

acc 10000/125/446

169/PAT

C. L. N. A. I.

Dec. ¹⁹⁴⁴ Ap ¹⁹⁴⁵

C. L. N. A. I.

Dec. 1944 - Ap 1945

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 10

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

TS/18/16/CA

19 April 1945

SUBJECT: Officials in Northern Italy

To:

HQ. 15 Army Group
SCAO 5 Army
SCAO 8 Army
SCAO IV CorpsCopy No. 1
2
3
4

The attached lists give the latest available information as

to:

- a) Persons nominated by CLNAI to assume temporary posts pending the arrival of AMG.
- b) CLNAI

FOR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER:

A.D. Bonham-Carter, Lt. Col.
CSC CA Section

Copies to:

RC Piemonte
RC Liguria
RC Lombardia
RC Venezia
RC Emilia
FILECopy No. 5
6
7
8
9
10-

Encl:

4973

TOP SECRET

LIST OF PERSONS NOMINATED BY CLNAI TO ASSUME TEMPORARY
POSTS PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

		<u>Name, Profession, Age, Politics</u>
<u>TURIN</u>	Questor	AGOSTI - Judge 35 Partito d' Azione.
	Prefect	PASSONI - Accountant 45 Socialist
	Mayor	ROVEDO - Civil Servant of SADOGLIO Government Communist (Jul 43)
<u>GENOA</u>	Questor	(Name?) - Lawyer 40 Non-Party
	Prefect	DE MARTINO - Lawyer 40 Liberal
	Mayor	RICCI - ex Mayor - 65 Liberal
<u>VENICE</u>	Questor	(Name?) Liberal Nominee
	Prefect	MATTER - Industrialist 45 Partito Azione
	Mayor	PONTI - Engineer 45 Christian Democrat
<u>MILAN</u>	Questor	(Name?) Liberal Nominee
	Prefect	LOMBARDI (GILBERTI) - Engineer 45 Partito d'Azione
	Mayor	GREPPI - Lawyer 55 Socialist
	Deputazione Provinciale	POSSATI - Christian Democrat
	Economic Commission	MERZAGORA - Liberal - General Manager of Pirelli
<u>BOLOGNA</u>	Mayor	DOZZA alias DUCATI - Communist

Known personally to Mr. LONGHI and supported by his personal recommendation.

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A. CLNAI - MARCH 1945

Chairman (Nonevoting)	LONGHI
Partito d'Azione	LEO LOMBARDI (GILBERTI) SOLARI (SOMMA)
Communist	ITALO LONGO SERENI (BERNARDI)
Socialist	PERTINI (SANDRI) MOLANDI (MATILDA) MARZOLA (OLIVIERI)
Liberal	ARPELANI (GIUSTINO) CODA (RONA) MEZAGHERA (CESARE)
Catholic	MARAZZA (FABIO)
Secretary (non-party)	CECCHONI

B. COMMANDO GENERALE

	VALENTI GALLO SOLARI
Chief of Staff	FARINA (Socialist)
Adjutants	ARGENTI (Liberal) BARCONA (Catholic)

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIST OF PERSONS NOMINATED BY CIGAL TO ASSUME
TEMPORARY POSTS PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF THE
ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Politics</u>
<u>TURIN</u>				
Questor	AGOSTI	Judge	35	Partito d'Azione
Prefect	PASCHINI	Accountant	45	Socialist
Mayor	ROVERO	Civil Servant of Benigno Government (Jul 43).		Communist
<u>CHERA</u>				
Questor	?	Lawyer	40	Non-Party
Prefect	DR. MARTINO	Lawyer	40	Liberal
Mayor	FRONI	Ex-Mayor	65	Liberal
<u>VIGEVANO</u>				
Questor	?			Liberal Nominee
Prefect	BATTI	Industrialist	45	Partito d'Azione
Mayor	PAVIA	Engineer	45	Christian Democrat
<u>MILAN</u>				
Questor	?			Liberal Nominee
Prefect	LOMBARDI (GEMELLI)	Engineer	45	Partito d'Azione
Mayor	GRETTI	Lawyer	55	Socialist
Deputazione Provinciale	POGGI			Christian Democrat
Economic Commission	BERNARDINI	General Manager of Pirelli		Liberal
<u>BOLOGNA</u>				
Mayor	DOZZA alias LUZZI			Communist Known personally to Mr. LUZZI and supported by his personal recommenda- tion.

TOP SECRETa) CHIAI - MARCH 1945

Chairman (Non-voting)	LEONINI
Partito d'Azione	LEO LEONARDI (GILBERTO) SOLARI (SILVIO)
Communist	LEON LEON SOLARI (GILBERTO)
Socialist	PERINI (GILBERTO) MORANDI (MATTEO) MORANDI (GILBERTO)
Liberal	ARISTIDE (GIUSEPPE) CORA (PIRELLA) MORANDI (GILBERTO)
Catholic	MORANDI (PIRELLA)
Secretary (non-party)	GIUSEPPE

b) COMANDO CENTRALE

Chief of Staff	VALPANI GALLO SOLARI
Adjutants	PARINA (Socialist) ARISTIDE (Liberal) MORANDI (Catholic)

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIST OF PERSONS NOMINATED BY CINAI
TO ASSUME TEMPORARY POSITS PENDING
THE ARRIVAL OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

	Name	Profession	Age	Politics
<u>TURIN</u>				
Quartier	ACOSTA	Judge	35	Partito d'Azione
Prefect	PASQUINI	Lawyer	45	Socialist
Mayor	NOVATI	Civil Servant of Benigno Government (Jul 43).		Communist
<u>GENOA</u>				
Quartier	?	Lawyer	40	Non-Party
Prefect	DE MARTINI	Lawyer	40	Liberal
Mayor	ROSSI	Architect	65	Liberal
<u>VERONA</u>				
Quartier	?			Liberal Republic
Prefect	MAZZINI	Industrialist	45	Partito d'Azione
Mayor	PONZI	Engineer	45	Christian Democrat
<u>MILAN</u>				
Quartier	?			Liberal Republic
Prefect	LOMBARDI	Engineer	45	Partito d'Azione
Mayor	(GILBERTI) GEMPI	Lawyer	35	Socialist
Deputations Provinciale	FORNARI			Christian Democrat
Executive Commission	MEZZAGLIA	General Manager of Pirelli		Liberal
<u>BOLOGNA</u>				
Mayor	DONZI alias BUCCHI			Communist

Known personally
to Mr. LOMBARDI and
supported by his
personal
recommendation.

