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PRO-USE-AVE

Press Corp
Feb 1944 -

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PRO-10-300

R4

Press Conference

1000 20 209

Feb 1944 - Apr. 1945

✓
4 April 1945

Subject: Col. Poletti's Press Conference

To : Mr. Brown

1. The conference went off very well, with 19 present, as per attached list.
2. FWB took pictures.
3. FWB also will take pictures pictures of presentation of Rome medal to Poletti tomorrow at 5 p.m.
4. Story for Allied correspondents on radio speech and medal coming up to you shortly.
5. Breese of FWB said someone from our office called yesterday to ask that pictures be taken of the regional commissioners being presented to the Prime Minister and that when he tried to do so, he was not permitted.

jpl

592

1

4

ALLIED COMMISSION

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

FILE No.

TO : Mr. Stewart Brown

2 Apr.

194

Sig. Cattin, of the Press Office of the Presidency, informs this Branch that the Ministry Soleri will hold a Press Conference at the Ministry of Finance (entrance via Corneia) tomorrow at 4.30 p.m.

DOX

591

NEWSPAPERS ATTENDING PRESS CONFERENCE BY BRIG. GEN. DUNLOP

Wednesday, March 28 at 1100 hrs. ce

- | | | |
|-----------------|----|-----------------------------|
| RISORGIMENTO | -- | Independent. |
| GIORNALE | -- | Liberal. |
| DOMANI D'ITALIA | -- | Democratic- Christian |
| LA VOCE | -- | Communist - Socialist |
| AZIONE | -- | Party of Action |
| LAVORO D'ITALIA | -- | Democratic Party of Labour. |
| Mr. HANDLEY | -- | P.W.B. Representative. |

May. Liscas
Thanks
g.B.

P.W.B. - 24544
Amoroso

Minister + ...

1/Sgt De Meza

530

REMARKS OF BRIGADIER DUNLOP

AT PRESS CONFERENCE FOR NAPLES JOURNALISTS

28 March 1945

On the afternoon of Saturday, 24 February, Mr. Harold MacMillan, President of the Allied Commission announced to H. E. Bonomi and later to a press conference the new developments of the Allied Governments' policy in respect of Italy. This pronouncement included a statement that all Allied officers would be withdrawn as soon as possible from Italian Government territory and that administration would be carried out directly by the various ministries in Rome and not through the intermediery of any Allied office or officials.

I wish in the first place to tell you today that the Allied Governments are absolutely sincere in their declaration and to you the resultant developments in Southern Italy.

Southern Region Allied Commission comprising the compartments of Molise, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria and Campagna will come to an end at midnight on Saturday next. The zone headquarters at Salerno, Catanzaro, Taranto and Lucera have already been closed down. After 31 March there will no longer be any Regional Commissioner, Southern Region, nor any Regional Officer.

Only in the case of Naples Commune will the present arrangements continue. This is necessary in view of the great importance of the Port of Naples to the Allied Cause. The headquarters of A.M.C. Naples Commune will be transferred to this building in which, by the way, will also be established the local headquarters of UNRRA. Thanks to the excellent understanding and cooperation

between Lt. Col. Simson on one hand and H. F. Selvagi and Avv. Fermeriello on the other, the arrangements at Naples have worked exceedingly smoothly in the past and I am sure that they will continue to run smoothly in the future. May I add at this time how fully I sympathize with and share the general regret that Lt. Col. Simson who has done such excellent work here, will also be leaving the Region. The war is still going on - and he is required for a post of great difficulty and international importance much further north. I know that he carries the best wishes of all. The new Commissioner will be Colonel Pennycuick, a most gallant soldier who has held for many months the post of Regional Commissioner, Sardinia. Lt. Col. Simson will occupy this post for one or two weeks until Colonel Pennycuick can arrive to take over.

At Bari there will be an Allied liaison officer whose main function will be to facilitate all relations between the Allied military and Italian civil authorities at that important port.

At certain other points there will also remain Allied technical officers whose duties are entirely concerned with the provision of various services for the Allied Armies or with the movement of Allied Commission traffic.

Finally there will also remain, for a strictly limited period, those Allied officers whose services have been requested by the Italian Government to assist in the olive oil campaign.

These minor exceptions do not effect the general and supremely important fact that at the end of this week the Allied powers restore to the Italian Government full authority for the administration of the Provinces.

Finally, there is one important instruction which the

Allied Commission has emphasized in assigning these liaison officers in the midst of your sovereign territory. It is this: liaison officers will be here chiefly as observers. They will not - repeat not - offer even advice to the Italian authorities. In fact, should Italian officials ask the liaison officers for advice, the officials will be referred to their competent Italian ministries at Rome.

Most of the Allied officers thus withdrawn will be preparing themselves at once for tasks of great importance in Northern Italy when those Provinces become liberated. I am sure that they will carry with them your good wishes, both for themselves and for the help they will bring to your brethren in the North. The problems that will await us in the North will be as difficult as any that we have faced. Destruction may be severe, dislocation general, food in short supply. For us of the Allied Commission some of our hardest work lies still ahead.

We of the Allied Commission have gained experience on the South which should serve us well in the time to come. Naples today presents a picture very different to that which it presented in October 1943. I am but the last of a line of Allied Regional Commissioners and my task has been lightened by the work of those who have laboured before me. I would wish to pay tribute on your behalf and on my own to General Hume, Colonel Kraege, Colonel Poletti, Colonel Chapman and Colonel Temperley who, each in their turn, laboured indefatigably for the good of Naples. Eighteen months ago Naples was a city of desolation, without water, without light, without means of communication. Its port laid waste, its streets blocked with ruin, threatened with disease and famine. Today Naples lives again. Together we have worked for this city and I believe we have

good cause for some measure of pride. There is still much to be done, but the fact remains that today Naples is alive.

Within the last three weeks I have travelled throughout Southern Italy paying visits of farewell to the Provinces. I have found the food situation satisfactory, the state of health good, industry reviving, and the railway service improving. There is much still to be done, but I am confident that the Italian people and Italian authorities will carry on that which we have together begun.

May I end with a personal word of thanks. I have spent a very happy five months in Southern Italy. I leave with personal regret, but also with satisfaction because the very fact of my departure signals confidence in the Italian people, and in ultimate victory. I wish to thank the Press for all the assistance they have given me. I wish, in fact, to thank all the citizens, officials, organizations, - public, private and party groups - who have helped in the common tasks we have faced.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

R4/PRE

21 February 1945.

Mr. Harold MacMillan, Acting President of the Allied Commission, invites all Allied correspondents to attend a cocktail party and press conference at the Grand Hotel at 5.30 p.m., Saturday, February 24, 1945.

AFHQ Notice Board
Colonel Arley DDPR AFHQ PRO
Maj Holmsten AFHQ PRO

585

File #

2

105

14. See 1 opposite.

E. M. D. M. J. -

20/11

PRO.

I am sorry. By some error I did not see this until today, after Mr. Macmillan had gone. I think the best plan now is to tell correspondents that he ~~has~~ is going to U.K. & Africa to meet & consult both governments in taking up his new post. Confirm with Rex's Office Caserta by tel. that they agree. ✓

M. J. 21/11

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

4/1/PRB

20 November 1944.

Subject: Press Conference.

To: Chief of Staff.

For the past ten days a good many correspondents have, naturally, been coming to me for details about Mr MacMillan's exact position and functions and the changes which may be expected to result from his appointment. They also press for interviews. I had hoped that he might possibly have been able to hold a Press Conference which could be based on the achievements of the past year and the new orientation of the AC. However, I realize the difficulties of this at present. It is possible nevertheless that correspondents here may bear him a grudge if he goes to Washington and London without seeing them or notifying them in any way of his intentions; more particularly if he gives publicity in London or Washington. I think an informal press conference here would be well received; failing that, I would suggest a press release announcing his departure and giving, if possible, some indication of his mission. This would at least prevent correspondents here from feeling that they were being ignored. Perhaps Mr MacMillan would allow me to speak to him about it.

Lionel Fielden
LIONEL FIELDEN,
Major,
Public Relations Director.

Page L. Fielden
A. C. C.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the situation.

