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REPORTS ON PIEMONTE REGION

OCT. - Nov. 1944

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THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN THE VAL D'AOSTA.

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GENERAL.

Ever since the early days of FASCISM, and more especially since ITALY came into the war on the side of the GERMANS against the ALLIES, there has existed in ITALY a small underground anti-fascist movement. Originally, this clandestine opposition was organized by the various anti-fascist parties; the Communists, Socialists, Liberals, Action Party, Christian Democrats and Catholics. Of these, the Communists and to a lesser extent, the Action Party, were the most important and active, since they had long been established and were more or less well organized. On the overthrow of MUSSOLINI, during the interim period between the assumption of power by BADOLLO and the armistice with the Allies, the resistance movement, hitherto clandestine, came into the open, a little prematurely, and were allowed to publish their own newspapers and express their views in public. Their freedom was however, shortlived. The armistice with the Allies was signed, the Allies invaded ITALY and the Germans rapidly occupied Northern ITALY, re-instating MUSSOLINI and the Fascist Republican Party. This meant that the anti-fascists were again driven underground, and many of the active members who had already compromised themselves by showing their hands, were forced to escape from the cities to the hills. There they tended to group together according to their political views and soon, a number of small bands came into being, each owing allegiance to the political party from which it drew its most active members.

In the towns although many of their members had been obliged to flee, the party organization remained and continued to carry out their work clandestinely. The intense anti-German feeling of the vast majority of the population and the added conviction they felt that now at least ITALY was at war with her real enemy, Germany, caused these underground anti-fascist parties to grow

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In the towns although many of their members had been obliged to flee, the party organization remained and continued to carry out their work clandestinely. The intense anti-German feeling of the vast majority of the population and the added conviction they felt that now at least ITALY was at war with her real enemy, Germany, caused these underground anti-fascist parties to grow in strength and influence. Soon in practically every town a Committee of National Liberation was formed on which sat representatives of the six original anti-fascist parties.

Thus, then, was the foundation of political resistance in ITALY; the Committees of Liberation operating in the towns with small bands of very **8514** political leanings in hiding in the hills and looking to their parent parties for political guidance and assistance.

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At the time of the armistice there were in Northern ITALY a large number of Italian Divisions. Due to a lack of clear direction or instructions from the centre, only token resistance was offered to the German forces which arrived to disarm and disband them. However, in some areas and especially in PIEMONTE, a large number of complete units took to the hills, taking with them their weapons and quantities of supplies. This was the case of several who formed the nucleus of the partisans in the VAL D'AOSTA, where the mountainous nature of the area with its many lateral valleys lent itself to guerilla type of resistance.

THE PARTISAN FORMATIONS. (Aug '44)

By July '44, it was estimated that there were over 4,000 partisans, split up into several bands, each with its own operational sphere corresponding roughly with the several valleys. These bands had only a loose sort of inter-connection and, in fact, enjoyed considerable independence.

The more important groups were located as follows:-

VAL GRESSONEY

Here there were some 500 partisans including 120 GROSSI - deserters from the AOSTA garrison and presumably part of the 2nd SLOVAK TECHNICAL (IND) DIVISION. This group had some form of contact with MOSCATELLI, the commander of the patriots of the VAL SESIA.

VAL CHALLANT - AYAS

In this valley, there were 60 partisans armed with carbines and Stens under HENRY and in the higher VAL D'AYAS, MARIUS commanded a force of 400 similarly armed.

VAL PELLANE

Between this valley and VAL TOURNAIHE was the DGRA BALTEA BAND under Capt. MEZARD, a regular ALPINE officer, ambitious, young, and an

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VAL GRESSONNY

Here there were some 500 partisans including 120 CZECHS - deserters from the AOSCVA garrison and presumably part of the 2nd SLOVAK TECHNICAL (IND) DIVISION. This group had some form of contact with MOSCATELLI, the commander of the patriots of the VAL SESIA.

VAL CHALLANT - AYAS

In this valley, there were 60 partisans armed with carbines and Stens under NEXY and in the higher VAL D'AYAS, MARIUS commanded a force of 400 similarly armed.

VAL PELLINE

Between this valley and VAL TOURNAICHE was the DORA BALTEA BAND under Capt. MEZARD, a regular AIRMAIL officer, ambitious, young, and an outstanding personality in the VAL D'AGNEA. His group numbered 1237 and were armed with carbines and rifles and also possessed 100 heavy machine guns and 120 light machine guns. In VAL PELLINE proper, IMELAR commanded a force of 55 men.

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(cont)

VAL FOURRANCHE

TITO, an ex-regular sergeant-major of ALPINI, with an excellent reputation as a soldier, led a group of 600 partisans, armed with carbines. His HQ's were in the vicinity of MACDALINA (D0512). He also controlled the MARIUS group in the VAL D'AYAS.

VAL DI VERTOSAN

Here a group of 260 men was commanded by BERT and was armed with rifles, carbines and berettes.

VAL DI LA TUIER

A band known as the RUIFOZ Band, 130 strong, operated in this valley, their arms including Bren guns.

VAL DI RHIMES

Here FRANCOIS commanded a group of 40 men.

VAL SAVARANCHE

In this valley, FALLINO with his "CRETINA" Band, 50 strong, armed with carbines had the task of defending the NIVOLET PASS (H6730).

VAL DI COCNE

The "VEZZAZIN" Band, under Lt. ILIK operated in this valley and were 150 strong.

VAL DI PENTIS

There were two groups in this valley, commanded respectively by ARNOLD and MANCO, totalling 170 men armed with carbines, with one heavy machine gun and four Bren guns.

VAL D'ISSOGNE

Here was a force of 200 men led by MARIUS. It is not known whether this group formed part of the MARIUS force of the VAL D'AYAS, or whether the two leaders were the same.

VAL CHUSNELA

VAL DI LA TUILLE

A band known as the RUILOZ Band, 150 strong, operated in this valley, their arms including Bren guns.

VAL DI RIEMES

Here IMANDOIS commanded a group of 40 men.

VAL SAVARANCHI

In this valley, PALLINO with his "CERETIER" Band, 50 strong, armed with carbines had the task of defending the NIVOLEN PASS (H6760).

VAL DI OCCINE

The "VEZZAZIN" Band, under Lt. FLIK operated in this valley and were 150 strong.

VAL DI VENIS

There were two groups in this valley, commanded respectively by ARNOLD and MANCO, totalling 170 men armed with carbines, with one heavy machine gun and four Bren guns.

VAL D'ISSOCHE

Here was a force of 200 men led by MARIUS. It is not known whether this group formed part of the MARIUS force of the VAL D'AYAS, or whether the two leaders were the same.

VAL CHIUSELLA

There were 700 partisans in this area, fairly well armed with Stens, rifles and carbines.

VAL SCANA

The "PEDRO" Band led by PEDRO, strength reported at 1,000, armed with 570 rifles and carbines, operated in this valley. Also in the VAL CHAMPICHER in the area of N. GLACIER (H9792).

(cont)

DELIAZ-HORRE (J1587)

In this area, there were 100 men under MAURO, with 80 carbines and 7 Stens. It is possible that this group formed part of the

"SILVIO PEDRO" Band in VAL CHAMPORCHER.

THE AOSTA COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION.

Side by side with this partisan form of resistance, there was developing in the town of AOSTA itself, a clandestine organisation controlled by a Committee of National Liberation, made up of representatives elected by the anti-fascist elements in the town. This committee included:-

Professor MEDONICO CHABOD - an autonomist and a very influential

VALDOSTAN.

AMEDEO BERTHOD

- an artist of VAL TORMANUZZO who had partisan experience with TITO's Band.

Ingen: ELIURI

- the official consultant engineer of the town.

Avv: ARCANNEY

Avv: CAVERI

Avv: PAGE

- three local lawyers.

Other prominent citizens included MARTINO BERTHOD, brother of AMEDEO, who was later captured by the Germans and sent to Germany; Doctor HUMEL, who was also TITO's M.O.; and the Count D'INTRAVERS, a local landowner and a very able man who eventually joined TITO.

As far as conditions permitted, this C.L.N. was subordinate to the C.L.N. TURIN, but in actual fact it enjoyed a large measure of independence since communications with the regional authority was at best extremely hazardous.

In early August, some attempt was made to regularise the position of the heterogeneous partisan formations in order that the C.L.N. AOSTA might be

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In early August, some attempt was made to regularise the position of the heterogeneous partisan formations in order that the C.L.N. AOSTA might be able to exercise a firmer control and so obtain a greater co-ordination of effort. A dual command was therefore established for the whole AOSTA valley, the upper valley, including the laterals, under the command of MELARD and the lower valley consisting of the central and lower DOGA BASSA with the lateral valleys running into it, under PEDRO.

(cont)

The situation seemed excellent, the population lived their normal life and their relations with the partisans were cordial; provisions arrived regularly and were generally sufficient. The morale of the men was high, discipline good, despite the lack of training and firing practice due to the scarcity of ammunition.

Towards the end of August, PEDRO was arrested in TURIN and the valley found itself without a commander for the lower sub-sector. MEZARD, who was popular on account of his VALDAGNAN origin, and thus had considerable influence over the partisans, endeavoured to assume complete control over the whole valley. He proceeded to fulfill his new and self-appointed obligation, by a systematic epuration of his own bands, removing the apathetic 'rangizans', who inevitably associate themselves with such a movement.

This 27 year old ALPINI, regarded himself as being outside politics in the ordinary 'party' sense, but had early identified himself with the autonomous movement which was rapidly becoming the main interest of the VALDAGNANS.

RECONSTRUCTION.

COENE, which had been occupied by the partisans towards the end of June, had been for some time the principal centre of partisan life in the upper AOSTA valley. The presence of a considerable mining industry with its vast organisation and huge telephone network, which incidentally connected with the guard posts and with the VAL SAVARANCH, naturally favoured the constitution and functioning of a small partisan army. Not only were the partisans supplied with food, but in the workshops, large quantities of road - mines, some Sten guns and mortars were manufactured.

Unfortunately for MEZARD's plans, the TURIN C.L.N. appointed a regular Army General of ALPINI, - ARMAND (MACELLANO), to be MILITARY COMMANDER of the entire VAL D'AGNAN.

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Unfortunately for MEZARD's plans, the TUDIN C.L.N. appointed a regular Army General of ALPINI, - AGUIARD (MACLIANO), to be MILITARY COMMANDER of the entire VAL D'AOSTA. The new commander, realising the unique advantages which COGNE afforded, set up his headquarters there, including a CHIEF of STAFF, a MAGISTRATE, and a lawyer for CIVIL AFFAIRS. This COMMAND was not merely decorative, nor did it bury itself in useless bureaucracy, but was extremely active. A short wave radio set was built, and by means of a set brought from SWITZERLAND, the FREE RADIO of VAL D'AOSTA was established.

Transmissions were controlled by the Command which had no political guidance

other than the C.L.N.

(cont)

General Aulhac, an expert in mountain warfare, in concert with the AOSIA C.I.N., divided the valley into two zones which corresponded approximately to the previous sub-sections of MEZARD and PERRO. The FIRST ZONE the general commanded personally, the SECOND ZONE he sub-divided into two parts, the one including the upper and central valleys under MEZARD, the other, the lower valley under SALVATORE. This latter had taken over PERRO's bands and had his headquarters at CHATELON (30390). The C.I.N. and the IN's of the zones desired that in addition to partisan formations, regularly constituted Italian units should be allowed to fight alongside the ALLIED troops in the ALPINE passes. It was felt that these formations could best be organized in FRANCE.

For this reason, Capt. SARDI, an expert in guerrilla warfare, was chosen to organize Italian Alpine Bands in FRANCE, and to lead them in combat in the ALPS. Meanwhile, effective liaison was established between HQ 2nd ZONE and the P.F.I. HQ at TOURS St. MAURICE. This also provided an efficient escape route for Allied P.W's.

Such was the set up in the VAL D'AOSTA at the end of August, in a zone of great military importance, controlling as it does, one of the most important passes into FRANCE - the LITTLE St. BERNARD. Provided that these numerous and reasonably well organized bands could be supplied with ammunition which was scarce, there was every prospect that they would be able to obtain a firm grip on the valley, and thus be of great assistance in the event of an ALLIED advance into PIEDMONT through the LITTLE St. BERNARD pass.

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SEPARATISM.

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SEPARATISM.

There were, however, several military actions during September and October, the most important being an attack by the NAZI-FASCISTS on the VAL SAVARACHE. The enemy succeeded in getting past the block-house guarding the approaches to the valley, and were advancing when one man, with remarkable courage, exploded a mine which caused a land-slide of 12,000 cubic metres of earth which fell and buried 27 of the enemy. The rest of the attacking forces retreated rapidly, and only succeeded in avoiding, by a few minutes, being cut off by a partisan column sent from COCURE.

(cont)

During this time, the Command was systematically opposed and sabotaged by separatist elements who saw in an organisation of such authority and prestige, a serious menace to the realization of their plans. This obstructionism was carefully fomented by LEZARD who had not taken kindly to his subordination to ANNAUD. He made use of the general desire for autonomy felt by the vast majority of the VALDOSTANS, as a cloak to further his real aim of complete separatism, and eventual annexation by FRANCE of the VAL D'AOSTA. He maintained a rather close liaison with the MAQUIS as has already been stated. The Command, immediately appreciating the gravity of the situation, reported it to the C.I.N.A.I., asking them to use their authority to guard against the annexation danger. The C.I.N.A.I. affirmed that after the war, the VAL D'AOSTA would be granted liberal, administrative, economic and cultural autonomy and that their traditions and needs would be guaranteed. Military relations were established on a plane of absolute parity with the FRENCH Command in SAVOY, in order to counter-act in this way too, the activities of the annexationists.

On 12th October, an AMERICAN Mission arrived at COGNE and was most favourably impressed by the organisation and work of the Command. It was mainly due to the trust inspired by General ANNAUD, that the partisans of the whole valley were granted those arms which the ALLIES had so often promised but had never sent. When the first of the longed-for supplies arrived in the VAL SAVARACHE, the morale of the men rose and they began to prepare for more daring action. Unfortunately, the lateness of the season and particularly the inclement weather, prevented the arms from being collected with the necessary rapidity.

TIN BREAK-UP.

