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10000/125/28 ACC/528 —

10000/125/28 ACC/528 — ADMINISTRATION AND TREATMENT
OF PATRIOTS IN ITALY
SEPT. 44 — NOV. 44

THE ACTUAL SITUATION OF THE PATRIOTS IN FLORENCE

Report of the Provincial Patriot Office of Florence

1° The Actual situation of the patriots in Florence

The Patriots of other Regions that are now in Florence amount to no less than 600, of whom about 500 are in hospitals or in the "Centro Raccolta" which was opened a few days ago in Via Montebello in the "Sassetti School", while the others are disbanded.

We shall illustrate these three positions in which the Patriots find themselves :

- a) Disbanded Patriots are those that do not want to lodge at the "Centro Raccolta", and have found other accomodation either with friend or at some Commands. These many amount to about 120-130 and are the more fortunate ones, because they are neither wounded nor ill and have settled themselves better than they could have done at "Centro Raccolta"; but these men are in no way controlled and the fact itself that they do not live at "Centro Raccolta" shows a kind of protest.
- b) Patriots lying in hospital, are about 220, and are in the various hospitals of Florence. The benefit of the Ration "M" and without being able to controll it, they have the entire ration which is due to the Patriots, when can say that the accomodations in the hospitals are fairly good. When wounded and sick patriots are dismissed from hospitals they are given 30- 60 or 90 days convalescence; but these convalescence which should be a period of rest to rebuild the exhausted organisms the patriots pass it now at the "Centro Raccolta" where they get the treatment stated in the following paragraph 'C' the same can be said of the mutilated ¹⁰⁶⁵ ~~in~~ leaving in the hospitals
- c) Patriot at the "Centro Raccolta". A few days ago the building of the "Sassetti School" in Via Montebello was requisitioned, and the patriots have been lodged there (about 60) those that at first had been in Via della Scala at the refugees' Camp and also those that lately have arrived in Florence. In the Refugee's Camp Center there are today two hundred and seventy patriots. The school house contains large and spacious school classrooms. The treatment the Patriots receive is the following:
 Two or three blankets,
 the possibility to take baths at the Refugees Camp.
 Flour for making bread gr.250
 " " " paste " 150

Vegetable powder	gr. 100
Vegetables	" 60
Meat stew	" 60
Sugar	" 7
Milk in powder	" 30
Salt	" 5

The kitchen is in the open, and without roof, There are only two water taps for the Patriots to wash at, one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor.

Order is maintained in the Barracks by the Patriots themselves who are sentries, do the cleaning up and the cooking themselves.

This center is well disciplined.

What is essentially needed and should have immediate attention is the following

Mess: The bread and food rations must be augmented -The Patriots are all young people and need sufficient nourishment especially after the hardships of the front line.

Clothes, underwear and boots

Patriots arrived with clothes in a very bad state, their boots are torn and often unmendable. They themselves are generally full of lice and many have scabb; it is not enough that they are able to take a bath, if afterwards they are obliged to put on their old dirty clothes, and it is impossible to have the clothes washed and cleaned if they do not possess a change- it is feared also that the scabb and lice propagate amongst the patriots.

Bedding- When One can not allow the Patriots to continue to sleep on the floor, as they are actually doing; only 28 have mattresses to sleep on, it is indispensable to find straw for them.

Wood-it is necessary to provide wood for cooking purposes as well as heating. The Patriots have to be able to cook, broken up and burnt the school benches - A truck has been asked for to go in the country to get wood.

Water-taps: it is necessary to have others put in.

Convalescent home - if it is not possible to have a real convalescent home for the sick, mutilated and wounded patriots that leave the hospitals, it is necessary to create special ward to give them special treatment and possibly beds or coats and better food.

Cigarettes: Nearly all patriots are smokers but they receive neither cigarettes nor tobacco.

Please notice:

- 1) That there exist already a gathering center for patriots in Via Galliano, which functioned well: it was suddenly requisitioned by the Allies without previously letting this Office know.
- 2) This new center has been constituted of repeated insistence of this office, which has had to overcome many difficulties and

and resistance and was established in a great hurry when it was possible that other patriots were arriving, as in fact they did.

- 3) That Patriots are not asking for anything special, they have been disillusioned and pained by the treatment they have received and this could possibly provoke and a demonstration of protest.

This office feels it its duty to obtain that this state of things should change as soon as possible, because does not seem right or just, that those who have performed their duty should not receive the welcome they deserve and that they have the right to expect.

