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G/92

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER POLICY

OCT 1944 - NOV. 1945

3820
3929

COVER I

C/92

30 September 1945.

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On 13 May, I wrote your predecessor to clarify the position and responsibilities of the Italian Government in regard to local defense plans.


It is now agreed that the paragraph of my letter which reads as follows:-

"In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. It will be noted from the foregoing that this is the only restriction as to arms and armament of Italian troops employed to quell civil disturbances."

is cancelled and the following is substituted therefor:-

"Where Italian Troops are used to quell civil disturbances, tear gas and/or smoke grenades may be employed. However, every security precaution must be taken to ensure that stocks of these grenades do not fall into unauthorized hands. All echelons must be instructed that these grenades will not be issued to troops or used by troops except on the command of an officer, that they will be employed only when the use of force is considered necessary and that the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire."

Yours very truly,



ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Farri
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

DISTRIBUTION:

3929

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Yours very truly,

W. W. Stone

WILLY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Ferri
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

3929

DISTRIBUTION:

LAND FORCES S/C
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PUBLIC SAFETY S/C
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EXEC COMM

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100

SUBJECT: Troops employed in the maintenance
of Public Order

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/92

28 Sep 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref A.C. letter G/92 dated 13 May 1945 and your letter 122244/I.2.
dated 22 Sep 1945.

1. If local Civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbance and the Allied Commander grants such assistance only in the form of Italian troops under his Allied Command, the Italian Troops so assigned immediately pass temporarily to the control of the Italian authorities and the rules set out in paragraph 1 of your cited letter will apply. In other words, Italian troops released from Allied Command for this purpose and under these conditions are temporarily under Italian control and subject to Italian law for all purposes while under Italian control.

2. If local Civil Authorities request an Allied Commander for Military assistance in quelling civil disturbance, and the Allied Commander decides that it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian Authorities, all Italian troops engaged (including ITI-ITI, US-ITI and BR-ITI, if any) come under command of the Allied District/Base Section Commander, who becomes the Supreme Military Commander regardless of whether or not the territory in question has been made an Allied Military Zone. The important point here is that because Allied troops are used in quelling civil disturbances, the Allied Commander is Supreme Military Commander of all troops (Allied and Italian) in the affected area.

3. Should the above not fully answer your questions I will be pleased to discuss the matter further.

L.B.

Major General
MMIA

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section, A.C.

WU

(agreed before issue
of above)

L.B.

392

See also (87)

TRANSLATION

From : M of War

To : MMIA

Ref : 122244/I.2.

Std : 22 Sep 45

Subject : Troops employed in the Maintenance of Public Order.

1.-- According to Italian law, when the Civil Authorities responsible for the maintenance of Public Order obtain the aid of military units, the following procedure is observed:

a) at places where disturbances occur or are foreseen, the duty of maintaining order is directed by a police official, who is responsible for deciding when it is necessary, under his command, to use troops, and when to discontinue action by them;

b) the police official must inform the unit commander of the objective he must achieve (clearing a square, blocking a street, defending a building etc.);

c) the unit commander, having learned the objective assigned to him, then establishes, on his own initiative, the plans of action; in particular, his is the responsibility of deciding if and when to load weapons, and to open and cease fire.

2.-- I wish to point out that a police official is the person most *adaptable* adapted, by reason of his professional experience, and no less, his knowledge of the general situation and the psychology of the crowd, to sum up the gravity of the disturbance, and to judge, with foresight, the advisability of whether or not to use armed force.

3.-- The above-mentioned rules are observed in territory restored to the Italian Government, when troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities are employed.

It is not clear whether the said rules may be applied when Civil Authorities maintain the aid of Italian troops under the command of a District, or Base Section, or other Allied HQ's.

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- b) the police official must inform the unit commander of the objective he must achieve (clearing a square, blocking a street, defending a building etc.);
- c) the unit commander, having learned the objective assigned to him, then establishes, on his own initiative, the plans of action; in particular, his is the responsibility of deciding if and when to load weapons, and to open and cease fire.

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3.- The above-mentioned rules are observed in territory restored to the Italian Government, when troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities are employed.

It is not clear whether the said rules may be applied when Civil Authorities maintain the aid of Italian troops under the command of a District, or Base Section, or other Allied HQ's.

In this case, too, since it has been foreseen (see letter dtd 13 May 45 from Admiral Stone to President Bonomi) that all Italian troops may come under the orders of District or Base Sections, it is not clear whether the above-mentioned rules are valid for the said troops under the command of the Italian Military Authorities.

4.- I consider it of the greatest importance that the delicate question of *relations*, at the scenes of disturbances, between police officials and unit commanders, should be clarified, stipulating the powers of each party, and in particular, *on* whom should fall the responsibility of

directing these duties - and consequently the responsibility of assigning to the troops the task which must be carried out - in the case of the Civil Authorities obtaining the aid of Italian troops dependent on Allied HO's.

I should be grateful for a kind and hasty reply.

The Minister,

sgd. Jacini.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]

CYCLING SIGNAL

FROM: NMIA
TO : 59 AREA
REF : C-124

Date Time
24 1700 B
RESTRICTED

FOR NMIA LO (.) SUBJECT MATTER YOUR
HWI/9/SD OF 2 JUL IS NOT CONCERN
OF NMIA

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED

Internal: File: C/92 ✓

25 24 July 1945

R/24/7

3926

CONFIDENTIAL

21st. July, 1945.

Mar 7 84

- 2

61.
 Public Safety
 War Ministry
 Advice ?
 Should any more x
 B. 23/1

Copy to:- HQ, 2 District. (Ref phone GSO 1 - MMIA LO of
MMIA LO, c/o 60 Sub Area. 20 July)

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3925

✓ ABC

24930

Subject under your NW 1/9/56 of 21 Feb is

COPY - INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHQCT

TO: ALCOM

DATE 18 TIME 1757B

ROUTINE

REF: F 24544

RESTRICTED

REQUEST YOU EXPEDITE REPLY TO OUR F 21330 OF 12 JULY

DISTRIBUTION

Action: SO TO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
 Info: CHIEF COMMISSIONER
 EXEC COMMISSIONER 2
 CA S EC
 P SAFETY SC
 L FORCES SC 2
 FILE

G Distribution:

Action: G/92

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F. 82

79

SIGNAL NOT SENT

CM(1) opia Pomo 13 Jul 1944

File

FROM: M M I A

TO : DISTHREE

INFO: 54 AREA

FOR MMIA LO (.)

FIRST (.) AFHQ SIGNAL PX 18343 OF 6 JUL PLACED GARIBALDI REGT UNDER COMD 3 DIST FOR EMPLOYMENT IN BARI AREA ON SUCH INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES AS MAY BE DIRECTED BY ITALIAN GOVT (.) THIS WAS PASSED ON TO 54 AREA IN 3 DIST SIGNAL G 0511 OF 7 JUL (.)

SECOND (.) DISTHREE IN THEIR SIGNAL SD 548 OF 11 JUL PLACED GARIBALDI UNDER OPERATIONAL COMMAND OF 9 TERRITORIAL HQ (.)

THIRD (.) PLEASE EXPLAIN TO DISTHREE THAT SECOND ABOVE IS INCORRECT BECAUSE ITALIAN GOVT EXPRESSES ITS WISHES ON SUCH SUCH MATTERS THROUGH MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND PREFECT AT BARI AND NOT THROUGH MINISTER OF WAR AND TERRITORIAL HQ (.)

FOURTH (.) SUGGEST GARIBALDI BE LEFT UNDER 54 AREA FOR ALL PURPOSES AND THAT PREFECT AT BARI BE CONTACTED BY 54 AREA COMD WITH VIEW TO OBTAINING ITALIAN GOVTS WISHES (.) REQUEST YOU ASK DISTHREE TO AMEND

3923

RECT UNDER COMD 3 DIST FOR EMPLOYMENT IN BARI
AREA ON SUCH INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES AS MAY BE
DIRECTED BY ITALIAN GOVT (.) THIS WAS PASSED
ON TO 54 AREA IN 3 DIST SIGNAL G C511 OF 7 JUL (.)
SECOND (.) DISTHREE IN THEIR SIGNAL SD 548 OF 11 JUL PLACED
GARIBALDI UNDER OPERATIONAL COMEND OF 9 TERRITORIAL

HQ (.)

THIRD (.) PLEASE EXPLAIN TO DISTHREE THAT SECOND ABOVE IS
INCORRECT BECAUSE ITALIAN GOVT EXPRESSES ITS WISHES
ON SUCH SUCH MATTERS
THROUGH MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND PREFECT AT BARI
AND NOT THROUGH MINISTER OF WAR AND TERRITORIAL HQ

(.)

FOURTH (.) SUGGEST GARIBALDI BE LEFT UNDER 54 AREA FOR ALL
PURPOSES AND THAT PREFECT AT BARI BE CONTACTED BY
54 AREA COMD WITH VIEW TO OBTAINING ITALIAN GOVTS
WISHES (.) REQUEST YOU ASK DISTHREE TO AMEND

THEIR SD 548 OF 11 JUL ACCORDINGLY (.)

FIFTH (.) 400 RFTS FOR GARIBALDI LEAVE UESANO BY ROAD 15 JUL

PRECEDENCE :

AUTHENTICATED:

See: 6/92

785020

SUBJECT: Authorized Units

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MILA)

6/98

13 July 48

TO: MILA LO 80 SUB MILA

1. Information required regarding the units mentioned in Appx "B" to your liaison report No 2 of 1 July is given below:-

S.	Unit	Remarks
1.	265/1 P.O. Coy	See page 44 MILA Orbat No 2/10 dated 8 June.
2.	1 motor ambulance Convoy	See page 47 MILA Orbat No 2/10 dated 8 June.
3.	3 I.W.M. Port Operating Company	See page 34 MILA Orbat No 2/10 dated 8 June.

These are all BR-171 units.

8. Transportation A.M.G.
Polizia Controllo Economico
Compartimento della Liguria

Nothing is known here of the above unit under this nomenclature. Transportation Sub Commission A.C. suggest it may be a temporary traffic control unit organised locally by A.M.G.

4. In the case of authorised BR-171 Units this HQ letter 30/94/1 of 2 June as amended by 31/94/1 of 5th and 14th July sets out A.C. strengths and correct nomenclatures and should be used in conjunction with MILA Orders of Battle in order to identify units in this category. It would greatly assist this HQ if Italian HQs and Units are instructed to use the correct nomenclatures laid down in these letters and in the Order of Battle.

3/1/48

Stewart
Major General, Cdt
MILA.

Internal: (three)

3922

No.	Unit	Remarks
1	206/L M.C. Coy	See page 44 MIA Orbat No 8/10 dated 8 June.
2	1 Motor Ambulance Convoy	See page 47 MIA Orbat No 8/10 dated 8 June.
3	1 L.V. Port Operating Company	See page 24 MIA Orbat No 8/10 dated 8 June.
	These are all MIA-LVI Units.	
4.	Transportation A.M.G. Polizia Controllo Economico Compartimento della Liguria	Nothing is known here of the above unit under this nomenclature. Transportation Sub Commission A.C. suggest it may be a temporary traffic control unit organized locally by A.M.G. <i>One to be used by 1/1</i>
4.		In the case of authorized LVI-LVI Units this M.C. letter 30/34/1 of 8 June is amended by 30/34/1 of 5th and 18th July sets out W.E. strengths and correct nomenclatures and should be used in conjunction with MIA Orders of Battle in order to identify units in this category. It would greatly assist this Hq if Italian Hqs and Units are instructed to use the correct nomenclatures laid down in these letters and in the Order of Battle.

Supplied to 24th.

Internal: A (three)
30/35

R/ 12/3

Dephewland
for Major General, Cpt
MIA.
3922

JW

COPY

77

INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : DISTREE 11 0850 B
TO : 54 AREA
TERR HQ BARI SECRET
INFO : 227 ITALIAN ADM DIV IMPORTANT
AFHQ (G3 PS)
AFHQ (GSCRG) AMO
MMIA MOV BARI
MMIA LO BARI
REF : SD 548

FURTHER MY GC 511 OF 7 JULY AND TO OUR D 530
OF 8 JULY NEITHER TO ALL (*) ON ARRIVAL
TRANI GARIBALDI REGT IS PLACED
UNDER OPERATION COMMAND TERRITORIAL HQ BARI
FOR SUCH INTERNAL SECURITY DUTY AS ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT MAY DIRECT

DIST

INFO-ACTION P SAFETY SC
L FORCES SC 2
INFO CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CAS
FILE

SD DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : C/92
INFO : SD/38/1
A
Q (Two)
MOV (Two)

jwb

3921

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

XXXXXXXXXX

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGCT

TO : ALCM

REF F. 21380.

121348 B

CONFIDENTIAL

Important

REFERENCE OUR FX 14947 OF 29 JUNE AND F 18113 OF 5

JULY AND YOUR 1137 OF 4 JULY AND 1157 OF 5 JULY (.)

ONE (.) THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TAKES A VERY SERIOUS
VIEW OF THE RECENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN THE ANDRIA ANDMINERVINO AREAS AND DOES NOT CONSIDER THE ACTION INDICATED
IN YOUR CABLES QUOTED ABOVE TO BE ADEQUATE (.)TWO (.) THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER DIRECTS THAT HE BE
INFORMED URGENTLY WHAT ACTION THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAS
TAKEN (.) A (.) TO CLEAR UP THE SITUATION IN THE ANDRIA
AND MINERVINO AREAS AND TO ENSURE THERE IS NO RECURRENCE
IN THE FUTURE (.) B (.) TO HUNT DOWN, DISARM AND SPEEDILY
BRING TO JUSTICE THE INSTIGATORS AND THOSE WHO TOOK PART
IN THOSE DISTURBANCES (.)THREE (.) THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EXPECTS THAT PERSONS
CONVICTED OF TAKING PART IN THE DISTURBANCES WILL BE SEVERELY
PUNISHED AND HE WISHES TO BE INFORMED OF THE SENTENCES NOTED
OUT IN EACH INDIVIDUAL CASE

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/92
Info: SD/38/1
A
Q (Two)

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Cps)

GSO 2 (GD)

GSO 2 (W-)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 2 (SD)

GSO 3 (Orbal)

GSO 3 (H)

DIST.

Action: SO TO CHIEF
COMMISSIONERInfo: CHIEF COMM,
EX COM, CAG:
LAND F. (2);
PUB SAF, CITE

ws 13 July 45

785020

COPY ENCLAVING SIGNATURE

FROM : ALICOM

TO : AFHQ G-5 SECURITY

1653

11 JULY 45

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SECRET PD

64

1 See 7080

PARA ONE (.) SUBJECT IS MOVE OF GARIBOLDI REGIMENT TO BRANT (.)

PARA TWO (.) SEE PARA FOUR OF MY 1157 OF 4 JULY 45 AND YOUR

FX 18951 OF 7 JULY 45 (.) ON THE ADVICE OF MY POLITICAL ADVISERS

I HAVE NOT YET ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER TO USE TROOPS IN THE

BARI AREA BUT I HAVE WRITTEN TO HIM ASKING FOR A FULL REPORT ON

THE SITUATION AND FOR A STATEMENT OF THE STEPS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT

IS TAKING OR INTENDS TO TAKE TO PREVENT A REPETITION (.)

PARA THREE (.) I AM INFORMED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT A

SIGNAL TO THE PREFECT OF BARI STATING THAT THE GARIBOLDI

REGIMENT SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY IN THE

BARI AREA (.) UNOFFICIALLY I BELIEVE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER

HAS MADE PLANS FOR THE HANDLING OF THIS INCIDENT WITHOUT USING

TROOPS (.) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND PENDING AN OFFICIAL REPLY

AS TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTENTIONS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE MOVE

OF THE REMAINDER OF THE GARIBOLDI REGIMENT TO BARI BE POSTPONED (.)

IN VIEW OF THE TIME FACTOR INVOLVED I HAVE TEMPORARILY POSTPONED

THIS MOVE WHICH IS DUE TO TAKE PLACE TOMORROW PENDING YOUR

DECISION (.) PAREN TO AFHQ GEORGE FIVE SECTION FROM ALICOM CITE

ACSCC9 PAREN (.) PARA FOUR (.) NEW SUBJECT IS SECURITY IN ITALIAN

GOVERNMENT TERRITORY (.) PARA FIVE (.) THE PRIME MINISTER HAS

RECENTLY ASKED ME IN GENERAL TERMS FOR ADDITIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY

TROOPS UNDER ITALIAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND FOR THE SOUTH (.)

2419

PARA TWO (.) SEE PARA FOUR OF MY L157 OF 4 JULY 45 AND YOUR
 EX 18951 OF 7 JULY 45 (.) ON THE ADVICE OF MY POLITICAL ADVISERS
 I HAVE NOT YET ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER TO USE TROOPS IN THE
 BARI AREA BUT I HAVE WRITTEN TO HIM ASKING FOR A FULL REPORT ON
 THE SITUATION AND FOR A STATEMENT OF THE STEPS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT
 IS TAKING OR INTENDS TO TAKE TO PREVENT A REPETITION (.)
 PARA THREE (.) I AM INFORMED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SENT A
 SIGNAL TO THE PREFECT OF BARI STATING THAT THE GARIBOLDI
 REGIMENT SHOULD NOT BE EMPLOYED IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY IN THE
 BARI AREA (.) UNOFFICIALLY I BELIEVE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER
 HAS MADE PLANS FOR THE HANDLING OF THIS INCIDENT WITHOUT USING
 TROOPS (.) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND PENDING AN OFFICIAL REPLY
 AS TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTENTIONS, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE MOVE
 OF THE REMAINDER OF THE GARIBOLDI REGIMENT TO BARI BE POSTPONED (.)
 IN VIEW OF THE TIME FACTOR INVOLVED I HAVE TEMPORARILY POSTPONED
 THIS MOVE WHICH IS DUE TO TAKE PLACE TOMORROW PENDING YOUR
 DECISION (.) PAREN TO AFHQ GEORGE FIVE SECTION FROM ALCOM ONE
ACSCCS PAREN (.) PARA FOUR (.) NEW SUBJECT IS SECURITY IN ITALIAN
GOVERNMENT TERRITORY (.) PARA FIVE (.) THE PRIME MINISTER HAS
RECENTLY ASKED ME IN GENERAL TERMS FOR ADDITIONAL INTERNAL SECURITY
TROOPS UNDER ITALIAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND FOR THE SOUTH (.) 13919
 WHOLE QUESTION IS BOUND UP WITH YOUR DECISION ON MY PROPOSAL IN
 MY 8251/180/20 DATED 7 JUNE 45 IN WHICH I PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF
 ONE INTERNAL SECURITY BRIGADE FOR ITALIAN MILITARY TERRITORIAL
 REGION (EXCLUDING SICILY) AND WOULD REQUEST AN URGENT DECISION ON
 MY PROPOSALS AS ABOVE (.) IN VIEW OF THE BARI INCIDENT I STRONGLY
 URGE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MY PROPOSALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (.)

ALCOM (Civil Affairs) Executive Comm.

Civil Affairs Section
 Public Safety Sub-Comm.

Land Force Sub-Comm. - ROME Area ALL.COMM.

6/3
 6/3/52. SD/38/1
 SD/46-A-2 (Two)-
 MCW (Two)

See 7658

785020

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

14 JUL 45
OPERATIONAL SECURITY.

TO: AFHQ C-5 SECTION.
FROM: ALONG OTHER AGENCIES

COS - (X)

A

Q - [Signature]

1. SUBJECT IS LOVE OF CARPITALI MEMORANDUM TO BRANT.
2. ONE TALK TON OF MT 1157 OF 4 JULY 45 AND TON PK 10951 OF 7 JUL 45.
ON THE ADVANCE OF A POLITICAL ADVANCE I HAVE NOT YET ASKED THE FINE
MATTERS TO THE COMING IN THE BAY AREA BUT I HAVE MENTIONED TO SOME ASKING
THE A FIVE HOURS OF THE SITUATION AND FOR A STATEMENT IN THE ADVANCE
IN ADVANCE THE MATTER.

