Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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HQ AC P.R.B.

File No. 29

Liaison With P.W.B. Vol. I

Jan. - MAY 1945

0643

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

G3B/me

9/PRB

31 May 45

SUBJECT: Dissolution of P.W.B. in Italy

TO : Chief Commissioner
(Through Executive Commissioner)

1. Reference is to the attached note from the Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat and the annexed paper from the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

2. PRB recommends that the Chief Commissioner ask the Communications Sub-Commission to set up the Technical Sub-Committee referred to in Recommendation 1 of the paper and instruct it to submit a report and recommendations to the Political Conference.

G. STEWART BROWN
Director.
Public Relations Branch

Copy for info to: Executive Commissioner
Civil Affairs Sec.
Political Advisors
Communications S/C

Encl.

1517

CONFIDENTIAL

P. R. B

22

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat K 183

S.C (P)(45)28
29th May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO 38

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

DISSOLUTION OF PWB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At Annexure 1 is a paper which, after discussion at the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee was submitted to the Chief of Staff by the Chairman of that Sub-Committee.

2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director PWB should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from PWB.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

J.G. SMITH,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAF	7
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12

1236

Ec Dist
31 May 45

31 Cum Code

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Note by Secretary

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2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director P W B should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from P W B.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

J.G. SKELTON,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, M.A.F	5
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Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, M.A.F	7
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ M.A.F	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, P W B	34
UNC	35
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	36-38
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	39-41
Spares	42-44

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Ec Dist
31 May 45
34 Chief Comm
34 Exec Comm
38 P. R. Br.

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ANNEXURE 1

K 183

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

26 May 1945

SUBJECT: PWB Functions in North ITALY.

TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 533 that informational activities in liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical problem which can be most easily studied by a technical sub-committee similar to that appointed to arrange the detailed transfer of facilities in ROME and Southern ITALY.

4. Radio and Press

1215

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I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 530 that informational activities in liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

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4. Radio and Press

1215

a. In Southern ITALY, the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of the radio network to Italian control, and the transfer of PWB controlled newspapers to private Italian companies. The return of the whole radio network would place in the hands of the R.A.I. and so indirectly of the Italian Government a powerful propaganda organ and the relinquishment of all Allied control over this organ and over the press might place Allied Military Government at a serious disadvantage should any tension develop. In such circumstances even the restoration of the pre-Fascist newspapers as non-political information papers would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

II

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b. But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by PWB might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by Allied Publications Board, on which AC, CWI, MOI and PWB are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North ITALY by means of licensing, allotments of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.W. Italy, and Austria

a. Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.W. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b. PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North ITALY, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That Allied Publications Board be instructed to prepare and recommend a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and radio in North ITALY, and of such Italian-controlled stations as are audible in North ITALY, (including Rome II) through press officers working in close cooperation with the Regional Commissioners, and that it prepare and recommend a directive to govern the work of those press officers.

3. That PWB be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of CWI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA, except for film distribution and activities required by para 3 above.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.E. Italy, and Austria

a. Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.E. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b. PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

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3. That PWB be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of OWI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA, except for film distribution and activities required by para 3 above.

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(intd) A. J. McC.
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

III

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat K 183

SAC (P) (45)28
29th May 1945

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COPY NO 38

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

DISSOLUTION OF PWB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At Annexure 1 is a paper which, after discussion at the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee was submitted to the Chief of Staff by the Chairman of that Sub-Committee.

2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director PWB should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from PWB.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

(sgd)
J.G. SWEETMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	7
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
[illegible]	10-11

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785014

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Secretary.

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Supreme Allied Commander	1
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Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	7
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, PWB	34
INC	35
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	36-38

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ANNEXURE 1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 183
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

26 May 1945

SUBJECT : PWB Functions in North ITALY.

TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 538 that informational activities in liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical-

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any tension develop. In such circumstances even the restoration of the pre-Fascist newspapers as non-political information would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

b) But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by PWB might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by Allied Publications Board, on which AC, OWI, MOI and PWB are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North ITALY by means of licensing, allotments of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.W. Italy, and Austria

a) Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.W. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b) PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North ITALY, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dessemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

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4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of OWI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA, except for film distribution and activities

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required by para 3 above.

(intd) A.J. McC.
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
UNIT NO.16.

PWB
Press Plan

31st May, 1945.

MEMORANDUM

The proposed plan for the Genoa independent newspaper starts with:

"the independent newspaper should take the place of the PWB controlled newspaper".

I think it is wrong, because it will delay the decision until the closing down of the PWB operation, which will occur in only about a month or so from now.

To form a new corporation with the head of the local political parties, the Prefect, Mayor, Clergy, and University is I believe unpracticable for the following reasons:

a) you cannot dispose of the Perrone Bros. property until the decision of the Italian Government on the subject is known. The Perrone Bros. property in Rome is under consideration and no action has been taken yet, therefore we cannot dispose of the Perrone Bros. property in Genoa. Any form of corporation will be inevitably considered illegal according to Italian law, when the Italian Government takes over the region.

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b) any sponsored newspaper in which we have a coalition of different political parties, will have difficulties from

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every source - financial, political and on personality level. Here again, I insist that the financial side of any newspaper should be left alone and it is up to the Italian Government to make a decision. We must give equal chances to the economic and political forces to fight their battle without any interference from us. In my opinion the solution of Genoa and Turin lies mostly in one problem, the possibility of concentrating the political party papers in Milan and leaving the other two regions free to print their own independent newspaper. This point is very important.

It was always my opinion that the Press Plan, although approved by AFHQ and the Italian Government, presents a potentially political danger, as you notice now in Lombardy we have in the provinces a string of C.L.N. daily newspapers and a similar thing will happen to Piedemont, Luguria and elsewhere, giving more power to the political parties monopolizing therefore the political party press.

D.GNUDI,
C.C.,P.W.B., Unit 16.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
UNIT NO. 16.

29th May, 1945.

To: Mr. Stewart Brown, P.R.O., A.C., Rome.

From: D.Gnudi, C.C.,P.W.B., Unit 16.

The increase of circulation of the party papers has been granted, against my desire and I think that the Central A.P.B. should revise the increase passed by the local Milan A.P.B.

As you know the problem of reviving the Italian newspapers in Turin and Genoa has been already brought to the surface, Senator FRASSATI for the "La Stampa" in Turin and the PERRONE BROS. for "Il Secolo XIX" in Genoa. The printing facilities of Turin and Genoa are very much limited in comparison with the Milan and Rome ones, and any authorisation for the new daily independent newspaper will inevitably interfere with the publishing of the local newspapers. I would suggest a possible solution. We have here in North Italy newspapers published simultaneously in at least three towns; why don't we try to concentrate the publishing of these political newspapers in Milan, achieving this way three aims:

1. easier supervision.

2. it would be possible to decrease their circulation in combining the three editions

3. relieving the printing situation in Turin and Genoa.

According to our instructions no newspapers can go out of their own region, this is a device which we should really repeal.

Il Secolo XIX, Genoa - The Commissario of the Printing Plant S.E.P. came to see me on account of the pressure of the Perrone Bros., to have that plant back and to resume publishing

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of their newspaper. I could not, of course, tell him anything because it was out of my jurisdiction, but nevertheless, I listened to his explanations. Apparently a plan has been put forward by the local C.L.N. to edit the newspaper under its auspices in one form or another, giving nevertheless, I would say, the political control of this independent newspaper to the five political parties. As long as the territory is under our jurisdiction, any decision reached by us will be put into effect, but we should to a certain extent look to the future to the time when the Italian Government will take over the region. I don't think that we should go into ownership in any form, and if an independent newspaper should be printed, I believe that the pattern we established in Milan is the best one under the circumstances. The plant should be put under the control of the Commissario, duly approved by A.M.G. and an editor should be found, and any question of form or re-form of any corporation should be left until the Italian Government takes over the territory.

I would like you to give a little thought to item 2.

D.Gnudi.

0664

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

9

J JW W

NR 5 TO BANCROFT ROME FROM EDMAN MILAN =

NR 3140 = FOBLOWING MESSAGE TO BERELAYED TO STEWART BROWN ALLIED COMMISSION MEETING JUNE FIFTH PWB HEAD QUARTERS BILLETS AVAILABLE STOP HAVE ALREADY INVITED ROBBINS END +++

SC/0630

Confirmation

BASIC NEWS

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

UNIT 16

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1504

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

0668

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PWB

OBJECTIVE: It is generally agreed that all units of PWB should be dissolved as rapidly as possible, consistent with the requirements of AMG.

THE PROBLEM: Some seven units of PWB seem to present special problems. To AMG: (1)News; (2) Press; (3) Radio; and (4) Films will continue to require some guidance and AMG is not prepared to take over.

PWB itself is concerned with (5) Intelligence.

The British and American Embassies have a stake in (6) Intelligence files now held by PWB, and in (7) the distribution of publications.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS: Since the Allied Publications Board cannot give way to the Italian Press Commission until AMG authority is also transferred, a simple solution would be to charge AMG with reasonable supervision of both Press and Radio in Northern Italy.

Incumbent PWB press officers could be attached to AMG in the various cities, and work as follows:

(a) under threat of withdrawal of license to publish, they would exercise strong influence on the handling by any publication of news and commentaries.

(b) while transferring existing PWB papers into independent information papers, they could also see that these papers carried AMG proclamations and news.

(c) in cooperation with AMG officials, they could temper radio news and commentaries by some such right as "withdrawal of power", restriction on size of transmitter, etc.

(d) they also could serve as official distributing officers for MOI and CWI publications which AMG wanted in the area.

Thus, News, Press, Radio and Publications could be properly supervised.

Film distribution can carry on as at present.

The Intelligence suggestions attached seem to be logical.

The Intelligence files could be taken over by AMG and PWB, and then made available to the Italian as well as other governments. (They are essential to epuration.)

1203

0667

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

THE OBJECTIVE: It is generally agreed that all units of PWB should be dissolved as rapidly as possible, consistent with the requirements of AFHQ.

THE PROBLEMS: Some seven units of PWB seem to present special problems. To AMG: (1) Films; (2) Press; (3) Radio; and (4) Film will continue to require some guidance and AMG is not prepared to take over.

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SUGGESTED SOLUTION: Since the Allied Publications Board cannot give way to the Italian Press Commission until AMG authority is also transferred, a simple solution would be to charge AMG with reasonable supervision of both Press and Radio in Northern Italy.

Incumbent PWB press officers could be attached to AMG in the various cities, and work as follows:

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Thus, News, Press, Radio and Publications could be properly supervised.

Film distribution can carry on as at present.

The Intelligence suggestions attached seem to be logical.

The Intelligence files could be taken over by AMG and PWB, and then made available to the Italian as well as other governments. (They are essential to operation.)

1502

0668

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

THE OBJECTIVE: It is generally agreed that all units of PWB should be dissolved as rapidly as possible, consistent with the requirements of AMG.

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PWB itself is concerned with (5) Intelligence.

The British and American Embassies have a stake in (6) Intelligence Files now held by PWB, and in (7) the distribution of Publications.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS:

Since the Allied Publications Board cannot give way to the Italian Press Commission until AMG authority is also transferred, a simple solution would be to charge APB with reasonable supervision of both Press and Radio in Northern Italy.

Incumbent PWB press officers could be attached to APB in the various cities, and work as follows:

a) under threat of withdrawal of license to publish, they would exercise strong influence on the handling by any publication of news and commentaries.

b) while transferring existing PWB papers into independent information papers, they could also see that these new papers carried AMG proclamations and news.

c) in cooperation with AMG officials, they could temper radio news and commentaries by some such right as "withdrawal of power", restriction on size of transmitter, etc.

d) they also could serve as official distributing officers for MOI and OWI publications which AMG wanted in the area.

Thus, News, Press, Radio and Publications could be properly supervised.

Film distribution can carry on as at present.
The Intelligence suggestions attached seem to be logical.

The Intelligence Files could be taken over by OSS and PID, and then made available to the Italian as well as other governments. (They are essential to epuration.)

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 183

SAC (P) (45)28
29th May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO 38

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

DISSOLUTION OF PWB IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At Annexure 1 is a paper which, after discussion at the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee was submitted to the Chief of Staff by the Chairman of that Sub-Committee.

2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director PWB should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from PWB.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

(sgd)
J.G. SWEETMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Secretary.

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Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	7
Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	13-14
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Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
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ANNEXURE 1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

K 183

26 May 1945

SUBJECT : PWB Functions in North ITALY.

TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 538 that informational activities in liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite

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1499

4. Radio and Press

a) In Southern ITALY, the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of the radio network to Italian control, and the transfer of PWB controlled newspapers to private Italian companies. The return of the whole radio network would place in the hands of the R.A.I. and so indirectly of the Italian Government a powerful propaganda organ and the relinquishment of all Allied control over this organ and over the press might place Allied Military Government at a serious disadvantage should

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any tension develop. In such circumstances even the restoration of the pre-Fascist newspapers as non-political information would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

b) But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by PWB might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by Allied Publications Board, on which AC, OWI, MOI and PWB are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North ITALY by means of licensing, allotments of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.W. Italy, and Austria

a) Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.W. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b) PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North ITALY, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dessemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That Allied Publications Board be instructed to prepare and recommend a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and radio in North ITALY, and of such Italian-controlled stations as are audible in North ITALY, (including Rome II) through press officers working in close cooperation with the Regional Commissoners,

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3. That PWB be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of OWI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VENEZIA GIUDIA and AUSTRIA, except for film distribution and activities

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required by para 3 above.

(intd) A.J. McC.
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 181
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PsWSC (45) 3rd Meeting
25th May 1945

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE HELD IN THE G-1 (B) CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1200 HOURS ON THURSDAY 24TH MAY 1945

PRESENT:-

Brigadier General A. J. McChrystal,
Chief, INC

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. A.C.W. Russell, representing
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, PWB

Mr. C.A.R. Radford, representing
Deputy Director, PWB

Lieutenant Colonel G. Eyres-Monsell, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Colonel J. F. Torrence, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier T. R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Ec List
13 Chief Comm } 26 May 45
14 Exec Comm }
25 PR Bn 31 May 45

SECRETARY

Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PsWSC (45) 2nd Meeting)

THE SUB-COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 16th March 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1200 HOURS ON THURSDAY
24TH MAY 1945

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Chief, INC

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Mr. A.C.W. Russell, representing
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, PWB

Mr. C.A.R. Radford, representing
Deputy Director, PWB

Lieutenant Colonel G. Eyres-Monsell, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Colonel J. F. Torrence, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ

Brigadier T. R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Ec Dist

13 Chief Comm } 24 May 45
14 Exec Comm }
25 PR Bn 31 May 45

SECRETARY

Major Robert T. Hanley

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PsWSC (45) 2nd Meeting)

THE SUB-COMMITTEE approved the minutes of their meeting held on 16th March 1945.

1496

2. PWB FUNCTIONS IN NORTH ITALY

(Paper No. PsWSC (45) (6))

THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them a paper recommending that an examination be made into the problems involved in the admission of private news agencies to North ITALY, and that a date be established as soon as possible after 15 June for transfer of the responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news in that area, both press and radio, from PWB to the private

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news agencies, Allied and Italian.

THE CHAIRMAN stated that as a result of several cases of non-concurrence in the paper following its publication, he had invited the Chairman, PWB, to submit a revised version, which omitted several controversial issues of the original. He, therefore, desired to place this revised paper before the Sub-Committee for their consideration.

MR. BARNES pointed out that due to unexpectedly settled conditions which had been found in North ITALY upon occupation, and to the fact that the war in EUROPE was now over, it was desirable that PWB should be dissolved as soon as possible. The press and radio in North ITALY were found to be in good financial condition and the anticipated degree of control had not in fact been necessary. It was therefore advisable to permit the introduction of private news agencies into the area at an early date. In reply to a question by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, he stated that a measure of control would continue to be maintained by the Allied Publications Board after the dissolution of PWB.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, expressing general agreement with the recommendations of the paper, queried the advisability of continuing to maintain intelligence units in ROME and MILAN after PWB activities had ceased in all areas of North-ITALY, with the exception of VENEZIA GIULIA. Referring to a statement by the Director, PWB, he considered that since PWB would be required to continue the distribution of films, paragraph 3 of the recommendations of the paper should be amended accordingly.

COLONEL TORRENCE queried that a control once released could be reestablished in such event as French refusal to withdraw their forces from North West ITALY after present governmental negotiations had been concluded. He considered that the transfer of control of press and radio from PWB to the Allied Publications Board would simply involve the transfer of personnel from the former organization to the latter.

MR. BARNES stated that the Allied Publications Board had sufficient personnel at the present time to assume the necessary control, which would be somewhat more free than that exercised by PWB. It would, moreover, permit a saving of some 500 persons now employed by PWB. These would be released when transfer became effective.

MR. RADFORD observed that once PWB control was transferred, its personnel would be released and it would, therefore, not be possible to reassemble them in case it became necessary for PWB to resume control in the future.

THE CHAIRMAN, referring to a question by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, pointed out that the censorship being imposed at the present time is entirely military in nature and that although copy is censored by Italian censors under Allied directives before being released for publication, this would no longer be the case when control had been handed to the Allied Publications Board.

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MR. BARNES stated that the Allied Publications Board had sufficient personnel at the present time to assume the necessary control, which would be somewhat more free than that exercised by PWB. It would, moreover, permit a saving of some 300 persons now employed by PWB. These would be released when transfer became effective.

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THE CHAIRMAN, referring to a question by the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, pointed out that the censorship being imposed at the present time is entirely military in nature and that although copy is censored by Italian censors under Allied directives before being released for publication, this would no longer be the case when control had been handed to the Allied Publications Board.

