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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394NSC/2441
21 May 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Flag Officer Northern Area, Mediterranean.
Subject: Private Photography in Ships and Establishments of
the Royal Italian Navy.

1. Upon receipt of FONAM letter No. 711-4 of 24 March, the Ministry of Marine was requested to furnish information concerning Italian Navy regulations on the subject of photography.

2. The following is a translation of the reply that has been received from the Ministry of Marine:

"The following regulations govern use of cameras aboard Royal Italian Navy Ships and in Naval Bases:-

- (a) Use of cameras strictly forbidden to all officers and personnel. Only exceptions are Official Naval Photographers appointed by the Ministry.
- (b) All officers and men have to report to their Commands that they are in possession of a camera; the latter take charge of same against receipts.
- (c) Naval Photographers can be of any rank; requests are forwarded to the Ministry and selection is based on technical capabilities. They have to carry special permits.
- (d) All pictures or films taken by Naval Photographers have to be developed at Press Office, this Ministry. No exceptions are allowed. Any contraventions are followed by confiscation of camera and permit, apart from disciplinary action.

Every Command has been ordered to impose strict observance of these regulations".

3. In view of the existence of the above quoted regulations, and the Ministry's assurance that every Italian Navy Command has been ordered to enforce them strictly, it is not considered necessary or practicable to prohibit the use of cameras altogether in Italian ships as suggested in paragraph 3 of FONAM letter No. 711-4.

IRN 8

Copy to:
CINC-MED.
TOTALI



(Sgd) G. L. WARREN

REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

1467

WWW
2

From: MINISTRY OF MARINE (Cabinet)
To : N.S.C. - Rome
Date: 16 May '45
Ref.: 293/CO


Subject: Photography Security Measures.

- Royal Italian Navy*
1. Your NSC/2024 of 4th ulto. refers.
 2. "The following regulations govern use of cameras aboard I.R.N. Ships and in Naval Bases :-
 - (a) Use of cameras strictly forbidden to all Officers and personnel. Only exceptions are Official Naval Photographers appointed by the Ministry.
 - b) All Officers and men have to report to their Commands that they are in possession of a camera; the latter take charge of same against receipts.
 - c) Naval Photographers can be of any rank; requests are forwarded to the Ministry and selection is based on technical capabilities. They have to carry special permits.
 - d) All pictures or films taken by Naval Photographers have to be developed at Press Office, this Ministry. No exceptions are allowed. Any contraventions are followed by confiscation of camera and permit, apart from disciplinary action.
 3. Every Command has been ordered to impose strict observance of these regulations."

CHIEF OF CABINET

1466

DG/P.



Ministero della Marina

GABINETTO

INDIRIZZO TELEGRAFICO: MARINA - ROMA

Roma, 15 Maggio 1945

Al NAVY SUB-COMMISSION
HEADQUARTERS, A.C.

Prot. No. 298/CC Allegati

ARGOMENTO: Misure di sicurezza per riprese fotografiche.

- 1°) - Riferimento al foglio NSC/2024 del 4 aprile.
- 2°) - Le seguenti norme regolano l'uso delle macchine fotografiche che a bordo delle R.N.N. e nell'interno degli Stabilimenti Militari e delle Piazzeforti Marittime:
- a) - L'uso delle macchine fotografiche è severamente proibito a bordo delle R.N.N. o nell'interno degli Stabilimenti Militari e Piazzeforti Marittime. La presente disposizione è valida per tutti gli Ufficiali e per i militari di qualsiasi specialità e grado. Fanno eccezione i soli "fotografi navali" espressamente designati dal Ministero.

b) - Tutti coloro, Ufficiali, Sottufficiali e militari del C.R.E.M., che sono in possesso di macchine fotografiche debbono farne denuncia ai Comandi da cui dipendono. I Comandi provvederanno al ritiro e alla custodia di tali macchine rilasciando al proprietario regolare ricevuta.

c) - I fotografi navali sono scelti tra gli Ufficiali e i militari di qualsiasi grado che ne facciano richiesta al Ministero e che diano particolare affidamento per capacità tecnica. Detti fotografi sono muniti di apposita tessera con fotografia e timbro a secco rilasciata dal Ministero. (Ufficio Stampa).

d) - Tutte le pellicole e le lastre impressionate dai fotografi navali devono essere inviate per lo sviluppo e la stampa al Ministero (Ufficio Stampa). Nessuna deroga per nessun motivo è consentita a questa disposizione. Eventuali infrazioni porteranno al sequestro della macchina e al ritiro a titolo definitivo della tessera, senza pregiudizio

1465

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1/65

...

30) - Un richiamo è stato fatto ai singoli Comandi affinché sorvegliano attentamente che le norme di cui sopra abbiano stretta osservanza.

IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
C. di P. T. BASLINI

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/2372
7 May 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Ministry of Marine - ROME.

Subject: Photography - Security Measures for.

1. An early reply to Navy Sub-Commission letter NSC/2024 dated 4th April 1945, would be appreciated.

H. ST. J. BUTLER
Captain, U. S. Navy,
for

REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.



9 MAY 1945

1464

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

NSC/2024
4 April 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Ministry of Marine - ROME.
Subject: Photography - Security Measures for.

1. A report has been received indicating that security measures are being violated by Italian Navy personnel on board ships and at shore stations by taking photographs of military equipment.
2. It is assumed that restrictions are in force in the Italian Navy prohibiting the use of cameras on board ships and at naval stations and depots. In addition, regulations should be in effect governing the developing, printing and censorship of photographs taken by Italian Navy personnel.
3. Information is requested concerning the orders which are in effect for the Italian Navy governing the use of cameras, in order that appropriate action may be taken, if necessary, to insure that security measures are not violated.

(Sgd) G. L. WARDEN
REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

Copy to:
CINC-MED
FOTALI
FONAM

(FONAM confi ltr F 711-4
of 24 Mar 1945, refers)



7 APR 1945

1463

B

● PHOTOGRAPHIC NEGATIVES ●

CONFISCATED BY CENSORSHIP

OWNER

MARTINI CARLO

ADDRESS

ITALIAN ROYAL NAVY

No. OF NEGATIVES

26

REG. No.

N/K 11215

DATE

1/1/50 OFFICER SECL

REMARKS

Shipping

18/19/1462

AREA

For the attention of Lt. Bureau N.A.V.R.

F.B.O. Western Italy

PSSN 873 3M 6-44

From Staff Officer Security
Naples Area
Date 20th March 1945
To Captain Hector Munro
7 Base Censor Unit C.I.F.

26 negatives registered number K/K11215
property of Martini Carlo Royal Italian
Navy have been confiscated for Security
Reasons.

Signed I. S. B. GROSSE
LIEUTENANT R.N.V.R.

Staff Officer Security,
Naples Area

1461

CONFIDENTIAL.Office of Flag Officer,
Northern Area,
Mediterranean.

at NAPLES. 24th March, 1945.

No. RONAM. 711-4.


FLAG OFFICER LIAISON ITALY - ROME.

(Copies to :- Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Station.
Flag Officer Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison Italy.)PRIVATE PHOTOGRAPHY IN SHIPS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
OF THE ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY.

The enclosed report which was sent to the Security Officer on my staff is forwarded for information.

2. In view of the remarks contained in paragraph 3, it is requested that the matter may be referred to the Ministry of Marine in order that this practice which constitutes a serious breach of security may cease.

3. It is for consideration whether an order prohibiting the use of cameras at all in Italian ships should not be requested.



L. Hammersley Martin

FOR REAR ADMIRAL

Enclosure.

Copy of Report No. 630/4810 dated 9th March, 1945.

2 Envelopes of negatives.

FORWARDED TO: [illegible] DATE ACTION.

1460
24 REAR ADMIRAL

Subject: Censorship, Photography -
Contraventions.

No. 7 Base Censor Group,
C.M.F.

GBC/4810.

Lieut. Grossa, R.N.V.R.,
F.B.S.O.,
Western Italy.

1. On 6 Mar 45 the enclosed 2 rolls of film were handed into Messrs Kodak's shop by a member of the Italian Navy for processing.
2. The films have been developed, and, in view of the subjects portrayed, they are forwarded to you for decision and disposal.
3. It is considered expedient to inform you that many such films are being handed into civilian photographic shops by members of the Italian Navy who may not realise that the handing in of films for processing of such a character is always a potential threat to Allied Security.
4. The negatives are forwarded to you for such action as you think necessary to prevent the continuance of this practice.

9 Mar 45.

(Signed) A. HECTOR MURO, Capt.,
Chief Photographic Censor,
for Chief Base Censor.

Flag officer Liaison ItalyTO WHOM IT MAY CONCERNJANUARY 1945.

The following Naval Unit has now established permanent Headquarters in Rome as follows : -

ADVANCED NAVAL INTELLIGENCE UNITS, MEDITERRANEAN
59, Via Sicilia (2nd floor),
R O M E .

	ROOM	TELEPHONE
Officer in Charge and 2nd Officer	64	478516
Joint Planning (British and U.S.)	35	471337
Italian Liaison Officers	44	478265
Secretaries	64A	478545
Information	59	478445 Ext. 95
Officers quarters, 11 Passeggiata di Ripetta		33916

1459

SECRET

AP 621 RHF/gem

• • • • •

: S E C R E T

:Auth: SAC, MT

Initials: *h*

10 Januar 1945

10 January 1945

TO : President, Allied Commission. — (2)(4-3)

2. Requests for personnel to be used for Secret Intelligence or Morale Operations may be made by the 2677th Regiment, Office of Strategic Services, (Provisional) and the Inter Services Liaison Detachment (British) directly to the Italian Governmental Agency or Department concerned.

By command of Field Marshal ALEXANDER:

2 - Addressee

3 - G-2

1 - G-3

1 - IS & PS

1 - US POLAD

1 - Mr Reslin

2 - AG Records

1 - AG M&D

HEADQUARTERS

14 JAN 1945

Jack Carter
JACK CARTER,
Captain, AGN,
Asst Adjutant General.

AC Dist

NAVY SC.

LAND FORCES SC

AIR FORCES SC

IR 119

SECRET 58

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INFORMATION DIVISION

SUBJECT: Extract Civil Censorship Report

2193/INFO

24 May 1944

TO : Navy Sub-Commission

1. The attached information was extracted from reports sent to the Information Division, A.C.C., by Civil Censorship Reports.

~~✗~~
JOHN V. HINKEL
Major, M.I.
Director,
Information Division

1457

SECRET

FROM : LEO Francesco, Serg. SDT
I Battaglione, III Compagnia
II Plotone, Caldas De Malavella
Spain, Maridiport, Taranto

TO: LEO, Antonio, Signor
S. Agata di Puglia
Prov. Foggia, Italia

ITALIAN NAVAL INTERNEES WELL TREATED IN SPAIN: 1000 COMFORTABLY
LODGED IN CALDAS DE MALAVELLA HOTELS SAYS "VIVALDI" SURVIVOR.

In letter to his parents writer states:

"As I informed you in my last letter, I am in better conditions here than I was in Cartagena, where I had to spend about 4 months after my a rival in Spain. There we were in quarters together with the Spaniards, while here we live in hotels, with the best of accommodations, and lead a free life. The food is good in both quality and quantity. Here, in this town, there are about 1000 Italian internees, the whole group from the Royal Navy, most of us survivors. We have been divided in groups, each group has a magnificent hotel. In my hotel we are 50 sailors; all of us from the sunken destroyer "Vivaldi".

Writer also encloses a letter for a friend to be sent by addressee to Dear ones in Ortona, at present out of bounds for civilian mail.

1456

RECEIVED
MAY 28 1944
ALLIED COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SECRET

SECRET

CSDIC (East) CME

Report No
CSDIC, CME (East) / 4/15.
9 Nov 44.

Interrogation Report on German survivors of:

TA 20 - AUDACE.
UJ 202 - AILFOMENE.
UJ 208 - SPINGLERDA.

RECEIVED BY INFO DIV AGC

Date 14/11 Time 1630

File Submarine / info

Sources: Ex 971 - Ex 980.

Place of Interrogation: 300 Mob Unit, CSDIC.

1. PREAMBLE.

This report contains the consolidated information obtained from the survivors of the above ships, sunk by UHS "HEATLAND and "AVONVALE" off PAG on 1 Nov 44.

The information has been crosschecked and can be taken as fairly reliable.

2. ACCOUNT OF ACTION.a) UJ 202 and 208.

Left FIUME at approx 1600 hrs on 1 Nov 44. At about 2030 hrs, approx half an hour before they were engaged, the presence of British craft was picked up by the RADAR with which both

UJ's were equipped.

On being engaged by the British destroyers both vessels received immediately direct hits. The ships soon began to list and sank so rapidly that no boats or rafts could be lowered.

Survivors: 202 - 22 ratings.

208 - 13 "

b) TA 20 - "AUDACE".

On the 1 Nov, at 1815 hrs, TA 20 left FIUME. At approx 2230 hrs presence of enemy naval craft was detected, star-shells went up from enemy craft, which were thereupon identified as British destroyers and a naval engagement ensued. Within a few minutes the TA 20 received direct hits. Ship was sinking rapidly and order to abandon ship was given by the captain, who was wounded and went down with it. The few remaining survivors took to the water and were picked up by a British destroyer.

The WT operator attempted to transmit a message in clear to his control station at FIUME in order to inform them of the action. Before he could complete the message, a shell splinter hit the transmitter and put it out of action. The message was sent on a frequency of approx 3550 kc's on a 40 watt transmitter. WT operator considers it unlikely that the message was picked up at FIUME, as the set probably failed after the first hit on the ship. They have

The part of the message which got through was:-

"Feindlicher Ueberfall, Bo....." (Enemy attack, Bo.....)

Survivors: TA 20 - 36 (incl 3 officers) three have died since.

3. DESTINATION.

1. PREAMBLE.

This report contains the consolidated information obtained from the survivors of the above ships, sunk by IIS "WREATHLAND" and "AVONVALE" off PAC on 1 Nov 44.

The information has been crosschecked and can be taken as fairly reliable.

2. ACCOUNT OF ACTION.a) UJ 202 and 208.

Left FIUME at approx 1600 hrs on 1 Nov 44. At about 2030 hrs, approx half an hour before they were engaged, the presence of British craft was picked up by the RADAR with which both

UJ's were equipped.

On being engaged by the British destroyers both vessels received immediately direct hits. The ships soon began to list and sank so rapidly that no boats or rafts could be lowered.

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3. DESTINATION.

The three ships were sailing towards ZAR, presumably to pick up a convoy, but no definite destination was known to any of the crews.

4. UJ 202 - "HELPOLEIS" and UJ 208 - SPINARDA.*H(a)* History.

These two ships belonged to the II Jagd Flotilla and were sister ships.

UJ 202 was built at MONTEALCANT, the first trial run was made end May, early Jun '44.

UJ 208 was built by the BREDA shipyards at VENICE and completed her trial runs in Jun/Jul '44.

Sullivan
Wemy

SECRET

- 2 - Report No CSDIC, CMT (East) / M/15.

Both were at first based on TRIESTE but were transferred to FIUME on about 10 Oct 44.

b) Movements. Their main employment consisted of reconnaissance patrols against submarines and MTBs as well as escort duties. They nearly always operated together in the Northern Adriatic and never went further SOUTH than ZARA.

Whilst based on TRIESTE they made two runs to VENICE and one to POLA. On the latter, they were engaged in searching for Croatian manned E-boats which had lost themselves in a storm.

Since their base had been transferred to FIUME on about 10 Oct 44 they left the port for patrol and escort duties practically every night. The biggest convoy they ever escorted was on about 17/18 Oct 44 when 202, 208, TA 20, TA 24, KT 6 and several ferries and landing boats formed a convoy from ZARA to FIUME.

On 22/23 Oct 44, 202 and 208 encountered British MTBs on the way to ZARA. There seems to be some confusion as to the actual outcome of the engagement which took place. German ferries (Fährprähm) had left ZARA ahead of schedule and when they appeared, with British MTBs in the vicinity, the German commanders of 202 and 208 mistook them for a Partisan convoy and sank several of their own vessels. (Note: The exact number of boats sunk cannot be ascertained. An official German newspaper report (see translation App A) announced the sinking of some 6 British MTBs and LCG boats, which was also announced by the commander of 208 without mentioning the sinking of their own ferries and landing boats).

On their return journey in the morning they encountered two British MTBs and claim to have sunk one (sic). (Ed. Note: Brit craft suffered NO losses).

Beginning of Oct they left TRIESTE to bombard a Partisan held island between ZARA and POLA. Also on the 30/31 Oct 44, they left FIUME to bombard two Partisan held islands between ZARA and FIUME for about 30 minutes with their 10 cm guns.

c) Constructional details.

Length	: 60 m.
Beam	: 6-7 m.
Draft	: 2-8 m.
Tonnage	: 650 tons.
Complement	: 120
Speed - max.	: 22 knots.

a) Armament.

(i) UJ 202.

1 x 10 (or 10.2) cm gun.
2 x 2 cm "vierlings".
3 x 2 cm twin guns.
2 x 2 cm guns.
3 x 3.7 cm guns.
1 x 8.8 cm.
Depth charge installation.
2 Rocket projectors ("Raketenwerfer").

(ii) UJ 208.

Same armament as 202, but had only 1 x 2 cm twin gun and in addition 2 x 2 cm guns, but no Rocket projectors.

1454

On the latter, they were engaged in a storm.

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2 Rocket projectors ("Raketenswerfer").

(ii) UJ 208.

Same armament as 202, but had only 1 x 2 cm twin gun and in addition 2 x 2 cm guns, but no Rocket projectors. **1454**

In both cases, the following guns had armour protection:

10 cm gun	: 4 mm armour plate.
2 of the 2 cm guns:	" " " "
"Vierlinge"	: 8 mm " "

It was intended that the two boats were to return to the shipyards at TRIESTE after their last trip to ZARA, when they were sunk and 208 was supposed to receive the same armament as 202. Both boats were also to receive complete armour plate protection for all guns as at the time of their leaving the shipyard the plates were not available.

Sources state that the 3.7 cm guns had no proper sights. None

SECRET

- 3 -

Report No OSDIC, CMF(East)/4/15.

of the guns was controlled by RADAR. They only received approximate direction from the bridge.

e) Speed. The average speed was 15 knots. The maximum speed was 20 knots.

f) Reinforcements. On the 26 Oct 44, twenty six men were posted as reinforcements and replacements, most of whom went aboard the 202.

g) Routine. On ordinary runs the crew, except for the technical personnel, were divided in two watches, known as "halbe Kriegswache". The watches were 4 hours on 4 hours off and were changed at 0800, 1200, 1600 hrs etc. Then there was any danger of British boats, "volle Kriegswache" was ordered and both watches were at their stations. The technical personnel changed every six hours.

h) General. All Sources agree that there are now NO further UJ boats in the ADRIATIC.

They also understand that the UJ 201 (EGIRIA) 205 and 206 were sunk before 202 and 208 operated.

A rumour has it that UJ AGENIA (number unknown) was captured by British forces off ZARA early '44.

5. TA 20 - "AUDACE".

a) History. Built at GLASGOW in 1915 was later handed over to the Italian Navy. In Nov '43 she was refitting in TRIESTE and was slightly altered.

She was taken over from the Italians during Aug '43.

b) Movements.

Feb '44 TRIESTE - VENICE (escorting minelayers).

Mar '44 Trips DALMATIAN coast to SIBENIK.

Apr/Jun '44 Dock in FIUME, bridge altered.

Mid " " Trip to ZARA and TROGIR.

End " " TRIESTE, general repairs.

Mid Aug '44 FIUME - TRIESTE (escorting minelayers).

Beginning Oct '44 TRIESTE - FIUME.

18 " " FIUME - ZARA, recon trip.

19 " " FIUME - ZARA; escorting convoy (See Movements of

UJ 202 and 208, para 4 b).)

Approx 22 " " ZARA - FIUME.

25 " " FIUME - ZARA.

1 Nov '44 FIUME towards ZARA, when action took place.

c) Armament.

2 x 10.2 cm guns.

1 "Vierling" 2 cm.

1 Twin 2 cm.

1 x 3.7 gun.

6 Single 2 cm (Oerlikons).

2 Rocket projectors.

NO torpedo tubes.

g) Routine. On ordinary runs the crew, except for the technical personnel, were divided in two watches, known as "Halbe Kriegswache". The watches were 4 hours on 4 hours off and were changed at 0800, 1200, 1600 hrs etc. Then there was any danger of British boats, "volle Kriegswache" was ordered and both watches were at their stations. The technical personnel changed every six hours.

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2 Rocket projectors.

NO torpedo tubes.

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6. OTHER GERMAN NAVAL SHIPS in ADRIATIC.

a) TA 21 - "INSIDIOSO" (also known as WILDFANG). In old Austrian boat built in 1914.

Approx tonnage 1000 tons.

Armament same as TA 20 "AUDACE" but her speed is slightly higher, about 25 knots.

On 1 Nov 44 in FIUME with engine trouble.

b) TA 44 - "A. PICARETTI". Approx tonnage 1600 tons. Speed and armament is NOT known, but believed to have 3 gun turrets with twin guns probably larger calibre than "AUDACE".

/4...

S E C R E T

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On 1 Nov 44 in FIUME in seaworthy condition.

c) TA 45 ("SPICA ?"). A new Italian destroyer, first commissioned in Dec '43 at TRIESTE. Last seen in VENICE in Sep '44 - seaworthy.

d) TA 48 (ex T 3). An old Yugoslav TB, with a complete complement of CREWTS. One German LO on board.

