Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ACC 10000/125/447

RANKIN + ALPINE CLUB

AUG. 1944

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+ ALPINE CLUB

G. 1944

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Top Secret

12 August 1944

To : Lieut. Colonel REVETRIA
S.I.M. P.M. 135.

From : Lieut. Colonel F.S. Smythe
G(Ops) Advanced A.A.I.

With reference to my Conversation with you of todays date it is understood:
1. You will forward immediately to H.Q. 5th Army the following personnel (Ref. H.Q. 5th Army's letter of August 9th A.G. 331. 4. Y. Subject:-Italian Guides).

Sodensi. Capt. (Engr)
Pera, Mariano C.C.R.R. Legione Allieri
Carcano, Lt. Col. (Arty)
La Fiani, Capt. (Arty)

Note : - Trombetta, Lt. Col. is at present at Siena, c/o Commando Presidire A.M.G. I am requesting that he be released for duty with 5th Army.
2. It is understood that you will provide transport for the above mentioned officers.
3. The above mentioned officers should report in uniform and should be provided with the necessary equipment including bedding.
4. Will you please notify H.Q., 5th Army, the approximate time of arrival of these officers.
5. It is understood that these officers will be paid by the Italian Army but that H.Q. Fifth Army will provide Messing and accomodation.

F.S. Smythe (F.S. Smythe)
Lieut. Colonel.

Copy to H.Q., 5th Army APO, 464 U.S. Army.
Lt/Col. Hampton, Army L/C A.C.C.
Capt. Salvadori Patriot Branch A.C.C.

5107

ISTRUTTORI PER LA TECNICA DELLA MONTAGNA.

- Sig. BERLIRI ZOPPI Gaetano - Sottotenente Alpini - Compl.
  Roma, Via Brofferio, 6 - Tel. 33152

- Sig. CASTELLI Tullio - Maggiore Alpini - S.P.E.
  Roma, Via Sistina, 15 - Tel. 480235

- Sig. COLESCHI Giuseppe
  Roma, Piazza Esedra, 43 - Tel. 41305

- Sig. MARTELLO Vittorio - Tenente Colonnello già Artiglieria Alpina S.P.E.
  Roma, Via della Salara, 21, int.3 - Tel. 880074

- Sig. MEZZATESTA Guido - Tenente Alpini - Compl.
  Roma, Via Marsala, 96b- Tel. 44957

- Sig. VECCHIETTI Enrico - Capitano Alpini - Compl.
  Roma, Via Clitunno, 22 p.1 - Tel. 862818

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PRATICI DI ZONA

- Sig. BERLIRI ZOPPI Gaetano - Sottotenente Alpini Compl.
Roma, Via Brofferio, 6 - Tel. 33152

Alta Valle Stura di Demonte (M. Pebrun, Col.Puriac, Enchastraye, Col de la Pelouse, Col de Fourches) - Colle Sestriere (M. Fraiteve, Salice) - Alta montagna del Gruppo Disgrazia, Cresta Forno e Cime Ovest Gruppo Bernina - Itinerari invernali della alta Val Gardena e Alta Val Badia - Alpi Aurine e Pusteresi - Altipiano Asiago - Versante Sud del Grappa -

Guida locale : Alpi Aurine e Pusteresi - Conca di Brunico.

Sig. CASTELLI Tullio - Maggiore Alpini - S.P.E.
Roma, Via Sistina 15 - Tel. 480235

Monte Cimone, Piano di Lama Mogogno, Pavullo nel Frignano (Appennino Tosco-Emiliano) - Zona Valsavignone, Passo di Monte Coronaro, Verghereto, Bagno di Romagna (App. Umbro-Marchigiano) (zona acavallo della strada Tiberina fra Città di Castello e Bagno di Romagna) - App. Ligure (zona a nord di Genova, Maxone, Scoffera, Monte Fasce, Promontorio di Portofino) - Alpi Marittime (Valle Roja, Pigna, Briga M., Tenda, Val Vermenagna, Valli italiane della Tinea, Valli dei Gessi) - Alpi Cozie (Valle Stura di Demonte, Val Grana, Val Maira, Val Varaita) - Alpi Graie (Valli del Pellice, Dora Riparia, Sestriere, Mongenéve, M. Cenisio) - Alpi Dolomitiche (Zona Passo Costalunga, Antermoie, Cortina d'Ampezzo, Dobbiaco).

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Guida locale: Zona Valsavignone ecc. ecc. ..... (vedi

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- Colle Sestriere (M. Fraiteve, Salice) - Alta montagna del Gruppo Disgrazia, Cresta Forno e Cime Ovest Gruppo Bernina - Itinerari invernali della alta Val Gardena e Alta Val Badia - Alpi Aurine e Pusteresi - Altipiano Asiago - Versante Sud del Grappa -

Guida locale : Alpi Aurine e Pusteresi - Conca di Brunico.

Sig. CASTELLI Tullio - Maggiore Alpini - S.P.E.
Roma, Via Sistina 15 - Tel. 480235

Monte Cimone, Piano di Lama Mogogno, Pavullo nel Frignano (Appennino Tosco-Emiliano) - Zona Valsavignone, Passo di Monte Coronaro, Verghereto, Bagno di Romagna (App. Umbro-Marchigiano) (zona acavallo della strada Tiberina fra Città di Castello e Bagno di Romagna) - App. Ligure (zona a nord di Genova, Masone, Scoffera, Monte Fasce, Promontorio di Portofino) - Alpi Marittime (Valle Roja, Pigna, Briga M., Tenda, Val Vermenagna, Valli italiane della Tinea, Valli dei Gessi) - Alpi Cozie (Valle Stura di Demonte, Val Grana, Val Maira, Val Varaita) - Alpi Graie (Valli del Pellice, Dora Riparia, Sestriere, Mongenève, M. Cenisio) - Alpi Dolomitiche (Zona Passo Costalunga, Antermoie, Cortina d'Ampezzo, Dobbiaco). 5105

Guida locale: Zona Valsavignone ecc. ecc. ..... (vedi sopra). Appennino Ligure (vedi sop.) - Alpi Marittime: Alta e bassa Valle Roia, Alta Valle Gesso = Alpi Cozie: Tutta la Valle Stura di Demonte, Val Maira zona di Chianale = Alpi Graie (vedi sopra) = Alpi Dolomitiche: Zona Passo di Costalunga, Zona di Cortina d'Ampezzo.

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- Sig. COLESCHI Giuseppe
Piazza Esedra, 43 - Tel. 41305

Alta Val Gardena (Sella, Sassolungo, ...) = Catinaccio = Gruppo Ortles Cevedale
Guida locale : Alta Val Gardena.

Sig. CALZINI Mario
Roma, Via Candia, 25 - Tel. 370305

Gruppo del Cimone, dall'Abetone Ovest alla Via Porrettana; Versante Nord sino a Pievepelago, Fenano, Gaggio; Versante Sud sino a Bagni Lucca, Pescia, Pistoia.
Guida locale: Zona di cui sopra.

- Sig. FERRERI Mario
Roma, Via in Arcione, 71 c) - Tel. 62402

Alpi Apuane, dal Pizzo Uccello allaPania: versante est sino alla Carfagnana = Versante ovest fino al piano.
(non si trasferisce fuori residenza.)

Sig. MARTELLO Vittorio - Tenente Colonnello già Artig. Alpina-S.P.E.
Roma, Via della Salara 21 int. 3 - Tel. 880074 -

Alpi ligure entro i limiti: Limone Piemonte, Fontane, Colle di Nava, Briga Marittima = Alte Valli del Gesso, Roia, Vesubia, Tinea, Stura di Demonte, Po, Varaita di Chianale, Chisone, Stura di Ala = Alta Valsavara, Alta Val di Cogne = Alpi Pennine = Dolomiti di Brenta = Sella = Sassolungo = Marmolada =

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Sig. CALZINI Mario

Roma, Via Candia, 25 - Tel. 370305

Gruppo del Cimone, dall'Abetone Ovest alla Via Porrettana; Versante Nord sino a Pievepelago, Fenano, Gaggio; Versante Sud sino a Bagni Lucca, Pescia, Pistoia.
Guida locale: Zona di cui sopra.

- Sig. FERRERI Mario

Roma, Via in Arcione, 71 c) - Tel. 62402

Alpi Apuane, dal Pizzo Uccello allaPania: versante est sino alla Carfagnana = Versante ovest fino al piano.
(non si trasferisce fuori residenza.)

Sig. MARTELLO Vittorio - Tenente Colonnello già Artig. Alpina-S.P.E.

Roma, Via della Salara 21 int. 3 - Tel. 880074 -

Alpi ligure entro i limiti: Limone Piemonte, Fontane, Colle di Nava, Briga Marittima = Alte Valli del Gesso, Roia, Vesubia, Tinea, Stura di Demonte, Po, Varaita di Chianale, Chisone, Stura di Ala = Alta Valsavara, Alta Val di Cogne = Alpi Pennine = Dolomiti di Brenta = Sella = Sassolungo = Marmolada =
Guida locale: Zona a cavallo della displuviale fra M.Mongioie e Colle della Lombarda = Alta Valle del Po = Nodo del Colle del Mulo = Gruppo Niblè-Ambin = Alta Valle Stura d'Ala (oltre Balme) = Zona di Cogne = Alta Valsavara.

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- Sig. MEZZATESTA Guido - Telente Alpini - Compl.
Roma, Via Marsala, 96 b) - Tel. 44957.

Gruppo del Bernina = Rosa = Adamello = Dolomiti centrali = Disgrazia = Ortles Cevedale = Alpi Giulie (Monte Nare, ecc.).
Guida locale: Valle Isonzo = Tolmino = Bogatin = Scherbine (Grande, piccola).

Sig. VECCHIETTI Enrico - Capitano Alpini Compl.
Roma, Via Clitunno, 22 p.1 - Tel. 862818 (abitaz.)
Ufficio: ore 8,30-13 - Tel. 683641

Fascia Ovest-Est Alpi Apuane da Carrara alla Carfagnana - Conca Fornovo di Taro ovest (appennino Tosco-emiliano) = Sarzana e fiume Magra = Catibona, Altare (Alpi Marittime) - Ovada (Appennino Ligure) = Nodo Monte Bego (Alpi Marittime) = Colle Sestriere = Alta Valsesia; Val Mima; Val d'Egua = La Zona di alta montagna dei gruppi: Gran Paradiso, di Val Savara; Cervino Monte Rosa; Monte Disgrazia; Ortles Cevedale; Adamello; Brenta centrale; Venoste, Passirie e Breonie di ponente (Linea di frontiera austriaca) = Alcune vie di alta montagna della Weisskamm (Oetztal), delle Vedrette di Ries (Alpi Pusteresi) - itinerari invernali e alpinistici: dell'alta Val Badia, dell'alta Val Gardena, dei Monti d'Ampezzo, dell'alta Valle Spöl - Conca di Brunico (Alpi Orientali Val Pusteria) = Rolle (Dolomiti S. Martino) = Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugana, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e le cime dell'Ortigara.
Guida locale : itinerario: Carrara, Colonnata, Falde Sagro, Falde Uccello, Val di Donna, Garfagnana (Alpi Apuane).

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bine (Grande, piccola).

Sig. VECCHIETTI Enrico - Capitano Alpini Compl.
Roma, Via Clitunno, 22 p.1 - Tel. 862818 (abitaz.)
Ufficio: ore 8,30-13 - Tel. 683641

Fascia Ovest-Est Alpi Apuane da Carrara alla Garfagnana - Conca Fornovo di Taro ovest (appennino Tosco-emiliano) = Sarzana e fiume Magra = Catibona, Altare (Alpi Marittime) - Ovada (Appennino Ligure) = Nodo Monte Bego (Alpi Marittime) = Colle Sestriere = Alta Valsesia; Val Rima; Val d'Egua = La Zona di alta montagna dei gruppi: Gran Paradiso, di Val Savara; Cervino Monte Rosa; Monte Disgrazia; Ortles Cevedale; Adamello; Brenta centrale; Venoste, Passirie e Breonie di ponente (Linea di frontiera austriaca) = Alcune vie di alta montagna della Weisskamm (Oetztal), delle Vedrette di Ries (Alpi Pusteresi) - itinerari invernali e alpinistici: dell'alta Val Badia, dell'alta Val Gardena, dei Monti d'Ampezzo, dell'alta Valle Spöl - Conca di Brunico (Alpi Orientali Val Pusteria) = Rolle (Dolomiti S. Martino) = Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugana, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e le cime dell'Ortigara.

Guida locale : itinerario: Carrara, Colonnata, Falde Sagro, Falde Uccello, Val di Donna, Garfagnana (Alpi Apuane).

Conca di Brunico (Val Pusteria) = Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugano, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e Cime Ortigara = In genere le zone di alta montagna.

5103

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PRATICI DI ZONA

Sig. Marciano Massimo - Tenente complemento alpini
Roma, via Porro, 4
(effettivo al C.I.L.)

Alpi Apuane (dal M.Pisanino alla Penia della Croce, versante ovest sino al mare) - Sarzana e fiume Magra - Alpi Pennine - Api Graie - Gruppo Adamello - Gruppo Ortles Cevedale - Gruppo di Brenta centrale - Alpi Breonie di ponente - Alpi Pusteresi e conca di Brunico - Alta Val Gardena - Alta Val di Fassa - Conca di Cortina - Altopiano di Asiago.

Guida locale : Valsavarenche - Valgrisanche - Val di Rhemes - Valle del Piccolo San Bernardo - Val Ferret - Val Veni - Valpellina - Valtornenza - Valle d'Ayas - Val di Gressoney - Gruppo di Brenta centrale - Val di Solda - Alpe di Siusi - Passo Sella e Passo Gardena - Alpe di Fanes - Bassano del Grappa, M. Grappa e Valli circostanti.

Sig. VILLA Renato - Capitano Alpini S.P.E.
Roma, Via Genova 2 - Tel. 482505

Appennino modenese e zona del Pisano - Alpi Marittime - Alpi Cozie - Alpi Graie - Alpi Pennine - Alpi Venoste - Passirio - Busteresi - Conca di Brunico - Altopiano di Asiago.

Guida locale: Alpi Marittime (perfettamente) - Tutte le Valli d'Aosta (perfettamente) - Valsugana - Altipiano di Asiago - Zona montagnosa tra Val di Fiemme e Val d'Adige.

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sante ovest sino al mare) - Garzana e fiume Magra - Alpi Pennine - Api Graie - Gruppo Adamello - Gruppo Ortles Cevedale - Gruppo di Brenta centrale - Alpi Breonie di ponente - Alpi Pusteresi e conca di Brunico - Alta Val Gardena - Alta Val di Fassa - Conca di Cortina - Altopiano di Asiago.

Guida locale : Valsavaranche - Valgrisanche - Val di Rhemo - Valle del Piccolo San Bernardo - Val Ferret - Val Veni - Valpellina - Valtornenza - Valle d'Ayas - Val di Gressoney - Gruppo di Brenta centrale - Val di Solda - Alpe di Siusi - Passo Sella e Passo Gardena - Alpe di Fanes - Bassano del Grappa, M. Grappa e Valli circostanti.

Sig. VILLA Renato - Capitano Alpini S.P.E.

Roma, Via Genova 2 - Tel. 482505

Appennino modenese e zona del Pisano - Alpi Marittime - Alpi Cozie - Alpi Graie - Alpi Pennine - Alpi Venoste - Passirio - Busteresi - Conca di Brunico - Altopiano di Asiago.

Guida locale: Alpi Marittime (perfettamente) - Tutte le Valli d'Aosta (perfettamente) - Valsugana - Altipiano di Asiago - Zona montagnosa tra Val di Fiemme e Val d'Adige.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

- 7 AUG Rec'd

SECRET

Subject:- Italian Guides.

C(Ops) Branch
Adv Headquarters
Allied Armies in Italy

16/4/C(Ops

5 August 1944

To:- Capt. M.W. Salvadori
HQ Allied Control Commission
R.C. & M.G. Section
APO 394

Sir,

Colonel C.D. McCarthy has handed me your letter of 3 August 1944. I am collecting the names and qualifications of Italian mountaineers including members of the Club Alpino Italiano with knowledge of the mountainous country over which the Allied Armies are likely to operate. I have already received a list of 10 mountaineers who were selected from a number of Italians interviewed in Rome I understand, however, that others with local knowledge of the Appenines especially the vicinity of the Gothic Line are available. I would be gratified therefore for information as to these as soon as possible so that they can be made available. Exact information is required as to knowledge of ground and this should be traced in considerable detail giving routes traversed and mountains ascended.

If you would be so kind as to let me have a list of possible guides I will arrange to interview and select them.

5101

Yours truly,

F.S. Smythe

(F.S. Smythe)
Lieut. Colonel, C(Ops)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
R.C. & M. Section
APO 394

3 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Alpine Club.

TO : Colonel Repée Rieser
A.A.I. Adv.

I would be grateful if you would inform Brigadier Mannaiting that the Alpine Club presented me yesterday with their first list of of suitable men available.

M.S.
C.D. MC CARTHY,
Colonel,
Patriots Branch,
R.C. & M.G. Section.

MS/FRS.

5100

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Urgent

To: ~~Major Whitby~~ Colonel Ryan AAI
Adm.

From: Capt. SALVADOR, Judge Adv. Branch
AGC

I would be grateful if you would
have Uniform Brigadier Manners that
the Aguinaldo Club ~~has~~ presented me
yesterday with a first list of military
men ~~who~~ available.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1/8/44

List of people whom the leaders of the Alpine Club of Rome think suitable.

M. S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ISTRUTTORI PER LA TECNICA DELLA MONTAGNA

= SIG. BERLIRI ZOPPI Gaetano = Sottotenente Alpini = Compl.
Roma Via Brofferio, 6 Tel. 33152 = (Temporaneamente assente da Roma)

= SIG. CASTELLI TULLIO = Maggiore Alpini = S.T.E. =
Roma, Via Sistina, 15 Tel. 480235 =

X = SIG. COLESCHI GIUSEPPE
Tel. dopo le 10 am a 13-15 pm
Roma, Piazza Esedra, 43 Tel. 41305 =

= SIG. MARTELLO VITTORIO = Tenente Colonnello già Artiglieria Alpina S.T.E.
Roma, Via della Salara, 21 int. 3 Tel. 880074 =

= SIG. MEZZATESTA GUIDO = Tenente Alpini = Compl.
Roma, Via Marsala, 96 b) Tel. 44950 =

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= SIG. VECCHIETTI ENRICO = Capitano Alpini - Cpmpl.
Roma, Via Clitunno, 22 P.1 Tel. 862818 =

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PRATICI DI ZONA

= SIG. BERLIRI ZOPPI Gaetano = Sottotenente Alpini Compl. =
Roma, Via Brofferio, 6 Tel. 33152 =

Alta Valle Stura di Demonte (M. Tebrun, Col Puriac, En= chastraye, Col de la Pelouse, Col de Fourches) = Colle Sestrie re (M. Fraiteve, Solice) = Alta montagna del Gruppo Disgrazia, Cresta Forno e Cime Ovest Gruppo Bernina = Itinerari inverna= li della alta Val Gardena e Alta Val Badia = Alpi Aurine e Pusteresi = Altipiano Asiago = Versante Sud del Grappa = Guida locale: Alpi Aurine e Pusteresi = Conca di Brunico =

= SIG. CASTELLI Tullio = Maggiore Alpini-S.F.E. =
Roma, Via Sistina, 15 Tel. 480235 =

5096

Monte Cimone, Piane di Lama Mogogno, Pavullo nella Fri= gnano (Appennino Tosco=Emiliano) = Bona Valsavignone, Pas= so di Monte Coronaro, Verghereto, Bagno di Romagna (App. Umbro=Marchigiano, Zona a cavallo della strada Tiberina fr. Città di Castello e Bagno di Romagna) = App. Ligure (Zone a nord di Genova, Masone, Scoffera, Monte Fasce, Pro= montorio di Portofino) = Alpi Marittime (Valle Roja, Pigna, Briga M., Tende, Val Vermenagna, Valli italiane della Tinea Valli dei Gessi) = Alpi Cozie (Valle Stura di Demonte, Val Grana, Val Maira, Val Varaita,) = Alpi Graie (Valli del Pel= lice, Dora Riparia, Bestriere, Mongenève, M. Cenisio) = Al=

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

pi Dolomitiche (Zona Passo Costalun), Antermoie, Corti= na d'Ampezzo, Dobbiaco) = .

Guida locale: = Zona Valsavignone ecc. ecc. .... (Vedi sop.) Appennino Ligure (Vedi sop.) = Alpi Marittime: Alta e bas= se Valle Roia, Alta Valle Gesso = Alpi Cozie: Tutta la Val= le Stura di Demonte, Val Maira Zona di Chianale = Alpi Graie (Ved.sop.) = Alpi Dolomitiche: Zona Passo di Costa= lunga, Zona di Cortina d'Ampezzo.

= SIG. COLLEGHI GIUSEPPE

Piazza Esedra, 43 Tel. 41305 =

Alta Val Gardena (Sella, Sassolungo, ...) = Catinac= cio = Gruppo Ortles Cevedale =
Guida locale: Alta Val Gardena.

= CALZINI Mario

Roma, Via Candia, 25 Tel. 370305 =

N + W of Pistoia
Knows Lunigiana
between P° y B rds.
Knows 2nd hand information
F.L. near Passo delle Radici

Gruppo del Cimone, dal Abetone Ovest alla Via Porre= tana: Versante Nord sino a Pievepelago, Fanano, Gaggio; Versante Sud sino a Bagni Lucca, Pescia, Pistoia,.

Guida locale: Zona di cui sopra.

5695

= SIG. FERRERI Mario

Roma, Via in Arcione, 71 c Tel. 62402 =

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Alpi Apuane, dal Pizzo Uccello alle Pania: Versante est fino alla Carfagnana = Versante Ovest sino al piano =
(non si trasferisce fuori semicerchio)

= SIG. MARTELLO Vittorio = Tenente Colonnello già Artigl. Alpina-S.P.E. Roma, Via della Salara, 21 int. 3 Tel. 880074 =

Alpi liguri entro i limiti: Limone Piemonte, Fontana, Colle di Nava, Briga Marittima = Alte Valli del Gesso, Roia, Vesubie, Tinea, Stura di Demonte, Po, Varaita di Chianale, Chisone, Stura di Ala, = Alta Valsavara, Alta Val di Cogne = Alpi Pennine = Dolomiti di Brenta = Sella = Sassolungo = Marmolada = Guida locale: Zona a cavallo della displuviale fra M. Mongioie e Colle della Lombarde = Alta Valle del Po = Nodo del Colle del Mulo = Gruppo Nibla-Ambin = Alta Valle Stura d'Ala (Oltre Balme) = Zona di Cogne = Alta Valsavara =

= Sig. MEZZATESTA Guido = Tenente Alpini-Compl. Roma, Via Marsala, 96 b) Tel. 44957 =

5694

Gruppo del Bernina = Rosa = Adamello = Dolomiti Centrali = Disgrazia = Ortles Cevedale = Alpi Giulie (Monte Nero ecc.) =
Guida locale : Valle Isonzo = Tolmino = Bogatin = Scherbine (Grande, piccola).

./.

= Sig. VECCHIETTI ENRICO = Capitano Alpini Compl.

Roma, Via Clitunno, 22 p. 1° Tel. 862818 - ~~26.~~ - Ufficio P. tratte 13 n. tel. 6783641 a 5

Fascia Ovest-Est Alpi Apuane da Carrara alla Garfagnana = Conca Fornovo di Taro Ovest (Appennino Tosco-Emiliano) = Sarzana e fiume Magra = Catibona, Altare (Alpi Marittime)-Ovada (Appennino Ligure) = Nodo Monte Bego (Alpi Marittime) = Colle Sestriere = Alta Valsesia ; Val Rima ; Val d'Egua = La Zona di alta montagna dei gruppi: Gran Paradiso di Val Savara; Cervino Monte Rosa; Monte Disgrazia ; Ortler ; Cevedale ; Adamello; Brenta centrale; Veronese, Passirie e Breonie di ponente (Linea di frontiera austriaca) = Alcune vie di alta montagna della Weisskamm (Oetztal), delle Vedrette di Ries (Alpi Pusteresi) = itinerari invernali e alpinistici: dell'alta Val Badia, dell'alta Val Gardena, dei Monti d'Ampezzo, dell'alta Valle Sarol = Conca di Brunico (Alpi Orientali Val Pusteria) = Rolle (Dolomiti S.Martino) = Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugana, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e le cime dell'Ortigara.

Guida locale: itinerario: Carrara, Colonnata, Falde Sagro, Falde Uccello, Val di Donna, Garfagnana (Alpi Apuane) =

Conca di Brunico (Val Pusteria)

Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugano, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e Cime Ortigara =

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Fascia Ovest-Est Alpi Apuane da Carrara alla Garfagnana = Conca Formovo di Taro Ovest (Appennino Tosco Emiliano) = Sarzana e fiume Magra = Catibona, altare (Alpi Marittime)-Ovada (Appennino Ligure) = Nodo Monte Bego (Alpi Marittime) = Colle Sestriere = Alta Valsesia ; Val Rima ; Val d'Egua = La Zona di alta montagna dei gruppi: Gran Paradiso di Val Savara; Cervino Monte Rosa; Monte Disgrazia ; Ortles Cevedale ; Adamello; Brenta centrale; Venoste, Passirie e Breonie di ponente (Linea di frontiera austriaca) = Alcune vie di alta montagna delle Weisskamm (Oetztal), delle Vedrette di Ries (Alpi Pusteresi) = itinerari invernali e alpinistici: dell'alta Val Badia, dell'alta Val Gardena, dei Monti d'Ampezzo, dell'alta Valle Stol = Conca di Brunico (Alpi Orientali Val Pusteria) = Rolle (Dolomiti S.Martino) = Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugana, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e le cime dell'Ortigara.

Guida locale: itinerario: Carrara, Colonnata, Valde Sagro, Valde Uccello, Val di Donna, Garfagnana (Alpi Apuane) =

Conca di Brunico (Val Pusteria)

Conca di Strigno e Borgo Valsugano, col Gruppo Cimon Rava e Cime Ortigara =

In genere le zone di alta montagna.

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PRATICI DI ZONA

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= Sig.Marciano Massimo - Tenente complemento alpini -
Roma , via Porro 4 -
(Effettivo al C.I.L.)

Alpi Apuane (dal M.Pisanino alla Pania della Croce, versante Ovest sino al mare)- Sarzana e fiume Magra - Alpi Pennine- Alpi Graie- Gruppo Adamello - Gruppo Ortles Cevedale - Gruppo di Brenta centrale - Alpi Breonie di ponente - Alpi Pusteresi e conca di Brunico- Alta Val Gardena - Alta Val di Fassa - Conca di Cortina. - Altopiano di Asiago.

Guida locale - Valsavaranche- Valgrisanche- Val di Rheme- Valle del Piccolo San Bernardo- Val Ferret - Val Veni - Valpelline - Valtornenza- Valle d'Ayas- Val di Gressoney - Gruppo di Brenta centrale + Val di Solda- Alpe di Siusi- Passo Sella e Passo Gardena- Alpe di Fanes - Bassano del Grappa, M.Grappa e Valli circostanti.

= Sig.Villa Renato - Capitano alpini S.P.E. -
Roma , Via Genova 2, Telef. 482505

~~Alpi Occidentali - Alpi della Frontiera Italo-Austriaca -~~
~~XXXX

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TOP SECRET

Headquarters
Eighth Army.
M 528 CL

Feb 45

HQ 5 Corps
13 Corps
1 Canadian Corps

Copy to: AFHQ.
15 Army Gp.
10 Corps.

Attached is a detailed account of Partisan Operations in the RAVENNA area.

On the subject of the handling of partisans and of the control and co-ordination of their activities with those of our own troops these operations offer a number of lessons which may prove of use when our advance brings us into contact with the Partisan Groups in the North.

(Sgd) G.A. Thomas

Brigadier,
General Staff.

PARTISAN OPERATIONS

in the RAVENNA Area, 10 Sep - 7 Dec 44

PREAMBLE

The operations, an account of which is attached, had their origin in an isolated mission carried out by OSS for GSI at this HQ.

The planning and development of the operations was carried out by C.C. O.S.S. Det Eighth Army and C.C. O.S.S. Maritime Unit, with the co-operation of African Coastal Flotilla (Northern Adriatic), and D.A.F. Co-ordination was the responsibility of GSI (Civil Liaison) at Army. At a later stage the control and development of the operation was delegated to HQ 1 Cdn Corps.

CONTENTS

1. Communications

(a) W/T

The whole success of this operation was founded on W/T communications. The W/T operators were supplied by OSS Maritime Det and OSS Eighth Army Det, and were trained by OSS Eighth Army Det. Without W/T communication no contact could have been made with the partisans, no arms or supplies delivered, and no information passed or co-ordinated plan put into operation. Signal communications worked very smoothly throughout, due to the training and handling of the operators. At one moment the amount of intelligence traffic was so unexpectedly large that the code books ran out and it was difficult, owing to weather, to get more in. Only mutual confidence between the radio operators and the control at this juncture prevented the operators, the set, and all the partisans from coming down into our lines.

A total of 339 messages were passed from the set to the control.

(b) Sea and Air

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This was always extremely uncertain due to moon and weather conditions, and outside factors, such as unexpected German movements near the pin-point, and mistaken signals. It is anticipated that more use can be made of the partisans' own rowing boats in operations in the coastal sector up to VENICE. The prevalence of mines near the coast between the COMACCHIO and VENICE, as well as the oncoming winter storms, will make boating by MTBs increasingly difficult throughout the winter.

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2. Co-ordination

A central Allied co-ordinating body at Army is essential, with delegations which include two CSS Dets, Army and R.A.F., as well as the formations operating in the area and the possible participation of such units as FFA and FSG (formerly "X" Force).

3. Liaison

With forces in which a small handful is as important as it is with partisans, a near comment and a personal visit by an Allied officer is important. At a later stage the presence of a Canadian L.O. from 5th Corps made it possible to obtain close co-ordination with operations by our troops.

The job of an L.O. in these circumstances is not an easy one. He should be responsible for explaining to the partisans the difficulty of supply, Allied situations, conditions in liberated Italy, situation of the Italian army, and what will happen after Liberation. Unless informed on these points, partisans may take difficulties because they are not immediately controlled and taken as frustrations "to the Premier". By explaining how best partisans may help the Allied cause, showing how this help redounds to the credit of Italy, pointing out facts about training, equipment, and the action ceiling, misunderstandings and possible bitterness may be dissipated or may be avoided, and the best get out of the partisans when they meet our advancing forces.

The visit of Bailey to Army HQ did much for the success of the operations as a whole, and his interviews with CSI(b) about enemy agents, and with AMG on behalf of the Committee of National Liberation, all proved their value later.

4. Intelligence

Information from civilians requires careful checking. The arrival of an Allied Intelligence Officer with large scale maps, interpreters, and a new plan of RAVENNA resulted in an immediate improvement. By detailed interrogation and cross-checking it was possible to reduce conflicting views and inaccuracies to a minimum. All information was carefully collated before being passed [illegible] there is no doubt that [illegible]

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4. Intelligence

Information from civilians requires careful checking. The arrival of an Allied Intelligence Officer with large scales, photographs, and a town plan of RAVENNA resulted in an immediate improvement. By detailed interrogation and cross-checking it was possible to reduce exaggerations and inaccuracies to a minimum. All information was sifted and collated before being passed on, and there is no doubt that a high degree of reliability was obtained. German batteries were engaged within a few hours of moving into new positions, and independent reports confirmed that the German complained of the extraordinary accuracy of our artillery fire. Examples of the intelligence provided will be found at Appendix "D".

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5. Detention of Command

It is essential that Command of partisans behind the lines who have been organised and supplied under Army directions, should be delegated at the right moment to the formation and later the units which will meet them on the ground. Units on the ground should be fully informed as to what they are meeting, and appropriate ends for supplies. For example, during the period 4 - 6 Dec when ammunition was urgently required and the Army 5.7" howitzer was trying to fly it in - unsuccessfully owing to unsuitable duty weather - Command had not been delegated to brigade or lower, and it was left to PIA to contact the partisans on their own initiative and get the ammunition in by sledge & hand route.

