

ACC

10000/124/204

10000/124/204

GEN. CORRES. INDUSTRIES
OCT. 45 - SEPT. 46

WSI-3

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Office of the Chief Commissioner
APO 734

Ref. : 9/28/CA

6 September 1946

SUBJECT: Manufacture of small arms.

TO : G-5 Section,
AFHQ.

1. I have received numerous requests from various departments of the Italian Government as well as from certain private firms, for permission to manufacture or repair and to sell to State Departments, Commercial undertakings or private individuals, certain types of arms and ammunition.
2. The only direction which I appear to have received from you on this matter is contained in your AG 308/3/087 GSC/C of 2 August 1945 copy of which is attached for easy reference. This Directive, which was written before the conclusion of the war in the East and which consequently lays stress on our war effort, is quite clear as far as "Armaments and ammunition or implements of war" are concerned. It does not, however, define these items or state whether the manufacture of such weapons as sporting shot guns, small practice rifles or pistols of small calibre is to be restricted. Further, as this directive pre-supposed the signing of a peace treaty within a comparatively short space of time after the end of the war, it did not allow for the circumstances which have arisen in Italy during the past 12 months and which may continue for some time.
3. In fact (see my letter 501/443/20 of the 22 November 1945) positive control of manufacture of war material has not been complete owing to the absence of qualified technical staff, the only control existing being through the service sub-commissions and their respective Ministries, leaving the manufacture by private firms without direct control.
4. As a result of this situation I on receiving the requests referred to in para 1 above, together with frequent complaints on the injustices due to a system (or rather, a lack of system) under which certain small firms are able to make and sell various weapons without any control, whereas the large and reputable firms who are under contract

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WSI-3

760

with Service Ministries are still waiting for authority to enable them to execute similar orders.

5. I therefore recommend that two decisions be taken -

- (a) that the term War like material should be defined and that weapons which need not be considered essentially war-like, e.g. shot guns, sporting rifles and pistols or revolvers below 8 mm should be excluded from the definition.

and

- (b) that the control of manufacture, repair and distribution of weapons other than those considered as war-like, should be left entirely to the Italian Government, who may however, be required to give us such information regarding their system of control as we may require.

6. It is very desirable that some such ruling should be given at the earliest possible moment.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone

ELDERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

Copy to: Chief Commissioner
Rm. Commissioner
Land Forces S/C
Navy S/C
Air Forces S/C
Exec. Section
CA Section

3070

CINC MED (R) F O L I
RNO VENICE
NSCAC ROME

NOIC TRIESTE
14.11.35

CONFIDENTIAL

Your 111129. It is expected torpedoes will be ready for shipment about the end of March. As opportunities for direct shipment to MALTA are now very rare it is recommended for consideration that an L.C.T. be made available for purpose. There is also a considerable quantity of material at TRIESTE and a winch ex L.C. I. 278 at ANCONA for shipment. RNO VENICE's 131100 refers.

DTG 14.11.35 March

T/P P/L

TOR 1901/14

WJCB 15.3.46

REF:- Report when expected to be shipped

DIST:- O, 2 - 4, 6, NSC(4)

(3289). Wt. 30147/D.8071. 25,000M. 11/44. P.I.

S. 1320d.
(Established—May, 1930)
(Revised—June, 1944)

U/C.

TO. FOLI (R) OINC MED, NSC, AO. COMAVMED. NOIC TRUSTE.
SUSNLOT. VAM. CS MALTA.

FROM. RNO VEHICLE.

Expect packing cases to be ready in 12 days. On shipment of torpedoes
will be able to proceed with closure of station.

== 431100A/MARCH

Ref. Is closure of delayed by packing of torpedoes?

T/P P/L TOR 4505 P.R. 13/5.

Dist. 1-6. 4Q. log. NSC(4).

WSI - 3003

RESTRICTED (DEFERRED TO ALL EXCEPT VENICE).

TO. RNO VENICE (R) CINC MED. COMNAVMED. S.U.S.N.L.O.I. FROM. FOLI(2).
NSC.AC. NOIC TRIESTE. VAN.C.S. MALTA.

For Officer in Charge, Allied Naval Experimental Station.
Paragraph 2 of your 261131 January not to all. Closure of
Station is to be expedited. If unnecessary delay is arising from
lack of packing materials for shipment of torpedoes, application
should be made to S.N.S.O. Malta giving full particulars of requirements.

... 111259A/MARCH ...

R.f. Servicing and boxing of 6 torpedoes.
T/P F/L TOD 2300
Dist. 1-6. 10. 10g. NSC(4).

P.R.

11/3.

NOSS TRISATE (R) F O L I
 RNO TENVOR
 NSO AG ROME

CINO MED
 111129

CONFIDENTIAL

Request you will report when the three S.S.B. Human Torpedoes
 are expected to be shipped to N A S O MALTA.

2. NSO AG ROME 060915 February refer.

111129 March

R/R P/L

TCR 1322/11

WJOB 11.3.46.

REF:- Human torpedoes at SAN ANDREA

DEST:- C - 4, 6, NSO(A)

NSC/4629
21 February 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

Subject: Miniature Submarines at Caproni Works of Milan.

Reference: (a) Navy S/C ltr NSC/4558 dated 6 Feb. 1946.

Enclosure: (A) Letter from Lt. Comdr. L.K.P. Crabb, RNVR to RNO, Venice, dated 13 Feb. 1946. (Copy).
(B) Navy S/C ltr NSC/4612 dated 18 Feb. 1946.
(C) Copy Legal S/C, AC ltr AC/4005/L dated 20 Feb. 1946.

1. Pursuant to reference (a), enclosures (A), (B) and (C) are forwarded herewith for information.

2. Final disposal of SSB Torpedoes at Caproni Works in Milan will be held in abeyance for the present as requested in Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean's signal DTG 160846 February.

G. F. MENTZ,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY,
FOR REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC,
For CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

Copy to:
FOIL
Senaluslo, Italy
RNO, Venice

26 FEB 1946

From: Lt. Comdr. K.K.P. CRABB, R.N.V.R.
To: R.N.O. Venice.

Subject: Miniature Submarine at Caproni Works, Milan.

Ref: (A) Navy S/C letter NSC/4558 6th Feb. 1946.
(B) Navy S/C letter NSC/4429 15th Jan. 1946
(C) AC/4005/L 4th, Feb. 1946.

1. When the writer first visited Caproni Workshops in Milan in June 1945, Ing. Goeta stated that the Germans had ordered 10 SSB. Four of these were in an advanced state of assembly and could be completed in three weeks, nine more could be produced in four months. Ing. Goeta suggested that in order to keep his men working he should carry on work in the four torpedos at his own risk. A signal was made to C-in-C Med (R) POTALI POTALI (Rome) SNOVA by NOIC Venice, stating these facts.
2. The matter was again referred to in my report to C-in-C Med paragraph 3 Sec: III of 26,6,45.
3. The Superintendent of Diving visited the works in July 1945 and referred to the torpedos in his report to D.T.M. dated 16,7,45 Appendix IV paragraph 2 and Appendix VII paragraph 4.
4. N.O.I.C.'s letter to Navy Sub Commission Rome, dated 3rd September 1945, No. 831/26/2 paragraph 6, states that 2 SSB had been completed and that 2 more were practically ready. At this time Ing. Goeta was told by me not to proceed further pending further orders.
5. Ref paragraph 3 of AC/4005/L 4th February 1946. Plans of these SSB had been sent to A.F.H.Q. from Venice by the Intelligence Collecting Unit early in May.
6. Ref paragraph 7 of the same letter it is desired to stress the fact that Ing. Goeta stated that three weeks work would serve to complete the four machines, that all parts were ready and present in his shops and that he would like to keep his men busy as they had to be paid in any case.
7. At this time the U.S. Navy was showing great interest in this type of craft and a visit from the Superintendent of Diving was expected, on his report it was expected that a final decision would be made as to the future of these machines.

/s/L.K.P. Crabb
Lt. Comdr. I.K.P. Crabb, R.N.V.R.

NHC/4612
18 February 1946.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Legal Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.

Subject: Italian Naval Munitions Production.

Reference: (a) Your ltr. AC/4005/L dated 4 February 1946.
(b) Navy S/C ltr. NHC/4429 dated 15 January 1946.

Enclosure: (A) Letter from Lt. Genr. L.K.P. Grabb, RNVR, to RND
Venice dated 13 February 1946. (Copy).

1. With regard to references (a) and (b), enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
2. It is requested that the Legal Sub-Commission inform the Navy Sub-Commission whether or not the facts set forth in enclosure (A) change the decision handed down in reference (a), paragraph 9.

/s/ G. F. MENTZ,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
for REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

AG/4005/L

/es
20 February 1946.

SUBJECT: Italian Naval Munitions Production.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.

1. Lt. Comdr. Crabb's letter does not disclose any fact which was not already known to your Sub-Commission.

2. The final decision to be taken in this matter appears to rest on a question of fact much more than on a point of law.

3. Either Ing. Goeta stated that he would like to keep his men busy and asked leave to continue the work on the four machines, fully understanding that he was doing so under his own responsibility without any commitment being undertaken by the Allied authorities.

4. Or Lt. Comdr. Crabb requested him to complete the SSB because of the interest shown in this type of craft by US Navy thus committing the Allied authorities to compensation for the cost of production.

5. As US Navy interest in SSB is fully admitted, it appears difficult to accept the first alternative unless Ing. Goeta confirms the facts set out in Para 6 of your enclosure (A).

6. I am afraid that until this evidence is obtained the opinion of this Sub-Commission cannot be modified.

/s/ G. G. HANNAFORD,
Lt. Col.,
Deputy Chief Legal Adviser.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

AG/4005/L

/es
20 February 1946

SUBJECT : Italian Naval Munitions Production.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission

1. Lt. Comdr. Crabb's letter does not disclose any fact which was not already known to your Sub-Commission.
2. The final decision to be taken in this matter appears to rest on a question of fact much more than on a point of law.
3. Either Ing. Goeta stated that he would like to keep his men busy and asked leave to continue the work on the four machines, fully understanding that he was doing so under his own responsibility without any commitment being undertaken by the Allied authorities.
4. Or Lt. Comdr. Crabb requested him to complete the SSB because of the interest shown in this type of craft by US Navy thus committing the Allied authorities to compensation for the cost of production.
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6. I am afraid that until this evidence is obtained the opinion of this Sub-Commission cannot be modified.