In the meantime, General ANNAUD, realising the difficulties in communicating with both the TURIN C.I.N. and the ALLIES, decided to move his headquarters

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THE BREAK-UP.

In the meantime, General ALMAUD, realising the difficulties in communicating with both the TURIN C.I.N. and the ALLIES, decided to move his headquarters to the VAL SAVARANCHÉ where everything was easier, and where the possibility of supplies and of surprise sorties on the road, were greater.

Owing to enemy activity, however, the General was soon obliged to leave the VAL SAVARANCHÉ and moved into the VAL TOUCMANCHÉ.

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(cont)

a) THE VAL TOURNAI ACTION.

He had barely settled in when the Germans attacked suddenly at 14.00 hrs on 28th October. The enemy forces consisted of about 700 NAZI-FASCISTS armed with 81 mm mortars, heavy machine guns and light machine guns, rifles and automatic weapons. They were supported by three tanks and 34 A.F.V's. The principal attack was directed along the VAL TOURNAI road, CHARLIER (D0405) to VAL TOURNAI (D0528), with diversionary attacks, COLE S. PANTALEONE - VERCHON (D0311) - VAL TOURNAI and VAL DI CHAULANT - COLE S. PANTALEONE (D1024) - BRUHL (D0735).

The Republican LUPACIA with elements of the GUARDIA NAZIONALE REPUBBLICANA arrived at the check post PORCAGE to begin negotiations with the VAL TOURNAI IN under Capt. BERT. Whilst negotiations were proceeding a German officer cut them short by giving to the partisans a five minute ultimatum to clear out of the valley. Without waiting for a reply the NAZI-FASCISTS attacked along the road PORCAGE - ANNEY (D0311) - VAL TOURNAI. For reasons not known, no resistance was offered at the check post nor were the pre-arranged demolitions carried out. The whole Band at VAL TOURNAI was taken by surprise and had no time to offer organised battle. ARNAUD and his staff took refuge at BRUHL. Meanwhile, the Germans had crossed the VAL DI AYAS without opposition; MARIUS having accepted terms from the enemy without informing TITO of his intentions. A group of 130 ALPES AGENTS crossed the CIME BLANCHE Pass and threatened BRUHL. Having no defence, ARNAUD left BRUHL and succeeded in descending by the 'filovia' to the MATEAU ROSA, entering SWITZERLAND on 29th October.

b) THE VAL DI COCHE ACTION.

The Germans then turned their attention to the VAL DI COCHE where

VAL DI CHALANT - COTE D'ALLE CITE BLANCHE (D1024) - BRUILL (D0735).

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b) THE VAL DI COCCE ACTION.

The Germans then turned their attention to the VAL DI COCCE where BENARD, convinced of the imminence of mopping-up operations directed against him, was organising the defence of the valley with the garrison of 250 men.

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At 0600 hrs on 2nd November, the enemy, 600 strong, and supported by mortars and heavy machine guns, began the attack in the direction of VILLANOVA (C7303) - PUTIGNON (H7299) - CHEVRIIL (H7497) - VILVRES (H7595) - COGNE (H8390). Diversionary attacks were also carried out in the direction of AOSTA - VERULA - ACQUAFRANDE, and BARD (J1588) - NORE (J1288) - CHAMPOURHER (J0590) - COGNE FINESTRA (H9488). MEZARD had arranged to cut the road at CHEVRIIL and also the canal East of that town; in addition the main valley road was mined in several places. The battle lasted with varying fortune until 1600 hrs when the partisans counter-attacked strongly from their third defensive position, and threw the enemy back beyond VILVRES. During the night, the NAZI-NAZIS abandoned the valley and withdrew to VILLANOVA. Owing to a grave shortage of ammunition, MEZARD decided to evacuate the valley and so the partisans moved into the VAL SAVARACHE.

The attack carried out on the ACQUAFRANDE check post proved abortive, the enemy losing twelve killed, thirty wounded besides considerable equipment. Two days later, on 4th November, the NAZI-NAZIS upon learning that COGNE had been evacuated, re-entered it in force and left a garrison, 200 strong, in the town of COGNE itself. On 5th November, TOCHONT, the 'FROGMALE' of AOSTA, tried to negotiate the surrender of the NAZI-NAZIS by promising them an amnesty. After the commanders, ARNOLD and MARCO had rejected the offer, mopping-up operations began, the results of which were negative. The situation of the partisans in the VAL SAVARACHE was, meanwhile, becoming more and more untenable. The Germans were preparing another attack with even larger forces, and since there was little or no possibility of defence due to the almost complete lack of ammunition,

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MEZARD now found himself once again in command of the patriots in the VAL D'ACSPA, or of such as remained. Many had returned to their homes after the recent battles, and others joined the NOCCARELLI group in the VAL SESIA.

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(cont)

With his usual unflinching energy, LEZARD began to reorganise the remaining bands on a more military basis. He enforced the elimination of the Political Commissars as being sources of disturbances.

The situation of the 10th November was as follows:-

- VAL CRUSSECOMME - occupied by the NAZI-FASCISTS.
- Partisans had moved into the area M. REMANORCA. (01717)
- VAL CHAILLANT - occupied by the NAZI-FASCISTS.
- VAL TOURNANCHE - occupied by the GERMANS.

A group of 39 partisans remained in the hills to maintain the FRANCOU ground.

- VAL PAILLE - occupied by the GERMANS.
- 24 partisans remained in the area M. BALLE (00522).

VAL DI VERGOSAN - A squad remained to look after the dropping ground in this area.

VAL DI LA TULLE - entirely occupied by the GERMANS.

VAL DI RHENES - the partisans here number 35.

VAL SAVARANCHE - occupied by the NAZI-FASCISTS.

VAL DI PERIS - Two groups of 70 men each remained under ARNOLD and MARCO.

VAL COMTECOCHINE - Nothing definite is known but there is good reason to suppose that it has been occupied by the GERMANS.

VAL GRAN SAN BERNARDO - The "FRANCIS GIBBONS" band of 110 men, has moved here from VAL PAILLE.

VAL S. BARTHES - A group of 30 men plus the remains of VAL TOURNANCHE are here.

VAL D'AYAS - occupied by the GERMANS. The partisans disbanded.

VAL CRISMANCHE - occupied by the GERMANS.

CONCLUSION.

Thus, by mid-November, after successive and individual attacks, the GERMANS and

A group of 39 partisans remained in the hills

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VAL PELLINE - occupied by the GERMANS.

24 partisans remained in the area M. BALME (06322).

VAL DE VERTOSAN - A squad remained to look after the dropping ground in this area.

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VAL DE NUBRES - the partisans here number 35.

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VAL CHAMPESSINE - Nothing definite is known but there is good reason to suppose that it has been occupied by the GERMANS.

VAL GRAN SAN - The "MILITO CHANOUX" Band of 140 men, has moved here from VAL PELLINE.

VAL S. RAINHELEMY - A group of 50 men plus the remains of VAL TOUNMANCHE are here.

VAL D'AYAS - occupied by the GERMANS. The partisans disbanded.

VAL CRISAICHE - occupied by the GERMANS.

CONCLUSION.

Thus, by mid-November, after successive and individual attacks, the GERMANS and FASCISTS succeeded in clearing the VAL D'AGOSTA. Patriot losses, on the whole, were few and the majority managed to cross into FRANCE where they are now undergoing intensive training and being re-organized and re-equipped with the assistance and supervision of our missions FIGUOLA and CLARINDA, in readiness for a resumption of the struggle in the Spring.

11 Jan '45.

6505

.....
Pirard M. L.
Capt.
 GIII (I)

No: 1 Special Force.

LETTER COLLECTION
PATRIOT BRANCH
ADV. DET.
APO 394

SECRET

Ref: ACC/507/2/PAT

To : Distribution below

15 November 1944

Enclosed herewith report No. 8 on Patriot Activities
in PIEMONTE Region.

B. L. DRAGE
Major, R.A.S.C.

Distribution:

R.C. Piemonte	(2)
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3. L. DRACE
Major, R.A.S.C.

Distribution:

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A.C.	
Political Sec.	(2)
Civ.Aff.Sec.	(2)
P.R.Branch	(3)
Patriot Branch	(2)
File	(2)

6504

SECRET

Ref. ACC/507/2/PAT.

Map Italy Road 1:200,000

15 November 1944

PATRIOT ACTIVITIES IN PIEMONTE REGION

REPORT No. 8

Source of information given below is from Hq. A.A.I. British Mission of No. 1 Special Force, as at 6 November 1944.

GENERAL.

The following message has been received from General CADORNO:

"NAZI FASCISTS try in every way possible to exterminate Partisan Activities by arresting leaders and breaking up formations.

In Piedmont after heavy clean-up between VALLE DI CUNEO (N 8754) and SUSAS (H 5441) formations are reorganizing but are short of arms and ammunition.

In VAL SESTIA (D - from W 3-4-5 from S 8-1-2) the bands, weakened by the recent attacks, have moved into the lateral valleys and the plain etc...".

A B.L.O. states that LONGHI, Political President of the C.L.N.A.I. states that North Italy is being drained of its wealth by the Germans. The Patriots lack explosives to interfere with them.

He is of the opinion that a General Strike could be staged, chiefly in Piedmont and Lombardy, but that it could be only done once.

TORINO PROVINCE. The TURIN CIN. reports that it is now practically without funds. The greater part of the original source was the funds of the 4th Italian army, but these are now exhausted. It is reckoned that the upkeep of a Partisan is over 1,000 Lire per man per month, for food only. Supplies bought from peasants and all transactions are on a strictly cash basis.

An O.S.S. source reports that North and North West of TURIN, the CANAVESANO (H-J from W to E 9, 1, 2; from S to N 5) and LANZO (H 8953) valleys are again firmly in Partisan hands and that the second and fourth GARI-BALDI Divisions are almost back to their original strength.

formations, activities of arresting leaders and breaking up formations. In Piedmont after heavy clean-up between VALLE DI CUNEO (N 8754) and SUSA (H 5441) formations are reorganizing but are short of arms and ammunition. In VAL SESA (D - from W 3-4-5 from S 8-1-2) the bands, weakened by the recent attacks, have moved into the lateral valleys and the plain etc...".

A B.L.O. states that LONGHI, Political President of the C.L.N.A.I. states that North Italy is being drained of its wealth by the Germans. The Patriots lack explosives to interfere with them. He is of the opinion that a General Strike could be staged, chiefly in Piedmont and Lombardy, but that it could be only done once.

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An O.S.S. source reports that North and North West of TURIN, the CANAVESANO (H-J from W to E 9, 1, 2; from S to N 5) and LANZO (H 8953) valleys are again firmly in Partisan hands and that the second and fourth GARI-BALDI Divisions are almost back to their original strength.

CUNEO PROVINCE. The Fascists occupied the town of ALBA (O 2897) (previously held by the Partisans) on the 3rd of November. A force of over 1.000 men with armour and artillery support was used by the enemy in the attack. Partisan losses were not heavy but their supplies are now very low.

6503

- 2 -

PERSONALITIES. The C.L.N. is known to include the
Avv. PELLERINI - Liberal
Ing. ROSELLI - Christian Democrat
" SILVESTRI - Socialist.

MONDOVI COMMITTEE.

Prof. BURRERI - Liberal
Avv. COMINO - Christian Democrat
Avv. GARELLI - Action Party
Maestro PIATONE - Socialist.

AOSTA PROVINCE. It is confirmed that VAL D'AOSTA (C 5065), including
TOURNACHE (D-0519) and the frontier with Switzerland
is completely occupied by the Germans.

0516

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND

No. 785016

AOSTA PROVINCE. It is confirmed that VAL D'AOSTA (C 8005), including
TOURNACHE (D-0519) and the frontier with Switzerland
is completely occupied by the Germans.

6502

New Image :-

10
P.N.

ACC/534/Pat

4 Nov 44.

TURIN, Intelligence on

Dr. Freund,
'D' Section,
P.W.B.

1. Reference our conversation, I obtained the attached information.
2. I consider this informant, who has just come from TURIN, reliable.

Cw
C. WADSWORTH,
Captain.

6501

0515

SECRET

T U R I N, Intelligence on.

PROPAGANDA :

Mlle. METZGER, German - draws for this dept.
GAULMIO, known Italian caricaturist, was stated to be
anti-German prior to war. Has little political interest.


LOCATION OF GERMAN DEPTS AND STAFF :

Gestapo and S.S. H.Q. via Asti - number not known, but
house opposite is No 23.

(SCHMIT - head of S.S. in TURIN)

German Tank Unit) Caserne Cavalle,
and Republican Troops) Via Vittorio Emanuele.

German H.Q. for PIEMONTE Region and TODT H.Q.



Albergo CORSO FIUME - outskirts of town, houses German
women and W.O.s working at H.Q.

Albergo PATRIA - houses Lt.s. and Captains.

Albergo Prince de Piedmont - (centre of town) houses Colonels
and above.

2500

GENERAL :

A General LYER (ex-Commander of LUCCA) is stated to have

0519

- 2 -

hidden his wife and nineteen year old son in the Chateau
MONCRIFFELLO. This chateau is situated near TURIN. It is
owned by the Marquesa of MONCRIFFELLO who is a widow with
two children. Stated not to be interested in politics.
It is stated that the General has no desire to go back to
Germany when the Germans pull out, and will go into hiding
at the same place.

6/22

10 NOV Recd MLC.

74

ALLIED COMMISSION
PATRIOT BRANCH
ADVANCE DETACHMENT.
A.O. 394

SECRET

Ref: ACC/507/2/Pat

4 Nov 44.

To: Distribution Below.

Enclosed herewith Report No. 7 on Patriot activities in
PIEMONTE Region.

.....
B.L. DRAGE,
Major, R.A.S.C.

DISTRIBUTION

AKG 5 Army (1)
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A.C. (1)
Political Sect. (2)
Civil Affairs (2)
P.R. Section (3)
Patriot Branch HQ (2)
File (2)

SEEN.	INITIALS	DATE.
Col. M. J. H. Y.		
Major B. L. Drage	B.L.	
Major J. V. D. C. R.		

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 Civil Affairs (2)
 P.R. Section (3)
 Patriot Branch HQ (2)
 File (2)

.....
 B.L. DRAGE,
 Major, R.A.S.C.

