

ACC

1000012015369

G/92

AID TO T

NOV. 1945

10000/120/5369

G/92

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER POLICY

NOV. 1945 - JAN. 1947

3930
4060

CONFIDENTIAL

Dep. Cmdr (S)
Col A/Q < SP

BSS

uncl

09/92

150

SECRET

April

Ref. : 3636/231/50

23 December 1946

SUBJECT: Public Order.

TO : AFHQ,
G-5 Section.

Referring to this HQ signal 5839 dated 18 Dec 46, I forward herewith copy of a letter from the Prime Minister enclosing instructions given by the Ministry of the Interior for the maintenance of public order.

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

R. W. SMITH

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

Copies to: AFHQ G-5 Section
Public Safety Div
Land Forces S/O
Air Forces S/O
Navy S/O

4060

T. L. Smith

NA

B.F. to GSOI

uncl

Translation

THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome, 12 Dec 46.

Dear Admiral,

file 4/63
file 53 Cover III

Referring to your letter No. 3636/243/EC dated 21 Nov.

1946, I enclose copy of the instructions given for the implementation of the Order issued by Allied Force Hq.

/s/ De Gasperi

Rear Admiral Hilary W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner,
Allied Commission,
Rome.

4059

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
No. 442/24267

Rome, 12 December 1946.

SUBJECT:- Public Order.

The Allied Commission, in order to determine the competence and tasks of the Allied and Italian Authorities, respectively, for the maintenance of public order in the national territory, has sent a communication, the fundamental points of which are summed up in the two enclosures.

The regulation regarding the use of tear-gas bombs and smoke-bombs, (an allotment of which will be made soon), does not exclude that they may be used by the police and Italian troops even when the latter are not operating under the control of the Allied Authorities.

The present provisions repeal those contained in the circular no. 442/5734 of 4 July 1945 sent to the Prefettura, then administrated by the Italian Government.

FOR THE MINISTER,

4058

TRANSLATIONGENERAL ORDER

1. This Operative Memorandum substitutes the Operative Memorandum N. 78 (Territorial Defence) dated 22 July 1945 that is therefore cancelled.
2. For the maintenance of the internal security (that is the maintenance of law and order and the defence against sabotage) within the zone of competence of SACMED.
 - a) The Commander in Chief C.M.C. Allied Forces of the Allied Forces Mediterranean Theater, will be responsible for the provinces of Udine and Venezia Giulia.
 - b) The Italian Government will be responsible for all the remainder of the Italian territory.
3. The material security of installations and locations of Allied Forces in Italy, wherever located, is due to the Allied Troops that occupy these installations and locations. The respective concerned commanders will ascertain that plans for protection of their own installations will be prepared.

MILITARY ZONES

4. The Supreme Command Allied Forces Mediterranean Theater is reserving the right of declaring Military Zone particular zones subjected to the Italian jurisdiction. After promulgation of such a declaration the exercising of the powers of a Military Government in the zone in question will be assumed by the Supreme Command Allied Forces Mediterranean Theater. It is however intended that this right will only be used in case of gravest threat to Allied interests.

USE OF TROOPS IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

5. For special orders, integral for the maintenance of law and order and for the prevention of sabotage in Italy see supplement "A".

4057

TRANSLATIONAPPENDIX "A"A. ITALIAN TERRITORY EXCEPT PROVINCES OF UDINE AND VENEZIA GIULIA

1. Within the Italian Territory, excepted the provinces of Udine and Venezia Giulia, the Italian Government is competent for the maintenance of law and order, and has therefore at his disposal the forces of the Police, the Carabinieri, and the Army.

2. Should the situation become worse, so that the Italian Authorities could not maintain law and order with their own resources, they can apply to Allied Troops for help. Such a demand will not be accepted at once, but will be submitted immediately to G.H.Q. Allied Forces. Should the disorder however menace directly Allied military property and installations and impend to interfere with operations of Allied Forces, the local commandant will take all measures that seem to him opportune for protecting Allied interests. With approval of G.H.Q. Allied Forces and on behalf of SACRED, he can as a last resource declare the threatened zone as Military Zone. In this case he will assume the command of all troops and of the whole Italian Police in this zone.

3. In case the local commandant should consider the state of emergency so serious and immediate that he has not sufficient time for asking the permission of G.H.Q. Allied Forces, he can act on his initiative. He has to refer all facts successively to G.H.Q. Allied Forces in the shortest possible time.

B. PROVINCES OF UDINE AND VENEZIA GIULIACRISISC. LACRIMATORS AND SMOKE GROWING BOMBS

7. In any case Italian and Allied troops, Police or Carabinieri should be used under Allied command for soothing civil disorder, they can make use of lacrimator or smoke growing bombs, but not of white phosphoric bombs, with the following limits:

- a) All precautions have to be taken that the depots of these bombs are not available for unauthorized persons.
- b) All superior commands will issue orders to their dependent parties about the use of these bombs, setting up the limitation that no bomb will be issued to the troops nor be used by them unless by order of an officer. In exceptional cases the responsibility for issuing such orders can be delegated to a non-commissioned officer. The use of these bombs will be permitted only if the use of force is necessary and the purpose can be reached with less damage for the persons by using lacrimators or smoke-growing bombs than by opening fire.

BGS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G III	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (C)	
GSO III (SD)	
GSO I (THO)	
G II (L)	

Ref: AG/14502/3/EB

11 October 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister,

It appears from published reports in the press that a statement has been made that an Allied order prevented the Italian police from using tear gas.

I must refer to my letter 6/92 of 30 September 1945 to Professor Parri of which I enclose a copy. In that letter the Prime Minister was notified that tear gas or smoke bombs could be used by Italian troops - which includes the CCN - to quell civil disturbances. I understand that the CCN had received an issue of tear gas bombs some time previous to the most regrettable incidents on October 9th, 1945.

As regards other police agencies, I cannot trace that any ban has been placed by the Allies on the use of tear gas. In fact the records of this Commission show that the Public Safety sub Commission has been strongly in favour of tear gas or smoke bombs being made available to the agents of public security. The grounds for such an opinion are that a non-lethal weapon of this type should be in the hands of unarmed or lightly armed police who normally deal with the early stages of public disorder rather than in the hands of more heavily armed police or of troops who may be called in as a last resort.

It appears to me, my dear Mr. Prime Minister, that the question of the issue of non-lethal equipment to police agencies has been a matter for decision by your Government especially since the beginning of the year when the handover of territory (except for UNTER and VALLE D'AOSTA) to the Italian Government was completed.

Very truly yours,

MEMO
FILE 6/92
DATE Reg/12/10

ELDER T. STONE
Deputy Chief, UNRRA
Chief Commissioner

4055

Dr. Alcide De Gasperi,
President of the Council of Ministers,
Italian Government,
ROME.

Copy to: CC.
EC.
Land Forces S/C.

GOC X
Dep Comd X
BGS X
Col P/R X
MP X

COPY

154B

G/92

30 September 1945

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On 13 May, I wrote your predecessor to clarify the position and responsibilities of the Italian Government in regard to local defense plans.


It is now agreed that the paragraph of my letter which reads as follows:-

"In any case where Allied or Italian troops are employed to quell civil disturbances, no smoke, tear gas, or chemicals of any kind will be employed. It will be noted from the foregoing that this is the only restriction as to arms and armament of Italian troops employed to quell civil disturbances."

is cancelled and the following is substituted therefor:-

"Where Italian Troops are used to quell civil disturbances, tear gas and/or smoke grenades may be employed. However, every security precaution must be taken to ensure that stocks of these grenades do not fall into unauthorized hands. All echelons must be instructed that these grenades will not be issued to troops or used by troops except on the command of an officer, that they will be employed only when the use of force is considered necessary and that the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire."

Yours very truly,



ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Professor Ferruccio Parri
The President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
ROME

4054

WP

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

-5: 940.21

2 June 1946.

SUBJECT: Security - Venice Area.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission
(Att: Chief Commissioner)
APO 794.

1. The Commander XIII Corps has expressed doubts as to the ability of the Italian civil authorities in Venice to maintain law and order in the city, particularly in connection with the protection of Allied personnel and installations. He reports that, from his observation, the training, administration and equipment of the police leave much to be desired.

2. While fully mindful of the many difficulties which beset the Italian Government in its efforts to build up a sufficient and efficient police body, the Supreme Allied Commander, because of the particular interest which the Allies have in Venice, is desirous that special attention be given to that city in the matter of security. He desires therefore that the Italian Prime Minister be informed by you of his concern, that he urges the Italian government to investigate the situation, and that he relies upon it to take early action to remedy any defects brought to light in the Venice police agencies, to the end that security of Allied personnel and installations may be ensured.

3. Please report the outcome of your discussion with the Prime Minister.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

EGS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G II	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II ()	
GSO III (SD)	
GSO III ()	
G II (G)	

Copy to:

Comd XIII Corps

(s) A.L. Hamblen

A. L. HAMBLEN

Brigadier General, G-5

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

M M I A - 'G'

FILE 4/5/92

DATE 8/5/6

EC DISTRIBUTION: 5 June

Action: ~~See G-5~~

Civ. Affairs sect.

Info: G-5

" Navy S/C

" Air S/C

" L.F. S/C

POLAD A

POLAD B

RECEIVED 5 JUN 1946
7787

SECRET

7 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT
FLORENCE

7588

REF: BM/27

Florence, 27 May 1946

Subject: Civil Disturbances - Maintenance of R.D.S.

To: Town Major - Florence
2 Coy 16 L of C. Signals

Copy: M.M.Y.A.

1. Ref. our BM/27 dated 11 May 1946 (copy attached) addressed to 7 Territorial Command, copy to you.
2. The attached reply has now been received from 7 Territorial Command and is passed to you for information.

E.W. HAMILTON
Major
GSO XI

BGS	W.M.
GSO I (SD)	W.M.
Dep G II	W.M.
GSO II (SD)	W.M.
GSO II (C)	W.M.
GSO III (SD)	W.M.
GSO I (GRC)	W.M.
G II (B)	W.M.

Encl: BM/27 dated 11 May 1946
7 Terr. Comd. 1887/Op dated 22 May 1946.

M.M.I.A. - 'G'

FILE

E/92

DATE

R/31/5

311200

See attached to Ho's 152B+C

152B

Translation

(Copy)

7 Territorial Command FLORENCERef: 1887/Op Prot.
Florence, 22 May 1946Subject : Civil Disturbances - Maintenance of S.D.S.To : 7 B.L.U.

Ref. letter BLU/27 dated 11 May 1946.

Higher Authority has given definite instructions that the "FOLGORE" Div. is not to be drawn on for either personnel or equipment. This Div. is under the direct Command of the a.m. higher Authority.

Even if the Div. could be used by this HQ. it would still not be possible to provide as many as the six armoured cars asked for.

The Chief of Staff
Col, FICCHINI

See Folio 152A

4051

1920
7 British Liaison UnitCOPY

Ref: BLU/27

Florence, 11 May 1946Subject : Civil Disturbances : Maintenance of S.D.S.To : 7 Territorial CommandCopies : Town Major - Florence
2 Coy 16 O/C Signals

1. In the early part of March a request was received from 211 Sub Area for six light armoured vehicles from 7 T.C. to be earmarked as Signal despatch vehicles in the event of civil disturbances.
2. This question was discussed between Major DOWNING of this HQ., and Col. FIGGIONI of 7 TC: the latter stated that it would not be possible to supply these vehicles at that time as only one armoured car was in serviceable condition, the remainder being off the road due to lack of spare parts. It was further stated that when these vehicles were repaired this HQ. would be notified.
3. Will you please now state whether, in the event of a civil disturbance six light armoured cars could be supplied for the maintenance of ~~signal~~ despatch services from FLORENCE TO BOLOGNA, LEGHORN and FOLIGNO

H.W. HAMILTON
Major
GSO II

See Folio 152 A+B

4050

RAAC MESSAGE FORM

15112

CALL	CIRCUIT No. NR 7097	PRIORITY OP	TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS
SPACES WITHIN RED LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY			
FROM (A) 10 100? BRITISH LIAISON UNIT	DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN 301500 B		
TO (FOR ACTION) LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION, AC (MMIA) ROME.			
TO (FOR INFORMATION) G1			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR
(REF. No.)	(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION) SECRET		

10 CAR

SECRET

FOR BGS. RECRUITS 10 CAR ON SECURITY DUTY.
MINIMUM 28 MAY TO 6 JUNE. GENERAL ROMANO INTENDS TO DECIDE
REGARDING SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT OF RECRUITS ON OR ABOUT
5 JUNE.

10 CAR AVELINO

BGS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G III	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO III (SD)	
GSO I (TRG)	
G II (D)	

BGS goes tomorrow 1 June.

CIPHER TELEGRAM

This message will not be distributed outside British or U.S. Government Department Headquarters or retransmitted even in cipher being paraphrased. (Messages marked O.C.R. need not be paraphrased.)

No Circulation

IMMEDIATE

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE.

ORIGINATING SECTION:

A. G. AUTHENTICATION:

ORIGINATOR'S AUTHENTICATION:

THI OR TOR

Opr.

TIME CLEARED

311400

TRANSLATION

VERY URGENT

DATE : 28 May 1946

FROM : HEAD OF STAFF TRANSPORT

TO : C.A.R. AVELLINO

INFO : MIA ROME
 HEAD OF STAFF ORD. ROME
 PRESIDIMILES R. CALABRIA
 PRESIDIMILES CATANZARO
 PRESIDIMILES COSENZA
 DETRAMILES NAPLES

REF, No.4025/F/53/P STOP TRANSPORT OF 1000 MEN FROM C.A.R.
 AVELINO DIRECTED 320 MEN TO REGGIO CALABRIA. STOP 570 MEN
 TO CATANZARO STOP 110 MEN TO COSENZA WILL TAKE PLACE 29 MAY
 IN CLOSED VANS FROM AVELINO TRAIN 7713 STOP FROM S. SEVERINO
 ROTA TRAIN 7835 DELAYED STOP FROM SALERNO TRAIN 8017 STOP
 FROM BATTIPAGLIA TRAIN 8815 STOP FROM SANTA EUFEMIA TRAIN
 8501 STOP MEN DIRECTED TO COSENZA WILL CONTINUE FROM

PAOLA WITH SPECIAL TRAIN 8615 STOP HEAD OF STAFF 120028

BGS	X
GSO 1 (SD)	X
Dep G. II	X
GSO 1 (SD)	X
GSO 1 ()	X
GSO 1 (SD)	X
GSO 1 (SD)	X
GSO 1 (SD)	X

TO SEE	
A/Q	/
Q	
Q. 1	
Q. 2	
ORD	/
REMARK	

sgd. Col. O. Bogliaccino

301500

G/92

149

TRANSLATION

DATE 28 MAY 1945

VERY URGENT

FROM : HEAD OF STAFF TRANSPORT
 TO : PRESIDEMILES CIVITAVECCHIA
 INFO : MMIA ROME
 COMILITER ROME
 S.I.DIV "CAGLIARI" TERR.OFFICE CAGLIARI
 HEAD OF STAFF ROME
 DETRAMILES ROME

REF. No. 4024/F/55/P STOP TRANSPORT FROM CIVITAVECCHIA TO ROME
 TERMINI OF 650 MEN COMING FROM SARDENIA FOR PUBLIC SECURITY
 DUTIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN 20 CLOSED VANS WITH SPECIAL TRAIN
 No. 7 LEAVING CIVITAVECCHIA 29 MAY AT 1348 HOURS AND ARRIVING
 AT ROME TERMINI AT 1555 HOURS STOP HEAD OF STAFF TRANSPORT

11302805

Col. O. Bogliaccino

Amil
30.5.45

TO SEE	
A/Q	
Q	
Q. 1	
Q. 2	
ORD	
REME	

See folder 150
19142 *4047*

BGS	<i>Wmm</i>
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G II	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II ()	
GSO II (-1)	
GSO III (REG)	
G II ()	

148

TRANSLATION

VERY URGENT

DATE : 28 May 1946

FROM : HEAD OF STAFF TRANSPORT
 TO : C.A.R. AVELINO
 INFO : MMIA ROME
 COMILITER NAPLES
 HEAD OF STAFF ORD ROME
 DETRAMILES NAPLES

REF. No. 4026/F/54/P STOP TRANSPORT OF 830 MEN FROM C.A.R.
 AVELINO TO NAPLES FOR PUBLIC SECURITY DUTIES WILL TAKE
 PLACE 30 MAY WITH THE FOLLOWING SPECIAL TRAINS STOP
 FROM AVELINO WITH TRAIN 7713 STOP FROM CODOLA WITH TRAIN
 8516 STOP FROM CANCELLO WITH TRAIN 8719 STOP HEAD OF STAFF
 TRANSPORT 120028

sgd. col. O. Bogliaccino

Handwritten: 301515

TO SEE	
A/Q	
Q	
Q. 1	
Q. 2	
ORD	
CEME	

Handwritten: 4046, 30140

BGS	
GSO I (SD)	
Dep G III	
GSO II (SD)	
GSO II (I)	
GSO III (-D)	
GSO I (TIG)	
G II (L)	

147

H K I A

07 3

9 H H

0.216

H H H H

REF TOUR 14/17 DATED 30 (.) GOO HOOK WAR HINDSTER AND HINDSTER
 DANGER OF OVERLAPPING (.) HINDSTER SEATED HINDSTER HINDSTER
 FOR HINDSTER AND HINDSTER OF HINDSTER (.) WAR HINDSTER WILL
 GIVE APPROPRIATE TO BE PREPARED BY TERRITORIAL CODES IN
 CONJUNCTION WITH HINDSTER AND WILL PERSONALLY ADDRESS TERRITORIAL
 CODES AT A FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE IN R O H H

4045

H H H H

C(00)

→ 2/72 ←

17/7/5

A.R.C. BOWEN, Lt Col

Subject : Maintenance of Public Order.

RECEIVED 2 MAY 1946

9 British Liaison Unit,
DARI.

146

14/17. *See Para 147*

30 April 46.

To : H.Q.
R.M.I.A.

*Relevant people subject
to this order are
2/5.*

1. With regard to the Referendum on 2 June, plans for ensuring Public Order cannot be completed until the Directive for the employment of troops is received from the Min. of War.
2. I am informed by the C of S, 9 Terr HQ, that the Ministry is in favour of employing troops at a strength not below that of one bn.
3. The local tentative plan, based on the small proportion of transport that can be placed on the road, is to station an inf. coy. in each of the eight provinces, leaving one bn. in reserve at Bari.
4. It is requested that :-
 - (a) Pressure be placed on the Min. of War to issue its directive with the least possible delay.
 - (b) It be made clear to the Min. of War that the employment of whole bns., is practicable only if they can provide the means for making the bns. mobile.

4044

*C.S.D. II (1) will speak to C.O.C. with a view to
raising other C.O.C. units Minister on 3 May 1946*

BGS

X Min.

(H. Ferro) Major GS.

Cond. O.P.T. II

1. With regard to the Referendum on 2 June, plans for ensuring Public Order cannot be completed until the Directive for the employment of troops is received from the Min. of War.

2. I am informed by the C of S, 9 Terr HQ, that the Ministry is in favour of employing troops at a strength not below that of one bn.

3. The local tentative plan, based on the small proportion of transport that can be placed on the road, is to station an inf. coy. in each of the eight provinces, leaving one bn. in reserve at Bari.

4. It is requested that :-

(a) Pressure be placed on the Min. of War to issue its directive with the least possible delay.

(b) It be made clear to the Min. of War that the employment of whole bns., is practicable only if they can provide the means for making the bns. mobile.

4044

GSO II (L) will speak to GOC with a view to raising when GOC meets Minister on 8 June 1942

BGS	✓	Wm
GSO I (SD)	✓	Wm
Dep GSO I	✓	Wm
GSO I (S)	✓	Wm
GSO I (S)	✓	Wm
GSO I (S)	✓	Wm
GSO I (S)	✓	Wm
GSO I (S)	✓	Wm

(H. Ferro) Major CS.
Comd. 9 B.I.U.

MMTA - 'G'
FILE G/92
DATE R/2/5

HR/OIT

02/13 4/42

MAJESTY'S SERV

by gumming this Label across
Label instead of tearing EnvelopeMaintenance of Public Order.

LAWD FORCES, SIB COM, AD, (MIA)

4/45 (Lablest)

4/92

12 Mar 46

To Ministry of War

Ref your 205601/11 dated 6 March 46.

1. My letter dated 26 Feb was written as a result of receiving reports that the situation described in my letter dated 28 Jan remained unchanged although a while month had elapsed.

2. The contents of your letter 205315/11 dated 26 Feb in reply to this HQ letter 6/92 dated 28 Jan are noted.

for
Major General.
M.I.L.A.

ARCH/LJB

4043

From M. of W.
To N.M.I.A.

Translation

Col. G3
GSO I (SD)
Dep. G3
GSO II (SD)
GSO II ()
GSO II (VZ)
GSO III (SE)
GSO III (OR34)
G (Trg)

Ref. 20560I/II

Date 6/3/46.

Subject Employment of C.R. Mobile Batts.

Ref G/92 of 26 Feb

142.

I - Further to what was pointed out in the a/m letter, we inform you that letter G/92 dated 28/I/46 has already been acknowledged in letter 2053I5/II dated 26/2/46.

4042

2 - We forward a copy of letter 2053I5/II in case you have not received it.

MMIA - 'G'

FILE: G/92

DATE: R/9/3

DAK

(XXXXXXXXXX)

illegible.

Translation.

1438

B/9-

From:- M. of W.

Ref:- 205315/11

To:- MMIA.

Date:- 26th. Feb. 46

Subject:- Employment of CCRR Mobile Bns.

131

Reply to your letter No.G/92 dated 28th.Jan.46

I) I acknowledge the contents of your letter to which I reply.

II) As known, the employment of CCRR (both Territorial Units and Mobile Bns) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior which rules same according to requirements of public order.

Since, in any case, I agree with you that, in following policies other than those suggested by you in letter G/92 dated 12/2/46, we would risk to employ very often units of the army, I thought advisable to call the attention of the M. of I. with letter of which copy is enclosed.

III) As regard to the special employment of the CCRR Mobile Bn of Bologna Area, I asked, for the reasons stated above, the M. of I. to define the question.

B9

Sgt. Fabre.

Sgd. BROSTO.

2B/4041 ✓

seen cclh

- Col. GS
- GSO I (ED)
- Dep. G3
- GSO II (SO)
- GSO II (I)
- GSO II (W)
- GSO III (ED)
- GSO III (ORB-1)
- G (Irg)

MMIA. 'G'
FILE: G/92
DATE: 2/25/46

29104

Translation.

From:- M. of W.

To:- M. of I.

Ref:-202870/11

Date:- 11th. Feb. 46

Subject:- Employment of CCHR Mobile Bns.

131

I) Herewith, for information, copy of letter No.G/92 dated 28/1/46 forwarded by MMIA and dealing with the employment of CCHR Mobile Bns.

II) With previous letter, dated 21st. Dec.45 and of which copy is enclosed, MMIA specified directives regarding the priority to be given in respect of the employment of troops for Public Order. In said priority, the employment of CCHR Mobile Bns comes before that of the units of the army.

Employing partly said bns, as stated in letter dated 21/12/45 referred to above, does not allow to have a strength with which to face special requirements of the P.O. service.

Such unavailability entails the more frequent use units of the army which, instead, should be employed only in special cases.

III) The above is forwarded for whatever action you ^{may} deem advisable to take on the matter with your dependant authorities.

4040

CF.

Sgd. BROSDIO.

172

SUBJECT : Maintenance of Public Order

LAIET POUHON 8TH COY, A.C. (SMIA)

— 9/92 —

26 Feb 46

TO : Ministry of War

131

Ref this M letter 6/92 of 28 Jan 46.