6. Tactics

It is now considered that a complicated operation, such as the occupying of Sant' Alberto and La Cilla and blowing the bridge at Sant' Alberto to prevent German armour counter-attacking normally came off. Since the partisans were not able to blow this bridge the holding of these villages became valueless and, indeed, a liability, for the German counter-attack took them right down to the canal half way to Ravenna.

As the Commander-in-Chief concludes in his report: "All our most successful actions were those in which forty or fifty partisans fought for four or five minutes and then retired into the night in little bands. On a number of occasions we attacked the enemy in prepared areas and held ground for a limited length of time, but in every case I felt that it was too ambitious. The partisan attack on PONTE GUBBINI through an enemy minefield was very well set and so vigorous that the Germans were driven from their arms SOME of the post before they had time to carry out their final conditions. For that reason the operation may be considered a success, but it was a serious risk to the extreme and it could easily have cost us a great many men because we were inadequately armed to do the job". Experience elsewhere confirms the verdict in favour of hit-and-run tactics since, however courageous personally, the partisans are almost always inferior to the enemy in concerted arms and in training.

7. Personnel, Equipment and Organisation

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7. Partisan leadership and organisation

A partisan movement in the present situation in Italy can grow up from virtually nothing, provided there is the right [illegible] facilities to get W/T sets and supplies from. At least a skeleton organisation must exist: in this case it was the military junta (2 C.P. Bde) of the Provincial Committee of National Liberation, and a first rate leader and organiser who already [illegible] the official representatives of the Committee. The importance of good organisation will increase as we [illegible] further North in the PO Valley, where Fascist activity and German counter measures drive partisan activity more and more underground.

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NARRATIVE

Early in September a party of Italian "San Marco" Marines, run by OSS Maritime Unit, were landed "blind" by MTB North of PORTO CORSINI with the task of getting through to FORLI an Italian engineer who had previously provided plans of the GOTHIC Line. The engineer thought that he could contact members of the Committee of Liberation who would in turn put him in touch with FORLI firms working on the GOTHIC defences. The whole party with any plans were to be evacuated in 5 days; it included a wireless operator known as radio BIONDA who was set working back to OSS Det attached 8th Army HQ. The engineer got to FORLI but returned to the coast without having accomplished his mission. In the meantime the landing party had, with considerable difficulty, contacted the local partisans who consisted of 200 local peasants hiding out in the marshes and armed with one Italian MMG and a few rifles and shot guns. The band was part of 28 GAP Bde organised by the Committee of Liberation in RAVENNA and put under the command of an Italian officer Lieut Arrigo BOLDRINI (nom de guerre Major BULOW).

On our instructions the partisans began to collect intelligence in RAVENNA Province and supplies were promised. A tented camp was set up on an island in the marshes, the set being defended by the solitary machine gun.

Owing to continual bad weather it was not possible to make a landing before the end of the dark period. The OSS party was not equipped for a protracted stay and finally came down to RIMINI by fishing boat on 11 Oct with a detailed intelligence report of the area. But they left behind the wireless operator, although suffering from malaria, in order to keep going the flow of intelligence: daily reports were received of coastal traffic to PORTO CORSINI and had already resulted in the sinking by DAF of several barges.

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The partisans and the wireless operator who were "living up to their knees in water" became steadily more discouraged as supplies failed to arrive. On night 16/17 Oct, first day when moon and weather conditions finally made operations possible, two tons of arms and supplies from OSS and Army resources were landed. The CO, OSS Det Eighth Army and 2 (CL) accompanied the expedition and presented the partisans on the

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of the Teatro line. The engineer knew at least 10 contact members of the Committee of Liberation who would in turn put him in touch with PCDI fir s working on the ...Dies defences. The whole party with any plans were to be evacuated in 5 days, it included a wireless operator known as Radio Bluff with a set working back to OSS Detachment at Bary HQ. The engineer got to PORLI but returned to the coast without having accomplished his mission. In the meantime the landing party had, with considerable difficulty, contacted the local partisans who consisted of 200 local peasants hiding out in the marshes and armed with one Italian MMG and a few rifles and shot guns. The band was part of 28 GAP Bde organised by the Committee of Liberation in RAVENNA and put under the command of an Italian officer Lieut Arrigo BOLDRINI (now Se Guerre Major BIRGW).

On our instructions the partisans began to collect intelligence in RAVENNA Province and supplies were promised. A target only was set up on an island in the marshes, the set being defended by the solitary machine gun.

Owing to continued bad weather it was not possible to make a landing before the end of the dark period. The OSS party was not equipped for a protracted stay and finally came down to RIMINI by flight, but on 11 Oct with a detailed intelligence report of the area. But they left behind the wireless operator, although suffering from malaria, in order to keep going the flow of intelligence. Daily reports were received of coastal traffic to PORTO GARIBALDI and had already resulted in the sinking by MAP of several barges.

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Army was at this time considering the possibilities of a landing by MAP behind the enemy lines. It was decided to send in a Recce party from MAP to investigate the possibilities of landing and operating Jeeps in the PORTO GARIBALDI area and Eastwards. The partisans, through the OSS link, had arranged a reception in this area on 13 Nov, but the landing

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was unsuccessful owing to bad weather, as were subsequent attempts at our usual landing place N of PORTO CORSINI.

In the meantime the partisans had located two missing OSS groups who had been dropped in the area by parachute on 4 Nov, and whose wireless sets had been put out of action by the drop. They also reported that they would shortly be receiving from the Committee of Liberation in RAVENNA an American pilot whom OSS had, on the request of 12th Air Force, asked the partisans to locate. He was shortly afterwards joined by a British pilot who had also baled out in the area. On 28 Oct a detachment of 300 of BULOW's partisans of the 28 GAP Bde, under the impression that we were about to enter RAVENNA, marched down STUTTGART road and reached our lines safely while certain redeps were in progress. These were distributed by the Partisan LO with PORTERFORCE among units and did useful work as guides and patrols, particularly with PPA and 27 L.

Intelligence showed a steady improvement. Many targets were engaged by D.F; successes included several barges sunk and an ammunition dump blown up. In the dark period in the middle of Oct repeated efforts were made to get in supplies but were prevented by weather or mishaps (e.g. the MTB getting involved in submarine nets).

Since the partisans were growing very impatient a further attempt was made on a misty night on 3/4 Nov during the moon period. It was decided to infiltrate the G3(CL) to co-ordinate partisans behind the enemy lines with operations by the forward troops, and also improve the intelligence service. Unfortunately the Italian MTB stuck in the entrance of SENIGALLIA harbour and subsequently caught fire.

Weather conditions were not again suitable for ten days. The situation was now serious since the ciphers (and time table) had run out and the partisans were threatening to cross the lines if their supplies did not arrive. On the nights of 16/17 Nov and 17/18 Nov a renewed attempt was made to infiltrate the G3 (CL) and another OSS wireless operator with the ciphers. Lights at PORTO CORSINI were selected for the partisan signals and the MTB joined, and was hailed by, a convoy being guided into the harbour to pick up German troops who were evacuating. When the German traffic had died down, two rubber boats, manned by OSS/Special Forces personnel, were launched towards a red and

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concentrate on intelligence until our arrival, and begin, in co-ordination with the Canadian Corps attack, operations -

a. small scattered actions on Route 16 between ELVENA and .ELOUGH

b. to seal off the Germans in FORET DE CORBIE and any w pockets in ELVENA and area

It was also decided to try out German reaction as soon as possible and see what reprisals they would take as the result of a small raid on a German outpost. As it was intended to delegate the command of DULOW's partisans to the unit or formation operating in the area, it was decided at the request of Canadian Corps, to send in Capt D. HEALY as representative of Can Corps HQ.

On the night of 22/23 Nov, on the second attempt, DULOW got through in his row-boat, taking with him Capt HEALY, a reserve OSS operator and some essential supplies. On the following night the DLT operation was finally brought off and 4 tons of arms, explosives and supplies, including medical supplies and instruments, were landed. Owing to thinning out of Germans along the coast it was possible to flash signals at every 1/2 hr. for a distance of 3 miles. The boat returned with two escaped Allied PW and two German deserters.

With the arrival of Capt HEALY intelligence showed an immediate and startling improvement. As a result of the advance up to the BUTTE it was now possible to spot targets for the artillery as well as for bombing, and the area covered by the intelligence net-work was extended inland to cover the front as far as AMIENS. Gun positions, troop concentrations etc, were daily reported and results of fire observed if possible. The OSS link for the next fortnight was dealing with 1,000 to 1,500 groups from the ELVENA party alone in addition to handling messages from other sets in enemy occupied territory. The information was particularly valuable since during most of this period bad weather made air reconnaissance impossible.

That so close a watch could be kept on German activity was largely due to the many stalwart, elderly peasant women to move about the countryside. These women were in fact the partisans' "runners", they carried, concealed about their persons, sketches, intelligence reports, marked maps and mail, and returned to their point of departure with orders from DULOW. Information was sifted as far as possible, checked and cross-checked by Capt

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On 29 Nov control of the partisans in the HAVENA area was passed from Army to Can Corps and on the following day the base station was moved from Army to Canadian Corps. Owing to the shortage of equipment and personnel this involved moving the entire OSS section which was also working two other sets in enemy territory.

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Capt HEALY reported further supplies were urgently required if the partisans were to be used in an operational role. The food situation was satisfactory since supplies were regularly airlifted from local civilians who also provided boats for transport, but the partisans were living under very difficult conditions. The men were half naked and had no means of keeping dry at night, groups of twenty or thirty would huddle together on a heap of straw under a tarpaulin and try to get a few hours rest. The partisans had a doctor but only a small amount of medical supplies sent in on the first landing when there were very few partisans. All weapons were clean and in working order, but the only deficient was brilliantine, and SHAEF were in rather short supply, particularly as expenditure is always heavy in partisan warfare since the men, not being trained soldiers, have no idea of conserving ammunition.

Arrangements were made to land the necessary supplies by MTB but owing to weather conditions this was not possible, though a party was sent down on 25/26 Nov and returned with supplies on the night 27/28. DAF laid on a successful drop on the night of 1/2 Dec when 5 planes dropped arms and supplies. Two of the containers with the mortars and a large amount of the ammunition were damaged owing to the parachutes not opening. Attempts were made to drop ammunition in improvised containers by our own Italian "S 79" bomber but owing to heavy mist the signal lights could not be seen.

Another OSS group with wireless set had been sent in with Capt HEALY to contact partisans near the mouth of the PO. On the way to his area this agent reported that he had met a SAAF pilot who had force-landed near PORTO GARIBALDI and was then routed South by partisans. The pilot was directed to BULLOW's headquarters and thence forward acted as assistant to Capt HEALY and took part in the various raids.

HQ Canadian Corps passed daily sitreps to the partisans and kept them informed of the air support available for any targets by them.

The small experimental raid which had been planned on a German outpost was carried out 25 Nov when a German 8 man patrol on the road from PORTO CORSINI to RAVENNA; 1 German was killed, and the only reprisals taken appear to have been systematic looting throughout the area. On 29 Nov the partisans began a preliminary attack on PORTO CORSINI with the object of testing out the partisans. Capt HEALY and Lieut D.C. RUDDELL, the

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An SBS group with wireless set had been sent in with Capt HEALY to contact partisans near the mouth of the PO. On the way to his area this group reported that he had met a S.A.F. pilot who had crash-landed near FORTE GARIBALDI and was then routed South by partisans. The pilot was directed to BULOW's headquarters and thence forward acted as assistant to Capt HEALY and took part in the various raids.

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The partisans forces were now divided into two Groups of 300 each with the following plan :

Group A. To occupy S. ALBERTO and LA CILLA South of LAKE COMACCHIO, blow the bridge at 512513, and then move in small groups towards ALFONSINE and IEZZANO to ambush enemy withdrawing on Route 16.

Group B. This was to be the main effort. To occupy or block enemy in MANDRIOLI and PORTO CORSINI, then move South to ambush enemy withdrawing between the sea and 5561.

Capt HEALY was ordered to start operations on 2 Dec. On the nights 1/2 Dec and 2/3 Dec ambush parties began to operate across Route 16, and E and NE of RAVENNA. Casualties inflicted on the enemy on these nights were 3 killed, 6 wounded and 2 PW of 114 Div.

On 3 Dec the partisans NE of IEZZANO were attacked by a scratch German force made up of supply personnel from Depot S. ALBERTO. They were easily beaten off and when later in the day a strong German patrol intervened, the partisans retired in good order. They claim to have killed 34 Germans in this action.

At first light of 4 Dec, 300 partisans attacked PORTO CORSINI, and by 1030 had occupied the Southern bank of the canal against little opposition, and reported 75 Germans blocked on the N bank. Many German dead were found in the streets.

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By the afternoon of 5 Dec partisan forces surrounding PORTO CORSINI were entangled in thick minefields and had many casualties. Meanwhile there was a rumour that the garrison was escaping by sea; this proved unfounded but Capt HEALY reported that he would not allow the partisans to make a second attack on prepared positions, particularly as there was now a serious shortage of ammunition.

A series of 6 blocks were instituted on the roads CASAL BORSETTI - PORTO CORSINI, RAVENNA - PORTO CORSINI. That day Lieut BADDELEY came down from PORTO CORSINI to RAVENNA leading 12 German PW who had been captured in the day's operations: and PBA patrols, which had arrived in the area yet in 60,000 rounds of S.A. to the partisans by road, took over the canals.

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Group B. This was to be the main effort. To occupy or block enemy in LAMDRIOLE and PORTO CORSINI, then move South to ambush enemy withdrawing between the sea and 5541.

Capt HEALY was ordered to start operations on 2 Dec. On the nights 1/2 Dec and 2/3 Dec ambush parties began to operate across Route 16, and E and SE of RAVENNA. Casualties inflicted on the enemy on these nights were 3 killed, 6 wounded and 2 PW of 114 Div.

On 3 Dec the partisans SE of MEZZANO were attacked by a scratch German force made up of supply personnel from Gruppe at S. ALBERTO. They were easily beaten off and when later in the day a strong German patrol intervened, the partisans retired in good order. They claim to have killed 34 Germans in this action.

At first light of 4 Dec, 36th partisans attacked PORTO CORSINI, and by 1030 had occupied the Southern bank of the canal against little opposition, and reported 75 Germans blocked on the N bank. Many German dead were found in the streets.

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By the afternoon of 5 Dec partisan forces surrounding PORTO CORSINI were entangled in thick minefields and had many casualties. Meanwhile there was a rumour that the garrison was escaping by sea: this proved unfounded but Capt HEALY reported that he would not allow the partisans to make a second attack on prepared positions, particularly as there was now a serious shortage of ammunition.

A series of 6 blocks were instituted on the roads CASAL BORSETTI - PORTO CORSINI, RAVENNA - PORTO CORSINI. That day Lieut BUDDILD captured from PORTO CORSINI to RAVENNA leading 12 German PW who had been captured in the day's operations: and FFA patrols, which had arrived in the area got 60,000 rounds of SAA to the partisans by moving boat along the canals.

At first light on 5 Dec S. ALBERTO was attacked and was occupied by the afternoon. L. CASSINA, LAMDRIOLE and LA CILLA were occupied by midday. LAMDRIOLE was occupied without fighting: as Bty I partisans entered the village and fixed notices in German announcing that the place was surrounded by

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partisans, the Allies only ten miles away, and calling on the Germans there to surrender. 14 Germans surrendered while the rest, some 15, dispersed.

At SAN ALBERTO the situation became confused. The village had been occupied against German opposition and with some casualties on both sides. It was found, however, impossible to blow the bridge at 512513, owing to not being able to find the fuses and charges, and the machinery to set it off. The German counter-attack which developed later in the afternoon consisted of about 5 SP guns, a few armed cars and some borried infantry: the partisans, who were armed only with Stens and rifles with a few MGs, were thrown into some confusion, and by the morning of 6 Dec had severe casualties. BULOW, who was directing operations in this area, and was wounded in the stomach, succeeded in making and orderly withdrawal on to the line of the canal running along the 45 Northing, and, to avoid reprisals had ordered the evacuation of the villages North of the canal by the civilian population. Even so, the reprisals that the Germans have taken up to date against SANT' ALBERTO have totalled 72 villagers hanged. The German armour finally retired, abandoning the attempt to relieve PORTO CORSINI from the north, largely as the result of a very courageous act by the OSS assistant wireless operator MALETTO, who took three Teller mines and placed them on the road C.S.A. BORSETTI - PORTO CORSINI, blowing up a German half track filled with troops. The fact that the enemy, at a time when a major attack was going on on the Corps front, saw fit to detach a small armoured force to deal with the partisans shows that the vigorous and unexpected attack of some 900 irregulars on his flank was not without effect.

During the main operations 3 Dec - 6 Dec, 27 German PW were taken by the partisans, and 37 dead were counted on the ground: but, it is certain, according to various accounts, that a much larger number were in fact killed and wounded. Capt HEALY's estimate is 75 - 125 killed and 30 - 50 wounded. Other achievements during this period include :

Three small bridges on the rd Due P. at RAVENNA saved from demolition, and the charges stacked some way away.

Mines cached in RAVENNA, and given by partisan guides to

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some casualties on both sides. It was found, however, impossible to blow the bridge at 512513, owing to not being able to find the fuses and charges, and the machinery to set it off. The German counter-attack which developed later in the afternoon consisted of about 5 SP guns, a few armed cars and some horsed infantry. The partisans, who were armed only with Sten and rifles with a few LMGs, were thrown into some confusion, and by the morning of 6 Dec had had severe casualties. BULOW, who was directing operations in this area, and was wounded in the stomach, succeeded in making and orderly withdrawal on to the line of the canal running along the 45 Northing, and, to avoid reprisals had ordered the evacuation of the villages North of the canal by the civilian population. Even so, the reprisals that the Germans have taken up to date against SANT' ALBERTO have totalled 72 villagers hanged. The German armour finally retired, abandoning the attempt to relieve PORTO CORSINI from the north, largely as the result of a very courageous act by the OSS assistant wireless operator FILETTO, who took three Teller mines and placed them on the road CASAL BORSETTI - PORTO CORSINI, blowing up a German half track filled with troops. The fact that the enemy, at a time when a major attack was going on on the Corps front, saw fit to detach a small armoured force to deal with the partisans shows that the vigorous and unexpected attack of some 900 irregulars on his flank was not without effect.

During the main operations 3 Dec - 6 Dec, 27 German PW were taken by the partisans, and 37 dead were counted on the ground: but, it is certain, according to various accounts, that a much larger number were in fact killed and wounded. Capt HEALY's estimate is 75 - 125 killed and 30 - 50 wounded. Other achievements during this period include :

Three small bridges on the rd due N. of RAVENNA saved from demolition, and the charges stacked some way away.

Mines marked in RAVENNA, and shown by partisan guides to our own tps entering the town.

An important SD agent, whose apprehension had been requested by CSI(b) during BULOW's visit to HQ Eighth Army, was handed over with his W/T set to the FSS in RAVENNA. Largely as a result of BULOW's interview with MG during this visit maximum collaboration was obtained from the local authorities and the civilian population.

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On 7 Dec the bulk of the partisans were withdrawn to BARI on orders of Canadian Corps, where they were refitted and re-equipped. Some 420 are now co-operating successfully with our troops in the coastal sector: of these 300 are at the moment in the line and have already captured a number of prisoners, including 7 saboteurs.

H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY.
4 Jan 45.

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H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY.
4 Jan 45.

Appendix "A"

MESSAGES DEALING WITH OPERATIONS

Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
24 Nov 0930	Partisans Control		Germans attempting to destroy partisans in area of 934521 SANT' ALBERTO nr SECCHIA 5000m TREMOTTE 524771 using launches in VALLI DI COMACCHIO. Send aircraft if possible. Urgent. HEALY.
24 Nov 1800	Partisans Control		6 man patrol regularly rd TRVENNA - PORTO CORSINI - PUNTA MARINA - RAVENNA. Will ambush and destroy.
24 Nov 1900	Partisans Control		Inf Coys in small cps S and N of RAVENNA. Partisans will harry and destroy isolated elements wherever ambush is possible. HEALY.
24 Nov 1900	Control	Partisans	For HEALY from KINGSMILL. If possible render ineffective demolition charges on brs route of adv. Removal would excite suspicion and defeat object. Suggest cutting wires and fuses and wetting charges. Advise if practicable.
25 Nov 1130	Partisans Control		Ambush 609426 two killed. Systematic looting throughout area.
25 Nov 1100	Partisans Control		Enemy has strong gds on brs prepared for dem. Impossible to remove or damage charges. If Cond wants particular br we can destroy charge but could only hold for short time with max support from gunners. We are bldg rafts to improvise foot br for the passage of inf and MICA, then under straw smoke.
25 Nov 1700	Partisans Control		Impossible for partisans to move area RUSSI-BAGNO CAVALLO-MEZZANO-RAVENNA. No conc here and NW of area [illegible] Plan 300

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		[illegible] Patrol using 2 vehicles in vicinity of CERVIA. Send aircraft if possible. Urgent. HEALY.
24 Nov 1600	Partisans Control	2 men patrol regularly rd RAVENNA - PORTO CORSINI - PUNTA ALBINA - RAVENNA. Will ambush and destroy.
24 Nov 1900	Partisans Control	Inf Coys in small pos E and W of RAVENNA. Partisans will harry and destroy isolated elements wherever ambush is possible. HEALY.
24 Nov 1900	Control Partisans	For HEALY from KINGSHILL. If possible render ineffective demolition charges on brs route of adv. Removal would excite suspicion and defeat object. Suggest cutting wires and fuses and wetting charges. Advise if practicable.
25 Nov 1130	Partisans Control	Ambush [illegible]9428 two killed. Systematic looting throughout area.
26 Nov 1100	Partisans Control	Enemy has strong pos on brs prepared for dem. Impossible to remove or dam ge charges. If Comd wants particular br we can destroy charge but could only hold for short time with max support from gunners. We are bldg rafts to improvise foot br for the passage of inf and hiding them under straw stacks.
26 Nov 1700	Partisans Control	Impossible for partisans to move area RUSSI-BAGNO CAVALLO - LEZZANO - RAVENNA. No conc here and NW of SANT ALBERTO in marshes. Plan 300 partisans destroy enemy area SANT ALBERTO then move in small grs towards ALFONSINE LEZZANO to ambush enemy withdrawing along Route 16 and other routes. 300 here will destroy enemy MANDRIOLI and PORTO CORSINI then move S to ambush forces withdrawing from area between sea and 5541. If we can clear N bank R. UNITI nr sea and provide boats for

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
			ferrying can you reinforce us with some of 10(SM)'s dare-devils or one Inf coy. Our main effort will be along Route 16 and from area 5541 to sea. Partisans will have large labour gangs on road clearance. Early RE advice and mine detectors required.
26 Nov 2200	Control	Partisans	For REALY from PRATER. Your people now in coad sector. They will tie up plan with you.
28 Nov 1000	Partisans	Control	If Cond wants inf br built at night what sig will be given. Warn all tps that partisans will wear armband on left sleeve. As attack develops mines will be marked where possible.
28 Nov 1400	Partisans	Control	Have DAF stop indiscriminate strafing boats and craft in VALLI DI COMACCHIO. Germans use motor launches excl. Strafing hampers partisan activities and is causing casualties.
28 Nov 1500	Partisans	Control	70 enemy 5545 thought to be covering force against partisans. General impression that enemy fears your attack towards RUSSI and is now preparing withdrawal. Many tps have left RAVENNA. Details in two hours.
28 Nov 1700	Control	Partisans	From KIRKSMILL. Local attack by neighbours to capture br 4326 tonight therefore br blgs not possible. General. Original date and plan of attack stands unless weather gets worse. Plan t. cut Route 16 W of RUSSI and turn SE to RAVENNA.
29 Nov 0800	Partisans	Control	Before morning, partisans will

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			for RAVENNA. Early air service and mine detectors required.
26 Nov 2200	Control	Partisans	For HELLY from PRATER. Your people now in cond sector. They will tie up plan with you.
28 Nov 1000	Partisans	Control	If Cond wants inf br built at night what sig will be given. Warn all tps that partisans will wear armband on left sleeve. As attack develops mines will be marked where possible.
28 Nov 1400	Partisans	Control	Have DAF stop indiscriminate strafing boats and craft in VALLI DI COMACCHIO. Germans use motor launches excl. Strafing hampers partisan activities and is causing casualties.
28 Nov 1500	Partisans	Control	70 enemy SS45 thought to be covering force against partisans. General impression that enemy fears your attack towards RUSSI and is now preparing withdrawal. Many tps have left RAVENNA. Details in two hours.
28 Nov 1700	Control	Partisans	From KINGSMILL. Local attack by neighbours to capture br 4328 tonight therefore br bldg not feasible. General. Original date and plan of attack stands unless weather gets worse. Plan to cut Route 16 E of RUSSI and turn SE to RAVENNA.
29 Nov 0800	Partisans	Control	Before morning Partisans will attack E. CORSINI. Object to destroy enemy there and to discover strength of sub forces which will come to his assistance.
29 Nov 0945	Partisans	Control	Enemy forces E. CORSINI estimated 50 men reacted to our attack. We silenced 2 MGs and inflicted cas. Details not yet available.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
29 Nov 1930	Partisans	Control	Enemy appears to have moved entire res of RAVENNA area to P. CORSINI. Est strength 3 inf coys.
30 Nov 1330	Partisans	Control	3 - 88 in Zone 574368 driven out. MQ 556386 results unknown impossible to keep under observation believed v quiet. Arty fire extremely effective. Gratifying number of C/S. Enemy gunners nervous because you keep finding them in spite of cam.
30 Nov 1600	Partisans	Control	Owing to enemy movts this HQ changed to 830505.
1 Dec 0800	Control	Partisans	BGS requests you keep Germans actively employed E and NE of RAVENNA until our ops begin.
1 Dec 1200	Partisans	Control	Destruction of br 512513 will drive 200 of enemy just arrived in S.F ALBERO into our ambush. Can you bomb.
1 Dec 1700	Partisans	Control	3 armed parties will operate tonight E and NE of RAVENNA.
2 Dec 1200	Partisans	Control	Partisans night 1/2 Dec inflicted following C/S 2 enemy killed, 6 wounded, 2 captured alive. Own C/S 1 wounded.
2 Dec 1300	Partisans	Control	Partisans took two prisoners 5948. Cpl Harold BISCOFF(?) nr 1641 Gun. 111 Jaeger. Sur KUHN (?)20 (?) nr 7574 same unit.
3 Dec 0845	Partisans	Control	Partisan op night 2/3 Dec. Enemy killed 1. Other results unknown.
3 Dec 1100	Control	Partisans	GOC 1st Div wants to know how long partisans could hold br 808390 and 813380. Op planned 72 hrs time. How many hrs warning necessary to intm partisans that ops. If poss to hold brs ops they be delayed and covered.

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		extremely effective. Gratifying number of c s. Enemy gunners nervous because you keep finding them in spite of cam.
30 Nov 1800	Partisans Control	Owing to enemy movts this HQ changed to 830505.
1 Dec 0800	Control Partisans	BGS requests you keep Germans actively employed E and NE of RAVENNA until our ops begin.
1 Dec 1200	Partisans Control	Destruction of br 812713 will drive 200 of enemy just arrived in S.E. ALBERGO into our ambush. Can you bomb.
1 Dec 1700	Partisans Control	3 robust parties will operate tonight E and NE of RAVENNA.
2 Dec 1200	Partisans Control	Partisans night 1/2 Dec inflicted following c s 2 enemy killed, 5 wounded, 2 captured alive. Own c s 1 wounded.
2 Dec 1300	Partisans Control	Partisans took two prisoners 5048. Cpl Harold BISCHOFF(?) nr 1041 GNR. 11+ Gunner. Sgt KUHLE (?) nr 7574 same unit.
3 Dec 0845	Partisans Control	Partisan op night 2/3 Dec. Enemy killed 1. Other results unknown.
3 Dec 1100	Control Partisans	GOC 1st Div wants to know how long partisans could hold br 808398 and 813806. Op planned 72 hrs till. How many hrs warning necessary to land partisans that area. If poss to hold hrs can they be dropped and covered.
3 Dec 1100	Partisans Control	Partisans gain bitter action last night 3 of Dec with max violence and determination. Carrying out Comd's instns with regard to isolated enemy and highway 16.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
3 Dec 1700	Partisans	Control	Jerry reacted strongly to attack of 350 partisans on Highway 16 between MEZZANO and ALFONSINE night 2/3 Dec. Partisans inflicted fairly heavy one. Details later. We are going flat out but please send us ammo for our 18's and more grenades. Does GSI(b) particularly want RAFFAELE DIMO alive.
			Comment: Raffaele Dimo an Abwehr agent whom it was known the Germans planned to leave behind in RAVENNA with W/T set. SUL(W had been instructed by GSI(b) Eighth Army during his visit to capture and hold him.
3 Dec 1700	Control	Partisans	KINGSHILL to HEAVY. Attack going well. Approx front line 494310 to 470340 to 486343 along railway to 390330 down LAMONE. Neighbours attacking last night today SW of P.M 24. Believe all enemy will leave RAVENNA tonight and tomorrow. Understand partisans.
3 Dec 1700	Control	Partisans	If possible request RAFFAELE DIMO alive.
3 Dec 2030	Partisans	Control	Impossible to guarantee anything concerning brs 408398 and 413386. The few partisans from RAGA CAVALLO area have been incorporated int. coln now harrying enemy between MEZZANO and ALFONSINE along Highway 16.
4 Dec 0800	Partisans	Control	Partisans attacked at first light PORTO CORSINI and 508447 and 508428. Details later.
4 Dec 1030	Partisans	Control	Have blocked 75 enemy PORTO CORSINI.