SEEN.	INITIALS	DATE
Col. Mc. HY	DR.	
No. 1		
Chief, D.A.S.C.		
Col. SIVADONI		

6498

SECRET

Ref. AC3/507/2/Pat

Ref: Map Italy Rd. 1:200,000

Nov 4.

PATRIOT ACTIVITIES IN PIEDMONT REGION
REPORT No 7 -- LOCATIONS, STRENGTHS OF
PATRIOT BANDS

1. Source of information given below is from H.Q. A.A.I. and No 1 Special Force, and gives positions as at end of October.

GENERAL :

- a) It is thought that the GARIBALDI Formations are the strongest organisations in PIEDMONT. They are communist in tendency and very anti-monarchist, however, the greater percentage of the men are not interested in politics. A political commission is attached to each brigade.
- b) Action Party formations:- Several are reported and are of good military value.
- c) Liberal, monarchist and Army groups:- also exist in PIEDMONT. Led by ex-Army officers - their military value is normally high.
- d) BATTISTA, Commander 2 GARIBALDI DIV was publicly hanged in TORINO.

ALESSANDRIA PROVINCE :

Major LAURI, who was reported to be at the head of formations in CUNEO - see Report No 6 CUNEO Province - is now stated to command area bounded by the following points:- CANALE, VILLERINO, TENDA PASS, COLLE DI LARCHI. Has under command a force of 10,000 men split into 5 Brigades in this area.

10 Partisan Div. Str. estimated 2400 mostly unarmed, is located N. of ALESSANDRIA.

GENERAL :

- a) It is thought that the GARIBOLDI Formations are the strongest organisations in FRIEDMONT. They are communist in tendency and very anti-monarchist, however, the greater percentage of the men are not interested in politics. A political commission is attached to each brigade.
- b) Action Party formations:- Several are reported and are of good military value.
- c) Liberal, monarchist and Army groups:- also exist in FRIEDMONT. Led by ex-Army officers - their military value is normally high.
- d) BATTIGNA, Commander 2 GARIBOLDI DIV was publicly hanged in MORINO.

ALESSANDRIA PROVINCE :

Major MAURI, who was reported to be at the head of formations in CUNEO - see Report No 6 CUNEO Province - is now stated to command area bounded by the following points:- CANALE, MILESSIMO, TENDA PASS, COLLE DI LARCHE. Has under command a force of 10,000 men split into 5 Brigades in this area.

10 Partisan Div. Str. estimated 2400 mostly unarmed, is located N. of ALESSANDRIA.

16th GARIBOLDI BRIGADE, area N.W. of ACQUI 0-6281.

74th GARIBOLDI BRIGADE, area S. of ACQUI 0-6281.

MONTEMAGNO band of 600 men.

51st and 3rd GARIBOLDI BRIGADES under "MARZO" and "DAN".

ROMANUZZO band under LIBERO.

GIUSTIZIA & LIBERTÀ band under Capt. PAUSTO.

These forces occupy area bordered by the PIACENZA BOBBIO VOGHERA roads. Reported earlier during the month to be on the offensive against enemy forces.

PAVIA has town group of 400 men.

- 2 -

TORINO PROVINCE

Bands S.E. of TORINO and S.W. of ASTI are now banded into 9 CARIBALDI DIV commanded by NANINI.

3 GARIBALDI DIV comprises:-

42 GARI. Bde - strength	920 -	Commander NEGNI
17 " "	850 -	MARIO
41 " "	620 -	TACCINO

This Div. is located along main road W. of TORINO from S. GIORGIO H-6438 to RIVOLI H-3929 in the order N. to S. - 42 Bde, 17 Bde, 41 Bde.

VAL DI LANZO band - 700 men well armed under ARLANDO and BARACHINI, VORACNO area - H-3159.

MARZOTTI Brigade - 1000 men under MARCELLIN. No information as to arms. Split into small groups of 100-200 men between VAL DI SUSA H-5441 and VAL DI PO. Stated to be occupying heights only.

GIAVENO band, 1500 men (700 armed) under VIAN West of GIAVENO H-7728.

GARI Bde - 1000 men - no information as to arms under BARBATO and SALUZZO area Val FELICE H-504.

The MARZOTTI Brigade also known as the VAL CHISONE brigade commanded by MARCELLIN. Strength 700 men poorly armed.

GARI DIV, 1500 men, poorly armed area middle and lower VAL SUSA H-5441. Commanded by VALENTI.

VAL SANGONE bde 700 men, poorly armed, area CHISONE and Upper VAL SUSA H-5441, commanded by NICOLETTA.

STELLINA Bde, 300 men, poorly armed, area mountains near SUSA H-5441, commanded by LAGHI.

VAL DEL LANZO H-8953, and CANEVESANO, have now been reoccupied by Patriots.

This Div. is located along main road W. of TORINO from S. GIORGIO H-6430 to RIVOLI H-3929 in the order N. to E. - 42 Bde, 17 Dde, 41 Bde.

VAL DI LANZO band - 700 men well armed under ALCANTO and BARACHINI, VORACNO area - H-3159.

MARZOTTI Brigade - 1000 men under MARCELLIN. No information as to arms. Split into small groups of 100-200 men between VAL DI GUSA H-5441 and VAL DI PO. Stated to be occupying heights only.

GLAVENO band, 1500 men (700 armed) under VIAN West of GLAVENO H-7728.

GARI Bde - 1000 men - no information as to arms under BARBATO and SALUZZO area VAL PELLICE H-504.

The MARZOTTI Brigade also known as the VAL CHISONNE brigade commanded by MARCELLIN. Strength 700 men poorly armed.

GARI DIV, 1500 men, poorly armed, area middle and lower VAL GUSA H-5441. Commanded by VALERIO.

VAL SANCONE bde 700 men, poorly armed, area CHISONNE and Upper GUSA H-5441, commanded by NICOLETTA.

STELLINA Bde, 300 men, poorly armed, area mountains near GUSA H-5441, commanded by LACHI.

VAL DEI LANZO H-3953, and CANEVESSE, have now been reoccupied by Patriots.

CUNEO PROVINCE

6497

VAL PELLICE Bde, 400 men, arms and military value good, commanded by RENATO.

VAL GERMANASCA Bde, 400 men, arms poor, commanded by UCCIO.

VAL formation, 1200 men, area VAL VARAITA N-5573. No information as to arms.

- 3 -

VERCELLI PROVINCE :

5th GARI DIV., 3 Bdes 600-700 unarmed, area BIELLA J-3781, between GRESSENEY D-2106 and outskirts BIELLA with western limit SERJA, eastern limit SESSIA river. The leader and the political commission ITALO are Communists - considered unscrupulous (London report).

NOVARA PROVINCE :

OSSOLA reported liberated. Character and strength of formations not known. October report mentioned the OSSOLA DIV commanded by Major SUPERTI, 420 armed and 180 unarmed.

DISTRIBUTION

A.G. 5 Army	(1)
R.C. PIEMONTE	(2)
P.C.s PIEMONTE	(7)
N° 1 Special Tce	(2)
PWB	(2)
D.C. G.A.O.	(1)

NOVARA PROVINCE :

OSSOLA reported liberated. Character and strength of formations not known. October report mentioned the OSSOLA DIV commanded by Major SUPERTI, 420 armed and 160 unarmed.

DISTRIBUTION

ANG 5 Army	(1)
A.C. PIEMONTE	(2)
P.C.s PIEMONTE	(7)
N° 1 Special Tro	(2)
PWB	(2)
D.S.G.A.O. A.A.I.	(1)
G.O.C. N° 2 Dist.	(1)
<u>A.C.</u>	
Political Sect.	(2)
Civil Affairs Sect	(2)
P.R. Section	(3)
Patriot Branch HQ	(2)
File	(2)

6496

ALLIED COMMISSION
PATRIOT BRANCH
ADVANCE DETACHMENT.
AFO.394

SECRET

Ref: ACC/507/2/Pat

4 Nov 44.

To: Distribution Below.

Enclosed herewith Report No. 7 on Patriot activities in
PIEMONTE Region.

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B.L. DRAGE,
Major, R.A.S.C.

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B.L. DRAGE,
Major, R.A.S.C.

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G.O.C. No 2 Dist. (1)
A.C.
Political Sect. (2)
Civil Affairs (2)
P.R. Section (3)
Patriot Branch HQ (2)
File (2)

6495

SECRET

Ref: AGO/507/2/Pat

Nov 64.

Ref: Map Italy Rd. 1:200,000

PATRIOT ACTIVITIES IN PIEDMONT REGION
REPORT No 7 - LOCATIONS, STRENGTHS OF
PATRIOT BANDS

1. Source of information given below is from H.Q. A.A.I. and No 1 Special Force, and given positions as at end of October.

GENERAL :

- a) It is thought that the CARLALDI Formations are the strongest organisations in PIEDMONT. They are communist in tendency and very anti-monarchist, however, the greater percentage of the men are not interested in politics. A political commission is attached to each brigade.
- b) Action Party formations:- Several are reported and are of good military value.
- c) Liberal, monarchist and Army groups:- also exist in PIEDMONT. Led by ex-Army officers - their military value is normally high.
- d) BATTISTA, Commander 2 CARLALDI DIV was publicly hanged in TORINO.

ALESSANDRIA PROVINCE :

Major MAURI, who was reported to be at the head of formations in CUNEO - see Report No 6 CUNEO Province - is now stated to command area bounded by the following points:- CANALE, MELLESENO, TUNDA PASS, COLLE DI LARCHI. Has under command a force of 10,000 men split into 5 Brigades in this area.

10 Partisan Div. Str. estimated 2400 mostly unarmed, is located N. of ALESSANDRIA.

16th C...

1 Special force, and gives positions as at end of October.

GENERAL :

- a) It is thought that the GARIBOLDI Formations are the strongest organisations in FIEDMONT. They are communist in tendency and very anti-monarchist. However, the greater percentage of the men are not interested in politics. A political commission is attached to each brigade.
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- c) Liberal, monarchist and Army groups:- also exist in FIEDMONT. Led by ex-Army officers - their military value is normally high.
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16th GARIBOLDI BRIGADE, area N.W. of ACQUI 0-6281.

74th GARIBOLDI BRIGADE, area S. of ACQUI 0-6281.

MONTEBAGNO band of 600 men.

6494

51st and 3rd GARIBOLDI BRIGADES under "MARZO" and "DAN".

ROMAGNULO band under LIBERO.

GIUSTIZIA & LIBERTA band under Capt. PAUSTO.

These forces occupy area bordered by the PIACENZA BOBBIO VOGHERA roads. Reported earlier during the month to be on the offensive against enemy forces.

PAVIA has town group of 400 men.

- 2 -

TORINO PROVINCE

Bands S.E. of TORINO and S.W. of ASTI are now banded into 9 GARIBALDI DIV commanded by NANHI.

3 GARIBALDI DIV comprises:-

42 GARI. Bde	- strength	920	- Commander	NEGRE
17 "	"	850	"	MARIS
41 "	"	620	"	TASCINO

This Div. is located along main road W. of TORINO from S. GIORGIO H-6438 to RIVOLI H-3929 in the order N. to E. - 42 Bde, 17 Bde, 41 Bde.

VAL DI LANZO band - 700 men well armed under AMANDO and BARACHINI, VORAGNO area - H-6159.

MARZOTTI Brigade - 1000 men under MARCELLIN. No information as to arms. Split into small groups of 100-200 men between VAL DI SUSA H-5441 and VAL DI PO. Stated to be occupying heights only.

GIAVENO band, 1500 men (700 armed) under VIAN West of GIAVENO H-7728.

GARI Bde - 1000 men - no information as to arms under BARBATO and SALUZZO area Val PELLICE H-5504.

The MARZOTTI Brigade also known as the VAL CHISONI brigade commanded by MARCELLIN. Strength 700 men poorly armed.

GARI DIV, 1500 men, poorly armed, area middle and lower VAL SUSA H-5441. Commanded by VALERIO.

VAL SANGONE bde 700 men, poorly armed, area CHISONI and Upper SUSA H-5441, commanded by NICOLETTA.

STELLINA Bde, 300 men, poorly armed, area mountains near SUSA H-5441, commanded by LACHI.

VAL DEL LANZO H-3953, and CANEVESANO, have now been reoccupied by Patriots.

This Div. is located along main road W. of TORINO from S. GIORGIO H-6433 to RIVOLI H-3929 in the order E. to W. - 42 Bde, 17 Bde, 41 Bde.

VAL DI LANZO band - 700 men well armed under ALCANTO and BARA-CHINI, VORAGNO area - H-5159.

MARTELLI Brigade - 1000 men under MARCELLIN. No information as to arms. Split into small groups of 100-200 men between VAL DI SUSO H-5441 and VAL DI PO. Stated to be occupying heights only.

GIAVENO band, 1500 men (700 armed) under VIAN West of GIAVENO H-7726.

GARI Bde - 1000 men - no information as to arms under BARBATO and SALUZZO area Val PELLICE H-504.

The MARTELLI Brigade also known as the VAL CHISONE brigade commanded by MARCELLIN. Strength 700 men poorly armed.

GARI DIV, 1500 men, poorly armed area middle and lower VAL BUSO H-5441. Commanded by VALERIO.

VAL SANGONE bde 700 men, poorly armed, area CHISONE and Upper BUSO H-5441, commanded by NICOLETTA.

STELLINA Bde, 300 men, poorly armed, area mountains near BUSO H-5441, commanded by LACHI.

VAL DEI LANZO H-8953, and CANEVESANO, have now been reoccupied by Patriots.

CUNEO PROVINCE

6493
VAL PELLICE Bde, 400 men, arms and military value good, commanded by RENATO.

VAL GERMANASCA Bde, 400 men, arms poor, commanded by UCCIO.

VAL formation, 1200 men, area VAL VARETTA N-5573. No information as to arms.

VEROMIA PROVINCE :

5th GARI DIV., 3 Bdes 600-700 unarmed, area BIZIA J-3781, between ORSEBONEY D-2106 and outcrops BIZIA with western limit BIZIA, eastern limit BIZIA river. The leader and the political commission ITALO are Communists - considered unscrupulous (London report).

NOVARA PROVINCE :

OSOLA reported liberated. Character and strength of formations not known. October report mentioned the OSOLA DIV commanded by Major SUPERTI, 420 armed and 180 unarmed.