3. THE ADVANCE ADVANCEMENT REPORT IS THAT THE FINE ADVANCEMENT IS NOT
A SIGNAL TO THE ADVANCE OF BAYI STANDING WITH THE ADVANCEMENT ADVANCEMENT
NOT BE INVOLVED IN THE ADVANCEMENT ADVANCEMENT IN THE BAY AREA. ADVANCEMENT
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3918

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$$\begin{pmatrix} \text{OAT} \\ \text{OAT} \\ \text{OAT} \end{pmatrix} \text{ AOM}$$

3977

REF : SD 2837

REF OUR SD 2831 DATED 9 JULY (.) ONE (.) GARIBOLDI REGT
STRENGTH 2000 ALL RANKS 150 TONS STORES WILL MOVE BY RAIL
VIERBO TO TRANI IN TWO SPECIAL TRAINS UNDER ARRANGEMENTS MOV
ROME ON 10 AND 12 JULY (.) TIMINGS AS FOLLOWS VIERBO DEPT
0700 10 AND 12 JULY TRANI ARR 0041 12 AND 14 JULY (.) TWO (.)
MEALS UNDER ARRANGEMENTS MOV FORTY EIGHT HOURS RATIONS WILL BE
CARRIED (.) THREE (.) ON ARRIVAL TRANI PERSONNEL WILL REMAIN
IN STOCK AND DETRAIN FIRST LIGHT (.) FOUR (.) ED PARTY MOVE 13
JULY STRENGTH 21 VEHs AND 39 MCS

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT
AUTHENTICATED Collyer

INTERNAL

A (TWO)
C (TWO)
MOV (TWO)
MED
8/92
FILE SD/38/1

JWB

3917

70

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FROM : MMIA
 TO : MINISTRY OF WAR
 INFO : HQAC
 DISTHREE FOR MMIA LO
 54 AREA FOR MMIA LO
 "P" MLTU CESANO
 REF : SD 2831

DATE 09
 TIME 15.5
 B

SECRET

REF OUR SD2830 DATED 7 JULY (*) GARIBALDI
 INF REGT MOVES BY RAIL 10 JULY FROM
 VITERBO TO TRANI TO UNDER COMD 54
 AREA (*) STRENGTH 2000 APPROX ALL RANKS 150
 TNS STORES

PRIORITY IMPORTANT

AUTHENTICATED [Signature]

INTERNAL DESTN:

A (Two)
 Q (Two)
 Mov (Two)
 Med
 G/92
 FILE : SD/38/1

69

SUBJECT:-- Carriage of Arms by Italian Tps

CONFIDENTIAL

3 District
Ext 8
346/G

8 Jul 45

To all Concerned

2/6/45. 70874

1. The question has been raised whether Italian tps in this District are entitled to carry automatic weapons and hand grenades.

2. The answer is contained at para 3(c) of Appx A to 3 District Op Instr No. 24 dated 30 May 45. This states that where Allied or Italian tps are employed to quell civil disturbances "Only small arms will be borne.....Specifically prohibited are automatic weapons and grenades".

3. This instruction applies to all Italian tps when under British Comd; this will include any Italian tps who, though normally under comd a Territorial HQ, have passed in an emergency to under comd of a local Allied Commander. It does not apply to Italian tps (whatever their normal comd) when operating under a Territorial HQ.

4. This instruction as at present drafted carries the following implication; it might be necessary for a British Commander having under comd both Allied and Italian troops to deal by means of rifles alone with a disturbance which had been exacerbated by the previous use by Italian military of automatics and grenades. Such a possibility is accepted.

5. This instruction does NOT apply to GTP patrols carrying out road checks nor to other tps assisting in such checks under GTP Orders. Separate orders have been issued for these. This HQ 520/4 of 11 and 22 Jun 45 refer.

MAILED
FILE 6/92
DATE 1/7

(CT FILES) Lt Col GS

DISTRIBUTION

- 52 Area (2) (your 177/463 of 25 Jun refers)
- 54 Area
- 56 Area
- 94 Sub Area
- Brit Tps SICILY
- 227 Italian Div.

ROME Area

8915

instr. No. 24 dated 30 May 45. This states that where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances "Only small arms will be borne.....Specifically prohibited are automatic weapons and grenades".

3. This instruction applies to all Italian troops when under British Command; this will include any Italian troops who, though normally under command of a Territorial HQ, have passed in an emergency to under command of a local Allied Commander. It does not apply to Italian troops (whatever their normal command) when operating under a Territorial HQ.

4. This instruction is at present drafted carries the following implication; it might be necessary for a British Commander having under command both Allied and Italian troops to deal by means of rifles alone with a disturbance which had been exacerbated by the previous use by Italian military of automatics and grenades. Such a possibility is accepted.

5. This instruction does NOT apply to GIP patrols carrying out road checks nor to other troops assisting in such checks under GIP Orders. Separate orders have been issued for these. This HQ 520/A of 11 and 22 Jun 45 refer.

FILE	6/92
DATE	3/7

(OF PERS) Lt Col
GS

DISTRIBUTION

52 Area (2)
54 Area (your 177/LCS of 25 Jun refers)
56 Area
94 Sub Area
Brit Tps SICILY
227 Italian Div.

ROME AREA

Land Forces Sub Commission LO (14714)
Territorial HQ NAPLES
Territorial HQ BARI
MIL LO BARI

A

MIL LO
ITALIAN LO

GS 01

GS 02

GS 03

GS 04

GS 05

GS 06

GS 07

GS 08

2915

67

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM: ~~XXXX~~ DISTRESS
 TO : 54 AREA
 INFO: 52 AREA
 AFHQ (G-3 ORG AND)
 MATA LO BARI
 TERRITORIAL HQ BARI
 227 ITALIAN DIV
 REF : GO 511

071210 B

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

FIRST (.) EFFECTIVE FORTHWITH GARIBALDI REGT STR APPROX
 STR 2000 ALL RANKS IS PLACED UNDER COMD 54 (?) AREA FOR
 ALL PURPOSES FOR EMP ON SUCH DUTIES AS ITALIAN GOVT MAY
 DIRECT (.)
 SECOND (.) AIM AS FOR COMBAT GP (.)
 THIRD (.) ETA 10 JUL (.) MOV ORDER FOLLOWS (.)
 FOURTH (.) REPORT DESTINATION SOONEST (.)
 SIXTH (.) SPOKE PARKS - NEVILL THIS DATE

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/92

Info: SD/38/1
 A
 Q (Two)
 MOV (Two)

ws 09 July 45

GSO 1

GSO 2 (G-3)

GSO 2 (G-3)

GSO 2 (G-3)

GSO 2 (G-3)

GSO 2 (G-3)

GSO 3 (G-3)

GSO 3 (G-3)

3914

Handwritten: 6/7, 9/7, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9, G10, G11, G12, G13, G14, G15, G16, G17, G18, G19, G20, G21, G22, G23, G24, G25, G26, G27, G28, G29, G30, G31, G32, G33, G34, G35, G36, G37, G38, G39, G40, G41, G42, G43, G44, G45, G46, G47, G48, G49, G50, G51, G52, G53, G54, G55, G56, G57, G58, G59, G60, G61, G62, G63, G64, G65, G66, G67, G68, G69, G70, G71, G72, G73, G74, G75, G76, G77, G78, G79, G80, G81, G82, G83, G84, G85, G86, G87, G88, G89, G90, G91, G92, G93, G94, G95, G96, G97, G98, G99, G100, G101, G102, G103, G104, G105, G106, G107, G108, G109, G110, G111, G112, G113, G114, G115, G116, G117, G118, G119, G120, G121, G122, G123, G124, G125, G126, G127, G128, G129, G130, G131, G132, G133, G134, G135, G136, G137, G138, G139, G140, G141, G142, G143, G144, G145, G146, G147, G148, G149, G150, G151, G152, G153, G154, G155, G156, G157, G158, G159, G160, G161, G162, G163, G164, G165, G166, G167, G168, G169, G170, G171, G172, G173, G174, G175, G176, G177, G178, G179, G180, G181, 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G1297, G1298, G1299, G1300, G1301, G1302, G1303, G1304, G1305, G1306, G1307, G1308, G1309, G1310, G1311, G1312, G1313, G1314, G1315, G1316, G1317, G1318, G1319, G1320, G1321, G1322, G1323, G1324, G1325, G1326, G1327, G1328, G1329, G1330, G1331, G1332, G1333, G1334, G1335, G1336, G1337, G1338, G1339, G1340, G1341, G1342, G1343, G1344, G1345, G1346, G1347, G1348, G1349, G1350, G1351, G1352, G1353, G1354, G1355, G1356, G1357, G1358, G1359, G1360, G1361, G1362, G1363, G1364, G1365, G1366, G1367, G1368, G1369, G1370, G1371, G1372, G1373, G1374, G1375, G1376, G1377, G1378, G1379, G1380, G1381, G1382, G1383, G1384, G1385, G1386, G1387, G1388, G1389, G1390, G1391, G1392, G1393, G1394, G1395, G1396, G1397, G1398, G1399, G1400, G1401, G1402, G1403, G1404, G1405, G1406, G1407, G1408, G1409, G1410, G1411, G1412, G1413, G1414, G1415, G1416, G1417, G1418, G1419, G1420, G1421, G1422, G1423, G1424, G1425, G1426, G1427, G1428, G1429, G1430, G1431, G1432, G1433, G1434, G1435, G1436, G1437, G1438, G1439, 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G1726, G1727, G1728, G1729, G1730, G1731, G1732, G1733, G1734, G1735, G1736, G1737, G1738, G1739, G1740, G1741, G1742, G1743, G1744, G1745, G1746, G1747, G1748, G1749, G1750, G1751, G1752, G1753, G1754, G1755, G1756, G1757, G1758, G1759, G1760, G1761, G1762, G1763, G1764, G1765, G1766, G1767, G1768, G1769, G1770, G1771, G1772, G1773, G1774, G1775, G1776, G1777, G1778, G1779, G1780, G1781, G1782, G1783, G1784, G1785, G1786, G1787, G1788, G1789, G1790, G1791, G1792, G1793, G1794, G1795, G1796, G1797, G1798, G1799, G1800, G1801, G1802, G1803, G1804, G1805, G1806, G1807, G1808, G1809, G1810, G1811, G1812, G1813, G1814, G1815, G1816, G1817, G1818, G1819, G1820, G1821, G1822, G1823, G1824, G1825, G1826, G1827, G1828, G1829, G1830, G1831, G1832, G1833, G1834, G1835, G1836, G1837, G1838, G1839, G1840, G1841, G1842, G1843, G1844, G1845, G1846, G1847, G1848, G1849, G1850, G1851, G1852, G1853, G1854, G1855, G1856, G1857, G1858, G1859, G1860, G1861, G1862, G1863, G1864, G1865, G1866, G1867, G1868, G1869, G1870, G1871, G1872, G1873, G1874, G1875, G1876, G1877, G1878, G1879, G1880, G1881, G1882, G1883, G1884, G1885, G1886, G1887, G1888, G1889, G1890, G1891, G1892, G1893, G1894, G1895, G1896, G1897, G1898, G1899, G1900, G1901, G1902, G1903, G1904, G1905, G1906, G1907, G1908, G1909, G1910, G1911, G1912, G1913, G1914, G1915, G1916, G1917, G1918, G1919, G1920, G1921, G1922, G1923, G1924, G1925, G1926, G1927, G1928, G1929, G1930, G1931, G1932, G1933, G1934, G1935, G1936, G1937, G1938, G1939, G1940, G1941, G1942, G1943, G1944, G1945, G1946, G1947, G1948, G1949, G1950, G1951, G1952, G1953, G1954, G1955, G1956, G1957, G1958, G1959, G1960, G1961, G1962, G1963, G1964, G1965, G1966, G1967, G1968, G1969, G1970, G1971, G1972, G1973, G1974, G1975, G1976, G1977, G1978, G1979, G1980, G1981, G1982, G1983, G1984, G1985, G1986, G1987, G1988, G1989, G1990, G1991, G1992, G1993, G1994, G1995, G1996, G1997, G1998, G1999, G2000, G2001, G2002, G2003, G2004, G2005, G2006, G2007, G2008, G2009, G2010, G2011, G2012, G2013, G2014, G2015, G2016, G2017, G2018, G2019, G2020, G2021, G2022, G2023, G2024, G2025, G2026, G2027, G2028, G2029, G2030, G2031, G2032, G2033, G2034, G2035, G2036, G2037, G2038, G2039, G2040, G2041, G2042, G2043, G2044, G2045, G2046, G2047, G2048, G2049, G2050, G2051, G2052, G2053, G2054, G2055, G2056, G2057, G2058, G2059, G2060, G2061, G2062

OUTGOING SIGNAL

FROM : M.M.I.A.
 TO : MINISTRY OF WAR
 INFO : RAAC
 DISTONE FOR MMIA LO
 DISTWO FOR MMIA LO
 DISTTHREE FOR MMIA LO
 54 AREA FOR MMIA LO
 60 SUB AREA FOR MMIA LO
 151 SUB AREA FOR MMIA LO
 F BLTU RDG

Date

Time

7 1453 B

REF : SD 2830S E C R E T

1 (.) OUR SD 2812 DATED 2 JUL NOT TO ALL IS
 CANCELLED (.) 2 (.) G A R I B A L D I INT REGT
 NOW UNDER COMD 3 D I S T FOR EMPLOYMENT B A R I
 AREA ON INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES AS REQUIRED BY
 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT (.) MOV ORDERS WILL FOLLOW (.)
 3 (.) LEADING REGT M A N T O V A G P A R L I V E S
 M I L A N AREA 9, 10 AND 11 JUL (.) DETAILS
 FOLLOW

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED

A (Two)
 Q (Two)
 MOV (Two)
 MED
 G/92
 SD/38/2

3913

REF : SD 2830

S E C R E T

1 (.) OUR SD 2812 DATED 2 JUL NOT TO ALL IS
 CANCELLED (.) 2 (.) G A R I B A L D I INF REGT
 NOW UNDER COMD 3 D I S T FOR EMPLOYMENT B A R I
 AREA ON INTERNAL SECURITY DUTIES AS REQUIRED BY
 ITALIAN GOVERNMENT (.) MOV ORDERS WILL FOLLOW (.)
 3 (.) LEADING REGT M A N T O V A GP ARMS
 M I L A N AREA 9, 10 AND 11 JUL (.) DETAILS
 FOLLOW

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

AUTHENTICATED

A (Two)
 Q (Two)
 MOV (Two)
 MED
 G/92
 SD/38/2
 File: SD/38/1

jc/

3913

See to 10.

80 SUB AREA FOR AREA LO
 151 SUB AREA FOR AREA LO
 P BLTU RTC

Register No. 4817

MESSAGE FORM

Call

Sgt. No.

IMMEDIATE

Transmission Instructions

VERY CIPHER SECRET

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

FROM (A)

Originator.

F/Dom Sgd. SACHED

Date-Time of Origin.

For Action.

RAAC

G(SD)

8/17

M.M.I.A.

Office Date Stamp

SIGNALS

TO

(W) For Information (INFO)

DISTHREE DISTWO MMIA NOV. ROME
WESTMOVES 5 Army NOV BARI

Originator's No.

FX 18951

SECRET

Message Instructions.

GR

ctrl FHGCT

GARIBALDI right strength
2000 prisoners 150 tons stores
will move by rail 10 sept 10
July from VITERBO (-) to BARI
area to under command DISTHREE
all purposes @ Exact destination to be
forwarded @ Above move under a/c 12
GTD (Mansfield and dn) str HRC

WESTHOMES 5 Army MON BARI

Originator's No.

FX 18951

SECRET

act FHGCT

GARIBALDI right strength

2000 personnel 150 tons stores

will move by rail 10 apt 10

July from VERBO(?) to BARI

area to under command DISTHREE

all purposes @ Exact destination to be

forwarded @ Above move under a 12

GTD (Monsieur and Kn) H2 H20

Latest on FX 17838 dated 5 July

This message may be sent
AS WRITTEN by any means
except

WIRELESS.

Signed.

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into
enemy hands, this message must be sent IN
CIPHER.

(S9)

Originator's Instructions.
Degree of Priority.

IMMEDIATE

Time

THI or TOR

071833Z

Time Cleared

System

Op

CEM OPS.

(62)

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM : AFHQ SG SACRED CITE FHGCT 061753 B
 TO : ALLIED COMMISSION DISTHREE
 INFO : DISTONE DISTWO RAAC FIFTH ARMY
 MIA
 REF : FX 16343 SECRET

PARA 1 (*) GARIBALDI REGIMENT UNDER COMD 3 DIST FORTHWITH
 FOR EMPLOYMENT IN BARI AREA ON SUCH INTERVAL
 SECURITY DUTIES AS MAY BE DIRECTED BY ITALIAN
 GOVT (*)
 PARA 2 (*) MOVE ORDERS FOLLOW SEPARATELY (*)
 PARA 3 (*) FOR FIFTH ARMY AND DISTWO (*) THIS CANCELS
 OUR 17838 OF 5 JULY (*) LEADING REGT MANTOVA
 GRUPPI WILL ARRIVE MILAN AREA 9, 10 and 11TH
 JULY (*) DETAILS FOLLOW

"G" DISTN

Action : G/92

Info : SD/38/2
 (Two)

GSO 1

GSO 2 (Ops)

GSO 2 (SD)

GSO 2 (S)

GSO 2 (L)

GSO 3 (SD)

GSO 3 (Ops)

GSO 3 (L)

3911

60
 Groups Napier put in picture (R. 1100/07)
 by hand (Hamm)
 (Lelby)
 Signal informing for
 R. 1100/07 + 101
 R. 1100/07 - Gribble
 are coming
 7 JUL 1945
 back

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

60

FROM : A F H Q SIGNED SACRED
CITE PHGUT
TO : ALCOM
REF : F 18113

061059 B
IMPORTANT
PRIORITY
SECRET

58
REFERENCE YOUR 1157 OF 5 JULY (.)

1 (.) YOUR PROPOSED LINE OF ACTION IS STRONGLY
SUPPORTED (.) 2 (.) POSSIBILITY OF MAKING
GARIBOLDI REG T AVAILABLE FOR INTERNAL
SECURITY DUTIES IN BARI AREA IS UNDER URGENT
CONSIDERATION (.)

DISTRIBUTION

Action: So to Chief Commissioner
Info : Chief Commissioner
Ex Commissioner 6
Ca Sec
Land Forces S/C 2
P. Safety S/C
File

SD DISTRIBUTION

Action Copy: G/92
Info : SD/38/1
A
Q(Two)

jc/7/7/45

GSO 1

GSO 2 (C/S)

GSO 2 (SD) X X

GSO 2 (C/S)

GSO 2 (C/S) X X

GSO 3 (C/S)

GSO 3 (C/S)

GSO 3 (C/S) X X

3910

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

58

FROM: ALCOM CITE ACCAS

TO : AFHQ CITE FHGCT

REF : 1157

O4 NPT

SECRET

IMPORTANT

PARA 1 (.) REFERENCE YOUR FX 14967 OF 29 JUNE AND FURTHER TO
ALCOM 1137 OF 4 JULY (.)

PARA 2 (.) THE RECENT DISTURBANCES IN ANDRIA ARE THE SECOND
OF THEIR KIND IN THE DISTRICT THIS YEAR (.) I TAKE A MOST SERIOUS
VIEW OF THEM AND WISH TO URGE THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO TAKE VERY
STRONGEST LINE OF ACTION (.)

PARA 3 (.) I AM DISCUSSING WITH THE AMBASSADORS THE DESIRABILITY
OF MOVING ITALIAN TROOPS INTO THE AREA TO SEARCH FOR ARMS AND TAKE
A VERY FIRM HAND ON THE WHOLE SITUATION (.)