That in the following days patriots will continue to flow into Florence, they belong to the units who up to now were in connection with Allied Troops, and functioned in vanguard and in the units that were occupied territory : two of this units have already courageously crossed the enemy line in compact units, when one, Commander by Capt. Nardi, not only brought back its own arms but also 30 German prisoners they have captured.

Following the proclamation of General Alexander which impressed them profoundly because in substance it told them to lay down the arms and to live as best they could, the Patriots were unable to remain where they were : to return to their occupied villages and towns was impossible and meant sure death; to remain where they were was also impossible and it was asking for death, owing to the weather conditions cold, they want of proper clothing and food.

It can be calculate that in a little while the Patriots in Florence will amount to about two thousand if not more.

- 4) Necessary provisions required to solve the Patriot question. The patriot question could easily be solved - if there were only a few offices and few people to attend to it; and once is established who is to look after patriots and surmising follow the logical consequences.

1063-

The surmising amounts to this :

It is undiscutably necessary, for the Italian Government as well as for the Allies to acknowledge that patriots are military men and this is proved by the fact that the privileged pension of war is awarded to wounded and mutilated patriots and same ceremonies are granted to the following patriots and therefore the necessary conclusion is that :

The treatment due to the patriots is that which is given to the Army. It is also evident that this treatment is due to the Patriots from the day they crossed the lines and until they are effectively smobilized returning to their own homes, or joining the forces etc.etc.

Applying ~~ex~~ rigorously these principles the patriot problem is automatically solved, because if the patriots are in the army are considered as military they should also have :

- 1) A barrack of their own.
- 2) The same rations as given to the army
- 3) Comforts as allowed to the armed forces.
- 4) Tobacco as given to the army
- 5) Folding beds or materasses with strow.
- 6) Clothing, underwear and boots so they should not suffer from the cold and are able to change underwear.
- 7) The possibility to pass period of convalescen in a way to build up the organismus.
- 8) The possibility to have some honest ameneties to ~~leave~~ lift the pressed moral.
- 9) A minimum pay, for small expenses.

IL RAPPRESENTANTE CENTRO
MILITARE
Signed : Maggiore G.Terrosi

IL RAPPRESENTANTE DEL C.L.N.
Signed: Avv. I.TROMBETTI

24 Novembre 1944.

0048

To: *Patricia G.*
MAI PRAC
 All Affairs section,
 The Allied Forces in Italy
 This Project is

100/0/2/11.2
 13 Nov 44

528

File

Subject: Discussion 15/16 Nov. ASD PLS, Army
 SOLO IV Group and Patriots Rev (ASR),

Doc- 100/0/2/11.2

Doc- 100/0/2/11.2

1. After consultation with Hq (2), Col. Meyer, on the subject of Patriots, it was decided that the following should be done: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

2. The information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

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4. In connection with the information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

5. At the same time as the information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

6. The information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

7. In connection with the information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

8. The information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

9. The information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

10. The information of interest for the following should be given: (a) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (b) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government, (c) to see that the Patriots are not used as a cover for the activities of the Italian Government.

they went only on the ground persons so-called in a... mentioned to keep the treatment "different" than that given the people usually handled by that Group.

6. Col. Mullen agreed that near installations within relatively easy transport distances, solely for logistics would be an ideal solution, and in this connection the towns (areas) of Lima, Ilo and Pisco were mentioned as possible sites.

7. Col. Mullen raised another serious problem, that of providing protection to the present time Patriotas wanted in this area are needed when Group at San Mateo (Military) come packed up in a truck, then they are sent to civilian hospitals, there, the distances in transport and in military (armies) attempts to supply them patients with a little extra in the way of food, some with disinfectant, and some with medicine, and in a civilian hospital and then you put up in a civilian hospital which does not have to do with the military and which is by an armed force in the area. Col. Mullen said he to see this altered.

8. As Col. Mullen also pointed out that only "legitimate fighting" Patriotas should be permitted to have weapons, in the case the Government of Peru. Col. Mullen said that all weapons should be given to the Government of Peru. It was suggested that all weapons should be given to the Government of Peru. It was also suggested that all weapons should be given to the Government of Peru. It was also suggested that all weapons should be given to the Government of Peru.

9. The question of food again came up. Col. Mullen suggested the boys that written material and actual equipment be given to provide foodstuffs on a basis at least equivalent to the standard. In practice, in the forward areas Patriotas are actually fed very well but this is not sufficient and we keep it in being done, and we have to use these people occasionally, should be done to help in the practice and standardize it.

