if you could attend a meeting to discuss the revision and abrogation of the Armistice Terms at 1500 hours today in my office.

2. After preliminary study the way I propose to tackle the question is to have a very short document either in the form of conditions or preferably in the form of an agreement which will cover:

- (a) preamble terminating the present armistice regime;
- (b) political clauses;
- (c) future of Italian armed forces;
- (d) rights of Allied forces (this will take the form of a civil administration agreement already in draft);
- (e) economic clauses.

3. Will you be prepared to make recommendations on the points which affect your Section or Sub-Commission.

250 1 ☒ \_\_\_\_\_  
250 2 (U) \_\_\_\_\_  
250 2 (E) \_\_\_\_\_  
250 2 (W) \_\_\_\_\_  
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M S Lusk  
Brigadier,  
Executive Commissioner.

MMIA-'G'  
FILE: 2/6  
DATE: 7/12.

SUBJECT: Interview given to Signor JACCHIA, Editor  
of "Il Giornale del Mattino" by R.E. on  
Nov 21, 1945.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (MIA)

INT/114

28 Nov 45

TO : See Distribution below:

1. G.O.C. directs me to forward to you herewith for your information, the translation of an interview recently granted to the Italian press by the British Ambassador in Rome.
2. The views expressed by the Ambassador give a clear picture of the background against which MIA is to work and should be studied in this context.

X *See* X

GSO 1

GSO 2 (1)

GSO 3 (1)

GSO 4 (1)

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GSO 6 (1)

GSO 7 (1)

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LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (MMA)

INT/114

28 Nov 45

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2. The views expressed by the Ambassador give a clear picture of the background against which MMA is to work and should be studied in this context.

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0043

INTERVIEW GIVEN TO SIGMOR JACCHIA, EDITOR OF  
"IL GIORNALE DEL MATTINO" BY H.E. ON NOV 24, 1945.

Mi permetterò, anzitutto, di prospettare all'E.V. alcuni quesiti su argomenti d'ordine generale che stanno particolarmente a cuore, in questo momento, al popolo italiano.

Question

1. Come considera personalmente, e quale corrispondenza trova ancora oggi nel sentimento del popolo inglese, il contributo dato dall'Italia alla vittoria Alleata sulla Germania?

Answer

1. Anyone who has had, as I have, the opportunity of working in Italy for nearly eighteen months, is able to appreciate the contribution which democratic Italy made to the defeat of the German armies in Italy. Those who fought and died naturally come first to one's mind, and I should like to pay a special tribute to the units of the re-organised Italian army who took part in the final offensive along-side the British and American armies, also to the Italian Navy and Air-Force and to the Partisan formations who so admirably cooperated with Allied Liaison officers and who bore the long hard months of waiting and disappointment last winter with such fortitude. We must also remember the many thousands of Italians working in labour battalions, in dock yards or in factories who performed essential and useful work and thus enabled the Allied armies to put the maximum number of troops into the fighting line.

It is natural that the detail of Italy's sacrifices are not so well known in England or indeed to anyone outside Italy, but I do, I think, fairly say that the extent of it is now becoming more generally known with the correspondingly favourable change of opinion towards the Italian people.

Question

2. La resistenza popolare all'oppressione nazifascista, la guerra partigiana, l'insurrezione del Nord, il sacrificio di migliaia e migliaia di vite per la causa comune, costituiscono, a suo giudizio, titoli validi per il riconoscimento di un già conseguito riscatto morale del passato fascista?

Answer

2) Most certainly. In my opinion not only is Italy's war effort and her sacrifices in blood and wealth a title to recognition of her new attitude, but also the strenuous efforts which she is making to revive her political life on a democratic basis, entitle her to friendly consideration by the Allied powers and, speaking for my Government, I think she is receiving such consideration in large measure.

Question

- 3) E, in conseguenza, anche a prescindere dall'adempimento patto formale di cobelligeranza, pensa V.E. che l'Italia democratica debba essere considerata non più come il nemico vinto, ma come il popolo che, scosso il giogo fascista ed abbattuta la dittatura, ha voluto con tutte le sue forze e secondo il suo

# Answer

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## Answer

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## Question

3) E, in conseguenza, anche a prescindere dall'adempimento patto formale di collaborazione, pensa V.E. che l'Italia democratica debba essere considerata non più come il nemico vinto, ma come il popolo che, scosso il giogo fascista ed abbattuta la dittatura, ha voluto con tutte le sue forze e secondo il suo intimo sentimento, recare il proprio contributo alla guerra antinazista di liberazione?

## Answer

4) Mussolini's Declaration of war at a time when England's ally France was defeated, and England and the British Empire stood alone before the German armies, was an act of cowardly and misguided self-interest, which the British people cannot easily forget. It is natural that the thousands of British who fought against Italian troops in North Africa and elsewhere, must hold the Italian people in some measure responsible for supporting Mussolini's decision,

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and therefore take legitimate pride in their victory. Nevertheless, as time passes, the British troops in this country have had many opportunities of appreciating Italy's efforts to redeem her past and I believe there are few British now who do not sincerely desire to see Italy's recovery.

As regards your expression "conquer' enemy", can anyone who stops to think really believe that we w nt to treat Italy in this way?

Question

4) Nessuno ignora e misconosce in Italia l'alto spirito di giustizia e di umanità che è antico, tradizionale ed armonico della vita morale, della educazione politica e della civiltà britannica. Non riterrei, tuttavia, che la serenità di giudizio nei confronti del polo italiano sia, in talune occasioni dell'opinione pubblica, inglese male influenzata da preconcetti di sfiducia che occorrerebbe prontamente chiarificare?

Non prova, ad esempio, il lillo, l'io che, senza tenere conto della sostanziale differenza di condizioni esistenti fra i due paesi, si insisteva nel paragonare la linea e le norme della vita politica inglese a quella americana dell'Italia, per dedurre che il popolo italiano dà prova di immaturità ed è ancora veramente in regime di libertà e di democrazia?

Non sembra all'A.V. che il pensò travaglio della vita iniziò nel suo essere politico sia conseguenza diretta e fu lo sviluppo di venti anni di direzione amministrativa, della ingiusta guerra e delle miserie materiali e morali e univoco del Paese ?

L'italia deve rifarsi alle fonti nostre. Devo escludere lo scorie di cui il fascismo ha ho infettate. Devo darsi nuovi istinti. Si in politica, saggio di lucidanza e di irripetibile disorientamento l'unico naturale dei correnti e concessioni politiche contrattanti?

E in libertà il pensiero non uscirebbe gravemente minato o distrutto? E la conservazione del pensiero stesso si dannerebbe?

Oio! posto, se V.L. ritiene utile, come credo, una chiacchierata intorno non importante se in senso positivo o neg. vivo per noi l'attenzione dei presentati all'occasione verso il nostro Paese, ma li potremmo essere la forma d'ogni-  
to, all'incontro dei normali contatti diplom. tuoi o ufficiali li?

quel che si vuole e' il conseguimento (vedi lo ci' or nov. latest) di un popolo, intore che dovrebbe facilitare la ricostituzione effettiva dell'unico principio italiano.

Vale la pena, allora, secondo questo obiettivo, con tutti i suoi limiti, perseguire questi fini di informazioni, in chiave culturale, missionaria, ecc.: quanto insomma, può migliorare il popolo inglese da vera anima ed i veri intendimenti del popolo italiano, oltre ogni f'orovolo apparente?

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4) British democracy today is the result of hundreds of years political evolution. It is not a gift from heaven.

serenità. Il fatto che l'opinione pubblica inglese non influenzerà in modo decisivo la politica estera del paese, che occorrerebbe prevedere un chiarimento?

Non trova, ad esempio, all'idea che, senza tenere conto della sostanziale differenza di condizioni economiche tra i due paesi, si insisteva nel paragonare la linea e la natura della vita politica inglese e quella francese della linea, per definire che il popolo francese ha prova di insubordinazione ad un governo, veri e propri in regime di libertà e di democrazia?

Non sembra all'U.V. che il pensiero di Vaglio della vita ideale sul piano politico sia conseguenza diretta e naturale dell'attuale situazione di guerra e delle materie materiali e morali correnti del paese?

Ma il che deve rifarsi allo fondamento. Dove esprimerle le scorie di cui il fascismo ha la infettività. Dove darvi nuovi incentivi. E in realtà, segno di decadenza e di irreversibile disorientamento l'attuale materiale correnti e concezioni politiche correnti?

Il la libertà di pensiero non uscirebbe governante almeno da una concezione del pensiero stesso al punto di chiuderla?

