

ACC 10000/120/6396

G/115

TRAINING DIRECTIVES

July - Sept. 1947

TRAINING DIRECTIVES

July - Sept 1947

4526
4568

SUBJECT:- Firing exercise.

5 Section 1st Gen Unit.
Tele: 553.
G 115/

8 Sept 47.

A.E.G. WIDE PROV.

It is confirmed that the Finance Guard will carry out
firing exercises on the S. Jacinto del Prioli Range (C4429)
on Fri 12 Sept 47.

RD
TR/WRW

Alman
Major,
for Lt Colonel, G.S.

File
Diary.

4568

1116

144H

COMANDO CIRCOLO GUARDIA DI FINANZA - UDINE.

No 9313

6 Sep 47

SUBJECT:- Fire-exercises 1947.

TO :- 5 BLU UDINE.

C.2429

We inform this BLU that on 12 inst. fire exercises will be made at the S. DANIELE DEL FRIULI rifle range, by personnel of this Command.

Ver. d'ordine

Signed:- F. Parrinello Major
Commanding Officer.

- 6 SET. 1947

SEEN BY	
GSO I	<i>[Signature]</i>
GSO II	<i>[Signature]</i>
DAA & CMO	<i>[Signature]</i>
S. C. FEWS	
S. C. S. & T.	
S. C. OFD.	
CLERKS.	

Inform AMG

4567

COMANDO DEL CIRCOLO DELLA GUARDIA DI FINANZA DI
UDINE

N. 9313 di prot.

Udine,

144

OGGETTO: Esercitazioni di tiro al bersaglio
1946-47.-

AL COMANDO 5° D. L. U.