10. It was also pointed out that the Patriotas encountered are for the most part in dire need of clothing and shoes. Col. Mullen stated that these items are not available as they are not up to the present value to the making of arms.

11. Criticism of the method of making weapons was made on the part of our "publicity" men. Col. Mullen said that Patriotas are in a hurry for things they have been promised and he has never been informed as to what is being received. He suggested that all equipment be given directly to the Patriotas men either by mail or by air transport so they can be kept in the area as they are doing anything they can be available.

12. It was suggested that some thing be done so that the Patriotas should actually be working in a manner which with the Government of Peru, and the Patriotas should be able to do the following:

13. Patriotas are working the ground in a manner which is being located Patriotas Government office Patriotas may be located and for Patriotas up to 20 days.

14. These Patriotas are working (actual operations) in the field at each center to establish the Patriotas (with Patriotas) find the whereabouts of the centers) and so

1. Permit for the work to be done in the
2. Establish the Patriotas
3. Organize "work" groups
4. Assign "working" to Patriotas (working Patriotas Group of those who after 20 days will return with loyalty or flight.

15. Establish a radio scale for these centers to receive messages with text and to be able to

7. As it stands it has also reduced to the only "legitimate fighting" Patriotic groups to be permitted to have supplies to the front. The movement of Patriotic groups is significantly, have no standing elsewhere with those of the north and it thus requires that all supplies be sent to the Central Committee for Patriotic to be made solely on the recommendations of Patriotic groups (MIR) through the Union.

8. The question of food supply only is. Col. Martin expressed the hope that without supplies and medical supplies be given to supply the needs of a section at least equivalent to what is needed. In practice, in the forward areas Patriotic are actually fed very poorly but this is not authorized and on long as it is being done, and as long as we use these people operationally something should be done to help in the practice and standardize it.

10. It was also pointed out that the Patriotic movement was for the most part in dire need of clothing and shoes. Col. Martin stated that while there is such a situation as might be set up, would be of the greatest value to the country of service.

11. Criticism of the method of making business reviews in the rest of our "published" was not. Col. Martin said that Patriotic was to making the things they have been provided and he has been informed even as to what all being provided. He suggested that all concerned be given notice of any business and either by post-let or broadcast) so they can at least determine in advance as to why anything may not be available.

12. In relation to food supply, which is to be that the Patriotic groups should actually get something in a program which with the Ministry of AG, 1955, and the Army should effect the following points:

13. Establish and coordinate the operation of all strategically located Patriotic groups whose positions may be bombed and for periods up to 30 days.

14. Also Patriotic organizations (national organizations) be established at each country to administer the Patriotic (also Patriotic) and the Patriotic of the country) and to:

- i. Provide for the armed forces in Italy
- ii. Supply the Patriotic groups
- iii. Organize "anti" groups
- iv. Administer "aiding" to Patriotic groups of those who after 30 days will continue work locally in flight.

15. Establish a ration scale for these groups to compare favorably with that of the rest of the country.

16. Arrange for wounded Patriotic to be treated at military hospitals until they do not require further hospitalization.

17. Establish a system of clothing and shoes at these centers (through Red Cross, private charity and more importantly through MIR).

18. Patriotic groups should be furnished a direct directive about 1080
from to originate and operate these centers.

19. It is suggested that the MIR, the MIR of the Patriotic movement be appointed to deal with the actual establishment and operations involved, subject to

was recommended by Civil Engineer Section 10, VI. This opinion is the present opinion of no officer who has experience in conducting working installations, and his personal and professional ability is beyond question. It is suggested that an appointment. For instance, with the American Commission it is suggested that an officer of rank and position be appointed as Coordinator of the team to be used.

It is also recommended that all national committees be notified of the results of the election, and that they be requested to inform the public of the results of the election.

2. It is recommended that all attempts be made to have in the field a place that the estimate can be made for the day and not for the month.

Phetor. Correll

A. Colantuoni, Inc.

Photo. Larned

WILLIAM A. LARNED,
Lt. Colonel, Inf.

1059

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

MEMORANDUM

Ref : 4/7M/3A

4 Nov 44

SUBJECT : Patriots.

TO : Regional Commissioners Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Venezia, Emilia
ROMA : V & VIII Army.

1 The functions of the Patriots Branch of this HQ are now under review and this memorandum is addressed to you with a view to discussion at the Siena Conference on the 5th November.