Cio' posto, se V.M. ritiene utile, come credo, una chiarezza non importa se in senso positivo o negativo per noi italiani. Qui prendono in considerazione verso il nostro paese, su di potremmo essere le forme degenerate, all'incirca sui normali contrasti di potere e ufficio?

Ma che si vuole e' il costituzionalismo. Ma lo di un nuovo istituto dei due popoli, intesa che dovrebbe e' allargare la partecipazione effettiva della politica all'opinione pubblica.

Vale la pena, allora, secondo questo obiettivo, con una più intensa stampa, tempestiva e di informazioni, per i due culturali, missionari, spacciati, ecc.: quanto tempo, per il popolo inglese la vera anima ed i veri intenti del popolo italiano, oltre ogni e' necessario apprezzamento?

Answer:

British democracy today is the result of hundreds of years political evolution in circumstances of peace and freedom from invasion which is not been the good fortune of many highly civilized European countries to date. We recognize that the political system which the British have chosen to build their own people would not achieve fully until those of other countries. I do not believe that any responsible British, or even a world body, could be imposed on the liberation of the British system of government, on any other people, any want to build any other people democracy. Independent nations that are not to adopt our own views on democracy.

There are, nevertheless, certain fundamental rules of political practice which are common to the constitution of any country which has the right to call itself truly democratic. They have been repeatedly stated by the Allied leaders during the war. They are:-

1. The freedom of the individual to vote for whom he likes and for what he likes without fear of violence or intimidation.
2. Respect for the law.
3. Respect for the authority of the Government as representing the will of the majority of the people.
4. Respect for the liberty of the minority by the majority and for the authority of the majority by the minority.

There is no reason to believe that the majority of the Italian people are not firmly persuaded of the importance of these rules, and I am sure that no outside power would seek to limit their authority to adopt whatever political system was judged best suited to the needs of the country.

I believe that close understanding between countries can only be founded on full and accurate information, and welcome any exchange of contacts whether political, journalistic or cultural which can serve this end. It is a matter of satisfaction to me that the Italian press is now beginning to have its own correspondents in England, and I look forward to the day when communications between our two countries will have so far improved as to allow a regular exchange of visits by representative figures in all fields of public and professional life.

#### Question

5) V.E. ha visitato, se non erro, vaste regioni dell'Italia. Quali impressioni ha tratto dai contatti che ha avuto e dalle indagini che ha compiute? La domanda si riferisce tanto alle condizioni generali del Paese sul terreno economico, che alle possibilità di ripresa industriale e di ricostruzione agricola, possibilità subordinate, naturalmente alla collaborazione antichevole ed agli aiuti Alleati.

Come considera le necessità alimentari dell'Italia -specialmente in vista del prossimo inverno - i rifornimenti di carbone, di materie prime e di manufatti? Quali sono le disposizioni Alliate in proposito?

#### Answer

5) It is obvious that the war, and in particular the long division of the country into enemy and Allied territory, has done great damage to the economic structure of Italy. Nevertheless, I think that there are hopeful signs of revival.

In the first place the rapidity of the Allied advance in the spring of this year, and the prompt and effective actions of the partisans, prevented the destruction by the Germans of many vital centres of industrial production.

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In the first place the rapidity of the Allied advance in the spring of this year, and the prompt and effective actions of the partisans, prevented the destruction by the Germans of any vital centres of industrial production. The plants are for the most part intact, and only require raw material and fuel to start work at full pressure. The Allies are doing their best to satisfy Italy's essential needs in this respect, and I may refer you to the recent delivery of substantial quantities of coal, wool, cotton etc.

Great Britain is doing and will continue to do her best to make such contributions as she can, but it would be unreasonable to expect too much from her.

For nearly six years, Great Britain to a greater extent than any other country in the world, put her national wealth and resources into winning a war from which she has emerged victorious but poor.

If we are not to suffer the same fate as Italy, we must have a strong and prosperous Italy, and we should certainly supply whatever we can spare.

Before the war, Italy's economy, based on Fascist policy, was in many ways unbalanced and ill-suited to her needs. I have no doubt that the Italian Government will wish to eliminate or reduce any race radically revise those Fascist run or Fascist subsidized industries which contributed nothing to the welfare of the country, and will wish to concentrate Italy's industrial capacity on the manufacture of those things which contribute most to the welfare of her people.

Italy is going to face a hard winter, but at my time it will be without the hated presence of Germans on her soil, and I hope that with the improvements of communications allowing for the transport of food from production centres to the cities, the exertions of U.M.B.R., the Italian Government and the Allied Commission, she will get through without great suffering, and be well on the road to recovery next spring.

Finally, I should like to associate myself with the remarks of the Italian Foreign Minister in another context. Signor di Giampà said that whether Italy was or was not a great power politically or militarily she was certainly a great power in her labour resources. In my opinion there is not only an abundance of labour in this country, there is also a great capacity to work. I have been impressed in my travels through Italy by the outstanding efforts which the Italian people, whether individually or collectively, are making to restore their country. I believe this determination to put their country once more on its feet is a factor of the greatest importance and that in long as it lasts Italy need have no fear for the future.

#### Conclusion

6) Ritorno V.E. one il popolo italiano si rende conto di quanto sta a rischio il suo paese, e per questo si muove per difenderlo, lo per due milioni.

#### Conclusion

6) I believe that the Italian people are generally appreciative of the efforts which the British are making to help them during this war, and that however many faults they may find with the Allies in Italy, they are fully aware that but for their presence the Germans and the Fascist regime would be the firmly installed. Nevertheless, I am bound to say that I am astonished at the widespread ignorance which exists in Italy about Great Britain's war effort. In November 1944, the British Government published a White Paper giving details of this enormous achievement. Any I remind you of some of them.

Out of a total population of forty-seven millions, thirty million are within the Government's war-time registration scheme. Of these 47% served in the armed forces, Civil Defence or munitions, 26% in agriculture, mining or other essential industries, and 27% in the building (including armaments and barracks), civil engineering and clothing trades. Only one fifth of the labour in the armed forces of the Government was used to work for civilian needs. The labour



One in every three houses in the U.K. was damaged by enemy action, and one in every twenty-eight destroyed or made totally uninhabitable.

I love to wish to continue this record indefinitely and figures can be meaningless unless it is understood that behind them lies the story of millions of English men and women living and working under more or less continuous air attack, their homes broken up, and they themselves deprived of practically every comfort or little luxury which makes a life of unrelenting hard work bearable.

Further, no set of figures can ever express the full contribution which Great Britain made. To the United Nations' war effort her scientists contributed radium, penicillin, the perfected invasion plans, and her ships in the construction of the atomic bomb. Above all she gave people of all nations faith. It is useless to speculate on what might have happened had Great Britain and the Empire surrendered in 1940. She did not, and by so doing she brought faith and hope to the millions of Europeans who were living under the Nazi domination.

Even now that the war is over, the British people have not come to the end of their sacrifices. One of the first things which the British Government did after the Armistice was to reduce the food and clothing rations. Europe is crying out for supplies, and the British people have willingly foregone part of their rations they had during the war to feed and clothe the destitute people of Europe.

In the effort to win the war, Great Britain disposed of the greater part of her foreign assets, and has also lost a large part of her other invisible exports. She has moreover run up very substantial sterling debts to neutral countries and the Empire. A great part of British production is now being turned on to the manufacture of export goods to replace these debts. It is our hope that before long we shall recapture the markets which we had to surrender during the war, but I cannot emphasize too strongly that the change from war production to peacetime production will mean practically no relief to the individual Englishman. I think it is important that foreign countries which may be impressed by the sight of Great Britain's apparent wealth should understand that though we have every intention of recovering our former economic position, we have no illusions about the price it is going to cost us.

Question

7) Vorrei permettere, a questo punto, di proporre a V.E. alcuni quesiti in merito di politica estera:

3633

(a) Vede la loro utilità come un problema per lo stato, o la loro utilità nell'industria? Vede come la loro utilità sia di conseguenza diversa da quella di un'industria; o come la loro utilità sia di conseguenza diversa da quella di un'industria; o come la loro utilità sia di conseguenza diversa da quella di un'industria?

Answer

7) (a) The question of the use of the treaty with Italy cannot be considered by itself. Great Britain has a different attitude towards Italy, I am under the

Great Britain made. In the United States, the war effort has been concentrated on the production of the atomic bomb. It is useless to speculate on what might have happened had Great Britain and the Empire, surrendered in 1940. She did not, and by so doing she brought faith and hope to the millions of Europe who were living under the Nazi domination.