6 SET. 1947

UDINE

~~~~~  
Per notizia s'informa questo Comando  
che il giorno 12 corr. mese avranno luogo, pres-  
so il poligono di S. Daniele del Friuli, le eserci-  
tazioni di tiro al bersaglio dei militari dipen-  
denti da questo Circolo.-

IL MAGGIORE COMANDANTE

(F. Ianniello)

*[Signature]*

4566

115

ARMY FORM (2136 (Small))

MESSAGE FORM

Call      Srl. No.      Priority

Transmission Instructions

4 SE 1947

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM (A)

12 B-L-U CTR

Date/Time of Origin

NFT.

For Action

5 B-L-U CTR

TO

(W) For Information (INFO)

|                      |                                     |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Register No.         |                                     |
| SECRET               |                                     |
| GSO I                | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| GSO II               | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| DA & CNG             | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| SEC. S. & T.         | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| S. & G. N.           | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| Message Instructions | GR                                  |

Originator's No.

ASSO UNCLASS FOR KRECAT FOR GIBBON

REFERENCE YOUR GUS OF 620 HOW PUNCHATION DUE

4565

ARRIVE

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS EXCEPT WIRELESS

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

SENT NR 5201 BY DA 1515  
AT 1515 BY RA 1515

Time System Op

THI or TOR

Time cleared

SIGNED

SIGNED

ARMY FORM 02191 (Small)

## MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

Call

Srl. No.

Prio

Transmission

Instructions

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM  
(A)

Originator

Date/Time of Origin

OFFICE DATE TIME

5 British Liaison Unit

02 1430

B

For Action

TO

12 British Liaison Unit RUS

(W) For Information (INFO)

- Message Instructions - GR -

Originator's No.

4.115 (.) unless (.) for col GIBSON from Maj FITZPAT (.) have got your  
 publications (.) shall I h-11 them till you care or dispatch

P.S. 2. 1. 1. (2000 pages of 100) 17-42

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS SUCH IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR TO ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
 BY ANY MEANS EXCEPT (W) INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS REG. DEGREE OF PRIORITY  
 WIRELESS SAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

SIGNED


*[Signature]*  
 Major  
 for Lt G.L.G.

SIGNED

ROUTINE

|              |    |     |
|--------------|----|-----|
| Time         | By | Op. |
| THI or TOR   |    |     |
| 1605         |    |     |
| Time cleared |    |     |

*[Signature]*



SUBJECT:- Training

141

5 British Liaison Unit  
Tele: UDINE Mil 1553  
G 115/141

28 Aug 47

5 Territorial Command.

HQ 3 AGRA (Fd)

A.M.G. UDINE.

1. Further to this HQ letter G 115/138 dated 20 Aug 47.

2. When Firing takes place on constructed ranges, Units will inform local A.M.G. Officers at least 72 hrs in advance, in order that proclamations can be made, thereby ensuring that no misunderstandings arise in the minds of the local officials and/or populace.

Fd /fm

File  
Diary.

*Redman*

Major,  
for: Lt-Col,  
GS.

5 Territorial Command.

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Fd /fm

File  
Diary.



Major,  
for: Lt-Col,  
GS.

4567

1122

140

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS  
Italian Land Forces Branch

Tel: 478421

G/33/1

Ext: 218

21 Aug 47.

5 BLU  
6 BLUSubject: - Report on Italian Training Camps,  
and Gruppo Esplorante.

1. Herewith reports on Training Camps and Gruppo Esplorante

These have been written by the G.O.C. as a result of his tours and visits in Northern Italy.

2. They are for British Consumption only and it is not desired that they should be passed by you to the Italian Army.

23 AGO 1947

Major General,  
Director.*Handwritten signature*  
4563WLM/cow.

| SEEN BY       |  |
|---------------|--|
| GSO I         |  |
| GSO II        |  |
| DAA & CMO     |  |
| S. C. FEME    |  |
| S. C. S. & I. |  |
| S. C. CMO     |  |
| C. F. F.      |  |

4563

REPORT ON ITALIAN ARMY TRAINING CAMPS

1. From Mid July to Mid August the Italian Army has carried out an intensified period of training. It is proposed to train the conscript class, who will join their units at the end of August, for a similar period during September.

Most Units were sent to training Camps close to suitable areas where live ammunition could be fired since such areas are not generally available near permanent locations.

2. Of the five Infantry Divisions in the Italian Army, two of these have recently moved to the Venezia Giulia Area to take over duties on the North East Frontier when the Peace Treaty is finally ratified.

These two Divisions have been busy settling into permanent or temporary accommodation, and have carried out some training from their new locations.

The remaining three Divisions proceeded to Camp in the mountainous terrain of North Italy. Training Camps have also been arranged for the Infantry Regiments of Territorial Commands. In their case Garrison duties are heavy, Regiments are much below strength, training can only have been elementary and few men available. An exception must be made of the Alpini Regiments who are mentioned in para 19. They have spent most of the summer in the mountains.

3. Camps are roughly 50% under canvas, 50% in empty Barracks or billets. Camps seen were well laid out, in pleasant surroundings. Their neatness and cleanliness was most noticeable and the general administration and sanitation appeared to be first class.

4. Stress has been laid on the morale value of the training period, and of the opportunity to get officers and men together, to accustom young soldiers to live under canvas.

With this object in view no attempt was made to overwork the troops, and life in the camp was made as pleasant and enjoyable as possible.

5. The period is regarded as an advertisement and a good morale raiser for the new Army, both in the eyes of the soldiers themselves and in the eyes of the public. A certain amount of publicity has therefore been given to these camps in the Press, and this has led to the Report that the Army is carrying out manoeuvres, which is untrue.

6. Strength of Units. Units are at all times 33% under strength for 33% of the Unit is the conscript class in training at the C.A.R. (Depot).

Further reduction in Unit strengths was necessary for personnel for normal Garrison duties and maintenance of permanent locations.

Infantry Battalions of Divisions proceeded to camp 200-250 men strong, whilst those of Territorial Regiments would have been even less strong.

Some Regiments amalgamated Bns forming two Bns (one of Recruits and one of older soldiers) in each Regiment.

Other Regiments retained their normal Battalion organisation to allow officers and NCOs to command their own units. In the latter case, during some of the Exercises, sub units were amalgamated to form Coys or

north west frontier when the Peace Treaty is finally ratified.

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7. Training Areas. Training areas were generally adequate for Company training. Exercises on a Battalion level were restricted by the crabs, limitations and the rough wild terrain of the mountain valleys of Italy. Lack of Roads and Tracks make exercises involving movement of M.A. almost impossible.

...../2.

4552

6. Administrative difficulties are probably the greatest restriction to the scope of Exercises. The following are examples of difficulties:-

- (a) Strictest economy in the expenditure of petrol and the conservation of materials and equipment.
- (b) Motor Transport is very short, and very old, tyres are worn out and cannot be replaced. The day to day administration on mountain roads sufficiently taxed Motor Transport without the further strain of its use for Tactical Training.
- (c) Boots are in short supply, they cannot be expected to stand up to the wear and tear of mountain country and in consequence must not be overtaxed.
- (d) The items of the ration as issued are unsuitable to provide the soldier with a haversack ration. Field cooking apparatus is non-existent. The soldier has therefore to be fed in his Camp.
- (e) Much vital equipment is lacking. Particularly noticeable was the shortage and in some cases the complete lack of wireless sets and batteries. Means of communication had to be improvised or left to imagination thus creating unrealistic situations.

9. Ammunition for Training. Despite a grave shortage of all natures of ammunition, SAA and 25 Pdr Ammunition was allotted on a scale that can be justly described as adequate though not generous. A/Tank Ammunition, both 6 and 17 Pdr is almost non-existent.

- 10. (a) The greater part of the Training was of Platoon and Company level and the Technical Training of the soldiers of the Artillery, Artieri (Engineers) and Signal Bns.
- (b) Bns of the Infantry Divisions carried out at least two Exercises to practice Co-operation with Field Artillery on the Battalion level. Regimental Mortar and detachments of Artieri and A/Tank Artillery also took part. In one case two spiffies of the Italian Air Force co-operated in attacking enemy targets. Unhappily bad weather caused this support to be called off. In at least one of these exercises live ammunition was used.

- (c) So far as is known no two sided exercises took place. The enemy were represented by targets or by skeleton troops.

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  - (c) So far as is known no two sided exercises took place. The enemy were represented by targets or by skeleton troops.
  - (d) Some Units carried out a 36 hour march. This was not a tactical manoeuvre.
  - (e) Practically no training at night took place. No particular importance appears to be attached to this.
  - (f) No exercise seen lasted longer than 4 hours. The time was totally insufficient to practice a Bn in Co-operation with other arms.
- Administrative problems are generally omitted. In view of remarks in Para. 8. it is difficult to see how other than theoretical problems could have been introduced.

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11. (a) There is a lack of a practical approach to Training methods and a lack of appreciation of the objects of the exercise, what special lessons are to be taught and to whom they apply.
- (b) The ignorance of Senior Officers as to how to set and direct an exercise is most noticeable and alarming  