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TOP SECRETa) CIRAI - MARCH 1945

Chairman (Non-voting)	LONGHI
Partito d'Azione	LEU LOMBARDI (GIUSEPPE) MAGGI (GIUSEPPE)
Communist	TRAILO LONGO BERRI (FERDINANDO)
Socialist	NEPPE (GABRIELE) MERLINI (MATTEO) MAGGI (OLIVIERO)
Liberal	ALFONSI (GIUSEPPE) CINI (ENZO) MAGGI (GIUSEPPE)
Catholic	MAGGI (MATTEO)
Secretary (non-party)	GIUSEPPE

b) COMANDO GENERALE

	VALENTI GALLO SOLARI
Chief of Staff	PARINA (Socialist)
Adjutant	ARZUFFI (Liberal) MAGGI (Catholic)

TOP SECRET

LIST OF PERSONS NOMINATED BY CINAI
TO ASSUME TEMPORARY POSITS PENDING
THE ARRIVAL OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Politics</u>
<u>AVIGNON</u>				
Quartor	AGOSTI	Judge	35	Partito d'Azione
Prefect	PASSCHI	Accountant	45	Socialist
Mayor	ROVEDO	Civil Servant of Badoglio Government (Jul 43).		Communist
<u>GENOVA</u>				
Quartor	?	Lawyer	40	Non-Party
Prefect	DE MARTINO	Lawyer	40	Liberal
Mayor	RIGGI	Ex-Mayor	65	Liberal
<u>VERICE</u>				
Quartor	?			Liberal Nominee
Prefect	MATTEO	Industrialist	45	Partito d'Azione
Mayor	PONTI	Engineer	45	Christian Democrat
<u>MIJAN</u>				
Quartor	?			Liberal Nominee
Prefect	LOMBARDI	Engineer	45	Partito d'Azione
Mayor	(GIORGIO) GEMPI	Lawyer	55	Socialist
Deputations				
Provinciale	ROSSATI			Christian Democrat
Economic				
Commission	MENZAKORA	General Manager of Pirelli		Liberal
<u>BILOGIA</u>				
Mayor	DOZZA alias DUCATI			Communist

Known personally
to Mr. LANCINI and
supported by his
personal
recommendation.

4966

TOP SECRETa) COMAI - MARCH 1945

Chairman (Non-voting)	LENGHI
Partito d'Azione	LEO LEONARDI (GIUSEPPE) SOLARI (SERIO)
Communist	ITALO LEMO ROSSI (BERNARDO)
Socialist	PEROTTI (GIANFRANCO) MERLINI (MATTEO) MANZONI (OLIVIERO)
Liberal	APPALANI (GIUSEPPE) COLO (ROSA) MARCHETTI (CESARE)
Catholic	MARAZZI (FABIO)
Secretary (non-party)	GIUSEPPE

b) COMANDO GENERALE

	VALENTI GALLI SOLARI
Chief of Staff	PARRA (Socialist)
Adjutants	ARCHETTI (Liberal) MARCHETTI (Catholic)

TOP SECRET

ALLIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Tasks for "Agents" in connection with FILE No. TS/18/16/CA
Patriot Activities in Northern Italy.

TO : Patriot Branch 10 March 1945

Reference Enclosure G-5/S/24 dated 6 March 1945.

- 1) This paper is submitted for your study and comment.
- 2) Please return to GSO CA Section by midday Sunday 11 Mar 45.

R.R.
w/ R.R. CRIPPS, Col.
GSO CA Section.

/pr.

4964

TS/LSO/52.

TOP SECRET

Copy No 2.

O-3208
APR 1215308D/7560
APR 1314308
RCH/121515 ARMY GROUP
AFHQ INFO ALCON 5 ARMY 8 ARMY

TOP SECRET

This answers your PI 58661 CITE PWGBO of 11 April.

Our plan for future treatment of patriots brings on establishment of patriot centres for their care and maintenance prior disarmament. Establishment of centres completely conditional on adequate supply of food and clothing. Anticipate need for some of these centres will occur in near future as our Armies advance. Initial increment of Partisans already overrun by 5th Army and need care. Accordingly request very urgently authorization to proceed under provision para 3 of your PWGBO 226918 of 14 February.

List

Copy No 1 & 2	Info-Action - GA Section (2)
3	Info - A/President
4	Chief Commissioner
5	Exec Commissioner
6	Recn Sec
7	Land Forces
8	File

TOP SECRET

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TS/CSO/19.

TOP SECRET.

FILE TS/18/16/CA.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

10a

Ref: 3201/206/EC.

10 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problem in N. ITALY.

TO : VP, CA Section.

1. In reply to your letter TS/16/18/CA of 5 March 1945, herewith for your retention copy of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).

2. In accordance with Conclusion 7(c) of the Minutes of SACRED's Political Conference of 20 February 1945, (copy forwarded you under this office letter 3201/190/EC of 28 February) the last sentence has been deleted from para 6 of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).

9a

E. G. M. M. M.

Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

/JG.

Copy to: SO to CC (with copy of JPS Study No. P/265
Pol Adv (Final and to note para 2 above).

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C O P YC O P YC O P YP/365 (Final)TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

18 February 1945

INTERIM REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH
PATRIOT PROBLEMS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

Cover Note by MJPS.

1. In accordance with terms of reference received from Chief of Staff on 16 February 1945, we have prepared the attached interim report on measures to deal with patriot problems in Northern ITALY.
2. In the time available it has not been possible to consult 15 Army Group, Allied Commission, or UNIA.

(Sgd) G. L. EBERLE
Brig. General, U.S.A.,
G-3 Plans.

Representatives concurred in
conference but the time
factor has prevented signature
being obtained

{ L.T. PARKHURST,
{ Air Commodore
{ MAAP Plans
{ W.A. ADAIR
{ Commander,
{ Staff Officer, Plans

DISTRIBUTION:

List "A" plus,
CG, 15th Army Group
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission
Commander SOG
British Resident Minister
US Political Adviser
A/C of 3, G-5

4961

TOP SECRET.

E/265 (Final)

TOP SECRET.