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#### Question

7) Vorrei permettermi, a questo punto, di proporre a V.E. alcuni quesiti in materia di politica estera:

3633

(a) Vedo la nave italiana come un problema per lo stato, e lo comprendo nella misura in cui, prima o poi, che la Marina Unita si sono presentate da istaurare; online di fronte a tale situazione, diretti in un'equilibrata della pace tra i popoli e alla definitiva estinzione di ogni rischio fascista?

#### Answer

7) (a) The question of the peace treaty with Italy cannot be considered by itself. Great Britain has obligations towards her allies. I can understand and sympathize with Italy's desire for an early revision of her position status, though I think people here are perhaps somewhat inclined to underestimate Italy's difficulties. Nevertheless I can see no reason for Italy's request in a world order established and maintained by all the United Nations.

#### Question

7) (a) Vorrei permettermi di proporre a V.E. alcuni quesiti in materia di politica estera, appropriati al momento attuale della guerra mondiale.

- 6 -

Answer

- 7) (b) For the West, Italy will ultimately have and indeed has already, an opportunity of making important contributions to international peace and the extirpation of Fascism. Even now she can take steps to see that not only the individuals responsible for Fascism, but also the attitude of mind which produced Fascism are for ever eliminated from her national life. In the future she can appear with her hands cleansed of her immediate past and take the place to which her long tradition of liberty and culture entitles her as a full and equal member of the United Nations.

Question

- 7) (c) Non rivolgo, naturalmente, a V.V. domande specifiche in relazione ai problemi delle frontiere. Potrebbe tuttavia, V.V. manifestarmi a grandi linee il suo pensiero sui criteri generali d'ordine morale e di diritto che dovrebbero ispirare la pace per l'Italia?

Answer

- 7) (c) The principles governing the British Government's attitude towards the revision of frontiers have been publicly stated. In common with the Government of the United States, we consider that wherever possible frontiers should be decided on the ethnic principle. We recognize, however, that in certain parts of Europe this principle, owing to the intermingling of local populations, can either not be applied, or can only partially be applied. It may be that transfers of populations may solve the difficulties. Furthermore it will be our object to ensure that no fundamental human right is disregarded and that people will be able to live and work securely and peacefully in accordance with their legitimate desires wherever they may be.

Question

- 7) (d) Che tema in materia di riparazione?

Answer

- 7) (d) The question of reparations is not for any one of the Allied powers to decide. Nevertheless, I think I may say that His Majesty's Government would not support any claims to reparations which might seriously damage Italy's chance of recovery.

Question

- 7) (e) Se la politica dell' Italia democratica non risponda, come si intende, ad obiettivi imperialistici, ma nuove, in questo campo, da necessitare di lavoro da da concetti puramente sociali, si può inhibire all'Italia l' espulsione di determinate attività coloniali?

(r) Data la buona prova offerta in passato, la missione di civiltà adempita, gli enormi investimenti di denaro e di fatica, le realizzazioni insubordinatamente conseguite, sarebbe giusto togliere all'Italia le colonie pre-

3637

Question

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3637

Question

7) (e) Se la politica dell'Italia democratica non risponde, come si vede, ai cubietti imperialistici, si muove, in questo campo, la necessità di limitare la concezione puramente sociale, di più, inibire all'Italia l'espansione di determinate attività coloniali?

(f) Data la buona prova offerta in passato, la missione di civilizzazione, gli enormi investimenti di denaro e di fatica, la realizzazione indubbiamente conseguita, sarebbe giusto trasferire all'Italia le colonie pro-fasciste?

(g) E quale, a suo giudizio, potrebbe essere - in subordine - il miglior regime coloniale da adottare? Colonie o impero?

Answer

7) (e)(f)(g) The future of Italy's colonies is a question which does not concern the British Government alone; there is, therefore, no way in reply to your questions on this subject. I have no doubt, however, that the British Government would be glad to consider any theory which might be put forward by Italy, and that it would be able to make any theory no doubt have the support of the British Government. I am a socialist for an socialist for her surplus in production and for a socialist in the of the labour and wealth expended in production. I will not say a socialist in the account.

Question

8) Sempre a proposito della pace con l'Italia, dato l'ingrandimento della regione e della firma del trattato, non troverebbe utile, anche a soprattutto agli effetti del consolidamento interno, accordare al nostro Paese uno status provvisorio in sostituzione delle attuali condizioni armistiziali che ostacolano gli sviluppi ricostruttivi della vita italiana?

Answer

8) The British Government would, I think, certainly be glad to examine most sympathetically any request from the Italian Government for an agreement aimed at restoring Italy's status to something more approaching normality and is well aware that continuance of the armistice regime is irksome to the Italians. Nevertheless, I feel bound to say that there appear to be many misconceptions about the original nature of this instrument, and even all of the extent to which it has been applied and is still being applied. Now that the armistice terms have been published, I think many Italians must be agreeably surprised at the liberal interpretation which has been given to some of its more severe clauses, and will agree that the fact that the Allies have not chosen to exercise their powers under this instrument is a proof of the confidence they have felt in the new Italy.

Question

9) Preghiamo in ultimo Sir Noel Charles di manifestarci il suo pensiero sulle cooperazioni avvenire italo-orientali.

Answer

9) This subject is so large that I feel I must confine myself to rejecting in general terms what I have already said. The British Government and the British people have, in Mr. Eden's words, no intention of treating Italy as though Mussolini were still in power. The machinery of international settlement is unfortunately often slow and cumbersome; nevertheless, it is our hope that Italy will shortly regain her rightful place in the world, and I look forward to the day when Great Britain and Italy can resume in full the closest political, cultural and economic associations which bound our two countries together for so many years before this war.

Typed by: JN  
JD

27 Nov 45.

3636

( ) Organization of Interior Italian Army

MEMO FOR THE SUB COM, I.C. (EXIA)

6/6

To: Ministry of War

Reference your 22322/11 dated 13 Nov 45.

1. I am directed to express to you General BROWNING's satisfaction that on such a great majority of the matters discussed his views are in accordance with those of the Ministry of War.

2. General BROWNING would, however, be grateful for details of the proposals by which you intend to recruit, train and employ INFANTRY troops on a regional basis, whereas employment of the rest of the Army is to be on a national basis. (Para. 3 of your letter refers).

3. General BROWNING further considers (ref. para. 10) that the intended period of four years for the training of young officers is excessive, and would like in due course to have further discussion with you on this point.

4. Will you please consider the matters raised in my paras. 2 and 3 above, and let me have your proposals and reasoning at your earliest convenience, in order that General BROWNING may further examine these questions?

22/11/45

see FOS 16/11/45

*Attentively*  
Lt-Col.  
G.B.

Copy to: 'a'

Appendix 3

in an I he letter on the answer of other  
it arrives *MB*

3635

Action re paras 2 & 3  
transferred to G (reg). *MB*

*14/11*

1. ATTACH attached to G/6 of 23 Nov 45

GSO1  
-----

G.O.C's. note below for action by 'G' to be passed to War Ministry in substance of reply to folio 24 (file A.016).

Transfer to your 'G' file and send copy of your reply to 'A' for their file A.016.

"WP" Col A/Q 22 Nov 45

-----

Office Note

Ref Ministry of War 224922/11 of 13 Nov 45.

1. I agree with all paras except 5 and 10.

2. Ref para.5

How do Ministry of War envisage ALPINE troops fitting into the ORBAT and scheme for 140,000?

I should like their detailed proposals for their ALPINE projects.

3. Ref para.10

I think four years is much too long. It is the old question of training in leadership balanced against technical training.

"LB" 22 Nov 45

Say I am delighted that so many of our views agree with theirs. 363

GEO 1

COEF

TRAINING

GEO 2

GEO 3

FROM : Ministry of War

REF : 224922/11

TO : M.H.I.A.

DATE : 13/11/45

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of the Army (meeting of the Military Territorial Commanders).

As is known, on the 29th and 30th of October I held a meeting of the Military Territorial Commanders to discuss matters, relative to the organisation of the Army, which were considered in letters G/5 of the 14 Sept and DO/2 of the 23rd Oct., of your Mission.

The detailed and profound examination of the subjects under discussion gave rise to the following conclusions:

1. Not to abandon the principle of "general obligation" (conscription and "personal obligation" to military service) in the Army, therefore of a mixed system: 50 - 60% volunteers, 50 - 40% conscripts;

2. To lay down:

for the volunteers: a 5 year period of service, giving the better elements the opportunity to sign on again;

for the conscripts: a 12 month period of service.

