

ACC 10000112016238

6

TRAINING

Jan. 24, 1945 - Nov. 5, 1945

TRAINING

24, 1945 - Nov. 5, 1945

7666
7694

CONFIDENTIALEXTRACT FROM LETTER FROM 51 BLU DATED 22 JAN 45."2. MORALE

This, at the time of writing, is high, and is higher than at any time I have known in the Gruppo. Desertion is at a lower figure than it has been and the tps stand up to the weather conditions very well. There seems little doubt of their personal courage.

3. INF TRG.

As I stated in my memo of 5 Jan the Gruppo will have to learn a lot the hard way. The necessity for digging in is at last being absorbed, the use of wire and mines are now realised etc. [Fire discipline is completely non-existent and in my opinion is responsible for a lot of unnecessary trouble which befalls the Gruppo. There are signs of improvement in this but I think this will always be a weakness.] Patrols, as might be expected, were very noisy and timid but these are definitely improving.

The worst fault which has come to light has been the too easy abandoning of fwd posns when threatened or bombarded by the enemy. The Gruppo explanation that this is caused by sections being weak is NOT the real answer in my opinion although a contributory factor. It is, of course, bad leadership. It is also stupid and wasteful as it involves a comparatively major operation to retake the abandoned posn. I do NOT think we shall get this right while the Gruppo remain extended as they are. Care of weapons has improved but is still bad. There is no doubt that the Bn Trg Majors have been the inspiration of the defence, and it is problematical what would have occurred without them.

4. COMMUNICATION.

These were utterly chaotic if not non-existent for the first 48 hrs the Gruppo was in the line. The Gruppo bore this with considerable fortitude but I think at last grasped the vital necessity of communications. They are now satisfactory.

5. ADMIN

This is always lamentable but in some occult way the food reaches the tps. Far too much tpt still mills round fwd areas, but strong BLU pressure has reduced the volume.

6. INFORMATION.

The passing back of infm is very bad. The Ops section at Gruppo HQ is incompetent and does NOT try to extract infm from the units but the latter are most unhelpful and appear to have no idea of the importance of the time factor in the passing of the infm. I am paying considerable attention to this aspect."

2.

4. There has been a definite improvement in the Bn since being in the line. For example on the first few nights the Bn front was ringing throughout the night with small arms fire, none of it enemy, targets were mainly animals, trees and shadows, now they have learnt to hold their fire, and unless enemy patrols bother them they are quiet at night.

There are still many things at fault, in some cases the fault does not lie within the Bn and I think steps could be taken to rectify them. I feel at the moment some of them may not be known, so I will endeavour to tabulate some of the outstanding ones.

1. Interference by the Italian Higher Command.

The Comd of the 22nd Regt is very fond of planning pl attacks arriving at the Bn HQ in the middle of the Bn Comd's conference, and taking things in his own hands. If he was up to date in pl attacks it would not be so bad, but as he is not I suggest he might spend more time at his own HQ trying to organise it and get some system going, because at the moment it is deplorable. Then Bn Comds would get a chance to run their own Bns. In the case of the 1st Bn, the Bn Comd hadn't a clue, but my Bn Comd has a few clues, and if let alone in time will be successful.

2. Passing back of Information.

This at the moment is very bad, and I feel that Div HQ has not got up to date picture of what is really going on, which must make it extremely difficult for them to function. Information gets through, but I don't think through Italian sources as it should. For instance the exact locations down to Fls on the Bn front are not known, and when Coy reliefs are carried out no one bar the Bn knows. I have checked the channels by which information is passed back from this Bn, and I am satisfied that it is now on sound lines. A DR goes to Regt HQ twice per day, and also the IO of this Bn visits the Canadian Bn on the left each evening to find out their patrol programme etc.

I feel at the moment the hold up is at Regt HQ and if an officer could be sent back to Div since they have been in the line, and also check their routine and method of sending back information, and give them some sound advice the information might start getting through to Div.

3. Deterioration in man power.

The following are the figures showing the strength of the Bn on arrival in the line, and the position at the moment.

(A)	Bn strength on arrival in line	=	Officers	24	ORs	463
(B)	" " at the moment	=	"	21	"	589
(C)	Number taken prisoner or missing	=				28
(D)	" killed	=				4
(E)	" wounded	=				41
(F)	" sick	=				4

From the above it can be seen that after a short time in a static role the Bn is down 77, this I consider is very high; 28 prisoner and missing is bad, and the wounded 41 is very high. I should say that 50% of the wounded have occurred through bombing in one room of a house during shelling instead of dispersing, and taking cover in slit trenches or sandbagged positions which they are very idle in making, and at times appear quite helpless.

Another interesting fact about the wounded, when a man is hit very little effort is made to apply a field dressing to his wound before evacuating him to the RAP, in many cases a wounded man is left by his friends and allowed to fall into enemy hands, they are extremely callous about assisting their own wounded.

4. Field Hygiene.

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4. Field Hygiene.
At the moment such a thing doesn't exist, and to walk round Coy, and Pl posns is quite revolting. As the weather improves disease will certainly break out, and strength will be greatly reduced to sickness.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Report on Italian Bn's first experience in the line.

52 British Liaison Unit,
OME.

To: Main 1 Canadian Corps
50, 52, 53, 56 HLU
G1 (Trg) 8 Army
DWT

G 6

IPMIA

1. Attd is an entirely "off the record" report by an officer of 55 Trg Inco which is attd to this HLU. The officer in question is a Regular Officer with considerable battle experience. The Bn which forms the subject of the report is an average one. It is forwarded to you as I feel it may be of interest.
2. Various points which are brought out have already received considerable attention from this HQ with some results. The vital question of hot food for troops in fwd posns is a difficult one as the normal containers - to which the Gruppi are entitled - are NOT AVAILABLE. Camp kettles have been issued in lieu. It will be appreciated that it would require considerable attention from officers to ensure anything like a hot meal for fwd tps when insulated containers are absent. It is the lack of this attention which is the most serious fault of the Italian officer.
3. The typically Italian attitude towards their own wounded is symptomatic. Life is cheap in Italy and the Italian is emotional but NOT sentimental.
4. The question of hygiene is of course eternal. Div HQ pay lip service to it but at heart the whole Gruppo regard our incessant stressing of this subject as just a tiresome English eccentricity.
5. Traffic control is improving.
6. It must be remembered that this Gruppo is - owing to the question of time - completing its trg in the line.

30 Jan 45.

Lt Col.
SS.

COPI.

Subject: An account of an Italian Bn's first 2 weeks in the line.

The 2nd Bn 22nd Regt since being in the line has by no means excelled itself, on the other hand the enemy have made things difficult, and before I start my criticism I must give the Bn its due.

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The 2nd Bn 22nd Regt since being in the line has by no means excelled itself, on the other hand the enemy have made things difficult, and before I start my criticism I must give the Bn its due.

1. There have been no cases of desertion in spite of an active propaganda campaign by the enemy, in the form of 2 editions of leaflets, and at night a broadcasting programme through loud speakers placed on the enemy FDLs all along the Italian front. One Coy Comd of this Bn who had a number of prisoners taken from his Coy in the early stages was asked by name to go over and join the enemy with his Coy, where he would find many of his old friends waiting for him, and he would make a lot of new ones.
2. The Bn has held its front as taken over from the Canadians bar the sacrifice of two outposts positions CASA GIAZOL 494511 and CASA LOMI 494505.
3. An offensive attitude has been maintained in trying to regain the ~~offenses~~ positions, but up to date casualties have occurred and not much success has been achieved.

/3.