THE CHAIRMAN:- 1495

Directed the Secretary to redraft for his approval the revised paper, in form suitable for submission to the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political), in accordance with the above discussion.

3. PRESS PLAN FOR NORTHERN ITALY

(Paper No. PsWSC (45) (5))

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THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them a press plan for Northern ITALY, outlining the responsibility of PWB for the dissemination and collection of news in that territory.

THE CHAIRMAN stated that, after informal concurrence by the members of the Sub-Committee, the plan had been approved by the Chief of Staff. It had been put into effect and was working satisfactorily, though in a large measure it had been overtaken by events.

THE SUB-COMMITTEE:-

Took note of the above report.

Robert T. Hanley

ROBERT T. HANLEY,
MAJOR, G.S.C.,
ASST. SECRETARY TO S.C.

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Robert T. Hanley

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

K 183

SAC (P) (45)28
29th May 1945

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COPY NO 38

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE (POLITICAL)

DISSOLUTION OF PWB IN ITALY

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2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director PWB should take action to implement them.

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(sgd)
J.G. SWEETMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Secretary.

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Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9-102

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2. The Chief of Staff has approved the recommendations of this paper and accordingly directs that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, and Director PWB should take action to implement them.

3. On receipt of the report of the Technical Sub-Committee to be set up in accordance with Recommendation 1 of the paper, the subject will be brought before the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) for final approval of the transfer of responsibility from PWB.

4. Meanwhile, the attached paper and the above note of decisions taken in regard to its recommendations are circulated for the information of members of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

(sgd)
J.G. SWEETMAN,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION

	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, MAAF	5
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Northwest African Waters	6
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Commanding General, 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	18-19
Assistant Chief of Staff (Br)	20
Chief, Liaison Section	21
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	22-26
U.S. Political Adviser	27-29
British Resident Minister	30-33
Director, PWB	34
INC	35
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	36-38

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEXURE 1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 183
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

26 May 1945

SUBJECT : PWB Functions in North ITALY.

TO : Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSION

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 538 that informational activities in liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

2. It is the opinion of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

3. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical

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4. Radio and Press

a) In Southern ITALY, the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of tha radio network to Italian control, and the transfer of PWB controlled newspapers to ppivate Italian companies. The return of the whole radio network would place in the hands of the R.A.I. and so indirectly of the Italian Government a powerful propaganda organ and the relinquishment of all Allied control over this organ and over the press might place Allied Military Government at a serious disadvantage should

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any tension develop. In such circumstances even the restoration of the pre-Fascist newspapers as non-political information would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

b) But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by PWB might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by Allied Publications Board, on which AC, OWI, MOI and PWB are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North ITALY by means of licensing, allotments of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

5. Venezia Giulia, N.W. Italy, and Austria

a) Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region. The scheme proposed can also be postponed if the situation in N.W. Italy develops so as to make such delay essential.

b) PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North ITALY, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dessemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That Allied Publications Board be instructed to prepare and recommend a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and raddio in North ITALY, and of such Italian-controlled stations as are audible in North ITALY, (including Rome II) through press officers working in close cooperation with the Regional Commissoners, and that it prepare and recommend a directive to govern the work of

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3. That PWB be instructed to provide the Allied Publications Board with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective.

4. That press officers, attached to Allied Publications Board act as agents for the distribution of OWI and MOI publications in North ITALY.

5. That, upon approval of the recommendations of the sub-committee to be set up under para 1 above, PWB should, at a date so determined, cease all activities other than those required for VENEZIA GIULIA and AUSTRIA, except for film distribution and activities

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required by para 3 above.

(intd) A.J. McC.
Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

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P.R.B.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

24th May, 1945

SUBJECT: PWB Functions in North Italy.

TO : Chief of Staff

I. DISCUSSIONS

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN.558 that informational activities in liberated Italy should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations, and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

It is the opinion of PWB that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in Italy in which Allied control of the informational services could largely be relaxed with a view to restoring progressively and as speedily as possible the freedom of press and freedom of expression to which the United Nations are pledged. The timing of this restoration is partly dependent on political developments and partly on the restoration of communications facilities. While the former factor cannot be exactly forecast, the latter is under our own control, and the restoration to civilian agencies must be largely dependent on this purely technical problem. On the political side, the immediate restoration to civilian agencies may be open to objection, but it would appear to PWB that a considerable relaxation of control is desirable as soon as the solution of the technical communications problems allow and that provision for consultation and coordination with the Italian Government and Italian agencies should be provided for from the outset.

2. News

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencies requested one months notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical problem which can be most easily studied by a technical sub-committee similar to that appointed to arrange the detailed transfer of facilities in Rome and Southern Italy.

3. Radio and Press

1459

In Southern Italy, the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of the radio network to Italian control, and the transfer of PWB controlled newspapers to private Italian companies. The return of the whole radio network would place in the

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1489

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Note: Brought by C.C. from AFHQ.

Sec List - 26 May 45
Chief Comm
Exec Comm
P. R. B.

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information papers would be insufficient to guarantee that the Allied point of view were properly presented to the North Italian public, and that inflammatory material were avoided.

But to secure such control, as is required, a more flexible system than that hitherto employed by PWB might well be set up, and discussions with the AC suggest that the most suitable organ for this purpose is Allied Publications Board. Working under an over-all directive drawn up by APB, on which AC, OWI, MOI and PWB are all represented, it would be possible to exercise control by means of regional press officers acting in close cooperation with the regional commissioners. Should events develop smoothly, the function of these officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North Italy by means of licensing, allotment of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

4. Intelligence

PWB Intelligence Units in Rome and Milan will be required as long as PWB retains responsibilities in any part of North Italy. In addition, it will be necessary for arrangements to be made for the transfer to other agencies of work at present done by PWB and still required by the State Department and FID. It is suggested that the persons required for this work, which will outlast the existence of PWB, be attached to the British and American Embassies. A detailed plan is attached, TAB A.

5. Venezia Giulia and Austria

Venezia Giulia is excluded from the scope of the present paper in view of the special circumstances prevailing in that region.

PWB commitments to Austria will also necessitate the retention of certain facilities in Italy and these are considered elsewhere.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North Italy, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after July 1st for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

1438

2. That APB be instructed to prepare a detailed scheme for the control of the Italian press and radio in North Italy, and of such

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officers would be to afford to the Italian press and radio advice and assistance, more particularly to furnish the Italian agencies with material from Allied sources which would not otherwise be at their disposal. But should the development of events render this desirable in the view of AC or of the Regional Commissioners, these officers would be able to exert considerable pressure on the Italian Press and radio in North Italy by means of licensing, allotment of paper and other forms of economic pressure.

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1438

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3. That PWB be instructed to provide APB with all necessary facilities, including the provision of the necessary staff, to make the foregoing project effective, and that PWB cease all other activities in Italy outside Venezia Giulia.

4. That press officers, attached to APB, act as agents for the distribution of OWI and MOI publications in North Italy.

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CONFIDENTIAL

K 178

R. R. B.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

PsWSC (45) 6
23rd May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO 25

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

PWB FUNCTIONS IN NORTH ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. The Director, PWB, has forwarded the attached paper on PWB functions in North ITALY.

2. The Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee in conference, are invited to recommend to the Chief of Staff that the recommendations in Section II of the attached paper should be approved.

Robert T. Hanley
ROBERT T. HANLEY,
MAJOR, G.S.C.,
ASST. SECRETARY TO SAC.

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Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U.S. Political Adviser	6-8
British Resident Minister	9-12
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	13-14
G-2	15-16
G-3	17-18
G-5	19-20
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	21-23
Spares	24-26

Returned

Ec Dist

13 Chief Comm'r } 24 Mar 45
14 Exec Comm'r }

25 R. R. B. 31 Mar 45

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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13 Chief Comm'R } 24 MAY 45
14 Exec Comm'R }
25 P.R. Br. 31 MAY 45

I

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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INCOMING MESSAGE

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

Author's Reference: VF 518
Time of Origin: MAY 18/1010B

P.W.B

Message Centre No: E/1707
Date Time Rec'd: MAY 21/1025B
Precedence: ROUTINE

TO: MUNRO VENICE

ACTION : MINIFIE EDMAN FLORENCE INFO: GNUDI MILAN COUSLAND FLORENCE
VINING ROME FOR AC

IN CLEAR.

Have arranged publication of CORRIERE DELLA SERA on May 23 under non party editor MA_RIO BORSA. Advise everyone against prepublication publicity or further party discussion. Reporting back to MILAN on May 22 to see matter through. Meanwhile in VENICE conferring with Col SKINNER HOFFLER SONNABEND and local authorities for newspaper coverage of VENETO and ALTO ADIGE and to adjust PWB newspaper contracts.

DIST

INFO - ACTION : PR BR

INFO : A/PRESIDENT
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
EX COMMISSIONER
PWB
FILE (2)
FLOAT

RECEIVED 21 MAY 1945 A.F.H.Q.

ACTION

1486

CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

CONFIDENTIAL

10th May 1945

SUBJECT: PWB Functions in North Italy

TO: Chief of Staff.

I. DISCUSSIONS:

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed in FAN 538 that informational activities in Liberated ITALY should be separated on national lines when integration ceases to serve in direct support of military operations, and that public informational facilities should be released to civilian agencies as soon after liberation as military conditions allow.

It is the opinion of PWB that the unconditional surrender of the German forces has brought about conditions in ITALY in which allied control, other than censorship for security reasons, of the informational services, is no longer necessary. It is also felt by PWB that the Italian patriot contribution to victory has been such that any attempt to prolong this control beyond the minimum period necessary for the re-establishment of communications, would arouse Italian hostility and excite non-cooperation to an extent which would embarrass allied administration more seriously than the inconveniences which might arise from the uncontrolled entry and dissemination of news, including comments critical of allied policy and administration.

2. Geographical Considerations .

These considerations apply to the whole of North ITALY, but the matter is most urgent in the industrial areas of the Northwest, where the patriots, especially the Left elements, most critical of allied control, are strongest. It would therefore be logical to suggest that measures should apply in the first place to LOMBARDY, PIEDMONT, LIGURIA and EMILIA, that they should be extended as soon as possible to the VENETO and if circumstances permit to VENEZIA TRIDENTINA. VENEZIA GIULIA is a special case which is not considered in this paper.

3. News.

The first step in the release of public informational facilities is the admission of the private news agencies. On a previous occasion, the agencie requested one month's notice of intention to transfer responsibility in a given area. It is thought that this would be sufficient. An equally essential pre-requisite to transfer is the restoration of civilian communications, a technical problem which can be most easily studied by a technical sub-committee similar to that appointed to arrange the detailed transfer of facilities in ROME and Southern ITALY.

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4. Radio

In Southern ITALY the admission of the private news agencies was accompanied by the return of the radio network to Italian control. PWB feels that this should also happen in North ITALY, but it is felt desirable to draw attention to the fact that Liberated North ITALY contains powerful transmitters which, added to those already available at ROME, would place in the hands of MI and so indirectly of the Italian government, a propaganda weapon more powerful than that available to neighbouring allied countries, which might well raise grave objections. This would appear to be a political matter outside the competence of PWB, which will not require these transmitters for operational reasons, except to a very limited extent.

II

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5. Press.

With the entry of the private news agencies, it is not felt desirable to retain PWB controlled papers. It is however, considered essential that non-political information papers be set up as provided for in the North Italian Press Plan, and it would therefore appear essential that the pre-Fascist papers be re-started before PWB papers are suspended.

6. Information Services.

Transfer of information services to OWI and MOI should take place at the time of the entry of the private news agencies in accordance with the detailed plans laid down in respect of South ITALY.

7. Intelligence.

PWB Intelligence Units in ROME and MILAN will be required as long as PWB retains responsibilities in any part of North ITALY. In addition, it will be necessary for arrangements to be made for the transfer to other agencies of work at present done by PWB and still required by the State Department and PID. It is suggested that the persons required for this work, which will outlast the existence of PWB, be attached to the British and American Embassies. A detailed plan is attached at Appendix 'A'.

8. AUSTRIA.

The present paper does not deal with PWB responsibilities towards AUSTRIA

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That AC be instructed to set up a technical sub-committee to examine the problems involved in the admission of the private news agencies to North ITALY, and to recommend a date as soon as possible after June 15th for the transfer of responsibility for the collection and dissemination of news from PWB to the private news agencies, Allied and Italian.

2. That as a first stage the transfer be made in LOMBARDY, PIEDMONT, LIGURIA and EMILIA. That a second stage covering the VENETO and if conditions permit VENEZIA TRIDENTINA follow as soon as facilities can be provided.

3. That PWB put into force as quickly as possible the provisions of the press plan concerning pre-Fascist Italian newspapers in order to ensure that non-political information papers exist in the Northern cities and that PWB cease publication of its own papers when the private news agencies are admitted.

4. That control, other than censorship, of the Italian radio network in the North be returned to RAI at the date fixed for the admission of the private news agencies and that should the retention of political control be considered desirable for the reasons cited above, the AC be invited in conjunction with the US and British Embassies and PWB to examine the problem and set up the necessary machinery.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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PWB Intelligence Units in ROME and MILAN will be required as long as PWB retains responsibilities in any part of North ITALY. In addition, it will be necessary for arrangements to be made for the transfer to other agencies of work at present done by PWB and still required by the State Department and PID. It is suggested that the persons required for this work, which will outlast the existence of PWB, be attached to the British and American Embassies. A detailed plan is attached at Appendix 'A'.

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4. That control, other than censorship, of the Italian radio network in the North be returned to RAI at the date fixed for the admission of the private news agencies and that should the retention of political control be considered desirable for the reasons cited above, the AC be invited in conjunction with the US and British Embassies and PWB to examine the problem and set up the necessary machinery.

5. That responsibility for British and US Information services be transferred to OWI and MOI on the date fixed for the admission of the private news agencies and that the general lines of the transfer follow those laid down for South ITALY.

6. That PWB restrict its activities in the field of intelligence to th needed for its own operation in North ITALY and that other intelligence activities, at present carried out by PWB and still desired in WASHINGTON or LONDON, be transferred to the US and British Embassies.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

APPENDIX 'A'

DETAILED PLAN

SUBJECT: PWB RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY

1. On 31st March 1945, the Chief of Staff directed Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee to examine the possibility of reducing the activities of PWB in regard to the collection of intelligence in ITALY.

2. Since that date, lack of personnel and the necessity of freeing officers for work in North ITALY has already caused the cessation of PWB activities in the field of economic intelligence and in the reporting of press and publications in Liberated ITALY. In addition, the work of the Italian Documents Section has been temporarily suspended.

3. As long as PWB retains any responsibility for psychological warfare activities in Northern ITALY, it will be necessary to retain intelligence units in ROME and MILAN and other centres where PWB offices exist, for the collection of the intelligence needed to guide and direct propaganda and other activities. Reports by these units should be made available to other allied agencies as at present, after clearance with AC on existing lines.

4. It is however, felt that the scope of these reports should in future be restricted to the following matters :

(a) The growth and doctrines of Italian political parties.

(b) Italian public opinion, more particularly in its reaction to current events.

(c) Reactions to allied propaganda.

(d) Information about Italian press, publications, etc.

It is further felt that a daily cable of press extracts for the use of OWI and FID should continue until such time as other arrangements can be made.

5. The personalities section located in ROME should continue to function until such time as information available from North ITALY can be incorporated in the card index. Arrangements have been made for microfilming of this card index so that copies may be available to the American and British Embassies in ROME and for despatch to WASHINGTON and LONDON.

6. The activities of the Italian Documents section have been temporarily suspended in order to make the personnel available for work in North ITALY. One officer and one NCO have been attached to the 5th Army Combat Team with specific instructions to locate and report on certain Fascist archives, including the Mussolini Archives and the archives of the Ministry

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6. The activities of the Italian Documents section have been temporarily suspended in order to make the personnel available for work in North ITALY. One officer and one NCO have been attached to the 5th Army Combat Team with specific instructions to locate and report on certain Fascist archives, including the Mussolini Archives and the archives of the Ministry of Popular Culture which were transferred to North ITALY in September 1943. It is felt that further research of these archives would not be of immediate benefit to PWB and that such research would fall outside the proper function of PWB. It is, however, known that such research is desired by the State Department and by the Foreign Office and it is felt that the appropriate organisation to carry out this research should be attached to the US and British Embassies, and that PWB should be relieved of all responsibility in this respect.

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7. If the foregoing suggestions be accepted, it is submitted that the Intelligence Services of PWB should continue only so long as PWB is responsible for the control of the Press and Radio in Northern ITALY and that FID, OWI and other organisati ns at present receiving PWB Intelligenc reports should immediately be informed, so that alternative arrangements may be made by the organisations themselves to obtain their legitimate requirements through other channels.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

PsWSC (45) 3rd Meeting
23rd May 1945

CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE G-2 (B) CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1200 HOURS ON THURSDAY 24TH MAY 1945.

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PsWSC (45) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)

2. PWB FUNCTIONS IN NORTH ITALY
(Paper No. PsWSC (45) 6 - to be circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:

3. PRESS PLAN FOR NORTH ITALY
(Paper No. PsWSC (45) 5 - already circulated)

Robert T. Hanley

ROBERT T. HANLEY,
M.C., U.S.A.,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION:

	COPY NO
Chief, PWD	1
Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U.S. Political Adviser	6-8
British Resident Minister	9-12
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	13-14
G-2	15-16
G-3	17-18
G-5	19-20
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	21-23
Spares	24-26

1:31

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

T E [illegible] MEETING OF T E PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
SUB-COMMITTEE [illegible] BE HELD IN THE C-1 (B) CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1200 HOURS ON [illegible] TUESDAY 24TH
JAN 1 4.