3. To reduce the numbers obtained from the conscript call-up, by means of rigorous physical selection and ample exemptions for employment and family reasons. Only in the case of the number to be absorbed - after exemption - being larger than that required, will resort to lottery be made.

4. To carry out ball-ups every four months.

5. To carry out assignments to the training centres on a regional basis (in the sense that each Military Territorial Command trains the recruits of its region), and assignments to the Corps by the training centres, on a national basis. Alpine troops will be trained, recruited, and employed on a regional basis.

6. To divide the recruits between arms and services, at the centres, after the first month of training, unless a further examination of the question reveals the advisability of carrying out said division at the districts.

7. To form only one training centre for each Military Territorial Command (rather than 1st and 2nd class centres).

8. Not to form like centres at each Infantry and Internal Security Division.

9. To carry out: selection of specialists at the training centres; confirmation and appointment at the Corps.

As is known, on the 29th and 30th of October I held a meeting of the Military Territorial Commanders to discuss matters, relative to the organisation of the Army, which were considered in Letters G/3 of the 14 Sept and D/2 of the 23rd Oct., of your Mission.

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6. To divide the recruits between arms and services, at the centres, after the first month of training, unless a further examination of the question reveals the advisability of carrying out said division at the districts.

7. To form only one training centre for each Military Territorial Command (rather than 1st and 2nd class centres).

8. Not to form like centres at each Infantry and Internal Security Division.

9. To carry out: selection of specialists at the training centres; confirmation and appointment at the Corps.

10. To lay down courses for the preparation of Regular Army officers (Academy and Advanced Training School) of a total duration of not less than four years, the period considered as the indispensable minimum for the making of a good officer.

11. To keep, for the time being, the depots and districts separate, postponing the examination of the possibility of joining them together later on, until the organisation has been positively defined.

Signed: JACIERI

War Minister.

Translated by: Cpl DANIEL O.  
Typed by : Cpl WARD J.

19 Nov 45

DISTRIBUTION: Action : G/6

'A'

TRC

NOTES ON CONFERENCE G.O.C.

Present

G.O.C.  
Col A/Q  
GS I SD  
GS II TRG

1. Call-up

The practicability of the four monthly call up was agreed.

2. Accommodation and Training of 40,000 recruits.

40,000 Recruits will be called up at the end of February. Training centres will by that time be ready both as regards staff and accommodation.

3. Instructors.

In order to cater for the larger numbers concerned, squads will have to be bigger than was originally intended. They will still, however be small enough for good instruction.

4. Barracks.

M of W have prepared a list of Barracks needed. This will be vetted by 'G' and 'Q' and steps taken to complete repairs etc as soon as possible.

5. War Establishments.

Figures are now being worked out from which war estabs for Cesano Group and T.T.C. will be written. The T.T.C. estab will be based on an original intake of 3,000 plus a progressive increment for each additional 500.

6. MMIA Memorandum.

As a result of the 'G' conference at Milan, and various conferences with M of W, it can be seen that certain changes are necessary in the W.E. of Inf Divs etc.

Based on Minutes of Milan conference MMIA will produce a comprehensive memorandum to crystallise the project to date.

This should be ready not later than the 7/10th December.

A copy will be sent to AFHQ for information.

7. Demobilisation.

The rate of demobilisation will be governed by the rate of effective intake. Under no circumstances will the strength of the army be allowed to drop below a figure compatible with operational efficiency. It must be ready always to cope with disorder in the country without having to call in Br tps to help maintain order.

363

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3631

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The rate of demobilisation will be governed by the rate of effective intake. Under no circumstances will the strength of the army be allowed to drop below a figure compatible with operational efficiency. It must be ready always to cope with disorder in the country without having to call in Br tps to help maintain order.

8. Territorial HQ.

The 7,000 allowed for T.H.Q. should be implemented as soon as possible.

9. New W.E. (BLU).

A signal has been sent to G.H.Q. asking for implementation of new BLU W.E. immediately.

2/.....

- 2 -

Conferences.

A monthly conference between MMIA and comds BLU would help everyone. They should be held alternately in Milan or Rome.

The next conference should be about the middle of December.

A 'Q' conference in Milan would help BLU to settle their conversion difficulties.

3629

140  
SUBJECT : Conference Notes-Interim Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COMM, AD. (MFA)

0/6

10 29 Nov 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

(Personal for GENERAL MUZZI)

Herewith Notes on yesterday's Meeting held at  
this HQ.

2. General BROWNING has studied and discussed the Notes, and approves of the agreements which were reached.

3. I am directed to request that you will press forward the "study of relative costs" mentioned in para 1: also that you would provide the plan, referred to in para 3 (d) for affiliating regiments to regions, at the earliest possible moment, together with your views on the question of special regiments and battalions, such as the ALPINI.

4. (a) General BROWNING also requests that you will institute forthwith a detailed study of the proportion of Regular long service cadre to your total Interim Army of 140,000 which you consider would produce the optimum efficiency and balance.

(b) The study should show the full basis of calculations e.g. number of regular officers required for command and staff, for regimental duty, as technical officers, the number of regular NCOs required, and how both officer and NCO figures were reached; the number of tradesmen and specialists required, in view of the time required to train them etc.

(c) As soon as this study is received, General BROWNING would consider what further action should be taken to obtain your requirements.

(PERSONAL FOR GENERAL BROWN)

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2. General BROWNING has studied and discussed the Notes, and approves of the agreements which were reached.

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(c) As soon as this study is received, General BROWNING would consider what further action should be taken to obtain your requirements.

ARCS/sb  
INFO : A

*S. P. Dwyer*

Lt. Col.  
CS

NOTES ON MEETING HELD AT MMIA  
ON THE 8TH NOVEMBER WITH  
GENERAL LUZZI AND COL PIACENTINI OF SMRE  
ON THE TERMS OF SERVICE AND MANPOWER SITUATION  
THE INTERIM ITALIAN ARMY

MMIA Officers Present

Colonel Pidsley  
Lt Colonel Albert  
Lt Colonel Gilmore  
Lt Colonel Southby  
Major Medlam  
Major Christie

Interpreters

Major Baumann  
Captain Pacini

1. Conditions of Service, relative strengths of permanent cadre and conscript element.

The SMRE opinion was that the optimum was 50% regular, 50% conscript whereas under present circumstances they did not see their way clear to enlisting more than 20% as regulars. While agreed that this was not sufficient to provide all the officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists which would be necessary to lead, train and administer the interim army, it was suggested that the obstacle to a larger regular cadre was "finance". In view of this obstacle, which MMIA felt was only a vague one, it was agreed that SMRE would produce a study of the relative costs of maintaining soldiers on both the regular and the conscript bases bearing in mind the current cost of living and the fact that the actual pay handed to him over the pay table was only a very small proportion of that needed for his complete upkeep. As soon as this study is ready, we will meet again and consider from it the relative costs of a conscripted and a regular army bearing in mind that for equal effectiveness the conscripted army must be very much larger than a regular one because of the complete turn-over of the whole army annually.

2. Future Intake.

In order to maintain the interim army at the approved figure of 140,000 and to permit the gradual demobilisation, SMRE proposed to call up from those regions which had not yet been called up the 1925 class and the remaining 2/3 of the 1924 class. The total yield of this class is estimated at 200,000 of which 120,000 might be selected in three intakes of 40,000 each; the first 40,000 to be ready by the last week in February. Without prejudice to future call-up arrangements, it was agreed that this call-up of approximately 40,000 in February should be proceeded with and that arrangements should be made to take approximately 3,600 recruits in to the training centres on the first of March.

3. Distribution of Recruits.

- 2 -

It was agreed:-

- (a) That new intake into the army would be trained at depots within the territorial regions from which they were called up.
- (b) That all regional training centres would be approximately the same size.
- (c) That surplus men called up in any of the heavily populated regions would be transferred for training to centres in the under-populated regions.
- (d) That after training, men would be posted to units stationed away from their regions in such a way that men from a particular region would all serve in a particular unit. SMRE agreed to produce a plan affiliating regiments to regions and at the same time to consider the question of special regiments or battalions such as Alpine, etc. In the case of the islands, SMIA would examine the provision of sea transport.