18 February 1945

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff.

INTERIA REPORT ON MEASURES TO DEAL WITH PATRIOT PROBLEMS
IN NORTHERN ITALY.

OBJECT.

1. To examine all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern Italy and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:
 - a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.
 - b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
 - c. The prevention of fighting between Slovene and Italian patriots in North-eastern Italy, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VENEZIA GIULIA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.

2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern Italy were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.
- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern Italy.

a. BY ARMY.

- (1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest Italy" was issued on 24 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 26918 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans based on the above.

2980

ORDER.

1. To examine all plans that have been made for dealing with patriots on the occupation of Northern ITALY and to submit recommendations regarding further measures required to provide for:

- a. The rapid disarmament and absorption into civil life of the Italian Armed Forces of all Italian patriots as the Allied armies advance.
- b. The prevention of fighting between patriots and Fascist forces remaining behind when the Germans withdraw.
- c. The prevention of fighting between Slovenes and Italian patriots in North-eastern ITALY, which would prejudice the security of supply through TRIESTE and VERONA to AUSTRIA, and also aggravate the political problems of future frontier settlement.

MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN.2. Current Special Operations Policy.

Instructions for the support of Italian resistance throughout Northern ITALY were issued by this Headquarters in a directive dated 4 February 1945 to 15th Army Group, when the following policy was established:

- a. Indiscriminate expansion of patriot forces to be discouraged.
- b. Supply to be concentrated largely on non-warlike stores and arms to be supplied only on a selective basis for special tasks.
- c. Preparations to be made for the post-liberation period.

3. Occupational Plans.

The following measures have been taken to prepare for the occupation of Northern ITALY.

a. By AFHQ.

2920

- (1) An Operation Instruction "Occupation of Northwest ITALY" was issued on 21 December 1944 to 15th Army Group. This was supplemented by telegram F 26918 of 14 February 1945, giving directions as to collecting, disarming, feeding, clothing and paying patriots and for their medical care. 15th Army Group have been requested to forward their plans, based on these instructions, as soon as possible.
- (2) The covering approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the scales of food and clothing, envisaged in the instructions given to 15th Army Group, has been asked for in MAP 864 dated 15 February.
- (3) A letter is being dispatched to MIIA, copy to 15th Army Group, which lays down a general policy for the introduction of patriots into the Italian Army to fill, as far as possible, the 48,000 existing vacancies under the present ceiling, and instructs MIIA to form reconnaissance companies of a strength of 500 each from patriot bands for employment with the five Italian combat groups. (Patriots are now filtering through the lines at a rate of about 500 per week

and it is anticipated that on the occupation of Northern Italy it will be possible to absorb about 10,000 patriots in this manner into the Italian Army. Depending on the success with Italian combat groups, the use of Italian patriot reconnaissance companies with British and U.S. divisions is also envisaged.

b. By 15th Army Group in conjunction with Allied Commission.

It is understood that the following measures have been taken:

- (1) Messages giving detailed anti-aircraft instructions have been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.
- (2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centres.
- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and IOs with patriot bands.

c. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CLN representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

3. Summary of Present State of Action.

4979

In general, plans for Northwestern Italy are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern Italy are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the Slovene difficulty.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

been prepared for issue to patriots when a German withdrawal becomes evident.

- (2) Discussions are in progress to determine suitable areas for the establishment of patriot reception centres.
- (3) Detailed arrangements are being made for liaison, in the period immediately following liberation, between AMG officers and LGOs with patriot bands.

2. By Allied Commission.

A special procedure, additional to the normal processes of establishing Allied Military Government, is planned for dealing with patriots. This involves:

- (1) The provision of regional and provincial patriot teams, each consisting of one AMG "patriot" officer and one Italian military officer, to be joined once the area for which they are responsible is liberated, by a local CMM representative. The immediate duty of these teams will be to contact local patriot leaders.
- (2) The establishment of patriot committees to help AMG officials to discriminate between genuine and bogus patriots.
- (3) The provision of staffs for patriot reception centres.
- (4) The provision of mobile Italian Army recruiting agencies.
- (5) Local re-employment of patriots as far as possible through patriot committees.
- (6) Reporting by local committees of "unemployable patriots" to central AMG authority.

3. Summary of Present State of Action.

In general, plans for Northwestern ITALY are now well advanced. Plans for Northeastern ITALY are only commencing but the same procedure will be adopted, subject to modifications as necessary in view of the Slovene difficulty.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

4. To meet the object stated at paragraph 1 above, the following additional measures are recommended:

a. The Establishment of Closer Links between the CMMI and the ROME Government.

There will be advantages in representatives being credited from each of these organisations to the other, though the nomination of suitable persons will represent a difficulty. In this connection an exchange of missions between SACRED and the CMMI has also been considered, but as our object is now to play down the patriots, such a course does not appear desirable.

-3-

b. Informal Agreement as to Suitable Italians for Military Government Positions.

There will be advantages if the ROSE Government and the CLNAI can be induced to agree on lists of suitable candidates for employment as Prefects, etc., under A/C. SACMED could then undertake that, when instituting an Allied Military Government, agreed nominees would be considered for such appointments.

5. In regard to the object of paragraph 1 b, we have assumed that this refers to riots and not to normal operations of war against Fascist formations which may be complying with German orders. In our opinion, the danger of armed disturbances developing between Fascists and patriots is small and the real danger is that of strife among patriots of diverse political opinions. The measures already taken, supplemented by those suggested at paragraph 4, should deal with this contingency.

6. In regard to the object given at paragraph 1 c, the best insurance will be the speedy occupation of vital areas and the establishment of stable government. Decisions remain urgently required, therefore, as to what form of government is to be imposed, and in what areas it is to be established, in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY. ~~Subject to agreement that may have been made at the COMSEC Conference, we remain of the opinion that the present situation in the disputed portions of Northeastern ITALY is not likely to change until the 1945 elections will present the~~

1958

Serial TS/C80/11.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION.

Ga

TS/16/18/CA.

5th March 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problems in Northern Italy.

TO: Executive Commissioner

Reference your letter 3201/190/EC dated 28 February 1945.