DISTRIBUTION

ANG 5 Army	(1)
R.C. PIEMONTE	(2)
P.C.s PIEMONTE	(7)
N° 1 Special For	(2)
PVB	(2)
D.C.C.A.O. A.A.I.	(1)
G.O.C. No 2 Dist.	(1)

0 5 3 5

OSSOLA reported liberated. Character and strength of formations not known. October report mentioned the OSSOLA DIV commanded by Major SUPRENTI, 420 armed and 180 unarmed.

DISTRIBUTION

- A.G. 5 Army (1)
- R.C. PIEMONTE (2)
- P.C.s PIEMONTE (7)
- No 1 Special For (2)
- PWB (2)
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- A.G.
- Political Sect. (2)
- Civil Affairs Sect (2)
- P.R. Section (3)
- Patriot Branch HQ (2)
- File (2)

6492

TOP SECRET

PWB ITHQ

P.N.

PLAN FOR

PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN TO NORTHERN ITALY.

Object:

To reduce to a minimum the calls upon Allied armies in Italy to maintain order in North-West Italy as soon as the Germans withdraw from it by preparatory propaganda directed at North-West Italy immediately.

Information:

There is the possibility of unrest in North-West Italy when the Germans withdraw, because of the factions between the various parties, who may be striving to gain predominance to take the responsibility of government in their own hands.

Of the five parties, the two strongest are the Communist and the Socialist. The indications are that they would not be likely to depart from the directives given them respectively by Togliatti, Communist Minister without portfolio, and Nenni, Secretary of the Socialist Party.

The people of North-West Italy as a whole are more developed politically and more capable of discipline than those of the south. This factor could work adversely or in our favour.

The present indications of rivalry would seem to be due to lack of confidence in the Italian Government in Rome, and to some extent in the intentions of the Allies.

This lack of confidence is due partly to lack of knowledge of what is happening in liberated Italy, increased by German and Fascist propaganda attacking the Italian Government and the Allied administration.

Plan:

To undertake a campaign of propaganda directed to North Italy generally, but in fact specifically aimed at North-West Italy, to build up the confidence in the Italian Government, emphasizing that it is a coalition government supported by all parties and emphasizing also

Information:

There is the possibility of unrest in North-West Italy when the Germans withdraw, because of the factions between the various parties, who may be striving to gain predominance to take the responsibility of government in their own hands.

Of the five parties, the two strongest are the Communist and the Socialist. The indications are that they would not be likely to depart from the directives given them respectively by Togliatti, Communist Minister without portfolio, and Nenni, Secretary of the Socialist party.

The people of North-West Italy as a whole are more developed politically and more capable of discipline than those of the south. This factor could work adversely or in our favour.

The present indications of rivalry would seem to be due to lack of confidence in the Italian Government in Rome, and to some extent in the intentions of the Allies.

This lack of confidence is due partly to lack of knowledge of what is happening in liberated Italy, increased by German and Fascist propaganda attacking the Italian Government and the Allied administration.

Plan:

To undertake a campaign of propaganda directed to North Italy generally, but in fact specifically aimed at North-West Italy, to build up the confidence in the Italian Government, emphasizing that it is a coalition government supported by all parties and emphasizing also the support given to it by the Allies.

Methods:

The methods at our disposal are

- (a) Leaflets
- (b) Radio
- (c) Agents

8491

(a) Leaflets will be dropped on the principal centres in the form of a newspaper published and edited by P.W.B. and containing articles by members of the Italian Government with news of their activities and those of A.M.C. and of the Allied Commission, together with general war news. This will be supplemented where necessary by leaflets in the name of the Commander-in-Chief A.A.I. giving instructions.

(b) Leaflets will be backed up by radio programmes from the B.B.C. and the new 20 kw. short wave transmitter from Rome which covers the whole of Northern Italy, giving talks by members of the Italian Government aimed specifically at Northern Italy and giving news of Italian Government and A.C. activities in liberated Italy.

(c) Agents. (a) and (b) will be supported by the activities of PWB Agents in the principal centres in N.W. Italy; who will also provide intelligence from their respective areas on which propaganda lines can be based.

Provisor:

This propaganda plan will not concern itself in any way with the activities of Italian patriots in the North. Propaganda to patriots will continue to be conducted independently through Italia Combattente radio programmes and leaflets.

31.10.44

Distribution.

A.A.I. Advance HQ. (5)
A.C. Brigadier Lust
Mr. Gascia
Mr. Schott
Major Fielder
Patriots Branch
Special Force (2)
No. 1 I.S.L.D.
PWB AFHQ (3)
PWB ITHQ (20)
Outposts (F.Y.I.)
5th and 8th Armies (F.Y.I.)

TOP SECRET

Copy No. ...

Ref: IS/16/35

30th October 1944.

To: Lt. Col. Shipp, A.O.C.
Major Page, I.S.I.D.
Major Sir P. Magnus, A.O.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

The attached report is a summary of the field traffic from our main British Mission in North East Italy. It is forwarded for your information.

Fuller
Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

V.P., C.A.S.

Passages underlined are of interest.

*P.D. Magnus*30 Oct 44 *Major*

TOP SECRET

REPORT FROM NORTH EAST ITALY

Dated 23rd October 1944

GARIBOLDI leaders returned from 9 Corps where they were received with open arms by Slovenes and by the Russian mission there. Meeting of all GARIBOLDI commanders and commissars has been called to study their future plans in the light of present military problems also as a result of the conference at 9 Corps.

Following political situation in partisan circles in this zone requires careful study. GARIBOLDI brigades are all sponsored by the communist party. They have always fought well and never avoided action or sabotage. Until recently the leaders in this zone have faithfully followed the direction of the COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE. Lately they have been considering the position when once the Allies arrive here. News from the South has convinced them that no efforts are being made to purge ex-Fascist and reactionary elements and in fact they are equally convinced that the Allies favour these elements rather than those who are determined to eradicate the old regime, and military cliques. They regard their participation in this war as a crusade against Fascism and its allies rather than an effort to liberate Italy for particular motives. News that partisans in zones occupied by the Allies had been disarmed and dissolved caused criticism and resentment. They expressed their determination to retain their arms and formations until they were satisfied that the intentions of the Allies towards those Italians holding responsible positions were consistent with their own ideas on the subject. So long as they operate as Italian partisans under directives of the COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE they realise that they must conform to the orders of the Allied Command when once in this zone. They therefore made an approach to the Slovenes with a view to being placed operationally under their command and thus in a position to accept orders only through TITO. Such a move was made without consulting our B.I.O. or the Regional Command of the COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE. It appears that Slovenes are fully agreeable to take them under their wing and no doubt Russian mission at 9 Corps supports such a move. The present conference of GARIBOLDI officers in this zone will decide whether or not to enter into this alliance. The OSOPRO forces, greatly reduced after recent offensive, will not consider participation and are representing independently of GARIBOLDI.

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These few decide the policy for all. In the probable event of an alliance with the Slovenes it is suggested that our mission should adopt the following policy. Our mission is concerned solely with sabotage, in all aspects, of enemy communications and war effort. We will therefore support all Italian partisans who are willing to dedicate themselves to this end.

This support will embrace material, clothes and arms necessary for sabotage. Instruction, directives and leadership are also available. Any other requirements of arms and ammunition for GARIBOLDI must come from Slovene sources. A merger with TITO's forces has as its object a guarantee of independence once the Allies arrive. Until then it is felt that we can continue to count on full support from GARIBOLDI in our sabotage programme. All the above serves to emphasise possible post-armistice difficulty in this zone where communist elements will find a helpful neighbour in Russian backed Slovenes.

There are increasing signs of Slovene aspirations towards North Eastern Italy. They are pushing their propaganda and recruitment by force into the zone as far west as TAGLIAMENTO. The population is certainly of mixed origin in the mountain areas between RONCO and TAGLIAMENTO but Slovene attitude is resented and feared. We can definitely say that west of 1914 frontier there is no sympathy for Slovenes and even elements of Slav origin turn to the Italians for protection.

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SECRET

Ref: LS/16/32

25th October 1944

To: Chief of Staff, A.C.C.
Col. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Regional Commissioner, (Piedmont), A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

The attached report is based on an interrogation of two delegates sent out by the TURIN Committee of Liberation in early October.


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Major, G.S.,
for Commander, RNVR.,
Comm. No. 1 Special Force.

SECRET


NORTH - WEST ITALY

1. A. CHAIN OF COMMAND (Political)



(---) means 'Courier'

B. CHAIN OF COMMAND (Military)



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2.

TURIN C.L.N.

Representatives of five parties:

Party	Representative	Age
Communist	Jaymonet	40
Socialist	Passoni Chiaromello	45 50
Liberal	Verzone	45
Azione	Greco	45
	Duccio Gallinelli Bianchi (Adv)	40

Definitely
Leftist
policy since
the Partito
Azione passed
to the Left.

Segretario Cassio
Comissario Bands
Autonome
Piemonte

(-----) means 'Courier'

B. CHAIN OF COMMAND (Military)

CLMVI → (CLMVI) -----> TURIN CLN
(Mil. Adv)
Gen. TRABUCCHI - Banda
cittadino
Gen. ALESSANDRI - Banda
Unificate
DUCCIO CALLINOTTI -
Banda T.L.

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Democ- ristiano :	Callinottti (Avv.) Garrullo	

Definitely
Leftist
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Azione passed
to the Left.

Owing to numerous arrests, the composition of the CLN varies from week to week. The members live in fear of the Gestapo and change meeting places often. In good weather they use the peripatetic methods under the trees of various avenues.

In rural areas, where the peasants are used to a semi-feudal state of life, influential landlords, lawyers, doctors or priests can approach 'peasants' with proposals of bringing two or three hundred votes against promises of personnel or local advantage.

B. All wing of parties among political-minded people is roughly as follows:

	<u>TURIN</u>	<u>CHAMBERSE</u>
Communist	50%	10%
Socialist	10%	8%
Liberal	30%	50%
Radical	10%	30%
Democratism	5%	12%

4.

POLITICS IN BONDS.

Two kinds of bonds must be distinguished:-

- (a) Those which started with a political leaning,
- (b) Those that required a political colour for reasons of convenience.

To the first group belong the GRUPPI DI AMICIZIA or LIBERTY factions. To the second, most of the "military" bonds. However, though, the leaders alone have definite political ideas. The ordinary participants join a particular faction because it is well organized, or happens to be nearest to their home, or is the first one they could surrender to. There are reasons to believe that after the German withdrawal the bonds will split into various opposing factions.

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Well aware of the fact, the Communists and Partito d'Azione leaders have appointed Political Commissioners to their bands. The other parties have not yet done so.

TURI bands have unofficial commissioners. He himself says he is non-political, but in reality he depends on the support given to him by the Liberals and in a lesser measure, by the Demo-Christians.

TURIN CLM has only nominal authority over bands, owing to

- (a) difficulty of functioning properly;
- (b) non-cooperation between parties;
- (c) difficulty of communication with bands;
- (d) incomprehension of local problems.

Even the Communists or the Azione people cannot boast of controlling their own partisans.

-----000-----

5.

LOCAL C.L.N.s

They are being created in all capitals of the old "circondati": ALBA, BRA, CEA, CUNEO, FOSSANO, MONTORI, PIEMONTE, SALUZZO. No members known to date as consultations are still in progress.

Each Committee will be of five members. Their duties will include compiling prescription lists, denouncing Fascists to the Partisans or setting as skeleton Administration after German withdrawal.

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6.

LABOUR ORGANISATIONS

(TURIN): None. After the 25th July 1943, however, COMMISSARI DI FABRICA were nominated as sorts of co-between Labour and Management. They were to organise factory masses.

In general no antagonism between workers and managements, especially in the smaller factories. Some of the bosses, however, are cordially hated as pro-Germans and

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CLERGY

Generally speaking, support the Partisans. Some priests openly live with them (without being suspended by authorities), others act as recruiting agents, unofficial chaplains, etc. Bishop of MONDOVI is favourable to the movement.

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ECONOMIC SITUATIONA. FOOD

Owing to great difficulties of transport, food is scarce in some areas and plentiful in others. The big towns are usually the worst off. The Alpine valleys are also short of supplies. But such areas as the CUMENSE or ASTIGIANO have nearly all the food they want.

- (a) for fats, such as oil which used to come from LIGURIA and now costs 1,000 - 2,000 lire per litre on black market, and butter, which used to come from the Alpine valleys and now costs about 300 to 400 lire on the black market.
- (b) for meat, which costs 150 - 200 lire a kilo. The reason is that the Germans have systematically requisitioned cattle and whatever herds remain cannot be scientifically bred any longer.

Some prices (black or open market).

Bread	- 25 lire per kilo	)	These prices are only for
Potatoes	- 15 " "	)	the CUMENO area, where cost
Cheese	- 250 " "	)	of living is about ten
Wine	- 40 " " litre	)	times higher than before
Eggs	- 150 lire per dozen	)	the Armistice. They fluctuate
		)	to an enormous extent from
		)	one area to another; a kilo
		)	of flour costs 5 lire in
		)	MONDOVI and 300 lire in GENOVA.

On the producers' side, difficulties are

- (a) scarcity of labour, because of call to arms, flight to Partisans or deportations to Germany;

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- (a) scarcity of labour, because of call to arms, flight to Partisans or deportations to Germany;
- (b) scarcity of fertilisers;
- (c) scarcity of selected seeds and selected breeds of cattle and poultry;
- (d) scarcity of fuel for tractors, thrashing machines, etc.;
- (e) requisitions by Germans and Fascists.

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B. CLOTHING

Old pre-war stocks have gradually come to the black market at high prices. The country folk, who barter food against cloth, have never been better dressed. The town people on the contrary can only buy what the peasants have to use for. So spindles, spinning wheels and hand-made frames and looms are the fashion. People have begun breeding Angora rabbits, or sheep, or silkworms in their backyards. But that is, of course, insufficient to meet all needs, especially as for as winter clothing is concerned.

Scarcity of all is foot wear. No new supplies are available; on the other hand the Germans and fascists have often requisitioned shoes and boots off the feet of the persons stopped for identity checks at the road blocks.

Prices : Light shoes - 1,000 - 2,000 lire
 Boots - 3,000 - 3,500 lire.