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			send us gun for our 105s and more grenades. Does GSI(b) particularly want RATTENBURG DING alive.
			Comment: Raffaelo Ding an Abwehr agent whom it was known the Germans planned to leave behind in RAVENNA with W/T set. SULOW had been instructed by GSI(b) Eighth Army during his visit to capture and hold him.
3 Dec	1700	Control	Partisans	KINGSHILL to HILLY. Attack going well. Approx front line 484318 to 470340 to 485343 along railway to 390330 down L.of C. Neighbours trading last light today SW of Pad Za. Believe all enemy will leave RAVENNA tonight and tomorrow. Unleash the partisans.
3 Dec	1700	Control	Partisans	If possible request RATTENBURG DING alive.
3 Dec	2030	Partisans	Control	Impossible to guarantee anything concerning bns 408398 and 413386. The few partisans from D.OLA O.VALLO area have been incorporated into coln now carrying enemy between [illegible] and .DRUSINO along Highway 16.
4 Dec	0800	Partisans	Control	Partisans attacked at first light FORLI CURSI.T and 505447 and 500428. Details later.
4 Dec	1030	Partisans	Control	Have blocked 75 enemy FORLI CURSINI.
4 Dec	1220	Partisans	Control	Partisans report RAVENNA evacuated at 0700 hrs. Br being built over CURTI on Route 16.
4 Dec	1330	Partisans	Control	Boat with two wounded and one Br pilot will be square 00500 at 1500 hrs local time.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
4 Dec 1430	Partisans	Control	Enemy sent reinforcements from RAVENNA 1000 hrs. 1500 hrs German column moving North from F. CORSINI into our ambushes. 574374 - Garibaldi Square.
4 Dec 1700	Control	Partisans	In RAVENNA 574374. Coln approaching from W at 932305. Coln going NE to cut Route 16 now at BORGO FUSINA 4839.
4 Dec 2200	Control	Partisans	Partisans in holding role from there to coast at VALLI DI COMACCHIO depending on line enemy adopts. Partisans army to assemble soonest RAVENNA. Partisans our side of the line now assembling under Capt Maitland 27 Lancers. Request planning conference at RAVENNA as soon as convenient for BULOW his officers and yours. Suggest you turn over majority of arms to partisans to be left behind enemy lines as arms and equipment to be issued in RAVENNA. Make piece of supply landing point in VALLI DI COMACCHIO for partisans W of SAN ALBERTO and collect small boats on E coast VALLI DI COMACCHIO for ferrying supplies.
5 Dec 0715	Partisans	Control	Partisans located two pockets of enemy in RAVENNA. One of 30 in fort in SE other of 10. 2 Sqn 27L and partisans engaged them.
5 Dec 1015	Partisans	Control	Sending Lt MUDD 2L South African pilot and 11 prisoners to 6.2 Int. Con Corps. Escorted guard and 3 Lorries to S. SAVIO PINE VALLI DI COMACCHIO 5733. Lorries to report 1300 hrs.
5 Dec 1300	Partisans	Control	Last night tried to find a ferry

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4 Dec 1700	Control	Partisans	ing from W at 932805. Coln acing SE to cut Route 16 now at 8080 FUSARA 4639.
4 Dec 2200	Control	Partisans	Partisans in holding role from there to coast at VALLI DI COMACCHIO depending on line enemy adopts. Partisan army to assemble soonest RAVENNA. Partisans our side of the line now assembling under Capt Heitland 27 Lancers. Request planning conference at RAVENNA as soon as convenient for BULOW his officers and y.w. Suggest you turn over majority of arms to partisans to be left behind enemy lines as arms and equipment to be issued in RAVENNA. Make recce of supply landing point in VALLI DI COMACCHIO for partisans W of SAN ALBERTO and collect small boats on E coast VALLI DI COMACCHIO for ferrying supplies.
5 Dec 0715	Partisans	Control	Partisans lost last two pockets of enemy in RAVENNA. One of 30 in fort and other of 15. 2 Sqn 27L and partisans engaged them.
5 Dec 1015	Partisans	Control	Sending 1t MUDD 11 South African pilot and 11 prisoners to C.2 Int. Gun Corps. Send armed guard and 3 lorries C. S. Grab VIVEN UNEMI from FANO, 938735. Lorries to report 1300 hrs.
5 Dec 1300	Partisans	Control	Last night tried to find anybody in authority in RAVENNA dispersed to help. For CSI(1) 2 Army. RAVENNA DMG is alive and in RAVENNA gaol.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
5 Dec 1300	Partisans Control		If you can provide max support assistance Highway 16 will be cleared to MEZZANO in 24 hrs. Population of RAVENNA warned all mines as instr.
5 Dec 1300	Partisans Control		occupying PORTO CORSINI. Germans there withdraw towards CASAL BORSETTI now strongly held by us. LA CASSINA 8(54 ours. MANDRIOLI ours. SAN ALBERTO following. LA CILLA 8(51 ours.
5 Dec 1300	Control	Partisans	Do you own SAN ALBERTO and PORTO CORSINI. Am sour that enemy escaping latter by boat. Can you confirm.
5 Dec 1345	Partisans Control		Sitrep. 5 Dec. Enemy blocked in PORTO CORSINI but I will not authorise second assault on prepared posns. Will let artl 5G on ice for PORSNI or any regular tps. Coln 11G strong attacked SAN ALBERTO first light. If you can get bridging thro through today will exploit W or SW. as Corps instructs.
5 Dec 1630	Partisans Control		Fighting through thick mine fds P. CORSINI. Two enemy strongpts still holding out. Progress slow but PORTO CORSINI should be ours by last light.
5 Dec 1800	Partisans Control		We don't know the situation P. CORSINI. SAN ALBERTO was falling 1200 hrs. Confirmation that town is in our hands expected 1800 hrs. Some enemy may have left by sea last night but we are still killing people we are sure came from there.

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			where withdrew towards Grosseto. BORGHESE now strongly held by us. L. CASSIA 6054 cure. ILDEBRANDO cure. SAN ANDREA falling. La CILLA 5051 cure.
5 Dec	1300	Control	Partisans Do you con. SS. ALBERTO and PEDRO CORSINI. Rumour that enemy escaping. Letter by boat. Can you confirm.
5 Dec	1345	Partisans Control	Sitrep. 5 Dec. Enemy blocked in LUCIO CASELLA but I will not authorise second assault on preparation grens. Will let artie 60 shells for PIRSKI or any regular type. Coln 11C strong attacked SAN ALBERTO direct in it. If you can get brewing, drive through today will exploit W or SW, as Gond instructs.
5 Dec	1630	Partisans Control	Fighting through thick mine fds T. CORSINI. Two enemy strong pts still holding out. Progress slow but PIETRO CORSINI should be ours by last light.
5 Dec	1800	Partisans Control	We don't know the situation T. CORSINI. SS. ALBERTO was falling 1200 hrs. Communication that town is in our hands expected here. Some enemy may have left by aut. last night but we are still killing people we are sure could from there.
5 Dec		Partisans Control	C.S.I. BORSIENI - still fighting. Partisans have made local by CORSINI and there and also by BORSIENI and ILDEBRO.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
5 Dec	Cdn Corps	8 Army	2 enemy strong points holding out in CORSINI. Partisans attacking. S. ALBERTO - situation vague. C. BORSETTI and MANDRIOLE 5652, LA COSINA 5650 and LA CILLA 5651 all in our hands. HEAVY can get 100 boats 400 lb capacity. SAAF escaped officer brought in 12 PW.
5 Dec 1200	Control	Partisans	German password tps area SAN ALBERTO 6 Dec HINSCH. CABE 7 Dec GLASS. ROHR.
6 Dec	Partisans	Control	Large punitive raid near ALBERTO towards C.BORSETTI. 5 by tanks, PW say "Tigers". Some SPs. Inf with 3" mortars, drove partisans out of ALBERTO.
6 Dec	Partisans	Control	All roads out of CORSINI blocked by partisans. 562429 [illegible]) 562421) rd 562480 on canal) blocks 563480) C.S BORSETTI) 562533) road blocks 614556) MANDRIOLE) Fighting at ALBERTO 512510 LA CILLA C. BORSETTI 567480) strong Bridge over canal 595456) points Houses 595458) Many Germans in woods 59 - 60 Lastings. S ALBERTO 5646 concentration of 3-4 in marshes. Some South to harass Route 16. Reaction strong - mortars etc. Ambush now established at LA CILLA. 560/9 to G for Partisans - BULOW etc.

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			c.n 86t 100 boats 40C lt capacity. S.A.F escaped officer brought in 12 PW.
5 Dec	1200	Control	Partisans German password this area SAN ALBERTO 6 Dec HIRSCH. CAPE 7 Dec GLASS. NOW.
5 Dec		Partisans Control	Large punitive raid near ALBERTO towards C.BORSETTI. 5 by tanks, 2W say "Bisons". Some Sigs. Inf with 3" mortars, drove partisans out of ALBERTO.
5 Dec		Partisans Control	All roads out of CORSINI blocked by partisans. 037429 CASTIL-MANIN) 612641) rd 620460 on canal) blocks 630480) CAS BORSETTI) 620533) road blocks 613556) MANNICELE) Fighting nr ALBERTO 512510 L. CILLA C. NUOVA 587480) strong Bridge over canal 595450) points Houses 595480) Many Germans in woods 59 - 60 Meetings. S ALBERTO 544 concentration of 3-400 in morshes. Come South to harass Route 16. Junction strong - mortars etc. Ambush now established at L. CILLA. CCC/9 'C' Gp for Partisans - BULOW etc. L.VENNA Every civilian in town reporting on mines and warning them.
8 Dec		Partisans Control	Yesterday partisans KO'd half-track between C BORSETTI and P CORSINI by moving German mines.

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Appendix "D"

EXAMPLES OF MESSAGES DEALING WITH INTELLIGENCE

Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
19 Sep 1700	Partisans Control		Bomb the petrol dump under the vines on the east side of route 67 from point 302405 to 300390 by 150 metres deep. Scale 1:25,000. Bomb the four houses west of the road and 100 metres south of the river at point 613390 Scale 1:100,000. There are tps and explosives. In the first white house north of the river and west of the road there is a German TCPT headquarters.
21 Oct 1000	Partisans Control		At point 32[illegible]61 on the south bank of the canal dock workers are unloading gun and ammo. On the south bank beneath the Church there is a barge loaded with ammo. Bomb immediately. Scale 1:25,000 RAVENNA
23 Oct 1300	Partisans Control		There are 7-105 mm cannons at 575518 150 metres south of S. ILLARIO - MADRICE road situated among the first rows of vines alongside of the path on the edge of the vineyard. At the end of the path in the same vineyard are two 20 mm AA guns. Scale 1:25,000 ILLARIO
23 Oct 1700	Partisans Control		The Coy of the 329th Regt of the Turcoman Div is in MADRICE.
24 Oct 1430	Partisans Control		Approx 700 Germans billeted in houses at S[illegible] ILLARIO. Bomb the two storey house with the pyramidical roof at 576253 200 metres North of the railroad and 20 metres west of the road. The house is surrounded by a small [illegible]

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		by 150 metres deep. Scale 1:25,000. Both the four houses west of the road and 100 metres south of the river at point 613338 Scale 1:100,000. There are two rail explosives. In the first white house north of the river and west of the road there is a German ECDF headquarters.
21 Oct 1000	Partisans Control	At point 328481 on the south bank of the canal dock workers are unloading war time party. On the south bank beneath the Church there is a large locked with van. Scale immediately. Scale 1:25,000 MAPSTA
23 Oct 1300	Partisans Control	There are 7-105 mm guns at 375518 150 metres south of S. ANDREO - MONDRAGON road situated among the first rows of vines along side of the path on the edge of the vineyard. At the end of the path in the same vineyard are two 20 mm AA guns. Scale 1:25,000 MANDRIER
23 Oct 1700	Partisans Control	The Coy of the 389th Regt of the Turcoman Div is in LANDRIEN.
24 Oct 1430	Partisans Control	Approx 700 Germans billeted in houses at SAINT CLOTTO. Both the two storey house with the pyramidical roof at 376453 200 metres North of the railroad and 20 metres west of the road. The house is surrounded by a small wood of very high trees and is a German HQ and Check Point (importance indicated by 17 telephone lines servicing it) There is a large ammunition dump under the trees in the woods.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
24 Oct 1700	Partisans	Control	Ammo dump located under the trees at 516515 in the Memorial Park of SANT' ALESSIO. Scale 1:100,000
25 Oct 1730	Control	Partisans	Try to give us a better description and pinpoints of Memorial Park.
26 Oct 2130	Partisans	Control	Memorial Park of SANT' ALESSIO is in form of rectangle 100 metres long and 30 metres wide containing small cypress trees and surrounded by a hedge. Located at 524520 100 metres west of the Public Gardens between the two small groups of houses on the North side of the road. These houses are West of the crossroads.
24 Oct 1900	Partisans	Control	From a trustworthy German we've learned that a raft loads with cannon and gun will leave RAVENNA this week for VENEZIA tonight at 2100 hrs local time.
25 Oct 1100	Partisans	Control	There 3 wagon loads of war material, horses and tps in 2 large bamboo shacks at point 625407 - 100 metres south of the only house on the edge of the pine wood. Request bombing.
28 Oct 1800	Partisans	Control	The SANT' ALESSIO - RAVENNA rd is flooded with 20 cm of water where it crosses the LAMONE river (547479). A minefield in in the area bordered by the following points: 550349 - 553329 - 549355 - 551335. The field is 400 metres long and 50 metres wide continuing along the E bank of the LAMONE river for 100 m.
30 Oct 1300	Partisans	Control	Battery of 5 - 14.5 cm cannon emplaced with bunkers

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		Memorial Park.
25 Oct 213[illegible]	Partisans Control	Memorial Park of SANTA ALBERTO is in form of rectangle 100 metres long and 30 metres wide containing small cypress trees and surrounded by a hedge. Located at 525520 100 metres west of the Public Gardens between the two small groups of houses on the North side of the road. These houses are West of the crossroads.
24 Oct 1900	Partisans Control	From a trustworthy German agent we learned that a raft loaded with cement and rum will leave RAVENNA and head for VENEZIA tonight at 2100 hrs local time.
27 Oct 1100	Partisans Control	There 3 wagon loads of war material, horses and tpe in 2 large bamboo sheds at point 623407 - 100 metres south of the only house on the edge of the pine wood. Request bombing.
29 Oct 1800	Partisans Control	The SANTA ANDREA - RAVENNA rd is flooded with 2[illegible] cm of water where it crosses the LAMONE river (547478). A minefield in the area bordered by the following points: 530348 - 528349 - 529352 - 531335. The field is 60 metres long and 50 metres wide continuing along the S bank of the LAMONE River for 100 m.
30 Oct 1300	Partisans Control	Battery of 3 - 149 mm camon emplaced with branches located at 541402 on the W bank of the canal west of the rd. Scale 1:25,000.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
11 Oct 1130	Partisans	Control	Two 105 mm guns at 525338 One 105 mm gun at 533358 Two 105 mm guns at 555371 Scale 1:100,000
31 Oct 1130	Partisans	Control	Large conc of munitions in the COLLINA GENINA at 537427. 3-75mm guns and 30 men at 553358. Four 105 MM guns and 30 men at 547360. Scale 1:100,000
1 Nov 0830	Partisans	Control	Conc of vhc and tps among the houses E of the rd at ERE DeVITE 552415. Scale 1:25,000.
1 Nov 1130	Partisans	Control	German HQ located in a house at 259516 in the locality of CHIESA VIA VA. The house is an isolated one in the SW corner at the angle formed by the X-rds and is surrounded by a small wood containing high trees. The General Staff lives in two large bldgs 200 metres NW of the Staff HQ in the first bldgs across the rd. Several generals can be found at Staff HQ during the night. Sheet 88 Scale 1:100,000
4 Nov 0930	Partisans	Control	Abt sixty med arty pieces of unknown caliber at 574405 and 578404 in the middle of the vineyard and on the E side of the rd.
4 Nov 1300	Partisans	Control	Crane loading war material on rafts along the SE bank of the canal at 611432 Scale 1:25,000. Continuous movt of barges unloading with nets in the canal at 6CE NIA LAGUNA 637429 Scale 1:25,000 PAVIA
7 Nov 1000	Partisans	Control	Heavy losses were inflicted on the tps formerly reported in ERE DeVITE

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		CCLOMBIA HARENA at 637427. 3-75mm Guns and 30 men at 555350. Four 105 MM guns and 40 men at 547300. Scale 1:100,000
1 Nov 1130	Partisans Control	Core of vks and vps among the houses 1 of the rd at FME POINT 652418. Scale 1:25,000.
1 Nov 1130	Partisans Control	German HQ located in a house at 259510 in the locality of CHIESA SANTA. The house is an isolated one in the SW corner at the angle formed by the X-rds and is surrounded by a small wood containing high trees. The General Staff lives in two large bldgs 200 metres NE of the Staff HQ in the first bldg across the rd. Several generals can be found at Staff HQ during the night. Sheet 88 Scale 1:100,000
4 Nov 1930	Partisans Control	Abn camp and army pieces of unknown caliber at 376405 and 378404 in the middle of the village and on the E side of the rd.
4 Nov 1300	Partisans Control	Crane loading war material on rafts along the SE bank of the canal at 611431 Scale 1:25,000. Continuous mvt of barges camouflaged with nets in the canal at PONTE CANDIA. Germans continue storing ammo in the COLONIA MARINA 637429 Scale 1:25,000 RAVENNA
7 Nov 1000	Partisans Control	Heavy losses were inflicted on the vps formerly reported in PONTE PICOLI. Following the bombing the survivors moved to a new posn 600 metres NW of [illegible] in the houses at 043361 [illegible] the E bank of the UGHI River. Scale 1:25,000

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
5 Nov 1630	Partisans Control		Bomb and strafe immediately the units at 290351 along the S bank of the canal 150 metres W of the Lighthouse as the Germans are making preparations to leave tonight.
11 Nov 2030	Partisans Control		There are 3 units loaded with war material loaded on the S bank of the canal at 811433 Scale 1:25,000.
24 Nov 1430	Partisans Control		Three 88 mm guns between 574388 and 575388. Two 150 mm guns (howitzers) between 553397 and 554398. Trees cut down and fd of fire cleared in vine yard nr of 576389 ten huts in posn there now. Nov 22 one fd arty unit left RAVENNA for area N of BC SABBIALE 575423.
25 Nov 0800	Partisans Control		Presence in RAVENNA of one bn Alpine tps wearing oak leaf on sleeve confirmed. Approx one in houses 563418 and patrol int RAVENNA by day. These tps say they were chosen to defend RAVENNA. Bn strength estimated 350. All in city except one pl. Scale 1:25,000.
25 Nov 1700	Partisans Control		Four guns in action between 578392 and 579393. HQ and tks hidden villa CALLEGARI 553386 approx. Recommend bombing. Urgent.
25 Nov 1700	Partisans Control		Arty halted for few hrs at 580390. Estimated 40 guns. Bomb now.
26 Nov 1400	Partisans Control		Enemy strengths PORTO CORSINI 630401 twenty. COLONIA MARINA 637428, PORTO FUORI 604364 to [illegible] two [illegible]

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		Control.
11 Nov 2030	Partisans Control	There are 3 carts loaded with war material loaded on the S bank of the canal at 011433 Scale 1:25,000.
24 Nov 1430	Partisans Control	Three 88 mm guns between 574388 and 576388. Two 150 mm guns (howitzers) between 553387 and 554388. Trees cut down and fd of fire cleared in vine yard at 576389 ten MGs in posn there now. Nov 02 one fd arty unit left RAVENNA for area N of LC SPECIALE 575423.
25 Nov 0800	Partisans Control	Presence in RAVENNA of one bn Alpine tps wearing oak leaf on sleeve confirmed. Approx one in houses 5.5418 and patrol int RAVENNA by day. These tps say they were chosen to defend RAVENNA. Total strength estimated 350. All in city except one pl. Scale 1:25,000.
25 Nov 1700	Partisans Control	Four guns in motion between 576392 and 579393. HQ and tks hidden vicin CALLEGARI 553386 approx. Recommend bombing. Urgent.
25 Nov 1700	Partisans Control	Arty noted for fow hrs at 580390. Estimated 40 guns. Dumb now.
26 Nov 1400	Partisans Control	Enemy strengths PORTO CORSINI 836401 twenty. COLONIA MARINA 837428, PORTO FUORI 804354 to sea, twenty supported by nine fd guns with in reserve 300 alpine tps plus 100 remnants of units which have withdrawn. S LORENZO 534520 - 30 alpine, 565418 - 40 alpine. My view Precautionary but my appreciation is that enemy proposes to hold line of river MONTONE and LOWER UNITI with delaying forces to gain time to compl. defences on river LAMONE.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
28 Nov 1700	Control	Partisans	Height of br and type of construction 333337 required.
28 Nov 0800	Partisans	Control	Br 333337 wooden trassel. Solid earth banks. Span approx 15 metres. River bed proper 5 metres. Height of br 6 metres. Average depth of water 1 to 1 1/2 metres.
29 Nov 1000	Control	Partisans	What mines are there in and just outside PORTO CORSINI. Demolitions of the quays. The state of Port installations.
29 Nov 1300	Partisans	Control	Sheet 89 III NW and 89 IV SW 10 and 11 Nov. Estimated 2000 enemy ALFONSINE area left for N nights of 11/12 and 13 Nov. Saw two and half track moved in direction of FERRARA. Still considerable movement 1000 hrs. Until first light all troops left ALFONSINE 27 62 Nov for FERRARA. Estimated 600 enemy some wearing leather hard some wearing cork leaf either bronk or silver colored on left breast left for FERRARA CANALE 390383 1300 hrs 26 Nov. Morale very low many were weeping others drunk and all said they were tired of war. Observer thought ops were very young. 300 Bersaglieris were sent back to FERRARA same day.
29 Nov 1930	Partisans	Control	Can you bomb and strafe area 023450 and "L.F.BERICA" VECCHIE" 023450 and br at 023452 out of existence and make towns with machine gun fire. Suggested time for attack first or last light or during hrs of darkness. During day proper proportion of troops occupied in anti partisan forays.

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			metres. Depth of or 6 metres. average depth of water 1 to 1 1/2 metres.
29 Nov 1300	Control	Partisans	What mines are there in and just outside PORTO CORSINI. Demolitions of the quays. The state of Port installations.
29 Nov 1300	Partisans	Control	Sheet 89 III SW and 89 IV SW 10 and 11 Nov. Estimated 2000 enemy ALFONSINE area left for N nights of 11/12 and 13 Nov. Day the rad half track moved in direction of FERRARA. Still considerable movement 1800 hrs. Until first light all whays left ALFONSINE 27 of Nov for FERRARA. Estimated 600 enemy some wearing death head some wearing oak leaf either dark or silver colored on left breast left for [illegible] C.W.III(39(303 1300 hrs 28 Nov. Morale very low many were weeping others drunk and all said they were tired of war. Observer thought the were very young. 300 Bongolians were sent back to FERRARA same day.
29 Nov 1930	Partisans	Control	Can you bomb and strafe area 623450 and "LA FABBRICA" VECCHIA" 623450 and br at 623452 out of existence and make towns with machine gun fire. Suggested time for attack first or last light or during hrs of darkness. During day proper proportion of troops occupied in anti partisan forays.
31 Nov 1500	Partisans	Control	PORTO CORSINI. Breakwater blown up and entrance to port blocked. No block ship. All harbour installations appear to be destroyed. Last as far as existing 625 and C-and to approx 612435 sown with magnetic mines. Semi-

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:
26 Nov 1500	Partisans	Control	All AA guns recc PASTIA 310570 S PIAGI 306578 moved night of 24/25 Nov. Few AA hy MGs remain. Enemy tps concentrating RUSSI 433332 before taking up posn. Both with everything available now.
26 Nov 1630	Partisans	Control	Urgent. Shell or bomb 8 vehs 480438.
27 Nov 2300	Partisans	Control	6 guns at 573385. Shell heavily at 2300 hrs. One gun 503731. Two guns 553396. 7 MGs which were at 572367 gone. 4 guns 501386. After shelling of area 567370 to 575373 enemy abandoned his posns there. Present whereabouts unknown. Tks patrolling NE from 564377 firing towards front. Still 300 enemy between RAVENNA and sea. Your arty fire drove enemy from mortar posns area 578370 to 574370. Civilians evacuated from all houses E of PIAGE WEST and E of Existing 62. Enemy said by fighting would take place there within a few days.
28 Nov 1130	Partisans	Control	50 hy tks and wksps hidden woods 375430 to 380439 to 380434 to 374437. General and his HQ in 3 houses at 377442. Bomb now.
28 Nov 1700	Partisans	Control	Gun 40 m south of house 574537 38. 3 FD guns house E of rd 569389. 3 guns 572393. Gun and 40 enemy house 569539. 33. 3 guns 562374. 4 guns 542376. Gr tower surrounded by houses 535447. 4 tks left night of Nov 27/28 direction ALFONSINE. Mortars and MGs 573370 and all guns have been destroy

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26 Nov 1630	Partisans	Control	Urgent. Shell or bomb 8 vcls 463435.
27 Nov 2300	Partisans	Control	3 guns at 573386. Shell heavily at 2300 hrs. One gun 564731. Two guns 563303. 7 vcs which were at 572307 gone. 4 guns 561360. After shelling 02 area 567370 to 575373 enemy abandoned his posns there. Present whereabouts unknown. Pls patrolling NE from 564377 firing towards front. Still 300 enemy between RAVENNA and sea. Your arty fire drove enemy from center posns area 572370 to 574370. Civilians evacuated from all houses E of RIVER UNITE and E of Existing 62. Enemy said my fighting would take place there within a few days.
28 Nov 1130	Partisans	Control	50 My tks and wkaps hidden vcls 375440 to 380439 to 380434 to 374437. General and his Hq in 3 houses at 377442. Bomb now.
28 Nov 1700	Partisans	Control	Gun 40 m south of house 574537 30. 3 fd guns house E of rd 569389. 3 guns 572393. Gun and 40 enemy house 569539. 33. 6 guns 562374. 4 guns 542375. CP tower surrounded by houses 535447. 4 tks left night of Nov 27/28 direction APCONSTE. Mortars and vcs 573370 and all guns have been destroyed 5078 driven out by your arty. 50 enemy 573367. 70 enemy between 547367 and 553366 in houses both sides rd. Enemy evacuating RAVENNA. No enemy remaining between PORTA PONTE and PORTA NUOVA. Shell ref given at 1000 hrs. Gun crews manned guns yesterday. Maximum weight of shells requested.

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Date & Time:	From:	To:	Message:

circle of mines from 823452 to 824453 to 824456 and from 825455 to 827456 to 826457. Town sealed off by mine field 828458 to 835453. Mines in canal bank beside rd from 814446 to 828439. Exact nature unknown but anti-personnel may be to blow canal bank down. Having known about mining in town itself. Beach north to canal 813SE0M no mines. Bridges mined 812434 and 823462. Can you bomb bridge by PIERRIC VECCHIA and certain adjacent building which now contain 60 or 70 Krauts.

1 Dec 1240 Partisans Control Intelligence. Fusignano: Marked concerted movement 24/25 of Nov. Many weapon pits form "C" being dug from 20 to 200 yds East of rd SE/N between 384437 and 430455. German general commanding troops warning unit leaves shortly. Nowhere in Via Vittorio Veneto with his staff. Approx location 378431. Key troops left PIEVE CAVALLO night 26/27 of Nov. Above mentioned German HQ moves from PIEVE CAVALLO to FUSIGNANO. Enemy busily mining road PIEVE CAVALLO to 418403 to 436431 to 435470 and North towards FAENZA. More details not yet available.

2 Dec 0830 Partisans Control Artillery and two mortars at 598387. Personnel at 598373 and 598387, and horses between Existing 595 and Point 594 on Via PONTA. Personnel 598384 and 598390. Two mortars 598387 firing 5711390. Moved after first shelling. Two guns 578393. Found them once and for all after first light.

2 Dec 2140 Partisans Control 30 Germans assembling, advancing

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2 Dec 2147 Dateline Omitted

2 Dec 0130 Dateline Omitted

1-Inc 1524 Dateline Omitted

Date & Time	From:	To:	Remarks:
2 Dec 2400	Partisans	Control	(Contd)

Comment: Civilians subsequently interrogated confirm that the muzzle, which was in fact a demonstration of anti-aircraft fire, took place at the time reported and was heavily shelled, though casualties were light.

3 Dec 0800	Partisans	Control	Strafe everything moving on all r.s between Hastings 43 and 50 and between Martinique 33 and 44. Certain moving personnel and equipment in columns camouflaged as refugees. With oxen. Cattle. Farm carts.
4 Dec 1000	Partisans	Control	Bomb from 823453 to 830450 low.
4 Dec 1630	Partisans	Control	British in M.TERRA. Regards to all M.COMD. M'20.

Comment: CSS operators.

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SUBJECT : Organisation and Functions of CSI (Civil Liaison), EIGHTH ARMY

SECRET

Main Headquarters
Eighth Army, CMF
M 502 CL
17 Dec 44.

DCS(I) Adv HQ 15 Army Gp (2)

Copy to : G.2.(I) 5 Corps
10 Corps
13 Corps
1 Can Corps
2 Polish Corps
AC of S, G-2, Fifth Army
OC, Co "D" 2677th Regt OSS (Prov), MTO 512, US Army
Comd., 1 Special Force, c/o 2 District, CMF
I.S.S. c/o 2 District, CMF
Lt-Comdr Tyndt, African Coastal Flotilla (E. Adriatic)

DCS
G.1.(Ops)
G.1.(Plans)
G.2.(I)(1)

DSAO, AMG
CO, OSS Det Eighth Army
CO, OSS Maritime Unit,
Eighth Army.

1. Attached is a paper on the organisation and functions of the Civil Liaison section of CSI at this HQ. The section was reorganised in Feb 44 to meet the needs of the Italian campaign and it has been thought worth while to set out its development and present functions.

2. Its purpose is to exploit the help which the population of a friendly country can give the army as a source of intelligence and for irregular operations :

a) On the Intelligence side it has been found that information from civilians, if they are handled in a friendly manner and interrogated by trained officers, British and Italian, can be accurate and detailed: to obtain the full value, interrogation must be carried out as far as possible by the unit or formations interested: officers have therefore been placed with almost all units which are likely to benefit from civilian information.

b) Conditions in enemy occupied [illegible]

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13 Corps
1 Can Corps
2 Polish Corps
AC of S, G-2, Fifth Army
CO, Co "D" 26[illegible]th Rest CSS (Prov), APO 512, US Army
Comd., 1 Special Force, c/o 2 District, CMF
I.S.S. c/o 2 District, CMF
Lt-Comdr Iquett, African Coastal Flotilla (H. Adriatic)

DOS
G.1.(Ops)
G.1.(Plans)
G.2.(I)(b)

SCAO, AFO
CO, CSS Det Eighth Army
CO, CSS Maritime Unit,
Eighth Army.

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a) On the Intelligence side it has been found that information from civilians, if they are handled in a friendly manner and interrogated by trained officers, British and Italian, can be accurate and detailed: to obtain the full value, interrogation must be carried out as far as possible by the unit or formations interested: officers have therefore been placed with almost all units which are likely to benefit from civilian information.

b) Conditions in enemy occupied ITALY at present approximate to those of civil war between the Fascists collaborating with the Germans and the mass of the population, the active element of which is represented by the partisan movement.

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h) contd.

For the army to obtain full value from these conditions both for intelligence and for operations it has been found necessary to have an organisation within the Army which is responsible for the encouragement of partisan both behind the enemy lines on the army front and immediately they are over-run by our troops. The working of this organisation is to be as far as possible decentralised to formations and units.

3. Experience has shown that the exploitation of the civilian population on both sides of the line as a source of intelligence, and their employment as partisan auxiliaries with the Army, are so closely connected that a unified control at Army Headquarters is necessary.

D.Pratt

Lieut-Colonel,
General Staff Intelligence.

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SECRET

Organisation and Functions of CSI (Civil Liaison), EIGHTH ARMY. — 8 502 CI

14 Dec 44

1. ORGANISATION

CSI (Civil Liaison) is organised as follows :

a) British Personnel

GSO 2) At Main HQ
GSO 3) EIGHTH ARMY

Five LOs (inter ogators) att respectively to 5 Corps, 10 Corps, 13 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

Three Partisan LOs att respectively to 5 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

b) American Personnel

CSI (CI) is responsible for liaison with the following American units operating under Eighth Army :

OSS Detachment att Eighth Army (American spy-operating unit)

OSS Maritime Unit (American-run unit of Italian "San Marco" marine saboteurs).

c) Italian Personnel

Attached to CSI (Civil Liaison) is NUCLEO "I", which is an Italian headquarters responsible for administering Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers at formations and units.

2. FUNCTIONS

The functions of CSI (CI) fall into the following main

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14 Dec 44

1. ORGANIZATION

GSI (Civil Liaison) is organised as follows :

a) British Personnel

GSC 2) At Main HQ
GSC 3) EIGHTH ARMY

Five IOs (Interrogators) att respectively to 5 Corps, 10 Corps, 13 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

Three Partisan IOs att respectively to 5 Corps, 1 Canadian Corps, 2 Polish Corps.

b) American Personnel

GSI (CL) is responsible for liaison with the following American units operating under Eighth Army :

OSS Detachment att Eighth Army (American spy-operating unit)

OSS Maritime Unit (American-run unit of Italian "San Marco" Marine saboteurs).

c) Italian Personnel

Attached to GSI (Civil Liaison) is MOCLLC "I", which is an Italian headquarters responsible for administering Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers at formations and units.

2. FUNCTIONS

The functions of GSI (CL) fall into the following main headings :

a) Civilian interrogation
b) Liaison with "secret societies"
c) Partisans

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GSI (CL) is NOT concerned with questions of civil administration in liberated ITALY, Security or relations with the regular Italian Army.

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3. CIVILIAN INTERROGATION

GSI (CI) is responsible for the In interrogation, in the Army area and in 13 Corps area, of persons who have military information of interest to the Army, and are NOT enemy PW, i.e. civilians in the forward areas, refugees from LOC, escaped PW etc.

For this purpose the following organisation has been set up :

a) GSI (CI) at Corps HQ

A British officer is attached to GSI at each Corps (including 10 Corps and 13 Corps). He normally sets up an office in the nearest town to Corps HQ and is responsible for :

(i) Interrogating refugees from ECF. These are usually concentrated at the Corps PW Cage.

(ii) Finding civilians in the area with military information, e.g. former ECF workers, who have proved a valuable source of intelligence for enemy defences, former interpreters at German HQs, partisan leaders, local engineers etc

In most cases officers are assisted by an Italian officer.

Interrogation reports are prepared on a standard Civil Liaison pro-forma and in accordance with instructions and questionnaires issued by GSI (CI) at this HQ or by GSI at the Corps to which the officer is attached.