G.G. Hannaford
G.G. HANNAFORD, 3054
Lt. Col.,
Deputy Chief Legal Advisor.

NSC/4612
18 February 1946

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Legal Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.

Subject: Italian Naval Munitions Production.

References: (a) Your ltr AC/4005/L dated 4 February 1946.
(b) Navy S/C ltr NSC/4429 dated 15 January 1946.

Enclosures: (A) Letter from Lt. Comdr. L.K.P. Crabb, RNVR, to RNO Venice dated 13 February 1946. (Copy).

1. With regard to references (a) and (b), enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
2. It is requested that the Legal Sub-Commission inform the Navy Sub-Commission whether or not the facts set forth in enclosure (A) change the decision handed down in reference (a), paragraph 9.

G. F. MENTZ,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY,
FOR REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

19 FEB 1946

WSI-3 3003

FROM : RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER, VENICE.

DATE : 13rd February 1946.

TO : NAVY SUB. COMMISSION, H.Q. ALLIED COMMISSION. ROME.

Subject :- Miniature Submarines at Caproni Works of Milan.
Ref. :- Your NSC/4558 of 6th February 1946 and AC/4005/L of
4th February 1946.

Enclosed please find a statement from
Lt. Cdr. L.K.P. Crabbe R.N.V.R. Commanding Officer Allied Navies
Experimental Station, San Andrea, forwarded for your information.

T.S. Avery
M COMMANDER R.N.
R.N.O. VENICE.
RESIDENT NAVAL OFFICER VENICE

3003

Venice Feb. 13th, 1946

From: Lt/Comdr. L.K.P. CRABB R.N.V.R.

To : R.N.O. Venice

Subject: Miniature Submarine at Caproni Works Milan.

Ref.: (A) Navy S/C letter NSC/4558 6th Feb. 1946

(B) Navy S/C letter NSC/4429 15th Jan. 1946

(C) AC/4005/L 4th, Feb. 1946

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1) - When the writer first visited Caproni Workshops in Milan in June 1945, Ing. Goeta stated that the Germans had ordered 18 SSB. Four of these were in an advanced state of assembly and could be completed in three weeks, nine more could be produced in four months. Ing. Goeta suggested that in order to keep his men working he should carry on work in the four torpedos at his own risk. A signal was made to C-in-C-Med (R) FOTALI FOTALI (Rome) SNOMA by NOIC Venice, stating these facts.

2) - The matter was again referred to in my report to C-in-C-Med paragraph 3 Sec: III of 26, 6, 45.

3) - The Superintendent of Diving visited the works in July 1945 and referred to the torpedos in his report to D.T.M. dated 16, 7, 45 Appendix IV paragraph 2 and Appendix VII paragraph 4.

4) - N.O.I.C.'s letter to Navy Sub Commission Rome, dated 3rd September 1945. No 831/26/2 paragraph 6, states that 2 SSB had been completed and that 2 more were practically ready. At this time Ing. Goeta was told by me not to proceed further pending further orders.

5) - Ref paragraph 3 of AC/4005/L 4th February 1946
Plans of these SSB had been sent to A.F.H.Q. from Venice by the Intelli-

NAVY LETTER ABC/4429 15th Jan. 1946

(c) AC/4005/L 4th, Feb. 1946

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- 1) - When the writer first visited Caproni Workshops in Milan in June 1945, Ing. Goeta stated that the Germans had ordered 18 SSB. Four of these were in an advanced state of assembly and could be completed in three weeks, nine more could be produced in four months. Ing. Goeta suggested that in order to keep his men working he should carry on work in the four torpedos at his own risk. A signal was made to C-in-C-Med (R) FOTALI FOTALI (Rome) SMONA by NOIC Venice, stating these facts.
- 2) - The matter was again referred to in my report to C-in-C-Med paragraph 3 Sec: III of 26, 6, 45.
- 3) - The Superintendent of Diving visited the works in July 1945 and referred to the torpedos in his report to D.T.M. dated 16, 7, 45 Appendix IV paragraph 2 and Appendix VII paragraph 4.
- 4) - N.O.I.C.'s letter to Navy Sub Commission Rome, dated 3rd September 1945. No 831/26/2 paragraph 6, states that 2 SSB had been completed and that 2 more were practically ready. At this time Ing. Goeta was told by me not to proceed further pending further orders.
- 5) - Ref paragraph 3 of AC/4005/L 4th February 1946 Plans of these SSB had been sent to A.F.H.Q. from Venice by the Intelligence Collecting Unit early in May.
- 6) - Ref paragraph 7 of the same letter it is desired to stress the fact that Ing. Goeta stated that three weeks work would serve to complete the four machines, that all parts were ready and present in his shops and that he would like to keep his men busy as they had to be paid in any case.
- 7) - At this time the U.S. Navy was showing great interest

in this type of craft and a visit from the Superintendent of Diving was expected, on his report it was expected that a final decision would be made as to the future of these machines.

L. K. P. Crabb

Lt. Comdr. L.K.P. CRABB R.N.V.R.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
RESEARCH EXPERIMENTAL STATION ST. ANDREA VENICE
DATE 13.2.46.

\$ 3000

NSC (R) FOIL
NOIC TRIESTE
HNO VETICE

CINC MED

SECRET

Your 060945 paragraph 3.

Consider it would be advisable for the final disposal of SUGAR SUGAR
BAKER torpedoes at CAPRONI's to be left in abeyance for the present.

DTG 160846 February

T/P W/CY GR 50

1456/16

17.2.46.

REF:- Disposal of Human Torpedoes

DIST:- 0 - 4, 13, NSO(4 copies), log.

3059

NSC/4558
6 February 1946

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
Subject: Miniature Submarines at Caproni Works of Milan.
References: (a) Navy S/C ltr NSC/4171 dated 5 December 1945.
(b) Navy S/C Signal 301131 January and Previous Signals on the Same Subject.
Enclosures: (A) Navy S/C ltr NSC/4429 dated 15 January 1946.
(B) Copy Legal Sub-Commission, AC ltr AC/4005/L dated 4 February 1946.

1. With regard to references (a) and (b), enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

2. In view of the last sentence of paragraph 7, and paragraph 9, of enclosure (B), and paragraph 2 of Resident Naval Officer, Venice's D.T.G. 261137, the Navy Sub-Commission proposes to take no further action on the Caproni SSB Human Torpedoes without further instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. The present status of these torpedoes is that they are "frozen" at the Caproni Works in Milan on Allied authority.

(Sgd) G. L. WARREN

REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC,
For CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

Copy to:
FOIL
SENAUSLO, ITALY
RNO, VENICE.

7 FEB 1946

WSI-3

COPY

COPY

NSC/4429
15 January 1946

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Legal Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
Subject: Italian Naval Munitions Production.

1. There exists at the Caproni Works of Milano 4 miniature submarines known as "Maiali-Delta". In the course of an investigation in November concerning illegal Italian naval munitions production, an Allied naval representative contacted Ing. Vincenzo Goeta, the naval consultant for Caproni, and the files of the firm were examined. The following is an excerpt from a report made by the above-mentioned Allied naval officer, giving the history of the 4 miniature submarines:

"Approximately one month ago work was completed upon 4 Mezzi d'Assalto known as the "Maiali-Delta". This is an underwater naval weapon which was used by the GAMMA GROUP of the 10th MAS Flotilla for attack upon Allied shipping. Goeta was questioned about his authority to complete these weapons without definite Allied approval. He assumed all responsibility for this production, however stating that several months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni plant and evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed. However, Goeta admits that no order to complete these weapons were given to him by Lt. Comdr. Crabb. He completed them hoping that the company could sell them to the Allies for experiments. In the meantime, he continued, the Allied Experimental Station salvaged several "Maiali" in Venice and there was no further need for the Caproni product. These weapons were examined at Caproni by this officer and they were found to be complete in every detail minus the explosive charge in the warhead. This was the only evidence of production of naval munitions in this plant altho they are producing civilian goods. No manufacture of any submarine or section thereof was noticed. Orders were given to the Caproni officials to put these weapons in a locked warehouse and to cease all production of naval armament unless definite authority was received."

2. The existence of the above-mentioned miniature submarines was reported to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. It is the desire that the Allies take possession of the submarines and destroy them.

3. The Navy Sub-Commission would appreciate being informed whether or not it has the legal power to take possession of the miniature submarines and dispose of them as it sees fit.

/s/ H. W. Ziroli
Commodore, U.S. Navy,
for REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

/mdn.

AG/4005/L.

4 February 1946.

SUBJECT : ITALIAN NAVAL MUNITIONS PRODUCTION.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.

1. Referenced your Confidential letter No. NSC/4429 of 15 January 1946.
2. Several months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni works in Milano where he saw 4 miniature submarines known as "Maiali-Delta" under construction. He did not order all work to cease and the confiscation of the partly constructed four vessels; on the contrary according to Caproni's naval consultant, Ing. Goeta, he "evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed". While it is true that no specific order was given for the submarines to be completed, it must be borne in mind that upon seeing these examples of a new type of submarine the Allied Naval representative did not order their confiscation or say that they were not to be completed.
3. It is presumed from the facts submitted that the details of construction of these miniature submarines were unknown until they were seen by the Allied Naval Authorities to whom they would be of great interest. It is almost certain that Lieut. Comdr. Crabb on seeing for the first time an entirely new type of submarine would have made a report to his superiors in which he would have stated what action he had taken with regard to the completion of the vessels. If such a report is in existence, it should have been submitted, as it will contain facts essential to be known in giving the opinion requested. The fact that a report was made by the officer who saw the completed submarines in November strengthens the view that there must have been a report several months earlier when the vessels were first seen.
4. In November an Allied naval officer visited the Caproni works and found the four miniature submarines had been completed. There is no suggestion that there had been any attempt to conceal the work of completion. Ing. Goeta on being questioned stated that several months earlier Lt. Comdr. Crabb had visited the works and "evidenced an interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed." He further stated "in the meantime the Allied Experimental Station salvaged several "Maiali" in Venice and there was no further need for the Caproni product."
5. Upon these facts an opinion is sought as to whether the Allied Authorities have the legal right to take possession of the submarines and dispose of them.
6. Under Art. 13 of the Long Terms the manufacture, production and construction of war material is forbidden, but the principal question here to be determined is whether these four submarines have been constructed in breach of the Armistice Terms.