-----oOo-----

9.

CIRCULATION

- (a) RAILWAYS : The TURIN-VENTI MILIA line and the TURIN-SAVONA line work only as far as FOSSANO.
- (b) ROADS : Irreparable damage inflicted to the TURIN-CUNEO-COLLE DELLE MADDALENA road and the TURIN-MONDOVI-CEVA-SAVONA road. Besides in the MAURI area all the secondary network is practically destroyed.
- (c) MOTOR CARS : Nearly all requisitioned. No petrol. In Turin the Germans are using many electric cars. Some cars work on producer-gas plants. Tyres in worst possible conditions.
- (d) HORSE DRAWN VEHICLES : Practically all horses and pack-animals have been requisitioned.
- (e) BICYCLES : Most have been requisitioned, and the circulation is prohibited in many districts or TURIN and in all the plain.

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10.

SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES.

Roads are controlled by a system of fixed road blocks and flying squads. Control of documents is severe enough. Italian documents are practically valueless. German documents carry more weight. Lately, however, the police have shown a tendency to arrest people whatever documents they produce (and release them only after thorough investigation), if their behaviour looked in the least suspicious. Patriots therefore always attempt to avoid road-blocks. A special permit is necessary to travel by bicycle.

10. (Continued)

It is forbidden to walk with one's hands in one's pockets. Any person seen doing this is liable to be shot at sight.

In all towns and villages in the CUBO area two cards must be pinned on the door of every flat. On the first is a list of all regular tenants of the flat; on the second a list of temporary visitors. At the street door is a cumulative list. In TURIN, the porter has a list of all the tenants and visitors, and is held personally responsible for any name omitted.

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11.

COURIERS

Great use is made of women, who always have more chance of getting through. Other couriers are physicians or lawyers who can justify urgent professional need for their frequent journeys.

As trains have been suspended, and bicycles are liable to instant requisition, only practical way is using one of the very few motor cars left in circulation.

MAURI is in contact with TURIN C.L.N. through two couriers

(a) Prof. ROMA, Director of the "SANATRIZ" a TURIN clinic, and C.L.N. representative. Weekly trip - TURIN - MONDOVI.

(b) Avv. VERZONE (member of TURIN C.L.N.) who was arrested by Germans in April and let free in August. Frequent but irregular trips.

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12.

RELATIONS between BANDS and CIVILIAN POPULATION

A distinction must be made between areas firmly controlled by partisans and areas where hit-and-run tactics are applied. In the latter, partisans are being considered as a dangerous nuisance, but are also generally feared and respected.

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In areas such as MAURI-held CUNEISE, the population is all in favour of the Partisan movement. They are grateful to the Patriots for the security they bring to the area, and help them in every conceivable way.

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13.

RELATIONS BETWEEN BANDS and GERMANS

Wherever the Partisans are weak, they are treated like outlaws. In areas where they can hold their own, they are sometimes granted official GERMAN recognition.

In the MAURI area, the MONDOVI GERMAN commander had granted belligerent status to the bands. An agreement was made, according to which:

(a) were recognized as lawful actions:-

Armed attacks against barracks, storehouses, warehouses, GERMAN or FASCIST patrols, sabotage actions;

(b) were recognized as unlawful:-

Attacks against lone soldiers.

In the first case, the GERMANS took no hostages and did not carry out any reprisals against the civilian population. In the second case they did both.

Prisoners were treated fairly by both sides and often exchanged. Spies were shot without trial, also by both sides. In general, however, one may say that the GERMANS and the Partisans live in mutual terror of one another.

-----oo-----

14.

RELATIONS BETWEEN BANDS and FASCISTS

The TURIN CIN has issued a directive that should a member of the Italian Regular Army Force be captured, he must be treated as a prisoner of war.

That, however, does not apply to the members of the S.S., of the Brigade Nere, the S. Marco Battalion, the Monte Rosa Battalion, the Barbarigo Battalion, because they have distinguished themselves for inhuman cruelty.

-----oo-----

15.

RELATIONS of BANDS among THEMSELVES

Bands generally act independently, and their allegiance to Regional Commands is only theoretical.

At the moment, there exist some

6482

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-----COO-----

15.

RELATIONS of BANDS among THEMSELVES

Bands generally act independently, and their allegiance to Regional Commands is only theoretical.

At the moment, there exist some groups of bands, but even then the detachments enjoy great independence.

Bands of different political colour join readily enough against the common enemy, but are always ready for petty bickerings. In all cases, they slender each other with gusto.

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SECRET

PM

Copy No. 2

Ref: IS/16/31

25th October 1944

Subject: Report on PIEDMONT and LIGURIA

To: Chief of Staff, A.C.C.
Col. T. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
Regional Commissioner, (LIGURIA), A.C.C.
Regional Commissioner, (PIEDMONT), A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

1. Attached are extracts from a report submitted by a British Officer who recently spent some time in Southern Piedmont and Liguria.

2. The officer was not a B.L.C. and, as much of his information was collected, as he puts it, 'en passant', he confines himself to personal observations.

Truller

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.E.V.R.,
Comd. No. 1 Special Force.

6481

SECRET

EXTRACTS from GENERAL REPORT on PIEDMONT & LIGURIA

1. POPULATION IN GENERAL

(a) MORALE

As is to be expected the chief concern of the population is when the war will end. The Allied victories have heartened them considerably and the activities of the partisans in their immediate areas have done much to explode the "TEDESCHI" myth.

(b) ATTITUDE TO PARTISANS

They have no alternative but to support the partisans. All the same the population is wholeheartedly behind the movement. Even if it means the possibility of having their homes burned and their possessions looted. As most will say - "we are now free to talk and we get a fair share of what is going. Under the Fascists there was the Gestapo and no share and share alike." They readily help the partisans with all the food and information they have.

(c) ATTITUDE TO ALLIES

This can mostly be assessed from their treatment of ex-POWs and airmen who have 'baled out' in these areas. Most prisoners agree that the population in general has done as much for them as it can, giving lodging; clothing and food wherever possible and helping them to keep out of German and Fascist hands. B.L.O.s will I think agree that they are treated extremely well by all they meet. The people are generous and anxious to reply their earlier deeds as enemies. The B.B.C. news broadcasts are listened to regularly.

(d) ATTITUDE TO GERMANS and FASCISTS

Here there is nothing but hatred. Enemy propaganda is still good and a certain proportion still believe that the enemy may pull some last secret weapon out of his sleeve. Mussolini's speech threatening the use in October by the enemy of a deathray

As is to be expected the chief concern of the population is when the war will end. The Allied victories have heartened them considerably and the activities of the partisans in their immediate areas have done much to explode the "FREDSCHI" myth.

(b) ATTITUDE TO PARTISANS

They have no alternative but to support the partisans. All the same the population is wholeheartedly behind the movement. Even if it means the possibility of having their homes burned and their possessions looted. As most will say - "we are now free to talk and we get a fair share of what is going. Under the Fascists there was the Gestapo and no share and share alike." They readily help the partisans with all the food and information they have.

(c) ATTITUDE TO ALLIES

This can mostly be assessed from their treatment of ex-POWs and airmen who have 'baled out' in these areas. Most prisoners agree that the population in general has done as much for them as it can, giving lodging; clothing and food wherever possible and helping them to keep out of German and Fascist hands. B.L.O.s will I think agree that they are treated extremely well by all they meet. The people are generous and anxious to reply their earlier deeds as enemies. The B.B.C. news broadcasts are listened to regularly.

(d) ATTITUDE TO GERMANS AND FASCISTS

Here there is nothing but hatred. Enemy propaganda is still good and a certain proportion still believe that the enemy may pull some last secret weapon out of his sleeve. Mussolini's speech threatening the use in October by the enemy of a deathray which will immobilise Allied air and mechanised forces

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preys on the mind of the more simple sections of the community. The word "TERRORE" still arouses fear, but, in general, the average Italian is beginning to realize that it is only a matter of time before the enemy will have to pull out of these areas. From all aspects the future of the Fascist is hopeless. The trail of ruin the Republicans have left behind them will never be forgotten. The population hates them but with no vestige of the respect they still have for the German efficiency and fighting power. The Fascist is the Jackall and as such is loathed.

2. POLITICS

The people at the moment are not particularly interested in politics. They are apprehensive, of course, of what will happen after the war, but, as they have no means of assessing their future, they are occupying themselves with the usual questions of how soon the war will end, how much food they have and the chit chat of daily life. I doubt whether the peasants and village folk of this area ever were politically-minded to any large extent - the whole rise of Fascism seems to indicate political apathy on the part of the majority. There are no indications at the moment, as far as I have observed, that any actual general political movement is afoot. Among the two partisan groupings, Garibaldi on the one hand and Badogliani on the other, there is not much love lost, especially among the leaders, but among the rank and file there is no indication of any schism or uprising between these two groups. A Garibaldi partisan at FIENA told me that his brother was with MAURI. I asked whether it was because he was pro the Badogliani. The partisan was puzzled and then smiled saying: "No. He lives in that area and one band is as good as another provided they kill the enemy."

3. FOOD

In Piedmont food appears plentiful in the areas controlled by the partisans and here it is shared out on a communal basis by the head of the band. Reports indicated that in the larger towns, and TURIN especially, the position became really serious with the

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3. FOOD

In Piedmont food appears plentiful in the areas controlled by the partisans and here it is shared out on a communal basis by the head of the band. Reports indicated that in the larger towns, and TURIN especially, the position became really serious with the advent of winter.

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- 3 -

Black markets seem to be encouraged in the towns occupied by the enemy. The partisans raid these towns and the enemy supply routes for such commodities as salt, sugar, tobacco and wheat. For several weeks to come fruit will still be plentiful. At the British Liaison officer's H.Q. we were feeding extremely well with plenty of meat, pasta and eggs. The flour in this area is white.

In LIGURIA the position is totally different. Cut off from the fertile plains by the mountains, and with German forces along both the coast and the main supply roads, there are many shortages. At PIAGGIA and especially PIGNA the average daily diet of the Partisans and civilian population is a potato-soup-cum-stew, sometimes with a meat addition, approximately 300 grammes of brown wheat husk bread and fruit while the season lasts. Some persons have a little rice but there is no pasta asciuta. The little milk there is is reserved for children. There is no butter and a certain amount of goat's milk cheese. Honey is 280 lire the kilo and oil more valuable than money. Tobacco is virtually unobtainable. Children are the main source of worry to the population and partisans alike as they are definitely undernourished. VENTIMIGLIA's position is exaggerated by the shelling, thus disorganising distribution. By winter, if the Allies are not in possession of this area, the position will become serious.

4. MEDICAL SUPPLIES

The Piedmont area is again in a reasonably good position as parachute drops have contained good quantities of medical supplies including sulphanilamide and other of the rarer drugs. Bandages and gauze are short but the partisans reserve all parachutes for this purpose.

Shortages are more noticeable in LIGURIA for, apart from the question of the supply routes, no drops have been had by the Partisans. Concentrated foods are unobtainable together with bandages and many essential drugs, together with anaesthetics.

N.B. The Partisans in all these areas maintain small hospitals in the safe districts and

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5. CLOTHES

Clothes are obtainable but all woollens are 'ersatz' and give no wear. The partisans in their areas control the more essential items, such as warm coats, etc. Boots are also controlled in this manner and are obtainable only through Partisan controlled channels. Good boots of the ski type cost from 1200 - 2000 lire. Bootmakers are extremely clever in repairing and studding of boots.

6. SOAP

Extremely scarce and expensive and completely 'ersatz' when one can get it, mainly an abrasive such as sand or pumice.

7. FUEL

The country is well wooded everywhere so fuel is plentiful for domestic use.

8. TRANSPORT

In the Piedmont area the MAURI Division of the Badogliani have a certain amount of transport. In Liguria the Garibaldini have not more than half-a-dozen vehicles. There is little or no petrol, sometimes the partisans capture it from the Germans and Fascists. In the Garibaldini areas in Liguria there are about 100 mules in use. Mules in this area are valued at between 25,000-- 50,000 lire according to strength and training.

9. COMMUNICATIONS

In Piedmont certain secondary roads are controlled by the Partisans who seem to move reasonably freely in the CUNEO - MONDOVI - BOSSOLASCO areas. Multi tracks are known and patrolled by the Partisans and all travel is on foot. In Liguria roads suitable for M.T. in the PIGNA - TRIORA - COLLA LONGUN area are controlled by the 5th Brigade of the Garibaldini. In the road PIGNA - ISOLABONA - VENTIMIGLIA is cut below PIGNA by the Partisans. The enemy keeps the

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10; INDUSTRY

Little or no industry is continued in Western Piedmont or Liguria except a certain quantity of oil pressing and wine making.

11. GERMAN and FASCIST FORCES

Along the Franco-Italian frontier in Liguria the enemy is keeping what troops he has on the move to give the impression of greater strength than he actually has in the area. When he passed through VENTIMIGLIA it was estimated that he had no more than 200 troops in the town. These numbers vary from day to day and we reported latest information to American Task Force H.Q. in Nice. The enemy is short of transport and it is estimated that except for an occasional small convoy a negligible amount of M.T. passes through VENTIMIGLIA. No tanks have been observed on this front but a certain number of S.P. guns are in use. Against the partisans the usual weapons used by the enemy are M.G. 42s, 81 mm. mortars and occasionally light artillery. Only a small percentage of the Germans and Fascists are equipped with MGs. Morale is extremely low and desertions are daily occurrences.

There are a number of Ukrainians and Poles with the 5th Brigade and from reports they fight well It is definitely known that the German troops in this area are buying up civilian clothes presumably to aid desertion. German troops have also attempted to lure partisans into ambush by sending out Germans in partisan guise. Fascists have also employed this ruse with some results. Fascists are employed for the more sadistic work such as village burning. As at FIGMA the enemy is not over-anxious to press home the attack on the partisans and in this area is trying to keep his back door open for escape. The day before we left FIGMA a report arrived saying that the enemy was taking every available man in the area to mine roads and mountain tracks. In our march to the coast we saw much evidence - holes dug for mines in the tracks linking the casemates of the line of frontier fortifications through which we passed. It is obvious that the enemy is all set to pull out of this area.

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12. POSSIBILITIES OF SITUATION AFTER GERMAN WITHDRAWAL.

