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ALLIED COMMISSION ORG.
FEB. 44 - FEB. 47

NSC-2

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 600/EC.

19 December 1945.

SUBJECT: Reorganisation of Allied Commission.

TO : 4/VP., Economic Section
VP., CA Section
VP., Est Section
Director, Navy S/C.
Director, Land Forces S/C (MILA)
Director, Air Forces S/C
Director, Communications S/C
Chief Legal Adviser
Chief Financial Adviser

The attached copy of MAT 965 - FX 56242 dated 12 December 1945
is forwarded for your information.

For Mr. Alexander
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

100-200000

Director, Navy S/C.
Director, Land Forces S/C (LMLA)
Director, Air Forces S/C
Director, Communications S/C
Chief Legal Adviser
Chief Financial Adviser

The attached copy of MAT 965 - EX 56242 dated 12 December 1945
is forwarded for your information.

For Mr. Leggett, U. S. Consul
Brigadier,
for Executive Commissioner.

8038

Nice - 2

INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Originator's Reference: FX 56242

Message Centre No: G/5541

Date/Time of Orin: 122042A

Date Time Rec'd : 141400

FROM : AFHQ SIGNED SACRED GITE PHOEG

Precedence : ROUTINE

TO : (FOR ACTION) AGWAR FOR COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
(FOR INFO) CABINET OFFICES LONDON, ALCOM ROME.

SECRET.

This is MAT 965.

Reference your W 35740 - TAK 719 dated 29 November 1945.

PART (1). Discussion. A. The basic policy set forth in your para 1 is agreed, subject to detailed comment below presuue that last two sentences of para 2 (A) PAR 437 continue to apply.

B. In the reorganization of ALCOM consideration must be given to the fact that within its present structure (but not as a separate entity) there exists the Headquarters of the AMG for Italy. AMG uses the machinery of Italian governmental in all phases of public life, it can remain effective only as long as it maintains the closest day to day contacts with the respective Italian Ministries. Even if ALCOM functions in connection with Italian controlled territory cease, some AMG Headquarters must remain in existence at the seat of the Italian Government as long as military government exists over a small area. The AMG Headquarters should retain substantially the present structures as ALCOM but on a smaller scale.

C. It is agreed that the Service Sub-Commissions should remain in basic policy set forth for ALCOM until they become separate Service Missions. Agree also that Headquarters Executive Branch and Establishment Section should remain. If the foregoing remain, it appears desirable to retain the Deputy President in direct charge in ROMS. Presume that it is intended that the French and Russian Representation in ALCOM shall remain. I now have several liaison officers in Italian Government territory for liaison with military formations and to keep me informed as to political and economic conditions. I desire to retain these, but these interested in the allocation and distribution of imported materials will revert to UNRRA.

D. It is agreed that the Sub-Commissions listed in your paragraph 2B may be abolished so far as they pertain to Italian Government territory. They will be required on a small scale for AMG territory. While not retained as a separate Sub-Commission it is proposed that certain functions of the Local Government Sub-Commission pertaining to electoral procedure and minority problems such as exist in BOLZANO shall be handled by the Executive Branch until after elections. Until UNRRA takes over it

PART (1). Discussion. A. The basic policy set forth in your para 1 is agreed, subject to detailed comment below presuming that last two sentences of para 2 (A) CAN 437 continue to apply.

B. In the reorganization of ALCOM consideration must be given to the fact that within its present structure (but not as a separate entity) there exists the Headquarters of the AMG for Italy. AMG uses the machinery of Italian governmental in phases of public life, it can remain effective only as long as it maintains the closest day to day contacts with the respective Italian Ministries. Even if ALCOM functions in connection with Italian controlled territory cease, some AMG Headquarters must remain in existence at the seat of the Italian Government as long as military government exists even over a small area. The AMG Headquarters should retain substantially the present structures as ALCOM but on a smaller scale.

C. It is agreed that the Service Sub-Commissions should remain in basic policy set forth for ALCOM until they become separate Service Missions. Agree also that Headquarters Executive Branch and Establishment Section should remain. If the foregoing remain, it appears desirable to retain the Deputy President in direct charge in ROM. Presume that it is intended that the French and Russian Representation in ALCOM shall remain. I now have several liaison officers in Italian Government territory for liaison with military formations and to keep me informed as to political and economic conditions. I desire to retain these, but those interested in the allocation and distribution of imported materials will revert to UNRRA.

D. It is agreed that the Sub-Commissions listed in your paragraph 23 may be abolished so far as they pertain to Italian Government territory. They will be required on a small scale for AMG territory. While not retained as a separate Sub-Commission it is proposed that certain functions of the Local Government Sub-Commission pertaining to electoral procedure and minority problems such as exist in BOLZANO shall be handled by the Executive Branch until after elections. Until UNRRA takes over it appears desirable to retain a small medical supply unit in the Supply Group of the Economic Section when the Public Health Sub-Commission is abolished. A group from the Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission on allocation and utilization of electric power will be similarly assigned on the abolishment of the Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission. See (G) below re the supply subcommission.

E. The effectiveness of the sub-commissions listed in your para 2 C would be greatly lessened if removed from ROME. If they are placed under AFHQ and remain in ROME supervision will be most difficult. War Materials is largely liaison and has been absorbed within economics. Italian Prisoners of War has been absorbed by Land Forces Sub-Commission. The others should remain for AMG purposes. No disadvantage can be seen in keeping them in ALCOM until they cease to function or until I can determine a more suitable assignment. Any transfer to AFHQ or other agencies will be notified to you prior to effective date. So far as the Italian Government is concerned, any transfer to AFHQ might well give rise to a feeling that military control was being tightened instead of being eased.

(i) As regards Finance Sub-Commission, I have implemented TAM 692 set up an Allied Supply Accounting Agency responsible to AFHQ. It is located in ROME and attached to ALCOM for administration. Agreed that currency supply and accounting functions of Allied Financial Agency including various services to Allied Forces can be transferred to AFHQ. I recommend that the Chief Financial Advisor remain with ALCOM to handle financial problems under the Armistice and to negotiate the currency agreement under paras 12-17 of FAN 583.

(ii) A portion of the functions of the Transportation Sub-Commission should remain in the ALCOM Supply Group until UNRRA takes over. The remaining functions are liaison and should not come to AFHQ.

F. Your para 2 D is agreed except that similar Sub-Commissions must function for AMG territory. It is assumed that this proposal is based on UNRRA supply of Italy. Should Italy be supplied otherwise further consideration will be necessary.

(i) is to Industry, the functions of advising the Italian Government and developing and reviewing projects for reconstruction of utilities including railways and industries should be transferred to the Embassies. The Embassies point out however that they are not yet in position to assume this function owing to lack of personnel.

(ii) is to Commerce, the advisory function (consisting of negotiations for re-opening private commercial trade) cannot be transferred to the Embassies because of their inability to receive them before 1 January 1946. The duties of screening export programmes and channelling clearances laid upon ALCOM by TAM 640 must be continued until the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct otherwise.

G. Read your para 2 E. The Displaced Persons Sub-Commission is less directly connected with the Italian Government than other Sub-Commissions. Plans are now under way transferring to AFHQ those displaced persons functions which UNRRA cannot undertake. With regard to the proposed Supply Sub-Commission and the transportation function, the Supply Group has been set up within the Economic Section in ROME which includes those functions (Food and Agriculture, Industry and Commerce) which are directly related to the import programme and which will be transferred to UNRRA when UNRRA takes over.

H. Your para 3 agreed except as pertains to AMG. I request prior consultation in respect of key positions. Desire to point out however that full advantage should be taken to change present incumbents to civil status or as is practicable before new personnel are introduced. The heavy turnover thus far experienced with civilian personnel has not been conducive to efficiency.

I. In view of above suggest deletion of your para 4.

PART (2)

A. Recommend pursuant to discussion in Part I that a directive be issued substantially as follows:

1. It is desirable to remove from the Allied Commission as many functions as possible retaining only those necessary for maintaining Headquarters Allied Military Government for territory under AMG control, and this absolute minimum for a temporary period. Y

(ii) as to Commerce, the advisory function (consisting of negotiations for re-opening private commercial trade) cannot be transferred to the Embassies because of their inability to receive them before 1 January 1946. The duties of screening export programmes and channelling clearances laid upon ALCON by TAW 640 must be continued until the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct otherwise.

G. Read your para 2 E. The Displaced Persons Sub-Commission is less directly connected with the Italian Government than other Sub-Commissions. Plans are now under way transferring to ITHQ those displaced persons functions which UNRRA cannot undertake. With regard to the proposed Supply Sub-Commission and the transportation function, the Supply Group has been set up within the Economic Section in ROME which includes those functions (Food and Agriculture, Industry and Commerce) which are directly related to the import programme and which will be transferred to UNRRA when UNRRA takes over.

H. Your para 3 agreed except as pertains to AMG. I request prior consultation in respect of key positions. Desire to point out however that full advantage should be taken to change present incumbents to civil status or as is practicable before new personnel are introduced. The heavy turnover thus far experienced with civilian personnel has not been conducive to efficiency.

I. In view of above suggest deletion of your para 4.

PART (2)

A. Recommend pursuant to discussion in Part I that a directive be issued substantially as follows:

1. It is desirable to remove from the Allied Commission as many functions as possible retaining only those necessary for maintaining Headquarters Allied Military Government for territory under AMG control, and this absolute minimum for a temporary period. They are directed to reduce and terminate those temporary residual functions as expeditiously as practicable, eliminating them without further reference to Combined Chiefs of Staff when in your opinion they serve no useful purpose. All rights under the Armistice and additional conditions of Armistice of 29 September 1943 would still be held in reserve as set forth in para 1 of FAW 487; the power of enforcement will in all cases remain with SACMED as President of Allied Commission. Last two sentences of para 2 (of FAW 487 continue to apply.

2. In accordance with the above you should reorganize Allied Commission as follows:

A. Sub-Commissions whose functions are to be retained in Allied Commission:

- (1) Navy, Army, Air Force Sub-Commissions should remain with Allied Commission until they become separate service missions.

(2) Hq. Executive Branch and Establishment Section will Sub-Liaison Groups as may be required in the field. Size will depend upon responsibilities still remaining in Allied Commission.

- (3) Sub-Commissions required for the exercise of military government in AMG territories. These Sub-Commissions will interest themselves only to subject pertaining to military government in being and only to the extent they affect such military government in being.
- (4) Local Government (functions to be absorbed in Executive Branch).
- (5) French and Russian representatives with their presently authorized staffs will remain in Allied Commission.

B. Sub-Commissions whose functions are to be abolished except as they pertain to military government in being and territory included therein:

Education;

Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives;

Public Works and Utilities (except electric power unit which is transferred to Supply Group);

Public Health (except for medical supply functions which are transferred to Supply Group);

Legal (Supply Groups); (Legal Advisor to Allied Commission and reviewing officers will be retained);

Patriots Branch of Local Government Sub-Commission.

C. Sub-Commissions whose functions, except as they pertain to military government in being, will be eliminated or transferred to other agencies including AFHQ to the extent to which you consider their functions are necessary to carrying out of policies laid down by Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Communications;

Public Safety;

War Materials (less Italian Prisoners of War already absorbed in Land Forces Sub-Commission);

Public Relations;

Finance (currency, combined billing, services to Armies and para 10 of FAW 583 Position of Chief Financial Advisor will be retained in Allied Commission who will be responsible for negotiating agreement foreseen in paras 12-17 of FAW 583);

Displaced Persons and Refugees.

Public Works and Utilities (except electric power unit which is transferred to Supply Group);

Public Health (except for medical supply functions which are transferred to Supply Group);

Legal (Supply Groups): (Legal Advisor to Allied Commission and reviewing officers will be retained);

Patriots Branch of Local Government Sub-Commission.

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Communications;

Public Safety;

War Materials (less Italian Prisoners of War already absorbed in Land Forces Sub-Commission);

Public Relations;

Finance (currency, combined billing, services to Armies and para 10 of FAN 583 Position of Chief Financial Advisor will be retained in Allied Commission who will be responsible for negotiating agreement foreseen in paras 12-17 of FAN 583);

Displaced Persons and Refugees.

D. Sub-Commissions whose functions are to be transferred to the United States and United Kingdom Embassies as soon as is necessary personnel can be procured:

Industry (advisory functions);

Commerce (advisory functions).

Commerce Sub-Commission will continue in Allied Commission to perform function undertaken in TLM 640 until other arrangements are made.

Labour;

Finance (advisory functions and duties under FAN 583 except paras 10, 12 and 1

Food (insofar as NOT concerned with imports);

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Agriculture (advisory functions).

E. Sub-Commissions whose functions are to be retained in Allied Commission until UNRRA takes over;

Food;

Industry (except advisory functions);

Economic Staff Branches having supply functions;

Transportation Sub-Commission (handling of transport and warehousing problems connected with imported supplies, and requirements and allocation problems connected with the imported supplies for the transportation system itself.

3. Either the United States or United Kingdom Governments will civilianise any of the posts in any Sub-Commission remaining in Allied Commission after consultation with you. The present process of introducing into the Sub-Commissions whose functions are to be taken over by UNRRA and civilian personnel who intend to transfer to UNRRA when the latter assumes the functions of these Sub-Commissions will be continued.

AC DIST

INFO/ACTION: EXEC COMAR (2)

INFO: CHIEF COMMR

POLAD (A)

POLAD (B)

FILE (SKELETON)

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

2 August 1945.

EXECUTIVE ORDERS)


NUMBER

55)

Abolition of Shipping Sub-Commission and Reallocation of its
Functions II - ABOLITION OF SHIPPING SUB-COMMISSION AND REALLOCATION OF ITS
FUNCTIONS

Pursuant to the authority contained in letter, G-5 Section, Allied
Force Headquarters, dated 16 July 1945, reference C-9, the Shipping
Sub-Commission is hereby abolished.

The functions and activities of the Shipping Sub-Commission are
allocated to the Transportation Sub-Commission.

ELLERY W. STONE,
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.DISTRIBUTION:

"A"

Including Gp III
Loss Serial 80.

HSC-2

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RESTRICTED

NAVY S/C

Tel: 590

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ECONOMIC SECTION

EB/ama

Ref: 1.38/ES

24 July 45

SUBJECT: Shipping Sub-Commission, AC

TO : Executive Commissioner

1. Reference 1.38/ES of 13 July 45.
2. Approval from G-5, AFHQ has been given to the proposal that the Shipping Sub-Commission be abolished and its functions be assigned to the Transportation Sub-Commission (C-9 of 16 July 45, copy attached).
3. It is recommended that the following executive memorandum be published effecting this transfer:

"Pursuant to authority in letter, G-5 Sec, AFHQ, 3 July 45, Ref: C-9; the Shipping Sub-Commission, AC is abolished.

The functions and activities of the Shipping Commission are assigned to Transportation Sub-Commission."

4. With the promulgation of the above order it is important that consideration be given to amending AC office Memo No. 20, dated 21 December 44, as proposed in letter 3 July 45 (Ref: 1.04/ES). The amendment provides for direct contact by Sections and Sub-Commissions of AC with representatives of the Ministry of Marine on routine matter of which the Navy Sub-Commission has been cognizant.

(Signed)
CHARLES W. WALTON
Col. B. McKim
Brigadier General, USA
Acting Vice President

cc:
Transportation S/C
Shipping S/C
Navy S/C —

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CO
P
Y

Copy file # 1.38

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 SECTION
APO 512

Ref : C-9

SUBJECT : Shipping Sub-Commission AC

16 July 1945

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394

Reference your 1.38/ES dated 15 July 1945.

1. Approval is given to the proposal that the Shipping Sub-Commission be abolished and its functions assigned to the Transportation Sub-Commission.

2. WFT and WSA at this Headquarters have expressed their agreement in this matter.

(S) A. L. Hamblen

A. L. HAMBLEN,
Brigadier General, U.S.C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.

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COPY

Ref. 1.38/ES

13 July 1945

SUBJECT: Shipping Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

TO : G-5 Section
A.F.H.Q.

1. It is recommended that:
 - a. The Shipping Sub-Commission be abolished.
 - b. The functions and activities of the Shipping Sub-Commission be assigned to the Transportation Sub-Commission.
2. The recommendation is made because the functions and activities of the Shipping Sub-Commission have for some time been carried on in the Transportation Sub-Commission and there appears to be no need for continuation of the Shipping Sub-Commission. No transfers of personnel or duties are involved.
3. Mr. Campbell of MEDCO and the Shipping Sub-Commission has been consulted and agrees to the above recommendation.
4. Your approval is requested.

sgd. Ellery W. Stone
ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

cc Transportation Sub-Commission
Mr. Ian Campbell
25 Corso d'Italia
Navy Sub-Commission ✓

8032
N 5 C 2

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 212/EC.

3 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Correspondence for Representative of
Chief Commissioner AC in MILAN.

TO : Distribution below.

1. The name and correct address for the above correspondence is as follows:

Office of Representative of Chief Commissioner, AC
16 Via Buonaparte,
MILAN.

2. The cable address is as follows:

ALCOM MILAN FOR FISKE

3. Mail and cables destined for one of the representatives of the Sub-Commissions will be marked additionally for the individual or Sub-Commission concerned.

4. On no account will the title AC Advance Headquarters be used.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Frank H. Hild
Executive Brigadier,
Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

Group I - List 'A', one copy serials:
40, 41, 43 to 47, 54, 59.
Group II - List 'B'.
Group III - 2 copies each serial.

NSC-2 8031

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 212/EC.

3 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Correspondence for Representative of
Chief Commissioner AC in MILAN.

TO : Distribution below.

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Office of Representative of Chief Commissioner, AC
16 Via Buonaparte,
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4. On no account will the title AC Advance Headquarters be used.

For the Chief Commissioner:

Frank H. Hild
Executive Brigadier,
Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

Group I - List 'A', one copy serials:
40, 41, 43 to 47, 54, 59.
Group II - List 'B'.
Group III - 2 copies each serial.

8030

REVIEW OF ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE ALLIED
COMMISSION IN ITALY

I

On July 10, 1943 the United States and the United Kingdom began the greatest military government experiment, democratic style, in modern times when civil affairs officers disembarked with the armies on the landing beaches of Sicily in the first breaking of the Axis fortress of Europe.

Exactly four months later General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, established the Allied Control Commission (now the Allied Commission) to enforce the terms of an armistice upon an Italian nation that was militarily defeated, politically at sea and left with but the barest form of government.

The military government teams that went into Sicily were military units. The Allied Control Commission set up by General Eisenhower was also a military unit. The Allied Commission is still a military unit. It is part of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean Theater, operating under the direct supervision of AFHQ and following the directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

The mission of the Allied Commission has been five-fold. First, to organize military government operations with the 5th

with the armies on the landing beaches of Sicily in the first breaching of the Axis Fortress of Europe.

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The mission of the Allied Commission has been five-fold. First, to organize military government operations with the 5th and 8th Armies in direct support of combat troops; second, to render whatever immediate aid is practicable to the civilian population in the rear of the armies in order to allay disease and unrest; third, to prepare the governmental administration and economy to be turned back to the Italian as quickly as possible; fourth, to supervise execution of the terms of the Italian Armistice; and fifth, to be the spokesmen of the United Nations to the Italian Government.

To gain these objectives, the Allied Commission established a national headquarters which always sits at the seat of the

N.S.C.-2

The last two roles of the Allied Commission - armistice supervision and speaking for the United Nations - are general overriding factors in its task. Because of these responsibilities, the Allied Commission has had perforce to interest itself in politics to the extent of promoting the formation of an Italian Government that could be the at least temporarily effective representative of an Italian people freed from Fascist influence and ready to support the Allied war effort. The political mission, therefore, of the Allied Commission has been simply to see that the Italians (1) formed a stable government; (2) made it as democratic as possible pending free elections.

The account that follows is a survey of the Allied efforts to bring peace and order in the wake of the armies of liberation, to give moral and physical assistance to a misled and shattered people and to afford a former enemy country an opportunity to redeem itself. This experiment has been not only an example of the working out of democratic objectives with humanity and equity in time of war but has also provided a testing ground from which practical lessons of the new military branch of civil affairs could be learned and their conclusions put to use in areas liberated later, not only in new areas of Italy but also in Western Europe.

Allied direction in that part of the Italian nation which had been freed from the enemy ran through various stages: initial military government, control under armistice terms, sympathetic supervision of co-belligerency, and lastly and most

simply to see that the Italians (1) formed a stable government, (2) made it as democratic as possible pending free elections.

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Allied direction in that part of the Italian nation which had been freed from the enemy ran through various stages: initial military government, control under armistice terms, sympathetic supervision of co-belligerency, and lastly and most recently, guidance of a nation virtually restored to full sovereignty. These various stages sometimes ran - and still run - concurrently, since first and foremost the necessities of war have had to be the deciding factor. Controls have had to be fitted to new conditions as they arose in the rapid turnover of events. Fluid conditions had to be met with immediate solutions. From the first the Allied Control Commission had to confront the two recurrent demands: the sheer practical need of food and the no less

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insistent appeal from the Italian Government and people for recognition and sympathetic encouragement of their desire for a new and democratic life.

Chronologically, the division may be made into four periods: the Sicilian invasion, the Palermo-Brindisi period, the Naples-Salerno period and the Roman phase. The Fifth and last period will come with full liberation of North Italy. Operational, military and political developments set off these periods, though the categories do not always fit smoothly into the same dates. It would be historically inaccurate to isolate any one phase of Allied activity in this field; while AMGOT was governing Sicily, ACC was in embryo at Brindisi, and when, at the other end of the scale AC functioned in Rome, the forward areas were still subject to AMG, facing problems in essence no different from those that were encountered in the early stages of the Sicilian invasion. Old problems remain to be attacked from a different angle and with progressively more adequate machinery, but as each phase brings new problems, political, social or military, former experience is only partially helpful.

RSC/bjp

CG 1014

11 June 1945

TO : Regional Commissioners,
 LIGURIA Region,
 PIEMONTE Region,
 LIGURIA Region,

In the interim period before Phase II comes into operation, I am sending Colonel FISH, Deputy Executive Commissioner, as my representative to interpret the policy of the Allied Commission to the Commanding Generals of 5th Army and IV Corps, and to assist them in every way possible in connection with the coordination of civil affairs in the Army Area.