2 The timing and dispersal of Patriots is essentially a matter for Regional Commissioners and their provincial commissioners this Headquarters assists by providing:-
a) information
b) Patriot representatives.

3 As to information: at the present time, the forward staff officers of the Patriots Branch of Florence compile information collected from various military sources on the distribution and activities of Patriots, the names of their leaders, etc.

4 The views of Regional Commissioners will be requested on:-
a) whether they desire the information to continue to be supplied on the present lines, or
b) whether they would be interested to receive reports in greater detail comprising a larger variety of subjects such as economic conditions, the destruction of factories, bridges and the like which may be of economic importance. Such technical information could without difficulty be added to the reports, or
c) whether the reports are found to be of acutful utility in view of the fact that many changes are likely to happen before Regional Commissioners enter their Regions, and the information will be out of date. In this connection it should be noted that information about Patriots will in future be readily available at HQ V Army, and I think also at HQ VIII Army, as well as HQ ALI.

5 Patriot representatives have been supplied to Provincial Commissioners from the Italian National Patriot Committee, and it is known that Provincial Commissioners have found these useful in dealing with problems of finding employment for Patriots and so forth. It has been suggested, however, that in future Patriot representatives could more usefully be found through Patriot leaders who may be met with in Northern Regions such as Florence.

Handwritten notes:
By General J
13
3-28
3-28

SUBJECT: Patriots.

TO: Regional Commissioners Liguria, Piemonte, Lombardia, Venesia, Emilia
CCAC : IV & VIII Army.

- 1 The functions of the Patriots Branch of this HQ are now under review and this memorandum is addressed to you with a view to discussion at the Siena Conference on the 8th November.
- 2 The planning and dispersal of Patriots is essentially a matter for Regional Commissioners and their provincial commissioners this Headquarters assists by providing:-
 - a) information
 - b) Patriot representatives.
- 3 As to information: at the present time, the forward staff officer of the Patriots Branch of Florence compiles information collected from various military sources on the distribution and activities of Patriots, the names of their leaders, etc.
- 4 The views of Regional Commissioners will be requested on:-
 - a) whether they desire the information to continue to be supplied on the present lines, or
 - b) whether they would be interested to receive reports in greater detail comprising a larger variety of subjects such as economic conditions, the destruction of factories, bridges and the like which may be of economic importance. Such technical information could without difficulty be added to the reports, or
 - c) whether the reports are found to be of doubtful utility in view of the fact that many changes are likely to happen before Regional Commissioners enter their Regions, and the information will be out of date. In this connection it should be noted that information about Patriots will in future be readily available at HQ V Army, and I think also at HQ VIII Army, as well as HQ LVI.
- 5 Patriot representatives have been supplied to Provincial Commissioners from the Italian National Patriot Committee, and it is known that Provincial Commissioners have found these useful in dealing with problems of finding employment for Patriots and so forth. It has been suggested, however, that in future Patriot representatives could more usefully be found through Patriot leaders who may be met with in Northern Regions or who can be supplied from more Northern towns such as Florence. A further question arises as to whether in view of the existing situation Patriot representatives should be withdrawn to Rome and sent up later if required, as against this it must be remembered that there is bound to be some delay in getting patriots transported up to the front at the time when they are most required if they are not withdrawn.

BY COMMAND OF THE ACTING CHIEF COMMISSIONER

1058

G.R. VERJOIN Brig,
VP CA Section,
Deputy COS.

Copy to: Deon Sec
(Attention Mr Antolini)

388

15 November 1944

SUBJECT: Memorandum.

ITALY

From day to day the political situation with regard to the Patriots grows worse. Despite all the efforts of the Officers concerned the Patriots are so ill provided for that they exist in Florence and other towns dispirited, ill fed, ill clothed and demoralized.

It is only natural that the genuine Patriot who has fought and suffered for many months at the invitation of Allied Program should expect material support and encouragement when he comes through the lines. As it is, most of the men refuse to work not so much because they are not prepared to do so as because they feel that their dignity as fighters for their country is being impaired. Also they refuse to join the Italian Army because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the Senior Officers are loaded with pocket squares and they have no confidence in their military capabilities. The present situation is grave and most competent observers agree that unless radical measures are taken there is the greatest danger of anarchy in this country.

It would seem most urgent therefore to establish a well coordinated organization for the rehabilitation and welfare of the Patriots. It should be possible to form teams of competent Officers to receive them when they pass through the lines, to look after their immediate well being and to draft them into civilian work before they become demoralized.