5. Observations on walking round Pl positions.
 The men are very cheerful, and are resting during the day. Each day I am asked the same question: "Can we have some English cigarettes Italiano Niente Buona, they make us cough at night, and the Germans fire on us" My reply was: "Bring me one German prisoner, and I will give you my complete cigarette ration and a bottle of whiskey." I should hate to part with these but I have so far hung on to them.
- Many have no laces of any sort in their boots, a lot use string, Trench foot has just started, 4 cases today.
- Cooking utensils and containers are limited, and they complain that their ~~cooking~~ food is seldom warm.
- What I cannot understand is they appear to me from their general bearing miserable looking creatures, and yet they are always smiling, the fault lies among the officers and NCOs and not the men who if well led would fight.
- There is far too much transport throughout the day on the main road running along the front. It is in full observation, and the shelling has to be borne by the people living along the road, and very often not the drivers. A policing system I feel would help matters.
- Order Groups whether on Bn, Coy or Pl level, are nothing more than a social gathering for the day. They will not get down to essential facts, or be precise, and although at a Bn conference I have seen the Bn Comd commence proceedings, before long everyone is talking, and all go away none the wiser.
6. At the moment there is one Coy fwd and 2 in reserve, the fwd Coy is relieved every five days.
- When CASA LILLI has been taken the Bn front will be very secure, and have sufficient depth which it did not have before. The arrival of a Canadian Bde on the left has helped matters considerably.
7. Conclusion.
 The Bn is definitely improving with experience, but commanders are still inclined to get into a flat spin over very little, and if anything serious started it is difficult to say how they would compete.
- I consider a local counter attack by the enemy could be held mainly by the use of arty DFs, and tanks, but even this might not succeed unless accurate information reached this HQ in time. There is about a fifty fifty chance of this happening.
- If enemy tanks appeared I rather think the Italian infantry would panic, if they could hold an infantry attack I would be pleased but would not be prepared to give any guarantee. If there was a greater proportion of British personnel with Coys I consider it would make a great difference. At the moment there are none.

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7691

Major J. Hope for Done

① ③

CONFIDENTIAL

TRAINING ARRANGING FROM 8 MARCH CONFERENCE

1. The following additional personnel will be attached to 11th on arrival at HANOI.
 - (a) 7 Liaison officer interpreters. They rank as British officers.
 - (b) 2 Artillery officer instructors
 - (c) 2 British and 4 Italian I.O.s as instructors for I.O.s and I.S.O.s.
 - (d) 4 Lt. British M.B. to instruct in mine warfare
2. Training will be concentrated on the following main points
 - (a) Patrols
 - (b) Liaison up to Regimental strength but incl Div HQ and Arty.
 - (c) Certain attacks up to Coy strength.

All training also to be planned for mountain country but H.B. sectors to concentrate fire when it will be practised.
3. Officers will be attached to units in the line under orders from 13 Corps. The General will visit the line but must be accompanied by a senior officer of the Div. This officer will ensure that the Division is completely reacquainted as regards its strength and state of training.
4. Heavy should be given from MPTA to those men who have applied for leave north of the army line.
5. Winter clothing problems will be taken up direct with 13 Corps.
6. Vehicles will be taken up with 13 Corps and the situation explained.
7. Signal Officer will visit G.S.O. 8 Army with his requirements in sets, telephones, cable and cable vehicles.
8. The Division will be prepared to take over a defensive sector in mountainous country by the 2nd week in March.

Phillips
 Lt. Col.
 G.S.O. 8.
 52 British Liaison Unit.

MUE/PN.

- (c) 2 British and 4 Italian I.L.O.s as instructors
 (a) 4 Lt. British R.E. to instruct in mine warfare

2. Training will be concentrated on the following main points

- (a) Patrols
 (b) Beliefs up to Forts and strength but find only 10 and Army.
 (c) Counter attacks up to day strength.

All training should be planned for mountain country but Lt. Col. never to concentration areas should be provided.

3. Officers will be attached to units in the line under orders from 13 Corps. The general will visit the line but must be accompanied by a senior officer of the G.S. This officer will ensure that the Division is correctly represented in regard to its strength and state of training.
4. Leave should be given from 1000A to those men who have applied for leave north of the army line.
5. Winter clothing problems will be taken up direct with 13 Corps.
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7. Signal Officer will visit G.S.O. 8 Aug with his requirements in sets, telephones, cable and cable vehicles.
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1344/10.

Phillips
 Lt. Col.
 G.S.O. 8.
 52 British Division Unit.

DISTRIBUTION:- To All Officers 52 DIV
 To All Officers 101 Trng Troopment.

7190

*Major Hope Johnston*TEL: Freedom 621CONFIDENTIALSUBJECT: Appointments - Officers

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

16737/Ms15 Nov 45Land Forces Sub-Commission (MMIA).

1. Approval is given to the following:-

Capt (T/Major) H.I.N.H. JOHNSTONE (166102) RF from UK to be GSO II (Trg) 52 BLU retaining the temporary rank of Major wef 11 Sep 45 vice T/Major T.P. LUCKOCK (52654) Som LI to X(iv) List.

2. This casualty will be reported to GHQ 2nd Echelon on A.F. W3010A by 52 BLU, WITHOUT DELAY.

3. A copy of this authority will be handed to Major JOHNSTONE by 52 BLU.

R.D.W. Maxwell
Capt
R. D. W. MAXWELL, Capt.,
Staff Captain,
for Colonel,
Deputy Military Secretary.

OAS/WMC

Copies to:- 52 BLU.
A.G. GHQ., CMF.
GHQ., 2nd Echelon
Gazette Section

7689

0284

May Hamilton

BRITISH CIPHER. INC 5157.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM: DMT 56 AREA PRECEDENCE: OP TIME DATE GROUP MAY031230B
REF. NO. DMT/348. CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED TIME DATE RECD 031540B

- TO: ACTION HQ
- (1) 50 BLU
 - (2) 51 BLU ✓
 - (3) 52 BLU ✓
 - (4) 53 BLU
 - (5) 56 BLU
- INFO
- (6) HQ 15 ARMY GROUP
 - (7) HQ 8 ARMY.

(G.I. ...)
ll

RESTRICTED. SUBJECT IS TRAINING INCREMENTS. FORWARD FOLLOWING INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF EACH OFFICER OF TRAINING ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ INCREMENT SERVING WITH YOU NOW EARLIEST POSSIBLE.

ONE. NAME PERSONAL NUMBER REGIMENT.

TWO. TYPE OF COMMISSION

THREE. AGE.

FOUR, PERIOD OF COMPLETED OVERSEAS SERVICE.

FIVE. WHETHER ELIGIBLE FOR SERVICE IN SAEC.

SIX. PREFERENCES FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT.

IN PARTICULAR WHETHER DESIRES SERVE IN SIMILAR APPT GREECE OR APPT IN AUSTRIAN DISARMAMENT AND DISBANDMENT COMMISSION. TREAT AS URGENT.

7688

0285

ARMY FORM C 2136 (Large)

MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

Call

Srl. No.

Priority

Trar

ission Instructions

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

Office Date Stamp	
FROM (A)	Date: Time of Origin. 051000 B
Originator 52 BLU	
For Action DMT 56 AREA	
(W) For Information (INFO)	
TO	Message Instructions. GR

Originator's No.

336 (.) SECRET (.) Ref DMT/348 of 3 (.) 66102 Major I.H. JOHNSTONE Royal Fusiliers (GSO 2 "O" Trg Ino) posted to UK on compassionate grounds under authority APHQ letter GR/4311/G1(Br) dated 23 Apr (.) Read (1) number rank name regt (2) commission (3) age (4) completed overseas service (5) whether eligible for GSO (6) preferences for future employment (.) (1) 165598 Major H.W. HAMILTON Buffs (2) War emergency (3) 48 (4) 18 months (5) No (6) First choice remain with present unit second choice TRG or Liaison work in ITALY rpt ITALY (.) Major HAMILTON is medical category B (permanent) (.) (1) 239322 Major M.O.A.T. HILL General list (2) War emergency (3) 41 (4) 12 months (5) No (6) First choice remain with present unit second choice TRG or Liaison work in ITALY rpt ITALY third choice AUSTRIA (.) Major HILL is medical category A (defective vision)

Message Instructions GE

(W) For Information (INFO)

Originator's No.