4. Demobilisation.

SMRE referred to the proposals for demobilising the 1921, 1922 and 1923 classes, who, they stated, had been under arms a long time, were getting restive and should not come in contact with the new call-up of the 1924 and 1925 classes. Col. Pidsley explained the danger of promising early demobilisation which later could not be fulfilled, and gave as the worst situation that the 1921 class might not be demobilised before May and at the best that it might be in March. Final decision could not be given until after Christmas when we knew the result of the Christmas wastage, whether large numbers of BR-ITI and US-ITI service troops would become available for the Italian Army, how many volunteers were coming in under the voluntary scheme and how the prospects of the call-up were going. If all of these conditions were favourable, we might demobilise the 1921 class in March and the 1922 in April.

5. Leave.

Col. Pidsley asked SMRE to consider the question of leave in the interim army, and felt that if recruits were given leave immediately after their training before leaving their regions it would ease the transportation problem and should suffice for the period of their twelve-months' service. SMRE undertook to look into this question and make recommendations.

(Signed) W. PIDSLEY.

361, SMIA.

je

8 Nov 45

COPY

Spec

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

AG 091.711 G(ED)-0

SUBJECT: Handover of Italian Army to Italian Government.

TO: Chief Commissioner  
Allied Commission  
APO 594

FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (MILIA)

.....  
: E H G R E T :  
: Auth: SAC, IT :  
: Initials: :  
: Date: 2 Nov 45 :  
: ..... :  
: 2 November 45 :  
: .....

*Frederick*

I.

ORIGINAL

1. Approval has now been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the interim policy to be adopted towards the Italian Armed Forces pending a final settlement by peace treaty. You will therefore inform the Italian Government that the following arrangements will be made for the hand-over of the Italian Army to their control and for its future organization, training and administration.

II.

#### HANDOVER OF ITALIAN ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL

2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hrs, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the III-ITF category together with the five BR-ITF combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in BR-ITF category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

#### 3. Future of US-ITF and BR-ITF Units

(a) US-ITF and BR-ITF units less the five BR-ITF combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Force Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to 100,000. It is estimated that in the case of US-ITF personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of BR-ITF personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-ITF and BR-ITF personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

(b) Administration and maintenance of US-ITF and BR-ITF Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

4. Future of Carabinieri. Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and over-riding authority of AMG in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

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2. Transfer of Units. With effect from 2400 hrs, 14 November 1945, units of the Italian Army that are now in the IRI-III category together with the five IR-III combat groups and their support units and 10,000 Carabinieri now held in IR-III category will be transferred to the control of the Italian Government. Allied commanders will have no powers of command over such units except as stated in paragraph 5, below.

3. Future of US-III and IR-III units

(a) US-III and IR-III units less the five IR-III combat groups referred to above will continue to be employed in accordance with existing arrangements as long as they are needed by the Allied Military authorities. Such units will remain under the operational command of Allied Forces Headquarters. The numbers employed will gradually be reduced to NIL. It is estimated that in the case of US-III personnel, this stage will be reached in approximately February 1946 and in the case of IR-III personnel in approximately June 1946. When no longer needed by the Allied military authorities, US-III and IR-III personnel or units will be offered to the Italian Government.

(b) Administration and maintenance of US-III and IR-III Service Units, and the Italian Navy and Air Force will be in accordance with paragraph 10, below.

4. Future of Carabinieri Control of the Carabinieri will be the responsibility of the Italian Government subject to the supervision and over-riding authority of AMF in those areas which remain outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Strength will not exceed 65,000 which will be additional to any ceiling figure agreed for the Italian Army. The Carabinieri will be used for civilian security purposes only and will not be responsible for military security.

5. Reservations

(a) The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre reserves the right to assume command at any time of the whole or any part of the Italian Army located in the theatre, and to delegate his authority to command formations and units of the Italian Army to any Allied commander whom he may direct.

(b) The Italian Government will furnish to the Supreme Allied Commander such information regarding the strength, organization, training, movements, administration, real estate, stocks of material and equipment, and other matters concerning the Italian Army as may be required from time to time.

(c) Italian troops in territory not handed back to the Italian Government, and 806 US Battalion although included in the ceiling set out in paragraph 7 below, will remain under operational command of Allied Force Headquarters for the time being.

## 6. Military Mission

(a) An Allied Military Mission will be provided to advise and assist the Italian Government in the organization, training and administration of the Italian Army and Carabinieri and to obtain and transmit to superior authority such information as is required. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Force Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for supervising those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied Military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

(b) The Allied Military Mission will for the present be the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (ALFA). A revised directive to the Land Forces Sub-Commission (ALFA) will shortly be issued.

## III

### FUTURE ORGANISATION, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATION.

7. Organization. During the interim period until the peace treaty becomes operative the Italian Army under control of the Italian Government will consist of not more than 140,000 personnel and will be organized on the following lines:

#### (a) Local Reserves

|                                                                                                |         |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Three Internal Security Divisions each of 5,000 men,<br>two in SICILY and one in SARDINIA..... | 15,000. |
| Ten Independent Brigades each of 2,500 men for ten<br>Territorial regions on the mainland..... | 25,000. |
| Total.....                                                                                     | 40,000. |

#### (b) Mobile Reserves

Five combat groups and supporting troops.

|            |         |
|------------|---------|
| Total..... | 50,000. |
|------------|---------|

#### (c) Command

362

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

Headquarters

|            |        |
|------------|--------|
| Total..... | 9,000. |
|------------|--------|

#### (d) Administration

|            |         |
|------------|---------|
| Total..... | 31,000. |
|------------|---------|

destruction of the Italian Army and Government. The Italian Government will normally accept the advice of this Mission. If it should find itself unable to do so, the matter will be referred to Allied Forces Headquarters by the Allied Military Mission. The Mission will also be responsible for screening those demands for supplies and equipment which continue to be met from Allied Military sources, and will exercise supervisory control over the use of such materials.

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##### (b) Mobile Reserves

|                                           |         |
|-------------------------------------------|---------|
| Five combat groups and supporting troops. |         |
| Total.....                                | 50,000. |

362

##### (c) Command

Ministry of War and Territorial Region

|              |            |        |
|--------------|------------|--------|
| Headquarters | Total..... | 9,000. |
|--------------|------------|--------|

##### (d) Administration

|            |         |
|------------|---------|
| Total..... | 31,000. |
|------------|---------|

##### (e) Training and Reinforcements

|            |          |
|------------|----------|
| Total..... | 10,000.  |
|            | 140,000. |

8. No alteration to the general layout shown above will be made by the Italian Government without the consent of Allied Forces Headquarters. Detailed requirements within the above framework will, however, be worked out as a matter of urgency by the Italian Government, as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MFLA) and reported to Allied Forces Headquarters.

9. Training. The training of the Italian Army will be the responsibility of the Italian Government as advised by the Land Forces Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission (MFLA).

3/.....

# 10. Administration

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945 the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the administration of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri. Administrative units required will be formed from within the authorised ceiling so that the Italian Army is self-administering and no longer dependent on Allied base and lines of communication units.

(b) Italian Navy and Italian Air Force personnel will continue to be administered and maintained as at present, through Italian service channels.

(c) BR-ITI personnel in diluted British units will continue to be administered and maintained as at present. BR-ITI Army Service units will continue to be administered and maintained through Italian service channels, except in respect of the provision of rations. With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision and issue of rations will be as follows :-

(1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued to such units through British Service channels.

(2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian Administrative channels.

(d) US-ITI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US Service channels.

## 11 Maintenance and Provisioning

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in Paragraph 7 above and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri:-

(1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorised by Allied Force Headquarters.

(2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.

(3) Through the Italian Government import programme.

(c) As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 (b) above, will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import program the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources

except in respect of the responsibility for provision of 14 November 1945, responsibility for provision as follows :-

- (1) The British portion of the ration only will be issued direct to such units through British Service channels.
- (2) The Italian portion of the ration will be issued direct to units through Italian Administrative channels.

(d) US-IMI Service Units will be administered and maintained through US Service channels.

11 Maintenance and Provisioning

(a) With effect from 2400 hours, 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will assume responsibility for the maintenance of the Italian Army outlined in Paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri.

(b) Procurement in respect of food, clothing, medical stores, warlike and non-warlike equipment will be effected from the following sources and in the following priorities subject to any subsequent instructions which may be issued regarding the standardisation of equipment of the Italian Army and of the Carabinieri:-

(1) From indigenous Italian resources including captured material (except German weapons) and such local manufactures as may be authorised by Allied Force Headquarters.

(2) By purchases from appropriate US and UK surplus disposal agencies in ITALY of stocks which are available to those disposal agencies.

