

ACC 10000/120/5980

Q/1/24

(1)

WAR DIARY - DAILEY JOURNAL

Sept. 1944 - Jan. 1946

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WAR DIARY . DAILEY JOURNAL

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44 - Jan. 1946

Q/RATIONS/ACCOUNTS

SUMMARY FOR WAR DIARY FOR MONTH OFJANUARY 1946

Concerted pressure has been put on the Ministry of War for the procurement of subsistence for the Interim Army. Although the Ministry of War understands that the Italian Government is responsible for maintenance of the Army it has reported serious difficulties of cooperation and assistance from the Ministry of Food. The latter Ministry does not appear to consider that Allied Military assistance terminated, officially, on 1 Dec 45.

In consideration of these difficulties and the lack of an import program financed by the Italian Government, as opposed to the existing import programs financed by UNRRA and FEA appropriations, agreements have been reached between AMHQ and MMIA on behalf of the Italian Government for loans of subsistence, subject to repayment in kind, and release of certain items declared surplus to Allied Military requirements in Italy, for repayment in dollar credits.

Negotiations were effected for procurement of certain foodstuffs for maintenance of the Italian Army up to and including the month of March. A loan of flour for January and part of February requirements was made from British Army stocks.

It is not anticipated that any foodstuffs from Allied Military stocks will be available in the future. The Ministry of War has been advised of this.

Considerable difficulty has been encountered in the physical procurement of items allocated from local resources by the Ministry of Food, to the Ministry of War. It is another indication of passive resistance by one agency of the Government to the War Ministry.

It has been requested that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission will have a conference with the Head of the Italian Government in order to clarify the position of responsibility for maintenance of the Interim Army. 1085

Vouchers are still being received for issues to Italian Armed Forces. Routine accounting action has been taken to debit the Italian Government with the charges so raised.

KRN
K. ROBERT NELSON
Major CAC

SUBJECT : Submission of War Diaries.

G BRANCH

MILIA

G/99

22 Jan 46

To : All Branches and Services (two copies each)

Ref Office Instructions Nos 106 of 16 Nov and 109 of 1 Dec 45.

1. Para 3 of Office Instruction No. 106 as amended by para 1 of Office Instruction No 109, states that :

"Sections and Services will submit narratives and appendices for the previous month to branches under branch instructions by the 3rd day of every month. These will be collated by each branch on Army Form C.2413 and signed and submitted in duplicate by the Head of the branch to GSI by the 6th day of every month for final collation and submission to GHQ O2A."

2. The procedure as outlined above is not being adhered to, services submitting to their respective branches copies of War Diaries completed and signed by heads of services. These have not been incorporated into branch War Diaries, but fwd to GSI as received by the Branch.

3. In future, the procedure adopted by branches and services will conform to that laid down in the two Office Instructions quoted above, i.e. that services will submit War Diary material to branches in rough form with appendices for incorporation into the branch War Diary, in order that the final branch version may :

(a) cover all aspects of the work of the branch incl services and secs in a concise form,

(b) not duplicate information as would inevitably be the case were branches, services and sections to submit their War Diaries independently.

4. War Diaries for A and Q Branches will be sent to Colonel A/Q by 6th of each month.

1084

As per [illegible]

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1. Para 3 of Office Instruction No. 106 as amended by para 1 of Office Instruction No 109, states that :

"Sections and Services will submit narratives and appendices for the previous month to branches under branch instructions by the 3rd day of every month. These will be collated by each branch on Army Form C.2113 and signed and submitted in duplicate to the Head of the branch to GSI by the 8th day of every month for final collation and submission to HQ Q2E."

2. The procedure as outlined above is not being adhered to, services submitting to their respective branches copies of War Diaries completed and signed by heads of services. These have not been incorporated into branch War Diaries, but fwd to GSI as received by the Branch.