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PsWC (45) 2nd Meeting - already circulated)

2. PWB FUNCTIONS IN NORTH ITALY
(Paper No. PsWC (45) 6 - to be circulated)

TO TAKE NOTE ONLY:

3. PRESS PLAN FOR OCCUPIED ITALY
(Paper No. PsWC (45) [illegible] - already circulated)

Robert T. Hanley

ROBERT T. HANLEY,
A.C., G.S.C.,
SECRETARY.

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G-5	19-20
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	21-23
Spares	24-26

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Ec List - 24 May 45

Corr/
13 Ex Comm R

14 P. R. Br.

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IL TESTO INGLESE E' IL TESTO ORIGINALE

CONFIDENZIALE

20 Aprile 1945.

QUARTIER GENERALE DELLE FORZE ALLEATE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

Piano stampa per l'Italia settentrionale

Pubblicato con l'approvazione del Chief of Staff, A.F.H.Q.

1. Questo Piano Stampa per l'Italia Settentrionale abroga tutte le istruzioni precedenti. La responsabilità di effettuare il presente piano riguarda il PWB del 15o Gruppo di Armate, tramite il Capo dei Capi Ufficio Stampa, conformemente alle direttive del Comando Supremo delle Forze Alleate, soggetto però al Comando Militare del 15o Gruppo di Armate ed in stretta cooperazione con l'AC e l'APB.

2. SOPPRESSIONE DEI GIORNALI FASCISTI. Appena entrati in una città o zona liberata da poco, tutti i giornali e gli altri periodici creati dal Fascismo o diretti da capi Fascisti, per esempio il «Regime Fascista» di Farinacci a Cremona, dovranno essere soppressi e non sarà loro permesso di tornare in vita.

3. FOGLIO DI INFORMAZIONI DEL «COMBAT TEAM». I Combat Teams del PWB pubblicheranno il «Corriere Alleato» come foglio di ripiego per le notizie e le informazioni. La condotta, la locazione e la durata di tali giornali dipenderà dall'iniziativa e la discrezione dei Combat Teams del PWB al seguito delle rispettive Armate, agendo secondo le direttive generali del PWB del 15o Gruppo di Armate. Oltre alle notizie, essi pubblicheranno i proclami dell'AMG e dell'Armata. Il personale di questi giornali fa parte del PWB del 15o Gruppo di Armate.

4. TRATTAMENTO DEI GIORNALI CLANDESTINI. I giornali ed altri periodici favorevoli alla causa Alleata e che venivano pubblicati prima della liberazione da parte degli Alleati, possono continuare pubblicamente la loro attività, mantenendo la loro periodicità in generale, soggetti però al paragrafo 10, in caso di quotidiani, ed alle condizioni seguenti:

a) dietro richiesta di un permesso provvisorio (ved. paragrafo 11) che deve essere fatta entro sette giorni dal proclama del Governatore Militare.

b) tutti i giornali devono essere soggetti alla censura militare (vedi par. 14).

Gli elenchi dei più importanti giornali clandestini di cui si conosce l'attività in ogni regione prima dell'arrivo degli Alleati, saranno inviati all'Ufficiale per gli affari civili dell'AMG dal Chief Press Officer del PWB.

5. GIORNALI NON FASCISTI. I giornali non fascisti (se ve ne siano) e quelli di natura tecnica possono chiedere di continuare la pubblicazione alle stesse condizioni del permesso provvisorio, compatibilmente con le esigenze militari.

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6. NUOVI GIORNALI. Tutti gli altri giornali non clandestini di cui al par. 4, possono presentare la domanda per i permessi provvisori di stampa.

7. GIORNALI PRE-FASCISTI. I giornali esistenti prima del Fascismo che però erano stati trasformati in periodici fascisti, saranno sospesi all'entrata degli Alleati, in attesa della nomina di un Commissario da parte del Commissario Regionale dell'AMG. Non appena il Commissario può dimostrare che l'epurazione è stata completata, tali giornali potranno riapparire sotto i loro nomi storici, in qualità però di fogli di informazioni indipendenti da ogni partito. Qualora il Commissario Regionale lo ritenga necessario o se una richiesta viene a lui, presentata da elementi responsabili della comunità, al Commissario verrà aggiunto un comitato di tre persone con capacità consultiva. I giornali si atterranno a tutte le restrizioni economiche o di altro genere imposte dalle condizioni di tuttta la stampa in genere dovute alla guerra. Ogni introito che risulterà dalla gestione verrà bloccato dal Commissario che manterrà il proprio controllo finchè la zona non sarà restituita all'amministrazione italiana.

Ogni questione di proprietà e di eventuale controllo politico verrà sistemata in accordo con la procedura che sarà decisa dal governo italiano, il quale ha convenuto che nessuno di tali giornali venga restituito al controllo dei proprietari fascisti.

8. GIORNALI DI INFORMAZIONI DEL P. W. B. Dato che la libertà di stampa esclude automaticamente ogni diritto degli Alleati di imporre le proprie direttive per le notizie o la propria politica agli editori italiani, gli Alleati si riserveranno il proprio mezzo di informazioni con l'uso di fogli di notizie apertamente dichiarati proprietà alleata, che potranno essere pubblicati in lingua italiana nei seguenti centri: Bologna, Milano, Torino, Genova, Venezia e Trieste. Questi giornali saranno posseduti ed amministrati da italiani ma tutti gli articoli di fondo, i commenti e l'impaginazione di questi giornali seguiranno le direttive del P. W. B. Il P. W. B. fornirà la carta, l'inchiostro e quant'altro occorre al loro funzionamento. In nessun caso tali articoli e commenti saranno firmati dagli autori. Questi giornali saranno considerati come attività operativa, la quale può essere iniziata o terminata dall'Allied Publications Board senza alcuna obbligazione o riferimento a qualsiasi interesse italiano commerciale o di proprietà, eccetto la formale notificazione della decisione presa dall'Allied Publications Board. Ciascuno di questi giornali sarà chiamato « Corriere » con l'indicazione della regione cui è dedicato (p. e. « Corriere dell'Emilia » in Bologna). La frase « a cura del P. W. B. » farà parte della testata. Nei casi nei quali il controllo editoriale del P. W. B. sia finito verranno prese misure per l'abolizione dei titoli di questi giornali.

Il P. W. B. pubblicherà i bollettini di notizie come richiesto, anch'essi porteranno sulla testata la frase « a cura del P. W. B. ».

9. C. L. N. Onde prevenire la discriminazione fra gli aspiranti e per aiutare il raggiungimento di una equa distribuzione di carta in folio o in rotoli, si riconosce per principio che i partiti del C. L. N. avranno precedenza assoluta quando, eventualmente, le domande per i giornali politici verranno prese in considerazione.

10. QUOTIDIANI E SETTIMANALI. Con riferimento ai par. 4, 5, 6 e 7, e relativamente alla pubblicazione in generale dei giornali, prima che le zone del nord vengano restituite alla giurisdizione italiana, tutti i quotidiani, dovunque, dovrebbero essere solamente fogli di informazioni (siano essi di partito o meno) e i giornali di partito dovrebbero essere settimanali. Comunque, se il locale C.L.N. richiederà

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che gli organi dei partiti vengano ammessi quali quotidiani e purchè tale richiesta venga approvata dall'A. M. G., l'A. P. B. giudicherà la questione della ratifica solamente dal punto di vista della carta disponibile. Viene riconosciuto che Milano e Torino presentano a questo riguardo speciali problemi e che se il locale C. L. N. chiederà dei quotidiani di partito, tale richiesta sarà presa in considerazione purchè sia possibile procurare la carta necessaria.

11. PERMESSI PROVVISORI. Nelle zone avanzate militari i permessi provvisori verranno normalmente rilasciati tramite il capo ufficio stampa del P. W. B., soggetti al diritto che l'ufficiale dell'A. M. G. presso il Quartier Generale dell'Armata e l'ufficiale addetto agli affari civili dell'A. M. G. (non appena egli cominci la sua funzione) hanno di autorizzare tali pubblicazioni che essi possono considerare necessarie nell'ambito di questo piano.

Tali permessi provvisori saranno sempre soggetti a sospensione o ritiro, dietro ordine del Governatore militare.

12. A. P. B. Non appena le condizioni lo permetteranno, l' A. P. B. formerà delle Commissioni regionali alle quali verranno rivolte tutte le richieste di permessi di pubblicazione. I permessi provvisori rilasciati, secondo quanto detto nel paragrafo precedente, saranno riferiti a tali Commissioni regionali per la relativa azione da parte dell' A. P. B.

Nell'assegnare carta ai giornali già clandestini ed agli altri primi richiedenti, le Commissioni regionali dell' A. P. B. terranno in considerazione le richieste dei giornali non di partito di cui al par. 7.

13. FINANZIAMENTO E DIREZIONE. Ad eccezione della responsabilità del P. W. B. a riguardo delle pubblicazioni del corriere alleato, nè il P. W. B. nè l'A. M. G. si immischieranno nella parte amministrativa o finanziaria di giornali e altri periodici. Nel caso di giornali di informazioni del P. W. B. di cui al paragrafo 8, i gruppi italiani saranno finanziariamente ed amministrativamente responsabili, mentre il P. W. B. si limiterà al controllo editoriale e all'aiuto per le necessità di lavoro, come la carta e l'inchiostro.

14. CENSURA MILITARE. La censura militare è essenziale. Nessun permesso verrà preso in considerazione o rilasciato a meno che non si possa garantire e mantenere sul posto una censura militare.

Nelle grandi città (Bologna, Milano, Torino, Genova, Venezia, Trieste) verranno installati gli uffici di censura della stampa del Comando Supremo Forze Alleate, i quali assumeranno la responsabilità della censura militare per la radio e la stampa locale, come avviene attualmente a Firenze.

Nelle località oltre a quelle sopra indicate, la censura verrà esercitata da persone responsabili, designate dai Commissari provinciali dell'A.M.G. Questi censori agiranno in accordo con le direttive per la censura militare, diramate dal Comando Supremo Forze Alleate, le quali verranno fornite dai capo uffici stampa dei Combat Teams del P. W. B. Il collegamento tra i censori della stampa del Comando Supremo Forze Alleate nelle grandi città ed i censori nominati dall'A.M.G. situati nelle altre località, dovrebbe essere stabilito e mantenuto.

15. CLAUSOLA PER LA DIFFUSIONE. Nessun giornale, anche di partito, stampato fuori della zona del 15.o Gruppo di Armate, sarà autorizzato ad entrare in qualsiasi punto della suddetta zona senza l'approvazione specifica del Comandante Militare, dietro raccomandazione del P. W. B.

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16. DEPOSITI DI CARTA. Non appena ciascuna città zona venga occupata dalle truppe alleate, a ciascun possessore di depositi di carta in foglio o in rotoli, verrà richiesto dall'ufficiale per la stampa del P. W. B. di dichiarare quali depositi abbia in mano e per quale scopo vengano usati.

17. SERVIZIO NOTIZIE. Dietro richiesta il P. W. B. provvederà un servizio di notizie gratuito in lingua italiana, speciali articoli, cartine e fotografie a tutte quelle pubblicazioni autorizzate, nei limiti permessi dalle communicazioni esistenti o da installare. Nessun altro servizio fotografico o di notizie sarà autorizzato ad operare nella zona del Gruppo di Armate fino a quando la Commissione Alleata permetterà la riassunzione delle normali notizie commerciali e della distribuzione di fotografie.

26 Aprile 1945.

Lt. Col. I. S. MUNRO
Chief Press Officer
P. W. B., Italy

Nota speciale per il Piano di Stampa

Per tutto il tempo che ci saranno truppe alleate operanti da basi in Italia, come il 15.o Gruppo di armate, e fino a quando tutto il territorio tornerà sotto la responsabilità del Governo Italiano, il Piano per la Stampa continua ad essere in atto.

La fine della guerra in Italia non significa la fine dell'Italia come fattore di importanza strategica nella condotta generale della guerra in Europa e nel mondo; così, poichè continuano le ragioni di sicurezza militare e per venire incontro alla pubblica tranquillità, le previdenze alleate nei riguardi della stampa rimangono immutate, con la sostenuta leale cooperazione delle autorità Italiane e del popolo.

I. S. MUNRO
Lt. Col.
Chief Press Officer.
3 Maggio 1945.

PsW B Press Plan

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

20 April 1945

SECRET SECTION

PRESS PLAN FOR NORTHERN ITALY

1. This Press Plan for Northern ITALY supersedes all previous instructions. Responsibility for carrying out this Press Plan lies with P.W.B. 15th Army Group, through P.W.B. Chief Press Officer, in conformity with AFHQ directives, but subject to 15th Army Group Military Command and in strict cooperation with A.C. and Allied Publications Board.

2. Suppression of Fascist Papers. On entering a newly liberated town or area, all newspapers and other periodicals of Fascist orientation or papers identified with Fascist leaders, such as Farinacci's "Regime Fascista" of Cremona, will be suppressed and not allowed to re-appear.

3. Combat Team Information Sheet. PWB Combat Teams will issue "Combat Team Alleato" as an emergency news and information sheet. The content, allocation and duration of these Combat Team papers will be on the initiative and at the discretion of PWB Combat Teams with the respective armies, acting under general PWB 15th Army Group directions. In addition to news, they will carry AMG and Army proclamations, as required. The personnel of such papers form a part of PWB 15th Army Group.

4. Treatment of Clandestine Press. Newspapers and other periodicals favorable to the Allied cause and publishing clandestinely prior to Allied liberation may continue to publish openly, keeping their periodicity in general, subject to para. 10 in the case of leaflets, on the following conditions:

(a) Application for a provisional permit (see para.11) must be made within seven days of the Military Governor's proclamation.

(b) All papers must be subject to military censorship (see para. 14).

Lists of the more important clandestine papers, known to be in existence in each area on order to Allied entry, will be supplied by the C.M.G.O. of AFHQ by the Chief Press Officer, PWB.

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10. Political Parties. With reference to paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 and with reference to the publication of newspapers in general prior to the restoration of the Northern areas to Italian jurisdiction, all daily papers everywhere should be information sheets only (all party or no party) and party papers should be weeklies. However, if the Local Committees of National Liberation recommend that party organs be allowed as dailies and provided such arrangements are approved by AMG, Allied Publications Board will judge the matter of restriction solely upon the point of view of newsprint available. It is recognized that MILAN and TURIN present special problems in this respect and that if the Local Committee of National Liberation ask for party dailies, such requests would receive consideration provided that it were possible to supply the necessary newsprint.

11. Provisional Permits. In Army forward areas provisional permits will normally be issued through the PWB Press Officer, subject to the right of the AMG Officer at Army HQ and the C.A.C. AMG (as soon as he shall begin to function) to authorize such publications as he may consider necessary within the framework of this plan.

Such provisional permits are at all times subject to suspension or withdrawal by order of the Military Governor.

12. Allied Publications Board. As soon as conditions permit, Allied Publications Board will set up Regional Boards to which all applications for permits will thereafter be made. Provisional permits granted in accordance with the preceding paragraph will be referred to these Regional Boards for action by Allied Publications Board. In allocating newsprint to the ex-clandestine and other early applicants, Allied Publications Regional Boards will take into account the requirements of the non-party papers referred to in paragraph 7.

1478

13. Finance and Management. With the exception of PWB's responsibility for the combat "Corriere Alleato" publications, neither PWB nor AMG will concern themselves with the financial or administrative side of newspapers or other periodicals. In the case of the PWB information papers referred to in paragraph 8, Italian groups will be financially and administratively responsible, PWB confining itself to editorial control and supply of operational necessities, such as paper and ink.

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14. Military Censorship. Military censorship is essential. No permits will be considered or allowed unless military censorship control on the spot can be guaranteed and sustained.

In the large cities (BOLOGNA, MILAN, TURIN, GENOA, VENICE, TRIESTE) AFHQ Press Censorship Offices will be established and will assume responsibility for military censorship for local Press and Radio, as at present in FLORENCE.

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In localities other than those mentioned above, censorship will be exercised by responsible persons designated by AMG Provincial Commissioners. These censors will act in accordance with military censorship directives laid down by AFHQ, which will be furnished by PWB Combat Team Press Officers. Liaison between AFHQ Press censors in large cities and AMG-appointed Censors in other localities should be established and maintained.

15. Circulation Proviso. No party or other newspapers published outside the 15th Army Group area will be allowed to enter any point within the said area without the specific approval of the Military Commander on recommendation from PWB.

16. Paper Stocks. As each town or area is entered by the Allied troops, every stockholder of newsprint or flatbed paper will be required by PWB Printing Officer to declare what stocks and resources he has in hand and to what purpose they are being used.

17. News Service. PWB will provide on demand a free Italian language news service, special articles, maps and photographs, to all authorised publications within the limits of whatever communications exist or may be established. No other news or photographic service will be permitted to operate in the Army Group area until such time as the Allied Commission permits the resumption of normal commercial news and picture distribution.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

INCOMING MESSAGE

FROM O.W.I. MICHEL
CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY
TO: P.W.B. ROME FOR LINEN

REF. NR. WARCE 17717
DATE TIME SIG.: 1723092
DATE TIME REC. 18th. MAY. 45.

TEXT

Regarding ins release in Tito:

Press agencies on Wednesday night issued story that Tito had ordered partial withdrawal of forces from Istria and port of Trieste. This story was carried first on OWI broadcast but later corrected. At present we are running following story "Press Dispatch informs that Tito ordered troops to withdraw from a zone West of Isonzo" This ~~in~~ is as you know an area not under discussion.