PARA 4 (.) I REQUEST YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS MATTER REGARDING THE USE
OF TROOPS AND THAT YOU CONSIDER POSTPONING THE MOVEMENT OF GARIBALDI
REGIMENT NOW SCHEDULED

INT DISTRIBUTION

Chief Comm
Exec. Comm
Pub Safety S/C
Land Forces S/C
Civ Affairs Sec

SD DISTRIBUTION:

Action: G/92

Info: SD/38/1

A

C (Two)

WS 06 July 1945

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FX 14947
June 292021B

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JUNE 290700B
PRIORITY

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FNGCT
ALCOM INFO DISTHREE

pe 46

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Following reports received this Hq on civil disorders in Andria and Minervino.

A. On 25 June group of 35 well armed communists, attacked Carabinieri barracks in Minervino, disarmed and interned 80 CC.RR. in barracks, and released 7 prisoners. 500 CC.RR. sent to rescue on 26 June resulted in battle in which one civilian killed and several wounded. Interned CC.RR. released following agreement that 500 CC.RR. withdraw from area. Communists arms not confiscated.

B. 27 June communists seized Andria and released 46 prisoners, including 4 Allied prisoners. All transportation and communications facilities seized and road blocks established. Fighting in ANDRIA resulted in 4 or 5 killed several wounded. On 28 June communists attacked homes of known fascists in ANDRIA, and armed conflict resulted in 3 killed 1 wounded.

2. Request you ascertain urgently from Italian Government, and inform this Hq, what steps have been taken to:

- Restore and maintain order.
- Confiscate communist firearms.
- Prevent similar outbreaks in other towns.
- Recapture released prisoners.

CONFIDENTIAL.

DATA "G"	
FILE:	6/92
DATE:	6/7

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COPY

58B

G FIVE AFHQ

1137

4 JULY 1945


PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE YOUR FOX YRAY ONE FOUR NINE FOUR SEVEN DATED TWO
NINE JUNE PD

PAREN TO G FIVE AFHQ FROM ALCOM CITE ACPST PAREN

CARABINIERI COMMAND DESPATCHED ON TWO NINE JUNE THREE ZERO
ZERO AGENTS FROM ROME LEGION TO EFFECTED AREA AND FORCE IN
BARI HAS BEEN DEPLOYED TO EFFECT GREATER STRENGTH.



GEO 1 _____
GEO 2 _____
GEO 3 _____
GEO 4 _____
GEO 5 _____
GEO 6 _____
GEO 7 _____
GEO 8 _____
GEO 9 _____
GEO 10 _____

Public Safety S/C

478427-580

W. DOHERTY, Col.

NICHOLAS PIOMBINO
CWO, USA
Assist. Adjutant

3908

MESSAGE FORM

Call

Srl. No.

Priority

Transmission Instructions

GUR4 CIPHER SECRET

Register No. 58D

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

FROM
(A)

F/Don sqd. SACHIED

Originator

Date-Time of Origin

301844B

For Action

RAAC.

Office Date Stamp

233

TO

(M) For Information (INFO)

S Army IS A Gp. MMIA DISTWO

Message Instructions

GR

Originator's No.

FX 15390

SECRET

CLR FHGCT

IS A Gp SD 1810 dated 29 June

net the all response

Warning order

Para 1 O GARIBALDI 15gt. will move

by rail VERBO - MILAD to arrive by

10 July 6

Para 2 O Arrange for immediate despatch 3907
 advance rps to HQ IV Corps to

GR

Message Instructions

5 Aug 15 A Gp MMIA DISTWO

Originator's No.

FX 15340

SECRET

CIR FHGT

15 A Gp SD 1810 dated 29 June

not to all refuse

Warning order

Para 1 O GARBALDI right. W.H. move
by rail VITERBO - MILAN to arrive by

10 July

Para 2 O Arrange for immediate despatch 3907
advance rps to HQ IV Corps to
prepare reception

This message may be sent
IS WRITTEN by any means
except: WIRELESS.

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into
enemy hands this message must be sent IN
CIPHER.

Originator's Instructions,
Degree of Priority

Signed

Time	System	Op
THI or TOR 010305		
Time Cleared		

IMPORTANT

S7A

SUBJECT: Responsibilities of the Italian Government
in regard to Local Defense Plans

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (EMIA)

G/92 ✓

7 June 45

TO : EMIA LO SARDINIA
EMIA LO SICILY
EMIA LO 54 AREA
EMIA LO 1 DISTRICT
EMIA LO FENBARK
EMIA LO FENBARK

56A

1. For your information, attached as Appx "A" is a copy of a recent letter concerning the above subject from HQ A.C. to the Prime Minister.

2. EMIA LO 54 Area, this answers your LO/1/ED of 1 June 45.

Tex E Penkley
for Major General
EMIA

R 8/6

(K)

Appendix "A" to NMIA letter
9/92 dated 7 June 1945

STB.

0/92

13 May 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In order to clarify the exact position and responsibilities of the Italian Government in regard to local defense plans, the following will serve as your guide:

The Italian Government is responsible for defense against sabotage and the preservation of law and order in all territory in the rear of the Army Areas excepting that under AMG.

As you know, the right is reserved by SACMED to declare specific areas of Italian Government territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such declaration, the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the area in question is assumed by SACMED.

To carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, Italian civil authorities have under their control the Carabinieri. If the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, the local Italian authorities should appeal to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters. If there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/Base Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. For this reason it is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied static headquarters and local Italian civil and military authorities.

what for?

Should local Italian authorities ask Allied commanders for military assistance in quelling civil disturbances, the local Allied Commander has orders to point out that the quelling of civil disturbances is the responsibility of Italian authorities and to refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied Military Interests. Further, the Italian authorities will be warned that the territory in question will be immediately liable to be made an Allied military zone. If assistance is granted, the first troops to be used will be such Italian troops as may be under command of Allied District/Base Sections.

Where it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian authorities, all Italian troops thus engaged will come under command of Allied District/Base Section Commanders.

Tel-Bari 11458.

SECRET

Subject:- Public Order.

Liaison Office,
Land Forces, Sub Comm.,
A.C. (MMIA) c/o 54 Area.

Ref. LO/1/SD.

1 May 45.

To:- HQ.MMIA.

Ref 2621/Op of 26 May 45 copy attached.

1. 54 Area have agreed to provide transport for the 1400 men if they have to be used for the maintenance of Public Order, but naturally enough have refused to let them go out of 54 Area.
2. As the likelihood of disorders in LOWER APULIA and the BASILICATE (52 Area) is no less if not more than in 54 Area, 9 Terr.HQ. are somewhat concerned, and I have advised them to take the question up with War Ministry, which I understand they are doing.
3. I do not know how far the responsibility for maintenance of order rests with the Italian army nor to what extent Allied policy is involved, but you will doubtless wish to be informed of the position.
4. There is certainly a lively possibility of serious disorders throughout APULIA and in the BASILICATE, resulting from the disturbed political state of the country and the abnormally low rainfall this spring, which threatens to cause shortage of work and food.

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: 6/92
DATE: R4/5

GPH/agn

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 GSO 2 (Op) X RER X
 GSO 2 (SD) _____
 GSO 2 (WS) _____
 GSO 2 (L) _____
 GSO 3 (SD) _____
 GSO 3 (Orist) _____
 GSO 3 (I) _____

G. Holt
 Maj,
 Senior MMIA LO.
 Eastern Italy.

04103R

3905

TRANSLATION.

FROM: Territorial Military Command, BARI.
TO : Major HOLT, MMIA LO, BARI.
REF : N°. 2621/Op.
BARI, May 26, 1945.

SUBJECT: Use of labor units for the maintenance of public order.

With its letter of January 30th last addressed to the 230th Division, the 3rd District informed us that MMIA in complying with the requests from Italian authorities, authorised the use of Italian troops under Allied Command for the maintenance of public order, after direct negotiations between the Territorial Commands and the Areas and Sub Areas concerned.

As a result, Col. VALLONE, LO with the 3rd District, contracted immediately the 54th Area (BARI), the 52 Area (TARANTO) and the 208th Sub Area (BRINDISI) in order to determine the strength which each of them could make available for the above mentioned purpose.

The 54th Area, with secret letter 171/GO of May 12 1945 (a copy of which was sent to you with letter 2590/Op of the 21st inst.) authorised the use of 1.400 Italian engineers, of whom 1.000 under the command of the 66th Group P.C. of Bari and 400 under the command of the HQ 5th Port Op. Group RE of BARLETTA.

The 52th Area, with letter of February 27, 1945 informed us that the limited number of troops at its disposal - split up, as they were, in small groups - prevented it from placing any unit at our disposal for the maintenance of public order.

However, it added that in the event of serious disturbances it would place at our disposal what few forces were available.

The 208th Sub Area, with letter of February 21, 1945 signified its readiness to comply with the request and placed the units present in BRINDISI at the disposal of the authorities concerned.

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105

With its letter of January 30th last addressed to the 230th Division, the 3rd District informed us that MMIA in complying with the requests from Italian authorities, authorized the use of Italian troops under Allied Command for the maintenance of public order, after direct negotiations between the Territorial Commands and the Areas and Sub Areas concerned.

As a result, Col. VALLONE, LO with the 3rd District, contracted immediately the 54th Area (BARI), the 52 Area (TARANTO) and the 208th Sub Area (BRINDISI) in order to determine the strength which each of them could make available for the above mentioned purpose.

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However, it added that in the event of serious disturbances it would place at our disposal what few forces were available.

The 208th Sub Area, with letter of February 21, 1945 signified its readiness to comply with the request and placed the units present in BRINDISI at the disposal of the authorities concerned.

At this time, in view of the departure of many units for the North, the available strength of the 52nd Area and 208th Sub Area is considerably reduced, and it may therefore be conceded that the only troops that can be counted upon for the organization of a tactical group to be moved to the places where disorders occur, are solely the 1.400 engineers at the disposal of the 54th Area.

In view of the foregoing, this HQ would like to call attention to the advisability of using these engineers - the event of emergency - not only within the territory of the 54 Area but throughout the territory under the jurisdiction of the Territorial Command.

(sgd) Col. V. PETITTI
Chief of Staff.

Translated by: Welk

jv

MMIA-G
FILE: C/92
R/s

Translation

The President of the Council of Ministers
Minister of the Interior

17270

Rome, 16 May 1945

Dear Admiral,

I received your letter of the 13th, n. G/92,
and I thank you for your kind interest about the important
question for the maintenance of public order in the territory
under the administration of the Italian Government.

I recognize the criterions expressed in your letter and
and, on this subject, I have already given the necessary or-
ders to the Military Ministers, the Chief of the Police and
the Commander General of the Royal Carabineers.

The prefects are also being imparted instructions on
this important matter.

I remain, my dear Admiral,

Yours sincerely,

s. I. Bonomi

Admiral Ellery W. Stone
Chief Commissioner
Allied Commission
R o m e

e.c.

MMI
FILE: 6/92
DATE: 19/5

190930

LAND FORCES S/

55

G/92

19/5

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X REP X

EC ISIST - 18 MAY 45

ACTION: LAND FORCES SC

INFO: CHIEF COMINT

EXEC COMINT

C A SEC 39J3

SECRET

SUBJECT: Local Defence

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/92

17 May 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. Reference is made to Allied Commission letter G/92 dated 13 May, signed by Chief Commissioner.
2. This letter answers your 104455/1/2 of 23 Feb, subject, 129.1.7 Employment of Italian Tps for Public Order Services in SICILY, and cancels MMIA letter S/G/33 of 5 Dec 44, subject, Italian Troops Employed to quell Civil Disturbances.

Major General
MMIA

3902

GSO 1 X REP XGSO 2 (Ops) X REP X

GSO 2 (SD) _____

GSO 2 (WE) _____

GSO 2 (L) _____

GSO 3 (SS) _____

GSO 3 (Ordn) _____

GSO 4 (I) _____

C/2

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

13 May 1945

See 87

In order to clarify the exact position and responsibilities of the Italian Government in regard to local defense plans, the following will serve as your guide:

The Italian Government is responsible for defense against sabotage and the preservation of law and order in all territory in the rear of the Army Areas excepting that under AUSA.

As you know, the right is reserved by AUSA to declare specific areas of Italian Government territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such declaration, the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the area in question is assumed by AUSA.

To deny out its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, Italian civil authorities have under their control the Carabinieri. If the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, the local Italian authorities should appeal to the nearest Italian military headquarters. If there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/Zone Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. For this reason it is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied static headquarters and local Italian civil and military authorities.

Should local Italian authorities ask Allied commanders for military assistance in quelling civil disturbances, the local Allied commander has orders to point out that the quelling of civil disturbances is the responsibility of Italian authorities and to refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests. Further, the Italian authorities will be warned that the territory in question will be immediately liable to be made an Allied military zone. If assistance is granted, the first troops to be used will be such Italian troops as may be under command of Allied District/Zone Sections.

Where it is necessary for Allied troops to assist the Italian authorities, all Italian troops thus engaged will come under command of Allied District/Zone Section Commanders.

F. 55

Reply: See F. 85

3901

In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. It will be noted from the foregoing that this is the only restriction as to arms and armament of Italian troops employed to quell civil disturbances.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Leone Ronchi
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

DISTRIBUTION:

CG, CTR
C-5, AFHQ
Land Forces S/c
CA Sec
Public Safety S/c
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of War
CC
Exec Comm

3900

SECRET

(59)

SUBJECT: Local Defence Plans.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MMA)

G/92

/ May 45.

TO : HQ ALLIED COMMISSION
(for EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER.)

(50)

Ref your 2606/135/EC, subject as above, dated
30 April 45.1. Forwarded herewith letter for final signature
by the Chief Commissioner.REP
for Major General
MMA

iv.

3899

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

Tel: 735

30 April 1945.

Ref: 2606/135/EC.

SUBJECT: Local Defence Plans.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

1. With reference to your letter G/92 dated 24 Apr 45, draft letter Appendix "C" is approved as amended and is returned herewith for preparation for final signature by the Chief Commissioner. It should be addressed to both the Minister of the Interior and Minister of War, and Commanding General Carabinieri should have a copy.

2. Appendix "B" to your letter is returned as requested.

AFHQ Op Memo N° 76 of 15 Apr.

G/92 folio "

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Incl:
as above

MMIA - 'G'
FILE: G/92
DATE: 1/5/45.

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GSO 2 (SD)			
GSO 2 (WE)			
GSO 2 (L)			
GSO 3 (SD)			
GSO 3 (Orbat)			
GSO 3 (I)			

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010920

SECRET

Appendix "B" to MILIA letter
C/92 dated April 1945

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

C/92

Recd
April 1945

SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans

TO : Minister of the Interior
Minister of War

RESPONSIBILITY

1. Under authority AFHQ Operation Memorandum No. 75 of 15 April 1945 the responsibility for Ground Defense in ITALY (including SICILY, SARDINIA, and ELBA) rests with various headquarters as follows:-

(a) In Army Areas: The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.
(b) The Area including No. 1 District and that part of PBS North of ROMA AREA ALLIED COMMAND for defense against a possible enemy breakthrough, seaborne and airborne landings:
The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.

(c) Territory in rear of Army Areas for defense against sabotage (except as noted in para 2 below) and the preservation of law and order: The A.M.G. or Italian Government Authorities as the case may be.

2. All Ground and Air Commanders directly under S.C.M.D. are responsible for guarding localities occupied by their respective commands and installations. Allied Ground Force Commanders are further responsible for guarding Naval Shore installations within their commands where sufficient naval personnel are not available.

MILITARY ZONES

3897

TO :

Minister of the Interior
Minister of War

RESPONSIBILITY

1. Under authority AFHQ Operation Memorandum No. 75 of 15 April 1945 the responsibility for Ground Defense in ITALY (including SICILY, SARDINIA, and ELBA) rests with various headquarters as follows:-

- (a) In Army areas: The Commanding General of 15 Army Group,
(b) The area including No. 1 District and that part of PES
North of ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND for defense against a pos-
sible enemy breakthrough, seaborne and airborne landings:
The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.

(c) Territory in rear of Army areas for defense against
sabotage (except as noted in para 2 below) and the preser-
vation of law and order: The A.M.G. or Italian Government
authorities as the case may be.

2. All Ground and Air Commanders directly under SACMED are re-
sponsible for guarding localities occupied by their respective commands
and installations. Allied Ground Force Commanders are further responsible
for guarding Naval Shore installations within their commands where suffi-
cient naval personnel are not available.

MILITARY ZONES

3. The right is reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Medi-
terranean Theatre, to declare specific areas of Italian Government
Territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such a declaration,
the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the Zone in ques-

3897

tion is assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Should the situation in any area become such as to convince the District/ Base Section Commander that the establishment of Zones is necessary, he will after consulting the HQ Allied Commission where possible, report accordingly to ~~the Headquarters~~ ^{AFMIS}, giving full reasons to justify his views.

USE OF TROOPS IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER

4. (a) Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To achieve this, the local Italian Civil Authorities have under their control the local Carabinieri. If, in the opinion of the local Italian Authorities, the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should appeal to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters for the assistance of such Italian Troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian Troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/ Base Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied static HQs and local Italian Civil and Military authorities.

(b) Should the local Italian authorities ask Allied Commanders for the assistance of troops in quelling civil disturbances, the local commander ^{should} point out that the quelling of civil-
ian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian authorities and ~~he should~~ refuse such assistance, unless he is of the

3896

Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To achieve this, the local Italian Civil Authorities have under their control the local Carabinieri. If, in the opinion of the local Italian Authorities, the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should appeal to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters for the assistance of such Italian Troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian Troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/ Base Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied Station HQs and local Italian Civil and Military authorities.

(b) Should the local Italian authorities ask Allied Commanders for the assistance of troops in quelling civil disturbances, the local commander ^{should} point out that the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian authorities and ~~he~~ ^{they} refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied Military interests. Furthermore, before rendering such assistance, the local commander will warn the local official that the territory in question will be liable to be made forthwith

9888

- 3 -

an Allied Military Zone. The local commander will, if time permits, consult his superior commander before giving assistance. In any event, if the decision is made to grant the assistance required, the first troops to be used will be such Italian Troops as may be under command of Allied District/Base Sections. ~~As a matter of routine, Commanders will inform their superior commander without delay of any requests made to them and of the action taken thereon.~~

(c) Where it is necessary for Allied Troops to go to the assistance of the Italian authorities or AMG, all Italian Troops engaged in the operation will come under command of Allied District/Base Section Commanders.

(d) Within areas which are still under AMG control, the local AMG Officer is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of AMG for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local AMG Officer will appeal to the nearest Allied static HQ.

(e) The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

(f) In any case where Allied or Italian Troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.

LOCAL SECURITY NAPLES COMMUNE

5. The NAPLES Commune, being still under AMG control, and having within it the headquarters of several independent Allied Commands, con-

stitutes a special case.

3895

Assistance of the Italian authorities or AMG, all Italian Troops engaged in the operation will come under command of Allied District/Base Section Commanders.

(d) Within areas which are still under AMG control, the local AMG Officer is responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

The local Carabinieri are under the control of AMG for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local AMG Officer will appeal to the nearest Allied static HQ.

(e) The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

(f) In any case where Allied or Italian Troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.

LOCAL SECURITY NAPLES COMMUNE

5. The NAPLES Commune, being still under AMG control, and having within it the headquarters of several independent Allied Commands, constitutes a special case. Accordingly, CC Southern District PBS will be responsible for coordinating the defense plans of all Allied agencies located within the NAPLES Commune.

RESTRICTIONS

6. Please notice from the above that now the only restriction as

3895

to arms and armament of Italian Troops employed to quell civil disturbances is that in any case no smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.