Reports continue that half the POLARIS COY Mobile Bn is still dispersed to various parts of SMIA and is still used, e.g. to reinforce guards on prisons, to the prevention of all training.

It is submitted that this is contrary to the principles agreed by you for employment of Mobile Bns, and that you may wish to take some action on this information.

APC [Signature]
for Major General *abc*
M M I A *cx*

Copy to : 6 BCU (Program Report No 4 dated 19 Feb 1946 2 refer)

A/30/2

MMIA/abc

4039

171

SUBJECT : Employment of Troops in aid of Civil Power.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AG (M.M.I.A.)

G/92

21 Feb 46

To : Ministry of War

Your revised draft circular on the subject of "Use of Troops in aid of the Civil Power" has been received and is agreed to by this Headquarters.

Attest
for Major General.
M.M.I.A. *CS*

AAS/151

4038

140A
RECEIVED 19 FEB 1946
1857

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-3 SECTION

File: G-3 AFHQ/135

18 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Use of Arm'd Cars by Carabinieri

TO : M.M.I.A. (for B.G.S.)

1. Ref query by Brigadier Hope when he visited this HQ last week. Herewith extract from a letter just received from 2 District:

"1. There is no record in this HQ of any order forbidding the Italian Army to use the 37 mm Armament of Arm'd Cars.

2. The only decision taken at this HQ on those lines was on the question of amm for the CCRR Arm'd Cars of British make. The relevant paras of this HQ letter 2351 G(SD2) of 20 Sep 45 were as follows:-

"1. The only issues of British amm for use by the CCRR and similar bodies under the control of AMG which can be authorised by this HQ are those for the British Arm'd Cars issued to the CCRR. Other types must be applied for by AMG to HQ AC ROME.

2. It has been decided that the use of the 37 mm guns in the Arm'd Cars is undesirable and no issues will therefore be made of this type of amm to the CCRR."

Col. G3
GSO 1 (G3)
Dep. G3
GSO 2 (G3)
GSO 3 (G3)
GSO 4 (G3)
GSO 5 (G3)
GSO 6 (G3)
GSO 7 (G3)
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D. PEEL YATES,
Brigadier G.S.
AC of S, G-3.

SUBJECT: Employment of Troops on Duties of Public Order

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MILIA)

9/92 ←

2 Feb 46

TO : Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

1. The previous draft on the above subject prepared by the ITALIAN Ministry of War, dated 26 Nov 45 was discussed by MILIA with you in early Dec 45.

2. As a result of this discussion a suggested re-draft of para II was sent to the Ministry under our 9/92 of 12 Dec 45 (copy to you).

3. The ITALIAN Ministry objected to this draft on the grounds that it detailed specifically the arms to be carried by troops

(a) against defenseless disturbers of the peace.

(b) against armed disturbers of the peace.

As, however, it would often not be possible to determine beforehand whether (a) might not develop into (b) they proposed a more general wording of the paragraph which, while accepting the same principles would give more latitude to the local commander.

4. At our request they have now submitted a fresh draft of para II and have also at the same time slightly reworded paras 3 and 12 of our suggestion in order to avoid ambiguity as to responsibilities of the civil and military authorities.

A copy of the new draft in ITALIAN and a copy of the translation are attached.

5. I should be glad to have your early approval of the new draft in order that publication may proceed.

See to 143A

M. W. H. 895

Major General
M. F. I.

100/100

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1. The previous draft on the above subject prepared by the ITALIAN Ministry of War, dated 26 Nov 45 was discussed by DIA with you in early Dec 45.

2. As a result of this discussion a suggested re-draft of para 12 was fwd to the Ministry under our 0/50 of 12 Dec 45 (copy to you).

3. The ITALIAN Ministry objected to this draft on the grounds that it detailed specifically the arms to be carried by troops

(a) against defenseless disturbers of the peace,

(b) against armed disturbers of the peace.

As, however, it would often not be possible to determine beforehand whether (a) might not develop into (b) they proposed a more general wording of the paragraph which, while accepting the same principles would give more latitude to the local commander.

4. As our request they have now submitted a fresh draft of para 12 and have also at the same time slightly reworded paras 3 and 12 of our suggestion in order to avoid ambiguity as to responsibilities of the civil and military authorities.

A copy of the new draft in ITALIAN and a copy of the translation are attached. 4036

5. I should be glad to have your early approval of the new draft in order that publication may proceed. 139A

See to 143A

M. W. H. BGS

for Major General M. H. I. R.

11/12/45

IMW/abc

ITALIAN draft to be returned to MHEIA.

Public Safety Sub Commission replied on the minute sheet of their file AC/14602/5/PS

"From a public safety point of view the draft appears entirely satisfactory"

Sgt.

E. J. Bye Col.

14.2.46.

Abc 10/12

DRAFT OF CIRCULAR

139A

SUBJECT: Employment of troops in Public Order duties.

NA - NT

16A 416B

This document replaces and cancels circulars Nos. 110950/11 of 30.12.44; 100500/1 of 9.1.45; 1112250/1 of 21.5.45; and 123550/1 of 6.10.45.

1. - In the territories controlled by the National Government, the maintenance of public order and seeing that the law is respected is the responsibility of the Police authorities, in accordance with the directives of the Prefects and the Ministry of the Interior.
When the Police forces are not in a position to reestablish order and the power of the law, or when they have reason to fear disorders on a large scale, the responsible authorities may request the intervention of troops.

2. - The intervention of units of the Army in the service of public order must be limited to cases of exceptional gravity only; request for intervention will be made, therefore, after a calm estimate of the situation has been made, and, in any event, only when the authorities responsible for public order have exhausted all available police and G.O. RR forces.
Troops engaged in duties of public order must understand that their intervention is solely for the purpose of safeguarding the citizens from disorder and violence.

3. - In cases of exceptional gravity - referred to in the previous paragraph - requests for army units will normally have to be made by the Political Authorities to the Military Territorial Commander controlling the area, pointing out the duty to be carried out and giving all useful information on the situation.

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Troops engaged in duties of public order must understand that their intervention is solely for the purpose of safeguarding the citizens from disorder and violence.

3. - In cases of exceptional gravity - referred to in the previous paragraph - requests for Army units will normally have to be made by the Political Authorities to the Military Territorial Commander controlling the area, pointing out the duty to be carried out and giving all useful information on the situation. The concession and size of the units is therefore entrusted to the judgement, and is the responsibility, of the said Commander who will always take into consideration the principle of only employing such forces as are strictly necessary.

4. - Troops employed in Public Order duties will remain at all times under the exclusive and direct command of the military M.A.S., which, in relation to the task entrusted to them by the civilian

authorities, have the widest powers, and consequent responsibilities, in laying down the executive procedure which they consider most suitable to reach the desired end.

The basic principle, also because of its psychological effect on the crowd, is decisive and immediate employment en masse.

Dispersion of the forces in order to be everywhere is an error which will be avoided at all costs.

5. - It may so be that the troops at the disposal of the Military Territorial Command are not sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation; in this case the civilian authority must apply to the nearest Allied Military Territorial Command, requesting the grouping of the Italian troops which may be at the disposal of such H.Q., and specifying, on the approval of the Military Territorial Commander, the force of troops which it considers necessary.

These troops, which will be granted by the Allied H.Q.s, will pass for all effects, immediately and temporarily, to the command of the Military Territorial H.Q. which will employ them in accordance with the standing laws, regulations, and directives of the Italian Army.

6. - The Allied Supreme Command (A.P.H.Q. - Caserta) reserves the right to declare any territories already restored to the ~~4034~~ Government, "military zone". With this declaration, the exercising of powers of government in the area concerned will be assumed by an Allied Military Government. Zones in which grave disturbances of public order are met with are likely to be declared "military zones".

7. - In the event of disturbances of exceptional gravity, the Ministry of the Interior and, on its authority, the Prefects, have the power

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- These troops, which will be granted by the Allied H.Q.s, will pass for all effects, immediately and temporarily, to the command of the Military Territorial H.Q. which will employ them in accordance with the standing laws, regulations, and directives of the Italian Army.
6. - The Allied Supreme Command (A.P.H.Q. - Caserta) reserves the right to declare any territories already restored to the Italian Government, "military zone". With this declaration, the exercising of powers of government in the area concerned will be assumed by an Allied Military Government.
- Zones in which grave disturbances of public order are met with are likely to be declared "military zones".
7. - In the event of disturbances of exceptional gravity, the Ministry of the Interior and, on its authority, the Prefects, have the power (see standing I.S. Laws, art. 217 and foll.) to declare a State of War. Consequent to this, the direction of the service of Public Order and the responsibility for its execution, will pass to the Military Authorities.
- In this event all the police forces will pass to the command of the Military Authorities.

8. - It may so be that an Allied Command - on its own initiative if the disorders threaten to affect Allied military interests, or following a request for assistance on the part of the Italian authorities - considers it necessary to employ also Allied troops in order to reestablish order.

In this event, the direction of the service of law and order and the responsibility for its execution will be assumed by the Allied command, and all Italian troops engaged on Public Order duties - including ITI-ITI, US-ITI and BR-ITI, troops, if any - in addition to all the police forces, will pass to the command of the Allied Military Commander commanding the area, who will thus become the Commander-in-Chief of all Allied and Italian forces, even if the area in which the disorders are taking place has not been declared a "military zone".

9. - When Italian troops are engaged in public order duties under the command of an Allied H.Q., it is for this H.Q. to issue the instructions regarding the procedure of employment and the line of conduct to be adopted in respect of the disturbers of the peace, especially as far as the use of arms is concerned.

When the Allied Command omits such instructions, the employment of Italian troops will be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this circular.

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10. - In order to guarantee the speediest and most efficient intervention by troops, it is of the utmost importance that very close liaison is maintained at all times between the civilian authorities and Allied and Italian Military Commands.

11. - Troops employed in public order duties will have at their disposal, normally, the arms (individual and unit) with which they are equipped and eventually reinforced: the employment of these

in addition to all the police forces, will pass to the command of the Allied Military Commander commanding the area, who will thus become the Commander-in-Chief of all Allied and Italian forces, even if the area in which the disorders are taking place has not been declared a "military zone".

9. - When Italian troops are engaged in public order duties under the command of an Allied A.C., it is for this A.C. to issue the instructions regarding the procedure of employment and the line of conduct to be adopted in respect of the disturbers of the peace, especially as far as the use of arms is concerned. When the Allied Command omits such instructions, the employment of Italian troops will be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this circular.

4033

10. - In order to guarantee the speediest and most efficient intervention by troops, it is of the utmost importance that very close liaison is maintained at all times between the civilian authorities and Allied and Italian Military Commands.

11. - Troops employed in public order duties will have at their disposal, normally, the arms (individual and unit) with which they are equipped and eventually reinforced: the employment of these weapons - which must always be governed by an officer - will, however, be at all times in relation to the armament and to the armed resistance offered, by the disturbers of the peace. Normally, as against unarmed disturbers of the peace, troops will be armed with pistols and rifles only. L.M.G.s and other similar weapons may be carried in place of rifles since such weapons can be regulated to fire single shots only.

The automatic weapons, held in reserve, will be employed only when armed resistance is met with.

When it appears that the disturbers of the peace have automatic weapons and hand grenades at their disposal, the troops will be authorized to make use of the same weapons and even weapons of greater power (including the hand grenades), in relation to the principle that they who are called upon to restore order must always possess superior armament to that of those who have disturbed order.

With the exception of the CC.AA., who are authorized to carry their weapons loaded when they consider it necessary, troops, normally, will proceed to the scene of the disorders with their weapons unloaded; weapons will be loaded on the spot only on the order of an officer. Should the troops, however, in order to reach the scene of the disorders, be compelled to make a journey during which some surprise may be expected from elements interested in obstructing the maintenance of order, the unit, following specific orders from the highest ranking or senior officer present, will be authorized to leave with their weapons loaded.

In this case, the unit commander will have the duty of making all the most advisable advance preparations to ensure the avoidance of ambushes; the responsibility for this assurance thus becomes his personally.

12. - The Military Territorial Command, complying with the request to assemble troops and specifying the numbers (as pointed out in para. 3), must clearly indicate to the unit commander, in agreement with the political authorities, the task to be carried out on the basis of the valuation of the situation prevailing. It will then be the duty of the said unit commander to establish the procedure with which he will execute the mission entrusted him.

With the exception of the CC.RR., who are authorised to carry their weapons loaded when they consider it necessary, troops, normally, will proceed to the scene of the disorders with their weapons unloaded: weapons will be loaded on the spot only on the order of an officer. Should the troops, however, in order to reach the scene of the disorders, be compelled to make a journey during which some surprise may be expected from elements interested in obstructing the maintenance of order, the unit, following specific orders from the highest ranking or senior officer present, will be authorised to leave with their weapons loaded.

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12. - The Military Territorial Command, complying with the request to assemble troops and specifying the numbers (as pointed out in para. 3), must clearly indicate to the unit commander, in agreement with the political authorities, the task to be carried out on the basis of the valuation of the situation prevailing. It will then be the duty of the said unit commander to establish the procedure with which he will execute the mission entrusted him.
- Lower is given, however, to the Public Safety official, or in his absence to the CC.RR. officer who has been entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining public order in the area, to make, in relation to the altered situation on the spot, alterations to the task previously fixed by the military authorities. These alterations, however, must always limit the task to the possibilities of the unit employed; the commander of the said unit is responsible for the task being adequate with the strength of the unit.

The said Public Safety official is moreover held responsible for

giving to the unit commander all the necessary information for the carrying out of the task entrusted to him and which may influence the conduct to be borne by the troops in respect of the disturbers of the peace.

13. - The commander of the unit engaged in duties of public order, being acquainted with the task assigned to him and having properly summed up the situation, will decide upon the method with which he intends to carry out the task and, in particular :

- decide whether, in order to reach the desired end, it will be necessary to resort to the use of arms;
- decide which of the arms available to his unit (rifles, M.G.s, automatic weapons, hand grenades) will have to be employed;
- order the loading of weapons, the opening of fire, and the cessation of fire.

These responsibilities, which are inseparable from the exercise of command, will be assumed with calmness and without hesitation, bearing in mind that the use of firearms is reserved for extreme cases only, in which there is no other way of preventing the continuation of the disorders or in which the insurgents endanger the troops by they themselves making use of firearms or other means of offense.

Fire will be directed against the most dangerous looking individuals, those who are inciting violence, and, possibly, against the ringleaders of the demonstration.

It is forbidden to fire indiscriminately on the crowd and on women and children.

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Fire will be directed against the most dangerous looking individuals, those who are inciting violence, and, possibly, against the ringleaders of the demonstration.

It is forbidden to fire indiscriminately on the crowd and on women and children.

Troops may not open fire, except in case of legitimate defense, without the order of their commander.

- 14. - In view of the functions of the commander of the unit engaged in duties of public order, it is necessary that he always be an officer.

- 15. - The "Regulations for Garrison Duties", which replace the cancelled "Regulations for the Territorial Service", still remain

applicable as far as they concern duties of public order
(art.202 and following), always provided that they do not
contradict this circular to which an extract from the said
instructions have been attached for ease of consultation.

THE MINISTER

B R C S I O

C. Danin Cpl.

Priority 1. *Postscript Map 139B*

SCHEMA DI CIRCOLARE

OGGETTO : Impiego della truppa nei servizi di ordine pubblico.

. . . . indirizzi
(direzioni estese ai Com/di di battaglione)

La presente sostituisce ed abroga le circolari n. 110950/I. del 30/12/1944; n. 100500/I. del 9/1/1945; n. 112250/I. del 21/5/1945 e n. 123550/I. del 6/10/1945.

1.- Nei territori controllati dal Governo nazionale la responsabilità di mantenere l'ordine pubblico e di fare rispettare le leggi compete alle autorità di Polizia secondo le direttive dei Prefetti e del Ministero dell'Interno.

Quando le forze di Polizia non siano in grado di ristabilire l'ordine e l'imperio della legge, o quando si abbia motivo di temere disordini di vasta portata, le autorità responsabili possono richiedere l'intervento della truppa.

2.- L'intervento di reparti dell'Esercito nel servizio di ordine pubblico deve essere limitato ai soli casi di eccezionale gravità; la richiesta di intervento va fatta, pertanto, dopo una serena valutazione della situazione e, comunque ²solo quando le autorità responsabili dell'ordine pubblico avranno esaurito ogni disponibilità di forze di polizia e CC. RR.

I militari comandati in servizio di ordine pubblico devono comprendere che il loro intervento risponde unicamente alla necessità di salvaguardare i cittadini dal disordine e dalla violenza.

3.- Per i casi di eccezionale gravità - di cui al numero precedente - le richieste di reparti dell'Esercito dovranno essere rivolte, di norma, dalle Autorità Politiche ai Comandanti

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^ militari territoriali competenti per territorio comunicando il compito da assolvere nonché tutte le informazioni utili sulla situazione. La concessione e l'entità dei reparti resta però affidata al giudizio ed alla responsabilità di detti Comandanti i quali terranno sempre presente il criterio di impiegare le sole forze strettamente necessarie.

La richiesta di reparti di truppa può venire rivolta anche dall'Autorità di pubblica sicurezza al Comandante del Presidio, limitatamente però ai casi urgenti e sempreché la truppa debba essere impiegata a breve distanza dei limiti del presidio.

In tal caso, il Comandante militare territoriale dovrà essere informato col mezzo più rapido della richiesta in questione ed intervenire con le modalità indicate al 1° capoverso.

- 4.- La truppa comandata in servizio di ordine pubblico rimane sempre alla esclusiva e diretta dipendenza dei comandi militari che, in relazione al compito ad essi affidato dall'autorità civile, hanno la più ampia facoltà, e la conseguente responsabilità, di stabilire le modalità esecutive che ritengono più idonee per raggiungere l'intento.

Criterio base, anche per i suoi effetti psicologici sulla folla, è l'impiego a massa, deciso e immediato.

Lo sparpagliamento delle forze per essere presenti ovunque è un errore che va ad ogni costo evitato.

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- 5.- Può verificarsi che le truppe a disposizione del Comando militare territoriale non siano sufficienti per far fronte alla situazione; in questo caso l'autorità civile dovrà rivolgersi al più prossimo comando militare territoriale alleato, chiedendo il concorso di truppe italiane eventualmente a disposizione di tale Comando specificando, sentito il Comandante militare territoriale, l'entità delle truppe che si ritengono necessarie.

Queste truppe, se saranno concesse dai Comandi alleati, passeranno a tutti gli effetti, immediatamente e temporaneamente, alle dipendenze del Comando militare territoriale che le impiegherà secondo le leggi, i regolamenti e le direttive in vigore

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per l'Esercito italiano.

- 6.- Il Comando Supremo alleato (A.F.H.Q. - Caserta) si è riservato il diritto di dichiarare "zona militare" territori già restituiti al controllo del Governo italiano. Con tale dichiarazione l'esercizio dei poteri di governo nella zona interessata viene assunto da un Governo militare alleato.

Le zone in cui si verificano gravi perturbamenti nell'ordine pubblico sono passibili di essere dichiarate "zona militare".

- 7.- In caso di perturbamenti di eccezionale gravità il Ministero dell'Interno e, per sua delega, i Prefetti, hanno facoltà (vfr. Testo Unico Leggi di P.S., art. 217 e segg.) di dichiarare lo Stato di guerra. In conseguenza di ciò la direzione del servizio di o.p. e la responsabilità della sua esecuzione passano all'Autorità militare.

In questo caso tutte le forze di polizia passano alle dipendenze dell'Autorità militare.

- 8.- Può verificarsi che un Comando alleato - di sua iniziativa se i disordini minaccino di ledere interessi militari alleati, o in seguito a richiesta di assistenza da parte dell'Autorità italiana - ritenga necessario impiegare, per ristabilire l'ordine, anche truppe alleate.

In questo caso la direzione del servizio di ordine e la responsabilità della sua esecuzione vengono assunte dal Comando alleato e tutte le truppe italiane impiegate in servizio di ordine pubblico - comprese le truppe ITI-ITI, US-ITI e BR-ITI se ve ne sono - nonché tutte le forze di polizia, passano alle dipendenze del Comandante militare alleato competente per territorio, il quale assume così la figura di Comandante in Capo di tutte le forze alleate e italiane, anche se la zona in cui i disordini hanno luogo non sia stata dichiarata "zona militare".

- 9.- Quando le truppe italiane siano impiegate in servizio di o.p. alle dipendenze di un Comando alleato, spetta a questo Comando di

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dare le direttive circa le modalità di impiego e la linea di condotta da tenere nei riguardi dei perturbatori dell'ordine, specie per quanto si riferisce all'uso delle armi.

Quando il Comando alleato ometta tali direttive, l'impiego delle truppe italiane avverrà secondo i criteri fissati nella presente circolare.

10.- Per garantire il più pronto ed efficace intervento delle truppe, è della massima importanza che fra Autorità civili e Comandi militari italiani e alleati sia mantenuto sempre uno stretto collegamento.

11.- Le truppe impiegate in servizio di ordine pubblico disporranno di norma dell'armamento (individuale e di reparto) di cui sono fornite ed eventualmente rinforzate: l'impiego di tali armi - che dovrà essere sempre regolato da un ufficiale - sarà, però, sempre in relazione all'armamento ed alla resistenza armata apposta dai perturbatori dell'ordine.

Di norma, per fronteggiare perturbatori disarmati, le truppe saranno armate solo di fucili e pistole.

Fucili automatici ed altre armi similari potranno essere portati in sostituzione dei fucili purché tali armi siano messe in posizione tale da sparare solo colpi singoli.

Le armi automatiche, tenute in riserva, saranno impiegate solo quando si incontrerà una resistenza armata.

Quando risulti che i perturbatori dell'ordine dispongano di armi automatiche e di bombe a mano, la truppa sarà autorizzata a servirsi delle stesse armi ed anche di armi di maggior potenza (comprese le bombe a mano), in relazione al criterio che l'armamento di chi è chiamato a restaurare l'ordine deve essere sempre superiore a quello usato da chi l'ordine ha turbato.

Ad eccezione dei CC.RR., i quali sono autorizzati a portare le armi cariche quando lo ritengono necessario, la truppa, di norma, si recherà sul luogo dei disordini con le armi scariche: queste saranno caricate sul posto solo dietro ordine di un uffi-

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ciale. Qualora però la truppa, per portarsi sul luogo del disordine, sia costretta a compiere un percorso durante il quale possa prevedersi qualche sorpresa da parte di elementi interessati ad ostacolare il mantenimento dell'ordine, il reparto, in seguito ad esplicito ordine dell'ufficiale più elevato in grado o più anziano presente, sarà autorizzato a partire con le armi cariche.

In tal caso, al Comandante del reparto competono tutte le predisposizioni più opportune per evitare il verificarsi di imboscate: la responsabilità di tale garanzia resta così affidata alla sua persona.

12.- I Comandi militari territoriali, aderendo alle richieste di concorso di truppe e nel precisarne l'entità (come indicato al n.3) dovranno chiaramente fissare al Comandante del reparto, d'intesa con le autorità politiche, il compito da assolvere in base alla valutazione della situazione contingente. Spetterà poi al predetto Comandante di reparto fissare le modalità per condurre a termine il mandato affidatogli.

E' data, peraltro, facoltà al funzionario di P.S. ed in sua assenza all'ufficiale dei CC.RR. alla cui responsabilità è stato affidato il mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico della zona, di apportare, in relazione alla mutata situazione in posto, varianti al compito precedentemente fissato dall'Autorità militare. Tali varianti, però, devono sempre contenere il compito nelle possibilità del reparto impiegato; responsabile dell'adeguatezza del compito alle forze del reparto è il Comandante del reparto stesso.

In predetto funzionario di P.S. è inoltre tenuto a dare al Comandante del reparto tutte le informazioni e indicazioni necessarie per l'assolvimento del compito assegnatogli e che possano influenzare il contegno che dovrà tenere la truppa nei riguardi dei perturbatori dell'ordine.