DISTRIBUTION.

F.Y.I. MR. LINEN.
LT.COL.LUMLEY.
MR. BANCROFT.
MR. SHARP.
MR. RIEGEL.
MR.W.ROBINSON.
MR. SUNDBERG.
MISS.B.WHITE.
MR. SHEA. (POUCH)

INFORMATION

1476

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY DATE TIME REC: 18th. MAY. 45.

TO: P.W.B. ROME FOR LINEN

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Regarding ins release in Tito:

Press agencies on Wednesday night issued story that Tito had ordered partial withdrawal of forces from Istria and port of Trieste. This story was carried first on OWI broadcast but later corrected. At present we are running following story "Press Dispatch informs that Tito ordered troops to withdraw from a zone West of Isonzo" This ~~is~~ is as you know an area not under discussion.

DISTRIBUTION.

F.Y.I. MR. LINEN.
LT.COL.LUMLEY.
MR. BANCROFT.
MR. SHARP.
MR. RIEGEL.
MR.W.ROBINSON.
MR. SUNDBERG.
MISS.B.WHITE.
MR. SHEA. (POUCH)

INFORMATION

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Printed by PWB AFHQ Printing & Paper Division

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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PWB

MEMORANDUM

May 17, 1945

TO: Mr. G. Stewart Brown

FROM: James Linen

Supplementing the attached should be a paragraph covering radio reading somewhat as follows:

"The Press Officers' task would also include the general supervision of news and commentaries put out over radio stations located in north Italy. The exact technique of this supervision should be fairly easy to set up."

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May 17, 1945

DRAFT MEMORANDUM TO AMBASSADOR KIRK

As per my conversation with you this morning, Stewart Brown, Major Anderson, J. B. Straley, Chief Administrative Officer of PWB, and myself got together to discuss the PWB paper of March 10, entitled "PWB Functions in North Italy". Stewart Brown began the meeting by pointing out that AC was worried about what might happen in Northern Italy during the AMG phase after PWB had been liquidated. AC feels that trouble may arise from irresponsible distribution of information in AMG territory and believes that competent controls should be maintained during AMG's tenure.

The line of thought developed at the meeting, which was subscribed to by all present, was as follows.

If such control is considered definitely essential there are at least two methods of achieving that control:

A. Control of Information at the Source.

This is the method now utilized by PWB. All news and information for use by newspapers, magazines and radio stations in North Italy are either prepared by or thoroughly vetted by PWB before distribution. All Allied publications are edited by or vetted by PWB and distributed through PWB channels.

The consensus of opinion at the meeting re this type of control was that it offered a good many important disadvantages. Among others, it would necessitate the maintenance of a complete PWB ~~news operation for Northern Italy~~.

~~It~~ News and distribution operations for Northern Italy. It would necessitate keeping the private news agencies out of Northern Italy during the AMG phase--a procedure that would inevitably cause a storm of protest.

It would necessitate stringent and very difficult regulation of all editors to make sure that they utilized no material whatsoever except that obtained from PWB sources--another potential source of great irritation and perhaps unrest.

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It will be impossible and extremely undesirable to emulate previous German methods by attempting to limit radio listening to those particular stations controlled by PWB.

If such processing of news at the source is to result in 'angling' to any material degree, such 'angling' is bound to be discovered and capitalized on by the press of Liberated Italy as well as that of Northern Italy.

Finally, there is President Truman's statement in yesterday's press conference, quoted as follows in the May 17 Stars and Stripes:

> "A free press should be permitted in Germany 'in a manner consistent with military authority', President Truman said, reversing a policy announced a week ago by OWI Director Elmer Davis.
>
> "The OWI statement said magazines and newspapers published in Allied countries would be barred from Germany, and that all German newspapers would be published under Allied military control.
>
> "President Truman said he had contacted General Eisenhower on the matter, and that the Supreme Allied Commander has issued no policy or order dealing with the importation of publications into Germany.
>
> "'The general has expressed the personal opinion that a free press and a free flow of information and ideas should prevail in Germany in a manner consistent with military security', the President said.
>
> "He pointed out, however, that restoration of a free German press in Germany must await elimination of Nazi and militarist influences.
>
> "'We are not going to lose the peace by giving license to racialist, pan-Germans, Nazis and militarists, so that they can misuse democratic rights in order to attack democracy as Hitler did', he explained.
>
> "President Truman said the OWI director had

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"acted in good faith in handing out last week's statement, but that Davis had based his policy statement upon information obtained from a 'lower level'."

This would certainly seem to indicate that the United States' official policy is to keep such informational controls to an absolute minimum, consistent with every effort to prevent any attempt to misuse democratic rights in order to attack democracy.

If this is to be United States' policy in Germany, it would seem difficult to maintain a stricter policy in Northern Italy.

B. Everyone agreed that continued control at the source on the present PWB model is not the right solution. We all felt that another and much simpler method would suffice.

The Allied Publications Board controls all paper supplies and licenses to publish. The retention of the present system of PWB press officers as agents of the Allied Publications Board during the AMG phase would provide a very adequate control over the relatively small area of subject matter which might cause trouble. Such an arrangement would enable all other controls and bans to be lifted and would permit PWB to go through with its general plan of liquidation.

The organization needed for such a control system could be recruited from PWB ranks and financed along PWB lines. It would consist of an Allied Publications Board, chairmanned as at present, with PWB's Chief Press Officer. Each AMG area would have attached to it an individual Press Officer or observer responsible to APB. Each Press Officer undoubtedly would also need one Intelligence Officer and a small local staff. While exercising their control functions these Press Officers and their staffs could follow through on Recommendation 3 of the May 10 paper, calling for the institution, as quickly as possible, of the press plan "concerning pre-Fascist Italian newspapers". They could at the same time be the channel through which official AMG communications would be placed in the Northern Italian press. They could also act as a temporary channel for the distribution of MOI and OWI material.

As soon, therefore, as communications are restored and private news agencies able to operate in North Italy, all other phases of PWB activity, except movie distribution, could be liquidated or transferred to other agencies, and

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the remaining PWB personnel and equipment could be returned to the organizations from which they came for orderly disposition according to the laws and regulations governing those organizations.

The film distribution would need to continue until the commercial distributing organizations are allowed to operate in Italy.

James A. Linen

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

GSB/mew

9/PRB

18 April 1945

SUBJECT: P.W.B. Request for Information

TO : Mr. Richard Bazzanella
Transportation Sub-Commission

1. Reference attached letter from P.W.B.

2. Miss Reilly is known to us and we are of the opinion that her request is legitimate and should be granted.

G. STEWART BROWN
Director,
Public Relations Branch

Encl. (1)

Copy to Mr. Titchener, P.W.B.
PRB Files

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COPY

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

To: Mr. Stewart Brown
Public Relations Branch,
Allied Commission

16th April 1945

Dear Mr. Stewart Brown,

It would be very much appreciated if you could supply us with information on the following points:

i) German demolition of ports in Liberated Italy and the amount of loss suffered by shipping through this demolition.

ii) Information and figures on reconstruction carried out and planned on ports in liberated Italy.

iii) Any information on the salvaging of ships.

iv) Figures showing how sea transport has contributed to the solution of the transport problem.

I believe Mr. Jim Hurley, of Ports and Warehouses Section, has this information in his possession, but cannot release it to us without authorisation from your department. I would be most grateful if you could give him this authorisation. Miss Reilly, whom I think you know, is the research assistant concerned.

We need the information for release in Northern Italy immediately after liberation - and in the case of figures on German demolition, possibly for use in leaflets dropped over areas still occupied. Naturally we would only want information which your experts are prepared to release for this purpose.

Yours truly

for Lanham Titchener

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

O/PRB 7 Apr. 1945

SUBJECT : WD permit.

TO : CWO N. Piombino, Asst. Adjutant.

Mr. D. Gnudi, Head of Italian Affairs, PWB, has applied to this Branch for a WD permit on behalf of Sig. Alberto ANTONUCCI, who is to proceed to Bari together with Mr. Gnudi in the latter's car - PWB vehicle No 1033 - next Tuesday, April 10. Sig. Antonucci will remain in Bari.

Could you please issue the requested permit ?

As Sig. Antonucci is at present absent from Rome we have not been able to obtain his Identity No. Would it be possible to leave it blank and fill it in as soon as the person concerned can be reached ?

THOMAS G. BERGIN
Major AUS
D.D.P.R.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION

APO 394

Office of the Executive Commissioner

file

noted GWB

Ref: 9267/00.

4th April 1945.

SUBJECT: PWD Activities in ITALY.

TO : Public Relations Branch
Pol Adv (2)
Pol Adv (3)

1. Attached for your information is extract from the minutes of SACMED's Political Conference of 29 March 1945 at which this subject was discussed.

2. Copy of Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 13 of 26 March 1945 referred to in the minute was passed to Public Relations Branch by this office on 28 March. Copies are attached herewith for the Political Advisers.

E. Shuckburgh
Chief Staff Officer
for Executive Commissioner.

/KG.

EXTRACT. CONFIDENTIAL. EXTRACT.

Extract from Minutes of SACMED's Political Conference held on 29th March 1945.

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES IN ITALY.

(Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 18).

THE CONFERENCE had before them a paper attaching a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, requesting their covering approval to the reorganisation which had taken place in psychological warfare activities in ITALY, together with draft detailed instructions to the Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, on the future PWB organisation in ITALY.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCREERY/AL stated that the changes outlined in the draft telegram and in the detailed instructions to PWB had in fact already taken place. The purpose of the cable was, therefore, to legalise the position.

MR. MACMILLAN, while expressing general agreement with the draft cable, queried whether, as PWB activity was now limited to Northern ITALY and AUSTRIA, it was necessary to retain in liberated ITALY a news distribution service. He also asked whether PWB could release further printing facilities, as he had been approached informally by the Italian Prime Minister with a request that the Allies should release further printing presses in liberated territory.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCREERY/AL stated that the only news services, which it was proposed to retain, were those essential for operational propaganda in the forward areas.

MR. BARNES said that PWB had only one press in operation at the present time and this was in ROME. The press in BARI was under the control of the British Army. The problem for the Italians, however, was not so much the control of the presses as the supply of paper and ink.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL ROBERTSON said that the question of military requirements for printing facilities and paper was a complex one. He would however undertake an investigation to determine what further assistance could be given to the Italians in this respect.

X BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCREERY/AL suggested that para 4 of the draft telegram should be amended to read: "Collection of propaganda intelligence".

MR. MACMILLAN agreed. He considered, however, that PWB activities in connection with the collection of intelligence in liberated ITALY, should cease as they were not proper functions for a military agency to perform, especially in view of the directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to withdraw military control from liberated ITALY. If such intelligence was really required the Embassies should collect it.

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MR. BARNES stated that the Office of War Information was not authorised to carry on intelligence work since its proper function is the dissemination of information. The requests received from LONDON and WASHINGTON for intelligence reports on conditions in ITALY could, however, be carefully screened

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Allied Force Headquarters, the future PWB organization in Italy.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL considered that this activity could gradually be reduced but that the matter should be taken up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a separate signal.

MR. BARNES stated that the only additional activity which PWB would then retain in liberated territory was in connection with films. There were some 300 individuals now concerned in this work which included receiving the films from Great Britain and the United States, their booking and delivery to Italian cinemas and collection of fees. He did not consider that this PWB activity could cease until such time as the Allied authorities gave permission for civilian representatives of British and United States film companies to operate in ITALY.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL, SPOFFORD stated that the question of entry of merchants and businessmen, who were associated with business enterprises in ITALY prior to hostilities, was already under examination and suggested that the entry of film representatives should be reviewed at the same time.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, in reply to a question by Mr. Offie, said that his policy was gradually to withdraw military control from liberated ITALY, so that the country should return to normal as soon as possible, consistent with the overriding requirements of our military operations.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MORGAN, referring to para 5 of the instructions to Director, PWB, considered that the reference to the BALKANS was misleading, as PWB operations would only continue in respect of enemy occupied areas. He suggested, therefore, that the first sentence should be amended to read: "AUSTRIA and the areas of the BALKANS now in German occupation".

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Instructed the Chief of Staff:

(i) To revise the draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in accordance with the amendments suggested at 'X' above, and subsequently to despatch it. ©

(ii) To revise the instructions circulated under Appendix "B" in accordance with the amendment at 'Y' above, and subsequently to issue them as amended.

(iii) To investigate the possibility of reducing activities of PWB in regard to the collection of intelligence and to report to him accordingly.

(b) Instructed the Chief Administrative Officer:

(i) To examine, in connection with his current investigation of the feasibility of allowing entry of private business personnel into ITALY, the possibility of permitting the entry of film representatives.

(ii) To investigate what further assistance could be given to the Italian Government by releasing printing facilities and supplies of paper.

© Despatched as NAF 903. Ref. No. DX-52033, 29 March 1945.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

SAC (P) (45) 18
28th March 1945

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COPY NO. 4

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES
IN ITALY

Note by Secretary

1. At SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting, Director PWB was instructed to submit recommendations regarding the future functions of PWB in liberated ITALY.

2. Discussions have therefore taken place between PWB and Allied Commission, United States and British Embassies, British Ministry of War Information and United States Office of War Information, and agreement has been reached in regard to certain proposals for reorganisation. These are summarised at Appendix 'A' in a draft cable to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, whom it is considered should be informed accordingly.

3. In order to implement this policy Director, PWB, recommends, with the concurrence of the agencies mentioned at paragraph 2 above, that he should be given the detailed directions set out at Appendix 'B'.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to approve:-

(a) The despatch of the draft cable at Appendix 'A' to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) The issue to Director, PWB, of the detailed directions at Appendix 'B'.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Commanding General 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11

EC 11:57
29 MAR 45
Chief Censor
Exec Censor

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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4. The Supreme Allied Commander is therefore requested to approve:-

(a) The despatch of the draft cable at Appendix 'A' to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

(b) The issue to Director, PWB, of the detailed directions at Appendix 'B'.

HEADQUARTERS
28 Nov 1944
A. C.

J. G. SWEETMAN,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL,
SECRETARY.

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Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5	18-19
Chief, Liaison Section	20
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	21-25
U.S. Political Adviser	26-28
British Resident Minister	29-32
Director, PWB	33
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	34-36
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	37-39
Chief, IMC	40
Spares	41-45

EC List
27 MAR 45
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Exec Comm
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S.(0.)A. - 3-44 - 1200 - 250,000

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APPENDIX 'A'

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D R A F T

TO: AGWAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND TO AMSSO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

INFO: SHAEF MAIN

This is NAF_____. Subject is Psychological Warfare activities in ITALY.

1. During initial stages of occupation PWB, in addition to conducting combat propaganda, was responsible for distribution and control of all news, newspapers, moving pictures, books and other publications except for military censorship. PWB published newspapers in certain Italian cities and operated all Italian civilian radio stations. It also monitored enemy radio stations and collected and distributed intelligence required for its activities.

2. Recently PWB has been divided into :

(a) PWB 15 Army Group, responsible for operational propaganda in direct support of the armiss and directed towards areas of ITALY north of the rear Army control line.

(b) PWB Liberated ITALY, responsible for activities in areas south of the control line and in regard to which it is not yet possible to relinquish allied control.

3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN 487, PWB has now :

(a) Handed over the distribution of news to private news agencies, Italian and foreign.

(b) Relinquished control of newspapers which are now published 1463

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ITALY.

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3. In liberated areas, to foster in the Italians a greater sense of responsibility as directed by FAN 487, PWB has now :

(a) Handed over the distribution of news to private news agencies, Italian and foreign.

(b) Relinquished control of newspapers which are now published under Italian editorial arrangements. 1483

(c) Relinquished control of Italian radio network which is now operated by Italian Radio Agency.

(d) Handed over as appropriate informational activities in connection with Books, Plays, Copyrights, News features and photographic services to Allied Commission, OWI, MOI and British and United States Embassies.

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Similar action will be taken in respect of areas further north as soon as convenient after their liberation.

4. To conduct operational propaganda, it remains necessary to retain control of the following services in the liberated area : Central News Services, time on Italian radio transmitters, and facilities for leaflet printing, radio monitoring and collection of intelligence. Distribution of American and British films and preparation of documentary films required by Allied organisations must also remain Allied functions at present.

5. Your covering approval to these arrangements is requested.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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5. Your covering approval to these arrangements is requested.

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S.G.M.A. — 5-45 — 1430 — 250,000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

APPENDIX 'B'

DETAILED DIRECTIONS TO PWB

1. That responsibility for the introduction of news features and similar background material be transferred immediately to American and British Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

2. That responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British news photos be transferred to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information, as soon as convenient.

3. That responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British publications and all responsibilities concerning copyright be transferred immediately to the respective Embassies, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

4. That radio monitoring, other than that required for the servicing of AFHQ, and other Allied military organisations, be liquidated or that the facilities be passed to the Italian Press Secretariat as soon as convenient.

5. That PWB retain the technical facilities and accommodation required for the central servicing of the news operation towards North ITALY, AUSTRIA and the BALKANS. These facilities consist of five requisitioned Morse transmitters together with the necessary accommodation and the personnel required for their use.

6. That PWB retain on the Italian transmitters, ROME short wave and BARI respectively three hours and forty-five minutes and four hours of transmitting time.

7. That PWB retain such requisitioned printing facilities as may be required for the preparation of operational leaflets.

8. That PWB retain responsibility for the distribution of films on existing lines, until such time as private distributors can take over.