GS 6 (.) SECRET (.) Ref DME/348 of 3 (.) 66102 Major I.H.
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 dated 23 Apr (.) Read (1) number rank name regt (2) commission
 (3) age (4) completed overseas service (5) whether eligible
 for ORO (6) preferences for future employment (.) (1) 167598
 Major H.H. HAMILTON Buffs (2) War emergency (3) 48 (4) 18 months
 (5) No (6) First choice remain with present unit second choice
 TRG or Liaison work in ITALY rpt ITALY (.) Major HAMILTON is
 medical category B (permanent) (.) (1) 239322 Major M.C.A.T.
 Hill General list (2) War emergency (3) 41 (4) 12 months (5)
 No (6) First choice remain with present unit second choice
 TRG or Liaison work in ITALY rpt ITALY third choice AUSTRIA
 (.) Major Hill is medical category A (defective vision)

This message may be sent
 AS WRITTEN by any means
 except } WIRELESS.

If liable to be intercepted or to fall
 into enemy hands this message must
 be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's Instructions.
 Degree of Priority

Signed

Signed

Michael Major

IMMEDIATE

Time System Op.	
THI or TOR	
Time cleared	7687

FORM C 2156 (Large)

MESSAGE FORM

Register No. 183

Spl. No.

Priority

Transmission Instructions

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

FROM

(4)

52 BLU

Originator

Date-Time of Origin

021600 B

For Action

Office Date Stamp

TO

(W) For Information (INFO)

Message Instructions. GR

Originator's No.

A2/10 (.) CONFIDENTIAL (.) Personal for COL KENSHOLE ADMS
 from Lt - COL DOUGLAS (.) FROM 52 BLU to FIVE ARMY REAR (Brit Inc) (.)
 165598 Major HAMILTON of 'C' Trg Inc att'd 52 BLU graded Category "B"
 (Permanent) at Medical Beard held at 107 SA Gen Hospital on 21 Apr
 and instructed to report to Reallocation Centre (.) As his present
 duties here are in the nature of Liaison duties at Bde HQ I earnestly
 request he be permitted to remain with this unit

Handwritten notes:
 do see part 10/11

TO

(W) For Information (INFO)

Message Instructions. GR

Originator's No.

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 request he be permitted to remain with this unit

Handwritten notes and scribbles on the lined paper, including a large 'X' and some illegible markings.

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except

WIRELESS.

Signed

Signed

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's Instructions. Degree of Priority

URGENT

Time System Op.

THI or TOR

Time cleared

7688

Subject : Occupation of property at Trevignano Romano.

52 British Liaison Unit.
C.M.F.
9 Jun 45.

CT/I

D.A.D. Claims & Hirings.
53 Claims & Hirings C.M.F.

Ref your CH/53/E/III dated 2 Jun 45. The delay in replying is regretted.

Major Hope Johnstone has now left this unit, but it is confirmed that this unit did occupy cottage at TREVIGNANO ROMANO from 1 Jan 45 to 4/5 Feb 45 and that damage as stated in your letter is agreed.

HWH/hjj

W. Hamilton
Major.
OC "C" Trg Inc.

Subject:- Occupation of property at Trevignano Romano

Ref. CH/53/H/111

C.C.
52 B.L.U.
CMF

1. May a reply be now supplied please to this Office memo of even number dated 1 Mar 45 copy attached.

19 Apr 45
LS.

Major
D.A.D.Claims & Hirings,
53 Claims & Hirings.CMF.

COPY

Subject:- Occupation of property at Trevignano Romano

Ref. CH/53/H/111

C.C.
52 B.L.U.
CMF.

1. Piacentini Matilde fu Pietro, Via Conciliazione 44, Rome, says that from 1 Jan to 4/5 Feb 45 her 3 room cottage at Trevignano Romano was occupied by officers of your unit.

2. She has a chit signed by Major J.H.Johnstone of your unit that the following were broken or missing:-

- 2 window panes and frames
- 1 door pane and frame
- 3 canvas covered cushions
- 2 chaises longues
- 4 square metres of glass

3. It would appear that the premises should be requisitioned for the period during which they were so occupied so that the claim for dilapidations can be paid by Comando Genio Militare.

4. Will you please confirm the period of occupation and the particulars of damage caused.

1 Mar 45
RBH/LS

Signed R.B.Hungerford. ~~Captain.~~
Claims & Hirings Officer
53 Claims & Hirings.CMF.

ME/

Major Hamilton

SUBJECT: Officer Appointments

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CMF

Tel: 11667

DME/55/10/MT1

16 May 45.

HQ 50 BLU, CMF
HQ 51 BLU, CMF
HQ 52 BLU, CMF
HQ 53 BLU, CMF
HQ 56 BLU, CMF

Copy to:
HQ M.M.I.A.
G-1 (Br) AFHQ
GHQ 2nd Echelon

1. Cases have occurred where Majors Instructors have been struck off strength without proper authority. To clear up this matter the following information is forwarded.

- (a) All officers shown on the attached list are carried on the strength of the Trg Inc as shown.
- (b) All officers shown on the attached list and not actually serving with the Trg Inc will be shown as detached for duty elsewhere as indicated on the attached list.

2. If casualties have been rendered striking off strength any of the officers on the attached list they will be cancelled and proper casualties rendered.

3. NONE of the officers on the attached list has relinquished his appointment.

Hamilton
Brig.
D.M.T.

Copy to:
 HQ M.M.I.A.
 G-1 (BF) AFHQ
 CHQ 2nd Echelon

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W. M. L. A.
 W. M. L. A.
 D.M.T.

7687
 7687

Appendix 'A' to DME/55/10/IC
dated 16 May 45.

NOMINAL ROLL

54 Trg Inc	Major E.F. SMITH Major J.S. HUGHES Major P.D.H. FENGELLY Major D.P. SELLS Major W.L. FAIRWEATHER	GSO II Detached to 503 (ITI) Cd Bn Detached to 502 (ITI) Cd Bn
55 Trg Inc	Major J.A.E. CRIBBLE Major J.G. FISHER Major D.R.Y. DAWSON Major HAMILTON Major T.G.C. WARD Major A.D. WOODS	GSO II Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF To be S.O.S. at date to be notified. (see DME/55/10/MT4 dated 15 May 45)
'C' Trg Inc	Major H.W. HAMILTON Major M.G.A.T. HILL Major R.F.S. EVANS Major J. EDWARDS Major T.K. KEMLEY Major F.S. FLAK	Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF Detached to 519 (ITI) Cd Bn
'D' Trg Inc	Major E.H.O.E. MARWELL Major R.G. FENN Major T. KEMMY Major E.V. BRADLEY	Detached to 503 Cd Bn and later to HQ 4 Ind Div
'E' Trg Inc	Major W.L. MEDLAM Major F.G. COX Major F.P. DUFFY Major G. HUDSON Major HONIG Major E.H. KENBY Major S.E. SNEEZUM	GSO II Detached to 503 Cd Bn and later to HQ 4 Ind Div

'55 Trg Inc

Major J.A.R. GRIEBBLE
Major J.G. FISHER
Major D.R.Y. DAWSON
Major HAMILTON
Major T.G.C. WARD
Major A.D. WOODS

GSO II

Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF

Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF
To be S.O.S. at date to be notified
(see DMT/55/10/MT1 dated 15 May 45)

'C' Trg Inc

Major H.W. HAMILTON
Major M.C.A.T. HILL
Major R.F.B. EVANS
Major J. WINDONDS
Major T.K. KEMLEY
Major P.G. FLAK

Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF
Detached to 'F' BLU RTC, ICF
Detached to 519 (III) Gd Bn

'D' Trg Inc

Major B.V.C.E. MARWELL
Major R.G. FENN
Major T. LILLY
Major E.W. BRADLEY

Detached to 503 Gd Bn and later to
HQ 4 Ind Div

'E' Trg Inc

Major W.L. MEDLAM
Major F.G. COX
Major F.E. DUFFY
Major G. HUDSON
Major J. HENRY
Major E.H. NEWBY
Major S.E. SKELZUM

GSO II

. 7682

STAFF LIST - "LEGNANO" COMBAT GROUP.