7. After the visit of Lt. Comdr. Crabb to the Caproni works several months prior to November it is incredible that Caproni, or in fact any firm, would have put in several months work and spent a large sum of money in completing these submarines, if they were not to receive some reward for their labour and materials. The work of completion was done quite openly without any attempt at concealment. When the vessels were first seen by Lt. Comdr. Crabb about the month of August, he could have ordered their immediate confiscation. This he did not do, nor did he give any order to discontinue the work on the submarines. In my opinion the irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the facts is that there was an understanding, express or tacit, between Lt. Comdr. Crabb and the Caproni Coy. that the Company should go ahead and complete the four vessels. From this it follows that, as these submarines have been constructed with the Allies full knowledge and with their express or tacit consent, they cannot be said to have been made in breach of the Armistice Terms, and consequently the Allied Authorities have no right to confiscate them, certainly without compensation.

8. It is obvious that the Allied Naval authorities were considerably interested in this new type of submarine, and would in all probability have taken them over upon completion, as the makers allege Lt. Comdr. Crabb intended to do. The only reason Allied interest has ceased in the four submarines completed by Caproni is that prior to their completion the Naval Authorities in Venice salvaged several submarines of the same type. From the time the Naval Authorities first saw the Submarines, and allowed the Company to proceed with their construction something in the nature of a implied promise to pay for the cost of construction must be inferred. The Coy. would never have put in several months work on any other understanding. In my opinion it would be a breach of an implied undertaking and in fact highly unjust if the Naval Authorities could now say to the Caproni Coy.: "We have no further interest in the four submarines, as we have now salvaged others from the harbour in Venice, but we propose to confiscate and destroy them." This attitude is one which the Allied Authorities cannot honourably take.

9. For the reason set out above this Sub-Commission is of opinion that the Navy Sub-Commission has not the legal power to take possession of the four miniature submarines, and that, if it desires to do so, it can only do so upon paying to the Caproni Coy. a sum that would cover the cost of production plus a reasonable profit to the builders on the whole undertaking.

/s/ Masgrave Thomas, 3055
MUSGRAVE THOMAS,
Italian Branch,
for Chief Legal Advisor.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

/mda.

AC/4005/L.

4 February 1946.

SUBJECT : Italian Naval Munitions Production.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.

1. Reference your Confidential letter No. HSC/4429 of 15 January 1946.

2. Several months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni works in Milano where he saw 4 miniature submarines known as "Maiali - Delta" under construction. He did not order all work to cease and the confiscation of the partly constructed four vessels; on the contrary according to Caproni's naval consultant, Ing. Goeta, he "evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed". While it is true that no specific order was given for the submarines to be completed, it must be borne in mind that upon seeing these examples of a new type of submarine the Allied Naval representatives did not order their confiscation or say that they were not to be completed.

3. It is presumed from the facts submitted that the details of construction of these miniature submarines were unknown until they were seen by the Allied Naval Authorities to whom they would be of great interest. It is almost certain that Lieut. Comdr. Crabb on seeing for the first time an entirely new type of submarine would have made a report to his superiors in which he would have stated what action he had taken with regard to the completion of the vessels. If such a report is in existence, it should have been submitted, as it will contain facts essential to be known in giving the opinion requested. The fact that a report was made by the officer who saw the completed submarines in November strengthens the view that there must have been a report several months earlier when the vessels were first seen.

4. In November an Allied naval officer visited the Caproni works and found the four miniature submarines.

15 January 1946.

1. Reference your Confidential letter No. MSC/4429 of

2. Several months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni works in Milano where he saw 4 miniature submarines known as "Maiali - Delta" under construction. He did not order all work to cease and the confiscation of the partly constructed four vessels; on the contrary according to Caproni's naval consultant, Ing. Goeta, he "evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed". While it is true that no specific order was given for the submarines to be completed, it must be borne in mind that upon seeing these examples of a new type of submarine the Allied Naval representation did not order their confiscation or say that they were not to be completed.

3. It is presumed from the facts submitted that the details of construction of these miniature submarines were unknown until they were seen by the Allied Naval Authorities to whom they would be of great interest. It is almost certain that Lieut. Comdr. Crabb on seeing for the first time an entirely new type of submarine would have made a report to his superiors in which he would have stated what action he had taken with regard to the completion of the vessels. If such a report is in existence, it should have been submitted, as it will contain facts essential to be known in giving the opinion requested. The fact that a report was made by the officer who saw the completed submarines in November strengthens the view that there must have been a report several months earlier when the vessels were first seen.

4. In November an Allied naval officer visited the Caproni works and found the four miniature submarines had been completed. There is no suggestion that there had been any attempt to conceal the work of completion. Ing. Goeta on being questioned stated that several months earlier Lt. Comdr. Crabb had visited the works and "evidenced an interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed." He further stated "in the meantime the Allied Experimental Station salvaged several "Maiali" in Venice and there was no further need for the Caproni product."

5. Upon these facts an opinion is sought as to whether the Allied Authorities have the legal right to take possession of the submarines and dispose of them.

6. Under Art. 13 of the Long Terms the manufacture, production and construction of war material is forbidden, but the principal question

here to be determined is whether these four submarines have been constructed in breach of the Armistice Terms.

7. After the visit of Lt. Comdr. Crabb to the Caproni works several months prior to November it is incredible that Caproni, or in fact any firm, would have put in several months work and spent a large sum of money in completing these submarines, if they were not to receive some reward for their labour and materials. The work of completion was done quite openly without any attempt at concealment. When the vessels were first seen by Lt. Comdr. Crabb about the month of August, he could have ordered their immediate confiscation. This he did not do, nor did he give any order to discontinue the work on the submarines. In my opinion the irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the facts is that there was an understanding, express or tacit, between Lt. Comdr. Crabb and the Caproni Coy. that the Company should go ahead and complete the four vessels. From this it follows that, as these submarines have been constructed with the Allies full knowledge and with their express or tacit consent, they cannot be said to have been made in breach of the Armistice Terms, and consequently the Allied Authorities have no right to confiscate them, certainly without compensation.

8. It is obvious that the Allied Naval authorities were considerably interested in this new type of submarine, and would in all probability have taken them over upon completion, as the makers allege Lt. Comdr. Crabb intended to do. The only reason Allied interest has ceased in the four submarines completed by Caproni is that prior to their completion the Naval Authorities in Venice salvaged several submarines of the same type. From the time the Naval Authorities first saw the Submarines, and allowed the Company to proceed with their construction, something in the nature of a implied promise to pay for the cost of ~~completion~~ ^{construction} must be inferred. The Coy. would never have put in several months work on any other understanding. In my opinion it would be a breach of an implied undertaking and in fact highly unjust if the Naval Authorities could now say to the Caproni Coy.: "We have no further interest in the four submarines, as we have now salvaged others from the harbour in Venice, but we propose to confiscate and destroy them." This attitude is one which the Allied Authorities cannot honourably take.

9. For the reason set out above this Sub-Commission ^{is of opinion} that the Navy Sub-Commission has not the legal power to take possession of the four miniature submarines, and that, if it desires to do so, it can only do so upon paying to the Caproni Coy. a sum that would cover the cost of production plus a reasonable profit to the builders on the whole undertaking.

Murray

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Muscgrave Thomas

MUSGRAVE THOMAS,
Italian Branch,
for Chief Legal Advisor.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
LEGAL SUB-COMMISSION

/mda.

AG/4005/L.

4 February 1946.

SUBJECT : Italian Naval Munitions Production.

TO : Navy Sub-Commission.

1. Reference your Confidential letter No. NSC/4429 of 15 January 1946.

2. Several months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni works in Milano where he saw 4 miniature submarines known as "Maiali - Delta" under construction. He did not order all work to cease and the confiscation of the partly constructed four vessels; on the contrary according to Caproni's naval consultant, Ing. Coeta, he "evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed". While it is true that no specific order was given for the submarines to be completed, it must be borne in mind that upon seeing these examples of a new type of submarine the Allied Naval representative did not order their confiscation or say that they were not to be completed.

3. It is presumed from the facts submitted that the details of construction of these miniature submarines were unknown until they were seen by the Allied Naval Authorities to whom they would be of great interest. It is almost certain that Lieut. Comdr. Crabb on seeing for the first time an entirely new type of submarine would have made a report to his superiors in which he would have stated what action he had taken with regard to the completion of the vessels. If such a report is in existence, it should have been submitted, as it will contain facts essential to be known in giving the opinion requested. The fact that a report was made by the officer who saw the completed submarines in November strengthens the view that there must have been a report several months earlier when the vessels were first seen.

4. In November an Allied naval officer visited the Caproni works and found the four miniature submarines had been completed.

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5. Upon these facts an opinion is sought as to whether the Allied Authorities have the legal right to take possession of the submarines and dispose of them.

6. Under Art. 13 of the Long Terms the manufacture, production and construction of war material is forbidden, but the principal question

here to be determined is whether these four submarines have been constructed in breach of the Armistice Terms.