He will work in close contact with the Regional Commissioners but the channels of communication will be from the Allied Commission direct to Regional Commissioners and vice versa, with copies to 5th Army and IV Corps.

Until Phase II is established, SCs in North Italy will be in the same position as AG 5th and 6th Armies; that is to say, they will be under the military command of the Commanding Generals, 5th and 6th Armies and will receive their functional directions from the Allied Commission through the channels of communication set forth in the preceding paragraph.

/s/

WILLIAM S. FISH
 Rear Admiral, USN
 Chief Commissioner

Copy to: SCAG, AG 5th Army
 SCAG, AG IV Corps
 AGC, COMZ.
 CA Sec.
 SCAG, 5th Army
 SCAG, 13th Corps
 AG, Emilia Region
 AG, Venetia Region
 Director, Air Forces S/C
 Director, Land Forces S/C
 Chief, Naval S/C
 Communications S/C
 AG 5th Army S/C

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner
+++++

Ref: 212/EC.

12 June 1945.

SUBJECT: Directives on Policy Matters.

TO : Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section,
Economic Section,
Establishment Section.
Director,
Navy Sub-Commission,
Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA),
Air Force Sub-Commission,
Communications Sub-Com,
WMD & IFW Sub-Com
Public Relations Branch.

1. The Chief Commissioner has noticed a tendency to depart from the principles laid down in Office Memorandum No.17 of 13th October 1944 by which directions on policy must be signed by the Vice President of the Section, the Executive Commissioner, or the Chief Commissioner. He considers that it is most important, having regard particularly to the difficult situation in the North where administration and economics are inextricably interwoven with politics, that coordination at Headquarters should be effected and that directives on policy should be discussed either at the Executive Commissioner's conferences or at Vice Presidents' meetings before despatch. In the majority of cases directives should be prepared for his signature.

2. Will you please bring this to the notice of Heads of Sub-Commissions.

MSL/JG.

M S Lark
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

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D
SECRETHEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Navy Sub-Commission*File d*
HQC/1740

5 March 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq, AC.
To : Executive Commissioner, AC.
Subject: A/President's Conference - 8 Mar 45.

With reference to your letter No. 216/51/EC of the 1st March 1945, information is sought as to whether there is any general statement of policy indicating broadly what functions will continue to be carried out by the Allied Commission, or alternatively, what adjustments of its activity are likely to be made, in the event of the cessation of European hostilities.

G. L. WARREN,
Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, AC.



6 MAR 1945

*File d*SECRET
8025

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
AFO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Tel. 735

1 March 1945

Ref: 216/51/EC

SUBJECT: A/President's Conference - 8 Mar 45.

TO : Distribution below.

With reference to 216/45/EC of 26 Feb 45 and minutes of Executive Commissioner's Meeting of 20 Feb 45, para 1 (b), please submit to this Office by 7 Mar points of high policy you desire to raise.

G. H. Anderson
Chief Staff Officer,
To Executive Commissioner.

Dist.

Political Section
Economic Section
Establishment Section
Land Forces Sub Com
Navy Sub Com ✓
Air Force Sub Com
WMD & IPW Sub Com
Communications Sub Com
Public Relations Branch
DCCAO

CRET

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HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

SECRET
~~SECRET~~

MSC/1656
14 February 1945

To: Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.

Subject: Allied Commission - New Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff on.

Enclosure: (A) Copy subject secret Directive PAM 487 undated.
(B) Copy Land Forces Sub-Commission Secret File No. 6/6 of 6 February 1945.
(C) Copy Air Forces Sub-Commission Secret ltr AFSC 312/CSG of 8 February 1945.

1. Enclosure (A) contains a new directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Allied Commission to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. The primary objective of the directive is to relax control over the Italian Government under the Armistice and Surrender instrument. The rights of the United Nations thereunder will be held in reserve and only such control exercised as the military needs may require. The new directive, therefore, relates primarily to political, administrative, economic and financial considerations, rather than to military matters.

2. The Land Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. and the Air Forces Sub-Commission, A.C. submitted comments on the new directive in enclosures (B) and (C). It is not considered that the new directive will necessitate any considerable modification of the present arrangements by which the Italian Navy is administered and controlled by the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through the Flag Officer Liaison, Italy, and by the Navy Sub-Commission, A.C. under the provisions of the Armistice Terms, the Cunningham - de Courten Agreement and Combined Chiefs' of Staff Secret Directive CCS 515/1 of 19 March 1944.

3. The following comments are submitted with reference to the respective paragraphs in enclosure (A):

2(a) This paragraph relates to appointments in Italian Government Territory only. It is considered essential that control over appointments and removals from office of Italian Navy personnel should be maintained irrespective of Italian government jurisdiction over the territory involved. While no express power over appointments is stated, it is fully implied in Article 22 of the Armistice Terms, Paragraph 2 of the Cunningham Agreement and paragraphs 7 and 8 of CCS 515/1 of 19 March 1944.



15 FEB 1945

SECRET~~SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APC 394NSC/1696
14 February 1945Subject: Allied Commission - New Directive from Combined Chiefs
of Staff on.

The present practice is for the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, through the Flag Officer Liaison Italy, instead of the Navy Sub-Commission, A.C., to approve the appointment of all Italian Flag Officers and Commanders of important independent units. It is considered that this practice should continue.

- 7(b) As indicated in Navy Sub-Commission, A.C. secret letter NSC/1505 of 16 January 1945, a policy has been established which will permit the maximum utilization of Italian Navy warships plants for the economic rehabilitation of Italy, provided the efficiency of the Italian Navy is not impaired and the facilities are not required in the interest of the Allied war effort.

4. The above comments with respect to the new directive on the Allied Commission are submitted for your information and such action as you may require.

H. W. ENOLI,
Commander, U. S. Navy,
Deputy Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.

Copy to:

AFHQ - less encl.(A).
CINC-MED. - less encl.(A)
COMSTH FLEET
HQ. AC. - - less enclosures.
POTALI, ROME "
LAND FORCES SC.AC. "
AIR FORCES SC.AC. "

COPI

SECRET
SECRET

NEW DIRECTIVE FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF ON THE ALLIED COMMISSION

FAN 487.

Following is Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September, 1944, the US and UK Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in ITALY.

In the light of this agreed US-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

POLITICAL SECTION

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the US and UK Ambassadors in ROME. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission.
- (b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.

(c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of

such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in ITALY.

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- (b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other Governments.
- (c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.
- (d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine.
- (e) The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it.

8021

- (f) The US and UK Governments have agreed that the Italian Government will be advised that it is the Allied desire to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit you will facilitate any arrangements for the flow of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature between ITALY and the United Nations and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between ITALY and the United Nations.
- (g) The US and UK Governments have agreed that in accordance with the terms of the MOSCOW declaration it is desirable to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and you should be guided accordingly.
- (h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in ITALY other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be terminated by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

2. The internal organization of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganization of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:

- (a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.
- (b) As far as certain Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Govt. Control should NOT be exercised in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
- (c) The Sections and Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianized to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).

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- (c) The Sections and Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianized to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).
- (d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located in places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

ECONOMIC SECTION

4. It is necessary that the maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured. The Italian Government should be advised that to this end and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance it must formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible. In the event that these conditions are NOT met the Allied authorities will NOT hesitate to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures.

5. For the duration of combined operations, the combined US-UK military authorities will be responsible for providing:

(a) Those quantities of food, fuel, clothing, medical, sanitary and other agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to such operations.

(b) Those supplies such as fertilizer, raw materials, machinery and equipment, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph. At the time when combined military responsibilities will terminate will NOT be known when requisitions are being prepared and considered, the importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph will NOT be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may NOT be felt during the period of combined military responsibility.

(c) Those supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against GERMANY and JAPAN.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and ITALY must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will NOT be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the UNITED STATES and British Governments. The UNITED STATES and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.

7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of paragraph 4 of MAP 778 are answered as follows:

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To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programs and ITALY must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

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7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of paragraph 4 of HAF 778 are answered as follows:

(a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in ITALY, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Government.

(b) It is desired that industrial rehabilitation in ITALY be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by the Italian resources and such supplies as you may be authorized to import, consistent with the discharge by you of your military mission, with the exception that industries for the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war shall be rehabilitated only to the extent required by you in discharge of your military mission and as will further the military effort in other theatres. Except

for those industries the rehabilitation of which is essential to the discharge of your military mission and in furtherance of the military effort in other Theatres, which rehabilitation should be given first priority, industries other than those excluded by the preceding sentence will be given such precedence in rehabilitation as may be determined by the Italian Government.

- (c) The extent of your responsibility with respect to the importation of supplies into ITALY is defined in Paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof. Except as is so defined, you have NO responsibility for the importation of supplies into ITALY.

- (d) Within the limitation of available shipping and subject to military considerations as determined by you, the extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. The appropriate civilian agencies of the British and American Governments are currently considering methods by which the Italian Government may be assisted in these respects and as soon as decisions in this connection are reached, you will be advised with respect thereto.

8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into ITALY must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.

FINANCIAL SECTION

9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

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8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into ITALY must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.

FINANCIAL SECTION

9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

8018

SECRET

Subject: Italian Army.

SECRET

SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com. AC.
(M.M.I.A.)

File No. G/6

6 Feb 45

AFHQ for Chief of Staff
" Chief Administrative Officer.

Reference new directive FAN 487 from C.O.S. on the Allied Commission, I have the following observations to make: -

1. Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MMA) has two separate functions and methods of procedure in its capacity of : -
 - (a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AC.
 - (b) M.M.I.A.

See your AG. 091.112/079 OCT-0 of 25 Oct 1944.

2. (a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give as much responsibility as possible to the Italian Army in order to : -

- (i) Save Allied manpower
- (ii) Raise Italian morale
- (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Peak Tpt Coy.

- (b) (i) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, from the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of nepotism and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for MMA to order something to be done; in many cases we have to tell the Italians how to do it and watch to see that it is done.

- (ii) Unless we retain the right of veto and "Supervision

8017

(a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AG,
(b) H.H.I.A.

See your AG. 091.112/079 GCT-0 of 25 Oct 1944.

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- (i) Save Allied manpower
 - (ii) Raise Italian morale
 - (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pz Div Coy.

- (b) (i) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, from the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of nepotism and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for WIA to order something to be done; in many cases we have to tell the Italians how to do it and watch to see that it is done.

- (ii) Unless we retain the right of veto and "Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals....of Italian Army personnel" of all ranks (see para 4(c) of your AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 Nov 44) I consider that we cannot effectively control the Italian Army and that the result will be a lessening of the direct Italian Military aid to the Allied war effort. The same applies as regards the efficient working of the supply side.

- (iii) I therefore recommend that NO change be made in your AG 091.711/169 GCT-0 of 16 Nov 44. "Command and Administration of the Italian Army"; or of your AG 091.112/079 GCT-0 of 25 Oct 44.

- (c) The above is in particular reference to para 2(d) of Pan 457.

3. The other main aspects of FAW 487 with which my Sub-Commission is concerned are :-

para 2(h) I have already submitted to AC my views as to the future status of "cooperators" - see P.N. Sub-Commission AC file 174/36.

para 7(b) I am working in cooperation with Industry & Commerce Sub-Commission AC over this. Briefly, the Italian Army has enough stocks to maintain the service units and Internal Security Divisions working for the Allies. The Combat Groups are armed and equipped with British Equipment. Depending on such factors as the possibility and advisability of importing material, machinery etc, to restart factories "to further the military effort in other theatres"; the urgent necessity to turn production into civil rehabilitation channels; the post war set up and function of the Italian Army etc, - there appears to be no need to apply Italian industrial facilities to the production of lethal munitions of war.

/s/ L. Browning

Major General
(M.W.I.A.)

Copy to: HQ AC

" " Naval Sub-Commission A.C.

" " Air Force Sub-Commission, A.C.

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/s/ L. Browning

Major General
(M.M.I.A.)

Copy to: HQ AG

" " Naval Sub-Commission A.C.

" " Air Force Sub-Commission, A.C.

8016

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

FROM: AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.
COPY TO: NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.
" " LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 8TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/312/UNG.

With reference to the new Directive FAN. 487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I wish to make the following remarks from the point of view of this Sub-Commission.

2. It is considered that it is most important that this Sub-Commission retains the right of general supervision within the Italian Air Ministry and Air Force, and in particular the right of veto and the supervision of appointments, promotions and dismissals, particularly of senior officers.
3. The most important part of our directive is the organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force Operational Squadrons, which are working in active aid of the Allied war effort.
4. Unfortunately there is still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Air Force, from the Air Ministry downwards, and not only is the closest supervision necessary, but it is usually necessary to give an order and see that it is carried out.
5. A certain number of Italian aircraft remain in service, and to maintain these a few civilian firms are still employed in the overhaul of engines and airframes. If our operational effort is to be sustained, we must continue to employ these.

/s/ R.A.D. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

(ENCLOSURE) 8095

SECRET

Subject: Italian Army

SECRET

Land Forces Sub Com AC.
(M.M. I.A.)

File No. G/6

6 Feb 45

ATTN: for Chief of Staff.
" Chief Administrative Officer.

Reference new directive FAW 487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I have the following observations to make :-

1. Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (MFA) has two separate functions and methods of procedure in its capacity of :-
 - (a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AC.
 - (b) M.M. I.A.

See your AG.091.112/079 OCT-0 of 25 Oct 1944.

2. (a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give as much responsibility as possible to the Italian Army in order to :-

- (i) Save Allied manpower.
- (ii) Raise Italian morale.
- (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pack Tpt Coys.

- (b) (i) On the other hand, there is unfortunately still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Army, from the Ministry of War downwards. The Italians lack initiative, organising ability and a sense of urgency. There also is an undercurrent of nepotism and disinclination to remove inefficient officers. It is not enough for MFA to order something to be done; in many cases we have to tell the Italians how to do it and watch to see that it is done.

Reference new directive EAM 487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I have the following observations to make :-

1. Land Forces Sub-Commission AC (LMFA) has two separate functions and methods of procedure in its capacity of :-
 (a) Land Forces Sub-Commission AC,
 (b) M.M.I.A.

See your AG. 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 1944.

2. (a) It has always been the policy of this Sub-Commission to give as much responsibility as possible to the Italian Army in order to :-

- (i) Save Allied manpower.
- (ii) Raise Italian morale.
- (iii) Gradually enable the new Italian Army to stand on its own feet.

In this connection see my SD/3 of 6 Feb 45 re proposed reduction of British Cadres with Italian Pack Tpt Coys.

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- (ii) Unless we retain the right of veto and "Supervision of appointments, promotions, dismissals ... of Italian Army personnel" of all ranks (see para 4(c) of your AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 Nov 44) I consider that we cannot effectively control the Italian Army and that the result will be a lessening of the direct Italian Military aid to the Allied war effort. The same applies as regards the efficient working of the supply side.

801.

- (iii) I therefore recommend that NO change be made in your AG 091.711/169 GCT-O of 16 Nov 44. "Command and Administration of the Italian Army"; or of your AG 091.112/079 GCT-O of 25 Oct 44.

- (c) The above is in particular reference to para 2(d) of Pan 487.

.....2/

-2-

3. The other main aspects of EAW 407 with which my Sub-Commission is concerned are :-

para 2(a) I have already submitted to AC my views as to the future status of "cooperators" - see P.W. Sub-Commission AC file 4FW/36.

para 7(b) I am working in cooperation with Industry & Commerce Sub-Commission AC over this. Briefly, the Italian Army has enough stocks to maintain the service units and Internal Security Divisions working for the Allies. The Combat Groups are armed and equipped with British Equipment. Depending on such factors as the possibility and advisability of importing material, machinery etc, to restart factories "to further the military effort in other theatres"; the urgent necessity to turn production into civil rehabilitation channels; the post war set up and function of the Italian Army etc, - there appears to be no need to apply Italian industrial facilities to the production of lethal munitions of war.

A. Brown

Major General
(M.M. I.C.)

Copy to: HQ AC
" Naval Sub-Commission A.C.
" Air Force Sub-Commission A.C.

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 lethal munitions of war.

d. Brown

Major General
 (M.I.A.)

Copy to: HQ AC
 " Naval Sub-Commission A.C.
 " Air Force Sub-Commission A.C.

8013

RESTRICTED
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
 Italian Military Affairs Section
 APO 794

71

IMAS/115/CS

11 February 1947.

SUBJECT: Relationship with French Representation to the Allied Military Authorities in Italy.

TO : Director, Naval Sub-Section. ✓
 Director, Land Forces Sub-Section.
 Director, Air Forces Sub-Section.

Pending decision on this question by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the former French Representation to the Allied Commission, headed by Capitaine de Vaisseau de Villefosse, will continue to have the same relationship with your Sub-Sections as formerly existed between the French Representation and your former Sub-Commissions.

Elery W. Stone

ELERY W. STONE
 Rear Admiral, USNR
 Chief
 Italian Military Affairs Section

Copy to:
 Capitaine de Vaisseau de Villefosse
 Chief of Branch IACAB

MSC-2

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 11 FEB 1947
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COPY

P/328 (1st Draft)

SECRET

14 June 1946.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

A SPECIAL SECTION TO ASSUME THE
FUNCTIONS OF ALLIED COMMISSION AS
REGARDS THE SERVICE SUB-COMMISSIONS

Subject: Terms of reference.

1. The following terms of reference have been received from the
Chief of Staff:

"You are directed to examine the
implications of paragraph IIIa of the
'Agreement modifying the Italian
Armistice Regime' and to make appro-
priate recommendations as to the form
the Special Section to be established
should take, its chain of command,
location and relationship to AFHQ,
CMF, MTOUSA and to Allied Naval and
Air Headquarters."

2. In accordance with this directive, the attached paper, P/328, has
been prepared and is submitted for study.

3. A meeting of the Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff for the
purpose of discussing this paper is scheduled at 1430 hours, Tuesday,
18 June 1946, and will be held in the G-3 War Room.

4. Will addressees please provide representation.

/s/ PERRY McC. SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chairman.

HR/gts

"You are directed to examine the implications of paragraph IIIa of the 'Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime' and to make appropriate recommendations as to the form the Special Section to be established should take, its chain of command, location and relationship to AFHQ, CMF, MTOUSA and to Allied Naval and Air Headquarters."

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/s/ PERRY MCC, SMITH,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chairman.

HH/gts

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P/328 (1st draft)

SECRET

14 June 1946

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff

A SPECIAL SECTION TO ASSUME THE FUNCTIONS
OF ALLIED COMMISSION AS REGARDS THE SERVICE
SUB COMMISSIONS

AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE ITALIAN ARMISTICE REGIME:

1. Paragraph III of the subject document is quoted in full below:

"(a) A special Section of Allied Force Headquarters, under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, who will act as Chairman, shall be established to assume control functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy, and Air Force Sub Commissions in the Allied Commission. This Section shall control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces and shall control the production of armaments.

"(b) The employment and disposition of the Italian Navy shall remain as at present under the Command and Control of the Supreme Allied Commander.

"(c) Pending the coming into force of a Treaty of Peace, Allied Military Government shall be continued under the Supreme Commander Mediterranean in VENEZIA GIULIA and in the province of UDINE".

OBJECT:

2. To examine the implications of paragraph III of "Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime, "hereinafter referred to as the "New Agreement," and to make appropriate recommendations as to the form the special section to

"(a) A special Section of Allied Force Headquarters, under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, who will act as Chairman, shall be established to assume control functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy, and Air Force Sub Commissions in the Allied Commission. This Section shall control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces and shall control the production of armaments.

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"(c) Pending the coming into force of a Treaty of Peace, Allied Military Government shall be continued under the Supreme Commander Mediterranean in VENEZIA GIULIA and in the province of UDINE".

OBJECT:


2. To examine the implications of paragraph III of "Agreement modifying the Italian Armistice Regime, "hereinafter referred to as the "New Agreement," and to make appropriate recommendations as to the form the special section to be established should take, its chain of command, location and relation to AFHQ, COMF, MTOUSA, and to Allied Naval and Air Headquarters.

SECRET

8010

PRESENT ORGANIZATION OF ALCOHOL

CHIEF COMMISSIONER, A. C.



4. The Chiefs of Sub-Commissions deal directly with the Italian government ministry appropriate to their service. If coordination with other ministries, or with the government as a whole is required, the case is presented to the Chief Commissioner who then takes the matter up with the head of the Italian government.

NEW ORGANISATION :

5. It is not considered practicable to comply with the exact wording of the directive in that all sections of AFHQ are obviously under the orders of SAC, and it is unnecessary and impractical for SAC to chairman a section of the headquarters of which he is the commander. Nor is it considered practicable to establish a section which would CONTROL the functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces now exercised by the three American Expeditionary Service Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission.

6. It is believed that the organisational structure and the method of operation of the existing Service Sub-Commissions is in general satisfactory.

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NEW ORGANISATION:

5. It is not considered practicable to comply with the exact wording of the directive in that all sections of AFHQ are obviously under the orders of SAC, and it is unnecessary and impractical for SAC to chairman a section of the headquarters of which he is the commander. Nor is it considered practicable to establish a section which would CONTROL the functions of supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces now exercised by the three ~~Service Sub-Commissions~~ Service Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission.

6. It is believed that the organisational structure and the method of operation of the existing Service Sub-Commissions is in general satisfactory, and do not warrant any radical change.

7. The problem, therefore, resolves itself into one of providing a working organization to coordinate the activities of the Service Sub-Commissions, and to control the production of Italian Armaments. There are the following possible ways in which this might be achieved:

a. Designate one of the existing Chiefs of a Sub-Commission as the coordinating head, in addition to his Sub-Commission duties.

b. Place the Service Sub-Commissions under the new civil **8009** affairs head who will coordinate

SECRET

their activities by means of a special section of his staff.

6. Create an entirely new Staff Section of AFHQ.

8. The alternative stated in paragraph 5-a above is not recommended. The coordinating head should not be involved in the actual operation of a Sub Commission, but should be free to supervise and coordinate all activities of his organization.

9. While the alternative stated in paragraph 5-b above has certain definite advantages, such as providing for only one channel between the military and the head of the Italian government, it is not considered to be the best solution. It is not considered to meet with the terms of the Directive even though the Sub-Commissions would continue to remain operationally answerable to the heads of their respective services.