The boat is considered very unreliable and has never been in action, usually "develops engine trouble when nearing danger zone".

Armament: 1 x 7.5 cm gun.

1 x 3.7 " "

1 "Vierling" 2 cm gun.

2 (or 3) x 2 cm guns.

Speed approx 20 knots.

Tonnage 350-400 tons.

Crew approx 70 men.

e) TA 52. One Source believes that this ship was torpedoed off ZARA beginning of Oct '44.

f) Minelayers "TASANA" and "TAIB III". Sources state that "TAIB III" is also known as "KIEBITZ".

"TASANA" has been usually in dock at TRIESTE with engine trouble and in Oct '44 was in the SAN ROCCO shipyards (TRIESTE) to have new engines fitted.

Lines have been layed recently by both vessels but NO information could be obtained as to location of minefields.

g) KT 6. This vessel has been very active lately in evacuating troops from ZARA. She was present in the convoy which had an encounter with British LTB (see para 4 b).)

Her armament is believed to be:-

1 x 2 cm Vierling.

2 (or 3) x 3.7 cm guns.

1 x 7.5 gun (Not sure of calibre) mounted forehead.

Sources heard of another KT ship (KT 3 or 4) in the Adriatic but have never seen her.

h) Submarines. Sources are unable to give any information about s/m or midget s/m and doubt if there are any left in the Adriatic.

i) Siebel Ferries. On 20 Oct 44 three or more Siebel Ferries were seen in SUSAK.

Nothing is known to Sources about Siebel Ferries being dismantled in FIUME.

During Aug '44 some were being assembled at TRIESTE, the parts having arrived from GENOA.

j) E-boats. On 1 Nov 44 there were 6 to 8 Croatian manned E-boats at FIUME.

The boat is considered very unreliable and has never been in action, usually "develops engine trouble when nearing danger zone".

Armament: 1 x 7.5 cm gun,
1 x 3.7 "
1 "Vierling" 2 cm gun,
2 (or 3) x 2 cm guns.

Speed approx 20 knots.
Tonnage 350-400 tons.
Crew approx 70 men.

e) TA 32. One Source believes that this ship was torpedoed off ZARA beginning of Oct '44.

f) Minelayers "PASANA" and "RAIB III". Sources state that "RAIB III" is also known as "KIEBITZ".

"PASANA" has been usually in dock at TRIESTE with engine trouble and in Oct '44 was in the SAN ROCCO shipyards (TRIESTE) to have new engines fitted.

Engines have been layed recently by both vessels but NO information could be obtained as to location of minefields.

g) KT 6. This vessel has been very active lately in evacuating tons from ZARA. She was present in the convoy which had an encounter with British MTB (see para 4 b).)

Her armament is believed to be:-

1 x 2 cm Vierling,
2 (or 3) x 3.7 cm guns.
1 x 7.5 cm (Not sure of calibre) mounted forehead.
Sources heard of another KT ship (KT 3 or 4) in the Adriatic but have never seen her.

h) Submarines. Sources are unable to give any information about s/n or sidget s/n and doubt if there are any left in the Adriatic.

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During Aug '44 some were being assembled at TRIESTE, the parts having arrived from GENOA.

j) E-boats. On 1 Nov 44 there were 6 to 8 Croatian manned E-boats at FIUME.

k) Battleship "ILIPERO". NO information available, nor could an explanation be obtained regarding the move to CAPDISTRIA bay. 452

some time back.

One Source claims that in Sep '44 the "CANOUR" was moved from the S. MARCO shipyards to the bay and returned after some days. He claims to have seen the name distinctly.

7. CROATIAN and ITALIAN CREWS.

A number of Sources agreed that the 6-8 E-boats in FIUME were still manned by Croatian personnel. They are NOT however considered trustworthy by the Germans and only left the harbour once during the last fortnight of

SECRET

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Report No OSDIC, CMF(East)/M/15.

Oct '44. Generally however both Croatian and Italian crews are mainly used in guarding shore establishments and vessels in harbour. Sometimes, they were also used to check Partisan activities.

8. WHITEHEAD TORPEDO WORKS (FIUME).

These works are completely destroyed and NO production has taken place since at least Apr '44. Sources heard that production had actually ceased mid '43.

9. PERSONALITIES.

(i) II Flotilla - 1 Escort Squadron.
Korv. Kap. THORWEST, believed killed in action on 1 Nov '44
aboard "AUDACE" (TA 20).

Adjt Lt. PAULSEN.

TA 20.
CO

GURKE, believed killed in action on board "AUDACE".
NAIROT - wounded, PW.
SCHROCKENBERG.

(ii) II Pursuit Flotilla (Jagdflottille).
OC III Jagdflottille
OC 202
1st Officer UJ 202
OC 206
1st Officer UJ 208
2nd Officer UJ 208

Ka.	Lt.	VOLLMEIER.	} Believed killed in action.
Lt.		TRAUTWEIN.	
Lt.		PATZKE.	
Lt.		WENKE.	
2/Lt.		DRESSLER.	
Lt.		ECKERS.	

/HM

P.K./S.B./A.H.

Greenham Capt
C.R. Waddell,
Capt.
Officer i/c OSDIC
(East), C.M.F.

Distribution as attached.

Translation of German communiqué in "DEUTSCHE ADRIAZEITUNG".

SUCCESSFUL SUB-MARINE CHASERS

BERLIN.

According to a report from ZARA, British seamen confirmed the German communiqué concerning the great defeat of British MTB's ("Schnellboote") near the Dalmatian Islands, where, in the early hours of the morning of the 23 Oct 44, in several engagements 4 ICG's (Artillerie-schnellboote) and 2 MTB's (Torpedoschnellboote) were sunk, two more MTB's probably sunk, two badly damaged and one more left burning.

The engagements which took place NW from ZARA, off the island HAN, started on the 22 Oct shortly before 10 p.m. On this occasion, one of the four attacking enemy boats was probably sunk. After a short break, the British received reinforcements and renewed the attack. This engagement, in which only two German submarine chasers took part, required from those two German boats a first class fire control as the enemy formation attacked from all sides. One of the German submarines succeeded to sink one ICG and one MTB and heavily damaged two chasers. The other submarine chaser sunk two ICG's and set on fire one more. Our own casualties amounted to 3 killed, 14 wounded, whilst our ships suffered superficial damage from gun fire. Next morning, shortly before 7 o'clock, another naval engagement took place in the same area in which another MTB was sunk after having fired its torpedoes without success. In this engagement our two submarine chasers suffered no losses.

The same evening, a German "Kampffahnenflottille" (LCI-Flotilla) encountered several British MTB (Schnellboote) in the vicinity of the Dalmatian islands. One of the British boats was annihilated by a direct hit from a 8.8 cm gun and others suffered many direct hits on their withdrawal. One of the German ferries suffered some damage and had to be beached a few hours later. The cargo was, however, salvaged. Our losses amounted to 4 killed and a few wounded.

According to statements by members of the crews which took part in the above actions, the majority of the crews of the sunk British boats lost their lives.

(Editors comment: British craft suffered NO losses in these engagements).

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C-2 (Intelligence Objectives sub-section) AFHQ
c/o Rome Allied Area Command
APO 79, U.S. Army

16 October, 1944

Intelligence Report B-80

Torpedoes--Industrial Organization in

in GERMANY and RUSSIA.

SOURCE: From S.I.S. Regia Marina, Rome,
through S. O. (I), Rome.

4. Germany.

The following information was obtained from the report of Engineer G. POISSON's visit to GERMANY, from February, 1942, December, 1942, January, 1943:

1. In GERMANY there are no torpedo factories constructing the complete job. The need for producing large quantities of torpedoes in a short time has decided the GERMANY Navy to reorganise the system thus:-
2. The production of torpedoes is determined at KILNROD, Kiel (the Central torpedo works), where tests and research are carried out.
3. The separate parts usually arrive in large quantities from the specializing workshops, which are scattered throughout the Reich.
4. Each workshop receives rough casts from the foundry, and finishes them according to specifications.
5. The separate parts are sent to the main assembly works at KILNROD (compressed-air torpedoes) and at COHLFELDEN, Dantsig - (torpedoes - compressed air and electrical).
6. The organization of KILNROD comprises a Research Bureau and a Commercial and Organising Bureau.
7. There are also three assembly shops where all parts are tested; attached to them are two torpedo testing ranges. About 6000 workers are employed, producing some 600 torpedoes a month.
8. The electrical method of recording the velocity and propeller speed of the torpedoes on the torpedo testing range operates on a system installed by Siemens: hydrophones planted 1000 metres apart. The speed of the torpedo can be followed by indications on a luminous dial.
9. Moreover, it is possible to listen to the motor by telephonic means making it easy to recover a sunken torpedo or one going off its course.
10. In view of the need for maintaining these efforts, GERMANY in 1943 froze supplies of copper, nickel, tin, to the extent of 80 percent.
11. The chrome-nickel steel alloy for the bodies was originally made of manganese-silicate steel.

1448

SOURCE: From S.I.B. Regia Marina, Rome, through S. O. (I), Rome.

4. Germany.

The following information was obtained from the report of Engineer ROBERT S. visit to GERMANY, from February, 1942, December, 1942, January, 1943;

1. In GERMANY there are no torpedo factories constructing the complete job. The need for producing large quantities of torpedoes in a short time has decided the GERMAN Navy to reorganise the system thus:-
2. The production of torpedoes is determined at ERLENFELD, Kiel (the Central torpedo works), where tests and research are carried out.
3. The separate parts usually arrive in large quantities from the specialising workshops, which are scattered throughout the Reich.
4. Each workshop receives rough casts from the foundry, and finishes them according to specifications.
5. The separate parts are sent to the main assembly works at ERLENFELD (compressed-air torpedoes) and at GOETTERWERK, Danzig - (torpedoes - compressed air and electrical).
6. The organization of ERLENFELD comprises a Research Bureau and a Commercial and Organising Bureau.
7. There are also three assembly shops where all parts are tested; attached to them are two torpedo testing ranges. About 6000 workers are employed, producing some 600 torpedoes a month.
8. The electrical method of recording the velocity and propeller speed of the torpedoes on the torpedo testing range operates on a system installed by Siemens: hydrophones planted 1000 metres apart. The speed of the torpedo can be followed by indications on a luminous dial.
9. Moreover, it is possible to listen to the motor by telephonic means making it easy to recover a sunken torpedo on one going off its course.
10. In view of the need for maintaining these efforts, GERMANY in 1943 froze supplies of copper, nickel, tin, to the extent of 80 percent.
11. The chrome-nickel steel alloy for the bodies was originally made of manganese-silicate steel.
12. All gears are constructed NOT of bronze, but of steel.
13. Almost all the welding is electrical or oxyacetylene.

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14. The scarcer metal alloys are used only for the steering gear, the frames for the hydrostatic apparatus, and a few other details.
15. Also the main shaft of the motor is made of fused bronze and steel; many parts are made of rustless steel, normally in chrome. Only in exceptional cases is chrome-nickel used. Galvanizing is largely used to prevent rust.

B. FIUM

"Hitler's" Torpedoes - Activity since the Armistice

1. On the 15 September, 1943, the factory was occupied by GERMANY troops, who ordered the resumption of all work. At the end of November work proceeded with difficulty by cutting off the FIUM - TRIESTE railway line.
2. As from the end of November work was slightly stimulated by an initial payment of 3,000,000 (M? Lire?) on the orders of the German Government. Work was undertaken on 400 jobs ready for testing.
3. A second payment of 5 or 6 millions was then made on GERMANY orders.
4. After the first bombing of FIUM (February, 1944) work on torpedoes was greatly reduced.
5. After the second bombardment (March, 1944) work was almost suspended.
6. At this period the machine tools were removed from FIUM: partly to GERMANY, and partly to the region of TRIESTE.

M. H. d. Capt
for A. J. COVENSURE
Major, D.S.,
C-2 (I.O.S.S.) AFHQ.

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"Hitchcock" Torpedo - Activity since the Armistice

1. On the 15 September, 1943, the factory was occupied by GERMAN troops, who ordered the resumption of all work. At the end of November work proceeded with difficulty by cutting off the FUESS - FRIEDL Railway line.
2. As from the end of November work was slightly stimulated by an initial payment of 3,000,000 (RM? lire?) on the orders of the German Government. Work was undertaken on 400 jobs ready for testing.
3. A second payment of 5 or 6 millions was then made on GERMAN orders. After the first bombing of FUESS (February, 1944?) work on torpedoes was greatly reduced.
4. After the second bombardment (March, 1944?) work was almost suspended.
5. At this period the machine tools were removed from FUESS: partly to GERMAN, and partly to the region of FRIEDL.

for M. J. COVENTRY
Major, C.S.S.
G-2 (I.C. 3-3) AFHQ.

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OSD/CIT

OSD/CIT/SIN/OD 25

Copy No: 42

This report contains information on the production of torpedoes in GERMANY and on the WILHELMSDORF torpedo factory at ITZHOE.

Translation of extracts from detailed interrogation by SIN/OSD/CIT of an Italian engineer.

SOURCE No 340 SIN Ref 26 OD

A. PRELIMINARY

Source 340, is a civil and hydraulic engineer who was employed as Asst Manager at the WILHELMSDORF Torpedo Factory in ITZHOE. He paid business visits to GERMANY in Feb and Dec 42 and Jan 43. He is an intelligent man and his statements appear to be reliable.

B. PRODUCTION OF TORPEDOS IN GERMANY

1. Organisation

GERMANY has NO specialised torpedo factories such as exist in ITALY, where each torpedo factory produces its own types down to the last detail. The necessity of producing large quantities of torpedoes as quickly as possible has induced the German Navy to adopt the following system:-

- (a) Projects are studied and specimen torpedoes tested at the torpedo experimental stn at BOERNEFORD.
- (b) When the prototype has been approved, production in series begins, a large number of factories being employed, each producing some part or assembled group of parts (e.g. air flasks, bodies, engines, gyros, etc.). The raw materials for these parts are supplied to the factories by foundries. These specialised factories, which are of vital importance and often only produce one part, are scattered all over GERMANY.
- (c) On completion the parts or groups of parts are sent to the torpedo stns, the chief of which are BOERNEFORD and GUNDE, where the torpedoes are finally assembled.

2. Experimental Station at BOERNEFORD

This consists of a research dept, a commercial and admin dept, assembly shops, wkps for testing the various instruments (hydrostats, engines, gyros, etc.), and two experimental launching stns, one on the EAST and one on the WEST side of the bay. The entire personnel comprises about six thousand workers and six hundred torpedoes are tested every month, with the exception of two months in the winter when there is ice in the bay.

A. PREAMBLE

Source 340, is a civil and hydraulic engineer who was employed as Asst Manager at the WITTHEAD Torpedo Factory in FUME. He paid business visits to GERMANY in Feb and Dec 42 and Jan 43. He is an intelligent man and his statements appear to be reliable.

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- (a) Projects are studied and specimen torpedoes tested at the torpedo experimental stn at ECKERNFORDE.
- (b) When the prototype has been approved, production in series begins, a large number of factories being employed, each producing some part or assembled group of parts (e.g. air flasks, bodies, engines, gyros, etc.). The raw materials for these parts are supplied to the factories by foundries. These specialised factories, which are of vital importance and often only produce one part, are scattered all over GERMANY.
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Points of interest are:-

- (a) The electro-acoustic system of signalling the course and speed of torpedoes during tests in the bay. This is a SIEMENS installation and consists of hydrophones placed on the sea-bottom at various points along the course - 1000, 2000, 3000 m etc. The hydrophones are connected with a central mechanism which automatically determines the posn of the torpedo, whose course can be followed on an illuminated board. With this apparatus it is also possible to check the running of the engine by using headphones. Thanks to this system, torpedoes which sink or get off their course can easily be located.
- (b) The final testing of hydrostats and gyros. For testing purposes these are mounted in torpedoes on special oscillating testing benches, their sensitiveness being determined by the oscillations of the rudders and hydroplanes.

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- 2 -

Taken as a whole Source considered that the individual component parts of torpedoes are less accurately manufactured than is the case in ITALY, while the German engines are less powerful and more delicate. Judging from the test launches he saw, Source thinks that the Italian torpedo is definitely superior to the German.

3. Factories producing parts for torpedoes

Source visited the following factories, but is unfortunately unable to give the names:-

- (a) BERLIN - A small factory making supports for gyros. It employs about fifty men and is very well equipped, specialising in the production of this one part, of which it produces about twenty a day.
- (b) FRANKFURT a.M. ODER - Factory for the production of the rear portions of torpedoes, heads, sleeves and one or two other minor parts. It employs about 2,000 workers and is being enlarged.
- (c) KIEL - Large factory for the production of compressed-air flasks, bodies and other parts. Engines are also tested here.

There are other factories at GDINIA, which Source did NOT visit, where both electric and compressed-air torpedoes are tested.

4. Materials

GERMANY has been making great efforts to substitute materials of German production for the metals hitherto used in the manufacture of torpedoes and Source states that by 1943 a saving of 80% in the use of copper, nickel and steel for such purposes had been effected. Instead of nickel-chrome steel for compressed-air flasks, chromosilicate steel was first used and subsequently manganese-silicate steel. Sleeves are made of steel instead of bronze and almost all plating was substituted by electric or oxy-acetylene welding. The only parts still made of the rarer metals were the gyro casing with certain accessories and the hydrostat supports. Engine gear cases, previously made of cast bronze, are now of cast steel, and many other parts are made of stainless steel, normally of chrome steel and only rarely of chrome nickel steel. To prevent rust, coppering is frequently used.

5. Supply of German materials to ITALY

Source states that in Dec 43 the RAVENHILL Steel Coy of BERLIN received instructions to supply ITALY with certain materials needed for the construction of torpedoes in ITALY for German account. The supply of steels for this purpose was allotted to BOEHMER of VIENNA, that of bronze to MANFRED WEISS, BUDAPEST.

6. The WHITEHEAD Torpedo Factory after the Armistice

On 15 Sep 43 the WHITEHEAD Torpedo Factory was occupied by German troops and orders were given that the workers were to return to work and that unfinished orders were to be completed. This was done, but great difficulties were encountered mainly as regards communications, as the TRIESTE-FIUME railway was out of action until mid Nov 43. After November conditions improved and 400 torpedoes which were ready

to give the names:-

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CSDIC,
CIT,
2 Oct 44.

R. F. Edwards
(R.F.F. EDWARDS)
Lt-Col.
Comdt CSDIC, CIT.

Report No. CSDIC/G.F/SE/CD

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	CEWA.....	1		IS 9 CMF.....	1
	CPIC.....	1		No 1 I (u) Sec.....	1
	AFRC.....	1		500 PS Sec.....	1
	ISLD.....	1		" " " No 1 Det.....	1
	G-2 (IW).....	1		ISLD Adv.....	1
<u>FE</u>	BCS (I).....	1		SLD PIONE.....	1
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~~SECRET (Subcentre East)~~

Report No
CSDIC, CIP (East)/AB/327,
21 Sep 44.

Interrogation Report on an Italian Refugee

Source No: Ex 930.

Arrival in Allied Occupied Territory: 17 Sep 44.

Place of Interrogation: CSDIC (Subcentre East), CMF.

Maps used: ITALY 1:100,000 - Sheets 65a, 77a.

1. PREAMBLE.

Source is a 29 year-old native of ROVINJO (Istria) who knows the coastline in that area intimately having sailed those waters for many years in his cutter.

In Sep 43 he joined the Italian Partisans, with whom he was active later in the HELLINO and TRENTINO areas. He rose to the rank of bn comd. In early Aug he crossed into YUGOSLAVIA with 14 British escapees. The whole party was evacuated by air on 17 Sep 44.

NOTE: This report should be read in conjunction with Report No CSDIC, CIP (East)/AB/326 as it amplifies the topographical details given therein.

2. TOPOGRAPHY.

Coastline Pt GROCE (H 6814) to Pt GUSTIGNA (H 7503).

a) General.

The whole of the coast between the above two points is rocky and low. Rocks are also to be found offshore, covered at high tide but emerging about 80 cm at low water. These rocks are for the greater part, smooth and flat.

There are NO sandy beaches on this stretch of coast, but at some points there are small pebble beaches where MT with four-wheel drive could be landed and could reach the roads leading inland.

There is a difference of about 1 m between low and high water level.

b) PUNTA GROCE (H 6814).

The coastline here is rocky and stands 2-3 m above high water level.

Rocks which stretch about 10 m out from the shore and which are uncovered at low tide prevent all but flat-bottomed craft from approaching the shore. The sea bottom then shelves fairly steeply.

The above conditions prevail from the above point to Pt MUCCIA (H 7011).

c) VAL DI BORA (H 7111).

The NORTH of this bay is sheltered but in the Southern part seas run high when the LIBECIO blows.

At point H 7111 there is a childrens' holiday camp with a very small artificial sandy beach. Approach for anything but flat-bottomed craft is dangerous owing to rocks which emerge at low tide for a distance of about 5-6 m offshore. Inland there are dense pinewoods.

The rly line, which is at some points supported and protected from the sea by walls, runs along the Eastern shore of the bay.

d) PUNTA AURORA (H 7009).

The coastline from ROVINJO to this point is flat and rocky. At points a wall has been constructed to support the coastal road. The shore stands on an average about 1 m above high water level.

The sea bottom shelves steeply and at point H 7120, where there is a small bathing establishment, there are at least 1½ m of water right up to the

1. Introduction.

Source is a 29 year-old native of ROVIGNO (Istria) who knows the coastline in that area intimately having sailed those waters for many years in his cutter.