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1. Before I give you some interesting facts and figures about the Italian Campaign, I propose to carry you swiftly through it from the days when we stood in SICILY after its capture in 36 days, up to the present time.
2. I must ask you to carry your minds back as far as April and May 1943, when we were still fighting the Battle of TUTTOLA, even then in the midst of that struggle to free the North African Coast, we were planning the invasion of SICILY; and the invasion of SICILY was not to be an end in itself, but a stepping stone towards bigger things, namely, to put ITALY out of the war, and the Germans out of ITALY. Allied Armies would then stand in the open doorway of Southern Europe, ready to strike at the Nazi Fortress.
3. You will see how the pattern of the Sicilian Campaign fits into this bigger picture when you remember where we landed and how the EIGHTH ARMY and the American SEVENTH ARMY in a converging movement struck towards the Straits of MESSINA.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN

1. Before I give you some interesting facts and figures about the Italian Campaign, I propose to carry you swiftly through it from the days when we stood in SICILY after its capture in 38 days, up to the present time.
2. I must ask you to carry your minds back as far as April and May 1943, when we were still fighting the Battle of TUNISIA, even then in the midst of that struggle to free the North African Coast, we were planning the invasion of SICILY; and the invasion of SICILY was not to be an end in itself, but a stepping stone towards bigger things, namely, to put ITALY out of the war, and the Germans out of ITALY. Allied Armies would then stand in the open doorway of Southern Europe, ready to strike at the Nazi Fortress.
3. You will see how the pattern of the Sicilian Campaign fits into this bigger picture when you remember where we landed and how the EIGHTH ARMY and the American SEVENTH ARMY in a converging movement struck towards the Straits of MESSINA.
4. During the fight in SICILY, I was then with A.F.H.Q. planning the attack on the Italian Mainland. There were many considerations which affected the plan, the terrain to be fought over, the size and location of the enemy forces opposing us, availability of landing craft for amphibian operations, relative strength of air forces, range of fighters, etc.
There were 5 German Divisions in ITALY; 3 or 4 in the Southern part, and one somewhere in the NAFILES area. It was clear that the easiest approach into the Italian Mainland was across the Straits of MESSINA, but this alone, an advance up such a narrow corridor against 4 - 5 divisions would be slow, costly and perhaps impossible.

(Page 4 Contd.)

-2-

It was for consideration if such an approach should not be abandoned and an amphibious force landed somewhere up in the left. If this line of action was adopted, how many troops could be landed over the sea, and where? We had an initial lift for only 4 divisions with a long and slow build up for say another 2. In other words we should limit ourselves to employing only 6 divisions out of our 20 to oppose a German strength of 5 divisions and probably more. And this does not take into account the Italians who had a large number of divisions still fighting with the Germans, as by that time they had not thrown their hand in.

5.

I decided therefore and recommended a line of action which always appeals to me - the double handed punch - a right and a left. This enables the attacker to switch his effort from the right to the left or vice versa, and by so doing enables one to keep the initiative and one's opponent, guessing and on the hop. It is the technique of the ring.

We did it with success in TUNISIA with the EIGHTH ARMY (right) and the FIRST ARMY plus Americans and French (left).

We did it with success in SICILY with the EIGHTH ARMY again on the right and the SEVENTH US ARMY on the left; and you will see when my story unfolds itself, how successful it was to be in the breaking of the winter line; again the EIGHTH ARMY on the right and the FIFTH ARMY on the left from ADZIO and finally the breaking of the GOTHIC LINE with the same technique. Because it has been so successful in the past it doesn't follow that I shall always employ these methods. Good Generalship depends largely on mystifying one's enemy, thereby gaining surprise.

6.

To return for a moment to the attack on ITALY. I decided to attack the toe with the EIGHTH ARMY to draw down all, or as many of the Germans into the south, and land behind them with the FIFTH ARMY. The choice of a landing place had many considerations; the main factors are these :-

561

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- (a) We had to ensure taking a good port.
- (b) The expedition had to be covered by fighters.
- (c) The two armies had to be sufficiently near each other to influence the battle.

NAPLES was ideal for this, but NAPLES could not be taken by direct assault because the harbour was protected by mines, there are no suitable landing beaches, it is a fortified area and it was out of fighter cover.

SALERNO was suitable, because it had good landing beaches; it was not a fortified area; it was just within fighter cover and it was within striking distance of the Port of NAPLES.

7.

- 3 -

Well in August the EIGHTH ARMY landed and as I expected drew down some 3 to 4 divisions against it. On Sept 10th the American FIFTH ARMY consisting of one British Corps and one American Corps landed against one German division and established its bridgehead. Immediately the Germans reacted by withdrawing all but one division from EIGHTH ARMY front and throwing all they had against SEVEN ARMY at SALERNO. 4 divisions of ours were opposed by 4 German divisions. The situation for a time was critical but this is where the double handed punch came in. I ordered EIGHTH ARMY who now had little opposition to advance with all speed to POTENZA, to come in behind the Germans attacking our landing at SALERNO.

I also produced a third punch by landing the British Parachute Division in destroyers at TARANTO, a fairly weak but highly mobile force to crack about in the enemy's rear.

And there was one more punch in our bag and that was the switching of the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces, lights, mediums and heavy strat onto the German concentrations around SALERNO.

You know the results. The enemy fell back to cover his L of C to the North and we advanced to seize two vitally important objectives, the Port of NAPLES in the West and the FOGGIA airfields in the East, as well as the Ports of BARI, BRINDISI and TARANTO in the heel of ITALY.

We were now firmly established in Southern ITALY and could say we had decisively won the first round. ITALY as you will remember had collapsed and was out of the war as an opponent.

8.

So ended the 1st Phase of this campaign. I say ended, because a great regrouping of Allied Forces had to take place.

Several divisions were withdrawn for 2nd front, together with nearly all the landing craft and a great many installations, such as Signal units, Engineers, etc etc. In exchange for what had been taken away we got something very useful. We got the French Expeditionary Force which was to turn out a very fine one and we also got some very fine American divisions, so I can really say my armies had pretty well made up what they lost. I suppose no General is ever satisfied with what he has got.

9.

My armies in ITALY had therefore to be completely reorganised and regrouped and plans made to continue with the remainder of our task. We had put the Italians out of the war, but we had not yet put the Germans out of ITALY. That was still before us. So now we turn to Phase 2 which I will call the Winter Campaign.

At this time, the Germans built up the forces in ITALY to a formidable strength.

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At this time, the Germans built up the forces in ITALY to a formidable strength.

Hitler ordered the holding of the famous winter line which we know as the GUSTAV LINE at CASSINO backed by the reserve position of the HITLER LINE. I will not say anything about these positions and their strongly prepared defences; they are well known to you.

The thing which caused me most concern was the realisation that if we allowed Kesselring to spend the winter in this formidable position, with time to complete it, we should find it very difficult to break it in the spring.

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10. Before the end of the year of 1943 my forces which had been depleted by the withdrawals for 2nd front were to some extent made up with the French divisions which came in and by some new American formations; but we still lacked sufficient airborne forces or landing craft to carry out any ambitious operations; and of course winter conditions were not so favourable for our air and superiority in tanks and other mobile formations.

Nevertheless, I could not accept inaction. Further, it was vitally necessary at this stage in the war, when preparations for 2nd front were going on to keep away and maul as many German divisions as possible to keep them from the Western Front and the Eastern Front as well.

11. I therefore tried to improve our positions before the Spring campaign with the first of these surprise operations in landing craft. The first was ANZIO. Owing to limitations in landing craft, only a lift for 2 divisions plus was available. But even with this small force, if a surprise landing on the enemy's flank, aimed at getting astride his main L of C from Rome to the front, could be pulled off, it might force him to withdraw from his winter line, or alternatively to send divisions from his main winter line to deal with the ANZIO landing. This would have weakened his GUSTAV LINE, so that he would not be strong enough to hold it. The result of the ANZIO landing was very interesting. He didn't weaken his main battle front, but brought down from the North some ten fresh divisions. I must admit that although we foresaw that he might do this, I did not welcome it, although from the large strategic picture, it was a move which gave considerable satisfaction to those who conduct the strategy of our war effort. The Germans were getting more and more drawn into the battle of ITALY and expending their strength away from the battle fronts of the East and West. ANZIO was not the 100% victory we hoped of it, but as you will see later, it played a vital if not decisive factor in the success of our 1944 campaign, by giving me once again that double handed punch.

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CASSINO was the key to the winter line. The fortress of CASSINO barred the way into the LIRI Valley and if we could gain that key bridgehead into the open plain, we could start our advance on ROME through an open door.

To take CASSINO by storm in the winter would have been very costly in men and material, and in view of the forthcoming summer campaign of 1944, I had to rest and train my troops. I could not at this stage afford to start 1944 with tired troops and with weakened formations.

/Page 5.....

(Para 12 Contd.)