(a) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

From discussions with various civilians and partisans there seems to be the belief that whatever the Italians themselves wish to do the Allies will establish a Government to fit in with their General European policy following the peace. Many have a faith that this will happen and say that after all Italy relies on her neighbours and if they are in line then Italy must be too. Most agree that the differences of political point of view between the various groups of partisan bands will only come into the open when the peace comes but it all depends upon the Allies and what they do - all is conjecture. If there is any solid plan it is not known or spoken of by the majority of partisans and civilians. Everywhere one goes one is asked the same question: "What will the Allies do with us?" and "Poor Italy is in a bad position. We are poor and our industries are no more; we will need much help." Many ask whether emigration to the Americas or Dominions will be allowed to the Italians. No one that I met was optimistic of the future of Italy after the war, but place an almost childish belief in what the Allied Armies will do in the immediate future after the liberation of those areas at present in German hands.

(b) PARTISAN INTENTIONS

Again I have heard no definite plan except that of making sure that no Fascists remain after the Allied liberation of the territory. When there was mention of arms having to be collected, many understood, as it was realised that it was impractical to allow indiscriminate armed bands to roam the countryside once it was in Allied hands. Most affirm that they would only hand over arms to the Allies NOT TO THE CARABINIERI.

The above are only impressions - it would require a trained political observer to begin to assess the possibilities as a whole of the situation

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13. FASCIST INTENTIONS

Many Republicans when captured reiterate the

- 7 -

maxims poured out by the Fascist Radio - all realise that they will receive short shift from the partisans. In most cases the Republican stick firmly with the German forces and move when they move. A number have deserted to the Partisans, but in the main they will await the arrival of the Allies where they feel they will have more chance of getting off with their lives. The Germans must have much difficulty with the families of the Fascists who, when the Germans withdraw, will want to move with them. News that the Germans were moving with Fascist families from TURIN to VENICE came through when we were in Piedmont - this may only be a rumour.

14. IMPORTANCE OF PARTISAN BANDS in the GENERAL SCHEME of THINGS

The obvious observation that comes to the mind is that with good direction, liaison and co-ordination these bands could materially help the Allied advance in the first part and in the subsequent period of occupation. With the Garibaldi in Liguria one sees the effect of ignorance of any Allied plan in the area upon the population as a whole. Here direction and specific propaganda would dispel many of the illusions regarding Allied strength and intentions - the food shortage and apparent inability of the Allies to liberate the area round VENTIMIGLIA (held only by a skeleton force) does undoubtedly dampen the morale of partisans and civilians alike. Even a radio link with the Allies would work wonders in the effectiveness of the bands in this area. The results achieved in Piedmont are, I am sure, in no small way due to the B.I.C. and the partisans morale and activities are boosted by the fact that they know that news of their achievements is reported to the advancing Allied Armies.

15. PROPAGANDA

In PIGNA we heard an announcement on the B.B.C. that British troops were within six miles of TURIN. This, together with the earlier announcement of the capture of VENTIMIGLIA caused considerable depression among the population - possibly this news emanated from enemy sources - if so the news was a deliberate attempt to demoralise the population.

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fake. Many of the partisans who had gone down to VENTIMIGLIA narrowly avoided capture and affirmed that the Allies had given out the news to find out information from the Germans at the expense of the partisans. This sort of thing is difficult to explain away. Many partisans ask if it is not possible on the Italian news to give fuller information re the Italian front. All news bulletins on partisan activities are eagerly listened to.

FILMS

Many of the small towns have projections and a cinema - Allied propaganda films could be shown with great effect.

Matches and cigarette papers are very scarce and the type used by the Americans in North Africa would serve as excellent propaganda and be circulated immediately.

WEATHER

PIEDMONT

Normally there is no snow in the plains round CUNEO - MONDOVI. Villages in the foot hills of the Alpes Maritimes such as PREA - BARACCA, etc. are snowed in and in peace time the valleys of VALPAISIO - VAL MILERO - VAL CORSAIGLIA (the area of the 3rd Alpine Division of the Badogliani) were minor winter sports resorts.

LIGURIA

Mountains such as Monte Collardente and Pietracchia will be snow covered but villages such as PIGNA, ISOLABONA and ROCCETTA will be free from snow. Snow, if it does fall here, will not lie.

PARTISAN DRESS

The most popular uniforms are those made from

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PARTISAN DRESS

The most popular uniforms are those made from camouflaged Italian ground sheets and are cut on ski-suit lines. Magazines for automatic arms are

carried vertically on the chest in a canvas compartmented pocket. Caps in the same material and cut on the pattern of the Italian peaked cap used in Africa and much worn.

SPIES

Fascists in partisan and civilian dress are known to abound. Women suspected of spying for the fascists are shaved by the partisans, if found guilty are shot. The partisans usually know the areas where the population (if any) is pro-Fascist. Here movement is made at night and all contact with the population avoided.

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SECRET

Copy No. 1.....5

Ref: IS/14/17

16th October 1944

Subject: Report from the field
-----To: Colonel McCarthy, Patriots' Branch.
Lt. Colonel Shipp, Chief of Staff Sec.,
Regional Commissioner, Piedmont.
Regional Commissioner, Liguria.From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

Attached report was written by the
Second-in-Command of the British Mission
operating in the area East of CUNEO in
PIEDMONT.

This officer was exfiltrated early
in October.

Fulmer

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

V.P. Cas

I agree
grain

2843

This is one of the best reports I have yet
read. To me it underlines the difficulty we are all going to
have in disbanding the Patriots with a quick word of ~~Secret~~. They
are getting increasingly unwilling to be disbanded. Cdr 18/x

2th October 1944

RELATIONS AND GENERAL

The attitude is on excellent terms with the Partisans. They appreciate the presence of British personnel and the assistance given them. The Partisans are always ready to take advice and grateful for encouragement or acknowledgment of their work and will obey British orders and directives. The Partisans are quite frank and open with the British on all matters, including politics, and provided us with daily situation reports covering all their work.

The Partisans to whom the Mission were attached are the BALUCHIYANI or Military Party taking their directives from "the General", who is a member of the TUNIX Committee. In fact the directives are few and far between, and to all intents and purposes the Commander of each Partisan Division is supreme commander of his area for all purposes. Directly through the Partisans it would be easy for the British to take complete administrative control of the area on evacuation of the enemy.

ORGANISATION, etc.

The BALUCHIYANI with whom we were working were organized in two divisions based on mountain areas:

(i) Major SAUNDI's Division (LACHHE Division) was based in the hills called the LACHHE, to the North West of MOWAVI, the H.Q. being at MARSAGLIA near MURAGALGO. The area controlled by Partisans stretched North from this point to MOWAVI and DIAGO, West to CORTHILLIA and South to SAUNDI; on the West it was bounded by the plains. This area is not by any means impenetrable to the enemy, but in passing they must come in force and are always liable to be attacked.

(ii) The 3rd ALPINE Division (Capt. COBA). This Division is situated in the mountains South of MOWAVI in three valleys: VAL DIAGO - VAL MARSAG (Div. H.Q.) - VAL CORTHILLIA. The area is definitely a free area in these valleys and on the mountains between, and it is very doubtful if the enemy would penetrate the area without considerable force.

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ORGANIZATION, etc.

The MADONIANI with whom we were working were organized in two divisions based on mountain areas:

(i) Major MAORI's Division (LANGHE Division) was based in the hills called the LANGHE, to the North West of MONDOVI, the H.Q. being at MARSALEA near TURIN. The area controlled by Partisans stretched North from this point to MONTEBELLUNA and DIANO, west to CORTINA and south to PRINCE. On the east it was bounded by the plains. This area is not by any means impenetrable to the enemy, but in passing they must come in force and are always liable to be attacked.

(ii) The 3rd ALPINE Division (Capt. COSSA). This Division is situated in the mountains South of MONDOVI in three valleys: VAL D'AGNO - VAL D'ALBA (Div. H.Q.) - VAL CASSALE. The area is definitely a free area in these valleys and on the mountains between, and it is very difficult if the enemy would penetrate the area without considerable force.

STRENGTHS and EQUIPMENT

The LANGHE Division is estimated at about 3,000 armed men, and the ALPINE at about 1,200 armed men. They are armed with a few MAG's (of all patterns, chiefly BRERA), STEN guns and rifles.

Recently they have received in drops some anti-aircraft guns which are very well received. There are no heavy arms, mortars, AT guns or artillery. The LANGHE Division is better armed and equipped than the 3rd ALPINE.

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WORK, MORALE, etc.

The morale of the Partisans is excellent. The Italians are particularly suited to this flamboyant type of work. They have great ingenuity and are very keen. They do not need encouragement to carry out demolitions.

On a separate report will be seen the actual demolitions carried out by these Divisions. The 3rd ALPINE has done particularly meritorious work in road and railway destruction.

The Partisans do not carry out attacks on enemy formations and personnel to any large extent. This is partly due to reprisals which render it costly in goodwill of civilian population, but also due to lack of desire for direct action. On account of lack of enemy troops to guard communications, the Partisans can usually carry out their demolitions without contact with the enemy.

On the other hand, if the enemy comes into Partisan held country, the Partisans will fight if they consider they can hold, thereby safeguarding the civilian population.

The Partisans should be encouraged by broadcast to mine all roads and attack German convoys and troops on the move. There are tremendous possibilities in this type of work but as yet the Partisans have not achieved much.

CHARACTER, etc.

The Partisans as a whole are much as is to be expected. They are fighting largely for selfish interests in that it is far easier, safer and more comfortable to live as a Partisan than in the towns under GERMAN surveillance and in constant danger of deportation to the SSIC. On the other hand, they loathe the Germans, and, more so, the Fascists, and want to clear them out of the country. In the whole, the officers with the REPUBLICAN Partisans are good. They take their job seriously and are not politically minded. It would be stupid to say they have NO politics, but the trend is merely towards a military control by themselves and the Partisans, with no

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The Partisans should be encouraged by broadcast to mine all roads and attack German convoys and troops on the move. There are tremendous possibilities in this type of work but as yet the Partisans have not achieved much.

CHARACTER, etc.

The Partisans as a whole are much as is to be expected. They are fighting largely for selfish interests in that it is far easier, safer and more comfortable to live as a Partisan than in the towns under GERMAN surveillance and in constant danger of deportation to the Reich. On the other hand, they loathe the Germans, and, more so, the fascists, and want to clear them out of the country. On the whole, the officers with the RASCHLITANI Partisans are good. They take their job seriously and are not politically minded. It would be stupid to say they have no politics, but the trend is hardly towards a military control by themselves and the Partisans, with no radical change until after the war. They are firmly anti-Communist. The RASCHLITANI group are undoubtedly the only people now who could take over the RASCHLITANI area on evacuation of the enemy and run it with some semblance of organization.

TURIN

In TURIN the committee is a rather uncertain factor.

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it has very little control over the work of the Partisans outside and only serves them as an information service and liaison with the Allies. The CHIEF, who, as a member of both Military and Political Committees, represents the Military body (RABOTNIK), is trying hard to obtain command of the whole Committee. His representative put out very strong feelings in an interview with us towards this end.

The other Military parties, the Communists (GARIBOLDINI) and "Giustizia e Libertà", seem to keep firmly separate.

ORGANIZATION IN TURIN

There appears to be only a very small force available in TURIN, due to lack of arms, inclination and opportunity to organize a force. The city is divided up into six zones. Each zone is subdivided into squads. Each squad has its designated job on evacuation of the enemy, and order for action, but at the moment they could not possibly fulfill it. Political differences will also hinder any proposed action. It is essential at the moment to supply arms on a large scale to TURIN. For this purpose dropping grounds have already been submitted. It is also highly desirable that a British officer arrives in TURIN soon to settle political differences and insist on organization and action at once. The representative was very vague about the arrangements made for taking over civil services after the German evacuation: it appeared that those matters had in no way been taken in hand.

The COMMUNISTS (GARIBOLDINI)

In PIEDMONT, south of TURIN, there is a powerful group of GARIBOLDINI in the LANGHE area. This group is the 9th GARIBOLDINI Division and consists of three Brigades, the 16th, 18th, and 48th, with B.A.'s at PRUNETTO north east of MONSIEGLIO, at BOSSO-LANCIO and at MONFALCONE respectively. The strength of the whole Division is about 1,500 - 2,000 armed men and innumerable possible recruits as yet unannounced. The Commander is called NANNI, an excellent type, young, and a scholar. He is very efficient and highly respected by his men.

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ORGANIZATION IN TURIN

There appears to be only a very small force available in TURIN, due to lack of arms, inclination and opportunity to organize a force. The city is divided up into six zones. Each zone is subdivided into squares. Each square has its designated job on evacuation of the enemy, and order for action, but at the moment they could not possibly fulfill it. Political differences will also hinder any proposed action. It is essential at the moment to supply arms on a large scale to TURIN. For this purpose dropping grounds have already been submitted. It is also highly desirable that a British officer arrives in TURIN soon to settle political differences and insist on organization and action at once. The representative was very vague about the arrangements made for taking over civil services after the German evacuation: it appeared that those matters had in no way been taken in hand.

THE COMMUNISTS (GARIBOLDINI)

In PIEMONTE, south of TURIN, there is a powerful group of GARIBOLDINI in the LANGHE area. This group is the 9th GARIBOLDINI Division and consists of three Brigades, the 16th, 15th, and 48th, with H.Q.'s at PRUNETTO north east of MONSIELO, at BASSO-LABCO and at MONFORTE respectively. The strength of the whole Division is about 1,500 - 2,000 armed men and innumerable possible recruits as yet unsummoned. The Commander is called NANNI, an excellent type, young, and a scholar. He is very efficient and highly respected by his men. This division has a high proportion of FRENCH personnel and is very aggressive. I landed with one of their units and the following day saw them in action against the enemy. This group is by no means all Communists. The leaders are Communists and they have Political Commissars - also Communists. Of the rank and file, about 50% are Communists. Apart from the leader, NANNI, and the French officers, I was not impressed by the other officers.

