

ACC 10000 | 120 | 6268

C/62 (52 BLU)

MOVEMENT

MAR. 14, 1945 - OCT. 18, 1945

BLO) MOVEMENT

MAR. 14, 1945 - OCT. 18, 1945

(1715
1733)

Subject: Carriers - MANOVA Inf Div.

52 British Liaison Unit,
CMT.
18 Oct 45.

6/62/11

HQ LANCASHIRE Inf Division.

The following signal from HQ 59 Area is forwarded
for information.

No

ll
Lieut-Col.
GS.

DEF


From: 59 Area.

17154A

To: Rev MILAN.
52 RH.
HQ SAVONA.

6/25/100 (.) 100 Carriers MANOVA Gruppo 120 personnel
left FLORENCE by rail 16 Oct for MILAN (.) 100 carriers
MANOVA Gruppo 120 personnel leaving FLORENCE by rail
19 Oct for SAVONA

1733

ARMY FORM C-2135 Large		MESSAGE FORM		Register No. 80
Call	Srl. No.	Priority	Transmissio	Instructions
	251		12162	17/11
ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY				
FROM (A)		Originator	Date-Time of Origin	Office Date Stamp
170V MILAN 52240			171545A	
RTOS ADVISOR				
TO		(W) For Information INFO:	Message Instructions GR	
Originator's No. 525/100		M25 Sec	QCH 32	
170V MILAN 52240 RTOS ADVISOR 16 OCT for MILAN 0.100 MANITOVA GRUPPO 120 PERSONNEL LEAVING FLORENCE by rail 19 OCT for SAVONA				

1732

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except	If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.	Originator's Instructions Degree of Priority	
		Time TH1 or TOR 1815	System F
Signed	Signed	Time cleared	

G M/C NR R-3151
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY

COMING MESSAGE

FROM: MMIA PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE TIME DATE GROUP JULY
REF. NO. SD 2819 CLASSIFICATION RESTRICTED TIME DATE RECD 031730B
032140B

TO: 50 BLU - 51 BLU - 52 BLU - 53 BLU - 56 BLU
INFO "F" BLTU

RESTRICTED. IN ORDER TO KEEP THIS HQ INFORMED OF MOVES OR
PROJECTED MOVES OF G R U P P I PLEASE SIGNAL THEM UPON
RECEIPT WARNING ORDER

SUBJECT:- Move of Leg. to Group

Rear HQ.,
52 British Liaison Unit
CMF.

1 May 45

AQ/8/115

To:- "Q" Branch

British Increment
HQ Fifth Army

1. On 28th April Legnano Group received orders from Fifth Army to move from its location at LONGARA and to concentrate in the area of BRESCIA. It was stated by the Army representative that concentration was wanted to be complete by 0600 hrs 29th April. It was explained by this HQ and the Legnano Group that the Divisional transport establishment did not permit of this unless provision for a minimum of 300 x 3-ton lorries (or the equivalent) was made from Army sources. This quantity of transport not being available the order was amended to Concentration being completed as soon as possible.

2. On 28th April 20 American semi-articulated vehicles were provided by Army and with these and Divisional transport a task force was moved to the new area on 28th April.

3. Further convoys with Army transport were arranged for 29th April. Considerable delay in the starting of these convoys occurred for the following reasons:-

- (a) The Movement Order laying down the start time as 0820 hrs arrived at this HQ from Army at 0825 hrs.
- (b) The Army transport due to arrive at 0500 hrs in fact arrived at 0845 hrs.
- (c) The Army vehicles arrived without petrol and had therefore to be sent to refuel, returning from this between 1200 hrs and 1300 hrs.

4. From and after 29th April no programme was given to the Group for future convoys or the provision of transport. As and when transport returned from BRESCIA it was reloaded and sent forward again. For this reason Units could not be warned of definite starting times and though they were standing by in a state of readiness delays inevitably occurred. Further, convoy timings had to be obtained for forward movement as and when vehicles reported and it was necessary to wait for clearances.