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We therefore tried to jump CASSINO by a surprise attack. To wipe it out by overwhelming fire power, and then to occupy it with the minimum forces. In other words, to whip out an aching tooth by a sudden wrench of the forceps; and we very nearly succeeded. I maintain that any other troops except the 1st Para troops of the German div would have lost it. However, like ANZIO although not a 100% success, it succeeded in giving us a limited bridgehead with relatively few casualties and gained us a footing half into the fortress and a bridgehead over the RAPIDO River which greatly helped us when the time came to launch our Spring offensive in May.

So ended Phase 2; the winter fighting.

13.

Now we come to the summer campaign of 1944 which resulted in the partial destruction of the German Armies in ITALY, the capture of ROME and the liberation of ITALY up to FLORENCE. The aim of this summer's campaign was twofold.

- (a) To destroy as much of the enemy forces as possible.
- (b) To produce a first class victory over the Germans just before 2nd front was launched.

Very careful calculations with regard to timings had to be made for this. ROME must be taken a few days before the Western invasion. What was the plan? It was to group the whole of EIGHTH ARMY opposite the LIRI valley unbeknown to the enemy. To make the enemy fear a breakout from ANZIO, so as to keep his eye away from the main battle fronts. By a sudden surprise attack to break through the Winter line and to draw off strength from the ANZIO bridgehead, so that they in turn could break out and get behind and astride the enemy's L of C. If successful this pincer movement would destroy the German right wing and of course ROME would fall automatically into the bag.

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Well! you know the result.

But to give you some idea of the difficulties in correct timing ANZIO breakout was a very good example. If I could have said to General Clark, the time has now come for you to attack from ANZIO; and he could have started that attack within a few hours of receipt of my order, it would be easy. But he had to have four days. Guns, infantry, tanks etc had to be moved secretly under cover of darkness into their assault positions, otherwise surprise would be lost, the enemy would see it coming and have time to prepare, he would have all seen from which direction from the bridgehead the attack was to be launched. Therefore with that time lag, I had

(Page 14 Contd)

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to calculate when the correct moment had arrived, by anticipating several days ahead. I do not wish to blow my own trumpet - luck plays a great part in these matters - and up to date I have been lucky. ROME fell on June 4th - 24 - 48 hours before the Western invasion was launched. We made a slight miscalculation there, it was running it a bit fine, but it worked out all right because as you will remember ~~2nd front~~ was postponed 24 hours owing to bad weather - luck again.

15

The advance up through Italy is well known to you, and by the end of the summer's fighting we had reached the Gothic Line.

Phase III of the Italian campaign was ended.

16

Now we come to the final phase of the fighting up to date. At this stage of the war, I cannot tell you what my original plan for the breaking of the Gothic Line was. But certain alterations had to be made in the regrouping of my armies, when the decision to attack the South of France was made. This entailed the withdrawal of all the French and some American Divisions, together with other installations which I needed.

However, only those who are responsible for the conduct of the war as a whole can decide what is best for the strategy as a whole, and we have to carry out our tasks with what we are given.

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17

You know already how we broke through the Gothic Line. Again by secret regrouping and the careful timing of first one punch and then another, always keeping the enemy on the run and never knowing where or when he is next going to take it. When the forces are equally matched only such tactics are the ones which pay, and I would call your attention to this fact. At no time during the Italian campaign have we had any but slight superiority in numbers. It is true that our superiority in the air is complete. We have more tanks and guns. Against this the enemy has or did have all the advantages in ground and the flexibility of only one army against my Allied armies, which consist of British, Americans, Canadians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Poles, French, Greek, Italians and Brazilians - Indians, and who knows if I shan't add other United Nations to these.

That, gentlemen, is a short summary of the Italian campaign from August 1943 to the present time. To what extent we have been successful is for you and others to judge, but I have a nice smacking feeling that when the history of this war comes to be written, the Italian campaign will be judged as one of the most brilliant and successful fought in this war, and bearing comparison with any others fought in this country.

With this background, I should like to give you some facts and figures which I am sure you will find interesting.

Just before I finish, let me say just one or two nice things about other people.

I don't think that any Allies have ever got on so well with so little friction as we have with the Americans. I think it is exactly the same all over the world. I can certainly speak with authority here in Italy as I am responsible for the Italian campaign. It is a wonderful thing - our headquarters are integrated - the 15th Corps and the 5th Division happy and proud to fight with the American Fifth Army under General Clark. I know the Americans feel just the same about fighting with us. Thank God we have a common language - otherwise it would be impossible - We do understand each other - if you can get on so well together under the stress and strain of war - it's a good sign and augurs well for the future. I think also that you can see for yourselves that all the nationalities fighting on our side get on together excellently. You also see for yourselves the close co-operation between the air, the Navy and the Ground Forces. In fact, if we didn't have complete understanding, give and take complete co-operation, we couldn't succeed, because modern battles are combined operations, either - air, land or sea. In this we have been highly successful, and I hope it will go on being so. United we stand, divided we fall.

PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

PRB/R4

8 Sep. 1944

SUBJECT : Trades Union Delegates - Press Conference.

TO : Acting Chief Commissioner.

Correspondents are all extremely interested now in the Trades Union Delegates. I presume that Bria's despatch has been published and their papers have cabled them for more - and they are pestering me to arrange a Press Conference when the delegates return to Rome on the 15th.

AFHQ PRO won't touch it. I don't really see how we can avoid it. Possibly a Press Conference is better than individual interviews. What do you think?

(Sgd)

LIONEL FIELDEN
Major
Public Relations Director

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HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

PRB/R20

29 August 1944

Memo:

Brigadier General O'DWYER'S Conference With
Italian Journalists.

1. Brigadier General WILLIAM O'DWYER, Vice President of the Economic Section, ACC, and Mr. ALBERT ANTOLINI, Executive Director of the same section, held a conference for representatives of the Rome press in the Ex-Ministry of Corporations Building at 1600 hours today.

2. After a few introductory remarks by Brigadier O'DWYER which were translated to the Italian correspondents by Mr. ANTOLINI, the latter conducted the remainder of the conference in Italian, translating and interpreting where necessary for other ACC officials who spoke, notably Colonel LEGG, Director Food Sub-Commission and Lt. Col. JENNY, Director Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission. Mr. MOLINARI, Director General of the Central Statistical Institute, spoke in Italian.

3. The discussions consisted of (1) general remarks by Mr. ANTOLINI on general problems of supply and (2) answers to correspondent's questions, which had been submitted previously to the PRO by the seven newspapers listed below:

ITALIA LIBERA
ITALIA NUOVA
RICOSTRUZIONE
RISORGIMENTO LIBERALE
TEMPO
UNITA'
VOCE REPUBBLICANA

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4. The journalists who attended the conference and the newspapers they represent are:

AVANTI	: Dott. SUPPINI
CORRIERE DI ROMA	: Avv. LONGO
	Dott. TEODOLI
ITALIA LIBERA	: Dott. NERI
	Dott. ALFONSI

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ITALIA NUOVA	: Dott. SCODRO Dott. CLAROTTI
OSSERVATORE R.	: Dott. SANGIORGI
POPOLO	: Dott. Canali Dott. Calabresi Signora Sacchetti
QUOTIDIANO	: Dott. Camillis
RISORGIMENTO LIB.	: Dott. Bartoli Dott. Gorrezio
RICOSTRUZIONE	: Dott. Gasparini
TEMPO	: Dott. Rapaci
UNITA'	: Dott. Vaia
VOCE REPUBBLICANA	: Conte Giovani
UNITED NATIONS NEWS SERVICE	: Dott. Cerretto

5. A copy of the invitation delivered by hand to Rome's 12 authorized newspapers Saturday, 26 August, is attached.

(Sga)

John Atkinson
2/Lt., CMP
ACC - PRO

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PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

PRB/R4

25 July 1944.

Subject: Press Conference

To: Acting Chief Commissioner.

I have a strong feeling as Public Relations Officer that you should before long hold a Press Conference. I think that you yourself and ACC HQ should be better known here; there is far too much publicity of Poletti, Huse, Johnson etc. and far too little of Captain Stone and ACC. I have been wondering whether August 15 would be a good date and whether you could not then give correspondents some explanation of points such as:

- (1) exact powers and responsibilities of Italian Government in territory handed over;
- (2) full story on patriot treatment;
- (3) background of changes in Economic Section;
- (4) full story on electricity;
- (5) up-to-date food and transport figures.

I realize that all this is rather tricky but you can always speak "off the record" and we could, I think, assemble a good deal of information for you. Correspondents are very much on the hunt for news and would certainly come to a conference, I think, unless Florence provides some special magnet for them.

(50)

LIONEL FIELDEN,
Major,
Public Relations Director.

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ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

PRB:R4

11 July 1944

Subject: Armistice terms.

To: Acting Chief Commissioner.

