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10000120/5305

G/10

REDET

1000012015305

G/10

REDEPLOYMENT OF ITI OF FORMATIONS

NOV. 1945 - APR. 1946

4110
4110

COVER I

5 British Liaison Unit
C.M.F.

G/125/9

12 Apr 46

Main 13 Corps

Ref your signal 0309 of 11 April.

Present locations of major operational units
of Italian Army in 13 Corps Area are these:-

1. 516 Ga Bn (Feltre Bn) MESTRE. With one Coy detached at UDINE
2. 517 Ga Bn (Tolmezzo Bn) Hq. LOVARIA. 1 Coy at S. MARTINO DI
CODROIPO
2 Coy at RIMAN ZAGGO
3 Coy at PALMANOVA
4 Coy at LOVARIA

Note. 513 Ga Bn left ESTE to-day for Legnano Div Area Milan
and has not yet been replaced in 13 Corps Area by 1' AQUILA Bn
- my G/110/15 of 1st April refers.

The above is position at present.

FUTURE MOVES IN PERIOD 17 - 22 APRIL.

A.) 1' AQUILA Bn will arrive in 13 Corps Area from Sondrio.
This Bn less 2 Coys will establish in BELLUNO. Fentuzzi Barracks.

B.) 5 Alpini Regt Hq. from Sondrio will also establish in
BELLUNO. Salse Barracks.

C.) 516 Ga Bn (Feltre Bn) will move from present locations at
Mestre and Udine to BELLUNO for a period of 2 months for training.
In order to do this, it will be relieved by one Coy 1' AQUILA Bn
at UDINE, and one Coy 1' AQUILA Bn at MESTRE. The 2 Coys referred
in Para (A) above.

Therefore the position of major Italian operational
troops by 24 April 46 will be as follows:-

5 Alpini Regt Hq at BELLUNO

0654

1. 516 Gd Bn (Feltre Bn) MESTRE. With one Coy detached at UDINE
2. 517 Gd Bn (Tolmezzo Bn) Hq. LOVARIA. 1 Coy at S. MARTINO DI CODROIPO
2 Coy at REMANZACCO
3 Coy at PAINAMOVA
4 Coy at LOVARIA

Note. 513 Gd Bn left ESTE to-day for Legnano Div Area Milan and has not yet been replaced in 13 Corps Area by 1'AQUILA Bn - my G/110/15 of 1st April refers.


The above is position at present.

FUTURE MOVES IN PERIOD 17 - 22 APRIL: 4183

- A.) 1'AQUILA Bn will arrive in 13 Corps Area from Sondrio. This Bn less 2 Coys will establish in BELLUNO. Fentuzzi Barracks.
- B.) 5 Alpini Regt Hq. from Sondrio will also establish in BELLUNO. Salsa Barracks.
- C.) 516 Gd Bn (Feltre Bn) will move from present locations at Mestre and Udine to BELLUNO for a period of 2 months for training. In order to do this, it will be relieved by one Coy 1'AQUILA Bn at UDINE, and one Coy 1'AQUILA Bn at MESTRE. The 2 Coys referred in Para (A) above.

Therefore the position of major Italian operational troops by 24 April 46 will be as follows:-

5 Alpini Regt Hq at BELLUNO



Col GS	WAVET
GSO 1 (SD)	
Dep GS	
GSO 4 (SD)	
GSO 4 (U)	
GSO 1 (HQ)	

MMIA - 'G'

FILE: *215/10*

DATE: *2/15/3*

Major,
G. II 5 B.I.U.

Copy to:- M.M.I.A. ROME.

Land Forces Sub Commission A.C.
(M.M.I.A.) R O M E.

5 British Liaison Unit
C.M.F.

G/110/21

11 Apr 46

1. Reference telephone conversation this morning and our signal G/110 of the 6 Apr 46, herewith attached copy of the letter in question.
2. Dates referred to in the signal have been entered on this copy of our letter G/110/15 of 1 Apr 46.

Cdr. GS	
GSD I (V)	
GSD II (V)	
GSD III (V)	
GSD IV (V)	
GSD V (V)	
GSD VI (V)	
GSD VII (V)	
GSD VIII (V)	
GSD IX (V)	
GSD X (V)	
GSD XI (V)	
GSD XII (V)	
GSD XIII (V)	
GSD XIV (V)	
GSD XV (V)	
GSD XVI (V)	
GSD XVII (V)	
GSD XVIII (V)	
GSD XIX (V)	
GSD XX (V)	
GSD XXI (V)	
GSD XXII (V)	
GSD XXIII (V)	
GSD XXIV (V)	
GSD XXV (V)	
GSD XXVI (V)	
GSD XXVII (V)	
GSD XXVIII (V)	
GSD XXIX (V)	
GSD XXX (V)	

RECEIVED 15 APR 1946
5226

MMIA-'G'

FILE: *11/15/46*

DATE: *8/15/46*

W. Selby
Major,
G.S.O. II.

4187

81B

MEMO

5 MAY

11

B

O.22

DECLASSIFIED

NOT YOUR LOG Q/110 OF 6 APR 46
NO SIGN OF YOUR LETTER Q/110/15 OF 1 APR 46 HAVING BEEN REC'D
IN THIS HQ (.)
PLEASE FORWARD FOREIGN COPY

*Hold until 6/10/15 of Apr arrives
to subject area file
Filing blank
Please fill now & add file no
to out registry book.*

4186

ROUTING

6 (2)

A. L. HENNINGSEN, Maj.

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : 5 BLU
TO : MMIA ROME
REF : G/110

061145 B

UNCLASSIFIED

*amended
11/4*

REF MY LETTER G/110/15 OF 1 APR. DATES IN PARA 3 ARE 7 TO 11 APRIL (.)

DATES IN PARA 5 ARE 17 TO 20 APRIL (.) JOHNSTONE

See also 81A

DISTRIBUTION :

ACTION : G/37/5
C/10

4184

15 April 1946
sb

002Y

SUBJECT: - Change over of Italian Battalions.

Mo. 5 British Liaison Unit,

C.M.F.,

G/110/15

1st April 1946.

TO: G(SD)

HQ. MAIN 13 CORPS.

COPY: M.M.I.A. ROME.

1. Reference your telephone conversation this morning. It is confirmed that HQ 5 Alpini Regt. will not now be at Padua. Another place is being searched for and I will inform you of the result.

2. Reference my G/106/23 of the 22nd of March. The Italian Ministry of War has directed that 513 and 516 Gd. Bn. will be sent to Legnano Division (Milan Area) in exchange for 1'AQUILA Bn. The composition therefore of 5 Alpini Regt will now be:

1'AQUILA Bn.
517 Gd.Bn. (Tolmezzo)
516 Gd.Bn.

3. 513 Gd.Bn. will move out of Legnano Division on 7-11 Apr.

4. On the completion of this move 516 Gd.Bn. at MESTRE will then be named "FELTRE" Bn.

5. Provisional dates for the arrival of 1'AQUILA Bn. in 5 Territorial Command are 17 to 20 Apr.

6. Locations for 1'AQUILA Bn. will be submitted to you as soon as known. Also 5 Alpini Regt. Hq.

For info - HQ 5 Alpini Regt

See file 80.

Sgd: J.H. JOHNSTONE

Major,

G.S.O II.

4137

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Bus.

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
RUMB.

5 British Liaison Unit
G.M.F.

G/106/24

6 Apr 46.

Herewith copy of letter from 5 B.L.U. to 13 Corps
for your information. Now awaiting reply and will keep
you informed.

Major,
G II.

To: G (Ops) 13 Corps.

1. On Tuesday, G (SD) rang us to inform us that HQ 5 Alpini Regt, due to arrive approx 18 Apr, cannot be allowed in Padua. Accordingly, it is now submitted that they be allowed to establish in BELLUNO, and together with 1. AQUILA Bn from Legnano (due to arrive also about that time, 18 Apr 46). If there is no objection to this they will be housed in Fantuzzi and Salse Barracks there. These are Italian Barracks and not occupied by Allied troops.
2. Belluno is an excellent place for Alpini training and would be an ideal site.

Major,
GSO II.

Col. GS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dev. G3	
GSO II (S)	
GSO II (I)	

See file 81D.

RECEIVED 9 APR 1946

Land Forces Sub Comm. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
ROME.

6 Apr 46.

Herewith copy of letter from 5 B.L.U. to 13 Corps
for your information. Now awaiting reply and will keep
you informed.

V. H. Thomas
Major,
G II.

To: G (Ops) 13 Corps.

1. On Tuesday, G (SD) rang us to inform us that HQ 5
Alpini Regt, due to arrive approx 18 Apr. cannot be
allowed in Padua. Accordingly, it is now submitted
that they be allowed to establish in Belluno, and to
with 1st AQUILA Bn from Legnano (due to arrive also about
that time, 18 Apr 46). If there is no objection to this
they will be housed in Pantuzzi and Salsa Barracks there.
These are Italian Barracks and not occupied by Allied troops.
2. Belluno is an excellent place for Alpini training and
would be an ideal site.

Major,
GSO II.

Col. GS	W
GSO I (SD)	
Deo. G3	
GSO II (S)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO II (W)	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (S)	
G (H)	

MMIA-'G'
FILE: <i>2/10</i>
DATE: <i>29/4</i>

0861

79

SUBJECT: Transfer of Units - 87 Inf Regt and 5 Alpini Bn.

LAND BOMBERS REG-DEN, 40 (120a)

6/10

5 May 46

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref your letter 1510/op dated 5 Apr 46.

The move of HQ 87 Inf Regt and 11/87 Inf Bn from Area BELLEFONTE -
FRENCH to Area BELLEFONTE - ITALY is agreed as a temporary measure pending
accommodation being available for those two Units South of River Po.

This HQ Letter 6/10 dated 14 Mar 46 and your letters 1260/op
dated 24 Mar 46 and 1304/op dated 26 Mar 46 refer.

75

76

74

W. J. Cunningham
Major-General
1946

Copy to: 4 British Liaison Unit
6 British Liaison Unit

Internal: Q

AAB/2r

4181

78

B/10.

TRANSLATION

FROM: M. of W.
TO : M.M.I.A.

REF: IS10/Op
DATE: 5/4/46

*Sent to 79
for summary.*

SUBJECT: Transfer of Units of the 87th Infantry
Regiment and the 5th Alpine Rgt.

- 1) - As the H.Q. and a battalion of the 5th Alpine Rgt. (at present at Padova) have to be transferred *to* the area of Belluno - Feltre - this S.M.N.E. would have been of the opinion to transfer the H.Q. of 87th Infantry Rgt. and the 2nd Bn. belonging to said Rgt. to Bolzano - Laives area.
- 2) - We ask you to kindly inform us whether you approve.

sgd. Liuzzi
Gen.

4180

Col. GS	
Gen. (1)	
Gen. (2)	
Gen. (3)	
Gen. (4)	
Gen. (5)	
Gen. (6)	
Gen. (7)	
Gen. (8)	
Gen. (9)	
Gen. (10)	

MMIA-'G'
FILE: <i>R/10</i>
DATE: <i>RS/4</i>

76

TRANSLATION

FROM : M of W

REF: 1304/OP

TO : M.M.I.A.

DATE: 26/3/46

SUBJECT : Billets for the H.Q. and two Battalions of the 87th Infantry Regiments.

1. Further to letter 1260/op of 24th March 1946.

2. Further to information promised in para 3 of the above mentioned letter, we would inform you that the H.Q. of the 87th Infantry Regiment and the 1st and 2nd Battalions could be accommodated as follows:

a) in the temporary barracks at Forlì and in the "Gorizia" barracks at Ravenna when they are left unoccupied by the Allied Troops who occupy them at present;

b) in the "Paolini" and "Montevecchi" barracks at Fano, which are at present at the disposal of the Allied Authorities and used for the billeting of a few evacuees, also when these are made available

M.M.I.A. 'C'

FILE: *see 10*DATE: *R/29/3*

Col. GS	
G. 1 (1)	
Dep. GS	
G. 2 (1)	
G. 3 (1)	
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Action in R/217

Sgd. Liuzzi
Gen.

W.P.

4173

0684

TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

SP

REF: 1260/Op

TO: M.M.I.A.

DATE: 24.3.46

SUBJECT: Billets for the H.Q. and 2 battalions of the 87 Infantry Regiment.

- 1) - In reply to letter G/10 of 14.3.46
- 2) - The present impossibility of making use of the buildings of the Casa Balilla and the Reggio Emilia Artillery Barracks (already pointed out to your Mission as being necessary, in letter 597/Op. of 18.2.46) together with the presence of the CAR of the Udine Military Territorial Command at Modena, still excludes, for the moment, the accomodating of the H.Q. and the two remaining battalions of the 87 Infantry Regiment in Emilia.
- 3) - Further enquiries are being carried out by the Bologna Military Territorial Command and we will inform you of the results of them as soon as they are known.

Sgd. LIUZZI

Gen.