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- 13.- Il Comandante del reparto in servizio di ordine pubblico, conosciuto il compito assegnatogli e opportunamente orientato sulla situazione, stabilisce le modalità con cui intende assolvere il compito e, in particolare,
- decide se, per raggiungere lo scopo, sia necessario fare uso delle armi;
 - decide quali delle armi di cui dispone il reparto (fucili, fucili automatici, armi automatiche, bombe a mano) devono essere impiegate;
 - ordina di caricare le armi, di aprire il fuoco, di cessare il fuoco.

Queste responsabilità, che sono inseparabili dall'esercizio del comando, vanno assunte con serenità e senza esitazione, tenendo presente che l'uso del fuoco è riservato ai soli casi estremi, in cui non ci sia altro mezzo per impedire la continuazione dei disordini o in cui i rivoltosi mettano in pericolo la truppa facendo essi stessi uso di armi da fuoco o di altri mezzi di offesa.

Il fuoco dovrà essere diretto contro gli individui che appaiono più pericolosi, che incitano alla violenza e, possibilmente, contro i capi della dimostrazione.

E' vietato far fuoco indiscriminatamente sulla folla e su donne e bambini.

I militari non possono fare fuoco, salvo il caso di legittima difesa, senza averne avuto ordine dal loro comandante.

- 14.- Date le funzioni del comandante del reparto in servizio di ordine pubblico, è necessario che questi sia sempre un ufficiale.
- 15.- Le "Norme per il servizio di Presidio", che sostituiscono l'abrogato "Regolamento sul servizio territoriale", conservano la loro efficacia per quanto si riferisce al servizio di ordine pubblico.

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co (art. 202 e seguenti), compresché non siano in contrasto con la presente circolare alla quale, per facilità di consultazione, è allegato uno stralcio delle predette norme.

IL MINISTRO

F/to M. Brosio

4023

*No change in this Section from
original draft*

CAPO XVII

SERVIZIO D'ORDINE PUBBLICO

*There is
no translation of
this section
in attachment.*

.....OMISSIS.....

202. - SCOPO DEL SERVIZIO:

- a) - mantenere o ripristinare l'ordine e concorrere ai servizi di ordine pubblico nelle strade e nelle piazze;
- b) - tutelare, in caso di perturbamento dell'ordine pubblico, località da proteggere in modo particolare (palazzi reali, assemblee legislative, uffici pubblici di speciale importanza, ambasciate, legazioni, consolati, stabilimenti carcerari, banche, pubblici servizi, impianti industriali che assicurino servizi di prima necessità, quali gas, luce, acque, trasporti, magazzini viveri ecc.);
- c) - assicurare, con uomini e materiali, il funzionamento di servizi di pubblico interesse (214), che non possono restare sospesi senza grave danno imminente per le popolazioni e che non potrebbero funzionare con altri mezzi.-

203. - Per ognuno dei porti indicati dalla lettera b) del numero 202, dovrà essere compilata, d'accordo con l'autorità di pubblica sicurezza, apposita consegna, con le norme prescritte per il servizio di guardia.-

NOTIFICAZIONI O.P.

4022

204. - L'Autorità di pubblica sicurezza segnala normalmente al comandante di presidio gli avvenimenti di rilievo relativo all'ordine pubblico, specie se possono indurre o richieste di picchetti armati.-

PROGETTI O.P.

205. - I progetti o.p.:

- a) - vengono compilati solo:

In previsione di gravi perturbamenti interni;
nei presidi tenuti da ufficiali generali e in quelli dei centri abitati di notevole importanza, nel

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quelli ciò sia ritenuto opportuno dal Prefetto;

b) - entrano in funzione:

normalmente a richiesta dell'Autorità di pubblica sicurezza;

eventualmente d'ordine del comandante di presidio e delle autorità militari della quale il presidio dipende, nei casi di assoluta gravità e urgenza.-

DIREZIONE DEL SERVIZIO

206. - La Direzione del servizio, con la conseguente responsabilità della sua esecuzione:

a) - è tenuta normalmente dall'autorità di pubblica sicurezza;

b) - in caso di gravi perturbamenti può essere assunta dall'autorità militare, con le norme previste dal testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza (articoli 217 e seguenti) nel qual caso anche le forze di polizia passano alle dipendenze dell'autorità militare.

INTERVENTO DELLE TRUPPE

207. - L'intervento delle truppe ha luogo:

a) - per l'arma del CC.RR.: di iniziativa secondo le norme speciali vigenti nell'Arma (200); ovvero a richiesta dell'autorità di pubblica sicurezza;

b) - per le altre armi e specialità: normalmente a richiesta dell'autorità di pubblica sicurezza, e eventualmente di iniziativa dell'autorità militare, quando ad esso è affidata la direzione del servizio, in casi di particolare gravità e urgenza.-

PICCHETTI ARMATI

208. - I picchetti armati sono reparti di truppe, disponibili per il servizio d'ordine pubblico o di soccorso pubblico.- Vengono ordinati dal comandante di presidio, previa richiesta del prefetto e sono normalmente sostituiti da unità organiche.- Possono essere: ordinari, straordinari e speciali.-

209. - Il picchetto armato ordinario:

a) -, è disponibile normalmente nelle caserme designa

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te del comandante di presidio, il quale ne stabilisce anche forza, inquadramento ed eventuali modalità per assicurarne l'impiego rapido ed efficace;

- b) - è in servizio giornaliero, che ha inizio al distacco della guardia;
- c) - è costituito da militari comandati a turno fra tutti i presenti ai reparti e prendono parte, di massima, a tutte le istruzioni.- Però nelle ore di libera uscita:

Il comandante di picchetto, dopo aver riunito e passata in rivista la truppa, può uscire dalla caserma, ma dev'essere sempre prontamente reperibile (nome e recapito devono essere affissi, di volta in volta, nella camera dell'ufficiale di picchetto);

I militari di truppa rimangono in caserma e indossano l'uniforme prescritta per i servizi di ordine pubblico; possono spogliarsi dopo la ritirata;

Quando il picchetto² uscito di caserma per servizio d'ordine pubblico o di soccorso pubblico (231) il comandante del reggimento, o l'ufficiale che ha la precedenza gerarchica fra quelli presenti in caserma, provvede immediatamente a sostituirlo con un picchetto straordinario (211).-

- 210. - GRUPPI E RAGGRUPPAMENTI DI PICCHETTI ARMATI: possono essere eccezionalmente prestabiliti dal comandante del presidio, per eventuali loro riunione, in vista di particolare e transitorie esigenze locali affidandone, al comando e ufficiali designati a turno dal comando del presidio, fra quelli dei corpi dipendenti.-
- 211. - IL PICCHETTO STRAORDINARIO di forza adeguata alle esigenze di impiego, può essere ordinato dal comandante di presidio:
 - a) - in seguito a richiesta fatta dall'autorità o da ufficiali di pubblica sicurezza;
 - b) - di iniziativa - informandone l'autorità di pubblica sicurezza - quando occorre rinforzare o sostituire il picchetto armato ordinario.-

Può essere, altresì, ordinato da qualunque altro ufficiale, limitatamente al corpo cui appartiene, nei casi di assoluta gravità e urgenza, informandone, nel modo più sollecito, le autorità sopra indicate.

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212. - IL PICCHETTO SPECIALE:

- a) - viene ordinato, di volta in volta, dal comandante del presidio, per mantenere l'ordine:
nelle stazioni ferroviarie e negli scali marittimi in occasione di grandi movimenti di truppe;
presso i tribunali militari, le corti d'Assise e i tribunali penali o speciali;
nelle sezioni elettorali, in occasione di elezioni;
- b) - può essere richiesto dagli enti locali interessati, che ne indicano anche il compito e, se del caso, le modalità per assolverle;
- c) - viene sostituito ogni 24 ore, qualora il servizio dovesse durare più giorni.-

ARMAMENTO**213. - L'armamento delle truppe:**

- a) - è limitato, di massima, alle armi individuali, con le seguenti dotazioni di cartucce:
ogni fucile o moschetto: 12 cartucce o mitraglia e 36 pallottole;
ogni pistola: 36 cartucce o pallottola;
- b) - comprende eventualmente mitragliatrici e fucili mitragliatori del reparto, con dieci caricatori a pallottola per ogni arma;

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.....OMISSIS.....

RICHIESTE**214. - Le richieste di picchetti armati:**

- a) - sono fatte, normalmente per iscritto, dalla autorità di pubblica sicurezza:
al comandante di presidio se devono essere impiegati non oltre i cinque chilometri dai limiti di presidio;
al comandante della divisione, negli altri casi;
al Ministero della Guerra, per il tramite del Ministero dell'Interno, se le truppe devono essere impiegate per servizi di pubblico interesse (lettera c) del numero 202);

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b) - devono indicare:

forza, espresse in numero approssimativo, di uomini ed eventualmente di mitragliatrici e altre armi e mezzi speciali occorrenti;

scopo per il quale si richiedono;

ora e luogo d'intervento;

qualifica e possibilmente nome dell'ufficiale di pubblica sicurezza che avrà la direzione del servizio sul luogo d'impiego.-

215. - L'autorità di pubblica sicurezza deve evitare di richiedere che reparti di truppe del presidio, oltre i picchetti armati ordinari, siano consegnati in caserma con misura precauzionale, se prima lo stesso provvedimento non è stato adottato per i carabinieri dello stesso presidio.-

Quando vi sia disparità di parere fra il comandante del presidio e l'autorità di pubblica sicurezza;

decide il comandante del presidio, se si tratta di stabilire le specie delle armi e dei mezzi da impiegare;

decide il comandante del corpo d'armata, se si tratta di stabilire l'entità delle truppe da impiegare o in tutti gli altri casi.-

216. - Richieste urgenti di concorso alla forza pubblica, da parte di ufficiali di pubblica sicurezza, ovvero da parte di ufficiali del carabinieri reali (199), possono essere fatte, per iscritto o verbalmente, ma confermate per iscritto appena possibile:

a) - ai posti di guardia: secondo quanto è prescritto al n. 279;

b) - a qualsiasi caserma o località ove sono alloggiati, o si trovino temporaneamente reparti dell'esercito, dove il comandante o l'ufficiale che ha la precedenza gerarchica fra i presenti, deve aderirvi, inviando il picchetto armato ordinario o straordinario (209-211).-

Tali richieste possono essere fatte solo da persone conosciute o munite di documenti di riconoscimento della persona e della carica.-

217. - I militari isolati hanno il dovere di aderire a richieste di concorso, loro rivolte da funzionari o agenti di pubblica sicurezza, che si facciano riconoscere come tali, in caso di tumulto, di pubblico infortunio o di comune pericolo, ovvero nella flagranza di reato.-

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AUTOTRASPORTI DI PICCHETTI ARMATI

218. - Sono fatti con le seguenti norme:

- a) evitare possibilmente trasporti di notte;
- b) far procedere la colonna da autoblindo, carri veloci o da un autocarro staffetta, se del caso, e distanziare gli altri nella colonna;
- c) procedere a velocità ridotta;
- d) tenere sempre le armi alla mano (non accostarle mai in fondo alle macchine);
- e) guardarsi da possibili sorprese provenienti da incroci, svolte, siepi o altri ripari fiancheggianti la strada;
- f) guardarsi da fili o altri ostacoli posti in traverso alle strade;
- g) far scendere la truppa dagli automezzi, a conveniente distanza dal luogo di impiego e proseguire poi a piedi;
- h) vigilare, con scorta armata, gli automezzi scarichi.

219. - Criteri d'impiego dei picchetti armati;-

- a) l'impiego del picchetto armato ha un solo scopo: ristabilire l'impiego della legge;
- b) il picchetto è fatto per agire: la richiesta d'intervento e d'impiego dev'essere quindi ponderata con grande avvedutezza;
- c) il compito è indicato - possibilmente per iscritto o a voce alta - dall'ufficiale dei carabinieri reali ²⁰¹⁷¹ comandante delle truppe stabilisce le modalità per assolverlo;
- d) il picchetto rimane sempre alla diretta dipendenza dei propri comandanti e agisce sotto il loro comando e la loro responsabilità;
- e) evitare incertezze e debolezze che sempre nuocciono alla disciplina e al prestigio delle forze militari;
- f) il picchetto agisce con energia pronta e risoluta imposta dallo scopo da conseguire; ma con la calma ferma e serena che scaturisce dalla coscienza del dovere da compiere e della propria forza. Il comandante del picchetto, nell'assumere il servizio, deve ricevere dall'ufficiale di pubblica sicurezza responsabile, tutte le notizie e le indicazioni necessarie per lo svolgimento del servizio o che possano influenzare il contegno che do-

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vrà tenere la truppa.-

220. - SCIoglimento di riunioni o assembramenti.-

Per sciogliere riunioni o assembramenti minacciosi o sgombrare località occupate da rivoltosi o tumultuanti:

- a) l'ufficiale di pubblica sicurezza, fregato della sciarpa tricolore (in sua assenza l'ufficiale o il sottufficiale dei carabinieri reali) che dirige il servizio, intima al pubblico di sciogliersi, ripetendo l'intimazione tre volte ognuna preceduta, possibilmente, dal segnale di tromba alti
- b) riuscita vana la terza intimazione, richiede, da alta voce, di impiegare la forza armata;
- c) qualora, in casi di rivolta o di violenza degli assembramenti, non si potessero fare le prescritte intimazioni, si procede senz'altro all'impiego della forza armata, sempre su richiesta dell'onizidetto dirigente del servizio.

Autoblinde e carri armati dei vari tipi sono particolarmente adatti a tale compito.

221. - IMPIEGO DELLE ARMI.-

Le armi, mezzo estremo a disposizione, vengono impiegate solo e fin quando indispensabile per assolvere il compito, nel seguente ordine:

- a) armi bianche (balonette, sciabole; quest'ultima prima di piatto e poi, occorrendo di punta o taglio);
- b) armi da fuoco (pistola, fucili, ed eccezionalmente mitragliatrici).

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222. - L'IMPIEGO DEL FUOCO.-

- a) non dev'essere mai fatto a solo scopo di intimidazione;
- b) è ultimo mezzo d'azione contro i rivoltosi che:

facciano essi stessi l'uso di armi da fuoco o di altri mezzi di offesa, che possono mettere in pericolo la truppa;

abbiano commessi atti di incendio o devastazione e non vi sia altro modo per impedire la continuazione dei disordini.

Qualche colpo sparato in aria può solo servire per richiamare urgente rinforzo da parte di forze dislocate nelle vicinanze.

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PATTUGLIE

223. - Le pattuglie in servizio d'ordine pubblico:

- a) - vengono costituite col concorso di militari di truppa, solo in casi assolutamente eccezionali e sempre in via transitoria;
- b) - il loro compito e le modalità per assolverlo vengono indicati dall'autorità di pubblica sicurezza; se la pattuglia è eccezionalmente costituita di sola truppa le modalità per assolvere il compito, indicato dall'autorità di pubblica sicurezza, vengono stabilite dall'autorità militare;
- c) - la loro forza viene fissata, a seconda delle esigenze, di comune accordo tra l'autorità militare e quella di pubblica sicurezza;
- d) - sono normalmente comandate da un graduato dei carabinieri reali od anche da un carabiniere;
- e) - eccezionalmente possono essere condotte da altri agenti di pubblica sicurezza, nel qual caso i militari di truppa si limitano a prestare man forte, all'agente che li conduce, per l'esecuzione degli ordini e delle consegne a lui dati;
- f) - le pattuglie di truppa non comandate da carabinieri reali o condotte da altri agenti delle forze pubbliche, non possono mai essere incaricate di eseguire servizi di polizia.

ARRESTI

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224. - ARRESTI DURANTE IL SERVIZIO DI ORDINE PUBBLICO:

- a) - sono normalmente eseguiti da agenti di pubblica sicurezza;
- b) - sono eccezionalmente eseguiti dalle truppe solo:
in mancanza o insufficienza di agenti di pubblica sicurezza;
quando si tratta di persone che direttamente insultano, minacciano od offendono la truppa;
- c) - le persone arrestate dalla truppa devono essere consegnate, al più presto possibile, agli agenti di pubblica sicurezza, previo rilascio di regolare ricevuta;
- d) - quando la truppa ha in consegna persone in arresto,

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deve vigilare per impedire con ogni mezzo, che possono evadere.

225. - SCORTA AD ARRESTATI DURANTE IL SERVIZIO D'ORDINE PUBBLICO.

E' fatto:

- a) - se trattasi di persone in uniforme militare: esclusivamente dai carabinieri reali;
- b) - se trattasi di persone in abito civile: normalmente da carabinieri reali o altri agenti di pubblica sicurezza;

In via assolutamente eccezionale anche da militari di truppa, nel qual caso il servizio viene eseguito:

secondo istruzioni impartite dal funzionari di pubblica sicurezza o, in loro assenza, dagli ufficiali dei carabinieri reali;

con le armi cariche e la baionetta innestata;

con energia decisa ma corretta, senza cioè insultare o maltrattare gli arrestati; reprimendo però con ogni mezzo e, ove occorra, anche con l'uso delle armi, ogni loro reazione violenta, come anche ogni tentativo violento per liberarli arbitrariamente da chiunque venga fatto.

R A P P O R T I

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226. - Il comandante del picchetto o del gruppo di picchetti, impiegati in servizio d'ordine pubblico, deve segnalare al comandante del presidio avvenimenti od esigenze inerenti al servizio;

di volta in volta e direttamente, in casi di particolare gravità od urgenza;

al termine del servizio e per tramite gerarchico, negli altri casi.

CESSAZIONE DEL SERVIZIO

227. - L'ALLONTANAMENTO del picchetto armato dal luogo d'impiego può avvenire solo in seguito ad autorizzazione dell'autorità di pubblica sicurezza preposta al servizio.

1. This is to advise you informed of the further developments to be made
 outlined in our 1.334.6 at 19 Jan and 6/92 of 1963.

2. The military need designated to replace MAHAR, Gen MAHAR, and
 him to be present the equipment at the last moment. There is no other
 suitable candidate, and it has been decided that the end of the MAHAR Div,
 the Gen MAHAR, shall be a "winner" for the present. He has been
 in the Ireland many months and has a good reputation with his team.

3. The core of the MAHAR Div of the MAHAR Div from MAHAR to
 MAHAR is to be present, and it is to be decided that the other ways will be
 assembled at MAHAR by 10 Feb. The major value of the MAHAR has been main-
 tained so as to make the unit as well as possible and independent of the
 local railway etc.

4. The 2nd was sent to MAHAR in the interests of the MAHAR in the
 MAHAR and against the wishes of the MAHAR and General MAHAR, who MAHAR
 and the MAHAR already in the MAHAR MAHAR for the MAHAR. MAHAR agreed
 to the MAHAR of the MAHAR on the condition that it should not remain in the
 MAHAR for longer than three weeks unless absolutely necessary. The MAHAR will
 be given MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR MAHAR
 the end of the three weeks will return to MAHAR.

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M. W. H. J.

Major General
H M I A

Copy to 1 A

GMB/alc

A/11/2

SUBJECT : Maintenance of Public Order

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MILIA)

G/92

2 Feb 46

To : Ministry of War

1 Ref my letter G/92 of 21 Dec 45.

1. I have been informed that the CARIPALDI Regt of the FOLGORRE Div is being ordered to SICILY for the purpose of assisting to restore public order.

While I appreciate that it is entirely a matter for the ITALIAN Govt to decide where and when additional troops are needed for this purpose, I feel I am bound to draw your attention to certain unsatisfactory aspects of the situation in SICILY which have made this action necessary.

2. Provision has been made in the layout of the Interim Army for two Internal Security Divisions for SICILY, each 5,000 strong, plus one CRR Mobile battalion 578 strong. These forces have been considered by your Ministry to be ample for maintaining law and order in the island, and there is no doubt in my mind that if they are up to strength and have been properly employed there should be no need for extra troops at this time.

3. Your circulars 226090/11 of 6 Dec and 227900/11 of 20 Dec lay down precise instrs on how and when the military are to co-operate with civil powers to restore or maintain law and order, but from reports I have received there appear to have been several cases in SICILY recently in which:

- (a) troops were called out hurriedly without adequate consultation between civil and military authorities as to the object to be achieved and the method to be followed;
- (b) these troops were given insufficient orders and instrs by the military command as to the precise task that they were to undertake, and the way they were to carry out that task and as a result they were employed in a totally ineffective manner.
4. A particular instance occurred recently at MONTELEONE, when, after the place had been attacked by bandits, a bn of inf was hastily called out and despatched towards the town without any operational plan or specific instrs of how it was to deal with the bandits when it got

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4. A particular instance occurred recently at MONTESAPPE, when, after the place had been attacked by bandits, a bn of inf was hastily called out and despatched towards the town without any operational plan or specific instructions of how it was to deal with the bandits when it got into the town.

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19/2/2.

5. It is appreciated that at the time in question :
- (a) The Territorial Comd was engaged in political activities entirely out of keeping with his post;
 - (b) That relations between military and civil authorities were strained;
 - (c) That the High Commissioner was absent in Rome during the critical period;

and it is understood that this has come to the notice of the appropriate authorities and that this state of affairs is not likely to be repeated.

6. Over and above this, however, it would appear that no attempt was made to deploy the Mobile bn of the OORR before resorting to the use of tps, and this may have been due to :

- (a) Previous dispersal of this bn so as to make it unavailable at short notice;
- (b) The Bn being understrength;
- (c) Lack of tps to make the bn mobile;
- (d) Lack of adequate equipment.

7. I feel that the first essential in restoring the situation in SICILY is to reinforce with men and equipment the OORR Mobile bn in PAITERMO, at the expense of Regions that are at present less unsettled, so as to provide a readily available striking force and so reduce the necessity of calling out tps. In this connection, issue from Allied Army sources of 125 armoured cars is shortly to be expected and it is hoped that the first Armoured cars to be delivered will be made available by you to the PAITERMO bn.

8. When, however, it may still become necessary to make use of military forces, I trust that the most careful consideration will be given by the military commander :

- (a) To the method of employment of the tps on a proper military plan;
- (b) To the co-ordination of their action with that of the OORR;
- (c) That clear and comprehensive orders be issued to the officer in command of the tps that are to be employed.

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(c) That the High Commissioner was absent in Rome during the critical period;

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- (a) To the method of employment of the tps on a proper military plan;
- (b) To the co-ordination of their action with that of the OCRR;
- (c) That clear and comprehensive orders be issued to the officer in command of the tps that are to be employed.

AMH/150

Major General,
M.M.L.A.

Copies to: HQ, Allied Commission. (2) - 1 Copy for Public Safety Sub Com.
War Diary (2)

Copy forwarded to Lord Mountbatten 1/2

136

SUBJECT: Aid to the Civil Power

LAND FORCE SUB COM, AC (MIA)

- 0/92 -

1 Feb 46

To : ARMD

Ref your RMD/CI/3 of 25 Jan 46.

This matter has been taken up with the Ministry of War who inform us that CC PAMIA Legion has been instructed to give UDIAE Cps priority. It is understood that certain items have already been made available. CND I OCHR Section at this headquarters is following the matter up to ensure that action continues.

RMD/130

W. W. Hage Ags
Major General.
M.A.I.A.

Cong to: OCHR Section, MIA
Bear HQ 13 Corps, ref your 1001/1/4 of 6 Dec 45.

4010

D R A F T

134

File

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Public Order

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MILIA)

Q/92 *K*

Jan 46

TO : Ministry of War

See 131.

Ref my letter Q/92 of 21 Dec 45.

1. I have been informed that the GARIBOLDI Regt of the POLSARE DIV is being ordered to SPILL for the purpose of assisting to restore public order.

While I appreciate that it is entirely a matter for the ITALIAN Govt to decide where and when additional troops are needed for this purpose, I feel I am bound to draw your attention to certain unsatisfactory aspects of this particular case.