I gather that there is some possibility of the Armistice terms being released. If this is done, and even if the release comes from AHCQ, I think we should have some sort of Press Conference at which experts could explain the terms to correspondents and also explain what has been done under them so far.

SECRET

Lionel Fielden.
LIONEL FIELDEN,
Major,
Public Relations Director.

Only a possibility.
If it is done, there
will be a simultaneous
release here. There is
considerable opposition to
publication in some quarters.

Confidential

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PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

PRB/R/4.

19 June 1944.

Emergency Press Conference
held at Grand Hotel Rome
June 19 1944

General MacFarlane said that he understood that the press wished him to talk about the political situation. He thought that they were probably in the picture just as much as he was. What he did say would be on the record but he did not wish it to be quoted as coming from him; his name must not be mentioned.

It was a completely straightforward story. The King had transferred his powers to the Crown Prince as soon as he was informed that the Allies had entered Rome. In accordance with constitutional procedure the Prime Minister and Government tendered their resignations to the Lieutenant General of the Realm who had then asked Marshal Badoglio to reform the Government, taking advantage of the presence of political leaders found in Rome.

The next step had been to bring Marshal Badoglio and the Government to Rome to meet the political leaders. The meeting had taken place in that very room. It became clear at once that Marshal Badoglio was unable to form a government, and that the parties desired Bonomi. Everything had proceeded constitutionally: Bonomi had seen the Crown Prince who asked him to form a Government. When that was done they all returned to Salerno.

There had been a slight but inevitable delay because clearly in the situation which existed between Italy and the Allied Governments, the approval of the latter was necessary. That approval had now been received.

Question: Is Bonomi already functioning in his office?

Answer: I understand that the oath will be taken on Thursday. The delay could not be avoided. Moscow, London and Washington had to be consulted, and the authorities were preoccupied with the Second Front operations.

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Question: Did the Allied Governments find the new government an unexpected development?

Answer: It was perhaps generally expected that Marshal Badoglio would form a government.

/ Question:

-2-

Question: Is the new government going to take the oath to the Crown Prince?

Answer: That will take place on Thursday. I cannot tell you what the exact oath will be. I can only say that a form of oath has been mutually agreed.

Question: You do not know what it is?

Answer: I should not like to say until I have seen it. Off the record. I think the Prime Minister will take the normal oath and the others will take an oath to serve Italy, agreeing that there should be no change in the constitutional question until the Italian people can decide.

Question: Will that take place at Salerno?

Answer: At Salerno or Naples: certainly not in Rome.

Question: Were any conditions made by the Allied Governments?

Answer: Any Italian Government naturally assumes the obligations of its predecessor.

Question: Was it not understood that Badoglio would get back?

Answer: No doubt there was enormous speculation on the subject. Many people in the Government would be happy to see him back. He started life with a pencil and a piece of paper with him (General MacFarlane) in Brindisi and knew a great deal about this rather complicated situation. There was an urge, no doubt, to put him in.

Question: By Ministers?

Answer: I can't answer that.

Question: In Rome he is very unpopular?

Answer: That is news to me.

Question: Did the Advisory Council for Italy act?

Answer: They considered the question and submitted recommendations. 569

Question: Is it definite that Badoglio is not returning?

Answer: I do not know. I don't think he is anxious to do so. I think he wants a period of rest.

Question: Were there any intimations from the Allied Governments that they would like to see Badoglio back?

Answer: Of course not.

/ Question:

-3-

Question: Has not this delay put the Bonomi Government under a cloud?

Answer: I don't think so. The delay was rather prolonged owing to other preoccupations, but any new Government clearly had to have the Allies' approval.

Question: Was that understood before the Government was formed?

Answer: Yes. It is obviously a very complicated position. As long as Italy has an armistice, the Allies must have a say in any Government that is formed, that is, until the basic situation changes.

Question: Were the Allied Governments anxious about the Monarchy?

Answer: That is a question you should put to Washington and London.

Question: Did Bonomi appoint himself?

Answer: I can't tell you what went on in this room. Badoglio failed to get support. They all wished to serve under Bonomi.

Question: Then is the Atlantic Charter not operative until Italy is clear?

Answer: Frankly I don't know. Italy has an armistice. When the armistice is replaced by a peace treaty things will be different. But I don't think anything has been done which is contrary to the Atlantic Charter.

Question: The Allied Governments have not much confidence in Bonomi?

Answer: I am not prepared to give their view. It was a straightforward piece of political evolution.

Question: But Badoglio is not excluded?

Answer: Bonomi is free to invite anyone. Badoglio may change his mind and accept.

Question: Were the Allied Governments disappointed?

Answer: No.

Question: When will the Italian Government come to Rome?

Answer: I can only say that for administrative purposes there is every advantage in getting them here quickly. The decision is not mine. I can't say exactly when they will come.

Question: Will there be any further transference of territory?

Answer: That is being investigated now. / Question:

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Question: Who would really ask Badoglio to join the Government? The Allied Governments or AMG or ACC?

Answer: I have a lot of half-bricks thrown at me: I don't want a whole brick. AMG doesn't appoint Governments. If we find an Under-secretary inefficient we can ask the Prime Minister if he will remove him: that's all. We do not bring pressure to bear.

Question: Were the Ministers informed of the Armistice terms?

Answer: Yes, I think they all knew them.

Question: President Roosevelt said recently in a Press Conference that now that Rome was taken the secret armistice terms could be revealed. Can we know what they are?

Answer: I have to keep secrets until I am instructed to divulge them.

Question: Was there any agreement with the Vatican upon what would be politically desirable in Italy?

Answer: No -- apart from the fact that the British and American ministers were in contact with their Governments.

Question: Will the new Government mobilize more Italians for the Army?

Answer: It is a large question, depending on many factors. It is difficult. Clearly the Italian Army will continue its machinery as we go forward. We shall find younger age-groups among Italians in the North. Ordinary calling-up will go on to take them in, and then the older age-groups can be released.

Question: What about volunteers?

Answer: Unless we can provide them with arms and equipment there's not much to be done. Also it would be necessary to train them. In a time of crisis it is difficult to cut across the existing organization. We might train and equip a few Commando units. But it would be impossible to cut across the whole army and substitute a volunteer organization.

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Question: Is partisan resistance in North Italy good?

Answer: Yes, I think quite good.

Question: Is there any indication as to how partisans have accepted the new Government?

Answer: Very little information. What there is shows that the new Government is preferable.

/ Question:

-5-

Question: Did the Eonomi Government begin to function today or yesterday?

Answer: I don't know. I think yesterday. (Mr Caccia, consulted, did not know. Colonel Monfort, consulted, thought today but was not sure).

Question: Are the Ministers free to come to Rome?

Answer: Yes. I have given them all permits.

Question: Are the Ministries here allowed to carry on in a skeleton way?

Answer: They are sorting out their offices and generally preparing things. It is unlikely that they will do much more at present.

Question: But they are not prevented from working?

Answer: There is no objection to routine work - archives and so on.

Question: Which Allied Governments were consulted?

Answer: All those represented on the Advisory Council - British, American, Russian, French, Greek, Yugo-Slav.

Question: Which Yugo-Slav government?

Answer: On the whole both. (Mr Caccia, consulted, said Mr Krek was the Yugo-Slav representative on the A.I.C.).

Question: Is Mr Krek representing Tito?

Answer: (Mr Caccia, consulted, said he represented "the other chap", he thought, but was not quite sure).

Question: Was there a full meeting on Saturday?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Will the A.I.C. move with the Government?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Will the authority of the ACC be extended over Elba?

Answer: It is already ALG.

/ Question:

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Question: Can you tell us about the harvest prospects?

Answer: They are generally good. Transport is difficult, but there is no reason to think that we shall fall down on it. There are labour difficulties - the Bari labour on which Foggia usually draws is now fully occupied, so we are calling in the Italian Army. The position at Latera is easier. We hope that the increase from 200 to 300 grammes will have a good effect on the Ammassi.

Question: Are the communal committees functioning well?

Answer: It is too early to say. Everything is going well now. We can't say what success we shall have.

Question: Have you any reports from Sicily?

Answer: Nothing definite. Undoubtedly Sicily will be difficult.

Question: When the Italian Government moves will it control Rome?

Answer: Not necessarily. The handing over of territory always depends on how Italians shape locally. My plans are to hand back progressively and I hope to accelerate the process. It is already worked out in considerable detail up to Rome inclusive. If the Government were permitted to return before Rome was handed over, it would function quite happily with AMG. They are prepared to do that.

Question: Is your personnel being thinned out in the south?

Answer: Very much so. My personnel even in Rome is being thinned out. Personnel and transport questions get worse with the advance; refugee questions get better. Those who shape our destinies never thought that they would have to deprive me of transport for the harvest.