O. Danin Sgt.

Col. GS	
GSO I (DI)	
Dep. G3	
GSO II (S)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO II (W)	
GSO III (SC)	
GSO III (OR&S)	
G (119)	

MMIA - 'G'

FILE: E/10

DATE: R/26/3

1173

260845

1. SUBJECT: Move of 87 Inf Regt

2. FROM: Joint Forces GCHQ, AG, (JFIS)

6/10

14 For 14

To: Ministry of War

See to 19

Ref telephoned agreement on 25 Jan and this is signal
O-173 of 29 Jan 46.

By this is please be informed that progress has been made
in finding suitable accommodation for HQ 87 Inf Regt and for 1/87 and
11/87 in BILBY, and that you anticipate that it will be possible for
this Regt to leave the BILBY area for concentration SOUTH of B. 20.

Atkinson
all

Major General
M. R. D. M.

Copy to: 51/40/1
(with copy of O-173 of 29.1.46.)

AMC/2.3b

417R 14/3

2 SUBJECT : Concentration of 6 Inf Regt

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (HMLA)

G/10

21 Feb 46

TO : 6 MU

Ref this Hq letter G/10 of 28 Jan, copy to you, att herewith in copy of reply received from ITALIAN War Ministry under cover of their letter 460/QP of 6 Feb 46.

Please report on the concentration of this Regt :

- (a) as to whether it is proceeding satisfactorily.
- (b) any reasons for which it is not proceeding satisfactorily.

72A

Amey
Lt Col
GS

ABC/abc

4176

MINISTRY OF WAR
General Staff
Operations & Training Office
Ops Sec

SUBJECT : Concentration of the 1st and 2nd Bns of the
6th Inf Regt at MODENA and FERRARA

REFERENCE: 460/OP

Rome - 6 Feb 46

TO : LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (MIA) - ROME

1. In reply to letter 6/10 dated 28 Jan 46.
2. The concentration of the units as above has already been effected with the exception of the 7th Coy located at present between FORLI and CASERTA. This Coy will be moved to the concentration area once accn etc has been prepared for its reception.

*per letter
12*


signed Giorgio LIUZZI

General Adjutant

4175

FU/ag.

728



MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
UFFICIO OPERAZIONI E ADDESTRAMENTO
SEZIONE OPERAZIONI

N. 450/Op. di prot.

Roma 5 febbraio 1946

OGGETTO:

BATT. CONCENTRATION I & II belonging to the 6th Inf. at Modena
Concentramento battaglioni I e II del 6^o fanteria in Modena
e Ferrara.
a Ferrara.

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA

Reply to letter c/o dated 28 Jan. 1946

1°)- Risposta foglio c/o del 28 gennaio 1946.


2°)- The o/m CONCENTRATION HAS ALREADY TAKEN PLACE WITH THE
Concentramento in oggetto è già avvenuto meno per 7^a compagnia
EXCEPTION OF THE 7th COY LOCATED BETWEEN FORLI & CESENA due
dislocata tra Forlì e Cesena per difficoltà approntamento loco
TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF LOCAL PREPARATION

3°)- INSTRUCTIONS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT FOR ALSO THE RECOVERY OF SAID
In corso predisposizioni per recupero anche di detta compagnia.
COY.

IL GENERALE ADDETTO
- Giorgio Livizi -

ghivizi

Col. CS
GSO I (C)
D. M.
G. M. P. A.
GSO II (C)
GSO II (C) 9
GSO III (C)
GSO III (C) 9
GSO III (C) 9
G (100)



FILE: 16/10
DATE: R/7/2

OUTSTANDING MESSAGE

FROM :	DATA	DATE :	TIME :
TO :	00-0000	10/1/68	4
INFO :	0-173	8 40 48 Z	

FOR INFO OF 1/2535 OF 10 JAN 68. U.S. 0-173 OF 25 JAN
(.) FOR INFO OF 10 JAN 68 TO 0000 11/27 17 JAN
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REMARKS :

REMARKS :

Important
Clairmont
may.

FOR INFO OF 10 JAN 68

0-173 OF 10 JAN 68

4173

0-173 OF 10 JAN 68

B/24/1

0670

70 A

Subject: Concentration of formations for training and ease of control; 1945-1946.

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949

25 Jan 46

1. Summary of facts

70B

70C

Ref this memo of 14/1 of 8 Jan 46 and your 120/6p of 16 Jan 46.

1. It is reported that 5 Inf Bn has two of their own units up into nine different localities.

2. It is felt that such dispersal must greatly prejudice both control and training, and must render this regiment almost useless as a reserve for internal security.

3. It is, of course, appreciated by this HQ that concentration may be made difficult by shortage of accommodation, or of transport.

4. This information is brought to your notice for any action which you may think advisable, taking into account your full knowledge of the circumstances.

See M/W Ref 787/F/13/P of 25 Jan 46 (SD/13/1 folio 148). LPH

25/1/46

Copy sent 6/1/46

Internal: 0/1/1

4170

see 12

see 72

9/28/1

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR GOCSummary of events, redeployment TRIULI Div.

13 Dec 45 2 DISTGO/4299 copy to MIA notified intention to move one regt of TRIULI SOUTH of R PO on grounds of internal security.

5 Jan 46 2 DIST 2101/11 G(SDI) recommended move of III/114 from MILAN back to area of parent formation (MANTOVA) near GENOA.

8 Jan 46 MIA SD/44/1 to Ministry of War recommended on General lines that Inf Divs be concentrated for control and trs, quoted III/114 as an example, and asked for views and proposed actions of Ministry of War.

18 Jan 46 Ministry of War 124/Cp to MIA

- (i) agreed to move III/114 to GENOA
- (ii) proposed to move remainder of 114 Regt also to GENOA
- (iii) proposed to cancel move of 87 Regt TRIULI to area REGGIO EMILIA
- (iv) proposed to move III/87 back to area BELLUNO from which it had come.

22 Jan 46 MIA 0-172 asked 2 DIST for their views on these proposals.

23 Jan 46 2 DIST SDI/2636

- (i) agreed to proposal to move 114 Regt
- (ii) urged that III/87 remain in area MODENA and that remainder of 87 Regt move SOUTH of R PO as planned.

Recommendations based

- (a) on accommodation (accommodation at BELLUNO now occupied by 87 Regt required for ALLIED tps if MONTE VERNONESE is to be freed for ITC)
- (b) on internal security situation in BOLOGNA province
- (c) on fact that Gen GARICA himself wants tps SOUTH of R PO.

GOC arranged to meet 18 Dec 45 to meet 4163
 The above letter in the day 23 Jan 46
 Lombardi stated that not only would
 the initial with 18 Dec 45 that 21/87
 be obtained in northern area but
 also that remainder of 87 Regt would
 move also under these circumstances

69
 FILE

6/10/46
 20/10/46
 25/1/46

8 Jan 46 MIA SD/44/1 to Ministry of War recommended on general lines that Inf Divs be concentrated for control and trg, quoted III/114 as an example, and asked for views and proposed actions of Ministry of War.

18 Jan 46 Ministry of War 124/Op to MIA

- (i) agreed to move III/114 to GENOA
- (ii) proposed to move remainder of 114 Regt also to GENOA
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23 Jan 46 2 DIST SD/2636

- (i) agreed to proposal to move 114 Regt
- (ii) urged that III/87 remain in area MODENA and that remainder of 87 Regt move SOUTH of R PO as planned.

Recommendations based

- (a) on accommodation (accommodation at BELLUNO now occupied by 87 Regt required for ALLIED tps if NORTH VERONESE is to be freed for LTC)
- (b) on internal security situation in BOLOGNA province
- (c) on fact that Gen CURICIA himself wants tps SOUTH of R PO.

4163

Col arranged to meet 13 Dec 46 to 14 Jan 46
 The above letter is the day 22 Jan 46
 Lombardi stated that not only would
 he insist with 13 Dec 46 that III/87
 be retained in BELLUNO area but
 also that remainder of 87 Regt move
 there also. Under these circumstances
 - I have not cancelled him in
 - I have with 13 Dec 46
 This spontaneous decision by MIA
 agrees with 2 Dist. wishes. So
 all is well. L.A.
 22 Jan 46

AIDE MEMOIRE FOR GOC.

Basis for recommendations to Minister for War on subject move of 87 Regt TRIULI Div from area BELLUNO to area MODENA.

1. (a) The move was projected in mid-Dec when TRIULI were under op comd 2 DIST.
(b) On assumption that move would take place, 2 DIST planned reallocation of available accommodation in order to free MONTE VERONESE bks (at present occupied by ALLIED tps due to replace 87 Regt in BELLUNO) for use as a TIC.
(c) To move back to BELLUNO III/87 Regt now would upset whole 2 DIST accommodation project.
Anticipated accommodation in BELLUNO would not be available for ALLIED tps, and ALLIED tps could not therefore vacate MONTE VERONESE for use by ITALIANS as a TIC.
(d) Great effort has gone to obtaining MONTE VERONESE, 2 DIST have been helpful, no alternative exists, and to lose it now would be most serious.
2. (a) The presence of combat tps in BOLOGNA province will have a salutary effect in an area which is agreed to be dangerously disturbed.
(b) General CERIOA himself would like TRIULI tps in the area for this purpose.

3. It is realised that to retain one bn of 87 Regt in area MODENA and leave the regt less one bn in BELLUNO would contradict the principle of concentration for tps, but in view of 1 and 2 above and of the desirability of not provoking any clash of authority in the newly handed back territory, it is recommended on this occasion that III/87 should remain near MODENA and the remainder of the Regt stay ~~on~~ at present near BELLUNO.

4. (a) III/87 need not remain in area MODENA indefinitely,
(b) to move this bn back to the frontier area in a few months time might have an excellent political effect, much in excess of any political advantage to be gained by insisting on the move now.

4163

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief Commissioner

Col. 1	11/1
Col. 2	11/1
Col. 3	11/1
Col. 4	11/1
Col. 5	11/1
Col. 6	11/1
Col. 7	11/1
Col. 8	11/1
Col. 9	11/1
Col. 10	11/1
Col. 11	11/1
Col. 12	11/1
Col. 13	11/1
Col. 14	11/1
Col. 15	11/1
Col. 16	11/1
Col. 17	11/1
Col. 18	11/1
Col. 19	11/1
Col. 20	11/1
Col. 21	11/1
Col. 22	11/1
Col. 23	11/1
Col. 24	11/1
Col. 25	11/1
Col. 26	11/1
Col. 27	11/1
Col. 28	11/1
Col. 29	11/1
Col. 30	11/1
Col. 31	11/1
Col. 32	11/1
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Col. 93	11/1
Col. 94	11/1
Col. 95	11/1
Col. 96	11/1
Col. 97	11/1
Col. 98	11/1
Col. 99	11/1
Col. 100	11/1

Ref: 8251/EC.

31. December 1945

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.

1. (a) I am in receipt of your AG.091.711/1044 D-O dated 15 Dec 45.
(b) The agreed subject matter of your paras 1-5 has already been conveyed to the War Ministry verbally, during the discussions over the last fortnight.
(c) It will now be communicated officially on paper to the Italian Government.
2. Reference your para 6, I was aware of the situation in this respect. Para 3(b) and 5(h) of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov 45 was merely inserted as a relevant factor in the problem.
3. Reference your para 7, the recommendations in para 5 of my letter 8251/EC dated 28 Nov 45, were reached as the result of the combined factors enumerated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of my letter, to which I have nothing to add. Would you let me know of any point on which you need clarification.
4. I may say that this whole matter was fully discussed in my office ROME at a conference between Brigadier YATES, Major General BROWNING, my Executive Commissioner and myself on 3 Dec 45, when all aspects of the question were ventilated and I understood complete agreement was reached.

573 3/1/46

4165
ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: G-5, AMHQ
Land Forces S/C (MILA)

No. 2 District
No. 3 District

FILED: 6/10
DATE: 8/3/1

0.6751

785020

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT : Distribution of IM DIRM LAND FORCES

LAND FORCES SUP COM, ...C. (MHL)

G/10

19 Dec 45

TO : OC No. 1 BLM
 OC No. 3 BLM
 OC No. 4 BLM
 OC No. 7 BLM
 OC No. 10 BLM

Herewith by order of SAC, copy of an appreciation by Chief Commissioner
 L.S., on the distribution of IM DIRM Land Forces (8251/390/AC dated 28 Nov and
 4 Dec 45).

This document is for the info of yourself and your staff only, and
 its contents will not be divulged to the IM DIRM.

ACK on att form.

LRCS/abc

Atty General
 for Major General
 H. H. I. A.

TO : LAND FORCES SUP COM, ...C. (MHL)

Receipt is ACK of your letter G/10 dated 19 Dec, enclosing one
 copy each of L.S. letters 8251/390/AC dated 28 Nov and 4 Dec 45.

Dec 45

Signed

Unit

416

TO : CC No. 1 BLU
CC No. 3 BLU
CC No. 4 BLU
CC No. 7 BLU
CC No. 10 BLU

Herewith by order of GOC, copy of an appreciation by Chief Commissioner
A.G., on the distribution of ILLAN land Forest (8251/390/EC dated 28 Nov and
4 Dec 45).

This document is for the info of yourself and your staff only, and
its contents will NOT be divulged to the ILLANS.

CK on att form.

ARC3/abc

Approved
for Major General
H. I. I.
62

TO : LAW FORCES SUB COM. A.G. (MIL)

416

Receipt is ACK of your letter G/10 dated 19 Dec, enclosing one
copy each of A.G. letters 8251/390/EC dated 28 Nov and 4 Dec 45.