10. The alternative stated in 7-c above is considered to meet best with the terms of the directive. The Chief of this new Staff Section would be in a position to coordinate the activities of the three Service Sub-Commissions with each other, with other sections of AFHQ and with other headquarters of the Allied Armed Forces. He would also be free to deal with the control of armament and the demilitarization program, should one be established.

Under this organization, the Sub-commissions would continue to operate under the direction of the heads of their respective services, and would continue to deal directly with the appropriate ministries in the Italian government. As it is considered desirable to maintain only one contact with the head of the Italian government, the following procedure could be set up:

a. A matter of interest to a Sub-commission requiring

tion. It is not considered to meet with the terms of the directive even though the Sub-Commissions would continue to remain operationally answerable to the heads of their respective services.

10. The alternative stated in 7-c above is considered to meet best with the terms of the directive. The Chief of this new Staff Section would be in a position to coordinate the activities of the three Service Sub-Commissions with each other, with other sections of AFHQ and with other headquarters of the Allied Armed Forces. He would also be free to deal with the control of armament and the demilitarization program, should one be established.

Under this organization, the Sub-commissions would continue to operate under the direction of the heads of their respective services, and would continue to deal directly with the appropriate ministries in the Italian government. As it is considered desirable to maintain only one contact with the head of the Italian government, the following procedure could be set up:

a. A matter of interest to a Sub-commission requiring coordination with an Italian government agency with which that Sub-Commission does not normally deal, or which requires action by the head of the Italian government, would be referred to the Chief of the new Section.

b. The Chief of the New Section would then refer the matter, complete with all necessary information, to the Chief of the Civil Affairs Section in Rome.

2. The Chief of the Civil Affairs Section would take the matter up with the head of the Italian Government and report results back to the Chief of the new Section.
- d. Matters concerning control of armament or demilitarization would be referred by the Chief of the new Section to the Chief Civil Affairs Officer in the same manner.

NOMENCLATURE:

11. The new section should be give a title clearly indicative of its duties. "ITALIAN MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION" (IMAS) has been suggested. The three Service Sub-commissions would then become Sub-Sections of IMAS.

LOCATION:

12. In view of the fact that the work of the Sub-sections of IMAS would be almost entirely with the various instrumentalities of the Italian government, all of which are located in ROME, it is considered the logical location for the Sub-sections is in ROME, as at present.
13. The Chief, ^{IMAS}~~IMAS~~ and its sub-sections should be located in ROME as at present. He would thus have ready access to the command echelon of AFHQ and could more readily coordinate with other AFHQ staff sections and other headquarters, British and American.

CHAIN OF COMMAND:

14. Paragraph III of the New ~~Agreement~~ Agreement implies that this special section is to be answerable directly to SAC. However, it is believed it should enter the organisational structure on the same level as any general staff section of

11. The new section should be given a title clearly indicative of its

duties. "ITALIAN MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION" (IMAS) has been suggested. The three Service Sub-commissions would then become Sub-Sections of IMAS.

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CHAIN OF COMMAND:

14. Paragraph III of the New ~~Agree~~ Agreement implies that this special section is to be answerable directly to SAC. However, it is believed it should enter the organisational structure on the same level as any general staff section of AFHQ and be subject to control by the Chief of Staff in the same manner as he now controls other staff sections of this headquarters.

RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER MILITARY ELEMENTS:

15. As a section of AFHQ, IMAS would bear the same relationship to other sections of AFHQ, to CTF, MTOUSA and other Allied naval and military headquarters as do the existing staff sections of AFHQ. However, its Sub-sections should have authority to deal directly with the appropriate elements of the Italian government and with other headquarters of the Allied Forces.

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FUNCTION:

16. IMAS should deal solely with the functions established for it by the New Agreement; i.e. supervision and direction of the Italian Armed Forces heretofore exercised by the Land, Navy, and Air Forces Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission. It is also directed to control the size and character of all the Italian Armed Forces and to control the production of armaments. Certain functions now being carried out by the Service Sub-Commissions do not lie within a literal interpretation of the terms of the New Agreement. These extraneous functions are listed below:

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION:

Italian PW's
Police (CCPR)

NAVAL FORCES SUB-COMMISSION:

Salvage of Allied shipping, particularly French.
Shipbuilding and ship-repairing.
Italian Coast Guard, provided one is established.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION:

Civil Aviation.
Aircraft construction.

Whether these extraneous matters should continue to be functions of the Sub-sections of IMAS is a matter for considerable study. It is considered that the Chief, IMAS, should be directed to initiate such a study and to make appropriate recommendations. This should be a part of the directive referred to in paragraph 25 below.

LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION:

Italian PW's

Police (CCPR)

NAVAL FORCES SUB-COMMISSION:

Salvage of Allied shipping, particularly French.

Shipbuilding and ship-repairing.

Italian Coast Guard, provided one is established.

AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION:

Civil Aviation.

Aircraft construction.

Whether these extraneous matters should continue to be functions of the Sub-sections of IMAS is a matter for considerable study. It is considered that the Chief, IMAS, should be directed to initiate such a study and to make appropriate recommendations. This should be a part of the directive referred to in paragraph 25 below.

PARTICIPATION BY OTHER NATIONS NOW REPRESENTED IN ALCOM:

17. The French representative on the Allied Commission has informed the Chief Commissioner that his government would insist on stronger French representation in the Allied Commission or any alternative organisation which might be set up. Specifically, he stated that his government would insist on functional participation by French officers in Service Sub-commissions or their successors. It is considered highly desirable that supervision and control of the Italian Armed Forces be retained in the hands of the U.S. and British military. Admission of other nations to equal participation in the Service Sub-commissions is believed to be a matter for determination by the four Foreign Ministers and not for MFS.

SECRET

However, a policy recommendation on this matter should be included in the IJPS Report.

CONCLUSIONS:

18. The existing structure of the Service Sub-commissions of Allied Commission should remain unchanged, pending results of the study called for in paragraph 25 below.
19. A staff section of AFHQ to be called "ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTIONS" (IAFS) should be established to assume the functions prescribed by paragraph III of the New Agreement.
20. The Service Sub-Commissions, to be known as Land Forces, Naval Forces, and Air Forces Sub-sections of IAFS, should remain as at present in ROME.
21. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should be located with AFHQ in Caserta.
22. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should ~~remain~~ in all respects be subject to the normal operating procedure of an orthodox staff section.
23. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should be an integrated section with a British Chief and an American Deputy, or vice versa, service immaterial. Its staff should include representatives of each of the three services.
24. Matters requiring coordination with the head of the Italian government will be referred to the Chief Civil Affairs officer by the CHIEF, IAFS.
25. The Chief of IAFS, AFHQ, should be initially charged with a study of the present Services Sub-Commissions with a view to making recommendations as to any change in their directive, organization, strength or method of operation.

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21. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should be located with AFHQ in Caserta.

22. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should ~~be~~ in all respects be subject to the normal operating procedure of an orthodox staff section.

23. THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES SECTION, AFHQ, should be an integrated section with a British Chief and an American Deputy, or vice versa, service immaterial. Its staff should include representatives of each of the three services.

24. Matters requiring coordination with the head of the Italian government will be referred to the Chief Civil Affairs officer by the CHIEF, IAFS.

25. The Chief of IAFS, AFHQ, should be initially charged with a study of the present Services Sub-Commissions with a view to making recommendations as to any change in their directive, organization, strength or method of operation that appears to be desirable.

26. Participation in IAFS and its sub-sections should be limited to the U.S. - U.K.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

27. It is proposed, after the meeting of MJPS for the purpose of discussing this draft, to prepare a draft directive on the organization and operation of IAFS for submission to the Chief of Staff for approval and for publication at the proper time.

NAVAL MESSAGE

FROM

TO CIRC MED, FOLI (R) NLO SACMED.

FROM NSC.

Unclassified.

Add to para 2 of NSC message 011350 and Commodore H.W. Zirola that
of Deputy Director.

00001 1705A/Ped...

REF: Closing down of Allied Commission.

DIST: 0-12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 106.

CZW. T/P(RAC)

P/L

AM 2nd

DGS

3/2/57.

8004

NAVAL MESSAGE

CANC MED POLY INFO NIO SACMED

FROM....NSC ROME.

Unclassified.

On closing down of Allied Commission 31st Jan: the Navy Sub-Commission has been replaced in accordance with instructions of Combined Chiefs of Staff by Naval Sub-Section under Italian Military Affairs Section. Short title (I.M.A.S.) of AFHQ, and its functions and personnel have been transferred to new organisation which remains at same address.
2. Rear Admiral G.L. Warren assumes title of Director, Naval Sub-Section.

Dist: C-42 14 15 46 21 Inc.01 1350/AFHQ....

CCW T/P(RAAC)

P/L

EXD P.M. 1st:

RP

2/2/47.

8003

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
ESTABLISHMENT SECTION

Ref/5712st.

10 December 1945

SUBJECT: U. S. Participation in A. C.

TO : Naval S/C

1. Reference is made to our request for certain information on letter AFHQ G-5:387.4 - 1, Subject as above, of 8 December 1945.

2. May reply to our query be expedited please.


Geo W. Barnes III,
Captain Cavalry,
Staff Officer.

NSC-2
8002

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/4212

10 December 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Establishment Section, Allied Commission.
Subject: United States Participation in Allied Commission.
Reference: (a) Establishment Section ltr 57/Est of 10 Dec. 1945.
Enclosure: (A) List Naval Personnel Attached Allied Commission.

1. In compliance with reference (a), a list of naval personnel attached to the Allied Commission is forwarded herewith as enclosure (A). It is pointed out that the list includes personnel attached to the Office of the Chief Commissioner, the Finance Sub-Commission, AC and the Telecommunications Section, AC, as well as the Navy Sub-Commission, AC.

H. ST. J. BUTLER,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY,
FOR REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

11 DEC 1945

NSC-2
8001

UNITED STATES PERSONNEL, MILITARY AND CIVIL
ATTACHED TO ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME

Office of Chief Commissioner

Officers

Name and Rank

Rear Admiral E.W. STONE, USNR
Lieutenant J. LANNIN, USNR
Lieut.(jg) E.J. NEHN, USNR

Title

Chief Commissioner, A.C.
Senior Aide
Junior Aide

Enlisted Men

DORAN, J."A"E., CY, USNR
CRAVOTTA, C., MM5lc, USNR
KEYSER, W.E., Flc, USNR

Secretary
Driver
Driver

Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.

Officers

Commodore H.W. ZIROLI, USN
Captain H. ST.J. BUTLER, USN
Lt. Comdr. W.F. BAHLMANN, USNR
Ensign F.A. DEMARSTRI, USNR

Deputy Chief
Chief Staff Officer
Staff Officer(Administrative)
Staff Officer(Liaison)

Enlisted Men

MILLER, G.L., CY, USNR
PERRE, W.F., Ylc, USNR
SHANDELING, A.I., Ylc, USNR
VOLIVA, W.B., Y2c, USNR

Yeoman in Charge
Stenographer
Stenographer
File Yeoman

Finance Sub-Commission, A.C.

Lieutenant L.C. MOORE, USNR

Telecommunications Section, A.C.

Officers

Commander A.J. PERRONE, USNR
Lt. Comdr. A.E. CAMARINOS, USNR
Lt. Comdr. W.W. SMITH, USNR
Lieut. P. B. SKALKOS, USNR
Lieut. S.H. GARTH, USNR
Lt.(jg) G.P. RAKUS,

Chief
Venice
Bolzano
Merano
Trieste
Trieste

Enlisted Men

CSp(X) W. E. MILLER, USNR
CSp(X) J. M. BRYANT, USNR
CY N. PINO, USNR
Ylc W.R. WILSON, USNR
Sp(X)lc P.S. QUIROZ, USNR
Sp(X)lc W.S. CALAN, USNR

Rome
Bolzano
Merano
Rome
Venice
Trieste

C O P YWFOUSA HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5:387.4-1

5 December 1945

SUBJECT: Information US Participation in AC.

TO : Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, Rome.

1. A member of Congress has requested that he be furnished a description of the functions and objectives of the various divisions of the US Section of the Allied Commission, to include the number of personnel both military and civilian engaged in carrying out the functions of each of these divisions or sections. Based on your recent letter giving your recommendations for a T/O and the approved T/O as issued by CG WFOUSA sufficient information is available at Headquarters WFOUSA to furnish the military information, except for Naval personnel. It will be pointed out in our reply that the personnel situation is a fluctuating one and that the authorized T/O is not fully implemented. No information is available as to civilian personnel, either native or imported. As the enquiry is from the Appropriations Committee it is assumed that all personnel whose hire is a charge against U.S. appropriations should be reported. This would include supporting personnel such as chauffeurs, guides, clerks, storekeepers, charwomen, etc., both at Headquarters and in the field.

2. Although the attached paper listed certain employees by name as known to the War Department, it is not necessary for you to submit a nominal roll of native employees. A list according to civil service classification is considered more appropriate. The War Department however requests that the attached list be brought up to date.

3. Due to the difficulties anticipated in getting precise detailed information from the field and the fluctuations which normally occur you may report your best estimates where necessary. It is preferable to sacrifice some accuracy in order to secure a prompt reply.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RIDGWAY:

A. L. HAMBLIN
Brigadier General 7989.C.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5.1 Incl:
List as above.

COPY

NAME	TITLE	SALARY	LIVING ALLOWANCE
Land, Sidney	Elec. Engineer	\$7,175	2,520
1/ Lehman, David *	Former Business Manager	6,230	2,520
Lukowski, Estelle	Clerk-Stenographer	2,232	1,980
Lundberg, Hazel	Clerk-Stenographer	2,100	1,980
2/ Malone, Caroline	Clerk-Stenographer	2,320	1,980
Manian, Samuel	Chemical Engineer	7,175	2,520
Marchese, Marion	Clerk-Stenographer	2,232	1,980
Matacia, Berilda	Clerk-Stenographer	2,166	1,980
Merritt, James	Actg. Special Rep.ative	8,750	2,520
Mills, Brindley	Administrative Assistant	3,750	2,160
Moss, Royce	Chief Rail Division	7,175	2,520
Murray, Leslie	Intelligence Officer	5,180	2,520
Naegely, Frank	Animal Husbandry & Coop Spec.	7,175	2,520
Neglia, Anne	Clerk	2,430	1,980
Passerini, Lena	Agric. Econ.	4,300	1,980
Pratt, Evelyn	Clerk-Stenographer	2,430	1,980
2/ Rapp, Conrad	Struct. Eng. Adviser	6,230	2,520
Rombert, Ernest	Ceramic Engineer	7,175	2,520
Richard, Edward	Chief Civil Engineer Br.	6,230	2,520
2/ Ryan, Charles	Railroad Operator Expert	6,230	2,520
2/ Sachs, David	Labour Relations Spec/	6,230	2,520
Satrins, John	Administrative Assistant	4,300	2,160
Sewell, Robert	Foreign Trade Spec	6,230	2,520
Smith, Margaret	Clerk-Stenographer	2,100	1,980
2/ Solomon, David	Const. & Bdg. Mat. Adv.	7,175	2,520
Spencer, Jeanna	Clerk	2,496	1,980
2/ Stauffer, Kenneth	Food Dist. Spec.	7,175	2,520
Sullivan, Aaron	Dir. Public Works	8,750	2,520
2/ Thomas, Corinna	Clerk-Stenographer	2,496	1,980
Thompson, Eleanor	Clerk-Stenographer	2,166	1,980
Townsend, Harold	Construction Advisor	7,175	2,520
2/ Upman, Frank H.	Dir. Trans. S/C	8,750	2,520
Van Wie, Lillian	Clerk-Stenographer	2,100	1,980
1/ Vaughan, William	Ind. Dev. Adviser	8,750	2,520
Wade, Minnie	Jr. Professional Asst.	2,320	1,980
Walker, Dorothy	Clerk-Stenographer	2,364	1,980
Wells, Mary	Clerk	2,430	1,980
Westbrooks, Grace	Fiscal Accounting Clerk	2,630	1,980
Whitehead, Howard	Textile Specialist	7,175	2,520
Wollenhaupt, Roberta	Clerk-Stenographer	2,640	1,980
Wukasch, Lois	Administrative Assistant	2,980	1,980
3/ Salinger, David L.	Security Analyst	7,175	2,520
Lynch, Edward S.	Transportation Specialist	6,230	2,520

- 1/ Returned to Washington
- 2/ Authorised to return to Washington
- 3/ In process - EGD
- 4/ In process - about to EGD
- 5/ Transferred from Netherlands
- 6/ Transferring from Mexico
- 7/ Transferring from North Africa.
- * On leave without pay
- ** Reim. detail from TVA

7998

October 29, 1945.

G O P

ITALY

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SALARY</u>	<u>LIVING ALLOWANCE</u>
1/6/Abascal Semira	Administrative Assistant	\$2,980	\$1,980
3/Allardice, Thomas	Combustion Engineer	7,175	2,520
Allen, Judson W.	Administrative Assistant	3,640	2,160
2/Aessante, Giulia	Clerk-Stenographer	2,320	1,980
Avallone, Mildred	Clerk-Stenographer	2,232	1,980
Bartley, Mary H.	Clerk-Stenographer	2,496	1,980
Bazzanella, Richard	Coastal Shipping Officer	6,440	2,520
Ben-Dor, Ben-Ani	Food Analyst	6,230	2,520
Benecchi, Olga	Clerk-Stenographer	2,100	1,980
Blauw, Thelma	Administrative Assistant	3,640	2,160
Bradie, Helen	Clerk-Stenographer	2,100	1,980
Brootskoo, Serge	Industrial Engineer	6,230	2,520
Brothers, Sara	Clerk-Stenographer	2,166	1,980
Buchanan, Daisy	Administrative Assistant	2,980	1,980
Burcalow, Frank	Agronomist	6,230	2,520
2/Carter, Mildred	Clerk-Stenographer	2,364	1,980
1/Cerrito, Orazio	Wage & Work Condition Officer	4,300	2,520
Checchi, Vincent	Requirements Officer	5,180	2,520
Clapp, Sallie B.	Clerk-Stenographer	2,364	1,980
Cleveland, Garland	Asst. Spec. Representative	6,230	2,520
Crooks, Charles	Fleet Transportation Expert	6,230	2,520
Dickens, Albert	Program Coordinator	6,230	2,520
Dickerman, Merlyn	Forestry Specialist	6,230	2,520
2/DiFede, Joseph	Labour Relations Specialist	6,230	2,520
Donahower, Bernice	Clerk-Stenographer	2,496	1,980
Borkovitch, Victor	Chemical Engineer	7,175	2,520
Eaton, Ray	Clerk-Stenographer	2,496	1,980
Farmer, Max	Metallurgical Engineer	7,175	2,520
Falsher, Lee	Clerk	2,320	1,980
7/Forbes, Anne	Administrative Assistant	2,980	1,980
Forman, Roxey	Clerk-Stenographer	2,364	1,980
France, Stanley	Administrative Assistant	3,750	2,160
Gallo, Nicholas	Special Assistant	6,230	2,520
Gimigliano, Emma	Clerk-Stenographer	2,320	1,980
Griffith, Fay	Chief Highway Equipment Spec	6,230	2,520
2/Gross, George	Coor. of Int. Trans.	6,230	2,520
Hartigan, Margaret	Clerk-Stenographer	2,100	1,980
Haslop, Leonora	Clerk-Stenographer	2,496	1,980
Hayes, William	Technical Assistant	7,700	2,520
1/Hazen, William	Agronomist	6,230	2,520
Hill, Evelyn	Clerk-Stenographer	2,496	1,980
2/Hollison, Elisabeth	Clerk-Stenographer	2,166	1,980
Holstein, Elwood	Special Assistant	7,175	2,520
Hughes, Joseph	Business Manager	5,180	2,520
Kinsey, Lucille	Clerk-Stenographer	2,364	1,980
2/Lacatena, Lucy	Clerk-Stenographer	2,364	1,980

C O P Y

The maximum rates are subject to the following deductions: (a) by 40%, when quarters are obtained at no cost or at not more than \$2 a day from or through the military or any other Government agency; and (b) by 20%, when meals are obtained at no cost or at not more than \$1.50 a day from military messes or messes provided with military rations, or from any Government agency authorized to furnish food.

PAGES MISSING OR
PAGINATION INCORRECT -
FILMED AS FOUND

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 304
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 9030/40

26 November 1945

SUBJECT: Meeting

TO : See Below

1. Reference cmt 9030/36/40 of 24 November.
2. Owing to the illness of Admiral Guy L. Harrois the above meeting has had to be postponed.
3. Addressees will be advised when it will be held.

ERB *for* *Letter*
for Brigadier
Executive Commissioner

TO : Field (A)
Field (B)
French Representative to AG
Economic Section
Army Subcommission
Liaison Officer to Chief Commissioner

BY: Chief Commissioner

NSC-2
7994

Hardy S/C

E X T R A C T

from

Administrative Memorandum No. 7A

4 Nov 1943

*II - FUNCTIONS

The functions of the Allied Control Commission will be as follows:

1. To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under the orders and general directives of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.
2. To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.
3. To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled.

Enclosure to this Office letter 9010/96/EJ of 24 Nov.

NSC-2
7993

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/3913
3 November 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Executive Commissioner, Hq. Allied Commission.
Subject: Disposition of Combined British - American Records.

1. It would be appreciated if information could be furnished to the Navy Sub-Commission concerning the responsibilities of the Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission in connection with Allied Force Headquarters letter AG 313 AFRA-O of 25 October 1945.

H. ST. J. BUTLER,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY,
REAR ADMIRAL
FOR
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

3 NOV 1945

NSC-2
7992

DCK/WB

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

AG 313 AFRA-C

25 October 1945

SUBJECT: Disposition of Combined British - American Records.

TO: All Concerned.