Question: Is AMG structure in Rome likely to change? Is Poletti coming?

Answer: You will see that in due course. Any more questions? Again, please don't mention my name.

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Question: Can we call you a "spokesman"?

Answer: No, I don't think so. You can say "authoritative sources".

PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

PRB 5.

14 April 1944.

Dear

Thank you for your letter of 12 April. I hasten to say that no-one could regret more than I do the short notice given for Messrs Macmillan and Murphy's Conference on the 12th. The Chief Commissioner agreed some time ago, at my instance, that he would call no conference at less than 48 hours' notice. On this occasion Mr Macmillan and Mr Murphy, who were leaving the same day, themselves decided to hold a conference. The decision was made at 10.45 a.m. and the notice was posted at your office ten minutes later. I fully appreciate the difficulties which such late arrangements create; but in this case I was helpless.

Yours sincerely,

LIONEL FIELDEN,
Major,
Director of Public
Relations.

Colonel P.R. Astley.
DDPR,
AFHQ PRO,
8 Via San Felice.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
ADVANCE ECHELON

12 April 1944

Dear

Fielden.

Regarding the question of arranging for press conferences, such as that laid on for General McFarlane today, would it be possible to give rather more warning beforehand?

In the case in question various releases to the press had been scheduled for the afternoon of 12 April; nor was sufficient warning of the General's conference given to enable correspondents from forward areas to attend should they desire to have done so.

In order to avoid such complications in the future, I would suggest it might be advisable, whenever possible, to consult this office in order that conferences may be properly coordinated beforehand.

Yours *Sincerely,*

P. R. Astley.

P. R. ASTLEY
Colonel
DDPR

Major Fielden
P.R. ACC

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PRESS CONFERENCE
held at the Provincia Building
NAPIES
on Wednesday 12 April 1944.

Present: Lt-Gen Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane, Chief Commissioner, ACC
Mr Robert Murphy, US State Department
Mr Harold Macmillan, Foreign Office
Sir Noel Charles, Foreign Office
Mr Caccia, Political Section, ACC
Mr Heber, Political Section, ACC
Col Astley, AFHQ PRO
Lt Col Oakshott, AFHQ PRO
Lt Col Galchrist, Cdn PRO
Major Fielden, ACC PRB
Major Bullock, ACC PRB
Capt Leacacos, ACC PRB
Major Hinkel, Inf Div, ACC
Mr Lumby, The Times
Mr Sprigge, Reuters
Major Macnaughton, Censorship
Mr Brown, Union Jack
Mr Concannon, Union Jack
Mr Reynolds, BBC
Mr Acheson, PWB
Mr Green, Stars and Stripes
Mr Cooper, Daily Express
Mr Robinson, PWB
Mr Fowle, CBS
Mr Moyes, Washington Evening Star
Mr Hovey, IWS
Mr Lang, New Yorker
Mr Helliwell, Daily Herald
Mr Legge, London Daily Telegraph
Mr Macdonald, Sydney Herald
Mr Kennedy, AP
Mr Hayden, Censorship
Mr Vindrich, New Chronicle
Mr Sulzberger, New York Times
Miss Tanara, New York Herald-Tribune
Mr Heyourn, Montreal Standard
Mr Morgan, Chicago Daily News
Mr Packard, UP
Mrs Packard, UP
Mr Rayner, PWB
Mr Roberts, PWB
Mr Mirfite, PWB
Mr Severeid, CBS
Mr Brown, Reuters
Mr Ure, The Times
Mr Bracker, New York Times.

Mr Robert Murphy said that he had thought that in view of their rather
late idea to meet the Press and to

Lt Col Galtchrist, Com 1st

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 Mr Acheson, PWB
 Mr Green, Stars and Stripes
 Mr Cooper, Daily Express
 Mr Robinson, PWB
 Mr Fowle, CBS
 Mr Hayes, Washington Evening Star
 Mr Hovey, INS
 Mr Lang, New Yorker
 Mr Hellinwell, Daily Herald
 Mr Legge, London Daily Telegraph
 Mr Macdonald, Sydney Herald
 Mr Kennedy, AP
 Mr Hayden, Censorship
 Mr Yindrich, New Chronicle
 Mr Sulzberger, New York Times
 Miss Tamara, New York Herald-Tribune
 Mr Heyburn, Montreal Star
 Mr Morgan, Chicago Daily News
 Mr Packard, UP
 Mrs Packard, UP
 Mr Rayner, PWB
 Mr Roberts, PWB
 Mr Minifie, PWB
 Mr Severoid, CBS
 Mr Brown, Reuters
 Mr Ure, The Times
 Mr Bracker, New York Times.

Mr Robert Murphy said that he had thought that in view of their rather long absence from Italy it might be a good idea to meet the Press and to answer any questions which they might want to put regarding the political situation. It was his impression that much progress had been made. We had all noted the King's statement, which he thought augured well for the future and which, he hoped, might bring all parties together in a coalition and thus forward the prosecution of the war, by helping us to implement the declaration made at Moscow. He thought that in the Mediterranean theatre there had been an overplay of the words "military expediency" which should rather be rendered "military necessity": he and his colleagues endeavoured to coordinate policy with necessity. He was now leaving his post on the

/ Advisory

Advisory Council which would be taken by Mr Alexander Mark who was due to arrive here very shortly.

Mr Harold Macmillan announced his replacement on the Advisory Council by Sir Noel Charles and said that the new arrangements would bring the Council to Italy in a more permanent way. He was here today to answer questions. He thought that absence helped one, on returning, to see things in perspective: and it seemed to him that there had been a political advance for which we had not given Italy full credit. He thought the King's decision would produce a Coalition government: and this had been brought about by the Italians themselves. This was very welcome to His Majesty's Government. Any native-born solution was better than one imposed from without. The next few weeks, he felt, would see a development towards a democratic coalition government which would not only be of immense assistance to us in our war effort, but would also be of great value in the advance of Italian politics in conformity with the principles enunciated by the United Nations. He felt that it was important to make the critical public at home understand that support of a healthy Italian organization would immensely help General MacFarlane's difficult task.

Mr Murphy asked if there were any questions.

Morgan: What is the significance of the King's declaration that his decision would be implemented only when Rome fell?

Mr Murphy: Possibly moral considerations: he left Rome under difficult circumstances and had no opportunity to confer at any length with the leading politicians. He may feel that many of his subjects in that area would wish him to take no hasty step without consulting them. This is just my hypothesis. Possibly he feels that it is in the interests of the monarchy that he should return to Rome before resigning. He believes that Italians want to keep a monarchy.

Morgan: Does this declaration really say anything new?

Mr Murphy: Not really --

Mr Macmillan: It is important to note that the King has announced his definite intention to withdraw from public affairs. This decision is final and irrevocable.

This was very welcome to His Majesty's Government. Any native-born solution was better than one imposed from without. The next few weeks, he felt, would see a development towards a democratic coalition government which would not only be of immense assistance to us in our war effort, but would also be of great value in the advance of Italian politics in conformity with the principles enunciated by the United Nations. He felt that it was important to make the critical public at home understand that support of a healthy Italian organization would immensely help General MacFarlane's difficult task.

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Mr. Macmillan: It is important to note that the King has announced his definite intention to withdraw from public affairs. This decision is final and irrevocable.

Morgan: Is he withdrawing today?

Mr. Macmillan: He has announced the decision and cannot revoke it. He wishes the formal transfer to take place in the capital, possibly because there would be a wider selection of political leaders in Rome and the Crown Prince would thus have a better chance of forming a stable government.

Bracker: Does this mean he will retire and live more simply?

Mr. Macmillan: He has not much show here: we all live pretty simply in Naples.

Sonia Tamara: Will he still have the title of King?

Mr. Macmillan: Legally, yes.

/ Sonia Tamara

Sonia Tamara: Then this is not an abdication?

Mr Macmillan: No: the only parallel I can think of is that of a Regency - such as that of George III.

Packard: Might he not return as King?

Mr Macmillan: No: his declaration is irrevocable.

Packard: But still he might return - say, if anything happened to the Crown Prince?

Mr Macmillan: It is possible, but I don't think so.

Bracker: Was pressure brought to bear by the Allies?

Mr Murphy: No, we have brought no pressure to bear: perhaps the Italians had done so.

Macdonald: Was the Giunta satisfied with the declaration?

Mr Murphy: There are indications that they are: at least the majority.

Macdonald: Did not Croce and Sforza want a Regency for the infant Prince of Naples?

Mr Macmillan: Maybe they do: it's their show. This declaration may not work.

Macdonald: Then the King is still King?