CONCLUSION

Annexure 1 to Appx 'C'

7. For your information, this cancels MMIA letter to Ministry of War S/C/33 dated 3 Dec 44 subject, Italian Troops employed to quell civil Disturbances, and answers Ministry of War letter to MMIA 134465/1/2 dated 23 Feb 48 subject, Employment of Italian Troops for Public Order Services in SICILY.

Annexure 2 to Appx 'C'

ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Commanding General

Copy to: AFHQ-C-5
LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C. (MMIA)
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION

WS

SECRET

SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, A.O. (MIA)

24 Apr 45
G/92

TO : HQ ALLIED COMMISSION
(for Executive Commissioner)

1. Para 5 of our letter S/G/33 of 28 Feb to AFHQ (copy at Appx "A" herewith) signed by Chief Commissioner recommended that no restrictions be imposed by the Allies as to what method or means the Italian authorities may use to quell civil disturbances or subdue bands of armed rioters except that no chemical gas of any type may be used. (This followed the SICILY disturbances).
2. The AFHQ reply agreeing to the above is incorporated in a new "Ground Defence" Op Memorandum dated 15 Apr, a copy of which is attached at Appx "B".
3. To put the matter right with the Italian authorities, I recommend draft letter vide Appx "C". As this matter concerns both military personnel and CC MIA I recommend the instruction be sent from your office.

Approved Browning
Major General
MIA

Enclosures: Copy MIA letter S/G/33 of 28 Feb 45.
Copy No 105 AFHQ Op Memo No 75.
MIA Draft letter G/92.
Copy MIA letter S/G/33 of 3 Dec 44.
Copy Ministry of War letter 104465/1/2 of 23 Feb 45.
123.1.7

Appendix A to the JMWL letter
C/92 dated 24 Jan 45.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 394

S/G/33

28 February 1945

SUBJECT: Local Defence Plans

TO : A.T.H.Q.

1. Reference is made to para 9 of your AG 370.6/065 COT-O dated 6 Jan 45. It is thought that the instructions as laid down in this paragraph are a definite handicap to the Italian military authorities in quelling civil disturbances.

2. For example, during the recent disturbances in SICILY several Italian Soldiers were disarmed by the rioters and one of the main reasons was that the Italian Officer had not ordered his troops to load their rifles. Furthermore, in SICILY, there are civilians who have machine guns in addition to small arms. If the Italian military are not permitted to use automatic weapons, they would not have as much fire-power as the rioters.

3. There is no serious objection to the instructions contained in your para 9 for a normal civil disturbance where the civilians are not armed. However, they do not allow sufficient latitude to the Italian Military to permit them to deal effectively with bands of armed rioters, such as were met in the SICILIAN disturbances.

4. You are referred also to "Report on the Rebellion in the Province of Regusa 5/11 Jan 45" para 7(c)(i) prepared by Lt. Col. HOWARD, MLI and Maj. McNIEY, FMB, copy to you.

5. It is recommended that in that part of liberated ITALY under Italian administration, no restrictions shall be imposed by the Allied authorities as to what method or means the Italian authorities may use to quell civil disturbances or subdue bands of armed rioters except that no chemical gas of any type may be used.

3892

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

1. Reference is made to para 9 of your AG 370.6/005 OCT-0 dated 6 Jan 45. It is thought that the instructions as laid down in this paragraph are a definite handicap to the Italian military authorities in quelling civil disturbances.

2. For example, during the recent disturbances in SICILY several Italian Soldiers were disarmed by the rioters and one of the main reasons was that the Italian Officer had not ordered his troops to load their rifles. Furthermore, in SICILY, there are civilians who have machine guns in addition to small arms. If the Italian military are not permitted to use automatic weapons, they would not have as much fire-power as the rioters.

3. There is no serious objection to the instructions contained in your para 9 for a normal civil disturbance where the civilians are not armed. However, they do not allow sufficient latitude to the Italian Military to permit them to deal effectively with bands of armed rioters, such as were met in the SICILIAN disturbances.

4. You are referred also to "Report on the Rebellion in the Province of Ragusa 5/11 Jan 45" para 7(c)(1) prepared by Lt. Col. HOWARD, MAITA and Maj. MANLEY, FHB, copy to you.

5. It is recommended that in that part of liberated ITALY under Italian administration, no restrictions shall be imposed by the Allied authorities as to what method or means the Italian authorities may use to quell civil disturbances or subdue bands of armed rioters except that no chemical gas of any type may be used.

Copy to: CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COM
LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION. A.C. (AMIL)

WS

3892

MURRAY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

SECRET

Appendix "C" to MIA Letter
G/92 dated April 1945

DRAFT

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Office of the Chief Commissioner

APO 334

G/92

April 1945

SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans

TO :

RESPONSIBILITY

1. Under authority AFHQ Operation Memorandum No. 75 of 15 April 1945 the responsibility for Ground Defense in ITALY (including SICILY, SARDINIA, and ELBA) rests with various headquarters as follows:-

- (a) In Army Areas: The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.
- (b) The Area including No. 1 District and that part of PBS North of ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND for defense against a possible enemy breakthrough, seaborne and airborne landings: The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.
- (c) Territory in rear of ARMY Areas for defense against sabotage (except as noted in para 2 below) and the preservation of law and order: The A.M.G. or Italian Government Authorities as the case may be.

2. All Ground and Air Commanders directly under SACRED are responsible for guarding localities occupied by their respective commands and installations. Allied Ground Force Commanders are further responsible for guarding Naval Shore installations within their commands where sufficient naval personnel are not available.

MILITARY ZONES

2891

TO :

RESPONSIBILITY

1. Under authority AFHQ Operation Memorandum No. 75 of 15 April 1945 the responsibility for Ground Defense in ITALY (including SICILY, SARDINIA, and ELBA) rests with various headquarters as follows:-

(a) In Army Areas: The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.
(b) The area including No. 1 District and that part of PBS North of ROME AREA ALLIED COMMAND for defense against a possible enemy breakthrough, seaborne and airborne landings: The Commanding General of 15 Army Group.

(c) Territory in rear of Army Areas for defense against sabotage (except as noted in para 2 below) and the preservation of law and order: The A.A.G. or Italian Government Authorities as the case may be.

2. All Ground and Air Commanders directly under SACMED are responsible for guarding localities occupied by their respective commands and installations. Allied Ground Force Commanders are further responsible for guarding Naval Shore installations within their commands where sufficient naval personnel are not available.

MILITARY ZONES

3. The right is reserved by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, to declare specific areas of Italian Government Territory to be Military Zones. By the issue of such a declaration, the exercise of the powers of Military Government in the Zone in ques-

tion is assumed by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Should the situation in any area become such as to convince the District/ Base Section Commander that the establishment of Zones is necessary, he will after consulting the Hq Allied Commission where possible, report accordingly to this headquarters, giving full reasons to justify his views.

USE OF TROOPS IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER

4. (a) Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To achieve this, the local Italian Civil Authorities have under their control the local Carabinieri. If, in the opinion of the local Italian authorities, the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should appeal to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters for the assistance of such Italian Troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian Troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/ Base Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied static HQs and local Italian Civil and Military authorities.
- (b) Should the local Italian authorities ask Allied Commanders for the assistance of troops in quelling civil disturbances, the local commander will point out that the quelling of civil disturbances or riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian authorities and he will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary.

4. (a) Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To achieve this, the local Italian Civil authorities have under their control the local Carabinieri. If, in the opinion of the local Italian authorities, the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should appeal to the nearest Italian Military Headquarters for the assistance of such Italian Troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian Troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the nearest Allied District/ Base Section Commander or his local representative, for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained between Allied static HQs and local Italian Civil and Military authorities.

(b) Should the local Italian authorities ask Allied Commanders for the assistance of troops in quelling civil disturbances, the local commander will point out that the quelling of civil disturbances or riots is a matter for the Italian authorities and he will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied Military interests. Furthermore, before rendering such assistance, the local commander will warn the local official that the territory in question will be liable to be made forthwith

an Allied Military Zone. The local commander will, if time permits, consult his superior commander before giving assistance. In any event, if the decision is made to grant the assistance required, the first troops to be used will be such Italian Troops as may be under command of Allied District/Base Sections. As matter of routine, Commanders will inform their superior commander without delay of any requests made to them and of the action taken thereon.

(c) Where it is necessary for Allied Troops to go to the Assistance of the Italian authorities or AMG, all Italian Troops engaged in the operation will come under command of Allied District/Base Section Commanders.

(d) Within areas which are still under AMG control, the local AMG Officer is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of AMG for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local AMG Officer will appeal to the nearest Allied static HQ.

(e) The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

(f) In any case where Allied or Italian Troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.

LOCAL SECURITY MAPLES COMMUNE

5. The MAPLES Commune, being still under AMG control, and having within it the headquarters of several independent Allied Commands, constitutes a special case. Accordingly, CO Southern District PBS will be responsible for coordinating the defense of the commune.

3889

Assistance of the Italian authorities or AMG, all Italian Troops engaged in the operation will come under command of Allied District/Zone Section Commanders.

(d) Within areas which are still under AMG control, the local AMG Officer is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of AMG for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local AMG Officer will appeal to the nearest Allied static HQ.

(e) The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

(f) In any case where Allied or Italian Troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.

LOCAL SECURITY: NAPLES COMMA

5. The NAPLES Comma, being still under AMG control, and having within it the headquarters of several independent Allied Commands, constitutes a special case. Accordingly, CO Southern District PBS will be responsible for coordinating the defense plans of all Allied agencies located within the NAPLES Comma.

RESTRICTIONS

6. Please notice from the above that now the only restriction as

3889

- 4 -

to arms and armament of Italian Troops employed to quell civil disturbances is that in any case NO smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.

(12)
CONCLUSION

Annexure 1 to Appx 'C' (to AC)

7. For your information, this cancels MMIA letter to Ministry of War S/C/33 dated 3 Dec 44 subject, Italian Troops employed to quell civil Disturbances, and answers Ministry of War letter to MMIA 104455/1/2 dated 129.1.7
23 Feb 45 subject, Employment of Italian Troops for Public Order Services in SICILY.

Annexure 2 to Appx 'C' (to AC)

ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: AFHQ
LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, A.C. (MMIA)
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION

WB

3888

SUBJECT: SICILYSECRETLand Forces Sub Gen, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

S:G:33

15 Mar 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. Further to MMIA Letter S/G/33 of 14 Feb 45.

2. To increase the efficiency of the Internal Security Divisions in SICILY, it is desired that you make the necessary arrangements for the delegation by the High Commissioner for SICILY and the Comandante Territoriale della Sicilia of full powers to the military commander on the spot in case of a grave emergency.

3. It is also desired that you review the motor transportation situation throughout the Island and form a plan for the most economical employment of what transport is available, bearing in mind the desirability of retaining in areas where civil disturbances are likely to occur, sufficient transport to ensure the rapid movement of troops.

tvs.

Major General.
M.M.I.A.

copy to: AFHQ (your 370.61/031 GGT-O of 9 March refers.)

INTERNAL: M.A. to G.O.C.

Q

BT

3887

SECRETSUBJECT: Radio Communication - SICILY

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. G/92
19 March 45

TO : AFHQ

1. Ref para 3 of your AG 370.81/031 GCT-0 of 9 March 45.
The matter of Radio Communication in SICILY has been referred to
Italian Ministry of War, who have been asked to submit a compre-
hensive plan showing:-

- (a) Number of stations required
- (b) Where they are required.

2. This plan will be submitted to conform to the instructions
regarding out-put as issued by CEO AFHQ.

3. You will be notified when the network is complete.

REP
Major General
M. M. I. A.

WS

3886

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

SECRET

By Authority of
MAGNETInitials *ARK* *AG*

Date 09 March 1945

S/G/33

AG 370.61/031 OCT-0

SUBJECT: SIGILY Disturbances - Report on Rebellion in Province of RAGUSA
5 - 11 January 1945TO: President
Allied Commission
FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission (LNTA)

1. Reference is made to your S/G/33, dated 24 February 1945 and to letter, this headquarters, AG 370.61/031 OCT-0, dated 20 February 1945, subject as above.

2. The action already taken on this matter is noted. It is, however, considered that the following two points require further amplification and it is desired that the attention of the Ministry of War be directed to them in accordance with paragraph 4 c and 4 b respectively of AG 370.61/031 OCT-0, dated 20 February 1945:


- distribution of MT generally throughout the Island
- delegation of powers by the High Commissioner to the military commander concerned, in the case of grave emergency.

3. It is noted from your X500/3, dated 24 February 1945 that telephone and telegraph lines on the Island have been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree. In view, however, of the facts that:

- should similar disturbances occur in the future the ease with which these lines can be cut is obvious
- authority for the security units in Sicily to use radio has already been granted,

it is considered desirable that military radio communication should be employed on the Island. You are therefore requested to bring this matter to the attention of the Italian authorities in order that they may take advantage of this authority to use radio communication.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

copy furnished
No. 3 DistrictA. B. KING
Lt Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General

SECRET

MMIA	FILE REF	Date Recd
		5/6/33

45

SECRET

SUBJECT: - Employment of Italian Troops for
Public Order Services in SICILY

LAND FORCES SUB COM A.C.
(MIA)
S/G/33

4 Mar 45

MINISTRY OF WAR

- 95-43

1. In answer to your letter 10/465/1/2 of 23 Feb 45, the question
129.1.7
of the proper arms to be used by the Military in quelling civil
disturbances is being studied with a view to revision. Therefore
you will not issue the order attached to your a/s letter until you
receive further instructions from MIA.

ANC

2/10
8/10/45

RTP
for Major General
MIA

MIA
FILE REF
Date Recd

R 3884
5/9/33
5 2/8/83

Land Forces S/C

~~SECRET~~

44

Reg out

3 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans.

TO : Allied Force Headquarters,
Attention: G-5 Section.TS/2/10
F.7

1. Reference is made to para 9 of your AS 370.6/005 COM-0 dated 6 January 1945. It is thought that the instructions as laid down in this paragraph are a definite handicap to the Italian military authorities in quelling civil disturbances.
2. For example, during the recent disturbances in SICILY several Italian soldiers were disarmed by the rioters and one of the main reasons was that the Italian officer had not ordered his troops to load their rifles. Furthermore, in SICILY, there are civilians who have machine guns in addition to small arms. If the Italian military are not permitted to use automatic weapons, they would not have as much fire power as the rioters.
3. There is no serious objection to the instructions contained in your para 9 for a normal civil disturbance where the civilians are not armed. However, they do not allow sufficient latitude to the Italian military to permit them to deal effectively with bands of armed rioters, such as were met in the SICILIAN disturbances.
4. You are referred also to "Report on the Rebellion in the Province of Ragusa 5/11 Jan 45" para 7 (c) (1) prepared by Lt. Col. Howard, M.M.I.A., and Major Manley, P.S.D., copy to you.
5. It is recommended that in that part of liberated ITALY under Italian administration, no restrictions shall be imposed by the Allied authorities as to the method or means the Italian authorities may use to quell civil disturbances or armed bands of armed rioters except that no chemical gas of any type may be used.

M. S. L. 34

B. 100-100

ELIOT V. STONE
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief CommissionerCopy to: Executive Commissioner,
Civil Affairs Section,
Public Safety Sub-Commission.

M.M.I.A.	3882
FILE REF	5/4/43
Date Recd	5/2/

DISPATCHED FROM OFFICE, 3 MARCH 1945

Translation

Copy

43

From: M/W
To: MMIA

duplicate to Ex Com 24 Apr.

Ref: 104465/1/2
129-1-7.

23/2/45

See GOC

Subject: Employment of Italian troops for Public Order Services in Sicily

Further to our letter 102105/1 dated 28th January

repeated comments
in May 1945
writing

The military Territorial Command in Palermo as a result to recent decisions taken by the Allied Commission in Sicily, has issued instructions as per attached letter.

See C.U.S.

We beg M.M.T.A.

4 has
REP
Answered

Don't publish order
until further
instructions

1) To kindly confirm the decision of the Allied organisation in Sicily approving the instructions as laid by Palermo Territorial Command:

2) To extend permission to the Carabinieri as to the bearing of hand grenades and automatic weapons when it is deemed necessary according to the arms held by disarmed groups of the public order.

Action at 7 (98)

(K)

(See)

at 11/1/45

Signed: Chief of the Cabinet

Pte. Enxera
H

6/2/45

Translation

From C.M. I. di P.

To M.M. I. R.

Ref. 1265/01 di post.

4/2/45

Subject: Use of troops in keeping public order.

The Allied Commission has informed us that troops may be used in the keeping of Public order, without previous communication with the Allied Military H.Q.

It is prescribed only, that liaison must be maintained between the military and civil Italian authorities, and their Allied Military H.Q. in order that the people concerned are fully acquainted with the situation, and also of the possibility of meeting it.

In consequence the all. 5204/01, and 5956/01 dated 11th Nov, and 16th Dec 1945 respectively are cancelled and the following instructions come into force.

- (A) In the case of a disturbance of Public Order, of a seriousness such that it is deemed necessary to intervene with troops, the Prefects should immediately ~~inform~~ give notice to the garrison H.Q. and at the same time, forward to the Territorial Military H.Q. of Palermo, the request for the use of said troops, for keeping public order.
- (B) The garrison commander will have the troops prepared, but will not allow them to leave barracks, without receiving orders from Military Territorial H.Q. of Palermo.
- (C) The preparing of the troops, consists of the troops being properly dressed in uniform, and steel helmets, and to have available the maximum number of vehicles for transporting them ~~13882~~ in case of disturbance.
- (D) Where the Prefects judge the disturbance (for which the troops have been called to intervene and restore public order) to be

2
of an importance equal to a "grave emergency", and not within the scope of the police force, or when the executive order to the garrison H.Q. is not forth-coming from the Territorial Military H.Q. of Palermo within a limited time, they can request without further delay, to the garrison H.Q. for the troops to be ordered out of barracks.

They must communicate immediately the facts to Territorial Military H.Q. of Palermo.

(E) When the troops leave the barracks to be employed in the said disturbance they are normally armed with rifle or musket, or pistol (unloaded) and must not be furnished individually with hand grenades. When the Prefects (through information of the ~~presence~~ ^{aiming} of the disturbers) deem it necessary that troops be issued also with (automatic rifles, and machine guns) and hand grenades, they should make special mention of it in their request for troops.

When the troops leave the barracks to be employed out of the garrison, they must always (over and above their individual arms,) be furnished with automatic rifles, and machine guns, and the individual issue of hand grenades. This being done independently of the Prefects request or not.

(F) On leaving their barracks the troops are put at the disposal of the local police, who will distribute them for duty to the respective squads of police from whom the officers in command will obtain information regarding the eventual opening of fire. Firing must only be carried out by order. Automatic rifles, machine guns and hand grenades, will only be used, after the disturbers have made use of the same weapons, and only when the police under whom they

work, have given the orders to do so.

- (G) In the case of disturbance of public order, as referred to in paragraph (A) a close communication must be maintained between the Italian Civil and Military authorities, and the Allied Military H.Q. (local) in order that the persons concerned are fully acquainted with the situation, and the possibility of meeting it.
- (H) Communicate to this H.Q. with the maximum urgency, any eventual disturbances, even if these do not give cause for the intervention of troops.

Admiral

The General Commanding,
ADAMO MARIOTTI

SECRET


Appx A

SUBJECT: SICILIAN DisturbancesLand Forces Sub Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
S/O/33
28 Feb 45TO : Executive Commissioner

Reference your 2606/99/EO of 26 Feb 45.

Forwarded herewith is amended letter for signature
by Chief Commissioner.

cgl.


Major General
M.M.I.A.

RUBIN

3879

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 394

S/G/33

February 1945

Subject: Local Defence Plans

TO : A.F.H.Q.

F 7 of 6/63 at

1. Reference is made to para 9 of your AG 370.6/005 GCT-0 dated 6 Jan 45. It is thought that the instructions as laid down in this paragraph are a definite handicap to the Italian military authorities in quelling civil disturbances.