9. That PWB retain responsibility for the preparation of news reels and other films required by other Allied organisations until such time as these can be handed over to private manufacturers, Ministry of Information and Office of War Information.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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S.C.M.A. - 5M4 - 1400 - 250,000

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat

P.R.B.

K 114

SAC (P) (45) 16
19 March 1945

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COPY NO 26

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES
DIRECTED TOWARDS THE BALKANS

Note by Chairman, Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee

1. In accordance with instructions received from the former Chief of Staff, the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee has considered the question of the separation, along national lines, of Psychological Warfare activities directed to the Balkans, and reports as follows.

2. In October 1943 PWB founded an integrated U.S./British organization at BARI, mainly for the purpose of carrying out activities directed towards Balkan countries. As a result of the liberation of certain of these countries and the position taken by the United States State Department (with the concurrence of the U.S. Office of War Information) that the combined PWB operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of PWB activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. It is considered that to meet this situation three distinct organizations are required:-

a. An integrated U.S./British organization under PWB to carry on Psychological Warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. A purely United States organization)
) For propaganda in liberated
c. A purely British organization) areas.

4. The necessary United States organization is already being provided by OWI and is operating entirely independent of PWB under an office which has been established in ROME. The British organization is at present being provided by PWB, personally responsible to the Deputy Director, PWB, in his British capacity; it is, however, envisaged that these British activities will shortly be turned over to the Ministry of Information and when this has occurred the British and United States organizations will be entirely parallel.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will however remain necessary as long as the Mediterranean continues to be a theater of war. It is felt that this control will best be effected if the respective British and United

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) For propaganda in liberated
c. A purely British organization) areas.

4. The necessary United States organization is already being provided by OWI and is operating entirely independent of PWB under an office which has been established in ROME. The British organization is at present being provided by PWB, personally responsible to the Deputy Director, PWB, in his British capacity; it is, however, envisaged that these British activities will shortly be turned over to the Ministry of Information and when this has occurred the British and United States organizations will be entirely parallel.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will however remain necessary as long as the Mediterranean continues to be a theater of war. It is felt that this control will best be effected if the respective British and United States governmental propaganda agencies, while carrying on the separate activities in the theater under the general guidance of their respective governments, are subject to the overriding authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

6. The Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee accordingly requests the Supreme Allied Commander:-

a. To direct that PWB, as an integrated organization, cease to participate in non-operational propaganda into ALBANIA, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREECE and the liberated portions of JUGOSLAVIA, except in so far as may necessarily result as an incident of operational propaganda directed to enemy occupied regions and enemy troops, and except in support of allied relief operations.

I

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

b. To authorize the dispatch of draft cable at Appendix "A" to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, informing them of the reorganization outlined above and requesting that the necessary representations be made to the British and United States governments in order that the foregoing arrangements may be carried into effect.

(intd) A.J. McC.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	7
Commanding General 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5	18-19
Chief, Liaison Section	20
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	21-25
U.S. Political Adviser	26-28
British Resident Minister	29-32
Director, PWB	33
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	34-36
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	37-39
Chief, ENC	40
Spares	41-45

E. C. HIST.
21 MAR 45
CHIEF CLERK
EXEC. CLERK 1459
R.R.B.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	7
Commanding General 15th Army Group	8
Chief of Staff	9
Chief Administrative Officer	10-11
Deputy Chief of Staff	12
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2	13-14
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3	15-16
Chairman, Mediterranean Joint Planning Staff	17
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5	18-19
Chief, Liaison Section	20
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ NAAF	21-25
U.S. Political Adviser	26-28
British Resident Minister	29-32
Director, PWB	33
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	34-36
Supreme Allied Commander's Secretariat	37-39
Chief, ENC	40
Spares	41-45

E. C. 1ST.

2: MARK 45

CHIEF CLERK

EXEC. CLERK 1459

P. R. B.

II

CONFIDENTIAL

S.G.M.A. - 5-44 - 1196 - 250,000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

K 114
APPENDIX "."

This is NAF_____.

1. I have recently reviewed the organization required for Psychological Warfare activities in this Theater. Present cable deals with activities directed to liberated areas in Balkan and Central European countries. PWB activities in Italy will be subject of a separate signal.

2. As a result of the liberation of Balkan and Central European countries and the position taken by the United States State Department that combined Psychological Warfare operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of Psychological Warfare activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. Consequently, three distinct organizations are required:

a. An integrated U.S./British organization to carry on psychological warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

b. A purely United States organization for propaganda in liberated areas.

c. A purely British organization for the same purpose.

4. The necessary independent United States organization is already being provided by O.W.I. The separate British activities are at present being undertaken by PWB though it is envisaged that this will shortly be turned over to the British Ministry of Information.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will, however, remain necessary as long as this continues to be a theater of war. This control will best be effected if these organizations, while carrying on separate

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

2. As a result of the liberation of Balkan and Central European countries and the position taken by the United States State Department that combined Psychological Warfare operations should terminate as soon as the direct war support functions are brought to an end, a measure of separation of Psychological Warfare activities along national lines has already occurred.

3. Consequently, three distinct organizations are required:

   a. An integrated U.S./British organization to carry on psychological warfare against areas where such action remains in direct support of the war effort.

   b. A purely United States organization for propaganda in liberated areas.

   c. A purely British organization for the same purpose.

4. The necessary independent United States organization is already being provided by O.W.I. The separate British activities are at present being undertaken by P.W.B. though it is envisaged that this will shortly be turned over to the British Ministry of Information.

5. Some military control over the independent British and United States propaganda organizations will, however, remain necessary as long as this continues to be a theater of war. This control will best be effected if these organizations, while carrying on separate activities under the general guidance of their respective governments, are subject to my overriding authority should it be necessary, for military reasons, to exert it.

6. I have, therefore, directed that the integrated Psychological Warfare organization under my command shall cease to participate in non-operational propaganda directed into ALBANIA, RUMANIA, BULGARIA, HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GREECE and the liberated portions of JUGOSLAVIA, except in so far as operational propaganda directed to

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CONFIDENTIAL

III -1- S.G.M.A. - 5-45 - 1150 - 250,000

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

any of the occupied regions and enemy troops is concerned, and except in support of allied relief operations.

7. Your approval of these arrangements, and your intervention, by means of such representations to the British and United States Government as may be necessary to ensure that the separate national propaganda agencies conform to the above policy, is requested.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

IV -2-

CONFIDENTIAL

G.S.A. - 543 - 1100 - 250,000

8752

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PRB-9

SUBJECT: Coordination between AMG and PWB in Northern Italy

TO : Executive Commissioner

1. Reference your 9251/1/EC of 24 February.

2. There is attached herewith the draft of a suggested paper to SACMED.

3. Personally I have some reservations about taking this matter to SACMED. In the brief time that I have been here it has been my observation that there has not been a lack of consultation and coordination between AC and PWB on top levels insofar as regards general directives and over-all policies. In my estimation the trouble is farther down the line in the actual operation of their news service to papers and radio stations.

4. It occasionaly happens, as apparently it did in Naples and Rome that the PWB News Bureau transmits news and radio material affecting or having repercussions on AMG operations without prior check with AC or AMG. In my opinion this is a matter which could be straightened out between AC and PWB in Rome. Perhaps the most practical method would be for us to assign an officer to sit in the PWB news room to check and clear all news going into AMG territory. PWB might object to this as it rather implies a censorship, but I believe we could make a good case for such an arrangement. The person assigned to such a task would have to read all copy which PWB proposed to send to the newspapers or radio stations in AMG territory in order to stop any stories which might have harmful repercussions on AMG operations. The present liaison between their office and ours is inadequately handled and does not allow adequate control. The only way this can be properly exercised is to have a PRB officer stationed in the PWB news room.

5. I recommend that we endeavor to work out such an arrangement rather than sending the matter to SACMED.

10 March 1945

G. STEWART BROWN
D. PRB

1456

Field Marshal The Honourable Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, G.C.B,
CSI, DSO, MC, ADC
Supreme Allied Commander
Allied Force Headquarters

My dear Field Marshal:

In view of the importance of fully-coordinated planning in connection with Military Government operations in Northern Italy, it is considered essential by the Allied Commission that the following policy be enunciated by AFHQ to PWB:

That the responsibility for administration of liberated territories in Northern Italy carries with it the responsibility and authority to supervise the contents of all news and propaganda to liberated Italian areas, either printed or broadcast, that may have any reference whatsoever to Italian affairs, exclusive of strictly military operations. In brief this means effective coordination and supervision by AMG over PWB material going to newspapers or over radio listeners in AMG territory.

This step is requested in the light of experience in Naples and Rome where unfortunately too many items were published or broadcast which had direct repercussions on AC-AMG operations, without PWB first having cleared the information in question with a competent AC-AMG authority.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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That the responsibility for administration of liberated territories in Northern Italy carries with it the responsibility and authority to supervise the contents of all news and propaganda to liberated Italian areas, either printed or broadcast, that may have any reference whatsoever to Italian affairs, exclusive of strictly military operations. In brief this means effective coordination and supervision by AMG over PWB material going to newspapers or over radio listeners in AMG territory.

This step is requested in the light of experience in Naples and Rome where unfortunately too many items were published or broadcast which had direct repercussions on AC-AMG operations, without PWB first having cleared the information in question with a competent AC-AMG authority.

1455

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

FEB 24 RECD
CC 573

Ref: 9251/1/EC.

24 February 1945.

Chief Commissioner.

1. We still have considerable leeway to make up in planning with PWB for the North. It is essential that we should not repeat the mistakes made in NAPLES and ROME due to lack of coordinated and forward planning by AMG and PWB.

2. We want to have clear-cut decisions on who is to be responsible for newspaper, broadcasting and film policy.

3. PWB are a difficult organisation and receive their directions from AFHQ. It is therefore necessary, in my opinion, that we should achieve this coordination at a very high level and that the direction be given by SACMED and possibly after (a) discussion at your level in the Commission between PWB, DCCAC and Northern Regional Commissioners, and at SACMED's level in his Political Committee.

4. If you agree I will arrange the first meeting.

Brigadier,
Executive Commissioner.

ESL/JG.

1154

PRJ/ No need for meeting here. Please submit a paper, in lieu of this morning's

Field Marshal The Honourable Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, G.C.B,
CSI, DSO, MC, ADC
Supreme Allied Commander
Allied Force Headquarters

My dear Field Marshal:

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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That the responsibility for administration of liberated territories in Northern Italy carries with it the responsibility and authority to supervise the contents of all news and propaganda to liberated Italian areas, either printed or broadcast, that may have any reference whatsoever to Italian affairs, exclusive of strictly military operations. In brief this means effective coordination and supervision by AMG over PWB material going to newspapers or over radio listeners in AMG territory.

This step is requested in the light of experience in Naples and Rome where unfortunately too many items were published or broadcast which had direct repercussions on AC-AMG operations, without PWB first having cleared the information in question with a competent AC-AMG authority.

1453

ELLERY W. STONE
Rear Admiral, USNR,
Chief Commissioner.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 9261/61/EC.

9th March 1945.

SUBJECT: PWB Activities in Liberated Italy.

TO : Public Relations Branch.

Herewith for your information a further extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Political Conference of 2nd March 1945 at which this subject was discussed.

/JG.

F.W. Steams
Chief Staff Officer
to the Executive Commissioner.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

EXTRACT

TOP SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, APO 512

SAC (P) (45) 2nd Meeting
2 March 1945

K 95

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE, POLITICAL

* * *

2. PWB ACTIVITIES IN LIBERATED ITALY

(Previous reference SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting, Minute 2)

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARDING reported that PWB had been authorized to hand over the distribution of news within liberated ITALY to private press agencies as from 4 March. A draft telegram to the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting out previous PWB responsibilities in liberated ITALY, enumerating those activities which had already been handed back to the Italians and stating plans for the future turnover of other functions, would be circulated for consideration at a future meeting.

MR. BARNES reported that a measure of agreement had been reached between AC, the US and British Embassies and PWB in respect of which further functions should be returned to Italian control and that the details of this agreement would be submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander for approval, through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above.

* * *

1451

TOP SECRET

(COPY)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
LIBERATED ITALY HQ.

1 March 1945

Minutes of PWB Meeting with ANSA, SI AND ORBIS AGENCIES

PRESENT:

Mr. Ehman
Mr. Titchener
Mr. Linen
Mr. Bancroft
Mr. Thomason
Mr. Meryll
Mr. Fischbach
Mr. Barzini (SI)
Mr. Quarenta (SI)
Mr. Isacchi (ANSA)
Mr. Forlaj (ORBIS)
Mr. Rossi (ORBIS)
Mr. Pedicini (ORBIS)

1. Mr. Ehman and Mr. Meryll outlined the purpose of the meeting which was to explain to the three news agencies represented that PWB wished to buy their services and to discuss prices. It was explained that PWB was different from any other customer in that any contracts it signed necessarily would be limited to the duration of its stay in Italy. Mr. Meryll explained that, despite the fact that the financial proposals each agency made to PWB had met with PWB approval, PWB was eager to discuss these proposals openly with all agencies involved before signing with any one of them. It had therefore been decided to call such a meeting.

2. The three agencies present could offer PWB the following volume of Italian news daily: ORBIS, about 5000 words; SI, about 4500 words and ANSA some 10,000 words. In addition, SI would make available a file of Liberated Italy news in English for PWB's use in its English-language output. These three services would provide PWB with complete Liberated Italy news coverage.

3. Mr. Meryll then communicated the financial proposals made by the agencies. ORBIS asked 4000 lire, SI 15,000 and ANSA 25,000 lire a month. PWB had agreed to all these figures as a fair cost for the services they would pay for. It was pointed out that SI asked for somewhat more than what it was being paid by individual Rome papers. Mr. Barzini explained that he had considered PWB as an agency and not as a paper and had therefore asked for the same amount the other agencies were saying SI. It was agreed that this was fair. ANSA's larger figure was justified by Mr. Isacchi by the fact that ANSA issued a larger file. He added that this figure was less than that paid by some of the Rome papers.

4. All agencies then were asked whether they approved the figures proposed. Mr. Barzini thanked PWB for its open approach to the question and expressed the hope that relations between his agency and PWB would be better in the future than in the past. He also said ANSA was right in asking a higher figure and that he had no objection to that. Mr. Forlaj said that the low price ORBIS asked was not based on commercial considerations, but was intended as evidence of its desire to establish friendly cooperation with PWB which would benefit both parties.

1450

5. The first part of the meeting was concluded in full agreement on the different prices at which PWB would buy the SI, ANSA and ORBIS files of Liberated Italy news. Payment would be retroactive to the date on which PWB

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

1. Mr. Edman and Mr. Meryll outlined the purpose of the meeting which was to explain to the three news agencies represented that PWB wished to buy their services and to discuss prices. It was explained that PWB was different from any other customer in that any contracts it signed necessarily would be limited to the duration of its stay in Italy. Mr. Meryll explained that, despite the fact that the financial proposals each agency made to PWB had met with PWB approval, PWB was eager to discuss these proposals openly with all agencies involved before signing with any one of them. It had therefore been decided to call such a meeting.

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4. All agencies then were asked whether they approved the figures proposed. Mr. Berzini thanked PWB for its open approach to the question and expressed the hope that relations between his agency and PWB would be better in the future than in the past. He also said ANSA was right in asking a higher figure and that he had no objection to that. Mr. Forlaj said that the low price ORBIS asked was not based on commercial considerations, but was intended as evidence of its desire to establish friendly cooperation with PWB which would benefit both parties.

1450

5. The first part of the meeting was concluded in full agreement on the different prices at which PWB would buy the SI, ANSA and ORBIS files of Liberated Italy news. Payment would be retroactive to the date on which PWB began receiving these services. These dates are as follows: ANSA as of 15 January 1945, SI and ORBIS as of 15 February 1945.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

6. Mr. Meryll then told the meeting that PWB was also interested in buying a world news service in Italian. It proposed to buy such a service from ANSA and would be ready to look into the usefulness of the world news files of any of the other news agencies. SI and ORBIS said they had no world news file at the present moment and therefore were not concerned with the question. Mr. Meryll told the meeting that ANSA had asked 50,000 lire for its 15,000 words of world news in Italian and that PWB had agreed to this figure. Mr. Rossi of ORBIS asked on what basis this figure had been agreed upon. He wished to know whether it was on the basis of the number of foreign agencies ANSA processed, or on the basis of the number of items it issued. Mr. Meryll answered that PWB judged the file on the basis of its usefulness and scope rather than by the number of foreign agencies processed. Mr. Bancroft said that whenever other agencies would have a world news file in Italian, PWB would study it to determine whether or not it could be of use. Mr. Linen said that the purpose of buying the services of news agencies is not to buy all agencies in the business, but to buy several representative ones which would assure PWB complete coverage on a basis of impartiality. PWB could not commit itself to buy any new service that might spring up.

7. It was agreed that the contract with ANSA for its world news service in Italian likewise should be retroactive to 15 January.

Distribution

One copy to each present at this meeting

Admiral Ellery W. Stone, Chief Commissioner, AC
Mr. G. Stewart Brown, PWB, A.C.
Mr. Russell Barnes, Chief, PWB, AFHQ
Mr. Stuart, British Press Attache
Captain C. C. Anderson, U. S. Press Attache
Colonel Munro, Chief Press Officer, PWB
Mr. Bookman, Chief, Forward News Operations

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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HMS/epc

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394

1st March, 1945

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting held in the Allied Commission on Wednesday February 28th, 1945 to discuss final arrangements for news distribution by private agencies.