7. After the visit of Lt. Comdr. Crabb to the Caproni works several months prior to November it is incredible that Caproni, or in fact any firm, would have put in several months work and spent a large sum of money in completing these submarines, if they were not to receive some reward for their labour and materials. The work of completion was done quite openly without any attempt at concealment. When the vessels were first seen by Lt. Comdr. Crabb about the month of August, he could have ordered their immediate confiscation. This he did not do, nor did he give any order to discontinue the work on the submarines. In my opinion the irresistible conclusion to be drawn from the facts is that there was an understanding, express or tacit, between Lt. Comdr. Crabb and the Caproni Coy. that the Company should go ahead and complete the four vessels. From this it follows that, as these submarines have been constructed with the Allies full knowledge and with their express or tacit consent, they cannot be said to have been made in breach of the Armistice Terms, and consequently the Allied Authorities have no right to confiscate them, certainly without compensation.

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9. For the reason set out above this Sub-Commission is ^{in my} opinion that the Navy Sub-Commission has not the legal power to take possession of the four miniature submarines, and that, if it desires to do so, it can only do so upon paying to the Caproni Coy. a sum that would cover the cost of production plus a reasonable profit to the builders on the whole undertaking.

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MUSGRAVE THOMAS,
Italian Branch,
for Chief Legal Advisor.

INFO VEHICLE (a) CINC MED FOIL NOIC TRIESTE

N S C

CONFIDENTIAL

1. SUSPENSION OF ACTION ON NSC 141122 JANUARY AS REQUESTED IN NSC 301131 JANUARY IS LIFTED AND SHIPMENTS OF SSD HUMAN TORPEDOES TO BE MADE FROM THOSE EXISTING AT SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION.

2. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHIPMENT OF TORPEDOES SHOULD BE MADE WITH NOIC TRIESTE WHO IS REQUESTED TO CONSIGN (a) THREE TO NAFO MALTA AND (b) TWO FOR US NAVY, BUORD, INVESTIGATION LABORATORY, NEF INDIAN HEAD, MD.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE CINC MED COMMENT ON PARAGRAPH 3 OF INFO VEHICLE'S DTG 261137 JANUARY.

4. SITUATION AS TO STATUS OF CAPRONI TORPEDOES WILL FOLLOW VIA LETTER

5. FORMER SIGNALS NOT TO NOIC TRIESTE.

DTG 060945A

DIST:- 0 - 4, 13, 15, 17, 25, CEB, Dep-Chief NSC

T/P P/L

WJCB AM 6.2.46.

3050

S. 1320b.

WA 30147/D. 8071. 31-2547.

1944 J. D. Co. Ltd.

NAVAL MESSAGE.

For use in
Signal
Department
onlyOriginators Instructions
(Indication of Priority,
Intercept Group, etc.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Codress/Pisindress

No. of
Groups

TO: RNO VENICE (R) CINC MED FOIL NOIC TRIESTE

FROM:
N.S.C.

| | | |
|----------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| A C R O S S | 1. SUSPENSION OF ACTION ON NSC 141122 JANUARY AS REQUESTED | 5 |
| | IN NSC 301131 JANUARY IS LIFTED AND SHIPMENTS OF SSB HUMAN | 10 |
| | TORPEDOES TO BE MADE FROM THOSE EXISTING AT SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION. | 15 |
| W R I T E | 2. ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHIPMENT OF TORPEDOES SHOULD BE MADE | 20 |
| | WITH NOIC TRIESTE WHO IS REQUESTED TO CONSIGN (a) THREE OF | 25 |
| | OF TO NASO MALTA AND (b) TWO FOR U.S. NAVY, BUORD, INVESTIGATION LABORATORY, NFF INDIAN HEAD, MD. | 30 35 |
| | 3. WOULD APPRECIATE CINC MED COMMENT ON PARAGRAPH 3 OF RNO VENICE'S D.T.G. 261137 JANUARY. | 40 45 |
| System | P/L Code or Cypher | Time of Receipt Dispatch |
| | | Operator P.O.O.W. Date |

30 50

S. 1320b.

Wk. 20147/D. SDHC 41-5347.

1. P. 1. 12/44. J. E. 06. Ltd.

NAVAL MESSAGE.

For use in
Signal
Department
onlyOriginators Instructions
(Indication of Priority,
Intercept Group, etc.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Codress/Plaindress

No. of
Groups

TO: RNO VENICE (R) CINC MED FOIL NOIC TRIESTE

FROM:
N.S.C.

(CONTINUED--PAGE 2 OF MESSAGE)

| | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|--------------------|---------------------|----------|----------|------|
| A C R O S S | 4. SITUATION AS TO STATUS OF CAPRONI TORPEDGES WILL FOLLOW | | 5 | | | |
| | VIA LETTER. | | 10 | | | |
| | 5. FORMER SIGNALS NOT TO NOIC TRIESTE. | | 15 | | | |
| | | | 20 | | | |
| | | | 25 | | | |
| W R I T E | | 060945R | 30 | | | |
| | | | 35 | | | |
| | | | 40 | | | |
| | Prepared: | | 45 | | | |
| | Released: | | 50 | | | |
| System | P/L Code or Cypher | Time of Receipt | Time of Despatch | Operator | P.C.O.W. | Date |

TO. RNO VENICE (R) COMNAVMEB, SENIOR US LIAISON OFFICER,
NOIS TRIESTE, AFSCACT, NSC., A.C. FOIL

FROM...C IN C MED

RESTRICTED

FOLLOWING FOR LT. CDR. CRANE.

YOUR 261131 YOUR PARAS 1 2 & 3 ARE NOTED.

EVERY EFFORT IS TO BE MADE TO ADVANCE THE DATE OF CLOSING DOWN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

2. YOUR PARAGRAPH H 2. 5 TORPEDOES ONLY ARE REQUIRED BY ROYAL AND US NAVIES VIDE C IN C MED'S 060930 AND 080928.

3. DISPOSAL OF ITALIAN PERSONNEL HAS BEEN TAKEN UP WITH AFHQ AND INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE FORWARDED TO YOU AS SOON AS DECISION IS MADE.

4. FOIL IS REQUESTED TO REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 4.

X LIA →
X PERSON
01 →

.....040927 FEB.....

REF...1. CASSINGNOE SAN ANDREA.

2. HUMAN TORPEDOES.

3. REQUEST ADDITIONAL TORPEDOES BE HELD FOR DISPOSAL BY C IN C MED.

DIST...C-4 13 15-17 25 NSC(4) 2 H/M AIR FORCES S/C

2 H/M SEN. USLO. O/O NSC.

T/P

P/L

TOR...1420

RCB

4/2

3023

RNO VENICE (R) CINC MED

FROM NAVY SUB COMMISSION
301131A Jan

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref. RNO VENICE DTG 281137 Jan. Legal Sub Commission, Allied Commission is investigating status of Caproni SSB Human Torpedoes. Although NSC signal 141122 Jan. intended shipment of torpedoes be made from those existing at San Andrea experimental station only, it is now requested that action on NSC signal 141122 Jan. be suspended temporarily until Legal Sub Commission reaches a decision. NSC signal 141122 Jan. being passed on to CINC MED.

==301131A Jan

Ref: Supply of SSB's from Caproni Works.

Dis: 1-4, 13, 15, 17, 25. NSC(4)

T/P

P/L

TOD 1610/30

D.T.I.

30/1

Ref: Supply of SSBs from Caproni works.

3017

Y. SUB-COMMISSION ROME INFO C IN C I ED FROM R.N.O. VENICE

.....
 Following from Lieut. Commander Crabb, R.N.V.R.

Reference C in C Med 190958A Dec
 COMNAVNAV 290730 Dec
 C in C Med 060930A and
 C in C Med 080928A Jan and
 N.S.C. (ESP?) 141122A Ja ..

- (1) It is not clear if Admiralt; and COMNAVNAV require SSB's from Caproni works additional SSB's being supplied from SANANDREA.
- (2) Caproni priced SSB at three and one half million Lire each. If these are required request instructions under what terms they should be taken.
- (3) suggest scrapping of SSB's not required will cause great resentment as R I N R I A? Capt. Forza continues unofficial solicitation for same. All six SSB SANANDREA and two SIG could be shipped half to Royal and half to U.S. Navies

D.T.G. 261137 Jan

3045

.....
 From Army A.M. 27th Jan D.R.E.C.

Dist 0 to 4 13 15 17 25 Log
 N.S.C. 4 copies.

OFFICER I/C ALLIED NAVAL EXPERIMENTAL STATION SAN ANDREA, VENICE
(R) C IN C MED NSC A.C. COMNAVNAV

CONFIDENTIAL.

FROM FOIL 2

IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO, YOU SHOULD REPORT PARTICULARS OF ALL TECHNICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT INCLUDING CRAFT TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF MEDITERRANEAN, FOR DISPOSAL INSTRUCTIONS.
(2) DISPOSAL OF S S B HUMAN TORPEDOES WAS DIRECTED IN C IN C MEDITERRANEAN'S 060930, AND NSC A.C.'S 141122 JANUARY, NOT TO ALL.

=== 211550A JAN ...

DIST. C-5,13,15,17,25. LOG.. NSC (4).

REF. AS ABOVE.

T/P

F/L

TOP 1602

IAG

21/1

0041

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

CONFIDENTIAL

HSC/4429
15 January 1946

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To: Legal Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
Subject: Italian Naval Munitions Production.