2. Provision has been made in the layout of the Interior Army for two Internal Security Divisions for SPILL, each 5,000 strong, plus one CAR Mobile Battalion 578 strong. These forces have been considered by your Ministry to be ample for maintaining law and order in the island, and there is no doubt in my mind that if they are up to strength and have been properly employed there should be no need for extra troops at this time.

3. Four circulars 286085/11 of 6 Dec and 227006/11 of 20 Dec lay down precise instructions on how and when the military are to co-operate with the civil powers to restore or maintain law and order, but from reports I have received there appears to have been several cases in SPILL recently in which:

(a) troops were called out hurriedly without adequate consultation

between civil and military authorities as to the object to be achieved and method to be followed;

(b) these troops were given insufficient orders and instructions by the military concerned as to the precise task that they were to undertake, and

4009

being ordered to arrive for the purpose of assisting to remove public order.

While I appreciate that it is entirely a matter for the Italian Govt to decide where and when additional troops are needed for this purpose, I feel I am bound to draw your attention to certain unsatisfactory aspects of this particular case.

2. Provision has been made in the layout of the Interim Law for two Internal Security Divisions for MOUL, each 5,000 strong, plus one para mobile battalion 578 strong. These forces have been considered by your Ministry to be capable for maintaining law and order in the island, and there is no doubt in my mind that if they are up to strength and have been properly employed there should be no need for extra troops at this time.

3. Four circulars 226098/11 of 6 Dec and 227500/11 of 19 Dec lay down precise instructions on how and when the military are to co-operate with the civil powers to restore or maintain law and order, but from reports I have received there appear to have been several cases in MOULZ recently in which:

(a) troops were called out hurriedly without adequate consultation

between civil and military authorities as to the object to be achieved and method to be followed;

(b) these troops were given insufficient orders and instructions by the military command as to the precise task that they were to undertake, and the way they were to carry out that task and as a result they were employed in a wholly ineffective manner.

4. A particular instance occurred recently at MOULZ, when, after the place had been attacked by bandits, a bn of inf was hastily called out and despatched towards the town without any operational plan or specific instructions as to how it was to deal with the bandits when it got into the town.

5. It is appreciated that at the time in question:

(c) The Territorial Govt was engaged in political activities entirely out of keeping with his post:

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12...

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-2-

- (b) That relations between military and civil authorities were strained.
- (c) That the High Commissioner was absent in Rome during the critical period - and it is understood that this has come to the notice of the appropriate authorities and that this state of affairs is not likely to be repeated.

6. Over and above this, however, it would appear that no attempt was made to deploy the Mobile bn of the OOR before resorting to the use of tps, and this may have been due to :

- (a) Previous dispersal of this bn so as to make it unavailable at short notice;
- (b) the bn being untrained;
- (c) lack of tps to take the bn mobile;
- (d) lack of adequate equipment.

7. I feel that the first essential in restoring the situation in SIGMA is to reinforce with men and equipment the OOR Mobile bn in Palermo, at the expense of Regiments that are at present less unsettled, so as to provide a readily available striking force and so reduce the necessity of calling out tps. In this connection, issue from Allied Army sources of 125 Armoured cars is shortly to be expected and it is hoped that the first Armoured cars to be delivered will be made available by tps to the PALERMO bn.

8. That, however, it may still become necessary to make use of military forces, I trust that the most careful consideration will be given by the military commander :

4008

- (a) to the method of employment of the bn on a proper military plan;
- (b) to the co-ordination of their action with that of the OOR;
- (c) that clear and comprehensive orders be issued to the officer in command of the bn that are to be employed.

(a) Previous discussion of this has been so as to make it unavailable to

about notice;

(b) We are being underestimating;

(c) Lack of try to make the in mobile;

(d) Lack of adequate equipment.

7. I feel that the first essential in restoring the situation in SECHIN is to reinforce with men and equipment the OOR Mobile bn in PARANO, at the expense of regions that are at present less unsettled, so as to provide a readily available striking force and so reduce the necessity of calling out troops. In this connection, I have from Allied Army sources of 12th Armoured Corps is shortly to be expected and it is hoped that the first Armoured Corps to be delivered will be made available by year to the PARANO bn.

8. Then, however, it may still become necessary to make use of military

sources, I trust that the most careful consideration will be given by the military

Commander:

4008

(a) to the method of employment of the troops on a proper military plan;

(b) to the co-ordination of their action with that of the others;

(c) that clear and comprehensive orders be issued to the officer in

command of the troops that are to be employed.

WLL/abc

Major General
M. H. A.

135A

SUBJECT : Employment of Troops in aid of the Civil Power.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (NMIA)

G/92

Feb 46

To : List 'B'

Cases have recently occurred in certain Regions where Prefects have attempted to give orders to Territorial Commanders over the provision of troops in aid of the civil power.

This is entirely incorrect and for your information I forward herewith a copy of a letter from Ministry of War to Ministry of the Interior on the subject dated 20 Dec 45. Copies of this letter were sent, for information, to all Territorial Commanders.

MMH/1JB

M B Hope

Brigadier
CS

4007

9/1/2.

COPY
TRANSLATION.

FROM : Ministry of War

Ref: 227900/11

TO : Ministry for the Interior

date: 20.12.45

SUBJECT : Employment of Army units on public order duties.

The Prefects are frequently making requests to the various Military Territorial Commands for troops to meet public order requirements.

I would confirm, in this respect, what has already been specifically pointed out to your Ministry in letter No. 226090/11 of the 6th December; that is, that the intervention of troops in this particular service must be limited to cases of exceptional gravity.

In this even Army units may only be employed when the responsible public order authorities have exhausted all available police and GCRH forces.

Only, therefore, in the event of all the police forces being employed and the situation threatening to assume alarming proportions may requests be made for Army units, the concession of which remains entrusted to the judgement, and on the responsibility of the competent Military Territorial Commander controlling the area.

Will your Ministry kindly bring the above to the attention of the political authorities under your command.

Sgd. BROGIO

/13b

War Minister

4J06

TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

TO: Ministry for the Interior

Col CS
GSO 1 (C)
Lso. 13
GSO 2 (C)
GSO 1 (C)
GSO 1 (C)
GSO 1 (C)
GSO 1 (C)
GSO 1 (C)
G (19)

REF: 227900/11

DATE: 20.12.45

SUBJECT: Employment of Army units on public order duties.

The Prefects are frequently making requests to the various Military Territorial Commands for troops to meet public order requirements.

I would confirm, in this respect, what has already been specifically pointed out to your Ministry in letter No. 226090/11 of the 6th. December; that is, that the intervention of troops in this particular service must be limited to cases of exceptional gravity.

In this event Army units may only be employed when the responsible public order authorities have exhausted all available police and CC.RR forces.

Only, therefore, in the event of all the police forces being employed and the situation threatening to assume alarming proportions may requests be made for Army units, the concession of which remains entrusted to the judgement, and on the responsibility of the competent Military Territorial Commander controlling the area.

Will your Ministry kindly bring the above to the attention of the political authorities under your command.

Sgd. BROSIO

O. Danin Cpl.

War Minister.

FILE: 9/92
DATE: 1/1/2

TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

TO: M.M.I.A.

MMIA. 'G'

FILE: G/92

DATE: R/31/1

REF: 202641/11

DATE: 30.1.46

SUBJECT: Employment of troops on duties of public order.

- 1) - I have taken action on the contents of your letter G/92 of 12 Dec. 1945.
- 2) - In respect of the armament of troops employed on public order duties I would point out that it is difficult to establish, at the moment of the employment of the units, whether the disturbers of the peace are armed or unarmed, since they can carry their weapons in many different ways.
It seems advisable therefore to plan for the arming of troops on public order duties with rifles, pistols, light automatic weapons, heavy automatic weapons, and hand grenades; the use of these weapons - always governed by an officer - shall be in relation to the armament and armed resistance offered, by the disturbers of the peace, in accordance with the procedure laid down by your Mission in the above quoted letter.
- * 3) - The use of teargas and smoke grenades cannot be planned since this Ministry does not have such means available.
- 4) - It does not appear to be possible to reconcile the responsibility which it is wished to attribute to the officer commanding the unit of ensuring that the troops are not surprised by ambush whilst proceeding to the scene of the disorders, with the order that the said troops must proceed to the scene with their arms unloaded.

With the order of keeping the weapons unloaded not only does it make it impossible to avoid ambushes, but puts the officer commanding the unit in a position of being unable to attend to the delicate duty with the necessary tranquillity.

It seems more advisable to order that, ~~as a rule~~ ^{as a rule}, ~~generally speaking~~, the units proceed to the place of employment with their weapons unloaded (also to take advantage of the moral effect which the order to load will have on the disturbers of the peace) with the exception of those cases in which the troops must, in order to reach the area of the disturbance, travel through an area in which it is presumed that some surprise attack may be planned by elements interested in obstructing the maintenance of order.

- 5) - I should be pleased if your Mission would kindly inform me of its opinions on the above mentioned matters.

Sgd. BROSIO

War Minister.

O. Danin Cpl.

4003

GI/bc



Ministero della Guerra

GABINETTO

URGENTE
N.

N. 22641/II di prot.

Roma,

 IN 14.15
 30 Gennaio 1946

O G G E T T O : - Impiego di truppe in servizi di ordine pubblico.

ALLA LAND FORCES SUB COMMISSION A.C. (M.M.I.A.)

ROMA G.

23

I - Ho preso atto di quanto segnalato da codesta Missione con la lettera G/92 in data 12 Dicembre.

II - Per quanto ha tratto all'armamento delle truppe impiegate in servizi di o.p. rappresento che riesce difficile stabilire, al momento dell'impiego dei reparti, se i perturbatori dell'ordine siano armati o disarmati, potendo essi celare le armi in modi diversi.

Pertanto, sembra opportuno prevedere l'armamento delle truppe in servizio di o.p. con fucili, pistole, armi automatiche leggere e pesanti, bombe a mano: l'impiego di tali armi - sempre regolato da un ufficiale - sarà in relazione all'armamento e alla resistenza armata apposta dai perturbatori, secondo le modalità fissate da codesta MMIA nella suindicata lettera.

III - L'uso di gas lacrimogeni e di granate fumogene non può essere previsto, non avendo, questo Ministero, alcuna disponibilità di tali mezzi.

IV - Non sembra possibile conciliare la responsabilità che si vuole attribuire all'ufficiale Comandante del reparto perchè le truppe non vengano sorprese in imboscate mentre si recano sul posto dei disordini, con la prescrizione che le truppe stesse devono recarsi sul posto con le armi scariche.

Con l'ordine di tenere le armi scariche non solo non si possono evitare imboscate, quanto si mette l'ufficiale comandante del reparto in condizione di non attendere al delicato servizio con la necessaria serenità.

Più opportuna sembra la prescrizione che, di norma, i reparti si rechino sul luogo dell'impiego con le armi scariche (anche per sfruttare l'effetto morale che l'ordine di cariche).

..//..

care le armi esercita sui perturbatori) ad eccezione di quei casi in cui la truppa, per portarsi sul luogo del disordine, debba compiere un percorso in zone dove è presumibile possa prevedersi qualche sorpresa da parte di elementi interessati ad ostacolare il mantenimento dell'ordine.

V - Sarò grato a codesta Missione se vorrà farmi conoscere il proprio pensiero sulle questioni dianzi accennate.

IL MINISTRO

Whor

131

SUBJECT: Employment of CO. HQ Mobile Bn.

LAND READER SUB COM, A.C. (MILA)

G/92

28 Jan 46

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref this HQ letter G/92 of 21 Dec 45.

1. It is reported that the CO. HQ Mobile Bn in the BOGOM area is split up into no fewer than five different localities and employed in a static guard role.
2. Such dispersal would seem to render this unit useless as a mobile striking force in the event of serious disturbance, and is entirely contrary to the purpose for which the Mobile Bn is designed.
3. This dispersal and employment is reported to have resulted from a request from the local Prefect to the Ministry of the Interior.
4. This information is brought to your notice for any action which you may think advisable, taking into account your full knowledge of the circumstances.

4001

La Folie 192
1430Spt. Lieut. Frank
19/2Major General,
H. H. I. A.Major General,
H. H. I. A.

AMM/39

Copy to: 6 AMM (plus copy G/92 of 21 Dec 45)

R/28/1

RECEIVED

28 JAN 1946

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

ESD/81/3

25 Jan 46

SUBJECT : Equipment of Carabinieri in UDINE Province.

TO : Allied Commission, Land Forces Sub Commission (MIA).

1. Forwarded herewith is a copy of Rear HQ XIII Corps letter 1001/1/Q of 6 Dec 45 and a copy of this Headquarters' reply.

2. It is fully appreciated that representations have already been made to the Italian Government on the question of the clothing and equipment of the CC.RR. It is requested, however, that the Italian Government be pressed to make an especial effort in the case of the CC.RR in UDINE province where it is considered operationally essential for a very high standard of efficiency and morale to be maintained.

AAF/hn/G(SD)

A. D. WARD,
Major General,
Chief of General Staff.

COPY TO:- CAO } incl copies
G-3 AFHQ } of
Civ Affairs } enclosures

Col. GS
GSO 1 (D)
L. G. 1
G. 2 (S)
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GSO 1 (100)

FILE: G/92
DATE: 1/28/46

C O P Y

130 B

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT :- Clothing and Equipment for Carabinieri
in UDINE Province.

Rear HQ 13 Corps
1001/1/Q

Tel No : 29955

6 Dec 45

A.F.H.Q.
for Chief of Staff

1. The Allied Military Government Provincial Commissioner for UDINE in his report for November, states that the morale of the Carabinieri in this Province would be considerably improved if only they could be provided with more and better clothing. He requests that strong pressure be brought to bear at once on the Italian Government to provide the necessary clothing and boots which are deficient, especially in the case of some 50 of the contingent who are still doing duty in civilian clothes.

2. The UDINE Carabinieri are doing good work under the most trying circumstances, which are well known to be peculiar to the Province. It is therefore most essential that the performance of their duties be not additionally impaired by the unsatisfactory clothing conditions under which they are at present forced to serve.

3. Allied Military Government, UDINE Province, have already represented the matter to the Allied Commission with no satisfactory result and the Corps Commander has directed that it now be submitted through Military Staff channels. He wishes you to know that unless the Carabinieri concerned are properly clothed and equipped, he will be unable to accept responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the Province.

4. He requests, therefore, that the matter be urgently represented to the Italian Government in the strongest terms.

5. Should it be beyond the power of the Italian Government to take urgent and satisfactory action, he requests that as UDINE Province is to remain under Allied Military Government, the necessary clothing and equipment be furnished from Allied resources.

6. In view of the importance of this subject, it will be appreciated if an early reply may be given to this letter.

3999

1. The Allied Military Government Provincial Commissioner for UDINE in his report for November, states that the morale of the Carabinieri in this Province would be considerably improved if only they could be provided with more and better clothing. He requests that strong pressure be brought to bear at once on the Italian Government to provide the necessary clothing and boots which are deficient, especially in the case of some 50 of the contingent who are still doing duty in civilian clothes.
2. The UDINE Carabinieri are doing good work under the most trying circumstances, which are well known to be peculiar to the Province. It is therefore most essential that the performance of their duties be not additionally impaired by the unsatisfactory clothing conditions under which they are at present forced to serve.
3. Allied Military Government, UDINE Province, have already represented the matter to the Allied Commission with no satisfactory result and the Corps Commander has directed that it now be submitted through Military Staff channels. He wishes you to know that unless the Carabinieri concerned are properly clothed and equipped, he will be unable to accept responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the Province.
4. He requests, therefore, that the matter be urgently represented to the Italian Government in the strongest terms.
5. Should it be beyond the power of the Italian Government to take urgent and satisfactory action, he requests that as UDINE Province is to remain under Allied Military Government, the necessary clothing and equipment be furnished from Allied resources.
6. In view of the importance of this subject, it will be appreciated if an early reply may be given to this letter.

SOD. ????
For Lieut-General,
Comd.

COPY TO: - BCS

3999

1300

ORIGINAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

CONFIDENTIAL

REF/84/3

Jan 45

ORIGINATOR :- Clothing and Equipment for Carabinieri in
UDINE Province.

TO :- Rear HQ 15 Corps.

1300

Reference your letter 1901/1/A of 6 Dec 45.

1. As you are probably aware, the supervision of the CC. RR has recently become the responsibility of the Land Forces Sub Commission of the Allied Commission (MELIA).
2. The whole question of the clothing and equipment of the CC. RR is now being considered with the overall problem of the equipment requirements of the Interim Italian Army and every endeavour is being made by this Headquarters in conjunction with AFHQ and HQ MAFUSA to provide the necessary equipment in the shortest possible time.
3. The responsibility for clothing the CC. RR now rests with the Italian Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have clearly laid down the methods by which the Italian Government will procure their requirements for these forces. The methods to be adopted are known by the Italian Government.
4. This Headquarters and MELIA are aware that the Italian Government have been somewhat dilatory in assuming their responsibilities in this matter and a letter couched in the strongest terms has recently been sent to them by MELIA pointing out, inter alia, that the responsibility for maintaining internal security rests primarily with the CC. RR and that that force should receive higher priority in the allocation of clothing and equipment than the Italian Army.

5. A copy of your letter is being forwarded to MELIA with instructions that the matter be taken up with the Italian Government and the necessity of an early allocation of clothing and equipment for the CC. RR in UDINE Province be impressed upon them.

6. Should there be an immediate operational requirement for weapons or vehicles for the CC. RR in UDINE Province, however, it is requested that details be forwarded to this Headquarters without delay, when every endeavour will be made to provide such weapons or vehicles in anticipation of the final decision as to the equipment to be released to the Italian Government for the CC. RR as a whole.

7. It is regretted that a reply to your letter has not been forwarded earlier, as the papers were unfortunately mislaid in one of the Branches of this Headquarters.

3398

2. The whole question of the clothing and equipment of the CC.MR is now being considered with the overall problem of the equipment requirements of the Interim Italian Army and every endeavour is being made by this Headquarters in conjunction with AFHQ and HQ MPMMA to provide the necessary equipment in the shortest possible time.
3. The responsibility for clothing the CC.MR now rests with the Italian Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff have clearly laid down the methods by which the Italian Government will procure their requirements for these forces. The methods to be adopted are known by the Italian Government.
4. This Headquarters and MIA are aware that the Italian Government have been somewhat dilatory in assuming their responsibilities in this matter and a letter couched in the strongest terms has recently been sent to them by MIA pointing out, inter alia, that the responsibility for maintaining internal security rests primarily with the CC.MR and that that force should now receive higher priority in the allocation of clothing and equipment than the Italian Army.
5. A copy of your letter is being forwarded to MIA with instructions that the matter be taken up with the Italian Government and the necessity of an early allocation of clothing and equipment for the CC.MR in URM Province be impressed upon them.
6. Should there be an immediate operational requirement for weapons or vehicles for the CC.MR in URM Province, however, it is requested that details be forwarded to this Headquarters without delay, when every endeavour will be made to provide such weapons or vehicles in anticipation of the final decision as to the equipment to be released to the Italian Government for the CC.MR as a whole.
7. It is regretted that a reply to your letter has not been forwarded earlier, as the papers were unfortunately mislaid in one of the Branches of this Headquarters.

A.D. WARD,
Major General,
Chief of General Staff.

ADM/ha/3(30)

COPY 501 - 540

9998

785020

SECRET

HQ 2 District CDR
2015 C(0)

23 Jan 46

CHIEF CDR
JULIA

Copy : 217 aros

RECEIVED 23 JAN 1945

100

Further to my letter 2015 C(0) of 5 Dec 45.

1. I am glad to report that the equipment situation with the CDR at BELGONA has recently improved considerably. They have received clothing, lorries and motor cycles, and are now getting their FOL direct from Italian Army Sources, which precludes any chance of being under-issued by the Prefect.

2. However, one important point has arisen. A number of the Prefects are demanding on COM Command in ROM for an increase in the strength of their local CDR. As a result, COM Command pass on the order to the Legion Command who has to send the reinforcements from the Mobile Bn which in consequence is dwindling away and will soon not be a bn at all. It cannot be overlooked that this may be a deliberate attempt by the Prefetti to dissipate the strength of the Mobile Bn for political reasons. (I have in previous letters described the infiltration of Communists into positions of public responsibility.)

I am convinced that the bn should be left intact so that it remains a powerful and centralised striking force.

A typical case has just occurred. The Prefect at PHARARA has received information that an attack on the gaol is to be made shortly by 200 armed men. He has already 150 CDR but has at once signalled ROM for reinforcements. There is no doubt that this will be passed for compliance to the Mobile Bn in BELGONA, and that, whether or no the attack ever materialises, those men will not be returned.

3. I therefore strongly recommend that the necessity for a central reserve be stressed to the COM Command, ROM, and that this Mobile Bn, which is at last becoming a reasonable unit, should not be treated as a reinforcement depot but should be allowed to maintain its individuality and existence.

Cal. G3

THUR

CA. H. de man

6/92 129

Further to my letter 2015 G(C) of 5 Dec 45.

1. I am glad to report that the equipment situation with the CORR at Bologna has recently improved considerably. They have received clothing, lorries and motor cycles, and are now getting their POL direct from Italian Army Sources, which precludes any chance of being under-issued by the Prefect.
2. However, one important point has arisen. A number of the Prefects are demanding on CORR Command in ROMF for an increase in the strength of their local CORR. As a result, CORR Command pass on the order to the Legion Comd who has to send the reinforcements from the Mobile Bn which in consequence is dwindling away and will soon not be a bn at all. It cannot be overlooked that this may be a deliberate attempt by the Prefetti to dissipate the strength of the Mobile Bn for political reasons. (I have in previous letters described the infiltration of Communists into positions of public responsibility.)


I am convinced that the bn should be left intact so that it remains a powerful and centralised striking force.

A typical case has just occurred. The Prefect at PARMA has received information that an attack on the gaol is to be made shortly by 200 armed men. He has already 150 CORR but has at once signalled ROMS for reinforcements. There is no doubt that this will be passed for compliance to the Mobile Bn in BOLCONA, and that, whether or no the attack ever materialises, those men will not be returned.

3. I therefore strongly recommend that the necessity for a central reserve be stressed to the Carr Command, ROMF, and that this Mobile Bn, which is at last becoming a reasonable unit, should not be treated as a reinforcement depot but should be allowed to maintain its individuality and existence.

CCLE/ae

Col. G5	→
G50 1 (SD)	→
Dep. G3	→
G50 11 (S4)	→
G50 11 (1)	→
G50 11 (S4)	→
G50 11 (S4)	→
G50 11 (S4)	→
G (12)	→



C.A. Hyden

Major General
Commanding 2 District



LASSI, POKKIO, SUN, CHEN, AND CHEN

602

26 26 26

TO : MEMBERS OF THE

1. Ref your letter 16542/100, dated 17 Jan 46 and this in
letter 240/24 of 21 Jan 46. You state that all items, less 13 OTHER items,
in order INVENTORY control the question of the savings of space by
intelligently removing use to Four-Material Region III is purely for
your own decision.

4. The possible use of arms against UNRWA personnel remains governed by my Letter of 27 Oct., 19 Jan and 18 Jan 56 addressed to your HQ.

G/14, 7010

01/1/2020

5/14 to 2

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ASTOR LENOX TILDEN FOUNDATION
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Walter S. & G. H. Jones, 2000

Public Safety 3-0 10)

This copy of letter retained
to insure 1. above.

2000-2001

3996

09/28/

SUBJECT: MESSAGE.

127

FROM: A.F. SUB COM (FOUR).