1. The above-mentioned letter has been received together with an extract from the Minutes of SACED's Political Meeting held on 20 February at which JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) was discussed.
2. Para 2 of your letter states that a copy of the paper JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) has been received by this Headquarters and is being held by the Chief Commissioner's office.
3. This Section wishes to acquaint itself with the measures to be adopted in dealing with Patriot problems in Northern Italy and, as on investigation it appears that a copy of paper under review is not held by the Chief Commissioner's office, may steps please be taken to make available to this Section the information required.

R. E. CHIPPIS, Col.
CSO CA SECTION.

4957

Serial: TS/CSO/11.

FILE: TS/18/16/CA.

TOP SECRET.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner.
+++++

Ref: 3201/150/SC.

28. February 1945.

SUBJECT: Patriot Problem in Northern Italy.

TO : Vice President,
Civil Affairs Section.

1. Forwarded herewith for your information is an extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Political Meeting held on 20th February 1945 at which the above subject was discussed.

2. Only one copy of the paper JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) referred to therein was received by this HQ and is held by the Chief Commissioner's office.

/JC.



Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

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EXTRACTTOP SECRETALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERSSAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting
20th February, 1945

X 77

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)7. PARTISAN PROBLEM IN NORTHERN ITALY
(JPS Study No. P/265 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them an interim report, prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, on measures to deal with Partisan problems in Northern Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING enquired whether there was any political objection to the despatch to Northern Italy of one or more senior liaison officers to improve the Partisan organization and to act as a steady political influence. The despatch of one such officer to Northwest Italy and one to Northeast Italy was under consideration.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR strongly supported the suggestion to improve liaison with the Italian Partisans in the manner suggested by the Chief of Staff, adding that much effort had been wasted owing to poor organization of air supply reception arrangements.

MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that there could be no harm in the appointment of such officers if their sole purpose was to increase the efficiency of distribution of supplies. It was important, however, that they should not succumb to the inherent tendency to participate in politics. Officers who did this were on occasions a source of political danger, in that they tended to elevate and distort sectional political views. He felt that, if high grade officers were sent in as proposed, they should be drawn from the ranks of the United States and British Services.

MR. KIRK supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasized the importance of confining the activities of such officers to operational functions.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the arrangement for providing the Italian Partisans with funds required careful supervision to ensure that no per cent was built up for use against the Allies after liberation.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that this matter was under discussion by the authorities concerned, and the arrangements proposed were likely in his opinion to afford satisfactory safeguards.

X

7. PARTISAN PROBLEM IN NORTHERN ITALY (JPS Study No. P/265 (Final))

THE CONFERENCE had before them an interim report, prepared by the Joint Planning Staff, on measures to deal with partisan problems in Northern Italy.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING enquired whether there was any political objection to the despatch to Northern Italy of one or more senior liaison officers to improve the partisan organization and to act as a steady political influence. The despatch of one such officer to Northwest Italy and one to Northeast Italy was under consideration.

AIR MARSHAL SLESSOR strongly supported the suggestion to improve liaison with the Italian partisans in the manner suggested by the Chief of Staff, adding that much effort had been wasted owing to poor organization of air supply reception arrangements.

MR. MACMILLAN expressed the view that there could be no harm in the appointment of such officers if their sole purpose was to increase the efficiency of distribution of supplies. It was important, however, that they should not succumb to the inherent tendency to participate in politics. Officers who did this were on occasions a source of political danger. He felt that they tended to elevate and distort sectional political views. He felt that, if high grade officers were sent in as proposed, they should be drawn from the ranks of the United States and British Services.

MR. KIRK supported the views of Mr. Macmillan and emphasized the importance of confining the activities of such officers to operational functions.

MR. MACMILLAN observed that the arrangement for providing the Italian partisans with funds required careful supervision to ensure that no war chest was built up for use against the Allies after liberation.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE replied that this matter was under discussion by the authorities concerned, and the arrangements proposed were likely in his opinion to afford satisfactory safeguards.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

- (a) Took note with satisfaction of the measures taken or contemplated to deal with partisan problems in Northern Italy, as described in JPS Study No. P/265 (Final).
- (b) Took note with satisfaction of Rear Admiral Stone's statement at 'X' above.
- (c) Directed that the Chief of Staff arrange for the deletion of the last sentence of paragraph 6 in all copies of JPS Study No. P/265 (Final) distributed outside AFHQ, in view of the discussion recorded under Minute 5 above.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

28 February 1945

SUBJECT: Partisan Treatment in NW Italy.

TO: Patriots Branch.

1. Attached hereto is a draft copy of a Memorandum treating of Partisan supervision and control, which has been received from G-5 Headquarters 15th Army Group.
2. This draft Memorandum has not yet been approved and is sent you for information only. You will be advised of the rulings of the final directive when it is received.
3. Please return this draft Memorandum to CSO CA Section.

R.R. Crutts
R.R. CRUTTS, Col.
CSO CA Section.

4954

Serial No: TS/CSO/6 (16) ~~TOP SECRET~~
ALLIED ~~COMMISSION~~ COMMISSION
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM FILE: TS/18/17/16/CA.
Passions Policy.

SUBJECT:

FILE No.

1 Sept. Aug. 1945

TO

P.S.

Attached report is forwarded for your information &
return.

The report referred to in para 1 first section was a
report by No. 1 Special Force and is not available for
distribution.

R. H. Gifford
4953

TOP SECRET.

Copy No. 111.

Patriot Policy

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

ARO 394

Office of the Chief of Staff

Ref: 6519/14/COS.31 January 1945

SUBJECT: Patriot Situation in N. ITALY.

TO : Distribution Below.

The following, sent to you for information, is the result of a study made by Political Section, HQ AC, of a document giving an appreciation of the patriot situation in N. ITALY:-

1. From the information contained in this report and that in many others received from British missions in Northern Italy during the last few months, Headquarters, No. 1 Special Force, C.M.F. felt impelled on January 15, 1945 to report to 15th Army Group that there is left to it "no doubt that those who control Communist bands are preparing to seize power by force when the Germans are expelled by the Allies." In particular, Communist-controlled bands in North East Italy were seen to pursue this course by:

- "(a) denying their operational responsibility to SACMED and placing themselves under TITO's SLOVENE IX Corps;
 - (b) ignoring the orders of the CLMAG;
 - (c) disarming partisans who will not profess allegiance to TITO;
 - (d) threatening not to cooperate with AMG and not to surrender their arms when North Italy is liberated."
2. On military grounds it is recommended "that Marshal TITO be requested to prohibit SLOVENE attempts to interfere with the operational control of Italian partisan bands in 15th Army Group territory."