3. In future, the procedure adopted by branches and services will conform to that laid down in the two Office Instructions quoted above, i.e. that services will submit War Diary material to branches in rough form with appendices for incorporation into the branch War Diary, in order that the final branch version may :

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APC/12b

It Col
G5

A. J. Bennett

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EM/G/6

OFFICE INSTRUCTION No. 106
COMPILATION OF WAR DIARY

1. Attention is called to GRO/327 of 1945 - preparation of War Diaries after the conclusion of the war in Europe.
2. Each branch of the staff will ensure that sections and services keep a war diary (in duplicate) in accordance with the instructions contained in M.E. Form 160 (Amended).
3. Sections and services will submit narratives and appendices for the previous month to branches under branch instructions by the 3rd day of every month. The first will be so submitted by 3rd December 1945. These will be collated by each branch and submitted complete to GSI by the 8th day of every month.
4. A War Diary will be kept by each of the following General Staff Sections and Services - G (Ops and SD) - GSI - G (Trg) G (Lincon) - RE - Sigs and will be submitted to GSI on the 3rd day in every month.
5. GSI will complete the HQ War Diary and despatch it in accordance with M.E. Form 160 (Amended) para 8.

Attest
Lt Col,
CS.

1083

LJNS/jw

16 Nov 45.Copy to: All Branches and Sections.

1124

W A R D I A R Y

2 November 1945

FROM: Q.1

TO : D.A.Q.M.G. (2)

- 29 Oct. Ltr. Q/1-98 to Minister for War, subj. "Rations for US-ITI's" states that as of 1 November 1945, all US-ITI's will obtain the Allied portion of the ration from U.S. depots. Also, procedure for preparing and forwarding of the vouchers covering these rations was outlined.
- 31 Oct. Ltr. Q/1/6-22 to CG PBS giving ration strength of Italian Armed Forces fed by U.S., and stock states of Italian Depots (U.S. origin only) as of 20 Oct. 45.
- 1 Nov. Ltr. Q/1-99 to Hq Allied Commission, Food Sub-Comm., and Economic Section, giving the subsistence requirements for the Italian Army (ITI-ITI category) for the month of December, requesting AC to review the recap. forwarded to ascertain what quantity can be furnished from Italian resources, and what can be furnished from civil imports.

Tommy T. Rose
TOMMY T. ROSE, Lt. Col.
Q.1 M.M.I.A.

ri

1082

DAILY ACTIVITIES

5 September 1944.

1.
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION: TIME: 0900. Major Smith at Naples--Major Rose.
Major Smith informed us that the typewriters which we have on requisition, fourteen (14) in number, are ready to be drawn at Aversa. Informed Major Smith to draw the typewriters in the weapons carrier which Pvt. Peixley is driving from Naples this morning. Informed Major Smith that we are sending a weapons carrier from the office to Naples office with 17 cots, stationery, and office supplies, if they are available, before the truck leaves. And that he is to send the remainder of the typewriters to this office when this truck returns. Informed him that he should keep one typewriter in his office, and one typewriter for Sardinia. He would receive instructions on the Sardinia typewriter later. Gave Major Smith the order number transferring Captain Hamilton to this Headquarters from 7th Replacement Depot.
2.
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION: TIME: 1100. Major Sampson, SOS NATOUSA--Major Rose.
Request Major Sampson to repay the 307,000 pounds of sugar released the 23rd of August from the Italian Military Depot.

Naples --	200,000 lbs.
Taranto --	107,000 lbs.
Total --	307,000 lbs.

Major Sampson to inform us this afternoon concerning this matter.
3.
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION: TIME: 1730. Major Rose to Captain Guthrie.
Informed Captain Guthrie to send the weapons carrier which he now has to Naples, 6 September 1944, and pick up the reconnaissance car for Major Smith. Captain Guthrie advises that Pvt. Price arrange to return there by carrier.