In Sep 43 he joined the Italian Partisans, with whom he was active later in the BELLUNO and TREVISO areas. He rose to the rank of bn comd. In early Aug he crossed into YUGOSLAVIA with 14 British escapees. The whole party was evacuated by air on 17 Sep 44.

NOTE: This report should be read in conjunction with Report No OSDIC, C.F.(East)/AB/326 as it amplifies the topographical details given therein.

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Coastline Pt CROCE (H 6814) to Pt GUSTIGNA (H 7503).

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The whole of the coast between the above two points is rocky and low. Rocks are also to be found offshore, covered at high tide but emerging about 80 cm at low water. These rocks are for the greater part, smooth and flat.

There are NO sandy beaches on this stretch of coast, but at some points there are small pebble beaches where MT with four-wheel drive could be landed and could reach the roads leading inland.

There is a difference of about 1 m between low and high water level.

b) PUNTA CROCE (H 6814).

The coastline here is rocky and stands 2-3 m above high water level.

Rocks which stretch about 10 m out from the shore and which are uncovered at low tide prevent all but flat-bottomed craft from approaching the shore. The sea bottom then shelves fairly steeply.

The above conditions prevail from the above point to Pt MUCCIA (H 7011).

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The rly line, which is at some points supported and protected from the sea by walls, runs along the Eastern shore of the bay.

d) PUNTA AURORA (H 7009).

The coastline from ROVIGNO to this point is flat and rocky. At points a wall has been constructed to support the coastal road. The shore stands on an average about 1 m above high water level.

The sea bottom shelves steeply and at point H 7120, where there is a small bathing establishment, there are at least $1\frac{1}{2}$ m of water right up to the shore at high tide.

e) VALLE CUNI (H 7208).

There is a small pebble beach at point H 719086, and from it a path leading inland to ROVIGNO. All submarine rocks are flat and can easily be seen, since the water is extremely clear. 5 m offshore there is a depth of $1\frac{1}{2}$ m.

In Source's opinion the beach could be traversed by a jeep.

The coast to the SE of VALLE CUNI is rocky and unsuitable for navigation close to the shore.

f) PORTO VESTRE (H 7506).

There is a good pebble beach at approximately H 754068. This is separated from a secondary rd by some cultivated fields which can be crossed by MT.

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File 57425 Antic HB

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- 2 - Report No CSDIC, CLT(East)/AB/327.

At about 5 m offshore there is 1 m of water. Source, who owned a small cutter, was able to beach his boat here after raising the centre-board, Channel between Island of S. ANDREA (H 7007) and mainland coast.

g) Care must be taken when negotiating the narrow channel between the Island of S. ANDREA and the mainland. The channel is divided by the rock known as SAMERI (H 702082). The stretch of water between this rock and the mainland is very shallow. At places there is a maximum depth of 1 m at low tide.

The narrow channel between the SAMERI rock and S. ANDREA Island is deep and can be navigated by fairly large schooners.

Between the islands of MASCHIN, STURAGO, and S. GIOVANNI there is deep water.

Strong currents are prevalent in the above area, especially when the tide changes.

3. ENEMY DEFENCES.

Fort at VARELLA (N 7899).

Source, whilst with the Partisans, entered this old fortification shortly after the Italian Armistice in order to remove some explosives which were stored there. He noticed four or five 149 mm long-barrelled guns from which the breech blocks had been removed and which had been otherwise damaged and rendered unserviceable.

Source had heard no reports suggesting that this fort had been reoccupied.

HN.

H.C.F.C.

E.W. Lunn
E.W. Lunn,

Maj.
Officer i/c CSDIC (Sub-
centre East), C.M.F.

Distribution as attached.

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CSDIC (Sub-centre East) CMF
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CSDIC (Sub-centre East) CLE

Report No
CSDIC, CLE (East)/AB/326,
19 Sep 44.

Interrogation Report on three Italian fishermen.

Source Nos: IX 927, 928, 929.
Arrival in Allied Occupied Territory: 12 Sep 44.
Place of Interrogation: CSDIC (Sub-centre East), CLE.
Maps used: ITALY 1:100,000 - Sheets 53a, 65a, 77a.
Town Plans of TRIESTE 1:8,150, PARENZO 1:5,000, ROVIGNO 1:5,000.

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Date 27/9 Time 1020
File SPARE Date 23

1. PREAMBLE.

Sources are the owner and crew of a 32-ton motor fishing-boat sunk by MTBs on 11/12 Sep 44 off CITTANOVA D'ISTRIA. They had been fishing off ROVIGNO previous to their capture. They are intelligent and know the WEST coast of the Istrian Peninsula between TRIESTE and POLA. They were eager to give information since most of their friends and relatives are engaged in Partisan activities in the vicinity of ROVIGNO. The information given below is dated 29-31 Aug 44, when Sources made their last trip along the WEST coast of ISTRIA.

2. EVENTS LEADING UP TO CAPTURE.

Sources were sailing from ROVIGNO to ISOLA D'ISTRIA in a convoy of five fishing boats which had been requisitioned by the Germans in TRIESTE. Two German soldiers had been placed as guards on the leading boat of the convoy. On the other four boats, and unknown to the Germans, a number of civilians who were endeavouring to avoid conscription for labour by the Germans, had taken their place among the crews.

3. ENEMY DEFENCES AND DISPOSITIONS.

a) TRIESTE.

- (i) There are two concrete air-raid shelters above ground on the RIVA TRE NOVEMBRE. They hold 100 persons each and are for the use of the Germans only.
- (ii) Two concrete shelters, each to hold 100 persons, are under construction just NORTH of the MOLO DELLA SANITA.

(iii) German officers are billeted in the Hotel SAVOIA (SOUTH of the LLOYD TRIESTINO building)

(iv) The German Naval Command is in the Via GALLATI at

(v) There are NO German guns in CAPODISTRIA and ISOLA D'ISTRIA.

b) PIRANIO.

The German Port Command is near the base of the North Breakwater. This Comd is staffed by 30 German Naval personnel and 20 local Fascist guards.

c) PORTOROSE.

The seaplane base WEST of PORTOROSE is abandoned and the hangars destroyed

d) Pt SALVORE-Pt BASSANIA.

There are several pieces of light arty on fd mountings along the coast from H 625569 to the lighthouse at H 601557. These guns

Town Plan
H 819735.

H 816733.

H 817732.

H 82157395.

53a, H 7862.

H 7361.

H 662600.

H 662586
141

1. PREAMBLE.

Sources are the owner and crew of a 32-ton motor fishing-boat sunk by MTBs on 11/12 Sep 44 off CITTANOVA D'ISTRIA. They had been fishing off ROVIGNO previous to their capture. They are intelligent and know the WEST coast of the Istrian Peninsula between TRIESTE and POLA. They were eager to give information since most of their friends and relatives are engaged in Partisan activities in the vicinity of ROVIGNO. The information given below is dated 29-31 Aug 44, when Sources made their last trip along the WEST coast of ISTRIA.

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3. KEY DEFENCES AND DISPOSITIONS.ISTRIAa) TRIESTE.

(i)

There are two concrete air-raid shelters above ground on the RIVA TRE NOVEMBRE. They hold 100 persons each and are for the use of the Germans only.

(ii)

Two concrete shelters, each to hold 100 persons, are under construction just NORTH of the MOLO DELLA SANITA.

(iii)

German officers are billeted in the Hotel SAVOIA (SOUTH of the LLOYD TRIESTINO building)

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The German Naval Command is in the Via GALATI at

(v)

There are NO German grns in CAPODISTRIA and ISOLA D'ISTRIA.

b) PIRANO.

The German Port Command is near the base of the North Breakwater. This Comd is staffed by 30 German Naval personnel and 20 local Fascist guards.

c) PORTOROSE.

The seaplane base WEST of PORTOROSE is abandoned and the hangars destroyed

d) Pt SALVORE-Pt BASSANIA.

There are several pieces of light arty on fd mountings along the coast from H 625569 to the lighthouse at H 601557. These guns are all close to the shore and well camouflaged with shrubbery. Since the beginning of Jul small vessels have been engaged in transporting cement and timber from TRIESTE to the S. GIOVANNI Mole. There are three barracks on the quay SOUTH of this mole. They are occupied by German gun crews numbering approx 50 and by members of the TOET Organisation. Local labour is conscripted for work on fortifications and every morning a small boat brings some 50 labourers from PIRANO to the S. GIOVANNI Mole.

20 German gunners are billeted in a house next to the light-house at Pt BASSANIA.

e) UMAGO.

10 German Naval personnel are billeted in a house near the base of the mole

Town Plan
H 819735.

H 816733.

H 817732.

H 82157395.

53a, H 7862.

H 7361.

H 662600.

H 668586
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H 612569.

H 621495.

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- 2 - Report No CSDIC, CEF (East) / AB/326

f) Pt CASTAGNIA.

2 x 12 mm HCs manned by 10 Germans at

65a, H 638379.
Town Plan
H 677264.

g) PARENZO.

(i) The German Command was in the Hotel RIVIERA which was destroyed in a raid during Aug. 2-3 Germans were killed.

(ii) The German Command is now in the Hotel VENEZIA just EAST of the Hotel RIVIERA.

(iii) 5-600 Germans and 100 Fascist Militia are billeted in the theatre in the Via TARTINI

(iv) There are three 20 mm guns on the mole on S. NICOLO Island at

(v) On the WEST coast of S. NICOLO Island there are 7-8 x 20 mm guns named by 20-30 Germans at

(vi) Two barrage balloons are moored on S. NICOLO Island and two from the bathing establishment at

H 68152645.

H 673264.

H 67192611.

H 68072565.
65a, H 6918.

H 7916.

h) ORSERA.

20 Fascist Militia are stationed in the town.

i) CUL DI LEE.

The br is guarded by 20 Fascist Militia.

j) ROVIGNO.

(i) The German Port Command with a staff of 40, is in the Town Hall

(ii) 100 Germans are billeted in the school at

(iii) An IEG is mounted on the hill on S. CATERINA Island at

Town Plan

H 71201035.

H 71751020.

H 70470975.

k) ROVIGNO-POLA.

The following is an estimate of inland grns between ROVIGNO and POLA.

(i) VILLA DI ROVIGNO

20 Germans with 1 truck and

1 MC

(ii) CANFANARO

100 Germans with 2-3 trucks

(iii) VALLE D'ISTRIA

40 Germans with 2 trucks

(iv) DIGNANO D'ISTRIA

100 Germans with 3-4 trucks

(v) BARBARIGA.

There were 4-5 CD guns in the old Austrian concrete

fort on the peninsula at

up to the time of the Italian Armistice. Sources do

NOT know whether these are still in posn.

On the shore immediately below the fort there are

some camouflaged wooden dummy guns.

(vi) BRIONI Islands.

Fortifications are being constructed on the BRIONI

Islands to cover the approaches to the R.SAMA Channel.

On the Northern tip of BRIONI MINORE there are some CD

guns and MCs at

On the Southern tip of BRIONI MAGGIORE there are

some CD guns at

(vii) POLA.

One of the Sources had been told by his mother, who left POLA on 1 Sep, that in the past two months the number of German tps at POLA had risen from 5-6000 to 40-50,000. All men of military age were conscripted for work with the TODT Organisation. All women and children had been evacuated to the country by 1 Sep.

65a, H 7713.

H 3715.

H 8305.

77a, N 8896.

N 788996.

N 788945.

N 802887.

1440

H 6619243.
H 673264.
H 67192611.
H 68072565.
65a, H 6918.
H 7916.
Town Plan
H 71201085.
H 71751020.
H 70470975.

65a, H 7713.
H 8715.
H 8305.
77a, N 8896.

N 788996.

N 788945.

N 802887.

1440

H 8072.

H 8174.

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There are three 20 mm guns on the mole on
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1 MC
(ii) CANFANARO 100 Germans with 2-3 trucks
(iii) VALLE D'ISTRIA 40 Germans with 2 trucks
(iv) DIGNANO D'ISTRIA 100 Germans with 3-4 trucks
(v) BARBARIGA.

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up to the time of the Italian Armistice. Sources do
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On the shore immediately below the fort there are
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Fortifications are being constructed on the BRIONI
Islands to cover the approaches to the FASINA Channel.

On the Northern tip of BRIONI MINORE there are some CD
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On the Southern tip of BRIONI MAGGIORE there are
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number of German tps at POLA had risen from 5-6000 to
40-50,000. All men of military age were conscripted
for work with the TODT Organisation. All women and
children had been evacuated to the country by 1 Sep.

4. NAVAL.

a) Shipping.

TRIESTE.
(i)

The hull of an IBERO class battleship is lying
alongside the NORTH side of Isola V of the EMANUELE
FILIBERTO Port

(ii)

Two TBs were seen at Moles II & III of
the VITTORIO EMANUELE Port
These TBs leave port daily in the direction of POLA
on escort duties.

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- 3 - Report No OSDIC, CUP(East)/LB/326

ISOLA D'ISTRIA.

The products of the APRIGONA and ALTEIRA canning factories are transported to TRIESTE daily by small unescorted MVs. Pt SALVORE.

NO escort ships are used between TRIESTE and Pt SALVORE CITTANOVIA.

H 6157.

Early in Aug '44 all fishing vessels were requisitioned here by the Germans. Crews were transported to the interior to work for the TODT Organisation.

PARENZO.

The traffic in bauxite from this port diminished greatly during Aug. Since the sinking of a 4000-ton MV loaded with bauxite off the Hotel RIVIERA on 10 Aug NO large vessels have been used for the carrying of bauxite. 4-5 30-metre fishing vessels are still employed for this traffic, their loading place being the RIVA TRE NOVEMBRE.

Some 200 tons of bauxite leave the port daily.

ROVIGNO.

Since Feb '44 NO bauxite has been shipped from ROVIGNO owing to the destruction of rly comms by the Partisans. The harbour is used only by small fishing craft in transit from TRIESTE to POLA. These lie up for the hours of daylight at the Mole VITTORIO EMANUELE III BARBARIGA-POLA.

H 67952635

Small fishing MVs patrol the coast and FASAMA Channel between BARBARIGA and POLA by daylight. Their armament is not known.

H 74231020.

b) Installations, Booms and Minefields.

(i) CUL DI LEME.

There is a wooden landing-stage 10 m long and adjacent to the coastal rd which joins Route 15 on either side of CUL DI LEME. The depth of water at the landing-stage is 2-3 m.

H 7916.

(ii) PARENZO.

In a raid on 11 Aug 44 half of the boom between the NORTH Mole on S. NICOLO Island and the mainland was destroyed. The part nearest to the mainland is intact.

There is NO boom protecting the entrance to the CAVALE DI LEME.

(iii) MUGLIA BAY.

A minefield was laid in Jun to protect the entrance to MUGLIA Bay. It is triangular in shape, each corner being marked by a buoy 3 m high. It covers the area H 786724-766715-780695.

(iv) POLA.

The location of three minefields laid by the Italians in 1940 for the protection of POLA and copied from a navigation chart in the possession of one of the Sources is given in Appx "A".

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5. TOPOGRAPHICAL.

a) Coast VALLE GUNI-PORTO VESTRE.

The coast between VALLE GUNI and PORTO VESTRE consists of rocks rising steeply out of the sea to a

H 725086-H 755067.

during Aug. Since the sinking of a 4000-ton MV loaded with bauxite off the Hotel RIVIERA on 10 Aug NO large vessels have been used for the carrying of bauxite. 4-5 30-metre fishing vessels are still employed for this traffic, their loading place being the RIVA TRE NOVEMBRE. Some 200 tons of bauxite leave the port daily.

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BARBARICA-POLA.

Small fishing MVs patrol the coast and FASANA Channel between BARBARICA and POLA by daylight. Their armament is not known.

b) Installations, Booms and Minefields.

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There is a wooden landing-stage 10 m long and adjacent to the coastal rd which joins Route 15 on either side of CUL DI LEME. The depth of water at the landing-stage is 2-3 m.

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5. TOPOGRAPHICAL.

a) Coast VALLE CUNI-PORTO VESTRE.

The coast between VALLE CUNI and PORTO VESTRE consists of rocks rising steeply out of the sea to a height of 0.5 - 1.5 m. The surface of the rocks is smooth and can be used by MT. Behind the rocks there is a 5-6 m wide belt of open ground, and behind that wooded country. The woods are young and NOT dense. The depth of water immediately off the rocks along this stretch is 50 cm. The small islands offshore are rocky.

The depth of water between POLARI Island and the coast is 2-3 m. There are several small inlets along this coast with pebblestone beaches and slight gradients easily surmountable by MT.

b) PORTO VESTRE Bay.

This has a good pebble beach. The small island offshore

H 67952635

H 71233020.

H 7916.

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H 725086-H 755067.

H 7107.
H 7307.

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- 4 - Report No CSDIC, CMT(East)/AB/326.

gives protection against observation from the sea, The channel between this island and the coast is NOT navigable.

H 745065.

c) PORTO VESTRE-Pt CUSTIGNA.

The coast between PORTO VESTRE and Pt CUSTIGNA is as in para (a) above, the rocks rising 1 m out of the sea. The country behind the coast is undulating, with fields and small woods. One exception is the small inlet

H 7503.

opposite the DUE SORELLE Islands, where there is a good sandy beach with a gentle gradient. The rocks at Pt CUSTIGNA are 1.5 m high and have a rough surface.

H 755050.

d) Road ROVIGNO-VALLE

The road connecting ROVIGNO with VALLE is of hard earth, 5 m wide and in good condition.

e) VALLE S. PAOLO.

The coast is as in (a) and (c) above except at the NE extremity of the inlet, where the rocks rise only 50 cm above sea level. Depth of water at a distance of 2 m offshore is 2-3 m. The country behind is sparsely wooded.

H 7703.

f) Pt COLONE.

The rocks here rise 50 cm above sea level. The water 2 m off-shore is 2-3 m deep.

H 7702.

6. PARTISAN ACTIVITIES.

The Italian Partisans are in virtual control of the country immediately behind ROVIGNO and of the coast below ROVIGNO as far as Pt CROSSI (H 7808.) They number approx 500. The bulk of the Partisans are between PORTO VESTRE and Pt CUSTIGNA. They have plenty of food sups but are short of arm. They are armed with "Mitra" Mgs, Italian rifles, shotguns and handgrenades. They have approx 40 rounds per rifle.

7. COMMUNICATIONS.

The only railway still in operation in ISTRIA is the line connecting POLA with TRIESTE.

8. ECONOMIC.

The Gas Works at ROVIGNO are no longer functioning.

9. PERSONALITIES.

ROVIGNO Harbour Master

Lt DICKHUT (German Navy).

HN

S.V.

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is as in para (a) above, the rocks rising 1 m out of the sea. The country behind the coast is undulating, with fields and small woods. One exception is the small inlet opposite the DUE SORELIE Islands, where there is a good sandy beach with a gentle gradient. The rocks at Pt GUSTIGNA are 1.5 m high and have a rough surface.

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f) Pt COLONE.

The rocks here rise 50 cm above sea level. The water 2 m offshore is 2-3 m deep.

H 755050.

H 7703.

H 7702.

6. PARTISAN ACTIVITIES.

The Italian Partisans are in virtual control of the country immediately behind ROVIGNO and of the coast below ROVIGNO as far as Pt GROSSA (H 7808.) They number approx 500. The bulk of the Partisans are between PORTO VESTRE and Pt GUSTIGNA. They have plenty of food sups but are short of arm. They are armed with "Mitra" MGs, Italian rifles, shotguns and handgrenades. They have approx 40 rounds per rifle.

7. COMMUNICATIONS.

The only railway still in operation in ISTRIA is the line connecting POLA with TRIESTE.

8. ECONOMIC.

The Gas Works at ROVIGNO are no longer functioning.

9. PERSONALITIES.

ROVIGNO Harbour Master

Lt DICKHUT (German Navy).

HN

S.V.

1438

E.W. Arnold

E.W. Arnold,

Mag.

Officer i/c OSDIC (Sub-centre East), C.M.F.

Distribution as attached.


APPENDIX "L"
SECRET


- V -

Report No CSDIC, CIP(East)/LE/326

LOCATION OF MINEFIELDS OFF ISTRIA

SCALE 1:273,000





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CSDIC (Subsidiary East) CME

Report No
CSDIC, CME (East) 11/9
15 Sep 44.

Interrogation Report on a German PW from the Subsidiary Harbour
Command, MESOLONGION

Name:
Rank:
Unit:
Id No:
P.P.N:
Source No:
Captured:
Place of Interrogation:

SCHUM, Willi
AB (GEFREITER).
KLEINES HAFENKOMMANDO MESOLONGION.
75753,
28460.
Ex 918.
2 Sep 44, at sea.
300 Mob Unit, CSDIC, 5 Sep 44.

RECEIVED BY INFO DIV ACC
Date 24/9 Time 1200
File SPICE Info AB

1. PREAMBLE.

PW is a 34 year-old ship's carpenter. He has no political leanings or military ambitions, and gave infm willingly. He is considered fairly reliable.

2. HISTORY and MOVEMENTS.

Dec '42 Called up to Naval Depot Coy (SCHIFFS STAFF KP) at DEUTSCH EYLAU.
Apr '43 Posted to a constr coy at KIEL.
Jul '43 Posted to EINHEIT DROSTE then in process of formation at NEUSTREHLITZ.
Aug '43 With above unit to PATRAS (Greece).
Feb '44 Posted to Subsidiary Harbour Command (KLEINES HAFENKOMMANDO) at MESOLONGION.