TO: M.A.A.C. SECRETARIAT, CASERTA.
(1) CHIEF COMMISSIONER, M.O. A.C. POMI.
(2) M.M.I.A.RECEIVED 25 JAN 1946
(By hand A.F.S.C.)
(By hand A.F.S.C.) ✓126.
SUBJECT: A-27 T.O.O. 251700 JANUARY 1946 (*)

REFERENCE LETTER AFSC/54/AFR OF THE 21ST JANUARY ADDRESSED A/V/M PRIORITY
AND OTHER AMENDMENTS ITALIAN AIR MINISTRY REQUESTED BY MINISTER OF DEFENSE
TO RETAIN THREE MIL 79 AIRCRAFT AT RAJENDRO UNDER CONDITIONS GIVEN IN PARA
FIVE OF ABOVE QUOTED LETTER. (*)
WILL NOTIFY YOU ANY CHANGES. (*)

I.M. BROOME,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICE CONSTANTINOPLE.

M.M.I.A.

PRIORITY: ROUTINE

FILE: 6/92

DATE: 25/1/46

Col. GS
GSO I
Dep.
GSO II
GSO II
GSO II
GSO II
GSO II
GSO II
GSO II

Col. GS
GSO I (50) 995
Dep. G3
GSO II (50)
GSO II (1)
GSO II (1)
GSO II (1)
GSO II (1)
GSO II (1)
GSO II (1)
GSO II (1)

25/1/46

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: AIR VICE-MARSHAL P.J. FURNEY, DFC, AFC, AOC, RAF, ITALY.
MAJOR GENERAL WARD, C.O.F.S., AFHQ.
CHIEF COMMISSIONER, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
H.M.I.A.✓

DATE: 21ST JANUARY, 1946.

REF: AFHQ/54/AFH.

RECEIVED 23 JAN 46.
736.

SECRET.

NOTES ON MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR, A.F.S.C. ON THE 21ST JANUARY, 1946.

Notes on the above mentioned meeting are forwarded herewith.

2. The Chief Commissioner agreed with the action proposed in paragraph 5, and consequently the Deputy Chief of the Italian Air Staff was sent for and instructed accordingly; he took notes and will be seeing the Chief of the Italian Air Staff and the Minister of Interior on the 22nd January.

L. P. Arden
L. P. ARDEN,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Col. GS
GSO I (D)
Dro. GS
GSO II (G)
GSO II (I)
GSO II (V)
GSO II (S)
GSO III (GAD)
O (Tro)

2200
2200
2200

(K)

3894 A - 03
FILE: 6/92
DATE: 2/23/

33010

NOTES ON MEETING HELD IN THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,
A.F.S.G. ON THE 21ST JANUARY, 1946.

Present: Air Vice-Marshal F.J. Fogarty. (AOC, RAF, Italy).
Major General Ward. (C. of S, A.F.H.Q.).
Air Vice-Marshal I.E. Drodie.
Brigadier General W. Lee.
Group Captain Pakenham. (M.J.P.B.).

1a and 2a were discussed partly as a test case ^{and partly} as applicable to the current troubles in Sicily, bearing in mind that these troubles ~~might~~ increase in seriousness.

2. It was agreed that the instructions in 2A should stand, but that A.F.S.G. should advise the Italian Air Ministry against the use of any aircraft for these operations in Sicily on the grounds that aircraft with untrained observers (who are liable to give false reports), are unlikely to produce results sufficient to justify the expenditure involved. (b) Any small advantage that might be gained is outweighed by the probability of distorted press or other reports, and by political opponents making capital out of the affair, e.g. aircraft on observation flights might be accused of firing or bombing (especially if Ground Forces are firing or using mortar), the dropping of flares might be reported as incendiary bombing. Flares might set light to villages. Firing or bombing is quite likely to harm inoffensive persons.

3. If only one inoffensive person is killed, the political reactions in Italy might be serious. Any untoward political or press campaign might lessen consideration favourable to the Italians by other Governments.

4. Operations by any type of aircraft on the Palestinian model requires a very high state of training, both in the air and on the ground and in co-operation one with the other - this the Italian Air Force at present lacks.

5. Therefore, it is proposed to advise the Italian Air Ministry as follows:-

(i) A small number of unarmed aircraft of only Italian design may be used for dropping supplies and for reconnaissance by day only, but A.F.H.Q. ~~should~~ ^{may} advise against the use of any aircraft whatever in these operations.

(ii) If the Italian Government does decide to retain aircraft in Sicily for these operations, aircraft should only be used at the direct request of the Officer Commanding the Italian Armed Forces in Sicily, carrying ~~only~~ ^{an} Italian ~~Army~~ ^{Army} ~~Officer~~ ^{Officer} ~~as passenger~~ ^{as passenger} - for observation and supply dropping by day.

Note: Supply dropping might benefit bandits as much as friendly forces.

(iii) If Italian aircraft are going to be used for these operations they must only operate from airfields not occupied by any unit of the RAF and USAAF, (because the Allies cannot undertake any additional precautions against unfriendly

current troubles in Sicily, bearing in mind that these troubles might increase in seriousness.

2. It was agreed that the instructions in 2A should stand, but that A.F.S.C. should advise the Italian Air Ministry against the use of any aircraft for these operations in Sicily on the grounds that aircraft with untrained observers (who are liable to give false reports), are unlikely to produce results sufficient to justify the expenditure involved. (b) Any small advantage that might be gained is outweighed by the probability of distorted press or other reports, and by political opponents making capital out of the affair, e.g. aircraft on observation flights might be accused of firing or bombing (especially if Ground Forces are firing or using mortar), the dropping of flares might be reported as incendiary bombing. Flares might set light to villages. Firing or bombing is quite likely to harm inoffensive persons.

3. If only one inoffensive person is killed, the political reactions in Italy might be serious. Any untoward political or press campaign might lessen consideration favourable to the Italians by other Governments.

4. Operations by any type of aircraft on the Palestinian model requires a very high state of training, both in the air and on the ground and in co-operation one with the other - this the Italian Air Force at present lacks.

5. Therefore, it is proposed to advise the Italian Air Ministry as follows:-

(i) A small number of unarmed aircraft of only Italian design may be used for dropping supplies and for reconnaissance by day only, but A.F.S.C. ~~should~~ ^{may} advise against the use of any aircraft whatever in these operations.

(ii) If the Italian Government does decide to retain aircraft in Sicily for these operations, aircraft should only be used at the direct request of the Officer Commanding the Italian Armed Forces in Sicily, carrying ~~an~~ ^{an} Italian ~~any~~ ^{any} officer as passengers - for observation and supply dropping by day.

Note: Supply dropping might benefit bandits as much as friendly forces.

(iii) If Italian aircraft are going to be used for these operations they must only operate from airfields not occupied by any unit of the RAF and USAF, (because the Allies cannot undertake any additional precautions against unfriendly action).

6. It was agreed that before A.F.S.C. advise the Italian Air Ministry as above, the Chief Commissioner should be consulted.

Copy: A.O.C. Italy.
Chief Commissioner.
A.F.S.C. file.
M.M.I.A. for information.

L.P. Brodie
L.E. Brodie,
Air Vice-Marshal.

DRAFT

125

Refuse for signature 26/1

SUBJECT : Authorisation for INF Personnel att to ITALIAN
Territorial HQ to carry personal Arms

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/92

Jan 46

TO : MINISTRY of WAR

- see folio 128 for this letter out do not*
1. Ref your letter 145342/PAV.2 dated 17 Jan 46 and this HQ letter S/SD/31 of 20 Jan 45. Now that all ITALY, less 13 CORPS area, is under ITALIAN control the question of the carriage of arms by Intelligence personnel att to Territorial Region HQ is purely one for your own decision.
 2. The possible use of arms against ALLIED personnel remains governed by my letters G/14 of 27 Dec 45, 12 Jan and 14 Jan 46 addressed to your HQ.

Major General
M M I A

Copy to : CA Sec AC
Public Safety S-C AC } Plus copy of letters referred
to in para 1, above.

3992

Internal: INF



Ministero della Guerra

STATO MAGGIORE R. ESERCITO
UFFICIO INFORMAZIONI

124

Rome 17 January 1946

SUBJECT: Authorization to carry weapons to "I" personnel
attached to Territorial HQs.

TO : Lan Forces Sub-Comm. A.C. (MMIA) Rome

1. Request for an extension of the authorization
S/SD/31 dated 20 January 45, ~~to~~ all personnel of the
Intelligence Office attached to Territorial HQs.
2. Said personnel is not included in the
War Establishment either of SIM or IAI.
3. It will be the care of this Office to advise
the Territorial HQs if authorization will be granted.

[Signature]
P. Agrifoglio
Colonel
Comm. Off.
IAI & SPU

LRAT For approval by CA & C
PS & C

Ministero della Guerra

*Ref. ... Now that all ITALY, Rome
is under Italian control 3991
the carriage of arms by personnel attached to Territorial
Region HQ is hereby given for your own decision
The former used arms against ALLIED personnel
remains governed by law ...*

*For further information
May 481867 Capt. TROBITZ*



4/6/46

British Embassy,
Rome.

15th January, 1946.

RECEIVED
64521 JAN 46
10.1

Dear General.

Many thanks for your letter no. G/92 of January 5th, covering a copy of the minutes of the meeting you held with General Brunetti to discuss clothing for the Carabinieri.

2. The Ambassador is sending copies of these minutes to the Foreign Office for information.

Yrs. ever

H.L. d'A. Hopkinson.

Major General L. Browning,
Land Forces Sub-Commission (M.M.I.A.)
Allied Commission,
Rome.

12/1

File
d/B
2930

121

MESSAGE PAGECONFIDENTIAL

FROM : M.M.I.A.

12 2125 A

TO : 11 111

SD 5122. 121

NOT EAR 8/21 OF 1211 (.) AGENT FOR ALLIED RESPONSIBILITY (.)

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION SHOULD APPLY ITALIAN CRIMINAL CODE (.)

WILL CHECK THIS WITH THE ITALIAN AGENTS (.)

MESSAGE PAGECONFIDENTIAL

6/98

info 6/92 -

3989

121

COPY INCOMING SIGNAL

FROM : 11 BLU

12 1230 A

INFO COPY

TO : MMIA ROME (RAAC PASS)

SECRET

ONLY

REF : G/21

OP PRIORITY

See to 122

See 8/98 to 83

LARGE SCALE BANDIT RAIDS ON CC.NR STATIONS CONTINUING (.)

ESSENTIAL THAT THE FOLLOWING BE MADE AVAILABLE AS EARLY AS

POSSIBLE ARMORED CARS PREFERABLY ARMED (.) LIGHT MACHINE

GUNS (.) RADIO SETS FOR SMALL STATIONS (.) VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH

RADIO (.) ALSO 3,000 CC.NR REINFORCEMENTS (.)

ACK

INFO COPY

ONLY

'G' DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : G/98

INFO : G/92

Jw
14 Jan 46

3988

Translation

From M. of W.

To M.M.I.A.

Ref. 200221/1

Date 4/1/46

Subject: Employment of Army Units for Public
Order Duties.

Ref. letter G/92 dated 21/12/45.

1°) - I acknowledge your letter referred to above.

2°) - In relation to that shown in para. 5, I agree on the advisability, concerning the employment of army units for public order duties, that it should be Terr. Mil. Commanders to decide regarding the allotment of these troops above all due to their responsibility of training regiments under their command. Regarding this matter I had already informed, in letter No 227900/II dated 20/12/45, copy attached, the Gen. Commander of the C.R. Corp, Min of the Intern; and Mil. Terr. Commanders.

Col. GS
GSO I (D)
Dep. G3
GSO II (S)
GSO II (I)
GSO II (W)
GSO II (B)
G. 111 (S-3)
G (H)

DAK

FILE: G/92
DATE: 4/9/1

(XXXXXXXXXXXXX)
illegible.

3987

091000

Translation

1208

From M. of W. Cabinet.
To Min. of Intern.

Ref. 227900/II
216.5.1.

Date 20/12/45.

Subject Employment of Army Units for Public Order Duties.

Request is frequently made by Prefects to Terr. Mil. HQs for units to meet with public order needs. ATT

Concerning this I confirm what has already been pointed out to the Ministry in letter N° 226090/II dated 6/12/45 and namely that the intervention of troops in this particular service must be limited to cases of exceptional gravity.

Thus the employment of army units can only take place when the Public Order Authorities have exhausted all available police and C.R. forces.

Only in the case therefore that the police find themselves fully engaged and the situation threatens to assume an alarming aspect can requests be forwarded for army units, the allotment of which remains entrusted to the judgement and responsibility of the Terr. Mil. Commanders concerned for the jurisdiction.

DAK

M. Brosio.

3986

FILE:	6/92
DATE:	8/5/1

Translation

From M. of W.
To The MIN. of INTERN.

Ref. 226090/II
222. 3. 12.

Date 6/12/45.

Subject Employment of Units for Jail Guards and Public Order
Duty.

120
See to 137

& 135A

Further to that already pointed out in letter No 224098/II dated 26 Nov. 45 I confirm the difficulties of adhering to the request for the intervention of troops for jail guard and public order requirements.

As is known, in fact, further to agreement reached with the Allied Authorities, many units have been disbanded or reduced in number due to which the present availability of troops at various Mil. Terr. Hqs - to whom a great area of jurisdiction has been entrusted - is reduced to a few guard units whose limited strength is absolutely inadequate even for army requirements.

It is necessary to add moreover that these units, in consequence of their recent formation, are almost all engaged in completion of their training; neither is it possible to replace them with others already instructed because, the latter, are all belonging to Inf. Divs to whom has been assigned tasks of another nature and which, on the other hand, are still under command of the allies regarding employment.

In respect of the above, I ask you to kindly point out this particular situation to the political authorities in order that they may bear it in mind when issuing the instructions concerned.

D.L.K.

Jacini.

3985

FILED	G/92
DATE	8/9/1.

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

6/92

5 January 1946

TO : Addressees as below.

1. In continuation of my G/92 dated 20 Dec. 45, I arranged a meeting with General BRUNETTI (Head of the CC.RR.) on 3 Jan. to discuss the whole question of clothing for the CC.RR.

2. The attached minutes of that meeting give the situation at this moment and show that this aspect of the problem is well in hand and that it is now a matter for the CC.RR. themselves.

LB/

L. Browning.
Major General,
M.M.I.A.

H. HOPKINSON Esq., British Embassy
Brigadier General FRANCIS M. BRADY, American Embassy
Executive Commissioner, A.C.
Minister of War (together with a copy of G/92 of 20 Dec 45)

Lil
G. 1/92

Amel

3984

Minutes of Meeting

at M.M.I.A.

on 3 Jan 1946.

Object:-

To review situation of clothing and equipment for CC.RR. in order to clarify present position; to determine availabilities vs. needs for Italian Army and CC.RR.

Present:-

M.M.I.A.	Col. Kerr	Deputy Commander (Chairman)
	Col. Fidsley	A/Q
	Lt. Col. Curties	A.Q.M.G.
	Lt. Col. Airey	A.D.O.S.
	Major Baumann	G.S.O. II (L)
	Captain Ward	Assistant G-4
War Ministry Commissariat :		General Pelligra
CC.RR. H.Q. :		Lt. Col. Nebiasi
		General Brunetti
		Col. Lanzani
		Captain Carloni

1. General Brunetti declared that in October a request had been made by CC.RR. to War Ministry for 30,000 sets of uniforms. To date, 17,000 suits had been furnished and material for the remaining 13,000 uniforms was in Como Clothing factory in process of production. General Pelligra declared these 13,000 would be finished by 15 February. In addition, CC.RR. would produce an additional 10,000 uniforms by 1 February in their own workshops from additional cloth lately released by War Ministry. Cloth for an additional 4,000 uniforms is now available for collection by CC.RR. By 1 January release has been made from War Ministry stocks to CC.RR. in the following quantities:

17,000	++	uniforms already delivered to CC.RR.	3983
13,000		uniforms in production at Como factory.	
10,000		uniforms in production in CC.RR. shops.	
4,000		uniforms to be produced in CC.RR. shops.	
44,000			

++ War Ministry contends that the figure of 17,000 uniforms already delivered to CC.RR. against CC.RR. demand for 30,000 should also include 10,000 uniforms received by the CC.RR. from the Como factory while under AMG control.

2. A letter from J.B.L.U. to M.M.I.A. informed that 2 District had released from C.E.M. 77,000 metres of cloth and 37,000 metres of lining to CC.RR. Only a part of this has been collected by CC.RR. General Brunetti will see that all is collected forthwith and will make a further 25,000 uniforms in Legion shops in February. War Ministry will furnish such additional lining and buttons as are needed.

Assistant G-4

General Pelligr
Lt. Col. Nabissi
General Brunetti
Col. Lanzani
Captain Carloni

Captain Ward

War Ministry Commissariat :
CC.RR. H.Q.

1. General Brunetti declared that in October a request had been made by CC.RR. to War Ministry for 50,000 sets of uniforms. To date, 17,000 suits had been furnished and material for the remaining 13,000 uniforms was in Como Clothing factory in process of production. General Pelligr declared these 13,000 would be finished by 15 February. In addition, CC.RR. would produce an additional 10,000 uniforms by 1 February in their own workshops from additional cloth lately released by War Ministry. Cloth for an additional 4,000 uniforms is now available for collection by CC.RR. By 1 January release has been made from War Ministry stocks to CC.RR. in the following quantities:

17,000	++	uniforms already delivered to CC.RR.
13,000		uniforms in production at Como factory.
10,000		uniforms in production in CC.RR. shops.
4,000		uniforms to be produced in CC.RR. shops.
44,000		

3983

++ War Ministry contends that the figure of 17,000 uniforms already delivered to CC.RR. against CC.RR. demand for 50,000 should also include 10,000 uniforms received by the CC.RR. from the Como factory while under AMZ control.

2. A letter from 3 B.L.U. to M.M.I.A. informed that 2 District had released from C.E.M. 77,000 metres of cloth and 37,000 metres of lining to CC.RR. Only a part of this has been collected by CC.RR. General Brunetti will see that all is collected forthwith and will make a further 25,000 uniforms in Legion shops in February. War Ministry will furnish such additional lining and buttons as are needed.

3. General Brunetti stated his immediate need was for 10,000 complete sets of uniforms. General Pelligr was unable to meet this demand due to imminent call-up. It was therefore decided to turn over to War Ministry from surplus Br-Iti stocks in Naples, 20,000 suits of Battledress, 20,000 shirts, 20,000 drawers wool. General Pelligr agreed to turn over immediately to CC.RR. 10,000 suits of Battledress, 10,000 shirts and 10,000 drawers wool. CC.RR. will uniform one or more legions, probably in South Italy, with this clothing, releasing grey clothing to other legions.

4. During period 1 October - 28 February, the CC.RR. will have received a total of 79,000 uniforms, plus 10,000 additional given to them by AMG. This will give each man one new uniform and provide a substantial reserve. On 1 October, the CC.RR. was not naked.

5. General Brunetti objected that repaired shoes were not serviceable. It was agreed, however, that CC.RR. would select and collect 30,000 used pairs of shoes from existing army stocks to supplement present issue of one pair per man.

6. It was agreed that no CC.RR. would be discharged in serviceable grey-green uniform. General Pelligra would make available old dyed Battledress to the CC.RR. for discharging men.

7. The proper distribution of clothing and equipment issued to the CC.RR. was discussed. General Brunetti stated that his orders provided for proper distribution and he was cautioned that he is responsible that the CC.RR. are properly clothed, inasmuch as his demands have been more than fully met.

JJW/ra

3982

OFFICE OF THE G. O. C.
MILITARY MISSION TO THE ITALIAN ARMY

File G/92

28 Dec 45

My dear Brady,

Thanks for yours of 27 Dec. re CCRR.

Our letters crossed. You will by now have received my dossier on the subject, which explains everything.

I think the point to remember is that:

- (a) It is the Italians own party now
- (b) we have done all we can - and more
- (c) Gen. Brunetti can and should "bleat" to the Minister of War if he is not satisfied
- (d) the time factor is operative i.e. that clothing etc. is on the way, nor one does not re-equip 65,000 chaps in a few weeks. It is only comparatively recently that the CCRR became 1st priority.

I'll pass your letter to the proper quarter.

Best wishes for 1946

Yours Sincerely

/s/ Langley Browning

APC

C O P Y

3981



Off. Comd. for assigned. Ref. our letter
22 Dec 117

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY AND MILITARY AIR ATTACHE
AMERICAN EMBASSY
Rome, Italy

FME/mhq

27 December 1945

Major General L. Browning
GOC, Military Mission to Italian Army
Allied Commission
Rome

Dear General Browning:

In connection with our conversation on the evening of December 24th as to equipment for the Carabinieri, and report of the Allied Commission that 30,000 uniforms of gray-green cloth complete with overcoats and 72,000 meters of blue cloth for the manufacture of other uniforms and overcoats have been made available, General Brunetti has submitted the following comments:

"From April to today, at various times, 15,500 gray-green uniforms were distributed to the Carabinieri. Another 1500 gray-green uniforms are actually being completed in Turin. Total available - 17,000 out of 30,000.

"Since the month of April the Carabinieri have received 19,000 gray-green overcoats out of the total of 30,000 promised.

"Therefore, this command must receive from the War Ministry 13,000 uniforms (blouse and pants) and 11,000 overcoats.

"In order to meet their pledge the War Ministry has decided that 8,000 gray-green overcoats should be drawn from the Quartermasters of the various territorial commands where they might be available. It is not known when they will be delivered.

"The 13,000 blouses and pants and 3,000 overcoats should be made from 72,000 meters of blue cloth presently located at the Lariano Depot of Como. This cloth should be drawn direct by this command and distributed to the various units to be manufactured by them. However, this plan drawn up by us and the War Ministry is frustrated by the opposition made by the above-mentioned Depot, who insisted that they themselves manufacture the uniforms, assuring delivery by the 15th of February. This matter is still being studied and discussed, and we do not know how it will be resolved.

"In conclusion, out of the 30,000 complete series of clothing, this command has only been able to distribute so far, 19,000 overcoats and 17,000 blouses and pants. The 72,000 meters of blue cloth do not represent a supplementary issue, but represent an integral part of the 30,000 uniforms and overcoats promised. In addition to this, however, I must say that the War Ministry has recently assigned to this command 30,000 meters of khaki cloth which will have to be drawn directly from the manufacturing companies, and this command has already issued orders to that effect. If this cloth is actually issued it will permit the manufacture of 10,000 uniforms.

"Enough gray-green cloth for the immediate manufacture of 4,000 uniforms has been issued to the Bologna unit which needs it particularly.

"At the present time, if one concedes that it is absolutely necessary to issue all the personnel at least two uniforms,

- a. one for normal services
- b. the other for interior or fatigue duty,


then the issues already made a little at a time and at wide intervals do not contribute any material benefit since they are just large enough to make up for the replacements due to normal wear and tear. Therefore, it would be necessary, in addition to what has been issued or available for issue, to make available an additional 65,000 uniforms (or else enough cloth - about 200,000 meters, preferably khaki) in order that we will finally be able to see the 65,000 Carabinieri properly clothed."

I believe the above comments of General Brunetti will be of interest to you. I will be very pleased to discuss this subject concerning equipment for the Carabinieri at any time it would be convenient to you. As I remarked to you the other evening, our Ambassador, Mr. Kirk, is very anxious to follow up on the action being taken to organize and equip public security forces.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

3979


FRANCIS M. BRADY
Brig. Gen., USA
Military Attache

15/T

REF: 229040/11

DATE: 29.12.45

SUBJECT: Maintenance of law and order in the Bologna area.

Reference your G. 92 of the 14th. inst.