Until the conception can be erased from the Army that the Senior Officer is the fountain head of all knowledge and cannot consult Juniors, even on technical matters, little improvement in this respect can be expected.
- (c) Situations were not introduced to practice or test Battle Procedure, the correct set up and functioning of HQs, Staffs and Communications. At no time, whilst an exercise was in progress, were Commanders set a problem which required them to make a plan, issue orders, co-ordinate the fire of supporting weapons and to really command and control their sub-units.
- (d) There is complacency that all these matters will work satisfactorily in Battle and that the spirit of duty and sacrifice and high morale of the soldier will make them make up for deficiencies in other respects.
- (e) There is, undoubtedly, an impression, which it is believed dates from pre war days, that since the soldier and young officers have been taught everything in individual training, exercises in the field are designed to demonstrate their ability to carry out what they already know.  
Partly for this reason infinite trouble is taken to prepare exercises and to plan the movements to be carried out in sub-units before the exercise starts. In fairness it must be stated that this is also done to ensure that the time allotted to the exercise shall not be wasted by inadequate preparation, and is an instance of a commendable but misguided effort to apply a principle in a practical manner.
- (f) Stress is laid on carrying out the exercise at high speed as a proof of the efficiency and training of the troops taking part.

12. Umpiring. The duties of Umpires appear to be imperfectly understood. On exercises there is almost a complete lack of umpires and means of indicating enemy fire to the troops taking part.  
This leads to a misguided effort on the part of Commanders to command, and at the same time to criticism and direct

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13. Conferences. Lip service is paid to holding conferences on the ground. In practice the troops generally return to Camps immediately the Cease Fire is sounded for their mid-day meal.

It is believed that attempts are made to impart lessons learnt to the officers. Due to the lack of criticism during the exercise only those points noticed by the Senior Officer and theoretical points of detail can be brought up.

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14. Battle Drill. Battle Drill is applied, almost too slavishly. Whilst useful for teaching Company and Platoon Tactics it is unsuitable for a Battalion supported by attached arms. The peculiar terrain of Italy further complicates its practical application, nor does the Italian Infantry Battalion with only three Rifle Companies fit this drill.

15. Field Firing with Live Ammunition. This is very popular with all ranks. Restrictions imposed by the limitations of the Training Area and Safety Precautions made such exercises of little value above Company level.

The exercises seen had been pre-arranged almost to the last detail and their value was principally in the Battle Inoculation of the troops and not Tactical Training.

As a spectacle the exercises were exceptionally good and could have been better run as Demonstrations with Commentators. Apparently this method of teaching is not considered to be of value to the Troops.

16. Senior Officers. Many have recently returned from Prisoner of War Camps and are ignorant of modern methods of training and the changes in tactical methods to meet modern Battle conditions.

Undoubtedly the majority are alive to, and interested in, the problem of fighting in mountainous country and in the organisation and equipment of Units for this purpose.

Senior Officers are showing a commendable interest in the problems connected with the handling of the Gruppo Esplorante (The Div Recce Regt).

Senior Officers from the Inspectorates of the Ministry of Defence made regular visits to the Training. They took a marked interest in the welfare and comfort of the troops and in the administration of their Camps as well as in the Training.

17. Young Officers. Young Officers are keen, have a sound knowledge of Platoon tactics. They are allowed to exercise little initiative or to make constructive criticism on the plans and decisions of their seniors.

18. The most striking feature of the Training was the enthusiasm and dash displayed by the soldiers themselves. The men looked very fit and hard.

Section leading, Intelligent use of ground and the movement of individuals were quite excellent.

19. ALPINE Regiments. The three ALPINE Regiments, although poorly equipped possess a high morale and have regained their traditional importance in the Army for mountain warfare.

A nucleus of personnel, experienced in the specialised technique of mountain warfare, exist, and a great effort is being made to impart

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A nucleus of personnel, experienced in the specialised technique of mountain warfare, exist, and a great effort is being made to impart this knowledge to the conscript soldier.

20. Gruppo Esplorante (Div Recon Unit) These units were formed in the winter of 1945/46. They are still very poorly equipped and do not possess more than 35% of their vehicles.

Formed from ex Cavalry Regiments there is a noticeable atmosphere of the Cavalry spirit, spit and polish and a high standard of discipline.

The organization of the Gruppo is unsuitable. There is much confusion of thought as to its tactical employment.

Lack of Patrol and Vehicles are making its training a difficult and lengthy business.

-5-

21. Artillery.

- (a) Field Artillery. The Artillery shoot accurately and well. The F.O.O. is noticeably good at observation and correction of fire. There is a lack of IGs to criticise and give decisions on technical points. There is a general unwillingness on the part of the Senior Officers to admit that they do not know everything and require advice on technical matters. The 25 Pdr is generally criticised as a weapon in mountain country. Since incremental charges have not been issued its value is not appreciated.

- (b) Anti Tank Artillery. There is a desperate shortage of ammunition. It is planned to put selected personnel through a practice Camp in September but it is doubtful if sufficient ammunition can be allotted for this purpose.

- (c) A.A. Artillery. 40 mm. Units are attending a practice Camp and a little firing at a sleeve target has taken place. Technical difficulties and shortage of Aircraft has restricted firing.

- (d) Artillery recruits have been well drilled and give a good display. They are enthusiastic and interested in the care of their equipments.

22. Artieri (Engineers) The Artieri are better served as regards instructors and have more experienced Warrant Officers and NCOs than most other Units.

The technical training of individuals, especially in Mine laying and Lifting, Bridging and Road Making appears to be thorough.

The Italian takes to this type of work and is quick at learning it.

Platoons co-operated in Bn Exercises. Field Companies are poorly equipped compared to British standards.

23. Signals. Since no training higher than Bn level was attempted no opportunity was given to see the Bn operate in the Field. Wireless and Telephone communications with isolated Camps were established and appeared to work satisfactorily.

24. In conclusion the following points are stressed.

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24. In conclusion the following points are stressed.

- (a) The Army is in much better shape than it was a year ago.
- (b) The individual training of the soldier is good.
- (c) There is a great improvement in turns out and clothing, though lack of boots is a serious defect to operational efficiency.
- (d) The morale and contentment of the soldier has made marked improvement.
- (e) The scope of the exercises although elementary are more advanced than could have been attempted a year ago.

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- (f) Exercises were of little value for either Training or Exercising Commanders and their Staffs.
- (g) The Conception of Training methods is imperfectly understood.
- (h) Equipment and weapons are getting older. Much has become worn and no replacements available.
- (i) Routine Administration, despite many difficulties and lack of means and above all money, is of a reasonably high standard. Senior Officers are particularly interested in this matter.
- (j) Means do not exist to test or practice Administration under Active Service conditions.

WCH/ter

*W. G. G. G. G.*  
Major General  
Director.

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*W. G. Anderson*  
Major General  
Director.

WGT/ter

4555

# APPENDIX 'A' TO REPORT ON ITALIAN ARMY TRAINING CAMPS

Exercises seen (During "Manoeuvre period 10 July to 10 Aug" reference Italy Map 1/200,000 Sheets 2,4,5 and 7.)

## Cremone Division

|                                        |                      |
|----------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Coy in attack. (with field firing). | S. Sebastiano (P.18) |
| 2. Bn in attack (with Engineer Bn).    | Varallo (D.50)       |
| 3. Engineer Exercise.                  | Varallo (D.59)       |
| 4. Bn in attack.                       | Alagna (D.51)        |
| 5. Divisional Recce Regt in attack.    | Sesto Calende (J.89) |
| 6. Arty (32) in. Shoot.                | Ivrea (J.27)         |

## Levano Division

|                                          |                       |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 7. Inf Bn attack with Fd Arty in Support | Colle D'Aprica (A.03) |
| Inf field firing.                        | Rovetta (A.80)        |
| 8. Coy in attack (with field firing).    | Bratio (E.91)         |
| 9. Arty 3d Bn. Shoot.                    | Sesto Calende (J.89)  |
| 10. Div Recce Regt (Patrol Exercise).    |                       |

## Triuli Division

|                                                                                     |                |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 11. Div Recce Regt advance to Contact                                               | Vipiteno (W.1) |
| 12. Inf Bn in attack with Fd Arty Bn in Support (Co-operation of I.A.P. Spitfires). | Malles (A.39)  |
| 13. Engineer Bn Exercise.                                                           | Vipiteno (W.1) |

## 6 Alpine Regt

|                                          |                       |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 14. Bn Attack with Fd Bn Arty in Support | Passo di Giovo (V.90) |
|------------------------------------------|-----------------------|