Dec 45

Signed

Unit

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces

SECRET

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

9/10
20 December 1945

Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.
(for Executive Commissioner)

Ref A.F.H.Q. Letter AG.091.741/10440-0 dated 15 Dec:-

1. Herewith suggested DRAFT for Chief Commissioner's signature.
2. (a) I am at a loss to understand the meaning of their para 7.
(b) The matter was obviously one for a combined appreciation, not a purely military one.
(c) All the factors are set out accordingly in your letter (8254/EC of 23 Nov.)
(d) We agreed it all with Brig. INTRE, which their paras 1-5 confirm.
(e) I cannot see that there is any more to be said.
3. Will you issue instructions to the Italian Prime Minister in accordance with the A.F.H.Q. letter or will you instruct me to do so to the War Minister?

LB/oo

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

4163

Ref A.P.H.Q. Letter AC.091.711/10140-0 dated 15 Dec:-

1. Herewith suggested DRAFT for Chief Commissioner's signature.
2. (a) I am at a loss to understand the meaning of their para 7.
 (b) The matter was obviously one for a combined appreciation, not a purely military one.
 (c) All the factors are set out accordingly in your letter (8251/SC of 23 Nov.)
 (d) We agreed it all with Brig. YATES, which their paras 1-5 confirm.
 (e) I cannot see that there is any more to be said.
3. Will you issue instructions to the Italian Prime Minister in accordance with the A.P.H.Q. letter or will you instruct me to do so to the War Minister?

LA/00

416

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

To see:-
 Dep Comd (K)
 Col MG
 GSOI (S) [initials]
 GSOI (T) [initials]
 AMG
 HQMG
 RAG

DRAFTSECRETHEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER

Ref : 8251/50

December, 1945.

SUBJECT : Location of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : A.P.H.C.

1. (a) I am in receipt of your AG.094.744/1044 D-0 dated 15 Dec.
 (b) The agreed subject matter of your para 4-5 has already been conveyed to the War Ministry verbally, during the discussions over the last fortnight.
 (c) It will now be communicated officially on paper to the Italian Government.
2. Ref your para 6, I was aware of the situation in this respect. Para 3(b) and 5(h) of my letter 8251/50 dated 28 Nov. was merely inserted as a relevant factor in the problem.
3. Ref your para 7, the recommendations in para 5 of my letter 8251/50 dated 28 Nov., were reached as the result of the combined factors enumerated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of my letter, to which I have nothing to add, though, if clarification of any particular aspect is desired, I should be glad to express the view of the Allied Commission.

4. I may say that this whole matter was fully discussed in my office with the Chief Commissioner at a conference between Mr. TATEO, Maj. Gen. BROWN, my Executive Commissioner and myself on 3 Dec., when all aspects of the question were ventilated and I understood complete agreement was reached.

ELIZABETH W. STONE
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief Commissioner.

4167

1. (a) I am in receipt of your AG.091.711/1044 D-0 dated 15 Dec.
- (b) The agreed subject matter of your para 1-5 has already been conveyed to the War Ministry verbally, during the discussions over the last fortnight.
- (c) It will now be communicated officially on paper to the Italian Government.
2. Ref your para 6, I was aware of the situation in this respect. Para 3(b) and 5(h) of my letter 8251/AC dated 28 Nov. was merely inserted as a relevant factor in the problem.
3. Ref your para 7, the recommendations in para 5 of my letter 8251/AC dated 28 Nov., were reached as the result of the unobscured factors enumerated in paras 2, 3 and 4 of my letter, to which I have nothing to add, though, for clarification of any particular aspect is desired, I should of course be glad to express the view of the Allied Commanders.
4. I may say that this whole matter was fully discussed in my office ROM at a conference between BRIDGES, Maj. Gen. BROGHINI, my Executive Commissioner and myself on 3 Dec., when all aspects of the question were ventilated and I understood complete agreement was reached.

MILARE V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner.

Copy to : G-5, A.F.HQ.
Land Forces S/C (MILA)
Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Veneto Region
LO No. 2 District
Executive Commissioner
H.Q. No. 2 District
H.Q. No. 3 District

Together with copy of
A.F.H.Q. letter
AG 091.711/1044 C-0
dated 15 December 1945.

1448

GSO 2

GSO 5 (GSO)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 3 (G)

AG CGL. 119/1044

GSO 2 (G)

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

APO 512

SUBJECT: Location of Italian Armed Forces

TO: Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
APO 394

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

GSO 2 (G)

1. Reference is made to your letters 8251/22 of 25 November and 8251/390/20 of 4 December.

2. The role of the Gruppi, when returned to Italian Government control, should be to act as a mobile reserve in the hands of the Italian Government. As such, they should remain free from any commitments in the areas in which they are located, and, pending a situation requiring their employment, should devote themselves to training.

3. It is agreed that when the Northern provinces are handed over, the main concentration of Italian mobile troops should be in the PO VALLEY. On taking over the Northern provinces, the actual location of the Gruppi will be a matter for the Italian Government to decide, but in making this decision they should give due weight to the availability of training facilities.

4. Considerable Allied Forces are now relieving the Gruppi on guard duties in the North of ITALY and other Allied Forces necessarily have to be located there; therefore, the actual location of the Gruppi for the time being must in addition to training requirements be determined very largely by the availability of remaining accommodations.

5. As a result of careful investigation, it appears that a maximum of four Gruppi can be located for the time being North of the Apennines. It is suggested that, in order to meet the wishes of the Italian Government as far as possible regarding detailed locations, your representative should maintain close liaison with Headquarters 2 and 3 District.

6. It would appear from your letters quoted above that you are not fully aware that it has been the Supreme Allied Commander's policy for some time to relieve all Italian Gruppi and Independent Regiments from guard duties. The relief of the Gruppi is now in progress and has only been delayed by the fact that insufficient accommodations are available for the relieving troops. This has necessitated the removal of one Gruppo to accommodations South of the Apennines. The relief of all Independent Regiments,

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG (MIA)

MMIA - 'G'

FILE: 119/1044

DATE: 17/12

SECRET

0682

45

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : DISTWO
TO : 7 ARMY GROUP RA - 59 AREA
217 AREA - 60 SUB AREA
INFO : GHQ CMF - MMIA - 1 BLU
2 BLU - 3 BLU - 4 BLU
6 BLU
REF : GO/4299

130339 A

SECRET

FURTHER TO OUR 2015 G (O) OF 22 NOVEMBER NOT REPEAT
NOT TO ALL (.) RELIEF OF ITALIAN COMBAT GROUPS GUARD
COMMITMENTS ON BRITISH INTEREST WILL BE COMPLETED
NOT REPEAT NOT LATER THAN 31 DECEMBER 45 (.) ACTION
ADDRESSEES WILL ADVISE EXACT DATES CONTEMPLATED AND
SUBMIT INTERIM PROGRESS REPORTS ON ACTUAL RELIEFS (.)
FOR 217 AREA AND 60 SUB AREA (.) F R I U L I
INFANTRY DIVISION WILL BE DISPLACED TO GENERAL AREA ON THE LINE
OF A D I G E WITH 1 REGIMENT SOUTH OF THE P O
AS DISCUSSED BRIGADIER TANNANT - COLONEL BROWNE

G DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : G/10
INFO : SD/40/1
Q
ST (two)

- 2011
- 2012 (Cpe)
- 2012 (SD)
- 2012 (We)
- 2012 (L)
- 2013 (SD)
- 2013 (Orsat)
- 2013 (H)

4153

14 Dec 45
sb

0683

OUTGOING SIGNAL

DATE TIME
10 18 15 A

FROM : MMIA

TO : HQ CMF FOR G(SD)
DISTWO
DISTTHREE
60 SUB AREA
61 AREA

REF : SD 3084

UNCLASSIFIED

REF MMIA LETTER SD/43/1 OF 10 DEC (.) REQUEST YOU
DELETE IN PARA 2 QUOTE 60 SUB AREA UNQUOTE AND INSERT
QUOTE 61 AREA UNQUOTE (.) COPY FOR 61 AREA FOLLOWS

PRECEDENCE

Routine

AUTHENTICATED

Chammaran May

INTERNAL:

WAR MINISTRY

File :

Q
ST (Two)
G/10

JW

4158

SECRET & IMMEDIATE.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief Commissioner

Ref: 8251/390/EC.

4. December 1945.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters.
Attn: Chief of Staff.

In continuation of my 8251/EC of 28 Nov 45 and the discussion with Brigadier VATES on the above subject in my office, ROME, on 3 Dec 45:

1. General BROWNING saw Signor JACINI, the War Minister, personally immediately after the discussion, as agreed.

2. Signor JACINI accepted the following:

(a) that the three (Combat) Infantry Divisions in the MILAN, TURIN and GENOA areas respectively should remain there:

(b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, FOIGORE Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APENNINES. He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible:

(c) that TRIULI Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve FRIULI of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of BOLZANO Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:

505 Bn at BOLZANO with one company at MERANO,
508 Bn at TRENTO with one company at VERONA,
514 Bn moving to BRESSANONE area.

Signor JACINI would like the Independent Regiment HQ moved to BOLZANO and the three Battalions located at BOLZANO, MERANO and BRESSANONE respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be relieved of guard duties by Allied troops. He wishes the existing FRIULI units in TRENTO to remain, particularly bearing in mind the "symbolic" and political reasons in that important area, an aspect which he stressed generally throughout the discussion with General BROWNING.

3. In view of the above, which appears reasonable and suitable to AFHQ views, it is suggested that:

(a) 3 District be ordered to make a recon and plan immediately in conjunction with Ministry of War through Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (AMIA) in order to allot suitable accommodation to FOIGORE as in para 2(b) above, the necessity of finding a site for

4157

In continuation of my 8251/EC of 28 Nov 45 and the discussion with Brigadier YATES on the above subject in my office, ROME, on 3 Dec 45:

1. General BROWNING saw Signor JACINI, the War Minister, personally immediately after the discussion, as agreed.

2. Signor JACINI accepted the following:

(a) that the three (Combat) Infantry Divisions in the MILAN, TURIN and GENOA areas respectively should remain there:

(b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, FOIGORE Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APENNINES. He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible:

(c) that FRIULI Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve FRIULI of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of BOLZANO Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:

505 Bn at BOLZANO with one company at MERANO,
508 Bn at TREVISO with one company at VERONA,
514 Bn moving to PRESSANONE area.

Signor JACINI would like the Independent Regiment HQ moved to BOLZANO and the three Battalions located at BOLZANO, MERANO and BRESSANONE respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be relieved of guard duties by Allied troops. He wishes the existing FRIULI units in TREVISO to remain, particularly bearing in mind the "symbolic" and political reasons in that important area, an aspect which he stressed generally throughout the discussion with General BROWNING.

3. In view of the above, which appears reasonable and suitable to AFHQ views, it is suggested that:

(a) 3 District be ordered to make a recon and plan immediately in conjunction with Ministry of War through Land Forces Sub-Commission AO (MIL) in order to allot suitable accommodation to FOIGORE as in para 2(b) above, the necessity of finding a swift and reasonable solution even at the expense of closing up Allied troops being stressed.

(b) 2 District be instructed to adjust locations of FRIULI and the BOLZANO Independent Regt as far as possible in accordance with para 2(c) above, in conjunction with General NEGRONI, Commanding BOLZANO Territorial Region through No. 4 B.E.U. accredited to General NEGRONI's HQ.

DRAFT

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner.

Ref :

December 1945.

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces

TO : A.F.H.Q. (For Chief of Staff)

In continuation of my 5251/XX dated 23 November and the discussion with Brigadier TADES on the above subject in my office, ROME, on 3 December:-

1. General INGROSSO and Signor JACINI, the War Minister, personally immediately after the discussion, as agreed.

2. Signor JACINI accepted the following:-

(a) that the three (Combat) Infantry Divisions in the MILAN, TURIN and GENOA areas respectively should remain there

(b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, PUGLIESE Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APENNINES.

He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible

(c) that BRIGLIA Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve BRIGLIA of guard duties. Signor JACINI accepted

this on condition that the Independent Regiment of PAVIANO Region was located in MILANO area. This Regiment has:-

505 Bn at MILANO with one company at VERONA

503 Bn at VERONA with one company at VENEZIA

514 Bn moving to VERONA area.

Signor JACINI would like the Independent Regiment HQ moved to MILANO and the three battalions located at MILANO, VERONA and PAVIANO respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be

controlled and supervised by Allied troops. He retains the existing

with Brigadier General Sir John Hackett, the War Minister, personally

1. General HACKETT saw Major JACINI, the War Minister, personally immediately after the discussion, as agreed.
 2. Major JACINI accepted the following:
 - (a) that the three (Combat) Infantry Divisions in the MILAN, TORIN and GENOA areas respectively should remain there
 - (b) that, particularly in view of the accommodation aspect, PAVIA Division should move to an area SOUTH of the APENNINES. He requested that it should be as near the PO Valley as possible
 - (c) that MILAN Division should remain roughly in the same area as at present, after the necessary adjustments to enable Allied troops to relieve MILAN of guard duties. Major JACINI accepted this on condition that the Independent Regiment of ITALIAN Region was located in BOLZANO area. This Regiment has:
 - 505 Bn at BOLZANO with one company at MERANO 415
 - 506 Bn at MERANO with one company at VERONA
 - 511 Bn moving to VERONA area.
- Major JACINI would like the Independent Regiment to move to BOLZANO and the three Italian units located at MILANO, MERANO and VERONA respectively. He assumes that the whole three battalions will be relieved of guard duties by Allied troops. He wishes the existing MILAN units in MERANO to remain, particularly bearing in mind the "symbolic" and political reasons in that important area, an aspect which he stressed generally throughout the discussion with General HACKETT.
3. In view of the above, which appears reasonable and suitable to A.P.H.Q., views, it is suggested that:

Sheet 2/.....