McGowan 1830

Army sources. The order was amended to Concentration being completed as soon as possible.

2. On 26th April 20 American semi-articulated vehicles were provided by Army and with these and Divisional transport a task force was moved to the new area on 26th April.

3. Further convoys with Army transport were arranged for 27th April. Considerable delay in the starting of these convoys occurred for the following reasons:-

- (a) The Movement Order laying down the start time as 0820 hrs arrived at this HQ from Army at 0825 hrs.
- (b) The Army transport due to arrive at 0500 hrs in fact arrived at 0845 hrs.
- (c) The Army vehicles arrived without petrol and had therefore to be sent to refuel, returning from this between 1200 hrs and 1300 hrs.

4. From and after 26th April no programme was given to the Group for future convoys or the provision of transport. As and when transport returned from BP2801A it was reloaded and sent forward again. For this reason Units could not be warned of definite starting times and though they were standing by in a state of readiness delays inevitably occurred. Further, convoy timings had to be obtained for forward movement as and when vehicles reported and it was necessary to wait for clearances.

Robert James
1830

Major.
DAA&CMG.

2044/44N.

Copy to:- G.S.O.I.,
52 BIN.

Subject: Account of the Malaya.

32 British Malaya Unit
32P.

21 Apr 45

6/22/45

REMARKS

The attached notes (written by Major Hugo Johnstone) on the account of the Malaya are designed to assist you with a view to future operations.

They are based on first-hand experience in a British Unit engaged on similar lines. It is emphasized, however, that they are forwarded as a guide only.

It is a difficult problem, and I hope they will be of assistance to you.

H. J. Johnstone
Major Johnstone
63.

Copy to:-
Gen. Hill.
Major Hamilton.
Major Hill.
Major Johnston.

1729

to be employed and the results of the investigation are to be reported to the appropriate authorities.

All sources must be kept confidential and no information is to be disclosed to any unauthorized person.

1. The following information is to be kept confidential:

(a) The identity of the source.

(b) The nature of the information received from the source.

(c) The methods used to obtain the information.

(d) The results of the investigation.

(e) The identity of the person who provided the information.

(f) The identity of the person who received the information.

(g) The identity of the person who disseminated the information.

(h) The identity of the person who used the information.

2. The following information is to be kept confidential:

(a) The identity of the source.

(b) The nature of the information received from the source.

(c) The methods used to obtain the information.

(d) The results of the investigation.

(e) The identity of the person who provided the information.

(f) The identity of the person who received the information.

(g) The identity of the person who disseminated the information.

(h) The identity of the person who used the information.

3. The above information is to be kept confidential and no information is to be disclosed to any unauthorized person.

1128

(1) Information of a confidential nature is to be kept confidential. In the event of a disclosure of such information, the source of the information is to be identified and the information is to be destroyed. The source of the information is to be identified and the information is to be destroyed.

(2) Information of a confidential nature is to be kept confidential.

(3) Information of a confidential nature is to be kept confidential.

(4) Information of a confidential nature is to be kept confidential.

RESTRICTED

Subject: General Aircraft in Domestic Control.

62 Division Liaison Unit,
G-2.

3 April 45.

4747.

RE: LIAISON.

The attached copy of AG 5 Army letter AG 452-2 dated 22 April is forwarded for information and action when necessary.

TB/AS

Copy to: Rear 52 WU.

W
Major,
G-2.

1726

52 BCU

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY
APO 464 US ARMY

AMP/JRC/mm

22 April 1945

AG 452-Z

SUBJECT: Use of Aircraft in Traffic Control

TO: See Distribution

1. L-4 (Cub) aircraft are now utilized by Fifth Army Transportation for road patrol and traffic control. Observers are Movement Control and Military Police Officers. Close contact is maintained with Traffic Control Points (TCP's) and IP patrols.

2. The Transportation Control aircraft are identified by a yellow disc on the under side of the left wing and on the right side of the fuselage, and two yellow stripes on both the vertical and horizontal tail surfaces. They are equipped with loud speakers for direct communication with persons on the ground.