2. In in sector (with Engineer Bn). (A.50)  
 3. Engineer Exercise. (D.59)  
 4. In in attack. (D.54)  
 5. Divisional Recce Regt in attack. (J.89)  
 6. Arty (PI) Bn. Shoot. (J.27)

Lernano Division

7. Inf Bn attack with Bn Ed Arty in Support (A.05)  
 Inf field firing. (D.80)  
 8. Co in attack (with field firing). (E.94)  
 9. Arty Md Bn. Shoot. (J.85)  
 10. Div Recce Regt (Patrol Exercise). (J.85)

Friuli Division

11. Div Recce Regt advance to Contact (WO.1)  
 12. Inf Bn in attack with Ed Arty Bn in Vipiteno  
 Support (Co-operation of I.A.F. Spitfires). (A.59)  
 13. Engineer Bn Exercise. (WO.1)  
 Vipiteno

6 Alpine Regt

14. Bn Attack with Ed Bn Arty in Support. (V.90)  
 Passo di Giorno

1137

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020

COMMENTS ON TRAINING

1. Direction of Exercises

Commanders require more experience in directing and controlling Exercises.

ALWAYS  
The objects of the Exercises are not clear, either as to the particular lessons to be learnt or to whom these lessons are intended to be taught.

I suggest that it is a good plan to include in the written instructions for the Exercise:

- (a) The object,
- (b) The particular lessons to be learnt on the Exercise,
- (c) When it is proposed to teach these lessons to.

2. Consider a stage of training has been reached when Company and Battalion training should aim at practising all component parts of these formations.

Situations should be introduced whilst the Exercise is in progress, which necessitate the Commander making a plan, issuing orders, - the consequent plans and orders by subordinate Commanders in accordance with their Commanders plan, and finally the execution of the plans by the troops themselves.

The making of a fire plan and the co-ordination of all supporting weapons, and the execution of this plan, whilst the Exercise is in progress, is the correct method of practising co-operation with supporting arms.

3. Battle Procedure and HQs

Insufficient attention is paid to the composition and functioning of HQs and Battle Procedure. HQs are seldom established with the necessary personnel to enable them to function properly if the Commander has to make a plan, issue orders and control his unit whilst the Exercise is in progress.

4. It is realized that the need for economy in petrol and conservation of materials together with shortages of much equipment must curtail the scope of Exercises.

Practical administrative problems are therefore difficult to introduce.

Nevertheless it is felt that more opportunities should be given to the Administrative Staff Officers and Services, to take part in the Exercises and to impress on all ranks the importance of Administrative factors.

Administrative factors should be allowed for Exercises designed to

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Insufficient time is allowed for Exercises designed to practice the co-operation of a Battalion and supporting arms.

Four hours was the maximum time allotted. This leads to an attempt to hurry through the Exercise without regard to the object and lessons to be learnt.

If time and ground permits and tools are available it is an excellent thing to practice infantry in digging themselves in during the consolidation phases of a battle, even if digging is only commenced.

### 5. Field Firing Exercises carried out by a Battalion

The restrictions imposed by the ground and the necessary safety precautions do not allow sub in its freedom of manoeuvre. The Exercise has to be conducted on a pre-arranged plan which does not enable the majority of troops taking part.

2/.....

Para 5 (Contd)

To avoid the possibility of false lessons being learnt these Exercises are best carried out in the form of a demonstration.

6. There is an atmosphere that everyone is well-trained, the officers in particular do not require exercising and that all will work well in battle. The word that an Exercise is conducted is not a proof that all are perfectly trained.

7. Umpiring

There is almost a complete absence of umpires to indicate the effects of enemy fire to the troops taking part. Those umpires should watch the troops reactions to this information and note a limited number of good and bad points to bring up at the conference to be held when the Exercise is over.

It is suggested that special arrangements be made to teach the art of setting and controlling Exercise, and the duties of umpires, and to include those subjects in courses at the Scuola Co-op d. V. Armia and Infantry School, and to run courses at Divisions.

8. Conferences

After the Exercises, short conferences are best held on the ground, those whom the Exercise has designed to teach being present.

In Platoon and Company training the interest of the soldiers themselves would be increased by holding simple conferences for their benefit.

9. Some officers are too conspicuous, both in their dress and by moving about regardless of enemy fire. This is partially due to the fact that officers are trying to command, and at the same time to criticise and supervise their sub units, due to the lack of proper umpires.

10. R/T Communications

There is a tendency for Commanders to assume that R/T Communications always work perfectly in battle and that accurate and detailed information will be quickly available by this means.

Officers do not appear to appreciate the value of officer to officer communication by R/T. No doubt this is due to the fact that there is a shortage of wireless equipment and few officers have had opportunities for practical experience in its use.

I foresee considerable difficulty in working wireless satisfactorily in mountainous country, and a physical difficulty in getting the sets to where they are most required.

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11. Platoon Explorers and Infantry Pioneers

This Platoon is used as a specialised unit available for Recon and Patrolling.

Provided it is not over-taxed, it will be a useful reserve in the hands of the Battalion Commander, particularly in a Battalion with only three Rifle Companies.

But, as so often happens in the formation of an "ad hoc" unit, another unit has to suffer in consequence.

In this case the Infantry Battalion is now without a Pioneer Platoon.

All Battalions state the need for a Pioneer Platoon. It is not practical or possible to rely on a Platoon of the Div Artieri always being available to support a Battalion and to carry out tasks which should be done by Infantry Battalion Pioneers.

2551

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the Artillery are specialised experts, and are fully employed on their own important tasks.

12. Training at Night

It is important to give the short service soldier some experience of Night conditions, if only to accustom him to moving about in the dark and overcoming the natural desire to sleep.

It is suggested, for the benefit of all ranks for example, to include in the training some simple patrol exercises, and the move of a Battalion with its supporting arms into "forming up" areas for an attack at first light.

Mine-laying, Bridge-building and most forms of technical training have been practised at night.

13. Co-ordination of Supporting Fire

Is well organised for the opening of the battle but situations are not introduced into the Exercises to practice this during remaining phases of the battle.

A more realistic study is required as to the control of the Regimental and Battalion mortars and the co-ordination of their fire with the Artillery.

It should be made quite clear whether mortars are placed under command, or in support of Companies. The indication and choice of targets (it is usually the man in front of the battle nearest the enemy who knows where mortar fire is required), and the decision as to whether these targets can be engaged without danger to our own troops or conflict with targets being engaged with other weapons, requires the most careful organisation. In the Exercises seen, the mortars shot both accurately and quickly, but their positions and tasks had been pre-arranged.

14. Battle Drill

- (a) Personally, and most people agree with me, I consider it is a dangerous principle to apply Battle Drill on a Battalion level. Modern battles are so complex, the tasks of a Battalion, the ground, the enemy positions, are so diverse, that it is not possible to apply it. Battle Drill is an excellent method of teaching "Principles" to minor units and junior commanders.

- (b) As a result of the application of Battle Drill in

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- (b) As a result of the application of Battle Drill in Battalion Exercises it was noticed that one of the three Rifle Companies was always employed as a Base di Fuoco. This would have been better performed by M.M.Gs leaving the Rifle Company available for another task. With only three Rifle Companies in a Battalion they will all be fully employed in fighting the battle or as a reserve under the Battalion Commander.

#### 15. Conservation of Ammunition

There is a tendency to allow uncontrolled and rather reckless expenditure of S.A.W. for automatic weapons. This should be checked especially in mountainous terrain where supply is difficult.

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- 4 -

16. Map Reference System

There is a requirement for a system similar to the grid system. The present methods lead to waste of time and inaccuracy.

17. Regimental and Divisional Signal Exercises

It is suggested that good value would be obtained by holding Divisional and Regimental Signal Exercises. In the case of the Divisional Exercises this would include HQs down to and including Battalions and corresponding formations, and in the case of the Regimental Exercises, HQs down to and including Company and corresponding formations.

The entire HQs complete with their personnel, both officers and soldiers and their equipment and vehicles should participate.

18. Field Artillery

The Artillery fire was always extremely accurate. F.O.Os are quick and good at correction and control.

But no opportunity was given to the Artillery to practice movement and engaging targets that had not been arranged before the exercise commenced.

There is a need for instructors in Gunnery to criticise and give decisions on technical points. Senior Officers cannot be expected to remember all such details perfectly.

19. Engineers

The technical training of individuals is being very thoroughly carried out. This could, on occasions, have been equally well carried out and introduced into a tactical setting.

20. Signals

Since the Exercises were not on a Regimental or Divisional level there was no opportunity to note the functioning of Divisional Signals Battalion.