(3) Through the Italian Government import programme. 362

(c) As the procurement procedure outlined in paragraph 11 (b) above, will take time before it becomes fully operative, particularly in respect of requirements included in the Italian Government import program the following procedure will apply to those requirements which cannot be met from the sources set out in paragraph 11(b) above :-

(1) Such requirements may be loaned from the US and British military stocks as a temporary expedient up to 1 Jan 1946. In addition, certain food may be sold or loaned to the Italian Government in accordance with paragraph 13(c) below.

(2) Thereafter, these items will be returnable to the US and British on demand or they may be transferred to the Italian Government through US and British disposals organisations in accordance with established procedure.

(d) With effect from 2400 hours 14 November 1945, the Italian Government will continue to be responsible for meeting the POL and Coal requirements of the Italian Army and Carabinieri from civil stocks and by means of the Italian Government import program.

.... /4

- 1 -

12. Warlike Equipment and Spares All arms, vehicles and other warlike equipment of US and British origin (including lease-lease) in possession of those units being used to make up the Italian Army of 140,000 and in possession of the Carabinieri as may be surplus to US and British requirements together with up to one years maintenance and spare parts for arms, vehicles and other equipment so provided as may be surplus to the US and British requirements will be disposed of to the Italian Government. Appropriate scales of ammunition of various nature will also be transferred and authorized expenditure replenished from Allied sources. In the case of vehicles and warlike equipment available to US and British disposal through the respective US and British financial organizations in accordance with established procedures, but with priorities requested for its sale to the Italian Government. In the case of lettable British warlike equipment, transfer will be made direct by the military.

13. Food Supply

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strength of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 120,000 and British will not exceed 81,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus/agencies will be requested to give the Italian Govt priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items now being furnished in the LFI-MI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending May 1 1946.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MIA are rescinded.

(b) Purchase of any surpluses of non-warlike stores is as authorized in para 14 (b) (2) above.

15. Medical Stores

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting

(a) Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records of the Italian Govt

362

13. Food Supply

(a) Subsistence will continue to be furnished by the US and British Army based on actual strengths of the Italian Army outlined in paragraph 7 above, and of the Carabinieri until 30 November 1945. US responsibility will not exceed 124,000 and British will not exceed 84,000.

(b) Subsistence for the Italian Army, including the Carabinieri, will be the responsibility of the Italian Government with effect from 1 December 1945. Its sources for provisioning are as set out in paragraph 11, above.

(c) The US and British surplus/agencies will be requested to give the Italian Govt priority in providing subsistence for the Italian Army from such supplies as may be declared surplus by the US and British military authorities. This priority is limited to items not being furnished in the MLI-MI ration or equivalent British scale and in quantities not in excess of that required for the actual strength and in no event in excess of 205,000, beginning with the date of the request and ending May 1 1946.

14. Clothing and Individual/Personal Equipment

(a) All previous directives pertaining to transfer of clothing individual/personal equipment and salvage to the Italian Army through MLI are rescinded.

(b) Purchase of any purchases of non-surplus stores is as authorized in para 11 (b) (2) above.

15. Medical Stores

Medical Stores of Allied origin which are held in Italian depots or by Italian units at the date of this letter will remain in Italian possession.

16. Accounting

(a) Financial arrangements consequent upon the above policy regarding supply remain to be settled. In the meantime, records will be maintained of all transfers made to the Italian Govt from the military stocks and accounting procedures in sub-para (b) and (c) below, will apply.

(b) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued to the Italian Govt in bulk for the Italian Army outlined in para 7 above, and for the Carabinieri, Italian Navy and Air Force will follow present established procedures for the MLI-MI category.

(c) Accounting for Allied military supplies issued from British and US depots direct to MLI-MI and US-MI units will follow established procedure of the British and US forces. Issues from US military stocks, other than disposals through MLI, will be through MLI (US contingent) who will maintain adequate records.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN  
C.W. ORLEMAN  
Colonel, AGO, General.  
Adjutant General.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

AC/53.2/LG

1 Nov 45

SUBJECT: Mine Clearance

TO : Public Works and Utilities  
Sub Commission

1. This Section has been informed by the Ministry of War that the Italian Government intend to make Mine Clearance a responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works in the near future.
2. This Section has no objection to this transfer of responsibility but does feel that adequate arrangements should be made to ensure continuity of the scheme. It is feared that if the order is made the Ministry of War may withdraw all their key personnel leaving the Ministry of Public Works in the position of having to start from scratch with no trained personnel which would cause complete dislocation of the present programme at an rate for some time. The Ministry of War which is at present responsible is apprehensive as to the successful continuity of the work in hand.

3. Perhaps you will contact the Ministry of Public Works and ascertain their views.

4. If the change over takes place it is presumed that you will take over in AC the future responsibility for Mine Clearance in AMG territory.

5. Will you please keep this Section informed of developments.

*W. H. H. H.*  
Lt. Col. Brigadier  
C. A. 362

100

test

in

copy to:

~~1st Brigadier~~

(PETA)

10-2-1968

54

TRANSLATION

FROM : Ministry of War  
TO : A.C. - M.M.I.A.

Ref. 223840/11  
220-22-1  
P.M.3600, Oct.30/45

SUBJECT : Organizing of a Mine Clearing Service.

This Ministry, in order to limit the activity of the units under its command to exclusive military interest, has examined the possibility of intrusting to another Ministry the task of clearing the mine fields in the National Territory.

Following an exchange of ideas with the Ministers of Public Works and of Agriculture and Forest, it has been suggested to entrust to the Ministry of Public Works all the activity concerning the execution of the works, reserving to the Military Administration only the following tasks:

10) Creation of specialized personnel (labourers, clearing foremen, assistants and technical directors) both directly, through an appropriate training course, and where necessary, carrying out inspection duties for the various classes of specialized workers trained with public or private firms.

Circulation of an information bulletin, having the aim of constantly keeping up to date technical information on the anti-mine work.

The question is at present being examined by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

I shall inform you of decisions taken regarding the above.

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The Minister,  
sgd. Jacini.

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Circulation of an information bulletin, having the aim of constantly keeping up to date technical information on the anti-mine work.

The question is at present being examined by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

I shall inform you of decisions taken regarding the above.

The Minister,  
sgd. Jacini.

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*(Signature)*

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*Suppl. n/a printing*  
*Min. of Public Works*

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*See*

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CP-PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SIGNED WITH PHOTOS

To: AGWAR FROM VANGOS INFO ALCON ROME, TROOPERS LONDON, CUMMINGS.

SECRET.

Reur W 74806 (not to all).

1. The Military implications of the publication of the Armistice terms with ITALY have been examined here on an Allied basis.

2. There is no purely military objection to publication, if such a course is considered to be politically desirable.

3. In order, however, to minimize the risk of publication of the armistice terms leading to Anti-Government or Anti-Allied agitation the following views are submitted for your consideration.

A. That the Italian Government should be fully consulted and that if possible they should be induced to take the initiative by asking for publication.

B. That the following documents should be published simultaneously with the armistice terms: (1) MR MACMILLAN'S Aide Memoire for the Italian Government of 24 February 1945, which was based upon the directive contained in Combined Chiefs of Staff signal W487. (2) A summary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Directives contained in their signals W483 and TAM 640 and in other modifying directives. (3) An agreed commentary, showing the extent in which implementation of the armistice terms has been relaxed in conformity with the above directives. Such a commentary, which would require the most careful wording, could be drafted here if called for.

4. It may also be considered desirable to publish the terms of the CUMMINGS-DE COURTEN agreement of 23 September 1943, regarding the employment of the Italian fleet and merchantile marine. There is no Military objection to this but C in C MAB points out that

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CONTINUATION PAGE 2

omission of those clauses of the agreement which may be unpalatable to the Italian Government would vitiate the whole of it and that therefore there must be no omission from the agreement if it is published.

DIST

INFO-ACTION EXEC COMMISSIONER 2  
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER  
POLAD (A)  
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C.A.S.  
NAVY  
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| FI             | C/S |
| DATE: R/25/10. |     |

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
APO 512

AG 303.6 (CCT-0)

19 October 1945

SUBJECT: Use of Italian Army

TO: Chief Commissioner  
Allied Commission  
APO 394

1. Reference letter this headquarters, file AG 091.711/115 SAC-C, dated 10 July 1945, subject as above.

2. Paragraph 6 of referenced letter is rescinded, and the following is substituted therefor:

"6. Italian Prisoners of War

a. Effective 25 October 1945, such Allied Responsibilities as exist in the reception and disposal of repatriated Italian prisoners of war will rest with MIA, which will thereafter deal directly with the Italian Ministry of War in these matters.

b. Effective on the above date, Allied Commission will transfer to MIA the personnel, with the necessary records and equipment, of the Italian prisoners of War Division, which now functions under Allied Commission.

c. Prior to the above date, Allied Commission will complete arrangements with MIA for the feeding of repatriated Italian P/W from civilian ration stocks prior to re-enlistment or demobilization."