It is clear that to clothe and feed these Patriots will be a great problem and it is also obvious that if these men are not clothed and fed they may present a still greater problem, both now and for years to come.

Their services, if used, could prove of the greatest value in such military necessities as the reconstruction of roads and railways and the clearing of mines. If the rebuilding of roads is considered, the potential requirement of labour is infinitely greater than can be supplied from this source alone.

From day to day the political situation with regard to the
 various groups varied. Because all the efforts of the officers
 concerned the various groups all provided for that they arrived
 in Florence and other towns designated, all led, all clothed
 and accompanied.

It is only natural that the genuine patriot who has fought and suffered for many months at the sanctification of Allied troops should expect material support and encouragement when he comes through the lines, as it is, most of the men refuse to work not so much because they are not prepared to do so as because they feel that their dignity as fighters for their country is being impaired. Also they refuse to join the Italian Army because they believe, rightly or wrongly, that the senior officers are almost all socialist sympathizers and they have no confidence in their military capabilities. The present situation is grave and needs competent measures more than that unless radical measures are taken there is the greatest danger of anarchy in this country.

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Now these Patriots will, if handled properly, work and work willingly. The problem is a psychological one - they will work if they are allowed to remain under their own leaders and in their own formations but they must be made to feel that the reconstruction of their country is a patriotic action and that they are still as it were, front line soldiers contributing to the war effort.

With regard to feeding and clothing these volunteers if it is to be done it should be done well. If these contingents are fed and clothed properly much material will be involved but still far less than would have to be supplied to labor units of the Allied Forces.

Some observers maintain that if these Patriot formations remain intact they may eventually be used for subversive or political action. The answer, I think, is that if you give an Italian work, food and a few cigarettes he is easily contented; and in any case after a few weeks of employment the militant ardour of these Patriots will tend to disappear.

With regard to Patriots that wish to go home it is essential that they should be manifested quickly before they have time to cause trouble and so that they may help in the reestablishment of the normal life in this country.

Lately the Patriots who arrive in Unoccupied Italy have had no organized and effective welcome from their fellow-Italians. It should be possible to establish centers and welcome centres where they may be made to feel that their past efforts have been appreciated; already in Florence a committee of Italians has been formed to collect clothes and money for the Patriots. Given the right stimulus and support such committees could be formed elsewhere.

To sum up the present situation once more, the Patriots feel that they are unwanted, unwelcomed and that they have been made the tools of Allied propaganda. Already there are many hundreds of them wandering about unemployed in the cities of the war zone. Whether they are to be blamed or not for refusing to work under present circumstances is irrelevant. If present conditions are allowed to continue they will prove a formidable obstacle not only to the resettlement of Italy but to the resettlement of Europe as a whole and will form an easy prey to almost any kind of subversive activity.

For the Patriot problem in one form has to be solved in every country which has fought against Germany.

C. J. Hay
9501 May 1946

7A

18 October 1944

AGC/528/PAT

HANDLING OF PATRIOTS.

TOP SECRET

COL. MAYNE
H.Q. AMG
5th Army

18 OCT 1944

File
528

Herewith copy of P.W.B. Cable No. 277 as promised.
Please acknowledge on duplicate.-

B.L. D R A G E
MAJOR
Patriot Branch

Rec'd with Thanks

G B Mayne
Col.

1055

1952-44

19 OCT 1944

P 128

6 A

HQ., ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

3074/26/A(O)

12 Oct. 44.

AMENDMENT NO 1TO ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO 58DISPOSAL OF PATRIOT VOLUNTEERS IN ARMY AREAS

The following amendment will be made to the above-mentioned Administrative Instruction:-

Para 8

After "scale"

ADD

"from A.C.C. stocks".

TDC/VRT

for *for* *for*
Major General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:- As for Adm Instr No 58.

1054

ACC/528/Pat

Handling of Patriots

Col C.D. McCarthy
Patriots Branch
ACC

11 Oct 64

1. I received last evening a visit from Major Henderson and his opposite American number, No 1 Special Force. These officers are deeply perturbed because of the way in which patriots are being handled in some instances when they first come through the lines.

2. The example which has brought this matter to a head is as follows:-

550 patriots came through the lines the day before yesterday. They were disarmed and were sent on to Florence soaked to the skin and unaided. These patriots on reporting to AMG in Florence said that they had been promised hot baths, clothing and food.