RESTRICTED

SUBJECT: Address by GOC MMIA

LAND FORCES SUB COM, AC (MMIA)

G / 95

14 Sep 45

TO : MMIA Outstation IOs
GSOs 1 BLUs att Combat Gps
Comd 'F' BL & TU

1. Attached hereto is copy of address given by GOC MMIA to Senior Italian War Ministry officials on 14 Sep 45.
2. This document is for your personal information so that you will be in the picture if Territorial and Div comds discuss with you. It is necessary that the information contained in the document should first reach Italian officials through Italian Ministry of War channels and you are requested NOT to use this information for the present for purposes other than personal knowledge of what is being examined this end in ROME.

rd

Lt.-Col.
GS.

1080

R E S T R I C T E D

Land Forces Sub-Commission A.C.,
M.M.I.A.
R O M E
C/3

14 September 1945

Address by G.O.C., M.M.I.A. to give an
outline of Allied views and intentions
as regards the future organization and
training of the ITALIAN ARMY.

1. Creation of existing Italian Army.

(a) The existing Italian Army represents an ad hoc build-up to suit immediate Allied war needs and dependent on factors such as supply, time available, the development of the war etc.

(b) It bore little relation to what ITALY will need as a post-treaty army. Yet we always had one eye on the future and tried to develop an organization which would fit post-war without detracting from the immediate war effort.

(c) The result is that now we already have an organization which can be and is being changed into a shape which will produce an army to meet Italian needs during the Interim period until the Peace Treaty is signed.

(d) We have the Ministry of War, the Territorial H.Q.'s organization, the Gruppi, 3 I.S. Divs, the Services, CESAMO, etc - and we are now planning to expand Territorial H.Q. from 2,000 to 7,000 and creating 10 I.S. Bdes.

(e) The immediate object of the Allies is to create this Italian Army and raise its quality and efficiency.

2. Peace Treaty Terms.

I do not know what these will be. That is a matter for the Allied Governments and is not yet settled. So do NOT think that I can tell you

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3. Post-treaty set-up.

(a) The post-treaty Italian Army will depend on the size, composition and armament authorized by the Allies, and on the matter of conscription or a long service army (much on the British model).

/... (b)

-2-

3. (Contd.)

- (b) Nevertheless, we have got to think ahead in anticipation and try to design a proper framework which will suit an army of any size that ITALY is likely to be allowed.
- (c) ITALY, undoubtedly, in any event, will only be able to afford a small army, and I know as soldiers that you will agree with me that it is far better for her to have a small army of high quality than a large army of low quality. So that simplifies our problem.

4.

Discussions with A.F.H.Q.

(a) I have been having discussion with A.F.H.Q. and other Allied authorities on this whole matter and I have called you together today to explain in broad outline what are the present Allied ideas and intentions subject to approval by higher authority. After I have explained this in outline, our respective staffs can examine the problem and its implications in greater detail.

(b) We have proceeded on the assumptions that :

(i) owing to war and the circumstances under which it was born, the existing Italian Army requires complete reorganization throughout.

(ii) the Allies are prepared and determined to assist in this reconstruction and I have no doubt that ITALY will welcome this.

(iii) the future Italian Army must be brought right up to date and purged of all the inefficiencies and out of date procedure which existed under the Fascist Regime.

(iv) quality not quantity is to be the keynote.

1078

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(c) The Italian Army proved in the post-armistice war that it had advanced a long way since the chaos of early 1944, but there is still a very long way to go yet.

(d) We appreciate that the full reconstruction will take time, but we must make a start now and go all out NOW to put a proper Italian Army on its feet. I know I can rely on your cooperation in this.

/.....(e)

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-3-

4. (contd.)

(e) I am now going to outline to you the Allied views on general organization and training.

5. Conscription versus a long service voluntary army.

(a) With a small army, with key-note quality, there is no doubt in my mind that a long service army is far the best in every way for ITALY and I believe you thoroughly agree with me.