3. (In its initial report on planning for the occupation of North East Italy to AFHQ Allied Commission recommended that an Allied-TITO understanding regarding this region be reached at the earliest possible date, to avoid controversy and possible conflict when the region is liberated).

4. The Slovenes now have indicated a claim on all of North East Italy to the Matisona River and they are attempting to attain a realisation of their aspirations by a show of popular support through propaganda, intimidation and forced mobilisation.

5. The Italian Communist leaders in North East Italy, to further their personal ambition and in the hope of witnessing an Italian Communist

4952

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5. The Italian Communist leaders in North East Italy, to further personal ambition and in the hope of witnessing an Italian Communist territorial link with the USSR through the Balkans, aid and abet the Slovenes in their activities. This reputedly is done with the agreement of the Slovene IX Army Corps and of the Russian mission attached to the Corps.

6. Similarly in North West Italy, Communist bands showed evidence of:

- "(a) taking, or likely to take, a similar line, hostile to Anglo-American operational control, and to the establishment of AMG when the North is liberated;
- (b) concealing and storing arms and funds for long term political purposes instead of using them against the enemy."

-2-

7. An estimate of the situation was afforded No. 1 Special Force by General CADORNI, a non-political Italian General who was infiltrated to the CLIC.I on the instructions of SICARD, and who established himself as head of the military command of the CLIC.I. He wrote in mid-December, 1944, as follows:

"It appears that the Allies continue to consider the partisan war as a normal military campaign, refusing to recognise its predominant political character. It must be stated very clearly that the resistance movement could not have existed without the political organization and that in this partisan warfare the Communist Party is predominant. The encroachment of political factors do not disappear by ignoring them. It is better to give them due consideration.

The Communist Party, which gives the lead, does not try in the least to hide its intention of seizing the reins and setting up a regime similar to the Russian. Its leaders in Northern ITALY (IRMO, MORE, MONTE, etc) have been trained in Russia and have seen service with the International Brigades in SPAIN and with Bolshevism in FRANCE.

They declare openly that they wish to lean upon Russia and TITO and will rebel rather than submit to the orders of the Western Allies."

8. It is pointed out in the report that the partisan movement initially was regarded as being of purely military character and so was treated by A.I. The partisans have shown that they will fight well under favourable conditions and, if properly instructed and led, will not cease in carrying out acts of sabotage. The number of partisans grew rapidly after the winter of 1943/44 and with this growth there was a proportionate increase in Allied support. Enormous damage was inflicted on the German and Italian Republican forces, both in loss of life and through acts of sabotage. This led the enemy to make determined efforts early in the current winter, to force the partisans from the hills where, with Allied aid, they might have wintered. The efforts were successful and aided by the hard winter, the number of partisans was reduced, their communications made difficult and they were reduced to operating in bands, engaged in sabotage, rather than as military formations ready to engage the enemy on a large scale, independently or in tactical support of the Allies. The last vestige of hope has been dissipated that the partisan movement might be built into a striking force resembling a secret army (the partisans never have been able to hold territory against enemy determination to seize it). However, even in reduced numbers and in a disorganized state, the very presence of the partisans will continue to tie down the enemy, and they may continue to carry out considerable sabotage--which is the natural outlet for their energies.

9. In the 15 months existence of the partisan movement it has become apparent that politics plays in it a role equally important to that of the military. The partisan formations depend politically upon one or other of anti-Fascist Parties represented in the CLIC.I. The latter, as a rallying point for anti-Fascist supporters, is a unifying body and a secret organization for maintaining the partisans by financing and feeding the bands. As such, it enjoys a limited measure of authority but it has not been able to exercise operational control through its military command, and it has not been able to prevent the several political parties from retaining their identity and continuing their separate activities which include the conduct of party warfare. The partisan movement can be considered to be no more or less

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The Communist Party, which gives the lead, does not try in the least to hide its intention of seizing the reins and setting up a regime similar to the Russian. Its leaders in Northern Italy (TITO, MARE, MONTE, etc) have been trained in Russia and have seen service with the International Brigades in SPAIN and with Bolsheviks in FRANCE.

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-3-

10. The Communists are numerically strong. They are well organized and have fought well under fanatical commanders and political commissars. They are a force to be reckoned by any foe, be he Fascist or Allied. Their Party is the closest active anti-Fascist organization. It pays lip service to the OLMU because the latter is a source of finance and supply, because it thereby retains Allied sympathy, because it thereby is afforded a respectable facade behind which to pursue its activities within a strong programme-- while, at the same time, it disregards the general directives of the OLMU and makes little effort to hide its aims and objectives. The report states that:

"Certain of their less discreet leaders have made damaging references to the Allies, whom they branded as enemies of a new socially reconstructed Italy. Against this, they pour praises on the Russians whom they recognize as the true friends of the future Italy. Manifestos issued by the Communist Party organization are becoming more and more violent in their approach to the people and throughout the text there can be seen a reflection of antipathy towards the efforts of the Allies in Italy."

11. In view of the above-described situation, No. 1 Special Force queries the desirability of reconsidering the future policy to be adopted towards the partisans as regards their military supply by the Allies to obtain for them the greatest measure of assistance during the course of military operations, with a minimum of disorder after the total liberation of the country. It is recommended that there be abandoned the hope of using guerilla bands in tactical support of the Allied armies and that the partisans (including the Communists, since any attempt to discriminate against them would precipitate the hostile reactions already evidenced by them against the Allies) be instructed to limit their activities to sabotage and anti-scorch. There would be ended the delivery of arms which eventually might be turned against the Allies and a concentration made on the provision of explosives, incendiaries, boots clothing and foodstuffs, and protective arms only."

ESM/JG.

Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer.

DISTRIBUTION: Copy No. 1 - CA Section
" " No. 2 - Econ Section
" " No. 3 - Land Forces Sub-Com (AMH.)
Aug 5 Army

6951

"Certain of their less discreet leaders have made damaging references to the Allies, whom they branded as enemies of a new socially reconstructed Italy. Against this, they pour praises on the Russians whom they recognise as the true friends of the future Italy. Manifestos issued by the Communist Party organization are becoming more and more violent in their approach to the people and throughout the text there can be seen a reflection of antipathy towards the efforts of the Allies in Italy."