21. Gruppo Esplorante

Attached is a paper given to Generals NIGROCHI and ESPERARDI on the problems in connection with the organisation and employment of the Gruppo.

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#### 21. Gruppo Espionante

Attached is a paper given to Generals NIGRONI and BERNARDI on the problems in connection with the organisation and employments of the Gruppo.

JHB/JV

15 August 1947

*C. H. G. W. H. M.*  
Major General,  
Director.

4549

NOTES ON THE "GRUPPO RECCO"

1. I should be interested to hear what conclusions you reach after further experience, as to the best organisation for the Gruppo, and the method of its employment in the role of Recce.

2. There is certainly ground for much thought and study on this subject.

It is complicated by virtue of the mountainous terrain of ITALY, the narrow roads and defiles and many rivers and bridges which dissect the country.

A further complication is the fact that, in the Italian Army there are no other Recce Units such as the Armoured Car Regiment in the British Army which can carry out Medium Recce up to 50 miles ahead of the Army.

The Recce Regiment of the Infantry Division in the British Army is designed to operate 10 - 20 miles ahead of the Division and to carry out a more detailed Recce than is possible with an Armoured Car Regiment.

It appears as if your Recce Regt may have to perform both these roles.

3. It must not be forgotten that there are roles other than Recce that the Gruppo will be called to undertake.

Some of these for example are:-

(a) Protection

- (i) to act as covering troops when the Division is halted.
- (ii) to act as covering troops either in front or to the flanks of the Division.

(b) Advance ahead of the Infantry to seize and hold a tactical feature.

(c) To cover a withdrawal.

(d) Pursuit.

(e) A mobile reserve in the hands of the Divisional Commander.

4. It is my opinion that the present organisation is unsuitable for almost every role the Gruppo may be required to undertake.

5. I consider that its main defects are as follows:-

(a) Squadrons are not suitably organised and equipped as self contained units.

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4. It is my opinion that the present organization is unsuitable for almost every role the Gruppo may be required to undertake.

5. I consider that its main defects are as follows:-

(a) Squadrons are not suitably organized and equipped as self contained units.

(b) Since all Squadrons are differently organized they are unable to relieve each other or carry out similar tasks.

(c) The communications within the Gruppo are insufficient. Except for the Ws of the Armoured Car Squadron, other Squadron Ws have neither the necessary R/T Sets or suitable vehicles.

(d) The Gruppo has too few Armoured Cars and Scout Cars.

(e) There is a requirement for a wheeled or half tracked Armoured Personnel Carrier to carry the Infantry personnel especially when they are required to accompany Armoured Car Patrols.

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- 2 -

6. As regards the defects mentioned in para. 5 sub paras (a) and (b) I know that you consider self contained mixed squadrons would offer insuperable difficulties and complications in training the soldier who only serves for one year.

But if the Gruppo has got to take its place in battle it should obviously be based on an organisation that will function during battle. The present organisation will not, and Squadrons are bound to be broken up in battle.

7. To illustrate this point I would quote the role of Recce in front of the Division, probably the most important role of the Gruppo.

There will be many occasions when more than one Squadron will have to be deployed to adequately cover the Divisional Front, at the same time requiring more than one Squadron Commander and his HQ for the task.

At once the problem arises as to how to organise the Squadrons, provision and composition of the required patrols, and correct communications for their command and control at Squadron and Gruppo HQs.

If the Gruppo is composed of two or more Squadrons, similarly organised say with Armoured Cars, Scout Cars and Infantry, similarly or better still Armoured Personnel Carrying Vehicles, any or all of these Squadrons would be available for the task.

Squadrons organised on these lines would be suitable to carry out the majority of the other tasks likely to be allotted to the Gruppo.

8. The Gruppo is a highly specialised formation, a most valuable reserve in the hands of the Divisional Commander. It will not be wasted by being used to attack enemy in strong positions.

The Infantry and Supporting weapons in the organisation are not intended for this purpose.

9. I am not in agreement that the size of the Gruppo should be increased.

It is impossible to provide a Unit with all the arms and the means to meet every contingency. At once the Unit becomes unwieldy and top heavy. Generally a reduction of arms and personnel has to be made elsewhere to the detriment of some other Unit.

For special occasions it is possible to allot other troops for its support.

One Gruppo of approximately the present size per Division is surely the correct proportion of troops to allot for the specialised role of Recce.

10. There are other smaller points on which I think agreement will be generally accepted.

(a) Some Anti Tank Guns should be provided for the Unit.

(b) A simple type of mine which can be easily laid to block approaches should be carried.

All ranks should have some knowledge of mines.

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(b) A simple type of mine which can be easily laid to block  
approaches should be carried.  
All ranks should have some knowledge of laying and lifting  
mines.

(c) Some personnel should be specially trained in the work  
of demolitions and in handling mines and explosives.

11. In the present stage of the training of the Gruppo and with  
the shortage of personnel and deficiency of vehicles and other equipment  
and economy of petrol, it is obviously impossible to carry out anything  
except the most simple exercise.

The greater part of training must be confined to teaching individuals  
to drive and maintain their vehicles, to handle their arms, and knowledge  
and care of the various equipments.

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- 3 -

12. I thought Col. RAVINNA made an exceedingly wise choice in the type of exercise he arranged last Thursday. The ground was well chosen, the exercise was simple and demonstrated with the means available, those particular lessons which he wished to teach.

13. The employment of the Gruppo as a complete Unit can be studied by Officers and Senior NCOs by holding exercises on the ground without vehicles or troops.

14. I suggest the following are points applicable to a Recce Unit which always requires study.

- (a) Road movement. Keeping vehicles correct distance apart a particular problem on narrow twisting roads.
- (b) Passing information up and down a column when on the move, when halted.
- (c) Protection on the move.
  - (1) Protection at halts. How far do crews of vehicles move from their vehicles. How do crews know whether the halt is a genuine one, or only a temporary check in the column. If crews move any distance from their vehicle they may delay the move of the column not a serious matter once, but a very serious one if it occurs frequently. If crews remain close to their vehicle they may not be able to give adequate protection.
  - (2) Movement of mixed patrols, composed of all or any of Armoured Cars, Infantry in Carriers or wheeled vehicles, the Command and Communications between them.
  - (3) Defence of Bridges. HOLDING a bridge (i.e. The Bridge command may be used by your own troops) and DENYING a bridge to the enemy (i.e. the enemy must not be allowed to get possession of the bridge). Different dispositions to be adopted in each case.
  - (4) Communication. The importance of this for a Recce Unit.
- (5) Use of R/T. Finally, and this point although mentioned here applies equally to all other units. I notice a tendency for Commanders to assume that R/T Communications always work perfectly, and that extremely detailed and accurate information will be quickly available by this means. This is due I think to the fact that little R/T equipment

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- (d) Protection at halts. How far do crews of vehicles move from their vehicles. How do crews know whether the halt is a genuine one, or only a temporary check in the column. If crews move any distance from their vehicle they may delay the move on of the column not a serious matter once, but a very serious one if it occurs frequently.
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- (f) Defence of Bridges. HOLDING a bridge (i.e. The Bridge can and may be used by your own Troops) and DEFENDING a bridge to the enemy (i.e. the enemy must not be allowed to get possession of the bridge). Different dispositions to be suggested in each case.
- (g) Conclusion. The importance of this for a Recce Unit.

15. Use of R/T. Finally, and this point although mentioned here applies equally to all other Units.

I notice a tendency for Commanders to assume that R/T Communications always work perfectly, and that extremely detailed and accurate information will be quickly available by this means.

This is due I think to the fact that little R/T equipment has as yet been issued and many Officers have had little practical experience in its use.

In my experience this is far from the case in actual Battle. I am no expert myself but I foresee considerable difficulty in working wireless satisfactorily in your mountainous terrain and a physical difficulty in getting the cars to where they are most required. 4346

(Sgd) E.H. GOULBURN

Major General,  
Director.

1 45 1

ARMY FORM 08136 (Small)

MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

Call      Ser. No.      Priority

Transmission Instructions

139

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM  
(A)

Originator

Date-Time of Origin

5 British Liaison Unit

20 B

TO

12 British Liaison Unit

(W) For Information (INFO)



Message Instructions

GP

Originator's No.

0115 (.) unless (.) for Col GUNDA (.) for your info (.) General LEE Inten to visit HAMEBA Div 26 and ALPHI POMMBA 27 (.) Territorial command considering laying on exercises for this (.) Col BOGARD will be in attendance

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS { } WIRELESS

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

URGENT

|                    |        |     |