3. Convoy Commanders, vehicle drivers, and others concerned will comply with instructions received from these aircraft (by public address or dropped message) in the same manner as when traffic directions are given by TCP or IP personnel on the ground.

4. Any person recovering a dropped message (convoy message case attached to a yellow streamer) which is not intended for him, will deliver it as quickly as possible to the nearest IP or TCP.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL TRUCCOTT:

John R. Truccott
JOHN R. TRUCCOTT
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

All Troops

1723

RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIALSubject; Traffic Control.52 British Liaison Unit
CMF.
20 Apr 45G/62/5HQ LEGNANO.

The attached copy of II Corps message dated 19 Apr 45, is forwarded for information and ~~action as necessary.~~ action.

Major,
GS.

RE:

Copy to: Rear 52 BLM.

1724

MESSAGE FORM

File No. _____ Date: 19 April 1945
 Office of origin G-4, II Corps
 Address APO 19

To:	PRECEDENCE
_____	WIRE or RADIO ESSENTIAL MILITARY MAIL
DIVISION	Urgent Airmail
SEPARATE UNIT COMMANDERS	Priority X Special delivery
_____	Routine Ordinary
_____	Deferred Registered
_____	Week end
_____	Any message not X'd for Initial
_____	precedence will be sent
_____	"Deferred."

Message:

CONFIDENTIAL X ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT ALL TRAFFIC IN CORPS AREA
 BE RIGIDLY CONTROLLED AND MILITARY POLICE OF ALL UNITS BE GIVEN
 EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT X INTERVALS CMA SLED
 LIMITS CMA AND PARKING OFF ROADS WILL BE PARTICULARLY STRESSED X
 CASUAL TRAFFIC WILL BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM X

APPROVED FOR TRANSMISSION:

C. C. Smith
 C. C. SMITH,
 1st Lt., A.C.D.,
 Asst Adjutant General.

Copies to:
 C/S
 G-3
 Engr
 FM
 TCC

1723

Copies required: Msg Ctr (2) Adjutant General (2) Each unit concerned (1)

Subject: Movement by Road.

52 British Machine Guns,

Q30.

23 Mar 45.

9/62/3.

Re: Movement.

1. The attached report made by Sgt Middleton Q30 (aka 52 MG) is self-explanatory, and there is no need to enlarge upon the seriousness of its contents: on however, the fact that these faults have not yet been eradicated will give rise to some concern, it is suggested that a Curfew Routine (order to be related to include the following points, so that all officers, drivers and troops are acquainted with the correct procedure when a convoy is on the march - or -

ROUTINE:-

(a) Convoy orders arriving at a CP should contact the Q30, and find out whether the MG they have been given by the Div staff has been altered, or any other information which the Q30 may have been given at the "last minute".

(b) Orders issued by the Div staff or Q30 to the Q30 are not countermanded by any junior officer, unless in very specific circumstances - at such time the officer will initial the Q30 note book.

(c) All drivers informed of the following:

(1) Speed.

Q30

Q30

Nearest Recovery Post

Nearest Refuel Point

When proceeding as a

long journey in convoy.

(11) All drivers will at all times drive on the RIGHT of the road.

(111) In the event of breaking down, the vehicle will be pushed as far as possible on to the RIGHT of the road. If on a narrow road, it should be towed completely off the road.

(iv) When a vehicle has broken down, the driver, whilst waiting for the LIO, will immediately start controlling the traffic.

(v) When a convoy halts for an authorised break, two or more men will be ordered to stand on the opposite side of the road, to control the traffic.

(vi) No driver will halt for any reason whatsoever on any route in this area, unless there is a recognised HAZARD AREA. These areas are clearly marked as such.

2. In the case of non-compliance with these Routine Orders, disciplinary action will be taken against the individual concerned, and this should be made clear to all drivers.