Mr Macmillan: Technically and legally, yes. He is King just as George III was under the Regency.

Sonia Tamara (to Mr Murphy): Was this idea first announced after your meeting with the King?

Mr Murphy: No: the plan was considered in February.

Sulzberger: Was there an Allied objection to the deferment of this declaration?

Mr Murphy: This is the King's own plan. The Allied Governments are not imposing any plan.

Sonia Tamara: But it would have been better if he had withdrawn now?

Mr Murphy: Possibly - but the Italians have to work out their own destiny.

Sulzberger: Who actually conferred with the King?

Mr Murphy: Mr Macmillan, Sir Noel Charles and myself: and of course General

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Mr Murphy: Mr Macmillan, Sir Noel Charles and myself: and of course General MacFarlane.

Sonia Tamara: Will the Crown Prince, as Lieutenant-General, alter the Government?

Mr Murphy: No: we merely hope that the parties will participate.

Sonia Tamara: We do in fact want a change?

Mr Murphy: Yes.

Sonia Tamara: How will it be done?

Mr Murphy: By the parties getting together.

Sonia Tamara: Will Badoglio be Prime Minister until Rome falls?

Mr Murphy: Can't say.

/ Morgan:

Morgan: Will the present members of the Government resign to make room for others?

Mr Macmillan: Why not? That is the usual method.

Morgan: By what method? Will Badoglio invite them to resign?

Mr Macmillan: It would be like any change of government, as for instance when

Mr Churchill came to power. There are various techniques.

Sprigge: The Giunta made a proposal of another sort, which was forwarded to the Allied Governments and apparently got no reply. During this long silence, had the Allied Governments indicated a different plan?

Mr Murphy: No, as far as I know no official cognizance was taken of the Giunta's proposals.

Sulzberger: Did you tell the King that the United States favoured a change?

Mr Murphy: The question was rather whether we objected to it. I voiced my opinion.

Sonia Tamara: Was Marshal Badoglio in favour of the declaration?

Mr Murphy: So far as I know, yes.

Sprigge: Does the declaration entail the resignation of the Government now?

Mr Murphy: No: I would rather say that it would lead to an adjustment.

Sprigge: But the change will not be deferred?

Mr Macmillan: The formal change would take place at Rome - kissing hands and so forth.

Mr Murphy: Our primary consideration is to get a responsible government which will carry out the terms of the Armistice. We need stability: radical changes might be bad. Any government must respect the obligations of the Armistice.

Fackard: Why did the King change his opinion and make this declaration so suddenly?

Mr Murphy: It was not sudden. The plans have been maturing for weeks. It was his plan and not ours. He chose the moment.

Morgan: The general conception is that this plan is quite new and arose as a result of Ercoli's declaration?

Mr Murphy: The plan was discussed by the King long before Ercoli appeared on the

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Mr Murphy: The plan was discussed by the King long before Ercoli appeared on the scene.

Morgan: Discussed with the Allies?

Mr Macmillan: It was generally discussed, as a result of the split between the parties. Some said that they wouldn't come in unless the King went: a way out had to be found. It was quite natural that various plans should be discussed.

Sir Noel Charles said he was glad to have this opportunity of meeting correspondents: he was at their service at any time they might wish to consult him.

The meeting adjourned at 4.5 p.m.

PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

11 March 1944.

Summary of Press Dispatches on General Mason MacFarlane's
Press Conference of March 10, 1944

Probably because much of what General MacFarlane said was "off the record" and the remainder unsensational, only two Special Correspondents, plus the main press associations (AP, UP and Reuters) sent cables.

Press associations treated the story in routine fashion, each of the major three filing about 300 words. The food story and the refugee story were combined, except by Sprigge of Reuters, who quoted General MacFarlane on the refugee situation and used Colonel Legg with direct quotes on what he said of the food situation.

Lumby (London Times) and Stoneman (Chicago Daily News) were the two specials.

"Definite assurances that the food situation in liberated Italy is looking up were given to-day by General Mason MacFarlane, Chief of the Allied Control Commission," Lumby began, and in a short dispatch quoted facts given by Colonel Legg.

Stoneman's piece did not use any of the material given out at the Conference, and was rather sharp. "After 5 1/2 months of Allied occupation," he wrote, "the Neapolitan black market not only shows no signs of losing its grip, but is in many respects worse than ever. A survey just completed shows prices uniformly higher and virtually all foods except the bread ration have to be secured at prices dictated by the black market.

"Prices bear no relation to those officially established by AMG. An outstanding example is flour, supposedly to cost 1,000 lire a metric ton, but actually selling at 18,000 lire.

"The daily bread ration is insufficient for anyone except an aged invalid, and only one issue of olive oil, to a part of the population, has been made. But olive oil can be bought on the black market for 280 lire a litre - a price few honest people can afford - which is 100 lire above the price at Christmas. This reflects the tendency of price increases.

"While political consequences of the food shortage cannot be described as serious, it is clear that the population is not pleased. They properly expect us to do something to stop the black market racket. In the estimation of most observers, including high-ranking officers, it is time that drastic steps are taken . . . A permanent solution is possible only if Washington and London really apply themselves to the problem."

Although off-the-record comment was made on the Italian flee' matter, the story appears dead from this source at the moment, an only two correspondents had anything to say in cables after the meeting.

/ Lumby

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Lumby of the Times said: "Churchill's announcement that no change is contemplated in present Allied arrangements concerning the Italian fleet has greatly relieved Italian feelings. His remarks are read in both Government and opposition camps as meaning that Allied treatment of Italy will be determined mainly by her contribution to the war effort."

Chinigo (International News Service) filed a speculative dispatch in which he said:

"In what is regarded here as a surprise move by Stalin is revealed in a message sent to Marshal Badoglio offering to exchange ambassadors as an expression of Moscow's recognition of the solidarity of Badoglio's government.

"Marshal Badoglio would not personally comment, but members of his Cabinet acknowledge a momentary confusion, in the first place because the Russian lead amounts to an official disownment of the Italian Communist forces, whose leaders have been claiming an intimate Moscow tie-up.

"The second element of confusion is represented by the fact that both the U.S. and Britain are at present limiting their relations with the Badoglio Government to the Advisory Council and its constituted consulates under the Allied Control Commission.

"The Italian Government is wondering whether Britain and the U.S. are aware of the Soviet move and if they are prepared to follow suit."

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PRESS CONFERENCE
held at the Provincia Building
NAPLES
on Friday, 10 March 1944.

Present:- Lieut General Sir Noel F.N. Mason MacFarlane
Mr Caccia
Mr Reber
Col Fiske
Lt Col Legge
Major Lionel Fielden, DPR, ACC.
Major T.L. Bullock, DDPR, ACC.
Capt E.B. Smith, PRO, ACC.
Capt J.P. Leacocca, PRO, Region 4, AMG.
Mr James M. Minifie, PWB.
Capt Davis, PRO, AFHQ Adv.
Capt Jack Angelman, Censorship
Mr Atcheson, PWB.
Commander Burrows, RN, Censorship
Capt Angus MacNaughton, Censorship
Capt Kessler, 5th Army Press Liaison
Mr Busvine, Times of India
Mr Lumby, The Times
Mr Stoneman, Chicago Daily News
Mr Morgan, Chicago Daily News
Capt MacFarlane, The Maple Leaf
Mr Reyburn, The Standard (Montreal)
Mr Sprigge, (Reuters)
Mr Schmidt, United Press
Mr Helliwell, London Daily Herald
Mr Stead, Christian Science Monitor
Mr Massock, Associated Press
Mr Brendan, Sunday Times (London)
Mr MacDonald, News Chronicle and Sydney Morning Herald
Mr Beckwith, BBC.
Mrs Packard, United Press
Mr Hawkins, Reuters
Mr Tatlow, Daily Mail
Mr Smart, Daily Express
Mr Buckley, Daily Telegraph
M Lecomte, La Patrie
M Tissier, Dernieres Nouvelles
M. Peonnet, Jouraux du Maroc
M Mazella, Radio-France
Mr Pearce, Daily Herald
Mr McDermott, Cleveland Plain Dealer

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General MacFarlane said that correspondents might like to hear the story of the recent threatened strike from his point of view, although they probably knew most of the facts already. He had been informed that the opposition parties wished to call a

/ strike

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strike as a protest against the Prime Minister's speech. He had asked the Executive Council of the Giunta to come and see him and told them that such a decision would be unfortunate and that strikes in forward areas could not be permitted. Those were the C-in-C's orders. They agreed and realized that their procedure was unsound, except for the Federation of Labour, who asked permission for their three leaders to meet him. He told them again that a strike was out of the question and that they must find some other method of demonstrating their aims. They then asked if they could have a public meeting and a popular petition. They were told that there was no objection whatever to any orderly procedures of that nature. It was decided to hold the meeting in the Galleria on March 12 and the parties were warned that personal protests against or abuse of Allied leaders would not be tolerated. The three centre parties had disassociated themselves from the proposed strike. As regards the meeting on March 12, there would be no live broadcast but there would be a broadcast resume as at Bari. Any resolutions would be published. Abuse or wild statements would come under the umbrella of the existing stops.