Prior to 1 January 1946, all combined British-American records now in the possession of any headquarters, general, special or other staff sections, boards, commissions and committees in this theater, will be processed and shipped without further delay to the Allied Force Microfilming and Records Depot in accordance with instructions contained in AFHQ Circulars Numbers 8 and 9; except those specifically exempted, as follows:

a. Current records of active staff sections, boards, commissions and committees of AFHQ and combined (Allied) air and ground headquarters and other installations under the jurisdiction of this headquarters (non-current records will be processed and shipped without delay).

b. Records which have been signed for and charged out to installations on the official loan certificate of the Allied Force Records and Microfilm Depot (see letter this headquarters, AG 313 AFRA-C, dated 3 October 1945, subject: "Historical Records of the Mediterranean Theater").

c. Organizations, installations or agencies which can present adequate written justification to the Allied Force Records Administrator for retention of certain blocks or series of records required for future use. Lack of duplicate copies of records will not ordinarily be considered sufficient justification. Small groups may be reproduced by typewriter; large groups by photostat or similar methods. In the absence of written requests for retention, records will be considered non-essential to the needs of the agency concerned and will be ordered by this headquarters for shipment to the Allied Force Depot on or before 1 January 1946.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

W. H. C. G. G. G.
C. W. G. G. G.
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

"C"

7991

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/3542
15 September 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Public Relations Branch, Hq. Allied Commission.
Subject: Press Release on Allied Commission accomplishments.
Reference: (a) Executive Commissioner, AC, ltr. 9258/110/EC,
undated.
Enclosure: (A) Proposed material for press release on Allied
Commission accomplishments between 1 May 1945
and the present.

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosure (A)
is submitted herewith.

(Sgd) G. L. WARREN

REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

Copy to:
Executive Commissioner, AC.

B
WWW
3

NSC-2

PROPOSED MATERIAL FOR PRESS RELEASE ON ALLIED COMMISSION ACCOMPLISHMENTS BETWEEN 1 MAY 1945 AND THE PRESENT:

1. Between the period from 1 May 1945 to the present date, there has been no change in the basic directives which outline the Navy Sub-Commission's responsibility in connection with the administration and supply of the Italian Navy; however, during this period every effort has been made to increase the self sufficiency of the Italian Navy by encouraging the Ministry of Marine to seek assistance from Allied Authorities only after exhaustive efforts to secure the assistance from Italian sources. Also, the Flag Officer Italy and Liaison, who is responsible for the operation of Italian Navy vessels, has permitted the Ministry of Marine to exercise an increasing degree of control over a certain large category of Italian Naval vessels.
2. During the period in question Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean made available a number of Italian Naval vessels, including a cruiser for the purpose of transporting displaced persons. Approximately 10,000 displaced persons have been ferried from the North in Italian Naval vessels both to the South of Italy and to Sicily, and approximately 3,000 to Sardinia. A ferry service of destroyers has been instituted between Naples and Cagliari, Sardinia. Over 600 such personnel will be transported every month.
3. The Ministry of Marine has made an effort to recover various Italian Naval and Mercantile units which have been held outside Italian waters as a result of the war. By agreement with the Turkish Government, three minor Italian Naval vessels and five fishing vessels will be returned to Italy at approximately the middle of September.
4. During May agreement was reached for the return of a portion of Naples harbor to Italian Government control. One discharge berth was released without restriction and three berths were released on Vigliena Mole subject to the right of Allied Naval Authorities to use one berth as required for the discharge of Allied tankers.
5. On 9 May Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean issued a communication which altered the fishing regulations and permitted day and night fishing in a large area surrounding Italy and the adjacent islands. The Ministry of Marine appointed Italian Naval Liaison Officers to a number of the Regional Commissioners for the purpose of assisting the fishing control and increasing the haul of fish.
6. At the end of June a large amount of machinery and equipment was released from the British Royal Navy dockyard, Ancona in order that it might be returned to the Railroad Wagon Works for the purpose of expediting rehabilitation of the Italian State Railways. This prompt return of the machinery was made possible by the releasing by AMG of the original Ancona Dockyard machinery which was found in the North after its liberation.

7. Approval has been given for Italian merchant vessels in the Mediterranean which carry Italian armament manned by Italian Naval personnel to be disarmed. Such action has permitted a considerable number of Italian Navy gun crews to be released for other naval duties.

8. A large number of Italian Navy personnel have been employed in disposing of mines that have drifted on to the Italian beaches and in operating minesweeping equipment along the coasts and in the ports.

9. During the period in question, a progressively greater share of responsibility has been given to the Italian Navy for the control and operation of Italian ports. A large number of important ports, including Genoa, La Spezia, Messina and Augusta, have been made the complete responsibility of the Italian Government.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

ABO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 9258/110/EC.

Subject: Press Release on AC Accomplishments.

To: Distribution below.

1. It is considered that our withdrawal from the North provides an excellent opportunity to obtain wide publicity in the Italian and Allied press on the achievements of AMG in the last few months.

2. I am therefore writing to ask you to prepare very brief statements setting out the facts and not attempting in any way to write a report. These statements should not be longer than two foolscap pages, single-sided and double-spaced, and should be addressed to the Public Relations Branch of this HQ. The Public Relations Branch will rewrite and consolidate the statements for a Press Release.

3. The period to be covered is from 1st May 45 up to the present day. The AC/AMG Review fully covers events prior to 1st May 45.

For Chief Commissioner:

J. Gallwey
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

Navy Sub-Commission.

2. I am therefore writing to ask you to prepare very brief statements setting out the facts and not attempting in any way to write a report. These statements should not be longer than two foolscap pages, single-sided and double-spaced, and should be addressed to the Public Relations Branch of this HQ. The Public Relations Branch will rewrite and consolidate the statements for a Press Release.

3. The period to be covered is from 1st May 45 up to the present day. The AC/ANG Review fully covers events prior to 1st May 45.

For Chief Commissioner:

E. J. J. J.
Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

Navy Sub-Commission.	} with copies for Sub-Commissions	7987
Land Forces Sub-Commission.		
Air Forces Sub-Commission.		
VF, Civil Affairs Section		
VF, Economic Section	} with copies for Provincial Commissioners.	
Regional Commissioner		
" "		
" "		
Commissioner, Naples Commune.		
AC Liaison Officer, Bologna.		

Copies to:- Pol. Ad (A)
Pol. Ad (B)
Public Relations Branch.

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 39A

NSC/1695

23 February 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Civil Affairs Section, Hq. AC.

Subject: Italian Navy Personnel - Appointments and removal of.

1. In reply to your letter 4/324/CA of 22 February 1945, the distinction in paragraph 2a and 2b between the appointment "of personnel in the three service Ministries" and the appointment of "officers", respectively, is not clear. Likewise the distinction between "our approval" and "AC's approval" is subject to interpretation.

2. The views of the Navy Sub-Commission, AC with respect to appointment of officers were expressed in Navy Sub-Commission letter NSC/1656 of 14 February 1945, copy to Headquarters, AC. The policy of the Navy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in this premise is stated in Allied Force Headquarters letter 65; 091.1 Italy, of 2 February 1945, a copy of which was forwarded to the Navy Sub-Commission, AC by Headquarters, AC letter 2810/10/EC of 21 February 1945.

3. In review, appointments and removals from office of Italian Navy personnel should be controlled as follows:

(a) By the Allied Commission:

The appointment and removal of all Italian Navy Cabinet officials and high ranking civilians, with the concurrence of Allied Force Headquarters and CISC-MED, when required.

(b) By the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

The appointment and removal of all Italian Navy officers of the rank of Captain and above.

4. No comment has been made in previous correspondence relative to the appointment and removal of officers and officials of the Italian Mercantile Marine, which is under the Italian Ministry of Marine. While the Italian Mercantile Marine is under the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in accordance with the Cunningham - de Courten Agreement, it is operated primarily by the Mediterranean Shipping Board through the Italian agency, COGEMA. The right should be reserved to the Allied Commission or the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as may be necessary to exercise control over the appointment to and removal from office of officers and officials attached to the Italian Mercantile Marine in important positions.

Copy to:
Land Force SC AC.
Air Force SC AC.

c. 1945

REAR ADMIRAL

Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, AC.

7986

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

CONFIDENTIAL

ESG/1695
23 February 1945

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Civil Affairs Section, Hq. AC.
Subject: Italian Navy Personnel - Appointments and removal of.

1. In reply to your letter L/321/CA of 22 February 1945, the distinction in paragraph 2a and 2b between the appointment "of personnel in the three service Ministries" and the appointment of "officers", respectively, is not clear. Likewise the distinction between "our approval" and "AC's approval" is subject to interpretation.

2. The views of the Navy Sub-Commission, AC with respect to appointment of officers were expressed in Navy Sub-Commission letter ESG/1656 of 14 February 1945, copy to Headquarters, AC. The policy of the Navy Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in this premise is stated in Allied Force Headquarters letter 05; 091.1 Italy, of 2 February 1945, a copy of which was forwarded to the Navy Sub-Commission, AC by Headquarters, AC letter 2810/10/2C of 21 February 1945.

3. In review, appointments and removals from office of Italian Navy personnel should be controlled as follows:

(a) By the Allied Commission:

The appointment and removal of all Italian Navy Cabinet officials and high ranking civilians, with the concurrence of Allied Force Headquarters and CINC-MED, when required.

(b) By the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

The appointment and removal of all Italian Navy officers of the rank of Captain and above.

4. No comment has been made in previous correspondence relative to the appointment and removal of officers and officials of the Italian Mercantile Marine, which is under the Italian Ministry of Marine. While the Italian Mercantile Marine is under the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in accordance with the Cunningham - de Courten Agreement, it is operated primarily by the Mediterranean Shipping Board through the Italian agency, COMITA. The right should be reserved to the Allied Commission or the Naval Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, as may be necessary to exercise control over the appointment to and removal from office of officers and officials attached to the Italian Mercantile Marine in important positions.

Copy to:
Land Force SC AC.
Air Force SC AC.

NAVY SUB-COMMISSION
FILE
CONTROL

G. I. WARDEN
Rear Admiral
Chief, Navy Sub-Commission, AC.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner
+++++

Ref: 2810/17/EC.21 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Approval of Italian Naval Appointments.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.

I am directed by the Executive Commissioner to forward
for your information copy of letter received from G-5, AFHQ, Ref:
G-5: 091.1 Italy of 2 February 1945, on the above subject.

/JC.

P. M. G. Russell

7981

PA to Executive
Commissioner.

FILE

8001.
28 4
~~SECRET~~ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

TRH/TBJ/JJJr

G-5: 091.1 Italy

2 February 1945

FEB 3 1945

SUBJECT: Allied Policy towards Italy.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394

1. Reference is made to paragraph 2(d) of FAN 487 a copy of which was sent to you by hand yesterday.

2. Information has been received through Inter Service and Political Secretariat this HQ that C-in-C Med desires it to be ensured that the present arrangement is perpetuated whereby he is kept informed of certain Italian Naval appointments. The relevant documents relating to the present arrangement are as follows. It is stated by IS&PS that the Acting President was advised of the arrangement in connection with the preparation of his paper on Allied Policy towards Italy (reference HQ. Alcom 4001/COS of 5 January)

- (1) The Cunningham-De Courten Agreement (paragraph (D), 2 and 4)
- (2) The minutes of a meeting between Admirals Cunningham and De Courten on 18th May, 1944, item 9 of which reads as follows:-

"With regard to paragraph 1(a), the Commander-in-Chief stated that he regarded the entire Mediterranean as being under Allied Military Control. It is, therefore, essential for all changes in appointment of Italian officers in command to be referred to him, through the Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy, for approval. It was agreed that the Minister of Marine should refer all changes in appointment of officers of the rank of Captain and above to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Flag Officer, Taranto, Adriatic and Liaison, Italy"

3. It is requested that as and when the Italian Government are informed of the purport of FAN 487 that it be made clear that the above procedure concerning Italian Naval appointments is still to be followed.

SECRET

T.R. HENN

7983

T. R. HENN
Colonel

Acting Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5.

Copy to:- IS & PS (your memo of 1 Feb. under SOS
log number 9010 refers).

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, A.C. ROME.

MEMO TO: NAVY SUB COMMISSION.

OFFICE SPACE.

Further to my AFSC/304/Org dated 21st March, herewith data called for in your NSC/1907 of 21st March:-

- a. 11 rooms at present occupied.
- b. 16 rooms required.
- c. 16 Officers
- d. 10 O.R's.
- e. 3
- f. See AFSC/304/Org dd. 21st March, 1945.
- g. Not on any higher floor.
- h. One Air Vice-Marshal & three Colonels.

F.M. Denny

F.M. DENNY, G/CAPT.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

Ref: AFSC/304/Org.
22nd March, 1945.

File

NSC-27982

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INTER OFFICE MEMO

From: WMD & IPCW Sub-Com.

FILE No. WMD/73/2

SUBJECT: Office space.

22 March 1945

TO: Navy Sub-Commission.

Reference your NSC/1907 dated 21 March 1945.

Herewith required information in respect of this Sub-Com :

- (a) 8 (total floor space 1957 sq. ft.) (e) 20.
- (b) Minimum of 10. (f) ~~Very~~ Satisfactory.
- (c) 9. (g) See (f)
- (d) 4. (h) On the basis of square footage - 200 for Director, 100 for other officers & 50 for other bodies, this Sub-Com. is 240 s.f. short.

J.A. CAMPBELL,

Lieut.-Colonel,

Director,

WMD & IPCW Sub-Com.

7981

HEAD QUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Communications Sub-Commission

B
HHS/rm

ADM. 215.3. CS

22nd March 1945.

SUBJECT: Office Space.

TO : Captain H. St. J. Butler, U.S.N. Navy Sub-Commission.

1. Further to our letter No. ADM. 195.89. CS of 21st March, and you letter No. NSC/1907 of 21st March 1945, the following is the data required:

- (a) Number of rooms now occupied. 8
- (b) Estimated number of rooms required 8
- (c) Number of officers attached to Sub-Commission.
Ceiling 8, actual 5.
- (d) Number of ratings attached to Sub-Commission. 3.
- (e) Number of Italian civilian personnel attached to Sub-Commission. 8.
- (f) Statement whether present location of offices is satisfactory. Yes.
- (g) Designation of any particular location of offices desired. None.
- (h) Any other pertinent data for presentation at the meeting. None.

91.11. J.L.H.
J.L. HENDERSON, *J.L. H.*
Colonel,
Director.

7980

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/1918
22 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN BUTLER:

Subject: Office Space - Headquarters, Allied Commission,
Allocation of.

1. The following information is submitted as requested in paragraph 3 of Navy Sub-Commission Memorandum NSC/1907 of 21 March 1945.

- a. Number of rooms now occupied - - - - - 11
- b. Estimated number of rooms required - - - - - 15
- c. Number of Officers attached to Sub-Commission:

Chief - - - - - 1
Aide - - - - - 1
Deputy Chief - - - - - 1
Aide - - - - - 1
C.S.O. - - - - - 1
Liaison to FOI - - - - - 1
Liaison - - - - - 1
Supply - - - - - 1
Personnel - - - - - 1
Administration - - - - - 1
Communications - - - - - 1

TOTAL:..... 11

- d. Number of ratings attached to Sub-Commission:

STRONG	MONTANA	GREEN	FLEMING	JAMESON
FOI	PREBE	LUKES	FORSYKE	BROWN
MUNIZ	PLAGE	FITCHER		DICKENS
JACOBSON				ASHFIELD
				SCOTT
TOTAL:..... 17				

- e. Number of Italian civilians attached to Sub-Commission.

2 - typists
2 - Drivers

TOTAL:..... 4

7979

Wotherspoon
W.W. WOTHERSPOON

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/1918
22 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN BUTLER:

Subject: Office Space - Headquarters, Allied Commission,
Allocation of.

1. The following information is submitted as requested in paragraph 3 of Navy Sub-Commission Memorandum NSC/1907 of 21 March 1945.

- a. Number of rooms now occupied - - - - - 11
b. Estimated number of rooms required - - - - - 15
c. Number of Officers attached to Sub-Commission:

Chief - - - - - 1 ✓
Aide - - - - - 1 ✓
Deputy Chief - - - - - 1 ✓
Aide - - - - - 1 ✓
C.S.O. - - - - - 1 ✓
Liaison to FOLI - - - - - 1 ✓
Liaison - - - - - 1 ✓
Supply - - - - - 2 ✓
Personnel - - - - - 1 ✓
Administration - - - - - 1 ✓
Communications - - - - - 1 ✓

TOTAL:..... 11 12

- d. Number of ratings attached to Sub-Commission:

STRONG	MONTANA	GREEN	FLEMING	JAMESON
FOTI	PREBE	LUKES	FORSYKE	BROWN
MUNIZ	PLAGE	PETHER		DICKENS
JACOBSON				ASHFIELD
				SCOTT

TOTAL:..... 17

- e. Number of Italian civilians attached to Sub-Commission.

2 - typists
2 - Drivers

TOTAL:..... 4

7978

W.W. WOTHERSPOON

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/1918
22 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN BUTLER:

Subject: Office Space - Headquarters, Allied Commission,
Allocation of.

1. The following information is submitted as requested in paragraph 3 of Navy Sub-Commission Memorandum NSC/1907 of 21 March 1945.

- a. Number of rooms now occupied - - - - - 11
b. Estimated number of rooms required - - - - - 15
c. Number of Officers attached to Sub-Commission:

Chief - - - - - 1
Aide - - - - - 1
Deputy Chief - - - - 1
Aide - - - - - 1
C.S.O. - - - - - 1
Liaison to FOI - - - 1
Liaison - - - - - 1
Supply - - - - - 1
Personnel - - - - - 1
Administration - - - 1
Communications - - - 1

TOTAL:..... 11

- d. Number of ratings attached to Sub-Commission:

STRONG	MONTANA	GREEN	FLEMING	JAMESON
FOTI	PREBE	LUKES	FORSYKE	BROWN
MUNIZ	PLAGE	PITHER		DICKENS
JACOBSON				ASHFIELD
				SCOTT
TOTAL:..... 17				

- e. Number of Italian civilians attached to Sub-Commission.

2 - typists
2 - Drivers

TOTAL:..... 4

7977

W.W. WOTHERSPOON

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Communications Sub-Commission

HHS/epc

ADM.195.89.05

21st March, 1945

SUBJECT: Office Space

TO: Capt. H.St.J.Bulter, U.S.N.
Navy Sub-Commission

1. Following is data on office space for this Sub-Commission - copy attached.

2. We require no additional space and are well pleased where we are.

92.13.5 made
J.L.HENDERSON
Colonel,
Director.

Incl: data on office space.

7976

Proposed Basis of Calculation

	<u>SQ. Ft.</u>	<u>Present</u>	<u>Ceiling</u>
Director	200	1 : 200	1 : 200
Other officers	100	4 : 400	7 : 700
Clerks (incl. 8 Ital)	50	11 : 550	11 : 550
		1150	1450

Actual: 1569

AIR FORCES SUB COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

MEMO. OF OFFICE REQUIREMENTS.

Five more offices, making 16 Offices in all. (We at present have eleven and are full)

This is necessitated by the addition of a Deputy Director (Colonel) an American "P" Staff-Officer, two Equipment Officers (1 Colonel) plus clerks, and four more Intelligence Officers shortly.

Total numbers will then be 16 Officers and 13 O.Rs., of which 1 is an Air Vice-Marshal, and ~~10~~ are Colonels.

3

F.M. Denny

F.M. DENNY, G/CAPT.
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

For: Navy Sub Commission representative on Office Accommodation Committee.
(Capt. Butler H.S.N.)

Ref: AFSC/304/Org.
21st March, 1945.

7974

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/1907
21 March 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

AIR FORCE SUB-COMMISSION, HQ. AC.
COMMUNICATIONS SUB-COMMISSION, HQ. AC.
WAR MATERIALS DISPOSAL AND ITALIAN PRISONERS
OF WAR SUB-COMMISSION, HQ. AC.
NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, HQ. AC.

Subject: Office Space - Headquarters, Allied Commission, Allocation of.

1. A Committee has been appointed to consider the problem of re-allocation of office space in Headquarters, Allied Commission, consisting of representatives from the following:

- i. Establishment Section
- ii. Economic Section
- iii. Civil Affairs Section
- iv. Land Forces Sub-Commission.

2. In addition, one officer will represent the Independent Sub-Commissions addressed.

3. A Meeting of the Committee is scheduled to be held on FRIDAY, 23 MARCH, 1945. It is requested that the following data be furnished by each addressed prior to 0900, 23 March 1945, for use at the meeting.

- (a) Number of rooms now occupied.
- (b) Estimated number of rooms required.
- (c) Number of officers attached to Sub-Commission.
- (d) Number of ratings attached to Sub-Commission.
- (e) Number of Italian civilian personnel attached to Sub-Commission.
- (f) Statement whether present location of offices is satisfactory.
- (g) Designation of any particular location of offices desired.
- (h) Any other pertinent data for presentation at the meeting.

H. St. J. Butler
H. ST. J. BUTLER,
Captain, U.S. Navy.

7973

8

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

ROOMS REQUIRED BY NAVY SUB-COMMISSION:

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

Chief - - - - -	1
Aide - - - - -	1
Dep. Chief - - - - -	1
Aide - - - - -	1
C.S.O. Representative to FOLI - - -	1
C.S.O. Navy Sub-Commission - - -	1
Liaison - - - - -	1
Personnel - - - - -	1
Administration - - - - -	1
Supply - - - - -	1
Translators - - - - -	1
Communications - - - - -	1
NSC Files - - - - -	2
FOLI, Rome, files. - - - - -	1

TOTAL: 15

NO. ROOMS PRESENTLY IN USE: - - - 11

Director
 D/Director
 Chief Personnel
 Chief Postal
 H. J. L. G. R. V.
 Asst. Chief Postal
 Censorship
 Chief Clerk

SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APC 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 210/91/EC.

16 March 1945.

MINUTES OF EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONER'S MEETING - 16 MARCH.

Dep Ex C was in the Chair in the absence of Ex C.

1. Minutes of Last Meeting.

(a) - 1(a). Allied Civilian Personnel. Dep Ex C asked what progress had been made. He ruled that UNRRA personnel came under the heading of (1) in the previous minute. HQ Commandant said that fifty-eight persons, including UNRRA personnel, would therefore be moved under the heading of (1) and he would report further at the next meeting.

(b) - 1(b). Wage Rates in AMG Territory. Gi Seo reported there had been a meeting on this matter but nothing definite had yet been settled.