Special orders should be given to the Q30 to take the particulars of any offender, so that he is punished immediately.

Also attached for your information and attention is a report in respect

(4) Convoy could arrive at a 12 should contain the DTP, and that the vehicle the DTP they have been given by the Div staff has been altered, or any other information which the DTP may have been given at the "last minute".

(5) Orders issued by the Div staff or DTP to the DTP are not considered by any junior officer, unless in very specific circumstances - at such time the officer will initial the DTP note book.

(6) All drivers informed of the following:

(1) Speed

100	}	When proceeding on a long journey in convoy.
100		
100	}	
100		

(14) All drivers will at all times drive on the RIGHT of the road.

(14.1) In the event of breaking down, the vehicle will be pushed as far as possible on to the RIGHT of the road. If on a narrow road, it should be moved completely off the road.

(14.2) When a vehicle has broken down, the driver, whilst waiting for the LAD, will immediately start controlling the traffic.

(14.3) When a convoy halts for an authorized break, two or more men will be ordered to stand on the opposite side of the road, to control the traffic.

1122

(vi) No driver will halt for any reason whatsoever on any route in this area, unless there is a recognised HALTING AREA. These areas are clearly marked on maps.

2. In the case of non-compliance with these Driving Orders, disciplinary action will be taken against the individual concerned, and this should be made clear to all drivers.

Special orders should be given to the DTP to take the particulars of any offender, so that he is punished immediately.

Also attached for your information and attention is a report in respect of Col. BATTISTONE Vehicle - 14 August 1964.

3. These few points have been selected as of primary importance, and it is considered that if instructions are issued to prohibit their violation it will go far towards ensuring the smooth running of a convoy of this nature, and above all, ensuring the minimum of delay and inconvenience to other users of the route on operational missions.

TSS/MS

Copy to: Room 52 HQ.

12.1.64/MS
12.1.64/MS
G.

HA "Legnano" D.V.
Records Office.

18th of March

Subject: Movement of Convoy on 15th of March.

Concerning the premature departure of the convoy, which left RADDH on the 15th for new Location Area, I want to report the following:

- O.C. Convoy: Col. EDMONDO DE RENZI, who is C.O. of 68th Inf. Regt. sent the first Echelon off in direction TAVERNELLE 30 minutes earlier than foreseen, with the intention of giving those vehicles ample time to form up into column of Route before the time fixed for their final Move-off. In his plan he never imagined, that this could cause any inconvenience, since he assumed, that the actual Convoy-Point would be blocked and that the Convoy therefore would have to stop on the Road until the time fixed for the departure.
- The first Echelon consisted of Reinforcement vehicles and their drivers exceeded the m.p.h. agreed upon, thus increasing the span of time to 45 minutes.

Secondly, since it was not foreseen, that the Personnel to be embussed at TAVERNELLE would be ready so much earlier than the head of the Convoy did not receive explicit orders to wait at the Convoy Formation Point until the time fixed for the Departure, he moved off after completion of Embussing.

- Col. DE RENZI, who was not travelling with the first Echelon, tried to overtake the head of the Convoy in order to avoid this inconvenience, but could not intervene early enough and therefore the Convoy moved off 45 minutes before the fixed Time.

This deplorable incident was certainly not caused by any will to act against orders, but by a chain of unforeseen happenings. In any case, as soon as I was informed of the incident, I reproached Col. DE RENZI for not taking all precautions in order to obviate such unfortunate, though unintended mishaps.

G. D. C.

Sgd.: UMERIO UTILI

COMANDO GRUPPO DI COMBATTIMENTO "L. ANANO"
S e g r e t a

P.M. 155. 18 marzo 1945.