Copies of all reports are passed to the Corps interested, and to GSI (CI) at this HQ which is responsible for passing them to branches of Eighth Army concerned. These branches are responsible for further dissemination, e.g. to MAFRU, DAF targets, AAI etc. Information on partisans is collated by GSI (CI) and incorporated in a Partisan Summary.

b) GSI (CI) Officer at the Army Refugee Interrogation Post

A GSI (CI) officer is attached to the Army RIP for In interrogation of refugees who have, for one reason or another, not been interrogated by Corps Civil Liaison sections.

c) Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers

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a) GSI (CL) at Corps HQ

A British officer is attached to GSI at each Corps (including 10 Corps and 13 Corps). He normally sets up an office in the nearest town to Corps HQ and is responsible for :

(i) Interrogating refugees from EOT. These are usually concentrated at the Corps PW Cages.

(ii) Handling civilians in the area with military information, e.g. former TODT workers, who have proved a valuable source of intelligence for enemy defences, former interpreters at German HQs, partisan leaders, local engineers etc

In most cases officers are assisted by an Italian officer.

Interrogation reports are prepared on standard Civil Liaison pro-forma and in accordance with instructions and questionnaires issued by GSI (CL) at this HQ or by GSI at the Corps to which the officer is attached.

Copies of all reports are passed to the Corps interested, and to GSI (CL) at this HQ which is responsible for passing them to branches of Eighth Army concerned. These branches are responsible for further dissemination, e.g. to MAFRU, DAF targets, AAI etc. Information on partisans is collated by GSI (CL) and incorporated in Partisan Summary.

b) GSI (CL) Officer at the Army Reduced Interrogation Post

A GSI (CL) officer is attached to the Army RIP for re-interrogation of refugees who have, for one reason or another, not been interrogated by Corps Civil Liaison sections.

c) Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers

6. Interrogation below Corps level is carried out by Italian officers. Some 100 officers are at present employed and are attached to Divs, Bdes, Inf, Regts and in some cases RE units, AGRA, CCGs etc. Officers are volunteers and are very carefully selected for their knowledge of English, keenness and capacity for fitting into British mess. They are given a short interrogation course before attachment.

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c) contd.

No officers are taken on until they have been vetted by British Security and by the Italian military authorities. They are administered and paid by an Italian Headquarters, Nucleo "I" att GSI (CL) at this HQ, under an Italian Lieut-Colonel.

In addition to interrogating civilians, officers at units are responsible for :

(i) Recruiting guides from the local population, as required. Partisans, if available, are normally found to be most satisfactory.

(ii) Liaising with partisan leaders in their unit area. If it is desired to employ partisans actively as patrols etc, officers are responsible for running them at unit level in conjunction with the British Partisan Liaison Officer at Corps.

d) Liaison with SIM/CSDIC and PWB

SIM/CSDIC is responsible for long-term interrogation of civilians, e.g. on conditions in parts of Northern Italy not primarily of interest to this army, economic subjects etc. At some GSI (CL) Corps sections an Italian SIM/CSDIC officer is attached for interrogation of civilians of interest to SIM/CSDIC and for routing them, if necessary, to ROME for more detailed interrogation.

Liaison is maintained by GSI (CL) officers with PWB interrogators who are engaged on interrogation of civilians on political and propaganda subjects.

4. LIAISON WITH "SECRET SOCIETIES"

GSI (CL) is responsible for liaison with "secret societies" operating in the Army area; it has a channel of communication through Ops(B) at AAI with organisations of this nature which have no representatives with Army. The channel of communication between Corps and the "secret societies" is through GSI (CL) unless the "secret societies" have representatives in the Corps area.

e) 2677th Regt CSS

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In addition to interrogating civilians, officers at units are responsible for :

(i) Recruiting guides from the local population, as required. Partisans, if available, are normally found to be most satisfactory.

(ii) Liaising with partisan leaders in their unit area. If it is desired to employ partisans actively as patrols etc, officers are responsible for running them at unit level in conjunction with the British Partisan Liaison Officer at Corps.

d) Liaison with SIB/CSDIC and PWB

SIB/CSDIC is responsible for long-term interrogation of civilians, e.g. on conditions in areas of Northern Italy not primarily of interest to this army, economic subjects etc. At some GSI (CI) Corps sections an Italian SIB/CSDIC officer is attached for interrogation of civilians of interest to SIB/CSDIC and for routing them, if necessary, to ROME for more detailed interrogation.

Liaison is maintained by GSI (CI) officers with PWB interrogators who are engaged in interrogation of civilians on political and propaganda subjects.

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a) 2677th Regt OSS

(i) OSS Detachment att Eighth Army

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OSS is an American organisation, a detachment of which has been allotted to Eighth Army. This unit (OC Capt A.P. PAINE, US) is responsible for operating Italian agents behind the enemy lines on the Army front. Planning of operations is undertaken jointly by Capt A.P. PAINE and GSI (CI). The tasks of agents and the area which they are to cover are selected by GSO 1 (I) Eighth Army: the agents themselves and all special equipment and supplies are provided by the OSS organisation: normal supplies are provided by Army.

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4.(c)(i) contd.

Administration of the agents and technical arrangements for their introduction into EOT are the responsibility of the OSS Detachment commander.

Personnel are all trained agents who have been vetted for security and have usually operated before. They normally work in groups with W/T and are dropped by parachute or landed from the sea; it has been found that only in exceptional cases is it possible to infiltrate agents with W/T across the lines and that short term espionage in the enemy forward areas is best carried out by the Partisan Liaison Officer organising a courier service between partisans on this side of the line and local resistance movements in enemy territory (see para 5 below). However, for a particularly important job, requiring a trained agent, OSS will provide a single spy if available.

OSS Detachment is located within easy reach of 5 Army Headquarters at ELEUTH ARMY, and agents' sets report direct to a control which moves with the detachment. Requests for amplification of their reports or for cross-checking of reports from other sources can therefore be transmitted to agents with a minimum of delay. The control has also regular contact with OSS headquarters at SIENA so that information can also be requested from OSS agents in Northern Italy not controlled by the Fifth Army detachment.

Though the agents are trained primarily for intelligence, they are frequently based on partisan bands and consequently become the link for the supplying etc of the band with which they are living. If, by the time we approach their area, the partisans have developed sufficiently to be of operational interest, it may be possible to establish a control at Corps HQ. At present, however, owing to limitations of personnel and equipment, this involves moving the whole station and can therefore only be undertaken in exceptional cases and for a limited period of time.

(ii) OSS Maritime Unit

This unit (OC Lieut KELLY, US Naval Reserve) is composed of Italian San Marco Marines under OSS command.

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equipment in the enemy forward areas is best carried out by the Partisan Liaison Officer organising a courier service between partisans on this side of the line and local resistance movements in enemy territory (see para 5 below). However, for a particularly important job, requiring a trained agent, OSS will provide a single spy if available.

OSS Detachment is located within easy reach of Main Headquarters EIGHTH ARMY, and agents' sets report direct to a control which moves with the detachment. Requests for amplification of their reports or for cross-checking of reports from other sources can therefore be transmitted to agents with a minimum of delay. The control has also regular contact with OSS headquarters at SIENA so that information can also be requested from OSS agents in Northern Italy not controlled by the Eighth Army detachment.

Though the agents are trained primarily for intelligence, they are frequently based on partisan bands and consequently become the link for the supplying etc of the band with which they are living. If, by the time we approach their area, the partisans have developed sufficiently to be of operational interest, it may be possible to establish a control at Corps HQ. At present, however, owing to limitations of personnel and equipment, this involves moving the whole station and can therefore only be undertaken in exceptional cases and for a limited period of time.

(ii) OSS Maritime Unit

This unit (OC Lieut KELLY, US Naval Reserve) is composed of Italian San Marco Marines under OSS command. The boats from which the unit operates (MTBs, L/Cs etc) are controlled and manned by the Navy (African Coastal Flotilla (N. Adriatic)), through whom all operations have to be laid on, and who are responsible for their coordination with other naval and air operations in the ADRIATIC.

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4.(c)(ii) contd.

Personnel are saboteurs and demolition experts and are trained primarily for landing behind the enemy lines for raids on objectives in the coastal area. Owing to the scarcity of worth-while sabotage targets on the coast, the unit has recently been employed mainly for infiltration agents of the OSS Detachment and landing supplies for partisans. Members of the Maritime Unit have also been used as agents.

b) I.S.9 (formerly "M" Force)

Liaison is maintained with I.S.9, particularly in connection with operations by the OSS Maritime Unit. I.S.9 also calls on boats from African Coastal Flotilla (North Adriatic) for the evacuation of escaped Allied PW. If possible operations are co-ordinated, e.g. boats being used for OSS Maritime Unit can take off escaped PW on the return journey. Partisans are encouraged to collect escaped PW for subsequent evacuation.

c) 1 Special Force

This is the British equivalent of OSS. If, as is hoped, a detachment from 1 Special Force comes up shortly, it will be dealt with by GSI (CI) at AFHQ in a similar way to the OSS Det. 1 Special Force has contact with, and to some extent control over, powerful partisan bands North of the PO.

5. PARTISANS

a) In Enemy Occupied Territory

GSI (CI) is responsible for the exploitation and supplying of partisans operating behind the lines on Eighth Army front (partisans further north are run by the various "secret societies" working under AMG) and for the collection and dissemination of intelligence concerning them.

Intelligence

Information about partisans is derived mainly from :

(i) Civilians interrogated by Corps CI

(ii) Leaders of partisan

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have also been used to agents.

b) I.S.9 (formerly "A" Force)

Liaison is maintained with I.S.9, particularly in connection with operations by the OSS Maritime Unit. I.S.9 also calls on boats from African Coastal Flotilla (North Adriatic) for the evacuation of escaped Allied PW. If possible operations are co-ordinated, e.g. boats being used for OSS Maritime Unit can take off escaped PW on the return journey. Partisans are encouraged to collect escaped PW for subsequent evacuation.

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This is the British equivalent of OSS. If, as is hoped, a detachment from 1 Special Force comes up shortly, it will be dealt with by GSI (CI) on same lines in a similar way to the OSS Det. 1 Special Force has contact with, and to some extent control over, powerful partisan bands North of the PO.

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GSI (CI) is responsible for the exploitation and supplying of partisans operating behind the lines on Eighth Army front (partisans further North are run by the various "secret societies" working under AMI) and for the collection and dissemination of intelligence concerning them.

Intelligence

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Information about partisans is derived mainly from :

(i) Civilians interrogated by Corps CI sections
(ii) Leaders of partisan bands which have already been over-run and heads of the Committee of National Liberation in recently occupied towns. They are also interrogated by Corps CI section.
(iii) W/T sets already operating behind the lines
(iv) Messengers from partisan bands in enemy occupied territory
(v) Captured German documents
(vi) PW

All such intelligence is incorporated in a Partisan Summary issued periodically covering partisan activities on both sides of the lines.

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3.(a) contd. Partisans (c) In enemy occupied Territory (contd)

Communications

Communications are the main factor in the organisation, supplying and operational employment of partisans in enemy territory. Whenever possible, OSS sets with operators are sent in earlier by air-drop or by landing; without W/T communication it is usually impossible to organise the exploitation of partisans on any considerable scale.

If, however, no W/T communication exists, Partisan Liaison Officers at Corps are responsible for organising a courier service from partisans on this side of the line to contact resistance groups in enemy territory. By this means an intelligence service can be built up and specific orders or general instructions transmitted to partisans; in particular, it is important that partisans should know when our arrival is imminent, so that they can act without fear of heavy reprisals.

General instructions can also be passed through PWB Eighth Army radio (which in any case transmits the "Italia Combatte" programme recorded from Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters to all partisans in occupied territory) or by dropping leaflets.

Uses

(i) Harassing German L of C by small scale sabotage on RR and attacks on isolated Germans and Fascists. In view of German reprisals, this activity dies down as soon as the Germans occupy a particular area in any force. There is usually a sudden recrudescence of this activity just before the Germans evacuate, when the fear of reprisals is less.

(ii) Providing intelligence: particularly bombing targets for any A/A act in our area. Alternatively, intelligence may be transmitted by a service of partisan couriers from this side of the line.

(iii) Collecting intelligence e.g. location of minefields for Sapper troops who contacted.

(iv) Preventing demolitions, usually minor demolitions

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[illegible] W/T communication it is usually impossible to organise the exploitation of partisans on any considerable scale.

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General instructions can also be passed through PWB Eighth Army radio (which in any case transmits the "Italia Combatte" programme addressed from Field Marshal Alexander's Headquarters to all partisans in occupied territory) or by dropping leaflets.

Uses

(i) Harassing German L of C by small scale sabotage on MT and attacks on isolated Germans and Fascists. In view of German reprisals, this activity dies down as soon as the Germans occupy a partisan area in any force. There is usually a sudden recrudescence of this activity just before the Germans evacuate, when the fear of reprisals is less.

(ii) Providing intelligence: particularly bombing targets for our A/C and in the area. Alternatively, intelligence may be transmitted by a service of private couriers from this side of the line.

(iii) Collecting intelligence on location of minefields for forward troops that contacted.

(iv) Preventing conflagrations, usually minor conflagrations, since normally it has been proved impossible for partisans to deal with the causes of more important installations.

(v) Sheltering Allied prisoners.

(vi) Collecting information on agents to be left behind by the Germans after withdrawal.

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Partisans (a) In enemy occupied territory (contd)

(vii) Employment in connection with special operations. Partisans provide reception and guides for parties dropping by parachute or landing.

(viii) Tactical employment in conjunction with our advance. This is usually only practicable when W/T contact exists and, if possible, a British Liaison Officer is with Partisan HQ.

Supplies

Supplies are obtained from OSS or from Army resources or through and from Special Operations Mediterranean. They may be sent in by any, or all, of the following means :

(i) By air drop. This can be arranged through and, in this case the operation is likely to take some time to arrange, since it has to be co-ordinated with supply drops throughout Northern Italy. Alternatively, the drop may be made by DAF or by an Italian S 79 bomber attached to OSS Det at this HQ.

(ii) By landings carried out by OSS Maritime Unit.

(iii) By fishing vessels or row-boats sent down by the partisans and manned by them.

Capabilities

The following are some of the factors which limit the exploitation and supplying of partisans in enemy territory :

(i) Reception

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parachute or landing.

(viii) Tactical employment in conjunction with our advance. This is usually only practicable when W/T contact exists and, if possible, a British Liaison Officer is with Partisan HQ.

Supplies

Supplies are obtained from OSS or from Army resources or through and from Special Operations Mediterranean. They may be sent in by any, or all, of the following means :

(i) By air drop. This can be arranged through AAI, in this case the operation is likely to take some time to arrange, since it has to be co-ordinated with supply drops throughout Northern Italy. Alternatively, the drop may be made by SAF or by an Italian S 79 bomber attached to OSS Det at this HQ.

(ii) By landings carried out by OSS Maritime Unit.

(iii) By fishing vessels or row-boats sent down by the partisans and manned by them.

Capabilities

The following are some of the factors which limit the exploitation and supplying of partisans in enemy territory :

(i) Reception

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Though "blind" air-drops and landings are sometimes undertaken they are usually very dangerous.

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Partisans (a) In enemy-occupied territory (contd)

(i) contd Unless the front is so open that agents can be passed straight through, reception (i.e. light signals etc) has to be arranged. This involves a great deal of detailed preparation and may always be affected by such factors as unexpected German movement, mopping-up etc.

(ii) Moon

Landing operations are only possible in the dark period except in exceptional circumstances when partisans have complete control of a stretch of coast. Air drops normally require a moon.

(iii) Weather

This is a most uncertain factor, particularly during the winter and affects sea even more than air operations. Conditions must be good enough between ANCONA and the target for small boats to operate in the open sea, and be completely calm for the landing from rubber boats. In the winter, however, such conditions are rare and at night are frequently accompanied by mist which makes it very difficult to see the light signals.

(iv) Priorities

If air drops are laid on through normal channels they are carried out from APULIA and have to wait their turn; in one case an Eighth Army OSS Group had to stand by for over three months to be dropped. In urgent cases, operations can be undertaken from Army with the co-operation of DAF or by our own bomber, but these planes are not really suitable and packing facilities, which are concentrated in APULIA, are not available.

Sea operations have to be co-ordinated with the demands of other agencies and with naval operations in the ADRIATIC and depend on the availability of craft. Planning is not helped by the fact that the OSS Maritime Unit has to be based at ANCONA at a considerable distance from Army HQ.

In view of the above, supply and organisation of partisans in enemy territory is a matter of months and not

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period except in exceptional circumstances when partisans have complete control of a stretch of coast. Air drops normally require a moon.

(iii) Weather

This is a most uncertain factor, particularly during the winter and affects sea even more than air operations. Conditions must be good enough between AJUCLA and the target for small boats to operate in the open sea, and be completely calm for the landing from rubber boats. In the winter, however, such conditions are rare and at night are frequently accompanied by mist which makes it very difficult to see the light signals.

(iv) Priorities

If air drops are laid on through normal channels they are carried out from AJUCLA and have to wait their turn; in one case an Eighth Army SOS group had to stand by for over three months to be dropped. In urgent cases, operations can be undertaken from Army with the co-operation of DAF or by our own bomber, but these planes are not really suitable and packing facilities, which are concentrated in AJUCLA, are not available.

Sea operations have to be co-ordinated with the needs of other agencies and with naval operations in the ADRIATIC and depend on the availability of craft. Planning is not helped by the fact that the OSS Maritime Unit has to be based at ANCONA at a considerable distance from Army HQ.

In view of the above, supply and organisation of partisans in enemy territory is a matter of months and quick or certain results cannot be expected. It is normally impossible to supply partisans with more than personal weapons (mainly Sten or TSMGs), hand-grenades, a few Brens and explosives.

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(iv) contd

Partisans are not trained soldiers and, with the weapons at their disposal and lacking a secure ammunition supply, they cannot be expected to engage the enemy on his own terms. Their main advantage is the ability to obtain surprise owing to local knowledge and contacts; with the help of these, they can, in favourable country (mountains and marshland), effectively harass the enemy withdrawal by small ambushes and tip-and-run attacks on his L of C. Above all, they can provide a basis for an intelligence service in enemy territory.

b) After contacting Our Troops

GSI (CL) is responsible for the organisation and exploitation of partisans encountered by our troops and for advising on their employment. Operational control of partisans operating with our troops is decentralised as far as possible.

Uses

(i) Bringing information e.g. minefields, gun and MG positions, HQs, concentrations.

(ii) Patrols in conjunction with Allied troops.

(iii) Guides

(iv) Clearing up snipers. This was particularly useful in FLORENCE and may be so again if the Germans leave Fascist snipers in large towns.

(v) Picking up German stragglers

(vi) Assistance to AMG and PS in preserving public order, manning check posts and getting public services running.

Organisation

British Partisan Liaison Officers

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(v) Picking up German stragglers

(vi) Assistance to AMG and PS in preserving public order, manning check posts and getting public services running.

Organisation

British Partisan Liaison Officers

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Three officers are at present attached to each Corps in the line; two more officers will shortly be available to help officers already operating.

Duties of these officers are :

(i) To advise Corps HQ on the employment of partisans, in accordance with general directives from Army.

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Partisans (b) After Contacting Our Troops contd

(ii) To liaise with leaders of partisan bands and, if suitable for employment, to allot partisans to units, RE etc

(iii) To make arrangements for the supply and welfare of partisans operating with our troops.

(iv) If the front permits, and with the agreement of CSI(b), to set a courier service going between partisans under their control and resistance groups in enemy territory with the object of :

organising a locally recruited service of short term agents for reporting on enemy positions, concentrations etc

giving instructions to parties not otherwise in contact with us, particularly as to when they should start active operations; this is normally just not before our arrival, in order to avoid German reprisals on the civilian population.

(v) To keep in touch with the CI Intelligence Officer at Corps and pass on to him suitable subject for interrogation.

(vi) To liaise with CSI(b) and FSS about security problems which may arise from employment of partisans.

(vii) To liaise with AMG Patriots' Branch representative about the demobilisation of partisans no longer required. It is essential that discretion should not be premature and should be carried out with the greatest possible tact (farewell speeches etc). Failure in this respect has immediate repercussions on the morale not only of partisans still being used on this side of the line, but also of those operating in enemy territory.

Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers

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(iii) To make arrangements for the supply and welfare of partisans operating with our troops.

(iv) If the front permits, and with the agreement of CSI(M), to set a courier service going between partisans under their control and resistance groups in enemy territory with the object of :

organising locally recruited service of short term agents for reporting on enemy positions, concentrations etc

giving instructions to partisans not otherwise in contact with us, particularly as to when they should start active operations; this is normally just not before our arrival, in order to avoid German reprisals on the civilian population.

(v) To keep in touch with the CI Intelligence Officer at Corps and pass on to him suitable subject for interrogation.

(vi) To liaise with CSI(M) and FSS on any security problems which may arise from the employment of partisans.

(vii) To liaise with AMG Patriotic Items representative about the demobilisation of partisans no longer required. It is essential that discharge should not be premature and should be carried out with the greatest possible tact (farewell speeches etc). Failure in this respect has immediate repercussions on the morale not only of partisans still being used on this side of the line, but also of those operating in enemy territory.

Italian Intelligence Liaison Officers

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These officers are attached to units primarily for interrogation of civilians but are also responsible for running any partisans allotted by the Partisan Liaison Officer to their units or met with during the advance.

Arms and Supplies

Arms and supplies for partisans with our troops have hitherto been shot in bulk by air on a monthly basis. AMG will shortly fix the amounts which may be released.

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Partie re (b) After cont ctd., Our Troops contd

Capabilities

Partisans who wish to continue the fight after liberation are usually anxious to go on operating as a band. In practice, this is impossible however favourable the country may be for operations by irregular forces, since partisans lack any supply or communications organisation.

The best results have been obtained by exploiting their knowledge of the ground and local contacts and employing them as pilots and guides and short-term agents, or to thicken up our troops in a very lightly held sector. This is best organised by partisans being sub-allotted as units by the Partisan Liaison Officer with the approval of the leader of the band.

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Conclusions

Partisans who wish to continue the fight after liberation usually continue to act as operating bands. In practice, this is impossible however favourable the country may be for operations by irregular forces, since partisans lack any supply or communications organisation.

The best results have been obtained by exploiting their knowledge of the ground and local contacts and employing them to create small guerilla and short-term saboteurs, or to thicken up our groups in a very lightly held sector. This is best organised by partisans being sub-allotted to units by the Partisan Liaison Officer with the approval of the leader of the band.

APPX. "A" - BIBLIOGRAPHY NOTE

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APPX. "A" - HISTORICAL NOTE

Eighth Army on its foundation took over the Western Desert Liaison Officer from Western Desert Force. He was responsible for liaison for intelligence purposes with the local Arab population, operating Arab agents, and for the encouragement of resistance movements in the Western Desert, e.g. the Senussi.

For the Sicilian campaign the name of the branch was changed to Civil Liaison with analogous functions. After SICILY the appointment lapsed owing to the confused conditions immediately following the armistice, and the rapidity of the advance through CALABRIA, which made it impracticable to operate agents on the Army front. In the meantime under GSI at 10 Corps, the skeleton of the present organisation was forming owing to the flow of refugees with information, the need to co-ordinate the activities of the various "secret societies" operating in the Corps area, and our first encounter with Italian partisans at CORRE A'NUNZIATA. The first Italian Liaison Officers were placed with the 7th Armd Div in Oct 43.

As a result of this experience the Civil Liaison section at Army HQ was expanded in Feb this year and became an integral part of GSI. CCS were requested to transfer to Eighth Army their cat element which had worked successfully for 10 Corps, then going into reserve. In July 44 the Italian Nucleo "I" was formed as a HQ to administer the growing number of Italian officers employed by GSI (Civil Liaison).

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As a result of this experience the Civil Liaison section at Army HQ was expanded in Feb this year and became an integral part of GSI. OSS were requested to transfer to Eighth Army their establishment which had worked successfully for 10 Corps, then going into reserve. In July 44 the Italian Branch "I" was formed at HQ to administer the growing number of Italian officers employed by CSI (Civil Liaison).

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CONFIDENTIAL

EIGHTH ARMY PARTISAN SUMMARY No.4.

Based on information received up to 13 Jan 45

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1. OPERATIONS

Coastal Sector

Partisans of 28 GAP Bde, organised by the RAVENNA Committee of Liberation and commanded by Major BULOW, had been active in RAVENNA province since the beginning of last year. Owing to lack of arms and equipment operations had been limited to occasional sabotage of M.T., telephone lines etc., or the waylaying of isolated Germans and Fascists. The main preoccupation during this period, as shown by the war diary and orders of 28 Bde, was the accumulation of arms against the day when more overt action might be possible: Carabinieri barracks were raided, explosives stolen from German dumps, and Republican soldiers, Germans and Fascists relieved of their personal weapons and all material stored in secret hiding places dispersed throughout the Province.

Owing to the nature of the terrain the partisans could not live together as a unit. Instead, the Province was divided into sectors, for each of which a detachment was responsible. Members of the detachment were recruited from the local inhabitants and continued to live as civilians. At the beginning of August the partisans' chance came when, as a result of extensive flooding of the coast Northward from PORTO CORSINI, it became possible to create a small detachment of some 120 men to operate as a unit in the marshes. Early in September contact was made with this detachment, and arms and supplies sent in. It was a tribute to the organisation and communications of the RAVENNA partisans that within a fortnight of supplies arriving the numbers in the marshes had trebled. During the succeeding months more supplies were got in and the partisans were used with considerable success as an intelligence service for the front South of RAVENNA. Owing to the threat of reprisals on the civilian population, and the danger of the partisans being mopped up, they were ordered to keep as quiet as possible for the time being. They did, however, capture an anti-tank gun and heavy machine gun, and [illegible]

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1. OPERATIONS

Coastal Sector

Partisans of 28 GAP Bde, organised by the RAVENNA Committee of Liberation and commanded by Major BULOW, had been active in RAVENNA Province since the beginning of last year. Owing to lack of arms and equipment operations had been limited to occasional sabotage of M.T., telephone lines etc., or the waylaying of isolated Germans and Fascists. The main preoccupation during this period, as shown by the war diary and orders of 28 Bde, was the accumulation of arms against the day when more overt action might be possible: Carabinieri barracks were raided, explosives stolen from German dumps, and Republican soldiers, Germans and Fascists relieved of their personal weapons and all material stored in secret hiding places dispersed throughout the Province.

Owing to the nature of the terrain the partisans could not live together as a unit. Instead, the Province was divided into sectors, for each of which a detachment was responsible. Members of the detachment were recruited from the local inhabitants and continued to live as civilians. At the beginning of August the partisans' chance came when, as a result of extensive flooding of the coast Northward from PORTO CORSINI, it became possible to create a small detachment of some 120 men to operate as a unit in the marshes. Early in September contact was made with this detachment, and arms and supplies sent in. It was a tribute to the organisation and communications of the RAVENNA partisans that within a fortnight of supplies arriving the numbers in the marshes had trebled. During the succeeding months more supplies were got in and the partisans were used with considerable success as an intelligence service for the front South of RAVENNA. Owing to the threat of reprisals on the civilian population, and the danger of the partisans being mopped up, they were ordered to keep as quiet as possible for the time being. They did, however, capture an anti-tank gun and heavy machine gun, and evacuate a number of Allied PW during this period.

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In the second half of November BULOW, who had set up his headquarters in the marshes, came across the lines to discuss the co-ordination of operations by his partisans with our attack on RAVENNA. He stayed at Army Headquarters for two days and had conferences with Eighth Army branches, including AMG, PWD and GSI(b), and at Canadian [illegible]. An outline plan was agreed on.

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The partisans were to concentrate on intelligence until our arrival, and begin, in co-ordination with the Canadian Corps attack, operations -

a. small sabotage actions on Route 16 between RAVENNA and ALFONSINE.

b. to seal off the Germans in PORTO CORSINI and mop up pockets in RAVENNA and area.

It was also decided to try out German reaction as soon as possible and see what reprisals they would take as the result of a small raid on a German outpost.

BULOW then returned with an Allied Liaison Officer.

The small experimental raid which had been planned on a German outpost was carried out 25 Nov on a German 8 man patrol on the road from PORTO CORSINI to RAVENNA: 1 German was killed, and the only reprisals taken appear to have been systematic looting throughout the area. On 29 Nov the partisans began a preliminary attack on PORTO CORSINI with the object of testing out the garrison: two MGs were silenced and an unknown number of casualties inflicted; the partisans then withdrew and the garrison of PORTO CORSINI was reinforced from RAVENNA.

The partisans forces were now divided into two groups of 300 each with the following plan :

Group A. To occupy S. ALBERTO and LA CILLA South of LAKE COMACCHIO, blow the bridge at 512513, and then move in small groups towards ALFONSINE and MEZZANO to ambush enemy withdrawing on Route 16.

Group B. This was to be the main effort. To occupy or block enemy in MANDRIOLE and PORTO CORSINI, then move South to ambush enemy withdrawing between the sea and 5541.

The partisans started operations on 2 Dec. On the nights 1/2 Dec and 2/3 Dec ambush parties began to operate across Route 16, and E and NE of RAVENNA. Casualties inflicted on the enemy on these nights were 3 killed, 6 wounded and 2 PW of 114 Div.

On 3 Dec the partisans NE of MEZZANO were attacked by a scratch German force made up of supply personnel from S. ALBERTO

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At first light of 4 Dec, 300 partisans attacked PORTO CORSINI, and by 1030 had occupied the Southern bank of the canal against little opposition, and reported 75 Germans blocked on the N bank. Many German dead were found in the streets.

By the afternoon of 5 Dec partisan forces surrounding PORTO CORSINI got entangled in thick minefields and had many casualties. Meanwhile there was a rumour that the garrison was escaping by sea: this proved unfounded but the Liaison Officer decided that he would not allow the partisans to make a second attack on prepared positions, particularly as there was now a serious shortage of ammunition.

A series of 6 blocks were instituted on the roads CASAL BORSETTI - PORTO CORSINI, RAVENNA - PORTO CORSINI. That day a SAAF pilot came down from PORTO CORSINI to RAVENNA leading 12 German PW who had been captured in the day's operations: and patrols, which had arrived in the area got in 60,000 rounds of SAA to the partisans by rowing boat along the canals.

At first light on 5 Dec S. ALBERTO was attacked and was occupied by the afternoon. LA CASSINA, MANDRIOLE and LA CILLA were occupied by mid-day. MANDRIOLE was occupied without fighting: a group of partisans entered the village and fixed notices in German announcing that the place was surrounded by partisans, the Allies only ten miles away, and calling on the Germans there to surrender. 14 Germans surrendered while the rest, some 15, dispersed.

At SAN ALBERTO the situation became confused. The village had been occupied against German opposition and with some casualties on both sides: it was found, however, impossible to blow the bridge at 512513, owing to not being able to find the fuses and charges, and the machinery to set it off. The German counter-attack which developed later in the afternoon consisted of about 3 SP guns, a few armed cars and some lorried infantry: the partisans, who were armed only with Stens and rifles with a few MGs, were thrown into some confusion, and by the morning of 6 Dec had had severe casualties. BULOW, who was directing operations in this area, and was wounded in the stomach, succeeded in making an orderly withdrawal on to the line of the canal running along the 45 Northing, and, to avoid reprisals had ordered the evacuation of the villages North of the canal by the civilian population. Even so, the reprisals that the Germans have taken up to date against SAINT ALBERTO have totalled 72

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During the main operations 3 Dec - 6 Dec, 27 German PW were taken by the partisans, and 37 dead were counted on the ground: but, it is certain, according to various accounts, that a much larger number were in fact killed and wounded. The Liaison officer's estimate is 75 - 125 killed and 30 - 50 wounded. Other achievements during this period include :

Three small bridges on the rd due N. of RAVENNA saved from demolition, and the charges stacked some way away.

Mines marked in RAVENNA, and shown by partisan guides to our own tps entering the town.

On 7 Dec the bulk of the partisans were withdrawn to RAVENNA. The partisan detachment who, as mentioned above had come down from RAVENNA on 28 Oct, and since then had been with British units, rejoined the parent formation and a reception centre was set up at which partisans were re-equipped and refitted. The partisans were anxious to be formed into a regular unit to hold a sector of the line and continue "to the Brenner". However, after a period of somewhat delicate negotiations, it was finally agreed that the reorganised 28 GAP Bde should be put under command of the British Brigade in the area, and that BULOW, who has been given the honorary rank of colonel, would sub-allot partisans to units as required; in addition, a band of partisans were given an independent role, with a British officer and W/T set, to re-occupy the former partisan headquarters in the marshes North of PORTO CORSINI where some 60 Germans were still besieged.