3. CAPTURE.

On 30 Aug 44 PW served as escort on one of two caiques (30-35 tons) each carrying 120 200-litre barrels of MT fuel from MESOLONGION to PREVEZA. The fuel was unloaded at PREVEZA, but after two days was reloaded on the caiques, which were to return via ASTAKOS to MESOLONGION. On 2/3 Sep, after having left ASTAKOS, they were intercepted and sunk by four British E-boats. The crews jumped overboard and most of them, together with the PW, were rescued by the British boats.

4. UNIT. (KLEINES HAFENKOMMANDO MESOLONGION)

This is the Harbour Command controlling all shipping entering and leaving MESOLONGION harbour. It is directly commanded by the SEKONTANTANT WESTERLICHENLAND, with whom it is in telephonic comm. It consists of one offr (Lt), a senior NCO and twenty ratings.

5. PERSONALITIES.

OC Subsidiary Harbour Command, MESOLONGION. Lt RATZENBERGER.

6. NAVAL.

Installations and traffic at MESOLONGION.

a) Installations. The harbour basin is equipped with three wooden jetties, one about 6 m long and the others about 4 m long. All jetties are

2.5 m wide. They stand about 1.5 m above water level.

The depth of water in the harbour basin is 5-6 m. The basin is connected with the sea by a straight channel, about 3 1/2 Km in length, the centre of which is dredged to a depth of 5-6 m.

b) Traffic. The average daily traffic amounted (summer '44) to 10-12 small Greek

RECEIVED BY INFO DIV ACC
 Date 24/8 Time 1700
 File SPARE Info 43

Id No: 75753,
 F.P.N: 28460.
 Source No: Ex 918.
 Captured: 2 Sep 44, at sea.
 Place of Interrogation: 300 Mob Unit, CSDIO, 5 Sep 44.

1. PREAMBLE.
 PW is a 31 year-old ship's carpenter. He has no political leanings or military ambitions, and gave infm willingly. He is considered fairly reliable.
2. HISTORY and MOVEMENTS.
 Dec '42 Called up to Naval Depot Coy (SCHIFFS STAMM KP) at DEUTSCH EYLAU.
 Apr '43 Posted to a constr coy at KIEL.
 Jul '43 Posted to EINHEIT DROSTE then in process of formation at NEUSTREHLITZ.
 Aug '43 With above unit to PATRAS (Greece).
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3. CAPTURE.
 On 30 Aug 44 PW served as escort on one of two caiques (30-35 tons) each carrying 120 200-litre barrels of MT fuel from MESOLONGION to PREVEZA. The fuel was unloaded at PREVEZA, but after two days was reloaded on the caiques, which were to return via ASTALIOS to MESOLONGION. On 2/3 Sep, after having left ASTALIOS, they were intercepted and sunk by four British E-boats. The crews jumped overboard and most of them, together with the PW, were rescued by the British boats.

4. UNIT. (KLEINES HAFENKOMMANDO MESOLONGI)
 This is the Harbour Command controlling all shipping entering and leaving MESOLONGION harbour. It is directly commanded by the SEKKOMMANDANT WESTGRUBENLAND, with whom it is in telephonic comm. It consists of one oftr (Lt), a senior NCO and twenty ratings.

5. PERSONALITIES.
 OC Subsidiary Harbour Command, MESOLONGION, Lt RATZENBERGER.

6. NAVAL.
Installations and traffic at MESOLONGION.
 a) Installations. The harbour basin is equipped with three wooden jetties, one about 6 m long and the others about 4 m long. All jetties are 2.5 m wide. They stand about 1.5 m above water level. The basin is connected with the sea by a straight channel, about 3 1/2 Km in length, the centre of which is dredged to a depth of 5-6 m.
 b) Traffic. The average daily traffic amounted (summer '44) to 10-12 small Greek caiques (2-3 tons) which brought fruit and vegetables from the neighbourhood of PATRAS and left laden with salt. In addition an average of five 30-ton caiques laden with rations for the German Army spent the night in the harbour each week.
 An old ferry-boat of Italian manufacture, and capable of carrying 4-5 trucks, ran an irregular service between PATRAS and MESOLONGION. This service had originally plied between PATRAS and KRIONERI, and it was only in mid-Jul '44 that the boat began to sail to MESOLONGION.

SECRET

- 2 -

Report to OODMO, OOD(East)/ M/9

7. ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS.

PW stated that the rly line passing through MESOLOMION had not been in operation since beginning of Aug '44.

HN.

A.M.

Greenham
for *E.W. Annan.*
Officer i/c CSDIC (Sub-
centre East), C.M.F.

Captn

Distribution as attached.

CSDIC (Sub-centre East), CMF
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MES	1	SO(I) TOTALI	2
MPIC	1	SO(I) POWIT	1
ISSU 6	1	SO(I) ADRIATIC	1
COMNAVNAV (NTU)	1	SO(I) ANCONA	1
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6 September 1944

P R U

ENGINEER PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SECTION
FIFTY-THIRD ARMY PHOTO CENTRE

SPECIAL ENGINEER REPORT

The RIVER PO from 63/777106 EAST OF OSTIGLIA to CASALMAGGIORE
(This report supersedes all previous Engineer Reports on this stretch)

SOURCE: 12PR 992 2 Sept.
12PR 987 28 Aug.

DATA: "STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY NO. 59

The RIVER PO is 420 miles long and drains a basin of 26,800 square miles. Average maximum discharge 182,500 cu. ft per sec, average minimum 5,500 and a mean discharge of 60,700 cu. ft. per sec. The maximum recorded discharge was 315,000 cu. ft per sec. in 1917. The River is leveed from CREMONA to its mouth. In places the levees are several miles apart to permit enlargement of channels during floods. The lower PO has a channel 650 to 1600 ft wide.

The PO has a fairly regular discharge with two high water periods, June and November. Flood stages are 20 to 30 ft above lower water stage. Sudden floods in the basin are uncommon, but unusually high stages may occur every few years when heavy summer rains coincide with high water from melting Alpine snows.

The PO is navigable up to the junction of SESIA RIVER 337 miles up-stream; 87 miles by boats up to 180 tons; remainder by smaller boats.

GENERAL: The river along this stretch has a wet gap varying from 655 to 2300 ft with an average width of 1000 ft. The banks are usually 15 to 20 feet high and slope at 1 to 2. In small areas the banks have gentle slopes. Levees 15 to 20 ft high with macadam roads on top parallel the river. At some points they form the bank. Inside the levees and along the river banks are dense forest. A good network of single and double lane roads exist inside of the levees.

River crossings will be limited to floating bridges and ferries. Numerous ferry landings and bridge sites exist along this stretch and are in use at present. These furnish the best crossing sites as they are located where the channel is narrow and tie in with the best road net.

The permanent bridges, other than pontoon, have been destroyed by bombs. Ground reports state that the permanent pontoon bridges cannot be used during high water stages. Due to the width of

The RIVER PO from 63/77108 East to 63/77109 East to 63/77110 East

(This report supersedes all previous Engineer Reports on this stretch)

SOURCE: 12PR 992 2 Sept.
12PR 987 28 Aug.

DATA: "STRATEGIC ENGINEERING STUDY NO. 59

The RIVER PO is 420 miles long and drains a basin of 26,800 square miles. Average maximum discharge 182,500 cu. ft per sec, average minimum 5,500 and a mean discharge of 60,700 cu. ft. per sec. The maximum recorded discharge was 315,000 cu. ft per sec. in 1917. The River is leveed from CHAMONA to its mouth. In places the levees are several miles apart to permit enlargement of channels during floods. The lower PO has a channel 650 to 1600 ft wide.

The PO has a fairly regular discharge with two high water periods, June and November. Flood stages are 20 to 30 ft above lower water stage. Sudden floods in the basin are uncommon, but unusually high stages may occur every few years when heavy summer rains coincide with high water from melting Alpine snows.

The PO is navigable up to the junction of SESIA RIVER 337 miles up-stream: 87 miles by boats up to 180 tons; remainder by smaller boats.

GENERAL:

The river along this stretch has a wet gap varying from 655 to 2300 ft with an average width of 1000 ft. The banks are usually 15 to 20 feet high and slope at 1 to 2. In small areas the banks have gentle slopes. Levees 15 to 20 ft high with macadam roads on top parallel the river. At some points they form the bank. Inside the levees and along the river banks are dense forest. A good network of single and double lane roads exist inside of the levees.

River crossings will be limited to floating bridges and ferries. Numerous ferry landings and bridge sites exist along this stretch and are in use at present. These furnish the best crossing sites as they are located where the channel is narrow and tie in with the best road net.

The permanent bridges, other than pontoon, have been destroyed by bombs. Ground reports state that the permanent pontoon bridges can not be used during high water stages. Due to the width of wet gaps, ferries are used extensively both by civilians and the Enemy.

1432

File
1432

DETAILS:

Possible Bridge and Ferry sites, existing bridge and ferry crossings.

- I. 63/777106 Possible Bridge or Ferry site.
Wet gap and channel width 1150 ft.
South bank 20 ft. high and slopes at 1 to 1
North bank 10 ft. high and slopes at 1 to 2
Distance between top of banks 1240 ft.
Net work of 2 and 1 lane gravel or macadam roads on the south and north of levees. Single lane dirt roads lead to the water edge, inside of levees.
Levees 15 feet high and 400 feet apart on both banks, 2 lane macadam roads follows top of levees. Levee crossings exist at numerous points.
Dense growth of trees inside of levees will furnish good cover.
Improvement of the bank approaches and roads will be required.
Suitable site for the construction of floating bridges in this area.
12PR992 3037-8-9
- II. 63/742120 Existing ferry crossings and good bridge sites.
Bank approaches exist at 2 points on north bank and 3 points on the south banks.
Wet gaps 330 to 900 feet wide.
Channel widths 615 to 900 feet.
North bank 20 feet high and 1 to 1 slope. Levee 20 ft. high
parallel to river.
South bank 10 to 15 feet high and gentle to 1 to 2 slope. Grades into sand bar which extends out into channel from 0 to 250 feet.
2 lane macadam road follows top of levee on north bank. Net work of 2 and 1 lane macadam or gravel roads lead to landing sites on the south bank.
Dense growth of trees inside of levee on south will furnish good ferry crossings.
This is a good site for the construction of floating bridges and approaches, if destroyed, on the north bank.
Town of OSTIGLIA on north bank.
12PR992 3060-1
- III. 63/737125 to 736129 2 ferry landings on each bank, good site for ferry crossings.
Wet gap and channel width 1320 ft. Banks 25 to 30 feet high and slopes at 1 to 2 on the south and 1 to 1 on the north.
Distance between top of banks 1445 ft.
Approach roads on both banks single lane dirt and gravel.
Dense growth of trees on both banks gives good cover.
Due to channel width and wet gap this site is only practical for ferry crossings.
12PR992 3059-60
- IV. 63/733125 Foot bridge under construction (type??) wet gap and channel width 1380 ft. Equipment in river (cranes, piledrivers and barges) indicate possible vehicle bridge under construction.
12PR992 3059-60

South bank 20 ft. high and slopes at 1 to 1
 North bank 10 ft. high and slopes at 1 to 2
 Distance between top of banks 1240 ft.
 Net work of 2 and 1 lane gravel or macadam roads on the south and
 Single lane dirt roads lead to the water edge, inside of levees.
 Levees 15 feet high and 4100 feet apart on both banks. 2 lane
 macadam roads follows top of levees. Levee crossings exist at numerous points.
 Dense growth of trees inside of levees will furnish good cover.
 Improvement of the bank approaches and roads will be required.
 Suitable site for the construction of floating bridges in this area.
 12PR992 3037-8-9

II. 63/742120 Existing ferry crossings and good bridge sites.
 Bank approaches exist at 2 points on north bank and 3 points on the
 south banks.

Wet gaps 330 to 900 feet wide.
 Channel widths 615 to 900 feet.
 North bank 20 feet high and 1 to 1 slope. Levee 20 ft. high

parallels into sand bar which extends out into channel from 0 to 250 feet.
 South bank 10 to 15 feet high and gentle to 1 to 2 slope. Grades

2 lane macadam road follows top of levee on north bank. Net work
 of 2 and 1 lane macadam or gravel roads lead to landing sites on the south bank.
 Dense growth of trees inside of levee on south will furnish good

Town of OSTIGLIA on north bank.

This is a good site for the construction of floating bridges and
 ferry crossings. Considerable bulldozing may be required to prepare new or improve
 approaches, if destroyed, on the north bank.

12PR992 3060-1

III. 63/737125 to 736129 2 ferry landings on each bank, good site for ferry
 crossings.

Wet gap and channel width 1320 ft. Banks 25 to 30 feet high and
 slopes at 1 to 2 on the south and 1 to 1 on the north.

Distance between top of banks 1445 ft.

Approach roads on both banks single lane dirt and gravel.

Dense growth of trees on both banks gives good cover.

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12PR992 3059-60

IV. 63/733125 Foot bridge under construction (type??) wet gap and channel width
 1380 ft. Equipment in river (cranes, piledrivers and barges) indicate possible
 vehicle bridge under construction.

12PR992 3059-60

V. 62/587140 Pontoon bridge in use (pontoons dispersed). Best bridge site along
 this stretch.

Wet gap and channel width 715 ft. distance between top of banks

800 ft.

North bank 20 to 25 ft. high and slopes at 1 to 2. The south bank
 is 10 to 15 ft. high and has gentle slope.

Levee 15 feet high follows along north bank. Levee 800 feet back
 from south bank.

2 lane macadam roads on top of both levees.

Approach road on south 2 lane tarmac, on north 2 lane macadam.

Dense growth of trees inside of levee on south will furnish good
 cover.

/over

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S.E.R. (con't)
6 Sept. 44

The best site for construction of floating bridges or ferry crossings. Considerable bulldozing will be required on the north bank to prepare b... approach if existing approach is destroyed. 12PR 992 3018-9

VI. 62/566128 Prepared ferry site and possible floating bridge or ferry crossing site.

Wet gap and channel width between the bank approaches 920 to 1000 feet.

Distance between top of banks 970 to 1120 feet.

The banks are 15 to 25 feet high and slope at 1 to 1.

The approach road on the East is a 2 lane macadam road following the top of the levee. The approach roads on the west are single lane with dirt and or macadam surface.

Trees inside of levees on both banks furnish good cover.

Good ferry crossing site steep banks on the East and levee near bank makes it a difficult bridge site. 12PR992 4077-8

VII. 62/520118 Pontoon bridge and ferry in use. pontoons dispersed. Good to tide and ferry site.

Wet gap and channel width 675 ft.

Distance between top of bank 715 ft.

Banks 10 to 15 ft. high and slope at 1 to 1.

The south approach roads are single lane dirt or gravel roads which run on a dirt fill to the landing bays. A 2 lane macadam road follows the top of levee on the south bank.

The north approach roads are single lane dirt roads leading to the 2 lane macadam road on top of levee.

Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. The approach on the south can be blocked by craters but repairs can be made with bulldozing. 12PR992 4012-3

VIII. 62/515113 Pontoon bridge site, bridge has been dismantled due to bombing and moved down stream. Suitable site for a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap 1050 ft. wide.

Channel width 1270 ft. wide.

South bank 10 to 15 feet high and near vertical, levee parallel to bank. North bank low and sloping onto a sandbar. Sandbar extends out into channel on the north for 320 ft.

The approach roads are 2 lane macadam or gravel leading onto 2 lane macadam roads that follow top of the levees. Trees inside of levee on the south will furnish good cover.

A suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. The south approach can be blocked by craters but can be repaired with bulldozing. 12PR992 4011-31

IX. 62/485107 Military crossing site under construction. Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

prepare to approach if existing approach is destroyed. 12PR992 4011-9

VI. 62/566128 Prepared ferry site and possible floating bridge or ferry crossing site.
Wet gap and channel width between the bank approaches 920 to 1000 feet.

Distance between top of banks 970 to 1120 feet.
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Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. The approach on the south can be blocked by craters but repairs can be made with bulldozing.
12PR992 4012-3

VIII. 62/515113 Pontoon bridge site, bridge has been dismantled due to bombing and moved down stream. Suitable site for a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap 1050 ft. wide.

Channel width 1370 ft. wide.

South bank 10 to 15 feet high and near vertical, levee parallel to bank. North bank low and sloping onto a sandbar. Sandbar extends out into channel on the north for 320 ft.

The approach roads are 2 lane macadam or gravel leading onto the lane macadam roads that follow top of the levees. Trees inside of levee on the south will furnish good cover.

A suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. The south approach can be blocked by craters but can be repaired with bulldozing.
12PR992 4011-431

IX. 62/485107 Military crossing site under construction. Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap 825 feet wide.

Channel width 1400 ft.

Sandbars extend out into the channel 115 ft on the south and tree covered; 460 ft. on the north and is brush covered.

The banks have gentle slopes onto the sandbars.
The approach roads (under construction) lead onto single lane dirt roads which join the 2 lane macadam roads on top of the levees. Suitable net for 2 way traffic.

Trees on both banks furnish good cover.

Suitable sites for construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. Working area restricted by trees and levee on the south bank.

12PR992 4008-9

/over

8-2-44 (Cont'd)
6 Sept. 44

44-

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X. 62/449114 Ferry crossing suitable site for a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap and channel width 1065 ft.
Distance between top of banks 1200 feet.
Banks 20 to 30 feet high and slope at 1 to 2
Bank approaches 2 lane gravel or dirt, 2 lane macadam roads follow the top of the levees.
Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. Working area on the south bank restricted by levee and bank slopes.
12PR987 3004-5

XI. 62/447213 Pontoon bridge destroyed by bombs, Suitable site for construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.
Wet gap 700 feet wide
Channel 1060 feet wide
Sand bar extends out into the channel from the north bank 360 feet.

Distance between levees 2000 feet.
Approach on south cratered by bombs for 125 feet, on the north for 560 feet, approach roads lead onto 2 lane macadam surface roads on top of levees.
Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. Bulldozing will be required to repair the approach roads. Working area restricted by bank slopes and levee on the south.
12PR987 3004-5

XII. 62/421117 Ferry crossing, possible site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap and channel width 1060 feet
Banks 10 to 15 feet high and slope at 1 to 1
Approach roads single lane dirt or gravel, 2 lane macadam road follows levee on north bank.
Distance between levees 2600 feet. Trees inside levee on the south will furnish good cover.
Suitable site for the construction of floating bridges or ferry crossings. Good working area on the south bank. Poor road net on the south.
12PR987 3007-8

XIII. 74/335984 Ferry in use, possible site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap 835 feet wide
Sand bars on both banks, also deep channel for ferry.
Approach roads are single lane macadam or gravel surface.
Dense woods on south bank will serve as good cover.
Not a desirable site for a floating bridge due to sand bars in channel and poor road net on both banks inside of levees.
12PR987 4037-8

XIV. 74/267974 Pontoon bridge destroyed, light ferry crossing in use below bridge. Suitable site for the construction of a ferry crossing.

Wet gap (at bridge) 165 feet and 1260 feet, separated by a sand bar.
Channel width 1790 feet
Old bridge had an overall length of 2575 feet.

for construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.
Wet gap 700 feet wide
Channel 1060 feet wide
Sand bar extends out into the channel from the north bank 360 feet.

Distance between levees 2000 feet.
Approach on south entered by bombs for 125 feet, on the north for 560 feet. Approach roads lead onto 2 lane macadam surface roads on top of levees.

Suitable site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing. Bulldozing will be required to repair the approach roads. Working area restricted by bank slopes and levee on the south,
12PR987 3004-5

XII. 62/421117 Ferry crossing, possible site for the construction of a floating bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap and channel width 1060 feet

Banks 10 to 15 feet high and slope at 1 to 1

Approach roads single lane dirt or gravel, 2 lane

macadam road follows levee on north bank.

Distance between levees 2600 feet. Trees inside

levee on the south will furnish good cover.

Suitable site for the construction of floating bridges or ferry crossings. Good working area on the south bank. Poor road net on the south,
12PR987 3007-8

XIII. 74/335984 Ferry in use, possible site for the construction of a floating-bridge or ferry crossing.

Wet gap 835 feet wide

Sand bars on both banks, also deep channel for ferry.

Approach roads are single lane macadam or gravel

surface.

Dense woods on south bank will serve as good cover.

Not a desirable site for a floating bridge due to sand bars in channel and poor road net on both banks inside of levees.
12PR987 4037-8

XIV. 74/267974 Pontoon bridge destroyed, light ferry crossing in use below bridge. Suitable site for the construction of a ferry crossing.

Wet gap (at bridge) 165 feet and 1260 feet, separated by a sand bar.

Channel width 1790 feet

Old bridge had an overall length of 2575 feet.

Approach roads 2 lane hard surface (macadam or

gravel). Due to channel width this site is best

suited for a ferry crossing. Approaches exist just below the bridge.
12PR987 3045-6

XV. 74/238984 to 244986 and 242990 Ferry landing sites. Suitable site for construction of a ferry crossing.

Wet gap varies from 750 to 2300 feet.

The banks are 10 to 15 feet high and slope at 1 to 1.

S.E.K. (con't)
6 Sept. 44

56

XV. (cont) Approach roads are single lane dirt or gravel leading on to 2 lane macadam roads on top of levees. Dense woods on South bank will furnish good cover. Not a good bridge site due to poor approach roads, restricted working area and wide channel. 12PR987 3048-9-50

XVI. 73/184032 Ferry in use. Suitable site for the construction of a ferry.

Wet gap varies from 1320 to 1925 ft wide.