O G G E T T O: movimento suoccolonna giorno 15.-

AL 52 3 L U

Circa l'anticipo verificatosi nel movimento della autocolonna che il giorno 15 u.s. doveva portarsi da Radde nell'attuale zona di dislocazione, rendo noto quanto segue:

- Il Comandante della colonna, Colonnello Edmondo De Renzi, Comandante del 68° Rgt. Pz., avviò i primi scaglioni in direzione di Taverne con un anticipo di circa 30', nell'intendimento che gli auto-mezzi raggiungessero il punto di incolonnamento e potessero avere ancora un margine di tempo per riordinarsi, prima dell'ora stabilita per il deflusso. Nelle sue previsioni immaginò che l'anticipo non potesse portare alcun inconveniente in quanto ritenne che il punto di incolonnamento fosse bloccato - con altrettanto anticipo - dal personale del comando di Gruppo, e che quindi la testa della colonna sarebbe stata fermata fino all'ora prescritta.
 - I primi scaglioni erano costituiti dagli automezzi di rinforzo e gli autisti mantennero una velocità oraria superiore a quella della scritta cosicché l'anticipo subì un ulteriore aumento di maniera che la testa della colonna arrivò a Tavernelle 45' minuti prima di quanto stabilito.
- Poiché non era certo previsto che il personale comandato si trovasse al punto di incolonnamento con un anticipo così sensibile rispetto all'ora fissata, ne conseguì che la testa della colonna non avendo ricevuto un esplicito ordine di raggiungere tale punto e di sostare fino all'ora prescritta (ordine che d'altra parte il Colonnello De Renzi non ritenne di dover dare in quanto tutti erano a conoscenza delle disposizioni che regolavano il movimento) defluì senz'altro.
- Il Colonnello De Renzi che non viaggiava col primo scaglione tentò di raggiungere la testa della colonna per ovviare all'inconveniente di cui egli stesso si era subito avveduto ma non gli fu possibile di intervenire tempestivamente e il movimento proseguì con l'anticipo di circa 45 minuti.

Il resto dipende dalla volontà

Circa l'anticipo
autocolonna che il giorno 15 u.s. doveva portarsi da Radde nell'attuale zona di dislocazione, rendo noto quanto segue :

- Il Comandante della colonna, Colonnello Edoardo De Renzi, Comandante del 68° Rgt. Str., avviò i primi scaglioni in direzione di Iavere nelle con un anticipo di circa 30', nell'intendimento che gli automezzi raggiungessero il punto di incolonnamento e potessero avere ancora un margine di tempo per riordinarsi, prima dell'ora stabilita per il deflusso. Nelle sue previsioni immaginò che l'anticipo non potesse portare alcun inconveniente in quanto ritenne che il punto di incolonnamento fosse bloccato - con altrettanto anticipo - dal personale del comando di Gruppo, e che quindi la testa della colonna sarebbe stata fermata fino all'ora prescritta.
- I primi scaglioni erano costituiti dagli automezzi di rinforzo e gli autisti mantennero una velocità oraria superiore a quella prescritta cosicché l'anticipo subì un ulteriore aumento di maniera che la testa della colonna arrivò a Tavernelle 45' minuti prima di quanto stabilito.-
Poiché non era certo previsto che il personale comandato si trovasse al punto di incolonnamento con un anticipo così sensibile rispetto all'ora fissata, ne conseguì che la testa della colonna non avendo ricevuto un esplicito ordine di raggiungere tale punto e di sostare fino all'ora prescritta (ordine che d'altra parte il Colonnello De Renzi non ritenne di dover dare in quanto tutti erano a conoscenza delle disposizioni che regolavano il movimento) defluì senz'altro.
- Il Colonnello De Renzi che non viaggiava col primo scaglione tentò di raggiungere la testa della colonna per ovviare all'inconveniente al cui egli stesso si era subito avveduto ma non gli fu possibile di intervenire tempestivamente e il movimento proseguì con l'anticipo di circa 45 minuti.-

L'inconveniente lamentato non è certo dipeso dalla volontà di contrevvenire ad un ordine ma è stato originato da una serie di imprevisti. Ad ogni modo, non appena venuta a conoscenza dei fatti, non ho mancato di far rilevare al Colonnello De Renzi come non fossero state prese tutte le precauzioni per impedire che si verificasse un così increscioso se pur involontario contrappunto.-

IL GENERALE COMANDANTE
(Umberto Utili)

Subject: Road Maintenance

RECEIVED

31 British Library Unit 6.
CIP.

20 Apr 45.

4/62/1

REFERENCE.