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

20 OCT 1945

C. CHRISTENBERRY  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

## DISTRIBUTION:

|                                      |             |                |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| 2 - Addressee                        |             | 2 - AG Records |
| 1 - Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA) |             | 1 - AG 12D     |
| 1 - C-1 (A)                          | 890 1       |                |
| 1 - A Branch                         |             |                |
| 1 - G(SD)                            | G 1 2 (Ops) |                |
| 1 - C-3 (MIA)                        | GSD 2 (SD)  |                |
| 1 - C-3 (MIA)                        |             |                |
| 1 - C-4 (A)                          | G 0 2 (Ops) |                |
| 1 - Q (aint)                         |             |                |
| 1 - Q (AE)                           |             |                |
| 1 - G-5                              |             |                |
| 1 - CAO                              |             |                |

3617  
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## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

ATO 594

Office of the Executive Commissioner

MEMORANDUM

Ref: 2608/EC

11th October, 1945

PUBLICATION LONG AMNISTICE ITALIE

The last official demand we have received from the Italian Government for publication of Long Amnistie Decree was in August 1944 from Beirut.

2. AFM, in their letter of 3 November 1944, directed delaying action and added that when publication is made responsibility for initiative in the matter should lie with the Italian Government.

3. The present Government accepted the "Amnistie and surrender instrument" but requested successfully that the title be changed to "Amnistie and Additional Conditions of Amnistie".

4. There have been demands made in the various political newspapers and the Prime Minister in his latest speech did not demand publication but rather enumerated the various limitations imposed on Italy by the Amnistie.

There has, however, been no official request since 1944 from the Italians.

5. Unless the Allied Governments wish to publish the terms by way of reply to Paris's speech it is suggested that before publishing them at the initiative of the Allies it would be wise to consult the Italian Government as to their real wishes, pointing out to them that many of the clauses are now imperative since hostilities have ceased and many have been modified in practice either as a result of directives from Allied Governments or because it was unnecessary to invoke the full force of the clauses.

6. If it is decided by the Italian and the Allied Governments that publication is desirable then we should insert a simultaneous publication of Mr. Macmillan's radio message of 24 February 45 (FAM 457) and a summary of FAM 583, 646 and other notifying directives. There should also be published an agreed commentary on the progressive modification of existing procedure adopted in implementation of the terms.

7. Unless this is done the publication will give an entirely distorted view of the effect of these terms, some of which have never been implemented and started only partially.

3616

## PUBLICATION LONG ARMISTICE TERMS

The last official demand we have received from the Italian Government for publication of Long Armistice Terms was in August 1944 from Bonanni.

2. AFHQ, in a letter of 3 November 1944, directed regarding action and advised that when publication is made responsibility for initiative in the matter should lie with the Italian Government.

3. The present Government accepted the "Armistice and surrender instrument" but requested successfully that the title be changed to "Armistice and Additional Conditions of Armistice."

4. There have been demands made in the various political newspapers and the Prime Minister in his latest speech did not demand publication but rather enumerated the various limitations imposed on Italy by the Armistice.

There is, however, not an official request since 1944 from the Italians.

Unless the Allied Governments wish to publish the terms by way of reply to Bonanni's speech it is suggested that before publishing that at the initiative of the Allies it would be wise to consult the Italian Government as to their real wishes, pointing out to them that any of the clauses are now imperative since hostilities have ceased and they have been modified in practice either as a result of directives from Allied Governments or because it was unnecessary to invoke the full force of the clauses.

If it is decided by the Italian and the Allied Governments that publication is desirable then we should insert a simultaneous publication of Mr. Macmillan's side memo of 24 February 45 (PMB 437) and a summary of FM 583, 640 and other modifying directives. There should also be published an agreed commentary on the progressive modification of existing procedure adopted in implementation of the terms.

3616

Unless this is done the publication will give an entirely distorted view of the effect of these terms, some of which have never been implemented and many of which have been implemented only partially.

We should also consider, subject to assent of G in C Mediterranean, the publication of the Cunningham de Courtenay document. Allied Commission does not object to publication on the same lines as in para 6 above.

5. Detailed comments on the clauses of the document are attached.

DISTRIBUTION

AFHQ (20)

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BRIGADIER  
Executive Commissioner

|       |          |
|-------|----------|
| FILE: | 8/6      |
| DATE: | 8/18/40. |

## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE  
COMMISSIONER

A F O 394

12th October, 1945

## ADDENDUM TO ALLIED COMMISSION

## MEMORANDUM

1. It is also fair to state that the Long Armistice Terms have in fact been progressively modified by each Document A (Terms of Restoration of Italian Territory) signed by SACIED and agreed by the Italian government as each portion of territory has been restored to the Italian Government.

2. These Terms of Restoration, although made without prejudice to the Armistice terms which remain in force do specify the requirements of the Allied Forces in virtual modification of the Armistice terms themselves.

13/10/45  
BRIGADIER  
Executive Commissioner

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## HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

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PROPOSAL FOR PUBLICATION OF LONG ARMISTICE TERMS.Clause No.Remarks.

1 - 5      Obsolete.      Superseded by events.

- 6      At the time of the German surrender the Army numbered 313,000 plus 65,000 CC.RR. This figure included troops serving with the Allies. It is anticipated that the interim Army will number about 140,000 plus 65,000 CC.RR, when the demobilization of the older classes is completed. The present strength of the CC.RR, 65,000, was requested by the first Prime Minister and later by Bonomi and is believed to be the Metropolitan pre-war strength. The maximum ceiling for the Italian Air Force prior to and since the cessation of hostilities has been fixed at 31,000. The established maximum strength of the Italian Royal Navy has never been formally laid down, but it was agreed, soon after the armistice, that victuals would not be provided for more than 75,000 officers and men. The present strength is about 64,000. In effect no demobilization took place but on the contrary recruitment up to the strengths above was effected.

7      Stands.

- 8      Has been modified in favour of the Italian Air Force, as it was intended to ground all aircraft at the end of hostilities. Restriction of flying has been based on scarcity of aircraft and POL. Not only were the Italian Air Force not completely grounded but they were permitted to use all available aircraft. In addition Allied aircraft was made available to them. Italian civil aviation is not permitted, but consideration is being given to the re-establishment of civil aviation.

9      This has been considerably relaxed.

- 10      The Italian Ministry of Marine continue to provide such information as is demanded and personnel and material are disposed where necessary at the direction of the Flag Officer, Italy and Liaison, and the Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. The same is being done with Land Forces and Air Forces. It is entirely in the interests of the Italian Government that they continue to do so.

It is anticipated that the demobilization of the CC.RR. when the demobilization of the CC.RR. about 140,000 plus 65,000 CC.RR. The present strength of the CC.RR. older classes is completed. The present strength of the CC.RR. 65,000, was requested by the first Prime Minister and later by Bonomi and is believed to be the Metropolitan pre-war strength. The maximum ceiling for the Italian Air Force prior to and since the cessation of hostilities has been fixed at 31,000. The Italian Royal Navy has never established maximum strength of the Italian Royal Navy has never been formally laid down, but it was agreed, soon after the armistice, that victuals would not be provided for more than 75,000 officers and men. The present strength is about 64,000. In effect no demobilization took place but on the contrary recruitment up to the strengths above was effected.

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9 This has been considerably relaxed.

10 The Italian Ministry of Marine continue to provide such information as is demanded and personnel and material are disposed where necessary at the direction of the Flag Officer, Italy and Liaison, and the Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission. The same is being done with Land Forces and Air Forces. It is entirely in the interests of the Italian Government that they continue to do so.

11 The requirements of this clause have been complied with by the Italian Ministry of Marine although it has been impossible to provide complete detail of the war materials formerly at its disposal. More recently authority has been given for the return of all Italian navy materials and equipment to the Italian Royal Navy subject to any specific requirements of the Allies. Information has been provided by the Italian Government in its own interests.

- 2 -

12 Largely carried out.

13 Stands. No comment.

14A It has been impossible for the Ministry of Marine to ensure that all merchant shipping, fishing vessels and other craft were made available in good repair and a seaworthy condition as priorities at all dockyards have, until recently, been accorded to the repair of Allied vessels. Italian ships have been repaired from time to time only as this priority arrangement for Allied vessels permitted.