Present:

Mr. Stewart Brown	Public Relation Officer, A.C.
Lt.Col.J.L.Hayden	F.W.B.
Lt.Col.H.H.Scudder,	Communications Sub-Commission A.C.
Major J.F.Condon,	U.S.A.A.C.
Mr.George Edman,	F.W.B.

Representatives of:

Associated Press
United Press
International News
Exchange Telegraph
Reuters
Ansa
Orbis
S.I.
N.A.I.
Italcable
Azienda di Stato

Mr.Stewart Brown presided and opened the meeting by reading the A.F.H.Q. communication authorising as of March 1st, 1945 distribution of news in Italian Government territory by private news agencies.

From the discussion which ensued it was established that complete withdrawal of F.W.B. present service on March 1st was somewhat precipitate. It was therefore agreed:

a. that F.W.B. would continue its present service until March 4th, 1945. Mr Brown will make a written

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ments for news distribution by private agencies.

Present:

Mr. Stewart Brown	Public Relation Officer, A.C.
Lt.Col.J.L.Hayden	U.S.C.
Lt.Col.H.H.Scudder,	Communications Sub-Commission A.C.
Major J.G.London,	A.A.A.C.
Mr.George Edman,	P.W.B.

Representatives of:

Associated Press
United Press
International News
Exchange Telegraph
Reuters
Ansa
Orbis
S.I.
E.A.I.
Italcable
Azienda di Stato

Mr.Stewart Brown presided and opened the meeting by reading the A.F.H.Q. communication authorising as of March 1st, 1945 distribution of news in Italian Government territory by private news agencies.

From the discussion which ensued it was established that complete withdrawal of P.W.B. present service on March 1st was somewhat precipitate. It was therefore agreed:

a. That P.W.B. would continue its present service until midnight March 4th, 1945. Mr Brown will make a written request to P.W.B. to this effect

b. Communication facilities for news distribution will be available from March 1st and any news agency wishing to use such facilities may do so without awaiting P.W.B's withdrawal of its service.

H.H.SCUDDER
Lt.Colonel,
Secretary.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

244/R1/PRB February 28, 1945.

Press Release - Immediate.

In keeping with its declared policy and in accordance with instructions from Allied Force Headquarters, the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) on March 5 will terminate its responsibility for furnishing news to Italian newspapers and radio stations in Liberated Italy, the Allied Commission announced today.

After that date commercial agencies and communications companies will be free to operate in this area.

It is expected by that date the four information Allies published under the editorial direction of PWB will cease publishing as Allied-controlled organs.

Those papers are:

Giornale di Sicilia	(Palermo)
Corriere di Sicilia	(Catania)
La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno	(Bari)
Risorgimento	(Naples)

If any of these papers continue publishing, it will be as private enterprises and will be detached from PWB or any other Allied control, and symbolic of the return of an independent press in Italy.

Since the original invasion the PWB News Division has been supplying press and radio in liberated Italy with a complete world and local news file, except when the press of Rome was captured, together with the PWB "Corriere di Roma", by combined control on January 15th.

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PASSED FOR PUBLICATION BY FIELD PRESS CENSOR.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
Office of the Executive Commissioner.

Ref: 9261/58/CC.

27 February 1945.

SUBJECT: Future of PWB.

TO : Public Relations Branch.

1. Further to my letters 9261/18/CCS of 4 January 1945 and 9261/20/CCS of 6 January 1945.

2. Herewith for your information extract from the Minutes of SACMED's Political Meeting held on 20 February at which this matter was again discussed.

/JG.

for F.W. Stevens
Chief Staff Officer,
to the Executive Commissioner.

Copy to: File 9267/20.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

EXTRACT.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 1st Meeting.
20th February 1945.

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL).

2. FUTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH.

(Previous reference: SAC(P)(44) 37th Meeting - Conclusion 5(b))

MAJOR GENERAL LEMNITZER explained that, in accordance with conclusion 5(b) of SAC (P) (44) 37th Meeting, a directive describing the organization of PWB and laying down its functions for the future and the procedure by which these would be controlled had been prepared and issued.* A copy of this directive, which was drawn in general terms, had been sent to WASHINGTON.

MR. MACMILLAN added that a detailed scheme for transferring PWB functions in liberated ITALY was being worked out.

MR. BARNES reported that private press agencies were now operating in ROME.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE reported that the Technical Sub-Committee previously set up, of which he was Chairman, had now completed its work and it was proposed to hand over to private agencies as from 1st March PWB's responsibility for the dissemination of news in liberated ITALY other than ROME.

THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

Took note of the above reports.

*AFHQ Staff Memorandum No.13 (1945).

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

9/PRB 20 February 1945.

SUBJECT : Reports of A.C. Sub-commissions

TO : Mr. George Edman, Head,
PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) HQ.

Further to my letter of 16 February in reply to yours of 5 February, I quote below letter received from Major Waldman, G-5 Section, AFHQ, on the above subject :

"1. In reply to your letter of 16 Feb., subject Reports of A.C. Sub-commissions, copies of cited reports are sent by this Headquarters to Major General A.V. Anderson, OBE, Director Civil Affairs, War Office, Whitehall, SW.1, London.

2. It is suggested that Mr. George Edman be advised of this procedure and it is recommended that PWE in London obtain its information from that source."

I hope this gives you the answer.

G. STEWART BROWN -
Public Relations Director.

1444

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
Press Branch
APO 512

18 February 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Mr. G. Stewart Brown, Director, Public Relations Branch, Allied Commission.

1. In reply to your letter of 15 February, subject Reports of A.C. Sub-commissions, copies of cited reports are sent by this Headquarters to Major General A. V. Anderson, CBE, Director Civil Affairs, War Office, Whitehall SW 1, London.

2. It is suggested that Mr. George Edman be advised of this procedure and it is recommended that PWE in London obtain its information from that source.

Floyd E. Reidman

FLOYD E. REIDMAN
Major, Air Corps,
G-5 Press Officer.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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15th February, 1945.

To: Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, PWB AFHQ.

From: George W. Ehman,
Head, PWB Liberated Italy HQ.

Subject: La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno at Bari.

Herewith are comments on the points raised in a memorandum to you under date 14th February, 1945 from Mr. Lente Gould. The points were discussed at a meeting held on February 13th in the office of Mr. James Stewart, Head of PWB Unit No. 9.

1. PWB should not meddle. Italian agencies have assured Admiral Stone's Committee of Communications that there will be sufficient communications facilities available by March 1.

(a) De-requisitioning is the business of AC with the Army if that is the desirable and necessary solution. Mr. Raleigh Bedford has offered to discuss the matter with AFHQ with a view to ensuring that the continued printing of this newspaper is not prejudiced by the fact that it is produced on machines under the control of Army Printing and Stationery (British military). There is always the possibility that even with the goodwill of Major Bale such permission may not be possible if it is not in keeping with Army regulations. That is the point which Mr. Bedford has first got to settle. PWB certainly does recognise the importance of La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno in Apuglia and so does the Italian Press Commission, which has agreed in principle not to reduce the circulation. The entire background and the problem facing La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno will be discussed with Mr. Stuart Brown, PWB-AC.

1 4 1

2. There is no reason why PWB-employed monitoring personnel should not be taken over by La Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno and Radio Bari if they are no longer needed by PWB. However, UNU (United Nations News Service) will not, and must not, be available. PWB is definitely going out of business in Liberated Italy. What will be done to prevent printing of news will be a problem for the Italians to deal with.

2

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3. The financial situation is one we can do little about now. The paper was taken over by Colonel Hazeltine in September 1943 and he made the arrangements for its continuance under its present ownership and name. The point is well taken, however, and plans being approved for the North would prevent the repetition of a similar situation.

4. The newsprint problem is serious. It has been called to the attention of Italian authorities, including His Excellence Bonomi, on several occasions, the latest being 10 days to 2 weeks ago. However, distribution of newsprint in territory under Italian Government jurisdiction is an Italian problem. Through the Allied Publications Board enough newsprint is deducted to serve papers in AFB territory. The Naples developments last week may have produced a crisis such as is often needed to precipitate action and a healthy reaction. A delegation has appeared before the Italian Press Commission to discuss the Naples problem. No doubt there will be action of some kind.

GWH

GEORGE W. HEMAN, Head,
PWB (Liberated Italy) HQ.

Copies to: Col. I.S. Munro
Mr. Gnudi
Mr. Stewart
Mr. Ellison
Mr. Linen
Mr. Stuart Brown, AC.——

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

9/PRB

16 February 1945.

SUBJECT : Reports of A.C. Sub-commissions

TO : Major Floyd Weidman, G-5, AFHQ.

Your attention is called to the attached copy of a memo from Mr. Edman of PWB. We have replied as per attached copy.

We would appreciate information as to how these reports are handled from AFHQ and, if our information is not correct, will you please let us know what the practice has been. If it has not been customary to send the reports to London, do you see any objections to our complying with the request of PWE?

Encl: 2 copies

G. STEWART BROWN
Public Relations
Director.

1240

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

9/PRB 16 February 1945.

SUBJECT : Reports of A.C. Sub-commissions

TO : Mr. George Edman, Head,
PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) HQ.

With reference to your letter of 5 February to Rear Admiral Stone, it has been our practice to send copies of all reports of Sub-commissions of the Allied Commission to G-5 at AFHQ. It is our understanding that from AFHQ they are sent to the respective Governments in London and Washington. We are, however, checking with G-5 AFHQ to determine whether this is the actual practice and, if not, whether copies of these reports can be forwarded by the British Section to PWE in London.

G. STEWART BROWN
Public Relations Director.

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FEB 6 RECD

PRB-1

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS

P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

5 February 1945

To: Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone, Chief Commissioner, Hq. A. C.

From: George W. Edman, Head; PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) HQ.

The following request has come to me today from PWE, London:

"Re: Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission in Italy:

"We are at present receiving very little material about the work of the Sub-Commissions of the Allied Commission in Italy. Such items as we do receive come to us as very brief summaries in telegrams from Civil Affairs. ("Civil Affairs" is Dr. Klibansky's description. I cannot eludicate who exactly sends these telegrams.)

"The detailed reports of the various subcommissions on the other hand contain valuable material for use in propaganda about the work of reconstruction in Italy performed with Allied help.

"We would therefore be grateful is you would arrange for a regular supply for us of these reports to start as soon as possible.

"We would also very much to have a regular copy of the AMG 5th and 8th Army Reports."

If we can help with this, we are at your service, but it would appear to be more the job of your PRO. At any rate, will you have someone let me know your decision so that I may reply?

George W. Edman

GEORGE W. EDMAN, HEAD
PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) HQ.

1238

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION

I8II5/F

I February I945

SUBJECT : Financial Arrangements for Sales of Books.

TO : (I) Chief Commissioner
(2) Public Relations Officer (Major Fielden).

I. At a meeting with PWB on I7 January I945, you directed the Finance Sub-Commission to investigate the financial arrangements for royalties and copyright fees on books.

2. The question was raised with the Financial Adviser, G-5, AFHQ, and I attach a copy of his reply, in which he concludes that foreign exchange transfers of such payments is forbidden by existing CCS directives and that these transfers are but one of many types of commercial transactions that will not be permitted until there is a general lifting of the Trading with the Enemy restrictions.

3. I would advise against pressing the matter further at this time. We will discuss this and similar problems with Messrs. Wade (British Treasury) and Glasser (American Treasury) during their forthcoming visit.

4. It should be noted that royalties may continue to accrue in US/UK and Italy; the Trading with the Enemy merely prevents remittance of such funds.

"(Signed) J. Lawler
Colonel, GSC."
Joint Director
Finance Sub-Commission

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

3

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

FAS/mjm

29 January 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE : G-5/123.7

SUBJECT: Financial Arrangements for Sales of Books.

TO : Headquarters, Allied Commission, APO 394.
(Attention: Finance Sub-Commission)

1. Your letter 13115/F of 24 January requests this Section to send a message to C.C.A.C. asking, (a), what should be done with royalties and copyright fees accruing in lire, and (b) what disposition is currently being made of royalties and fees accruing in U.S. and U.K. for Italian account.

2. We are reluctant to pass this request to the C.C.A.C. because it is our view that the information is already available to A.C. As to (a), TAM 136 makes it clear that the C.C.A.C. does not yet intend to permit the utilization of Italian dollar or sterling exchange for the transfer of commercial lire balances of this type. As to (b), TAM 420 reiterates that the U.S. and U.K. Treasuries do not at this time contemplate authorizing the depletion of blocked Italian assets in the U.S. or U.K. See our letter G-5/383.6-2 of 17 January 1945 for the terms upon which, subject to appropriate Italian arrangements, individual Italians may arrange for very limited utilization of their dollar assets. In the case of the U.K. not even this limited utilization of sterling assets is contemplated.

3. The basic situation, as we understand it, is that neither the U.K. nor the U.S. Treasuries are yet prepared to modify the Trading-with-the-Enemy regulations as applied to Italian dollar and sterling assets.

(Sgd) FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR.,
Commander, U.S.N.R.,
Financial Adviser.

1426

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB-COMMISSION
TEL: 47860h

13115/F

30 January 1945

SUBJECT: Financial Arrangements for Sales of Books.

TO : Major Fielden
Public Relations Officer

1. With reference to the attached copy of minutes, I enclose a copy of a letter addressed to G-5, AFHQ, requesting that the financial problems connected with the sale of books be brought to the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

J. J. Lawler
Cmdr. U.S.C.G.R.
Joint Director,
Finance Sub-Commission.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
FINANCE SUB - COMMISSION

13115/F

24 January 1945

SUBJECT : Financial Arrangements for Sales of Books.

TO : G - 5 (Financial Adviser) AFHQ.

1. In recent discussions between AC and PWB the question of the financial arrangements for payment of royalties and fees earned by the sale in U.S. and U.K. of Italian books published there since the Armistice and of American and British books published and sold in Italy since the Armistice was raised. The Chief Commissioner requested that the matter be referred to CCS.

2. I should be grateful if a message could be sent to CCAC, describing the problem and requesting a decision as to what to should be done with royalties and copyright fees accruing in lire. We should also like information as to what disposition is being currently made of such, royalties and fees accruing in the U.S. and U.K.

For the Chief Commissioner

Joint Director
Finance Sub - Commission

BM.T/msg

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

6

Chief Commissioner.

cc. 309.

Attached is submitted for your information/signature/approval.

I agree that no fresean should be made

1/2 · Agree Ins HS/4L 1433
cc

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

5

Chief of Staff
for Chief Commissioner.

As you will see the Finance Sub-Commission have taken action, as on the opposite page, on your directive re Books at the PWB reorganisation meeting.

2 Feb '45.

Lowe Snelden Major

CoS 6

Re - Book royalties and Copyright fees - As will be noted #2 folio 4 payments are forbidden by present CCS directives.

PRO to see.

3 Feb.

I agree - no fresh cert. HS (4)2

8

PRO To note. HS (6)2

Noted. 7/2

SECRET

PRB

SECRET

K 54

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

SAC (P) (45) 3. (Withdrawal)
6th February, 1945

COPY NO. 38

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
(POLITICAL)

REDEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES OF PWB

Note by Secretary

1. In consequence of the issue of Staff Memorandum No. 13 on 5 February defining responsibilities for Psychological Warfare in the Mediterranean Theatre, the Chief of Staff has directed that Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 be withdrawn.

2. Copy holders are accordingly requested to return their copies as soon as possible to this Secretariat.

3. Points of detail covered in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 which are not explicitly dealt with in Staff Memorandum No. 13 will be handled through the usual channels in accordance with the procedures laid down in Staff Memorandum No. 13.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	7
Chief of Staff	8
Chief Administrative Officer	9-10
Deputy Chief of Staff	11
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	12
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	13
Chief, G-3 Operations Section	14
Chief, G-3 Plans Section	15
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	16-17
Chief, Liaison Section	18
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ MAAF	19-23
U.S. Political Adviser	24-26

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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3. Points of detail covered in Paper No. SAC (P) (45) 3 which are not explicitly dealt with in Staff Memorandum No. 13 will be handled through the usual channels in accordance with the procedures laid down in Staff Memorandum No. 16.

J. H. LASCELLES
COLONEL
SECRETARY.

Distribution

	Copy No.
Supreme Allied Commander	1
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander	2
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	3-4
Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	5
Commander, Eighth Fleet, USN	6
Deputy Air Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean	7
Chief of Staff	8
Chief Administrative Officer	9-10
Deputy Chief of Staff	11
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2	12
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3	13
Chief, G-3 Operations Section	14
Chief, G-3 Plans Section	15
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5	16-17
Chief, Liaison Section	18
Director of Operations and Intelligence, HQ NAAF	19-23
U.S. Political Adviser	24-26
British Resident Minister	27-30
Director, PWB	31-35
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	36-38
Secretary, General Staff	39

1431

INTER SERVICE AND POLITICAL SECRETARIAT
Room 2002,
1st Floor
Archway B.

CoS IISM 1st — 8 Feb 45
Chief Comm
C-S
P.R.B.1.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

G/PRB 6 February 1945.

SUBJECT : COMMENTS ON PWB MEMO "SERVICING OF PWB 15TH ARMY GROUP FROM PWB LIBERATED ITALY".

TO : The Chief Commissioner, A.C.

You have asked me to comment on the PWB draft memorandum which alludes specifically to continuing PWB Operations in Liberated Italy. I feel bound to say - perhaps this is a personal view! - that this memorandum strikes me as an evasive and almost dishonest document which in fact undercuts the whole basis of the proposed PWB liquidation - or at any rate could be used to do so. If SACMED agrees to the action required of him in the concluding paragraph, it appears to me that PWB can operate in Liberated Italy until kingdom come.