2. For example, during the recent disturbances in SICILY several Italian soldiers were disarmed by the rioters and one of the main reasons was that the Italian officer had not ordered his troops to load their rifles. Furthermore, in SICILY, there are civilians who have machine guns in addition to small arms. If the Italian military are not permitted to use automatic weapons, they would not have as much fire-power as the rioters.

3. There is no serious objection to the instructions contained in your para 9 for a normal civil disturbance where the civilians are not armed. However, they do not allow sufficient latitude to the Italian Military to permit them to deal effectively with bands of armed rioters, such as were met in the SICILIAN disturbances.

4. You are referred also to "Report on the Rebellion in the Province of Ragusa 5/11 Jan 45" para 7 (c) (i) prepared by Lt. Col. Howard, MMIA and Maj. Manley, PWB, copy to you.

5. It is recommended that in that part of liberated ITALY under Italian administration, no restrictions shall be imposed by the Allied authorities as to what method or means the Italian authorities may use to quell civil disturbances or subdue bands of armed rioters except that no chemical gas of any type may be used.

ELBERT W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

8878

esl

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section
Public Safety Sub-Com.
Land Forces Sub-Com.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

SECRET

Ext: 735

Ref: 2606/99/EC.

26 February 1945.

SUBJECT: SICILIAN Disturbances.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (M.M.I.A.).

Reference to your letter S/G/33 dated 25 February 1945 your draft, as amended, is approved. Will you now have it typed for signature by the Chief Commissioner.

Encl.

Typed as amended at F 12
[Signature]
for *E. Gordon*
Chief Staff Officer
To the Executive Commissioner.

3877

M.M.I.A.	PR 24/2
FILE REF.	S/G/33
Date Recd	27/2/45

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
AFO 394

S/G/33

February 1945

Subject: Local Defence Plans

TO : A.F.H.Q.

1. Reference is made to para 9 of your AG 370.6/005 GCT-C dated 6 Jan 45. It is thought that the instructions as laid down in this paragraph are a definite handicap to the Italian military authorities in quelling civil disturbances.

2. For example, during the recent disturbances in SICILY several Italian soldiers were disarmed by the rioters and one of the main reasons was that the Italian officer had not ordered his troops to load their rifles. Furthermore, in SICILY, there are civilians who have machine guns and mortars in addition to small arms. If the Italian military are not permitted to use automatic weapons they would not have as much fire-power as the rioters.

3. There is no serious objection to the instructions contained in your para 9 ~~as~~ for a normal civil disturbance where the civilians are not armed. However, they do not allow sufficient latitude to the Italian Military to permit them to deal effectively with bands of armed rioters, such as were met in the SICILIAN disturbances.

4. *administration*
It is recommended that in that part of liberated ITALY under Italian ~~control~~, no restrictions shall be imposed by the Allied authorities as to what method or means the Italian authorities may use to quell civil disturbances or subdue bands of armed rioters except that no chemical gas of any type may be used.

5. *you are referred also to "Report on the Rebellion in the Province of Ragusa 5/11 Jan 45" para 7(c)(i) prepared by Lt Col Lawrence, MMIA + Maj Stanley. PWB, copy to you.*
MILERY W. STONE
Rear Adm. ~~Commander~~, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section ~~and~~
Public Safety Sub Com. ~~and~~
Land Forces Sub Com. ~~and~~

3876

SUBJECT: SICILIAN Disturbances

Land Forces Sub Com. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

25 S/C/33
Feb 45

TO : Executive Commissioner, Hq. A.C.

31
Your ref 171/-/COS of 9 Feb 45.

1. Attached is a proposed draft to be submitted to A.F.H.Q. by you concerning the use of Italian Troops and arms in quelling civilian disturbances which has been agreed by VP Civil Affairs Sec.

egl.

Ⓡ
Major General
M.M.I.A.

40
D
3875

SUBJECT: SICILY disturbances - Report on Rebellion
in Province of RAGUSA 5 - 11 January 1945

SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
 (M.M.I.A.)
 File No 3/0/33 ←
 24 Feb 45.

TO: AFHQ (2)

Ref your AG 370.61/031 GCT-O of 20 Feb 45.

1. Immediately on receipt of the report on the SICILY disturbances made by Lt Col HOWARD, M.M.I.A. and Major MANLEY, P.W.B., a meeting was called at this H.Q. and a copy of the minutes is enclosed herewith. All action in the minutes required of M.M.I.A. has been taken.
2. It is considered that all the points raised by you have been covered except your query as to whether it was thought that the rebellion was inspired by the enemy or by any known subversive organisation.
3. All evidence goes to show that, although one enemy agent was reported to have been dropped by air, the disturbances were purely of a political nature. The Sicilians, who consider that the war is over, object to being called upon to enlist into the Italian Army. In this connection it is interesting to note that following on the stern action of the Ministry of War in pressing the call-up and rounding up absentees, the SICILY call-up yielded 80% of the target figure. The town of RAGUSA itself has yielded 78% in spite of the disturbances.

two.

Major General,
 M.M.I.A.

3874

see F.46

COPY NUMBER 1.

~~TOP SECRET~~
 ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 APO 512

~~TOP SECRET~~ RHF/gem
 By Authority
 SACMT

AG 370.61/031 OCT-C

MMIA	
FILE REF	9/33
Date Recd	23/2/

Initials *[initials]*
 20 February 1945

SUBJECT: SICILY Disturbances - Report on Rebellion in Province of
 RAGUSA 5-11 January 1945.

TO: President, Allied Commission
 FOR: Land Forces Sub Commission, (MMIA).

1. Reference is made to G/33 of 26 January 1945.

2. Study of the report compiled jointly by Lt Colonel HOWARD, MMIA, and Major MANLEY, PWB, reveals certain weaknesses in the organization and administration of the Internal Security troops available to deal with the situation in SICILY at the time of the disturbances.

3. Present policy is to encourage the Italian Government to accept full responsibility in those areas which have been turned back to their control, and it is considered that they should be encouraged to review the whole question of their responsibility for the preservation of public order and the prevention of sabotage within SICILY in the light of the lessons learned during the recent disturbances.

4. With this object in view, you are therefore directed to take up the following points with the Italian Military Authorities, and render a report at an early date to this headquarters:

a. The report under consideration indicates that the distribution of Italian troops within Sicily is faulty. The necessity for a review of the distribution of the AOSTA and SABAUDA Divisions within the Island is apparent and a report on the organization, equipment, and efficiency of the two Divisions, with recommendations as to how their value for an internal security role could be increased, might profitably be combined with this review. So far as increasing the efficiency of these Divisions in their work of Internal Security is concerned, the attention of the military authorities should be drawn to the desirability of maintaining a small mobile striking force to be held as a reserve for immediate employment in cases of emergency.

b. The need for the delegation by the High Commissioner for Sicily and the Comando Territoriale della Sicilia of full powers to the military commander on the spot in a case of grave emergency should be studied.

See 36 - Letter to 10/10 on above subject.

AG. M & D AFHQ

No B247

~~TOP SECRET~~

3873
 F39
 40

~~TOP SECRET~~

Ltr, AFHQ, AG 370.61/031 GCT-O,
dtd 20 February 1945, (cont'd).

c. The striking power of the troops employed was apparently crippled from lack of transport in the vital area. There was a tendency to send MT columns by rail, shortage of fuel and tires being advanced in explanation of this procedure. A review should be made of MT throughout the Island and a plan worked out for the most economical employment of what transport is available, bearing in mind the desirability of retaining in areas where civil disturbances are likely to occur sufficient transport to ensure the rapid movement of troops.

d. There are indications throughout the report of general slackness in the Divisions, e.g. a lack of maps, absence of punctuality in most of the operations, habitual lack of reconnaissance, etc. It is felt that stringent measures should be employed to increase the general efficiency of the troops of the Island.

e. Information is also required as to the action taken by the Italian Authorities against the ring leaders of the rebellion. The names of these men and the results of their interrogation should therefore be obtained together with the opinion of the investigation officers on the apparent cause of the rebellion and the objects of its leaders. Attention is especially directed toward the importance of any evidence indicating whether the rebellion was inspired by the enemy or by any known subversive organization.

5. The question of the lack of radio communication is being investigated with a view to relaxing the present security ruling on this point in the Island.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

3872

TOP² SECRET

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG LIB-0

SUBJECT: Request for Publication

TO : Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army
FOR: Army Sub-Commission

1. Reference is made to your cable 0-692, dated 12 February 1945.
2. Attached is one (1) copy of letter, this headquarters, file AG 370.6/005 GCT-0, dated 6 January 1945, subject: "Local Defense Plans".
3. Please acknowledge receipt.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

1 Incl
Ltr. as above

See 10/63
in 9/63
See 10/63
in 9/63
See 10/63
in 9/63

R. H. Furse
R. H. FURSE
Captain, AGD
Asst Adjutant General



SECRET

3871

10-14-25

seen 2/1/45
we took action at 9/1/45

~~SECRET~~ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

RHM/jcm

: : : : :
 : ~~SECRET~~
 : Auth: SAC *[initials]*
 : Initials: *[initials]*
 : 6 January 1945
 : : : : :

291

AG 370.6/005 GCT-O

6 January 1945

SUBJECT: Local Defense Plans.

TO : Commanding General, 15th Army Group.
 General Officer Commanding, Number 1 District
 General Officer Commanding, Number 2 District
 General Officer Commanding, Number 3 District
 Commander, Balkan Air Force
 Commander, Land Forces, Adriatic
 Commander, Military Mission to the Italian Army
 FOR: Army Sub-Commission.
 Deputy President, Allied Commission
 Commanding General, Peninsular Base Section, APO 782.
 Commanding General, Rome Area Allied Command, APO 794.

1. Letters, this headquarters, file AG 370.6/106 GCT-O, dated 24 September 1944, AG 370.6/107 GCT-O, dated 27 November 1944, and AG 370.6/107 GCT-O, dated 8 December 1944, all subject as above, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

2. Your attention is directed to recent local uprisings and disorders which indicate the possible inability of local police to cope with such situations.

3. The present policy with respect to military zones and the employment of Allied troops to quell civil disturbances is laid down in paragraphs 5 and 6 of AFHQ Administrative Memorandum Number 57, 1944, subject: "Powers and rights of Allied Forces in Italian Government Territory". The following instructions are in amplification of those included in Administrative Memorandum Number 57.

4. There are two types of areas in that part of Italy in rear of the Army boundaries where civil riots or disturbances may occur: first, those areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, including islands of Sicily and Sardinia, and second, those areas still under Allied Military Government control.

5. Within areas which have been turned back to the Italian Government, the Italian Government is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. To accomplish this, the Italian local civil authorities have under their control the local carabinieri. If, in the opinion of the local Italian authorities, the Carabinieri are unable to deal with the situation, they should appeal to the nearest Italian military headquarters for the assistance of such Italian troops as the latter has under its control. If no such Italian troops are available, or if there is still need for additional troops, the Italian civil authorities should request the local district (base section) area or sub-area commander for assistance. It is essential that close liaison be maintained by district (base

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

REF ID: A6 370.6/005 GGT-0,
and 8 January 1945 (cont'd)

section) area and sub-area headquarters with the local Italian civil and military authorities.

6. Within areas which are still under Allied Military Government control, the local Allied Military Government authority is responsible for the maintenance of law and order. The local Carabinieri are under the control of Allied Military Government for this purpose. Should additional assistance be required, the local Allied Military Government authority will appeal to the local district (base section) area or sub-area commander. It is essential that close liaison exist between the local Allied Military Government commander and the local district (base section) area and sub-area commanders.

7. The above responsibilities as outlined apply to civil disturbances. A disturbance in which military personnel are involved is a military responsibility and will be dealt with by the appropriate military authority.

8. Immediate reports will be made through normal channels in all cases of riots or civil disturbance, whether or not it has been necessary to employ Allied troops.

9. In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, the following instructions will apply:

- a. Troops will be moved to the scene of the disturbance with weapons unloaded.
- b. Weapons will be loaded only on command of an officer.
- c. Only small arms will normally be borne by troops. Commanders are advised that the carrying of automatic weapons by troops in a civil disturbance is most undesirable and will only be allowed in the Army areas where they will be kept to a minimum and used only as a last resort. Grenades are specifically prohibited.
- d. No smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.
- e. No troops will even fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.

10. Within the Army areas, the Commanding General, 15th Army Group will issue such instructions as are considered necessary to implement the general principles outlined above.

11. Commanders concerned are responsible for the preparation of local defense schemes for the protection of Allied government property and to insure the security and efficiency of the lines of communication. Addressees who have not already forwarded copies of their local defense plans will do so without delay. Changes or amendments will be submitted immediately on publication.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

12. All addressees will acknowledge receipt of this order.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenbury
C. W. CHRISTENBURY
Colonel, AGH,
Acting Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

- "G-3(a)" plus
- 1 - AGC, Sardinia
- 1 - OC, British Troops, Corsica
- 1 - IS & PS
- 2 - AG Records
- 1 - AG H & D

3869

SECRET

SUBJECT: SICILY.

SECRET 36

Land Forces Sub Com, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

B/G/33

14 Feb 45.

To: Ministry of War.

1. At a conference at HQ M.M.I.A. the subject of the recent disturbances in SICILY were discussed as were also the Italian Internal Security Divs stationed there. Certain recommendations were made and these are passed to you for your necessary action.
2. The Internal Security Divs in SICILY do not have their full scale of arms. You should determine the needs of the Divs, to bring them up to the authorized scale, and then issue the necessary equipment.
3. It was not thought that distribution of troops is as efficient as it could be. However, it is your decision as to where the troops shall be stationed, but you might well review the troop disposition to see if any changes in location need to be made.
4. It would be desirable for the I.S. troops to receive more training. You should review the matter of how the time of the troops is spent and work in a training programme for them.
5. A large scale propaganda programme should not be used for the SICILY phase III call-up in order NOT to incite disturbances. However a moderate amount of propaganda will be needed.


Major General.
M.M.I.A.

178.

Rin

See F.48

3868

MMIA

12 1840 A

AFH

C-692

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Restricted

PLEASE FORWARD COPY YOUR LETTER A G 3706/005 GOT OF 6 JAN 48
URGENTLY REQUIRED THIS HQ

PRECEDENCE IMPORTANT

Internal: File: 3/3/53

AUTHENTICATED

Spencer Capt.

WS

See folio 37

R¹²

3867

CHS

T. 61.38.08

SUBJECT: Sicily Disturbances

TO: Chief Staff Officer

Reference your 3618/223/COS dated 9th Feb. 45.

1. It is considered that the communication facilities in Sicily are adequate, qualified by the condition that facilities in this poorly developed island never were on a lavish scale. This does not mean that communications are properly organized to deal efficiently with such disturbances as took place, as this general requirement needs standards of civil official and police staff organizations which may not be sufficiently high.

2. The latest figures available on the restoration of pre-war services in Sicily are at the end of November 1944. These are as follows:

Province	Telegraph Stations		Telephone Exchanges	
	Pre-war	Now in Service	Pre-war	Now in Service
Agrigento	47	45	31	17
Caltanissetta	22	22	13	6
Catania	82	59	60	18
Enna	23	21	17	8
Messina	159	150	43	9
Palermo	93	89	45	14
Ragusa	18	18	9	5
Siracusa	24	17	15	5
Trapani	46	41	20	5
	514 (90%)	462	253 (34%)	87

Matters have improved since that time, the telephone exchanges now in service being approximately 50% of pre-war. The situation is also really considerably better than that given by the percentage figure as the stations restored to service include all the more important localities.

3. Of course the Italian authorities are labouring under the well-known difficulties of shortages of transport and stores and low wages and bad living conditions of the personnel, and no doubt circuits are out of action for one reason or another for periods that would not be tolerated in normal times and circumstances.

30866
REF

- 2 -

4. I do not think much good can result from simply telling the Posts and Telegraphs Dept. that there is a generally unsatisfactory state of communications in Sicily as, firstly, they aren't bad all things considered and, secondly, they will only produce the usual good excuses for short-comings. Of course any particular case of a definite shortage of facilities will be willingly investigated.

5. I understand that one of the chief causes of communication difficulties was that all circuits out of Ragusa were cut. This is hardly the fault of the Posts and Telegraphs Ministry. Actually I feel that the fault probably lies more in the efficiency of the use made of the existing facilities i.e. the organization and competence of local police and civil official bodies.

Tel: 489081
Ext: 400

13th February, 1945

J. L. Henderson
J. L. HENDERSON
Colonel,
Director,
Communications Sub-Commission

Copy to Land Force Sub-Commission ✓

3865

SUBJECT: Italian Troops employed to
quell Civil Disturbances

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. S/G/33
12 Feb 45

TO: MINISTRY OF WAR

Your ref 102105 dated 28 Jan 45.
129-1-7

1. The question of regulations for troops used
in quelling civil disturbances is now the subject of
a study being made and you will be notified when a def-
inite decision has been reached.

RET

Major General
M. M. I. A.

WS

3864

SECRET

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT HQ MMIA
ON 9 FEB 45 ON SICILY DISTURBANCES

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AG, (MMIA)

S/G/33

11 Feb 45

OBJECT

1. The object of the conference was to discuss, from A.C. point of view, the problems confronting the authorities in the maintenance of law and order in SICILY and to recommend such measures as considered necessary.

PRESENT

Lt-Col	Ingledeu	MMIA
Brig	Carr	Regional Commissioner, Sicily
Col	Chapman	Public Safety Sub-Commission
Col	Simmons	MMIA Sardinia
Lt-Col	Doherty	Public Safety Sub-Commission
Lt-Col	Parks	HQ 3 District
Lt-Col	Howard	MMIA
Lt-Col	White	Civil Affairs Sec
Major	Talbot	Chief of Staff Sec
Major	Spray	HQ 3 District
Major	Manley	P.W.B.
Major	Pinkley	MMIA - Secretary

AGREED ACTION

3. It was agreed that:-
 - (a) There are now sufficient troops and CC RR in SICILY if they are properly employed and equipped.
 - (b) The organisation of the Internal Security Division is satisfactory. However, Divs do NOT have full scale of armn.
ACTION: MMIA to have War Ministry equip divs to scale.
 - (c) Present distribution of Italian troops is NOT satisfactory. Distribution of troops is an Italian responsibility.
ACTION: MMIA to suggest to Ministry of War that their plan of troop distribution should be studied.
 - (d) Not all officers of the Internal Security Divisions are efficient. However, Ministry of War has recently changed the senior officials and it is hoped that, as a result, further inefficient officers will be weeded out.

3883

in SICILY and to recommend such measures as considered necessary.

PRESENT

2.

Lt-Col Ingledew
Brig Carr
Col Chapman
Col Simmons
Lt-Col Doherty
Lt-Col Parks
Lt-Col Howard
Lt-Col White
Major Talbot
Major Spray
Major Manley
Major Pinkley

MMIA
Regional Commissioner, Sicily
Public Safety Sub-Commission
MMIA Sardinia
Public Safety Sub-Commission
HQ 3 District
MMIA
Civil Affairs Sec
Chief of Staff Sec
HQ 3 District
P.W.B.
MMIA - Secretary

AGREED ACTION

3. It was agreed that:-

- (a) There are now sufficient troops and OC RR in SICILY if they are properly employed and equipped.
- (b) The organisation of the Internal Security Divisions is satisfactory. However, Divs do NOT have full scale of arms.
ACTION: MMIA to have War Ministry equip divs to scale.
- (c) Present distribution of Italian troops is NOT satisfactory. Distribution of troops is an Italian responsibility.
ACTION: MMIA to suggest to Ministry of War that their plan of troop distribution should be studied.