A - GROUP HEADQUARTERS.

Commander
 2 i/c
 Chief of Staff
 ADC to Commander

Operations & Intelligence Section

Chief of Section
 Staff Officers

Interpreters

Administration Section

Chief of Section
 Staff Officers

Interpreter

Personnel Section

Chief of Section
 Staff Officers

Welfare Section

Welfare Officer

Medical Branch

Director of Medical Services
 Staff Officer

Commissariat Branch

Chief of Branch
 Staff Officer
 Adm Officer
 Interpreter

Workshops Branch

Chief of Branch

- Major-Gen UFFILI
 - Brig-Gen IMPERIALI
 - Colonel GAROFOLI
 - 2/Lieut BRIZIO

- Major SCARATI
 - Capt DURERO
 - Capt LIATO
 - Capt RICHEZZA
 - Capt CERELLI-IRELLI
 - Capt FAR
 - Lieut MORDIGLIA

- Major TERRANOVA
 - Capt FERRO
 - Capt PIZZUTI
 - Lieut GIORGI-DI VISTARINO

- Major CASABURI
 - Capt DELLINO
 - Capt CAVALLO

- Major GRASSI

- Lieut-Col FOLLESE
 - Capt FODERA

- Major SCOPPETTONE
 - 2/Lieut DEZZA
 - 2/Lieut IZZI
 - 2/Lieut LEGHISSA

- Major CATTALINO

Staff Officers

Interpreters

Administration Section

Chief of Section
Staff Officers

Interpreter

Personnel Section

Chief of Section
Staff Officers

Welfare Section

Welfare Officer

Medical Branch

Director of Medical Services
Staff Officer

Commissariat Branch

Chief of Branch
Staff Officer
Adm. Officer
Interpreter

Workshops Branch

Chief of Branch

- Capt. RICCHEZZA
- Capt. CEMELLI-IRELLI
- Capt. FAR
- Lieut. MORIGIOLA

- Major TERRANOVA
- Capt. FERRARO
- Capt. PIZZUTI
- Lieut. GIORGI-DI VISTARINO

- Major CASABURI
- Capt. DELLINO
- Capt. CAVALLO

- Major GRASSI

- Lieut-Col. FOLESE
- Capt. FODERA

- Major SCOPPETTONE
- 2/Lieut. DEZZA
- 2/Lieut. TEZZI
- 2/Lieut. LECHISSA

- Major CATALANO

• 7681

B - 68 INFANTRY REGIMENT - HQ.

Commander	-	Colonel DE RENZI
2 i/c	-	Lieut-Col RERSANI
Adjutant	-	Major DI STESANO
Senior Officer - General Duties	-	Major MINALI
Senior Officer - Legal Duties	-	Capt CLEPICI
Quartermaster	-	Capt FLORIS
Intelligence Officer	-	Capt LOVERDI
Medical Officer	-	Capt MACCHI
M.F. Officer	-	Capt MARILLINI
Administrative Officer	-	Lieut CASALI
Chaplain	-	Lieut FERONI

C - "SERVIZIO" INFANTRY REGIMENT - HQ.

Commander	-	Colonel SCARPA
2 i/c	-	Lieut-Col PICONS
Adjutant	-	Major RASERO
Senior Officer - General Duties	-	Lieut-Col BRILATORE
Senior Officer - Legal Duties	-	Capt ZANCHINI
Quartermaster	-	Capt DE MARDELLI
Intelligence Officer	-	Lieut VELARDI
Medical Officer	-	Capt MASSETTI
M.F. Officer	-	Capt RASTELLI
Administrative Officer	-	Capt FORNA
Chaplain	-	Lieut PERA

D - 11 INFANTRY REGIMENT - HQ.

Commander	-	Colonel RURELLI
2 i/c	-	Lieut-Col BRACCO
Adjutant	-	Capt SPAGNA
Survey Officer	-	Capt GROSSI
Officer i/c Supplies	-	Capt MONDINI
Officer - General Duties	-	Lieut GAROVANI
Administrative Officer	-	Lieut BRISANI
Medical Officer	-	Lieut TANCREDI
Chaplain	-	Lieut BONCHI

C - "SEMPLE" INFANTRY REGIMENT - HQ.

Commander	-	Colonel SCARPA
2 i/c	-	Lieut-Col PICCINI
Lieutenant	-	Major MASINO
Senior Officer - General Duties	-	Lieut-Col ERLETORE
Senior Officer - Legal Duties	-	Capt ZANCHELI
Quartermaster	-	Capt DE NARDINI
Intelligence Officer	-	Lieut VALLARDI
Medical Officer	-	Capt M. SENYI
M. T. Officer	-	Capt RISTENI
Administrative Officer	-	Capt BOHIA
Chaplain	-	Lieut PERA

D - 11 AIRBORNE REGIMENT - HQ.

Commander	-	Colonel BRUNELLI
2 i/c	-	Lieut-Col BRACCO
Adjutant	-	Capt SPIGNA
Survey Officer	-	Capt GROSSI
Officer i/c Supplies	-	Capt FONDINI
Officer - General Duties	-	Lieut GAROVANI
Administrative Officer	-	Lieut BRISINI
Medical Officer	-	Lieut TANCREDI
Chaplain	-	Lieut BOMBI

. 7680

Subject: Enemy Recognition Signals.

52 British Liaison Unit,
C.I.P.

BY LENNARD.

6/12/45.

1. Herewith copy of 1 District letter 701/5/GS(I) dated 25 Jan 45.
 - "1. Information has been received from S.I.A.F. that the enemy is using a specially recruited brigade of English speaking troops to go forward in advance of German armour, dressed in American uniform, with American equipment and transport. Their mission was to do as much damage as possible to our positions behind the lines.
 2. They identified themselves to each other by using a blue flashlight and/or raising the right arm. The reply is to raise the left arm, and/or use a red flashlight.
 3. British and Canadian uniforms are being collected from PW and may be used in the future.
 4. Normal security precautions should be taken to prevent our troops being deceived by such ruses."
2. The importance of maintaining a high standard of unit security applicable to ALL ranks is emphasized.

5 Feb 45.
221/36

Copy to: 'G' Troop Increment
Comp Commandant.

Alcock
Major,
GSOII.

SUBJECT: British Training Unit for the Italian Army

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ CME

Tel: 14667

DATE: 27/1/45

27 Jan 45.

To: All Concerned.