14B Allied controls over Italian inland transport have been relaxed and such transport has now for the most part been returned to normal Italian administration, except insofar as the redeployment and maintenance of the Allied Forces have to be affected.

15 The provisions of this clause, as regards small vessels and craft, have not yet been fully satisfied owing to the difficulty of locating and identifying the vessels and craft concerned. Their recovery when established as Allied property has been regarded as a matter for representation by the Governments concerned to the Italian Government through diplomatic channels where these exist.

16 Control of radio has been returned to Italian Government. Only restriction remaining is necessity to apply for frequency allocation to Allied Military authorities who coordinate such requests on an international basis. A delegation from the Italian Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications attended the meeting of the European Radio Conference in London in September 1945. Other telecommunications facilities have been progressively passed to the control of the Italian Government. At the present all telecommunications facilities not needed for military purposes are under the control of the Italian Government; facilities not being used by the military are being returned to Italian control. Censorship has been abolished; operation of radio is in the hands of the Italian Government or parastatal companies; in AMG territory radio emission is subject to the requirements of AMG. Censorship has been military rather than political and has only been operated as military necessity dictated.

It has always been the policy to have such censorship carried out by Italian personnel, and early in 1944 the direct operation of such censorship was turned over to the Italian General Staff with Allied control being reduced to a minimum. Censorship of external mails, telephone and telegraph has been continued as the only means of insuring to the Italian Government the control of foreign exchange.

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vessels permitted.

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It has always been the policy to have such censorship carried out by Italian personnel, and early in 1944 the direct operation of such censorship was turned over to the Italian General Staff with Allied control being reduced to a minimum. Censorship of external mails, telephone and telegraph has been continued as the only means of insuring to the Italian Government the control of foreign exchange and foreign commerce which is economically necessary. Such censorship is carried out by Italian personnel under general policy direction of a small Liaison Group of Allied Officers.

3613

The second sentence of this paragraph has never been invoked, except in two frontier areas.

This article stands without modification, as it is one of the bases for Allied payments policy in Italy. All local goods and services procured by the Allied Forces in Italy are paid for by the Italian Government, either directly or by the Allied Forces in Allied military lire which is charged to the Italian Government as an occupation cost. Care has been taken to conserve wherever possible Italian resources for the use of the civil economy, and to utilise local goods and services only when military necessity demanded. The Allied Forces Local Resources Board<sup>1</sup> was established as an allocation agency, before which the military agencies stated their needs and the Allied Commission appeared as a claimant for Italian civil needs. In other words, while the legal rights of the Allied Forces under Article 19 have not been modified, in practice it has been administered with as much regard as possible for Italian needs. With the redeployment of Allied Troops from Italy, the utilisation of local resources and facilities is diminishing rapidly.

<sup>1</sup> on the committees of which Italian representatives have sat.

Article 20 refers to the governance of AMG; Article 21 distinguished Italian Government territory. Article 20 was never fully enforced; no instruction issued for removal of Italian forces. It was the invariable practice to use Italian troops, e.g. CC.RR. The enforcement of Armistice terms was most rigorous in Army areas: where at times for operational reasons there was considerable restriction of movement, and offences against Allied troops, property or security were more frequently dealt with by Allied Courts.

This was progressively released in AMG Regional areas; the administration was almost entirely by Italian officials under AMG direction, restrictions were largely removed and cases except those of greater importance transferred to Italian Courts.

The third phase of relaxation was the handing over of the territory to Italian administration freed from AMG direction; the handing over the Allied reserved rights necessary for the maintenance and security of its armies including rights of trial but this latter was seldom enforced. AC officers left in Italian Government territory areas are not even advisers but have merely functions of observation and liaison.

At the time that Italy became a cobelligerent there was territory in all three phases of administration; in all three there were relaxations suitable to the new situation of Italy as a cooperator.

Then came FAN 487 and the Macmillan aide memoire by which the functions of AC itself were in day to day matters of administration changed and it had in such matters no powers even to advise unless its advice was sought.

This aide memoire stated that in matters of ordinary day to day administration we would not enforce our rights but would leave the Italians to administer as they thought fit.

to utilise local goods and services only when military necessity demanded. The Allied Forces Local Resources Board was established as an allocation agency, before which the military agencies stated their needs and the Allied Commission appeared as a claimant for Italian civil needs. In other words, while the legal rights of the Allied Forces under Article 19 have not been modified, in practice it has been administered with as much regard as possible for Italian needs. With the redeployment of Allied Troops from Italy, the utilisation of local resources and facilities is diminishing rapidly.

\* on the committees of which Italian representatives have sat.

20

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This aide memoire stated that in matters of ordinary day to day administration we would not enforce our rights but would leave the Italians to administer as they thought fit.

21A

Stands.

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This article still stands, particularly the first part which deals with the availability of free transit for Allied Nations war materials and supplies. Although the latter part must still stand, with the departure of a large number of troops from Italy, and the handover of the greater part of Italy to the Italian Government, for some time past the powers conferred in this have rarely been exercised. It has been the function of ALRB to effect the progressive handing back of plant and stocks as much as possible.

This article must clearly be contained in any Armistice terms. However, with the early declaration of war upon the Germans by the Italian Government, the cooperation and loyalty of the Italian people to the Allied cause, there has never been any necessity to involve it.

The first two sentences of this Article stand without modification. We are preparing to negotiate with the Italian Government a currency agreement whereby the Italian Government or its designated agency would be recognised as the issuing authority for all AM lire.

The last sentence of Article 23 has been substantially modified and modification explained to the Italian Government. AC informed the Italian Government that the Allied Commission will no longer intervene in Italian internal financial affairs (except in cases of Allied military necessity) and that, with two exceptions, the Italian Government no longer needed to obtain the approval of the Allied Commission prior to the execution of external financial transactions. The Minister of the Treasury was informed that the Italian Government was now free to fix or negotiate exchange rates for the lira without prior consultation with the Allied Commission. The cooperation of the Italian Government in the execution of this Article is considered to have been very good.

Modified by informing the Italian Government that private export trade may now be resumed and that all types of non-transactional and transactional commercial and financial correspondence may now go forward from Italy to the non-enemy world.

25A Obsolete

25B Obsolete

26A This has been modified so far as individuals are concerned to the extent that no Military Travel authorization is now required. Provided an individual has the necessary civil documents such as passport visa, etc. there is nothing to prevent him leaving Italian territory. If leaving Italy by land, movement is virtually

3610

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26A This has been modified so far as individuals are concerned to the extent that no Military Travel authorization is now required. Provided an individual has the necessary civil documents such as passport visa, etc. there is nothing to prevent him leaving Italian territory. If leaving Italy by land, movement is virtually unrestricted even though an AMG pass must be obtained before passing through the frontier Northern zone. Movement by air or sea is restricted by the fact that the United Nations control the transport services and an Allied travel order must be obtained before the journey can be made. As regards any mass movement of Italian subjects this continues to be controlled by AFHQ.

26B Ineffect obsolete.

27 Obsolete

28A Obsolete

28B Stands

28C Stands

28D Stands

29 Stands

30 First part/carried out; second part revoked.  
This article has never been enforced as expressed:  
the Commander-in-Chief has not issued any instruction. The Italian Government has of its own volition done all that would have been required. The Government does in fact keep AG informed.

31 Stands. All Italian laws involving discrimination on ground of race, colour, creed, or political opinion, have at the instance of the Italian Government been repealed. It is believed that all persons detained on any such grounds have been released, and those suffering any legal disability have been relieved therefrom. It has not been necessary for the Allied Commander in Chief to issue any "further directions" under the Article.

32A Obsolete

32B Carried out and now obsolete

32C The Italian Government has cooperated loyally in carrying out such instructions as have been given concerning the preservation and administration of United Nations property in Italy, previously sequestered by the Italian Government.

~~32B~~  
32B9

28C Stands

28D Stands

29 Stands

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33A Stands with explanation

33B Stands. The part relating to the furnishing of information stands. The part that deals with the disposal of foreign assets has been modified by FAN 383, in that prior approval of the Allied Commission for such disposal is no longer necessary.

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34 Stands. No comments.

35 Stands. No comments.

36 Stands, but modified by Macmillan aide memoire of  
24 February 1945.

37 Control has been dropped in Italian Government  
territory. See Macmillan aide memoire.

38 No comments.

39 No comments.

40 No comments.

41 Stands, with the exception of Albania.

42 No comments.

43 No comments.

44 No comments.

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