|--------------------|--------|-----|
| Time               | System | Use |
| THI or TOR<br>1225 |        |     |
| Time cleared       |        |     |

4545

SIXXO

for Lt Col

SIXXO

138

SUBJECT :- Training.

5 British Liaison Unit  
Tele : UDIN MIL 1553  
G 115/133

20 Aug 47

5 Territorial Command

H/3 AREA (PA)

AMC. UDIN

In order to conform with G.H.Q. policy, for training in the area controlled by Allied Military Government, the following rules, approved by G.H.Q., are forwarded.

In parts of your Command not controlled by A.M.G. there are no restrictions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

1. LIST OF RULES

- (i) No "Field Firing" exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, e.g. light machine-gun, sub-machine carbine, rifle and pistol, provided that these practices are carried out on properly constructed ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without arms) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that they do not enter Zone "A" or approach to within 5 kms of the FRONTIER.

2. USE OF RANGES

- (i) The PIONEER Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you may require. You are requested to give this HQ warning of your intention to use the ranges.  
It is possible that from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Artillery Shooting (~~other than~~ artillery) is permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory except on the PIONEER Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms and mortars, may be carried out provided that suitable localities

A.M.S. J.D.M.V.  
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# 1. RULES OF RANGE 13

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- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without aim) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that they do not enter "A" or approach to within 5 kms of the FRONTIER.

# 2. RULES OF RANGE 12

- (i) The FRONTIER Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you may require. You are requested to give this in warning of your intention to use the ranges.  
It is possible that from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Artillery Shooting (~~which is not permitted~~) is permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory except on the FRONTIER Ranges.
- (iii) "Field firing" exercises involving the use of small arms and mortars, may be carried out provided that suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of FANVILLIO-UNAVILLIO-<sup>5511</sup> MALBOMERO etc., should be avoided.
- (iv) It is not necessary to inform this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live ammunition.  
Should it be known that Allied units are in the vicinity it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (v) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night firing is not permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory.
- (vi) The Camp at GABRO is frequently occupied by British troops who carry out firing and other training from there.  
If you wish to train or shoot in this area, early contact should be made with the Unit in occupation.

3.

WARNING OF INTENTION TO SHOOT.

(1) So as to enable A.M.C. to give adequate warning to Sri Lanka; to give publicity in the press and to warn allied troops who may be training, will you please give this HQ the earliest possible notification of your intention to carry out "Field Firing" exercises?

(ii) Your application should be received in this office 72 hrs before the shooting day.

The following information is required :-

- (a) Date
- (b) Time of Firing
- (c) Unit
- (d) Map References of Firing Point Areas.
- (e) Map References of Target Areas.
- (f) Weapons to be used.

(iii) It is not sufficient to say, for example :-

"Firing is to take place in the LL Field Area between 1-25 August."

(iv) In view of the different maps in use, it could be more satisfactory if a representative of the formation or unit concerned, called in at this HQ and explained the details of the exercises.

4.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

You will appreciate that the Unit carrying out firing exercises will be responsible for taking all the necessary safety precautions.

With the single exception of the 17 pdr the 6 pdr is the most dangerous weapon to use. A strike at 1,000 yds may ricochet through 45 degrees and travel 7,000 yds. It should NOT be used in "field firing".

PC  
ALM/TW

Major  
Lt Col  
CS

*Redman*

see shooting day.

The following information is required :-

- (a) Date
- (b) Time of firing
- (c) Unit
- (d) Map References of Firing Point Areas.
- (e) Map References of Target Areas.
- (f) Weapons to be used.

- (iii) It is not sufficient to say, for example :-  
"Firing is to take place in the LL THIAN Area between  
1-25 August."
- (iv) In view of the different maps in use, it would be more satisfactory  
if a representative of the Formation or Unit concerned, called in  
at this HQ and explained the details of the exercises.

#### SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

You will appreciate that the Unit carrying out firing  
exercises will be responsible for taking all the necessary safety  
precautions.

With the single exception of the 17 pdr the 6 pdr is the most  
dangerous weapon to use. A strike at 1,000 yds may ricochet through  
45 degrees and travel 7,000 yds. It should NOT be used in "field  
firing".

PD  
ALH/TN

Major  
For Lt Col  
CS

*[Signature]*

File  
Diary

4543

SUBJECT:- TRAINING.

5. British Liaison Unit,  
Tele:- 1555,  
G 115/150,

6 Jul 47.

HQ., 5 Territorial Command.

In order to conform with G.M.C. policy, for training in the area controlled by Allied Military Government, the following rules approved by G.M.C. are formulated.

In parts of your Command not controlled by A.M.G. there are no restrictions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

1.

EAST of ROUTE 13.

- (i) No "Field Firing" exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, e.g. light machine-gun, sub-machine carbine, rifle and pistol, provided that these practices are carried out on properly constructed ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without gun.) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that tps do not enter ZONE "A" or approach to within 5 Kms of the FRONTIER.

2.

WEST of ROUTE 13.

- (i) The PORDENONE Arty Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you may require. You are requested to give this HQ warning of your intention to use the ranges.  
It is possible that from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Arty Shooting (other than 6 par ar) is permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory except on the PORDENONE Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms, mortar and 6 par ar guns, may be carried out provided that suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of TREVISO-UGOVIZZ - KALBERGHERO etc., should be avoided.  
It is not necessary to inform this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live ammunition. Should it be known that Allied Units are in the vicinity, it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (iv) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night Firing is not permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory.
- (v) The Camp at OSOPPO is frequently occupied by British tps who carry out firing and other training from there.
- (vi)

In parts of your Command not controlled by A.M.G., there are no restrictions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

# EAST OF ROUTE 13.

- (i) No "Field Firing" exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, e.g. light machine-gun, sub-machine carbine, rifle and pistol, provided that these practices are carried out on properly constructed ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without arms) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that tps do not enter ZONE "A" or approach to within 5 Kms of the FRONTIER.

# WEST OF ROUTE 13.

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It is possible that from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Arty Shooting (other than 6 par ar) is permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory except on the PORDENONE Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms, mortar and 6 par ar guns, may be carried out provided that suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of TARVISIO-UGOVIZ - MARCACHETTO etc., should be avoided.
- (iv) It is not necessary to inform this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live ammunition. Should it be known that Allied Units are in the vicinity, it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (v) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night Firing is not permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory.
- (vi) The Camp at OSOPPO is frequently occupied by British tps who carry out firing and other training from there.  
If you wish to train or shoot in this area, early contact should be made with the Unit in occupation.

4342

# WARNING OF INTENTION TO SHOOT.

- (i) So as to enable A.M.G. to give ample warning to Sindacco's; to give publicity in the Press and to warn Allied tps who may be training, all you please give this HQ the earliest possible notification of your wish to carry out "Field Firing" Exercises?

.....2/.....

...../2.....

- 3, (ii) Your application should be received in this office 72 hrs before the shooting day.  
The following information is required:-  
 (a) Date.  
 (b) Times of Firing.  
 (c) Unit.  
 (d) Map References of Firing Point Areas.  
 (e) Map References of Target Areas.  
 (f) Weapons to be used.
- (iii) It is not sufficient to say, for example:-  
 "Firing is to take place in the IL TILAN Area between 1 - 25 August".
- (iv) In view of the different maps in use, it would be more satisfactory if a representative of the Formation or Unit concerned, called in at this HQ and explained the details of the exercises.

4.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.

You will appreciate that the Unit carrying out firing exercises will be responsible for taking all the necessary safety precautions.

X

WD  
AIGW/etd

*Antony*  
Lt.-Colonel,  
G.S.

## COPIES TO:-

"G"(OPS)  
 TPO, G.H.Q.  
 -----

HQ., 3 A.G.R.A.  
 -----

HQ., A.M.G.  
 -----

4541

115

137

36600:- Infantry

HQ 3 Army Co RA (M)

0 43

TOLLO: INDIA 1542

B.I.U.

7 Aug 47

Ref your letter G.115/151 dated 3 Aug 47.

1.

comment:-

The Commander agrees with the orders but adds the following

8/2

"with the single exception of the 17 pdr the 6 pdr is the most dangerous weapon to use. A strike at 1,500 yds may pierce through 45° and travel 7,000 yds. It should not be used in field firing."