The first three paragraphs of the memorandum lead up to one conclusion which comes at the end of the third paragraph viz: "that a Central News operation will be required and that Rome should remain its location".

Is this really true?

The arguments adduced for it are
(a) that "Rome is the only centre where adequate facilities exist or are likely to exist" (Paragraph 1)
(b) that "at least some portion" (unspecified) of facilities for Austria and the Balkans would be required in Liberated Italy (Paragraph 2), and
(c) that various vaguely-defined activities, which include "the transmission of specialised items required by OWI and PWE", can only be discharged "if PWB maintains one strong central news operation".

In other words - in my view - PWB is going to remain just exactly where it is!

Take the three arguments seriatim. "Rome is the only centre etc.". This is nonsense. With the single exception of a large radio set-up, all facilities exist, and will exist, in other centres. And PWB, we know, is going to operate radio at XV Army Group and in Caserta - and possibly in Bari also! "Facilities for Austria and the Balkans". I just don't understand what this means and I am suspicious of it. I guess

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Therefore I do not see any case at all for a "strong central news operation" and I see everything against it.

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PWB was directed, as I understand, to liquidate by March 1; now here they are establishing a strong central news operation. Let them do that North of the Army Control line : but if they do it in Rome, then it means the perpetuation ad infinitum of ANSA, requisitioning (not only for printing but for photography and cinema and posters and leaflets and staff!) and, in fact, the complete PWB set-up. "Liquidation" becomes a farce.

Paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 deal with radio, and make what seem to me quite outrageous demands. The PWB are said to require :

One 20 kw long-wave transmitter
" unspecified short-wave transmitter
" unspecified medium-wave transmitter
" unspecified 1 kw transmitter.

All these are at Torre Nova near Rome.

In addition the PWB require, in this connection "certain"(unspecified) "office facilities, which can most conveniently remain in Italcable offices".

In other words PWB clamps down on Italcable office space (thus no doubt preserving ANSA as well as upsetting our plans for Italcable) and apparently holds on to a very large part of Rome's transmitting equipment.

I cannot believe that this is necessary. When in India I managed to get quite good coverage under difficult atmospheric conditions of an area 2000 miles square with a 20 kw transmitter. Of course one can always go for better coverage ad infinitum, but why should PWB Rome do that, when England has got multitudes of transmitters?

Paragraphs 5 and 6 seem to retreat a little from the previous position but the memorandum is so muddled that it is difficult to be sure which transmitters are referred to. It seems clear that PWB intend to initiate transmissions on the new Rome short-wave and Bari I, when they come into operation. My previous objections stand, only more forcibly. To seize time on new transmitters in territory which we have handed over seems an absolute negation of Italian jurisdiction.

Incidentally, the argument that Allied material has gone into some transmitters does not, surely, mean that we use them for ever, but only that the Italian Government should pay for the repairs.

1429

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Incidentally, the argument that Allied material has gone into some transmitters does not, surely, mean that we use them for ever, but only that the Italian Government should pay for the repairs.

1429

5½ hours per day <u>at peak periods</u> is - as you have already pointed out - far too much. But this point can be more forcefully contested if specific details of the programmes are supplied, and their value and necessity contrasted with similar programmes emanating from other sources e.g. London, Cairo, Algiers, or even U.S., whose short-wave programmes have a good kick behind them.

Paragraph 7 is very controversial. PWB's "agreement with" (read "dictation to") RAI is to include PWB's retention of "accommodation, technical equipment and personnel". What does this mean? It might mean anything : it certainly can NOT mean that RAI is master in its own studios! All this guff about "technical advice and assistance" being necessary

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is designed to keep PWB in being : Italian technicians are excellent and I don't believe that RAI could not provide a perfectly good technical service without PWB's intervention, and without reserving "accommodation".

Paragraph 8 states that German intelligence "is properly a function of PWB 15th Army Group" but "will function in Rome as long as proximity to AFHQ makes this desirable".

Presumably this means that the monitoring report has to be given to Caserta. If technical equipment or the lack of it makes it inevitable that Axis broadcasts be monitored at Rome (which I very much doubt : monitoring can be done almost anywhere) I fail to see why the material cannot be sent to Caserta and collated and distributed by the Unit there. Why in Rome?

Paragraph 9 leaves PWB absolutely free to maintain any and all printing requisitions it likes in Liberated Italy. No comment is necessary, except that PWB's printing, as far as one knows, is now limited to (a) leaflets and (b) controlled papers in forward areas. Obviously such printing can be done North of the Army control line.

To sum up, here is a logical case built on false premises. If you ask "why a strong central news operation in Rome?" PWB will reply "Because we have adequate facilities for monitoring, and for Austria and the Balkans", and if you ask "Why monitoring, and Austria and the Balkans in Rome?" the reply will (very soon) be "Because we have a strong central news organisation there". These are the tactics of limpets, not liquidators!

14128

LIONEL FIELDEN
Major
Public Relations Branch.

Copy to: Chief of Staff.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

1 DRAFT.

Servicing of PWB 15th. Army Group, from PWB liberated Italy.

1. The proposal to liquidate or transfer the greater part of PWB functions in liberated Italy south of the AOI while retaining these functions virtually unchanged in German-Occupied Italy, and in the disturbed areas behind the front makes its necessary to examine and lay down those central functions which have hitherto been shared by PWB units throughout Italy, and to define those of which the continuance is necessary for the efficient running of PWB 15th Army Group. For communications and other technical reasons it is desirable that certain of these technical functions should continue to be operated in Liberated Italy, particularly in Rome, which is the only centre where adequate facilities exist ~~xxx~~ or are likely to exist. The present memorandum sets out those facilities which PWB will require for the efficient working of its operations both in Italy and in other areas where its responsibilities continue.

2. While the facilities discussed in this memorandum are primarily those needed for PWB operations in North Italy these same facilities will be of very considerable assistance to PWB in its operations towards the Balkans and Austria, and that at least some portion of them would in any case be required in Liberated Italy itself in respect of those functions which PWB is likely to retain in the immediate future.

3. News. Cable and other communication facilities, establish Rome, at least in the immediate future as the only possible ~~xxxxx~~ centre for the reception and dissemination within the Mediterranean Theatre of world news and news from liberated Italy. In greater detail the responsibilities of PWB in this field, which includes the transmission back to the U.S. and Great Britain of specialised items required by OWI and PWB, are set out in the attached memorandum of 19th January drawn up by Mr. Bancroft, and this memorandum emphasises the fact that these responsibilities can be efficiently and effectively discharged, only if PWB maintains one strong central news operation. It is therefore suggested that a Central News operation will be required and that Rome should retain its location.

4. The technical facilities required for the operation as envisaged are set forth in the attached memorandum of 20th January from Mr. Bancroft and Mr. King. In the opinion of PWB these facilities represent the minimum possible required for the efficient ~~xxxxxx~~ working of the system. They are set forth in greater detail in the memorandum already cited. To summarise PWB will need one 20 Kw. long wave transmitter, one medium wave transmitter, and one short wave transmitter, together with a 1 Kw. transmitter for use towards Austria and other more distant objectives. The first mentioned transmitter was requisitioned from Italcable and reconditioned with U.S. equipment. The second and third were constructed by PWB from captured enemy equipment and U.S. equipment. The last mentioned was requisitioned from Italcable, and reconditioned with U.S. equipment. All four are located at Torinova. In addition to this equipment certain ~~xxxx~~ facilities will be required, and these can most conveniently remain in Italcable offices.

5. Radio. Under the suggested reddition of radio to the control of RAI the reservation is made that time be reserved to PWB for operational broadcasts to AFHQ targets. Schedules have been prepared in the case of Rome short wave (Hope) and Bari I, and are attached to this memorandum. Such schedules include transmissions at present in operation or transmissions

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

CONFIDENTIAL

which it is proposed to initiate in order more effectively to bring Psychological warfare to bear on targets laid down by AFHQ. Subject to those two transmitters PWB would not desire to reserve time on any Italian transmitters in the territory South of the present ACL, as it feels that the advantages to be gained by such reservation would be offset by the adverse reaction of the Italian authorities to such reservation of time which would necessarily diminish the time available to PAI.

6. The home short wave schedule makes provision for the reservation of five hours each day, and on Part 1 of 5½ hours each day. While it is not desired to consider these as fixed and unalterable requirements PWB would be prepared to agree that they represent the maximum possible requirements xx be prepared to agree that requests to vary these schedules would only be made as the result of an agreement with PAI, and to hand back to PAI at the earliest possible moment such periods as may become redundant.

7. In respect of such transmissions PWB will provide PAI with tech nical advice and assistance to meet the needs of such operational pro rammes, subject to an agreement with PAI to leave at the disposal of PWB for the purpose of these broadcasts the existing accommodation technical equipment and personnel, the agreement to be modified only insofar as may be mutually agreed between PWB and PAI.

8. Intelligence. PWB German Intelligence which is properly a function of PWB 15th Army Group will function in Rome as long as proximity to AFHQ makes this desirable.

9. Printing. PWB will require to retain in liberated Italy requisitioned printing works for the preparation of operational output such as leaflets where security and concentration of speed are necessary. PWB will review its needs under this heading and provide for the immediate dereuisitioning of such plants as are no longer required for the above purposes.

With regard to the PAI will be asked to direct (a) that PWB retain the technical facilities and accommodation referred to in paras 3 and 5, or their equivalent.
(b) that PWB be permitted to retain operating time on the transmitters Rome short wave, and Part I in accordance with the schedules referred to in paras 5 and 6, or such modifications as may be agreed between PWB and PAI.
(c) that PWB retain such printing facilities in Liberated Italy as may be required to carry out the responsibilities alluded to in para 9.

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DCK/ar

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
APO 512

STAFF MEMORANDUM)
: 5 February 1945
NUMBER 13)

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE RESPONSIBILITIES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

AFHQ Staff Memorandum Number 56 and Section II, Number 62, both 1943 and AFHQ Staff Memorandum Number 97, 1944, together with any other instructions regarding the responsibilities of PWB, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

I --- ORGANIZATION OF PWB

1. The Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of AFHQ operates under a Director, appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander and directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. The Director is assisted by a Deputy Director, who will be British if the Director is American and vice-versa.

2. The Director of PWB is responsible for its internal administration as to personnel, resources and technical operations.

3. PWB includes personnel and operating resources of the US Office of War Information (OWI) and of the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office (PID) in the Mediterranean Theater, and other military and civilian personnel.

II -- ACTIVITIES OF PWB

1. PWB is responsible in general for propaganda and other psychological warfare activities in support of AFHQ objectives in any areas in this Theater as directed by the Supreme Allied Commander. In particular, until otherwise instructed by the Supreme Allied Commander, PWB is at present responsible for the following principal activities:

a. "Tactical" propaganda in support of operations by Fifth and Eighth Armies.

b. "Strategic" propaganda of incitement or instruction to resistance elements in the general area of 15th Army Group's operations and instructions to disturbed populations in the area of AMG behind the front.

c. Depressive or surrender propaganda directed to enemy troops and populations.

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AFHQ Staff Memo # 13 (cont'd)

d. Propaganda of general political incitement to the population of AUSTRIA.

e. Propaganda (to be carried out exclusively by a unit of the Branch's British element) in support of Land Forces and Military Liaison GREECE.

f. Propaganda in support of Military Liaison in other areas as may be requested by G-5.

III - DIRECTION OF PWB ACTIVITIES

1. Psychological Warfare activities in this Theater will be conducted in accordance with the psychological and political global warfare policy as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Theater policy will be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander on the advice of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee This Sub-Committee will report to the Chief of Staff, and will consist of:

Chief, IMC - Chairman
Director, PWB
Deputy Director, PWB
US Political Advisor (or his representative)
British Resident Minister (or his representative)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ (or his representative)
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, AFHQ (or his representative)

together with such other persons as the Sub-Committee may from time to time coopt

2. Propaganda directives, based on the directives of PWE, LONDON, and OWI, WASHINGTON, will be drawn up by PWB. PWB will be responsible for obtaining concurrences of the Chief, IMC; the US Political Advisor; the British Resident Minister; G-2, AFHQ; G-3, AFHQ; G-5, AFHQ; and of any other agency which the Chief of Staff may prescribe. After concurrence, the directives will be distributed by PWB.

3. Activities carried on by PWB in any area within the Theater will cease, or be transferred to other agencies, as directed by the Supreme Allied Commander. Such cessation or transfer will be in accordance with detailed plans, fixing the time and manner of cessation or transfer of activities, and the agencies, if any, to which responsibility is to be transferred. Except as the Supreme Allied Commander has instructed or may instruct otherwise, such plans will be prepared by PWB and coordinated with all other interested agencies, and will be submitted for approval of the Chief of Staff through the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee, AFHQ.

BY COMMAND OF FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER:

C. W. CHRISTENBERRY,
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A"
10 - PWB (extra)

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DRAFT.

REORGANISATION OF PWB, LIBERATED ITALY.

1. This memorandum sets out the measure of agreement reached between AC, The U.S. and British Embassies, and PWB in respect of the transfer of PWB functions to other Allied Agencies or their addition to Italian Control. This agreement was reached at a series of meetings held between the interested parties and the decisions put forward are being forwarded to AFHQ for approval; subject to such approval the transfer of functions will take place either on or about the dates indicated under the various headings, or at the earliest possible date that can be agreed by the various interested parties subject to the continued efficient working of all necessary services.

2. In order to facilitate the liquidation of PWB functions in liberated Italy two separate HQ have been set up. (a) PWB Liberated Italy, HQ at Rome, Head: Mr. George Orman, Deputy Head: Mr. Lanham Titchener. (b) PWB 15th Army Group HQ at Florence, Head: Mr. John Rayner, Deputy Head: American, to be appointed

3. PWB Liberated Italy is responsible for all Psychological Warfare activities in Italy South of the Army Control Line, and is charged with the liquidation and transfer of these activities in agreement with AFHQ, AC, and the U.S. and British Embassies.

4. PWB 15th Army Group is responsible for all propaganda directed against the enemy in German Occupied Italy, for all propaganda directed towards the population of the same area, and for propaganda of consolidation in liberated Italian territory North of the Army control line.

5. In order efficiently to carry out its responsibility towards German occupied Italy and the territory North of the Army Control Line, PWB 15th Army Group will need to retain certain central services in Rome and elsewhere on Italian territory South of the Army Control Line. The nature and extent of these services is still under discussion, and a separate memorandum xxxxx is being prepared and xxxxx will be put forward to AFHQ xxxxxxx through normal channels. The present memorandum is not concerned with these services.

6. News. In accordance with instructions from SHAEF, private news agencies are already operating in the city of Rome, and are now at liberty to sell world news directly to the Italian newspapers in Rome. A technical sub-committee is at present sitting, under the chairmanship of Rear Admiral Stone, and is studying the communications problems involved in the admission of private news agencies to similar privileges in other parts of Liberated Italy. When the communications problems have been solved it is agreed that PWB will cease to have any responsibility for the supply of news to the Italian press and radio. It is thought that this transfer will take place on or about 1st March. In the meantime PWB is continuing to supply world news to the Italian radio, to the Italian press outside Rome, and to supply to the press and radio throughout Liberated Italy, news of Liberated Italy.

After March 1st, or such other date as the technical sub-committee may determine, PWB Liberated Italy, will have the following news responsibilities, other than those referred to in para 5. (a) The provision of a news[illegible] monitoring unit at Caserta for the reception and distribution within AFHQ of news and monitored intelligence material. (b) The retention at Rome of a similar unit for the servicing of PWB Liberated Italy, (it was agreed that PWB would make available to AC copies of this news service).

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The unit at Caserta is already functioning, though further transfers of staff will be required to provide the service required by AFHQ. The unit at Rome will in practice form part of the organisation required for the central servicing of PWB 15th Army Group, but arrangements have already been made to ensure that PWB news activities in Rome itself do not exceed those laid down after the date to be determined by the technical sub-committee.

7. Monitoring. PWB Monitoring in Liberated Italy will after March 1st, or such other date as may be determined by the technical sub-committee referred to in the previous paragraph, consist of: (A) the small combined news and monitoring unit at Caserta to which reference has already been made, and (B) such monitoring services as are essential for such PWB sections as are retained at Rome. These are principally the central services for PWB 15th Army Group and the Intelligence service.

As has already been stated the combined news and monitoring unit is already functioning at Caserta. Action has also been taken to reduce the monitoring unit at Rome to the dimensions required, and heavy reductions of staff have already been effected.

8. Radio. The administration and the entertainment programmes of Italian radio have already under earlier agreements been handed back to RAI. When Italian newspapers are able freely to acquire their news directly from private news agencies it will be difficult to defend PWB's retention of control of the Italian news broadcast over RAI transmitters. It is therefore proposed that the entire control of Italian broadcasting be returned to RAI subject to the reservation on Rome short wave and part of such time as may be required for operational programmes to AFHQ targets (this is fully discussed in the separate memorandum referred to in para 5.) Subject to these reservations PWB will require no facilities on Italian stations South of the present army control line, but it may be necessary to make provision for the retention of time for operational purposes on Italian stations at present North of the Control Line, when this is moved forward.

9. Press. The Corriere di Roma ceased publication on the 15th January, when the private news agencies were admitted to sell directly to the newspapers in Rome. It is proposed to follow the same procedure with the other PWB controlled papers in Liberated Italy. Since the setting up and subsequent liquidation of newspapers in German controlled Italy raise issues reaching beyond PWB operation as outlined in para 4, it is proposed to prepare a separate memorandum dealing with this subject on which there is no general agreement among the interested agencies.