With reference to that pointed out by your Mission,
I would inform you :

- 1) - I have ordered that absolute priority be given to the issue of stores (vehicles, clothing, etc.) to the CC.RR units and in particular to those located in the Bologna area.
As far as the vehicles are concerned, 10 lorries have already been assigned to each of the 6 mobile battalions, including that of Bologna. I have speeded up the issue of clothing, already being carried out.
- 2) - I have requested the Transport Ministry for a speedy handing over, in accordance with the agreements reached, of the vehicles which it has to issue to the Army in replacement of the military vehicles which have been left with civilians due to public utility requirements. The said Ministry has already ordered the issue of the first 150 vehicles.
- 3) - I have instructed the S.M.R.E. to examine the possibility of extending the fuel distribution procedure laid down for

With reference to that pointed out by your Mission, I would inform you :

1) - I have ordered that absolute priority be given to the issue of stores (vehicles, clothing, etc.) to the CC.RR units and in particular to those located in the Bologna area.
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2) - I have requested the Transport Ministry for a speedy handing over, in accordance with the agreements reached, of the ~~vehicles~~ ^{vehicles} which it has to issue to the Army in replacement of the military vehicles which have been left with civilians due to public utility requirements. The said Ministry has already ^{ordered} ~~ordered~~ the issue of the first 150 vehicles.

3) - I have instructed the S.M.R.E. to examine the possibility of extending the fuel distribution procedure laid down for the mobile battalions (which comes into effect on 1st. Jan., next) to all branches of the CC.RR.

I have already reached agreement with the Ministry for the Interior to this effect.

I await information as to your suggestions regarding the radio networks and the organisation of the CC.RR.

U. Danin Cpl.

Sgd. BROSIO

War Minister

114

Major General L. BROWNING, O.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.

→ G/92

27 Dec. 1945.

My dear

1. Herewith information on equipping of CC.RR which I sent, at his request, to HENRY HOPKINSON.
2. I have also sent a copy to BRADY (American Embassy) who talked to me about the same subject recently.
3. You already have a copy of my G/92 of 14 Dec. 1945.
4. In addition to the clothing figures shown in my G/104 of 3 Dec. (attached) we have now heard that 2 District have made available for the CC.RR the following cloth :-

MILAN	30,000 metres
LOMBARDIA	37,000 "
EMILIA	10,000 "
5. You will agree that we have gone all out to equip the CC.RR as a first priority; that the matter now is up to them as a manufacturing and distribution problem (apart from the MT we still require from the Minister of Transport); and that all concerned now have the necessary information to answer any questions re equipping of the CC.RR.

Yours

L.B.

Brigadier M.S. LUSH, CB. CBE. MC.,
Executive Commissioner,
A.C.

(Copy to H. HOPKINSON, Esq.)

/ago

3976

Major General L. BROWNING, C.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.
(M.M.I.A.)
C. M. P. ROME,

→ G/92

27 December, 1945.

My dear

1. Reference our conversation on Xmas day on the matter of the matter of the CC.RR, herewith some information I sent to Mr. HOPKINSON of the British Embassy, who specially asked for it.

2. In addition to the clothing shown as released, 2 District have released to the CC.RR the following cloth :-

MILAN	57,000	metres
LOMBARDIA	30,000	"
EMILIA	10,000	"

3. You can see that we are going all out to equip the CC.RR fully and that it is now up to them to see that proper distribution is achieved.

Yours

L.B.

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Brigadier General P.M. BRADY,
U.S. Embassy,
ROME.

P.S. Col. KERR has endorsed all the above, of course.

3975

/ago

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Public Order.

LAND FORCES SUB COM. A.C. (MILK)

— 6/92 —

2 | Dec 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

1. Allied Policy for the maintenance of public order has been that troops shall be employed in the following order of priority:

- (a) Static CCR
- (b) Mobile battalions CCR
- (c) Independent Regts and Internal Security Divs (classified by AFHQ as "local reserves" for this purpose)
- (d) Infantry Divs (classified by AFHQ as "mobile reserves").

2. It has been reported to this HQ that in some cases Prefects are expecting Independent Regts to carry out duties in aid of the Civil Power before calling upon or using to the full the Static CCR or the Mobile Battalions of CCR located in their areas.

3. This use of Independent Regts is also reported to be being made contrary to the advice and wishes of the Military Territorial Commander concerned.

4. Such employment of Independent Regts is not only contrary to the policy outlined in para 1 above, but also precludes the necessary training of these regts which is the direct responsibility of the Territorial Commander.

5. In agreement with the Public Safety Sub Commission HQ, this HQ therefore suggests, provided that you are in agreement with existing policy, that in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior a Directive should be issued to all Prefects and Territorial Commanders, clearly defining the priority in which available forces will be called in aid of the Civil Power, and the responsibility of Territorial Commanders for training Independent Regts and for advising Prefects on the responsibility or otherwise, in each specific case, of employing these Regts in such a role.

L. Br...

Major General,
M. M. I. L.

ARCS/jw

1. Allied Policy for the maintenance of public order has been that troops shall be employed in the following order of priority:

- (a) Static GCR
- (b) Mobile Battalions GCR
- (c) Independent Regts and Internal Security Divs (classified by AFHQ as "local reserves" for this purpose)
- (d) Infantry Divs (classified by AFHQ as "mobile reserves").

2. It has been reported to this HQ that in some cases Prefects are expecting Independent Regts to carry out duties in Aid of the Civil Power before calling upon or using to the full the Static GCR or the Mobile Battalions of GCR located in their areas.

3. This use of Independent Regts is also reported to be being made contrary to the advice and wishes of the Military Territorial Commander concerned.

4. Such employment of Independent Regts is not only contrary to the policy outlined in para 1 above, but also precludes the necessary training of these regts which is the direct responsibility of the Territorial Commander.

5. In agreement with the Public Safety Sub Commission HQ, this HQ therefore suggests, provided that you are in agreement with existing policy, that in conjunction with the Ministry of the Interior a Directive should be issued to all Prefects and Territorial Commanders, clearly stating that the priority in which available forces will be employed in Aid of the Civil Power, and the responsibility of Territorial Commanders for training Independent Regts and for advising Prefects on the advisability or otherwise, in each specific case, of employing these Regts in such a role.

ARCS/4W

Copy to: AC for (Executive Commissioner)
" " (Public Safety Sub Commission)

Major General,
M. M. I. A.

L. Bruns

Major General L. BROWNE, C.B., O.B.E., M.C.,
 Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.C.,
 (H.V.I.A.)
 R O N E.

3/92 20 December, 1945.

To : H. HOLLINGHAM, Reg.,
 Poland (Br.).

Reference your note dated 16 Dec (just received) on the matter of
 CC.NR, strength 65,000, herewith the information desired.

1. ARMS.

The figures of holdings in para 1 and 2 are compiled from the
 information furnished by the Ministry of War :

	<u>ARMS</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>AMMUNITION</u>
(a)	Automatic M.G. 6.5 mm	4,054	4,095,457
	Light automatic 9 mm	4,698	1,367,100
	Carbine (1691)	116,755	7,580,407
	Revolver	30,996	844,710
	Pistol Automatic 9 mm	46,527	484,702
	Pistol Automatic 6.35 mm	2,057	54,913
	Breda M.G. 8 mm	103	105,960

(b) In addition release was obtained, and War Ministry instructed
 to collect, prior to 2 Dec 45 the following weapons from the
 Beretta Arms Factory. Distribution was to be made as under but
 I am not informed as to progress in this respect.

	<u>CC.NR Bde.</u>	<u>Auto. Pistols 9 mm</u>	<u>Light Automatic 9 mm</u>
TURIN	500		1,539
MILAN	500		1,924
VIENNA	500		1,224
ROME	500		2,113
NAPLES	500		1,539
PALERMO	500		963
	3,000		10,000

(c) A.P.H.G. releases for 250,000 rounds 9 mm "sten" suitable for the
 9 mm automatic rifle has also been obtained.

(d) The above figures include Finance Guards and Public Safety Agents.

2. TRANSPORT.

Reference your note dated 16 Dec (just received) on the matter of
CC. 12, strength 65,000, herewith the information desired.

1. ARMS.

The figures of holdings in para 1 and 2 are compiled from the
information furnished by the Ministry of War :-

<u>ARMS</u>	
<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>AMMUNITION</u>
(a) Automatic M.C. 6.5 mm	4,034
Light automatic 9 mm	4,698
Carbine (1891)	116,755
Revolver	30,996
Pistol Automatic 9 mm	46,527
Pistol Automatic 6.35 mm	2,057
Breda M.C. 8 mm	105
	4,095,457
	1,367,100
	7,580,407
	844,710
	424,702
	54,913
	106,960

(b) In addition release was obtained, and War Ministry instructed
to collect, prior to 2 Dec 45 the following weapons from the
Baretta Arms Factory. Distribution was to be made as under but
I am not informed as to progress in this respect.

<u>CC. 12 Ide.</u>	<u>Auto. Pistols 9 mm</u>	<u>Light Automatic 9 mm</u>
TURIN	500	1,539
MILAN	500	1,924
FLORANCE	500	1,924
ROME	500	2,111
NAPLES	500	1,539
PALERMO	500	965
	3,000	10,000

(c) A.P.H.Q. release for 250,000 rounds 9 mm "Sten" suitable for the
9 mm automatic rifle has also been obtained.

(d) The above figures include Finance Guards and Public Safety Agents.

2. TRANSPORT.

	<u>British</u>	<u>Italian</u>
(a) 'A' Vehicles	45	159*
Motor cycles		1,046
Passenger Vehicles		627
Load Carriers		252
Other Vehicles		87

* British Armoured Cars with mobile bus in 2 District.
+ Old light and medium tanks.

/ (b)

23

Watercycles

Collect from	CAFUA	FOLIGNO	UDINE	MONZA	100
	154	78	65	5	

Deliver to Mob. Bu. C.C.R.	BOLOGNA	75
C.C.R. H.Q.	"	75
Mob. Bu. C.C.R.	FURIN	75
"	MILAN	45
"	GENOVA	50
		300

Load carrier's:

Collect from CAPUA 3 15 cwt trucks
Deliver to GCRR in 3 District whose instructions
are awaited.

(c) The War Ministry are giving priority to the C.U.I.R in release of recondition vehicles coming in to Efficient Vehicle Parks.

CONTRIBUTORS

3. CLOSING
The attached letter Q.104. of 3 Dec. gives the present state of

392

RECEIVED MAY 6, 92 OF 14 DEC.

ATTACHED HEREIN IS A COPY OF THE

(a) I think you will be interested in the attached letter C. 92 of 14 Dec. to the Minister of War.

(b) It summarizes our views and the general state of affairs, and I discussed it personally with Signor BROGIO, who agreed in principle.

(c) I understand that action is being taken so that the Minister of War intent for and distribute P.O.L. to the CC.RR, thus cutting out Prefects who might keep the CC.RR short deliberately for various reasons.

Various institutions

Deliver to Mob. Bn. CC.RR	BOLOGNA	75
CC.RR H.Q.	"	75
Mob. Bn. CC.RR	TURIN	75
"	MILAN	45
"	GENOVA	30
		300
		sum

Load Carriers :

Collect from CARIA 8 15 out trucks

Deliver to CC.RR in 3 District whose instructions are awaited.

(c) The War Ministry are giving priority to the CC.RR in release of reconduction vehicles coming in to Efficient Vehicle Parks.

3. CLOTHING

The attached letter Q.104 of 3 Dec. gives the present state of

affairs.

ATTACHED LET NR 9, 22 of 14 DEC.

4.

(a) I think you will be interested in the attached letter G. 92 of 14 Dec. to the Minister of War.

(b) It summarizes our views and the general state of affairs, and I discussed it personally with Signor BROGIO, who agreed in principle.

(c) I understand that action is being taken so that the Minister of War indent for and distribute P.O.L. to the CC.RR, thus cutting out Prefects who might keep the CC.RR short deliberately for various reasons.

(d) Para 2(b) refers to the "compromise" which I have ventilated so often and so strongly at Chief Commissioner's Meeting. As you see, if the Minister of Transport will "play", the CC.RR will get their M.T. It is up to the Italians. H.Q. A.C. are also exerting pressure.

(e) I may say that we are just completing a new Establishment for the 12 mobile CC.RR Bns. Then we will ask A.F.H.Q. to release armoured cars (to replace the few Italian light tanks) probably on the scale of about a dozen per Bn. We are training certain specialists (e.g. drivers) in army schools.

(f)

3972

4. (2) We are working under some difficulty over all this CO.ER business, because though this large extra responsibility has now been transferred to my Sub Commission, I have not yet received my extra staff to deal with it, though I hope to get such after 31 Dec., when the Northern Territories are handed over.

5. CONCLUSION

- (a) As you see, we are pushing the rehabilitation of CO.ER as first priority.
- (b) There have been deficiencies in the past, but these are being remedied - the rate of remedy depending on the Italians themselves and the efficiency of distribution of materials, of which large quantities have been released to them or are available in their depots.
- (c) I hope this gives you the picture and what you want. If you would like any further information, please let me know.

d. Browning

Major General,
G.O.C.,
Land Forces Sub Com. (M.M.I.A.)

9971

13/450

0
→ file on 6/92 109
Office of British
Political Adviser *hls*

General Langley Browning,
M.N.T.A.

We have on a number of occasions had enquiries from the Foreign Office about the equipment and armament of the Carabinieri. Signor Farri also complained about delays both privately to the Ambassador and publicly. I understand that as the result of recent measures, the process of clothing and arming the Carabinieri has been proceeding much more rapidly. I think it would be a useful thing if the Ambassador could have precise figures of weapons, equipment and transport handed to them so that he can answer any questions put to him by Italian politicians and also inform the Foreign Office of the position.

H. Hopkinson

16.xii.45

Filed (BR)

Recd 20 Dec

3970

0 2 9

SUBJECT : Law and Order in BOLOGNA area

LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA)

G/92

19 Dec 45

TO : Distribution List 'B'

Herewith a copy of a letter from GOC MMIA to Minister of War (MMIA G/92 dated 14 Dec 45) on subject of Law and Order in BOLOGNA area.

The same factors are operative or potentially operative throughout ITALY and this letter is therefore fwd for your info and guidance.

There is no objection to the contents being discussed with the ITALIANS if necessary.

Please ACK on att form.

LRCS/abc

for Major General
M K I A

Wol
CRS

TO : LAND FORCES SUB COM, A.C. (MMIA)

Receipt is ACK of your letter G/92 dated 19 Dec 45, enclosing one copy of MML: G/92 of 14 Dec 45.

Dec 45

signed _____

Unit _____

3989

SUBJECT : Maintenance of Public Order.

107

LAND POLICE SUB COM. AC (MIA)

4/92

18 Dec 45

TO : 2 RLU

96

Ref year 14/2 of 6 Dec.

1. Present policy for the maintenance of public order is that units shall be used strictly in the following order of priorities:

- (a) Static CC.RR.
- (b) Mobile bus CC.RR.
- (c) Independent Regts and Li Diva (local reserves).
- (d) Inf Divs (Mobile Reserves).

2. In ITALIAN Govt territory type other than CC.RR. will only be used on application by the local authority to the Territorial Comd and will only be granted by the Territorial Comd if in the latter's opinion such action is justified by the circumstances.

3. It would appear that the Independent Regt cannot be held in local reserve if it is already permanently committed in place of CC.RR. units.

The use of this Regt requested by the Prefect is therefore on the face of it incorrect.

4. You should discuss the actual necessities of the particular case with the A.C. Liaison Offr BARI and with 52 Area in light of the general policy outlined above.

Having reached agreement you should then respectfully advise the Prefect and the Territorial Comd.

5. This R.C. should be notified in the event of any further difficulty.

3968

AP. G. G. G.
Major General
MIA.

Copy to : Public Safety G-C, AC.

106

SUBJECT : Maintenance of Public Order.

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AG (MMIA)

6/92

10 Dec 45

TO : Public Safety S-C, AG.

Ref your minute dated 17 Dec re para 3 ¹⁰⁵ First sentence: ¹⁰³

Independent Regts are classified in AFHQ Directives as "Local Reserves".

A reserve is no longer militarily speaking a reserve once it has been committed.

Hence an Independent Regt is NOT fulfilling the role assigned to it by AFHQ, if, before trouble starts, it is already being used for any internal security purpose.

A. J. Gault
for
Major General.
MMIA.

3967

103

SUBJECT : Maintenance of Public Order.

LAND FORCES SUB-COM, AC (MMIA)

G/92

Dec 45

TO : 9 BLU. *96*

Ref your 14/2 of 6 Dec.

1. Present policy for the maintenance of public order is that units shall be used strictly in the following order of priorities:

- (a) static CC.RR.
- (b) Mobile bns CC.RR.
- (c) Independent Regts and IS Divs (local reserves)
- (d) Inf Divs (Mobile Reserves)

2. In ITALIAN Govt territory tps other than CC.RR. will only be used on application by the local authority to the Territorial Comd and will only be granted by the Territorial Comd if in the latter's opinion such action is justified by the circumstances.

3. It would appear that the Independent Regt cannot be held in local reserve if it is already permanently committed in place of CC.RR. units.

The use of this Regt requested by the Prefect *34 88* therefore on the face of it incorrect.

4. You should discuss the actual necessities of the particular case with the A.C. liaison Offr BARI and with 52 Area in light of the general policy outlined above.

-2-

Having reached agreement you should then respectively advise the Prefect and the Territorial Comd.

5. This H.Q. should be notified in the event of any further difficulty.

3965

Subject : Law and Order in BOLOGNA Region.

SECRET & URGENT

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
G.92

To : The Minister of War.

14 December, 1945.

SITUATION :

1. (a) I have received disturbing reports of the situation in BOLOGNA Region from G.O.C. 2 District and my L.O. with General CERICA (Commander BOLOGNA Territorial Region); who also, I know, is very concerned about the state of affairs.
- (b) Lawlessness, in the form of banditry, gaol storming and murder is rife. For example, on a recent occasion 50 armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction. Unless checked sternly, such lawlessness will tend to increase. BOLOGNA may thus be considered a test case. If order can be restored there, that will deter similar activity elsewhere - an aspect which will become even more important in the event of the Northern Territories being handed back to the Italian Government. While appreciating that lawlessness after the past war is a world wide symptom, I feel that every effort should be made and every assistance given to the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

FORCES AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

2. (a) The priority of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is :-

The CC.RR normal units
The CC.RR mobile columns
The Independent Army Regiments
The Infantry Divisions.

In war time the needs of the army were paramount. But in view of the above order of responsibility, the needs of the CC.RR should now have first priority. You will agree that it is inadvisable to use the Army Regiments and Divisions except in case of need. The CC.RR are the first line of defence.

- (b) The distribution, strength, armament and equipment of No. 3 Brigade CC.RR is, according to our latest information, as per Appendix 'A'. From this it can be seen that the strength and armament are adequate, but there is a very serious shortage in M.T.

- (a) I have received disturbing reports of the situation in BOLOGNA Region from G.O.C. 2 District and my L.O. with General CERICA (Commander BOLOGNA Territorial Region), who also, I know, is very concerned about the state of affairs.
- (b) Lawlessness, in the form of banditry, gaol storming and murder is rife. For example, on a recent occasion 50 armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction. Unless BOLOGNA may thus be considered a test case. If order can be restored there, that will deter similar activity elsewhere - an aspect which will become even more important in the event of the Northern Territories being handed back to the Italian Government. While appreciating that lawlessness after the past war is a world wide symptom, I feel that every effort should be made and every assistance given to the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

FORCES AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

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The CC.RR normal units
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The Independent Army Regiments
The Infantry Divisions.

In war time the needs of the army were paramount. But in view of the above order of responsibility, the needs of the CC.RR should now have first priority. You will agree that it is inadvisable to use the Army Regiments and Divisions except in case of need. The CC.RR are the first line of defence.

- (b) The distribution, strength, armament and equipment of No. 3 Brigade CC.RR is, according to our latest information, as per Appendix 'A'. From this it can be seen that the strength and armament are adequate, but there is a very serious shortage in M.T. As regards M.T., the Italian Army repair workshops are only just keeping their heads above water repairing and maintaining the M.T. of existing units. The Ministry of Transport however owes the Ministry of War the equivalent tonnage of 1666 army vehicles, reconditioned and in running order. Delivery of these was promised at the rate of 500 per month commencing 1 Nov., but NONE have been delivered yet. I suggest that you exert the strongest pressure on the Minister of Transport to implement his bend under and arrangement generously made by A.C. to assist the public economy and to avoid political repercussions by withdrawing Italian army transport illegally in possession of civilian firms or persons. I am asking H.Q. ...C. to exert similar strong pressure. I may say that the Minister of Transport has had 14500 vehicles handed over to him by the Allies.

...../(c)

3962

R 14/12

725020

2. (c) The clothing situation, I understand, is improving. This now is, of course, your responsibility, and with the large handover to you recently of cloth and uniforms out of "captured enemy material", together with the release to you of the COMO clothing factory the problem is one of distribution rather than supply.
- (d) The P.O.L. question is most unsatisfactory. The prefect allots P.O.L. to the CC.RR as he thinks fit. In BOLOGNA (and I understand also in GENOVA), region the amount allotted is only barely sufficient for the CC.RR to maintain and feed themselves, with none available for the CC.RR normal units or mobile columns to perform their necessary functions. My staff have already taken this up with you (see our letter ST/4604/2 dated 28 Nov 45 and Gen. LIUZZI's reply in agreement CC/3083/SSRV. C/2 dated 6 Dec 45) in connection with the mobile columns. I now feel that you should go further and that all P.O.L. requirements for the CC.RR should be indented for on C.I.P. and distributed through the Ministry of War. A reserve should also be built up in each centre or region as soon as possible.

- (e) At present intercommunication for CC.RR is by land-line only. Obviously wireless linking between the various H.Q.'s and internally in the mobile columns is essential as well, particularly in the event of serious disaster when land-lines would be cut. My signal officer is at the moment investigating the whole question of the wireless needs of and provision of suitable equipment for the CC.RR. I will inform you further when he has completed his investigation in a week or so.

REORGANIZATION OF CC.RR.

3. The BOLOGNA question raised the whole problem of the organization of the CC.RR. From a short survey it appears that points which must be considered are the possibility, if for allia, of organizing the CC.RR territorially with the same boundaries as the Army Regions; of organization of communal distribution of CC.RR; and of reorganizing the mobile columns themselves with a view to increasing flexibility and effectiveness. I am taking this matter up with General BRUNETTI and Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

CONCLUSION.

4. (a) The above presents my general view of the problem, as I see it.
- (b) The immediate problem for you appears to be :-

- (1) We must first, priority of issue of material (clothing, etc.) to the CC.RR - particularly in BOLOGNA Region.

3963

none available for the CC.RR normal units or mobile columns to perform their necessary functions. My staff have already taken this up with you (see our letter ST/1604/9 dated 28 Nov 45 and Gen. LUZZI's reply in agreement 60/3083/STW. G/2 dated 6 Dec 45) in connection with the mobile columns.

I now feel that you should go further and that all P.O.L. requirements for the CC.RR should be indented for on C.I.P. and distributed through the Ministry of War. A reserve should also be built up in each centre or region as soon as possible.

- (e) At present intercommunication for CC.RR is by land-line only. Obviously wireless links between the various H.Q.'s and internally in the mobile columns is essential as well, particularly in the event of serious disorder when land-lines would be cut. My signal officer is at this moment investigating the whole question of the wireless needs of and provision of suitable equipment for the CC.RR. I will inform you further when he has completed his investigation in a week or so.

REORGANIZATION OF CC.RR

3. The BOLOGNA question raises the whole problem of the organization of the CC.RR. Recent chart survey it appears that points which must be considered are the possibility, if or when, of organizing the CC.RR territorially with the same boundaries as the Army Regions; of organization of communal administration of CC.RR; and of reorganizing the mobile columns themselves with a view to increasing flexibility and effectiveness.

I am taking this matter up with General BRUNETTI and Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

CONCLUSION

4. (a) The above presents my general view of the problem, as I see it.