3883

- (d) Not all officers of the Internal Security Divisions are efficient. However, Ministry of War has recently changed the senior officials and it is hoped that, as a result, further inefficient officers will be weeded out.
- (e) It is desirable that the Italian troops should receive more training.
ACTION: MMIA to suggest this to Ministry of War.
- (f) Communications within the Island are NOT satisfactory.
ACTION: Chief of Staff Sec to take up with Communications Sub-Commission who will discuss with the Italian civil communications Ministry.

25-
..... / (E)

785020

(g) Sub-Area commanders are NOT fully aware of their limitations as to the commanding of Italian troops.
ACTION: HQ 3 District to inform 2C4 Sub-Area of the differences in function and responsibility of the Italian Corps Commander and Allied Sub-Area Commander.

(h) Present organization and equipment of the CC RR is NOT entirely satisfactory. Type of tanks furnished the mobile CC RR Bns is NOT satisfactory. Twenty four (24) civilian trucks should be requisitioned locally for the mobile CC RR Bns, for the Italian Army trucks now on loan are due to be returned.
ACTION: Public Safety Sub-Commission to improve the officer standard of the CC RR. Public Safety to submit recommendation to MIA as to which six (6) tanks surplus to the twenty four (24) tanks authorized should be returned to NAPLES and also which type of tank is best suited for mobile CC RR work. Public Safety will have CC RR requisition civilian trucks in SICILY and, if possible, return Italian Army trucks to the Army within a fortnight.

(i) The MONTIGRANERO personnel (now incorporated into CC RR) should retain their identity as a unit.
ACTION: Public Safety Sub-Commission to supervise, through CC RR, their future employment.

(j) The present regulations for the carrying of weapons and ammunition for the control of civil disturbances are not satisfactory. Regulations should make a distinction between a civil disturbance as against armed rioters.
ACTION: MIA to draft proposal for Chief of Staff to submit to ATHQ.

(k) The efficiency of the mobile CC RR Bns is NOT known because they have not yet been used.
ACTION: Public Safety Sub-Commission, through CC RR, to supervise employment.

(l) A large-scale propaganda program should NOT be used for the SICILY Phase III call-up, in case it incited further disturbances. However, a moderate amount of propaganda will be needed.
ACTION: MIA to inform Ministry of War.

3882

Rex C. P. [Signature]
 Lt. Col.
 G. S.

to MIA as to which six (6) tanks surplus to the twenty four (24) tanks authorized should be returned to NAPLES and also which type of tank is best suited for mobile CC RR work. Public Safety will have CC RR requisition civilian trucks in SICILY and, if possible, return Italian Army trucks to the Army within a fortnight.

(i) The MONTICANTERO personnel (now incorporated into CC RR) should retain their identity as a unit.

ACTION: Public Safety Sub-Commission to supervise, through CC RR, their future employment.

(j) The present regulations for the carrying of weapons and ammunition for the control of civil disturbances are not satisfactory. Regulations should make a distinction between a civil disturbance as against armed rioters.

ACTION: MMLA to draft proposal for Chief of Staff to submit to AMQ.

(k) The efficiency of the mobile CC RR bus is NOT known because they have not yet been used.

ACTION: Public Safety Sub-Commission, through CC RR, to supervise employment.

(l) A large-scale propaganda program should NOT be used for the SICILY Phase III call-up, in case it incited further disturbances. However, a moderate amount of propaganda will be needed.

ACTION: MMLA to inform Ministry of War.

3862

fd

Rex E. Pennington
Lt. Col.
G. S.

DISTRIBUTION

HQ 3 District (3)
Regional Commissioner, ~~Sicily~~ Sicily
Chief of Staff Sec, A.C.
Civil Affairs Sec, A.C.
Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.
M.A. to G.O.C.
2 i/c
A/Q
Lt-Col Howard.
File
War Diary (2)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 171/-/COS.

9 February 1945.

Subject: Sicilian Disturbances.To: Land Forces Sub Commission (LMTA)
(Attention: Lt.Col. Ingledew).

1. As agreed at the conference today, will you please prepare a draft letter to AFHQ asking them to consider amending their order No. 370.6/005 GCT-0 of 6 January on the subject of Local Defence Plans, with particular reference to para.9 regarding the handling of arms when quelling civil disturbances.

2. Will you please coordinate with Civil Affairs Section on this matter.

Copy to: Civil Affairs Section.

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

3861

SUBJECT: Carrying of Arms by CC RR

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. S/G/33
9 Feb 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Your ref.: 102430/1 dated 5 Feb 45.

1. Our S/G/33 dated 3 Dec 44 is not intended to prohibit the CC RR from carrying loaded weapons when it is necessary for them to do so.

REP
Major General
M. M. I. A.

3860

3618/223/CAS
Ref: ~~223/251/202~~

8/6/33
9 February 1945.

Subject: Sicily Disturbances.

To: Col. J.L. HENDERSON,
Communications Sub Commission.

At our conference today, convened by Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA) on the subject of the Sicilian disturbances, it was agreed to ask your Sub Commission to approach the Italian Government to see how the communications in the island could be improved, since it was thought that one of the reasons for the bad handling of the disturbances was the inadequacy of the communications.

The writer will come and see you on this matter if you so desire.

[Signature]
Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

Copy to: Land Forces S/C (MIA).

12 FEB 1945

3859

SECRET

LAND FORCES SUB-COM'AC (MFLA)

S/G/33

7 Feb 45

AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE ON
SICILY DISBURSANCES TO BE
HELD AT HQ MFLA ON 9 FEB 45

OBJECT

1. The object of the conference is to discuss, from A.C. point of view, the problems confronting the authorities in the maintenance of law and order in SICILY and to recommend such measures as may be considered necessary. The report made by Lt-Col H.A.C. HOWARD, MFLA, will be studied.

AGENDA

2. Is it considered that there are now sufficient troops and sufficient CC RR in the Island?

ACTION

	Personnel	Vehs	
		MCs	Trucks
WE Strength)	5000	47	88
SABAUDIA Div)	49 CORR att		
WE Strength)	5000	47	88
ACSTA Div)	49 CORR att		
Strength CC RR)	151 offrs	144	108
incl. MONTE-)	8618 ORs		
GRANERO Bn)			

Above includes two Mob CC RR units each of 12 lt tks and 12 vehs. Trucks are up to WE in personnel and tpt.

3858

OBJECT

1. The object of the conference is to discuss, from A.O. point of view, the problems confronting the authorities in the maintenance of law and order in SICILY and to recommend such measures as may be considered necessary. The report made by Lt-Col H.A.C. HOWARD, MIA, will be studied.

AGENDA

2. Is it considered that there are now sufficient tps and sufficient CC RR in the Island?

	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Vehs</u>	<u>MDs</u>	<u>Trucks</u>
WE Strength/ SALATA Div)	5000 49 CORR att		47	88
WE Strength/ ACSTA Div)	5000 49 CORR att		47	88
Strength CC RR/ incl. MONTE- GRANERO Bn)	151 effrs 8618 ORs		144	106

Above includes two mob CC RR units each of 12 lt tks and 12 vehs. Tams are up to WE in personnel and tpt.

3. Is it considered that Org and equipment of an Internal Security Div are adequate?

3858

ACTION

4. Is it considered that present distribution of tps is satisfactory?
5. Is it considered that offr of Internal Security Divs are efficient?
6. Is it considered that tng of tps is desirable and if so is it possible and what form should be recommended?
7. Is it considered that comms within the Island are satisfactory?
Comms are at present:-
 - (a) 30 short range WT sets
 - (b) Civil telephone
 - (c) MC
8. Is it considered that the Italian Corps Comd and Allied Sub Area Comd understand the differences between their respective functions and is there any overlapping?
9. Is it considered that present org of CO RR is satisfactory, bearing in mind:-
 - (a) present standard of offr

3857

6. Is it considered that the of this is desirable and if so is it possible and what form should be recommended?

7. Is it considered that comms within the Island are satisfactory?

Comms are at present:-

(a) 30 short range WT sets

(b) Civil telephone

(c) MC

8. Is it considered that the Italian Corps Comd and Allied Sub Area Comd understand the differences between their respective functions and is there any overlapping?

9. Is it considered that present org of CC RR is satisfactory, bearing in mind:-

(a) present standard of offr

(b) fact that many CC RR have families in SICILY

(c) present system is to have many "stazioni" and "tenenzie". Gen MARCOTI's recommendation is to come into "sezioni" and "tenenzie".

3857

- 3 -

ACTION

10. What is the best method of employment of MONTECRANERO personnel? There is a recommendation that these should be formed into an Alpine Legion CC RR. Extract of MELA LO's report on this subject is att. at appx "A".

11. Are the present regulations for the carrying of weapons and armor into action satisfactory?

12. Is efficient use being made of Mob CC RR units?

13. Is propaganda being spread in an efficient manner for SICILY Call-up phase III (due to start 1 Mar)? In this connection it is interesting to note that 967 personnel have presented themselves at RAGUSA and that 564 have been accepted, which is a very high average in comparison with other towns.

14. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SICILY Call-up phase III and can action be taken now to anticipate same?

15. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SARDINIA Call-ups Feb/Mar and can action be taken now to anticipate

3856

12. Is efficient use being made of Mob CC PR units?

13. Is propaganda being spread in an efficient manner for SICILY Call-up phase III (due to start 1 Mar)? In this connection it is interesting to note that 867 personnel have presented themselves at RAGUSA and that 864 have been accepted, which is a very high average in comparison with other towns.

14. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SICILY Call-up phase III and can action be taken now to anticipate same?

15. Are there likely to be any disturbances during SARDINIA Call-ups Feb/Mar and can action be taken now to anticipate same?

WS

3856

SECRET

Appendix "A" to MIA letter
S/C/33 of 7 February 1945

EXTRACT from
MIA LO'S REPORT ON
EMPLOYMENT OF MONTEGRENERO PERSONNEL

Tuesday 23 January

Lt. Colonel Talmone, Commanding Officer of the Monte Granero "Alpine" Battalion, called at the office and conferred with me in reference to clothing and equipment for his troops. The Alpine troops have not been used so far in conjunction with the Carabinieri, instead they are being used on various guard details. Lt. Col. Talmone informs me that his men are old veterans for the most part and have to be somewhat consoled. He states that they do not like the Carabinieri and do not like to work or associate with them. They do like the guard details and work which they are now doing. He dislikes the idea of joining the Carabinieri for this reason and also he would lose control he now has of the Battalion for it would be broken up into smaller groups and dispersed over the entire island. He stated further that the Battalion at the present has a high esprit de corps and are perfectly satisfied, but that if it is broken up, a lot of the men, due to their age and service, could and would take their discharges and return home.

Translation

From: M of W.

To: M M 112.

Ref: 102630/11.

Date: 5th Feb. 45.Subject: Hahan troops employed to control civilian disturbances.Ref. SC 33 dated 3rd Dec. 44.

While this office has already issued the necessary instruction ~~not~~ meant to modify Chapter XVII of Regulations for Garrison Duties for Hahan Troops employed to control civilian disturbances, we ask if the amendment in question referring to the rules of carrying unloaded fire arms should also be applied to CCKR of the CCKR Territorial Kds inasmuch as for these men, it is advisable that, on leaving the barracks they should always have their arms loaded in order that in case they ~~are~~ should be compelled to use their fire arms against bad ~~elements~~ ^{elements} they can do so.

Lt. Froese

1 Lt. 1 The Chief of Cabinet.

Amended
SF
22R

3855

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26

MMIA

03/445 A

HQ 3 DIST
REGIONAL COMMISSIONER SICILY
CIVIL AFFAIRS SEC. A.O.
PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COM. A.O.
CHIEF OF STAFF SEC. A.O.

C-684

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Secret

MEETING BEING HELD IN C(O) OFFICES HQ LAND FORCES SUB-COM
(M M I A) AT 1500 HRS WED 7 FEB TO DISCUSS RECOMMENDATIONS
TO BE MADE AS RESULT LT COL HOWARD'S REPORT ON SICILY
DISTURBANCES ISSUED UNDER REF G/33 OF 25 JAN (.) REQUEST
YOU BE PRESENT OR REPRESENTED ON FIRST GRADE STAFF OFFICER
LEVEL OR ABOVE

Important all

PROCEEDENCE

M. J. Ingledew

AUTHENTICATED

Lt. Col

Internal: A/Q
S/Sec
File: G/2
S/O/33
Float
B/S (2)

WB

3854

Subject: Use of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power

To: Ministry of War:

Reference Prot. No. 102105/I of 28 January 1945.

It is regretted that your request contained in the ^{reference} ~~request~~ letter cannot be granted.

It is useless to establish a policy, pass laws to comply with that policy and then start making exceptions. The exception requested is particularly ill chosen because it tends to ^{place} ~~define~~ Sicily and its people ⁱⁿ a very definite category with the possible result that the increased ill feeling may develop. Sicily is a part of Italy and the law must be the same ^{throughout} ~~in all~~ of Italy.

It is felt that an organized Italian military unit, using ordinary weapons, will be ^{capable of} ~~in position to~~ quelling riots because, whereas the former are trained, organized and ~~as a unit~~ have considerable fire power because every man is armed, the latter are disorganized, fight in spurts ^{or individually} and are subject to change of heart depending upon the success or otherwise of the moment and the feeling of the people in general. The average person, with the exception of very few radicals, does not resist organized and recognized ^{legal} authority, the reason why a show of strength is almost always sufficient. Once the leaders of a riot are removed, the riot ceases to exist. Handgrenades do not individualize but rather cause damage to those ^{marked} ~~marked~~ 353, although participating in the riot, are harmless.

It is hoped that the above ^{reply} ~~reply~~ satisfactorily answers your letter.

Translation

From Min. of War

R. Of. 102105/105

To MM&A

S.G. 339

129-1-7

Date Jan 25, 1945

Subject Italian troops employed in the service of public order.

With the enclosed circular, this Ministry has modified Chapter 17 of the "Regulations on garrison duty" as suggested by MM&A with letter S/G/33 dated Dec. 3, 1944.

However, the recent disorders in SICILY have shown that the people causing public disturbances make great use of automatic weapons and hand grenades, thus finding themselves in a superior position than the troops entrusted with re-establishing order, who are forbidden to use automatic weapons and hand grenades.

In order to eliminate this serious inconvenience, which among other things makes the people causing public disturbances more audacious, I propose that point No. 2, letter c)

12

12 F
m/w.
REP

3852

of said letter S.G. 33, he modified
for SICILY, thus permitting the
Prefects to request that the 3981
troops be armed with automatic
weapons and hand grenades
when they must intervene
against the people causing public
disturbances *salvo passetti*
and make use of said weapons.

I would like to know
what MR/IA thinks of this.

(Lgd) CASATI

cpl. V.C.
✓

Translation
 From Min. of War
 TO CAMPANIA MIL Hq.
 Subject Troops on Public Order Duty
 Ref. 110960 71
 129.1.7
 Date Dec 20, 1946

In partial ^{amendment} modification of Chapter
 17 of "Regulations on Garrison Duty"
 1942 Edition, we enclose, for compliance,
 a copy of MMDA's letter S. G. 33
 dated Dec. 3, 1944.

Please acknowledge
 receipt

cpl. V.C.
 TD

(Sgd) —

COPY

FROM: MEMO TO SARDINIA SCD SIMMONS
 TO: (ASST) MEMO FOR KERR

241000A

X 52

SECRET

REF YOUR LETTER SD/28 DATED 24 JAN SUBJECT MOBILE CCRR BN CLARIFICATION REQUESTED
 AS FOLLOWS (*) FIRST (*) NO AFVs HERE AND RECOMMEND SUBSTITUTION LIGHT TANKS 3/35
 SIMILAR TO THOSE SHIPPED (TO?) SICILY (*) SECOND (*) MESSAGE FROM ORLANDO TO
 CMS STATES BN TO BE FORMED FROM QUOTE ONE RPT ONE CCRR COY AND TWO RPT TWO
 COYS SERVICE MEN FROM OTHER BRANCHES UNQUOTE (*) WHAT IS TO BE SOURCE OF SERVICE MEN
 FROM OTHER BRANCHES QUERY IF THEY ARE TO BE SUPPLIED (HERE?) RECOMMEND THEY BE DRAWN
 FROM IMPENDING CALL UP (*) THIRD (*) REQUEST REPLY AT EARLIEST

IMMEDIATE

SD Dist: SD/141 - Action copy
 SD/77 - Info
 → G/33 " "
 Fleet "

3850

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

SECRET

SUBJECT: Use of Troop in Aid of the
Civil Power.

LAND FORCES SUB - COM. A.C.
(N.M.I.A.)

File No. 3/3/33

27 Jan 45.

To : G O S, A.C.

Your ref: 2605/85/008 dated 25 Jan 45.

R30

1. Following, at your request, are comments on the Regional Comm -
- issioners letter:-

A. Allied authorities laying down specific rules under which the Italian authorities are to discharge their responsibilities. This is felt to be necessary because of the possibility of Italian troops opening un-controlled fire upon civilians when the crowd should be able to be dispersed by a mere show of strength. Along this line, your attention is called to letter Allied Control Commission, Sicily Region HQ, file 128/014, dated 25 Oct. 44, in which Brig. CARR says "allegedly without orders from the Commander, the troops returned fire". As you know the standing instructions for riot control are laid down in detail for both the British and American Armies. If anything, the Italians should have more rigid regulations than either British or American troops.

B. Moving to scene of disturbances with rifles un-loaded. For an ordinary civil disturbance this policy is alright because it will prevent unnecessary firing and casualties. The officer in charge troops is empowered to order rifles loaded. When moving against armed rioters, the troop commander must use his judgement as to the proper time to order rifles loaded. The commander of the troop moving by truck exercised poor judgement by allowing his command to come close enough to armed rioters to be disarmed without having ordered rifles loaded.

C. Para 3 is agreed, but it is pointed out that the distinction has to be made in the mind of the troop commander. A competent officer should be able to decide what action is necessary.

Continued sheet 2

--- 2 ---

Continued:.....

- D. As for para 2 of your covering letter, the mobile Bns of the CC RR were approved by AFHQ and it is assumed they had this question in mind. The special Bns, by the nature of their equipment, would be used only in serious cases when other ordinary means had failed. The special Bns could hardly come under the same regulations as for other troops because the purpose of their existence is to have the necessary fire power and mobility which the ordinary Italian units lack.

JW

REP

Major General,
H. M. I. A.

for

SD/50

3848

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

W/35.3/CA

S/A/33
26/1/45

26 Jan 45

SUBJECT : Internal Security

TO : Economic Section

Herewith a copy of two letters (H/1021 of 16 and 19 Jan) recently received from RG Sardegna for such action as you may consider desirable. You will no doubt be interested in para 4 of the former and para 6 of the latter.

Handwritten signature
S.H. WHITE Lt Col
for VP CA Section

COPY TO: P. Safety S/C
Land Forces S/C

27 Jan
REP

3847

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

4/35.3/CA

26 Jan 45

SUBJECT : Internal Security

TO : Land Forces S/C.

Herewith a copy of two letters recently received from RC Sardegna, (HQ/1021 of 16 and 19 Jan), for your information and such action as may appear necessary.

As regards para 3 of the former, a signal was despatched on 18 Jan.

As regards para 7 it is considered undesirable that any further troops should be moved from Sardegna until there has been full consideration of the security position and consultation with the RC. The Public Safety Sub-Commission will be consulting you on some of the recommendations contained in this para.

S.H. White
S.H. WHITE Lt Col,
for VF CA Section

Copy to: Public Safety S/C.

3846

SECRET

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED COMMISSION
SARDEGNA REGION

HQ/1021

16 January 1945

SUBJECT : Internal Security

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission

1 With reference to your AC/14056/5/PS of the 6th January 1945, the situation as regards SICILY is noted. Should not Para 6 refer, however, to SARDINIA and not SICILY? The endeavour of this Headquarters has been to keep Sardinia affairs quiet as being the best contribution to the war effort. I do not know what repercussions there may be if disturbances start on this island and if they would have any outside material effect. I feel, however, that I should repeat previous warnings that trouble is not far below the surface and if it once starts it may be difficult to stop without considerable expenditure of force, and therefore the points below are set out for your consideration.