(c) - 2. Withdrawal from the South. Dep Ex C stated that RCs had been informed that they could go ahead on the basis of the directive of 7 March. The names of liaison officers had been sent to them. It was proposed that transport not needed for the North be turned over to the Italian Government, who would be responsible for supplying transport for the AC liaison officers left behind. A meeting of all RCs had been called for Monday, 19 March, at 1000 hrs, which would probably last all day, and Dep Ex C asked that Heads of Sections and Sub-Commissions make themselves available for consultation during the day.

Dep Ex C was in the Chair in the absence of Ex C.

1. Minutes of Last Meeting.

(a) - 1(a). Allied Civilian Personnel. Dep Ex C asked what progress had been made. He ruled that UNRRA personnel came under the heading of (1) in the previous minute. HQ Commandant said that fifty-eight persons, including UNRRA personnel, would therefore be moved under the heading of (1) and he would report further at the next meeting.

(b) - 1(b). Wage Rates in AIG Territory. CA Sec reported there had been a meeting on this matter but nothing definite had yet been settled.

(c) - 2. Withdrawal from the South. Dep Ex C stated that RCs had been informed that they could go ahead on the basis of the directive of 7 March. The names of liaison officers had been sent to them. It was proposed that transport not needed for the North be turned over to the Italian Government, who would be responsible for supplying transport for the AC liaison officers left behind. A meeting of all RCs had been called for Monday, 19 March, at 1000 hrs, which would probably last all day, and Dep Ex C asked that Heads of Sections and Sub-Commissions make themselves available for consultation during the day.

(d) - 6. Weekly Bulletin. Dep Ex C confirmed that the Weekly Bulletin would be re-classified "SECRET" 7821. It would therefore be mimeographed and not printed.

2. International Red Cross Vehicles. The International Red Cross owned two vehicles which bore AC markings, and therefore received AC maintenance, servicing, and petrol. Dep Ex C said he thought that this should not be an AC responsibility. He considered that the care and feeding of this organization, and the maintenance of its vehicles, was the responsibility of the Italian Government. This was agreed. CA Sec were directed to deal with the matter.

3. Italian Clerical Staff in HQ AC. There was discussion on the direction that a cut of 25% be made in the number of Italian civilian personnel employed in this building. (See Minute No. 2 of Executive Commissioner's meeting of 2 March 1945). It was the opinion of Sections that while certain reductions should be made, a flat reduction of 25% was not possible without impeding the proper functioning of HQ.

4. Office Space. Econ Sec complained that their Section was being scattered all over the building. There was discussion on office space generally, and Dep Ex C stated that CC had definitely ruled that AC HQ must fit into one building. He pointed out that AFHQ were working under far more crowded conditions than AC. Dep Ex C ruled that a Committee on office space should be formed. This Committee to consist of representatives from the following:-

- (1) Est Sec
- (2) Econ. Sec
- (3) CA Sec
- (4) Land Forces S/C

In addition, Col. Henderson was directed to approach the other Independent S/Cs to agree on an officer to represent them. The Committee would meet at the call of HQ Commandant and would consider the whole problem of reallocating the office space to ensure that Sections were not split up.

E. T. Allen

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

- G-5, AFHQ
- Executive Commissioner
- Office of the Political Advisers
- CA Sec
- Econ Sec
- Est Sec
- PRO
- DCC:O, 15 Army Group
- Maison Div

3 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3

the following:-

- (1) Est Sec
- (2) Econ Sec
- (3) Cl. Sec
- (4) Land Forces S/C

In addition, Col. Henderson was directed to approach the other Independent S/Cs to agree on an officer to represent them. The Committee would meet at the call of HQ Commandant and would consider the whole problem of reallocating the office space to ensure that Sections were not split up.

L. Talbot Major

Chief Staff Officer,
To the Executive Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

G-5, AFHQ
Executive Commissioner
Office of the Political Advisers
CA Sec
Econ Sec
Est Sec
PRO
DGCAG, 15 Army Group
Liaison Div
Land Forces S/C (MILA)
Communications S/C
WMD & IPW S/C
File
Spares for CSO
Spares

3 1 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 4 6

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: VICE PRESIDENT, CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION,
H.Q. A.C. ROME.
COPY: LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION.
COPY: NAVY SUB-COMMISSION. ✓

DATE: 23RD FEBRUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/357/ORG.

SECRET.

With reference to your 4/32 A/CA dated 22nd February 1945, it is confirmed that the views of this Sub-Commission are:

(a) That the posts of Air Minister, Under Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Staff should be subject to the approval of SACSED, through the Allied Commission.

(b) The Heads of Branches in the Italian Air Ministry and Officers Commanding and Chiefs of Staff of the Unita Aerea (Operational Headquarters) and four Zones, should be subject to the approval of the Allied Commission.

draft of new

2. In this connection will you please note the new directive which has been issued by Allied Force Headquarters under reference SAC(F)(45)3 dated 16th February. From this it will be seen that it is the intention to interfere to a far less extent than heretofore with the appointment of Officers in the Italian Air Force. The directive has, however, not yet become effective as it has not been approved, and it is considered advisable to retain the provisos set forth in paragraph 1 above, pending the final issue of the directive.

W.A.B. Bower-Bumster

W.A.B. BOWER-BUMSTER,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

7970

FILE

MC

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 99A
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

Tel. Ext. 525

Ref: 4/32 A/CA.

22 Feb 45.

SUBJECT: New Deal for Italy.

TO: Land Forces Sub-Commission,
Navy Sub-Commission,
Air Forces Sub-Commission.

- 1 Para 2 (d) of EAM 457, addressed to SACMED by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, states:

"The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine."

- 2 The Executive Commissioner has asked me to obtain your views and co-ordinate them for submission to the Chief Commissioner on the following:

- (a) Down to what level should the appointment of personnel in the three Service Ministries continue to be subject to our approval.
- (b) Down to what level should the appointment of Officers be subject to AC's approval.

G. R. Upjohn
G.R. UPJOHN, Brig..
VP CA Section.

7969

FILE

FROM: AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISSION,
ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

TO: CHIEF OF STAFF, ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME.

COPY TO: NAVAL SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION. ✓
" " LAND FORCES SUB-COMMISSION, ALLIED COMMISSION.

DATE: 8TH FEBRUARY, 1945.

REF: AFSC/318/ORG.

SECRET

SECRET.

With reference to the new Directive FAN.487 from C.C.S. on the Allied Commission, I wish to make the following remarks from the point of view of this Sub-Commission.

2. It is considered that it is most important that this Sub-Commission retains the right of general supervision within the Italian Air Ministry and Air Force, and in particular the right of veto and the supervision of appointments, promotions and dismissals, particularly of senior officers.
3. The most important part of our directive is the organisation, maintenance, supply, training and equipment of the Italian Air Force Operational Squadrons, which are working in active aid of the Allied war effort.
4. Unfortunately there is still a considerable amount of inefficiency in the Italian Air Force, from the Air Ministry downwards, and not only is the closest supervision necessary, but it is usually necessary to give an order and see that it is carried out.
5. A certain number of Italian aircraft remain in service, and to maintain these a few civilian firms are still employed in the overhaul of engines and airframes. If our operational effort is to be sustained, we must continue to employ these.

W.B.
W.A.B. BOWEN-BUSCARLET,
AIR VICE-MARSHAL,
AIR OFFICER COMMANDING.

SECRET 7968

FILE

SECRET.and URGENT.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Chief of Staff

+++++

Ref: 4001/COS.5 February 1945.

SUBJECT: New Directive from CCS on
the Allied Commission.

TO : VP, GA Sec
VP, Pol Sec (2)
VP, Econ Sec
VP, Est Sec
Director, Comms Sub-Com.
" WMD & IPW Sub-Com.

is

1. Attached/copy of the new directive from the Combined
Chiefs of Staff addressed to the Supreme Allied Commander.

2. The Chief Commissioner will discuss the implications
of this directive with you at 1600 hours, Tuesday, 6 February,
and directs that you should study it in the meantime.

3. The terms of the directive are to be considered as
SECRET and should not be referred to publicly in any way. The
CCS are at present considering a simultaneous announcement in the
United States, United Kingdom and Italy.

T. B. C.
Brigadier,
Chief of Staff.

MSL/JG.

Copy to: Chief Commissioner.
Land Forces Sub-Com (MMIA)
Air Force Sub-Com
Navy Sub-Com.

} Not required to attend
meeting.

7967

COPY.

SECRET.

NEW DIRECTIVE FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF
STAFF ON THE ALLIED COMMISSION.

FAN 487.

Following is Directive from Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. In order to implement the joint declaration of the President and the Prime Minister of 26 September, 1944, the US and UK Governments have agreed to relax the control of the Italian Government under the armistice and surrender instrument and only to exercise such control when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian Authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the armistice and surrender instrument will be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration, subject to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in ITALY.

In the light of this agreed US-UK policy, you should take action as rapidly as possible in conformity with the following paragraphs:

POLITICAL SECTION.

2. (a) The Political Section of the Allied Commission will be abolished. The Allied Commission will obtain advice from the US and UK Ambassadors in ROME. There is NO intention, however, to make any change in the responsibility of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Allied Commission; the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will, therefore, as occasion requires, continue to transmit directives in regard to the combined views of the two Governments on matters of major policy, and such other matters as are within the scope of the activities of the Allied Commission.
- (b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.
- (c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of supervising the decisions and actions of the Italian Government.

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- (b) The Italian Government shall be permitted to have direct relations with foreign diplomatic representatives accredited to the Quirinal, provided that the Allied Commission is kept generally informed by the Italian Government of any negotiations in which they engage with other governments.
- (c) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving the decrees and other legislation enacted by the Italian Government in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. Any new Italian Government will be requested to confirm that they will adhere to the obligations under the terms of surrender undertaken by their predecessors.
- (d) The Allied Commission shall abandon the practice of approving any Italian appointments in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government except in regard to Service Ministers and such military appointments as you may determine.
- (e) The Allied Commission shall as soon as possible withdraw all its officers stationed in the field in the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government. However, the Allied Commission should retain the right to send its representatives into territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government for any special tasks when Allied interests require it.

- (f) The US and UK Governments have agreed that the Italian Government will be advised that it is the Allied desire to encourage free trade in knowledge and learning with the Italian people. As far as the exigencies of the military situation permit you will facilitate any arrangements for the flow of books and other publications of a scientific, political, philosophical and artistic nature between ITALY and the United Nations and for the movement of scholars, artists and professional men between ITALY and the United Nations.
- (g) The US and UK Governments have agreed that in accordance with the terms of the MOSCOW declaration it is desirable to encourage the holding of elections for local public offices in territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government and you should be guided accordingly.
- (h) The status of Italian Prisoners of War now or hereafter held in ITALY other than those captured since the armistice was signed should be terminated by you upon adequate assurance being given by the Italian Government that their services will continue to be made available on terms satisfactory to you as Supreme Allied Commander subject to Combined Chiefs of Staff approval.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION.

3. The internal organization of the Allied Commission is primarily your responsibility. In the reorganization of the Allied Commission it is desired that you give consideration to the following policies and objectives:
- (a) The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels.
 - (b) As far as certain Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters are concerned such as Education, Arts and Monuments, Local Government, Labour and Legal, their advisory functions in respect of Italian Government territory should be exercised only when requested by the Italian Government. No other activities in respect of territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
 - (c) The Sections and Subcommissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianised to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Subcommissions and except to the extent that Subcommissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).

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- (c) The Sections and Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission Headquarters should be progressively civilianised to the fullest extent which in your opinion circumstances allow, except the Service Sub-commissions and except to the extent that Sub-commissions exercise functions with respect to territory under Allied Military Government (AMG).
- (d) To the extent feasible, officers of Allied Commission Headquarters dealing with AMG functions should be located at places other than Allied Commission Headquarters.

ECONOMIC SECTION.

- 4. It is necessary that the maximum production and effective and equitable distribution and control of consumption of local resources possible under existing conditions be secured. The Italian Government should be advised that to this end and as a prerequisite to increased economic assistance it must formulate and implement appropriate economic controls and take all other steps possible. In the event that these conditions are NOT met the Allied authorities will NOT hesitate to impose the necessary controls or take other appropriate measures.
- 5. For the duration of combined operations, the combined US-UK military authorities will be responsible for providing:

-3-

- (a) These quantities of food, fuel, clothing, medical, sanitary and other agreed essential supplies necessary to prevent disease and unrest prejudicial to such operations.
- (b) These supplies such as fertilizer, raw materials, machinery and equipment, the importation of which will reduce military requirements for the import of essential civilian supplies for the purposes referred to in this paragraph. As the time when combined military responsibility will terminate will NOT be known when requisitions are being prepared and considered, the importation of supplies under this sub-paragraph will NOT be excluded merely because the effect of such imports may NOT be felt during the period of combined military responsibility.
- (c) These supplies necessary for the restoration of such of the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against GERMANY and JAPAN.

To the extent contemplated by this Paragraph 5, essential civilian supplies cannot be divorced from the military supply programme and ITALY must be treated as a whole. It is understood that the date of termination of combined military responsibility for providing supplies as set out above will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

- 6. The Allied Commission shall be advised to assist the Italian Government in the preparation of programmes of supplies designed to rehabilitate Italian industry. These supplies will be in addition to those to be provided as a military responsibility. Such programmes when established by the Italian Government will NOT be subject to screening by Allied Force Headquarters, but will be reviewed and transmitted directly with appropriate comments and recommendations by the Allied Commission to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, which will transmit the programmes to the Combined Liberated Areas Committee for action by the appropriate civilian agencies of the UNITED STATES and British Governments. The UNITED STATES and British Governments will each make available such shares as may be mutually agreed of the cost of the provision of such of these programmes as may be approved by the Combined Liberated Areas Committee. Procurement covering such programmes should immediately be put in hand without reference to the present shipping position in order that the supplies may be called forward as and when shipping space becomes available. In this connection see Paragraph 8 below.
- 7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of

the Italian power systems and transportation and communication facilities as will further the military effort against GERMANY and JAPAN.

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7. The questions raised by you in Sub-paragraphs A, B and C of Paragraph 4 of MIF 778 are answered as follows:

- (a) The prime responsibility for the control of inflation in ITALY, including the imposition and administration of appropriate financial and economic controls and appropriate utilization of supplies, must rest with the Italian Government. Your responsibility in this connection, other than with respect to the importation of supplies, is, through the Allied Commission, to advise and assist the Italian Government.
- (b) It is desired that industrial rehabilitation in ITALY be carried out by the Italian Government to the fullest extent permitted by the Italian resources and such supplies as you may be authorized to import, consistent with the discharge by you of your military mission, with the exception that industries for the production or repair of munitions or other implements of war shall be rehabilitated only to the extent required by you in discharge of your military mission and as will further the military effort in other theatres. Except

-4-

for these industries the rehabilitation of which is essential to the discharge of your military mission and in furtherance of the military effort in other theatres, which rehabilitation should be given first priority, industries other than those excluded by the preceding sentence will be given such precedence in rehabilitation as may be determined by the Italian Government.

- (c) The extent of your responsibility with respect to the importation of supplies into ITALY is defined in Paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof. Except as is so defined, you have NO responsibility for the importation of supplies into ITALY.
- (d) Within the limitation of available shipping and subject to military considerations as determined by you, the extent to which exports are to be stimulated and the development of machinery to handle export trade are for determination by the Italian Government. The appropriate civilian agencies of the British and American Governments are currently considering methods by which the Italian Government may be assisted in these respects and as soon as decisions in this connection are reached, you will be advised with respect thereto.
8. Nothing herein contained shall constitute a commitment with respect to shipping. Any supplies to be imported into ITALY must be transported within such shipping as may be allocated from time to time.
- FINANCIAL SECTION.
9. The two Governments are discussing proposals for giving the Italian Government a greater measure of responsibility in financial matters; a further directive on these matters will follow.

SECRET

Copy No. 27.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

ARC 394

Ref: 4001/005.

5 January 1945.

Attached is a copy of a paper, "Allied Policy towards Italy", which I wrote and circulated to various Government Departments in London as a basis for my discussions with them during my visit to England a few weeks ago.

The paper was designed only as a preliminary essay and for consumption in London. It must be read in that light. Nevertheless I think that some of my American and British colleagues at Allied Force Headquarters and the Allied Commission will be interested to see it.

H. MACMILLAN,
The Resident Minister,

Ref: 4001/COS.

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H. MACMILLAN,
The Resident Minister,
Central Mediterranean,
Acting President
Allied Commission.

SECRET

7964

SECRET.

SECRET.

ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY.

Note by the Resident Minister, Central Mediterranean.

PART ONE.

Introductory.

I

Italy, like Gaul, is at present divided into three parts:

- (1) Kesselring's Italy, population approximately 24 million, covering about three-eighths of the country.
- (2) Liberated Italy, under Allied Military Government. This covers about one-eighth of the country; population about 5 million.
- (3) Liberated Italy with Sicily and Sardinia under the Italian Government. This covers about one-half of the country; population about 19 million.

The functions of the Allied Commission extend over these three territories. It must plan forward for Kesselring's Italy. It must plan currently for, and administer, Allied Military Government Italy, both in respect of present needs and in anticipation of restoring the territory to the Italians. It must plan and advise in respect of Italian Government Italy.

Any attempt to place these functions under separate authorities would be unworkable. Indeed, in the latter part of 1943 experience proved this to be the case, and the remedial measures then taken met with general approval.

It is not always recognized that for the greater part of the work of the Commission, with the exception of the Political Section (for which I am making separate proposals) concerning the first two of these territories. Moreover, the advisory duties will tend to decrease for Italian Government territory; although participation in planning of imports, both consumption and capital goods, must necessarily continue. Some degree of inspection must also be maintained in order to secure the minimum use of their own facilities by the Italian Government. This is the normal practice of screening authorities (such as the Middle East Supply Centre, North African Joint Economic Board and other similar bodies) with reference to their

- (2) liberated Italy, and... covers about one-eighth of the country; population about 5 million.
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It is not always recognised that for the greater part of the work of the Commission, with the exception of the Political Section (for which I am making separate proposals) concerns the first two of these territories. Moreover, the advisory duties will tend to increase for Italian Government territory; although participation in planning of imports, both consumption and capital goods, must necessarily continue. Some degree of inspection must also be maintained in order to secure the maximum use of their own facilities by the Italian Government. This is the normal practice of governing authorities (such as the Middle East Supply Centre, North African Joint Economic Board and other similar bodies) which have operated under the general guidance of the Combined Authorities in Washington.

This situation presents an exceedingly difficult administrative problem. Any reorganisation of the functions and composition of the Allied Commission in order to carry out the new policy towards Italy must have regard to these overriding facts or disaster will ensue.

II

Apart from the psychological difficulty inherent in maintaining Allied Military Government in a part of the liberated area while allowing the Italian Government to administer the rest, there has been a duality in Allied policy to Italy ever since the signing of the Armistice was followed by the doctrine of co-belligerency. Sometimes we have stood upon one leg - the strict enforcement of armistice terms upon a defeated enemy; sometimes upon the other - friendship and assistance to a co-belligerent whose relations with us are becoming more and more those of an ally.

We must now, I think take the line that the recent formal change of name from Allied Control Commission to Allied Commission has a real meaning. It should be our purpose only to exercise control where our military needs require it. Whenever possible the function of the Commission should be that of a mission of experts offering advice. If our advice is not accepted, we must stand on our shoulders and allow affairs to take their course. Only in this way can we bring a sense of reality and responsibility to the Italian authorities.

We should now inform the Italian Government that while we propose to hold absolutely to all our rights under the Armistice, and do not intend to discuss any settlement of purely post-war problems (for instance, territorial and colonial arrangements), yet, subject to the overriding military needs for the conduct of the campaign, we shall hold these rights largely in reserve. We shall make the transfer of authority to the Italian Government as great a reality as possible. In consultation with them we shall provide, if they require it, expert advice on such questions as justice, education, fine arts, and the like. If they prefer to do without these experts in their territory, we shall raise no objection. In the more important sphere of finance, labour regulation and wage negotiation, we should strongly urge them to listen to our views, although the principle would be that the final decision would rest with them. Indeed in every matter which is within the competence of the Italians to do for themselves, that is, regulation of their own internal political and economic life, we shall play the role of advisers, except to the extent that the military authorities require to control specific functions or to take over particular properties.

There are, however, two stern warnings which we should not hesitate to give. First, insofar as the scale of Allied imports depends upon the efficiency or otherwise of home production, we must make it clear that we shall have regard to the degree of Italian self-help - within the physical possibilities of their present situation - in fixing the standard of our help to them. Secondly, we must insist on the maintenance of law and order. If security is threatened, in a way to impede or imperil our military operations, we should not hesitate to reinstate military government either in whole or in part. Subject to these provisos, our handing over of control to the Italian Government in their territory should be far-reaching and sincere.

PART TWO.

Putting the middle "C".

(The Allied Control Commission has been renamed the Allied Commission).

There are certain specific charges which I recommend in pursuance of this policy. I have discussed them informally with the Chief Commissioner and some of the more important officials of the Commission and we have reached a broad measure of agreement.

we shall raise no objection. In the more important sphere of finance, labour regulation and wage negotiation, we should strongly urge them to listen to our views, although the principle would be that the final decision would rest with them. Indeed in every matter which is within the competence of the Italians to do for themselves, that is, regulation of their own internal political and economic life, we should play the role of advisers, except to the extent that the military authorities require to control specific functions on to take over particular properties.

There are, however, two return advantages which we should not hesitate to give. First, insofar as the scale of Allied inputs depends upon the efficiency or otherwise of home production, we must make it clear that we shall have regard to the degree of Italian self-help - within the physical possibilities of their present situation - in fixing the standard of our help to them. Secondly, we must insist on the maintenance of law and order. If security is threatened, in a way to impede or imperil our military operations, we should not hesitate to reimpose military government either in whole or in part. Subject to these provisions, our handing over of control to the Italian Government in their territory should be far reaching and sincere.

PART TWO.

Maintaining the middle "C".

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I

I propose that the Political Section of the Commission be abolished.

This Section, which is managed by an American and British Vice-President of equal rank, belongs to the early post-Armistice period. Then Italian sovereignty was little more than a fiction, resting upon an aged and exiled King, with his little retinue of insignificant courtiers and an impotent if gallant Marshal - huddled in a mediaeval castle in Brindisi, itself the most distant point in Italy which fugitives can reach.