(b) The immediate problem that you appears to be :-

(1) to secure first priority of issue of material (clothing, food, etc.) to the CC.RR - particularly in BOLOGNA Region.

(2) to press the Minister of Transport to honour his bond as regards M.T. owed by him to the War Ministry.

(3) to take over the demand for and distribution of P.O.L. for the whole CC.RR.

(c) I have not mentioned the political aspect in respect of subversive action on the part of Italian officials outside the CC.RR. That will be dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.

/As regards

3963

- 3 -

4. (c) contd.

As regards such elements inside the CC.RR I feel sure you are taking the strongest action to purge such ruthlessly, in order to create a non-party, national CC.RR police force.

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : H.Q. A.C. (for Chief Commissioner) - 2 copies
Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.
Transportation Sub Commission, A.C.
General BRUNETTI, Comd. CC.RR.
H.Q. 2 District.

Internal :

List "A" (less 10, 17 and 19.)

3962

Appendix "A" to IMA
letter G/92 dated
14 December 1945

No 3 Bde. CC.RR

1. H.Q. BOLOGNA

2. Consists of :-

(a) Bde H.Q.

(b) Four legions, one each at

BOLOGNA { 7 Groups
ANCONA { 5 Groups
FLORENCE { 5 Groups
LIVORNO { 5 Groups

(c) H.Q. Mobile Bn. Gp. at

BOLOGNA

(d) Two Mob. Bns., one each at

BOLOGNA
FLORENCE

3. Strength (BOLOGNA Area only)

	Actual		W.E.	
	Offrs	O.Rs.	Offrs	O.Rs.
(a) Bde. H.Q.	?	?	4	10
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	67	3425	58	3252
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.	2	40	7	40
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	7	338	30	548
TOTALS	76+	3803+	99	3850

LB/co

3961

Sheet No. 2.

4. Vehicles.

	M.C. Solo		M.C. Combination		Cars		Lt. Load carrying vehs		Hy. Load carrying vehs		Tech. vehs	
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held
(a) Bde. H.Q.	1				2							
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	874	75	9	3	60	38	73	3	9	14	9	NIL
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.					2		1				1	
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	95	NIL			3	NIL	26	NIL	20	2		
TOTALS	970	75	9	3	67	38	100	3	29	16	10	NIL

5. Arms.

	Pistols Mod 34		Automatic Rifles		Carbines Mod 91		L M G Breda		
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
(a) Bde. H.Q.	14		2		8		2		
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	3310	1253	649	467	2603	3251	123	61	
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.	47				40		4		
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	578	86	187	46	361	537	21	6	
TOTALS	3949	1339	838	513	3012	3788	150	67	

LB/co

Sheet No. 2.

Appendix "A" to MMIA
 letter G/92 dated
 14 December 1945

M.C. Sale		M.C. Combination		Cars		Lt. Load carrying vehs		Hy. Load carrying vehs		Tech. vehs		Armd vehs		REMARKS
W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
1				2										
874	75	9	3	60	38	73	3	9	14	9	NIL			
				2		1				1				
95	NIL			3	NIL	26	NIL	20	2			12	12	
970	75	9	3	67	38	100	3	29	16	10	NIL	12	12	

Pistols Mod 34		Automatic Rifles		Carbines Mod 91		L M G Breda		REMARKS
W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
14		2		8		2		
310	1253	649	467	2603	3251	123	61	
47				40		4		
578	86	187	46	361	537	21	6	
949	1339	838	513	3012	3788	150	67	

SECRET & URGENT

102

Subject:- Law and Order in BELGOWIA Region

Land Forces Sub-Commission, AG
(M.M.I.A.)

File Copy

C/92
14 December 1945.

Headquarters, ALLIED COMMISSION.
(For Chief Commissioner)

100

Ref. H.Q. 2 District letter 20156(C) dated 5 December 1945
on the above:-

1. Herewith DRAFT of a letter I propose to send to the Minister of War and also to discuss with him personally.
2. I would particularly ask your assistance in exerting pressure on the Minister of Transport re: para 2(b) of attached.

The situation is (equivalent tonnage):-

PROMISED :- 153 vehicles in October
500 " " on Nov. 1st.
500 " " Dec. 1st.

RECEIVED :- 143 " in Dec (of which 50% non-runners)
NIL " on Nov. 1st.
NIL " Dec. 1st.

In fact the vital matter of M.I. for the CC. is completely nullified by the failure of Minister of Transport to implement his promise.

3. I view with alarm the subversive political activities of the non-career Prefect and Minzoo of BELGOWIA (and probably other places). The fact of his starving the CC. of P.O.L. (as H.Q. 2 District mention in para 5 of their letter) shows the way the wind lies.

Action as in para 2(d) of my DRAFT letter herewith would go some way towards nullifying his activities.

4. You will appreciate that the task of dealing with the complete reorganization of the CC. must inevitably be a slow one, in view of the fact no extra staff for a "CC. Section" in my sub-commission has yet been furnished to me.

5. May I have your comments or approval to my DRAFT. I send you this for your consideration as I consider it is such an important matter, necessitating the fullweight of your influence and authority on a high level.

6. This matter has already been discussed in general terms with Col. VIZ and Col. CHAPMAN.

2. I would particularly ask your assistance in exerting pressure on the Minister of Transport ref para 2(b) of attached.

The situation is (equivalent tonnage):-

PROJECTED :- 153 vehicles in October
500 " on Nov. 1st.
500 " " Dec. 1st.

REGISTERED :- 143 " in Dec (of which 54% non-runners)
NIL " on Nov. 1st.
NIL " " Dec. 1st.

In fact the vital matter of M.O. for the CC.RR is completely stultified by the failure of Minister of Transport to implement his promise.

3. I view with alarm the subversive political activities of the non-career Prefect and Director of BOLCHAM (and probably other places). The fact of his starving the CC.RR of P.O.s. (as H.Q. 2 District mention in para 5 of their letter) shows the way the wind lies.

Action as in para 2(a) of my DRAFT letter herewith would go some way towards nullifying his activities.

4. You will appreciate that the task of dealing with the complete reorganisation of the CC.RR must inevitably be a slow one, in view of the fact no extra staff for a "CC.RR Section" in my sub-commission has yet been furnished to me.

5. May I have your comments or approval to my DRAFT. I send you this for your consideration as I consider it is such an important matter, necessitating the full weight of your influence and authority on a high level.

6. This matter has already been discussed in general terms with Col. EME and Col. CHAPMAN.

*Draft found - (R) -
Col. EME
21/5/50*

LB/oo

*Major General,
M.M.I.A.*

d. Brown

SECRET & URGENT

Land Forces Sub Commission, A.C.,
(M.M.I.A.)
R O M E.
C.92

December, 45.

SUBJECT : Law and order in BOLOGNA Region.

To : The Minister of War.

SITUATION

1. (a) I have received disturbing reports of the situation in BOLOGNA Region from G.O.C. 2 District and my L.O. with General CANICA (Commander BOLOGNA Territorial Region), who also, I know, is very concerned about the state of affairs.
- (b) Lawlessness, in the form of banditry, ¹⁰⁰ ~~garol~~ storming and murder is rife. For example, on a recent occasion 50 armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction. Unless checked sternly, such lawlessness will tend to increase. BOLOGNA may thus be considered a test case. If order can be restored there, that will deter similar activity elsewhere - an aspect which will become even more important in the event of the Northern Territories being handed back to the Italian Government. While appreciating that lawlessness after the past war is a world wide symptom, I feel that every effort should be made and every assistance given to the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

FORCES AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

3958

SITUATION

1. (a) I have received disturbing reports of the situation in BOLOGNA Region from G.O.C. 2 District and my L.O. with General CERICA (Commander BOLOGNA Territorial Region), who also, I know, is very concerned about the state of affairs.
- (b) Lawlessness, in the form of banditry, ~~and~~ ^{and} storming and murder is rife. For example, on a recent occasion 50 armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction. Unless checked sternly, such lawlessness will tend to increase. BOLOGNA may thus be considered a test case. If order can be restored there, that will deter similar activity elsewhere - an aspect which will become even more important in the event of the Northern Territories being handed back to the Italian Government. While approx- 3958
- iating that lawlessness after the past war is a world wide symptom, I feel that every effort should be made and every assistance given to the forces responsible for maintaining law and order.

FORCES AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

2. (a) The priority of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order is :-

The CC.NR normal units
The CC.NR mobile columns
The Independent Army Regiments
The Infantry Divisions.

In war time the needs of the army were paramount. But in view of the above order of responsibility, the needs of the

CC.RR should now have first priority.

You will agree that it is inadvisable to use the Army Regiments and Divisions except in case of need. The CC.RR are the first line of defence.

(b) The distribution, strength, armament and equipment of No. 3 Brigade CC.RR is, according to our latest information, as per Appendix 'A'. From this it can be seen that the strength and armament are adequate, but there is a very serious shortage in

M.T.

As regards M.T., the Italian Army repair workshops are only just keeping their heads above water repairing and maintaining the M.T. of existing units. The Ministry of Transport however owes the Ministry of War the equivalent tonnage of 1666 army vehicles, reconditioned and in running order.

Delivery of these was promised at the rate of 500 per month commencing 1 Nov., but NOIS have been delivered yet. I suggest that you exert the strongest pressure on the Minister of Transport to implement his bond under an arrangement generously made by A.C. to assist the public economy and to avoid political repercussions by withdrawing Italian Army transport illegally in possession of civilian firms or persons. I am asking H.Q. A.C. to exert similar strong pressure. I may say that the Minister of Transport has had 14500 vehicles handed over to him by the Allies.

(c) The clothing situation, I understand, is improving. This now is, of course, your responsibility, and with the large hand-

3957

Appendix A. From this it can be seen that the strength and armament are adequate, but there is a very serious shortage in

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(c) The clothing situation, I understand, is improving. This now is, of course, your responsibility, and with the large hand-over to you recently of cloth and uniforms out of "captured enemy material", together with the release to you of the COMO clothing factory the problem is one of distribution rather than supply.

(d) The P.O.L. question is most unsatisfactory. The Prefect allots P.O.L. to the CC.RR as he thinks fit. In BOLOGNA (and I understand also in GENOVA), region the amount allotted

3957

is only barely sufficient for the CC.RR to maintain and feed themselves, with none available for the CC.RR normal units or mobile columns to perform their necessary functions.

My staff have already taken this up with you (see our letter ST/4604/9 dated 28 Nov 45 and Gen. LIUZZI'S reply in agreement 60/3083/SERV. C/2 dated 6 Dec 45) in connection with the mobile columns.

I now feel that you should go further and that all P.O.L. requirements for the CC.RR should be indented for on C.I.P. and distributed through the Ministry of War. A reserve should also be built up in each centre or region as soon as possible.

(e) At present intercommunication for CC.RR is by land-line only.

Obviously wireless links between the various H.Q.'s and internally in the Mobile Columns is essential as well, particularly in the event of serious disorder when land-lines would be cut. My signal officer is at this moment investigating the whole question of the wireless needs of and provision of suitable equipment for the CC.RR. I will inform you further when he has completed his investigation in a week or so.

REORGANIZATION OF CC.RR.

3956

3. (a) The BOLOGNA question raises the whole problem of the organization of the CC.RR.

(b) From a short survey of this I am of opinion that much could usefully be reorganized, particularly in respect of :

(1) making CC.RR formation boundaries coincide with

Territorial Regional boundaries. The head of the

mobile columns.

I now feel that you should go further and that all P.O.L. requirements for the CC.RR should be indented for on C.I.P. and distributed through the Ministry of War. A reserve should also be built up in each centre or region as soon as possible.

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Obviously wireless links between the various H.Q.'s and internally in the Mobile Columns is essential as well, particularly in the event of serious disorder when land-lines would be cut. My signal officer is at this moment investigating the whole question of the wireless needs of and provision of suitable equipment for the CC.RR. I will inform you further when he has completed his investigation in a week or so.

3956

REORGANIZATION OF CCRR.

3. (a) The EMIGRA question raises the whole problem of the organization of the CC.RR.

(b) From a short survey of this I am of opinion that much could usefully be reorganized, particularly in respect of :

(1) making CC.RR formation boundaries coincide with

Territorial Regional boundaries. The head of the

CC.RR in each Region could then work in the closest

touch with the Army Commander of that Region. Dis-

parity in the size of CC.RR formations allotted to each

Region is of no importance.

(11) concentrating the very large number of small CC.RR posts

of 5 or 6 men each into larger bodies which could not

easily be overrun and would be more effective. Patrol-

ing would replace permanent residence.

(iii) internal reorganization of the mobile columns so as to make these more flexible, mobile and effective.

I am taking this matter up with General MARINETTI and Public Safety Sub Commission A.C.

4. CONCLUSION.

(a) The above presents my general view of the problem, as I see it.

(b) The immediate problem for you appears to be :-

(i) to ensure first priority of issues of material (clothing, M.T. etc.) to the CC.RR - particularly in BOLOGNA

Region.

(ii) to press the Minister of Transport to honour his bond as regards M.T. owed by him to the War Ministry.

(iii) to take over the demand for redistribution of P.O.L. for the whole CC.RR.

(c) I have not mentioned the political aspect in respect of sub-
versive action on the part of Italian officials outside the
CC.RR. That will be dealt with by Public Safety Sub-Commission,
A.C.

As regards such elements inside the CC.RR I feel sure you are
taking the strongest action to purge such ruthlessly, in order
to create a non-party, national CC.RR police force.

3955

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

(1) to ensure first priority of issue of material (clothing,

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A.C.

As regards such elements inside the CC.RR I feel sure you are
taking the strongest action to purge such ruthlessly, in order
to create a non-party, national CC.RR police force.

3955

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

Copy to : H.Q. A.C. (For Chief Commissioner) - 2 copies
Public Safety Sub Commission, A.C.
Transportation Sub Commission, A.C.
General BRUNETTI, Comd. CC.RR.
H.Q. 2 District.

Internal

List A (less 10, 17 and 19.)

/ago

Appendix "A" to MATA
Letter G/53 dated
December 1945

No 3 Bde. OC.HR

1. H.Q. BOLAGNA

2. Consists of :-

- (a) Bde H.Q.
- (b) Four Legions, one each at BOLAGNA (7 Groups)
ARICHA (5 Groups)
FLORENCE (5 Groups)
LIVORNO (5 Groups)
- (c) H.Q. Mobile Bn. Gp. at BOLAGNA
- (d) Two Mob. Bns., one each at BOLAGNA
FLORENCE

3. Strength (BOLAGNA Area only)

	Actual		W.B.	
	Offrs.	O.Bs.	Offrs.	O.Bs.
(a) Bde. H.Q.	2	2	4	10
(b) BOLAGNA Legion	67	325	53	3252
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Gp.	2	40	7	40
(d) BOLAGNA Mob. Bn.	7	338	30	548
TOTALS	76+	3803+	99	3850

3954

Sheet No 2.

3953

Appendix
letter G/S
Doc

4. Vehicles

	M.C. Solo		M.C. Combination		Cars		Lt load carrying vehs		Hy Load carrying vehs		Tech vehs		Armed vehs	
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held
(a) Bde. H.Q.	1				2									
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	874	75	9	3	60	38	73	3	9	14	9	NIL		
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Co.					2		1				1			
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	95	NIL			3	NIL	26	NIL	20	2			12	12
TOTALS	970	75	9	3	67	38	100	3	29	16	10	NIL	12	12

5. Arms

	Pistols Mod 34		Automatic Rifles		Carbines Mod 91		L M G Breda		Remarks
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
(a) Bde. H.Q.	14		2		8		2		
(b) BOLOGNA Legion	3310	1253	649	467	2603	3251	123	61	
(c) H.Q. Mob. Bn. Co.	47				40		4		
(d) BOLOGNA Mob. Bn.	578	86	187	46	361	537	21	6	
TOTALS	3949	1339	838	513	3012	3788	150	67	

LB/cc

Sheet No 2.

3953

Appendix "A" to MMIA
letter G/92 dated
December 1945.

No	M.C. Combination		Cars		Lt load carrying vehs		Hy Load carrying vehs		Tech vehs		Armed vehs		Remarks
	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
			2										
75	9	3	60	38	73	3	9	14	9	NIL			
			2		1				1				
IL			3	NIL	26	NIL	20	2			12	12	
75	9	3	67	38	100	3	29	16	10	NIL	12	12	

Mod 34	Automatic Rifles		Carbines Mod 91		L M G Breda		Remarks
Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	W.E.	Held	
	2		8		2		
1253	619	467	2603	3251	123	61	
			40		4		
86	187	46	361	537	21	6	
1339	838	513	3012	3786	150	67	

SUBJECT : Aids to Civil Power.

~~SECRET~~ 100

CHQ CMF.

MMIA.

HQ 2 DISTRICT, CMF.

2015 G(0)

5 DEC 45.

GSO 3

GSO 3 (Combat)

GSO 3

Copy to : Chief Commissioner, AC.
217 Area.

MMIA - 'G'

7/12/45

DATE: 5/10/45

Vol. 6 (2008)

Further to my 2015 G(0) of 23 OCT 45, a copy of which is attached for CHQ CMF.

1. Since writing the letter referred to above in which I stressed how greatly handicapped the CCNR were, a visit has been paid to BOLOGNA by Col. E.J. BYE, the Deputy Director Public Safety Sub Commission, AC. He is making recommendations about the supply of good clothing, petrol and vans to the CCNR and I am writing now because my certainty of the need of these improvements has recently increased.
2. The province of BOLOGNA is both a hot bed of militant communism and a focal point of British communications. Lawlessness in the form of banditry, gael storming and murder is rife. I attach a report of a more than usually serious but not untypical incident where fifty armed men raided a village and committed robbery, murder and abduction.
3. General GERICA, the Italian Territorial Commander at BOLOGNA, is certain that there will eventually be an armed communist uprising centred on BOLOGNA. The Comd of 217 Area is by no means so certain but agrees that it is not impossible. Were it ever to happen you will appreciate that several thousand armed men could hold or destroy the PO bridges and prevent the arrival of either 6 Arm Div or the Combat Groups to the north of the PO.
4. The situation is complicated by the fact that both the Prefect and the Sindaco are Communists and untrustworthy, and that communists have been placed in so many public positions of responsibility that it is not safe for ordinary citizens to oppose them. The last man to give reliable information about hidden arms is now dying as the result of reprisals. It is therefore extremely hard to get information on which to make raids for arms, and there are undoubtedly many in the area. In addition, General GERICA is not entirely happy about the reliability of his own staff, and as a

See Letter 129

- 2 -

result of this infiltration of terrorist influence the Italian Govt is not keeping law and order in this area.

5. Under these circumstances the need of equipment for the GCRR becomes even more marked. They can never move to a scene of disorder for lack of petrol, since their allotment is made by the Prefect who has no wish to make them mobile in case they impede his party's plans.

6. I would therefore again urge that petrol be allocated direct to the GCRR and not through the Prefect, that a drastic comb out of the GCRR be undertaken to eliminate the ex-partisans and that every encouragement, material and moral, be given to this body on whom rests the major responsibility for preventing civil disorder. If an increase in efficiency is not secured the use of combat troops, either Italian or British, to do a police job will be inevitable.

P.A. Hyndman
Major General,
Commanding, 2 District.

* Public Safety L/C consider that this is a
rip and should read "QUESTURA", not GCRR

all
11/10
3951

10 98
SUBJECT: Employment of troops on duties of Public Order.

LAND FORCES SUB-COMM, AC (MILIA)

— G/92 —

12 Dec 45

TO : MINISTRY OF WAR

Ref your 226050/II of 26 Nov 45.

I. This HQ, in consultation with Civil Affairs Section and Public Safety Sub-Commission of AC, approve your draft with the exception that it is suggested that you should re-draft para II on the following lines.

II. Troops engaged in public order duties will be armed in relation to the armament available to the disturbers of the peace.

- (a) against defenceless disturbers of the peace
- (i) troops will be armed only with pistols or rifles
 - (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will only be used to fire in that manner.
 - (iii) The carriage or use of any type of ~~grenade~~ ^{gas} is forbidden.

- (b) against armed disturbers of the peace
- (i) troops will normally be armed only with pistols or rifles.
 - (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will normally only be used in that manner.
 - (iii) Automatic weapons will be held in reserve, and will only be used in emergency.
 - (iv) Tear gas or smoke grenades may be used if necessary, except that the use of white phosphorus filled grenades is at all times prohibited.

I. This HQ, in consultation with Civil Affairs Section and Public Safety Sub-Commission of AC, approve your draft with the exception that it is suggested that you should re-draft para II on the following lines.

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 - (iii) the carriage or use of any type of ~~gr~~³⁹⁵⁰ is forbidden.
- (b) against armed disturbers of the peace
- (i) troops will normally be armed only with pistols or rifles.
 - (ii) Automatic rifles and other small arms may be carried in place of rifles provided that they can be set to fire single shot, in which case they will normally only be used in that manner.
 - (iii) Automatic weapons will be held in reserve, and will only be used in emergency.
 - (iv) Tear gas or smoke grenades may be used if necessary, except that the use of white - phosphorus filled grenades is at all times prohibited.
- Tear gas or smoke grenades will neither be issued to nor used by troops except on the orders of an officer of the rank of bn commander or its equivalent.
- These grenades will only be employed when the use of force is considered necessary and when the object will be achieved with fewer casualties by the use of tear gas and/or smoke than by opening fire.

R 12/12.

Note

1. The minimum necessary force will be employed at all times.
2. Where disturbers of the peace are properly armed, troops are authorised to employ weapons of similar or greater weight.
3. With the exception of CC RR who will carry loaded weapons as considered necessary, all troops will proceed to the scene of the disturbance with their weapons unloaded and will only load on the orders of an officer.
Officers are responsible that troops are not surprised en route with unloaded weapons.

Copy to : Civil Affairs sec AC
Public Safety S/C AC

Internal : GOC
Dep Comd
Col GS
Col A/Q
G SD & Trg
CC RR

ARCS/sb

L. Browning

Major General,
M. M. I. A.

3949

INFO COPY
ONLY

97

SUBJECT : Carabinieri. Strength.

FILE 4/018

TO : G.B.O. 1 (S.D.)

is :- The effective strength of the Carabinieri Legion at BOLOGNA

<u>Office</u>	<u>GR's</u>	<u>Total</u>
76	3803	3879

11 Dec. 45

Internal.

A/C. SD/4-7/2.

Info. G/92.

Wilson Capt.
"A.1"

3948

inf.

INFO COPY
ONLY

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

SUBJECT :- Maintenance of Public Order

9 British Liaison Unit
BARI
6 Dec 45

14/2

HQ Land Forces Sub Comm AC (MHLA)
R O M E.

1. The three guard battalions in 9 Inf Regt, 9 Terr Command, are being used almost continuously, at the request of provincial prefects, for the maintenance of public order. It appears that prefects are disinclined to rely solely on the CC RR mobile units, even when disorders are minor ones.

2. It is required to concentrate guard battalions for the continuation of their military training. This course cannot be adopted so long as prefects continue to call on bns as often as they do.

3. A case has arisen with 1st Bn at Taranto, where I was called upon to give a ruling, the facts of which are reported herewith :-

The Bn was ordered to move to Trani, by 9 Terr Hq, in accordance with the plan for training up the Regiment.

A request by the prefect, for their retention in Taranto was rejected by Generale Boselli, 9 Terr Comdr, on the grounds that :-

(a) Maintenance of Public Order at Taranto was the responsibility of the Naval Comdr. (Odta del Dipartimento del Gggo7 Adriatico e Ionio).

(b) The Bn is required to concentrate at Trani for training.

The attached request, with an enclosure from 52 Area, has now been received from AC Bari.

I have advised General Boselli to proceed with his plan of moving the Bn to Trani, for the reasons (a) and (b) above.

FROM:

1. The three guard battalions in 9 Inf Regt, 9 Terr Command, are being used almost continuously, at the request of provincial prefects, for the maintenance of public order. It appears that prefects are disinclined to rely solely on the CC RR mobile units, even when disorders are minor ones.