(a) 3 District be ordered to make a recess, and plan immediately in conjunction with Ministry of War through Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC(MFA) in order to allot suitable accommodations to PLOCHER as in para 2(b) above, the necessity of finding a swift and reasonable solution even at the expense of closing up Allied troops being stressed.

(b) 2 District be instructed to adjust locations of PLOCHER and the DELZANO Independent Regt. as far as possible in accordance with para 1(c) above, in conjunction with General HANSEN, Commanding DELZANO Territorial Region through No 4 D.L.U. accredited to General

HANSEN'S H.Q.

(c) PLOCHER to remain in its present location till its move direct to its new area SOUTH of the ALPHEUSSES, in order to avoid a double move - PLOCHER meanwhile being ordered to stand by to move at short notice.

HANSEN'S H.Q.
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
Chief Commissioner.

Copy to:- C-5, A.P.H.Q.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, AC(MFA)
Lombardia Region
Liguria Region
Piemonte Region
Venetia Region
L.O. No 2 District
Executive Commission
H.Q. No 2 District
H.Q. No 3 District

415

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : 60 SUB AUSA

042020 A

TO: LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION MIA AC

IMMEDIATE

INFO : DISTWO

4 B L U

REFERENCE 073N/

IT IS NOW ASCERTAINED THAT 4 B L U LETTER 604/1 OF 30 NOVEMBER WAS SENT WITHOUT THE
CONCURRENCE OF GENERAL HECROMI NO 4 TERRITORIAL COMMAND.

4154

SECRETSubject:- Distribution of Italian Armed Forces.Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG
(M.E.I.A.)

G/10

4 December 1945

Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION
(For Executive Commissioner)

1. Reference discussion this morning on above, herewith DRAFT of letter which it is suggested that Chief Commissioner should send to A.F.H.Q.
2. As agreed by Chief Commissioner I phoned Brig. YATES and gave him the gist of attached draft at 1900 hrs today.
3. He was very satisfied at the outcome and agreed:-
 - (a) in principle with para 2 of attached.
 - (b) that I should thus inform Minister of War, pending receipt of the A.F.H.Q. order - which I have done.

d.B.

Major General.

Original by hand to Brig Genl. 10 Dec 45

WFB

4153

Subject:- Distribution of Italian Armed Forces

Lead Forces-Sub-Commission, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

6/10
4 December 1945.

My Dear

Reference our discussion on above subject this morning, I understand that A.F.H.Q. will be agreeable to the proposals in principle viz. that:-

- (a) the LEGNANO, CREMONA and MANTOVA Divisions remain where they are
- (b) POLICENE will move SOUTH of the APPENNINES to an area as near the PO Valley as possible
- (c) the BOLZANO Independent Regt. will be located in the BOLZANO area and relieved of guard duties
- (d) FRIULI will remain roughly in its present area, after adjustments to enable Allied troops to take over its guard duties.
- (e) In consequence of (b), 3 District will immediately work out a plan with the War Ministry through M.M.I.A. for the locations of POLICENE SOUTH of the APPENNINES, POLICENE moving to these at once when they are decided on.

I tell you this in advance of the official A.F.H.Q. instructions as you may wish to warn those concerned that the above is almost certain to happen.

Yours

D.B.

Major General

Signor JACINI
Minister of War

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
OFFICE OF CHIEF COMMISSIONER

REF: 6851/EC.

28. November 1945

SUBJECT: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces

TO : AFHQ (for Chief of Staff)

1. HISTORY

(a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces, and therefore must consider now the ultimate disposition of the various formations and units.

(b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brigadier YATES and Major General BROWNING/Brigadier LUSH recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signals FX 54297 dated 24 November and FX 54298 dated 25 November.

(c) As a result of this, Colonel PIDSLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission, AC) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 November with Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and discussed the whole matter with GOC 8 District, returning to Rome on Sunday, 25 November.

(d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a conference with Signor JACINI, still functioning as Minister of War, on 26 November, by Brigadier LUSH and General BROWNING.

(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS

(a) The Eastern frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 Corps.

(b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to retain troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult security situation are involved.

(c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will be

HISTORY

- (a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces, and therefore must consider now the ultimate disposition of the various formations and units.
- (b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brigadier YATES and Major General BROWNING/Brigadier LUSH recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signals FX 54297 dated 24 November and FX 54298 dated 25 November.
- (c) As a result of this, Colonel PIDSLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission, AC) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 November with Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission and discussed the whole matter with GOC 8 District, returning to ROME on Sunday, 25 November.
- (d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a conference with Signor JACINI, still functioning as Minister of War, on 26 November, by Brigadier LUSH and General BROWNING.
- (e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

4151

POLITICAL FACTORS

- (a) The Eastern frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 Corps.
- (b) BOLZANO province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to retain troops there. Both frontier problems and a difficult security situation are involved.
- (c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also be an Italian responsibility. The withdrawal of British troops from the French frontier introduces a delicate situation. To avoid incidents, it is advisable that no major move of Italian troops to that frontier should be made, though limited patrol movement is necessary to avoid French infiltration.

Interim Dist.

MA. for G.O.C.

Col. A/R.

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C.C.

C.C.

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Intermed Dist.

MA. for G.O.C.

Col. A/R.

C.C.

G.

Col. Ken (Boul. (Boul.))

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G.O.C.

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(d) The internal security question will be dealt with by Italian troops in the following order of employment:

- (1) CC.RR
- (ii) CC.RR mobile columns
- (iii) Independent Regiments (see also Para 3(a) below)
- (iv) Combat Divisions.

The main function of Combat Divisions therefore is frontier defence and only in cases of extreme urgency should they be used for internal security.

(e) The resignation of the present Italian Government on 24 November, complicates the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

(f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal law and order will rest with the Italian Government, subject to SAC's over-riding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to bind themselves in advance to a fixed distribution of their available Forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Infantry Divisions for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

MILITARY FACTORS

(a) Excluding services and headquarters and training installations, the following FIGHTING TROOPS are available:-

(i) Five Infantry Divisions (FRIULI, CREMONA, LEGNANO, FOLGORE, MANTOVA). These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are up to WE as follows:-

Total Division.....	9,000
Each Infantry Regiment.....	2,700
Each Infantry Battalion.....	770
Artillery Regiment.....	1,500

For present locations see Appendix "B".

(ii) Ten independent regiments (Inf) of HQ and three battalions with WE:-

Total Regiment.....	2,500
Each Battalion.....	800

One Regiment per Territorial Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B") but Battalions are up to WE.

(iii) Three IS Divisions of two Brigades each of two Regiments of two Battalions. Vide Appendix "B"

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Regiments are not fully constituted yet (see Appx "B") but Battalions are up to WE.

(iii) Three IS Divisions of two Brigades each of two Regiments of two Battalions. Vide Appendix "B", SABAUDA and AOSTA IS Divisions in SICILY are at 80% of WE, while CALABRIA IS Division in SARDINIA is approximately at 80% of WE viz:-

Total IS Division.....	5,000
Each Brigade.....	2,500
Each Regiment.....	1,000
Each Battalion.....	530

They are equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

(b) A large part of the Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments are employed on guarding dumps and installations, and are widely dispersed. Supervision and training to any major extent is thus not possible at present. The present state of training is low in consequence, and further because there has been a heavy change-over of personnel due to:-

(i) Reduction in strength compared with that at the time of the German surrender.

(ii) Demobilisation of older classes - which is continuing.

(iii) Reduction of BR-ITI and US-ITI service units and transfer of soldiers of military age to formations as above.

The greater part of the older and better trained men and of tradesmen and specialists have been or are about to be released from the Army. Replacements are being trained at the maximum speed. To restore the efficiency of the Army, it is advisable that formations be relieved of their extensive guard duties and concentrated as far as possible in order to undertake controlled and extensive training.

Should, as is desirable for standardisation and other reasons, Independent Regiments and IS Divisions be equipped with British equipment, the necessity for intensive training will be further increased.

(c) AFHQ view is that apart from possible frontier trouble, the probable areas for employment of the strategic reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the HEEL of ITALY. They consider that this points to a distribution of three Infantry Divisions NORTH of the APPENNINES and two SOUTH.

(d) Morale, particularly in the Infantry and IS Divisions, is reasonably good at present. Italian officers and men regard service near the frontier as an honour, and would view a move from the frontier southwards as a withdrawal, especially if without Allied or Italian replacement. The War Ministry has similar views from a political and prestige angle.

Each Infantry Division has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move southwards. Much would depend on the published reason for the move.

(e) Any move southwards would ease the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical

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GOC, 2 District from the accommodation point of view would like one Infantry Division at any rate moved south of the APPENNINES. He can let FRIULI stay, with an

adjustment of its area locally. LEGNANO and CREMONA do not interfere - nor does MANTOVA. From 2 District point of view, therefore, a move of FOLGORE SOUTH of the APPENNINES would be adequate as regards the accommodation angle.

On the other hand, 2 District stated that there were large areas which they were not using or from which they were withdrawing Allied troops, and that adequate accommodation for one Italian Division (thus accommodating all five such North of the APPENNINES) might well be found after recce., particularly in the area MANTOVE - MODENA - PIACENZA. The Italians also consider that this should be possible.

It is understood that AFHQ have ordered FOLGORE to move to the BRESCIA area, the move to be completed by 10 December.

(f) Provided bids for rail transportation or POL were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.

(g) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or POL.

4. At the discussion with Signor JACINI on 26 November he stated the Italian Government's views as follows:-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Infantry Divisions of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the question:

- (a) Military
- (b) Internal political
- (c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being sea. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely populated agricultural areas of the South. "To hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY". ROME is well catered for and in any case "the key of ROME is MILAN". Southern areas, such as BARI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem. In any event, Independent Regiments are there as a reserve.

As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Infantry Division in the Mantova Division and occupied there, and

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As regards (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Infantry Division in the BOLZANO, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Infantry Division in the GENOVA Area, but as MANTOVA Division are stationed there and their accommodation is not wanted by the Allies, they would like to leave MANTOVA in situ to avoid a move.

The fifth Infantry Division (FOLGORE) should be somewhere in the PO Valley if accommodation can be found, which the Italians think is possible (see third Sub-para of 3(e) above). Failing this, FOLGORE should be as close to BOLOGNA as possible.

To sum up, the Italian Government, who will shortly be in operational control of these Divisions would prefer to locate all

five Infantry Divisions North of the APPENNINES. But, if pressed, they would agree to moving one SOUTH of the APPENNINES as near BOLOGNA as possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) IS Divisions to remain in situ.
- (b) Independent Regiments to remain in projected locations and be constituted up to full WE as soon as possible.
- (c) LEGNANO, CREMONA and MANTOVA to remain in situ.
- (d) Locations of FRIULI to be readjusted locally with 2 District to enable this Division to guard the ALTO ADIGE.
- (e) A recce. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District to discover whether FOLGORE can be accommodated in the PO Valley.
- (f) A simultaneous recce. to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of FOLGORE South of the APPENNINES in case the recce. as in (e) does not succeed.
- (g) No administrative difficulty over FOLGORE move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.
- (h) It is advisable to relieve Infantry Divisions and Independent Regiments of guard duties, to enable them to train.
- (i) It is strongly recommended, with full concurrence of GOC Land Forces Sub-Commission, AF (MIA) that proposals (j) - (f) above be accepted, that the FOLGORE Division be located as near to the PO Valley as possible and that AFHQ:

(1) Provide AC with the Order of Battle of Allied troops throughout ITALY:

(ii) give directions as to policy to be adopted as regards frontier defence:

(a) on ITALO-AUSTRIA frontier;

(b) on ITALO-FRENCH frontier.

Walter W. Stone
WALTER W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

COPY TO: AFHQ
Land Forces S/C (MIA)

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(e) A recess. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District to discover whether FOLCORE can be accommodated in the PO Valley.

(f) A simultaneous recess. to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of FOLCORE South of the APENNINES in case the recess. as in (e) does not succeed.

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W. W. Stone
 ELDERY W. STONE
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief Commissioner

US, AFHQ

COPY TO:

Land Forces S/C (MIA)
 Lombardy Region
 Liguria Region
 Piemonte Region
 Venezia Region
 LO NO. 2 District
 Executive Commissioner
 HQ, NO. 1 DISTRICT
 HQ, NO. 3 DISTRICT - 5 -

414

0703

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 785020

APPENDIX "A"

Phone conversation Brig. YATES/Gen BROWNING at 1000 hrs - 23 Nov 4

1. C.G.S., A.F.H.Q. wishes me to see the Italian Government and persuade them to:-

- (a) Move FRIULI and FOLGORE out of BOLZANO Area.
- (b) Move two Combat Divs South of the APPENNINES.