LIGURIA

In LIGURIA the only partisan band in force is the GARIBOLDINI band of CURTO. This band is the 2nd GARIBOLDINI Division with H.Q. at PIAGLIA. They control officially an area west to the French frontier, south to the sea, north till they meet the BADOGLIARI in the high Maritime Alps and west to the SACRIGNO IMPERIA road. In fact they do not cover this area, and are based on and control about three small towns: e.g. PIAGLIA, TIGRA, PIGNA. Their strength may be estimated at about 800 - 1,000 armed men, and again large numbers of unarmed "intellectuals" who hang around PIAGLIA in keen competition to grow the longest and most desirable head of hair. Their organization is very bad and CURTO struck me as a very decadent type, possibly an idealist but certainly no soldier. This band's activities have been limited to occasional raids on the coastal towns for arms and supplies, and denying of the inland routes to their H.Q.s. On the otherhand, the NAZZI organization carried out considerable demolitions and sabotage in their area.

ARMY

Enemy situations will be covered by Italian 'Servizio X' Reports brought with me, except for the situation on the frontier with France. This has already been reported in full to the American General Staff at MICH, so is only briefly dealt with here. On the frontier between SACRIGNO and VENTIMIGLIA the line is held by enemy artillery, their 0.7.s and 88s. As such, there is no infantry. The infantry of the 34th Division has left the area and returned to CUNEO. Along the coast from VENTIMIGLIA to SAVONA, the Germans are withdrawing and handing over to FASCIST troops. Eastwards from the CUNEO - VENTIMIGLIA road there are prepared defensive positions on each successive mountain ridge. These are very strongly fortified and could be defended by a small force. The Germans, however, do not apparently intend to take advantage of their positions and they are now unoccupied; this is probably due to the absence of infantry. To the North of SACRIGNO on the frontier, the Americans told me they were meeting fierce opposition and artillery bombardment. In general, it appears that the Germans are pulling out from the frontline area. They are aware that the Americans are holding a concealed defensive position along the frontier.

strength may be estimated at about 200 - 1,000 armed men, and again large numbers of unarmed "intellectuals" who hang around MACULIA in keen competition to grow the longest and most desirable head of hair. Their organization is very bad and CURTO struck me as a very decadent type, possibly an idealist but certainly no soldier. This band's activities have been limited to occasional raids on the coastal towns for arms and supplies, and denying of the inland routes to their F.I.S. On the otherhand, the HAMMI organization carried out considerable demolitions and sabotage in their area.

SURETY

Enemy situations will be covered by Italian 'Servizio X'. Reports brought with me, except for the situation on the frontier with France. This has already been reported in full to the American General Staff at MICE, so is only briefly dealt with here. On the frontier between SACRODNO and VENTIMIGLIA the line is held by enemy artillery, their P.A.s and MGs. As such, there is no infantry. The infantry of the 34th Division has left the area and returned to CURTO. Along the coast from VENTIMIGLIA to SAVONA, the Germans are withdrawing and handing over to FASCIST troops. Eastwards from the CURTO - VENTIMIGLIA road there are prepared defensive positions on each successive mountain ridge. These are very strongly fortified and could be defended by a small force. The Germans, however, do not apparently intend to take advantage of their positions and they are now unoccupied: this is probably due to the absence of infantry. To the North of SACRODNO on the frontier, the Americans told me they were meeting fierce opposition and artillery bombardment. In general, it appears that the Germans are pulling out from the frontline area. They are aware that the Americans are holding a purely defensive position along the frontier and, while German convoys carrying troops and artillery return via CURTO to the North, only supplies and ammunition go South to the front. When the Americans first reached NENTON, the enemy were quite prepared to retire to West of ALBONCA.

REPUBLICANI

The "Repubblicani", as the Fascists are called,

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are organized, fed, paid and equipped by the Germans. They are partly volunteers, partly conscripts, and have exceedingly low morale. Apart from the SAN MARCO and MONTE ROSA Divisions operating near GENOA, there are detachments in TURIN (about 10,000), 5,000 armed, with one Mechanized Brigade), CUNEO, MONDOVI and other towns. They are used by the Germans to guard lines of communication and base areas, and also to search for and attack Partisans. As the Partisans have always openly adopted the policy of executing without exception all "Repubblicani" captured, the "Repubblicani" will on no account surrender to the Partisans. This will produce a difficult situation when the Germans leave the area, as the "Repubblicani" will undoubtedly not surrender to the Partisans and will hold out in the towns until, as they hope, an Allied Force arrives to which they can safely surrender.

At present Partisans in the towns are not sufficiently strong to defeat the "Repubblicani", and all the Partisan forces, irrespective of party, will have to be called in to dislodge the "Repubblicani" from their stronghold. This will presumably need some coordinating H.Q., and must be done by the British, as the Italians would at present be incapable of organizing it.

MOVEMENT

Movement in the mountains is quite unhindered by the enemy. It is in very few cases by car on mountain roads, more usually by foot and mule. Mules are not very plentiful, but sufficient to carry essential Mission stores can always be obtained. Personnel must travel on foot. Horses are not available, and impracticable. In the plain, movement is possible by car only. The Partisans have M.T. but insufficient petrol. Cars travelling in the plains move in small highly armed convoys and travel fast. The plains are of course controlled by the enemy, but movement is possible by travelling on secondary roads. Recently movement has been restricted by the very extensive demolitions by Partisans.

GENERAL POINTS

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GENERAL POINTS

(1) Political

At present the political situation is not dangerous. There is ill-feeling among the two main parties, but as yet no action. With

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firm Allied control, there is no reason why any disension should arise. The RABOGLIANI continually accuse the GARIBOLDINI of organising large-scale underground movements with hidden arms, ready to arise at any given moment, and take supreme Communist control. This is exaggerated but not without basis. The Communists are jealous of the British support of the RABOGLIANI and accuse them of only half-resisting the enemy.

(ii) Civil

The population are pro-Allied in feeling but indifferent in action; they will help the Partisans but not at risk to themselves. They are apathetic and would be quite ready to accept Partisan administrative control. They would welcome any Allied influence.

(iii) Food and Supplies

A separate report has been sent in by the Italian Command on this subject. In all country districts and small towns the situation is good enough. In the larger towns such as TURIN and GENOA some organisation must be made for the winter months.

At present the partisans live exceedingly well. They requisition, but pay for, all necessary products, but do not cause the civilian population shortage or hardship.

(iv) Medical Supplies

These are short, particularly bandages, gauze, etc. Drugs are fairly plentiful, and drugs such as penicillin can still be purchased freely.

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Patriots Branch Adv. Det.,
H.Q. Allied Control Commission,
C.M.F.

Ref: A30/507/2/Pat

17 Oct 44.

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Enclosed herewith Report No: 6 on Patriot Activities
in PIEDMONTE Region.

Major R.A.S.O.

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PATRIOT ACTIVITIES IN PIEDMONT REGION
REPORT NO 6 LOCATIONS AND SIZE OF
PATRIOT BANDS

1. Part II of Report No 1 should now be amended according to information given below. This information which comes from AMI is reliable and gives position as at end of Sept. Para 4 of Part I, Report No 1 regarding the use of the terms "Brigade" and "Division" should be amended. Patriot "Brigades" and "Divisions" while varying greatly in numbers and efficiency are effective as military formations in as much as the HQ's are in contact with, and control the bands under them.

The most important concentrations of Patriot Bands and of arms are in Aosta Province, in the VAL D'AOSTA and tributary valleys. Next in importance are Turin, Cuneo and Novara Provinces. In Vercelli, Asti and Alessandria Provinces there are very few Patriot bands.

2. CUNEO PROVINCE

All the Patriot Bands and formations in Cuneo Province are nominally under the leadership of a "Major MAURI" who is in contact with No 1 Special Force Missions. For further information regarding this personality see Muster Sitrep.

Scattered throughout the mountainous areas of the Province are the Alpini Divs. These originated in Italian Army Alpini soldiers who took to the hills in Sept '43 under their own officers. Although the individual bands are widely separated they still maintain their identity with the Divs. Politically they are probably the least communist in sympathies. Locations are as follows:-

3 Alpini Div. Str estimated at 1500. No information as to arms. Commander "Capt COSSA". Elements at:- FRABOSA Sh 10 C 0742, MONTALBO C 1145, VILLANOVA C 0448, ARDONNO N 7745, (300 men) DEMONTE N 6747 (300 men) MOLLETTES N 5531, Cma di PRIMA CAVA N 6704.

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Scattered throughout the mountainous areas of the Province are the Alpini Divs. These originated in Italian Army Alpine soldiers who took to the hills in Sept '43 under their own officers. Although the individual bands are widely separated they still maintain their identity with the Divs. Politically they are probably the least communist in sympathies. Locations are as follows:-

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4 Alpini Div. Str 1500 are on the hill ground West of the rd BAGNASCO O 2542 - ORREA O 1425.

2 Alpini Div. consists of two detachments one 900 strong in the mountainous country between the T. VALLETTA and the Upper PO valley, approx area SALTFRONT Sh 7 N 7085 - West of SALUZZO N 8483 - north of COCCIGLIONE N 8374 - North of SAUPEYRE N 6077

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and the other 700 strong, in the mountainous area between the VAL MAIRA and the VAL GRANA, extending as far East as MONTAIGL, SH 10, N 7460.

There is a further concentration, apparently in the area of the Alpini known as Gruppo Leo, strength 1200, in a much smaller area on either side of the upper Vne. dell'Adda in sq N 55.

The Val di Stura Band, described as well armed, is around ARGENTERA N 3858. Str is 500. This also is probably independent.

The Langhe (Garibaldi) Div is in the Langhe mountains in approx. area bounded by NARCOLE Sh 7 O 1475 - CASNIGLIONE O 2277 - thence East of RA MONTELUPO D'ALBESSE O 2776 - MONTBARGARO Sh 10 O 3058 - MONTESINA O 2655 - CARRU O 1462. Elements of this Div are 16 Gar. Bde. around CISSONE Sh 7 O 2570 leader " SERGIO" and a group of 2000 Patriots directly under " Major LAURI" around BIVIGGERA, Sh 10, O 2263. There is a further group of 800 around MONCHIERO Sh 7 O 1772.

The Welle band, leader " Steve" Str 300 is around Mte S. BERNABO N 7268. This is same area as the detachment of 900 of 2 Alpini Div - see above, but the band is probably independent of the Alpini.

There is a Giustizia e Libertà (Action Party) Bde in the approx area VALDIERE N 7444 - south of ROCCAVIONE N 8466 - mountains West of RA ROCCAVIONE - TONDA N 8920. Leaders are " Capt AZEPTO" and Capt OLTT" Numbers are approx 1200 and the Bde is estimated to have that number of light arms.

3. TURIN PROVINCE

Patriot Bands in Turin Province are now reported to be less numerous than was indicated in Report No 1. In addition, owing to mopping up operations the tendency has been for larger Patriot Formations which had been formed, to break up into their component bands, and generally for formations to become smaller or to retire further into the mountains. This has been the case in the area West of Turin, in the Val Susa, Val Grana and Val Pellice.

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Elements of a Matteotti Bde now rather widely dispersed; are in the Val Susa, Val Chisone and Val Pellice. Leader is "MARCUCCINI" who also controls several bands directly. Bands and locations are as follows:-

General area MINEROLO Sh 7 H 731. Part of Matteotti Bde.

Leader "CONSTANTINO" Str 100.

Agrognic Band, leader Lt. "VIALAN" Str no known.

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General area IUSTINA H 6604. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "ROMANERO" Str 200. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "RUBINELLI" Str 100.

In same area, but independent of Matteotti Bde. is 4 Garibaldi Bde. Leaders "Maj BARBETTO" and "SALUZZO" Str 100.

General area GIÀVENO H 7826. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "NICOLETTO" Str 3 - 400. A "Marcellini" Band Str 30 is at CULIANA H 7822.

A Band, leader "VIAN" Str 1500 of which 700 are armed is around TARNO H 6925. This is probably independent of the Matteotti Bde.

General area PEROSA H 6520. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "MARCELLINI" Str 150 of which 40 armed. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "TRICO" Str 50.

A further "Marcellini" Band Str 200 is around M. MALANOT H 4548 in the Upper VAL SUSA.

A Band led by "ANDERA" and "BABBACANI" Str 700 all armed is at TORNO H 7065 in the Upper Val GRANDE.

General area CARMAGNOLA J 0514 South of TURIN in the TO Valley there is a nucleus of bands controlled by "Maj MAURI" (see CUNEO Province above)

MAURI I Band. Leader "FRANCO SERIA" Str 660

CAMILLE Band. Leader "MAURI" Str 1400 is at CANALE O 2520

MAURI II Band, Leader "NANDI" Str 200 is at MONTA O 2498.

Bands are also at TROPARELLO J 0520 Str 300 and at COCONATO J 3229 Str 150.

In TURIN itself there are reported to be 10,000 Partisans under Gen. TRABUCCI (see Muster Sitreps particulars this

CULIANA H 7822.

A Band, leader "VIAN" Str 1500 of which 700 are armed is around TARNO H 6923. This probably independent of the Matteotti Bde.

General area PIROJA H 6520. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "MARCELLINI" Str 150 of which 40 armed. Part of Matteotti Bde. Leader "TRICO" Str 50.

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CARMAGNOLA J 0514.

CANALE Band. Leader "MAURI" Str 1400 is at CANALE C 2523.
MAURI II Band, Leader "NANDI" Str 200 is at MONTE C 2493.

Bands are also at THOTARELLO J C520 Str 300 and at COCCONATO J 3229 Str 150.

In TURIN itself there are reported to be 10,000 Patriots under Gen. TRABUCCI (see Kuster Sitreps particulars this Personality). They are, however, poorly armed and probably somewhat loosely organized in GAP's.

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4. AOSTA PROVINCE

The bands in this province are well armed and organised, many of them having BIO's with them, and being in W/T communication with allied HQ. The most prominent leader in the VAL D'AOSTA is "Mezzard" who has considerable control over the bands in the area other than his own. Here as elsewhere the bands are at present nearly all in the mountains, but when the German withdrawal takes place they may be expected to occupy the nearest towns.

Western VAL D'AOSTA (North of R DORA BALTEA)

In the Comba di VERTOSAN sq 60 there are the following bands:- Comba di Vertosan Band, leader " Bert" Str 260 arms 100 Carbines.

M. Fallere Band, leader " Maurice" Str 300 arms 10 MG 100 Carbines. There are a further 700 Patriots organised in several bands in this area about which there are no particulars. They are well armed.