Banks are 20 ft high and slope at 1 to 1.

Approach roads consist of a net of single lane dirt or gravel roads leading onto 2 lane macadam on top of the levees.

No cover on South bank. Channel width, sand bars and road net makes this site unsuitable for bridging. 12PR987 3059-60

B. DETAILS: BRIDGES DESTROYED; NOT SUITABLE CROSSING SITES

I. 63/745114 Combined road and rail bridge (steel girder) on same piers destroyed by bombs. Road bridge has 2, 3 and 4 spans from the South destroyed; resulting gap 695 ft long and 45 ft high. The approach from the South is cratered, damaging the abutment.

The bridge was a 7 span steel girder bridge, 1570 ft span length and 45 ft high. Distance between top of banks 1280 ft. Wet gap and channel width 1195 ft. Levees 15 ft high parallel the banks with 2 lane macadam roads on top of levees. The banks are 20 ft high and slope at 1 to 2. 12PR992 3034-5

II. 62/445114 Railway bridge destroyed by bombs. End of 1 span dropped. The bridge at present is used for foot crossing. 12PR987 3004-5

III. 74/345992 Pontoon bridge partially destroyed. No attempt to repair or use. Bridge length and channel width 1545 ft. Net gaps (separated by sand bar) 115 ft and 1445 ft.

Not a good bridge site due to wide channel and sand bar. Not a good ferry site due to shallow sandbar on South bank. 12PR987 3034-5-6

4034-5

Henry L. Clark
HENRY L. CLARK

1st Lt., C.E.
Fifth Army Photo Centre

NOTE: Horizontal measurements subject to 10% error, vertical 20%.

DISTRIBUTION LIST 'E'

1430

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12PR987 3034-5-6
4034-5

Henry L. Clark
HENRY L. CLARK
1st Lt., C.E.
Fifth Army Photo Centre

NOTE: Horizontal measurements subject to 10% error, vertical 20%.

DISTRIBUTION LIST 'E'

1430

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INFORMATION DIVISION
A.P.O. 394

2192/INFC 14-A
21 August 1944

SUBJECT : Extract CSDIC-CMF.

TO : Navy Subcommittee.

1. Attached herewith is an extract from a report received by CSDIC - CMF.

for
William V. Hill
William V. Hill, EL
Major, U.S.A.
Director

1429

781

2192/14A

b) Republican Admiralty (5 Jun 44 - Sources 152 & 153)

F 965625

The Republican Admiralty is at MONTECCHIO MAGGIORE. The premises consist of about fifty concrete and wood huts, some of which have not yet been completed. The huts can be easily identified, as they are whitewashed and cover a large area.

781

F

1428

ACC
NAVY SUBCOMMISSION

Date:

21/8/48

NAVY SUBCOM

FOLI-ROME

(Please initial and date after reading (and acting if indicated))

CO. MCDONALD ZIROLI : ☒CO. MCDONALD PALMER : ☒CO. ANDER BUTLER : ☒ B-24/8CAPT BLACKBURN : ☒ B-24/8LT J. R. O. GAGG : ☒ B-24/8LT CDR E. C. DAVIES : ☒LT W. WOTTERSPOON : ☒LT E. V. HARVEY : ☒ALL HANDS : ☒ALL HANDS : ☒☒ INFO

RETURN TO NAVY SUBCOM

☒ ACTIONFILE: msc DATE: 21/8/48

1427

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Naval Sub-Commission
APO 394

NSC/672

2 August 1944.

TO: Minister of Marine.
SUBJECT: Trans Adriatic Coast Defences.

1. It is requested that you furnish Commander C. O'Callaghan, R. N. with such information as he may require regarding all coastal defences and vulnerable points on the Trans Adriatic Coast.

COMMODORE

1426

*1.2.11
Intelligence*

Commodore
Under action 8/1

S.O.(I),
59, Via Sicilia,
Rome.

31st July, 1944.

To:
Commodore Palmer,
Senior British Naval Officer,
Rome.

Major Bayley, G2 I, Land Forces, Adriatic, Bari
requires information regarding all coastal defences
and vulnerable points on the Trans Adriatic Coast.

It is requested that the necessary authority
for the Ministry of Marine to impart this information
may be obtained.

Challenger

Commander, R.N.

1425

COPYHEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INFORMATION DIVISION2146 /INFO/19A/18A
3 July 1944

SUBJECT : Extract Civil Censorship Report

TO : Naval Sub-Commission

1. The attached information was extracted from reports sent to the Information Division, A.C.C., by Civil Censorship Section.

/s/t/ JOHN V. HINKEL
Major, M.I.
Director
Information Division. 1424

COPY

*Original
forwarded to
Intelli for action
5-7-44
441*

*1 Ad
Intelligence
CC*

COPY

MITT.
CC Cap. BANDELLONI
Taranto

DEST.
Ministero Interno, PM 151
Carabinieri 5 Brigata
Napoli

28 June 1944

ITALIAN SAILORS STAGE ROYALIST DEMONSTRATION IN TARANTO

Translation:

At 1730 on 27 June in Taranto, about 300 sailors of various units now present in the port after saluting ships leaving through the canal massed in the principal streets of the city, shouting the praises of the House of Savoy and of the Royal Navy. Direct intervention of the Admiralty brought the demonstration to a close. No incidents. Public order normal. end of message.

rec 441

1923

cc

MITT.

Gandulli Ferdinando
Segretario Prov. Partito Azione
Taranto

DEST.

Partito Azione
Piazza Dante 53,
Napoli

27 - 6 - 44

PRO ROYALIST SENTIMENT RAMPANT IN ITALIAN NAVY

Translation:

Be advised that monarchial reaction fomented torpedo commands that subverts equipment and tacitly protected admirals grows every day. Today a large group of sailors praised House of Savoy and insulted Bonomi government. The crowd not being dispersed, it repaired to the Ministry of the Navy, where it clamored for release of Commander Facia di Cossato, who was punished because apparently the leader of the movement. Committee of liberation sought authority for violent protest. I denounce a dangerous situation which demands immediate and drastic measures to avoid popular reaction.

Dec 441

COPYcc
1422

REAR HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
NAVY SUB-COMMISSION
APO 394

P/tum

12 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Extract Civil Censorship Report.

TO : F.O.T.A.L.I., Navy House, Taranto.

1. Forwarded.
2. Dry-dock or shipbuilding yard referred to on attached report, namely, Presso Cantieri Navale Emanuele Reo, location unknown.
3. Request investigation be made around that area.

I. M. PALMER
Commodore
Navy Sub-Commission
(Rear) A.C.C.

2 Incls:
Ltr from R.C. & M.G. Sec.
Extract Civil Censorship Report.

*Rel
305*

1130

1421

CONFIDENTIALCONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION

2193/INFO
5 June 1944

SUBJECT: Extract Civil Censorship Report

TO : Navy Sub Commission

1. The attached information was extracted from reports sent to the Information Division, A.CC., by Civil Censorship Report.

Illigible
for NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel, Cavalry
Deputy Executive Commissioner

CONFIDENTIALCOPY

1420

COPYCONFIDENTIAL

FROM:

CURRERI, Girolamo
presso Cantiere Navale
Emanuele Noe

TO:

SCLAFANI, Luigi
Via Campidoglio 7
Porta di mare
Siacca
Agregento, Sicily

18 May 1944

NEWS OF A SHIP'S CONSTRUCTION

I have in dry-dock a ship of 300 tons in this ship-building yard. I must motorize it and I need capital. Please advise lawyer INDELICATO the amount of credit I possess in the "Giuseppe" for the motor.

Reviewer's Note: It appears that the sender means by the "Giuseppe", the Giuseppe Garibaldi Association, a banking association where seafaring people usually keep bank accounts.

CONFIDENTIAL

1419

SUBJECT:- Subversive Activity
in Italian Navy

HQ, ALLIED ARMS IN ITALY

SECRET

AAI/1402/2/GSI(b)

25 May 44

*Recd
249*

Navy Sub-Commission,
A.C.C.

Reference our letter of even number dated 3 May 44.

1. F.S.S. enquiries have revealed that the suspect stranger referred to in para 3 of our letter resides at STRADA SANTA No. 2, 1° Piano, BRINDISI.
2. Further enquiries have not been made by F.S.S. as it appears Cap. MANIGRASSO of C.C.S. is handling the case and it is not desired to prejudice his enquiries.

Elmurray Capt
for Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

JWF

F
1418

FATAL CENSORSHIP.

Letter dated. 1 December 1943.

From: GONZAGA M.
Naval Station of Mahon,
Balears.

To: Duke GONZAGA Gaetano Catalano
Ammiraglio di Divisione,
M.M. TARANTO.

SURVIVOR, WHO HOPES TO ESCAPE, DESCRIBES SINKING OF "ROMA".

"The "Roma" was sunk in 17 minutes. About six hundred were saved. Only one of the senior officers escaped, to be exact the Major of the Medical Corps. Nobody else of the senior officers was saved. Of the other officers, twenty-two saved their lives. The bombs struck our ship on the starboard, amidship and low. Practically nobody survived from amidships to bow, including the personnel of the tower (torrione). We arrived here at Mahon on the 10th September. My desire, after the defeat the Germans inflicted on us, was to avenge my eight companions who died performing their duty. We still hope that our ships may sail again, but for the time being it is only a dream. The ingratitude of the Spaniards is proverbial and meanwhile time is passing. The morale of our "Roma" group is good but the ships are not in an equally good condition. Please tell me if you know anyone in Spain who could help me in an eventual flight...."

Letter dated 9 February 1944.

From: TEDESCO Michele (Serg. Maggiore.)
R.T. "ALISEO"
TARANTO.

To: CASTELLI Carmelina
Via Garibaldi, 289,
AGRIGENTO.

NAVAL SECURITY VIOLATION BY ITALIAN SERVICEMAN WHO IS ALSO
INTERMEDIARY FOR CENSORSHIP VIOLATION.

"As for the letter it was impossible to deliver it in person, but I mailed it ~~xxxx~~ in CROTONE. I boarded the ship at Messina. From there I went to CROTONE and from CROTONE to TARANTO."

Letter dated. 25th February 1944.

From: SANTORO Rosalbina
Fuscaldo Marina,
COSENZA.

To: SANTORO Rosalbina
Ist. to. I Infanzia
Ospedale Martini, ORIA,
BRINDISI.

NAVAL SECURITY VIOLATION.

1417

exact the Major of the Medical Corps. Nobody else of the senior officers was saved. Of the other officers, twenty-two saved their lives. The bombs struck our ship on the starboard, amidship and low. Practically nobody survived from amidships to bow, including the personnel of the tower (torrione). We arrived here at Mahon on the 10th September. My desire, after the defeat the Germans inflicted on us, was to avenge my eight companions who died performing their duty. We still hope that our ships may sail again, but for the time being it is only a dream. The ingratitude of the Spaniards is proverbial and meanwhile time is passing. The morale of our "Roma" group is good but the ships are not in an equally good condition. Please tell me if you know anyone in Spain who could help me in an eventual flight...."

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Letter dated. 25th February 1944.

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Fuscaldo Marina, Ist.to. I Infanzia
COSENZA. Ospedale Martini, ORIA, 1417
BRINDISI.

NAVAL SECURITY VIOLATION.

"We received a little card from your brother Giovanni. In it he says he embarked again on the "CARAFFA D'ORIA" and that they were about to leave for MALTA."

(Sgt) L. M. PALMER

Naval Sub-Commission,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,
Near Headquarters.
26.4.1944.

COMMODORE.

ITALIAN SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS

~~Sicily and Sardinia~~

A8-2

ACC

SENIOR U. S. NAVAL OFFICER, ITALY

Serial (0052)

26 April, 1944.

SECRET

From: Senior U. S. Naval Officer, Italy.
To : Lieutenant Paul A. Alfieri, U.S.N.R., U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer.
Via : Commander Naval Operating Base, Cagliari.
Subject: Survey of Italian Command in Sardinia.
Reference: (a) U.S. Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer, FOIT, report on survey of Italian Naval Command at La Maddalena dated 14 April, 1944.

1. It is noted that in reference report it is stated that the Italian Naval Command at La Maddalena consists of 8200 officers and men. It is not entirely clear whether the figures given in this total include the Italian naval personnel attached to Cagliari and other naval commands in Sardinia.

2. It is requested that a break-down of personnel, as given in reference (a), be made for the naval units in Cagliari.

3. The subject report has been most valuable in connection with analyzing and checking the distribution of Naval Personnel in shore establishments of the Italian Navy.

H. W. ZIEROLI.

File
DSP

SUBJECT.

DISSATISFACTION IN ITALIAN NAVY.

FROM THE FLAG OFFICER, TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.
DATE 16th June, 1944. No. T.A. 1138.
TO HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY.
(Copy to: Navy Sub-Commission.)

The attached report on morale in the Italian Navy is forwarded with reference to your letter No.AAI/1402/2/GSI(b) of 3rd May, 1944.

REAR-ADMIRAL.

1415

SECRET

DISCOVERY OF ACOUSTIC MINE UNITS.

(Minister of Marine's letter No. 148/F.S. of 26th February 1944.)

II.

No. T.A. 290/16.

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION,

(Copy to: Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean Station.)

Comodore Palmer.

Forwarded in continuation of my T.A. 290/16 of
21st February, 1944.

2. The Minister of Marine has now agreed to give me a list of positions of all storehouses etc., and a general indication of their contents, so that they may be examined by my technical experts.

3. It is thoroughly unsatisfactory that there is still undeclared and valuable war material concealed in Southern Italy.

... 0VN 07

20 MAR 1944

H/84/44

TARANTO.
7th March, 1944.

(SGD). R. MCGRIGOR

1414

REAR-ADMIRAL.

101

DISCOVERY OF ACOUSTIC UNITS.

The attached communication received from F.O.T.A.L.I. on the above subject is forwarded for your information.

Salerno.
18th March 1944,

COMMODORE.
Head of Naval Sub-Commission.

H 84/44.

(Two Copy Kept)
RA

1413

From : Lieut. E.C. DAVIES R.N.V.R., A.C.C. SALERNO.
 To : Commodore I.M. PALMER R.N., A.C.C. SALERNO.
 Date : 30 March 1944.

Subject : Eruption of VESUVIUS March 1944.

In accordance with A.C.C. Special Order No. 38 of March 22, I proceeded to RESINA and reported to Major CANTOR, U.S.A. The morning of 23 March, Major CANTOR addressed the officers and men assembled to give aid in evacuation work of the towns and villages jeopardized by the flow of lava and showers of lava fragments and ashes.

2). I was detailed to proceed to POMPEI under the command of Capt. G.H. HEWITT, U.S.A., assisted by two American soldiers and one R.A.S.C. driver of a Jeep.

3). On arrival at POMPEI, Officers at the Town Hall were placed at our disposal by the Mayor. Contact was made with the police and a reconnaissance made of the district under our control. It was found that vegetables had been covered with lava fragments and ashes with a result that none were available for the population. The market held in the main square every morning ceased to exist. It was not possible to obtain supplies from districts which had not suffered on account of the restrictions placed on traffic. The stock of flour for the bread ration was sufficient for two days. With the balance of their allocation for the month of March stored at S. Giovanni a Taduoli. Arrangements were made for this stock to be transported to POMPEI and an appeal made for further supplies of food as a substitute for vegetables, resulting in an allocation being made of:-

Dried Vegetables (Beans)	Kgs. 4,000
Tinned Milk	200
Dehydrated Soup	300
Cheese	1,800

Late in the afternoon this food was delivered at POMPEI by two army trucks, an Italian civilian being responsible for delivery assisted by a representative from the Prefecture of Naples. It was obvious that there was a discrepancy in weights and actually there was delivered:-

Dried Vegetables (Beans) 86 sacks (marked 100 lbs nett each)
 10 of which were only half full.

Gross weight delivered. Kgs. 3,531

10 Cartons (marked 55 lbs gross each)

Gross weight delivered. Kgs. 254

Dehydrated Soup. 38 Cartons (marked 40 lbs nett each)

1 Can (marked 33 lbs nett)

2 Cartons (marked 51 lbs nett each)

Nett weight delivered. Kgs. 1,105

48 Cheese (marked in lbs 94 89 93

93 87 95 etc. each)

Approx. Gross weight. Kgs. 1,967

the morning of 23 March, Major GANTON addressed the officers and men assembled to give aid in evacuation work of the towns and villages jeopardized by the flow of lava and showers of lava fragments and ashes.

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10 Cartons (marked 50 lbs gross each)

Gross weight delivered. Kgs. 254

58 Cartons (marked 40 lbs nett each)

1 Can (marked 33 lbs nett)

2 Cartons (marked 51 lbs nett each)

Nett weight delivered. Kgs. 1,105

46 Cheese (marked in lbs 34 89 93

93 87 95 etc. each)

Approx. Gross weight .. Kgs. 1,937

1412

The Italian responsible for delivery stated that the difference in weight of Dehydrated Soup must have been due to his having delivered short weight to places where he made deliveries the same day.

Instructions were received by the Mayor to distribute this food against payment on presentation of ration cards. Delay in distribution was caused as the local authorities were not in possession of a price list and had to send a representative to Naples to obtain one.

There are 14,000 ration card holders in POMPEI and the authorities were at a loss to know how to allocate the tinned milk. We suggested that it should be reserved for sick children below the age of 2 years.

- 2 -

Having attended to the victimizing problems we were advised that there was a remote possibility of the cone of Vesuvius collapsing which may cause hot lava to fall in large pieces and cause fires to buildings. It was stated that the Observatory would be able to give three hours notice of such happening but we were to make all necessary arrangements for the eventuality and "be prepared", without causing alarm amongst the population which might lead to evacuation. With the Mayor we called on the Archbishop and conferred with him, the Bishop and the Archbishop's Secretary. It was arranged that we would give a veiled warning to the population during a church service and assure them that in the event of impending danger the church bells would be rung, when they should take cover in cellars or on the ground floor of buildings and that all able-bodied men would be expected to assist in the prevention of fire. Fortunately, the cone collapsed very gradually and the danger ceased to exist.

Advice was given to the local authorities regarding the cleaning of the roads and the prevention of drains becoming blocked by the ashes. A supply of shovels were obtained and loaned to the Mayor.

Whilst inspecting the work done to clear the main square of POMPEII I overheard a man complaining bitterly that he was starving and a few minutes beforehand had seen foodstuffs and cigarettes being taken from an Army truck into a house near the entrance to the ruins. I immediately summoned one of the local police who was standing nearby and I requested him to call a Carabinieri and investigate immediately. This resulted in the arrest of a boy, aged 13, who had approximately 2,300 English cigarettes (Gold Flake, Woodbines etc.) 9 tins of B. Beef, and one 27lb. tin of Carr's biscuits, which he stated he had bought from a soldier for Lit. 3.500.--, and the arrest of a man who had tins of B. Beef and packets of Lifebuoy soap. I detained both the arrested and sent to Torre Annunziata for the Military Police who searched the houses of the arrested and found British underclothing, woollen socks etc. in the house of the man. The seized goods together with the arrested were then taken to Torre Annunziata by the C.M.P.

The next day the C.M.P. advised me that my action had led to the arrest of a New Zealand corporal whilst selling W.D. property that morning.

We were called upon to assist the local police in disputes with British and American troops, and it is obvious that both British and American Military Police are needed in this area.

The Mayor is most anxious to have assistance for he explained that POMPEII is visited by so many men on leave and the town has become the rendezvous of the prostitutes who have escaped the Naples purge. Bars and restaurants have been placed out of bounds with a result that the back rooms of private houses have become eating places of black-market food and drinking places of the most poisonous "Cognac".

The troops when intoxicated are made to pay exorbitant prices. There have been many cases of intoxicated troops stealing from shops and the police are afraid to interfere as they have several times been threatened with fire-arms.

7411

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It may be of interest to know that we visited the training-school for some of people detained in prison. It is situated near the Railway Station of POMPEI and known as "Capizio per i fidi dei Incarcerati", administered by the Church. It contains: printing shop, book-binding shop, photographic department with facilities for copper engraving, engineering shop containing lathes etc., carpenters shop etc. All the shops appeared to be supplied with raw materials and it may be that they would be only too willing to carry out work for the United Nations.

- 3 -

- 4). On instructions we visited SCARATI and obtained a general report on conditions in the district which was forwarded to RESINA headquarters. It was found that the stocks of foodstuffs there were practically nil whereas stocks were held for them in SALERNO, PAGANI, NOCERA and PORTICI. Arrangements were made for stocks of essential food to be collected from NOCERA and thus impending hardships were alleviated. It should be mentioned that SCARATI is situated in King's Italy. Both in this place and in POMPEI the problem to be solved is TRANSPORT to enable the local authorities to collect essential stores.
- 5). The C.O. of 74 General Hospital accommodated us in the mess and he was kept advised with all news received to enable him to take every precaution at the hospital.

Lieut. R.M.V.R.

1410

C O P Y .

U.S. CONFIDENTIAL - equals British SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
A.P.O. 394.In reply refer to:
201 Bisconti, General Antonio.

4 February, 1944.

SUBJECT - BISCONTI, General Antonio,
TO: FONTALI, TARANTO.

1. ⁱⁿ The attached reports on the subject are forwarded.
2. It would appear from the record inclosed that representations have been made to Admiral Barone through the Minister of Marine to consider the removal of this officer.
3. It will be noted that complaints against this officer emanate from the Intelligence Service of the Italian Army.