2. A.F.H.Q.'s view is as follows:-

(a) The Italians need an efficient Army and we are prepared to give it to them.

(b) The Combat Divisions cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

(d) In any event, FRIULI and FOLGORE must move out of BOLZANO Area because:-

(i) The area is not suitable for training;

(ii) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regiment would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES and two South.

(f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration over-ride necessary military ones.

(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

3. Brig. YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered

(b) The Combat Divisions cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divisions North of the APPENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divisions of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divisions must be moved South of the APPENNINES. A.F.H.Q. do not insist that it should be the FRIULI or FOLGORE who move South of the APPENNINES, but unless it is those two Divisions who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

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(g) In view of all the above, A.F.H.Q. consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO Area and two Combat Divisions (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENNINES.

3. Brig. YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an order from A.F.H.Q. and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-arrange their administrative plan.

4. Gen. BROWNING stated that this was all a matter for "Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C." and that therefore it would have to be tackled in full conjunction with Chief Commissioner, A.C. Brig. YATES agreed.

23 Nov. 45

Signed: L. Browning,
Maj. Gen.

APPENDIX "B"

UNITTRIULI DIV.

- HQ
- 87 Inf. Regt.
- 88 Inf. Regt.
- 35 Arty. Regt.
- 120 Eng. Bn.
- Services

FOLGORE DIV.

- HQ
- Nembo Regt.
- Garibaldi Regt.
- 184 Arty. Regt.
- 184 Eng. Bn.
- Services

CREMONA DIV.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGNANO DIV.

- HQ
- 68 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANTOVA DIV.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 186 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

I.S. Regts.

- No 1 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
- No 2 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 3 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 4 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 5 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
- No 6 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 7 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)

LOCATIONS

LEVICO
BASSANO DEL GRAPPA
S. BONIFACIO
TRENTO
LEVICO
various

BRESSANONE
DOBBIAIO
BOLZANO
COLLE ISARCO
ORTISEI
VARIOUS

TURIN
ASTI
VERCELLI
CHIERI
CASAL MONFERRATO
VARIOUS

BERGAMO
BERGAMO
SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

TURIN
GENOA
BRESCIA
VERONA
PADUA
MODENA
LUCCA

414

FOLGORE DIV.

- HQ
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- Garibaldi Regt.
- 184 Arty. Regt.
- 184 Eng. Bn.
- Services

CREMONA Div.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
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- 166 Arty. Regt.
- 104 Eng. Bn.
- Services

I.S. Regts.

- No 1 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
- No 2 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 3 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 4 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 5 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
- No 6 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 7 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 8 I.S. Regt (1 Bn)
- No 9 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
- No 10 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)

DRESSANONE
DOBBIAIO
BOLZANO
COLLE ISARCO
ORTISEI
VARIOUS

TURIN
ASTI
VERCELLI
CHIERI
CASAL MONFERRATO
VARIOUS

BERGAMO
BERGAMO
SONDRIO
BRESCIA
BERGAMO
VARIOUS

VARAZZE
SAVONA
COMO
PIACENZA
CAIRO MONTENTOTTE
VARIOUS

TURIN
GENOA
ERESCLA
VERONA
PADUA
MODENA
LUCCA
VITERBO
BARI
NAPOLI

4147

APPENDIX "B"

UNIT

Miscellaneous Guard Bns.

- 513 Guard Bn
- 528 Guard Bn
- 529 Guard Bn
- 515 Guard Bn
- Grenadier Bn

I.S. Divs

SABAUDA Div
AOSTA Div
Calebria Div

LOCATIONS

LATERINA
VITERBO
VITERBO
AREZZO
ROME

MESSINA
PALERMO
CAGLIARI

COMMUNIST PARTY

FROM : NIA

DATE: 26
TIME: 4

TO : ASIA

INFO : AIA
DISPO
DISCLOSURE

REF : C-476

SECRET

REF FROM FX 54297 AND FX 54298 WASH WASH DC (.) VIEWS
OF D E E T O, A L G O B AND TRAILING MEMBERS OF
KAP HAVE BEEN OBTAINED AND DETERMINED (.) AS REQUESTED
BY LAST MESSAGE OF FX 54297, DETAILED APPROPRIATE MEMO
DISCUSSING COMING OF COMMISSIONER ALBON
FORWARD COPIES

PROVIDED INFORMATION

APPROVED

REFERENCE

FILE : C/10-1000

for 28 Nov 48

4146

9-11/45

to Ring handle 22

1. Put in both HHHH signal references.
2. Change "carried out" to "accepted" in para 5 (i). (done with)
3. Otherwise agree.

LTC to send reply to signal
from HHHH saying apply
from HC Ring sent tomorrow

4145

Please accept for
2024 for garden release - 10/1/24

22 Nov

20 P-11

in para 3 (c).

3. otherwise agree.

USC ordered reply to signal
from HHHH saying reply
from HC King sent tomorrow

4147

Please insert in Bureau
simple notes about (Bureau)

27 Nov

CD Fidler

Dear Wilfred

Can you hear this by led. No staff here!

yes.

Recd 1510/27 Nov

MS/27/11

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

My dear General.

Thank you very much for sending
me the draft. I have made a few
suggested alterations - marked Red.

If you agree I will submit to
CC. today for clearance.

I agree with procedure entirely

7

4145

J. J. J.

27/XI/45

G.10

27 Nov 45.

Subject: Disposition of Italian Armed Forces.

Dear Maurice,

References the covering let or and draft on the above that I sent you last night :-

1. Will you alter the number of the covering letter from G/5 to G/10.
2. Also strike out "Land Forces Disposition, A.C. (M.N.I.A.)" at the head of the draft. It will be your heading of course.
3. Perhaps you might add at the end of para. 2(a) -- "On the other hand the actual presence of such a Division in or near an area emphasises an influence towards the maintenance of an air order".
4. I had a rush to get the draft typed and out to you yesterday, so was not able to check carefully.
5. I think the HISTORY (para 3) and app. "A" are important to put in so as to show :-
 - (a) how the business all arose out of verbal conversations
 - (b) that we have wasted no time.

4143

Yours ever,

Laurier.

Brig. M.S. LURIA, C.B., D.S.O., A.C.

Dear Maurice,

Return the covering letter and put it on the above that I sent you last night :-

1. Will you alter the number of the covering letter from G/3 to G/10.
2. Also strike out "Land Women Sub Commission, A.C. (H.E.I.A.)" at the head of the draft. It will be your heading of course.
3. Perhaps we might add at the end of para 2(a) -- "On the other hand the actual presence of such a Division in or near an area overvoies an influence towards the maintenance of law and order".
4. I had a rush to get the draft typed and out to you yesterday, so was not able to check carefully.
5. I think the HISTORY (para 1) and App. "G" are important to get in so as to show :-

(a) how the business all arose out of verbal conversations

(b) that we have wasted no time.

4142

Yours ever,

Landier.

Prof. M.S. LUSH, C.B., C.T.E., A.C.

/dic

6/10.
27 Nov. 45.
Subject: - Disposition of Italian Armed Forces.

Dear Maurice,

Re: the covering letter & draft on the above that I sent you last night.

1. Will you alter the number of the covering letter from 6/3 to 6/10.
2. Also strike out "Land Forces Sub-commission ATC (MMA)" at the head of the draft. It will be

Your Reading of course.

3. Perhaps we might add at the end of para 2(d) -- "On the other hand the actual presence of such a Division in or near an area exercises an influence towards the maintenance of law & order."

4. I had a rush to get the draft typed & sent to you yesterday, so was not able to check

Carefully.

5. I think the HISTOR (para 1) & App. "A" are important to put in

- on the above
1. Will you alter the number of the covering letter from 0/3 to 0/10.
 2. Also strike out "Land Forces sub-commission ATC (MMA)" at the head of the draft. It will be your heading of course.
 3. Perhaps we might add at the end of para 2(d) -- "On the other hand the actual presence of such a Division in or near an area exercises an influence towards the maintenance of law & order."
 4. I had a wish to get the draft typed point to point yesterday, but was not able to check.
 5. So was not able to check carefully the HISTOR (para 1) & I think the App. "A" are important to put in so as to show:-
 - (a) how the business all arose out of verbal conversations
 - (b) that we have wasted no time

yours ever
Langley

Brig. M. S. LUSK
CB. C.E.MC.

URGENT AND URGENT.

Major General L. Browning, CB., CBE., MC.
Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C.

(M.M.I.A.)

8/13 5/10

26 November 1945.

SUBJECT:- Disposition of Italian Armed Forces.

Dear Maurice

1. Herewith two copies of a draft on the above, which I suggest you alter as you wish, let us see again and then send to A.F.H.Q. over the Chief Commissioner's signature, if he approves it.

2. We are agreed it is an A.C. matter on which I act as your military adviser.

3. The signal I refer to in para 1(b) of the DRAFT is the one you got on the subject from A.F.H.Q. today.

4. As A.F.H.Q. are asking for our views "as a matter of urgency" I send this to you (with apologies!) tonight, as you may like to read it quietly before you approach the tumult of your office tomorrow!

Yours

Ever

Langley Browning

Major General.

Brigadier M.S. LUSH, CB., CBE., MC.
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.

4140

Sgt Gillman

Can you type in my correction - after

Dear Maurice

Herewith two copies of a draft on the above, which I suggest you alter as you wish, let us see again and then send to A.F.H.Q. over the Chief Commissioner's signature, if he approves it.

2. We are agreed it is an A.C. matter on which I act as your military adviser.

3. The signal I refer to in para 1(b) of the DRAFT is the one you got on the subject from A.F.H.Q. today.

4. As A.F.H.Q. are asking for our views "as a matter of urgency" I send this to you (with apologies!) tonight, as you may like to read it quietly before you approach the result of your office tomorrow!

Yours Ever

Langley Browning

Major General.

Brigadier M.S. LUSH, CB., CBE., MC.
Executive Commissioner,
Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.

4141

Sgt Gilman

Can you type in my correction - after which I will send to Gen. Browning

W. Palmer

0718

SECRET AND URGENT

DRAFT

Subject: Distribution of Italian Armed Forces.

Land Forces and Commissioning A.G.
(M.S.I.S.)
R.O.M.S.

November, 1945.

To: A.P.H.Q. (for Chief of Staff).

1. HISTORY.

(a) AFHQ have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of these Forces.

(b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brig. YATES and Maj. Gen. BROWNING / Brig. LUSH recently, the latest verbal instructions from AFHQ being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AFHQ signal dated

(c) As a result of this, Executive Commissioner A.G. and Col. FIDALEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission A.G.) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 Nov and discussed the whole matter with G.O.C. 2 District, returning to HQM on Sunday 25 Nov.

(d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a Conference with Signor JACINI, Minister of War, on 26 Nov, by Brig. LUSH and Gen. BROWNING.

(e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

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2. POLITICAL FACTORS.

- (a) AMER have been considering the disposition of the Italian Armed Forces, with particular reference to the Infantry (Combat) Divisions and bearing in mind that, with the hand-over of the Northern Territories, the Italian Government will be responsible for and at liberty to decide on a suitable distribution of those Forces.
- (b) The subject was raised in verbal discussion between Brig. LAMES and Maj. Gen. BROWNING / Brig. LAMES recently, the latest verbal instructions from AMER being in a telephone conversation, summarized at Appendix "A" and in AMER signal dated
- (c) As a result of this, Executive Commissioner A.G. and Col. HEDLEY (representing Land Forces Sub Commission A.G.) flew to MILAN on Saturday, 24 Nov and discussed the whole matter with C.O.C. 2 District, returning to AMER on Sunday 25 Nov.
- (d) Despite the resignation of the Italian Government, the matter was discussed at a Conference with Signor JACINI, Minister of War, on 26 Nov, by Brig. LAMES and Gen. BROWNING.
- (e) The following represents the views of the Allied Commission and the reactions thereto of the Italian Government as stated by Signor JACINI.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS.

- (a) The Northern Frontier is the responsibility of the Allies through 13 Corps.
- (b) EMERSON province is to be handed back to Italian control. The Italians therefore must be permitted to retain troops there to control it.
- (c) The remainder of the frontier westwards will also be an Italian

/responsibility

0720

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2. (c) (Contd.)

responsibility. The withdrawal of British troops from the French frontier introduces a delicate situation. To avoid incidents, it is advisable that no major move of Italian troops to that frontier should be made, though limited patrol movement is necessary to avoid French infiltration.

(d) The internal security situation will be dealt with by Italian troops in the following order of employment:

CC RM

CC RM mobile column

Independent Regiments (see also para 2(a) below)

Combat Divisions.

The main function of Combat Divisions therefore is frontier defence and only in cases of extreme urgency should they be used for internal security.