1. There exists at the Caproni Works of Milano 4 miniature submarines known as "Maiali-Delta". In the course of an investigation in November concerning illegal Italian naval munitions production, an Allied naval representative contacted Ing. Vincenzo Goeta, the naval consultant for Caproni, and the files of the firm were examined. The following is an excerpt from a report made by the above-mentioned Allied naval officer, giving the history of the 4 miniature submarines:

"Approximately one month ago work was completed upon 4 Mezzi d'Assalto known as the "Maiali-Delta". This is an underwater naval weapon which was used by the GAMESA GROUP of the 10th MAS Flotilla for attack upon Allied shipping. Goeta was questioned about his authority to complete these weapons without definite Allied approval. He assumed all responsibility for this production, however stating that several months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni plant and evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed. However, Goeta admits that no order to complete these weapons were given to him by Lt. Comdr. Crabb. He completed them hoping that the company could sell them to the Allies for experiments. In the meantime, he continued, the Allied Experimental Station salvaged several "Maiali" in Venice and there was no further need for the Caproni product. These weapons were examined at Caproni by this officer and they were found to be complete in every detail minus the explosive charge in the warhead. This was the only evidence of production of naval munitions in this plant altho they are producing civilian goods. No manufacture of any submarine or section thereof was noticed. Orders were given to the Caproni officials to put these weapons in a locked warehouse and to cease all production of naval armament unless definite authority was received."

2. The existence of the above-mentioned miniature submarines was reported to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean. It is the latter's desire that the Allies take possession of the submarines and destroy them.

3. The Navy Sub-Commission would appreciate being informed whether or not it has the legal power to take possession of the miniature submarines and dispose of them as it sees fit.

16 JAN 1946

H. W. ZIROLL,
COMMODORE, U. S. NAVY,
FOR REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION, VENICE

NAVY SUB COMMISSION
141122A Jan

CONFIDENTIAL

IMPORTANT

1. Request 3 S.S.B. Human torpedoes for UK be consigned to MASO Malta and despatch arranged by quickest possible route.
2. Further request 2 S.S.B. Human torpedoes for USN, BUORD to be shipped to investigation laboratory NPP Indian Head MD.
3. Any remaining Human torpedoes should be mutilated and disposed of as soon as possible prior to closing down of San Andrea Experimental Station Venice.

141122A Jan

Dis: 0-5, 13, 15, 17, 25 NSC(4)

W/P

P/L

TOD 1153/14

E.T.I.

14/1

3043

S. 13206

NAVAL MESSAGE.

M11256/D7843: 300,000 pads. 8/44. C. B. & S. Ltd. 52-0597.

For use in
Signal
Department
only

| | | | | | |
|--|--------|---|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| Originators Instructions (Indication of Priority, Intercept Group, etc.) | | CONFIDENTIAL IMPORTANT | Address/Plaindress | No. of Groups | |
| TO: SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION, VENICE. | | | FROM: NAVY S/C | | |
| A C C R O S S W R I T E | 1. | REQUEST 3 S.S.B. HUMAN TORPEDOES FOR UK BE CONSIGNED TO NASO MALTA AND DISPATCH ARRANGED BY QUICKEST POSSIBLE ROUTE. | | 5 10 | |
| | 2. | FURTHER REQUEST 2 S.S.B. HUMAN TORPEDOES FOR U.S.N., BUOY TO BE SHIPPED TO INVESTIGATION LABORATORY NFF INDIAN HEAD MD. | | 15 20 25 | |
| | 3. | ANY REMAINING HUMAN TORPEDOES SHOULD BE MUTILATED AND DISPOSED OF AS SCRAP PRIOR TO CLOSING DOWN OF SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION VENICE. | | 30 35 40 | |
| | | | Prepared: <i>B.</i> | 45 | |
| | | | Released: <i>[Signature]</i> | 50 | |
| | | | <i>14/11/22/TAN</i> | | |
| | System | P/L Code or Cypher | Receipt | Time of Despatch | Operator |
| | | | | | P.O.O.W |
| | | | | | Date: <i>30-11-22</i> |

NAVY SUB COMMISSION

C IN C MED
120940

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR 101130 NO OBJECTION TO SUPPLY OF TORPEDOES FROM SAN ANDREA WHICH HOWEVER IS CLOSING ON THE 31st JANUARY.

(2) REQUEST ADDITIONAL TORPEDO (ME 080927 REFERS) MAY BE DESPATCHED WITH THOSE IN PARA 3 OF MY 060930.

(3) ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE FOR CAFRONI TORPEDOES TO BE DISPOSED OF AS IN PARA 4 OF MY 060930

.....120940

Ref. As above.

Dist. 0-5 13 15 17 25 NSC(4) Log.

T/P

P/L

TOE 1315

MP

12/1

30-1

C IN C MED

NAVY S/C
101130A JAN.

CONFIDENTIAL IMPORTANT

PROPOSE TO MAKE SHIPMENTS REQUIRED IN YOUR 060930/JANUARY AND
080928/JANUARY FROM TORPEDOES AT SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION,
VENICE, THEREBY LEAVING CAPRONI TORPEDOES AT MILAN FOR THE PRESENT
AS REQUESTED IN YOUR T.O.D. 261725/NOVEMBER. DO YOU CONCUR?

.....101130A JANUAR.....

REF...AS ABOVE,
DIST...C-5 13 15 17 25 NSC(4)

T/P

P/L

TOD...1145

RCB

10/1

\$ 3040

S. 1329b.

WL 30147/D. 5071. 51-5347. Form No. 12/44. J. D. & Co. Ltd.

NAVAL MESSAGE.

| | | | | | |
|--|---|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------|
| For use in Signal Department only | | | | | |
| Originators Instructions (Indication of Priority, Intercept Group, etc.) | | Codress/Plaindress | | No. of Groups | |
| TO: | | FROM: | | | |
| CINC MED | | NAVY S/C | | | |
| A C C R O S S | PROPOSE TO MAKE SHIPMENTS REQUIRED IN YOUR 060930A JANUARY | | | | 5 |
| | AND 080928A JANUARY FROM TORPEDOES AT SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL | | | | 10 |
| | STATION, VENICE, THEREBY LEAVING CAPRONI TORPEDOES AT MILAN | | | | 15 |
| | FOR THE PRESENT AS REQUESTED IN YOUR T.O.D. 261725A NOVEMBER. | | | | 20 |
| W R I T E | DO YOU CONCUR? | | | | 25 |
| | | | | | 30 |
| | | | | | 35 |
| | | | | 101130A | 40 |
| | | | Prepared: <i>[Signature]</i> | 300 | 45 |
| | | | Released: <i>[Signature]</i> | | 50 |
| System | P/L Code or Cypher | Time of Receipt Dispatch | | Operator | P.O.O.W. Date |

C IN C MED (R) FOIL NAVY SUB-COMMISSION ROME.

ADMIRALTY
091818A.

RESTRICTED.
YOUR 080927 JAN. REQUEST ADDITIONAL SSB TORPEDOES FOR WAR MUSEUM
BE SENT.

.....091818A.

Ref. As above.

Dist. 0-5 13 15 17 25 NSC(4) Log.

T/P

P/L

TOR 1950/10

MP

11/1

3033

NAVY SUB COMMISSION (R) FOIL SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL STATION VINICE

CINC MED
080928A JAN

RESTRICTED

Request one additional torpedo may be held for disposal by CINC MED.
My 060930 refers.

080928A JAN

Ref: Human torpedoes.

Dis: 1-5, 13, 15, 17, 25, NBC(4)

T/P

E/L

TOR 1109/3

D.T. I.

8/1

ADMIRALTY (R) FOIL, NAVY SUB COMMISSION ROME

C IN C MED
080927A JAN.

IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL

REQUEST INFORMATION WHETHER ADDITIONAL TYPE S S B TORPEDO IS
REQUIRED FOR THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM. MY 060930 JAN. PARAGRAPH 1
REFERS.

.....080927A JANUARY.....

REF...AS ABOVE,
DIST...O-5 13 15 17 25 NSC(4) LOG.

T/P

F/L

TOR...1317

RCB

8/1

3556

NAVY SUB COMMISSION ROME (R) FOIL NOIC TARANTO COMNAVNAV

RESTRICTED

FROM C IN C MED

MY 060930 COMNAVNAWS 040930 PASSED FOR INFORMATION.

== 070928A JAN ...

DIST. 1-5,13,15,17,25. LOG. NSC (4).

T/P P/L TOR 1317 IAG 7/1

3035

NAVY SUB COMMISSION ROME (R) FOIL ADMIRALTY COMNAVNAV SAN ANDREA EXPERIMENTAL
STATION VENICE, NOIC TARANTO VAM.

FROM C IN C MED.
060930A.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

- REFERENCE NSC/4171 DATED 5th DECEMBER 1945 (NOT TO ALL) TWO TYPE
S S B HUMAN TORPEDOES ARE REQUIRED BOTH BY COMNAVNAV AND ADMIRALTY.
2. REQUEST SHIPMENT TO US BE ARRANGED DIRECT WITH COMNAVNAV
COMNAVNAWS 290730/DECEMBER (NOT TO ALL) REFERS.
 3. TORPEDOES FOR UK SHOULD BE CONSIGNED TO NASO MALTA AND DESPATCH
ARRANGED BY QUICKEST POSSIBLE ROUTE IN VIEW OF EARLY CLOSING OF
SAN ANDREA AND TARANTO AM 011703/JANUARY (NOT TO ALL) REFERS.
 4. REMAINING TORPEDOES SHOULD BE MUTILATED AND DISPOSED OF AS SCRAP.

.....060930A. *jan*

Ref. As above.

Dist. 0-5 13 15 17 25 NSC(4)

T/P

F/L

TOR 1639/6

MP

7/1

3084

CINC MED

FOR INFORMATION OF

COMNAVSTA
040330Z JAN

CONFIDENTIAL

Further to my 290730Z.

Consign 2 human torpedoes to BUCARD. Material to be shipped to investigation
laboratory NPP Indian Head MD

--040330Z Jan.

DIS: 0-5, 13, 15, 17, 25, WOOD

REF: As above.

T/P P/L DR 0926/

6/1

3033

C IN C MED (R) NAVSUB ROME COMNAVNAV

ADMIRALTY...011702A JAN

RESTRICTED

YOUR 190958 REQUESTED THAT TWO IN NUMBER HUMAN TORPEDOES
TYPE S S B MAY BE DESPATCHED TO UNCLE KING CONSIGNED O C A S
PORT OF ARRIVAL INFORM D F M REQUEST DETAILS OF DESPATCH MAY
BE SIGNALLED.