3. The feelings of Major Henderson to my mind is natural. He feels that if this kind of talk is allowed to go on it would lead to serious repercussions and an unnecessary element of danger for allied individuals elsewhere. He, furthermore, feels that with the advent of winter something quite definite should be done with regard to the feeding of patriots in general, not just those volunteering to enter the Army. He has also pointed out that most of these patriots while operational, are wearing shorts and singlets only, so that a clothing problem arises.

4. I have discussed this matter with Col. Rolfe and Florence Province who, in fact, welcomed me on the subject. I pointed out to him that in my capacity here I was not in a position to interfere or to discuss the matter with Col. Maine, but I do feel that there is a grave risk if this dissatisfaction is allowed to grow, that numbers of these patriots may return to the other side and stir up trouble which might lead to grave difficulties for Special Forces. I think the time has come when

a) AMG arrives must be told quite definitely that these people must be fed

1053

Handling of Patriots

Col C.B. McCarthy
Patriots Branch
ACS

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250 patriots came through the lines the day before yesterday. They were disarmed and were sent on to Florence soaked to the skin and wired. These patriots on reporting to 25G in Florence said that they had been provided hot baths, clothing and food.

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- a) AIG Armed must be told quite definitely that these people must be fed
 - b) That some consideration should be given to the question of clothing
 - c) That mass publicity and propaganda must cease.
5. The Army is moving forward quite well now and the matter is urgent.

1053

SECRET

IN ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

3078/A(O)

7 Sep 44

COPY NO. 1.1.3

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO 292DISPOSAL OF PATRIOT VOLUNTEERS IN ARMY AREASGENERAL

It is intended that Italian Patriots who volunteer for military service will be enlisted into the Italian Army. The Patriots Branch of the Allied Control Commission are responsible for making the necessary arrangements for the collection, evacuation and disposal of such Patriots.

2. This Organization will be capable of handling, if necessary, up to several hundred such volunteers per day, and will be designed to move volunteers from Corps and Army Areas back to the main Italian Army Enlistment Centres which have been established at Rome and GENOVA. It is probable that the latter Centre will be moved at a later date to a more forward location.

SELECTION

3. Screening agents will be established in Army Areas to select suitable recruits for the Italian Army from the lists of Patriot volunteers held by AMG Officers. These screening agents will operate under the orders of the Army HQ in which they are located.

4. At Corps level PSE/OIG will assist in the screening process, where necessary, and every effort will be made to ensure that only suitable recruits are moved back to Army Headquarters.

5. All accepted volunteers will be given a pass stating that they will be taken on the strength of the Italian Army on arrival at the Enlistment Centres referred to in para 2 above.

MOVEMENT OF ACCEPTED VOLUNTEERS

6. Volunteers will be evacuated along the main Army supply routes to Army Road and Railheads, and thence to the Italian Army Enlistment Centres, by the most suitable means available.

(c) Requests for road movement will be made to the formation in command by Civil Affairs Officers in forward areas and by the Camp Commandant of Patriots Camps in rearward areas (See para 7)

(d) Requests for rail movement will be made to Movements with whom all

PATRIOTS 3A
3078/A(O)
3078/A(O)

6-00 1944

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 52

DISPOSAL OF PATRIOT VOLUNTEERS IN ARMY AREASGENERAL

It is intended that Italian Patriots who volunteer for military service will be enlisted into the Italian Army. The Patriots Branch of the Allied Control Commission are responsible for making the necessary arrangements for the collection, evacuation and disposal of such Patriots.

2. This Organisation will be capable of handling, if necessary, up to several hundred such volunteers per day, and will be assigned to move volunteers from Corps and Army Areas back to the main Italian Army Enlistment Centres which have been established at EGEE and CHIETI. It is probable that the latter Centre will be moved at a later date to a more forward location.

SELECTION

3. Screening agents will be established in Army Areas to select suitable recruits for the Italian Army from the lists of Patriot volunteers held by AOC Officers.

These screening agents will operate under the orders of the Army HQ in which they are located.

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(b) Requests for rail movement will be made to Movements with which all details will be arranged.

(c) In no circumstances will volunteers be moved from Corps Areas until they have been screened.

ADMINISTRATION

7. The responsibility for general administration of Italian volunteers will rest with the Patriots Branch, AOC, and that Branch will establish such camps and billeting areas in Corps, Road and Railhead Areas as may be necessary, by agreement with the Formation concerned. Wherever possible, these camps will be established in existing buildings. Equipment for the camps will in the first place be/

.. 2 ..

be found under ACC arrangements. Applications for assistance from military sources will be made to H. A. I. Armies can accept no responsibility for the establishment of these camps.