1. A British Training Unit is formed to assist D.M.T. and the Inspector General of Training S.M.R.E. in the training work of all PR - IVI forces. It is responsible to and works under the direction of the Director of Military Training C.M.F.
2. The Col i/c Unit will direct the work of all British Training Teams and Training Increments attached by D.M.T. to the Italian Army.
3. The Unit may where necessary also direct or train writers with 15 Army Gp and Districts, and will have direct access to Inspector General of Training S.M.R.E. It will matters other than training it will work in close touch with and through HQ MIA.
4. The Unit will be responsible for the following duties:-
 - A. To advise and assist Italian Inspector General Training, to organise training at the Italian Rft Depots, Centres and Schools. It will control the British Training Increments to Schools, Centres and Depots, and ensure training is carried out on the lines laid down by D.M.T.
 - B. To control the work of Training Increments with the Combat Groups, and to act in an advisory capacity to E.L.U.s. on training matters.
 5. Detailed duties of the British Training Unit in connection with the above are as follows:-
 4. The Organisation of Training at the Italian Rft Training Depots and Schools.
 1. Instructors.
 2. Provision of Training equipment
 3. Provision of Training ammunition
 4. Allotment of vacancies
 5. Training areas

1. A British Training Unit is formed to assist D.M.T. and the Inspector General of Training S.M.R.E. in the training work of all ER - ITI forces. It is responsible to and works under the direction of the Director of Military Training C.M.T.
2. The Col i/e Unit will direct the work of all British Training Teams and Training Increments attached by D.M.T. to the Italian Army.
3. The Unit may where necessary deal direct on training matters with 15 Army Gp and Districts, and will have direct access to Inspector General of Training S.M.R.E. In all matters other than training it will work in close touch with and through HQ MIA.
4. The Unit will be responsible for the following duties:-
 - A. To advise and assist Italian Inspector General Training, to organise training at the Italian Art Depots, Centres and Schools. It will control the British Training Increments to Schools, Centres and Depots, and ensure training is carried out on the lines laid down by D.M.T.
 - B. To control the cost of Training Increments with the Combat Groups, and to act in an advisory capacity to P.L.Us. on training matters.
 5. Detailed duties of the British Training Unit in connection with the above are as follows:-
 1. The Organisation of Training at the Italian Art Trg Depots and Schools.
 1. Instructors.
 2. Provision of Training equipment
 3. Provision of Training ammunition
 4. Allotment of vacancies
 5. Training areas
 6. Training accommodation
 7. Control of British Training Iners to Schools and Depots
 8. Arranging with MIA for the translation and issue of training publications.

5. (Cont)

B. Training Duties with the Italian Combat Groups

1. Control of Training Inco's with Italian Combat Groups
2. Issue of training equipment and arms
3. Training areas

6. Local administration and provision of accommodation are the function of MILIA who are providing a L.O. with the British Training Unit for this purpose.

7. Service officers and NCOs of the British Training Unit will be available to assist the L.O. in local administration and maintenance.

Alexander

HEP/ho

Brig.,
D.M.C.

DISTRIBUTION

HQBA AFHQ	2
HC Infantry AFHQ	2
MGRE AFHQ	2
C.S.O.	2
D.S.T.	2
Provost	2
G-2	1
D.O.S.	2
D.M.E.	1
G-4	1
G-5 Org	2
G-5 Org (T) AFHQ	2
G-5 Org (B) "	1
G-4 (B) AFHQ	10
HQ 15 Army Group	5
M.L.I.A.	50
HQ Rft Tr Centre	4
	10

HQ 50 BDU, CEF	5
HQ 51 BDU, CEF	5
HQ 52 BDU, CEF	5
HQ 53 BDU, CEF	5
HQ 56 BDU, CEF	5
HQ CMTG, CEF	10
HQ RATED & School, CEF	2
HQ EOE, CEF	2
HQ R. Sigs Depot & Sch of Sigs	2
HQ IRPD, CEF	2
HQ RASCTE, CEF	2
HQ Desert & Trg Batab CEF, CEF	1
HQ Mountain School, CEF	1
HQ AAC Trg Centre, CEF	1
HQ School of I & E, CEF	1
GHQ 2nd Echelon	1
S. & R.E.	1
Int. Aff.	2

Local administration and provision of accommodation are the function of IMAA who are providing a L.O. with the British Training Unit for this purpose.

7. Service officers and NCOs of the British Training Unit will be available to assist the L.O. in local administration and maintenance.

A. H. [Signature]

Brig.,
D.M.T.

DISTRIBUTION

HQRA AFHQ	2
H. Infantry AFHQ	2
WERE AFHQ	2
G-3.O.	2
D.S.T.	2
Provost	1
G-2	2
D.O.S.	1
D.M.E.	1
G-1	1
G-3 Org	2
G-3 Org (F) AFHQ	2
G-3 Trg (B)	1
G-4 (B) AFHQ	10
HQ 15 Army Group	5
M.M. I.S.	50
HQ Rpt Tr Centre	4
	10

HQ 50 BUC, CIP	5
HQ 51 BLU, CIP	5
HQ 52 BLU, CIP	5
HQ 53 BLU, CIP	5
HQ 56 BLU, CIP	5
HQ C.M.G., CIP	10
HQ R.M.D. & School, CIP	2
HQ DTE, CIP	2
HQ R. Sigs Depot & Sch of Sigs	2
HQ IRTD, CIP	2
HQ RASCTE, CIP	2
HQ Depot & Trg Lsteb CIP, CIP	1
H. Mountain School, CIP	1
HQ RACC Trg Centre, CIP	1
HQ School of E.M.E., CIP	1
GHO 2nd Echelon	1
S.M.R.E.	1
Intelligence Trg Centre	2
	1

7678

SUBJECT: British Training Unit for the Italian Army.

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ CMT

Tel: 41667

DMW/37/1/AMM

2 Feb 45.

To: All Concerned.

Ref DMW/37/1/AMM dated 27 Jan 45.

Para 4 B should be amended to read as follows:-

"To control the work of Training Increments with the Combat Groups and to act in an advisory capacity to HMs of training matters".

Note: As soon as a Gruppo comes under command a formation, that formation will be responsible for the training of the Gruppo, and will therefore take over control of the Training Increment from D.M.T.

imf/mb

HQRA AFHQ	2	HQ 50 BUI CMT	5
HQ Infantry AFHQ	2	HQ 51 BUI CMT	5
MCMT AFHQ	2	HQ 52 BUI CMT	5
C.S.O. AFHQ	2	HQ 53 BUI CMT	5
D.S.T. "	2	HQ 54 BUI CMT	5
Provost "	1	HQ CMT CMT	10
G - 2 "	2	HQ RAID & School CMT	2
D.O.S. "	1	HQ ITH CMT	2
D.M.T. "	1	HQ R. Sigs Depot & Sch of Sigs	2
G - 1 "	2	HQ ITH CMT	2
G - 3 Org AFHQ	2	HQ RASCTB CMT	1
G - 5 Org (F) AFHQ	1	HQ Depot & Try Estab CMT CMT	1
G - 3 Trg (B) "	10	HQ Mountain School CMT	1
G - 4 (5) AFHQ	3	HQ ITH Trg Centre CMT	1
HQ 15 Army Group	50	HQ School of I.C.M.E CMT	1

S.R. [Signature]
for D.M.T.

2 Feb 45.

To: All Concerned.

Ref BMY/87/4/AM4 dated 27 Jan 45.

Para 4 E should be amended to read as follows:-

"To control the work of Training Increments with the Combat Groups and to act in an advisory capacity to BILs on training matters".

Note: As soon as a Group comes under command formation, that formation will be responsible for the training of the Group, and will therefore take over control of the training increment from D.M.E.

A.R. Dunsford Col
for D.M.E.
D.M.E.

R.R./mt

HQRA AFHQ	2	HQ 50 BLS CMT	5
HQ Infantry AFHQ	2	HQ 51 BLU CMT	5
MGRM AFHQ	2	HQ 52 BLU CMT	5
C.S.C. AFHQ	2	HQ 53 BLU CMT	5
D.S.E. "	2	HQ 56 BLU CMT	5
Provost "	1	HQ CMTC CMT	10
G - 2 "	2	HQ TRAIN & School CMT	2
D.O.S. "	1	HQ INTL CMT	2
D.M.E. "	1	HQ 1. Sig. Depot & Sch of Sigs	1
G - 1 "	2	HQ INTD CMT	2
G - 3 Org AFHQ	2	HQ ASSC'D CMT	1
G - 3 Org (F) AFHQ	1	HQ Depot & Trg Estab CMT	1
G - 3 Trg (E) "	16	HQ Mountain School CMT	1
G - 4 (B) AFHQ	3	HQ HQO Trg Centre CMT	1
HQ 15 Army Group	50	HQ School of E & M I CMT	1
W.M.I.A.	4	CFO 2nd Echelon	1
HQ 1st Trg Centre	10	S.M.E.I.	2
Intelligence Trg Centre	1		

7877

SUBJECT: Designation and Addresses of BLUs, and
Trg Incs att Italian Combat Groups

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, COME

Tel: 11667

DET/55/MI1

12 Jan 45.

All Concerned

Cases have occurred of correspondence being wrongly delivered to BLUs and Trg Incs serving with the Italian Combat Groups.