2 There are two immediate causes that are likely to bring unrest:-
(a) A call up of new classes for the Italian Army
(b) Organised upheaval at the mining centres of INGLESIAS and CARBONIA.

As regards 2 (a), I have received no information of the proposed call up as yet except for a reference in AC/14056/5/PS dated 11th January 1945 and received on the 15th January 1945, and so cannot yet comment on the proposals; but the implications might be serious in view of what has happened in SICILY.

4 As regards 2(b), instructions have been received from AFHQ to step up the local production from its present rate of about 40,000 tons a month to 100,000 tons a month. This will mean the importation of a large number of miners from the mainland, and the adoption of firm measures in the mining districts where there has been some unrest. We must, therefore, be able to show force if it becomes necessary.

The Italian Army troops in SARDINIA have, however, been reduced below the minimum considered essential for internal security in the island, and troops have been taken away from the mining centre of INGLESIAS. In this connection your para 5 does not appear to represent the whole position. You refer to two battalions, but I understand that 800 men were taken from the Calabria Division early this month; and I am informed that the organisation required for battalions sent to the mainland does not match that of the battalions now in the Calabria Division. The despatch of 800 men has, therefore, unless I am misinformed, upset to some extent the organisation and effectiveness of four out of the eight battalions in SARDINIA. The choice of the mining centre of INGLESIAS as one of the two places from which the 800 men were withdrawn is unfortunate. I have had to ask the High Commissioner to arrange to send Carabinieri to replace them. INGLESIAS in an endeavour to re-establish strength at this centre.

3855

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- 5 The reduction of troops is partly offset by the creation in the Island of a new Italian Army unit 500 strong to assist the Carabinieri, and some of these men are already being used as train guards, etc. The unit has, however, no transport and I understand it may only be regarded as a temporary re-inforcement to the Carabinieri. We may be able to send part of this unit immediately to INGLESIA.

- 6 The internal security situation has been further complicated by the transfer of Public Safety Officers out of the Region and the departure of Allied Military Police. A great deal of the time of the small Public Safety staff is taken up over constant incidents between Naval personnel and seamen from merchant ships

and civilians. Firearms have been freely drawn and used and the Italian Authorities have expressed concern over relations with the Allies. This affects in particular the Port of CAGLIARI and has been the subject of a separate report.

7

I do not wish to be in any way an alarmist, but I have already reported that crime is increasing. More coal is being demanded from the mining district and firm action may well be required to get it. Although conditions in SARDINIA have been kept quiet we do not, therefore, want to allow disturbances to break out if they can be foreseen and prevented. I suggest, for your consideration, the following urgent requirements:-

- (a) Movement of Italian troops out of SARDINIA to cease, and the return of the 800 men removed to be considered so as to leave the Calabria Division complete.
- (b) The Regional Commissioner to be informed, and consulted before further moves of troops take place now that the minimum recommended for internal security has been reached.
- (c) Transport and equipment to be provided at once to enable one fully mobile Carabinieri Battalion to be formed from the Carabinieri now in this Island, as recommended in your AC 14056/5/PS of 11th January 45 with which I entirely concur.
- (d) Transport (5 trucks) to be provided to enable the five companies of the battalion already formed to help the Carabinieri to be used, if necessary, on detached duties.
- (e) The Regional Public Safety Officers not to be reduced but if possible to be re-inforced by an additional Officer.
- (f) A detachment of Allied Military Police, British and American, to be sent over to CAGLIARI. Details have been communicated separately.

s/ J.A.C. PENNYCUIK
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

Copy to : No 3 District (with copy of AC/14056/5/PS)

O.C. 63 Staging Wing, for information.

File RS/1528.

3844

SECRET

C O P Y

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
SARDEGNA REGION

Hq/1021

19 January 1945

SUBJECT : Internal Security

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission

- 1 In continuation of my Hq/1021 of 16 January 1945, there have been two demonstrations, on the 17th and 18th January, against the call-up for the Italian Army. There were no casualties on the 17th but on the 18th January one police agent was killed and eleven persons, including four Italian soldiers, injured. The casualties were caused by grenades and the police agent died in hospital. The Carabinieri seem to have acted well and they kept cool, no firing was reported.
- 2 The High Commissioner, who has been in to see me, has prohibited further meetings, ordered the arrest of certain agitators and organised a search for arms, particularly in the students' quarters. Carabinieri and Police patrols are in the city, and the P.W.B. are also fixing up a loud speaker in the Piazza Jena. The town is now quiet.
- 3 The demonstration on the 17th seems to have been a more or less spontaneous affair got up by students who wanted the local newspaper, the Unione Sarda, to publish a manifesto they had prepared protesting against the call-up, and publish the Armistice Terms. The newspaper obviously could not comply with these requests.
- 4 On the evening of the 18th an organised demonstration took place, again led by students, in the Piazza Jena. One speaker was allowed and a man by the name of MOCCHI put forward his views. He said he was a Lieutenant in the Army released for study and he protested against the call-up, arguments brought forward being:-
 - (a) Senior Officers in the Italian Army under the Fascists were inefficient and the same Officers are with the Army now.
 - (b) The Army lacks essential equipment, boots, clothes, etc.
 - (c) The Armistice Terms have not been published.
 - (d) Economic arguments.The speaker did not take up an unreasonable attitude and when he finished the Carabinieri stopped further speeches and kept the crowd moving. Just after dark, after 1900 hrs, thunder flashes and then grenades were thrown by people in the crowd and attempts were made to move on the office of the Unione Sarda and the Italian Army Headquarters. It was at this period that the casualties occurred.
- 5 The call-up is, I understand, to affect 10 classes, 1914 to 1924, which means 40,000 to 50,000 men in SARDEGNA. Of these more than half are now on indefinite leave from the Colours. A special point being made is the economic effect of the call-up. Soldiers only get some 5 lire a day and depend on receive an allowance which amounts to 8 lire per day for the wife and 2 lire per day for each child. This is the approximate position and families cannot live on these sums. I am informed, therefore, that there is considerable feeling on the subject.

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- (d) Economic arguments.

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6 I suggest for your consideration that men who are being called up be given the option of working in the coal mines instead of going into the Army. They would then get good pay though conditions would have to be made to ensure the immediate call-up of any man who did not work full time or give satisfactory service. As we want 2,000 to 3,000 more miners immediately this may be a way to get them.

s/ J.A.C. PENNYCICK,
Colonel,
Regional Commissioner.

Copy to: HQ No 3 District.
File HQ/2151 & HQ/2157

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

SECRET

Tel: 735

25 January 1945.

Ref: 2606/83/COS.

SUBJECT: Use of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power.

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission (LMIA).

1. With reference to AFHQ letter AG 370.6/005 GCT-O dated 6 Jan 45, subject: 'Local Defense Plans', attached hereto is copy of letter dated 19 Jan 45 from the Regional Commissioner, SICILIA Region.

2. You will see that he does not agree with the provisions of para 9 of the AFHQ letter and there may be something in his contention. As a matter of fact para 9 o. would invalidate the use of armoured vehicles which have recently been sent to SICILY and which presumably are armed with automatic weapons.

3. Will you kindly forward your comments on the Regional Commissioner's letter.

Incl:
as above

E. H. ...
Chief Staff Officer,
To the Chief of Staff.

3842

0022

SECRET

ALLIED COMMISSION
SICILIA REGION HEADQUARTERS
APO 394

FILE: RC/000.5

19 Jan 1945.

SUBJECT: Use of troops in aid of civil power.

TO : Headquarters Allied Commission,
E O M E

1. With reference to your 2606/79/005 of 15 JAN 45, this Headquarters is already in possession of a copy of AEHQ Administrative Memorandum No. 57 of 11 Dec 44.

2. In regard to your letter under reference and to AEHQ letter AG 370.6/005 CCT-0 of 6 Jan 45, I have the following comments.

If, as stated in para 5 of the AEHQ letter, the maintenance of law and order is the responsibility of the Italian authorities, I am at a loss to understand why the Allied authorities should, under para 9 of the letter, lay down specific rules under which the Italian authorities are to discharge their responsibilities.

During the recent disorders in this Island, when seeking information as to how it can happen that Italian police and troops can be disarmed by the population, I usually find that rifles were unloaded.

During the disturbances this month in RAGUSA Province I had heard that a considerable number of troops had been disarmed. My present information as the result of a personal tour of the area is that this happened when a column of troops in lorries were moving along a road to clear up the situation in a village. The troops, whose rifles were not loaded, were attacked en route and all disarmed.

Now that the disturbances are over the rioters have dispersed not only with the arms they brought into the battle but also with those taken from the Armed Forces.

The movement of troops under such circumstances is governed by para 9 a. of the AEHQ letter which lays down specifically that weapons must be unloaded.

3. It appears to me that in the case of this Island the minds of the local civil and military authorities have become much confused under the instructions which they have received. I think it essential that a distinction should be drawn between the forces of law and order dealing with a presumably unarmed crowd in a city and those dealing with rioters which are known to be armed and which, in the case of this Island, may be as well if not better armed than their opponents.

4. Although your letter under reference is only passed to me for information I respectfully suggest that urgent consideration of the points raised above may be necessary.

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4. Although your letter under reference is only passed to me for information I respectfully suggest that urgent consideration of the points raised above may be necessary.

(Signed) M. GARR,
Brigadier,
Regional Commissioner.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Carrying of Arms by Italian Military

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. S/SD/31

20 Jan 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Your ref.: 506813/2/QA dated 22 Dec 44.
314 - IV - 2

1. Authority is granted for military personnel of SIM or IAI units to be armed at all times because of their special duties. This ruling applies also in rear of Army Boundary.
2. Should this personnel be used as a unit in quelling civil disturbances, the regulations concerning the use of automatic weapons contained in MMIA S/C/33 dated 3 Dec 44 will be complied with.

REP
for Major General
M. M. I. A.

Internal: SD/50
S/G/33

3840

SECRETSUBJECT: Toxic AmmunitionLAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. TS/G/10


14 Jan 45TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. The use of toxic ammunition by all troops in this theatre will be governed by the following regulations:-

(a) TOXIC munitions will not be employed under any circumstances except on the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.

(b) The term "TOXIC Gas" as used in this directive is intended to include grenades or other munitions containing CN, DM, or a combination of these agents, (i.e. Lachrymators or Stimulators), and it is emphasised that under no circumstances will CN, DM or CN - DM munitions be issued for use in emergencies involving civil disturbances.

(c) Suitable security precautions will be maintained at all points where the above mentioned types of munitions are stored to ensure that they do not come into the possession of unauthorised persons.


Major General
M. M. I. A.Internal: 3D/50
S/C/33

3839

17
SECRET

SUBJECT: Italian Troops employed to quell civil disturbances

File
LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. 8/0/38
5 Jan 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR *16* *R%*

Your ref.: 110159/I dated 30 Dec 44.
129-1-7

1. The authorization to order the opening of fire is extended to all officers commanding troops on public order duty. In the event of no officers being present, the senior WCO will accept the responsibility. However, it is pointed out that troops should only in very exceptional instances be despatched to quell a disturbance without an officer in charge.

Copy to: Public Safety Sub Com, AC.

Internal: SD/50

[Signature]
Major General
M. M. I. A.

Translation

R⁴ 8/6/33

16

From: M of W

To: YHIA

Ref. 110159/I
129.1.7

Date: 30 Dec. 1944.

Subject: Italian troops employed to quell
civilian agitations:~~Re:~~ Re: Letter S/G/33 dated 3 Dec. 1944.

I) We have issued the directives as per a/m letter to units under our control with the enclosed circular.

II) We should like to know, urgently please, whether the authorization to order the opening of fire is to be extended to all O/C's of troops on public order duty, or — as prescribed by par. XVII of the "Rules for Garrison Service" — only to officers of P.S. ~~and~~ C.R.R., and whether M.O.'s of P.S. or C.R.R., in the absence of officers, have authority to order the opening of fire.

Translation
at YHIA.

S/ DE MICHELIS

3838

See folio 17

MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
Gabinetto

N° 110950 / I di prot.
129.1.7.

P.M. 3800, 30 dicembre 1944

OGGETTO: Truppe in servizio O.P.

- AL COMANDO MILITARE DE LA CAMPANIA
- AL COMANDO MILITARE DELLA SARDEGNA
- AL COMANDO MILITARE DELLA PUGLIA E LUCANIA
- AL COMANDO MILITARE DELLA SICILIA
- AL COMANDO MILITARE DELLA CALABRIA
- AL COMANDO MILITARE DEL LAZIO, UMBRIA E ABRUZZI
- AL COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CC.RR.
- AL COMANDO ITALIANO 212
- AL COMANDO DELEGAZIONE "T" dello S.M.R.E.

e, per conoscenza:

- ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° AIUTANTE DI CAMPO GENERALE DI S.M. IL RE D'ITALIA
- ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° AIUTANTE DI CAMPO GENERALE DI S.A.R. IL VICECOMANDANTE GENERALE DEL REGNO
- ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° AIUTANTE DI CAMPO DI S.A.R. IL DUCA D'AOSTA
- ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° AIUTANTE DI CAMPO DI S.A.R. IL DUCA DI GENOVA
- ALL'UFFICIO DELL'AIUTANTE DI CAMPO DI S.A.R. IL DUCA DI ANCONA
- ALLA P.A. IDENT. DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI - Gabinetto
- AL MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO - Gabinetto
- AL MINISTERO DELLA MARINA - Gabinetto
- AL MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA - Gabinetto
- ALLO STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE
- ALLO STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
- AL COMANDO GENERALE REGIA GUARDIA DI FINANZA
- AL COMANDO QUARTIER GENERALE MINISTERO GUERRA
- AL COMANDO CC.RR. MINISTERO GUERRA

P.M. 3400
P.M. 75/A
B A R I
P.M. 72
CATANZARO
P.M. 3800
P.M. 3800
P.M. 181
P.M. 179

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SEDE
3837

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

La parziale modifica del Capitolo XVII delle "Norme sul servizio di Presidio" Ed. 1942 si trasmette per l'osservanza copia della lettera S.G. 110950/12.1.1944 della M.V.F.

AL COMANDO MILITARE DELLA SICILIA
AL COMANDO MILITARE DELLA CALABRIA
AL COMANDO MILITARE DEL LAZIO, UMBRIA E ABRUZZI
AL COMANDO GENERALE DELL'ARMA DEI CC.RR.
AL COMANDO ITALIANO 212
AL COMANDO DELEGAZIONE "T" dello S.M.R.E.

e, per conoscenza:

ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° ADIUTANTE DI CAMPO GENERALE DI
S.M. IL RE D'ITALIA
ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° ADIUTANTE DI CAMPO GENERALE DI
S.A.R. IL DUCATO DI CAMPO DEL REGNO
ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° ADIUTANTE DI CAMPO DI S.A.R.
IL DUCATO DI AOSTA
ALL'UFFICIO DEL 1° ADIUTANTE DI CAMPO DI S.A.R.
IL DUCATO DI GENOVA
ALL'UFFICIO DELL'ADIUTANTE DI CAMPO DI S.A.R.
IL DUCATO DI ANCONA

ALLA PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI - Gabinetto
AL MINISTERO DELL'INTERNO - Gabinetto
AL MINISTERO DELLA MARINA - Gabinetto
AL MINISTERO DELL'AERONAUTICA - Gabinetto
ALLO STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE
ALLO STATO MAGGIORE REGIO ESERCITO
AL COMANDO GENERALE REGIA GUARDIA DI FINANZA
AL COMANDO QUARTIER GENERALE MINISTERO GUERRA
AL COMANDO CC.RR. MINISTERO GUERRA

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

4 parziale modifica del Capitolo XVII delle "Norme sul ser-
vizio di Presidio" Ed. 1942 si trasmette per l'osservanza copia del-
la lettera S.G. 33 in data 3.12.1944 della M.M.I.A.
Accusare ricevuta.

P.M. 72
CATANZARO
P.M. 3800
P.M. 3800
P.M. 181
P.M. 179

NAPOLI

ROMA

SUA SEDE

SUA SEDE

SUA SEDE
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ROMA
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P.M. 3800
P.M. 3800
ROMA
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SEDE
3837

IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
d'ordine
[Signature]

COPIASEGRETO

L.F.S.C. A.C. (M.I.I.A.)

S.G.33 3 dicembre 1944

OGGETTO: Truppe italiane impiegate per sedare agitazioni civili.

AL MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA

ROMA

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

1°) L'estratto del Capitolo XVII del "Regolamento dei Servizi di Presidio", rimessoci col vostro foglio 304443/C4 del 14 novembre 1944 è stato letto con interesse e si ritiene che la maggior parte dei punti sono giustamente considerati.

Tuttavia alcuni cambiamenti devono essere fatti.

2°) Sono stato incaricato d'informarvi che, in qualsiasi caso in cui truppe italiane siano impiegate per sedare agitazioni civili, si dovranno tener presenti le seguenti disposizioni:

- a) le truppe dovranno recarsi sul luogo dell'agitazione con armi scariche;
 - b) le armi saranno caricate soltanto dietro ordine di un ufficiale;
 - c) le truppe potranno portare soltanto armi di piccolo calibro. Si rende noto ai Comandanti che è sommamente indesiderabile che le truppe durante le agitazioni civili, portino armi automatiche, e ciò verrà permesso soltanto nella zona delle operazioni dove esse dovranno essere ridotte al minimo ed impiegate soltanto come ultima risorsa. Le bombe a mano sono specificatamente vietate;
 - d) è vietato l'impiego di materie fumogene, gas lacrimogeni o materiali chimici di qualsiasi genere;
 - e) le truppe non potranno aprire il fuoco sui dimostranti altro che in seguito a tassativo ordine di un ufficiale.
- 3°) Si prega pertanto modificare i regolamenti attuali che siano conformi alle istruzioni di cui sopra, e di rimettere a suo tempo a questo Comando la copia dei vostri ordini necessari.

4836

1°) L'estratto del Capitolo XVII del "Regolamento dei Servizi di Presidio", rimessoci col vostro foglio 304443/CA del 14 novembre 1944 è stato letto con interesse e si ritiene che la maggior parte dei punti sono giustamente considerati.

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- 3°) Si prega pertanto modificare i regolamenti attuali che siano conformi alle istruzioni di cui sopra, e di rimettere a suo tempo a questo Comando la copia dei vostri ordini necessari.

P. C. C.
IL CAPO UFFICIO I
(Ten.Col. L. Picozzi)

p. IL MAGGIOR GENERALE, M.M.I.A.
P.to Colonn. P. Kerr

SECRET

14

SUBJECT: Aid to the Civil Power.

Land Forces Sub-Cor., A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)

S/C/33

18 Dec 44

y

TO : Civil Affairs Section., A.C.

1. In reply to your AC/14602/PS of 16 Dec 44, your attention is directed to our letter S/C/33 of 3 Dec 44 to the Ministry of War, copy to you.

12
REP
for Major General
M.M.I.A.

3835

14A
File: S/G/33SECRET
-----SUBJECT:- Italian Troops employed to quell Civil DisturbancesLAND FORCES SUB COM A.C.
(MMIA)
File No: TS/G/10
17 Dec 44
-----TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

- 12
1. Paragraph 2(c) letter S/G/33 this HQ, subject as above, dated 3 Dec 44, is amended to read as follows:-

"C. Only small arms will normally be borne by Troops. Commanders are advised that the carrying of automatic weapons by troops in a civil disturbance is most undesirable and will only be allowed in the operational Zone where they will be kept to a minimum, and used only as a last resort. Grenades are specifically prohibited."

signed REX E. PINKLEY Major

for Major General
M M I A

Copy to:- AFHQ (your AG 370.6/107 GCT-O of 27 Nov 44 refers)
Public Safety Sub Com, A.C.
Civil Affairs A.C.