The island which was honey-combed with an elaborate system of communication trenches, covered with tarpaulins and tents, was an ideal base for patrolling, and the partisans soon had their first success with the capture of two German PW.

The brigade was reduced to some 400 men. The five detachments were kept together since, as a result of the "cell" system on which the brigade was organised during the German occupation, each detachment represented a particular district. Detachments are organised in 1 - 3 companies according to the size of the detachment, each company consisting of 30 men. A depot and reserve company of 90 men is at Partisan HQ in RAVENNA. Owing to a sabotage scare a special unit was created for guard duties at the British Brigade HQ; membership of this unit was made an honour for partisans who had distinguished themselves, and they were issued with particularly smart uniforms etc.

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Partisans with units are employed for patrols, holding flanking positions, establishing guard posts, and guides etc. They also succeeded in arresting no less than 7 German agents who were attempting to recross the [illegible] from Allied occupied territory.

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During the advance to the COMACCHIO partisans were used for reccoing to the shores of the lake. As a result of this advance, contact was made with a number of partisans from 28 Bde who had been cut off by the German advance down, and had since then operated on the various islands in the lake. They brought through two pilots who had force-landed in the area, bringing the total of escaped prisoners rescued by the partisans of 28 Brigade to five pilots and two Army ORs.

FAENZA Area.

8 GARIBALDI Brigade and the CORBARI Band which had operated for a year in the hills South of FORLI was finally dissolved at the beginning of December, having first paraded in the town and listened to an address by a senior British officer who, as an escaped prisoner of war, had been with them during the Spring. A small number of partisans were however kept on as guides for forward troops, and useful intelligence, particularly about the crossings of the LAMONE, was obtained from partisan sources. They were also given the rather unusual job of driving bullocks which were being used to get anti-tank guns across the LAMONE, and, which, under shell fire, refused to comply with orders given in English.

A number of attempts were made to get partisans across the LAMONE the capture of FORLI, with the task of contacting partisans in the town and collecting intelligence. Owing to the difficulty of crossing the river, all the attempts were unsuccessful, though in one case the partisan courier was actually in the river when spotted by a German MG position on the other side and compelled to swim back.

Partisan guides were used by troops entering FAENZA, and the battalion concerned expressed satisfaction with them. From the partisan side perhaps the main excitement was a short sharp bout in the main square between one of the guides and a Fascist who had informed on him to the Germans some months ago.

In the town itself some 40 GAP members, including women, were found. Owing to almost complete lack of arms they were not able to do anything active before the Germans left, but they had ready information of German mines etc. A number of partisans sent out to contact resistance groups in villages further on and collect intelligence, ran into Germans and had to retire before they had got very far. However, several partisan

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2. INTELLIGENCE

Apart from the usual GAP and SAP underground organisation there are few partisan bands in the PO Valley on Eighth Army front. The numerous but ill-organised and ill-armed bands in the marshy and wooded country at the mouth of the PO were badly mopped up during the first half of December, but in view of the very difficult country in which they operate, and the strong anti-Fascist sentiments of the peasantry and fishermen in the area, they may be expected eventually to come together again.

FERRARA is a Fascist centre with a very active "Black Brigade", and the Committee of Liberation has never recovered from the arrests of most of its members last Spring. However, there are a certain number (possibly 2/300) GAP members and they may have a certain amount of arms and explosives since considerable stocks are known to have been handed over to the Communist Party by the military leader of the FERRARA area before he had to escape to Allied territory as a result of the Spring arrests.

On the North bank of the PO in ROVIGO Province there are considerably more partisans, but they have been mainly driven underground by German and Fascist authority. They are, however, reported to have good stocks of hidden arms.

3. ORGANISATION OF PARTISAN UNITS

With the growth of the resistance movement and its centralisation under the Committee of National Liberation co-ordination has steadily improved and, though local variations abound, a basic organisation for partisan bands has been evolved. Though in areas where partisans are strong, e.g. the Western Apennines and the Alps, partisan divisions may be formed, the unit is almost always the brigade. Brigades take their name either from the district in which they are operating or from the party originally responsible for their formation, e.g. "Garibaldi" for the Communists, "Matteotti" for the Socialists, "Justice and Liberty" for the Action Party etc., although, particularly in the case of "Garibaldi" Brigades, the name is by no means always a sure indication of the political opinions, if any, of the majority of the partisans in the Brigade. The following applies to a "Garibaldi" Brigade which operated in the mountains South of FORLI and to 28 and 29 GAP Brigades which covered, respectively, the RAVENNA and the FORLI-FAENZA areas.

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(c) 8 GARIBALDI Brigade

Organisation was as follows :-

Brigade - HQ and 3-4 Bns.
Battalion - HQ and 3-4 Detachments.
Detachment - HQ and 3 Squads.
Squad - Commander and 10 men.

Under command Brigade for sub-allotment if necessary :-

Intelligence Section
Liaison Unit
Medical Section.
Supply Section.

Brigades, Battalions and Detachments, as well as a commander, have a political commissar. The name, with its echoes of 1917, is somewhat misleading, since most bands, whatever their political colour, have a commissar. It is apt to be forgotten that partisans are volunteers lacking the cohesion afforded by military discipline and military law. Morale therefore depends on their continuing to believe in what they are fighting for. The main function of the commissar is to keep up the anti-Fascist faith of the members of the band. At Appendix "B" to Partisan Summary No.3 was a translation of a kind of A.B.C.A. pamphlet published by the Central Committee of Liberation as the basis for a talk by a political commissar to his men. Though political problems always exist in partisan bands there is no doubt that the intention of the Committee of Liberation is that the commissar should be a unifying force, and not impose a particular ideology. Both commander and commissar are elected by the band. The Commissar usually relieves the Comd of responsibility for Administration and Supply.

In partisan warfare intelligence and communications are perhaps the most important factors. The intelligence section is responsible for collecting information to be passed to the Allies by any Allied wireless set in the area, and for keeping a watch on any indications that the enemy is preparing a "rastrellamento". The liaison unit, consisting of runners (usually women), is responsible for communications between units of the Brigade which may be scattered over a wide area.

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(b) 26 GAP Brigade

The organisation of 28 GAP Brigade was similar to that of 8 GARIBALDI Brigade. However, since GAP units operate in the towns or the plains, the organisation remains, in effect, embryonic till either the Brigade is able to concentrate in a safe area, as was the case with 28 Brigade, or the close approach of our troops makes it possible for the partisans to come into the open. While they are working under cover the Brigade is organised on a cell system each group consisting of a leader and 2-3 men. In theory, each man only knows his immediate superiors and units are only brought together for particular sabotage actions. The GAP is in touch with, and provides recruits for, the local partisan brigade in the mountains.

(c) SAP Organisation

The main task of the SAP organisation was to enlist the support of sympathisers for the particular tasks of slowing down industrial production & preventing the Germans removing food stocks, by refusal to thresh the harvest(liberated ROMAGNA is at the moment feeling the effects of the success of this campaign, since a good half of the harvest has been lost) and, if possible, saving public utilities etc from demolition. The more active members may be recruited into the GAP, and when the time comes for overt action as many of the SAP who can be armed are incorporated into the GAP Brigade. In ROMAGNA this was assisted by the fact that in any area the senior GAP leader was also sector or sub-sector commander, controlling both GAP and SAP.

5. RANKS AND BADGES

The following were the partisan ranks and badges :-

RANK - Worn above left shirt pocket.

Bde Commander)
Bde Commissar) Military Commanders : black
Bn Commander (or Bde 2 in C.)) stars on red background.
Bn Commissar (or Bde Deputy Commissar)) Political Commissars : black stars on green background.
Detachment Commander)

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Bn Commissar (or Bde Deputy Commissar)		
Detachment Commander		
Detachment Commissar		
Squad Commander		red
Group ("nucleo") Cond		

Note: In GAP Bdes, which are usually not divided into Battalions, the Detachment Cond wears two stars and the Second in Cond one star.

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4. THE WINTER CRISIS

At the end of the Summer the partisans in Northern ITALY were in control of considerable areas of the ALPS and APENNINES. In PIEDMONT they controlled many of the most important passes; in LOMBARDY the VAL D'OSSOLA and the SIMPLON were firmly in partisan hands; in N.E. ITALY most of the roads into AUSTRIA passed through partisan territory and had been effectively blocked by extensive demolitions. Further South, the partisans held wide areas in the foothills of the ALPS round BELLUNO and Lake GARDA. The Appennines from FLORENCE to GENOA were full of rapidly expanding formations. At this time the partisan High Command, recently re-organised as the GHQ of the Volunteer Corps of Liberation, under the Committee of National Liberation, was (somewhat premature) considering the problems arising from the administration, on a non-political basis, of territory occupied by the partisans.

During the Autumn the Germans, in a series of punitive expeditions, mopped up the partisan formations on either side of the River TAGLIAMENTO, opening up routes into AUSTRIA, /the induced the partisans to give battle on MONTE GRAPPA and worsted them; cleared the VAL D'OSSOLA, capturing the town of DOMODOSSOLA and forcing many of the partisans and the civilian population to take refuge in SWITZERLAND; in PIEDMONT the partisans have had to face continual attacks, and in LIGURIA and the Appennines, under constant German pressure, many of the more important bands have had to disperse or cross the lines into Allied territory.

The reasons for these set-backs may be summarised as follows :

(a) The onset of winter. The size of a band depends on the ability of the local civilian population to keep it supplied with food. Operating as the bulk of the partisans are, in inhospitable and snow covered mountains without proper clothing, it is inevitable that winter conditions should cause a considerable amount of disintegration. Recent instructions over the "Italian Committee" wireless programme that partisans should adapt themselves to winter conditions and concentrate on small scale sabotage rather than major operations, seem to have been taken in some areas as an indication that we were no longer interested in partisans and in others were simply not followed.

(b) The effect of Fascist and German

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into AUSTRIA passed through [illegible] effectively blocked by extensive demolitions. Further South, the partisans held wide areas in the foothills of the ALPS round BELLUNO and Lake GARDA. The Appenines from FLORENCE to GENOA were full of rapidly expanding formations. At this time the partisan High Command, recently re-organised as the GHQ of the Volunteer Corps of Liberation, under the Committee of National Liberation, was (somewhat prematurely) considering the problems arising from the administration, on a non-political basis, of territory occupied by the partisans.

During the Autumn the Germans, in a series of punitive expeditions, mopped up the partisan formations on either side of the River MAGGIAMBIO, opening up routes into AUSTRIA, /the induced the partisans to give battle on MONTE GRAPPA and worsted them; cleared the VAL D'OSSOLA, capturing the town of DOMODOSSOLA and forcing many of the partisans and the civilian population to take refuge in SWITZERLAND; in PIEDMONT the partisans have had to face continual attacks; and in LIGURIA and the Appenines, under constant German pressure, many of the more important bands have had to disperse or cross the lines into Allied territory.

The reasons for these set-backs may be summarised as follows :

(a) The onset of winter. The size of a band depends on the ability of the local civilian population to keep it supplied with food. Operating as the bulk of the partisans are, in inhospitable and snow covered mountains without proper clothing, it is inevitable that winter conditions should cause a considerable amount of disintegration Recent instructions over the "Italia Combatte" wireless programme that partisans should adapt themselves to winter conditions and concentrate on small scale sabotage rather than major operations, seem to have been taken in some areas as an indication that we were no longer interested in partisans and in others were simply not followed.

(b) The effect of Fascist and German propaganda which has made full use of reports on economic conditions in Liberated Italy, alleged misbehaviour of Allied troops, the slowness of our advance to discourage the partisans.

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An example of the interest taken by partisans in political developments in ROME is provided by a tenser crisis which arose some time ago among the partisans co-operating with our troops in the RAVENNA area, some of whom were on the point of going home as a result of a false rumour to the effect that BADOGLIO was to be brought back into the Italian Government. In the North East, Slovene penetration of areas formerly controlled by Italian formations has undoubtedly been furthered by the desire of some of the Communist bands to put themselves under the powerful protection of Marshal TITO in order to ensure good treatment when over-run.

(c) Shortage of supplies. During the summer, commitments in POLAND and the BALKANS severely curtailed the air lift available for ITALY, and air operations at present are limited by weather conditions.

(d) Infiltration by Germans and Fascists. The enemy is relying increasingly on penetration of partisan bands, including even Committees of Liberation. The restriction of areas under partisan control will, however, have made the spy problem less acute for the partisans. By bitter experience they have learnt to be ruthless in exterminating Fascist sympathisers, and are extremely suspicious, so genuine Allied agents and escaped PW have found. The very large number of German agents recently arrested in the forward areas by partisans operating with our troops shows the effect of this security training.

While the partisans are going through a very difficult period, there is no reason to believe that the organisation will not hold together till more active operations become possible in the Spring. In view of the importance to the enemy of securing his lines of communication behind the ADRIATIC Line, it is probable that his main effort will be directed against partisans in North East ITALY where he has already gained his greatest success. In particular he will have to make an effort to mop up the bands which are still carrying out very effective sabotage of railway communications in the Plain of VENETIA.

C. Pratt

Lieut-Colonel

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Lieut Colonel,
General Staff Intelligence.

15 Jan 45

APPENDICES:-

'A' ... Some Partisan Orders.
'B' ... German Methods in Anti-Partisan Warfare.
'C' ... "A Revolt to Partisan Activity".
'D' ... "Co-operation received from Partisans".
'E' ... Duties of a Partisan Liaison Officer.
'F' ... Operations by small British G.H.Q.
'G' ... "Warning to Partisans".

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Appendix "A" to EIGHTH ARMY Partisan Summary No.4.

SOME PARTISAN ORDERS

The following are translations of some orders issued by BULOW, the commander of 28 GAP Bde in the RAVENNA area, during the period just before he made contact with us. At the time the Gothic Line had just been broken and, like many others, BULOW expected a rapid advance across the plain to the PO. The employment which he envisaged for his partisans was harrying the German retreat and rapid occupation of the main towns, particularly RAVENNA and FAENZA - a role which was all the more attractive since many of the partisans came from those two towns. His main problem was mobilisation, since the Brigade was organised on a territorial basis, each Detachment being responsible for a particular area from which its members were recruited, and in which they lived as ordinary civilians except when a particular action was put on. The details of the mobilisation plan were settled in personal conferences between the leaders; the two general directives reproduced here are, apart from a certain amount of understandable jubilation in the first document, written in a sober style and without exaggeration.

The emphasis on the tricolour as the partisan emblem and on the use of the normal Italian military salute is the result of the determination of the partisan leaders to exclude politics from a military unit. Though the GAP and SAP organisation was originally started by the Communist Party, members of 28 GAP Bde belong to all parties or to no party, and the commander, BULOW, the son of an officer who was killed in the last war and the grandson of a member of Garibaldi's Thousand, was originally appointed as being an army officer without political affiliations.

Headquarters 28th GAP Bde "M. GORDINI" 4 Sep 44

To all GAP Det and Zone HQs.

The Gothic Line has been forced and the Allied Armies have broken into the plain of ROMAGNA. The time is hourly approaching when we can openly display our tricolour flags and engage the enemy.

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Headquarters 28th GAP Bde "M. GORDINI" 4 Sep 44

To all GAP Det and Zone HQs.

The Gothic Line has been forced and the Allied armies have broken into the plain of ROMAGNA. The time is hourly approaching when we can openly display our tricolour flags and engage the enemy.

Any Detachment or Zone HQ may find itself, at any moment, isolated from the rest of the Bde and this HQ; for this reason every unit must be in a position to act on its own if out of touch.

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The following instructions of a general nature are designed to give units an indication of how they should meet the situation.

1. All Detachment HQs must immediately fix an assembly area from where the men can proceed in battle order with the minimum of delay. The assembly area will be towards RAVENNA for all the Zones, except for Zones 5 and 6 (C. STROCCHI Detachment) the assembly area of which will be towards FAENZA.

2. As from today every Capist will have 2 - 3 days' rations ready to take with him.

3. Every Capist will be in possession of a tricolour flash to wear on his tunic.

4. Detail at once 4 runners per Detachment to be despatched to Bde HQ in the event of Detachments taking the field under command of Bde HQ.

5. In the event of a Detachment HQ finding itself in liberated territory before the rest of the Bde it will not act as an independent unit, or, engage the Germans and Fascists in the more important centres in its area; put itself at the complete disposition of the Local Committee of National Liberation; assist in order in the territory under its control; report to the Allied Forces as a Detachment of 28th GAP Bde M. GORDINI; remember you are simply Patriots, with only one flag, and a part of the new Italian Army. Be an example of discipline and order.

6. Any Detachment that loses touch with Bde HQ will bear in mind that our principal task is that of liberating the towns of RAVENNA and FAENZA (last named reserved for "Celso Strocchi" Detachment in collaboration with the Local SAP); it will therefore endeavour to reach these towns in the least possible time.

7. Any Zone or Detachment HQ with information about changes on the Front in its area should send runners at once to this HQ to keep it informed, and to receive orders.

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3. Every Copist will be in possession of a tricolour flash to wear on his tunic.

4. Detail at once 4 runners per Detachment to be despatched to Bde HQ in the event of Detachments taking the field under command of Bde HQ.

5. In the event of a Detachment HQ finding itself in liberated territory before the rest of the Bde it will act as an independent unit, or, engage the Germans and Fascists in the more important centres in its area; put itself at the complete disposition of the Local Committee of National Liberation; subordinate to the territory under its control; report to the Allied Forces as a Detachment of 28th Gal Bde M. GORDINI; remember you are simply Patriots, with only one aim, and a part of the new Italian Army. Be an example of discipline and order.

6. Any Detachment that loses touch with Bde HQ will bear in mind that our principal task is that of liberating the towns of RAVENNA and FAENZA (last named reserved for "Colso Strocchi" Detachment in collaboration with the Local SAP); it will therefore endeavour to reach these towns in the least possible time.

7. Any Zone or Detachment HQ with information about changes on the front in its area should send runners at once to this HQ to keep it informed, and to receive orders.

From this instant Commanders and men should consider themselves alerted and be prepared for any emergency.

DEATH TO THE GERMAN INVADER DEATH TO THE FASCIST RABBLE

BULOW
Comd,
28th G.A.F. Bde.

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Headquarters 20 G.A.P. Bde "N. GORDINI". 9 Sep 44

To all Det HQs.

For Inf. Provincial HQ.

In view of the general mobilisation of the Patriot forces of the Provinces, the following directive is issued to supplement previous instructions.

1. S.A.P formations are operationally under G.A.P HQ. In the event of mobilisation, S.A.P units indispensable for the occupation of smaller centres will remain at their posts. The remainder will join local G.A.P formations as reserve troops and put themselves under command of G.A.P HQ. G.A.P and S.A.P HQs will therefore be combined both on the march and in action.

2. All forces operating, or to operate militarily (G.A.P and S.A.P partisans), will wear only one distinctive flash, the tricolour. Severe measures will be taken against any Commanders and Commissars who, contrary to orders, move troops under their command with red scarves or red flags.

The salute is that of the Italian Army.

Detachment flags will be in the form of a right angle triangle (about 90 cm x 40 cm) with on one side "20 G.A.P Bde "N. GORDINI", and on the other ..(Name of Detachment)..... Detachment.

Avoid an excess of flags; one per detachment is sufficient.

3. All Captains must wear the heaviest possible clothing; military uniform may be worn if in possession, provided that all the insignia and target patches are removed.

4. Besides rations for 2 - 3 days every man should have a blanket. Zones and Det HQs will take all medical supplies available, especially bandages, gauze, cotton and alcohol.

5. HQs will carry all available explosive material with them (mines, bombs, T.N.T, detonators, fuses etc.).

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In view of the General Mobilisation of the Patriot forces of the Provinces, the following directive is issued to supplement previous instructions.

1. SAP formations are operationally under GAP HQs. In the event of mobilisation, SAP units indispensable for the security of smaller centres will remain at their posts. The remainder will join local GAP formations as reserve troops and put themselves under command of GAP HQs. GAP and SAP HQs will therefore be combined both in the march and in action.

2. All forces operating, or to operate collectively (GAP and SAP portions), will wear only one distinctive flash, the tricolour. Severe measures will be taken against any Commanders and Commissars who, contrary to orders, move troops under their command with red cockades or red flags.

The salute is that of the Italian Army.

Detachment flags will be in the form of a rightangle triangle (about 90 cms x 60 cms) with on one side "GAP Bde "M. GORDINI", and on the other ..(Name of Detachment)..... Detachment.

Avoid an excess of flags; one per detachment is sufficient.

3. All Patriots must wear the heaviest possible clothing; military uniforms may be worn if in possession, provided that all all insignia and Corps patches are removed.

4. Besides rations for 2 - 3 days every man should have a blanket. Zones and Det HQs will take all medical supplies available, especially bandages, gauze, cotton and alcohol.

5. HQs will carry all available explosive material with them (mines, bombs, TNT, detonators, fuses etc.).

6. Heavy automatic weapons (LMGs and MMGs) will be distributed among reliable HQ Groups, and be always available to the Commander.

7. The courier service between all HQs, and from them to Det and Bde HQs, will be developed to the greatest possible extent.

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It is again emphasised that in the event of mobilisation every Detachment is responsible that 4 Cpists are available for despatch as runners to Bde HQ as soon as its location has been announced. Such messengers must be selected from the more ardent and intelligent Cpists, and be well armed.

In addition to runners, every Detachment HQ as soon as it arrives at the formation assembly area, will send a runner every 20 minutes to Bde HQ to report the Detachment's location, estimated time to reach the objective, obstacles encountered etc.

Communications are the most important factor in any combined military operation; they must therefore be developed to the greatest possible degree of efficiency.

8. Any detachment HQ which does not succeed in assembling its forces in reasonable time will not wait, but move with the forces available leaving behind a responsible officer (e.g. the Second in Command) to follow up with the remainder to the battle area.

9. Any Detachment which finds itself overtaken by developments in the situation and has not received orders from Bde HQ, should act on its own initiative in accordance with any directives previously issued, and automatically put itself on a war footing without reference to any other HQ.

Cmnd. 28 G.P Bde.

HQ 28 G.P Bde "H. QUARTET". 18 Sep 44.

To all G.P Det HQs.

The addressees are requested to submit forthwith a list of names selected from the personnel of their detachments who have special political qualifications, organisational ability, intelligence and education.

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Cond. 28 G&F Bde.

Hq 28 G&F Bde "E". (NORDITE". 18 Sep 44.

To all G.F Det Hqs.

The addressees are requested to submit forthwith a list of names selected from the personnel of their detachments who have special political qualifications, organisational ability, intelligence and education.

These names will be put forward by us to fill political and administrative posts in the new set-up of the Province.

Each name should be accompanied by a statement of the character , qualifications, and record of service as a Patriot of the individual concerned.

Cond. 28 G&F Bde.

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HQ 2E G.T Bde "E. CORPS".

21 Sep 44.

To all Det HQs.

IMPORTANT

When our forces enter into action and during the enemy's retreat, all units a/c will endeavour to take as many German prisoners as possible. Prisoners, after being disarmed, will be kept in houses under guard, and only handed over to Bde HQ, which will be responsible for making a nominal roll and handing them over to the Allies.

In the event of an isolated detachment taking prisoners, a list will be made in duplicate, one copy to be countersigned by the Allied HQ when the prisoners are handed over.

Prisoners will be treated according to therules of war.

Cmdr. 28 GAF Bde.

Comment: 28 GAF has handed over 27 prisoners and 2 deserters to our troops.

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SECRET

Appendix "B" to EIGHTH Army Partisan Summary No.4

German Methods in Anti-Partisan Warfare

Three prisoners captured from an Anti-Partisan Unit organised by 362 Division received special instruction at a divisional school and have given the following information on the training and methods employed.

A. Training

The school which the PWs attended had a threefold purpose :
(a) to acquaint the men with existing partisan methods,
(b) to teach them how to detect and deal with the partisans properly and effectively so that
(c) German activities would not be hampered.
The training was not primarily designed to destroy Partisans. On the contrary, the platoon was to simulate organised action, large scale action, if possible, to scare partisans back into the hills where they could do little or no damage. In short, the platoon's ultimate function was to clear and make safe for German vehicles and soldiers all necessary routes of communication and supply.

One PW, the OC anti-partisan Pl; 2nd Lt. STURY, claims that similar operations have been successful in the past as Italian partisans are very apt to scatter when they first see organised troops obviously sent out to find and apprehend them. Instead of waiting to determine the strength of the approaching troops, the partisans scatter to hide, even though they outnumber the Germans by far. By using such small units, the German High Command hopes to conserve some of its depleted manpower, and to keep supply routes open and safe.

In addition to rendering the partisans harmless by causing them to disperse, the Germans have employed other methods to discourage and hamper partisan activities.

B. Anti-Partisan Methods

5059

1. Wherever possible, hostages, such as parents or sisters of partisan leaders or of well-known partisans, are taken. PW claims that these partisans are not maltreated, but held only for the purpose of exchange for the partisan sought. He admits, however, that he has heard of

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1. Wherever possible, hostages, such as parents or sisters of partisan leaders or of well-known partisans, are taken. PW claims that these partisans are not maltreated, but held only for the purpose of exchange for the partisan sought. He admits, however, that he has heard of atrocities committed against these hostages, but places all blame for them on SS units.

2. A regular order of battle of partisan band activities and locations is kept by all Divisional Int. Staffs. All information obtained on the various partisan bands is passed on through intelligence channels up to the Army Int Staff and likewise down to lower echelons. It is the duty of the Anti-Partisan Platoon to obtain information on partisan activities.

/ 3. All civilians ..

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3. All civilians in small villages are watched closely and interrogated often as to the location of certain partisan bands and to future operations planned by these bands. Without realising it, civilians have many times given away valuable information on partisan activities.

4. Churches are watched closely as it is known that they are used by partisans as observation posts and that sometimes, the Church bells are used to give signals.

5. All persons carrying flash lights and all persons displaying any light at night are immediately arrested.

6. Erstwhile Fascists, used as agents, join partisan bands with the ulterior motive of keeping the Germans informed of partisan locations and operations. Many agents have gained the confidence of some partisan leaders with an apparently honest admittal that they were Fascist in the past, but with the false claim that they wish to make up for their past, by joining and fighting together with the partisans. Many of these Fascists have been killed in the attempt to join, but a few have thus far been successful.

7. Sometimes English-speaking Germans, posing as escaped Allied Prisoners of War, join partisan bands with the hope, as they say, of crossing the front lines. Instead, they operate as agents.

8. All public buildings are watched closely, for the partisans have been noted to use decorative flags as a means of giving signals.

C. Classification of Partisans

2nd Lt STURY, who made it clear he was abiding by WEHRMACHT Regulations (NOT SS), claimed that when partisans are captured or arrested they are classified into two groups:

1. Partisans: Those who bear arms against the Germans.

2. Partisan Helpers: Those who do NOT bear arms against the Germans yet associate with partisans.

In either case the Anti-Partisan Platoon does not shoot the partisans or the partisan helpers. In every case all those arrested are delivered to the FELDGENDARMARI , who interrogate and dispose of them. If they are found to be partisans they are arrested as Prisoners of War. If they are found to be partisan helpers, they are given prison terms or sent to Germany where they will be forced to work. In the event that German deserters

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Germans found in German uniform fighting or otherwise engaged in anti-German activities are shot and killed on the spot without court-martial.

(SOURCE: AFHQ G.2 Intelligence Notes No.78. 17/10/44)

COMMENT:- Para C. As regards captured partisans, this report is certainly not borne out by other information. Captured partisans are [illegible] shot if [illegible]

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APPENDIX "C"
TO
EIGHTH ARMY PARTISAN SUMMARY NO. 4.

A REACTION TO PARTISAN ACTIVITY
DENUNCIATION OF A CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

305 Int Div
Ic (8SE)

Div HQ
5 Oct 44

Intelligence Directive

1. Participation of Partisans in Combat at the Front

Contrary to their former tactics, Partisans have recently intervened in regular combat at the front. On 27 September 1944 a band of Partisans, 50 to 70 strong, held M. Battaglia with two MGs until relieved by American troops.

2. Ambushing of Linesmen

On 4 October 1944 a group of linesmen, stopping at a point where the wire was broken, was taken under fire by Partisans. One man was killed. Others trying to recover the body received MG and machine pistol fire. The dead man and meanwhile been robbed.

Similar cases have occurred repeatedly. Partisans cut telephone lines at certain points where they set up ambushes for our linesmen.

It is ordered, therefore, to reinforce all groups of maintenance men by at least three uniformed men equipped with machine pistols.

3. Attacks on billets

Recent attacks on buildings occupied by our troops have shown that casualties by partisans can be expected anywhere. Adequate guards must be posted at occupied buildings at all times.

For the Division Commander

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Similar cases have occurred repeatedly. Partisans cut telephone lines at certain points where they set ambushes or lay mines.

It is ordered, therefore, to reinforce all groups of linesmen by at least three additional men equipped with machine pistols.

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Recent attacks on buildings occupied by our troops have shown that casualties by partisans can be expected anywhere. Adequate guards must be posted at occupied buildings at all times.

For the Division Commander

Chief of Staff

/s/ [illegible]

Original:
/s/ Illegible
2/Lt.

(Source: 3 Army G-2 Report No.443)

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Appx. "D" to Eighth Army Partisan Summary No. 4

The following report by a Canadian Coy Comd was made in reply to a request by a British Partisan Liaison Officer for a report on co-operation received from partisans :

" Sum of co-operation received from the partisans

Area OSTERIA - PIEVE QUARTA - CASTIANO - ST. PIERO in VINCOLI - RAVENNA.

Organised as follows:

A. Protective screen in front of foward troops
B. Check on civilians
C. Recce patrols. Information roads and enemy, behind enemy lines
D. Recce patrols with own troops forward of FDLS
E. Fighting patrols with own troops
F. Mopping up parties
G. Letter box system from beyond the RONCA
H. Work parties for road maintenance

The above was organised within 24 hrs after first contact, with the assistance of an Italian LO and the Partisan Leader. If we had known that partisans were operating in the area prior to our arrival, organisation and administration could have been immediate.

Administration:

The following should be regarded as immediate:

A. Rations (more bread than normal issue, less meat)
B. Gas capes or equivalent
C. Arms and ammo
D. Boots, socks and underwear
E. Medical supplies (small dressings)

5057

General Remarks:

At all times you must make clear that you are in command, show faith and trust in their abilities but at the same time double check all information if possible. Do not listen to any information unless it is from the Partisan Leader or from patrol leaders. Rumours are rampant. In mixed patrols brief and interrogate Partisan patrol leaders, making sure that it is

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A.P.O. 534 U.S. Army - Fifth U.S. Army - 88th FA Bn C - SP, FIELD in VINCOLI - RAVENNA.

Organised as follows:

A. Protective screen in front of forward troops
B. Check on civilians
C. Recce patrols. Information roads and enemy, behind enemy lines
D. Recce patrols with own troops forward of FDLS
E. Fighting patrols with own troops
F. Mopping up parties
G. Letter box system from beyond the FDNCA
H. Work parties for road maintenance

The above was organised within 24 hrs after first contact, with the assistance of an Italian Officer and the Partisan Leader. If we had known that partisans were operating in the area prior to our arrival, organisation and administration could have been immediate.

Administration:

The following should be regarded as immediate:

A. Rations (more bread than normal issue, less meat)
B. U.S capes or equivalent
C. Arms and ammo
D. Boots, socks and underwear
E. Medical supplies (Sulf Dressings)

General Remarks:

5057

At all times you must make clear that you are in command, show faith and trust in their abilities but at the same time double check all information if possible. Do not listen to any information unless it is from the Partisan Leader or from patrol leaders. Maintain morale. Before mixed patrols brief and introduce the opposite patrol leaders, making sure that it is understood that your officer or NCO is in command of the patrol, especially in the tactical handling. Actually use the partisans as guides and additional fire power. Information from partisan recce patrols proved to be authentic and we were successful in destroying enemy armour. In the five days activity with the partisan group we had cycle harmony but it was necessary to emphasise to the troops in the area, that the partisans were to be treated as equals.

We did not interfere with local partisan affairs, rumours, including the trial of four Fascists."

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Appendix "J" to EIGHTH Army Partisan Summary No.4

Duties of a Partisan Liaison Officer

The following list of his duties has been compiled by an EIGHTH Army Partisan Liaison Officer, and illustrates the variety of problems which arise when running a band of partisans to co-operate with our troops in the line. In practice, these tasks are as far as possible decentralised to Italian Intelligence Liaison officers who are attached to battalions or regiments and are responsible for operating the partisans allotted to their unit.