Since that time policy has developed. The Italians have received in Rome an American and a British Ambassador. They are sending their Ambassadors in return to Washington and London. Although there is some fine distinction (in the British, not the American case) between the pre-war and the post-Armistice relations, the ordinary public, not appreciative of the niceties

-3-

of the Protocol, do not easily differentiate between a diplomatic representative with the personal rank of Ambassador and a "right-down regular royal" Ambassador, old style.

Moreover, the Italians are now themselves in direct relations with United Nations and Neutral Powers. Interchange of Ambassadors and Ministers is going on at an ever increasing pace, the Latin Republics of South America being particularly prominent in this diplomatic pilgrimage to Rome.

In theory all formal communications between the representatives of other Powers and the Italian Government should pass through the Commission, there being no objection to informal and unofficial contacts. This has not applied to Russia; and the United States and British representatives have now notified the Commission of the resumption of direct relations between their Governments and the Italian Government. It would seem, therefore, that to maintain in theory a rule which was never in practice enforced or even capable of being enforced, would be useless and even ludicrous. I propose that we should confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal, and at the same time tell them that they will be expected to keep us generally informed on any negotiations in which they may be engaged.

Similarly, in theory all Italian communications to their representatives abroad are made through the Allied Commission. They are either sent in a cypher of which we hold the key or in Allied cyphers. Copies "en clair" are sent to the Political Section. In the case however of Russia, messages are sent through Soviet cyphers, no copy being sent to the Commission.

The Soviet representative on the Advisory Council has proposed that the Italian representative in Moscow be given his own cypher. It seems difficult to refuse this request. The question of the provision of independent cyphers for the Italian representatives in London and Washington has been raised by the Italians. It has been referred by the Commission to Allied Headquarters and by them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

I propose that this request should be granted.

I propose that this privilege should be extended to their representatives in other countries.

The original insistence upon the communication of copies of telegrams to the Political Section was based partly on considerations of military security. But members of the Advisory Council (including Greece, France, and Yugoslavia) have cypher facilities; so has the Brazilian Charge d'Affaires. It is true that other United Nations and neutral representatives accredited to the Quirinal have no facilities; but the representatives of the same Powers at

to maintain in theory a neutral position and of being enforced, would be useless and even ludicrous. I propose that we should confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal, and at the same time tell them that they will be expected to keep us generally informed on any negotiations in which they may be engaged.

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Thus, so far as military news coming out of Italy is concerned, we are already trying to block the channel with a sieve. Another leak or two are of little consequence.

If these concessions are made, there is no need for the Political Section as such to continue. The function of giving political advice to the Commission can be undertaken by the British and American Embassies. In order to effect this, I have worked out a plan (details of which are given in Appendix A.1) with the British and American Ambassadors in Rome and it has their approval. I propose that it should be put into effect forthwith.

1001

II

I propose that we surrender the control over Italian legislation in Italian territory.

In point of fact, nothing in the Armistice terms gives the Commission any right to be consulted on all decrees of the Italian Government. In practice, a large proportion of decrees proposed are sent for study and advice by the appropriate Sub-Commission. Sometimes, as in the case of a recent decree raising wage rates, the Council of Ministers approved the decree without prior and detailed approval from the Commission. (I am bound to observe that in this instance my sympathies were with the Italian Government, who as sometimes happens with Governments, could not withstand powerful political pressure fortified only by the theoretical arguments of civil servants and statisticians.) The formal claim to approve decrees is difficult to enforce - as has been proved - since the only remedy would involve the removal of the Minister or the fall of the Ministry. It is wiser, in the new conditions, to rely on moral persuasion and even, when required, pressure; and to develop a normal habit of consultation on matters, particularly economic, when our joint interests are involved or when action taken in Italian Italy must, in fact, be followed in Allied Italy. The formal renunciation of this right to approve decrees, would certainly be welcomed by the Italians.

III

Similarly, I propose that the control of Italian appointments in Italian Italy be modified or surrendered.

Again, it is doubtful whether we have a right to this control under the Armistice terms. But shortly after the first transfer of territory (14th February, 1944) there was an exchange of letters between General Mason MacFarlane and Marshal Badoglio. In effect, by these letters it was agreed that all appointments to the Government and all senior appointments by the Government would be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. I attach in Appendix B.i. a list of offices firmly agreed to be subject to this control, so far as the Civil Affairs Section is concerned. It will be seen that it goes down to the Mayors and Town Clerks of towns of 15,000 inhabitants. Appendix B.ii. gives a similar list affecting the Economic Section.

The Italian Government has recently requested that the position be revised. They have submitted a very short list of offices to which this right should apply. It includes Ministers and Under Secretaries of the Government, the heads of the fighting services and so forth (Appendix B.iii).

So far as the approval of officials in Appendices B.i. and B.ii. is concerned, I take it that the chief object was to secure "defascistization" rather than to guarantee efficiency. Indeed, after a country has been for a generation under a Fascist regime, these two purposes may well be contradictory rather than complementary. While the right of approval has certainly helped

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In practice, Italian nominations are approved almost as a matter of course.

I propose that our control over all the appointments in Appendices B.i and B.ii be surrendered forthwith.

About the list submitted by the Italians themselves I am not so sure, but my inclination would be to surrender this formal right also, and rely on Allied influence and authority only. I feel this all the more so the legal right only rests on this exchange of letters between the General and the Marshal. Although the undertaking given in these letters (Appendix B.iv) is no doubt one of those inherited by the Bonomi Government from its predecessor, yet (unlike the

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short and long Andstices terms which were read and accepted by every member of the new Government) these letters - either by mischance or contrivance - were overlooked.

I therefore urge that we waive the right of approval altogether - with one exception.

A short list should be agreed of Service chiefs - to include Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. In their case it would perhaps be wiser to ask that the approval should be obtained of the Supreme Allied Commander or the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

If this recommendation is approved, certain consequential changes will have to be made in the legal documents of transfer of successive provinces from Military Government to Italian Government, since it has been the practice to include in these a clause preventing the removal of any Italian appointed by Military Government authority to posts within the territories concerned.

This is a mere formality.

IV

I propose that local officers of the Allied Commission should be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy.

One of the features of the control which is most apparent to and therefore to some extent resented by the Italians is the presence of local Allied officers in all the regions handed back to Italian control. Since, in many cases, these are the same officers who were functioning during the period of military government, the change from "direct" to "indirect rule" is correspondingly obscured.

The Commission itself, under the two main Sections of General Administration and Economic Affairs, is organized into some twenty Sub-Commissions, corresponding to the various Italian Ministries. In the regions are regional officers, with specialists from one or other of these Sub-Commissions to assist them. Although a very drastic reduction has taken place recently in the total so employed, this only strengthens the argument for their total elimination. They are now insufficient to govern, but sufficient to interfere. And their presence tends to weaken the sense of responsibility of the Italians themselves.

For instance, during the recent riots at Palermo, it was the Italian prefect who was responsible for calling out the troops, which he did somewhat precipitately. He had a Regional Commissioner who was powerless either to act or restrain action. And the very presence of a Regional Commissioner in Italian administered territory allowed the Italians to pursue the conventional pattern of

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For instance, during the recent riots at Palermo, it was the Italian prefect who was responsible for calling out the troops, which he did somewhat precipitately. We had a Regional Commissioner who was powerless either to act or restrain action. And the very presence of a Regional Commissioner in Italian administered territory allowed the Italians to pursue the congenial plan of throwing upon us - in the public opinion of the world - a responsibility which belongs to themselves.

It is true that there must be local contacts between the Allied Military and Naval authorities in Italian Governed Italy, especially in places where there are still Allied installations. But this function could well be performed by Liaison officers attached to the various Military Area and District Commanders. Where matters were incapable of local adjustment or when technical advice was required (for instance, on transportation and public utilities) special "trouble shooters" could be summoned from the Commission at Rome or, at the request of the Italians, specialist officers made available to them for special duties.

The general view of the senior members of the Allied Commission favours complete withdrawal. The Political Advisers (in the shape of representatives of the Embassies) feel that it is of considerable psychological value. Allied Force Headquarters would have to agree in detail the system of Liaison Officers from the point of view of District and Area Commanders - but I do not anticipate any difficulty in devising a workable plan.

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Undoubtedly, the more the contacts and, where necessary, pressure - between the Allies and the Italian Government can be confined to the centre and at a high level, the better relations will be. Italian Ministers resent the appearance rather than the reality of control. And the withdrawal of officers from the field would enormously enhance the prestige of the Government.

The officers made available - probably some 150 if we begin with Southern Italy and the islands - could be used in the general pool. Some could strengthen H.Q. and replace some of whom we would wish to be rid; others would be most valuable for the Northern Regions; those surplus or least competent could be spared altogether.

V

Certain central, as well as local, functions of the Allied Commission in Italian Government Italy should be abandoned altogether.

There are a number of functions of sub-commissions organised to carry them out which can well be surrendered. This does not, I regret, mean that any of these sub-commissions can be liquidated. They must remain for the work in Allied Italy and to prepare the work in Kesselring's Italy. Such are, in the administrative field, Monuments and Fine Arts, Education, Local Government. In the economic field, arrangements are already being made to hand over to the Italians (subject only to inspection) the distribution of food and other supplies in Italian territory.

Here again, this proposal is approved by the leading officers of the Commission.

VI

Changes in the Commission itself have been suggested as likely to emphasize the sincerity of the new policy embodied in recent statements of the President and the Prime Minister. "Demilitarisation has been put forward on this as well as other grounds, and will be discussed in a later section of this paper. In view of the arguments advanced in the introduction, and the importance of the military government aspect of the Commission's work, there is a very definite limit to what can be achieved by this method. But, in general, both by the issue of a new and clear directive and by a re-statement publicly and with great precision of Allied policy towards Italy, the whole conception of the Commission's new purpose and functions in Italian territory can be made effective. We are to be advisers, not controllers; elder brothers to our weak and errant juniors.

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All Italians are children. They are naughty - very naughty, sometimes vicious children. But all are children. They must be treated kindly but firmly. In any case, we can take from their ancient literature as our guide a sentiment which we have often thought the prouder tradition of the Anglo-Saxon race - "parcere subiectis et debellare superbos".

To the Italians both parts of this sentence might apply. They were intolerably puffed up; they have been wholly defeated. Justice should now be tempered with mercy.

PART THREE

Allied Commission: Composition and Structure.

I

The introductory paragraphs of this paper explained the three-fold character of the Italian problem. This reflects itself in the somewhat complicated composition of the Commission itself. It has to serve needs arising out of past, present and future military operations. This should influence the approach to the question of demilitarisation, which is being recommended in certain quarters in London and in similar circles in Washington.

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I cannot believe that those who propose rapid or wholesale demilitarisation have understood that three-quarters of the effort of the Commission is necessarily concentrated on those parts of Italy occupied or about to be occupied by Allied armies - that is, what I have called, Allied Italy and Kesselring's Italy.

In Allied Military Government territory it is really quite impracticable for the organisation to function except with officers in uniform. This will apply until the final stages of the operation. When the enemy have been driven from all Italian territory and when the first shock has been taken by the U.S.C. organisation in the rear of our advancing armies, all Italy (except perhaps certain **disputed** provinces, such as Venezia Giulia), will in due course be returned to Italian control. The Commission can then be almost wholly demilitarized because its sole function will then be to give expert advice to the Italians and to protect our long-term interests under the Armistice.

If the plan for withdrawing local representatives of the Commission as a whole or by stages from Italian Government Italy is accepted, it will automatically reduce the number of military officers employed, or make them available elsewhere. It will also, however, eliminate altogether the one sphere, that is in the regions of Italian-controlled territory, where total "civilianisation" might have been practicable.

If it is agreed that the three Italies must be treated as a whole - and this has not been challenged by anyone who has seriously studied the problem on the spot - then the great majority of the officers of the Commission must be in uniform. The simplest example of the insoluble character of the Italian problem emphasises the impracticability of any but the most gradual demilitarisation. Oil from Apulia must be moved into the commune of Naples or the Province of Grosseto; so must wheat from Vercelli Provinces (which is a surplus area) be moved into Italian Government Italy further south. How can any plan be made of rehabilitation of power or productive resources, which does not take into account existing conditions in the two liberated Italies and make some calculation of probable needs in enemy occupied Italy?

"Demilitarisation" is only possible in the Headquarters of the Commission, not in the field. In Headquarters this is already being done to a considerable extent. There are 49 American although only 2 British civilians of officer status in the two key sections, Economic and Civil Affairs. There are being asked for. Brigadier Luan - Chief of Staff - has been occupied recently in London with obtaining additional British civilians for important posts. And there is no objection, in principle, to a further extension. But there are limiting factors to this process. Certain positions, for technical reasons, must be held by military officers. For instance, Allied Military Courts which are set up in different parts of the country, including Italian Government territory, must be manned by military officers since their only sanction is

as a whole or by stages from Italian Government Italy is adopted, it will automatically reduce the number of military officers employed, or make them available elsewhere. It will also, however, eliminate altogether the own sphere, that is in the regions of Italian-controlled territory, where total "civilianisation" might have been practicable.

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It is very important to allow some degree of flexibility. It is desirable to send officers from Headquarters in Rome into the field and vice versa. Since officials in the field in A.K.C. territory must be in uniform, this consideration clearly limits the extent to which civilians should be introduced to Headquarters. In effect, they should be confined to certain posts - mainly senior posts at Headquarters - particularly on the economic side. It may be urged that certain officials - for instance in the Monuments and Fine Arts Sub-Commission in the field might be civilians. Just the opposite is the case. The only hope of doing that early work of salvage on which so much depends is the prestige enabling a soldier to get some materials and labour out of the military at a time when they are naturally preoccupied with the battle. Many a Simone Martini or Giotto has been saved by timely attention - a little roofing or shoring up a frescoed wall. The professor in battle dress masquerading as a Colonel may succeed; in cap and gown (or even flannels) he would scarcely reach the scene of action.

Apart from the question of "demilitarisation" which has so exercised the War Department and the War Office (somewhat strangely, since in our citizen armies so many of the soldiers are but disguised civilians) the chief trouble of the Commission has been absenteeism. For a long period, there has been no Chief Commissioner, and for many months, the Vice President of the Economic Section absented himself. His successor functioned for a few weeks and then returned home. (It may perhaps be worth observing that civilians absent themselves without leave more freely than soldiers). If we are to have any chance of orderly progress, this must cease. There must be introduced a more serious attitude in London and Washington towards appointments to high places. The principle by which the right of appointment to particular posts has been regarded as vested (like an advowson) in one or other Government, is vicious. After due consideration I will suggest some necessary changes in the higher ranks. After that, I trust the promotion and discipline within the body will be left to the Chief Commissioner.

The morale of the Commission has been seriously shaken by these vacillations and uncertainties. And there has been a feeling that their work has been misunderstood and unfairly criticized.

I think that all is now set for a new phase, and I shall make every endeavour (with the help of the Chief Commissioner) to restore and revivify the organisation as a team, loyal both to itself and its duties.

PART FOUR.

The Economic Problem.

I. INTRODUCTORY

It is unnecessary to emphasise the serious situation in which present day Italy finds herself from the economic point of view. Even before the war, in spite of all the effort towards self-sufficiency made by the Fascist regime, the financial and economic position was radically unsound. Budgetary figures were faked or at least distorted to conceal the real facts.

The problem of whether the Italian Peninsula can be made a "going concern" is age-long. Without coal or iron, Italy is not a naturally strong unit. The development of hydro-electric power has to some extent in the last twenty years replaced the necessity for coal imports. But the hydro-electric power of Southern Italy has been greatly reduced; that of Central Italy has almost wholly gone; that of Northern Italy is threatened with total destruction.

Before the war the balance of payments, since imports of all kinds, including wheat and oil, were necessary, could only be kept stable by four means. First a constant export of surplus oil and high-class manufactured goods and

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Before the war the balance of payments, since imports of all kinds, including wheat and oil, were necessary, could only be kept stable by four means. First, a certain range of exports, chiefly of high-class manufactured goods and some agricultural products; second, tourist traffic; third, emigration; fourth, shipping earnings. The first and last have disappeared. The second has been replaced by a particularly unremunerative form of tourist - the Allied armies - who up to now at least have spent in Italy not dollars or sterling, but A.M.S. lire popularly known under the expressive sobriquet of "phoney dough". Emigration alone has continued in the shape of many hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners who are being maintained abroad. At the same time, apart from the destruction of power machinery, large quantities of poultry (in Southern Italy 85 per cent), sheep and cattle (in Southern Italy 60-70 per cent), horses, mules and oxen have been carried off by the Germans. Where they have been spared, by the retreating, they have been freely requisitioned by the liberating armies. Very substantial quantities of vegetables and meat running into some hundreds of thousands of tons have been purchased locally by the Allied Quartermasters. In addition to these traditional exactions modern invasions add a new injury to a country which medieval techniques at least avoided. Not only is property taken from the inhabitants, but it is paid for by a vast inflation of currency threatening the stability alike of savings and earnings. Considering the fact that the Italian financial position is quite desperate, it is a very remarkable tribute to the saving habits of the people and their confidence in established authority that a runaway inflation on the Greek model has so far been avoided.

In addition to all these disasters, the transport and communication system of liberated Italy has been largely destroyed. In liberating Italy it is being daily demolished by the efforts of the Mediterranean Air Force. Railways, bridges, culverts, rolling stock, motor transport, have suffered from Allied and enemy destruction alike. To the extent that these facilities have been replaced they are primarily reserved for military requirements.

All this, of course, is the well deserved punishment for the guilt of their rulers which the Italian people must bear. But none the less these are facts in the situation which cannot be overlooked by their liberators.

In these circumstances, nothing could have kept liberated Italy in existence except a high level of imports of civilian needs hitherto financed, requisitioned and shipped by the Allied military authorities. According to the President's statement of 4th October, 1944, those had to that date amounted to 2,300,000 long tons of civilian supplies of which 1,107,000 were food products.

II

THE IMPORT PROBLEM

These civilian imports into both sections of liberated Italy have up to now been regarded as a legitimate war expenditure and carried on the military budgets. Their scale has been regulated by the so-called "disease and unrest" formula; that is to say, the Supreme Allied Commander has been required to certify that his requisitions in this field are necessary in order to prevent the outbreak of either one or the other in a manner likely to impede military operations.

It is believed that the War Department has recently reached the conclusion that even on this scale there was no justification for carrying such expenditure in respect of "Southern Italy" on their budget. This is quite illogical. As already stated, Italy must be treated as a whole. Products must be moved from surplus to deficiency areas without regard to the exact geographical line dividing Allied Controlled Italy from Italian controlled Italy. Moreover, the lines of communication still to some extent traverse the latter territory. It is for this reason that the Commune of Naples is still kept under military government although geographically in a transferred area. In any case, whether these supplies are carried upon a military budget or not, they must be introduced into the country at the expense of the American and British taxpayer. Since they must be requisitioned as a military priority, called forward by military authorities and shipped by the military, it would seem more satisfactory that they should continue to be dealt with on the military account. It is absolutely essential from a practical point of view if we are to obtain delivery.

It is desirable, therefore, that imports of consumption needs and certain capital needs should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs in Italy. Moreover, since some continuity

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It is desirable, therefore, that imports of consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs in Italy. Moreover, since some continuity of planning is necessary for efficiency, they should be so provided as long as Italy is a theatre of or base for military operations and for a period of six months thereafter. In addition, the scale of these should be regulated by a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula, and this for two reasons. First, because another year of shortage has greatly increased the need of the people; second, because it is equitable that having regard to the fact that many Italians are actively engaged in military, air and naval operations in support of our arms, a standard of life for the civilian population, many of them dependants of the fighting men, should be regulated at a somewhat higher level than that suitable to a conquered but non-cooperative nation. The degree of increase cannot be represented by a fixed percentage. Account must be taken of each requirement. Imports of food must be such as to allow a daily ration of 500 grammes throughout the whole of the liberated areas and planning to allow such a ration when Kesselring's Italy is freed. At present General Wilson, by an act of wise statesmanship, has increased the ration south of the Garigliano from 200 to 300 grammes a day. It is true that his main purpose was to avert in the "unrassing" or grain collection and reduce the pressure on wages by breaking the black market. This experiment was remarkably successful in both its primary objects. But a second motive was a desire to raise standards to something nearer what doctors tell us

constitute the necessities of life. (It is interesting to note that the Swedish Red Cross has never provided less than a ration of 300 grams per day for the population of Athens, with 440 grams per day for heavy workers). General Wilson in his telegrams, stimulated by the statements of the President and the Prime Minister, has made several appeals for authority to extend the 300 gram ration north of the Garigliano line covering all Allied Italy. This is partly for humanitarian and partly for military reasons, since the condition of Rome, where the ration is 200 grams a day, and of such towns as Florence and Siena has caused great anxiety on security grounds to the military authorities. His telegram 140 763 of 19th October (See Appendix C) summarizes his arguments which were presented in earlier messages. So far, no reply has been received. Similarly, boots and clothing must be proportionately increased; trucks for civilian transport must be made available, together with tyres, tubes, and spare parts. In the President's Declaration of 4th October, 1,700 additional trucks were promised. None has arrived, nor has any indication yet been received from Washington, as to the date when they may be expected. The same declaration referred to temporary power facilities to furnish electricity. These have been on order for nine months. We know that they are actually in existence, but again their destination is wrapped in mystery and silence.

The normal requisitioning of civilian supplies on military account framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula is essential. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be willing to provide their share of the cost on the basis of percentage according to the over-all agreement with the United States Government.

In addition to supplies on this account, the declarations by the Heads of the two Governments have led us to believe that further deliveries would be made available to meet the needs not only of the present but of the immediate future. These were to be provided, so far as the United States were concerned, by various sources of finance outside military responsibility, such as value of the American taxon pay in Italy, remittances from American citizens to Italy, and various other items. It was not clear what the total would be. Various calculations have been made ranging from 150 to 250 million dollars. In any event, I trust that His Majesty's Government will contribute a percentage of whatever the sum may prove to be in the usual proportion.