15 AGO. 1947

F1  
JS/C2

| S. C. S. T. / |   |
|---------------|---|
| C.O. I        |   |
| C.O. II       | ✓ |
| C.O. III      |   |
| S. C. S. T.   |   |
| S. C. S. T.   |   |
| S. C. S. T.   |   |
| C.O. III      |   |

Hq  
BPA

cc. send to TC. The above amendment  
34419. 4540  
7 Aug 47 } see 135.  
16

1160

ARMY FORM C2130 (Small)

# MESSAGE FORM

136

|      |          |          |                           |
|------|----------|----------|---------------------------|
| Call | Sch. No. | Priority | Transmission Instructions |
|------|----------|----------|---------------------------|

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

|                                              |                     |
|----------------------------------------------|---------------------|
| FROM<br>(A)<br>Originator                    | Date/Time of Origin |
| HQ 5 British Liaison Unit, CMF<br>For Action | 18 1630-B           |
| TO<br>(W) For Information (INFO)             |                     |
| HQ., 12 British Liaison Unit, CMF.           |                     |

Origin Data Stamp

Message Instructions

Originator's No.

G 115 (.) URGENT (.) FOR COL GIBSON FROM LIAJ KITCAT  
 Further by G 115 of 16 Aug 47 (.) ONE (.) Mantova Div training is 22nd grouping  
 exercise (.) 23rd one battalion supported by 1 5th Arty Bty and 17 pdr and 6 pdr  
 A/T guns engineers and sigs (.) 24th exercise ends (.) TWO (.) PULORE Div  
 one battalion exercise with field firing twenty first - Area JORDANE (.)  
 Subject this list more worth seeing if you can make it

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN  
 BY ANY MEANS EXCEPT

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR TO  
 FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MES-  
 SAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
 DEGREE OF PRIORITY

SIGRO

1 cl  
 Major,  
 Lt. Colonel GB

SIGRO

IMPORTANT

|                    |        |     |
|--------------------|--------|-----|
| Time               | System | Set |
| THI or TOR<br>1730 |        |     |
| 1730               |        |     |

MESSAGE FORM

135

Priority

Att. No.

Transmission Instructions

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.

FROM

(A)

Originator

5 B.L.U.

Date-Time of Origin

Office Date Stamp

For Action

12 B.L.U. ROME

TO

(W) For Information (INFO)

Message Instructions

G.R

Originator's No.

G 115 (.) unclass (.) referring to your enquiry by telephone 16 August 47 (.) the following has been supplied by 5 comiliter (.) Quote (.) 1 poicne' il congedamento della classe anziana deve avvenire entro il corrente mese, il programma delle esercitazioni estive delle Divisioni "Mantova e Folgore" e dell'8 Regg. Alpini, e' stato concretato in modo da ultimare le esercitazioni stesse con conveniente anticipo rispetto alla fine del mese.

Allo stato attuale;

l'8 Regt. Alpini ha gia' ultimato il campo estivo;

la Div. Folgore lo ultimera' il 23 corr.

la Div. Mantova lo ultimera' il 25 corr. (come gia' comunicato dal 22 al 25 corr. la Mantova effettuera' le esercitazioni di cooperazione nella zona Gemona-Taranto-Cividale approfittando del rientro dal campo di reparti)

Dal 26 al 30 corr. i reparti saranno, in conseguenza di quanto sopra, in fase di congedamento anziani, riordino ed immissione nuove reclute.

In tale periodo non sono pertanto previste esercitazioni particolari, oltre alla normale attivita' addestrativa.

TO

(U) For Information (INFO)

G.P.

Message Instructions

Originator's No.

G 115 (.) unclass (.) referring to your enquiry by telephone 16 August 47 (.) the following has been supplied by 5 comiliter (.) Quote (.) 1 poiche' il congedamento della classe anziana deve avvenire entro il corrente mese, il programma delle esercitazioni estive delle Divisioni "Mantova e Folgore" e dell'8 Regg. Alpini, e' stato concretizzato in modo da ultimare le esercitazioni stesse con conveniente anticipo rispetto alla fine del mese."

Allo stato attuale;

l'8 Regt. Alpini ha gia' ultimato il campo estivo;

la Div. Folgore lo ultimera' il 23 corr.

la Div. Mantova lo ultimera' il 25 corr. (come gia' comunicato dal 22 al 25 corr. la Mantova effettuera' le esercitazioni di cooperazione nella zona Gemona-Taranto-Cividale approfittando del rientro dal campo d'i reparti)

Dal 26 al 30 corr. i reparti saranno, in conseguenza di quanto sopra, in fase di congedamento anziani, riordino ed immissione nuove reclute. In tale periodo non sono pertanto previste esercitazioni particolari, oltre alla normale attivita' addestrativa.

4538

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means except: WIRELESS

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Originator's Instruction Degree of Priority

Time System Or  
TH1 or TOR  
Time Cleared

Signer

Signer

To 12 B.L.U. Rome  
from 5 B.L.U. Ud.

SCH/els

COMANDO MILITARE TERRITORIALE DI UDINE (V)  
S.M. - Ufficio Operazioni e Addestramento

N. \_\_\_\_\_ /O.A. di prot.

Udine, 11 agosto 1947

OGGETTO: Programmi di addestramento per il periodo dal 26 al 31 corr.

AL 5° B. L.U.

S E D E

*Referencing to your inquiry by telephone 16 Aug. 47  
The following has been supplied by 5 Committee, Udine*

1. - Poichè il congedamento della classe anziana deve avvenire entro il corrente mese, il programma delle esercitazioni estive delle divisioni "Mantova" e "Folgore" 8 dell'8° Rgt. Alpini, è stato concretato in modo da ultimare le esercitazioni stesse con conveniente anticipo rispetto alla fine del mese.-

Allo stato attuale:

- l'8° Rgt. Alpini ha già ultimato il campo estivo;
- la divisione "Folgore" lo ultimerà il 23 corr.;
- la divisione "Mantova" lo ultimerà il 25 corr. (come già comunicato dal 22 al 25 corr. la "Mantova" effettuerà le esercitazioni di cooperazione nella zona Gemona-Tarcento-Cividale approfittando del rientro dal campo dei reparti).-

4537

2. - Dal 26 al 30 corrente i reparti saranno, in conseguenza di quanto sopra, in fase di congedamento anziani, riordino e immissione nuove reclute.

In tale periodo non sono pertanto previste esercitazioni particolari, oltre alla normale attività addestrativa.

5 TERRITORIAL COMMAND UDINE.  
Ufficio Addestramento e Oper.

No.  
 SUBJECT:- Training programmes for period 26 - 31 Aug 47.  
 TO :- 5 B.L.U. Udine.

Aug 47

1. As the release of the senior service-men should be finished during this month, the programme of Summer exercises for Mantova & Folgore Div's and for 8 Alpini Regt has been organized so that said exercises end with a certain anticipation before the end of the month.

At the present moment:-

- 8 Alpini Regt have finished their summer exercises;
- Folgore Div will finish them on 23 inst.;
- Mantova Div will finish them on 25 inst. (as previously informed, from 22 to 25 inst the Mantova Div will carry out their exercises of co-operation, in Gemona - Tarcento - Cividale areas as the units have come back from training fields)

2. From 26 to 30 inst. the units, according with the above, will be in the period of release in respect of seniors, and of enlistment and setting in order of the new service-men.

During that period no exercises are foreseen over the normal training activity.

134

OGGETTO: - Informazioni.5 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT  
Udine 16 Aug 1947.All'Ufficio Addestramento del  
5 Comiliter. Sede.

Si richiedono immediatamente le seguenti informazioni:-

- (a) Programma della Divisione "Montova" per i giorni del 26 al 31 Agosto.
- (b) Programma - se in esercizio - della Divisione "Folgore" e dell'8 Reggimento Alpini nello stesso periodo.

File, Diary

*Thesdette**Passa**has hand**Handing**AG.**up chief of staff**1200 hrs*Major,  
for Lt-Col  
G.S.Major  
for Lt-Col  
G.S.  
5 British Liaison Unit

453

1160

116'

UNIT 4 LROF NR 4127  
 FROM ITALIAN LAND FORCES BRANCH AFHQ 141530B  
 TO 5 BRITISH LIAISON UNIT  
 ET



133

TRG/62 UNCLASS (.) FOR WITCAT FROM GIBSON (.)  
 GOC WISHES TO SEE EXERCISES MANTOVA FOLGORE AND S ALPINI (.)  
 NOT BEFORE 22 AUG PREFERRELY LATER (.) NOT NECESSARILY HIGHER  
 LEVEL THAN COY (.) SIGNAL DATES AND TYPES OF EXERCISES

16 AGO 1947

BT 141530B

SENT "LROF" 4127

SENT "LROF" 0155 AF K

RD NR 427 0155 J.S. (AR&amp;S) TKS M

| SEEN BY       |           |
|---------------|-----------|
| GSO I         |           |
| GSO II        | <i>h</i>  |
| DAA & CNG     | <i>du</i> |
| S. C. REVE    |           |
| S. C. S. & T. |           |
| S. C. ORD.    | 4538      |
| CLEVER        |           |

1167

ARMY FORM C2136 (Small)

MESSAGE FORM

132

|      |          |          |                           |
|------|----------|----------|---------------------------|
| Call | Sel. No. | Priority | Transmission Instructions |
|------|----------|----------|---------------------------|

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

|      |                                    |                     |
|------|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| FROM | Originator                         | Date-Time of Origin |
|      | Hq., 5 British Liaison Unit, GAF.  | 14/830-3            |
|      | For Action                         |                     |
|      | Hq., 12 British Liaison Unit, GAF. |                     |
| TO   | (W) For Information (INFO)         |                     |



Originator's No. G 116 (.) UNCLASS (.) FOR GIL GIBSON FROM MAJ KITCAT (.)  
 SEWINGA DIV only are holding divisional exercises 22nd till end of August (.)  
 AFTER TROUBLE - CIVILIAN - TRAINED (.)  
 Success under details given you on your arrival (.)  
 REPLY will be available to elucidate and make any arrangements

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN  
 BY ANY MEANS **PLAIN** **WIRELESS**  
 Major,  
 For Lt.-Colonel, GAF.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR TO  
 FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE  
 MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
 DEGREE OF PRIORITY  
 LOW RANK

|              |      |
|--------------|------|
| Time         | 1532 |
| THI or TOR   | 1553 |
| Time cleared |      |

131

SUBJECT:- TRAINING Instructions.5 British Liaison Unit,  
Tele:- UDINE MIL 1547,  
G 115/31,HQ., 3 A.G.R.A.

8 Aug 47

Attached are the instructions to the 5 Italian Territorial Command about Shooting Ranges.

They have been approved by GI, who have instructed us to co-ordinate with you before issue.

Will you please forward any comments soonest, so as not to delay issue to the Italians.

FD  
TK/ctd

*Thurman*  
Major,  
For Lt.-Colonel,  
G.S.

FILE  
DIARY ✓

4531

SUBJECT:- TRAINING.

5 British Liaison Unit,  
Tele:- 1553,  
G 115/130,

HQ., 5 Territorial Command.

6 Jul 47.