(b) Some aspects of this are :-

(i) Modern training takes months. Unless the army is trained, it is no use. Therefore, with a conscript army, you have to have large training staffs to train the whole call-up authorized each year. During early training men are away from their units. The result is that the size of the effective part of the army is small and unable to fulfil its function.

(ii) With a conscript army of one year's service, you have to turn over and train 100% of the call-up each year; but with a long service army of 5 years minimum, only 20% which eases the training commitment and thus enlarges the "effective" part of the army.

(iii) A long service army would be a complete break with the past, which (though I am not a politician) seems to me to be an excellent thing politically and for army prestige.

(c) There are, of course, many other aspects which you realize as well as I do. The argument against long service is the COST. But I doubt if really the cost is very much greater. The main increase is the extra pay for volunteers. But you will have to...

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(c) There are, of course, many other aspects which you realize as well as I do. The argument against long service is the COST. But I doubt if really the cost is very much greater. The main increase is the extra pay for volunteers. But you will have to pay a conscript a living wage in future, higher than in the past - and I doubt if you would have to pay the volunteer much more. We are getting many volunteers today, though perhaps these are not drawn from the best types available.

/....(a)

5. (contd.)

- (d) In any event, I will tell my staff to examine the question with you and get your views. Personally, I think it far better to have a small long service, dependable army of high quality than a larger, less stable, conscript army of the same cost.
- (e) The OCRR give us a guide as to how a voluntary, long service army could be put into effect i.e. system, conditions of service, etc.

6. Call-up

- (a) If conscription continues to be the form of producing men for the army, I want you to examine the American system of call-up. (EXPLAIN)
- (b) It has worked excellently; is completely fair; and takes away an even % of men from each part of the country, thus assisting national economy.
- (c) I feel myself that it is the system ITALY needs and superior to your present methods.
- (d) It would make monthly call-ups possible, thus easing the strain on the training organizations and enabling that to be adjusted to meet a continuous and even flow of recruits.

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7. Inflow and training of recruits.

- (a) This DIAGRAM (on blackboard) gives an outline of how we envisage recruits being taken into the Army, trained and delivered to units. (EXPLAIN DIAGRAM ATTACHED).
- (b) We have based the design so that :-
- (i) it can fit either the voluntary or the conscription army.
- The matter is merely one of degree of size of the training establishments.

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(ii) an even flow of recruits can be dealt with and all training organizations are full simultaneously, thus reducing training overheads and maintaining the effective strength of the army.

(iii) the recruit gets a thorough grounding before he goes to his unit. This enables the C.O. of the unit to concentrate on collective training.

/....(iv)

-5-

7. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(iv) the higher training establishments (except Military Academy at MODENA and Staff College in ROME) are planned to be concentrated round ROME, with obvious advantages of supervision and control by the Ministry of War; and are also concentrated by arms, which means economy of equipment.

(v) collection and initial training of recruits is by Regions, thus preserving Territorial association and avoiding waste of time and transport in travelling.

(vi) it is a system which we can start putting into force as soon as we get permission from higher authority.

(vii) incidentally troops under training at CESANO are a potential valuable I.S. reserve centrally located.

(c) In many ways it is a complete break with the past, but it will undoubtedly be a more efficient machine for the purpose and the country round CESANO is ideal for training. Sentiment of using former artillery barracks at TURIN, for instance, must give way to efficiency. You remember the sentence in the Bible about "putting new wine into old bottles"! We have nevertheless tried to make the best compromise possible.

(d) (i) We have CESANO and BRACCIANO Schools already in being. We looked ahead and have secured further accommodation at CIVITAVECCHIA.

(ii) Now we must go ahead with planning and organizing the P.I.C.'s and I.T.C.'s, as well as adjusting CESANO and the other schools nearby.