Attached for information and action find necessary copy of:-

- 1. Div Memorandum No 46 (Conservation and control of motor vehicles and equipment) dated 15 Feb 44.
- 2. Div Memorandum No 23 (Standard Operating Procedure for motor operators) dated 15 Feb 45.

Handwritten signature
1711

Copy to: Home 12 111.

C U P Y

HEADQUARTERS 91st INFANTRY DIVISION
UNITED STATES ARMY
A.P.O. #91

15 February 1945

UNIKC-B

MEMORANDUM
TO:IC

CONSERVATION AND CONTROL OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

1. Memorandum No. 1a, this headquarters, 15 February 1945, on the above subject, is rescinded. All copies will be destroyed. The following is substituted therefor:

2. Reference letter, Headquarters Fifth Army, 4 February, on the above subject, and 1st Indorsement thereto, this headquarters, 7 February 1945, the controls as indicated below will be placed in effect.

3. a. The Division Provost Marshal will establish traffic control stations on roads leading out of the Division Area in the vicinity of (881168) and along the road leading southwest from the rd at 88181. These traffic control stations will be manned on a 24-hour basis.

b. All Division vehicles, with the exceptions noted in paragraph 4, leaving the Division Area, will be stopped at these traffic control stations and examined for authority to proceed. Division vehicles, other than those exempted, will not be permitted to pass the traffic control stations without special authority, either in the form of a special trip ticket or a Division movement number as described hereafter.

c. North of these traffic control stations vehicles may operate without special authorization, other than the normal trip tickets required by current regulations.

d. Special authorization for vehicles proceeding south of the above-named traffic control stations will be as follows:

(1) All convoys will be cleared with the Division Transportation Officer (para 41), who will assign a movement number to the convoy. This movement number will be chalked on the front and rear of each vehicle in convoy.

(2) All cargo vehicles not operating in convoy, whether carrying passengers or cargo, will be cleared with the Division Transportation Officer who will assign a movement number to the vehicle or vehicles. This movement number will appear on the trip tickets of the vehicles.

(3) Light passenger vehicles of the Division (sedans, 1-ton GSRs, 3/4-ton GSRs) proceeding south of the 16 northing will carry either a current trip ticket signed by regimental or separate battalion commanders or their executives, or a Division movement number secured from the Division Transportation Officer (para 41). In the case of Division Headquarters and separate companies, the special trip ticket will be signed by the Chief of Staff or the Commanding Officer, Special Troops (Headquarters Commandant). A daily report of special trip tickets issued, listing the type of vehicle, destination, and mission, will be submitted to this headquarters (Att: AG of S, G-4) by 1200 daily, covering the period of the preceding 24 hours.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

Page 2 of Memo #14

(4) Commanding Officers of Division units located south of the 16 northing will establish controls similar to the above, and will check carefully for compliance. The Division Ordnance Officer is responsible for the operation of vehicles assigned or attached to the 791st Ordnance Company. He or his executive will sign special trip tickets required. The Commanding Officer, 91st Division Rear Echelon, is responsible for the operation and control of vehicles assigned or attached to the Division Rear Echelon. Special trip tickets required will be signed in person by the Commanding Officer, 91st Division Rear Echelon, or by the Division Adjutant General. The Commanding Officer, 91st Division Rest Center, will sign special trip tickets for Division vehicles assigned or attached to the Rest Center, and will be responsible for the control and efficient operation of vehicles operating from the Rest Center.

(5) Vehicles of General Officers and full Colonels of the Division are exempted from the above controls when actually occupied by those officers.

e. The Division Provost Marshal will impound Division vehicles attempting to proceed south of the 16 northing without special authority as described above, and will hold them until they are reclaimed by an officer of the unit concerned.

f. Division movement numbers will be secured from the Division Transportation Officer as far in advance of the proposed movement as is possible (never less than three hours, except in an emergency).