4.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control
Commission;(Signed) ELLERY W. STONE.
Captain, USNR.
Acting Chief of Staff.

2 Incl.

Incl. 1. - Ltr. Hq. ACMF.

ACMF/1455/1/G(Ib), 1 Feb 44

Incl 3 - Ltr. FM Milit Intell Serv
21 Jan 44

1409

Navy 15 FEB 1944
834

GENERAL ANTONIO BISCONTI.
(Headquarters Allied Control Commission's No.201
dated 4th February 1944.)

II.

No.T.A.1027/83.

FLAG OFFICER, WESTERN ITALY.
(Copy to Allied Control Commission.)

Forwarded for information and any action you
consider necessary, observing that the complaints are
made by the Italian authorities and not by the Allied
authorities.

2. The remarks of F.B.S.O. Med., are attached.

15 FEB 1944
COMMODORE

D 57/44

(Sgd.) R. McGRIGOR.

TARANTO.
10th February, 1944.

REAR-ADMIRAL.

1408

COPY.

General Antonio BISCONTI

This officer has been known to F.B.S.O. Med. since the first day of the occupation of Naples. Along with the other Port Officials he was given a chance of remaining in office and working with the Allies. This state of affairs lasted exactly two days after which all the Italian officials were removed from the Port owing to their complete inefficiency.

A few days after his discharge, it was discovered that he had been obtaining from the Chief Pilot the names and berths of all the vessels in the harbour and anchorage, which he plotted on a relief plan of the harbour. He stated that he was doing this to keep proper statistics of the port. Both his plan and Port pass were removed forthwith and a watch kept on his activities.

He paid several visits to Taranto during November and December 1943, presumably in search of a job. Nothing further was discovered against him.

As far as is known, he has never been connected with the German Intelligence Service, and certainly not when he was in Naples. He was awarded a German decoration in August 1939.

F.B.S.O. Med. has met him on many occasions and the opinion formed is that he is a very charming and completely ineffectual personality, incapable professionally but very anxious to further his own interests by any possible means.

It is, however, considered that neither he nor TOMASELLI should be employed by the Allies. If his present appointment is a purely Italian one, it is up to the Italian authorities to take what action they think fit.

(Signed) M.L. COCHRANE Lt. Cdr. R.N.V.R.
F.B.S.O. MED.

1407

C O P Y

5 FEB 1944

Subject:- BISCONTI
General Antonio.

Headquarters,
Allied Central Mediterr-
anean Force,
C. M. F.

Br. CONFIDENTIAL - U.S. CONFIDENTIAL.

ACMF/1455/1/G(Ib).

A.C.C.

1 Feb 44.

1. Attached is a translation of a report on Subject received from the Italian Counter Intelligence Officer Of General BASSO's Headquarters and passed to this Headquarters by Peninsular Base Section.

2. P.B.S. point out that as a result of an investigation of General BISCONTI's background and activities, his removal from as President of the Independent Authority of NAPLES Harbour was secured through Italian Army Headquarters. Subject's record of close cooperation and personal association with the Germans, his record as an active Fascist, his professional incapacity, and the suspicion and distrust felt by both Allied and Italian personnel because of his reputed dishonest dealings made it impossible that he or his associate, Col. TOMASELLI, have any connection with the Port of NAPLES. It is believed by P.B.S. that his appointment to any office, actual or honorary, would be unwise.

3. The above is passed to you for your information and such action as you deem necessary.

(Signed) R.R. STANHOPE WRIGHT. CAPT.
for Brigadier.
B.G.S.(1).

C. P. Y.

15 FEB 1944

G. H. C.

Military Intelligence Service

Naples.

Naples, 21 January, 1944.

To: Hqs. Armed Forces of Campania.

SUBJECT: General (Royal Navy) Antonio Bisconti di Marrone.

General Antonio Bisconti di Marrone of the Royal Navy, former president of the Ente Autonomo del Porto di Napoli (Separate Port Organisation of Naples) was a member of the disbanded Fascist party since its very beginning. The fact that he took part on the march on Rome, that he was a legionary of Fiore, and had received the Sciarpa Littorio (Littorio Scarf) were made use of by him in order to gain political concessions and to achieve other ends.

Formerly in command of the port of Palermo, he managed, through the intervention of Host-Venturi with whom he was very friendly, to obtain a transfer to Naples.

In this city he was about to be promoted to the rank of General, but since this would have resulted in his being transferred, he again used the influence of the Minister Host-Venturi and other noted politicians in order to delay the promotion so that it would coincide with the formation of the Ente Autonomo del Porto di Napoli of which he managed to become president, obviously gaining a great deal.

Soon after he became president, Lt. Col. Tomaselli, who was also connected with the command of the Port of Naples, asked and was made by him director-general of the Ente Autonomo, drawing the salary of one hundred thousand liras a year.

Lt. Col. Tomaselli was considered as General Bisconti's right hand man and it is said that they took part in certain dishonest dealings in which the ex-minister Host-Venturi was also connected.

General Bisconti, for example, was accused of negotiating shady deals with certain port enterprises concerning building concessions and he is also known to have handed over to Fiat a large warehouse at a price which was below the real value.

It is also said that in the modification of the building where the Ente had its headquarters, which entailed the expenditure of 4 million liras, he realised a profit. Also known is the fact that the Ente Autonomo at the time when its constitution was formed had a capital of 9 million liras which for the most part had disappeared at the time of its liquidation.

He is also known to have maintained the most friendly relations with officers of the German Navy during this war.

Generally speaking he is known as an unscrupulous

1406

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He is also known to have maintained the most friendly relations with officers of the German Navy during this war.

Generally speaking he is known as an unscrupulous speculator, and he does not enjoy a good reputation although it is admitted that he is efficient as far as handling his affairs is concerned.

Despite the fact that recently he has been away from Naples, he has succeeded in being appointed commanding General of the Port Command personnel (Naples) in the service of the Merchant Marine.

Major of the GS.M. Capo Centro
Camillo Pecorella.

1406

SECRET

From .. Ministry of Marine . Cabinet .

Date .. 26th February, 1944.

No. 148/F.S.

To .. F.O.T.M.L.

ACOUSTIC APPARATUS FOR MINES.

Replying to your T.A.290/16 of 21st February.

1. I again confirm that the acoustic apparatus in question could not be considered either as "Naval device" or as "War Material" since as already explained to British specialists, they did not possess characteristics to render them suitable for the object for which they were intended, nor is it considered that any simple modification would transform them into efficient weapons.

The defects of the apparatus lay in the microphone and in the relay, that is the fundamental part of the device; a substitution for these parts would have given place to a completely different apparatus, for which a knowledge of the first type would not be of any assistance in the study of measures of defence against it.

2. With regard to the assurance requested in paragraph 6 of your letter, I point out that no statement of apparatus and material has been forwarded, because from the date of the Armistice it has been considered suitable ("Opportunity") by the members of the Commission of Control to ask for free access to storehouses and ships and then to judge which were interesting materials about which to ask for information. No objection to this procedure has been raised, seeing that if clauses 10 & 11 of the Armistice Agreement were interpreted to the letter, taking "naval devices" and "war materials" to mean any instrument or apparatus existing in an Arsenal, as well as parts of apparatus or weapons which have been abandoned in the past and only of historical interest, the statements forwarded would have had to be complete inventories of the storehouses.

The interpretation and the examination of such inventories by the Commission of Control would certainly have required a long time, in contrast with the war-necessity of knowing that which had an immediate interest.

I was therefore basing on this conception, and interpreting the spirit and not the letter of the Armistice clauses, that there has also been supplied to the British specialists by Italian officers information about apparatus not existing in the zone controlled by the United Nations, which were in the research or experimental stage, when it was thought that such apparatus or studies might fall into the hands of the Germans and be utilised by them.

3. In view of the system followed up till now in the request for information I have no way of ascertaining whether there is apparatus which may have escaped the notice of the British specialists, and in consequence I propose that officers delegated by you should again visit all storehouses together with Italian specialist officers, to check whether on the British

1405

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3. In view of the system followed up till now in the request for information I have no way of ascertaining whether there is apparatus which may have escaped the notice of the British specialists, and in consequence I propose that officers delegated by you should again visit all storehouses together with Italian specialist officers, to check whether on the British side, information has been obtained about everything, unless you prefer that complete inventories of stores should be handed over to you, which I am quite ready to have done.

THE MINISTER.

.....000000000000.....

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Naval Sub-Commission
APO 394

NSC/668

4 August 1944.

Minister of Marine:

SUBJECT: Italian Naval Gunnery - Information on.

1. It is requested that you furnish Commander C. O'Callaghan with such information as he may require regarding Italian Naval gunnery. Data is particularly desired with respect to improvements since July, 1943, in fire control systems, gun mountings and ammunition.

C O M M O D O R E

Copy to:
Cdr O'Callaghan

1404

S.O.(I), Rome,
RAAC. APO 794. U.S. Army.

27th July, 1944.

To:

Commodore Palmer,
British Senior Naval Officer,
Rome.

C in C Mediterranean Staff requests that the
Ministry of Marine be asked if they can provide
information on improvements in:

Fire Control Systems

Gun Mountings

Ammunition.

Since July, 1943.

P. H. Allen
Commander, R.N.

Cgo.

F

1403

REF:RM.5/1


S.O.(I),
69, Via Sicilia,
Rome.

4th August, 1944.

To:

Commodore Palmer,
Senior British Naval Officer,
Rome.

The attached notes are forwarded for information.


Commander, R.N.

Distribution:

2 copies to S.O.(I), Med.



838

CSO

1950

S. 7/9
K

1402

NOTES ON THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION IN TURKEY SUPPLIED BY
TEN COL. PORTO RENATO BOGGIO IERA
UP TO 9TH AUGUST 1943.

The Chief of the German Intelligence Service in Turkey is General Rhode, head of the German Military Mission at the German Embassy at Ankara. He directs the Military Secret Service and has the heads of the Navy and the Air Force under him.

Of the three services, the best known is the Navy. The head is Admiral Von der Marwitz, who is an elderly man but in excellent physical condition, and normal intelligence. He has a frank vivacious manner. His two assistants are Capitano di Corvetta Shrader and Lieut Waischer, reserve officer, who in civil life are lawyer and professor respectively. The former does not obtain a lot of information, but the latter has the gift of languages of which he knows at least a dozen. Waischer does nothing else for the Service but exercise his linguistic ability.

The Admiral's secretary has long been in the Intelligence Service, and is much senior to the others in the Service. Not very well educated, but very sly and full of courage. At the same time cautious and prudent. Probably of Russian origin as he lived there for twenty years pursuing his calling of engineer but always in the employ of the German Intelligence Service.

At the German Embassy in Istanbul there is in some of the departments - Navy excluded - an independent private informative network which has a certain importance. The head of it is not known, but some of its ramifications were known, and it was deduced that it possessed certain channels of information of great importance in the vicinity and the Middle East.

The Japanese Intelligence Service kept itself to itself. The head of it is Capitano di Vascello Matsuura, intelligent and wily. It must be remembered that for many years he was not been to sea and was always attached to the Intelligence Service. One of his ablest assistants was a well known journalist who in the first months of 1943 was expelled from the country.

The head of the Spanish Intelligence Service is a Russian who professes to be a White Russian and anti-Bolshevik. His name is Valikater and he is a naturalised Spaniard and married

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The head of the Spanish Intelligence Service is a Russian who professes to be a White Russian and anti-Bolshevik. His name is Velikotuev and he is a naturalised Spaniard and married to a Spaniard. He is about 45-48 years old. He has many acquaintances among the Russians who remained in Turkey after the withdrawal of Wangel's Army. He is able to furnish valuable information, is a quick worker and has a good memory.

The heads of the Bulgarian and Roumanian Intelligence Service are the Military Attaches of these respective legations. Major General Geletoff and Teodorescu. Both are intelligent, capable and prudent, but their activities are limited to matters appertaining to happenings between the two countries.

CONFIDENTIAL.

COPY.

FNMM/rj

7th April 1944.

Admiral De Courten called on me to-day and brought up the following points:

1. He is very anxious that F.O.T.A. and F.O.L.I. should be separate. I explained to him that Admiral Morgan would almost at once be taking over the dual role of F.O.T.A.L.I. and of Head of the Naval Sub-Commission of A.C.C.. De Courten is quite in favour of this arrangement but still thinks that F.O.T.A. should be separate from F.O.L.I. who would at the same time be Head of the Naval Sub-Commission. I told him that when and if we reached Rome it might prove necessary to deal with the situation in this way but he himself is anxious that the separation should take place as early as possible.

He produced several arguments in favour of his suggestion and I told him that you would doubtless be prepared to discuss the question with him when next you met him.

2. De Courten is most anxious to know when he is likely to receive the two old type battleships which he requires, as you know, for training purposes and which he understood would be made available, one for Taranto and one for Augusta. He stressed the urgency of his need and I told him that I would write to you on the subject.

3. De Courten is most anxious to get various factories which used to be employed on Naval war material rehabilitated and working again. Most of these are situated in the Naples area. I suggest that the question might be gone into by the Naval Sub-Commission working in with the Sub-Commission of the A.C.C. which deals with war factories. If you agree I will arrange for this with Morgan and see what can be done.

4. De Courten tells me ~~that~~ the Italian Navy is terribly short of transport, much of it having been requisitioned or used up by the Allies when they first landed in the Country. His demands are modest and he says that the supply of 50 lorries and 20 cars would restore the situation but that this number are very badly wanted indeed. He has tried everywhere to get them but has failed. As allotment of transport for special purposes of this nature is largely settled ~~by~~ at A.F.H.Q. I told him that I would mention it to you and it may be that NATOUSA or A.G. of A.F.H.Q. could provide.

I have not yet met Morgan but hope to very shortly.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant-General,
Chief Commissioner.

Admiral Sir John Cunningham, K.C.B., M.V.O.,
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,
Allied Force Headquarters.

1400

POSTAL CENSORSHIP.

From: MARVESTI Aurelio,
Via S. Catolico,
PROCIDA.

To: Ammiraglio P. BARONE,
Comando R. Marina.

Date of letter: 12 April 1944.

ITALIAN SHIPS AIDING BLACK MARKET ACTIVITY.

The writer, a former Navy man, writes to Adm. BARONE of the Italian Navy, stating that the Capitaneria del Porto (Port Authority) of Isola di Procida (Naples), does not take action against the scandalous irregularities which are taking place in their jurisdiction. It is stated that ships and fisherboats are berthing there with the aid of fat 'Grafte' and therefore they are able to avoid being registered and put to work for the Allied or the Italian Navy. They leave the harbour and sail for Calabria where they load Olive Oil which is sold at the Black Market. One typical case is the Motor-sailing boat "ELENA" which left to-day for her third trip.

It is requested that a strict investigation be made; same to be made by an honest and competent Navy Officer.

Letter dated: 27 March 1944.

From: QUERCIO Gaspare,
Via S. Antonio, 25,
GERALD.

To: Redazione (Editorial Dept.)
"SICILIA LIBERATA"
Via Stabile, PALERMO.

CRITICISM OF USE OF ITALIAN WARSHIPS.

Writer criticises the news published by 'SICILIA LIBERATA' that Italian Warships have escorted an Allied convoy.

He states that at least one third of these ships could transport some flour which is necessary for the needs of the population. He further states that before Allied landings in Sicily the ration of bread was of 500 grammes daily and the spaghetti ration was of Kg. 2.500.

Besides he states that the Americans would have remained in Africa if the Italians had resisted the Allied landing.

From: MUSICO Giovanni,
Via S. Giacomo, 5-7,
MESSINA.

To: GUCCIA Pietro,
Via Stabile, 124,
PALERMO.

1399

INTERESTED IN BUYING EX-GERMAN SUB-MARINE.

Letter dated 13 March 44.

The writer, a former Navy man, writes to Adm. BARONE of the Italian Navy, stating that the Capitaneria del Porto (Port Authority) of Isola di Procida (Naples), does not take action against the scandalous irregularities which are taking place in their jurisdiction. It is stated that ships and fisherboats are berthing there with the aid of fat 'Grafts', and therefore they are able to avoid being registered and put to work for the Allied or the Italian Navy. They leave the harbour and sail for Calabria where they load Olive Oil which is sold at the Black Market. One typical case is the Motor-sailing boat "ELENA" which left to-day for her third trip.

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MESSINA.

To: CUCCIA Pietro,
Via Stabile, 124,
PALERMO.

1399

INTERESTED IN BUYING EX-GERMAN SUB-CHASER.

Letter dated 13 March 44.

"In reply to yours of the 6th instant - with reference to your esteemed letter of the 25th inst. (must mean ult.) we inform you that we have friends interested in the purchase of the former German submarine chaser (MAS). We must know, however, where it can be seen in order the estimate necessary repairs and investigate the price."

Naval Sub-Commission.
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.
Rear Headquarters.
26.4.1944.

(S.M.) I. M. PALMER.

COMMODORE.

POSTAL CENSORSHIP.

From: Cav. ANGELIS Rodolfo fu Giuseppe To: Ministero Marina
Vibo Valentia Marina. TARANTO.

Date of letter: 21 March 1944.

CITIZENS ACCUSE ITALIAN OFFICER OF HAVING SOLD MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

A group of citizens state that Captain BORJA Giacomo, self appointed naval commanding officer at Vibo Valentia, after having assumed command of that Naval Section during the absence of the true commander just before the Allied invasion sold all the military equipment and supplies to civilians living in the "Mondella Galleria", keeping the profits for himself. Using a small military truck, he went around selling a great quantity of military food stuffs, equipment, supplies, and clothing in the villages of Longobardi, Bivona, S. Pietro, and Vibo Marina, likewise, after the Allied invasion, he sold a great quantity of lubricating material and iron left on the Vibo Marina beach by the Allied troops. After having been taken prisoner by the British, he used deception in order to regain his freedom, representing himself as Chief of Police. Then he deserted, and was nowhere to be found.

After the Allied authorities left Vibo Marina, he and his cronies went back to their former occupation as Naval Base Chiefs. He was charged with the recovery of lubricating material and gasoline from a sunken ship. He underpaid the workers engaged in the task, thus cheating both workers and Government. The following people will be able to furnish more details about BORJA and his detrimental activities:

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| 1. SESSA. Cav. Giovanni - | Customs Director. |
| 2. SERRA. | In charge of Railroad Station near Beach. |
| 3. SASTRIANI. Alfredo - | In Charge of Railroad Station. |
| 4. COLUCCI. | Brigadiere of R. Guardia di Finanza. |
| 5. CASSISI. | Appuntato " |
| 6. - | Carabinieri of Vibo Marina Station. |
| 7. POSTINA. Giovanni - | Railroad employee. |
| 8. GARNOVALE. Antonio - | |
| 9. COSTA. Giovanni - | Archpriest of Vibo Marina. |

Naval Sub-Commission
Allied Control Commission
Rear Headquarters.
26.4.1944.

(Sgd) L. M. PALMER

1398

COMMODORE.

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| 8. COSTA. | Archpriest of Vibo Marina. |
| 9. - - - - - | - - - - - |

Naval Sub-Commission
Allied Control Commission
Rear Headquarters.
26.4.1944.

1398

1398

COMMODORE.

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - BRINDISI.

FROM... FLAG OFFICER TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE... 29th February, 1944.

Ref. T.A. 940/7.

TO .. ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, BRINDISI.
Commodore Palmer.

The following is an extract from the Naval Officer in Charge, Brindisi's Report of Proceedings for January:-

"Political Situation in Brindisi Area.

Many complaints are still heard that the Fascists hold local government offices and use newly formed political parties as a cloak for their activities. During the month there has been much activity by the various parties - Partito d' Azione, Communists, Monarchists and Socialists. The political ferment reached its peak when a meeting of all the parties was held in Bari on 28th January, but the feared riots and strikes did not occur. The tension has lessened and few incidents have been reported.

The economic situation remains unsatisfactory. The Black Market still flourishes though it is believed that efforts are being made to counteract it. Some improvements may be expected now that Civilian rations have been slightly augmented and the Allies are supplying the Italians with flour, but there is need for a strict control of prices."

NSCC(9)
14 MAR 1944 }
(Amend.)

(ydy) 6. Off. Duffett
FOR REAR-ADMIRAL.

1397

Copy for Comdore Palmer.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRINDISI AREA.

FROM FLAG OFFICER TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE 3rd February, 1944.

No.T.A.763/43a.

TO ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION.

The following extract of the Report of Proceedings of Naval Officer-in-Charge, Brindisi for the month of December, 1943, is forwarded for information.

"The political and general situation in the Brindisi Area remains the same:-

Many Fascists are still in power ostensibly because the Badoglio Government is incapable of finding competent men to replace them.

The political situation is still confused - there are many political parties with different views as to what sort of a Democracy Italy should have.

"Black Market" still flourishes - Italian Government does nothing to counteract it. Italian people tend to blame Allies and Italian Government has not organised food rationing, as it should. Perhaps the new Control Economic Committee of the Italian Mainland which the Allies have recently established in Naples will tackle the problem.

Many demands for increase in wages are being received. Complaints are made that with the devaluation of the lire and increased cost of living, wages have risen accordingly."

(Sgd.) R. McGRIGOR.

1396

REAR-ADMIRAL.

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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF F.O.T.A.L.I.
TARANTO.

30th. January, 1944.

REF. TA.5/4

SUBJECT: ITALIAN NAVAL OFFICERS WHO ARE
COLLABORATING WITH THE GERMANS

The attached list, obtained from the Italian Naval Staff Secret Intelligence Branch, gives details of officers of the Italian Navy who are known to be in collaboration with the Germans.