South of R DORA BALTEA - Rhemes Notre Dame Band, leader "Francois" Str 40, arms Carbines, is in the Val di RHEMES.

Valsavranche Band, leader " Pallino" Str 50 arms 50 Carbines, is in the VALSAVRANCHE.

Cogne Band; leader " Vico" Str 100, arms 10 MG, 100 Carbines; is in the Val di COENE.

Central VAL D'AOSTA (North of R DORA BALTEA)

Dorabal Tea Band, leader " Memard" Str 1,237, arms 100 MMG and 120 LMH, Carbines, Rifles etc. is between the VALPELLINE and the VALTOURNANCHE sqs. C 80, 90, '81, 91.

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South of R DORA BALTEA - Rhemes Notre Dame Band, leader "Francois" Str 40, arms Carbines, is in the Val di RHEMES.

Valsavranche Band, leader " Pallino" Str 50 arms 50 Carbines, is in the VALSAVRANCHE.

Cogne Band; leader " Vico" Str 100, arms 10 MG, 100 Carbines; is in the Val di COGNE.

Central VAL D'AOSTA (North of R DORA BALTEA)

Dorabel Tea Band, leader " Memard" Str 1,237, arms 100 MMG and 120 LMH, Carbines, Rifles etc. is between the VALPELLINE and the VALTOURNANCHE sqs. C 80, 90, 81, 91.

Quarto Band, leader " Silvio" Str 100 arms 3 Stens, 100 Carbines is around QUARTO PRETORIA C 9005.

South of R Dora Baltea. Dora Baltea Band, leader " Pedro" Str 1500, arms 100 MMG, 120 LMG, Carbines, rifles, etc: is in area M EMILIUS sq H 89.

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Fenis Band, leaders " Arnold" and " Mark" Str 360 arms 17 Sten, 100 Carbines is in the Val di FENIS sq H 99.

Champorcher Band, Leader " Silvio Pedro" Str 500 few arms, are around M GLACIER sq H 99.

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Monte Rosa Band, Str 240, arms 20 Sten, 120 Carabines;
is around M ROSA sq H 98.

Pila Band, Leader "John" Str 40 arms 30 Stens, 30 Carabines.

Eastern VAL D'ACSTA (Chatillon D 00 area)

The La Magdaleine Band, leader "Bito" Str 130, arms
Carabines and Stens, is around Mount LA MAGDALEINE in sq
D 00.

The Challant Band, leader "Nery" Str 60 arms 3 stens,
40 Carabines is in lower VAL DI CHALLANT sq J 18.

Brusson Band Str 500 is around BRUSSON Sq D 10 in Upper
VAL DI CHALLANT sq D 10.

There are some 500 Patriots including 120 Czech Partisans
in area GRESSONEY sq D 21.

The Issogne Band, Leader "Marius" Str 200 arms 20 Stens,
100 Carabines, is around Issogne sq J 09

PONT S MARTIN AREA

The Donnaz Band, Str 100, arms 7 Stens, 90 Carabines, is
around DONNAZ sq J 18.

The Perlow bands, leaders "Isonzo" and "Cretaz" and
"Brivieri" Str 200 arms Stens and Carabines, are around Pont
S. Martin sq J 18.

There are 700 Patriots around VALCHIUSILLA J 07. All
are well armed with Stens, Carabines, Rifles etc:

The Piedro Band, leader "Piedro" Str 1000, arms 370 rifles;
is in the VAL SOANA sq H 97.

Other Areas

Carbines and Stens, is around Mount LA MAGDALEINE in sq D 00.

The Challant Band, leader "Nery" Str 60 arms 3 stens, 40 Carbines is in lower VAL DI CHALLANT sq J 18.

Brusson Band Str 500 is around BRUSSON Sq D 10 in Upper VAL DI CHALLANT sq D 10.

There are some 500 Patriots including 120 Czech Partisans in area GRESSONEY sq D 21.

The Issogne Band, Leader "Marius" Str 200 arms 20 Stens, 100 Carbines, is around Issogne sq J 09

PONT S MARTIN AREA

The Donnaz Band, Str 100, arms 7 Stens, 90 Carbines, is around DONNAZ sq J 18.

The Perlow bands, leaders "Isonzo" and "Cretaz" and "Brivieri" Str 200 arms Stens and Carbines, are around Pont S. Martin sq J 18.

There are 700 Patriots around VALCHIUSELLA J 07. All are well armed with Stens, Carbines, Rifles etc:

The Piedro Band, leader "Piedro" Str 1000, arms 370 rifles; is in the VAL SOANA sq H 97.

Other Areas

A band of 60 armed with 40 carbines is at IVREA.

1 Gruppo Ccco Pedro; Str 400 is at LOCANA H 9067.

6459

5. NOVARA PROVINCE

The main Patriot concentration is in the VAL D'OSSOLA. Bands in this area are as follows:-

Superbi Band, Leader Superbi, Str. 450, and Larios Band, Leader Larios, Str. 700, are around DOMODOSSOLA D.6040.

3000 Patriots, mostly unarmed under "Mercatelli" are stated to be in same general area.

Didio Band, (see Report No. 4) leader "Didio" now given as Str. 500 of which 300 armed. Band has now moved North and is in area CARNA DI NIBBIO sq. D 62.

Banda Pippo, Leader "Pippo" (H. Mario), Str. 700, of which 400 armed are in area PLENIA sq. D 65.

58 Garibaldi Division Leader "Gemisto" Str. 1900 of which only 400 armed are around MACUGNACA sq. D 32.

A Band, Leader "Bruno", strength and arms not known is around VANZONE D 4526.

Banda Rutto, Leader "Rutto" Str. 100, all armed, is around OMEGNA D 6614.

The M. Zeda Band, previously reported, is still around M. ZEDA D 7732. No particulars are given as to strength and arms.

6. VERCELLI PROVINCE

Verallo area. 1 Garibaldi Bde. Leader "Ciro" Str. 800 is around VALLO D 5408. This is also the H.Q. of the Moscatelli Garibaldi Division which now appears to be far less important than stated in previous reports. There is no information as to numbers

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-6458

~~SECRET~~

Copy No. 1

Ref: IS/13/15

13th October 1944.

No. 5 Detachment

has begun P.O.

No. 1 Special Force.

Copy the Report to King in Stage

Wm

Further Details of Patriot Organisations in N. ITALY.

1. This report has been compiled from No. 1 Special Force sources, including messages from the field and reports from London. It does not pretend to be exhaustive. All figures for patriot strengths should be considered as extremely variable, owing to the progress of supply dropping, enemy action and now to the approach of winter which may force many bands to disperse.

This report should be read in conjunction with "Italian Patriot Bands in the Alps" dated 24th August.

PIEDMONT

2. Types of Groups

(a) GARIBALDI formations: These are communist in tendency and very anti-monarchist. A political commission is attached to each brigade. 90% of the men are not interested in politics. (B.I.O. 30 Sept.). They are probably the strongest organisation in PIEMONTE; the second, fourth and fifth Garibaldi "divisions" as well as other formations which may be separate from the "divisions" are reported.

(b) Action Party formations: Several are reported, of good military value, but nevertheless "political".

(c) Liberal, Monarchist and Army groups: Several exist in PIEMONTE, led largely by ex-army officers. They are considered reactionary by the more "political" groups but their military value is usually high.

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3. ALESSANDRIA

The MUSTER mission to this area was briefed as follows on 25th September:

Major MAURI (Italian Army) commands the area bounded by the following points - CANALE, MILLESIMO, TENDA PASS, COLLE DI LARCHE. Within this area he has organised a force of some 10,000 men in 5 brigades.

6457

2.

10th Garibaldi Brigade, area North West of ACQUI.

74th Garibaldi Brigade, area south of ACQUI.

MONTMAGNO band of 600 men.

51st and 3rd Garibaldi Brigades under "MARZO" and "DAN".

ROMAGNESE band under LIBERO.

GIUSTIZIA e LIBERTA band under Captain FAUSTO.

All these forces, together with several smaller units, amount to some 4000 - 5000 men and occupy the area bordered by the PIACENZA BOBBIO VOGHERA roads. They are at present on the offensive against large enemy forces which had been attacking them supported by tanks and artillery. The partisan thrust is in the direction of VOGHERA, which is reported to have been captured. A similar thrust is in progress against PIACENZA.

PAVIA has a town group of some 400 men.

ALESSANDRIA itself is notoriously Fascist. It must however be taken into account that all the principal Italian towns now contain an organised, if unarmed, group of men who have been instructed to take over public installations at a given moment. Instructions to that effect have been passed through the Central Committee at MILAN.

4. TURIN

The MUSTER mission to this area was briefed as follows on 23 September, (Mo. 1 S.F. MU/775):

The following is a list of the known patriot groups in the TURIN area upon which you may be able to call for assistance.

VAL DI LANZO band - 700 men well armed under ARMANDO and BARACCHINI, VORAGNO area (55/8157).

All these forces, together with several smaller units, amount to some 4000 - 5000 men and occupy the area bordered by the PIACENZA BOBBIO VOGHERA roads. They are at present on the offensive against large enemy forces which had been attacking them supported by tanks and artillery. The partisan thrust is in the direction of VOGHERA, which is reported to have been captured. A similar thrust is in progress against PIACENZA.

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MATEOTTI Brigade - 1,000 men unknown armament under MARCELLIN. Split in small groups of 100-200 men between VAL DI SUSA (55/5439) and VAL DI PO (57/6887). They only occupy the heights as the Germans continue to hold the valleys.

GIAVENO band - 1,500 men (700 armed) under VIAN West of GIAVENO (55/7727).

6456

3.

Garibaldi Brigade - 1,000 men (armament unknown) under BARBATO and SALUZZO area VAL PELLICE.

The MARELLI brigade is apparently also known as the VAL CHISONE Brigade, commanded by MARCELLIN. It consists of 700 men, poorly armed, military, active, Liberal Monarchist, considered reactionary by the political bands. (BLO. 1st October).

5. The following formations have also recently been reported in TURIN.

(a) Second GARIBALDI Division, 1,000 men, poorly armed, commanded by BARTITA, in LANZO valleys which had recently been cleaned up by Fascists. (BLO. Sitrep 30th September).

(b) Fourth GARIBALDI Division. 1,500 men, poorly armed. Area: both sides, middle and lower VAL SUSA. Commanded by VALERIO. (BLO. 30th September.).

(c) VAL SANGONE Brigade. Area: CHISONE and upper SUSA. 700 men poorly armed, military, active, Liberal-Monarchist. Commanded by NICOLETTA. (BLO. 1st October).

(d) STELLINA Brigade. Area: mountains near SUSA. 300 men, poorly armed, Action party. Commanded by LAGHI.

CUNEO

o.

Since report referred to above dated 24th August and headed "Italian Patriot Bands in the Alps", the following formations are reported:-

(a) VAL PELLICE Brigade. Commanded by RENARO. 400 men, Action Party, arms good, military value good.

(b) VAL GERMANASCA Brigade. Commanded by UCCIO. 400 men, Action party, arms poor, military value quite good. (Source of (a) and (b): BLO. 1st October).

(c) "MEZARD" formation in VAL VARATE. 1,800

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(c) "MEZARD" formation in VAL VARAITA. 1,800 men, no further details. (BLO. 23rd September).

7. VERCELLI

5th GARIBALDI Division. Area: BIELLA between GRESSONEY (29/2707) and outskirts BIELLA with western limit SERSA, eastern limit SESIA river (30/5794). 3 brigades, 7000 - 7000 unarmed, 1,000 possible recruits.

6455

4.

Arms and explosive scarce. The leader and the political commission ITALO are communists and unscrupulous. The majority of the troops are more reliable. (London report 28th September).

8. NOVARA

OSSOLA is now reported as a liberated area but the exact strength and character of the patriot formations are not known. A London report of 2nd October mentions the OSSOLA division, commanded by Major SUPERFI. 420 armed and 180 unarmed.

Major, G.S.,

for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

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SECRET Copy No. 2.....

Ref: IS/14/20

17th October 1944

Subject: Report from IA SPEZIA Area.

To: Mr. Rayner, P.W.B.
Col. McCarthy, Patriots' Branch, A.C.C.
Col. Feecey, (Liguria), A.C.C.
Lt. Col. Snipp, Chief of Staff Section, A.C.C.

From: No. 5 Detachment,
No. 1 Special Force.

The following extracts are taken from a report received from a British Liaison officer working in the IA SPEZIA area. They give a clear picture of what steps are being taken in this area to conform with MUSTER directives.

1. The 'Division' is organised in four 'brigades'. It has been continually in action since its formation at the beginning of August 1944. Enemy reprisals have been heavy and the area has suffered considerably in the numbers of villages destroyed and populations massacred.

2. In the past few weeks attempts have been made to reorganise the various 'communes' in order to have some form of order and discipline in the civil population for the time when the Allies take over. The general outlines of the scheme are as follows:-

(a) Each 'Commune' has a Committee of National liberation and a 'civil guard' who will take over control as soon as the enemy departs.

(b) All persons in authority may be recognised by Allied troops by their armbands in the Italian National colours and by their identity cards, which are issued by the B.I.O. from his H.Q. No persons other than those having armbands and identity cards are authorised to carry arms or to represent the local authorities in any way.

(c) As many 'Communes' as possible will have an 'Information Service' formed of English speaking persons. These persons will have reliable information.

The following extracts are taken from a report received from a British liaison officer working in the LA S. 3221A area. They give a clear picture of what steps are being taken in this area to conform with MUSTER directives.

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(c) As many 'Communes' as possible will have an 'Information Service' formed of English speaking persons. These persons will have reliable information as to the serviceability of roads and bridges and the areas still held by the enemy.

(d) The local Committees will have available:-

673

(i) Working parties for use, under R.E. supervision, of road and bridge repairs.

(ii) Lists giving the minimum requirements for the feeding of the population in their areas.

3. It is hoped that the 'Communes' north of CASTEL NUOVO will be in the same state of readiness, but the recent murder of one of the leaders in this area and the subsequent loss of many documents has resulted in an increase in the difficulties of organisation.

Fulcher

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

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difficulties of organisation.

Fulloon

Major, G.S.,
for Commander, R.N.V.R.,
Commanding No. 1 Special Force.

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