5. Regimental and separate battalion commanders will submit a report to reach this headquarters not later than 23 February, listing the steps that have been taken within their unit to implement the directives contained in letter, Headquarters Fifth Army, referred to above.

By command of Brigadier General HOSPITAL:

JOSEPH P. DONNOVIN,
Colonel, U.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ James G. Burke
JAMES G. BURKE,
Capt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:

"C" plus: G-4 (6); 752 Tk Bn (7); 805 TD Bn (7); 337th FA Bn (5); 338th FA Bn (5); 339th FA Bn (5); 913th FA Bn (5)

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS 91ST INFANTRY DIVISION
UNITED STATES ARMY
A. P. O. 91

14 March 1945

GMAKC-H

MEMORANDUM:

NO.....23:

SOP FOR MOTOR MOVEMENTS

The following regulations will govern all movements of the Ninety First Infantry Division and attached Units when more than four vehicles are involved:

1. Upon notification for movement, the Division Transportation Officer (Pers 41) will be contacted for Road Clearance and other data.
2. Unit concerned must provide the Transportation Officer with the following information: entrucking area, IP, destination, total number of vehicles in movement, desired time for movement, and the number of trucks required to be furnished by Division.
3. Units will make prior reconnaissance of designated routes of march, entrucking and detrucking areas, and turn-arounds for vehicles.
4. March unit commanders and drivers will be oriented on their missions. Strip maps will be furnished each driver, when necessary.
5. Unit commanders of moving unit will send guides to organization furnishing trucks.
6. Trucks furnished by units will have tops up unless otherwise specified.
7. Convoy numbers will be written in chalk on front and rear of each vehicle.
8. Front and rear bumpers of all vehicles will be cleaned prior to beginning of movement and at all stops, in order that unit markings will be legible.
9. The first vehicle of each march unit will display a blue flag on the right front of the vehicle; the last vehicle of each march unit will display a green flag on the right front of the vehicle. In addition, the first vehicle of each march unit will display a sign "March Unit Follows".
10. The Provost Marshal will control traffic.
11. Convoy commanders will precede unit movements by ten (10) minutes, checking in at TCP's.
12. Exact compliance with schedules will be enforced.

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

Page 2 of Memo #23, Hq 91st Inf Div. 14 March 1945.

13. In the case of halted columns or single vehicles, men will be posted to the front and rear to control traffic past halted vehicle or vehicles.

14. Each march unit will have an organic vehicle as the lead vehicle, with an officer or non-commissioned officer of the organization in charge, who will be the March Unit Commander. Each march unit will also have an organic vehicle as trail vehicle, with an officer or non-commissioned officer of the organization in charge, to assist in the disposition of vehicles that may become disabled.

15. Each convoy commander will notify this Headquarters (as of S, G-3), of the times convoy clears the 12, and closes at destination.

16. Units using trucks will be responsible for meals for drivers, fuel, and emergency maintenance for vehicles. March unit and convoy commanders will check for and enforce normal first echelon maintenance.

17. March unit vehicles moving during daylight, or within the "Lights On" zone at night, will maintain a fifty (50) yard interval unless otherwise specified.

18. Upon completion of scheduled convoy movement, non-organic trucks will be released immediately, in accordance with clearance schedules.

19. When assistant drivers accompany trucks furnished by Division, they will ride in the truck cabs in order to accomplish their purpose as assistant drivers.

20. Infiltration of advance vehicles will be held to a minimum.

21. Vehicles of slow speed (less than 20 miles per hour) will be scheduled separately with the Transportation Officer.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL LIVESAY:

JOSEPH P. DONNOVIN.
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

James G. Burke
JAMES G. BURKE,
Captain, A.G.D.
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:

"C" Plus
Atchd Units
50 to Div Trans

R E S T R I C T E D

2066