8. Whilst in these camps accepted volunteers will be fed on the refugee ration scale. Rations will be drawn under arrangements to be made by the camp staff.

ACK *from ACC Stocks.*

TS/JLF

Sheldon
Major-General,
Chief Administrative Officer.

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HEADQUARTERS,
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M.G. SECTION
PATRIOTS BRANCH.
APO 394

Ref: 64/Pat

25 Sept. 44

SUBJECT: Treatment of Patriots in Italy -
Final stage.

To: Brigadier M. Lush,
Brigadier Upjohn,
Mr. Harold Gaccia.

Copies for information to:
Brigadier Maitland,
Commander Holdsworth
AMC Fifth Army
AMC Eighth Army

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (G)

By *S. Duller* NARS, Date *8/21/78*

1. Undoubtedly the handling of patriots in the North of Italy will be on a much larger scale than in central Italy; the patriots in the North are reputed to be tougher than those in central Italy; also they are well organised vide Appendix attached.

2. It seems clear that it is necessary to endeavour to harness and control the energies of the patriots in the North from now until such time as they are finally dissipated into the civilian population. Otherwise there is almost certain to be trouble wherever they are left uncontrolled especially if they are not put into proper civil or military employment after peace has been established in their areas.

3. HQ A.I. are eager that patriots in the north should now be satisfied about their future so that they may give of their best over the next few weeks. A letter is probably being sent to us from G Ops to this effect.

4. At present, the fact that many patriots, e.g. in Florence, have not been finally rehabilitated has not presented a serious public safety problem because, first, there are not enough of them and second, we have strong military forces everywhere in the vicinity.

5. What the patriots want is to know that they will be properly employed either in the Army or in civil life after the fighting is over. This means that if we wish to satisfy the patriots we must present to them terms for military and civil employment which they will accept.

6. The present military terms are unacceptable because the patriots wish to continue fighting with their own officers and they refuse to join up if they are to be split into different units in the army.

7. I have discussed the problem of recruitment briefly with General Browning and he has asked us to call meeting to discuss this after his return from Sardinia about the forth of October. Whether or not on all grounds it is desirable that the patriots should join the army has also to be

to: Brigadier M. Rush,
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Mr. Harold Gaccia.

Copies for information to:
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Commander Holdsworth
AMG Fifth Army
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7. I have discussed the problem of recruitment briefly with General Browning and he has asked us to call meeting to discuss this after his return from Sardinia about the forth of October. Whether or not on all grounds it is desirable that the patriots should join the army has also to be considered; and an answer must be given in the near future and the patriots told what that answer is.

8. With regard to civil employment, I find that many patriots refuse to accept the terms which the army can offer then because the pay is too low and the work unattractive. This has not been a serious problem in Florence but in the North it may be serious and it is suggested that the Italian Patriot Committee could produce one or two civilians for each Region who should canvas leading industrial firms and find jobs for patriots according to their qualifications and experience. If the Italian Patriot Committee can take on this work it would be of great assistance.

2.

9. Both the army authorities and any civilian employment bureau that is formed by Italians must be able to make early contact with patriots, if possible before they are finally disbanded so that a clear scheme for reemployment will be known to the bands in good time.

10. The difficulty in doing this is to get the armies and corps to agree to let the patriots be contacted in the most forward areas. I think, however, that AAI feels sufficiently strongly about the necessity of settling the quarrels of patriots on this head, to insist that patriots should be contacted at a very early stage.

11. Col. Mayne, feels strongly that the publicity given to patriots on the radio and in the press is exaggerated and that we are making too much fuss about their rehabilitation, and that the directives to this end given in our orders of 18 July and 24 July are not 'realistic'. He thinks all this will end only in causing trouble for Italy.

12. The daily Combatti programme, sponsored by Brig. Mainwaring, is probably the strongest single authority responsible for encouraging and emphasizing the importance of the patriots.

13. There is, undoubtedly, much in what Col. Mayne says but it is difficult to reconcile these views with the practical necessity for encouraging the Italian patriots at this juncture. A little later on perhaps one could ask PWB to include their comments on patriots amongst their articles on the courage and endurance of the whole civil population. At some stage it may be wise to eliminate from the news papers practically all reference to patriots but this presumably would be when Italy was almost entirely liberated.