Nevertheless, in spite of every effort by General Wilson to get some indication from Washington of how the declarations made in September and October are to be translated into reality, so far no reply of any kind has been received except of a negative and dilatory character. On the assumption, however, that this is merely due to the long technical procedure of the C.C.S. and C.C.A.C., General Wilson has given instructions for planning to proceed. These are set out in No. 840 of 1st November (Appendix D). On 1 of 9th November, which was sent during my absence in Athens, in attempting to elaborate the plan, departed from its essential principle. It should be withdrawn. A programme of industrial first-aid is being drawn up to range somewhere within the figures believed likely to be available - 150 million to 200 million dollars. This is

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The general requisitioning of civilian supplies on military account seemed upon a mere liberal interpretation of the "disposal and use" formula is essential. I trust that His Majesty's Government will be willing to provide their share of the cost on the agreed percentage now under to the over-all agreement with the United States Government.

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III

GENERAL.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the task of those who have to plan for the needs of the Italian people is no easy one. It requires one of those ingenious puzzles that torture young or old who fall beneath their spell, where it is necessary to entice four mercury balls in a small cardboard box to fall into their respective or appropriate holes. Two may easily be done at once, three often, but the single four present a formidable test of patience and administration. In this case the four balls are availability of supply, finance, shipping and port acceptability. It has seldom been possible to obtain clearance on all these at once. Yet without some near miracle of concurrent agreement, reasonable planning for the future becomes impossible. Of course it may be urged that there is no reason to worry ourselves unduly about the unhappy position in which the Italians find themselves. Their disasters are their own fault. But this policy, harsh though it might be, would at least have been practicable had it not been for the recent declarations formally made on behalf of the two Allied Governments. To turn now from the path of generosity there marked out is unthinkable. In addition, this more lenient mood seems to us greatly in the interests of the world in general. Whatever may be the post-war policy towards Germany, we have accepted Italy into a position different from that of a beaten enemy; we have invented and, to some extent, benighted by the doctrine of co-belligerency; and, from the larger aspect, prosperity like peace is indivisible. The problems that face Italy are serious enough. When we reach the North we shall find large working class populations in Turin and Milan. It will test all our efforts to keep them alive. They will be the first large urban populations in our own situated inland and not upon the seaboard. To bring them food without railways or trucks will present a formidable problem to Allied Military Government. At present, slaves although they may be of German occupation, the factories are running and the people are largely employed. When they are "liberated" the power will probably be destroyed, the factories largely dismantled, the machine tools wrecked or taken to Germany, and the raw materials not available. It will need all the patience, courage and devotion that British and American administrators can give if we are to preserve Italy and her 45 millions of people from collapse into despair, anarchy and revolution. To fail to make the effort because of our grievances against Italy, however justified, may be to have won the war and lost the peace.

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APPENDIX A 1

Political Section of the Allied Commission

Proposed Memorandum of Arrangements to be agreed between the United States Government and His Majesty's Government arising out of the establishment of American and British Embassies in Rome, and Italian Representatives in Washington and London.

7

I

The Political Section of the Allied Commission (formerly Allied Control Commission), which has hitherto consisted of two Joint Vice Presidents, one American and one British, will be abolished.

In its place, the United States and British Embassies have agreed to make available such facilities as the Commission may require.

The functions of the Advisory Council for Italy will of course remain as laid down in the Moscow Agreement.

II

In order to make this plan effective the following arrangements will be made :

(a) Frequent personal meetings between the Chief Commissioner, the United States Ambassador, and the British Ambassador will continue as heretofore.

(b) In addition, the United States and British Ambassadors will each nominate a senior member of their staff to give political advice to the Chief Commissioner and to the various sections of the Commission on day to day business as it arises. Suitable accommodation will be made available for them at the Offices of the Commission. They will each have an assistant and a small joint secretariat will be established in order to ensure the necessary co-ordination. All papers affecting political problems will be passed to them and their concurrence sought where necessary by the various sections. They will have the title of Political Adviser and be regarded as in every sense members of the Commission.

R.M.

18th November, 1944.

APPENDIX A 11

The technical officers of the Embassies in Rome, that is, the Commercial Counsellor, the Labour Attache and the Press Attache, find themselves in a somewhat difficult position since many of the functions that they would normally perform are in fact carried out by the Allied Commission; and information which they would normally have to obtain from the Italian Government is only really obtainable from the Commission or

The functions of the Advisory Council for Italy will of course remain as laid down in the Moscow Agreement.

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H.M.

18th November, 1944.

APPENDIX A ii

The technical officers of the Embassies in Rome, that is, the Commercial Counsellor, the Labour Attache and the Press Attache, find themselves in a somewhat difficult position since many of the functions that they would normally perform are in fact carried out by the Allied Commission; and information which they would normally hope to obtain from the Italian Government is only really obtainable from the Commission or some of the Sections of Allied Force Headquarters. On the analogy of the arrangements I have proposed for the Political side described in Appendix A i in my paper, I would propose the following arrangements and would do my best to secure their general support if acceptable to His Majesty's Government.

(1) Economic Section

I propose that the Economic Section (for which I have to find a suitable American and British head) should have attached to it as advisers the American and British Commercial Counsellors. They would not act in an executive capacity, but would be in a position not dissimilar from that of Directors on the Board of a Company. This would give Mr. Nesworthy a regularised position in the Commission, give him a room there, and allow him to see papers, etc. From my conversations with him, this is what he would like.

(2) Labour Attache.

I would propose that Mr. Brayne become (as has already been suggested by the Commission) head of the Labour Sub-Commission while retaining his position at the

British Embassy. This proposal was generally agreed, but has now been turned down by London - I understand by the Ministry of Labour. While I quite appreciate the Minister's feeling that the Labour Attache has really important work to do and should be free to accomplish it, I think it should be put to the Minister of Labour that he would be able to do this much more effectively by taking on the additional functions of head of the Labour Sub-Commission than placed as he is now. As head of the Sub-Commission he will be able to have contacts both with the Government and with the Trades Union leaders and play the role which I think Mr. Bevin wishes him to play of assisting to rebuild Italian labour on a properly organized trade union basis. When the Commission withers away, he will continue in his post as Labour Attache with great experience behind him and with great influence. If he merely remains in a detached position he cannot achieve very much; and I am sure it would be to the interests of those purposes which the Minister of Labour has at heart if he were allowed to accept the post of head of the Labour Sub-Commission while of course retaining his position as Labour Attache to the Embassy.

(3) Press Attache.

I am proposing a reorganization of the Press work in Italian Government Italy and Allied Government Italy. At present P.W.B. is the integrated organ for propaganda under the direct control of A.F.H.Q. The Allied Commission also has a Public Relations Officer and the whole mechanism of propaganda. The relations between these two have never been very happy or a very clear line of demarcation drawn as to their functions. I should like them to be amalgamated so far as Liberated Italy is concerned (both Italian and A.M.G. territory) and operate directly under the Commission. P.W.B. should, I think, retain its functions in respect of Kesselring's Italy where propaganda is a direct instrument of military operations and directed not so much to the Italians as to the Germans. If this reorganization takes place, I suggest that the Press Officers of the Embassies should be brought in either into the structure of executive control or in an advisory capacity so as to make a proper coordination of effort. On the American side this would present no difficulties. G.W.I. officers would be made available to the Commission. In the case of the British side, a certain number of P.W.B. officers will have to be seconded to the Commission. I am not sure what financial arrangements will have to be made. If they are Army officers on the Mediterranean War Establishment no trouble arises; if they are not, some special arrangements will have to be made. It is clear also that the joint publicity operations of the Commission will be divided into (a) telling the Italians about the American and British war effort, and in particular the work of the Allied Commission; (b) telling foreign correspondents about the work of the Allied Commission. There will be some purely British and purely American propaganda which the British Press Attache and the American Press Attache will have to handle separately. Nevertheless, under the present physical conditions they would be wise to get as much as they can done through the integrated machine, and if they are diplomatic and ingenious they should have no difficulty in this. At any rate this plan must assist and cannot injure the possibility of putting over British propaganda either jointly with the Americans or separately as our own effort.

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These proposals have in view -

- (a) To prevent the growth of any divergence between the Allied Commission and A.F.H.Q. and the Embassies.
- (b) To utilize to the best advantage the very efficient technical officers which the Embassies can provide.
- (c) To give these officers an opportunity of acquiring experience and influence and thereby strengthen their position when the time comes for the Commission to end.

30th November, 1944.

APPENDIX B 1

Civil Affairs Section's Appointments

LEGAL

First Presidents of Courts of Appeal
 Counsellors of Cassation and Appeal
 Procuratori Generali
 Sostituti di Procuratori Generali
 Presidenti di Tribunali
 Procuratori del Re

Primo Pretori (of towns of pop. 50,000)

INTERIOR

Prefects
 Vice Prefects
 Vice Prefect Inspectors
 Consiglieri Primo Grado
 Consiglieri Secondo Grado
 First Secretary to
 Prefect

Special Secretary
 Director of Religious
 Affairs

Sindaci) of communes of
 Town Clerk) pop. 15,000

PUBLIC SAFETY

Legion Commanders CC.RR.
 Legion Commanders Guardia di Finanza
 Questori Public Security Service
 Regional Directors Prison Service
 Commandants (and upwards) Fire Service

EDUCATION

Rectors
 Professors (titular)
 Presidi of Faculties
 Academy Inspectors of
 schools (local and
 centralised)
 Heads of Divisions in
 Ministry of Education
 Provveditori
 Presidi of Schools
 Inspectors of Schools
 University Lecturers

PUBLIC HEALTH

Chief Medical Officer at
 Ministry of Interior

APPENDIX B 14

Economic Section's Appointments

SUBJECT:-- Level at which appointment of Italian Officials should
 be approved by Allied Commission.

FINANCE: All appointments down to the level of Grade 4., Commissari, Direttori
 Generali, Sovrintendenti Generali of banks; insurance companies and other finance
 officials of the Italian

PUBLIC SAFETY

Legion Commanders CO.RR
Legion Commanders Guardia di Finanza
Questori Public Security Service
Regional Directors Prison Service
Commandants (and upwards) Fire Service

EDUCATION

Rectors
Professors (titular)
Presidi of Faculties
Academy Inspectors of
schools (local and
centralised)
Heads of Divisions in
Ministry of Education
Provveditori
Presidi of Schools
Inspectors of Schools
University Lecturers

PUBLIC HEALTH

Chief Medical Officer at
Ministry of Interior

APPENDIX B ii

Economic Section's Appointments

SUBJECT: - Level at which appointment of Italian Officials should be approved by Allied Commission.

FINANCE: All appointments down to the level of Grade 4., Commissari, Direttori Generali, Segretaria Generale of banks; insurance companies and other finance institutions clothed with public interest. Other appointments which the Italian Government may believe to be of interest to the Commission.

PUBLIC WORKS AND UTILITIES: Appointments down to Grade 5.
(Ispettore Generale del Genio Civile, Capo Compartimento etc.)

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY: Heads and Deputies of Direzione Generale, titular and managing directors of industrial or parastatal institutions. Vice Commissarios of important companies.

LABOUR: Commissioners of National Insurance Agencies and other national agencies formerly linked into the Fascist cooperative structures concerned with such labour matters as welfare, assistance, protection and safety of workers. Appointments to the position of Regional and Provincial labour Director.

AGRICULTURE: Chiefs of Ministerial Bureaus such as Bonifica and Usses, Compartimento Agrario of the rank of Agricultural Inspectors and Consorzio Agrario officials.

TRANSPORTATION: Director of Mercantile Marine, Principal Inspector of the General Inspectorate of civil motorisation and transportation concessions. Director General of the Italian State Railways.

SHIPPING: Commissioner of the four subsidized Italian steamship companies, "Italia", "Adriatica", "Tirrenia" and "Orion", formerly "Lloyd Triestino".

FOOD: Direttore Generale dell'Alimentazione and the Head of the Ufficio Nazionale dell'Approvvigionamento e Distribuzione Alimentare.

APPENDIX B iii

Italian Government's Proposed List

Ministri e Sottosegretari di Stato
Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale dell'Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Esercito
Capo di Stato Maggiore Marina
Capo di Stato Maggiore Aviazione
Principali Rappresentanti diplomatici
Alto Commissario per l'Eruzione
Vice Alti Commissari per l'Eruzione
Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza
Comandante Generale dei Carabinieri

Added Suggestions:-

High Commissioners for Sicily and Sardinia.

APPENDIX B iv

10th March, 1944.

Ref: CC/E/134/000.1

Recent events over certain appointments have shown that it is clearly desirable for us to have a mutually satisfactory arrangement to prevent misunderstandings and subsequent difficulties which it is in all our interests to avoid. I would suggest, therefore, that it should be agreed that you will let me know before any appointment to the Government is actually announced. Equally, I should be glad if you will impress upon all the members of your Government that they should, in turn, consult the appropriate authorities in the Allied Control Commission before making any senior appointments in their own departments either at the seat of the Italian Government or in those provinces under Italian jurisdiction. As they already enjoy close and friendly relations with the Sub-Commission with whom they work, this should be an easy

Ministri e Sottosegretari di Stato
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Capo di Stato Maggiore Marina
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Principali Rappresentanti diplomatici
Alto Commissario per l'Epurazione
Vice Alti Commissari per l'Epurazione
Direttore Generale della Pubblica Sicurezza
Comandante Generale dei Carabinieri

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I should be glad if you will let me know whether you are in full agreement with the proposals made in this letter. If so, I will give the necessary instructions to the various heads of Sections and Sub-Commissions of the Allied Control Commission as soon as you confirm that members of your Government have been notified of our agreement.

NOEL MASON MACFARLANE,
Lieutenant General
Chief Commissioner.

H.E. Marshal Pietro Badoglio
Capo del Governo.

Salerno, 13th March, 1944.

Dear General,

After having worked with me for quite some time, you know that it is my absolute decision to proceed in any matter in full accord with the Allied Control Commission over which you preside.

With regard to this, at next Thursday's Council of Ministers, I shall give definite orders to the effect that no government appointment be made without previous agreement with the Commission.

I hope that the same feelings prevail with the Control Commission toward us, so that it might be possible to come, in common agreement, to a revision of certain positions given to certain persons in the provinces recently turned over to the Italian Government, and which render nearly impossible a normal functioning of Government.

With cordial greetings,

/s/ BADDOGLIO.

To General Noel Mason MacFarlane,
Chief of the Allied Control Commission,
Naples.

APPENDIX C

LAC 763 of 19th October, 1944.

Reference CAL 852, LAC 736.

Subject is Bread Ration for Italy.

1. Recent public announcements, which have been given wide circulation in Italy by the press, are interpreted by me to mean that the policy is to provide a 300 gram bread ration immediately; this ration to be nation wide on liberation of the North.
2. Confirmation is requested that my understanding in paragraph 1 is correct and that you wish me to implement this policy.
3. This policy cannot be implemented without increased imports since the import program authorized for the months of November and December is below the monthly scale of imports indicated in paragraph 4 of my letter of 24th September. From a military standpoint the tranquility of the Mediterranean Theatre might be jeopardized if the 300 gram bread ration were not sanctioned.

/s/ B. DOGLIO.

To General Noel Mason MacFarlane,
Chief of the Allied Control Commission,
Naples.

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4. If I am to establish a 300 gram bread ration, there are 2 alternatives:

a. Step up monthly shipments to the level required to produce total imports of 1,500,000 tons during the harvest year. This would mean a monthly program based on all Italy estimated at 165,000 tons from January through June 1945, or beginning December if possible.

b. Use existing stocks, together with imports under the existing program. The effect of this plan would be to exhaust the amassed grain by 1st March assuming inland transport not a limiting factor. I can only undertake this procedure under an absolute guarantee that stocks so used will be replaced in full to permit continuance of the 300 gram ration until the next harvest season. Without such guarantee I can see nothing but trouble ahead.

5. I recommend the first alternative. However even if approved, I would be unable to announce such a plan prior to the approval of a shipping program to meet it.

6. Your instructions are requested. In the meantime and in any event ACC will step up its efforts to realize maximum local production, particularly in products which may be substituted for wheat, and will continue to tighten up the administration of cereals wherever possible.

APPENDIX D

REF 810 of 1st November, 1944.

Civilian supplies for Italy is subject.

In view of the public statements of the President and the Prime Minister, I am proposing to take the following steps.

1. I am arranging for all current requisitions for basic civilian supplies to be reviewed on two assumptions

First, that they will be provided and financed as heretofore;

Secondly, that they would be framed upon a more liberal interpretation of the "disease and unrest" formula.

2. In addition and in conformity with the joint statement of 26th September and the President's statement of 10th October, I have instructed the Allied Commission to draw up a programme of industrial first-aid. This will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

3. I am assuming that the necessary finance for (1) will be provided so long as Italy is a Theatre of or Base for Military Operations and for a period of 6 months thereafter.

4. For planning purposes for (2) I am assuming an expenditure commensurate with the sources of new finance outside military responsibility mentioned in the President's statement, to be spent over a period of 12 months.

I hope this will meet with your approval as I am convinced that this is the right course to pursue.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS, MADE IN THE NOTE
BY THE PRESIDENT MINISTER, CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN,
ENTITLED "ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS ITALY".

1. That the Political Section of the Allied Commission be abolished. (Page 3).
2. That the Allied Commission confirm to the Italian Government that they may have direct relations with foreign representatives accredited to the Quirinal. (Page 3).
3. That Italian representatives abroad be given their own cyphers. (Page 3).
4. That the Allied Commission surrender its control over Italian legislation in Italian territory. (Page 4).
5. That the right of approval by the Allied Commission of all Italian appointments in Italian Italy be surrendered except in regard to the appointments of Service Chiefs to include Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of formations re-equipped for active service in the field. (Page 4).
6. That local officers of the Allied Commission be withdrawn from Italian Government Italy. (Page 5).
7. That the functions of certain sub-commissions in respect of Italian Government Italy be abandoned by the Allied Commission. (Page 6).
8. That "demilitarization" is only possible at Headquarters, Allied Commission, and not in the field. (At Headquarters there are a number of limiting factors.) (Page 6).
9. That consumption goods and certain capital goods should continue to be imported by the War Department and the War Office for civilian needs in Italy and that these imports should be maintained as long as Italy is a theatre of base for military operations and for a period of six months thereafter, and that the "disease and unrest" formula should be more liberally interpreted for this purpose. (Page 9).
10. That an additional programme for industrial first-aid be approved, to be financed, so far as the American side goes, from the sources of new finance mentioned in the President's statement of 10th October; His Majesty's Government to contribute a percentage of whatever sum may prove to be in the usual proportion. (Page 10).

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27th NOVEMBER, 1944.

2675 Regt.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
JULIO GONZALEZ COMMISSION

Recd OHH/HRH/wh

DIRECTIVE NO. 2

December 2, 1943.

1. General

Reference is made to AGO General Orders No. 1 dated 10 November 1943, and to Directive No. 1 of same date.

2. Organization

a. When the Headquarters of the Commission is fully set up, the Provisional organization will be as shown in the attached chart, Appendix 'A' hereto. This will be substituted for Appendix 'A' to Directive No. 1 above referred to. All copies (other than AG file, record and war diary copies of the latter chart) will be destroyed.

b. It will be seen that it is contemplated that the Headquarters of the Commission will be split into a Main Headquarters and a Rear Headquarters. This is, for the present, dictated by accommodation considerations.

c. Apart from the alterations due to the split Headquarters, the principal changes are as follows:

- (i) The Deputy Chief of Staff (Admin) disappears, and a Vice Chief of Staff is introduced.
- (ii) A Liaison Section under the Deputy President is introduced.
- (iii) The Headquarters of the 2675th (American) Regiment and British Administrative Headquarters appear (for Administrative purposes) under the Executive Officers.
- (iv) The number of Sub-Commissions under the Administrative and Economic Directors is reduced, the remainder coming directly under the Vice-President (and his Deputy) Economic and Administrative Section.

3. Operation of new organization

The new organization will be put into operation forthwith to the extent possible, and progressively as and when future developments permit. Heads of Staff branches, Sections, Directorates, and Sub-Commissions will reorganize their personnel accordingly. Steps are being taken to fill positions.

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3. Operation of new organization

The new organization will be put into operation forthwith to the extent possible, and progressively as and when future developments permit. Heads of Staff branches, Sections, Directorates, and Sub-Commissions will reorganize their personnel accordingly. Steps are being taken to fill existing vacancies on the basis of the original (not the revised) Appendix E to Planning Directive No. 12 dated 22 October 1943.

4. Consequential Amendments to Directive No. 1

It is not proposed at this stage to issue detailed amendments to Directive No. 1. The amendments required to some of its appendices are sufficiently obvious from the chart Appendix 'A' hereto, which will prevail where there is any conflict between its provisions and those of the new chart.

5. Organization - Split Headquarters

Instructions regarding Office organization and procedure and other matters connected with the above will be issued shortly.

By Command of Major General JOYCE:

R. B. RABONE

R. B. RABONE,
Colonel,
Executive Officer.



DISTRIBUTION LIST

4	AFHQ	
6	IGS - AMIG	
2	NATOUSS	
4	Main CC	
12	CG MG 15th Army Group	
7	Hq Region I	
7	Hq Region II	
1	Deputy President	
1	PSO	
2	Chief of Staff	
2	G-1	
2	G-2	
2	Exec. Officer Admin.	
15	AG Colonel Clough	
1	Disc. AG	
10	Hq Commandant	
2	Internal Security	
2	Deputy C/S Operations Sec. Int.	
2	Industrie Planning Staff	
9	Military Section	
4	Political Section	
5	Econ. & Admin. Section	
4	Communications Section	
2	Economic Director	
2	Hq 2675th (A) Regt	
2	Br. Admin. Hq	
2	Sub-Commissions	
2	Information incl. Liaison P.W.S.	
2	Internees and D.P.	
10	Chief of Finance	
6	" " Ind. & Commerce	
2	" " Public Works & Utilities	
1	" " Fuel	
6	" " Agric. Forestry, etc.	
2	" " Labor	
2	" " Interior	
2	" " Public Health	
2	" " Legal	
2	" " Public Safety	
2	" " Property Control	
4	" " Monuments	
2	" " Education	
1	" " Shipping	

2	Exec. Officer Admin.
15	AC Colonel Clough
1	Misc. AG
10	Hq Commandant
2	Internal Security
2	Deputy C/S Operations Sec. Int.
2	Industrie Planning Staff
9	Military Section
4	Political Section
6	Econ. & Admin. Section
4	Communications Section
2	Economic Director
18	Hq 2675th (A) Regt
2	Bn. Admin. Hq
	<u>Sub-Commissions</u>
2	Operations incl. Liaison P.W.B.
2	Internees and D.P.
10	Chief of Finance
6	" " Inc. & Commerce
2	" " Public Works & Utilities
1	" " Fuel
6	" " Agric. Forestry, etc.
2	" " Labor
2	" " Interior
2	" " Public Health
2	" " Legal
2	" " Public Safety
2	" " Property Control
4	" " Monuments
2	" " Education
1	" " Shipping
1	" " Foreign & Internal
2	" " Internal Transportation
2	" " Telecommunications
100	Spare's {Apex 'A' only}
25	" {Directive " }

MAPS AND CHARTS TOO LARGE TO FILM
ON ONE EXPOSURE ARE FILMED CLOCKWISE
BEGINNING IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER,
LEFT TO RIGHT, AND TOP TO BOTTOM.