(e) The resignation of the present Italian Government on 24 Nov. clarifies the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

(f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal security order will rest with the Italian Government, subject to S.A.C.'s over-riding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to ⁴¹⁹ ~~419~~ ^{themselves} in advance to a fixed distribution of their available forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Inf. Divs. for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

3. MILITARY FACTORS.

Installation, the

- (d) The internal security question will be dealt with by Italian troops in the following order of employment :

CG RR

CC RR mobile columns

Independent Regiments (see also para 3(a) below)

Combat Divisions.

The main function of Combat Divisions therefore in frontier defence and only in cases of extreme urgency should they be used for internal security.

- (e) The rearmament of the present Italian Government on 24 Nov. emphasizes the issue, in that no authoritative Italian body can be consulted.

- (f) When the Northern territories are handed back to the Italians the responsibility for frontier defence and internal security will rest with the Italian Government, subject to S.A.C.'s overriding control. Possible future development being unforeseeable, the Italian Government cannot be expected to ⁴suppl these selves in advance to a fixed distribution of their available Forces, though they have agreed NOT to move Inf. Divs. for reasons of comfort and prestige only.

3. MILITARY POTENTIAL.

- (a) Reclaiming services and headquarters and training installations, the following PLACED THINGS are available :-

(1) Five Inf. Divs (SERRA, JASSONA, LOMBARO, FULCINO, MANTOVA).

These are equipped to scale with British equipment and are

up to S.A. as follows :-

Total Div 2,000

Each Inf. Div. 2,700

/Each Inf. Div.

- 3 -

3. (a) (1) Contd.

Each Inf. Regt. ... 770

Arty. Regt. ... 1,500

For present locations see appx. map

(12) Non Independent Regiments (Inf.), of 11, 12, and three less

with 4.2. :-

Total Regt ... 2,500

Each bn. ... 800

One Regt. per Terr. Region equipped with Italian Equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regts. are not fully constituted yet (see appx. "13") but

are up to 4.2.

(12) Three I.S. Divs of two Regts each of two Regts of two bns.

Vide Appx. "14", SARAJEVO and AUSTRIA I.S. Divs. in VIETNAM are

at 50% of I.S., while CALABRIA I.S. Div. in SARDINIA is approx.

at 50% of I.S. viz :-

Total I.S. Div. ... 5,000

Each Bn. ... 2,200

Each Regt. ... 1,000

Each bn. ... 500

They are equipped with Italian Equipment and NOT up to scale.

(b) A large part of the Inf. Divs and Independent Regts. are employed on guarding dumps and installations, and are widely dispersed.

Supervision and training to any major extent is thus not possible

at present. The present state of training is low in consequence, and

further because there has been a heavy change-over of personnel due

to :-

(1) reduction in strength compared with that at the time of the

Total Regt 2,500

Each bn. 300

One Regt. per Terr. Region equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

Regts. are not fully constituted yet (see Annex "B") but

are up to 80%.

(iii) Three I.S. Divs of two Regts each of two Regts of two Ins.

Vice Agts. "B", BAHAMON and SANTA R. S. Divs. in SICILY are

at 50% of I.S., while CALABRIA I.S. Div. in ABRUZZO is approx.

at 30% of I.S. viz :-

Total I.S. Div. 5,000

Each Regt. 2,500

Each Regt. 1,000

Each bn. 300

They are equipped with Italian equipment and NOT up to scale.

(b) A large part of the Inf. Divs and Independent Regts. are employed on guarding camps and installations, and are widely dispersed.

Supervision and training to any major extent is thus not ~~possible~~ at present. The present state of training is low in consequence, and further because there has been a heavy change-over of personnel due

to :-

(1) reduction in strength compared with that at the time of the

German surrender

(ii) demobilization of older classes - which is continuing

(iii) reduction of M-III and M-III service units and transfer of soldiers of military age to formations as above.

The greater part of the older and better trained men and of tradesmen and specialists have been or are about to be released from the Army. Replacements are being trained at the maximum speed.

3. (b) Contd.

To restore the efficiency of the Army, it is advisable that operations be relieved of their extensive guard duties and concentrated as far as possible in order to undertake controlled and extensive training.

Should, as is desirable for standardization and other reasons, Independent Regts. and I.B. Divs be equipped with British equipment, the necessity for intensive training will be further increased.

(c) A.P.H.Q. view is that apart from possible Frontier trouble, the probable areas for employment of the strategic reserves are GERMANY, TURKEY, HUNGARY and the BALKANS OF ITALY. They consider that this points to a dissemination of three Divs. Divs NORTH of the ALPINES and two SOUTH.

(d) Morale, particularly in the Inf. and I.B. Divs., is sensibly good at present. Italian officers and men regard service near the frontier as an honour, and would view a move from the frontier Southwards as a withdrawal, especially if without Allied or Italian replacement. The War Ministry has similar views from a political and prestige angle.

Each Inf. Div has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move Southwards. Most would depend on the published reasons for the move.

(e) Any move Southwards would cause the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the Allies in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out mutually with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical

equipment, the necessary
improvements.

(c) A.P.M.C. view is that apart from possible Frontier trouble, the probable reason for employment of the strategic reserve are ITALY, TURKEY, ROMANIA and the P.E.L. of USSR. They consider that this points to a distribution of these Inf. Divs NORTH of the APENNINES and two SOUTH.

(d) Morale, particularly in the Inf. and I.S. Divs., is reasonably good at present. Italian officers and men regard service near the Frontier as an honour, and would view a move from the Frontier Southwards as a withdrawal, especially if without allied or Italian replacement. The War Ministry has similar views from a political and prestige angle.

Each Inf. Div has a different reliability factor and would react differently to a move Southwards. Much would depend on the published reasons for the move.

Each would depend on 413

(e) Any move Southwards would mean the NORTH ITALY accommodation problem, but might mean that the ALLIES in 3 District would have to close up and make concessions. Details of actual locations would have to be worked out internally with 3 District, in order to avoid interference with projected Territorial Training Centres, technical locations of Independent Regts. and other permanent Italian military installations. Climate in the South favours a move in this direction during the winter.

G.O.C. 2 District from the accommodation point of view, would like one Inf. Div at any rate moved south of the APENNINES. He can let P.E.L. stay, with an adjustment of its area locally.

/LAWRENCE

5. (c) CANTON.

UNIMMO and CANTON do not interfere - nor does MANTOVA.

From 2 District point of view, therefore, a move of POLICONS SOUTH of the APPELLETT would be adequate as regards the accommodation angle.

On the other hand, 2 District stated that there were large areas which they were not using or from which they were withdrawing Allied troops, and that adequate accommodation for one Italian Division (thus accommodating all five such North of the APPELLETT) might well be found after noon., particularly in the area MANTOVA - MANTOVA - PAVANNA. The Italians also consider that this should be possible.

It is understood that A.F.H.Q. have ordered POLICONS to move to the MANTOVA area, the move to be completed by 10 loc.

(f) Provided basis for rail transportation or P.O.L. were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.

(g) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or P.O.L.

4. At the discussion with Major JAMES on 26 Nov. he stated the Italian Government's views as follows :-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Inf. Divs of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the

question :

(a) Military

(b) Internal political

(c) International (frontiers).

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drawing Allied troops, and that adequate accommodation for one Italian Division (then accommodating all five such North of the APENNINES) might well be found after recess., particularly in the area MANTOVA - VERONA - VICENZA. The Italians also consider that this should be possible.

It is understood that A.P.L.G. have ordered PERSONS to move to the VERONA area, the move to be completed by 10 Dec.

- (F) Provided help for rail transportation or P.O.L. were given Allied priority, there would be no difficulty over a move. Resultant distribution of troops would ease the transportation problem.
- (G) Provided seven days notice is given before the move of the first units, no difficulty is anticipated as regards supplies or P.O.L.

4-. At the discussion with Signor JACINI on 25 Nov. he stated the

Italian Government's views as follows :-

They are entirely in favour of relieving the Inf. Divs of Guard duties to enable them to train.

Apart from the accommodation angle, there are three sides to the

question :

- (a) Military
(b) Internal political
(c) International (frontiers).

As regards (a) Italian policy has always been to concentrate their troops in the North, which is far the most important frontier, the rest being less. This still holds good and the majority of their barracks are there.

As regards (b) Troubles always have come from the highly populated industrial areas of the North, rather than the more sparsely populated agricultural areas of the South. "To hold the PO Valley is to hold ITALY". ROME is well centered for and in any case "the key of ROME is MILAN". Southern areas, such as NAPI or NAPLES can never be more than a police problem.

4(Gent) In any case, Independent Regiments are to be as a reserve.
At recess (c) The Eastern frontier is an Allied responsibility. It is essential to have an Inf. Div. in the BRESCIA, MILAN and TURIN areas. It is not essential to have an Inf. Div. in the COMO area, but as MANTOVA Div. are engaged there and their accommodation is not wanted by the Allies, they would like to leave MANTOVA in situ to avoid a move.

The fifth Inf. Div. (POLONAISE) should be somewhere in the PO Valley if accommodation can be found, which the Italians think is possible (see last subparagraph of 3(c) above). Failing this, POLONAISE should be as close to BOLOGNA as possible.

To say up, the Italian Government would like all Civo Inf. Divs North of the APENNINES. But, if pressed, they would agree to moving one SOUTH of the APENNINES as near BOLOGNA as possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

- (a) I. & A. Divs. to remain in situ.
- (b) Independent Regts. to remain in protected locations and be engaged up to full S.F. as soon as possible.
- (c) BRESCIA, COMO and MANTOVA to remain in situ.
- (d) Location of MILAN to be readjusted locally with 2 District to enable this Div. to guard the ALTO ADIGE.
- (e) A recess. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District. to discover whether POLONAISE can be accommodated in the PO valley.
- (f) A simultaneous recess. to be made forthwith by 3 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of POLONAISE South of the APENNINES in case the recess. as in (e) does not succeed.
- (g) No administrative difficulty over POLONAISE move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.

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(h) It is envisaged to relieve I. & A. Divs. and Independent Regts. of

ARRANGED as near BUDAPEST as possible.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

- (a) I.S. Divs. to remain in situ.
- (b) Independent Regts. to remain in projected locations and be constituted up to full strength as soon as possible.
- (c) BUDAPEST, GYORS and MATEVÁ to remain in situ.
- (d) Locations of REGTS to be refigured locally with 2 District to enable this Div. to guard the ALTO AREA.
- (e) A recon. to be made forthwith by the War Ministry in conjunction with 2 District. to discover whether REGTS can be accommodated in the RO valley.
- (f) A simultaneous recon. to be made forthwith by 2 District in conjunction with the War Ministry to plan for a possible move of REGTS south of the ALTO AREA in case the recon. as in (e) does not succeed.
- (g) No administrative difficulty over REGTS move is anticipated, provided adequate warning and Allied help is given.
- (h) It is advisable to relieve I.S. Divs. and Independent Regts of guard duties, to enable them to train.
- (i) The above distribution is affected by the projected locations of Allied troops of which I.S. have little knowledge.
- (j) ARMY to decide in the light of all the above and issue an order accordingly

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5. (j) Contd.

accordingly specifying the policy to be adopted as regards
Frontier Defence, with particular reference to the French
frontier and BOLZANO province.

Chief Commissioner, A.C.

Copy to: Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C., (M.H.I.A.)

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APPENDIX "A"

Phone conversation with Mr. LAMM/Gen. PRINZ at 1600 hrs - 23 Nov. 45.

1. G.C.S., A.P.H.Q. wishes us to see the Italian Government and persuade them to:

- (a) Move PRINZI and PULCHER out of BOLZANO Area.
- (b) Move two Combat Divs South of the APENNINES.

2. A.P.H.Q.'s view is as follows:-

(a) The Italians need an efficient Army and we are prepared to give it to them.

(b) The Combat Divs cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defense and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in a Nutshell, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divs North of the APENNINES, as accommodation must be found for increasing non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divs of an ever-increasing part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divs must be moved South of the APENNINES. A.P.H.Q. do not think that it should be the PRINZI or PULCHER who move South of the APENNINES, but unless it is those two Divs who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

(2) In any event, PRINZI and PULCHER must move out of BOLZANO Area because:-

(1) the area is not suitable for training

(4) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO Area. The Independent Regt. would still remain at BOLZANO.

(e) Even the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, increasing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divs North of the APENNINES and two South.

(2) If the Italian Government wish to keep PRINZI and PULCHER in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration override necessary military ones.

(2) In view of all the above, A.P.H. consider that PRINZI and PULCHER should be moved out of BOLZANO area and two Combat Divs (preferably PRINZI and PULCHER) should be moved South of the APENNINES.

3. Mr. LAMM agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an order from A.P.H.Q. and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-organize their administrative plans.

4. Gen. PRINZI stated that this was not all a matter for "Land Forces" but that it would have to be backed in full

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(b) The Combat Divs cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defense and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of those commitments and concentrated for training.

(c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divs North of the APENNINES, as accommodation must be found for disarming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divs of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divs must be moved South of the APENNINES. A.F.H.4. do not insist that it should be the MILAN or VIGONZA who move South of the APENNINES, but unless it is those two Divs who do so, it means that there will be a double move.