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- (d) (i) We have CESANO and BRACCIANO Schools already in being. We looked ahead and have secured further accommodation at CIVITAVECCHIA.
- (ii) Now we must go ahead with planning and organizing the P.T.C's and I.T.C's, as well as adjusting CESANO and the other schools nearby.
- (iii) We must decide quickly on the barracks and locations of the P.T.C's and I.T.C's which should be alongside each other. If the most suitable site in any place is occupied by the Allies, I will see if that can be freed for you.
- (iv) We must get the District H.Q's and Depots organized and functioning. The Depot (in our system) would have a

/....dual

7. (contd.)

(a) (contd.)

(iv) (contd.)

dual role of an outfitting H.Q. and a Regimental Depot. I feel that District H.Q.'s and Depots should be merged to save overheads, movement and accommodation. I should like this examined in detail.

(v) We must get the CESANO and other nearby schools properly fitted up with suitable accommodation, roads etc. I am glad to see improvement there as regards this BUT WE MUST get the gas plant completely removed. We cannot have a civilian business in CESANO. It must be purely military - the shrine of the Italian Army, which in time will become a "show-piece" !

(vi) The great difficulty I see is on what figures are we to base the accommodation necessary? You need twice as much for a turnover of 200,000 as you do for 100,000. We don't know what the Peace Treaty will say. The turnover of recruits (and thus size of training staff) will be different for conscription to long service. But we have one advantage i.e. that we will start in a small way and increase gradually. So, even if we make a mistake we can alter it. I think we had better work backwards from a total figure of (say) 140,000 for the Interim Army plus 50%, i.e. about 200,000 or so on a conscript basis. That is the only figure I can think of to work on, and we can adjust up or down from that later - though I must repeat that it is a pure guess as I do NOT know what the Peace Treaty figures will be or whether it will be conscription or voluntary service.

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(e) We must also now train instructors for P.T.C's and I.T.C's, and in fact get everything ready as soon as possible to take on the first big call-up. We can "live on our fat" from BR-ITI's and US-ITI's and local volunteers, we estimate, till December. By that time we anticipate having demobilized down to the 1919 class inclusive. It looks as if we

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7. (contd.)

(e) (contd.)

if we will want a call-up in January, so all must be ready before Xmas - say 15 December. There is not too much time. We must hurry, hurry, hurry.

8. Officers.

(a) We agree to your having the military academy at MODENA. This raises the whole question of provision of officers on which any army basically depends. We have already started with the grading and removal of existing officers down to Major inclusive. That is one aspect - sorting out and keeping the best officers you have, and rehabilitating P.W. officers that you keep, by a course at GESANO.

(b) (i) The other angle is the provision and training of new entry into the Army. I would like you to examine now the question as to whether All "new entry" should not do 6 months in the ranks first before going as cadets to the Military Academy. The British and all the Dominion troops do this and it has been an unqualified success and invaluable to the officer

later on, as he then understands how his men live in the Army. 1073
(ii) Frankly, we feel that your whole basis of officer training

academic and not human or personal enough. We feel that the relationship between officer and man is not what it should be in a democratic world and to get the best team work. We feel your course for cadets is much too long.

(iii) I would like you to examine the whole business in the light of what we have found so beneficial in the Allied Armies.

(iv) Till MODENA is ready and with the requisite instructors, we

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(iv) Till MODENA is ready and with the requisite instructors, we shall have to continue temporarily with LECCE - though here again the forthcoming courses should be modernized and adjusted.

(v) As I say, the officer question is vital. No out of date tradition or procedure must stand in the way of producing the right type of modern army officer worthy of ITALY and which

/.....she

8. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(v) (contd.)

she needs so badly. We must start to build now for posterity and the word "Impossible" does not exist in my Dictionary !

9. Staff College.

This is not of such urgency but we want your views on this.

10. Standardization.

(a) Frankly, we feel that one of your troubles is the lack of standardization in your army organization. You have so many different types of units, all on different war establishments. An army cannot be really efficient thus. It complicates everything (training, reinforcements, supply - everything) and SIMPLICITY is a major element in military efficiency.