"G"
1. Advice on use of partisans.
2. Keep the formation to which he is attached informed of partisan order of battle.
3. Plan special partisan ops. Possibly organise and launch these.
4. Take part in important ops.

"I"
5. Organise collection of information as required.
6. Plan penetrations of enemy MLR to gather information.
7. Obtain maps and photographs for partisan HQ.
8. Contact GSI(CL) officer responsible for civilian interrogation.
9. Assist FSS in checking suspected civilians.
10. Sign and supervise partisan passes, identity cards, demobilisation papers, etc.

"A"
11. Supply partisans to units.
12. Liaise with units as to their conduct.
13. Investigate cases of poor performance with units.
14. Investigate cases of civil offences by partisans.
15. Deal with FSS re movement and conduct.
16. Deal with AMG re conduct, possession of arms, armbands, evacuations, etc.
17. Contact partisans newly overrun.
18. Supervise and assist Italian Intelligence Liaison officers with units.
19. Maintain nominal rolls (where possible) of partisan casualties, etc.

"Welfare"
20. Trace wounded and missing. } Inform AMG.
21. Burial of dead. }

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16. Deal with AMG re conduct, possession of arms, armbands, evacuations, etc.
17. Contact partisans newly overrun.
18. Supervise and assist Italian Intelligence Liaison officers with units.
19. Maintain nominal rolls (where possible) of partisan casualties, etc.

"Welfare"

20. Trace wounded and missing.) Inform AMG.
21. Burial of dead.)
22. Deal with personal troubles of partisans.
23. Contact AMG Welfare offrs.

5056

"Q" 24. Obtain supplies of arms, food, ammn, clothing, cigarettes, misc e.g. toilet comforts, fuel for HQ, etc.
25. Issue the foregoing.
26. Maintain feeding system for partisans not with units.
27. Baths at Mobile Bath Unit.
28. Maintain partisan tpt (mainly civilian).
29. Organise tpt for partisan leaders.

/ "Plans" .....

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Appx "F" to Eighth Army Partisan Summary No.4.

The following is an example of operations by a small partisan GAP with whom we had not been previously in touch, and whose only link with, and instructions from, the Allies, was by the "Italia Combatte" radio and Partisan GHQ in Milan via the Regional Committee in Bologna.

5th Documment 29th Brigade GAP CASTONE SOZZA

The following is a list of actions of Cassone Capiste during the last days preceding the arrival of Allied tps :

S. GIORGIO
M 0313

7 Germans taken prisoner, disarmed and handed over to English tps together with all their arms. The following men took part in this action :- ALTINI Vico, MONTI Mario, FABIOLI Dello, BARBIERI Silvano.

CHIAVICHE
M 0206

2 German prisoners taken and handed over to Allied tps together with arms. Capiet participants :- TAMBURINI Dino and TAMBURINI Ernesto.

CALADRINA
M 0311

1 German killed one another wounded, but not possible to collect their arms owing to the prompt intervention of other German tps. Participants :- CHIERI Enrico, ROSSI Enrico, BELLINI Primo.

SETTE CROCIARI
M 5506

20 Oct three Germans killed.
Participants :- MONTESI Rino and others whose names are not held.

CARPINETA
M 0000

20 Oct two Germans killed. Participants :- local Capiste.

PIEVE SESTINA
M 5711

20 Oct one German killed. ditto

TIPANO
M 5505

Two Germans killed. ditto

RONTA
M 5913

19 Oct eight German prisoners taken and handed over to English tps with all their equipment. Action carried out by Capiste BUCCELLI Enrico.

CESENA

19 Oct one German killed.

CESENA

19 Oct five German prisoners taken

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5th Detachment 29th Brigade GAP CESENE SOZZA

The following is a list of actions of Cesena Gapiste during the last days preceding the arrival of Allied tps :

S. GIORGIO M 0313	7 Germans taken prisoner, disarmed and handed over to English tps together with all their arms. The following men took part in this action :- ALTINI Vito, MONTI Mario, FABBOLI Delio, BARBIERI Silvano.
CHIAVICHE M 0209	2 German prisoners taken and handed over to Allied tps together with arms. Gapist participants :- BALDUCCINI Dino and BALDUCCINI Ernesto.
CALABRINA M 0311	1 German killed and another wounded, but not possible to collect their arms owing to the prompt intervention of other German tps. Participants :- CIOPPI Enrico, ROSSI Enrico, BELLINI Primo.
SETTE CROCIARI M 5505	20 Oct three Germans killed. Participants :- MONTESI Rino and others whose names are not held.
CARPINETA M 0000	20 Oct two Germans killed. Participants :- local Gapists.
PIEVE SESTINA M 5711	20 Oct one German killed. ditto
RIPANO M 5505	Two Germans killed. ditto
ROTTA M 5913	19 Oct eight German prisoners taken and handed over to English tps with all their equipment. Action carried out by Gapists BUCCELLI Enrico.
CESENA	19 Oct one German killed.
CESENA	19 Oct five German prisoners taken. 5055
MACERONE M 6606	29 German prisoners taken by local Gapists.
CALABRINA M 0311	14 German prisoners taken by Gapists CALPANA Alvaro, CALPANA Ettore, MARIANI Oreste.
CASSETTOLA M 0804	20 German prisoners taken by local Gapists.
MONTELEONE R 6196	3 Germans killed by local Gapists.

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Appx "F" (Contd)

LOVERDALE N 5801	In the countryside of LOVERDALE 1 German officer killed by Capist ALLUCCI Giovanni.
FERVA	Enemy vehicle set on fire on road from FERVA.
S. ERMINIO N 6012	Enemy vehicle attacked — Captain and 2/Lieut killed and 2 sergeant wounded — by Capist FALCIONI Secondo and PASCUCCI Primo.

Other actions have been planned, but not sufficient information is available to report on them.

CENSE, 4/11/44.

Partisan Commander
(Sgd) CASCIOLI Lucirano.

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Appendix "G" to EIGHTH Army Partisan Summary No.4.

A WARNING TO PARTISANS

The following are translations of two documents posted up at BRISIGHELLA near FAENZA. The references to the destruction of threshing machines by the partisans are of interest. On instructions broadcast over the "Italia Combatte" programme a very successful campaign was conducted in the ROMAGNA to delay the threshing of last year's harvest, and so make it more difficult for the Germans to remove stocks as they retreated. In most cases owners of threshing machines co-operated; if they refused their machines were destroyed.

ITALIANS!

The partisan rabble is trying here, too, in ROMAGNA to hinder the fight for freedom of your people and of the German people. Fascists and German soldiers have been assassinated and property of the German Armed Forces has been damaged; sabotage has been committed against military installations and threshing machines burnt in order to reduce the Italian people to starvation. The most severe measures will be taken against these criminals.

As retribution for the murder on 2nd August near CASALE of soldiers belonging to the German Armed Forces and of the Fascist GIULIO CESARE, five bandits and communists have been shot at the place where the murder was committed.

Hostages have been taken and, when the next incident occurs, will pay for the crimes of others. For every Fascist or soldier of the German Armed Forces, TEN Communists, whether bandits or hostages, will lose their lives.

ITALIANS, join in the work of purging this area of rebels and report the presence of partisans. The German Armed Forces will protect you against reprisals by the rebels.

In any case where news of partisans and the like are denounced and arrests made, a similar number of hostages will be released. All denunciations of this type will be regarded as confidential.

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ITALIANS, join in the work of purging this race of rebels and report the presence of partisans. The German Armed Forces will protect you as best possible by the rebels.

In any case when nests of partisans and the like are denounced and arrests made, a similar number of hostages will be released. All denunciations of this kind will be regarded as confidential.

The following orders come into effect as from this moment.

1. From 2000 hrs to 0500 hrs no Italian will leave his house. From 2100 hrs no-one may ride a bicycle. Anyone found in the street during hours of curfew will be fired on by patrols without any warning.

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2. When comb-outs are in progress every Italian must halt and show his documents. Anyone who tries to make off will be killed.

3. All arms and ammunition and also explosives must be handed over to Garrison Headquarters. If, during searches, the smallest quantities are found, the inhabitants will be killed and the house burnt.

4. On Monday 7 Aug 44 a beginning will be made on collecting grain into houses and threshing it, in the following parishes:

QUINTOLO, S.BRA, POGGIO, S. RUFFILLO, RITORTOLO, BACCAGNANO, BRISIGHELLA.

Any difficulties are to be overcome by any means possible in conjunction with the "Commissario Prefettizio"; if the difficulties are insuperable a report will be made to the Garrison HQ.

5. NO Italian will change his place of residence without the agreement of the Garrison Commander.

Anyone who does not follow these orders is considered a supporter of the partisans and will be treated accordingly.

BRISIGHELLA 6 Aug 1944 - XXII

For the Commissario Prefettizio
I. Silvestrini

Reidner Capt.
Ortskommandant.

(Source: GSI(CL) 5 Corps)

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REPUBLICAN FASCIST PARTY - HQ E. MUSI

BLACK BRIGADE

BRISIGHELLA

It is announced that as reprisal for the capture by Bandits of two young ladies of BRISIGHELLA who belong to the Republican Fascist Party, 30 hostages will be arrested.

If the above-mentioned young ladies are not returned to their families by 1500 hrs on the 7th of this month the hostages will be hanged in the public square and their houses burnt.

BRISIGHELLA
4 September 1944-XXII

THE BLACK BRIGADE

Comment: The "young ladies" were returned.
The C.O. of the Black Brigade was Lieut. MASSI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

If is [illegible]
Bandits of two young ladies [illegible] Republican Fascist Party, 30 hostages will be [illegible]

If the above-mentioned young ladies are not returned to their families by 1500 hrs on the 7th of this month the hostages will be hanged in the public square and their houses burnt.

BRISTOL
4 September 1944-XXII

THE BLACK BRIGADE

Comment: The "young ladies" were returned.
The C.O. of the Black Brigade was Lieut-
NASSI.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

TOP SECRET
Copy No 8

No1 Special Force,
C M F
Ref: MN/745
4 Sept 44

To: Distribution as in MN/742, dated 2 Sept 44.

Subject: OUTLINE PLAN BY No1 SPECIAL FORCE TO COVER SUDDEN RANKIN B CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

The attached map and legend are issued as an Appendix to MN/742, dated 2 Sept 44, and receive the same distribution.

R. Tillett

Lt.Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR.
Comd No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

To: Distribution as in MN/742, dated 2 Sept 44.

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R. T. Hewitt


Lt.Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR.
Comd No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.


5052

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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LEGEND

MILAN ..... Regional capitals at which existing British personnel can form the basis of a mission.

CUNEO ..... Provincial capitals at which existing British personnel can form the basis of a mission.

Vercelli ..... Provincial capitals at which existing Italian personnel can form the basis of a mission.

Imperia ..... Provincial capitals for which there are no personnel available in the field.

5050

TOP SECRET
Copy Nº

Nº1 Special Force
C M F
Ref: MN/742
2nd Spetember 1944.

To: Distribution as shown.

Subject: OUTLINE PLAN BY Nº1 SPECIAL FORCE TO COVER SUDDEN RANKIN B CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN ITALY.

The attached paper shows in preciseterms the contribution that this Hq can make durin, RANKIN B conditions in North-west ITALY.

The choice of towns and principal centres is largely arbitary and guidence from AAI and AGC giving priorities in this respect would be advisable.

In view of the possibility of immediate action being required of us under RANKIN conditions in these areas, it is requested that material for inclusion in the briefs of missions now in the field or under preparation be submitted to this Hq by interested authonities and agencies without delay.

R. T. Hewitt

Lt.Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR
Coma Nº1 Special Force.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Subject: OUTLINE PLAN BY No1 SPECIAL FORCE
TO COVER SUDDEN RANKIN B CONDITIONS
IN NORTHERN ITALY.

The attached paper shows in precise terms the contribution that this Hq can make during RANKIN B conditions in North-West ITALY.

The choice of towns and principal centres is largely arbitary and guidance from AAI and ACC giving priorities in this respect would be advisable.

In view of the possibility of immediate action being required of us under RANKIN conditions in these areas, it is requested that material for inclusion in the briefs of missions now in the field or under preparation be submitted to this Hq by interested authorities and agencies without delay.

R. T. Hewitt

Lt.Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR
Comd No1 Special Force.

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RTH/JHC.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

TOP SECRET
Copy No
Ref: MN/742

OUTLINE PLAN BY No1 SPECIAL FORCE TO COVER SUDDEN EXTENSIVE RANKIN B CONDITIONS IN NORTHERN ITALY

MILITARY SITUATION

1. In Southern France, the Allied advance troops are reported to have reached Lake Geneva.

2. Enemy troops are in strength in the PIEDMONT valleys leading to the French frontier, presumably to protect the escape route for troops cut off in Southern France, and to prevent any penetration by Allied troops from FRANCE into ITALY and the PO valley.

3. On the APPENNINE front, an offensive by Allied troops along the ADRIATIC sector has commenced and may be expected to reach the PO estuary and VENICE during the next few weeks. It is presumed that Allied troops will not turn Westwards into the PO valley, but will continue the advance towards the North East.

4. In the event of this offensive being successful, it is probable that the Germans will carry out a rapid withdrawal from North Western ITALY, the APPENNINES and the PO valley towards the North Eastern escape routes.

PROBABLE RESULTS OF RANKIN B CONDITIONS IN THESE AREAS

5048

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PROBABLE RESULTS OF RANKIN B CONDITIONS IN THESE AREAS

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5. The withdrawal of enemy troops from this large area of ITALY, and the withdrawal of enemy administrative services will certainly result in the complete collapse of the already ineffective FASCIST regime.

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6. In view of the fact that German troops will not be replaced by a considerable Allied Military occupation, it is ex - tremely probable that there will come into being a state of civil strife, and in some areas civil war, with a resultant chaos and breekdown in the minimum public services pending the arrival of a strong A.M.G. to take control.

7. It is, therefore, essential that some interim Allied control be established durin, the critical period between the with - drawal of the enemy ana the arrival of the proposed Allied Administrative authorities.

REQUIREMENTS OF INTERIM ALLIED AUTHROITY.

8. Principal requirements will be:

a) To be able to make immediate contact with whatever provisional local government is set up or to set up a provisional local government; (this will undoubt- edly be based on the existing Committees of Liberation).

b) To be able to establish immediate communications between the provisional local authorities and Allied Hq in order:

i) To transmit the orders of the Allies to these authorities.

ii) To be able to transmit to the Allies reports of the situation and the requirements of the areas concerned.

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7. It is, therefore, essential that some interim Allied control be established during the critical period between the withdrawal of the enemy and the arrival of the proposed Allied Administrative authorities.

REQUIREMENTS OF INTERIM ALLIED AUTHROITY.

8. Principal requirements will be:

a) To be able to make immediate contact with whatever provisional local government is set up or to set up a provisional local government; (this will undoubtedly be based on the existing Committees of Liberation).

b) To be able to establish immediate communications between the provisional local authorities and Allied Hq in order:

i) To transmit the orders of the Allies to these authorities.

ii) To be able to transmit to the Allies reports of the situation and the requirements of the areas concerned.

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iii) To be able to maintain order with the forces available (Carbinieri, Patriot Forces, etc.,)

iv) To arrange for the protection of public utilities, records, etc., and to control anti-Fascist excesses.

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AREAS IN WHICH ACTION WILL BE REQUIRED

9. As stated in paras 1 - 4, the enemy may be expected to carry out a rapid withdrawal from the following regions in the near future:

TUSCANY, LIGURIA, PIEDMONT, EMILIA,
LOMBARDY, VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, S.W. VENETO.

10. Line of Allied Advance

a) It is assumed that the line of advance of the Allied armies will include LUCCA, PISTOIA, BOLOGNA, FERRARA, PADOVA, TREVISO and the PIAVE and territories East of this line, and that normal A.M.G. will function immed - iately in the wake of the armies.

b) If this assumption is correct the most important areas, from the point of view of RANKIN planning are those West of this line of advance.

11. a) As the tasks of the missions will be chiefly administrative and as the spheres of influence of the Committees of Liberation have tended to follow the normal administrat - ive boundaries, with their seats in or near the admin - istrative centres, the first priority tasks will be to establish missions in the regional capitals. Considering only that part of Italy referred to in sub para (b) above, these are as follows:

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TUSCANY, LIGURIA, PIEDMONT, EMILIA,
LOMBARDY, VENEZIA TRIDENTINA, S.W. VENETO.

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5046

i) MILAN (LOMBARDY, also the seat of the Central Committee of Liberation for Northern Italy).

ii) TURIN (PIEDMONT).

iii) GENOA (LIGURIA).

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iv) TRENTO (VENZIA TRIDENTINA).

b) The second priority is to establish missions at the more important provincial capitals, and in this respect the importance of establishing missions will tend to increase with the distance of the province concerned from the area occupied by Allied troops and from the restraining influence exercised by the presence of these troops. The most important provincial capitals from the point of view of physical location would be as follows:

i) PIEDMONT

AOSTA
CUNEO
ALESSANDRIA
VERCELLI
BIELLA

ii) LOMBARDY

COMO
BERGAMO
BRESCIA

iii) VENEZIA TRIDENTINA

BOLZANO

iv) LIGURIA

IMPERIA
LA SPEZIA

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VERCELLI
BIELLA

ii) LOMBARDY

COMO
BERGAMO
BRESCIA

iii) VENEZIA TRIDENTINA

BOLZANO

iv) LIGURIA

IMPERIA
LA SPEZIA

v) EMILIA

PIACENZA
PARMA
MODENA

vi) VENETO

VERONA
VICENZA
BELLUNO.

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12. It would, therefore, seem that 19 RANKIN missions will be required, including 4 very strong ones for the regional capitals.

FERSONNEL AND FACILITIES AVAILABLE

13. The following personnel are immediately available for this work:

a) British missions already in the field with W/T communication with this Hq.

b) Italian missions already in the field with W/T communication with this Hq.

c) British personnel under training or earmarked for training.

d) Italian personnel under training or earmarked for training.

14. British Missions Already in the Field

a) A British mission is established in the CUNEO area and could be ordered to proceed to CUNEO itself.

b) A large British mission is working to the East of SPEZIA. It could be divided into five parts, each with separate W/T communication, and sent to LA SPEZIA, GENOA, FARMA, PIACENZA, and MODENA.

c) A mission consisting of an Italian General and a British officer is working in the MILAN area in conjunction with the CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR NORTHERN ITALY. This could form the nucleus of the mission to MILAN.

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munication with this Hq.

b) Italian missions already in the field with W/T communication with this Hq.

c) British personnel under training or earmarked for training.

d) Italian personnel under training or earmarked for training.

14. British Missions Already in the Field

a) A British mission is established in the CUNEO area and could be ordered to proceed to CUNEO itself.

b) A large British mission is working to the East of SPEZIA. It could be divided into five parts, each with separate W/T communication, and sent to LA SPEZIA, GENOA, PARMA, PIACENZA, and MODENA.

c) A mission consisting of an Italian General and a British officer is working in the MILAN area in conjunction with the CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR NORTHERN ITALY. This could form the nucleus of the mission to MILAN.

d) A mission is working in the VAL DI SUSA. This could form the basis of the TURIN mission.

5014

e) Two missions are working in the area North of VICENZA. These could be split up to cover VERONA, VICENZA and TRENTO.

f) A further mission is en route to the BELLUNO area and could proceed to BELLUNO itself.

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15. Italian Missions Already in the Field

a) One Italian mission is in the TURIN area. It could proceed to AOSTA pending the arrival of a British mission to this town.

b) One Italian mission is operating in the area East of CUNEO and could proceed to ALESSANDRIA pending the arrival of a British mission.

c) Two Italian missions operate North East of BIELLA and could proceed to BIELLA and VERCELLI respectively.

d) An Italian mission is operating near BERGAMO and would carry on in this area.

16. a) Only the following centres, therefore, could not immediately be covered by existing British Missions or by Italian Missions reinforced by British personnel parachuted to them:

COMO
BRESCIA
IMPERIA
BOLZANO.

b) These towns could quickly be covered by missions prepared in advance and infiltrated immediately from here, and necessary action is being taken.

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b) One Italian mission is operating in the area East of CUNEO and could proceed to ALESSANDRIA pending the arrival of a British mission.

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COMO
BRESCIA
IMPERIA
BOLZANO.

b) These towns could quickly be covered by missions prepared in advance and infiltrated immediately from here, and necessary action is being taken.

c) Thus, with the addition ofonly a small number of personnel, by using existing missions and communications, the whole of that part of ITALY with which we are here concerned could be covered within a very short time.

5013

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All missions, however, would be under strength and would require reinforcements or replacements.

d) Steps are therefore being taken to prepare the necessary:

i) Three complete missions with their own W/T communications.

ii) 13 reinforcement missions without W/T communication.

iii) 5 missions without W/T communication to take over from existing Italian missions.

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W/T communications.

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8	Colonel T. McCarthy, Patriots Branch, ACC.
9	Mr. H. Caccia, Political Section ACC.
10	Mr. J. Rayner, F.W.B.
11	Wing Comd Dennis, 'A' Force.
12	Lt. Col. P. Richardson, c/o SO(M).
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Rankin

Copy No 8
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No1 Special Force
C M F
Ref: MN/711
19th August 1944.

To: B.G.S.(Ops)
AAI.

Brigadier M.S. Lush,
Executive Commissioner,
ACC.

Copies to: High Commissioner.

G(Plans)
SOM.

Colonel Dodds Parker,
SOM Liaison Staff,
AFHQ.

LONDON.

Subject: ROLE OF No1 SPECIAL FORCE IN RANKIN/ITALY.

1. The attached paper attempts to show what No1 Special Force has already contributed to RANKIN B conditions in ITALY and to explain what further contributions can be made with the facilities available or likely to be made available.

2. Interim planning on the lines of this paper is going on at this HQ but no firm plans can be made until direction has been received from you as to the extent to which you wish us to assist in RANKIN B or C conditions.

3. It is therefore requested that

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3. It is therefore requested that you should give the attached paper your consideration and that a directive may be issued defining - so fas as is possible, and particularly in the light of para 8 the role of this HQ in RANKIN conditions.

4. A precis is attached at Appendix 'C'. 5040

R T Hewitt
Lt. Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR
Comd No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Copy No 8
TOP SECRET

No1 Special Force,
C M F.
19th August 1944.
Ref: MN/709

To: Distribution as shown.

Subject: ROLE OF No1 SPECIAL FORCE IN RANKIN/ITALY

The attached paper attempts to show what No1 Special Force has already contributed towards RANKIN/B conditions in ITALY and to explain what further con - tributions can be made with the facilities available or likely to be made available.

AAI and ACC are being approached and their views obtained.

R.T.Hewitt
Lt. Col. GS.
for Commander RNVR
Coma No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

To: Distribution as shown.

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R.T.Hewitt

Lt. Col. GS.
for Commander RNVR
Comd No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.

5629

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Copy No 8
TOP SECRET

No1 Special Force,
C M F.
Ref: MN/710
19th August 1944.

To: G(Plans)
SOM.

Copies to: LONDON.

Colonel A. Dodds Parker,
SOM Liaison Staff,
AFHQ.

Subject: ROLE OF No1 SPECIAL FORCE IN RANKIN/ITALY.

1. The object of the attached paper is to show what No1 Special Force has already contributed towards RANKIN/B conditions in ITALY, and to explain what further contributions can be made with the facilities available or likely to be made available.

2. Interim planning on the lines of the paper is going on at this HQ but no firm plans can be made until AAI and ACC have told us to what extent they wish us to undertake the tasks in view and SOM has decided what priority No1 Special Force is to have in the allocation of available personnel and equipment.

3. AAI and ACC are being approached and their views will be communicated to you as soon as they are obtained. Tentative exchanges are also taking place with 'A' Force, PWB, and appropriate sections of ACC.

R.T. H[illegible]H5838

Lt. Col. GS.

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To: G(Plans)
SOM.

Copies to: LONDON.

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SOM Liaison Staff,
AFHQ.

Subject: ROLE OF No1 SPECIAL FORCE IN RANKIN/ITALY.

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R.T. Hamilton

Lt. Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR.
Comd No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.

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TOP SECRET

Copy No 8
19th August 1944
Ref: MN/712

SUBJECT: PROPOSED RANKIN ROLE FOR
No1 SPECIAL FORCE

SITUATION IN ITALY SINCE SEPTEMBER 1943

1. Military - September 1943 to March 1944

a) RANKIN B conditions have obtained in Southern ITALY since the armistice and progressively in central ITALY.

b) For a variety of reasons it proved impossible for SOE to maintain direct communications with resistance elements before the armistice; and the rapid GERMAN withdrawal to a line north of NAPLES, together with the absence of any aircraft at all for work into ITALY before MARCH 1944, prevented any attempt at building up resistance groups far South of the general ROME area.

c) Further, during its first few months in ITALY, No1 Special Force was compelled to concentrate on marshalling its own forces and on preparing the various installations necessary for carrying out its work.

5037

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5037

d) During the first six months of the armistice, therefore, this HQ was no better placed than any other allied formation or organization to take advantage of opportunities presented by RANKIN B conditions. Ahead of us, no goodwill had been created by the delivery of personnel and stores, no missions had prepared the population for our

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arrival, the people had known nothing of the horrors of a prolonged GERMAN occupation, and we were too much occupied with forward military planning to attempt to assert ourselves in the liberated (or GERMAN evacuated) areas.

2. Political - September 1943 to present time

a) It was fortunate that the part of ITALY which was first evacuated by the GERMANS should have been politically the least important and the most apathetic. The fact that we failed, or were unable, to take advantage of RANKIN B conditions immediately, turned out, because of this, to be a matter of no consequence.

b) It so happened that the small SOE mission which landed at SALERNO with the invading armies was able to make contact with a number of the representatives of the then un-united six parties, the old opposition groups of fascist days. The mission was able to infiltrate a number of agents through the lines, to land them behind the lines by sea, and, with the help of the larger mission which arrived in BRINDISI at the same time and took it under command, to deliver them by air.

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5036

c) At the same time, the first representatives of SOE to land in BRINDISI, the seat of the King and of BADOGLIO, found it convenient and profitable to work in close collaboration with SIM, the SIS/SOE counterpart of Commando Supremo. Agents, recruited by SIM, were similarly infiltrated behind the enemy lines.

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d) Within a short time No1 Special Force assumed command of these two missions and thenceforward, although the original SALERNO mission was closed down in its former location, endeavoured to carry on the dual task of supporting at the same time the old covert opposition parties and the overt military elements still, for the most part, loyal to the King and to BADOGLIO.

e) From a military and a political point of view this policy paid. We were not operating on a sufficiently large scale to make the Coverts jealous of the Overts, or vice versa, and yet we had made our mark with them both and each knew that in the days ahead No1 Special Force was a factor to be reckoned with in its resistance programme.

f) By the time the front had become stabilised North of NAPLES the influence of the six parties on both sides of the line, now united and rejoicing in the title of Committee of Liberation, had become the decisive factor in ITALIAN politics. It was soon apparent that the BADOGLIO government, for all its broadening, would prove unacceptable to the six parties and that the liberation of ROME would end the regime of King and Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the ITALIAN military, as a whole, continued to support the existing government; No1 Special Force was obliged, for obvious reasons, to accept the

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5095

g) North of the lines a similar situation existed. The six parties, now united, were already establishing local Committees of Liberation in the big cities. The Resistance

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Groups, on the other hand, largely consisting of disbanded ITALIAN soldiers (as distinct from the old clandestine sabotage cells deriving from the original anti-fascists) were as yet unwilling to accept the leadership of the Committees of Liberation and looked to the military leaders around the King, to BADOGLIO and his generals, for guidance.

h) With the fall of ROME, the abdication of the King, and the resignation of the BADOGLIO government, the way was open for a settlement on both sides of the lines, and the political elements and the military came together with as much speed and cordiality as their memories and consciences would allow. In fact, because they were still going through the fire, they came together more quickly and wholeheartedly in GERMAN occupied ITALY than in the liberated territory. By now the fusion of political and military direction in the North appears to be complete; the resistance movement is the left wing, democratic expression of the former fascist soldiery, but the soldiers and the six parties have been content to forget their origins. In the South the fusion has not been attempted, partly because circumstances have not made it necessary and Government and Supreme Command are not synonymous, and partly because the memory dies hard.

3. Military - April 1944 to the present

5034

a) By the beginning of April a small air lift was available

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3. Military - April 1944 to the present

5634

a) By the beginning of April a small air lift was available to No1 Special Force, and resistance groups had begun to receive deliverics of stores, and a regular flow of personnel briefed by this Hq. At the time of the opening of the Allied assault on the GUSTAV line, therefore, the following factors had emerged to be taken into account in undertaking RANKIN B activities:

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i) each city had its local Committee of Liberation depending from the Central Committee of MILAN and working increasingly closely with the patriot bands and saboteurs;

ii) by the formation of the CNLAI a semblance of unified control had been established throughout the resistance movements;

iii) there were, behind the lines, numerous resistance bands and many local committees, directly or indirectly in contact with N°1 Special Force;

iv) this whole body of resistance looked to the Allies for supplies by air, and many of them looked to the British and (good security or not) to N°1 Special Force in particular;

5033

v) the advance of the Allies and the overrunning of resistance groups presented a situation in which the representatives of N°1 Special Force were greeted as friends and benefactors by the now most influential people of the locality, the patriots who

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5033

v) the advance of the Allies and the overrunning of resistance groups presented a situation in which the representatives of N°1 Special Force were greeted as friends and benefactors by the now most influential people of the locality, the patriots who had fought the BOSCHE before our arrival.

b) From the time of the Allied advances in MAY therefore, the ground has been well prepared for SOE to take advantage of RANKIN B conditions. It has been the practice for N°1

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Special Force to send its representatives forwerd with the regular forces into the more important centres of resistance as they are overrun. Because of our very limited facilities and personnel and the continued need for our principle efforts to be directed towards the destruction of the enemy rather than the rehab - ilitation of the patriots, many opportunities have passed and we have only achieved in a very few places a very small part of what could have been done with adequate material.

RANKIN B PROGRESS TO DATE

4. The three centres of resistance in which RANKIN B work, usually unconsciously and always subordinate to military requirements, has been carried out, are ROME, ANCONA, and FLORENCE. A brief account of the missions sent to these three places is given below.

5. ROME

a) General

5032

i) During the period preceding the liberation of ROME a large and efficient resistance organization had been built up in the city. This organization represented all shades of political and military opinion (excluding, of course, the Fascists) and had ramifi -

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5. ROME

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a) General

i) During the period preceding the liberation of ROME a large and efficient resistance organization had been built up in the city. This organization represented all shades of political and military opinion (excluding, of course, the Fascists) and had ramifi - cations in all government departments and in a number of German military offices. It was in communication with the Allies through a W/T centre, (infiltrated by SOE but work- ing for ISLD) and received by this means directives to set up machinery to carry on the civil administration during the interim

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period following the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allied administrative authorities. This was carried out successfully and public order and essential services were maintained during the few days necessary.

ii) In addition to being the centre for the resistance organization operating in the city itself, ROME was the Hq of the partizan movements in the whole of Central ITALY and exercised some control, through couriers, over them and over the organizations in the North. It was this aspect of the ROME organization which was of the greatest interest to No1 Special Force and one of the primary functions of the SOE mission in ROME was to contact this Hq organization in order to obtain all information available on resistance in that part of ITALY still occupied by the Germans.

iii) Although several attempts had been made during the months prior to the liberation of the city, we had not succeeded in establishing direct W/T communications with the resistance organizations in ROME. We were, however, in touch by means of couriers, and when the city fell were able to establish personal contact immediately.

5631

b) Composition of Mission

The mission which entered ROME with the first Allied troops

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5031

b) Composition of Mission

The mission which entered ROME with the first Allied troops consisted of the following:

1 Major (head of mission)
1 Captain (political advisor)

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1 Captain (ITALIAN Country Section officer)
1 Subaltern (F.S.P.)
7 O.R's.
3 vehicles (including W/T truck).

This party was shortly reinforced by 1 Security Subaltern, 1 Captain (Interrogations), and 1 F.S.P. N.C.O.

c) Tasks of Mission

i) To establish an advanced HQ in ROME for No1 Special Force;

ii) to make contact with resistance groups in the city;

iii) to recruit agents for use in enemy occupied territory;

iv) in conjunction with the appropriate authorities, to encourage political trends and tendencies favourable to Allied interests;

v) to collect intelligence of possible value to the Italian and German Country Sections

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v) to collect intelligence of possible value to the Italian and German Country Sections of N°1 Special Force.