The attached list of BLUs and their Trg Incs with their correct postal address is therefore forwarded.

HLF/hc

DISTRIBUTION

S.G.S. AFHQ	1
G-1 (BR) AFHQ	5
G-2 AFHQ	2
G-3 Org (F) AFHQ	1
G-3 Trg (BR) AFHQ	1
G-4 (BR) AFHQ	5
G-4 Mov & Tn AFHQ	5
A.G. Mail & Distribution AFHQ	2
Brig Infantry AFHQ	5
Engineer Sec AFHQ	1
Rd Arty Sec AFHQ	2
Liaison Section AFHQ	1
Medical Section (BR) AFHQ	1
Dep Mil Sec AFHQ	2
Ordnance (BR) AFHQ	1
HQ F.F.I. AFHQ	1
D.P.I.C. AFHQ	1
D.P. & S.S. AFHQ	1
Postal Directorate (BR) AFHQ	5

Signal Section AFHQ	5
Signal Centre AFHQ	5
S & T AFHQ	1
G-3 Trg (BR) HQ 15 Army Group	2
HQ DIGADH Army	5
HQ Br Inc FIFTH Army	5
HQ 1 District	5
HQ 2 District	5
HQ 3 District	5
H. L. I.	5
HQ 54 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 55 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 101 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 102 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 103 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 50 BLU	5
HQ 51 BLU	5
HQ 52 BLU	5
HQ 53 BLU	5

Brig.
D.H.T.

All Concerned

Cases have occurred of correspondence being wrongly delivered to BLUs and Trg Incos serving with the Italian Combat Groups.

The attached list of BLUs and their Trg Incos with their correct postal address is therefore forwarded.

[Handwritten signature]
BRIG.
E.M.T.

HMF/hc

DISTRIBUTION

- S. C. S. AFHQ 1
- G-1 (BR) AFHQ 5
- G-2 AFHQ 2
- G-3 Org (F) AFHQ 1
- G-3 Trg (BR) AFHQ 1
- G-4 (BR) AFHQ 5
- G-4 Mov & Trn AFHQ 5
- G. G. Intl & Distribution AFHQ 2
- Brig Infantry AFHQ 5
- Engineer Sec AFHQ 1
- Ed Arby Sec AFHQ 2
- Liaison Section AFHQ 1
- Medical Section (BR) AFHQ 1
- Dep Mil Sec AFHQ 2
- Ordnance (BR) AFHQ 1
- HQ F.P.I. AFHQ 1
- D.P.I.C. AFHQ 1
- D.E. & S.S. AFHQ 1
- Postal Directorate (MIL) AFHQ 2
- HOME AFHQ 1

- Signal Section AFHQ 5
- Signal Centre AFHQ 5
- S & T AFHQ 1
- G-3 Trg (BR) HQ 15 Army Group 2
- HQ EIGHTH ARMY 5
- HQ Br Inc FIFTH ARMY 5
- HQ 1 District 5
- HQ 2 District 5
- HQ 3 District 5
- R. A. I. I. 5
- HQ 54 Trg Inc BLU 5
- HQ 55 Trg Inc BLU 5
- HQ 16' Trg Inc BLU 5
- HQ 17' Trg Inc BLU 5
- HQ 18' Trg Inc BLU 5
- HQ 50 BLU 5
- HQ 51 BLU 5
- HQ 52 BLU 5
- HQ 53 BLU 5
- HQ 56 BLU 5
- HQ 56 Area 5

7874

SECRET

<u>BLU</u> with att	<u>TRG INC</u>	surviving with	<u>TRAINING COMBAT GROUP</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
50 BLU, CIP	54 Trg Inc	BLU, CIP	FRIULI	In area RADDA 10 miles NORTH of SIENA At ASCOLI PICENO
51 BLU, CIP	55 Trg Inc	BLU, CIP	CAMPANIA	
52 BLU, CIP	'C' Trg Inc	BLU, CIP	LEGNANO	At BRACCIANO, 10 miles NORTH of ROMA
53 BLU, CIP	'D' Trg Inc	BLU, CIP	FORLONI	At TULIASE, NW of BENEVENTO
56 BLU, CIP	'E' Trg Inc	BLU, CIP	MARANO	At S. GIORGIO, SOUTH of BENEVENTO

7675

SUBJECT: Designation and Addresses of BLUs, and
Trg Incs Att Italian Combat Groups

SECRET

DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY TRAINING
AFHQ, CEF

Tel: 11667

DE/55/AM1

12 Jan 49.

All Concerned

Cases have occurred of correspondence being wrongly delivered to BLUs and Trg Incs serving with the Italian Combat Groups.

The attached list of BLUs and their Trg Incs with their correct postal address is therefore forwarded.

HMJ/hc

DISTRIBUTION

S.G.S. AFHQ	1
G-1 (BR) AFHQ	5
G-2 AFHQ	2
G-3 OTC (F) AFHQ	1
G-5 Trg (BR) AFHQ	1
G-4 (BR) AFHQ	5
G-4 Mov & Tr AFHQ	5
A.G. Mail & Distribution AFHQ	2
Brig Infantry AFHQ	5
Engineer Sec AFHQ	1
Ed. Arty Sec AFHQ	2
Liaison Section AFHQ	1
Medical Section (BR) AFHQ	1
Dep Mil Sec AFHQ	2
Ordnance (BR) AFHQ	1
HQ P.V.I. AFHQ	1
D.P.L.C. AFHQ	1
D.P. & S.S. AFHQ	5
Postal Directorate (BR) AFHQ	5

Signal Section AFHQ	5
Signal Centre AFHQ	5
S & T AFHQ	1
G-3 Trg (BR) HQ 15 Army Group	2
HQ EIGHTH ARMY	5
HQ Br Inc FLETH ARMY	5
HQ 1 District	5
HQ 2 District	5
HQ 3 District	5
H. L.I.I...	5
HQ 54 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 55 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 'C' Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 'D' Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 'A' Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 50 BLU	5
HQ 51 BLU	5
HQ 52 BLU	5
HQ 53 BLU	5

7644

DWT/55/AT1

12 Jan 45.

All Concerned

Cases have occurred of correspondence being wrongly delivered to BLUs and Trg Ince serving with the Italian Combat Groups.

The attached list of BLUs and their Trg Ince with their correct postal address is therefore forwarded.

[Handwritten signature]
Brig.
D.I.T.