General MacFarlane then passed briefly over some ACC/AMG activities. The reorganization had improved matters and the machine was running smoothly. Food was looking up. He had recently visited refugee camps, and, while they were not yet all that they should be, more places were being taken over for billeting and the situation was improving. The biggest problem arose when they got back into Italian areas. It was up to the prefectures and communes to see that refugees were taken in and

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looked after. Every family must take a family of refugees. We had evacuated 55,000 since the end of January and 1,000 a day were passing through Naples.

Sprigge (Reuters) asked what compulsion there was to accept refugees.

General MacFarlane said there was no compulsion. It was up to the Italian authorities.

Lumby (Times) asked what percentage came from beyond the lines.

General MacFarlane said comparatively few. There were three types of refugee (a) those fleeing from battle areas, (b) those who had been made homeless or destitute and (c) those whom the army wished to evacuate for operational reasons.

Sprigge asked if the Germans were passing refugees through the lines.

General MacFarlane said he thought only a small quantity. Most refugees at the moment fell under category (c).

Questioned about the incidence of typhus, General MacFarlane said that he hadn't got the statistics in his head, but the peak was long past, the number of cases in Naples was now very small, and though there were sporadic cases elsewhere, all of which could be traced to Naples, there was no sign of epidemic anywhere. Over two million people had been de-loused, and research work was still going on.

Dana Schmidt (U.P.) asked if there was any likelihood that the ban on troops entering Naples might be lifted.

General MacFarlane said it wasn't a matter for his decision. He thought not yet awhile. Naples should have a clean slate for at least a week.

/ Lumby

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Lumby asked whether more information could be given about food. General MacFarlane asked Colonel Legg to make a statement.

Colonel Legg explained, off the record, that in the early days of the occupation the forecast had been incorrect and it had been necessary for him to take this up and suggest a drastic solution, based on raiding built-up stocks, which would make a satisfactory over-all solution possible. The solution has not yet been accepted, but he hoped it would not be long delayed. He gave a brief resume of the position as it had been two months ago and said that the bread ration had now not only been increased, but also assured. Other commodities, such as olive oil, dried peas and pulses, sugar and milk, had been put into circulation. In a few days time there would be a ration of cheese and soap. The food situation was in fact better than at any time since the occupation. Wheat was coming into the country.

Question: Where from?

It was coming from U.S. and Canada and would shortly be coming from Australia.

Question: From the Mediterranean area?

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Practically nil. We were hoping to make an issue of pasta shortly and the pasta machinery was being got ready. Italian-produced commodities were flowing more freely. Plans were under way to hand over more responsibility to Italian officials. The main difficulty there was that so many officials had been displaced. During the coming harvest we planned to process and preserve soft fruits and tomatoes. In that way we hoped to

/ save

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save 25,000 tons of shipping space. We had obtained the raw material for producing yeast and hoped to produce very shortly.

Stoneman (Chicago Daily News): How much olive oil has been issued in the last six months, and what steps have been taken to bring it to Naples by road?

Col Legg said that there was an issue of oil on February 1.

Stoneman: How much has been issued on ration cards since the occupation?

Colonel Legg said he could only be answerable for the period since the Food Commission was formed.

Stoneman: Don't the ration cards exist?

Colonel Legg said he thought that no records existed. Doubtless over the whole six months the figure would be small.

Stoneman: What steps have been taken to bring it by road?

Colonel Legg said that a special commission had been set up to hunt out olive oil, and as a result 800 tons had been issued on February 1. Another 600 tons was now in transit by rail from the East Coast.

Stoneman: But why not by road?

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Colonel Legg said that olive oil was very precious and there were thefts even from rail cars. Road haulage would be uneconomical and the provision of sufficient guards impossible.

Lumby asked if increased flour supplies had had the

/ effect

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effect of reducing black market prices.

Colonel Legg said the price had fallen by 30 to 40 lire; sometimes more.

Dana Schmidt asked if there had been any attempt to use other oils or fats.

Colonel Legg said that they had obtained 160 tons of cotton seed oil. There was a world shortage of fats and little likelihood of importation into a country normally rich in them.

Stoneman asked what was the bread ration in Rome.

Colonel Legg said that his information was that it was 150 grammes and that that was not always available.

Sprigge asked whether flour was always equitably distributed or was there leakage.

Colonel Legg said that leakage was certainly a problem, but on the whole he believed that distribution was equitable and steps were being taken to stop losses.

General MacFarlane said that distribution was always one of our biggest problems. It was a question of personnel. We were in process of forming a large fleet of lorries, but it was not yet completed. We had a fixed ceiling of personnel for the whole of Italy. Strict guarding required a mass of people whom we could not provide; therefore, as in all other aspects of the work, the ACC had to make Italians do the work with a minimum of supervision. We were taking every step to see that reserves were built up against 551 difficult times.

Colonel Legg said that we were planning to make Southern
/ Italy

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Italy and Sicily more self-sufficient. The Food and Agriculture Sub-Commissions were taking steps to see that crops were carefully controlled, and releases from the ammassi would be made according to regional requirements. We had already, on the basis of harvest expectations, cut down our July tonnage demands.

Sprigge asked about the rumoured cession of part of the Italian fleet to Russia.

General MacFarlane said that the versions of what the President was supposed to have said had naturally caused anxiety in Italian, not only Italian government, circles. But the Badoglio Government had been ready to await clarification. They had had their answer in the Prime Minister's speech (General MacFarlane read an OWI report of the relevant passage in Mr Churchill's speech).

Dana Schmidt asked if an official message had been given to the Italian Government.

General MacFarlane said not to his knowledge.

Macdonald (News Chronicle) asked why the Italians had been so worried.

General MacFarlane said that it was not clear that the Italian ships would fight under their own colours. They were ready to fight anywhere under their own flag.

Dana Schmidt asked if there had been any reply to the Giunta's project. 550

General MacFarlane said that the project had been forwarded in full. He had not yet had any reply.

Sprigge asked what limitations would be set on what could be said at the meeting on March 12.

/ General

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General MacFarlane said they could demonstrate their views, but protests or abuse directed against the Prime Minister or Allied Leaders could not be allowed.

The Conference ended at 4.10 p.m.

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

Agenda for Press Conference
3 p.m. March 10

1. History of threatened strike. *
2. Proposed meeting on March 12. *
3. Handing over of part of Italian fleet. *
4. Food achievements and plans
(possible questions about stealing and guards). ✓
- ~~5. Use of individual names in publicity.~~
6. Value of attending Regional Commissioners Conference
on April 14. ✓

Possible questions:

Railway accident; boarding of trains by trespassers. ✓
Grady's statement re improvement of life in Sicily. ✓
Political versus military censorship. ✓

1st press conference
2nd press conference
3rd press conference
4th press conference
5th press conference
6th press conference
7th press conference
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100th press conference

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

8 March 1944.

Lieutenant General Sir Noel Mason MacFarlane,
Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission,
will hold a Press Conference at 1500 hrs Friday,
10 March 1944 in the Conference Room, Provincia
Building, Naples.

W. Fielden
MICHAEL FIELDEN,
Major,
Director of Public Relations.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

A. F. H. Q.

9/69: JMW/WAR:

Singer Building,
167, Corso Umberto I,
N A P L E S:

16th February, 1944:

Major Lionel Fielden,
PRO-ACC,
Room 1,
Post Office Building,
NAPLES:

Dear Major Fielden,

For your information,
Dr. Italo de Feo, who is in charge of press
relations of the Committee of National Liberation
and of the Executive Giunta, is anxious to be
present at Press Conferences of interest to
Italians. He does not represent any paper, so
I don't see on what grounds he could be admitted,
but I thought you might like to know that he wants
to get in.

Yours sincerely,
p.p. JAMES M. MINIFIE,
Liaison, PWB-ACC:



Secretary:

(PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

④

February 11th 1944

To: Lieut. General Sir Noel F.N. Mason MacFarlane.
From: P.R.O., A.C.C.

So many correspondents attended the Press Conference yesterday that there was no necessity to issue a resumé. I have however prepared the attached draft for purposes of record only, and should be grateful to have your approval of it.