5030

d) Difficulties Encountered

i) Late arrival of Allied administrative authorities

Having established contact with resistance

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organizations and once its presence was known in the city the mission was immediately bombarded with requests and problems which did not properly fall within its competence. This was due to the non-arrival during the first days of adequate administrative machinery. The following are some examples of the problems which arose:

Ex-Allied P/W reporting for duty.

Leaders of resistance bands and organizations requiring transport to return to their 'parish.'

Requests for circulation permits, curfew passes, protection from indiscriminate requisitioning of transport by Army authorities etc. etc.

Protection and rescue from prison as a result of irresponsible denunciations.

Information on whereabouts of Fascist and pro-Germans.

A solution to some of the above problems was attempted by the unauthorised issue by the mission of passes etc. pending the setting up of official machinery to deal with these prob-

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A solution to some of the above problems was attempted by the unauthorised issue by the mission of passes etc. pending the setting up of official machinery to deal with these problems. This was successful in some cases but in many others the paper issued by the mission was ignored by the military authorities, which in turn caused further complications.

5029

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ii) Political

In the first days of the liberation of the city the political difficulties encountered by the mission were not great. All parties and creeds were, for the moment, united in their relief at the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the Allies. Such political developments as came about later such as the formation of the new Government were outside the scope of the mission and did not affect its work.

iii) Lack of Facilities

One of the chief difficulties in this respect was the complete, although only temporary, suspension of the telephone service and of public transport. Every contact and every minor matter which required discussion with other agencies meant a car journey. Every person sent on a mission meant that transport had to be provided. The time wasted in travelling in a city the size of ROME was therefore very considerable.

iv) Lack of Policy in dealing with overrun Partizans

5028

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iv) Lack of Policy in dealing with overrun Partizans

5028

The fall of ROME coincided with the liberation of areas where large partizan bands had existed. The higher authorities appeared to have no policy regarding the disarming and disposal of these bands and, as the problem became more and more acute, turned to the mission for advice and assistance. This task was outside

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the brief of the mission, except in so far as our direct agents were concerned, and imposed a further strain on the already overworked personnel and transport.

e) achievements of Mission

i) All the tasks of the mission as set out in c) above were accomplished to varying degrees. An advance Hq for No1 Special Force was set up on the day following the German evacuation, contact was established with resistance groups, a number of useful agents for further use were recruited, morat and material assistance to serious pro-allied organizations was given, and intelligence and documents useful to the Italian and German Country Sections were obtained.

ii) Liaison was established with ACC on the first day of liberation and they were kept informed of all important political and other developments which came to the notice of the mission.

iii) Liaison with P.W.B. was non-existant during the first few days owing to the already large commitments of the mission and to the fact that P.W.B. in ROME were engaged largely on local work. With the move forward to ROME of the main P.W.B. Hq close and continuous liaison was established. This has since proved to be most profitable to both agencies.

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iv) The arrival of the mission in ROME before the administrative machinery, the nature of its work which brought it into contact with all aspects of political and social life, and the

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fact that it included some of the first British officers in the city enabled the mission, by listening sympathetically to the many problems which arose and by helping where possible even outside its Charter, to create considerable goodwill towards the Allies.

v) The resistance organizations contacted in ROME were anxious to help the Allies in every way possible and to put their organizations at the Allies disposal. They supplied guards and labour for looking after requisitioned premises, assisted in finding transport, and provided guides for use within the city and in the neighbouring countryside.

In addition to the ROME leaders, the heads of a number of bands in other parts of Central ITALY were present in ROME to contact the Allies and to receive instructions. They also were anxious to help; but their use to the mission was not so great and was often, in fact, an embarrassment as they required facilities, such as transport, which brought no direct advantage to the mission's work but were difficult to refuse without giving the impression that the work previously done by them was not fully appreciated.

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f) Lessons Learned

i) The arrival of an SOE mission in an important liberated town or area before the arrival of the normal administrative services, and the comparative rapidity with which SOE establishes signal communications with its base, will always force the

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mission, (if it is to carry on its own special work) to accept responsibilities and commitments for which it is ill-equipped and which lie beyond its normal operational functions.

ii) In future, some arrangements with ACC and AMG should be made by which the SOE mission has power to issue temporary circulation passes, car permits, and assume certain other alternative functions pending the arrival of the appropriate authorities.

iii) A firm policy for dealing with liberated partizan forces is necessary. This policy must provide for the disposal of large numbers of young men without home, work, or resources and must take into account that these men have in many cases been risking their lives during the enemy occupation.

(This question has to a large extent been solved by the setting up of the patriots branch of A.C.C. to which two SOE officers have been lent).

iv) The ROME mission was not faced with certain major problems which confront missions in less important centres. The fact that ROME was a city of (temporarily) approaching 2 million inhabitants and was the political and civic

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iv) The ROME mission was not faced with certain major problems which confront missions in less important centres. The fact that ROME was a city of (temporarily) approaching 2 million inhabitants and was the political and civic capital of ITALY meant that a policy covering a large proportion of the expected problems had already been worked out and that a large, although inadequate, administrative force was sent into the city as soon as the enemy evacuated. This does not occur in smaller towns where an SOE advanced mission is called upon to make ad hoc decisions on major questions of policy.

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6. ANCONA

a) General

i) In November, 1943, a mission consisting of two Italian officers and a W/T operator was landed on the East Coast and soon established contact with patriot organizations in the MACERATA - ANCONA area. W/T contact was established with Hq, No1 Special Force almost immediately and the military organization of the MARCHE was created.

ii) During the succeeding months two further Italian missions were delivered and contact was established with three separate areas of the MARCHE - ANCONA - MACERATA and ASCOLI PICENO.

iii) The latter mission came to grief with the arrest of the W/T operator, but the MACERATA and ANCONA missions continued to operate up to the liberation of the area by the Allies.

iv) During this period (November, 1943 to June, 1944) patriot groups in the inland areas of the MARCHE received direction and material support from No1 Special Force until the time came, in June 1944, when the organization

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iv) During this period (November, 1943 to June, 1944) patriot groups in the inland areas of the MARCHE received direction and material support from No1 Special Force until the time came, in June 1944, when the organization (which by that time numbered some 5,000 armed men) was ordered into action by AAI.

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v) The efforts of the patriots of the MARCHE contributed to the success of Allied armies on the ADRIATIC sector. During the last two months of enemy occupation a British officer

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sent in by Nº1 Special Force was responsible for the coordination of activities in the MACERATA area. He was dropped by parachute to reception South of MACERATA and was cordially received by the local patriot leaders who looked to him in all that concerned the activitics of local patriot organizations.

b) Composition of ANCONA mission

As soon as MACERATA was freed our liaison officer made his way South to report on the activities of the patriots. After rendering his report he returned to MACERATA as head of our mission, which consisted of:

1 Major
1 2/Lieut
1 Italian Captain (lent by Comando Supremo)
1 driver and 15 cwt truck.

Communications continued to be maintained over one of the existing field sets which had been operating since November, 1943.

c) Tasks of Mission

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Communications continued to be maintained over one of the existing field sets which had been operating since November, 1943.

c) Tasks of Mission

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i) To regain contact with patriot organizations in order to assess the value of their work;

ii) to document the story of the patriot activities in the MARCHE and to cull from these activities lessons which would assist in

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the future development of North Italian organizations;

iii) to recover weapons and stores delivered to patriot organizations, which might otherwise have been used for "brigandage;"

iv) to contact and retrieve the many agents who had been delivered to the MARCHE during the preceeding 9 months;

v) to ensure that those leaders who had worked loyally for No1 Special Force during the German occupation were well treated and their work recognised;

vi) to advise local administrative authorities on the problems created in the area by the existence of a large disbanded patriot force, which unless controlled might be turned into a potential menace by undesirable elements or bad handling.

d) Difficulties encountered

5022

i) Lack of facilities once more proved the greatest stumbling block. The O.C. mission was

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vi) to advise local administrative authorities on the problems created in the area by the existence of a large disbanded patriot force, which unless controlled might be turned into a potential menace by undesirable elements or bad handling.

d) Difficulties encountered

5022

i) Lack of facilities once more proved the greatest stumbling block. The O.C. mission was considered locally as being the expert on patriot problems since he had worked with the patriots for 2 months. He was, however, hampered by a most serious lack of personnel and transport in handling the large number of patriots who wished to contact him as the acknowledged authority.

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ii) Moreover he possessed no administrative authority and was hard put to it to explain to the men he had once led that he was no longer "General ALEXANDER's representative" in the MARCHE, but could only advise local A.M.G. authorities.

iii) The political question had already proved dangerous during the BLO's stay with the patriots. Communist infiltration particularly interfered with military leadership of the bands. This problem was not solved with the arrival of A.M.G. who turned to our BLO to solve problems which he himself did not always understand since he was not in possession of any political brief.

iv) The problem of collecting arms from disbanded patriots proved extremely difficult and taxed the ingenuity of both the A.M.G. authorities and our mission.

v) The most serious handicap of all was the fact that local ACC and AMG officials had no knowledge of the exceptional qualifications possessed by the N°1 Special Force representative for advising them on the problems with which they were confronted. He, on the other hand, had no authority to press home his advice. Much val-

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entative" in the MARCHE, but could only advise local A.M.G. authorities.

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v) The most serious handicap of all was the fact that local ACC and AMG officials had no knowledge of the exceptional qualifications possessed by the No1 Special Force representative for advising them on the problems with which they were confronted. He, on the other hand, had no authority to press home his advice. Much valuable information is in the possession of a BLO, both personally and through Partizans who know, and who are known to, the BLO. His information has been obtained before the arrival of the armies, when the local population is to be seen in its true colours, and his advice is, therefore, the best available.

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e) Achievement of Mission

i) There is no doubt that from a purely military point of view both pre and post occupational missions to the MARCHE were of considerable assistance. In the first case widespread sabotage and disruption of enemy lines of communication were achieved. In the second instance, the patriots guided our troops and assisted them in the locating of enemy strong points and mines. The British mission also, to some extent, prevented political disruption (which is always liable to take place), and advised AMG on the conditions existing in the MARCHE before liberation.

ii) Outstanding leaders of patriot organizations which had assisted No1 Special Force were sent back to base where they were recompensed for the task they had carried out.

iii) Patriots were issued with certificat

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iii) Patriots were issued with certificates by the patriot sub-commissions on the recommendation of our mission:

iv) A considerable quantity of arms and explosives was collected. More would have been attained if collection had been confined to AMG officials

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and the BLO and if a more friendly, though not less firm attitude had been adopted.

v) Every effort was made to show our appreciation to the local patriots and to the whole population which for 9 months had assisted the patriots at great sacrifice to themselves. Assistance was given to AMG officials in the institution of relief measures and much was done to explain to disappointed villagers why relief on a larger scale was not more quickly forthcoming.

f) Lessons Learned

i) When a British Liaison Officer is sent to the field he must have an adequate staff to assist him in his task.

ii) A sufficiency of:

Transport

Funds

Rations

5019

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f) Lessons Learned

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ii) A sufficiency of:

Transport

Funds

Rations

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must be provided to forward missions in order that they may meet immediate problems.

iii) Above all some arrangement must be made with AMG or ACC in order that the advice of our missions, which usually understand the problems of the area, is acted upon.

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iv) The power of patriot sub-commissions must be increased if discontent among patriots is to be avoided.

v) The danger of brigandage, particularly on the part of local "cloth-cap-and-red-tie" elements must be taken seriously.

vi) The zone should be organized administratively by BLO's before liberation and this should be done with the full approval of ACC.

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7. FLORENCE

a) General

i) Prior to the arrival of Allied Forces in the city, No1 Special Force had no direct contacts with resistance organizations in Florence. Considerable information was however, available as to the composition and activities of the Committee of Liberation and no difficulties were anticipated in establishing contact with the Committee.

ii) The Florence organizations were in contact with and controlled a number of partizan formations in the mountains to the North and East of the city in addition to the organizations within the town itself.

b) Composition of the Mission

The mission consisted of two officers, one Italian interpreter, one driver and one armoured scout car, also a

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b) Composition of the Mission

The mission consisted of two officers, one Italian interpreter, one driver and one armoured scout car, also a W/T operator.

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c) Tasks of Mission

The tasks of the mission were similar in many ways to those of the ROME mission except that there was no intention of setting up a permanent base in FLORENCE. The

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mission was therefore saved a number of internal administrative problems which faced the ROME mission. The task of the FLORENCE mission included the following:

i) to make contact with the resistance organizations in the town;

ii) to find and send back to base couriers who had been sent down from missions further North to await the arrival of the Allies;

iii) to recruit agents for use in Northern Italy;

iv) to ascertain the fate of certain missions which had been infiltrated into Central Italy but had failed to make contact with base.

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d) Difficulties Encountered

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ii) to find and send back to base couriers who had been sent down from missions further North to await the arrival of the Allies;

iii) to recruit agents for use in Northern Italy;

iv) to ascertain the fate of certain missions which had been infiltrated into Central Italy but had failed to make contact with base.

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d) Difficulties Encountered

i) The difficulties encountered differed considerably from those met by the ROME mission. In the case of ROME there was no fighting in the city and combatant troops had moved on immediately leaving ROME deep in their rear within a few days. At

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FLORENCE, however, our troops were held up in the part of the town South of the ARNO for a considerable period and the SOE mission, which was with our regular forward units, was called upon to undertake tactical work pending the clearance of the enemy from the Northern bank of the river.

ii) At the time of writing the enemy has barely withdrawn from the city and it is therefore not possible to consider the difficulties which the mission will encounter in carrying out its original tasks.

e) Achievements of Mission

i) The mission arrived when the Allies were still held on the South bank, and established contact at once with the small executive committee of five members appointed by the FLORENCE Committee of Liberation.

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ii) Within three [illegible]

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e) Achievements of Mission

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ii) Within three days telephone communications across the river had been established between the mission and partizan Hq on the North Bank. The mission then acted as liaison staff between Corps Hq and the partizans.

iii) The next step was to set up a courier service between the two banks of the river by means of

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a secret passage. By this means military intelligence was obtained which proved to be of the highest value.

iv) The mission worked with AMG on sanitation and police problems and made plans for assisting in the control of the city for the short period between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the regular authorities.

v) Although the 3,000 partizans in the enemy occupied part of the town were forbidden to fight by the Allied authorities, instructions were given to them to clear mines and booby traps.

vi) By means of a secret passage food was delivered to the starving population on the North Bank.

vii) Information as to the fate of a number of our missions previously infiltrated into Central Italy was obtained, new agents were recruited,

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iv) The mission worked with AMG on sanitation and police problems and made plans for assisting in the control of the city for the short period between the departure of the Germans and the arrival of the regular authorities.

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vi) By means of a secret passage food was delivered to the starving population on the North Bank.

vii) Information as to the fate of a number of our missions previously infiltrated into Central Italy was obtained, new agents were recruited, and couriers sent down from the North were sent back to Hq. 5014

viii) In order to carry out Corps instructions to clean up Fascist pockets a patriot battalion of some 500 men was sent across the river.

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f) Lessons Learnt

i) In view of the fact that the mission has not yet been able to carry out fully all the tasks allotted to it, it is difficult to draw any deductions.

ii) Its experience so far, however, emphasises that advanced SOE missions are, and will be, called upon to carry out duties outside their normal military sphere, which by their experience and by the information at their disposal they are well equipped to do.

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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FOR FUTURE RANKIN B or C UNDERTAKINGS

8. Opportunities and Limitations

a) It is apparent that SOE, because of the nature of its work, is in a position to give great assistance to AAI and to ACC in RANKIN B or C conditions in ITALY. Because of its contacts with the resistance movements and of the material and moral support that it has given them over the last nine months, it is probably true to say that No1 Special Force, of all Allied Agencies, could have the greatest influence on the disbanded patriots.

b) The two limiting factors in any RANKIN work we may undertake are:

i) facilities in personnel and equipment;

ii) the degree of authority granted us by

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b) The two limiting factors in any RANKIN work we may undertake are:

i) facilities in personnel and equipment;

ii) the degree of authority granted us by AAI and ACC and, in particular, the degree of confidence placed in our representatives by members of the ACC in their local areas.

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Until a decision is given on these two matters it is not possible to begin firm RANKIN planning or to issue directives to missions suitably placed for RANKIN work.

9. Possibilities

It has been proved that No1 Special Force personnel in RANKIN conditions, particularly if they have lived as BLOs in the centres in which they are called upon to work, but still with a marked degree of success if they are sent in quickly to take control of ITALIAN missions previously infiltrated by us or in contact with us, will be specially qualified to undertake many tasks. The most important of these are outlined below and direction is required as to which of them it is thought proper for us to attempt. The fact that ITALY has been granted co-belligerent status and that the great body of the ITALIAN people is violently anti-GERMAN and pro-Allied, at least until the Allies have been in occupation for some months, means that a greater degree of co-operation can be expected from the civilian population than in some other Mediterranean or Balkan countries. The tasks we could undertake are:

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a) Military

i) Prevention of demolitions.

ii) Marking off mined areas and booby-traps.

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iii) Securing airfields and ports for landing troops and supplies.

iv) Collection of patriot and GERMAN arms.

v) Harrassing enemy withdrawal (B only).

vi) Preventing anti-GERMAN or anti-fascist excesses (C only).

vii) Bearing armistice terms to GERMAN formations and control of enemy troops (C only).

b) Civil Affairs

Assistance to ACC in:

i) Yes Exec i) Restoration of order.
in certain areas the Amb take over full control

ii) Yes Advice ii) Fairest distribution of supplies.

iii) Finding reemployment for disbanded patriots.

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b) Civil Affairs

Assistance to ACC in:

i) Restoration of order.

ii) Fairest distribution of supplies.

iii) Finding reemployment for disbanded patriots.

iv) Issue to patriots of Certificates from C in C for services rendered.

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v) Explanation of relief measures to population, and especially to remote villages which are usually forgotten.

vi) Supplying initial information in respect of "displaced persons."

c) I(b) and Security Services

i) The preservation of compromising records and files.

ii) Reporting fascist and other undesirable elements.

iii) Safeguarding proved Allied sympathizers.

d) Political

i) Encouraging those trends of political thought which have the support of the Foreign Office

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c) 1(b) and Security Services

i) The preservation of compromising records and files.

ii) Reporting fascist and other undesirable elements.

iii) Safeguarding proved Allied sympathizers.

d) Political

i) Encouraging those trends of political thought which have the support of the Foreign Office and the State Department.

ii) Discouraging, by clandestine means, those political trends whose further strengthening might prove to be an embarrassment to the Foreign Office and the State Department.

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iii) Generally spreading the democratic gospel of Western Europe.

e) P.W.B.

Submitting recommendations to PWB on the preparation and discemination of propaganda.

f) 'A' Force

Assistance in location and collection of POWs and in supplying them with food, clothing, and instructions.

g) Signals

To make available to the Allied Military Commander and to ACC W/T communication with all the principal cities of Northern ITALY.

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FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL AVAILABLE FOR RANKIN

10. RANKIN B

a) So long as RANKIN B conditions obtain there is little that N°1 Special Force with its present resources, can do beyond the scale on which we have already worked in ROME, ANCONA, and FLORENCE. So long as the GERMANS are withdrawing in accordance with a military plan the bulk of our effort must be directed towards bringing about his complete collapse, that is RANKIN C conditions.

b) However, with the breach of the APPENNINES, the Allies will be running into those parts of ITALY in which resistance has been greatest and in which the political and economic future of ITALY will be shaped. The great industrial centres, each with its local Committee of Liberation, and MILAN in particular, the centre of all resistance in the North, will be fertile ground for the sowing of new ideas and interests useful to the Allied cause. Whereas, hitherto, we have only been able to throw forward one small mission, once the Allies reach the plains of the PO valley, four parties at least, properly equipped and properly briefed, should be available for the tasks outlined in para

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c) Where BLOs are overrun they automatically become the RANKIN authorities in their own areas. This happened in the case of MACERATA/ANCONA. In such circumstances the size of the mission sent in to augment the BLOs existing team would be smaller; it could, in fact, in the most favourable circumstances, consist of one officer sent in by parachute with the latest RANKIN brief. It would be better to send one officer, one interpreter, and one driver/batman by road. The location of BLOs at present, and the expected increase during the months of August and September, is shown at Annexure 1.

d) Similarly, ITALIAN missions can have limited RANKIN directives passed to them if it proves impossible to strengthen them immediately with BRITISH personnel. The location of ITALIAN missions now in the field and their expected development in August and September is shown at Annexure 2.

II. RANKIN C

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d) Similarly, ITALIAN missions can have limited RANKIN directives passed to them if it proves impossible to strengthen them immediately with BRITISH personnel. The location of ITALIAN missions now in the field and their expected development in August and September is shown at Annexure 2.

II. RANKIN C

a) In the event of a total GERMAN collapse the resources of No1 Special Force, together with any additional resources to be made available to us, will be required for AUSTRIA as well as NORTHERN ITALY. The allocation of these resources cannot be determined until the RANKIN proposals for

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the two countries have been considered by AAI, ACC, SOM and LONDON. This paper is therefore confined to proposals for ITALY.

b) For RANKIN C conditions the same personnel would be available as for RANKIN B, that is BLOs in situ (see Annexure '1'), and the mobile parties whose composition is shown at Appendix 'A'. However, because a greater extent of territory and many more centres of interest would have to be covered at the same time, not four but eight such parties would be needed. In addition twelve parties would be required for infiltration to the existing BRITISH and ITALIAN missions. The personnel and equipment for these parties is shown at Appendix 'B' together with an explanation of how far these could be met from present resources.

c) Directives for RNAKIN 'B' and 'C' parties cannot be prepared until the extent to which our proposals are accepted is made known.

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b) For RANKIN C conditions the same personnel would be available as for RANKIN B, that is BLOs in situ (see Annexure '1'), and the mobile parties whose composition is shown at Appendix 'A'. However, because a greater extent of territory and many more centres of interest would have to be covered at the same time, not four but eight such parties would be needed. In addition twelve parties would be required for infiltration to the existing BRITISH and ITALIAN missions. The personnel and equipment for these parties is shown at Appendix 'B' together with an explanation of how far these could be met from present resources.

c) Directives for RNAKIN 'B' and 'C' parties cannot be prepared until the extent to which our proposals are accepted is made known.

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Distribution:

Copy No	
1	High Commissioner
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9	Mr J. Rayner, P.W.B.
10	Wing Comd. Dennis, 'A' Force.
11	Lt. Col. P. Richardson, c/o SO(M).
12	Commander
13 +	GSO I, Austrian Mission
14	GSO II, Italian Section
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17	DAAG/MG
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19	O.C. Signals
20	ROME Detachment
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9	Mr H. Caccia, Political Section, ACC.
10	Mr J. Rayner, P.W.B.
11	Wing Comd. Dennis, 'A' Force.
12	Lt. Col. P. Richardson, c/o SO(M).
13 +	Commander
14	GSO I, Austrian Mission
15 - 16 +	GSO II, Italian Section
17	GSO II, Ops
18	DAAG/MG
19	Finance Officer
20	O.C. Signals
21	ROME Detachment
22 +	London
23 - 24	War Diary
25 - 30	Spare.

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+ Only copies 3, 4, 13, 16, and 22 have Annexures I and 2 attached.

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APPENDIX 'A'

RANKIN B OR C PARTIES - PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

Column 1 Serial
Column 2 Item
Column 3 Scale per party
Column 4 Total requirements for 4 parties. (Number required for RANKIN B)

1	2	3	4
A.	**PERSONNEL**		
1.	Officer	1	4
2.	Driver/Batman	1	4
3.	W/T Operators	2	8
4.	G.D. man	1	4
5.	Italian Interpreter	1	4
	Total Personnel	6	24
B.	**TRANSPORT**		
6.	Armoured Car (White) U.S.	1	4
C.	**ARMS**		
7.	Vickers MMG + 5000 rds (mounted)	1	4
8.	Pistols Auto .45 + 50 r.p.g.	6	24
9.	T.S.M.G. (or equivalent) + 200 r.p.g.	6	24
10.	Grenades Mills 36	36	144
D.	**W/T STORES**		
11.	Set B Mk. II	1	4
12.	Set A Mk.III	1	4
13.	Batteries 6V. 125 a.h.	2	8
14.	Generator R.B.8	1	4

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1		2	3	4
A.	PERSONNEL			
	1.	Officer	1	4
	2.	Driver/Batman	1	4
	3.	W/T Operators	2	8
	4.	G.D. man	1	4
	5.	Italian Interpreter	1	4
		Total Personnel	6	24
B.	TRANSPORT			
	6.	Armoured Car (White) U.S.	1	4
C.	ARMS			
	7.	Vickers MMG + 5000 rds (mounted)	1	4
	8.	Pistols Auto .45 + 50 r.p.g.	6	24
	9.	T.S.M.G. (or equivalent) + 200 r.p.g.	6	24
	10.	Grenades Mills 36	36	144
D.	W/T STORES			
	11.	Set B Mk. II	1	4
	12.	Set A Mk.III	1	4
	13.	Batteries 6V. 125 a.h.	2	8
	14.	Generator R.B.8	1	4
	15.	Voltmeter	1	4
	16.	Tool Kit	1	4
E.	RATIONS			
	17.	Rations 24 hours	24	96
	18.	Emergency Rations (S Type)	6	24
	19.	Gallons water (in 2 gal. cans)	24	96

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Appendix A (cont)

1	2	3	4
F.	SUNDRY ITEMS		
20.	Torches large + 200% spares	6	24
21.	Knives clasp	6	24
22.	Compasses Prism	2	8
23.	Binoculars Prs.	2	8
24.	Cases Map	2	8
25.	Protractors	2	8
26.	Goggles	6	24
27.	Tools Entrenching	6	24
28.	Lamps Pressure	1	4
29.	Lamps Hurricane	1	4
30.	Candles	24	96
31.	Primus Stove	1	4
32.	Paraffin Gallons	1	4
33.	Tommy Cookers	48	192
G.	MEDICAL STORES		
34.	1 First Aid Box (Contents on advice of M.O.)	1	4
H.	TENTAGE		
35.	2-man bivouacs	4	16
I.	STATIONERY		
36.	Strong box and stationery (incl. rubber stamps)	1	4
J.	LIAISON STORES		
37.	Coffee [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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22.	Compasses Prism		2	8
23.	Binoculars Prs.		2	8
24.	Cases Map		2	8
25.	Protractors		2	8
26.	Goggles		6	24
27.	Tools Entrenching		6	24
28.	Lamps Pressure		1	4
29.	Lamps Hurricane		1	4
30.	Candles		24	96
31.	Primus Stove		1	4
32.	Paraffin Gallons		1	4
33.	Tommy Cookers		48	192
G.	MEDICAL STORES			
34.	1 First Aid Box (Contents on advice of M.O.)		1	4
H.	TENTAGE			
35.	2-man bivouacs		4	16
I.	STATIONERY			
36.	Strong box and stationery (incl. rubber stamps)		1	4
J.	LIAISON STORES			
37.	Coffee	lbs	112	448
38.	Sugar	lbs	112	448
39.	Salt	lbs	20	80
40.	Cigarettes		10000	40000
41.	Matches	boxes	576	2304
K.	MONEY			
42.	1,000,000 Lire		1,000,000	4,000,000

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Appendix A (cont)

NOTE

1. All stores and personnel can be provided from resources already allocated to No. 1 Special Force with the exception of:-

(a) White Sc .. Cars ..... A.A.I.

(b) W/T Operators ..... MS, S.O.(M)

(c) W/T stores ..... CSO, S.O.(M)

(d) Driver/Batmen ..... 02E (on instructions A.A.I.)

2. For RANKIN C conditions eight such parties, equipped to this scale, would be required, and A.A.I., S.O.(M), and 02E would have to supply twice the amount of personnel and equipment shown in Para. 1. MS (SOM) would also have to supply four officers from their operational pool and M.M.I.A. four interpreters.

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(b) W/T Operators ..... MS, S.O.(M)

(c) W/T stores ..... CSO, S.O.(M)

(d) Driver/Batmen ..... O2E (on instructions A.A.I.)

2. For RANKIN C conditions eight such parties, equipped to this scale, would be required, and A.A.I., S.O.(M), and O2E would have to supply twice the amount of personnel and equipment shown in Para. 1. MS (SOM) would also have to supply four officers from their operational pool and M.M.I.A. four interpreters.

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APPENDIX 'B'

RANKIN B OR C PARTIES TO EXISTING B.L.O. OR ITALIAN MISSIONS - PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT

Column 1 Serial
Column 2 Item
Column 3 Scale per Party
Column 4 Probable number of parties 12

1	2	3	4
A.	PERSONNEL		
1.	Officer	1	12
2.	Driver/Batman	1	12
3.	Italian Interpreter	1	12
	Total Personnel		
B.	TRANSPORT		
4.	Armoured Car (White) U.S.	1	12
C.	ARMS		
5.	Vickers MMG + 5000 rds. (mounted)	1	12
6.	Pistols Auto .45 + 50 r.p.g.	3	36
7.	T.S.M.G. (or equivalent) + 200 r.p.g.	3	36
8.	Grenades Mills 36	36	432
D.	RATIONS		
9.	Rations 24 hours	24	288
10.	Emergency Rations (S Type)	3	36
11.	Gallons Water (in 2 Gal. cans)	24	288
E.	SUNDRY ITEMS		
12.	Torches large + 200% spares	3	36
13.	Knives Clasp	3	36
		1	12

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1	2	3	4
A.	PERSONNEL		
1.	Officer	1	12
2.	Driver/Batman	1	12
3.	Italian Interpreter	1	12
	Total Personnel		
B.	TRANSPORT		
4.	Armoured Car (White) U.S.	1	12
C.	ARMS		
5.	Vickers MMG + 5000 rds. (mounted)	1	12
6.	Pistols Auto .45 + 50 r.p.g.	3	36
7.	T.S.M.G. (or equivalent) + 200 r.p.g.	3	36
8.	Grenades Mills 36	36	432
D.	RATIONS		
9.	Rations 24 hours	24	288
10.	Emergency Rations (S Type)	3	36
11.	Gallons Water (in 2 Gal. cans)	24	288
E.	SUNDRY ITEMS		
12.	Torches large + 200% spares	3	36
13.	Knives Clasp	3	36
14.	Compass Prism	1	12
15.	Binoculars Prs.	1	12
16.	Cases Maps	1	12
17.	Protractors	1	12
18.	Goggles	3	36
19.	Tools Entrenching	3	36
20.	Lamps Pressure	1	12

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Appendix B (Cont)

1	2	3	4
E.	SUNDRY ITEMS (Cont)		
21.	Lamps Hurricane	1	12
22.	Candles	24	288
23.	Primus Stove	1	12
24.	Paraffin Gallons	1	12
25.	Tommy Cookers	48	576
F.	MEDICAL STORES		
26.	First Aid Box (Contents on advice of M.O.)	1	12
G.	TENTAGE		
27.	2 man bivouacs	4	48
H.	STATIONERY		
28.	Strong box and stationery (incl. rubber stamps)	1	12
I.	LIAISON STORES		
29.	Coffee lbs	112	1344
30.	Sugar lbs	112	1344
31.	Salt lbs	20	240
32.	Cigarettes	10000	120,000
33.	Matches boxes	576	6,912

NOTE

(a) All stores could be provided without difficulty from SOM stocks with the exception of the White Scout cars and drivers whose release would [illegible] authorised by A.A.I.

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23.	Primus Stove	1	12
24.	Paraffin Gallons	1	12
25.	Tommy Cookers	48	576
F. MEDICAL STORES			
26.	First Aid Box (Contents on advice of M.O.)	1	12
G. TENTAGE			
27.	2 man bivouacs	4	48
H. STATIONERY			
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30.	Sugar lbs	112	1344
31.	Salt lbs	20	240
32.	Cigarettes	10000	120,000
33.	Matches boxes	576	6,912

NOTE

(a) All stores could be provided without difficulty from SOM stocks with the exception of the White Scout cars and drivers whose release would have to be authorised by A.A.I.

(b) Officers could be made available from the SOM Operational Pool but Italian Interpreters should be supplied to No. 1 Special Force for training immediately by MMIA.