(2) In any event, MILAN and VIGONZA must move out of POLZANO Area because:-

- (1) the area is not suitable for training
- (ii) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in POLZANO Area. The Independent Regt. would still remain at POLZANO.
- (e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TREVISO, BOLZANO and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risk, a proper distribution is three Combat Divs North of the APENNINES and two South.
- (2) If the Italian Government wish to keep MILAN and POLZANO in BOLZANO area, they are letting political consideration over-ride necessary military ones.

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(3) In view of all the above, A.F.H. consider that MILAN and POLZANO should be moved out of BOLZANO area and two Combat Divs (preferably MILAN and VIGONZA) should be moved South of the APENNINES.

1. Brig. BROWN agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an order from A.F.H. and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to rearrange their administrative plan.

2. Gen. BROWN stated that this was all a matter for "land forces sub-commander, A.O." and that therefore it would have to be decided in full consultation with Chief Commissioner, A.O.

Signed: L. Brown,
Maj. Gen.

23 Nov. 45

Copy to:- Brig. BROWN (A.F.H.)
Chief Commissioner, A.O.

APPENDIX 'M'UNITTRIULI DIV.

- HQ
- 87 Inf. Regt.
- 88 Inf. Regt.
- 35 Arty. Regt.
- 120 Eng. Bn.
- Services

FOLGORE DIV.

- HQ
- Mambo Regt.
- Garibaldi Regt.
- 134 Arty. Regt.
- 134 Eng. Bn.
- Services

CREMONA DIV.

- HQ
- 21 Inf. Regt.
- 22 Inf. Regt.
- 7 Arty. Regt.
- 144 Eng. Bn.
- Services

LEGHANO DIV.

- HQ
- 60 Inf. Regt.
- 69 Inf. Regt.
- 11 Arty. Regt.
- 51 Eng. Bn.
- Services

MANOVA DIV.

- HQ
- 76 Inf. Regt.
- 114 Inf. Regt.
- 155 Arty. Regt.

LOCATIONS.

LEVICO
BASSANO DEL GRAPPA
S. BONIFACIO
TREVISO
VARIOUS

MESSANONE
DOBBIAIO
BELLANO
COLLE ISARCO
ORTIGHE
VARIOUS

SUXIN
AGGI
VINCENZI
CHIERI
CASAL MONFERRATO
VARIOUS

BERGAMO
BERGAMO
BONENGO
BRESCIA
BREMBO
VARIOUS

VARANSE
SAVONA
COMO
PLAGENZA

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/No 8

-- HQ
 -- Veneto Regt.
 -- Garibaldi Regt.
 -- 134 Arty Regt.
 -- 134 Eng. Bn.
 -- Services

CHRONICA DIV.

-- HQ
 -- 23 Inf. Regt.
 -- 22 Inf. Regt.
 -- 7 Arty. Regt.
 -- 144 Eng. Bn.
 -- Services

LEGHANO DIV.

-- HQ
 -- 60 Inf. Regt.
 -- 69 Inf. Regt.
 -- 11 Arty. Regt.
 -- 51 Eng. Bn.
 -- Services

MANOVA DIV.

-- HQ
 -- 76 Inf. Regt.
 -- 114 Inf. Regt.
 -- 135 Arty. Regt.
 -- 104 Eng. Bn.
 -- Services

L.S. Regte.

No 1 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
 No 2 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
 No 3 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
 No 4 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
 No 5 I.S. Regt (2 Bns)
 No 6 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
 No 7 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)

MODICA
 MILANO
 COLLE LIAICO
 ORNISEI
 VARIOUS

TURIN
 AOSTA
 VERCELLI
 CHIARI
 CASAL MONFERRATO
 VARIOUS

BERGAMO
 BRESCIA
 BUSTO ARSIZIO
 CREMA
 INVERIGO
 VARIOUS

VARIGET
 SAVONA
 OMO
 PIACENZA
 CAIRO MONTENOTTE
 VARIOUS

TURIN
 GENOVA
 VERONA
 VERONA
 PAVIA
 MODENA
 LUCCA

0733

785020

4217

APP. A.

- 2 -

UNIT

LOCATIONS

I.S. Regts (contd)

No 8 I.S. Regt (1 Bn)
No 9 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)
No 10 I.S. Regt (3 Bns)

VITERBO
BARI
NAPOLI

Miscellaneous Guard Bns.

- 513 Guard Bn
- 528 Guard Bn
- 529 Guard Bn
- 515 Guard Bn
- Grenadier Bn

LATINA
VITERBO
VITERBO
ARDEO
ROME

I.S. Div.

SARAJEVO DIV
AOSTA "
CALABRIA "

MONTE
PALERMO
CAGLIARI

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FBCT
 TO : NMIA
 INFO : DISTWO
 DISTHREE
 ALCOM
 REF : FZ 54297

24 1239 A

SECRET

IMPORTANT

G-11

C

G80 2

G80 2 (Wc)

G80 2 (L)

G80 3 (SD)

G80 3 (Cont)

G80 3

REFERENCE DISTWO CABLE 891/2574 OF 20 NOV AND CONFIRMING VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED ALREADY (.) ONE (.) RELIEF OF ITALIAN GRUPPI FROM GUARD DUTIES IN DISTWO IS BEING IMPROVED BY FACT THAT SUFFICIENT ACCOMMODATION FOR RELIEVING TROOPS DOES NOT EXIST UNLESS ON RELIEF A PROPORTION OF GRUPPI ARE MOVED OUT OF DISTWO (.) TWO (.) IT IS APPROVED POLICY THAT ITALIAN ARMY WHICH WE ARE IN PROCESS OF RETURNING TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL SHALL BE RAISED TO HIGH STATE OF EFFICIENCY AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE (.) IT WILL BE APPRECIATED THAT THIS CAN NOT BE DONE AS LONG AS IT REMAINS LARGELY EMPLOYED ON GUARD AND OTHER STATIC DUTIES NOR CAN IT BE CONSIDERED AS AVAILABLE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES WHILE SO EMPLOYED (.) PLANS HAVE THEREFORE BEEN MADE TO RELIEVE ALL ITALIAN TROOPS FROM GUARD DUTIES (.) THREE (.) THEN RETURNED TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL THE FIVE ITALIAN GRUPPI WILL FORM THE GOVERNMENT'S STRATEGIC RESERVE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE LOCATED ACCORDINGLY (.) FOUR (.) BEARING IN MIND THE AREAS IN WHICH INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS ARE POSSIBLE AFTER THE NORTHERN PROVINCES HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO ITALIAN GOVT CONTROL IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE GRUPPI SHOULD BE LOCATED GENERALLY AS FOLLOWS: (A) THREE GRUPPI NORTH OF THE APENNINES (B) TWO GRUPPI SOUTH OF THE APENNINES (.) FIVE (.) YOU ARE REQUESTED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF WAR TO THE GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF GRUPPI SHOWN IN PARA 4 ABOVE ON RECEIPT OF WHICH DETAILED MOVE ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED BY THIS HQ (.) IN THE EVENT THE ITALIAN MINISTRY OF WAR DOES NOT AGREE YOU SHOULD FORWARD THEIR REASONS AND ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

'G' DISTRIBUTION: ACTION: G/10-INFO: SB/43/1,4,9

4123

AC DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : LAND FORCES S/C (2)
INFO : CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COMM (2)
POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
C.A. SECTION
FILE

Msg Note:- Delayed, due to having to be serviced.

jw 26 Nov 45.

4127

SECRET

FX 54298
NOV 24 1244 A

04299
NOV 25 1330 A

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FRGOT
ACTION : ALCOM FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER

INFO: MMIA

SECRET.

Reference our FX 54297 of 24 November 45.

Para 1. We are anxious to settle the question of the GRUPPI on the lines suggested in our cable under reference.

Para 2. In the event that service advice does not achieve desired result request you assist by taking up matter with Prime Minister.

DIST

ACTION: S.O. TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER

INFO : EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER (2)

POLAD (A)
POLAD (B)
C.A. SECTION
LAND FORCES S/C (2)
FILE

G DISTRIBUTION

ACTION

: G/10

INFO

: SD/43/1

A

Q

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (S/C)

GSO 2 (S/C)

GSO 3 (S/C)

GSO 3 (S/C)

GSO 3 (S/C)

GSO 3 (S/C)

4126

Phone conversation Brig YATES / Gen BROWNING at 1000 hrs 23 Nov 45

1. C.G.S. AFHQ wishes me to see the Italian Government and persuade them to:-
 - (a) Move FRIULI and FOLGORE out of BOLZANO area.
 - (b) Move two Combat Divs SOUTH of the APENNINES.
2. AFHQ's view is as follows:-
 - (a) The Italians need an efficient Army and we are prepared to give it to them.
 - (b) The Combat Divs cannot train and remain efficient if they are doing frontier defence and guarding static dumps. Therefore they must be relieved of these commitments and concentrated for training.
 - (c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divs NORTH of the APENNINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divs of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divs must be moved SOUTH of the APENNINES. AFHQ do not insist that it should be FRIULI or FOLGORE who move SOUTH of the APENNINES, but unless it is those two Divs who do so, it means that there will be a double move.
 - (d) In any event, FRIULI and FOLGORE must move out of BOLZANO area because:-
 - (i) the area is not suitable for training,
 - (ii) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO area. The Independent Regt would still remain at BOLZANO.
 - (e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divs North of the APENNINES and two South.
 - (f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political considerations over-ride necessary military ones.
 - (g) In view of all the above, AFHQ consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO area and two Combat Divs (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APENNINES.
3. Brig YATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an operation order from AFHQ and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-arrange their administrative plan. 413
4. Gen BROWNING stated that this was all a matter for "Land Forces Sub-Commissioner AC" and that therefore it would have to be tackled in full conjunction with Chief Commissioner AC. Brig YATES agreed.

- (c) For accommodation reasons in 2 District, it is not possible to retain all five Combat Divs NORTH of the APPENINES, as accommodation must be found for incoming non-Italian troops who are to relieve Combat Divs of at any rate part of their commitments. Therefore two Combat Divs must be moved SOUTH of the APPENINES. AFHQ do not insist that it should be FRIULI or FOLGORE who move SOUTH of the APPENINES, but unless it is those two Divs who do so, it means that there will be a double move.
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- (i) the area is not suitable for training,
 - (ii) for accommodation reasons they cannot be relieved of their commitments and stay in BOLZANO area. The Independent Regt would still remain at BOLZANO.
- (e) From the aspect of the strategic reserve, this must be located strategically. The main areas for possible employment of this reserve are MILAN, TURIN, BOLOGNA and the heel of ITALY. Therefore, assessing risks, a proper distribution is three Combat Divs North of the APPENINES and two South.
- (f) If the Italian Government wish to keep FRIULI and FOLGORE in BOLZANO area, they are letting political considerations over-ride necessary military ones.
- (g) In view of all the above, AFHQ consider that FRIULI and FOLGORE should be moved out of BOLZANO area and two Combat Divs F. (preferably FRIULI and FOLGORE) should be moved South of the APPENINES.
3. Brig YEATES agreed that the above moves would be ordered in an operation order from AFHQ and that sufficient time would be allowed to enable the Italians to re-arrange their administrative plan.
4. Gen BROWNING stated that this was all a matter for "Land Forces Sub-Commission Commissioner AC. Brig YEATES agreed.

LB/jw
23 Nov 45.

L.E.
Friday 23 Nov 45.

Copy to: Brig YEATES (AFHQ)
Chief Commissioner AC.

13

Move of FULCORE and TRIULI Div.

AM 21 Nov

GSOI spoke personally to Gen. LIUZZI in sense of GOC's aide-memoire att'd ('A'). Received impression that the ITALIANS were against the move, but within the then terms of reference, did NOT invite them to state an objection.

PM 21 Nov

GOC spoke Brig YEATES on telephone; immediate agreement and choice of new location required from ITALIANS. GSOI to see Gen. LIUZZI AM 22 Nov.

AM 22 Nov

(i) GSO II (GD) returned from AMHQ bringing confirmation of telephone conversation from Brig. YEATES.

(a) ITALIANS to state whether they agreed "in principle" to the move.

(b) ITALIANS to undertake not to reverse the move, once made, in the near future except for urgent operational reasons.

(c) When (a) and (b) had been settled move to be laid on AMHQ-2 DIST/5 DIST - MIN/Min. of War in usual manner

(ii) GSO II (I) telephoned Min of War making appt for GSOI to visit Gen. LIUZZI.

(iii) GOC gave to GSOI an aide-memoire (B) which was to form the background of verbal agreement with Min of War and the basic draft for a written confirmation to AMHQ.

(iv-) GSOI accompanied by GSO II (L) visited Gen. LIUZZI and Col. LOMBARDI who were both completely opposed "in principle", chiefly for unexpressed political and national prestige reasons, to any move south of any Divs. and most particularly to the move of either FULCORE or TRIULI. ITALIAN order of preference if Divs MUST move is 1. MANTOVA 2. LEGNANO 3. GORIZIA 4. TRIULI 5. FULCORE.

(v) GSOI reported to Col A/Q, who spoke Brig YEATES on telephone: Col. A/Q suggested regularising posn by 4122g to Min of War for their views in sense of draft att 'C', stressing to Brig YEATES the Govt crisis in progress, the political implications now revealed and the matter had now become one for action through AG, having ceased to be purely a military one.