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(b) The Bn is required to concentrate at Trani for training.

The attached request, with an enclosure from 52 Area,

has now been received from AC Bari.

I have advised General Boselli to proceed with his plan of moving the Bn to Trani, for the reasons (a) and (b) above.

4. I am withholding my reply to 52 Area, until the receipt of any instructions you may issue.

GSO 1

GSO 2 (CPR)

GSO 3 (SD)

GSO 4

GSO 5

GSO 6 (CPR)

GSO 7 (V)

HF/ea

(H FERRO) Major
GS

MINIA 'G'
FILE: 8/92
DATE: 8/13/12

C O P Y

ALLIED COMMISSION
LIAISON OFFICE
BARI

96A

4 December 1945

SUBJECT: Maintenance of Public Order
TARANTO.

Ref : LB/113/

TO : 9 British Liaison Unit,
CMF, BARI.

Herewith attached please find the copy of a
signal received from GSO II, HQ 52 Area, which is passed
to you for your information and such action as you may
deem necessary.

GMR/fh

G.M.REVELEY, Major
Liaison Office, A.C.
BARI.

3946

C O P Y.

M D V MERM NR 147 QVR 1 M
FROM 52 AREA 031630A
TO ALCOM BARI (PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFR)
INFO R PREFETTURA - TARANTO
QQX BT

GS/O3 . RESTRICTED. REF TELE CONVERSATION PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFR -
GSO II HQ 52 AREA A M 3 DEC . REQUEST YOU ENDEAVOUR TO KEEP
1 BN 9 ITALIAN INF REGT IN TARANTO FOR MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC
ORDER SHOULD DISTURBANCES ARISE.
PRESENCE OF THESE TROOPS REQUESTED BY PREFECT TARANTO AND CONSIDERED
NECESSARY

BT 031850
SENT JA AR K
READ AS DISTURBANCES K
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TRANSLATION

FROM: Ministry of War

TO: W.M.I.A.

See by C.C. & C.A.P.

See minutes 102

REF: 226050/11

DATE: 26.11.45

SUBJECT: Employment of troops on duties of Public Order.

In informing the H.Q.s under command of such as was laid down by your Mission in letter G/92 of the 28th. September, regarding the command of troops employed for the maintenance of public order, I considered it advisable for greater clarity, to summarise in a single circular all the instructions in force relating to public order, underlining several particularly important matters, such as:

- a) - intervention by troops for public order duties only in case of absolute necessity;
- b) - complete independance of the Military Commands in the selecting of procedure with which to carry out the task given them by the civilian Authority;
- c) - arming of the troops to a scale comparable with that of the disturbers of the peace;
- d) - responsibility for opening fire to be ~~the~~ exclusively that of the unit Commander.

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
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- c) - arming of the troops to a scale comparable with that of the disturbers of the peace;
- d) - responsibility for opening fire to be ~~the~~ exclusively that of the unit Commander.

To this end the enclosed draft of a circular has been compiled, which I am forwarding to your Mission with the request that you acquaint me with your observations on the matter, notifying at the same time the advisability of a copy of the said circular, once approved, being sent, for information, to all the interested

Allied H.Q.s

Sgd. JACINI

Minister for War.



O. Danin Cpl.

DRAFT OF CIRCULAR

SUBJECT: Employment of troops in public order duties.

This document replaces and cancels Circulars: 110950/11 of 30.12.44;
100500/1 of 9.1.1945; 112250/1 of 21.5.1945; and 123550/1 of 6.10.1945.

1. - In the territories controlled by the National Government, the maintenance of public order and seeing that the law is respected is the responsibility of the Police authorities, in accordance with the directives of the Prefects and the Ministry of the Interior.

When the Police forces are not in a position to reestablish order and the power of the law, or when they have reason to fear disorders on a large scale, the responsible authorities may request the intervention of troops.

2. - The intervention of units of the Army in the service of public order is exceptional; request for intervention will be made, after a calm estimate of the situation, only in cases of absolute necessity, bearing in mind the principle of the most strict economy of the forces.

Troops engaged in duties of public order must understand that their intervention is solely for the purpose of safeguarding the citizens from disorder and violence.

3. - Request for armed picquets will be made by the Public Security Authorities to the Garrison Commander, only in urgent cases and always provided that the troops must be employed at a short distance from the garrison area. In other cases the request will be made to the Military Territorial Commander

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- 3. - Request for armed picquets will be made by the Public Security Authorities to the Garrison Commander, only in urgent cases and always provided that the troops must be employed at a short distance from the garrison area. In other cases the request will be made to the Military Territorial Commander whose jurisdiction extends to the place off the disorder, proposing the force, armaments, and any eventual special equipment, of the troops which are being requested.

The Military Territorial Commander, having considered the situation, will lay down the size of the forces to be employed and their armament, giving this information to the Prefects.

4. - Troops employed in Public Order duties will remain at all times under the exclusive and direct command of the military H.Q.s, which, in relation to the task entrusted to them by the civilian authorities, have the widest powers, and consequent responsibilities, in laying down the executive procedure which they consider most suitable to reach the desired end.
The basic principle, also because of its psychological effect on the crowd, is the employment en masse, decisively, and immediately.
The dispersion of the forces in order to be everywhere is an error which will be avoided at all costs.

5. - It may so be that the troops at the disposal of the Military Territorial Command are not sufficient to meet the requirements of the situation; in this case the civilian authority must apply to the nearest Allied District or the nearest Base Section, asking for the merging of the Italian troops which may be at the disposal of such H.Q.s, and specifying, on the approval of the Military Territorial Commander, the force of troops which ~~they~~^{it} considers necessary. These troops, which will be granted by the Allied Commands, will pass for all effects, immediately and temporarily, to the command of the Military Territorial H.Q., which will employ them in accordance with the standing laws, regulations, and directives, of the Italian Army.

6. - The Mediterranean Supreme Allied Command (SACMED), reserves the right to declare any territories restored to the Italian Government, "military zone". With this declaration, the exercising of powers of government in the area concerned will be assumed by an Allied Military Government.
Zones in which grave disturbances of public order are met with, are likely to be declared "military zones".

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Zones in which grave disturbances of public order are met with, are likely to be declared "military zones".
7. - In the event of disturbances of exceptional gravity, the Ministry of the Interior and, ~~on its authority~~^{on its authority}, ~~may~~^{may} the Prefects, have the power (see P.S. Laws, art. 217, and foll.) to declare a State of War. As a consequence of this, the direction of the service of public order and the responsibility for its execution, will pass to the Military Authorities.
In this event all the police forces will pass to the command of the Military Authority.

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8. It may so be that an Allied Command - on its own initiative if the disorders threaten to affect allied military interests, or following a request for assistance on the part of the Italian Authorities - considers it necessary to employ also Allied troops in order to re-establish order.

In this event, the direction of the service of law and order and the responsibility for its execution will be assumed by the Allied Command and all Italian troops engaged on Public Order duties - including ITI-ITI, US-ITI, and BR-ITI, troops, if any - in addition to all the police forces, will pass to the command of the competent District or Base Section Commander of the territory, who will thus become the Commander in Chief of all Allied and Italian forces, even if the area in which the disorders are taking place has not been declared a "military zone".

9. When Italian troops are engaged in public order duties under the command of an Allied H.Q., it is for this H.Q. to give the instructions regarding the procedure of employment and the line of conduct to be adopted in respect of the disturbers of the peace, especially as far as the use of arms is concerned.

When the Allied Command omits such instructions, the employment of Italian troops will be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this Circular.

3941

10. In order to guarantee the speediest and most efficient intervention by troops, it is of the utmost importance that very close liaison is maintained at all times between the civilian authorities and the Allied and Italian Military Commands.

11. Troops engaged in public order duties will be armed in relation to the armament available to the disturbers of the peace.
As against defenceless disturbers of the peace, troops will be

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As against defenceless disturbers of the peace, troops will be armed, normally, with only pistols and rifles.

Automatic rifles and other arms capable of firing single shots may be used in place of rifles.

The use of hand grenades is forbidden.

Automatic weapons, held in reserve, will only be used in extreme cases, when armed resistance is met with.

When it is found that the disturbers of the peace have automatic weapons and hand grenades at their disposal, the troops will be authorized to make use of the same weapons and even weapons of greater power, in relation to the principle that they who are called upon to restore order must always possess superior armament to that of these who have disturbed order.

The use of chemical or smoke appliances, is, however, in any case, forbidden. *NO See G 92 Pages 87 X*

Troops must proceed to their place of employment with weapons unloaded; they will only be loaded on the order of the unit commander. This instruction does not apply to carabinieri, who may carry their weapons loaded when they consider it necessary.

12. - With the exception of the instances cited in Nos. 7 and 8, the direction of the duties of public order on the spot in which disturbances occur or are expected to occur, will be carried out by an official of the Public Security or, in his absence, by an officer of the carabinieri.
- It is the responsibility of whoever is directing operations to decide as to when it is necessary to employ the troops placed at his disposal and when their action may cease.
- The same official or carabinieri officer, directing operations, has the duty of acquainting the unit commander, clearly *add 40* unequivocally, with the task entrusted to the unit, a task which must be proportionate to the strength of the said unit.
- The director of operations is, moreover, held responsible for giving to the unit commander all information and intelligence necessary for the carrying out of the operation and which may influence the conduct to be borne by the troops in respect of the disturbers of the peace.

13. - The commander of the unit engaged on duties of public order.

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NO. 100 692 (old file copy)
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13. - The commander of the unit engaged on duties of public order, being acquainted with the task assigned to him and having properly summed up the situation, will decide upon the method with which he intends to carry out the task and, in particular:

- decide whether, in order to reach the desired end, it will be necessary to resort to the use of arms;
- decide which of the arms available to his unit (rifles, L.M.G.'s, automatic weapons, hand grenades) will have to be employed;

- 4 - order the loading of weapons, the opening of fire, and the cessation of fire.

These responsibilities, which are inseparable from the exercise of command, will be assumed with calmness and without hesitation, bearing in mind that the use of firearms is reserved for extreme cases only, in which there is no other way of preventing the continuation of the disorders or in which the insurgents endanger the troops by they themselves making use of firearms or other means of offense.

Fire will be directed against the most dangerous looking individuals, ^{these} who are inciting violence, and, possibly, against the ringleader of the demonstration.

It is forbidden to fire indiscriminately on the crowd and on women and children.

Troops may not open fire, except in cases of legitimate defense, without the order of their commander.

14. - In view of the functions of a unit commander engaged on duties of public order, it is necessary that he be an officer. When, under very exceptional circumstances, the Command of the unit must be assumed by a N.C.O., he will assume all the responsibilities laid down in the preceding para.

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15. - The "Instructions for Garrison Duties", which replace the cancelled "Regulations for the Territorial Service", still remain applicable as far as they concern duties of public order (art. 202 and following), always provided that they do not contradict this circular to which a summary of the said instructions have been attached for ease of consultation.

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THE MINISTER.

O. Danin Cpl.

TRANSLATION

PART XVII

SERVICE OF PUBLIC ORDER

.....
202. - SCOPE OF THE SERVICE

- a) - maintain or reestablish order and assist in public order duties in the public highways and places;
- b) - to guard, in the event of disturbance of public order, places requiring particular protection (Royal palaces, law courts, public offices of special importance, embassies, legations, consulates, prisons, banks, public services, industrial establishments supplying essential requirements, such as gas, light, water, transport, feed, etc);
- c) - to ensure, with men and materials, the functioning of services of public interest (214) which cannot be suspended without serious imminent harm for the population and which would not be able to function by other means.

203. - In accordance with the Public Security authorities, appropriate orders must be compiled for each of the places mentioned in (b) above, together with the guard orders laid down. 3938

PUBLIC ORDER NOTIFICATIONS

204. - The public security authorities will normally notify the garrison commander of any happenings of importance in respect of public order, especially if they may lead to a request for armed picquets.

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PUBLIC ORDER SCHEMES

205. -- Public order schemes:

- a) will be compiled only:
- in expectation of serious internal disorders;
 - in garrisons commanded by General officers and in populated centres of some importance, in which, that is, it may be considered advisable by the Prefect;

- b) will come into force:
- normally at the request of the public security authorities;

Eventually by order of the garrison commander and the military authority commanding the garrison, in cases of absolute gravity and urgency.

DIRECTION OF THE SERVICE

206. - The direction of the service, with the consequent responsibility for its execution:

- a) is normally performed by the public security authorities;
- b) in the event of grave disturbances may be assumed by the military authorities, under the regulations laid down by the standing public security laws (articles 217 and sub.) in which case the police forces will also come under the command of the military authorities.

INTERVENTION BY TROOPS

207. - Intervention by troops will take place:

- a) by the carabinieri : on their own initiative in accordance with the special regulations in force in the Corps (200); or on the request of the public security authorities;
- b) by other arms and specialists : normally at the request of the public security authorities; eventually on the initiative of the military authorities should they be charged with the direction of the services, in cases of particular gravity and urgency.

ARMED PICQUETS

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ARMED PICQUETS

208. - Armed picquets are military units, available for duties of public order of public assistance. They will be ordered by the garrison commander following a request by the Prefect and are normally formed of complete units. They may be : ordinary, extraordinary, and special.

209. - THE ORDINARY ARMED PICQUET:

- a) - is normally available in the barracks appointed by the garrison commander who will also lay down its strength,

constitution, and eventual procedures for ensuring its rapid and efficient employment;

- b) - is on duty daily, commencing in guard dismounting;
- c) - is composed of troops taken in turn from a roster of all the unit, who will take part, generally, in all instruction. During off duty hours, however:

the picquet commander, after having assembled and inspected his men, may leave barracks, but must be speedily recallable (name and whereabouts must be left in the room of the picquet officer);

the men of the picquet will remain in barracks and wear the dress laid down for public order duties; they may undress after retreat.

When the picquet is out of barracks on public order or public assistance ⁽²¹¹⁾ duties, the Commanding Officer or next senior officer left in barracks, will immediately arrange for its replacement with an extraordinary picquet. (211)

210. - GROUPS OF ARMED PICQUETS, maybe, under exceptional circumstances, laid down in advance by the garrison commander, for eventual assembly, in the event of particular and temporary local needs, the command of such group being entrusted to an officer appointed in turn by the garrison commander from among ~~the~~ ³³ of the units under command.

211. - THE EXTRAORDINARY PICQUET, of a strength adequate to requirements, may be ordered by the garrison commander:

- a) following request made by public security authorities or officers;
- b) on his own initiative - informing the public security

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211. - THE EXTRAORDINARY PICQUET, of a strength adequate to requirements, may be ordered by the garrison commander:

a) following request made by public security authorities or officers;

b) on his own initiative - informing the public security authorities - when it is necessary to reinforce or replace the ordinary armed picquet.

It may likewise be ordered by any other officer, within the limits of the Corps to which he belongs, in cases of absolute gravity and urgency, informing the above mentioned authorities as speedily as possible.

212. - THE SPECIAL PICQUET:

- a) will be ordered, as required, by the garrison commander, to maintain order:
on railway stations and quays at the time of large scale troop movement;
at military tribunals, assize courts, and penal or special tribunals;
in the electoral sections, at the time of elections.
- b) may be requested by the local units concerned, which will also indicate the duty to be performed and, if necessary, the method of carrying it out;
- c) will be changed every 24 hours should the duty last several days.

ARMS

213. - The armament of the troops:
- a) is limited, mainly, to individual arms, with the following scale of ammunition:
each rifle or carbine: 12 buckshot cartridges and 36 ball cartridges;
each pistol: 36 ball cartridges;
 - b) includes eventually M.M.G.s and L.M.G.s of the unit, with 10 ball cartridge magazines for each weapon;

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REQUESTS

214. - Requests for armed picquets:
- a) will be made, normally in writing, by the public security

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REQUESTS

214. - Requests for armed pickets:

- a) will be made, normally in writing, by the public security authorities:
 - to the garrison commander, if they are to be employed not more than 5 kilometers from the limits of the garrison;
 - to the divisional commander in other cases;
 - to the War Ministry, through the Ministry for the Interior, if the troops are to be employed on the services of public interest as in No.202 (letter c);

b) must show:

strength, in approximate figures, of men and eventually M.G.s

and other weapons and special means required;

scope for which they are required;

time and place of intervention;

rank, and possibly name, of the public security officer who will be directing the service on the spot.

215. - The public security authorities must avoid asking for units of the garrison troops, in addition to the ordinary armed picquets, to be confined to barracks as a precautional measure, if the same measure has not first been adopted in respect of the carabinieri of the same garrison.

When there is a divergence of opinion between the garrison commander and the public security authorities:

the garrison commander will decide if the question is one of specifying the types of arms and means to be employed; the army corps commander will decide if the question is one of establishing the strength of troops to be employed, or in all other cases.

216. - Urgent requests for assistance to the public forces, on the part of public security officers or carabinieri officers (199), may be made, in writing or verbally, but confirmed in writing as soon as possible:

- a) to guard posts, in accordance with the contents of No. 279;
- b) to any barracks or locality where army units are billeted or temporarily located, in which case the commanding officer or senior officer present must comply with the request, detailing an ^{army} extraordinary armed picquet (209-211).

These requests may be made only by persons already known or in possession of identity documents as to person and duty.

217. - Isolated troops must comply with requests for assistance, made to

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217. - Isolated troops must comply with requests for assistance, made to them by public security officials or agents, ^{who make themselves} ~~known to them as such, in cases of uprear, public misfortune or common danger, or evidence of crime.~~

TRANSPORT OF ARMED PICKETS

218. - The following instructions are laid down:

- a) avoid transport by night if possible;
- b) have the convoy preceded by an armoured car, fast light tank,

or by a D/R vehicle, according to circumstances, and keep the other vehicles at intervals;

c) proceed at reduced speed;

d) weapons will be kept in the hands at all times (they must not be laid down in the vehicle);

e) guard against possible ambushes from, crossroads, bends, hedges, or other repairs flanking the road;

f) guard against wires or other obstacles stratched across the road;

g) troops will de-bus at a suitable distance from their place of duty and then proceed on foot;

h) post an armed guard on the empty vehicles.

219. - Principles for the employment of armed picquets.

a) - the employment of an armed picquet has only one object: to reestablish law and order.

b) a picquet is formed to operate: a request for intervention and employment must therefore be made with foresight.

c) the duty will be pointed out - either in writing or verbally by the public security officer or in his absence by the CC.RR officer; the O.C. troops will lay down the method with which it is to be carried out.

d) the picquet will remain at all times under the direct command of its own commander; and will act under its own command and its own responsibility;

e) avoid uncertainty and weakness which always decrease discipline and the prestige of the military forces;

f) the picquet will act with the speed and resolute energy demanded by the object to be attained; but with the calm serenity which emerges from the conscientious discharge of duty and knowledge of strength;

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 - f) the picquet will act with the speedy and resolute energy demanded by the object to be attained; but with the calm serenity which emerges from the conscientious discharge of duty and knowledge of strength;
- The picquet commander, on taking up his duty, must receive from the responsible public security officer all the intelligence and information necessary for the discharge of the duty and which may influence the conduct to be maintained by the troops.

220. - DISPERSION OF CROWDS OR ASSEMBLIES.

To break up threatening meetings or assemblies or to clear premises occupied by rebels or trouble makers:

- a) the public security officer, bearing the tricolour (in his absence the CC.RR officer or NCO), who is directing the service, will instruct the public to disperse, repeating the order three times, preceding each warning, if possible, with the "halt" call on the bugle.
- b) the third warning being in vain he will request in a loud voice the employment of armed force;
- c) should it not be possible, in cases of revolt or of violence by the assembled persons, to give the prescribed warnings, resort will, without fail, be made to the employment of armed force, always provided that it is requested by the above mentioned director of the service.
- Armoured cars and tanks of various types are ideally suitable for this task.

221. - USE OF ARMS.

Weapons, the most extreme means available, will only be used when they are essential in order to carry out the task, in the following order:

- a) side arms (bayonets, sabres: the latter, first with the flat of the blade, and afterwards, if necessary, the point or edge);
- b) firearms (pistols, rifles, and in exceptional cases M.G.s).

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222. - USE OF FIRE.

- a) must never be used for intimidatory purposes only;
- b) is the last means of action against revolutionaries: using firearms themselves or other offensive means which are likely to endanger the troops; who have committed incendiary or destructive acts and when there is no other way of preventing the continuation of the disorders.

armed force, always provided that it is requested by the above mentioned director of the service.

Armoured cars and tanks of various types are ideally suitable for this task.

221. - USE OF ARMS.

Weapons, the most extreme means available, will only be used when they are essential in order to carry out the task, in the following order:

- a) side arms (bayonets, sabres: the latter, first with the flat of the blade, and afterwards, if necessary, the point or edge);
- b) firearms (pistols, rifles, and in exceptional cases M.G.s).

3932

222. - USE OF FIRE.

- a) must never be used for intimidatory purposes only;
- b) is the last means of action against revolutionaries: using firearms themselves or other offensive means which are likely to endanger the troops; who have committed incendiary or destructive acts and when there is no other way of preventing the continuation of the disorders.

Several shots fired in the air may only be used to call for urgent reinforcement from troops located in the vicinity.

PATROLS

223. - Patrols on public order duties:

- a) will be formed by assembling troops only in very exceptional cases and at all times temporarily only;

- b) their task and the method of carrying it out will be indicated by the public security authorities; if the patrol is, under exceptional circumstances, formed of troops only, the method of carrying out the task as indicated by the public security authorities will be laid down by the military authorities;
- c) their strength will be fixed, in accordance with requirements, by common agreement between the military authorities and the public security authorities;
- d) are normally commanded by a junior NCO of the carabinieri or even a carabinieri;
- e) in exceptional cases they may be led by other public security agents, in which case the troops will limit themselves to giving moral support by their presence to the agent leading them, in the execution of the orders and duties given him;
- f) military patrols not commanded by CC.RR or led by other agents of the public forces cannot be instructed to carry out police duties.

A R R E S T S

224. - ARRESTS DURING THE SERVICE OF PUBLIC ORDER:

3931

- a) are normally effected by public security agents;
- b) may be effected by troops under exceptional circumstances only:
in the absence or due to the insufficiency of, public security agents;
when the person concerned directly insults, threatens, or offends, the troops;
- c) persons arrested by the troops must be handed over as soon as possible to public security agents after a proper

or even a carabinieri;

- e) in exceptional cases they may be led by other public security agents, in which case the troops will limit themselves to giving moral support by their presence to the agent leading them, in the execution of the orders and duties given him;
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 - when the person concerned directly insults, threatens, or offends, the troops;
- c) persons arrested by the troops must be handed over as soon as possible to public security agents after a proper receipt has been released;
- d) when the troops have an arrested person on their charge, they must guard against his escape with all possible means.

225. - ESCORT OF ARRESTED PERSONS DURING PUBLIC ORDER DUTIES.

Is carried out:

- a) if the person is dressed in military uniform: by CC.RR only;

b) if the person is dressed in civilian clothes: normally by CC.RR or other public security agents; in absolutely exceptional cases they may also be escorted by troops, in which case it will be done: according to instructions issued by public security officials or, in their absence, by CC.RR officers; with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed; with decisive vigour but correctly, without, that is, insulting or maltreating the persons arrested; restraining, however, with all available means and resorting where necessary to the use of arms, any violent reaction on their part such as a violent effort to break away from whoever is holding them.

REPORTS

226. - The commander of the picquet or group of picquets employed on public order duties, must notify to the garrison commander any happenings or requirements connected with his duty: from time to time and directly, in cases of particular gravity and urgency; when his duty is over and through higher channels, in other cases. 393)

END OF THE SERVICE

227. - The removal of the picquet from its place of employment may only take place following authorisation of the public security authorities in charge of the service.

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