38343

13

5/6/33

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Civil Affairs Section
APO 394

R/2

AC/14602/PS

5/17/44

16 December 1944

SUBJECT : Aid to the Civil Power.

TO : Land Forces, Sub-Commission ✓

1. Reference is made to 3 District Operation Instruction
No. 18 dated 1 December, subject as above.

2. Will you please inform Civil Affairs Section this
Headquarters what steps have been taken to publish the contents
of para 7 of the above O.I. to the Italian Army?

G.S. Parkinson
G.S. PARKINSON, Brig.
A/VP CA Sec.
A/DCOS, AC

15 Dec
Answered 20 Dec

See folio 14

3833

SUBJECT: Italian Troops employed to
quell civil disturbances.

SECRET

12

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(N.S.I.A.)

8/6/33
Dec 44

TO : Ministry of War.

R⁴/₁₂

1. The extract of chap XVIII of "Regulations for Presidio Services" forwarded under your 304443/CA of 14 Nov 44 has been read with interest and it is thought that most points are well covered. However, there are a few changes which must be made.

2. I am directed to inform you that in any case, where Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, the following instructions will apply:-

- a. Troops will be moved to the scene of the disturbance with weapons unloaded.
- b. Weapons will be loaded only on command of an officer.
- c. Only small arms will be borne by troops. Automatic weapons and grenades are specifically prohibited.
- d. No smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed.
- e. No troops will open fire upon rioters except on the express order of an officer.

3. You will please therefore change your existing regulations where they are at variance with the above instructions and in due course send this HQ a copy of your necessary order.

Copy to:-
AFHQ (your AG 370.6/107
GCT-D of 27 Nov 44 refers)
Public Safety Sub-Com. A.C.
Civil Affairs Sec A.C.

Major General
N.S.I.A.

3832

all info 14
14

SUBJECT: Riot control by the Italian Army

LAND FORCES SUB-COM. A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
File No. S/G/33
16 Nov 44

TO : CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, A.C.

1. In compliance with your 14602/4/PS of 7 Nov, the question of Standing Orders for Italian Military with regard to action taken when called out as an aid to the Civil power has been taken up with the Ministry of War.
2. The employment of troops in maintenance of public order is regulated by "Regulations for Presidic Services" - Chap XVII - an extract of which is attached.
3. It is thought that these regulations, if carried out as laid down, are sufficient in detail and are not in need of further improvement.

[Signature]
Major General
M. M. I. A.

3837

TRANSLATIONChap. XVIIPUBLIC ORDER SERVICE.202 Purpose of service:

- (a) to maintain and reestablish order and aid the public order services on the streets and in the squares.
- (b) to safeguard, in case of disturbance of the public order, premises which require special protection (Royal palaces, legislative assemblies, public offices of special importance, embassies, legations, consulates, such as gas, electricity, water, transport, food stores, etc.);
- (c) to assure, with men and materials, the functioning of public services (214) which cannot be suspended without serious damage to the population and which could not function with other means.

204 The public safety authorities generally inform the "presidio" commander of important events regarding the public order, especially when they may lead to a request for armed emergency squads.

206 The service command, as well as the executive responsibility.

- (a) is normally held by the public safety authority.
- (b) in case of serious disorders can be assumed by the military authority, according to regulations as per public safety laws (Art. 217 and following) in which case also, the police forces command, under military authority.

207 Intervention of the troops will take place:

- (a) for the CC.RR. upon initiative, according to existing special regulations of the Art (200), or upon request by public safety authority.
- (b) for other arms and specialties:
 - normally upon request of public safety authority;
 - eventually upon initiative of the military authority, when the service command is entrusted to it, or in particularly serious or urgent cases.

208 The armed emergency squads are troop units, available for public order and public aid service. They are ordered by the "presidio" commander upon request by the Prefect, and are normally forced by garrison units. They can be ordinary, extraordinary and special.

212 Armament of the troops:

- (a) is, as a rule, limited to individual arms, with the following allotment of cartridges:
 - for each rifle or carbine - 12 buckshot cartridges and 36 ball cartridges.
 - for each pistol - 36 ball cartridges.
- (b) includes, eventually, machine-guns and automatic rifle *ggg* the units, with 10 ball clips for each weapon.
- (c) is carried, for arrival at place of employment:
 - rifle or carbine loaded with buckshot, safety pin and bayonet fixed.

as gas, electricity, with men and material, (c) to assure, with men and material, services (214) which cannot be suspended without serious damage to the nation and which could not function with other means.

204 The public safety authorities generally inform the "presidio" commander of important events regarding the public order, especially when they may lead to a request for armed emergency squads.

206 The service command, as well as its executive responsibility, is normally held by the public safety authority.

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(b) in case of serious disorders can be assumed by the military authority, according to regulations as per public safety laws (Art. 217 and following) in which case also, the police forces command under military authority.

207 Intervention of the troops will take place :

- (a) for the CC.M., upon initiative, according to existing special regulations of the Arm (200), or upon request by public safety authority.
- (b) for other arms and specialties :
 - normally upon request of public safety authority,
 - eventually upon initiative of the military authority, particularly when the service command is entrusted to it, or in particularly serious or urgent cases.

208 The armed emergency squads are troop units, available for public order and public aid services. They are ordered by the "presidio" commander upon request by the Prefect, and are normally formed by garrison units. They can be ordinary, extraordinary and special.

212 Armament of the troops :

(a) is, as a rule, limited to individual arms, with the following allotment of cartridges :

- for each rifle or carbine - 12 buckshot cartridges and 36 ball cartridges.

- for each pistol - 36 ball cartridges.

- for each machine-gun and automatic rifle, the

- includes, eventually, machine-guns and automatic rifle.

(b) units, with 10 ball clips for each weapon.

(c) is carried, for arrival at place of employment :

- by foot troops: pistol loaded, rifle or carbine loaded with

- by foot troops: pistol loaded, rifle or carbine loaded with

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- by foot troops: pistol loaded, rifle or carbine loaded with

- by foot troops: pistol loaded, rifle or carbine loaded with

- 2 -

(b) they must show:

- strength, expressed in appropriate figures, of men, and, eventually, of machine guns and other, special arms and means needed;
- purpose for which required;
- hour and place of intervention;
- rank, and, possibly, name of public safety officer who will be in charge of operations on the place of employment.

216 Urgent requests for support of the public force, by public safety officers or CC.MR. officers (199), may be made in writing or verbally, but must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible:

- (a) to guard posts, as per 279,
- (b) to any barracks or locale where units of the Army are billeted or temporarily stationed; the senior officer present must comply, sending the ordinary or extraordinary emergency squad.

Such requests may only be made by persons already known or furnished with documents of personal identification and showing their authority.

217 Isolated military must comply with requests for support made by public safety officials or agents, who identify themselves as such, in case of disorder, public emergency or common danger on a flagrant crime.

218 Directions for employment of armed emergency squads:

(a) the employment of the armed emergency squad has only one purpose - to reestablish lawful order;

(b) the squad is made for action - the request for intervention and employment must, therefore, be made with great care;

(c) the task is made clear - possibly in writing or in a loud voice - by the public safety officer, or, in his absence, by the CC.MR. officer; the troop commander decides on the way it is to be accomplished;

(d) the squad remains always under its own commanders and acts under their orders and their responsibility;

(e) to be avoided are indecision and weaknesses which have always harmed discipline and prestige of the military forces;

(f) the squad acts with the ready and resolute energy required by the purpose, but with the firm and level-headed calm which springs from the consciousness of the duty to be performed and of one's own strength.

The squad commander must, upon assuming the service, receive from the responsible public safety officer all information and indications necessary for the performance of the service on which might have a bearing on the troops' attitude.

220 Dispersing of meetings or gatherings.

For the dispersal of meetings or gatherings of a threatening character or for clearing places occupied by rebels or rioters:

3829

- (a) the public safety officer, adorned with the tricolor sash (in his stance the officer of H.C. of the CC.MR.) who is directing the service, challenges the crowd to disperse, repeating the challenge three times, each time possibly being preceded by the bugle call "halt."
- (b) if the third challenge has no results, he repeats, with a loud voice, the challenge of armed force.

212 Isolated military unit comply with requests for support made by public safety officials or agents, who identify themselves as such, in case of disorder, public emergency or common danger on a flagrant crime.

219 Directions for employment of armed emergency squads :

- (a) the employment of the armed emergency squad has only one purpose - to reestablish lawful order;
- (b) the squad is made for action - the request for intervention and employment must, therefore, be made with great care;
- (c) the task is made clear - possibly in writing or in a loud voice - by the public safety officer, or, in his absence, by the C.M. officer; the troop commander decides on the way it is to be accomplished;
- (d) the squad remains always under its own commanders and acts under their orders and their responsibility;
- (e) to be avoided are indecision and weaknesses which have always harmed discipline and prestige of the military forces;
- (f) the squad acts with the ready and resolute energy required by the purpose, but with the firm and level-headed calm which springs from the consciousness of the duty to be performed and of one's own strength.

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220 Dispersing of meetings or gatherings.

For the dispersal of meetings or gatherings of a threatening character or for clearing places occupied by rebels or rioters :

- (a) the public safety officer, adorned with the tricolor sash (in his absence the officer of M.C.O. of the C.C.M.R.) who is directing the service, challenges the crowd to disperse, repeating the challenge three times, each time possibly being preceded by the bugle call "halt."
 - (b) if the third challenge has no results, he requests, with a loud voice, the employment of armed force;
 - (c) if, in case of revolt or violence of the gatherings, the prescribed challenges cannot be made, armed force is to be employed at once, always at the request of the above director of the service.
- Armed cars and tanks of various types are particularly suited to such a task.

221 Employment of arms: The arms, extreme means available, are employed only and when absolutely necessary in order to accomplish the task, in the following order :

- (a) side arms (bayonets, sabres; the latter first flat, and then, if necessary, with point or edge);
- (b) fire arms (pistol, rifle, and, exceptionally, machine guns).

- 3 -

222 Employment of fire :

- (a) never to be used solely for intimidation.
- (b) it is the last means of action against rebels who :

themselves make use of firearms or other means of armed aggression, which might endanger the troops; have committed acts of arson or destruction and there is no other way of preventing further disorders.

Several shots fired in the air may only be used for calling emergency reinforcements from nearby forts.

(Sgt) S/MULLEN RUMI

3828

10

Translation.

From: M of W
To: MHA

Ref: 304443/CA
Date: 14 Nov. 1944.

Subject: Public order services.

8 Dec

Referring to letter S/G/33 of the 10 Nov.

1) In the provinces which have been turned back to Italian Government administration the maintenance of public order is entrusted to the Civil Authorities.

The Military Commands follow the directives of the Prefects.

2) The material employment of troops in public order services is regulated by "Regulations for 'presidio' services" - ~~part~~ ^{Chap.} XVII - an extract of which is attached.

S/ Oxilia

EBS.

See folio 12

3827

TranslationChap. XVII

9

5 copies

Public Order Service.202 Purpose of service:

a) ^{to} maintain and reestablish order and aid the public order services on the streets and in the squares.

b) to safeguard, in case of disturbance of the public order, premises which require special protection (Royal palaces, legislative assemblies, public offices of special importance, embassies, legations, consulates, prisons, banks, public services, industrial plants of prime necessity, such as gas, electricity, water, transport, food stores, etc.);

c) to assure, with men and materials, the functioning of public services (214) which can not be suspended without serious damage to the population and which could not function with other means.

204 - The public safety authorities generally inform the "presidio" commander of important events regarding the public order, especially when they may lead to a request for armed ~~guards~~ emergency squads.

206 - The service command, as well as its executive responsibility:

- a) is normally held by the public safety authority.
- b) in case of serious disorders can be assumed by the military authority, according to regulations as per public safety laws (Art. 217 and following) in which case also the police forces come under military authority.

207 - Intervention of the troops will take place:

a) for the C.C.R.R.: upon initiative, according to existing special regulations of the Arm (200), or upon request by public safety authority.

b) for other arms & specialties:

- normally upon request of public safety authority;
- eventually upon initiative of the military authority, when the service command is entrusted to it, or in ~~some~~ particularly serious or urgent cases.

208 - The armed ^{emergency squads} ~~forces~~ are troop units, available for public order and public aid service. They are ordered by the "presidio" commander upon request by the Prefect, and are normally formed by garrison units. They can be ordinary, extraordinary and special.

209 - Armament of the troops:

- a) is, as a rule, limited to individual arms, with the following allotment of cartridges:

Sheet 2

- for each rifle or carbine: 12 buckshot cartridges and 36 ball cartridges.
- for each pistol: 36 ball cartridges.

b) includes, eventually, machine-guns and automatic rifles of the units, with 10 ball clips for each weapon.

c) is carried, for arrival at place of employment.

by foot troops: pistol loaded, rifle or carbine loaded with buckshot, safety on and bayonet fixed.

by mounted troops: saber drawn.

214 - The requests for armed emergency squads:

a) are, normally, made in writing by the public safety authority:

• to the "presidio" commander, if they are to be employed not more than 5 km from the "presidio" limits;

to the division-commander, in the other cases; to the M of W, via the M of I, if the troops are to be employed in public interest services.

(~~para~~ (e) of 202);

b) they must show:

strength, expressed in approximate figures, of men, and, eventually, of machine guns and other,

3825

special arms and means needed;
purpose for which required;
hour and place of intervention;
rank, and, possibly, name of public safety
officer who will be in charge of operations on the
place of employment.

216 - Urgent requests for support of the public force,
by public safety officers or C.R.R. officers (199), ~~may~~
be made in writing or verbally, but must be
confirmed in writing as soon as possible:

a) to guard posts, as per 279.

b) to any barracks or locale where units of
the Army are billeted or temporarily stationed;
the senior officer present must comply, sending
the ordinary or extraordinary emergency squad.

Such requests may only be made by
persons already known or furnished with docu-
ments of personal ~~and~~ identification and of
showing their authority.

217 - Isolated military must comply with requests
for support made by public safety officials or
agents, who identify themselves as such, in case of
disorder, public emergency or common danger or
a flagrant crime.

Sheet 3

219 Directions for employment of armed emergency squads.

- a) the employment of the armed emergency squad has only one purpose: to reestablish lawful order;
- b) the squad is made for action: the request for intervention and employment must therefore be made with great care;
- c) the task is made clear - possibly in writing or in a loud voice - by the public safety officer, or, in his absence, by the C.R.R. officer; the troop commander decides ^{on} the way it is to be accomplished;
- d) the squad remains always under its own commanders and acts under their orders and their responsibility;
- e) to be avoided are indecision and weaknesses which have always harmed discipline and prestige of the military forces;
- f) the squad acts with the ready and resolute energy required by the purpose, but with the firm and level-minded calm which springs from the consciousness of the duty to be performed and of ~~the~~ ^{one's} own strength.

The squad commander must, upon assuming the service, receive from the responsible public safety officer all information and indications necessary for the performance of the service or ³⁸²⁴ which might have a bearing on the troops' attitude.

220 - Dispersing of meetings or gatherings.

For the dispersal of meetings or gatherings of a threatening character or for clearing places occupied by rebels or rioters:

a) the public safety officer, adorned with the tricolor sash (in his absence the officer or NCO of the (C.R.R.) who is directing the service, ^{challenges} ~~initiates~~ the crowd to disperse, repeating the ^{challenge} ~~invitation~~ three times, each time possibly being preceded by the bugle call "halt!";

b) if the third ^{challenge} ~~invitation~~ has no results, he requests, with a loud voice, the employment of armed force;

c) if, in case of revolt or violence of the gatherings, the prescribed challenges cannot be made, armed force is to be employed at once, always at the request of the above director of the service.

Armored cars and tanks of various types are particularly suited to such a task.

221 - Employment of arms. - The arms, extreme means available, are employed only and when absolutely necessary in order to accomplish the task, in the following order:

Sheet 4

- a) side arms (bayonets, sabres; the latter first flat, and then, if necessary, with point or edge);
- b) fire arms (pistol, rifles, and, exceptionally, machine guns).

222 - Employment of fire:

- a) never to be used solely for intimidation.
- b) it is the last means of action against rebels who:

themselves make use of firearms or other means of armed aggression, which might endanger the troops;

have committed ~~in~~ acts of arson or destruction and there is no other way of preventing further disorders.

Several shots fired in the air may only be used for calling emergency reinforcements from nearby forces.

S/Millofiorini.

EBB.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Civil Disturbances.

Land Forces Sub-Com. A.C.
(E.M.I.A.)

5/6/33

10 Nov 44

Ministry of War.

Will you please inform this H.Q. what "Standing Orders," if any, govern the action of Italian troops in quelling civil disturbances. In particular will you please say upon whose authority military troops may be called upon.

L.M.G.
Major General
E.M.I.A.

3822

SECRET

EWS/ajp

Ref 2506/39/003

1 November 1944

SUBJECT: Powers and Rights in Italian Government Territory

TO : C-5 Section, Allied Force Headquarters

1. From the Regional Commissioner, Sicily Region, I have received the attached copy of letter dated 17 October 44, sent to him by 3 District Commander. I would draw your attention to Paras 2 and 3 of this letter, in which it is laid down that in quelling civil disturbances not directly affecting Allied interests Italian troops will not, except in grave emergency, be employed without prior reference through the Allied Commission to the Allied Area Commander.
2. In AAI Administrative Instructions No. 48, para 7, it is stated that "the quelling of civilian riots or disturbances is a matter for the Italian Administration and he (the local Allied Commander) will refuse such assistance, unless he is of the opinion that it is necessary for the protection of Allied military interests".
3. The possibility of the employment of Italian troops is not specifically mentioned in Administrative Instructions No. 48, and it would appear that a procedure for this contingency should be established.
4. However, the channel for permission to use them, as laid down by 3 District, would, I suggest, in some instances delay their employment to a considerable extent. For example, a demand for Italian troops from a Province in the interior of Sicily administered from Palermo would have to pass to the latter and from there to Catania, HQ of the Sub Area Commander, and of course, follow the same route back. Having regard to the length and slowness of communications, a considerable period would elapse before consent could be obtained, by which time damage and casualties might have occurred.
5. It is suggested that where Italian troops are disposed in Italian Government Territory, the Italian authorities should have liberty of action in the event of a civil disturbance, provided that Allied interests are not directly involved.
6. It is for consideration however if it would not be advisable to prescribe rules and limit the armament of troops so employed.
7. The foregoing does not arise out of the recent incident in Sicily, as you will see by the date of the letter from 3 District, but that occasion does give point to the foregoing proposal. Will you kindly raise the matter and let me know your conclusions.

1 Incl:
As in para 1 above.

ELDERY W. STONE
Commodore, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

COPY

SUBJECT : Aid to the Civil Power.

SECRET

3 District
Ext 9
69/G

17 Oct 44.

Under authority of AAI Adm Instr No. 48 dated 8 August 44, (which has been subsequently endorsed by AFHQ letter AG 370.6/107 GCT-O dated 24 Sep 44) this HQ issued Operation Instruction No. 10, "Aid to the Civil Power" (Copies attached for LAZIO and ABRUZZI/MARCHE Regions ACC)

1. Area/Sub Area Grn commanders will ensure that their liaison with ACC Zone Commissioners (Regional HQ in Sicily) is such that they receive early information of any civil disturbances, should they arise.
2. While the quelling of civil disturbances, which do NOT directly affect Allied interests, is a matter for Italian administrative authorities, it will be borne in mind that the latter will normally only dispose of police and CC.RR. for the purpose. Area defence schemes will be drawn up in the light of this.
3. Where as in SICILY and CALABRIA the Italian authorities do dispose of troops, such will NOT, except in grave emergency, be employed without prior reference through ACC to the Area Commander, who will be kept fully informed of all incidents and actions taken.
4. Areas will forward full reports of all civil disturbances to this HQ, although Allied action may NOT have been called for,

/s/ E.P. Warner

/t/ Lt. Col.
G S
(EP WARNER)

3820

10 1 8 2