BLE/no

DISPOSITION

S.G.S. AFHQ	1
G-1 (BR) AFHQ	5
G-2 AFHQ	2
G-3 CTS (F) AFHQ	1
G-3 Trg (BR) AFHQ	1
G-4 (BR) AFHQ	5
G-4 Mov & Trn AFHQ	5
A.G. Mail & Distribution AFHQ	2
Brig Infantry AFHQ	5
Engineer Sec AFHQ	1
Td arty Sec AFHQ	2
Liaison Section AFHQ	1
Medical Section (BR) AFHQ	1
Dep Mil Sec AFHQ	2
Ordnance (BR) AFHQ	1
HQ F.P.I. AFHQ	1
D.P.I.C. AFHQ	1
D.P. & S.S. AFHQ	5
Postal Directorate (BR) AFHQ	5
REAR AFHQ	1

Signal Section AFHQ	5
Signal Centre AFHQ	5
S & T AFHQ	1
G-3 Trg (BR) HQ 15 Army Group	2
H. EIGHTH Army	5
H. Br Inc FIFTH Army	5
HQ 1 District	5
HQ 2 District	5
HQ 3 District	5
H. ...	5
HQ 54 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 55 Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 'C' Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 'D' Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 'E' Trg Inc BLU	5
HQ 50 BLU	5
HQ 51 BLU	5
HQ 52 BLU	5
HQ 53 BLU	5
HQ 56 BLU	5
HQ 56 area	5

7674

SECRET

<u>BLU</u> with etc	<u>TRG INC</u>	serving with	<u>PLAIN CODE</u> <u>GROUP</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
50 BLU, CAP	54 Trg Inc BLU, CAP		TRIUMI	In area RADDIA 10 miles NORTH of SIENA
51 BLU, CAP	55 Trg Inc BLU, CAP		CREMONA	At ASCOLI PICENO
52 BLU, CAP	'0' Trg Inc BLU, CAP		LIVORNO	At BRACCIANO, 10 miles NORTH of ROME
53 BLU, CAP	'5' Trg Inc BLU, CAP		FOLGOMI	At TELISE, NW of BENEVENTO
56 BLU, CAP	'5' Trg Inc BLU, CAP		ALIVONA	At S. GIORGIO, SOUTH OF BENEVENTO

7673

(2) SECRET

Subject: Organization of Platoons of Support Coy
of an Infantry Battalion.

52 British Liaison Unit,
CAF.
29 Dec 41.

C/1A/13

HQ LEONARD.

Further to para 6 of this HQ letter C/1A/13 dated 26 Dec 41.

1. Attached appendices show the suggested organization for

MOBILE Platoon - APPX "A"
CARRIER Platoon - APPX "B"
S/IX Platoon - APPX "C"

of the Support Coys of Infantry Battalions in this Gruppe.

2. The following notes on these organizations are given:-

(a) wireless.

The wireless lay-out for the Support Coy has been notified in this HQ letter C/1A/13 dated 27 Dec 41.

Wireless operators, who are held on the strength of HQ Pl of Support Coy, have not been shown in the attached appendices, but it must be remembered that, when allotted to Platoons, the wireless set and one or both operators will normally be carried in the Pl Comd's Carrier, and that room must therefore be allowed for them.

(b) Stretcher-bearers.

Stretcher-bearers are held on the strength of HQ Pl of Support Coy, and these also have not been shown in the attached appendices. The Platoons of the Support Coy may often be dispersed over a wide area and it may be advisable for these stretcher-bearers to be allotted to the Platoons. Consequently room must be found for them, either in Pl Comd's Carrier or elsewhere.

(c) Batacn.

No provision is made in the HQ for batacn for Pl Comds. Batacn must therefore be found from the personnel of the Pl.

(d) Brens, 81mm and 2" Mortars.

None of these weapons in the Support Coy 1st-

Further to para 5 of this HQ letter 2/1A/10 dated 25 Dec 44.

1. Attached appendices show the suggested organization for

- MORIAN Platoon - APPX "A"
- CARRIER Platoon - APPX "B"
- A/IX Platoon - APPX "C"

of the Support Coy of Infantry Battalions in this Gruppe.

2. The following notes on these organizations are given:-

(a) wireless.
 The wireless lay-out for the Support Coy has been notified in this HQ letter 2/1A/11 dated 27 Dec 44.
 Wireless operators, who are held on the strength of HQ Pl of Support Coy, have not been shown in the attached appendices, but it must be remembered that, when allotted to Platoons, the wireless set and one or both operators will normally be carried in the Pl Comd's Carrier, and that room must therefore be allowed for them.

(b) Stretcher-bearers.
 Stretcher-bearers are held on the strength of HQ Pl of Support Coy, and these also have not been shown in the attached appendices. The Platoons of the Support Coy may often be dispersed over a wide area and it may be advisable for these stretcher-bearers to be allotted to the Platoons. Consequently room must be found for them, either in Pl Comd's Carrier or elsewhere.

(c) Batacn.
 No provision is made in the WL for batacn for Pl Comdr. Batacn must therefore be found from the personnel of the Pl.

(d) Brens, Plats, and 2" Mortars.
 All of these weapons in the Support Coy are:-

Brens	-	16
Plats	-	6
2" Mortars	-	14

7672

These should be allotted as follows:-

- Brens. Mortar Pl - 2. (Sub allotted 1 per section)
- Carrier Pl - 12. (Sub allotted 1 to each carrier less Pl Comd's Carrier)
- A/IX Pl - 2. (Sub allotted 1 per Detachment)

.....

2.

PIATs. Mortar Pl - 3. (Sub allotted 1 per section)
Carrier Pl - 4. (Sub allotted 1 per section)

2" Mortars.

Carrier Pl - 4. (Sub allotted 1 per section)
A/Tk Pl - 2. (Sub allotted 1 per Detachment)

The above allocation leaves 8 - 2" Mortars spare in the Support Coy - 48 in the Group, and it is suggested that they are distributed as follows:-

1 to each Infantry Regt HQ = 2
4 to 6 pr Gun Coy of each
Regt = 8
4 to Mortar Coy of each Regt = 8
1 to HQ Pl of each Rifle Coy = 18
The remainder = 12 = 2 per Inf Bn, as Bn reserve.
48.

3. It is requested that the contents of this letter are forwarded by you to all Bn Comds, in order that all Bns work on the same basic organizations.

A copy of this letter is being sent to "C" Training Increment.

TFL/MS

Michael
Major,
55011.

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APPX "A"

ORGANIZATION OF MORTAR PLATOON
OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION

SUB UNIT	VEHICLE	PERSONNEL	OFFR SPTS	GRS	PMS
PLATOON HQ	Carrier	Pl Comd (Subaltern) Driver Pte (Geniostrivist) Pte	1		1
	Motor-cycle	Orderly			1
	Motor-cycle	Orderly			1
	15 cwt truck (ammunition)	Driver Sgt (Pl Sgt) 2 Ptes (asn numbers)	1		2
	15 cwt truck (ammunition)	Driver 2 Ptes (asn numbers) Pte (Signaller)			2
	15 cwt truck (Stores etc)	Driver Armorer/Mechanic Pte (Signaller)			1
	Carrier No 1	Sgt (also MCO 1/c 1 Sec) Driver Cpl 2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)	1	1	2
	Carrier No 2	Sgt Driver Cpl 2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)			1
	Carrier No 3	Sgt (also MCO 1/c 2 Sec) Driver Cpl 2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)	1	1	2
	Carrier No 4	Sgt Driver Cpl 2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)	1	1	2
TOTAL	5 Carriers 2 M/co 3 Trucks (15 cwt)	37 All ranks	1	5	4
					27
					7670

Motor-cycle	Orderly				1
Motor-cycle	Orderly				1
15 cwt truck (Ammunition)	Driver				1
	Set (Pl Set)				
	2 Ptes (Ann numbers)				2
15 cwt truck (Ammunition)	Driver				1
	2 Ptes (Ann numbers)				2
	Pte (Pinner)				1
15 cwt truck (Stores etc)	Driver				1
	Armorer Mechanic				1
	Pte (Signaller)				1
1 SECTION	Carrier No 1				
	Set (also NCO 1/c 1 Sec Driver		1		1
	Cpl			1	
	2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)				2
Carrier No 2	Sgt		1		
	Driver				1
	Cpl			1	
	2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)				2
2 SECTION	Carrier No 3				
	Set (also NCO 1/c 2 Sec Driver		1		1
	Cpl			1	
	2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)				2
Carrier No 4	Set		1		
	Driver				1
	Cpl			1	
	2 Ptes (Mortar numbers)				2
TOTAL	5 Carriers 2 M/c 3 Trucks (15 cwt)		5	4	27
					7670

APPENDIX B

ORGANIZATION OF THE CARRIER PLATOON
OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION.