W. H. R. R. R. R. R.

ENG. LIEUT. COMMANDER, R.N.

S. O. (I). TARANTO.

DISTRIBUTION.

D.N.I.	3	S.O. (I). CIBALTAR	3
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F.C.T.A.L.I.	1	S.O. (I). MED.	1
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I.S.L.D.	1	COMMUNIC. (NIV)	1
I.S.L.D. M.F.	1	Commodore ZIROLI, USN.I.	1

MOST SECRET.

ITALIAN NAVAL STAFF.

SECRET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.21st. January, 1944.PROMEMORIA - NO. 42.Subject: Officers of the Italian Navy who remain in collaboration with the Germans.

Admiral FALANGOLA - was Ministerial Commissioner for the Italian Navy and later Chief of Cabinet in Admiral LEGNANI's Ministry.

Admiral SPARZANI - to begin with he accepted the post of SECRETARY GENERAL of the Ministry of the Navy of the Fascist Republic. On 13/1/44 he was nominated Chief of Staff of the Fascist Republican Navy.

Captain FERRINI - Under Secretary of the Fascist Republican Navy.

Captain D'ADENZO - Director General of MARITIME

General (Engineering)

DE RENZIO - " " " MARIOCOST.

General (Armaments)

ROBILLO - " " " MARINARMI

General (Accountancy)

REZZA. - " " " MARIOCOMI

Admiral ELENA - Deputy Chief of Staff.

Admiral VARELLI PLAZZA - Head of Operations Office attached to German Navy.

Commander LEONI - Chief of Admiral FALANGOLA's Cabinet - at present Naval Officer in Charge, TRIESTE.

Lieut Colonel (Engineers) MANTOVANI

Lieutenant

Captain

Major

Lieut Colonel

Colonel

Colonel (A.N.)

Lieut Commander

FRANCOSIO

PIOTCHARDONE

PIESTRENI

RIZZANI

GLACINI

in active collaboration with the Germans.

Commander BORGHESI - Commanding 10th. MAS Flotilla at Spezia.

Lieut. Colonel (A.N.) ALLECHI

Lieut. Commander CERRINA FERRONI

Admiral URBALDO degli UBERTI

German Commander HEINTZ - At the end of August, 1943 left the post of Additional Naval Attache at ROME and at the end of September returned to ROME to replace the German Admiral LOWISCH as Naval Attache.

German Admiral HANKE. - Was in the Ministry of Marine at ROME in the post-waristic period.

Lieut Commander (previously

Lieut. Engineer) BARBISCH - Would appear to be at present in ROME

1394

Admiral PALANGOLA - was Ministerial Commissioner for the Italian Navy and later Chief of Cabinet in Admiral LEGNANI's Ministry.

Admiral SPARZANI - to begin with he accepted the post of SECRETARY GENERAL of the Ministry of the Navy of the Fascist Republic. On 13/1/44 he was nominated Chief of Staff of the Fascist Republican Navy.

Captain FERRINI - Under Secretary of the Fascist Republican Navy.
 Captain DI ARLENZO - Director General of MARITIME
 General (Engineering) " " " " MARICOST.
 General (Armaments) " " " " MARINARI
 General (Accountancy) " " " " MARICOMI
 Admiral ELENK. - Deputy Chief of Staff.
 Admiral VARELLI PELICCI - Head of Operations Office attached to German Navy.

In Admiral
LEGNANI's Ministry.

Commander LEONI - Chief of Admiral PALANGOLA's Cabinet - at present Naval Officer in Charge, TRIESTE.

Lieut Colonel (Engineers) MANFROTTO
 Lieutenant TOMMASI
 Captain FERRETI
 Major FLANDOSIO
 Lieut Colonel PICCHARDONE
 Colonel FESERINI
 Colonel (A.N.) RIZZANI
 Lieut Commander GILCHIN
 in active collaboration
with the Germans.

Commander BORGHESE - Commanding 10th. MAS Flotilla at Spezia.
 Lieut. Colonel (A.N.) ALLEGRI
 Lieut. Commander GERRINI. FERRONI
 Admiral UBALDO degli UBERTI

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German Admiral HANKE. - Was in the Ministry of Marine at ROME in the post-justice period.

Lieut Commander (previously
 Lieut. Engineer) BARDELLI - Would appear to be at present in ROME commanding the "S.MARCO" REGIMENT which is engaged in the search for hidden officers of the Italian Navy who have not gone over to the Fascist Republican Navy.

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AMENDMENT TO REPORT NO. T. 5/4 30/1/44

SUBJECT: OFFICERS OF THE ITALIAN NAVY WHO REMAIN IN COLLABORATION WITH THE GERMANS.

Subsequent to the receipt of information on this subject from the Secret Intelligence Branch of the Italian Naval Staff, a Commander of the Royal Italian Navy, who escaped from Rome on 26th. December, 1943, has supplied the following additional details:-

1) The Ministry of the Fascist Republican Navy has left Rome, and is now established at HELLINO, 47 miles North of VENICE.

2) Admiral PALINGOLA - Has now relinquished his appointment as Chief of Cabinet, but still continues to carry on propaganda activities. His new appointment is not known.

General (Armaments)
RUBELLE - Has left MARTINATI and has not been replaced.

Admiral ELENA - Has not collaborated with the Germans. He has been in hiding since the Armistice.

Admiral VAROLI PLAZZA - Resigned from his appointment when Commander BORGHESE was promoted (see below). He is described as being "fanatically pro-German" and still very active in seeking adherents to the Navy of the Fascist Republic.

Commander LECCHI - Has been given a new appointment; details not known. He is a very active collaborator.

Colonel (A.N.) RIZZANI - Although still in the employment of the Germans, he is said to be duping them.

Commander BORGHESE - Has been promoted to Deputy Chief of Staff at the Republican Navy Ministry. Described as a pompous individual, whose exploits with the assault craft of the 10th. LES Flotilla brought him much fame. When his efforts failed to induce Italian Naval Officers in German Occupied Italy to join him, he is known to have threat-

subject from the Secret Intelligence Branch of the Italian Naval Staff, a Commander of the Royal Italian Navy, who escaped from Rome on 26th. December, 1943, has supplied the following additional details:-

- 1) The Ministry of the Fascist Republican Navy has left ROME, and is now established at VERONA, 47 miles North of VENICE.
- 2) Admiral PALANGOLA - Has now relinquished his appointment as Chief of Cabinet, but still continues to carry on propaganda activities. His new appointment is not known.
- General (Armaments) RUELLE - Has left MARTINI and has not been replaced.
- Admiral ELENA - Has not collaborated with the Germans. He has been in hiding since the armistice.
- Admiral VARELLI PLAZZA - Resigned from his appointment when Commander BORGHESI was promoted (see below). He is described as being "fanatically pro-German" and still very active in seeking adherents to the Navy of the Fascist Republic.
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- Admiral UBALDO degli UBALDI - Is the Chief of the Republican Navy Press Section.

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3) The following are also collaborating with the Germans:-

Captain MERINI -

Is the now Director of the C.R.I.M. -
Training Establishment for all Naval
ratings.

Captain FERRUTTI }
Captain SICO } -
Captain CONTI }

Ministry.

Commander DE MONTE - Secret Intelligence Service.

4)

Rear Admiral FRANCO MAUGERI - Was the Chief of the Royal
Italian Navy Secret Intelligence
Service in ROME. Is still hiding
in ROME and being persistently
sought by the Germans.

Commander DONINI -

Cryptographer. Is employed by the Germans
but is known to be duping them. He is
said to be in clandestine contact with
Admiral MAUGERI.

Vice Admiral PERREI -

In hiding. Is recognised to be the
Head of all those Royal Italian Naval
Officers who are trying to get away or
who are waiting to join the Allies.

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LT. Davis } RNVIR

The attached is for Commodore Palmer.

R. L. Stuma.
LT COL. R. CNVR.

Jan 20. 1944.

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APPENDIX "A"
TO FIFTH ARMY G-2 REPORT NO. 131

REPORT ON ROME

The following information on ROME supplements Appendix "A" to Fifth Army G-2 Report No. 35 "Conditions in ROME".

1. General.

a. Demolitions and Preparations for Demolitions.

Confirmation has been received that all bridges over the Tiber in ROME are prepared for demolition. Rumors are still strong that the Germans are mining ROME. An Italian reports that he was arrested by the Germans while in ROME, and worked for them mining the following locations:

- (1) The basement of the MINISTERO DELLA MARINA (F-732690). The workers dug holes about five yards long, filled these with dynamite, covered the dynamite, and then electrical contacts were attached.
- (2) The bridge, PONTE DEL LITTORIO (F-731689), immediately southwest of the MINISTERO DELLA MARINA.
- (3) Under the arch in the PIAZZALE FLAMINIO (F-736886). (This probably refers to the PORTA DEL POPOLO).
- (4) The basement of the MINISTERO DELLE FINANZE, (F-754680).

b. Tactical.

No fixed or mobile defenses reported in city.

2. Property control.

The number of Polizia Africana Italiana numbers about 10,000. They are well armed with pistol and Beretta 9-mm sub-machine gun.

3. Medical.

There is no incidence of infectious disease, but medical supplies are scarce.

Health is normal.

4. Economics and Supplies.

- a. Stores are open and well provided and the banks have been reopened for small trade. Food seems to be getting scarce. This may be due to the fact that restrictions on movements of civilians have prevented the buying of food just outside of ROME where it is relatively available. Lack of transportation facilities may be another reason. However, the Black Market is functioning as well as ever.

b. Following are some Black Market prices:

Meat	100 lire/kilo
Butter	400 lire/kilo (very scarce)
Flour	50 lire/kilo
Oil	400 lire/liter
Bread	35 lire/kilo

c. The following extracts from recent Fascist Journals are of interest:

- (1) Anyone who does not deliver or delivers only in part, the quantity of farm products fixed for the market is subject to the death penalty.

In cases less serious, punishment is confinement or imprisonment.

There may also be a fine and the confiscation of the violator's goods.

The same penalty will be imposed on those who without legal authority bring to market goods to be killed, animals which should be brought to the

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There may also be a fine and the confiscation of the violator's goods.

The same penalty will be imposed on those who without legal authority kill, or cause to be killed, animals which should be brought to the market; or to those who mill, cause to be milled, cereals or oil products or who accept for killing or work no matter how, animals or agricultural products for persons not holding proper authorization.

SOURCE: Voce Di Romagna - Sunday 2 January 1944.

Settimanale del Fascio Repubblicano d'Imola.

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- h. Report on ROME.
Latest conditions in ROME as compiled from many sources, are contained in the attached report, appendix "A".

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

No Change. See G-2 Report No. 109.

for info

for EDWIN B. HOWARD, C. SC.
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

Annex No. 1, Overlay,
Appendix "A", Report on ROME.
Appendix "B", Translation of German Company Order.

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- the attached report, Appendix 1.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITY 3.
No Change. See G-2 Report No. 109.

Annex No. 1, Overlay,
Appendix "A", Report on ROM E.
Appendix "B", Translation of German Company Order.

DISTRIBUTION:
G-2 Special.

for
EDWIN B. HOWARD, G-2
Colonel, G.S.C.,
A.C. of S., G-2.

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- (2) Salt is rationed 300 grammes per person per month.
SOURCE: Il Resto Del Carlino, January 2, 1944.
(3) As of the first of December bread ration cards are valid for 325 grammes of bread daily and for 225 rations for children from 9 to 18 years. Purchasers of bread may demand from bakeries the difference between what they have already received and what is still due them under this new regulation, as of the first of December. New laws are being examined for those who have received grain instead of flour. This regulation was passed after 1 December 1943 and is therefore, retroactive.

SOURCE: Giustizia Sociale, (Giornale Dei Lavoratori), Modena.
(4) On 3 January 1944 there arrive in ROME 361 quintelli of vegetables and 1,951 quintelli of fruit (among which were 1,252 quintelli of oranges). 1,400 quintelli of vegetables were brought directly to the market.

- (5) Milk: Milk will today be apportioned as follows:
a. All the milk called for by ration cards, specifically for babies.
b. 50% of milk called for by ration cards of the sick.
c. 50% of milk called for by ration cards of hospitals, clinics, infirmaries.
d. 200 grammes of milk for children up to three years.
e. 50% of milk called for by ration cards of workers engaged in unhealthful work.

SOURCE: Cronaca Di Roma 4 January 1944.

- (6) Gas will be turned on 5 January with normal pressure during the evening from 7 to 8. Ration cards from communities other than ROME will not be valid in ROME.

SOURCE: Il Popolo Di Roma 4 January 1944.

- d. ^a FW who was in ROME recently makes the following statements:
Prices for common household commodities are unknown to FW, but he claims that prices in general are rather high. Soldiers are not allowed to make purchases as all food stuffs for civilians are rationed. All foods come from the countryside around ROME and within the province of ROME, and all imports into the city are controlled and checked by the Germans. German vehicles are used for transportation of these goods. White Italian bread and white macaroni are rationed but available to the civilian population in small but sufficient quantities. Meat is available but also rationed. Vegetables are plentiful and not rationed. Most of the food is brought to the Market Place in ROME or to the wholesale house just at the edge of the city, where storage and distribution takes place. (No definite locations). How much food stuffs are available is not known, but FW estimates that if food sources were cut, populace could still be fed for a period of 2 to 3 weeks with the commodities on hand. Nevertheless, a big BLACK MARKET exists. FW does not know the punishment for violations. The Germans have instituted soup kitchens for the needy. These are located in various districts throughout the city. Strict regulations govern the admission of others to these kitchens. There is no indication that flour mills, warehouses, bakeries and markets are in the process of being demolished.

5. Labor.

The Germans employ Italians to work on public construction. These employees are fed by the Germans and given some wages. Wages are up about 30%.

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5. Labor.

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6. Finance.

The Zecca Mint has left ROME with all its machinery. No new type of notes has been issued.

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(Equals British SECRET)

7. Vatican.

- a. On the whole the neutrality of the Vatican is respected. The Osservatore Romano is rigidly censored by the Germans, even omitting those portions of the Pope's speeches which criticize the Axis by implication. The Vatican Radio no longer broadcasts.
- b. The Germans gave the bombing of the Vatican a great build-up over the radio and in the papers, even taking moving pictures in the Vatican. A sudden discontinuance of so much as a mention of the attack has convinced the people that the bombing was an Axis effort. "For if it had been American they wouldn't have dropped a couple of small bombs, but thousands."
- c. German sentinels are posted at the entrance to St. Peter's Square and prevent the entry of all Germans, including officers. At the entrance to the Vatican City and the church itself are Swiss guards who stop all soldiers in uniform, except those on officially conducted tours, and all civilian men under the class of 1906.
- d. The food situation is much better than in Rome itself.

8. Resistance.

- a. The character of resistance is primarily political.
- b. Glandastine publications and pamphlets are distributed through the theatres during movies. Some cases of sabotage have been reported. Recently the curfew was moved to 6:00 P.M.

9. Military.

- a. Recruiting of Fascist Republican armies is proceeding very slowly. At present the names of old Italian divisions are used, although none are known to have been completed as full strength divisions. The Caserma on Via Lepanto is used as a recruiting center. The volunteers to the Republican Fascist Army. Students are in the Battaglioni "M", others are in the Militia.
- b. Recent reports indicate that with the exception of some S.S. troops, there are no combat soldiers in Rome.
- c. All reports indicate that the population of Rome is pro-Allied. It has been suggested that even the Italian Police would cooperate with the Allies in the event that a threat of Rome being taken by the Allies were indicated.

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EXTRACTS OF REPORTS FROM BARI AND BRINDISI.

FROM.. FLAG OFFICER TARANTO AND ADRIATIC.

DATE.. 11th January, 1944.

No.T.A.763/25.

TO .. THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION, BRINDISI.

Commodore Palmer.

The attached extracts of the Reports of Proceedings of the late Naval Officer-in-Charge, Bari and of the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Brindisi for the month of November is forwarded for your information and any action you may consider desirable.

1 1016N 10111
COMM-5111012/44
8/8(Signal) R. McRIGOR
REAR-ADMIRAL.

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EXTRACT OF REPORT FROM THE NAVAL OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, BARI.

" There is no doubt in my mind that there remains a very considerable Fascist element in Bari which is causing considerable concern to those Italians who are truly co-operative. Many of these Fascists remain in high positions in the military and civil Government of the town and are disposed to use their influence to foster ill-feeling to our cause when an opportunity offers. The civil riot possibilities should, therefore, I consider by no means be disregarded. I would submit that serious consideration should be given to the removal of these high-placed Fascist elements in the near future.

There is no doubt that the tone of the population has altered very considerably during the month of November and from being a cowed and bewildered community they have become one which feels that the Allied cause cannot progress without their assistance. The situation cannot yet be considered acute but might, I consider, at any time take a turn which would be to our disadvantage."

EXTRACT OF REPORT FROM THE NAVAL OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, BRINDISI." POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRINDISI AREA.

This report is based on information volunteered by British Officers of the Naval Base, attached Italian Naval Liaison Officers, Italian families, Port Security Officers, and the general attitude of the "men in the street".

It is necessary to accept each opinion with reserve but as the information so far collected is derogatory there appears to be no reason to suspect that it was not given in good faith. One thing is obvious to the most unbiased onlooker and that is that all is not well in Brindisi. There is a feeling of unrest, of uncertainty, of surprise that the local Fascisti are still allowed to hold most powerful positions in the area, especially in local government, and moreover that they are using their powers to their own advantages and that their friends, and to the detriment of Allied interests.

POLITICAL FACTORS.

The Fascist "Squadriste" are not only at liberty but continue to hold their former positions in the area. As they are well known individuals the average moderate-thinking Italian considers that the "amazing" situation is condoned by the Allied authorities.

Literature has recently been distributed in the town on behalf of the Fascist "Partito Fascista Repubblicano", and from Mesagne and Catoni come reports of openly and publicly declared propaganda on behalf of the Germans.

Communism appears to be growing (4,000 enrolled members in Brindisi) but it is considered that this is the natural reaction of a people subjected so long to fascism, and is being fostered by the feeling of frustration occasioned by the apparent lack of interest shown in their future welfare by the Allies.

FOOD SHORTAGE.

Under German control the food situation in a district which has never been very productive was adequate without being plentiful, the system of rationing being rigid but just. In International law the responsibility of the feeding of conquered peoples rests with the conqueror, and it is felt that the Allies, particularly the British, upon whom so much trust in matters of political justice has been placed in the past, have failed lamentably in this matter of primary importance. The inadequate rationing, the handing over of food control to local officials many of whom were ardent pro-fascists before our entry, and the flourishing "Black Market" trade which is being fostered by our methods, have done much to alienate the "moderate" Italian from giving active help and assistance to our armies of occupation. That we have lost "face" is apparent and it is considered that unless remedied by quick and drastic action, repercussions may be felt for many years to come. German and Fascist propagandists are making the most of the situation and the seeds of discontent are being well sown in the minds of the Italian people. Already there has been a disturbance in the market and the police have had to intervene.

GENERAL SURVEY.

The Badoglio Government is mistrusted and considered incapable of putting things right even if it wanted to do so. At a meeting of the members in Bari in November it was reported that they were very concerned about a proposal that they should take over from AMGOT in Sicily. The Italian people are like a ship without a course to steer - they feel that we have misled them, their own government is weak, and unreliable. Fascist

is a feeling of unrest, of uncertainty, of surprise that the local Fascists are still allowed to hold most powerful positions in the area, especially in local government, and moreover that they are using their powers to their own advantages and that/their friends, and to the detriment of Allied interests.

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Under German control the food situation in a district which has never been very productive was adequate without being plentiful, the system of rationing being rigid but just. In International Law the responsibility of the feeding of conquered peoples rests with the conqueror, and it is felt that the Allies, particularly the British, upon whom so much trust in matters of political justice has been placed in the past, have failed lamentably in this matter of primary importance. The inadequate rationing, the handing over of food control to local officials many of whom were ardent pro-Fascists before our entry, and the flourishing "Black Market" trade which is being fostered by our methods, have done much to alienate the "moderate" Italian from giving active help and assistance to our armies of occupation. That we have lost "face" is apparent and it is considered that unless remedied by quick and drastic action, repercussions may be felt for many years to come. German and Fascist propagandists are making the most of the situation and the seeds of discontent are being well sown in the minds of the Italian people. Already there has been a disturbance in the market and the police have had to intervene.

GENERAL SURVEY.

The Badoglio Government is mistrusted and considered incapable of putting things right even if it wanted to do so. At a meeting of the members in Bari in November it was reported that they were very concerned about a proposal that they should take over from AMGOT in Sicily. The Italian people are like a ship without a course to steer - they feel that we have abandoned them, their own government is weak, and unreliable. Fascist and Nazi propaganda is strong whereas that of the Allies is weak, the Fascists appear to be as powerful as ever in local government, undesirable growths such as the Black Market are flourishing, the ordinary individual is undernourished and the general state of confusion exists. The danger lies in one of the rabble parties attempting to take control, and it is considered that the time is ripe for us to declare our hand and take a decided course of action.

Attached is a translation of a manifesto, signed by 36 citizens, which was recently handed in to the Port Security Officer.

COPY OF MANIFESTO PRESENTED BY 36 CITIZENS OF BRINDISI.

"To: The Allied Commanding Officer, Brindisi."