14. In the mean time the present policy is to endeavour to look after the patriots when they are disbanded and I should like to have a directive if I am to proceed on the lines mentioned above and take particular trouble to put patriots into the army and civil employment. Also is it desirable to cut down our propaganda?

C.D. McCarthy
C.D. McCarthy,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch.

SECRETTHE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS OF THE PARTISAN
MOVEMENT IN ITALY.

1. From information received in the last few days it is possible to give a somewhat clearer picture of the internal organization of the Partisan movement in Italy.
2. The "GHQ" of the movement, as has of course long been known, is in MILAN. This is the logical result of three main causes:
 - (a) MILAN is the natural centre of German occupied Italy.
 - (b) As Italy's principal industrial town it has a large working population which has, in the past, proved a fertile field for anti-Fascist organization.
 - (c) As a result of (b) the Committee of National Liberation in MILAN had a firm foundation of well organized underground activity which parties of the left had established and maintained throughout the Fascist regime. The CLM was thus able to begin the evolution of an active central organization at a time when Partisan activity in the rest of Italy was sporadic and entirely uncoordinated. The Committee has gradually increased the extent of its influence until at present it is believed that it is recognised by the great majority of the Partisans.
3. In essence the CLM aims to coordinate the activities of all resistance elements which are prepared to act against Germans and Fascists, and to eliminate friction arising both from the wide variety of causes which have induced Italians to join resistance groups, and from the tendency of a large number of political parties to attempt to capitalise on the resistance movement.
4. (a) The sources from which the Partisan movement derives almost all its active strength are five-fold: -
 - (i) Members of the Italian Army before the Armistice, who for various reasons later refused to throw in their lot with the Germans and Fascists. Their political views appear to be predominantly monarchist and it is probable that the majority of those bands which remained independent of the CLM derived

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- (ii) Communists.
- (iii) Action Party members.
- (iv) Socialists.
- (v) Christian Democrats.

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- (b) The rigidity of this classification should however be qualified. Operating with Partisans is a large and heterogeneous body of Italians of no, or only the loosest, political allegiance, together with an unknown number of Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, and even German deserters from the Wehrmacht, Slovenes, and a considerable number of Allied ex-PW.

5. When it became clear that the CLN in MILAN had achieved a real authority over this complex movement, and had in fact been recognised by the Italian Government, it was decided to send a distinguished Italian officer, with an unexceptionable democratic background, as a representative of A.A.I. to the CLN. He will be referred to as "Colonel X". What follows is based in the main on reports from this officer.

6. (a) The General Command of the MILAN CLN consists of five members, one from each of the five principal resistance elements, and a military adviser.

(b) The Operations section of the Command virtually rules the CLN and consists of the Communist and Action Party representatives and the Military Adviser.

(c) Colonel X was welcomed by all parties and was nominated President of the Committee. This however raised a difficulty in that the three parties of the left could not agree as to the allocation of the secondary posts. He therefore refused the Presidency and has taken up the appointment of Military Adviser with its ex officio seat in the Operations section, a task for which his capabilities make him eminently suitable.

7. The Committee has achieved a creditable degree of cooperation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in passing it is pointed out that where communications consist chiefly of couriers on foot, bicycle, or occasionally motor car, liaison duties assume a very great significance.

109

8. The lack of communications and the clandestine nature of the organisation have made close control of military operations particularly in the case of instant bands, out of the question. The Committee therefore contents itself with broad operational policy and concentrates mainly on organisation. A.A.I. therefore

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9. The CLM has under its direct command the MILAN city command and has divided the remainder of enemy occupied Italy into five regional commands. Each of these regional commands has a number of zones, that of PIEDMONT having the TURIN town command in addition. The bands acknowledging the CLM come directly under the respective zones. The following table shows the position in graphic form: -

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C. L. V. MEYER

MILAN City Commander

EMILIA	REGIONAL	COMAND	5 Zones
LIIGURIA	REGIONAL	COMAND	2 Zones
PIEDMONT	REGIONAL	COMAND	5 Zones
LOMBARDY	REGIONAL	COMAND	4 Zones
VENETO	REGIONAL	COMAND	5 Zones

The present position is considered to be satisfactory from the point of view of the Allied Armies, in that whilst the CIM achieves a large measure of political unity and common policy, the control of operations remains with HQ AAI, acting through its British and American operating agencies. The presence of Colonel X with the MILAN CIM will it is hoped do much to ensure that the Committee's activities are directly related to the furtherance of Allied military operations.

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