011702A JANUARY.....

REF (CONFID) AS ABOVE

T/P P/L TOR 1230/02 FAG.D. 3/1/46
DIST. 0-5 13 17 25 NSC(4) LOG.

3038

C IN C MFD (INFO) ADMIRALTY - NAVSUB ROME

O MINAVNAV
29 730 Dec.

CONFIDENTIAL

For shipment to U.S., (C.N.O's 27 111 not to you refers, your 190958 refers) will require ~~require~~ two Type SSB in serviceable condition.

29 730 Dec.

List: 0-5, 13, 15, 17, 23, NSC (4)

Ref: Disposal four human torpedoes.

3081

ADMIRALTY, COMNAVNAV (info) NAVSUB ROM 3

C in C MED.
190958A

CONFIDENTIAL

CAPRONI's at Milan have four complete Human Torpedoes Type SSS. There are also a number of these Human Torpedoes at San Andrea, Venice for which disposal instructions will be required when the experimental station there closes down. A.II.08214 (not to COMNAVNAV) refers.

(2) Request information whether any of these Human Torpedoes are required in U.K. or in U.S.A.

190958A Dec.

T/P P/L TOR191206A

Dist: 0-5, 13, 17, 25, WSO(4).

S. point

3030

ADMIRALTY, COMNAVANT (Info) NAVSIB ROME

C in C MED.
190948A

CONFIDENTIAL

COMNAVANT at Milan have four complete Human Torpedoes Type SSB. There are also a number of these Human Torpedoes at San Andrea, Venice for which disposal instructions will be required when the experimental station there closes down. A.II.082143 (no. to COMNAVANT) refers.

(2) Request information whether any of these Human Torpedoes are required in U.K. or in U.S.A.

190 58A *Dec*

T/T P/L TOR191205A

Dist: C-3, 13, 17, 25, NSC(4).

3029

R.N.O. Venice for Allied Navy (Info) F.O.I.I., Sen USNLO,
Experimental Station C in C Med

From W.S.C.

SECRET IMPORTANT

Ref. Allied Navy Experimental Station Venice 250730 Nov. Ministry of Marine has not (R) not been authorized to purchase Human Torpedoes. Request CAPRONI be informed not to make delivery.

(2) For your information paragraph 4D of AFHQ secret directive AG 388.3/087 (EC-0 of 2nd August 1945 states in part: The output of Italian arms and munitions plant will NOT (R) NOT be furnished to the Italian Navy without the prior consent of C in C Med. In present case consent has not been given. C in C Med 261725 refers.

T.O.O. 291752A. Nov

T/P "C" TOB 291810.

Dist O-5, 13, 14, 17, 25 USNLO, NSC(4)

SM-1
3023

S1320f

(GV320) Wt. 49577 / D5944' (EM Page 6/43. H. & S. Ltd. 45-238.

NAVAL MESSAGE.

use in
pher or
ding Office
nly.

Originators Instructions:
(Indication of Priority,
AIDAC, NOTWT
For Exercise).

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

IMPT

INTERCEPT GROUP.

TO: RNO VENICE FOR ALLIED NAVY EXPERIMENTAL
STATION (INFO) FOIL, SEN USNLO, CINCMED

FROM:

N.S.C.

REF ALLIED NAVY EXPERIMENTAL STATION VENICE 250730 NOV X
MINISTRY OF MARINE HAS NOT (R) NOT BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
PURCHASE HUMAN TORPEDOES X REQUEST CAPRONI BE INFORMED NOT
TO MAKE DELIVERY X ~~REF OF ITALIAN TORPEDOES~~ X
FOR YOUR INFORMATION PARAGRAPH 4D OF AFHQ SECRET DIRECTIVE
AG 388.3/087 GEG-0 OF 2 AUGUST 1945 STATES IN PART: THE
OUTPUT OF ITALIAN ARMS AND MUNITIONS PLANT WILL NOT (R) NOT
BE FURNISHED TO THE ITALIAN NAVY WITHOUT THE PRIOR CONSENT
OF CINCMED X IN PRESENT CASE CONSENT HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN X

CINCMED 261725 REFERS

RELEASED:

PREPARED:

| Book or Table to be used for | | Initials of Cypherer or Coder. | Time of Receipt in Cypher or Coding Office. | Date. |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|-------|
| Cyphering or Coding. | Recyphering or Recoding. | | | |
| | | | | |

302

SENIOR U.S. NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER, ITALY
ROME, ITALY

FROM: CINCPAC

ACTION: M.S.C.

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

INFO: F.O.I.L.,
SENIOR USNLO,
R.N.O. Venice for
Allied Navy Experimental Sta

ORIGINATED BY: _____

RELEASED BY: _____

DATE: 28 November 1945

261725A Nov.

ALLIED NAVY EXPERIMENTAL STATION VENICE 250730A AND MED 45/00460/17
DATED 9TH SEPTEMBER, IT IS CONSIDERED MOST UNDESIRABLE THAT MINISTRY
OF MARINE SHOULD TAKE DELIVERY OF HUMAN TORPEDOES AND THAT THESE WEAPONS
SHOULD REMAIN AT CAPRONI'S WORKS FOR THE PRESENT X

Ref.- not held by Senaluslo.

3026

DISTRIBUTION:

INTERNAL:

INTERNAL:

ACTION: 40

INFO: (FILE) 00-03, 21

TOR: 280900A Nov.

INCOMING & OUTGOING
DISPATCH

D/T GR. 261725A Nov.

N.S.C. (Info) F.O.I.L., Senior USNFO,
R.N.O. Venice for Allied Navy Experimental Sta

CONFIDENTIAL

from C in C Med.

Allied Navy Experimental Station Venice 250730A and MED 45/70460/47
dated 9th September, it is considered most undesirable that Ministry
of Marine should take delivery of human torpedoes and that these
weapons should remain at CARONI's works for the present.

V/L P/L TOR270135
D/L 0-4, 13, 14, 17, 25, 28, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100

T.O.O. 261725A NDV.

SM-4 3025

T.S.O. (Info) C in O M&A, FOILs
Major 35 50 Dept of the Army, H.I.S. Vernon

From Allied Navy's Experimental
Sta. Venice.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

250750A

^{S.A.}
RMC SGT GONDA CARON SOCIE LAN: MILAN, state on Monday 20th
November Colonel GIACOLA, Director Army Navali Milan Royal Italian Navy
requested verbally to deliver four human torpedoes type SUGAR SUGAR
BAKER acting on orders of Italian Ministry of Marine. Craft to be
shipped to Taranto by rail.

(2) RMC GONDA has not complied with request pending instructions
from Allied control via this station

T.O.O. 0730 NOV

E/L Hand via Army Signal

Dist 0-5, 13, 14, 17.

SM-1

3024

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

NSC/4129
5 December 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Executive Commissioner, Allied Commission.

Subject: Italian Munitions Production.

Reference: (a) AFHQ Secret signal 201315A of October 1945.
(b) District TWO Secret signal 172140 of October 1945.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, Italy's ltr. AB-2, Serial 00146 of 29 November 1945, and enclosure thereto.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for the Executive Commissioner's information.

2. Upon receipt of references (a) and (b), the Navy Sub-Commission requested the Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, Italy, to investigate the reported manufacture of miniature submarines in Milan. Enclosure (A) contains the results of the investigation conducted. Evidently the original report that miniature submarines were being manufactured in Milan was submitted by a British Officer, Major Adams. The manufacturing was being conducted at the Caproni plant in Milan without, it appears, either Allied or Italian authorization, and merely on the initiative of the company who had hopes of selling the "Maiali" submarines to the British and American naval authorities for experimental purposes. Four miniature submarines are involved, which were completed approximately a month ago; they are complete in every detail except that no explosive charge has been placed in the warhead. Orders have been issued to the Caproni officials to put the weapons in a locked warehouse and to cease all naval armament production unless definite authority is received by them.

3. Final disposal instructions for the four completed miniature submarines involved above are being awaited from Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

6 DEC 1945

(Sgt) G. L. WARREN

REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

SECRET

NSC/4171
5 December 1945.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
Subject: Miniature Submarines at Caproni Works of Milan.
Reference: (a) AFHQ secret ltr. AG 388.3/087 GEG-O dated
2 August 1945.
Enclosure: (A) Navy Sub-Commission Secret ltr. NSC/4129
of 5 December 1945 and enclosure thereto.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for in-
formation.

2. In view of reference (a), paragraph 4 (d),
it would be appreciated if Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean
would issue disposal instructions for the four completed
miniature submarines being held by the Caproni Works of
Milan.

(Sgd) G. L. WARREN
REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.
for CHIEF COMMISSIONER.

6 DEC 1945

3022

[Handwritten initials]
WSE-3

SECRET

SENIOR U. S. NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER, ITALY.
ROME, ITALY.

JFM:bas
File : AB-2
Serial: 00146

29 November 1945

SECRET SECRET

From: Senior United States Naval Liaison Officer, ITALY.
To: Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
Subject: Italian Naval Munitions Production.
Reference: (a) Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission secret ltr.,
serial NSC/3818, dated 21 October 1945.
Enclosure: (A) U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, Northwest Italy
secret ltr., serial 0012, same subject, dated 10
November 1945, to Staff Intelligence Officer, SEN-
ALUSLO, Italy.

1. Upon receipt of Reference (a) this command ordered the U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer for Northwest Italy to investigate subject matter in the Lombardy area.

2. Enclosure (A) which is the final report of the Northwest Italy Intelligence Officer has been received by this command and is forwarded for information in accordance with Reference (a).

James F. Murray, Jr.
JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.
By direction

3021

JFM:bas
File : AB-2
Serial: 00146

29 November 1945

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

From: Senior United States Naval Liaison Officer, ITALY.
To: Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission.
Subject: Italian Naval Munitions Production.
Reference: (a) Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission secret ltr., serial NSC/3816, dated 21 October 1945.
Enclosure: (A) U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, Northwest Italy secret ltr., serial 0012, same subject, dated 10 November 1945, to Staff Intelligence Officer, SEN-ALNSLO, Italy.