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ESI/JC.

Chief Staff Officer.

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" No. 10	-	VENETIA Region
" No. 11	-	No. 2 District
" No. 12	-	NEW ITALY Planning Committee (Lt. Col. Morley-Fletcher)
" No. 13	-	"A" File
" No. 14	-	File
" No. 15-18	-	Spare

6951

TOP SECRETHEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION

TR/18/16/CA.

23 March 1945

TO: HQ. NO.2 DISTRICT.

1. Reference Allied Force Headquarters signal FX 48273 dated 23 Mar 45.
2. Enclosed herewith is copy of AFHQ's F 27859, paraphrasing their F 26918, which we are instructed by Allied Force Headquarters to forward to you.

FOR CHIEF COMMISSIONER :

E. R. CRIPPS,
CSO
Civil Affairs Section

Encl:

4950

INCOMING MESSAGE
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSIONOriginator's Reference: FX 48273
Date/Time of Origin: MAR 231044Message Centre No: D/5816
Date Time Rec'd: MAR 231125
Precedence: ROUTINEFROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FMGT
TO: ALLIED COMMISSIONER ROME INFO HQ DISTWO


23 MAR 1945

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED.

Please furnish HQ DISTWO by DRLS copy of our F 27859 paraphrasing our F 26918.

ACTION

DISTACTION
INFOC A SEC
A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EXEC COMMISSIONER
ECON SEC
LIAISON DIV
L FORCES
FILE

RESTRICTED

1945

2931

Serial No: TS/CSO/1

TOP SECRET

new file TS/18/16/CA.

N. ~~Italy~~ Italy - Occupation

4A

ALLIED COMMISSION, ROME

N80/16

AFHQ SIGNED SACKED

TOP SECRET

F-27059

ROUTINE

FEB 16/1151

CITE PHOTO

TOP SECRET.

The following is paraphrase of our F-26918 to 15 Army Group furthering our Operation Instruction dated 21 December 44 and Administrative Instruction dated 25 January 45 on occupation of Northwest Italy.

1. Occupation of Northwest Italy may take place earlier than thought due to Russian successes.

2. Subject to approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff the following policy in dealing with the Partisans is proposed by SACKED. Recognition of assistance to Allied cause will be basis of treatment together with necessity that they be disarmed, disbanded, placed in employment as quickly as possible. Unless and until they are taken into existing categories of Italians they will not rpt not be treated as belonging to any existing category. Areas of assembly will be specified as soon as arrangements for reception can be made. These areas must be selected considering suitability from Partisan viewpoint as well as other factors. Disarmament of Partisans will take place on entering reception areas. Paragraphs three, four and five outline assistance, after disarmament, that will be rendered them until final disposition has been made. The Allied Commission will be responsible for the final disposition and should aim at a completion date of three months.

TOP SECRET

FEB 16/1152

/continued....4948

TOP SECRETAMHA GABLE T-27859 of 16 FEB 1945 (continued):

3. During phase 1 Army Headquarters (together with Allied Military Government of the Army Headquarters) will feed and clothe partisans in areas concerned; Armies will supply necessary food and clothing for this purpose as follows;

a. Italian Military Forces ration scale as modified later in detail will apply.

b. Minimum essential scale of clothing will be issued from military sources.

4. Italian Government will be responsible for pay. Necessary arrangements with the Italian Government will be made by the Allied Commission who will notify 15 Army Group of arrangements including rate of pay.

5. United States and British will assist Italian Military who will be responsible for hospitalization.

6. Amplification of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 will be furnished later in a detailed Administrative Memorandum. Approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is being requested for issue of rations and clothing outlined in paragraphs 3 a. and b.

DISTRIBUTION by Chief Comm'r:

ACTION: Executive Commissioner

INFO: A/President
Chief Commissioner
~~Political Section~~
Land Forces S/C
Political Section
CA Section (2)
ECON. SEC. (2)

4947

TOP SECRET

TS/C80/61

TOP SECRET

QA SEC

Copy No 4

F 64613

APRIL 23/1948

D/8485

APRIL 24/1948

PRIORITY

APPROX SHOWN SACRED CITY FIBED

ACTION: ALCOHOL

TOP SECRET.

Reference our FA 39051 and F 39096 both of 5 March.

Understood FERNANDEZ now returned home. Request you obtain report from him and submit here so that in order decision may be taken as to attachment military officer.

DIST

Copy number 1 & 2 ACTION : EX COMMISSIONER

"	"	3
"	"	4
"	"	5
"	"	6
"	"	7
"	"	8

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
CHIEF
CHIEF
CHIEF
CHIEF
FILE

4946

TOP SECRET

TS/CSO/22..

ICASEC TS/18/5/EA

TOP SECRET

Copy No 6

O 272 B
MAR 131135AD/4954
MAR 140700A
ROUTINE15 ARMY GROUP
AFHQ RPTD ALCON

TOP SECRET

This is in reply to your FHGCT PX 41006.

No further effort will be made to infiltrate funds direct to Partisans direct during March. Prior to receipt of your signal 1500000 lire despatched by parachute courier to PERRENA MODENA area. Disagree your conclusion that need does not exist for using channels of infiltration other than CLMaf. Accordingly will submit on 15 March details for proposed infiltration during April of 60 millions for FLEMMONT and 50 millions to other compartments. Meanwhile we consider that military value of resistance movement suffers because of delayed receipt of funds. Regret you saw fit not to follow our recommendation in this matter.

Dist

Copy No 1	Info-Action - Finance SC
2	Info - A/President
3	Chief Commissioner
4	Exec Comm
5	Econ Sec
6	CA Section
7	Patriots Br
8	File

6945

TOP SECRET

Ts/C50/16

TOP SECRET

COPY NO 6

9 March 1945

VP h. Sam
P.M.
12

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The approval of the Supreme Allied Commander for the visit of Marchese Medici Tornasquinci into enemy occupied territory has been obtained with the proviso that the visit is limited to a period of a fortnight.