In order to conform with G.H.Q. policy, for training in the area controlled by Allied Military Government, the following rules approved by G.H.Q. are forwarded.

In parts of your Command not controlled by A.M.G. there are no restrictions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

1.

EAST of ROUTE 13.

- (i) No "Field Firing" exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, e.g. light machine-gun, sub-machine carbino, rifle and pistol, provided that these practices are carried out on properly constructed ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without gun.) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that tps do not enter ZONE "A" or approach to within 5 kms of the FRONTIER.

2.

WEST of ROUTE 13.

- (i) The PORDENONE Arty Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you may require. You are requested to give this HQ warning of your intention to use the ranges.  
It is possible that from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Arty Shooting (other than 6 pdr ATR) is permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory except on the PORDENONE Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms, mortars and 6 pdr ATR guns, may be carried out provided that suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of TAVISIO-GRONVIZZO - MARGHERA etc., should be avoided.  
It is not necessary to inform this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live ammunition. Should it be known that Allied Units are in the vicinity, it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (v) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night firing is not permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory.
- (vi) The Camp at OSOPPO is frequently occupied by British tps who carry out firing and other training from there.

ions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

1.

#### EAST OF ROUTE 13.

- (i) No "Field Firing" exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, C.C., light machine-gun, sub-machine carbine, rifle and pistol, provided that these practices are carried out on properly constructed ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without arms) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that tps do not enter ZONE "A" or approach to within 5 kms of the FRONTIER.

2.

#### WEST OF ROUTE 13.

- (i) The PORDENONE Arty Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you may require. You are requested to give this HQ warning of your intention to use the ranges.  
It is possible that from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Arty Shooting (other than 6 pdr ATR) is permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory except on the PORDENONE Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms, mortars and 6 pdr ATR guns, may be carried out provided that suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of TAVISIO-UNOVIZZO - MARGHERETO etc., should be avoided.
- (iv) It is not necessary to inform this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live arms.  
Should it be known that Allied Units are in the vicinity, it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (v) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night firing is not permitted in A.M.G. controlled territory.
- (vi) The Camp at OSOPPO is frequently occupied by British tps who carry out firing and other training from there.  
If you wish to train or shoot in this area, early contact should be made with the Unit in occupation.

4530

3.

#### WARNING OF INTENTION TO SHOOT.

- (i) So as to enable A.M.G. to give ample warning to Sindacco's; to give publicity in the Press and to warn Allied tps who may be training, will you please give this HQ the earliest possible notification of your wish to carry out "Field Firing" exercises?

.....2/.....

...../2.....

3. (ii) Your application should be received in this office 72 hrs before the shooting day.  
The following information is required:-  
(a) Date.  
(b) Times of Firing.  
(c) Unit.  
(d) Map References of Firing Point Areas.  
(e) Map References of Target Areas.  
(f) Weapons to be used.
- (iii) It is not sufficient to say, for example:-  
"Firing is to take place in the IL TIMAN Area between 1 - 25 August".
- (iv) In view of the different maps in use, it would be more satisfactory if a representative of the Formation or Unit concerned, called in at this HQ and explained the details of the exercises.

4.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.

You will appreciate that the Unit carrying out firing exercises will be responsible for taking all the necessary safety precautions.

FD  
AUG/68d

*[Signature]*  
Lt.-Colonel,  
G.S.

## COPIES TO:-

"G"(OPS)  
Tao, G.H.Q.  
-----

HQ., 3 A.G.R.A.  
-----

HQ., A.M.G.  
-----

4529

1172

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785020SUBJECT : Training.

130

G(Ops) Tac GHQ

7075/G

5 AUG 47

Tel DUINO Ext 10

Tel No 29844

5 BLU  
- - -

The att draft is approved.  
Please coordinate these instructions  
with 3 AGRA (Pd) before issuing them.

- 7 AUG 1947

IC/sa

| SECRETARY |            |
|-----------|------------|
| GSO I     |            |
| GSO II    | <i>Ar</i>  |
| DAA B     | <i>uen</i> |
| S. C. 1   |            |
| S. C. 2   |            |
| S. C. 3   |            |
| CHECK     |            |

*for* Brigadier,  
Chief of Staff. *may*

4528

D R A F T . - *for review*  
*by GHQ*

SUBJECT:- TRAINING.

5 British Liaison Unit,  
Tele:- 1553,  
G 115/ ,

29 Jul 47

HQ., 5 Territorial Command.

In order to conform with G.H.Q. policy, the following rules for training in the area controlled by Allied Military Government are fwd.  
In parts of your Command not controlled by A.M.G. there are no restrictions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

1.

EAST of ROUTE 13.

- (i) No "Field Firing" Exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, e.g. light machine gun, sub-machine gun, rifle ~~and~~ pistol, provided these practices are carried out on properly constructed ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without amm.) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that tps do not enter "A" or approach to within 5 kilometres of the FRONTIER.

2.

WEST of ROUTE 13.

- (i) The PORDENONE Arty Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you require. You are requested to give this HQ warning of your intention to use the ranges. *1/42*  
It is possible from time to time, the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Arty Shooting (other than 6 pdr ATR) is permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory except on the PORDENONE Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms, mortars and 6 pdr ATR guns, may be carried out provided suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of TREVISO - GORIZIA - UDINESE etc., should be avoided.
- (iv) It is not necessary to notify this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live amm. Should it be known that Allied units are in the vicinity, it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (v) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night firing *not* permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory.

In order to conform with G.H.Q. policy, the following rules for training in the area controlled by Allied Military Government are fwd. In parts of your Command not controlled by A.M.G., there are no restrictions in so far as the Allies are concerned.

1.

EAST OF ROUTE 13.

- (i) No "Field Firing" Exercises to be carried out.
- (ii) There is no objection to the firing of small arms, 0.3, light machine gun, sub-machine gun, rifle or pistol, provided these practices are carried out on properly controlled ranges and also provided that these ranges are at a reasonable distance from the FRONTIER.
- (iii) Minor tactical exercises (without amm.) up to Coy level, may be carried out provided that they do not enter "A" or approach to within 5 kilometres of the FRONTIER.

2.

WEST OF ROUTE 13.

- (i) The PODEMONTE Arty Ranges have been handed over to you for use, as and when you require. You are requested to give this HQ warning of your intention to use the ranges. <sup>1/427</sup> It is possible from time to time the Allies may require the use of these ranges, but it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulties in making satisfactory mutual arrangements.
- (ii) No Arty Shooting (other than 6 pdr ATR) is permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory except on the PODEMONTE Ranges.
- (iii) "Field Firing" exercises involving the use of small arms, mortars and 6 pdr ATR guns, may be carried out provided suitable localities are found. Areas in the vicinity of TAVILLO - OGVILO - ALFONSO etc., should be avoided. It is not necessary to notify this HQ of the intention to carry out training exercises by day which do not involve the use of live amm. Should it be known that Allied units are in the vicinity, it would be advisable to contact them so as to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.
- (v) Early notification should be given to this HQ of the intention to carry out night exercises. Night firing is not permitted in A.M.G. Controlled territory.
- (vi) The Camp at OSSO is frequently occupied by British troops who carry out firing and other training from there. If you wish to train or shoot in this area, early contact should be made with the Unit in occupation.

3.

WARNING OF INTENTION TO SHOOT.

- (i) So as to enable A.M.G. to give ample warning to Sindaco's; to give publicity in the press and to warn allied troops who may be training, will you please give this HQ the earliest possible notification of your wish to carry out "Field Firing" Exercises?

.....2/.....

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3.

(ii) Your application should be received in this office 72 hrs before the shooting day.

The following information is required:-

- (a) Date.
- (b) Times of Firing.
- (c) Unit.
- (d) Map References of Firing point Areas.
- (e) Map References of Target Areas.
- (f) Weapons to be used.

(iii) It is not sufficient to say, for example:-

"Firing is to take place in the IL TILAU Area between 1 - 25 August".

(iv) In view of the different maps in use, it would be more satisfactory if a representative of the Formation or Unit concerned, called in at this HQ and explained the details of the exercises.

4.

#### SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.

You will appreciate that the Unit carrying out firing exercises will be responsible for taking all the necessary safety precautions.

ED  
AGW/otd

*Actual*  
Lt.-Colonel,  
G.S.

FILE  
DIARY

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