1. Upon receipt of Reference (a) this command ordered the U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer for Northwest Italy to investigate subject matter in the Lombardy area.
2. Enclosure (A) which is the final report of the Northwest Italy intelligence Officer has been received by this command and is forwarded for information in accordance with Reference (a).

JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.
By direction

3020

SECRET

0012

10 November 1945.

From: Lieut. Paul A. Alfieri, USNR.
To : Staff Intelligence Officer, Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer,
Italy.

Subject: Italian Naval Munition Production.

Reference: (a) Navy Sub Commission, HQ Allied Com. secret ltr. NSC/
3818, dated 21 October 1945.
(b) SUSNLOI secret letter 00143 dated 25 October 1945.

1. In compliance with reference (b) an investigation was conducted on the alleged production of submarines in the Milano district as requested in reference (a).
2. Contact was established with HQ District II and conferences were held with the Intelligence Officer, G-1 of that unit. Apparently they have no files on the alleged production of submarines in this area. G-1 stated that it was reported to them by a British Army officer that the production of submarines was going on in some area of Milano but that they lacked any definite information on that subject.
3. This officer's files and the files of the Centro Marina RIN for Lombardy disclose that the only submarine manufacturing concern in the Milano district is the Caproni Works of Milano, where they produced miniature submarines during the war. A surprise visit was made to this concern and a complete inspection of the warehouses and plant was made. Ing. Vincenzo Goeta, the naval consultant for Caproni was contacted and the firms files were examined. Examination of the files and the inspection resulted in the disclosure of the following.
4. Approximately one month ago work was completed upon 4 Mezzi d'Assalto known as the "Maiali-Delta". This is an underwater naval weapon which was used by the GAMMA GROUP of the 10th MAS Flotilla for attack upon Allied shipping. Goeta was questioned about his authority to complete these weapons without definite Allied approval. He assumed all responsibility for this production, however stating that several ~~next~~ months ago Lt. Comdr. Crabb, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni plant and evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed. However, Goeta admits that no order to complete these weapons were given to him by Lt. Comdr. Crabb. He completed them hoping that the company could sell them to the Allies for experiments. In the meantime, he continued, the Allied Experimental Station salvaged several "Maiali" in Venice and there was no further need for the Caproni product. These weapons were examined at Caproni by this officer and they were found to be complete in every detail minus the explosive charge in the warhead. This was the only evidence of production of naval munitions in this plant altho they are producing civilian goods. No manufacture of any submarine or section thereof was noticed. Orders were given to the Caproni officials to put these weapons in a locked warehouse and to cease all production of naval armament unless definite authority was received.
5. The following is a survey and an inventory of the naval armament in the Caproni plant:-

Enclosure (A) to SENALUSLO, Italy secret ltr., serial 00146 of 29 November 1945.

3 CC Miniature Submarines of 100 tons, dismantled in 3 sections, and rusting in an open yard. Work ended in 1944 on these and nothing was done on them after that date. Two have 90% of the hull completed and 50% of the electrical work done. They have no engines. One other has 40% of the work completed.

30 CB (Caproni B) Miniature Submarines of 45 tons. On these, not one is assembled. Work had progressed up to the assembly of only 16% of the essential parts. No work was done on these after 1944.

12 MEZZI D'ASSALTO, MAIALI DELTA. Four were completed as explained above. Four are now dismantled after being 85% completed. Four are about 50% assembled but all parts are available.

Orders were received from the German Command to complete 40 CIF (speed boats firing 2 torpedoes). Caproni has material on hand to produce 20 such boats up to a maximum of 20% completion and 20 up to 5% completion.

Also in open storage, are 2 MAS hulls and one CIF hull, minus motors, which are ruined by exposure.

At Rovereto Caproni is one CA-4, a 12 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton sub. It was demolished by the Germans during their retreat.

6. Contact was established with the British R.E.M.E. unit using part of the Caproni plant. It was learned after interviewing Major Adams of that unit that he was the officer who had made the original report that Caproni was manufacturing miniature submarines. He had seen them working on the "Maiali" and upon learning that they were underwater weapons he reported them as miniature subs to II District. He knows of no other production of naval weapons in the Caproni plant.

7. AMG - Lombardy Region was contacted for any other further information on this subject. Interviews with the HQ, the Investigation Section, and the Public Safety and Intelligence Officer resulted in no additional evidence of production of naval munitions in this area. Other Allied Intelligence Agencies were contacted, with the same negative result.

8. Further inquiries and conferences with the Commandant, the Genio Navale and the Genio Armi Navale of the Centro Marina disclosed that there are no other manufacturing plants in this area where subs had been built or could presently be built.

Paul A. Alfieri
Paul A. Alfieri

3015

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

NSC/4104
27 November 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Executive Commissioner, Hq. Allied Commission.
Subject: Italian Armament Industry - Illegal Manufacture
of Arms.
Reference: (a) Exec.Com. ltr. ES/12.11 dated 24 November 1945.

1. With regard to reference (a), paragraph 4, the Navy Sub-Commission wishes to inform the Executive Commissioner that to date no manufacture of arms or ammunitions has been authorized by the Navy Sub-Commission.

M. ST. J. BUTLER,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY,
FORREAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

28 NOV 1945

3017

~~SEH~~
WSI-3

SECRET

24 November 1945

Ref. : IS/12.11

SUBJECT: Italian Armament Industry - Illegal Manufacture of Arms

TO : Land Forces Sub-Commission - Allied Commission
 Air " " " " "
 Naval " " " " "

1. Reference is made to Distwo Secret Message GO/3956 of 17 October 1945, subject "Italian Munitions Production".

2. Report of inspection by a representative of Industry Sub-Commission (ref. AE/448/N/Ind - Allied Commission Milan Headquarters 15 November 1945) states:

(a) "Soc. Fabbrica Nazionale d'Armi-Brescia which is part of the Caproni group was visited and the production of machine pistols, shot guns, bicycle parts and general carpentry work is taking place. When questioned regarding the production of machine pistols the firm stated that they were producing on the instruction of the Italian War Ministry. No written evidence of the order could be produced but certain correspondence has taken place between the firm and Rome on the subject. The firm has its own civilian guards on the factory gates. Within the firm's magazine there were some 12000 rifles of French origin alleged to have been deposited there by the Germans.

(b) The plant of Soc. Beretta - Gardone is actually producing:

- (1) Automatic pistols
- (2) Shot guns
- (3) Completing the assembly of machine pistols

Considerable quantities of these arms are in progress thru-³⁰¹⁰ out the factory, and within the firms' magazine there are stored some 12000 machine pistols (Tommy Gun Type). A British military guard is provided by a detachment of the "Loyals" whose object is to prevent any arms other than shot leaving the factory, but I do not consider the present arrangement of guards sufficient.

- (c) The report continues - Every facility to inspect the above plants was provided by the different managements and no effort at concealment was noticed. It is thought that these firms are anticipating orders from the Italian Government when the Northern Regions are handed back to their control, in the meantime, they are endeavoring to keep together their teams of skilled workmen and provide employment. No other evidence of arms manufacture within Lombardia Region has been discovered."

3. In AFHQ Secret Message FX 49604 of 20 October, Allied Commission was directed that any manufacture of warlike stores which are discovered or reported to the Commission will be investigated with a view to discovering whether they are taking place at the direction of or by permission of United States and British Armed Forces or (in the case of production for the Italian Armed Forces) the Naval Land and Air Sub-Commission of the Allied Commission. If the manufacture concerned is taking place by permission of one of these authorities, it will be permitted to continue and the circumstances will be reported by the Allied Commission to AFHQ, together with a statement as to why the manufacture concerned is necessary. If the manufacture is not authorized in writing by one of the above mentioned authorities, the Allied Commission will cause the manufacture to cease immediately and report made to AFHQ.

4. It is requested that each of the addressees hereto immediately inform the Allied Commission with respect to the manufacture now taking place as indicated in paragraphs hereof relative to:

- (a) Is the manufacture concerned taking place by your written permission?
- (b) If answer to (a) above is yes, please state circumstances and make a statement as to why the manufacture concerned is necessary.
- (c) If the manufacture concerned has not been authorized by you in writing, do you wish to so authorize? If not, orders will be issued causing the manufacture to cease immediately.

5. May this matter be considered urgent?

CC: R. G. Lombardia Region
L. O. Distwo
Industry/Utilities S/C
Economic Section

(sgd) L. D. DENSMORE

Copy for
Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner

3015

ALCOM (R) AFHQ FOR CMF OPS

DISTWO
310930A OCT.

UNCLASSIFIED IMPORTANT

REQUEST CONFIRMATION YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS HQ SIGNAL
GO/3956 OF 17 OCT. SENT YOU SECRET AND IMMEDIATE. SUBJECT
ITALIAN MUNITIONS PRODUCTION.

==310930A OCT.

DIS: NSC(4)

HAND

P/L

TOR AM/1/11

AC DIS: ACTION-EX-CHIEF COM.

INFO-CHIEF COMMIS

ECON SEC 2

NAVY S/C

LAND FORCES

AIR S/C

FILE 30 FLOA

30 1 1

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED COMMISSION
Navy Sub-Commission APO 394

SECRET

SECRET

NSC/3818
21 October 1945.

From: Navy Sub-Commission, Hq. Allied Commission.
To : Senior U. S. Naval Liaison Officer, ITALY.
Subject: Italian Naval Munition production.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of District II secret dispatch
172140 October to Allied Commission.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. The Navy Sub-Commission has no information concerning the alleged manufacture of miniature submarines in Milan as reported in paragraph (2) of enclosure (A). It would be appreciated if the Senior U. S. Naval Liaison Officer, ITALY could arrange for an officer to visit Headquarters District II and to inspect the submarine manufacturing sites to determine full information concerning their alleged production. It is noted in enclosure (A) that Headquarters District II is making a further investigation with Allied Military Government assistance.