(b) (i) Till now, we have had I.S. Divs and Bdes on a different W.E. to the Gruppi. That could not be helped. But now we must plan to get on to a standard Infantry organization.

(ii) I have told my staff to examine with you as to whether the hastily-put-together Gruppo organization is correct. We will then adjust it and put I.S. Divs and Bdes on a similar organization. A Gruppo Regiment is about the same strength as an I.S. Bde. We will call these converted I.S. Bdes "Independent Regiments". They need not have the same full scale of equipment but should be inter-changeable with Gruppo Regiments.

(iii) These "Independent Regiments", (similarly to all formations, units and establishments in a Territorial Region) will be under the command and control of the Territorial Region.

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(iii) These "Independent Regiments", (similarly to all formations, units and establishments in a Territorial Region) will be under the command and supervision of the Territorial Regional Commander.

(iv) CESANO, BRACCIANO and CIVITAVECCHIA Schools would be the exception. These should be controlled by one General under orders of the Ministry of War.

(v) M. of W. would lay down the standard syllabus for P.T.C.'s

/.... I.T.C.'s

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10. (contd.)

(b) (contd.)

(v) (contd.)

and I.T.C's, thus ensuring standardization of training. But the Territorial Commander would supervise and issue all orders.

(vi) The whole lay-out, as you see, is a SIMPLE one, with decentralization to the Territorial Commanders combined with central control by the M. of W.

(vii) One last aspect of standardization is the matter of "Alpine Groups". We query whether these need a separate organization and W.E. to the Gruppi. The Gruppi (and all British and American Divisions) fought in the mountains of ITALY perfectly effectively with the aid of "Alpine increments" e.g. mule companies, etc. The same should apply as regards "Alpine Groups" based on the fundamental Gruppo organization. We thus would have a uniform training for all recruits, who could then do their specialized or higher training in their units.

We 1071

11. Services.

(a) Parli passu with plans for all the reorganization I have mentioned must be plans for the reorganization of the services and the M. of W. to correspond.

(b) We think, for instance, that you must have a separate signal corps, a separate P.E.M.E. corps divorced from all other services, a separate Training Directorate which will have a very big task.

(c) I would like you to examine this also with my staff.

12. Conclusion

control by the M. of W.

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12. Conclusion.

I want to emphasize that what I have said is subject to confirmation by higher authority. It is intended to be the best forecast I can make for us to plan now and thus take time by the forelock.

LB/ar

L. Browning

Major General,
M.M.I.A.

1070

FLOW AND TRAINING OF RECRUITS

2 Weeks


4 Weeks

8 Weeks

Travelling Time
NOT specified

Period needed by
Unit C.O. for
selection of
Specialists

Travelling Time
NOT specified



Recruits called up, documented, Med. Inspect. Inoculation Clothing. Travel

Training common to all Arms of the Service. Personnel Selection Board, Screening, grading and posting to Arm of Service for which found most suitable.

Each Arm has its own Centre or Centres. Recruits passing out of these will have completed individual training. Infantry will have completed Section Training and Other Arms an equivalent standard.

On arrival in Unit & in subsequent period C.O. will watch recruits and select those he wishes to have trained as Specialists. They will be posted to the appropriate school in accordance with requirements.

FLOW AND TRAINING OF RECRUITS


8 Weeks

1070

Travelling Time
NOT specified

Period needed by
Unit C.O. for
selection of
Specialists

Travelling Time
NOT specified

Various periods
required to train in
different Subjects

Selected Specialists
enter Specialist
School for Arm of
Service


Trained Specialists

Each Arm has its own Centre or Centres. Recruits passing out of these will have completed individual training. Infantry will have completed Section Training and Other Arms an equivalent standard.

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At the Specialist Schools for each arm of the Service recruits will complete the courses of various lengths laid down

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