The under-signed, citizens of Brindisi, take the liberty of presenting the following to the Commanding General:-

1. Since 25th July, 1943, we have seen no change in the political administration in Brindisi.
2. That the provincial powers are still in the hands of the Fascists.
3. That the Prefectura and Questura, people who belong body and soul to the fallen regime, still are in command.
4. That in all the political offices and syndicates there still are creatures of Mussolini.
5. That in all the important centres in Brindisi there are Fascists spreading propaganda against the Allies and their armies.
6. That in offices acts of sabotage which may have important consequences, such as the shortage of seed for the crops which may cause shortage of wheat on the next years harvest, are taking place.
7. That everything is continuing as it did before the fall of Fascism.
8. That thefts, dishonesty, complicity and immorality, continue.
9. That all the municipal services, even the most simple, are carrying on the same as before, and even worse.
10. That no propaganda is being made against Fascism and against Germans.
11. That the Anti-fascists are not being taken into any consideration, that we still have not our liberty.
12. That all this producing discontent amongst the population.
13. That the government of Regiooglio does not wish and does not know how to end this intolerable state of affairs.

WE REQUEST /

14. That Brindisi and the province be taken away from a Government incapable of settling things right, and to give to the people of Brindisi political liberty and just administration and the proper functioning of all the most important services, and therefore that Brindisi be considered like Sicily and be taken under the protection of the Anglo-American authorities to whom we will give our utmost collaboration.

signed by 36 persons -

(Sta. 94/35)

22668 Wt 36005/D8794 18.000M 12/41-McC & Co Ltd-51-1826

S. 1320h.
(Established-October, 1933)NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: AIZ.387.

FROM: C in C MED

SECRET CYPHER. BALEGRAM.

SITUATION REPORT No.256.

- (1). Convoy GUB 25 was attacked by aircraft in position 035°(216°)North, 016°58'East at 1648, 21st December. S.S.AL(PF)ERAT was seriously damaged by (2near) mines and later sank, there was no casualties. Two Mosquitos covering convoy attacked and claim damage to two JU.88.
- (2). Area in which "FELIXSTOWE" was mined on 18th. December has been cleared. 10 Mines out.

T.O.O.221945.December.

T.O.R.230255.

Dist. A (Neg.PMSO. NCSO. CST. BEO.)+ Commodore PALMER.
+ C.S.15.

5150. B. TWE. LWH.

1385

1869

(Sta. 94/35)

22663 W. 36005/D8794 18,000M 12/41-McC & Co Ltd-51-1826

S. 1320h.
(Established—October, 1919)

To: J. L. C. MED (R) NAVAL MESSAGE
WLO 3TH. ARMY

FROM: P.O.T.A.I.I.

SECRET CYPHER.

Sitrep No. 41.

- (1). TYRIAN and TEAZER patrolled YUGO SLAV coast DRIVENIK to ZIRJE Island and FARNDANE and BRECON swept south of KORCULA and RIJET Island, night 22nd/23rd. Both BLANK.
- (2). HUB's successfully attacked with torpedoes the stranded Cruiser DALMATIA (ex RIGBT) night 21/22nd.
- (3). SIEBEL Ferry in Sitrep No. 35 Para 2 has been located burnt out ashore. C.B. Chest has been recovered intact and it is intended to tow the hull with a good engine back to Bari.
- (4). Fresh German landings in vicinity TEKLENA on KORCULA reported.
- (5). No report from ETH's operating night 22nd/23rd.
- (6). Since my SITREP 37 a further 26 tanks have been ferried TERMOLI to SANGRO River. Service continues.

T.O.D. 231823, December

T.O.D. In transit.

Dist A + 242 Group. & Commodore Palmer.
LWH.

1384

(Sta. 94/35)

(5/854) Wt. 44983/D6358. 35,000M. 3/41. H. & S. Ltd. 61-8876.

S. 1320h.
(Established—October, 1935)**NAVAL MESSAGE.**TO: IN C (R) NLO 8TH ARMY
NLO 15TH ARMYFROM:
TOTALI**SITREP NO. 40.****SECRET CYPHER**

- TEAZER and FENI patrolled YUGO SLAV coast between Lat. 43° 35' N and Lat. 43° 25' N night 19th/20th no result yet reported
2. MTB 642 captured two German Schooners at 1200 19th north of HVAR and returned to BARI with crews totalling 12 Germans. Schooner handed over to Partisans.
3. 130 Partisan troops shipped to VIS night 19th/20th and returned with 40 wounded Partisan troops.
4. Small ex-German tanker ULJESARA towed back from VIS to BARI by LCI 127 night 18th/19th. This LCI took to KORCULA six 6 pounder guns and two jeeps to tow them.
5. MTB 97 evacuated one wounded British officer from ALBANIA night 18th/19th.

I/T A

TOO 201853
TOR IN TRANSITDIST. SEC A/SECS CSO SOD SOD2 OPS SOI SOP SSO SOSO
COMMODORE PALMER

1383

(SAC 04/85)

(S 1854) Wt. 44983/106308. 35,000M. 3/4L B. A. S. Ltd. 51-8876.

S. 1320h.
(Reestablished—October, 1935)NAVAL MESSAGE.TO IN C MED (R) FLO 8th ARMY
FLO 15th ARMY GROUP

FROM OTALL

SECRET CYPHER

SITREP 38.

TYRIAN & TEAZER swept coast from DURAZZO to
DUBROVNIK. No result.(2) M.G.B. report of operations 6th to 13th Dec indicate
one vessel only engaged during the period and that escaped
inshore in vicinity of CAPE LOVISTE.(3) Two M.G.B's and two M.T.B's at present operating in
Island area.

NC/A

TOO 18 1801 A Dec

TOB in transit

Dist "A" Commodore PALMER 242 GROUP.

Wes

1382

(Sta. 04/35)

(S. 854) Wt. 44983/D6358. 35,000M. 3/41. U. & S. Ltd. 51-8876.

S. 1320h.
(Established—October, 1935)**NAVAL MESSAGE.**To: C IN C MED (R) N.O. 8TH ARMY
N.O. 15TH ARMY GROUP

From: FOTALI

SECRET CYPHER

SITREP NO 36.

- (1) TYRIAN AND PHAZER SWEEP ITALIAN COAST BENEDETTO TO ANCONA NIGHT 13TH/14TH NO RESULT.
- (2) SAME DESTROYERS SWEEP DUBROVNIK TO DURAZZO NIGHT 14TH/15TH AND SHELLED TUG AND LIGHTER OFF KOTOR. TUG SEEN LISTING AND SMOKING AND BOTH CRAFT LATER DISAPPEARED. FLARE ACTIVITY FROM SHORE AND DESTROYERS WITHDREW.
- (3) ONE LCI(L) EMPLOYED FERRYING FURTHER LOAD OF TROOPS TO VIS NIGHT 14TH/15TH.
- (4) UGB'S OPERATED OFF PELEJESAC PENINSULAR 14TH/15TH NO RESULTS KNOWN.
- (5) FOUR LIFEBOATS OF CAP PADARAN RECOVERED IN GOOD CONDITION.
- (6) 242 GROUP HUNTING SUBMARINE IN AREA OF YOUR 142050 ALL DAY 15TH WITHOUT RESULT.

T.O.O. 151757 DEC

REF. 142050. U BOAT REPORTED.

ST. "A" NEG DEC. CST. NCSC.

242 GROUP. C.S. 15. COMMODORE PALMER.

W/T A SW/EW TWH

1381

187A 121/531

48/245. WL 1 75 0944. 7,500M. 43. C.H.A.B.L.M.

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

S. 1320d.

(Established—May, 1950)
(Revised—January, 1953)

To: C IN C LED (R) FLO 15TH ARMY:
FLO 8TH ARMY:

FROM:

TOTAL

SECRET CYFHER

SITREP 3:

1. PTYRIAN AND "TRAGER" PATROLLED ITALIAN COAST ANCONA TO 042° 50' NORTH, RESUME DASH. SAN BENEDETTO WAS SHELLED IN MISTY WEATHER, RESULTS NOT KNOWN.
2. M.T.B.'s OPERATING PORTS VIS AND EVER HAVE HAD NO LUCK.
3. B.N.L.O. MYAN REPORTS THAT GERMAN AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN ACTIVE AND PARTISAN GUNBOAT "IRKA" HAS BEEN BOMBED AND SUNK. SCHOOLERS HAVE BEEN MACHINE GUNNED.
4. DETAILS OF SINKING OF "CAP VERDAN" AND SUBSEQUENT SUPPLIES WERE CONTAINED IN AUGUSTA 101243 AND NY 10-245.
5. FURTHER 300 PARTISANS FERRYED TO VIS WINTER 9/10

T.O.C. 101851 A DEC.

T.O.D. IN TRANSIT

DIST. A 242 GROUP COLONORE PALMER 5036(A)

1/T. A GW. EST.

1380

(STA. 12V53)

45/243. WL 49. 00044 7.600M. 4/43. C.B. & L.L.D.

SECRET
NAVAL MESSAGE

S. 1320d.

(Established - May, 1930)
(Revised - January, 1933)

To: C IN C MED. (R) TOTALI FLAMBO
NLO 8TH ARMY
NO. 2 DISTRICT

FROM:

NOIC TARANTO

SECRET CYPHER

SITREP NO. 34.

CARGO DISCHARGED FOR 7 DAYS ENDING 10TH DECEMBER 1943.
24318 TONS INCLUDING WEIGHTS OF 3725 VEHICLES. ALSO 11400 TONS OIL
FUEL. 569 TONS COAL AND CONTENTS OF 23 IST AND 16 LCI.

37480 PERSONNEL DISSEMBARKED. 2274 PERSONNEL EMBARKED.
CARGO LOADED 885 TONS STORES INCLUDING WEIGHTS OF 108 VEHICLES.
FLOATING DOCK NO. 6 ARRIVED EX RIZERTA. CONGESTION OF SHIPS GR EARLY
EASTD. NO VACANT BERTHS NO SHIPS AWAITING DISCHARGE. CONVOY ARRIVING
13TH WILL COMMENCE DISCHARGE IMMEDIATELY.

TOO 111837

I/T

W/T A

DIST. B COMODORE PALMER DIST NO. 2 DISTRICT

1379

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

C IN CMED (R) TOTALI NLO 8TH ARMY
NO 2 DISTRICT FLAMBO PSTO MED

FROM: NOIC TARANTO.

IMPORTANT SECRET CYPHER.

~~SITREP NO 33.~~

CONGESTION OF SHIPPING IN TARANTO IS INCREASING. PORT IS WORKING EFFICIENTLY TO AGREED CAPACITY BUT TOO MANY SHIPS ARE BEING SENT. 2. AFTER COMPLETING AND SAILING 12 SHIPS TODAY AND STARTING DISCHARGE ON A FRESH BATCH THERE ARE STILL 8 SHIPS AWAITING BERTH. BERTHS SHOULD BE CLEAR FOR MISC TO START ON 7TH OR 8TH ON WHICH DAYS 12 MORE SHIPS ARRIVE ALSO ~~REPRESENTATIONS~~ 10 PERSONNEL SHIPS AND 20 LST's. HOSPITAL SHIPS WILL ALSO HAVE CLAIMS.

3. REPRESENTATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO NO 2 DISTRICT WHO STATE ARRANGEMENTS IN HAND WITH FLAMBO TO DIVERT FUTURE SHIPPING UNTIL POSITION CLEARS.

CARGO DISCHARGED FOR 7 DAYS ENDING 3RD DECEMBER 1943 22917 TONS OF STORES INCLUDING WEIGHTS OF 2767 VEHICLES. ALSO 13525 TONS OF OIL FUEL AND CONTENTS OF 25 LST 3 LCI 1 LCT, 8609 PERSONNEL DISEMBARKED. AGREED.

TOO 041941

SENT IN TWO PARTS TOO OF PART I 041941.

DIST B. NEG 242 GROUP COMODORE BALMER.

1378

121.121/331

45/245 W. 49. 12144 7.000M. 4/45 C.H. 34.1.00

SECRET
NAVAL MESSAGE.

S. 1320d.

(Established May 1930)
(Revised January 1933)To: C IN C MED (R) NLO 8TH ARMY
NLO 15TH ARMY GROUP

FROM: TOTALLY

MOST SECRET CYPER

SITEEP NO.32.

- (1) Tyrian and Teeser patrolled traffic route Pola to Aninella night 8th/9th. Blank.
- (2) Stores are ferried from Bari to Yugo Slav Islands in Partisan ships every night. This routine traffic will not be included in each siteep.
- (3) "Seahawk" landed British personnel for S.O.F. and stores Brac, Hvar, Vis and Korcula nights 3rd/4th to 5th/6th inclusive.
- (4) German Hospital Ship Gradiska brought into Brindisi and 129 British and 824 Italians removed.

T.O.O. 091851 DEC

DISTR A + COMMODORE PALMER (negative BBO 831 PM30 1030 OPS)
W/T A SW

1377

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: C IN C MED. (R) NLO 8TH ARMY From: POTALL
NLO 15TH ARMY GROUP

SECRET CYRNER

SITREP NO. 29.

1. QUEENBOROUGH AND RAIDER PATROLLED ITALIAN COAST SOUTH OF ANCONA BLANK.
2. MFB's OPERATED IN CHANNELS OFF SPLIT NO REPORT.
3. MINES DETONATED AT BOTH BARI AND BRINDISI DECEMBER 4TH

T.O.O. 051807 A DEC.

T.O.D. IN TRANSIT

DIST. A 242 GROUP COMMODORE PALMER.

I/T A. HSE HSE.

1376

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: C IN C MED (R) NIO 15 1ST Y GROUP FROM: FOTALL
NIO 8TH 1ST Y

MOST SECRET

SITREP 28.

1. No destroyer activities. No reports from MTB.
2. Bicester and Zetland arrived Taranto from Bari with superficial damage and gas casualties. Vienna and MTB3 from Bari temporarily unserviceable owing to contamination.
3. Two more mines exploded Brindisi.
4. ISLD agents landed night 29TH/30TH near San Benedetto.
5. Unsuccessful attempts made on 5 nights to recover 4 SAS personnel from beach South of Ancona. Last attempt night 1ST/2ND.
6. Partially successful attempts to land stores and embark personnel from beach 40°05'N 13°44' E night 1st/2nd.
7. Italian Sub. returned Brindisi 3rd Dec from landing agents south of CHIAGGIA.
8. Agents and SAS personnel landed beaches near Civitanova night 3rd/4th.

T.O.O. 041917 DEC

T.O.B. in transit

DISTN SEC A/SECS COS SOP SSO SOO SOO2 SCSC SOSC(A) NOIC
SOI COMODORE PALMER.
W/T A SW

1375

Commo Palmer
SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE. *MP2*

To: C IN C MED (R) NLO 15 ARMY GROUP
NLO 8th ARMY

From:

TOTALI

SECRET CYPHER

SITUATION REPORT 27.

- (1) PARI RAIDED 2000 NOVEMBER 2nd AMMUNITION SHIP HIT SEVENTEEN SHIPS PROBABLE TOTAL LOSS VITHOTHERS DAMAGED. MY 031035 REFERS.
- (2) QUILLIAM AND XXXX LOYAL BOMBARDED COAST ROAD BETWEEN PESCARA AND CUILIGNOVA DURING AFTERNOON 2nd. BRIDGES AND FIXED TARGETS WERE XXXX FIRED AT. NO TRAFFIC SEEN ON ROAD. GOOD SPITFIRE COVER GIVEN
- (3) NIGHT 2nd/3rd SAME DESTROYERS SHELLED ANCONA AND SAN BENEDETTO AND SANK THREE SCHOONERS OFF THE COAST IN THE AREA. TWO FURTHER SCHOONERS WERE DAMAGED, BOTH WERE ABANDONED AND ONE LEFT IN SINKING CONDITION.
- (4) INEFFECTIVE SHORE FIRE WAS OPENED DURING AFTERNOON BY LARGE GUNS WHEN RETIRING FROM ANCONA AT NIGHT NO DAMAGE TO SHIPS.
- (5) QUEENBOROUGH AND RAIDER SANK ONE 50 TON MOTOR VESSEL NORTHBOUND IN POSITION 42°30'N 15°54'E AT 0220 3rd.
- (6) NO REPORTS YET RECEIVED FROM MTES OPERATING IN CHANNELS SOUTH OF SPLIT.
- (7) YOUR 021658 REPORT ON CHANDESLINE OPERATIONS FOLLOWS.

E.O.O. 031001

T.O.D. IN TRNSIT

NC/A
DIST. A 2LO (STATION) 500 (PICK) COMMODORE PALMER
END/LWY

1374

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

C IN C MED (R) NLO 15TH ARMY GROUP
To: NLO 8TH ARMY

From: FCTAL1

SECRET GIPPER

SITREP 25

1. RIDGSTER AND ZETLAND PATROLLED OFF DALMATIAN COAST
NIGHT 1/2 BETWEEN SIBENIK AND SPLIT. NOTHING SIGHTED.
2. FLEET DESTROYERS UNABLE TO REACH PATROL AREA NORTH
OF FERRARA DUE TO WEATHER.
3. NO REPORT FROM M.T.B. 's PATROLLING IN CHANNELS SOUTH OF
SPLIT.
4. ONE MINE DETONATED IN ENTRANCE TO BRINDISI. AT 1600/2

TOC 021911
IN TRANSIT

A

DIST A NEG BEC OUT

1373

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: C IN C MED (R) NLO 15TH ARMY GROUP
NLO 8TH ARMY

From: FOTALL

SECRET CIPHER

SITREP 26

1. BICESTER AND ZETLAND PATROLLED OFF DALMATIAN COAST
NIGHT 1/2 BETWEEN SIBENIK AND SPLIT. NOTHING SIGHTED.
2. FLIGHT DESTROYERS UNABLE TO REACH PATROL AREA NORTH
OF PISCARA DUE TO WEATHER.
3. NO REPORT FROM M.T.F. 's PATROLLING IN CHANNELS SOUTH OF
SPLIT.
4. ONE MINE DETONATED IN ENTRANCE TO BRINDISI. AT 1600/2

A

TOO 021911
IN TRANSIT

DIST A NEG BEO CST

1372

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: C I N C MED.

(R) NIO 5TH ARMY NIO 15 ARMY

From:

P.C.P.A.I.I.

SITREP. NO 25.

NIGHT 30TH/1ST QUEENBOROUGH AND RAIDER SWEEP EAST ADRIATIC COAST FROM DURAZZO TO DUBROVNIK. 34 H.A. SHELLS FIRED INTO DURAZZO ONE LARGE FIRE STARTED. STARSHELL AND INEFFECTIVE FIRE FROM SHORE AS SHIPS LEFT BAY. SAME DESTROYERS ILLUMINATED DUBROVNIK WITH STARSHELL BUT SAW NO SUITABLE TARGET.

(2). BIGSTER AND ZETLAND PATROLLED DARIAN COAST BETWEEN SIBERNIK AND SPLIT CHANNELS. BLANK.

(3); M.P.BS OPERATED IN STRAITS SOUTH OF SPLIT AND SWEEP COAST DUBROVNIK TO HVAR. BLANK.

(4); THREE MORE LINES DETACHED DEPART AT 1400 1ST NO DAMAGE.

P.C.C. 011725 DECEMBER.

DIST. A. ELO SPARTAN.

W/T NC A 1/5 1/12.

1371

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: C IN C MED. (R) FLO 3TH ARMY From: FOTALL
FLO 15TH ARMY GROUP

SECRET CYPHER.SITREP NO. 24.

NIGHT 29/30 WILLIAM AND LOYAL SIGHTED NOTHING ON
PATROL BETWEEN SIBENIK AND SPLIT CHANNELS.

2. TRINDISI FORT OPENED P.M. 30TH.
3. NO REPORTS FROM LTPs OPERATING IN CHANNELS OFF SPLIT

T.O.C. 301955 A. NOV.

T.O.D. IN TRANSIT

DIST. 'A'

W/T. A ETH HSE.

1370

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To: C in C MED (R) NLC 8TH.ARM
NLC 15TH.ARM

FROM: FOTALI.

SECRET CYPHER.

Sitrep No.23.

Destroyers demonstration for operation HARDMAF went according to plan night 28th/29th.

(2). Three magnetic mines detonated by MMS. a.m.29th. in approaches to BRINDISI. Three other explosions heard during night 28/29. MMS/03 damaged and beached. Port closed. Sweeping continues. QUEENBOROUGH and RAIDER are in BRINDISI.

(3). Intend QUILLIAM and LOYAL to operate off DALMATIAN Coast between 42°40' and 42°20' North to-night 29th/30th. and M.T.B's to operate in channel south of SPLIT.

T.O.O.291743.November.

T.O.D.In transit.

Dist A.

A. GBC. LWH.

1369

SECRET

NAVAL MESSAGE.

To:

O IN C MED.

FROM:

(R) NLO 8TH ARMY NLO 15 ARMY CORP.

F.O.T.A.L.I.

SECRET CIPHER.

SITREP NO. 22.

REFERENCE SITREP 21 PARA 2. M.T.BS WERE ASHORE IN HVAR NOT
VIS AS REPORTED.

2. NO MINES YET DETONATED OFF BRINDISI CONVOYS AH 10 AND MAX
HA 10 IN AND OUT WITHOUT INCIDENT SWEEPING CONTINUES.
3. CONVOYS FOR OPERATION HARDMAN SAILED AND DESTROYER
AND M.T.BS FOR DEMONSTRATION BOMBARDMENT.

T.O.O. 28 1817 NOVEMBER.

DIST. A. BLO IN SPARTAN COMM. PALMER. ALLIED MISSION BRINDI

NO A.

1368

1886