H. ST. J. BUTLER,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY,
REAR ADMIRAL
CHIEF, NAVY SUB-COMMISSION, AC.

301 WWW

22 OCT 1945

WSP-3

ALCON ROBE FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER (R) DISTWO, DISTURBE,
 PEBASE, C IN C MED, R.A.F. MEDICAL, 13 CORPS.

FROM: ADJUTANT
 SACRED OMB
 FIGURE
 201315A.

FX.49604.

IMPORTANT. SECRET.

REF. OUR LETTER AG.588/3/087 GEG-O AUGUST 2.

1. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED TO THIS H.Q. THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF UNCONTROLLED MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IS BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE NORTH OF ITALY. CONSTRUCTION IN MILAN OF A NEW TYPE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND OF 1 MAN SUBMARINES, IN TURIN OF VARIOUS MIRRAGES HAS BEEN REPORTED.

2. THE QUESTION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH PRODUCTION IS TO BE PERMITTED IN THE FUTURE IS UNDER EXAMINATION IN THIS H.Q. ANY MANUFACTURES OF WARLIKE STORES WHICH ARE DISCOVERED OR REPORTED TO YOU WILL BE INVESTIGATED BY YOU WITH A VIEW TO DISCOVERING WHETHER THEY ARE TAKING PLACE AT THE DIRECTION OF OR BY PERMISSION OF THE U.S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES OR (IN THE CASE OF PRODUCTION FOR THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES) THE NAVAL LAND AND AIR S.C.'S OF THE ALLIED COMMISSION. IF THE MANUFACTURE CONCERNED IS TAKING PLACE BY PERMISSION OF ONE OF THESE AUTHORITIES IT WILL BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS H.Q. TOGETHER WITH A STATEMENT AS TO WHY THE MANUFACTURE CONCERNED IS NECESSARY. IF THE MANUFACTURE IS NOT AUTHORISED IN WRITING BY ONE OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED AUTHORITIES, YOU WILL INSTRUCT THE ITALIAN GOVT. TO CAUSE THE MANUFACTURE TO CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL REPORT THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO THIS H.Q.

T.O.O. 201315A OCT.

P/L HAND. TOR.1100/22.
 DIST: 0-5,17,24 HSC(L)

Dist: Exec. Commissioner F (R)
 Chief Commissioner, Comd Sec 2.
 Air S.C., L. Police S.C.,
 Navy S.C. File.

3013

TO: ALCOM (R) AFHQ FOR CMF OPS

FROM: DISTWO

SECRET IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT ITALIAN MUNITIONS PRODUCTION. AFHQ LETTER AG/388.3/087 GEO-O OF 2ND AUGUST REFERS.

- 1.. ENQUIRIES HERE TEND TO SHOW THAT NO CONTROL OF PRODUCTION IS BEING EXERCISED AS ORDERED IN ABOVE QUOTED DIRECTIVE AND THAT AMG IN REGIONS HAVE RECEIVED NO INSTRUCTIONS.
- 2.. INVESTIGATION HAS SHOWN THAT BERETTA FACTORY GARDONE HOLDS 12,000 MACHINE PISTOLS AND FABRICA NAZIONALE FACTORY BRESCIA HOLDS 13,000 RIFLES. BOTH ARE ASSEMBLING MORE MACHINE PISTOLS. IN MILAN ARE BEING MADE MINIATURE SUBMARINES AND A MILITARY AIRCRAFT. ONE CASE SUSPECTED CLANDESTINE ARMS MANUFACTURE TURIN. FURTHER INVESTIGATION WITH AMG ASSISTANCE BEING MADE.
- 3.. IN VIEW OF LARGE NUMBERS ARMS FACTORIES IN NORTH ITALY AND GRAVE SECURITY MENACE IF NOT CONTROLLED REQUEST YOU STATE WHETHER YOU CAN CARRY OUT AMG DIRECTIVE AND IF NOT WHAT ALTERNATIVE YOU PROPOSE.

DIST: O-5, 17, 21 (NIC) ✓

TOP 172140 COT

HARD MESSAGE FROM ARMY TOR. 2 M. 16TH.

3011

COPIESECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

G-5: 004,01-1

31 January 1946

SUBJECT: Italian Armament Industry and the Re-equipping
of the Italian Armed Forces.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission,
APO 394.

Reference is made to your letter 5012/143/BJ of November 1945.

1. In regard to para 4 (e) thereof, you should advise the Italian Government to press on with their study of the armament industry with a view to turning over as much as possible of this industry to civil production.

2. The initiative in recommending any reactivation of the Italian armament industry will be left to the Italian Government, who will be advised and controlled as necessary by the appropriate Service Sub-Commission of Allied Commission. They should be informed accordingly and notified that a directive will shortly be issued as to the extent to which the Italian Government will be required to provide arms for their forces.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN:

F.G.A. PARSONS,
Brigadier
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

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WSI-3

SECRET

344-c-45

912-1000

Senior USN Liaison Officer Rome, Italy

12 December

45

(see below)

A-2

ITALY - Navy - Naval Munitions production.

Enclosure; (A) One copy of report from SEMINUSLO Northwest Representative, dated 10 November 1945, same subject.

Enclosure (A) was forwarded to this command by the Northwest representative as a result of Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission request for investigation, and is forwarded herewith for information.

3000

Enclosure (A) One copy of report from SHANNON Northwest Representative, dated 10 November 1945, same subject.

Enclosure (A) was forwarded to this command by the Northwest representative as a result of Navy Sub-Commission, Allied Commission request for investigation, and is forwarded herewith for information.

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WEST-3

CND; continuing confidentiality; H/A memo; subject, less enclosure

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10 November 1945

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From: Northwest Representative, Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, ITALY.
To: Staff Intelligence Officer, Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, ITALY.
Subject: Italian Naval Munition Production.
Reference: (a) Navy Sub-Commission, HQ Allied Commission secret ltr., NSC/3818, dated 21 October 1945.
(b) SENALUSLO Italy secret ltr., serial 00143 dated 25 October 1945.

1. In compliance with reference (b) an investigation was conducted on the alleged production of submarines in the Milano district as requested in Reference (a).
2. Contact was established with HQ District II and conferences were held with the Intelligence Officer, G-1 of that unit. Apparently they have no files on the alleged production of submarines in this area. G-1 stated that it was reported to them by a British Army officer that the production of submarines was going on in some area of Milano but that they lacked any definite information on that subject.
3. This officer's files and the files of the Centro Marina RIN for Lombardy disclose that the only submarine manufacturing concern in the Milano district is the Caproni Works of Milano, where they produced miniature submarines during the war. A surprise visit was made to this concern and a complete inspection of the warehouses and plant was made. Ing. Vincenzo GOETA, the naval consultant for Caproni was contacted and the firm's files were examined. Examination of the files and the inspection resulted in the disclosure of the following.
4. Approximately one month ago work was completed upon 4 Mezzi d'Assalto known as the "Maiali-Delta". This is an underwater naval weapon which was used by the GAMMA GROUP of the 10th MAS Flotilla for attack upon Allied shipping. Goeta was questioned about his authority to complete these weapons without definite Allied approval. He assumed all responsibility for this production, however stating that several months ago Lt. Comdr. CRABB, RNVR, of the Allied Naval Experimental Station at Venice visited the Caproni plant and evidenced a possible interest in using these "Maiali" if they were completed. However, Goeta admits that no orders to complete these weapons were given to him by Lt. Comdr. CRABB. He completed them hoping that the company could sell them to the Allies for experiments. In the meantime, he continued, the Allied Experimental Station salvaged several "Maiali" in Venice and there was no further need for the Caproni product. These weapons were examined at Caproni by this officer and they were found to be complete in every detail minus the explosive charge in the warhead. This was the only evidence of production of naval munitions in this plant although they are producing civilian goods. No manufacture of any submarine or section thereof was noticed. Orders were given to the Caproni officials to put these weapons in a locked warehouse and to cease all production of naval armament unless definite authority was received.
5. The following is a survey and an inventory of the naval armament in the Caproni plant:

ENCLOSURE (A)

SECRET

3 CC Miniature Submarines of 100 tons, dismantled in 3 sections, and rusting in an open yard. Work ended in 1944 on these and nothing was done on them after that date. Two have 90% of the hull completed and 50% of the electrical work done. They have no engines. One other has 40% of the work completed.

30 CB (Caproni B) Miniature Submarines of 45 tons. On these, not one is assembled. Work had progressed up to the assembly of only 16% of the essential parts. No work was done on these after 1944.

12 MEZZI D'ASSALTO, MAIALI DELTA. Four were completed as explained above. Four are now dismantled after being 85% completed. Four are about 50% assembled but all parts are available.

Orders were received from the German Command to complete 40 CIF (speed boats firing 2 torpedoes). Caproni has material on hand to produce 20 such boats up to a maximum of 20% completion and 20 up to 5% completion.

Also in open storage, are 2 MAS hulls and one CIF hull, minus motors, which are ruined by exposure.

At Roverto Caproni is one CA-4, a 12-1/2 ton sub. It was demolished by the Germans during their retreat.

6. Contact was established with the British R.E.M.E. unit using part of the Caproni plant. It was learned after interviewing Major Adams of that unit that he was the officer who had made the original report that Caproni was manufacturing miniature submarines. He had seen them working on the "Maiali" and upon learning that they were underwater weapons he reported them as miniature subs to II District. He knows of no other production of naval weapons in the Caproni plant.

7. AMG - Lombardy Region was contacted for any further information on this subject. Interviews with the HQ, the Investigation Section, and the Public Safety and Intelligence Officer resulted in no additional evidence of production of naval munitions in this area. Other Allied Intelligence Agencies were contacted, with the same negative result.

8. Further inquiries and conferences with the Commandant, the Genio Navale and the Genio Armi Navale of the Centro Marina disclosed that there are no other manufacturing plants in this area where subs had been built or could presently be built.

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PAUL A. ALFIERI

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