Very truly yours,

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Commissioner

His Excellency Ivanoe Bonomi
President of the Council of Ministers
Italian Government
Rome

AC DISTRIBUTION:

cc: Exec Comm

- Copy No 1 - Addressee
2 - Exec Comm
3 - A/President
4 - US Ambassador
5 - British Ambassador
6 - CA Section
7 - CC Files

TOP SECRET

4944

Ts/cso/16

TOP SECRET CASE

COPY No 6

P-39896
MAR 081551AD/4525
MAR 081900A
PRIORITYAFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGEG
ACTION: ALCOM

TOP SECRET

Reference ALCOM 2972.

1. Approved is the request of Italian Government to send TORNAQUINCI on mission as suggested. Agree that visit should be limited in period to fortnight.
2. See our reply to FAN 497 repeated to you as NAF 875.

AC Dist

Copy No	1	Action - Exec Comm
	2	Info - A/President
	3	Chief Commissioner
	4	US Ambassador
	5	British Ambassador
	6	CA Section
	7	File

TOP SECRET

1943

Ts/CSO/15

TOP SECRET CASE

Copy No 6

FX 39851
MAR 081516AD 4526
MAR 082000A
ROUTINE

AFHQ SIGNED ALEXANDER CITE PHOGG

AGVAF FOR CCS AND TO AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF RPTD TO
SHAEP AND TO ALCOM FOR INFO

J. W.

TOP SECRET

This is NAF 875.

1. Concurrently with your PAN 497 Italian Govt has asked permission to send TORNAQUINCI, present Under Secretary of State for Ministry of Interior to contact CLRAI in occupied ITALY. Object of visit to prepare ground in north to avoid misunderstandings at moment of liberation.

2. TORNAQUINCI is reliable and it is felt no harm can be done by such mission which may bring back useful information.

3. Propose to await TORNAQUINCIS return which should be within 2 to 3 weeks before deciding whether to attach officer as suggested PAN 497 stipulated.

Dist

Copy No 1	Info-Action - Exec Comm
2	Info - A/President
3	Chief Commissioner
4	US Ambassador
5	British Ambassador
6	CA Section
7	File

TOP SECRET

4942

Serial TS/CSO/13.1

TO : AFHQ
FROM : HQ ALCON

2972

6 March

PRIORITY.

TOP SECRET PD

PARA ONE PD SIGNORE BONOMI HAS ASKED WHETHER ITALIAN GOVERNMENT CAN SEND MEDICI TORNAQUINO LIBERAL UNDER SECRETARY FOR OCCUPIED ITALY TO VISIT CHARLIE LOVE NAN ABLE ITEM IN PRESENTLY GERMAN OCCUPIED ITALY IN ORDER TO QUOTE PREPARE GROUND IN NORTH AND AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND FRICTION BETWEEN CHARLIE LOVE NAN ABLE ITEM AND ALLIES OF LIBERATION UNQUOTE PD MISSION HAS APPROVAL OF LEADERS OF FOUR PARTIES ALTHOUGH FOR SECURITY PURPOSES PROJECT HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED AT FULL CABINET MEETING PD

PAREN TO AFHQ FOR SACRED (ACTION AND FOR GEORGE DASH FIVE (INFO) FROM HQ ALCON PAREN PD

PARA TWO PD MEDICI WOULD BE INFILTRATED BY NUMBER ONE SPECIAL FORCE PD
PARA THREE PD I THINK THE MISSION MIGHT DO GOOD PD IT CAN CERTAINLY DO NO HARM AND I HAVE BONOMI'S WORD THAT THIS WILL NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR FURTHER ACTIVITIES OF NEW MINISTRY IN NORTHERN ITALY PD UNITED STATES AND BRITISH EMBASSIES AGREE PD IN VIEW FAM FOUR NINE SEVEN I THEREFORE RECOMMEND YOUR EARLY CONCURRENCE

Copy to: US Ambassador
British Ambassador
A/President
Chief Commissioner
CA Section.

Office of the Executive Commissioner.
343

(Sgt) M. S. LUCH
Brig,
Ex.Com.

4941

Ts/esol/17.

TOP SECRET

CA SECTION

Copy No 6

FX 41006
MAR 101550AD/4710
MAR 101730A
URGENTAFHQ, BOMBED SACHET CITE FIDOT
ACTION 15 ARMY GROUP INFO ALCOM**TOP SECRET.**

Reference FX 39503 dated 7th.

Information received here from various agencies does not warrant any infiltration during March of funds to CLNAI in compartments other than FIDEMONT already arranged with FIDRIO. In accordance with LONGHI wishes full credit of 100 million Lire will be made to BERNE for March and any subsequent proposals for infiltration in April will be submitted on 15th in accordance with this HQ AF 973 dated 15th February para 1 (b). It is our policy to limit unilateral action to minimum and only when there is absolute certainty as was case in FIDEMONT that money is not getting to the destinations as required by LONGHI will implementation of para 3 of AF 973 dated 15th February be permissible. Am confirming to LONGHI that full credit of 100 million Lire for March will be made.

LIST

4940

Copy No 1	INFO- ACTION: Finance S/C
" " 2	INFO: A/President
" " 3	Chief Commissioner
" " 4	Executive Commissioner
" " 5	Asst Sec
" " 6	CA Sec
" " 7	Patriots Br
" " 8	File

TOP SECRET

Ts/Cso/18.

TOP SECRET

Ts/18/5/CA.

CA Sec

FX 39303
MAR 071734AD/4423
MAR 080830A
OP PRIORITY

FROM: AFHQ SIGNED SACRED CITE FHGCT
TO : ACTION: 15 ARMY GROUP INFO AC ROME

TOP SECRET.

Ref OSS signal from FLORENCE.

"1. We have received the following message from BALDWIN "

" From CLNAI to Brigadier General BRICKMANN in CASERTA. Please pay in at once amount due February 1st for LOMBARDIA LIGURIA VENETO EMILIA totalling 100 million lire. Such amounts have already been cashed and distributed by me. Confirm by radio. On March 1st please pay in same amounts and confirm. Signed LONGHI."

2. This should be done according to AFHQ procedure which to us is unknown"

Assume you will take necessary action regarding confirmation asked for, giving LONGHI details of distribution of 15 million lire infiltrated last month from 100 million lire allotment for compartments in above quoted signal. Assume you will leave LONGHI with full 100 million for March as he requests.