SUB UNIT	VEHICLE	PERSONNEL	OPR SUIS	OPLS PERS
PLATOON HQ	Carrier	Pl Comd (Subaltern) Driver Pte	1	1 1 1
	Motor-cycle	Orderly		1
	Motor-cycle	Orderly		1
	15 cw. truck (Ammunitions blankets etc)	Driver Pte		1 1
	15 cw. truck (Stores)	Driver Pte (Pl storeman)		1 1
1 SECTION	Carrier No 1	Set (NCO i/c 1 & 2 Sections)	1	
		Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)		1 1 1
	Carrier No 2	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner) Pte	1	1 1 1
2 SECTION	Carrier No 3	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner) Pte	1	1 1 1
	Carrier No 4	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner) Pte	1	1 1 1
	Carrier No 5	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner) Pte	1	1 1 1
3 SECTION	Carrier No 6	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner) Pte	1	1 1 1
	Carrier No 7, 8, 9.	As for 1 Section	1	3
				7669

Carrier No	Personnel	Count	Notes
1 SECTION	Meter-cycle	1	
	Meter-cycle	1	
	15 cwt Truck (Ammunitions blankets etc)	1	
	15 cwt Truck (Stores)	1	
	Driver Pte (Pl storeman)	1	
	Carrier No 1	1	Sgt (NOO 1/c 1 & 2 Sections)
		1	Cpl
		1	Driver
		1	Pte (Bren-runner)
		1	Pte
2 SECTION	Carrier No 2	1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
		1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
	Carrier No 3	1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
		1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
	Carrier No 4	1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
		1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
	Carrier No 5	1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
		1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
	Carrier No 6	1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
		1	Cpl Driver Pte (Bren-runner)
3 SECTION	Carrier No 7, 8, 9	3	As for 1 Section
4 SECTION	Carrier No 10, 11, 12	3	As for 2 Section
TOTAL	13 Carriers 2 M/co 2 Trucks (15 cwt)	12	57 All ranks

7689

ORGANIZATION OF THE ANTI-TANK PLATOON
OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION.

APPX "C"

SUB UNIT	VEHICLE	PERSONNEL	OPPR SOLD	CPLS	PRES
PLATOON HQ	Carrier Loyd	Pl Comd (Subaltern) Driver	1		1
	Motor-cycle	Armsman Mechanic			1
	15 cwt Truck	Orderly			1
		Driver	1		1
	Sgt (Pl Sgt)		1		
1 DETACHMENT	Carrier Loyd No 1 (towing gun)	Sgt (NCO i/c Det) Driver	1		1
		Cpl) 2 Ptes) gun numbers		1	2
	Carrier Loyd No 2 (Ammunition)	Cpl) Pte) gun numbers		1	1
		Driver Pte (Ammunition No)			1
2 DETACHMENT	Carrier Loyd No 3 (towing gun)	Sgt (NCO i/c Det) Driver	1		1
		Cpl) 2 Ptes) gun numbers		1	2
	Carrier Loyd No 4 (Ammunition)	Cpl) Pte) gun numbers		1	1
		Driver Pte (Ammunition No)			1
TOTAL	5 Carriers Loyd 1 M/c 1-15 cwt Truck	24 All ranks	1	3	4
					15

7858

UNION JACK (me) oledì 24 gennaio 1945)

DICHIARAZIONE SULL'ITALIA DIRAMATA DAL GABINETTO DEL PRIMO MINISTRO BRITANNICO.

(traduzione letterale eseguita dal colonnello Edmondo De Renzi)

Londra, martedì 23 gennaio 1945

Il seguente comunicato è stato diramato dal gabinetto del Primo Ministro Britannico la notte scorsa:

" E' stata attirata la nostra attenzione su un equivoco a cui ha dato luogo un periodo di un discorso del Primo Ministro Britannico del 18 ultimo scorso, al quale è stata data erronea interpretazione in Italia e altrove, distaccando una frase dal suo contesto. E' stato riferito che il Primo Ministro avrebbe detto: "noi non abbiamo bisogno dell'Italia" mentre egli ha in realtà detto: "noi diciamo ancora una volta per tutte che non abbiamo alcuna combinazione politica in Europa o altrove, per la quale abbiamo bisogno dell'Italia come associata. Noi non abbiamo bisogno dell'Italia più che non abbiamo bisogno della Spagna, poichè non abbiamo alcun progetto che richieda l'appoggio di tali potenze".

Queste parole si riferiscono all'impressione largamente diffusa, che la Gran Bretagna si andasse imbarcando in un sistema di predominio politico in Europa e specialmente nel Mediterraneo. Le suddette parole in nessun caso sostituiscono o modificano la dichiarazione del Primo Ministro diramata nel decorso agosto sull'Italia, dichiarazione appresso citata, e neppure implicano che l'Italia ora o in futuro debba essere esclusa da un onorevole compito nel sistema politico Europeo. Ecco il testo delle dichiarazioni:

Lasciando il territorio italiano, dopo una visita profondamente interessante ed istruttiva voglio inviare alcune parole di incoraggiamento e di speranza al popolo italiano. Sono profondamente commosso della eccezionale gentilezza con la quale venni salutato in tutti i villaggi e in tutti i paesi attraverso i quali sono passato, visitando l'intero fronte. Non vi è dubbio che, nella zona delle armate, le relazioni degli italiani con i britannici, americani, ed altri alleati, sono im-

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7677 /.

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"" internazionali perchè essi facciano quanto possibile, in armonia con
 "" i loro colleghi, per andare incontro a queste difficoltà e son sicu=
 "" ro che questi sforzi saranno caldamente appoggiati dai nostri allea=
 "" ti.

"" Alla fine della guerra in Europa, che potrà non essere così
 "" prossima come noi in precedenza ci aspettavamo, un dono sarà certa=
 "" mente fatto all'Italia, quando le normali condizioni di vita saranno
 "" ripristinate, il dono prezioso della libertà. Duro lavoro, forti ri=
 "" soluzioni, elevati intenti e soprattutto autentica unione fra tutti,
 "" sarà necessaria all'Italia per nutrire il suo popolo e perchè essa
 "" possa riprendere il suo posto fra le principali potenze d'Europa.

"" L'esaltazione politica ed i clamori dei numerosi partiti non
 "" realizzeranno i beni ed i diritti a cui aspira la massa del popolo.

"" Molti anni or sono un Uomo politico inglese (.....),
 "" insigne membro della Camera dei Comuni, come era chiamato, indirizzò
 "" una famosa esortazione alle classi sociali ed ai partiti più violen=
 "" ti dell'Impero Britannico, esclamando: - siate un solo popolo - .

"" Settant'anni più tardi questo fu il tema che Mazzini predicò
 "" e Garibaldi attuò.

"" L'Italia deve riconquistare gli ideali di libertà che ispira=
 "" rono il suo Risorgimento. Possa questo pensiero essere operante in
 "" Voi attraverso le vostre pene e possano i vostri molti amici, in In=
 "" ghilterra ed al di là degli oceani, vedere ricompensate le loro spe=
 "" ranze verso di Voi. ""

"" (Napoli, 18 agosto 1944) -

(Comunicato dell'Agenzia Reuter)

" " prossima come noi in precedenza ci aspettavamo, un dono sarà certa-
 " " mente fatto all'Italia, quando le normali condizioni di vita saranno
 " " ripristinate, il dono prezioso della libertà. Duro lavoro, forti ri-
 " " soluzioni, elevati intenti e soprattutto autentica unione fra tutti,
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 " " ranze verso di Voi. " " "

" " (Napoli, 18 agosto 1944) -

(Comunicato dell'agenzia Reuter)

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