(vi) In circumstances Brig IMA/CS said that no present further action was to be taken with Lin of War, that we should tell AG, and that he would continue by other channels.

25 Nov 15

ARCS/sb

APC/Lawrence

Lt-Col.
U.S.

'A'

13A

1. Assume Legnano, Cremona and Mantova stay where they are,
2. Can Friuli and Folgore get into BRESCIA and PIACENZA area?
3. Do they like 2?
4. 2 District would prefer Friuli and Folgore South of the Apennines. Can this be done? Where?
5. Bear in mind TTC and Ind Regt. project for accdn - also conc for trg.

4124

B
136

1. M of W say that the question of whether they agree in principle to moving and keeping two combat gps SOUTH of the APENNINES depends on:

- (a) future possibilities of trouble which noone can foresee.
 - (b) the combined presence and numbers of Allied tps in the NORTH.
2. They are anxious to fall in with AFHQ's wishes, but they do not want to give a categorical guarantee not to move tps back from SOUTH of the APENNINES as the situation may demand this later.

3. On the other hand they will guarantee not to move tps back solely for purposes of comfort or prestige.

4. M of W entirely agree that it is better not to have a double move. The selection of appropriate areas for FRIULI and FOLGORE SOUTH of the ALPS will need a certain amount of recon so as not to interfere with projected locns of TTCs, Independent Regts and other "interim army" installations, and, if possible, so as NOT to have to ask for the evacuation of Allied forces from ITALIAN barracks. Moreover, they will require a little time to make a new adm plan to correspond. Also, for trg purposes, FRIULI and FOLGORE should be as conc as possible in their new locns, though it appears that a certain amount of distn will have to be accepted.

Postponement of FOLGORE move?
We think this reasonable and cooperative.

4121

DRAFT'C'

130

MINISTRY OF WAR

1. In order to ease certain problems of accommodation and administration in 2 District area, AFHQ propose moving immediately two Italian Inf Divs from 2 District to 3 District area.
2. Please inform me as a matter of urgency if you are agreeable to this in principle and on general grounds.
3. Are you further prepared to agree that, after the return of AMG territory to Italian Government control, the two Inf Divs so moved would not, in the immediate future, be moved back to the North for any reason except operational necessity.
4. If you agree to the move, in what part of 3 District area would you prefer that these Divs should be located? The ultimate decision on the location will naturally be subject to discussion and agreement with 3 District.
5. If you do not agree to the move please state your reasons.

A

Assessment of Plans

1. Assume happened, they are
- how stay where they are
2. Can Fried & Folger get into
Brazil & Pichuca area?
3. Do they like 2?
4. 2 did. would prefer Fried &
Folger South of the Amazon.
Can they be done? Where?
TTC + Ted.
5. Bear in mind project for each.
Regt. project for each.
- also one in forestry.

Directive

1/ We ought not to take orders
direct- for AFHQ in this
and through A.C.

2/ Will they want ops order after
coordination with administration
branches.

B

1. M of W. say that the question of whether they agree in principle to moving & keeping two combat gpos. South of the Appennines depends on:-

(a) future possibilities of trouble which none can foresee

(b) the continued presence & numbers of Allied gpos. in the North.

2. They are anxious to fall in with Anglo wishes, but they do not want to give a categorical guarantee not to move gpos. back from South of the Appennines as the situation may demand this later.

3. on the other hand they will, naturally, not to move the back solely for purposes of contact or for a bridge.

4. M of W. entirely agree that 4118 is not to have a doubt to move. The question of appropriate areas for TRAVEL & REAR "quitting" the ground is a certain amount

- (a) future possibilities of trouble which no one can foresee
- (b) the continued presence of members of the group in the north.

2. They are anxious to talk in wide range wishes, but they do not want to give a categorical guarantee not to move to the south. Each team South of the APPARATUS as the situation may develop later.

3. On the other hand they will mean the not to move to the south solely for purposes of comfort or convenience.

4. M. F. W. Entirely agree that it is not to have a doubt to move the selection of appropriate areas for travel & travel with the APPS. will need a certain amount of space so as not to interfere with projected to carbon, etc. in the Independent People & other "in the way" installed; and, if possible, so as not to have to deal for the execution of all these.

4. from Italian families. Moreover, they will suggest a little detail to make a new administrative plan to correspond. Also, for exp. sum - poses, prices & foreign should be as good as perfect place in the new locations, though it appears that a certain amount of distribution will have to be accepted.

Development of Polboke 44174 ?

We think the reasonable & cooperating.

0753

023066
222-3-1*Il Ministro della Guerra*

Roma, 20 Novembre 1945

Caro Generale,

Io S.M.R.E. mi ha informato che la divisione "Fol-gore" ha ricevuto ordine di trasferirsi nelle provincie di Cre-mona e Brescia, iniziando i movimenti il 26 corrente.-

Le faccio presente che, durante il recente incon-tro avuto con il gen. Morgan, ho prospettato la necessità che l'Alto Adige continui ad essere presidiato da truppe italiane, per evitare le gravi ripercussioni di carattere nazionale ed internazionale che certamente si avrebbero qualora la "Folgore" non venisse sostituita da altra unità italiana.-

Il generale Morgan convenne pienamente con quanto da me rappresentato e promise di impartire disposizioni in merito.-

In relazione a quanto sopra, La pregherei farmi conoscere se e quale unità italiana è stata destinata a sostit-uire la divisione "Folgore".- Nel caso che ciò non fosse sta-to ancora deciso, Le sarei grato se volesse disporre di soprag-sedere alla partenza di detta divisione fino a quando essa non possa essere gradualmente rimpiazzata da altri reparti italia-ni.-

Al Generale
LANGLEY BROWNING
Capo della Land Forces Sub Commission
- A.C. - (M.M.I.A.) ROMA

R/20/11

From: Lt Col F.H. McCleary, Chief Staff Officer.

Ref: 8277/134/EC

17th November 1945

My dear Dr Prunas,

I feel I should enlarge upon my letter 8277/EC of 13 November which was in reply to your letter 16/25392/64 of 9 November 1945.

As you are no doubt already aware it has for some time past been the intention to withdraw the Folgore Gruppo from the Bolzano area. This move was to take place on the 15 November and the Gruppo should now be on its way to the Brescia-Gardone area for training. It was, however, never intended that all Italian Forces should be withdrawn from the Bolzano area and guard battalions are being maintained in the Bolzano-Trento and Bressano areas. In addition to these guard battalions, there will be also one combat battalion.

I trust that the above now makes the position quite clear. If there is any further information you require please let me know.

Very truly yours,

F.H. McCleary Lt Colonel

Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

Dott Renato Prunas,
Ministro Plenipotenziario,
Segretario Generale degli Affari Esteri,
Ministero degli Esteri,
ROME.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C.

R/19/4

411

0753

COPY OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : MMIA
 TO : MMIA LO MILAN
 REF : O - 151

DATE TIME
 14 1430 A

RESTRICTED

FOR SENIOR MMIA LO (.) REF YOUR SIGN G/1 DATED 08 AND 10 (.)
 ONE (.) COPY OF MY G/7 DATED 08 SUBJECT HANDOVER OF ITALIAN
 ARMY TO ITALIAN GOVERNMENT ALREADY SENT (.) TWO (.) MY C - 150
 DATED 13 ORDERS MOVES OF BLU'S ON AUTHY A F H Q (.) THREE
 (.) NO OBJECTION ANTICIPATED FROM A F H Q TO EVENTUAL MOVE
 OF FOLGORE OR FRIULI OR BOTH INTO AREA
 DISTHREE, PROVIDED AGREED FROM OPERATIONAL ANGLE BY
 DISTWO AND REQUESTED BY MINISTRY OF WAR WHO MUST CHOOSE
 AREA AND ENSURE ACCOMMODATION (.) YOU MAY INFORM DISTWO
 AND ITALIANS TO THIS EFFECT, STRESSING AGREEMENT OF DISTWO
 ESSENTIAL AND FOR ITALIANS THAT MOVE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE
 IMMEDIATE

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANTAUTHENTICATED A.R.C. SOUTHBY Lt Col GS

INTERNAL: A
 Q (Two)
 Trg
 FILE : G/8
 SD/43/1
 SD/40/1

ARCS/jw
 14 Nov 45.

4114

copy

Ref: - 8277/CC

13 November 1945

My dear Mr. Prunas:

In reply to your letter 16/25392/64 of 9 November 1945, the Chief Commissioner has asked me to say that he has been informed that certain British troops units are presently being transferred to the Alto Adige to replace American formations which have been in that area since the German surrender. The Commission is not aware as yet that any change has been made in the deployment of Italian troops presently in that area, but should some relief take place it is most probable that it shall be by other Italian formations.

I appreciate the importance that the Italian Government attaches to the maintenance of Italian formations in the Alto Adige at this time and assure you that it is not the intention of the Allied authorities to take any action which would prejudice the existing situation.

Very truly yours,

NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel
Deputy Executive Commissioner

Dott. Renato Prunas
Ministro Plenipotenziario
Segretario Generale degli Affari Esteri
Ministero degli Esteri
Roma

Copy to: Land Forces S/C.

6/92
16/11

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERIRough TranslationCOPY

(3)

NO. 16/25392/64

Rome, November 7th, 1945

Dear Admiral Stone,

It is reported that units of British troops have been transferred to Alto Adige from other regions of Northern Italy. Such movements are probably connected with the recent departure from Alto Adige of some American formations. However, in certain quarters of that region the strengthening of British garrisons is being interpreted and explained as preliminaries to the removal of Italian troops now stationed there. The aims of such interpretation are obvious, just as it is obvious that it contributes to render still more acute the deplorable state of anxiety and restlessness, which I had the occasion to point out to you.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is acquainted with the contents of a note the President of the Council of Ministers addressed to you on July 20th, 1945, to represent the advisability of replacing units of the "Folgore" division with other Italian troops. Since then, the "Folgore" regiment "San Marco" was replaced with another Italian formation. Such substitution did not alter, but rather stressed the principles already established by the Allied Authorities, right after the liberation, that Italian troops share in the various tasks entrusted to Allied units in Alto Adige.

While on the subject of these rumors which are spread by propaganda hostile to Italy, I take the opportunity to draw your attention to the importance that the Italian Government - mainly for reasons of a moral character - attaches to the presence of formations of Italian troops in Alto Adige. I shall also appreciate it greatly if you will see fit to take up the matter with the Allied Forces Headquarters, so that, should movements of Italian units now stationed in Alto Adige be planned, the same be replaced by other Italian formation.


I shall be very grateful if you will let me know whatever information may be in your possession on the subject and the decisions the Allied Military Authorities will take in the matter.

Please accept, dear Admiral Stone, the expression of my friendliest regards.

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) R. PRUNAS

4113



HEADQUARTERS
VENEZIA REGION
Allied Military Government
APO 394

TO : Allied Commission
Attn: Executive Commissioner

5 Nov 45

SUBJECT : BOLZANO - Troop Movements

FILE No. : RTH/650.12

1. I have to report that I had a conference on this subject on Saturday 3 November with Colonel A.J.L. HURVELL Commander 60 Sub Area and with Colonel S.W. PHILLIPS Provincial Commissioner BOLZANO.
2. The withdrawal of POLICIA Division to the BRESCIA Region for training will commence next week. CASTALDI Regiment will be the first to be relieved by a British Artillery Regiment in the SILENO Area. MERTO will then be relieved, also by a British Artillery Regiment in the BRUNICO area. Finally the Divisional troops of POLICIA will be withdrawn.
3. I also interviewed Colonel DE LUCA commanding the BOLZANO Region of Carabinieri. He is shortly receiving a reinforcement of 500 men. Thanks to very helpful cooperation on the part of Major General REVEREND GOC No 2 District, cloth for uniforms has been made available so that the CARABINIERI in this most important province can appear well turned out.
4. The number of road blocks in the Province has been reduced from over 40 to 9. These nine are operated by Carabinieri. Italian military personnel are also present to deal with Italian military vehicles.

signed Regional Commissioner.
7 Nov

Copy to : TO BOLZANO Province
R.P.C.O. Venezia.

Info-Action Exec Com
Info: 1344
CA Sec

Executive Commissioner's Distn.

4111

MESSAGE FORM

FROM : MIA
TO : DISIWO
INFO : MIA LO MILAN, CHQ, CEF

16 1715 A

SD 5013

UNCLASSIFIED

REF VISIT OF GENERAL WARD TO MIA 15 OCT (.) MIA AND MINISTRY OF
WAR AGREE TO WITHDRAWAL OF F O L G O R E INT DIV FOR TRG
PURPOSES (.) MINISTRY OF WAR SUGGEST AREA V E R O N A - L A K E
G A R D A AND HAVE INSTRUCTED LOCAL TERRITORIAL COMD TO STUDY
ACCOMMODATION IN DETAIL AND INFORM MIA LO (.) MIA LO WILL ENVI
WITH YOU SO THAT YOU MAY ORDER MOVE

PRECEDENCE

UNCLASSIFIED

COPY TO: MIA TO GOC

"A"

"Q"

SD/43/1

Exec Com AG

4110

0759