AO Dist

Copy No.1 Info-Action - Finance S/C
2 Info - A/President
3 Chief Commissioner
4 Exec Comm
5 Econ Sec
6 File
7 C.A. Sec
8 Patriots Br.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
(BY AUTHORITY OF CHIEF
(COMMISSIONER, AC

TRANSLATION

THE PRESIDENT
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

27th December, 1944.

Dear Admiral,

Here is the declaration signed by me and by Sig. Mare,
representing the Comitato di Liberazione Alta Italia (Committee of Liberation
for North Italy).

The document, of which I have a signed copy, may remain with the
Allied Command.

Cordially,

(Signed) Ivanoe Bonomi.

Trans: Sgt. Shenfield/lws.

TOP SECRET

(CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
(BY AUTHORITY OF CHIEF
(COMMISSIONER, AC _____

TRANSLATION

PRESIDENCY
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

ROME. December, 1944.

The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

The Italian Government designates the C.L.N.A.I. as its representative in the struggle that the patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and Germans in that part of Italy not yet liberated.

The C.L.N.A.I. agrees to act towards this end as the delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the Government which signed the Armistice Terms and is the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has already been or will later on be restored to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Signed) Ivanoe Bonomi

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTH ITALY

(Signed) Mare

Trans - LWS/lws.

ROME. December, 1944.

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THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(Signed) Ivanoe Bonomi

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTH ITALY

(Signed) Mare

Trans - LWS/lws.

6937

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

7th December, 1944.

To:
The Committee of National
Liberation for Northern Italy.
(C.L.N.A.I.)

Referring to the agreement which we have signed this day, I am pleased to note that the C.L.N.A.I. has appointed General Valenti as the military head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and that Messrs. Mauritzio and Gallo have been appointed as his joint deputy commanders.

I sincerely appreciate the excellent work which has been accomplished by the C.L.N.A.I. and its military command the Volunteers of Liberty. I hope that when the present crisis in the Italian Government is resolved, early consideration may be given to the recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. as the agent of the Government in enemy occupied Italy.

Appreciating as I do the fighting qualities of the Volunteers of Liberty, I am pleased to be able to inform you that steps have been taken to enlist into the Italian Armed Forces as many suitable volunteers of high medical category as the existing ceiling for the Italian Armed Forces will allow.

I hope that these Volunteers will continue to fight with the Allies until final victory is achieved.

I have issued instructions that all Allied Missions, receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., on my behalf, will at all times act in the closest cooperation and consultation with those formations of the Volunteers of Liberty to whom they are accredited. Only in this way can our common aim be achieved.

I am glad to have had the opportunity to discuss with you so many problems of common interest, and hope the decisions reached will make our cooperation closer.

I wish you a safe return to your posts and every success in the tasks which lie ahead.

(Sgd.) H. Maitland Wilson

GENERAL
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER.

Referring to the agreement which we have signed this day, I am pleased to note that the C.L.N.A.I. has appointed General Valenti as the military head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and that Messrs. Maurizio and Gallo have been appointed as his joint deputy commanders.

I sincerely appreciate the excellent work which has been accomplished by the C.L.N.A.I. and its military command the Volunteers of Liberty. I hope that when the present crisis in the Italian Government is resolved, early consideration may be given to the recognition of the C.L.N.A.I. as the agent of the Government in enemy occupied Italy.

Appreciating as I do the fighting qualities of the Volunteers of Liberty, I am pleased to be able to inform you that steps have been taken to enlist into the Italian Armed Forces as many suitable volunteers of high medical category as the existing ceiling for the Italian Armed Forces will allow.

I hope that these Volunteers will continue to fight with the Allies until final victory is achieved.

I have issued instructions that all Allied Missions, receiving orders from the Commander-in-Chief, A.A.I., on my behalf, will at all times act in the closest cooperation and consultation with those formations of the Volunteers of Liberty to whom they are accredited. Only in this way can our common aim be achieved.

I am glad to have had the opportunity to discuss with you so many problems of common interest, and hope the decisions reached will make our cooperation closer.

I wish you a safe return to your posts and every success in the tasks which lie ahead.

(Sgd.) H. Maitland Wilson

GENERAL
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER.

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE
OF OPERATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY.

1. The Supreme Allied Commander wishes the utmost military cooperation to be established and maintained among the elements which are active in the resistance movement. The CINAI will establish and maintain such cooperation as will bring together all active elements in the resistance movement whether they belong to the CINAI anti-fascist parties or to other anti-fascist organisations.
2. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CINAI) will, on behalf of the CINAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.
3. The Military Head of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty (being the military command of the CINAI) must be an officer acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.
4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CINAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CINAI will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority

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2. During the period of enemy occupation the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY (being the military command of the CINAI) will, on behalf of the CINAI, carry out all instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander. It is in general the wish of the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER that particular care should be given to all measures which will safeguard the economic resources of the territory against scorching, demolitions and like depredation by the enemy.

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4. When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CINAI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, CINAI will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the GENERAL COMMAND OF THE VOLUNTEERS OF LIBERTY in liberated territory will come under direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government on his behalf, including such orders to disband and surrender

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their arms, when required to do so.

5. During the period of enemy occupation in Northern Italy the utmost assistance will be given to the CLNAI in common with all other anti-fascist organisations, to meet the needs of their members who are engaged in opposing the enemy in occupied territory; a monthly contribution not exceeding 160 million lire will be made on the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander to meet the expenses of the CLNAI and all other anti-fascist organisations.

Subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, this sum will be apportioned to the following areas in the following ratio for the support of all anti-fascist organisations in those areas:-

LIGURIA	20
PIEMONTE	60
LOMBARDIA	25
EMILIA	20
VENETO	35

The above sum and allocations will be subject to variation according to the requirements of the military situation: the maximum sum will be reduced proportionately as and when Provinces are liberated.

6. Allied Missions attached to the CLNAI, to the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty, or to any of their components, will be consulted by them in all matters relating to armed resistance, anti-scorch and maintenance of order. Orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief, AAI., under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the missions concerned will be carried out by CLNAI, the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty and their components.

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SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
MEDITERRANEAN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

(Sgd.) H. Maitland Wilson
General

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FOR THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION FOR NORTHERN ITALY

(Sgd.) Pietro Nenni

Maurizio

Mare

E. Sodio

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