SEE DIAGRAMS BELOW.



REAR HQ.

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
G-1 AND G-4
HQ. 2675TH REGT. (A)
ADMIN. HQ. (B) TPS.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF
OPERATIONS AND SECURITY

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

IN

REAR
MIL. SECTION

REAR
POLITICAL
SECTION

REAR
ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SECTION

DEPUTY VICE PRESIDENT

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED INITIAL ORGANIZATION

REAR HQ.

Vice

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
OPERATIONS AND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

INDUSTRIAL PLANNING

OFFICERS

4

(A)

Tps.

REAR
MIL. SECTION

REAR
POLITICAL
SECTION

REAR
ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SECTION

DEPUTY VICE PRESIDENT

REAR
COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION
DEPUTY V. P.

SECRET

MAIN HQ.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT *Sam. H. Fairbank*

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

P. R. O.

Secretariat

LIAISON SECTION

Maj. Doe
Capt. Slaughter
" Collins MILITA
" Buckley VICE

MILITARY SECTION

VICE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY V. P.

POLITICAL SEC.

VICE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY V. P.

ECONOMIC & ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

VICE PRESIDENT

THE SUB-COMMISSION

THE SUB-COMMISSION

SUB-COMMISSION:

THE COMMISSION

ANNUAL DISPOSAL SUB-COMM.

INTERNAL SUB-COMMISSION

P. W. B.

PERSONS SUB-COMMISSION

SUB-COMMISSION

SUB-COMMISSION

COMMISSION

H-Commission

TY SUB-COMM.

TH SUB-COMM.

B-COMMISSION

WORKS AND MINES SUB-COMMISSION

E, FORESTS & FISHERIES SUB-COMM.

COMMISSION

ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTOR DIRECTOR

ON

SECURITY

APPENDIX "A" TO DIRECTIVE NO. 2.
DATED 2 DECEMBER 1943

MAIN HQ.

DEPUTY PRESIDENT *Don Van Forehand*

P. R. O.

SON SECTION

POLITICAL SEC.

VICE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY V. P.

ECONOMIC & ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

VICE PRESIDENT

COMMUNICATIONS

SECTION

VICE PRESIDENT

INTERNAL SUB-COMMISSION

P. W. B.

PERSONS SUB-COMMISSION

SUB-COMMISSION

SUB-COMMISSION

COMMISSION

SUB-COMMISSION

TY SUB-COMM.

TH SUB-COMM.

B-COMMISSION

KS AND MINES SUB-COMMISSION

E, FORESTS & FISHERIES SUB-COMM.

COMMISSION


SUB-COMMISSION

TRANSPORT SUB-COMMISSION

ICATIONS SUB-COMMISSION

ECONOMIC
DIRECTOR

ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTOR



- NOTES: 1. HYDROELECTRICAL MISSION, TEMPORARILY SEPARATED FROM P.
 2. WHEN SUFFICIENT OFFICERS ARE AVAILABLE, THE SHIPPING S.
 3. JUNIOR STAFF OFFICERS ARE NOT SHOWN.

REAR
ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SECTION

DEPUTY VICE PRESIDENT

- INTERIOR SUB-COMMISSION
- PUBLIC SAFETY SUB-COMMISSION
- PUBLIC HEALTH SUB-COMMISSION
- FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION
- PUBLIC WORKS AND MINES SUB-COMM.
- AGRICULTURE, FOREST & FISH SUB-COMM.
- LEGAL SUB-COMM.
- EDUCATION SUB-COMM.
- PROPERTY CONTROL SUB-COMM.
- MONUMENTS SUB-COMM.

POOL OF
INTERPRETERS

SUPPLY
OFFICER

HEADQUARTERS
COMMANDANT

REAR
COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION
DEPUTY V. P.


- INTERNAL TRANSP. SUB-COMM.
- TELECOMMS. SUB-COMM.
- SHIPPING SUB-COMM.

DET HQ. COMDT.

DEPUTY ADJ. GEN.
(REAR)

- NAVAL FORCES SUB-COMM.
- LAND FORCES SUB-COMM.
- AIR FORCES SUB-COMMISS
- P. OF. W. SUB-COMMISSIO
- WAR MATERIAL DISPOSAL

LY SEPARATED FROM PUBLIC WORKS SUB-COMMISSION, IS NOT SHOWN.
ABLE, THE SHIPPING SUB-COMMISSION WILL BE REPRESENTED AT ADV. HQ.
VN.



RESTRICTED

DCK/ar

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER

19)

31 March 1945

Allied Commission I
Coal Importation and Allocation II

I -- ALLIED COMMISSION

1. Announcement of the establishment of the "Allied Control Commission" was made in AFHQ Administrative Memorandum Number 74, 1943, and its redesignation as "The Allied Commission" was announced in Section I, Administrative Memorandum Number 45, 1944.

2. The functions of the Allied Commission as set out in Administrative Memorandum Number 74, 1943, were defined as follows:

"1. To enforce and execute the instrument of surrender under the orders and general directives of the Allied-Commander-in-Chief.

"2. To insure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to the requirements of an Allied Base of Operations, especially transportation and communications.

"3. To be the organ through which the policy of the United Nations towards the Italian Government is conducted and the relations of the United Nations with the Italian Government are handled."

3. In accordance with the policy of the United Nations to afford Italy a greater degree of self-government, directives have been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the control of the Italian Government under the Armistice and Surrender Instrument will be relaxed, and will only be exercised when military needs require it, thus developing in the Italian authorities a greater sense of responsibility. The rights under the Armistice and Surrender Instrument will thus be held in reserve in the matter of day to day administration subject always to overriding military needs and the requirements of the campaign in Italy.

4. Administrative Memorandum Number 74, 1943, will be interpreted accordingly. Detailed instructions, in accordance with those received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their telegram FAN 487 of 31 January 1945, have been communicated to the Acting President, Allied Commission.

RESTRICTED

7952

R E S T R I C T E D

AFHQ Administrative Memo #19 (cont'd)

II - COAL IMPORTATION AND ALLOCATION

1. AFHQ Administrative Memorandum Number 40, 1943, (Revised to 25 November 1943); Administrative Memorandum Number 16, 1944; and Section III, Administrative Memorandum Number 34, 1944; all pertaining to "Coal Importation and Allocations" are rescinded.

2. Current instructions are contained in AFHQ letter, file AG 463.3/141 SUP-0, dated 27 March 1945, subject: "Coal Importation and Allocations."

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. Christenberry
C. W. CHRISTENBERRY
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

C

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 4001/163/EO

27 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Relations with Italian Government.

TO : VP, Economic Section (15)
VP, Civil Affairs Section (10)
Director, Communications Sub-Commission
Director, War Material Disposal &
Italian PW Sub-Commission

1. Vice Presidents will impress upon the Directors of their Sub-Commissions, and Directors of Independent Sub-Commissions upon their officers, the necessity of implementing the policy of the CCS directive defining the new relations of the Allied Commission with the Italian Government, especially with respect to the following paragraph:

"The Staff of Allied Commission Headquarters should occupy itself primarily with consultation and advice to the Italian Government at high levels."

2. Experience during the last six months has shown that whereas officers in the field have been careful to avoid executive action or speech with officials of the Provincial governments, there has been a tendency at HQ for officers in the Sub-Commissions to forget that the dropping of the "Q" from A.C.C. was intended to convert the relations between the Allied Commission and the Italian Government to those of adviser (and provider of supplies) on the one hand and of a sovereign government on the other. I have heard reports of discussions and conferences which lead me to think that more forceful measures than advice have been used to persuade - if indeed not to compel - the Italian Government to accept the views of the Allied Commission and come into line. In some instances these measures have been taken by subordinate officers of Sub-Commissions speaking perhaps to subordinate officials of the Italian Government. But the effect has been the same - and is unfortunate. The Italians presume that every member of the Commission speaks with the authority of the Chief Commissioner and they suffer, in their estimation, from a multiplicity of masters, and the application of conflicting policies of "advice" and "control".

3. In future, hereafter, Vice Presidents and Directors of Sub-Commissions will ensure that such formal advice as it may be necessary to convey to the Italian Government is given by Vice Presidents or their Deputies or by Directors

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3. In future, therefore, Vice Presidents and Directors of Sub-Commissions will ensure that such formal advice as it may be necessary to convey to the Italian Government is given by Vice Presidents or their Deputies or by Directors of Sub-Commissions, to Ministers or Under-Secretaries. At lower levels officers should refrain from giving formal advice and should restrict their functions to verbal consultation and discussion, expressing informally and unofficially any advice which they may feel should be given and would have the complete approval of their Director or Vice President. Generally speaking, in all their dealings with members of the Italian Government on matters affecting Italian Government territory, officers must act with diplomacy and tact rather than as mentors or governors. Only thus will the Italian Government learn to shoulder responsibility.

Copies to: Acting President
Political Advisers (2)
VP Establishment Section
Navy Sub-Commission
Land Forces Sub-Commission (MIA)
Air Forces Sub-Commission
Public Relations Branch
Liaison Division.

ELERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Elery W. Stone

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Relations with Italians.

Headquarters,
Allied Armies in Italy,
C.M.F.
5063/3/A(PS).
11 Jun. 44.

CG FIFTH ARMY
EIGHTH ARMY (Main)
EIGHTH ARMY (Rear)
5 Corps
1 District
2 District
3 District

When Allied troops invaded ITALY in September 43, I issued a directive (15 Army Group Signal MCA140 of 28 Sep. 43), regarding their behaviour towards the Italians. In brief, I said that their attitude should be correct but not familiar, as befitted the soldiers of a victorious Army entering a conquered country.

The time has come when I consider it desirable to modify this directive.

During the past eight months we have had valuable and sincere co-operation from the Italian armed forces and population in occupied ITALY. The people have had a hard time and have borne their lot well. Their combat troops have acquitted themselves well in the line, others have done good work in our bases and ports. Their Navy and Air Force have given important assistance.

ITALY has not yet been accorded the status of ally. It is not the policy of the Allied Governments that this status should be given to her yet. It is not, therefore, my wish that we should treat with the Italians on those terms of cordiality and familiarity which obtain between allies.

On the other hand I do consider that we should show sympathy for their difficulties and consideration for their legitimate needs. I have in mind, for example, such questions as the requisitioning of accommodation, in which our attitude in the past may perhaps, in some cases, have been dictated more by consideration of convenience than of military necessity. I also feel strongly that their troops who are fighting by the side of our own should be treated fairly in all things and given encouragement.

In brief, while the Italian Government, troops and people

said that their attitude should be correct but not familiar, as befitted the soldiers of a victorious Army entering a conquered country.

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In brief, while the Italian Government, troops and people co-operate with us in the defeat of Germany, I consider it to be proper and expedient that we should show them good-will without familiarity and consideration without weakness.

This document must not be circulated below Brigade, Regiment or equivalent H.Q. but commanders are requested to ensure that all officers serving under them are aware of my wishes and respect them.

/s/ H. R. Alexander

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

7950

CRBAN

Russian Military with Allied Control Commission

Major General SOLODOUNIK

Lieutenant GOLUBEU

Russian Naval Officer with Allied Control
Commission

Lieutenant GRISHINSKY.

QCC
7949

File - Personnel

*Comm. Zircali
Taranto*

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. Section
APO 394

Ref/125/39/CA.

19 May 1944.

EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 60)

DESCRIPTIONS OF ITALIAN TERRITORY

1. In order to avoid any confusion in the minds of officers of the Commission and in official correspondence, regarding the general types of territory into which Italy has become divided by the course of the war it has been decided that the following descriptions shall be adopted:
 - (a) For territory handed back to the Italian Government - Italian Government Territory.
 - (b) For territory under Allied Military Government - Military Government Territory.
 - (c) For all other Italian territory - German Occupied Territory.
2. These names will be used, as required, in all correspondence.
3. Legal and other official documents will continue to conform to the descriptions of territory used in existing documents to which they refer unless otherwise stated in the preamble.

Norman E. Fiske
NORMAN E. FISKE
Colonel,
Deputy Executive
Commissioner.

DISTRIBUTION:

Naval Sub-Commission
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Navy House, Taranto
RECEIVED MAY 22 1944

"A"

7948

No 2 District

SECRET
HQ 2 District CMF
1476 Q

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO 19

29 Feb 44

(Cancelling GS Instr No 4 dated 27 Dec 43)

ORGANIZATION OF ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
AND ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

GENERAL

1. With effect from 11 Feb 1944 that part of the Italian Peninsula which lies SOUTH of the Northern boundaries of the Provinces of SALERNO, POTENZA, and BARI, together with the island of SICILY (but exclusive of the islands of PANTELLARIA, LAMPEDUSA, and LINOSA) was restored to the jurisdiction of the Italian Government, and passed from the government of the Allied Military Government (AMG) to the supervision of the Allied Control Commission (ACC). This is all now known as "King's Italy".

2. The area with which 2 District has to deal is therefore still subject to two forms of government, viz:-

(a) Italian Civil Government (under supervision of ACC) in the whole of 2 District lying SOUTH of the Northern boundaries of the Provinces of BARI and POTENZA (ie. the "MASON - DIXON" line).

(b) Allied Military Government in the remainder of 2 District (ie FOGGIA Province).

ORGANIZATION

3(a) The Allied C-in-C is ex-officio President of the ACC and the authority in whose name AMG is conducted.

(b) The C-in-C ACMF is Deputy President of the ACC.

4(a) The original HQ ACC, HQ AMG, and AMG 15 Army Gp are now combined in HQ ACC at NAPLES which controls all ACC and AMG activities under a Chief Commissioner - Lt General MASON MACFARLANE. Thus both Military Government in the more forward areas and ACC control in territory administered by the Italian Government are carried out by one organization.

(b) ACC HQ is divided into five Sections (vide Appendix A).

(c) The Regional Control and Military Government (RCMG) Section, and the Independent Sub-Commissions only are executive, the remainder being advisory.

(d) RCMG Section controls all Civil affairs (whether ACC or AMG) and is also responsible for all liaison and contact with HQ ACMF and Allied Military Formations. All communications between 2 District and HQ ACC will therefore be conducted through the RCMG Section.

(e) A Liaison officer from the ACC is attached to HQ No 2 District to whom he is responsible for liaison and information on all matters concerning ACC and AMG.

(2)

5. The chain of command is as follows:-

AFHQ
:
ACMF
:
HC ACC
:

Region I (ACC) (SICILY)	Region II (ACC) (All Italy SOUTH of MASON- DIXON line)	Region III (AMG)(NAPLES BENVENTO AVELLIMO)	Region IV (AMG)(LAZIO and UMBRIA later).	Region V (AMG)(FOGGIA -later ABRUZZI and MARCHE	AMG 5 Army	AMG 8 Army
-------------------------------	--	---	---	--	------------	------------

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

6 AMG is the government in the territory under its jurisdiction. Proclamations posted by AMG have the force of law. Military Courts are set up to try and condemn criminals, but have no jurisdiction over Allied Service personnel.

7. Region HQ have all necessary Staff branches to carry out their functions, and normally have Provincial Commissioners in all provincial capitals and Provincial Officers in all principal towns. All AMG officers are executive.

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

8 The broad functions of ACC are to enforce the conditions of the Italian surrender; to ensure that the conduct of the Italian Government conforms to our requirements; and to be the organization through which all relations between the United Nations and the Italian Government are conducted.

9 In "King's Italy" the Italian Government is the lawful Government. ACC ensures that the conduct of the Government conforms to Allied requirements. At the same time the law remains Italian, and changes in it can only be such as ACC induce the Government to make. Allied personnel are NOT subject to the jurisdiction of Italian Courts. Complaints or charges against them will be forwarded by the Italian Authorities to ACC.

10 Region HQ have all necessary Staff branches to carry out their functions (as well as representatives of various sub-commissions of the Administrative and Economic Sections), and have Provincial Commissioners at each provincial capital. ACC officers are NOT executive, and cannot issue orders to civil authorities as in the case with AMG officers.

COMMAND

11 All ranks of ACC and AMG are under command of the Executive Commissions of RCMG Section through their respective RCC for Discipline and Administration. In cases of military necessity Sub-Area Comds are empowered to issue to all ACC and AMG personnel such orders as the situation demands.

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

(3)

12 HQ 2 Districe is concerned directly with

- (a) For "KING's ITALY" area
(b) For FOGGIA province.

HQ ACC Region II.
HQ AMG Region V.

13 Matters of policy will be referred by Area/Sub Areas to 2 District who will deal direct with HQ ACC on matters of high policy, and with HQ ACC Region II or HQ AMG Region V on normal policy matters.

14. Matters of detail. Area/Sub Areas will deal direct with ACC/ AMG provincial Commissioners.

15 Matters relating to the Italian Army. Area/Sub Areas will deal direct with the commanding officer of the Italian tps allocated to them. Other matters will be referred to 2 District who will deal direct with the Army Sub-Commission of the ACC, the Military Mission to the Italian Army (MMIA).

16 Comms to HQ ACC will be addressed

- (a) Letter Main HQ ACC (in duplicate)
APO 394
(b) Signal Messages FARGO

17 . All ACC and AMG Officers have orders to assist Sub-Area Comds in their dealings with the civil population. Similarly Sub-Area Comds will at all times assist ACC and AMG officers and uphold their authority, if necessary by military action in an emergency.

18. Area/Sub-Areas will maintain close liaison with ACC or AMG representatives in their areas.

FUTURE ORGANIZATION

19 (a) As the Rear Army boundaries move forward AMG Region IV will take over the Compartimenti of LAZIO and UMBRIA and AMG Region V those of ABRUZZI and MARCHE (in addition to the province of FOGGIA already taken over) from AMG 5 and 8 Armies respectively.

(b) AMG Region III and FOGGIA province will probably be handed back to the Italian Government, under the supervision of ACC, as soon as is practicable.

ACK on attd (substitute) AF A16.

(Signature Illegible)

Col i/c Adm,
No 2 District.

TOC

C O P Y

C O P Y

C O P Y

79:6


HQ Allied Control Commission Organization

ADC Chief Commissioner PA
Deputy Chief Commissioner PA

Secretary General

Appendix A to 2
Adm Instr No 19
dated 28 Feb 44

SECRET



F.O.T.

~~11/11~~ 23/4

U.S.N.L.I.

Cdr. Palmer left the enclosed
"chain of command" chart, showing
organization of A.C.C., with me.

Report for information &
retention by USNLI

J. S. S. 23/4

7944

Totale L.

Il Capo dei Servizi amministrativi
o l'addetto incaricato

QUIETANZA

Si dichiara di aver ricevuto la somma di L.
(Lire _____) come da dettaglio suddetto.

Taranto, li

194

Anno

Banco di Napoli - Succ. di Taranto
IL CASSIERE

Esente da bollo - legge 14 giugno 928-VI n. 1310

HEADQUARTERS

INITIAL

REAR

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
G1 & G4
HQ 2675 (A) REGT
ADMIN HQ. (B) Tps

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
OPERATIONS & SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

INDUSTRIAL PLANNING

REAR
MIL. SECTION

REAR
POLITICAL SECTION

REAR
ECONOMIC
ADMINISTRATIVE
SECTION
DEPUTY VICE PRESIDENT

REAR COMMUNICATIONS
SECTION

DEPUTY V.P.



HEADQUARTERS

A

C

C

INITIAL

ORGANISATION

ADVANCED

CHIEF OF STAFF
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF

DEPUTY PRESIDENT

LIAISON SECTION

MILITARY SECTION
VICE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY V.P.

POLITICAL SECTION
VICE PRESIDENT
DEPUTY V.P.

ECONOMIC & ADMINISTRATION
VICE PRESIDENT

RES. SUB.COM.
RES. SUB.COM.
RES. SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
TECHNICAL DISPOSAL SUB.COM.


INTERNAL SUB.COM.
FROM P.W.B.
RES. SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.
SUB.COM.


ECONOMIC DIRECTOR


ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR

INDUSTRIAL PLANNING

COMMUNICATIONS
V.P.







NAVAL FORCES SUB.COM
 LAND FORCES SUB.COM
 AIR FORCES SUB.COM
 P.O.W. SUB.COM
 WAR MATERIAL DISPOSAL SUB.COM
 FOREIGN & INTERNAL SUB.COM
 LIAISON FROM P.W.B.
 DISPLACED PERSONS SUB.COM
 INDUSTRY SUB.COM
 ECONOMIC DIRECTOR
 COMMERCE SUB.COM
 LABOUR SUB.COM
 INTERIOR SUB.COM
 ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR
 PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUB.COM
 PUBLIC HEALTH SUB.COM
 FINANCE SUB.COM
 PUBLIC WORKS & MINES SUB.COM
 AGRICULTURE ETC SUB.COM
 LEGAL SUB.COM
 EDUCATION SUB.COM
 INTERNAL TRANSPORTATION SUB.COM
 TELECOMMUNICATION SUB.COM

DET. H.A. COMDT.
 ADJ. GEN.
 DET. POOL OF INTERPRETERS
 AIR TRANSPORT
 A.C.C. SIGNALS
 DEPUTY ADJ. GEN.

0181