I saw all the stories filed by correspondents last night. Except for Stead, who (apparently) gave a good deal of attention to the six parties, and Smart, who invented a silly story about the news having leaked out and resulting in an ovation for Badoglio, the stories were all pretty straight and accurate.

Lowell Fielden
Major.

Public Relations Officer.

O.K.

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PRESS CONFERENCE
held at the Provincia Building
Naples
on Thursday February 10
1944

Present: Lieut. General Sir Noel F.E. Mason MacFarlane
Captain Ellery Stone

Colonel Nelson W. Monfort

Mr Cassia

Mr Reber

Major Lionel Piellan P.R.O., A.C.C.

Major Bullock

Captain Leacacos } P.R.O.'s Region 4

Captain Haller } P.R.O Region 4

Major Hareshan } P.R.O Region 5

Major Winkel Allied Intelligence Committee

Mr Tellow Daily Mail

Mr Allen Raymond Saturday Evening Post

Mr Robert Vermillion United Press

Mr Richard Massock Associated Press

Mr Edgar Clarke Stars and Stripes

Mr Buckley Daily Telegraph

Mr Sterck Hemsley Press

Mr Smart Daily Express

Mr Macdonald Sydney Morning Herald

Mr Pearce Daily Herald

Mr Lang Time

Mr Luby The Times

Mr Gillard B.B.C

Mr Spriggs Reuters

Mr Stead Christian Science Monitor

Mr Garrity Union Jack

Mr Ellison }
Mr Duxflinger } P.W.B news services

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General MacFarlane opened the Conference at 1500 hours.
After dictating certain alterations to paragraphs 2,3,7,8, 10 and 11,
General MacFarlane explained the background and meaning of the transfer
of territory, stressing the importance of this first major step, upon
which would depend the speed and extent to which we should be able to
make successive transfers. The ultimate ideal, he said, was to hand back

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to Italian administration all territory behind the rear boundaries of our armies operational areas. For the present of course military government would continue in the combat zones, and A.M.G would act operationally under the commanders concerned. Otherwise, like all AMG/ACC personnel in Italy, they would come under the control of Headquarters here. ~~Experiences up to date in what we could~~ Experience up to date in what we could call our first experiment in dealing with a piece of the European mainland had shown that it was quite essential that A.C.C and A.M.G personnel and the control of both organisations must be fused to get the best results. That fusion had taken place and it meant that from the moment that military government personnel took charge of an area occupied by the advancing armies that personnel received guidance and control and technical direction from the heart of the Allied Control Commission, which is provided with experts and executives in all subjects and which produces in all respects the policy to which it is desired to work. That meant - or one hoped that it meant - that from front to rear A.C.C and A.M.G activities would be coordinated and guided by the same policy.

The personnel must be largely interchangeable and it was clear that if Italian administration proved equal to its task the number of counsellors and administrators in areas handed over to the Italians would be gradually and substantially reduced.

What I have tried to do here, said General MacFarlane, is to weld the whole A.C.C and A.M.G into one team with one common object - to carry out the directive we receive. It is a task of the first importance, and the first experiment in the rehabilitation of Europe: on our experience here must be based and will largely depend our success elsewhere when the time comes. We have a large job to do, and to make this large organisation work together as one team and one family with one object is my principal endeavour.

Our chief job, continued General MacFarlane, boiled down to

(3)

(a) ensuring the smooth running of everything connected with the Armistice terms, (b) helping the Italians to give the maximum possible assistance in every respect to the Allied War effort, and (c) last but not least taking off General Alexander's shoulders any necessity for having to take over his shoulder: that is to say, take on everything in connection with controlling and supervising Italian territory behind the front.

There would be, first, the military government personnel in the combat zones, divided between the fifth and eighth armies: then behind them a belt of territory under military government. When the Italian administration proved its success in competing with the first transfer, that belt also would be handed over. There would be Regional Controllers in Sardinia, Sicily, and what had been Region 2.

Headquarters was now divided into major sections - Administrative, Economic, Political, and Regional Control & Military Government. This last acted as operational Headquarters of the machine and issued directives to Regional Controllers or AMG commands in the forward areas. There were also a small number of independent sub-commissions, the chief being Naval, Land, and Air. The Italian Government had now completed its move to this side, and the whole of ACC/AMG main headquarters were also installed and functioning. The three service sub-commissions would be with the respective operational centres of the Italian services.

General MacFarlane then asked for questions.

Q. Will communique be available in London to-night?

A. Can't say.

Q. Can we cable before midnight?

A. Yes, provided release time stated and adhered to.

Q. Which C-in-C issued the announcement?

A. General Maitland-Wilson.

Q. What is the full and proper title of the Italian Government?

A. It may be called Royal Italian Government.

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Q. Its nominal head is Victor Emmanuel?

A. Yes, as long as he remains.

Q. Will the Italian Government be responsible for order in the transferred territory?

A. Definitely.

Q. Has it the physical means to ensure it?

A. If they are prepared to play, yes.

Q. Have you observed the reactions of the Italian people to this transfer?

A. No, except among those among whom I have been working: they are not really pleased. I saw a crowd of about 500 people round Marshal Badoglio's house.

Q. Has Pantelleria been handed over?

A. It is not included in the announcement. Nor are Lampedusa and Linosa.

Q. What about the islands just off Sicily?

A. They go with Sicily.

Q. Does A.M.G. function in Pantelleria?

A. Not under me. Obviously there is some form of military government.

Q. What does the allusion to "after the capture of Rome" mean?

A. We do not bind ourselves to support the present administration after the capture of Rome.

Q. But do we in fact bind ourselves to support another?

A. The sentence means what it says, no more, no less. It is not meant to imply anything except that we don't bind ourselves to any Italian government. But really we cooperate at present with the government which signed the armistice.

Q. Doesn't the announcement suggest that changes should be made?

A. No; (intervention of Mr Reber) this government bound itself to resign when Rome is reached. Badoglio has said he would resign.

Q. What would happen if and when Badoglio officials are found not to be of proven good faith and Allied sympathies?

A. If we think that we shall make representations.

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Q. Is there any obligation on the Italian government to apply in Sicily and Sardinia the same measures as AMG elsewhere, e.g. sindacal?

A. I think the measures applied in Kings Italy will be applicable throughout.

Q. Can we take over again at any time?

A. Certainly.

Q. Will Italian Government control civil air lines?

A. They have practically no aircraft. But all airfields are military installations and we retain the necessary rights and privileges.

Q. What power does Badoglio get tomorrow that he doesn't have today?

A. He administers the transferred territory.

Q. Isn't it really just a change of status?

A. Yes, if you like. Some AMG officials remain, but the Italians issue the orders. The executive passes to the Italian machine.

Q. Have the Italians any plans for holding elections?

A. None certainly, I think, until after the fall of Rome.

Q. Then all officials will be appointed?

A. Inevitably. Elections under present conditions would be very difficult.

Q. Will greater latitude now be given to Italians in areas still under military government?

A. No, the situation will be unchanged. My hope is that - except for AMG in operational areas - we shall be able to hand over considerably more territory in the near future, so as to make the forward area of transferred territory coincide with the rear combat line.

Q. Was General C-in-C's announcement made after consultation with the Advisory Council?

A. Almost certainly yes.

Q. Is there a parallel conference in Algiers to-day?

A. I don't know.

Q. What determines the date of handing back territory?

A. The question of when and how much was studied by the Advisory Council and the recommendation was made by them.

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Q. Is the time factor governed by the recession of war?

A. No, by whether local administration is capable. This country presents a peculiar problem because we signed an armistice with a government in being. It might be different elsewhere.

Q. Why was the transfer made now?

A. (off record) The decision was made when I was not here. It was studied and recommended by the Advisor Council. That's all I know. (intervention of Mr Reber) It was recommended by the Moscow Conference;

Q. Will future legal acts of Italian government take the same form as Proclamation 18 (racial discrimination)?

A. They issue their own proclamations. For AMG territory I do. I expect them to consult me.

Q. Have you had expressions of opinion about this from the six parties in opposition?

A. No. This is the first time it has been made public. I could not discuss it before.

There were no further questions. The Conference concluded at 1625 hours.

(PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

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PRO

February 5th 1944



To: Lieut General Hagon Macfarlane
From: P.R.O., A.C.C.

May I ask you to give us at least 48 hours notice before you hold the next Press Conference? Correspondents are showing a great deal of interest in the transfer of territory, but they complain that they had insufficient notice for the last Conference: this applies particularly in the forward areas and they ask to be notified at least 48 hours in advance.

Wm. D. ...
Major
P.R.O., A.C.C.

OK.
Wm. D. ...
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