(c) Indents and requests will be submitted as soon as it is known to what extent the No. 1 Special Force RANKIN proposals have been accepted.

(d) An alternative method of infiltration in RANKIN C conditions is by parachute; but transport would have to follow up in every case.

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APPENDIX 'C'

OUTLINE OF PAPER

1. The brief sketch of the military and political situation in ITALY from September 1943 until the present, which is given in paras. 1 - 3, shows that from the time the Allies opened their attack on the GUSTAV line conditions obtained in GERMAN occupied ITALY of which SOE personnel were especially qualified to take advantage in RANKIN conditions. The principal reasons for this were:-

a) The delivery of stores and personnel by No. 1 Special Force to the principal resistance groups who were, by this time, closely associated with the local Committees of Liberation in the main towns; and the goodwill which had been established thereby towards No. 1 Special Force.

b) The specialised knowledge of individuals and conditions in GERMAN occupied ITALY, which close study of the principal centres and direct W/T contact with those areas had engendered.

c) The presence, in many parts of GERMAN occupied ITALY, of missions, often led by British officers, sent in by No. 1 Special Force and in direct W/T communication with us.

2. Paragraphs 5 - 7 give an account of the entry of No. 1 Special Force representatives into ROME, ANCONA and FLORENCE under RANKIN B conditions. The ANCONA mission was led by a British officer who had worked with the patriots in the MACERATA - ANCONA area for two months before the Allies reached the city.

Each of these missions went forward for purely military and SOE reasons. Each found that the conclusions arrived at in para. 1 of this appendix were correct; and each was compelled by circumstances to undertake RANKIN work, either in conjunction with the AMG authorities or, in cases of emergency, independently and without ACC authority.

3. It has therefore been proved in theory and by experience that No. 1 Special

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to take advantage in RANKIN conditions. The principal reasons for this were:-

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Each of these missions went forward for purely military and SOE reasons. Each found that the conclusions arrived at in para. 1 of this appendix were correct; and each was compelled by circumstances to undertake RANKIN work, either in conjunction with the AMG authorities or, in cases of emergency, independently and without ACC authority.

3. It has therefore been proved in theory and by experience that No. 1 Special Force is bound, by the nature of its work, to be called upon to undertake RANKIN work. During RANKIN B conditions its main effort must always be military and designed to assist in bringing about the defeat of the enemy in accordance with directives issued by A.A.I.; but a part of its resources, for this very reason, must continue to be employed on work in newly captured cities and centres of resistance. In RANKIN C conditions, however, its work can be either military or

/ administrative .....

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administrative. Direction is therefore required from A.A.I. and A.C.C. in order that S.O.(M) may be approached for the necessary facilities and concrete plans prepared. The tasks which No. 1 Special Force could undertake, if authority is given, are outlined in para. 9 of the main paper, and are repeated below for convenience.

a) Military:-

i) Prevention of demolitions.

ii) Marking off mined areas and booby-traps.

iii) Securing airfields and ports for landing troops or supplies.

iv) Collection of patriot and GERMAN arms.

v) Harassing enemy withdrawal (B only).

vi) Preventing anti-GERMAN or anti-Fascist excesses (C only).

vii) Bearing armistice terms to GERMAN formations and control of enemy troops (C only).

b) Civil Affairs:-

Assistance to A.C.C. in

i) Restoration of order.

ii) Fairest distribution of supplies.

iii) Finding re-employment for disbanded patriots.

iv) Issue to patriots of Certificates from C. in C. for services rendered.

v) Explanation of relief measures to population, and especially to remote villages which are usually forgotten.

vi) Supplying initial information in respect of "displaced persons".

c) I(b) and Security Services:-

i) The preservation of compromising records and files.

ii) Reporting Fascist and other undesirable elements.

iii) Safeguarding proved allied sympathisers.

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ii) Marking off mined areas and booby-traps.

iii) Securing airfields and ports for landing troops or supplies.

iv) Collection of patriot and GERMAN arms.

v) Harassing enemy withdrawal (B only).

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v) Explanation of relief measures to population, and especially to remote villages which are usually forgotten.

vi) Supplying initial information in respect of "displaced persons".

c) I(b) and Security Services:-

i) The preservation of compromising records and files.

ii) Reporting Fascist and other undesirable elements.

iii) Safeguarding proved allied sympathizers.

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d) Political:-

i) Encouraging those trends of political thought which have the support of the Foreign Office and the State Department.

ii) Discouraging, by clandestine means, those political trends whose further strengthening might prove to be an embarrassment to the Foreign Office and the State Department.

/ iii) .....

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iii) Generally spreading the democratic gospel of Western Europe.

e) P.W.B.:-

Submitting recommendations to P.W.B. on the preparation and dissemination of propaganda.

f) 'A' Force:-

Assistance in location and collection of P.O.W.'s and in supplying them with food, clothing and instructions.

g) Signals:-

To make available to the Allied Military Commander and to A.C.C. W/T communication with all the principal cities of Northern ITALY.

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TOP SECRET
Copy No. 8

No1 Special Force,
C M F.
Ref: MN/735
29th August 1944

To: Distribution as shown.

Subject: REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF No1 SPECIAL FORCE MISSION IN FLORENCE.

1. The attached report was written by Major C.N. Macintosh, Intelligence Corps, who commanded the small mission sent into FLORENCE by this Hq. A brief account of the Mission's tasks, difficulties, and achievements was given in our MN/712, dated 19 Aug 44, which was circulated to addressees under the title "PROPOSED RANKIN ROLE FOR No1 SPECIAL FORCE."

2. This fuller report again shows how missions sent forward by this Hq to patriot strongholds for operational reasons are invariably called upon to perform RANKIN duties, and how competent they are to do this. The necessity for authorizing this role now, before RANKIN conditions obtain widely, is therefore stressed still more. Forward missions could do far more to help military formations, AMG, and other Allied agencies, if they were recognized in advance as being specially qualified for this work.

3. The other most urgent need is for the granting of the extra facilities in personnel and equipment required by this Hq to carry out its inevitable tasks. Direct negotiations with the appropriate authorities continue to this end.

R. T. Hewitt

Lt.Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR
No1 Special Force

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R. T. Hewitt

Lt.Col. GS.
For Commander RNVR
Comd No1 Special Force.

RTH/JHC.

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TOP SECRET

Copy N° 8
28th August 1944
Ref: MN/732

Subject: REPORT on the FLORENCE OPERATION.
PERIOD 4th - 24th August 1944.

Ref Maps: ITALY 1:100,000. Sheet N° 106.
FLORENCE TOWN PLAN. 1:10,000.

GENERAL

1. The advanced party of N°5 Detachment, N°1 Special Force consisting of two British officers, one Italian officer and three other ranks in an Armoured White Scout car arrived in the Southern part of FLORENCE on August 4th. The South bank of the ARNO was only in parts occupied by our own troops. By August 7th despite the interference of a very active enemy both North and South of the River ARNO this detachment had established direct communication with the Patriot organization in the German occupied North of FLORENCE.

2. From August 7th till August 11th the detachment controlled the only means of communication available to the Allies between the North and South banks of the ARNO. By secret telephone line and by couriers the wishes of the Allied Command, given in general directives, were passed as precise orders to the representatives, both Military and Civil of the Committee of National Liberation.

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Ref Maps: ITALY 1:100,000. Sheet N° 106.
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The Committee of National Liberation at all times accepted and acted on the orders received from this H.Q. These affected both Military and Civil Affairs.

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3. On August 7th, a personal recce was made of the secret passages in order to study the possibilities of infiltrating troops.

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On August 12th the patriots held a patrol line which enabled the Royal Engineers to put a Bailey Bridge across the river ARNO without interference from the enemy patrols, whom the patriots engaged on a front of some two miles.

4. From August 12th, when three companies of British and Indian troops crossed the river, until my relief on 24th August, the patriots, under command, at all times maintained contact with the enemy in the city and suburbs of FLORENCE in advance of our own troops and were also responsible for the elimination of the highly trained German and Fascist sniper posts within the city and suburbs.

5. In the early stages of contact a highly efficient intelligence service was organized. Two four page reports were prepared daily as from August 7th on enemy gun and troop positions and passed to Brigade, Division and Corps. This information was at various times referred to by the Intelligence and Operational Staffs of the formations concerned as "the best they had ever had." (Copies of these reports and of daily log passed under cover of letter to G(Plans) S O (M); Ref MN/722 of 24 Aug 44).

6. On August 11th, 8 tons of flour and milk delivered by A.M.G. on South Bank were passed to the Committee of Liberation on the North Bank. On August 16th, due to incidents in the A.M.G., occupied part of FLORENCE, the leader of the Detachment was ordered to assume the responsibilities of the Allied Government for the entire Province of FLORENCE. Owing

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7. At the time of writing fighting by Allied and Patriot forces is in progress in the city.

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN FLORENCE

8. I met a body of ten people, which included representatives of all political parties and services in the city of FLORENCE, in the Prefectura (Ref: 793689) in the North part of the City of FLORENCE at 10.00 hours on August 11th. In view of the circumstances the meeting lasted only ten minutes and orders given were necessarily very brief. They were:

a) To give the support of all parties to Lieut. Col. NICCOLI, leader of all Patriot forces.

b) To accept all orders passed by us through Lieut. Col. NICCOLI as orders from Allied Command.

c) To organize the distribution of food and water passed by us to the North Bank.

d) To assume responsibility for all hospitals and sanitary services in the city as soon as possible prior to the arrival of A.M.G. officials.

e) Not to play at politics.

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e) Not to play at politics.

The behaviour of the Committee was, in my opinion, most correct and the above instructions were always obeyed.

MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

9. Appointed by the Committee of Liberation, headed by Lieut. Col. NICCOLI, this committee was of the greatest possible assistance. Patriot Forces in contact with the Committee

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amounted during the occupation to some 3,000 men on the North Bank of the ARNO, of which some 1,000 were armed.

10. These forces increased as the Germans showed signs of withdrawing from the town and actually amount to some 1,800 armed men under command, organized in two "DIVISIONS" of two and four "BRIGADES," (each "BRIGADE" having support troops in the form of assault squads of some 20 men), and one independent "BRIGADE." Details of the organization of these forces as at 22nd August are given in Appendix 'A'. Copy of a letter to the Minister of War is given in Appendix 'B'. This deals with the recognition of the services of Lieut. Col. NICOLLI and Lieut. Henry FISHER, (an Italian Officer).

MILITARY SITUATION IN FLORENCE

11. The enemy had available highly trained parachutist troops and engineers which in the early days sniped from both banks of the ARNO. These were augmented by specially trained fascist snipers in considerable numbers. In order to move about the city even on the South bank one had to be prepared to meet M.G. and Small Arms fire.

12. Corps orders to patriots were that they should not engage in battle with the Germans but should watch for snipers. The patriots on the South bank were asked to clean up snipers; the ones on the North bank were told to lie low. While help- [illegible] South bank the patriots suffered casual -

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12. Corps orders to patriots were that they should not engage in battle with the Germans but should watch for snipers. The patriots on the South bank were asked to clean up snipers; the ones on the North bank were told to lie low. While helping the army on the South bank the patriots suffered casualties, including the death of the Commander of the 4 Arno division POTENTE. It was evident that we could not restrain the Patriots on the North Bank for long. Owing to the 24 hour curfew for all men and the absolute lack of water and food their position was desperate.

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13. On the morning of the 11th August, the Germans started to move out of the city and at 07.00 hours the bells of PALAZZO VECCHIO gave the signal for the uprising. A good and accurate description of the general situation is given in the translation of an Italian newspaper article APPENDIX 'C'.

Apart from occasional patrols and strong points, the Patriots by 10.00 hours held a line HIPODROME - PIAZZA PUCCINI - MUGNONE CANAL (including the FORTRESS of BASSO) and the Railway on the East of the town down to the PIAZZA LEON ALBERTI. See Sketch No1. At 07.30 hours that morning our small H.Q., consisting of Lieut. NORRIS, Gunner HUNT and myself, moved to the Northern Bank of the ARNO into the PALAZZO VECCHIO (Ref: 792683), the defences of which were checked by Lieut. NORRIS.

14. On 12th August, the Germans attacked the patriots with tanks. The following is a quotation from the situation report of 21st Indian Bde at 21.00 hours.

"Enemy counter-attacked patriots this morning. Tanks penetrated to 803693, 777698 and 763697; infantry to 794697 PIAZZALE DEL RE. Tanks crossed canal by BRIDGE 780702 which is intact. Enemy now withdrawn North of Canal. Patriots now believed control West to, excluding PIAZZALE DEL RE, SAN JACOPINO, North to CANAL, East to PIAZZA CAVOUR 798698 and 803691."

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Repeated orders were passed to Patriots not to engage in pitched battles with the enemy but only to maintain contact with him.

15. The hunting of snipers continued and it is estimated that 20 specially trained snipers armed with L.M.Gs or machine pistols were taken and executed in the first four days.

16. By the 16th the major part of the 21st Indian Infantry

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Bde had crossed the river and occupied a front of 1½ miles some 1,000 yards deep. BRITISH casualties were negligible. Patriots by 12.00 hours of 14th August had reported following casualties: killed and missing believed executed 123, wounded 310. These figures are, we consider, somewhat on the high side. On August 20th the "DIVISIONE GIUSTIZIA E LIBERTA" alone had 86 wounded in hospital out of a grand total of 615.

17. On August 15th the Germans crossed the Canal, occupied the houses up to and including VIALE MARGHERITA and PIAZZA CAVOUR, (Ref: 798698). The Patriots had to abandon all positions and on this line (due to lack of ammunition and provisions) except for the FORTRESS of BASSO (Ref: 786696) and one block of houses. From this advantageous position the Germans were able to machine gun the centre of the town as far as the Partizan H.Q. at the PREFECTURA, (Ref: 793689).

18. On August 17th, at 15.00 hours, 200 patriots re-crossed the VIALE MARGHERITA (Ref: 793697) and re-occupied the houses immediately South of the Canal. At 17.00 hours our armoured cars were abel to follow up as far as the South part of the VIALE MARGHERITA and do a shoot in support of the patriots. They, however, did not cross the road. Our own troops were then able to move up to this line without casualties. At 08.00 hours on the 18th the Germans withdrew from the line of the Canal closely followed by the Patriots to the out-skirts of the city. Our own troops were able to move up to the line of the Canal again with only minor casualties. See Sketch Map No2.

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19. On the 19th, Patriot patrols had [illegible]

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1989

19. On the 19th, Patriot patrols had reached S.DOMENICO, but suffered considerable losses principally from mortar fire. On the 20th, although two Patriot recce patrols reached as far N.E. as FIESOLE, the Germans in general became very aggressive and strong patrols commenced to terrorise the population North of the Canal. The population in the "no man's land area" amounted to some 100,000 civilians. This number was soon re-

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duced by the infiltration of numerous small groups to our own lines to some 50,000 by the 22nd of August. The situation of the remaining civilians is extremely serious since they lack food and are liable to be mortared and machine gunned by the enemy.

20. The position now is that the Germans come down to the fringes of the town in strong parachutist patrols of 40 men, all heavily armed with automatic weapons, covered from any major interference from our own troops by the guns on the commanding heights 1,000 yards north of the outskirts. These and any smaller patrols are engaged by the patriots with small arms fire. The Patriots have captured from the enemy two 20 mm cannons and a mortar with ammunition, but up till August 23rd Brigade had forbidden the use of these weapons for fear of reprisals. The number of MAUSERS, SCHMEIZERS and LUGGERS which are now being used by the Patriots is evidence of the effectiveness of their small scale actions, against the German parachutist. It must not, however, be considered that they are able or even prepared to engage the enemy in any major action. The Patriots at all times held the FORTRESS of BASSO despite enemy shelling and M.G. and Mortar fire.

POLITICAL

22. The two political parties in FLORENCE which have contributed mostly to the Civil and Military achievements of the Committee of Liberation are unaoubtealy the PARTITO D'AZIONE and the Communist party.

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POLITICAL

22. The two political parties in FLORENCE which have contributed mostly to the Civil and Military achievements of the Committee of Liberation are undoubtedly the PARTITO D'AZIONE and the Communist party.

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23. The leaders and most enterprising members of the Committee were all PARTITO D'AZIONE. They provided the President of the Committee of Liberation, the leader of the Military Committee and all the couriers who made the original crossings; they also put at our disposal their excellent intelligence service.

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24. The Communists on the other hand provided the greater part of the fighting patriots. These were relatively well armed with Stens and Brens received from No1 Special Force. They also showed excellent organization from a military point of view and provided the greater number of outstanding active officers.

LAW and ORDER

25. One of the most remarkable features of the occupation of FLORENCE by the Patriots was the calm and quiet that prevailed in the city. Certain cases of wrongful arrests and looting have been reported, but all parties have agreed to take strong disciplinary action. The Carabinieri, brought in by A.M.G., were totally incapable of dealing with snipers or any real disturbance within the city. The part played by the patriots in maintaining law and order under very difficult circumstances was undoubtedly considerable.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY THE MISSION

26. Command

The detachment was attached to No1 I.C.U. and it was understood by me that this was only from the point of view of administration, security and general supervision while the city was in a disorganized state. When the responsibilities of the mission assumed such vast proportions I approached 13 Corps as the senior formation in "working distance" of FLORENCE and asked them to assume responsibility.

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We were then placed operationally under the direct orders of the Commander of the Forward Brigade.

No1 I.C.U. heard of this and wrote a note to that effect to BGS(I),AI.

As nothing further was heard by the detachment it is presumed that AI confirmed the steps taken by 13 Corps.

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27. Staff

In this exceptional case the small mission was presented with a multitude of problems which entailed 22 hours work a day for a fortnight.

The problems can be listed under the heading:

a) Military activities

i) General situation.

ii) Responsibility for actions of Patriots.

iii) Own protection and protection of Hq.

iv) Rations and weapons and ammunition for Patriots.

v) Fusion of all political parties in one single military command and supervision of behaviour of military bands organized in the first place on a political basis.

vi) Maintenance of military discipline.

vii) Transportation for food and ammunition of Patriots.

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b) Military Intelligence

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i) Organization of Intelligence Service.

ii) Coordination of intelligence and passing of immediate intelligence to military for - mations.

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iii) Maintenance of means of communications (telephone line, sewers, secret passage) and security of same.

c) Civil

i) Collection of civil intelligence on wounded, hospitals, disease and sanitary conditions.

ii) The passing over and distribution of food and water.

iii) The presentation of the difficulties of the civilian population to military formations.

iv) Permits to cross river and control of all crossing points for three days.

v) The administration of the Province of FLORENCE for 20 hours.

vi) Security.

d) Agents

i) Interviewing of all Patriots and agents with stories from the North.

ii) Reporting on these interviews and sending of reports and agents to Rome (Captain Gubbins,

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e) The wounding of 2/Lt. NORRIS on 13th made the situation extremely difficult and this was only relieved by the arrival of Major Henderson on August 22nd, by which time also the conditions inside the cit, had become fairly normal except for light shelling and considerable mortar fire in the outskirts.

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28. Transportation

A jeep and trailer, carrying two other ranks, joined the party on August 12th. The jeep was, however, only useful for operations inside areas well covered by our own troops. The White scout car is somewhat large for the narrow streets and it is felt that the ideal would be to have one White scout car (American) and 1 Humber scout car (British) for recce duties, and transportation of key personnel within the danger zone.

29. Rations

Rations were obtained for Italian patriots actually working with this Hq., some 15 officers, only with the greatest difficulty and waste of time.

30. Permits

In the absence of any other authority the Detachment was obliged to issue passes and documents which it was not competent to give.

31. Security

The late arrival of security and any form of vetting organization belonging to our own organization (as distinct from FSS with No1 I.C.U., who were in any case fully occupied).

32. Troops

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32. Troops

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The absence of any trained troops under command meant that British troops had to be borrowed from Brigade and I.C.U. to guard telephoe lines, approaches to passages, etc. These were untrained in work with Patriots and the fact that there were no accidents or clashes can only be described as extremely

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fortunate. The responsibility for any such disaster however remained.

33. P.O.Ws.

The enforced interviewing of P.O.Ws., all of whom believe their story to be of the most immediate operational interest and most of whom are not quite normal mentally.

34. Batmen

The lack of a batman or base men to look after kit etc. I lost all my personal kit with the exception of one haversack that I kept with me and a bed roll. The fact that no batman was available increased greatly the physical exhaustion of the party. In this respect the administration by I.C.U. was invaluable but not comprehensive enough.

35. Translations

A serious breakdown would have occurred in the translation and circularising of information but for the great help given by No1 I.C.U.

CONCLUSION

36. The ideal formation of the party would, in my opinion be:

a) Transport

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CONCLUSION

36. The ideal formation of the party would, in my opinion be:

a) Transport

1 British Scout Car (Bren gun)
1 White scout car (American)
armed with Vickers plus a 50 calibre American M.G. To be followed, as soon as a secure base is obtained, by a 3 ton or 15cwt load of essentials - food, ammo etc.

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b) Personnel

2 British Officers
2 Italian Officers
2 Drivers
1 Signalman
1 Batman
1 Machine gunner
1 Senior N.C.O.
4 Attached Commando trained British troops
(Italian would col.

c) The party should always be attached to I.C.U. if possible but only for administration, not for operations.

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1 Signalman

1 Batman

1 Machine gunner

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Index to Appendices

'A' ORGANIZATION of FORCES UNDER COMMITTEE of LIBERATION.

'B' Copy of letter to Chief of Staff, Minister of War, Rome.

'C' Translation of Italian newspaper article.

'D' TRACE: Showing relative military situation in FLORENCE on August 4th, 12th, 14th and 19th.

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DISTRIBUTION

Copy No	
1	High Commissioner
2 - 3	Major General, SO(M).
4	BGS (Ops), AAI.
5	Executive Commissioner, ACC.
6	Brigadier, Adm Echelon, SO(M).
7	Colonel Dodds-Parker
8	Colonel T. McCarthy, Patriots Branch, ACC.
9	Mr H Caccia, Political Section, ACC.
10	Mr J. Rayner, F.W.B.
11	Wing Comd Dennis, 'A' Force.
12	Lt.Col. F. Richardson, c/o SO(M).
13	Commander
14	GSO I, Austrian Mission
15 - 16	GSO II, Italian Section
17	GSO II, Ops
18	DAAG/MG
19	Finance Officer
20	O.C. Signals
21	ROME Detachment
22	London


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7	Colonel Dodds-Parker
8	Colonel T. McCarthy, Patriots Branch, ACC.
9	Mr H Caccia, Political Section, ACC.
10	Mr J. Rayner, P.W.B.
11	Wing Comd Dennis, 'A' Force.
12	Lt.Col. F. Richardson, c/o SO(M).
13	Commander
14	GSO I, Austrian Mission
15 - 16	GSO II, Italian Section
17	GSO II, Ops
18	DAAG
19	Finance Officer
20	O.C. Signals
21	ROME Detachment
22	London
23 - 24	War Diary
25 - 30	Spare.

Only marked copies have Appendix 'D' attached. 4900

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APPENDIX 'A'



Casualties Reported as at 21 Aug 44

Wounded in hospital	220
Wounded already evacuated	100
Total wounded	400
Total killed	120
Total missing believed executed	50
GRAND TOTAL	2,000

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"V" Bde	"Rosselli" Bde	Assault Gps
160	120	160

"SENICALLA" BDE	"CAIANI" BDE	"BRUNO BUOZZI" BDE
233	230	152

Counter Espionage Group

40

"FANCIULLACCI" BDE

270

Intelligence Service

30

Casualties Reported as at 21 Aug 44

Wounded in hospital	220
Wounded already evacuated	100
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Total killed	120
Total missing believed executed	50
GRAND TOTAL	2,000

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APPENDIX 'B'

No5 Detachment,
No1 Special Force,
C M F.
25th August, 1944.

Chief of Cabinet,
Ministry of War,
ROME.

Sir,

In accordance with your request of to-day I have the honour to bring to your notice the names of two Italian Army officers, whose outstanding courage and devotion to duty in the recent fighting in Florence should, it is submitted, be recognized.

The writer personally witnessed the bravery displayed by these two officers.

2. Lieutenant Henry FISHER

a) This officer was the first to establish contact between the representatives of the Committee of National Liberation and the enemy-occupied North bank of the River ARNO and the Allies on the South Bank on August 7th.

b) To make the crossing of the River ARNO he had to cross what remained of the galleries above the Ponte Vecchio. This gallery had been prepared for demolition; certain of the charges had been blown and others were still in position. The Germans were in occupation of some of the rooms leading off the passage he had to use.

c) Having crossed the river he then had to descend a seven metre long rope and to make his way over the rubble of the demolished houses on the South

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c) Having crossed the river he then had to descend a seven metre long rope and to make his way over the rubble of the demolished houses on the South bank over a distance of 20 metres. During the descent of the rope and the crossing of the open space he was in full view of the houses 150 metres distant, from which enemy machine gunners opened fire on anything that moved on the Southern bank. The rubble of the houses was known to be mined and booby-trapped.

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d) Having established contact with the writer he volunteered to, and returned, via the same route to the North bank during the hours of daylight on the 8th August, carrying a telephone and telephone line.

e) At the writer's request he returned to the South bank of the river with Lieut. Col. NICOLLI and other officers that same afternoon.

f) Having, in accordance with Lieut. Col. Nicolli's instructions, placed himself at the orders of the writer he at all times during the difficult days that followed showed the greatest courage and devotion to duty.

3. Lieut. Col. NICOLLI

a) This officer made the crossing described in paras (b) and (c) of 2 above on the afternoon of 8th August. Having discussed the situation and reached complete agreement on future action to be taken with the local Allied Commanders, he returned to the North bank on the morning of the following day. The physical difficulties alone of making the return crossing for a man of Lieut. Col. NICOLLI's age and exhausted physical condition were, in the writer's opinion, almost insurmountable.

b) From his HQ on the North bank of the river Lieut. Col. Nicolli has at all times directed and is directing the action of the Patriots in FLORENCE in accordance with the Allied Military Command.

4. The value of the work of the Patriots in FLORENCE can only be properly assessed after the action has been completed, but the fact that it has been coordinated with the wishes of the Allied Command is directly due to the efforts of these two officers.

Major

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Major
Coma N°5 Detachment,
N°1 Special Force.

1977

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APPENDIX 'C'

WHEN the FLORENTINES were FIGHTING on their O[illegible].

(Our special service)

At about 14.00 hours on the 4th August there appeared on the walls of FLORENCE posters to the effect that the whole population had to return to its several homes and not to leave them for any reason, this without exception.

The Patriots go into action

The situation had become so tense during the previous days that the news was received almost with satisfaction: the population hoped that the end of its sufferings was imminent. Another poster, headed 'A Crime,' accused General Alexander of having decided on the destruction of FLORENCE, while the Germans had gone to immense pains to avoid this eventuality. Also the order to evacuate the two banks of the ARNO, carried out in a few hours (about 150,000 persons compelled to leave their houses carrying with them as best they could a mattress or two and a little food), was put into force by the German Command on the pretext of the necessity of avoiding casualties among the civil population consequent upon Allied air attacks on the ARNO briages.

In the three hours which elapsed between the posting of the manifests and the commencement of the state of emergency, all the political and military organizations of the Party and of the C.L.N. gather together at pre-arranged places. In Via Roma the military HQ of the 3rd Zone, the central zone entrusted to the Partito d'Azione, began to function. Immediately in neighbouting streets the HQ and the political giunta of the C.L.N. and the political committee of our party got themselves installed.

Female Couriers

The night of the 5th August was terrible: the Germans had mined all the bridges and all roads leading to the PONTE VECCIO - which was not mined - with large explosive charges as had been done to many buildings used as public offices. The first explosions which were heard in the early evening were like an earth - quake. At Palazzo Pitti where 5,000 evacuees were billeted, 80 were wounded as a result of the blast. Explosion followed explosion all through the night. On the third day of emergency, the morale of the population (500000 people locked up in their houses as in a prison without being able to remove their dead or get water, food or light) was very low. A few women started to come out to get water at the public fountains, but the Germans started to fire on them. Later it was known that permission had been —

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A War Criminal

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The Germens were few in number, mostly parachutists,

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tough, bloodthirsty, cynical. It was clear tha. if the town had acted at the wrong moment the orders of Col Fuchs (whose name must be remembered as that of a war criminal) would have been to carry out heavy reprisals. Meanwhile the shops were systematically looted sometimes even the houses, the high tension tram cables torn down, the mortars which were shelling the other side of the ARNO, where Allied troops had already penetrated, were placed in the most central points of the town as from the 6th August the Partito D'Azione had succeeded in making direct contact with the Allies by a daring action. The Galleria Delgi Uffizi above the Palazzo Vecchio although mined and damaged had not fallen completely. A few comrades having entered the Palazzo Vecchio with the aid of local policemen who were also on our side, daringly penetrated across the corridors and threw a rope to the other side of the bridge where the corridor had been broken off by the explosion of a mine, so as to be able to lower themselves on the rubble, dangerous owing to unexploded mines, and reached the Palazzo Pitti where Allied officers hadalready made contact with the delegation of the Comitato Liberazione Nazionale. Once the possibility of communication by this means had been recognized a telephone wire was laid joining the two parts of the town. The evening of the 10th, of August, thesituation was getting worse also from a sanitary point of view, although the medical services organized by the Fronte Della Gioventu with members of the Partito D'Azione and Partito Comunista had been active some days. On the side of the Arno which had not been liberated first cases of Typhus and Colera were reported. In the houses in which evacuees were billeted cases of deaths by starvation of children were reported. The population locked in their houses knew nothing. By means of a battery set we managed to issue a daily typewritten bulletin. The night of the 11th, the usual artillery duel became more intense and we had the impression that a battle was in progress. At dawn in the houses crowded with people the news got around that the Germans were evacuating.

The Bell of the Palazzo Vecchio rings

One knew only that an armed Fascist or two had been seen on the streets. But all of a sudden the bell of the Palazzo Vecchio and that of S.Lorenzo ring out their tintinabulation. The people begin to come out of doors. The Germans really have gone away. Where? No one knows anything. The first formations of partizans form up, the tricolour brassards of the CLN start to circulate, flags are hung out on balconies. And now - the city is filling up.

The city is in our hands. All the public buildin s are occupied. Towards ten o'clock the first Allied officer, not at first recognised as such by the population, enters the city by the

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The city is in our hands. All the public buildin s are occupied. Towards ten o'clock the first Allied officer, not at first recognised as such by the population, enters the city by the corridor of the Palazzo Pitti, and goes to the Prefecture to con - fer with the CLN. In Via Roma, at the HQ of the 3rd Zone, is a complete confusion of orders and dispositions, a hurly-burly of couriers and armed men. Out men, all equipped with arms taken from the Germans, Fascists and Police by audacious coups-de-main, are already in the line, and are knocking hell out of the Germans.

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Our Insurrection

The city had been divided into four zones, of which one was South of the Arno, and three to the North. The third zone,

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entrusted to us, was the principle one, because it comprised all the centre of the city. The other two cannot yet function freely, as they are under the Germans at this moment. Ours is the entire responsibility for the insurrection; the communist "Garibaldi-Arno" division is still on the other side of the river; it is up to our "Rosselli" Brigade to get moving and take the initiative. They are marvellous boys: they go under fire with an admirable simplicity and enthusiasm. Altogether, the Ha has at its disposal more than 2,500 men; waiting for the "Arno" to cross the river. But a complete military occupation of the city is essential, and arms are getting scarce. The Germans have placed themselves immediately outside the city centre, along the line of the circular roads, from where they are being driven slowly back onto the Mugnone, onto the Railway, towards the Campo di Marte and onto the Affrico: but they are replying to our attack. The first of our boys are beginning to fall: from many windows and roofs snipers are firing on the population.

Thus was begun the Civilian insurrection of Firenze. It is due to the magnificent men of the "Rosselli" brigade and of the "Arno" (now "Potente") division, brought in as reinforcements after the first two days of battle, to the other smaller formations of Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Youth groups, that the German rearguard troops have been compelled to take up lines of resistance further back, and that many of the snipers of Tavolini and Carita have been caught and dealt with summarily. It is due to the really heoric sacrifice of these boys (The Partito D'Azione, in the first insurrection, has also been the first to make the sacrifice, with 40 dead and 90 wounded), that Firenze - devastated, impoverished, ill-armed - has written a page of her glorious resurrection against the barbarous and brutal fury of the enemy.

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