10. APB. Since APB operating under Staff Memorandum No.50 will retain certain functions in Liberated Italy it was agreed that it should remain in being.

11. Publications. PWB will cease to be responsible for the preparation and distribution within Liberated Italy of American and British publications, these functions being transferred to the appropriate departments of the respective Embassies. In Italy North of the Army Control Line PWB will act as the distributing agency for publications desired by the two Embassies, subject to the requirements of military censorship.

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and Posters

12. Wall Newspapers. These will cease to be an Allied responsibility in Liberated Italy (in fact now are now being operated by PWB).

(wall newspapers)

13. Books, plays and copyright. Responsibility for all such matters will be assumed by the U.S. and British Embassies.

14. Propaganda shops. PWB will cease as soon as possible the operation of these shops in the area South of the Army Control line. The Embassies do not desire to continue these activities, and the properties concerned will be derequisitioned.

15. Film Distribution. PWB should retain this responsibility throughout Liberated Italy until such time as it should be possible for private agencies to take over. The question will be reviewed by PWB in conjunction with AC and the U.S. and British Embassies on or about May 1st.

16. Film production. PWB will continue to be responsible for the production of the Italian newsreels, and short documentaries which may be agreed.

17. Intelligence. PWB will continue to carry on its present Italian and German Intelligence services. It should be noted that the German Intelligence service is properly a function of PWB 15th Army Group, but that the proximity to AFHQ and shortage of accommodation in Florence combine to make it more easy to run the major part of this service in Rome.

18. News features. The U.S. and British Embassies will take over entire responsibility for the provision of news features and other material required for "the projection" of their respective countries.

19. Photographic services. Until private agencies can operate effectively PWB will retain responsibility for the provision of photographs for the Italian Press.

20. Printing. PWB will retain in Liberated Italy only such essential printing services as may be required for the production of operational material (e.g. leaflets.) PWB will in addition retain the right to place contracts with Italian firms for the printing of such long term non-security material as may be needed for its operation, more particularly those directed towards Balkan countries, the transfer of which is not envisaged at the present moment.

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ACTION ALREADY TAKEN: The following action has already been taken, and is set out under the appropriate paragraphs of this memorandum,
(a) The division of PWB AFHQ into two separate units, one of which is more particularly charged with the responsibility for the liquidation of PWB functions in Liberated Italy.
(b) The admission of private news agencies to the city of Rome where they are selling news directly to the Italian newspapers; consequent on this the PWB controlled Corriere di Roma has suspended publication.
(c) The institution of a separate news and monitoring unit at Caserta to provide ~~for~~ the services required by AFHQ.
These decisions are based on instructions issued by SACMED, or are internal changes within the organisation of PWB.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN: SACMED's authority is sought for the agreed decisions outlined in this memorandum.

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More particularly SACMED is requested to direct ~~xxx~~

(a) That the private news agencies be permitted to sell directly to the Italian press and news agencies throughout Liberated Italy South of the present Army Control Line, beginning March 1st, or such other date as the technical sub-committee may recommend.

(b) That the private news agencies and that the Italian news agencies be permitted to sell directly to RAI, and that RAI be responsible, subject to military censorship, for the presentation of all Italian news over Italian transmitters situated South of the present Army Control line (N.B. operational programmes, such as Italia Combatte, are directed solely to North Italy, and are not covered, but RAI shall be free to agree with PWB to take such programmes and broadcast them over the Italian network.

(c) That PWB be relieved of all responsibility for the provisi on of news to the Italian press, radio, and any other organ situated in the area South of the present army control line.

(d) That PWB cease to exercise control over any Italian paper south of the army control line, and cease to have any responsibility for press liaison in the same area, subject to the res ponsibilities of AFHQ as set forth in Staff mem randum No.50.

(e) That PWB cease to be responsible for the introduction and distribution of American and British publications into Italy, other than the distribution of publications introduced through normal channels into territory North of the army control line.

(f) That PWB be relieved of all responsibility for the introduction and distribution of American and British books and plays into Italy, other than their distribution North of the Army control line, and that PWB cease to be responsible for all matters concerning copyright.

(g) That PWB cease to operate propaganda shows in the area south of the ACL. on lines already operating, until such time as differently ins tructed.

(i) That the licensing of films for exhibition in Italy cease to be the responsibility of PWB and be carried out by the Italian Film Board.

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Chief of Staff
for Chief Commissioner.

Attached is the draft put up by Commander Lawler with reference to the Chief Commissioner's direction at the PWB reorganisation meeting.

2 February 1945.

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RE-ORGANISATION OF P.W.B.

SUMMARY OF POINTS RAISED AT MEETING HELD ON SATURDAY

27 JANUARY, 1945.

Present: Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff
Mr. Radford
Mr. Edman
Major Fielden.

Brigadier Lush pointed out that Mr. Barnes' original paragraph on the territorial responsibility of PWB XV Army Group should be amended so as to show clearly that responsibility was for areas North of the Army Control Line.

The PWB Administrative Memorandum No. 4 of January 15 was discussed and the following alterations made :

Para 2. For "Provincial Commissioner at Florence for civil affairs" read "D.C.C.A.O. 15th A.G.".

Para 4. Omit "and other interested authorities".

With reference to the date for handing over R.A.I. (E.I.A.R.) to Italian control, which had been provisionally fixed for February 1, the Chief Commissioner thought that would probably not be before March 1 when the Technical Sub-Committee would have made their plans for the distribution of news outside Rome, and agencies could then sell their news to R.A.I. direct.

Basic News. Mr. Edman said that this was still being produced for internal PWB consumption and agreed to send 3 copies to the A.C. for the Acting President, Chief Commissioner and Chief of Staff.

Monitoring. Mr. Edman said that the monitoring unit at Rome was essential for the PWB intelligence services.

Reservations of time for PWB on Italian radio. There was a difference of opinion. The Chief Commissioner asked Mr. Radford for exact figures. These added up to close on 5 hours a day, mostly at peak periods. The Chief Commissioner said that such large reservation made the "handover" a

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Radio Technical services. Mr. Radford agreed that the word "assistance" should be substituted for "supervision" provided, he said, that that "meant carrying on as at present."

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PWB newspapers in forward areas. There was a difference of opinion. Mr. Radford held that PWB newspapers such as the CORRIERE DI ROMA were necessary "to counteract Italian party papers". The Chief Commissioner did not concur, and felt that it would be far better to adopt a straight Allied news bulletin in Italian such as Mr. Linen had suggested. Mr. Radford said that PWB would have to have an order from AFHQ before it changed its policy. He pointed out that all radio would be Italian. The Chief Commissioner drew his attention to the reservations of time on the radio which he had suggested. It was suggested that Italian opinion should be sought on whether Italians would like a bulletin such as Basic News as much as they liked a paper such as the CORRIERE DI ROMA.

Books. The Chief Commissioner asked PRO to see that Finance Sub-Commission went ahead with a note on financial arrangements as had been suggested.

Propaganda Shops. It was agreed that these should be closed down. Mr. Radford said that Mr. Stewart had expressed a wish to take over some of the leases. The Chief Commissioner said he thought that the premises had been requisitioned and therefore that could not be done.

Press Reading and Digest. It was agreed that PWB should continue its press reading as required for its intelligence services and that AC should continue the Press Digest independently.

Distribution: Acting President
Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff
Colonel Grafftey-Smith
Mr. Radford
Mr. Edman
Major Fielden.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Distribution: Acting President
Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff
Colonel Grafftey-Smith
Mr. Radford
Mr. Eiman
Major Fielden.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

9/PRB

26 January 1945.

SUBJECT : RE-ORGANISATION OF P.W.B.

TO : The Chief Commissioner, A.C.

Edman's paper does not differ seriously from mine, but I would draw your attention to the following points :

Page 2. Para 4. News: "Private News agencies are already operating in the city of Rome, and are now at liberty to sell world news either to Italian agencies or directly to the Italian newspapers."

This does not quite conform to the Caserta directive which said ....."directly to the Rome press", nor, I think, to your ideas.

Same Para: "It (PWB) is also continuing to supply the press and radio throughout Liberated Italy with news of Liberated Italy."

This is true, but I feel that we ought to know how it is being done. Through ANSA?

Page 2. Para 4. News - Sub-para 2: "PWB will produce daily mimeographed bulletins".

This means in fact that Basic News is continuing. For how long? And if it is being continued I am pretty sure that ANSA and IL GIORNALE DEL MATTINO will have it. Then what was the point of stopping the printed Basic News?

Page 3. Para 4. News - Sub-para 3: "..... the facilities which PWB will require to maintain in liberated Italy....."

A very evasive statement. Does it not in fact mean buying news from ANSA in order to maintain the "fullscale news operation" mentioned on the preceding page? However, we are to get a separate memorandum on this.

Page 3. Para 5. Monitoring: "A second unit is now organised at Rome;"

You expressed an opinion that this was quite unnecessary since the PWB would have monitoring services at AFHQ and XV Army Group.

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Page 3. Para 5. Monitoring: "A second unit is now organised at Rome;"

You expressed an opinion that this was quite unnecessary since the PWB would have monitoring services at AFHQ and XV Army Group.

Page 3. Para 6. Radio: "Provision has been made for the retention by PWB of time ....."

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There is no mention of any limit. Your ruling was not more than one hour per day.

Page 5. Para 13. Film distribution: "..... responsibility of PWB throughout Italy until such time as private distributors could take over.

This is in accordance with the meeting but I venture to think it is wrong. It leads inevitably to deals (such as ANSA) between PWB and distributing agencies. This should be a responsibility of the Film Board.

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Page 6. Para 17. Photographic Services: The supply of photographs for the Italian press would be retained by PWB until it is practicable to release this service to private agencies.

Again here you will be faced with the prospect of PWB presenting a monopoly of personnel and equipment to an Italian Agency.

Page 7. Para 21. PWB Bari: "..... it will still be necessary to maintain at Bari a PWB HQ which will continue to need very considerable facilities for printing and other services."

Bari is a sore spot, as you know: and this paragraph is very wide in its commitments. Maybe we can't help it, but I don't like it. The same idea crops up at Page 6 Para 18 "..... considerable amount of work destined for other areas."

On the whole Edman's paper follows our ideas IF we can take it as an honest intention of purpose! But it is also clear that the whole liquidation idea might prove a farce if PWB keeps a large HQ at Bari, a Monitoring Unit and Intelligence Services at Rome, and so on.

LIONEL FIELDEN
Major
Public Relations Director.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Public Relations Director.

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9 PRO. (2)

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch
APO 512

AMENDMENT TO

24 January 1945.

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
Numbers 3 and 4.

1. Wherever the designation PWB (XV Army Group) appears in Administrative Orders Numbers 3 and 4, 15 January 1945, it is amended to read:

PWB (15th Army Group).

This is the only designation to be used.

By order of Mr. BARNES:

H. L. HARRIS
Major, Inf.
for the Military Director

Distribution: List "A"

1434

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SECRET

P.R.B.

K 45

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PsWSC (45) 1st Meeting
24th January 1945

SECRET

COPY NO 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE HELD IN THE G-1 (B) CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1430 HOURS ON SATURDAY, 20TH JANUARY 1945

PRESENT :-

Brigadier General A.J. McChrystal,
Chief, INC

Mr. C. Offie, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. A.C.M. Russell, representing
British Resident Minister

Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, PWB

Brigadier W.F. Jeffries,
Deputy Director, PWB

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT :-

Rear Admiral Ellery W. Stone,
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel S.S. Hill-Dillon, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Lieutenant Colonel S.L. McKenney, representing
Chief, G-3 Special Operations, AFHQ

Lieutenant Colonel L.P. Reeves, representing
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ.

SECRETARY

Major W.A. Bannister

COS List
26 Jan 45

CHIEF OPNS (12)
COS (13)
P.R. B (14)

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PRESENT :-

Brigadier General A.J. McCrystal,
Chief, INC

Mr. C. Offie, representing
U.S. Political Adviser

Mr. A.C.M. Russell, representing
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Mr. Russell Barnes,
Director, PWB

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Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, AFHQ

Colonel T.R. Henn, representing
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, AFHQ

Lieutenant Colonel S.L. McKenney, representing
Chief, G-3 Special Operations, AFHQ

Lieutenant Colonel L.P. Reeves, representing
Chief Signals Officer, AFHQ.

SECRETARY

Major W.A. Bannister

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING

(PsWSC (44) 8th Meeting)

THE SUB-COMMITTEE approved the minutes of the 8th Meeting held on 26th December 1944.

2. LIQUIDATION OF PWB FUNCTIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. PsWSC (45) 1)

3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROPAGANDA DIRECTED TO THE BALKANS
(Paper No PsWSC (45) 2)

THE SUB-COMMITTEE had before them a paper by the Director, PWB, recommending discontinuance of its activities with reference to liberated ITALY, with 1 March

/1945 SECRET

C.o.S. List
26 Jan 45

C-in-C Comm R (12)
C.o.S (13)
P.R. B (14)

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

1945 as a tentative date for discontinuance of all such activities, and recommending the turn-over, to various other agencies, of specified responsibilities of PWB. THE SUB-COMMITTEE also had before them a paper by the Director, PWB, recommending the restriction of the responsibilities of PWB to certain specified propaganda activities, and the discontinuance of present propaganda activities of PWB directed to the Balkan countries. Upon the recommendation of Mr. Barnes, these two papers were considered together.

MR. BARNES stated that the two papers submitted by him constituted a blueprint for the future of PWB. He stated that his recommendations resulted from four principal causes:-

(a) The need for a rolling-up of the rear and flank of PWB activities to free personnel and equipment for operations with respect to enemy occupied ITALY and AUSTRIA.

(b) The already accomplished fact of removal of PWB control over news in ROME, rendering it no longer practicable for PWB to execute its previous directives for liberated ITALY, and therefore making it desirable that its functions in respect to liberated ITALY be turned over to other agencies.

(c) Pressure from CWI for discontinuance of PWB's operation in liberated ITALY.

(d) The announced desire of Mr. Macmillan, as President of the Allied Commission, to effect certain changes in the structure of Allied organisation in ITALY.

In answer to a question by Rear Admiral Stone, Mr. Barnes stated that PWB did not intend in future to direct propaganda to disturbed populations in liberated ITALY. In his opinion, this would become a function of the Italian government. In answer to a question by Brigadier General McChrystal, as to what, if anything, PWB would expect to do in the event of issuance of propaganda by the Italian government deemed prejudicial to the Allied interests, Mr. Barnes replied that under these circumstances PWB would have to seek a special directive from AFHQ. He emphasized that PWB had no intention of upsetting any needed psychological warfare service, and that PWB intended to continue all present functions until such functions were taken over by other agencies in accordance with current instructions.

REAR ADMIRAL STONE, in answer to an enquiry by Colonel Hill-Dillon, stated that in respect of its propaganda activities, the Allied Commission would expect to give advice to the Italian Government.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL enquired of those present whether there was any objection to the principle of turn-over of PWB responsibilities as set forth in the two papers. No objections of principle were raised.

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(c) The need for a rolling-up of the rear and flank of PWB activities to free personnel and equipment for operations with respect to enemy occupied ITALY and AUSTRIA.

(b) The already accomplished fact of removal of PWB control over news in ROME, rendering it no longer practicable for PWB to execute its previous directives for liberated ITALY, and therefore making it desirable that its functions in respect to liberated ITALY be turned over to other agencies.

(c) Pressure from CWI for discontinuance of PWB's operation in liberated ITALY.

(d) The announced desire of Mr. Macmillan, as President of the Allied Commission, to effect certain changes in the structure of Allied organisation in ITALY.

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BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL enquired of those present whether there was any objection to the principle of turn-over of PWB responsibilities as set forth in the two papers. No objections of principle were raised.

1113

REAR ADMIRAL STONE stated that in the course of consultations held outside the present committee, including meetings of the Technical Sub-Committee on News Distribution appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander, conclusions had been reached which led him to consider inadvisable the designation, at this time, of the Allied Commission as the agency to assume responsibility for supply of materials and facilities for the Italian press and radio, distribution of motion picture films, and collection of intelligence on certain items (Paper No. PWSC (45) 1, Part VI, para 3 (b), i, iii, iv). He recommended that the determination of the new agencies to be responsible for these things be worked out together between the CWI, MOI and the Allied Commission. He also questioned Part VI, para 3(e) of the same paper, stating that it seemed impracticable

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to make requests to private Italian news and radio agencies to undertake activities of the same sort as had heretofore been carried on by PWB, when such activities might not be commercially profitable to them. He furthermore stated that in his opinion Part VI, para 3(g), referring to the activities of Italian partisans, was outside the province of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee.

COLONEL HILL-DILLON likewise queried whether Part VI, para 3(g) was within the province of the Sub-Committee.

MR. BARNES pointed out, as an example, the fact that through an order issued to them by AMI, the partisans had preserved an excellent printing plant in LEGHORN.

BRIGADIER GENERAL MCCREARY agreed with Mr. Barnes' statement of the facts, but was of the opinion that the matter should be embodied in purely operational directives.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL REEVES stated that he regarded Part VI, para 3(h) as unnecessary since as field service regulations stand at present, it is the duty of the 'S' Force as soon as it goes in to effectuate seizure of radio stations.

THE CHIEF, PWC:

Directed that the Secretary prepare a paper* on behalf of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee recommending to the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference the following:

(a) That he direct PWB to discontinue its activities with reference to liberated ITALY at such time as will allow proper coordination with the extension of the operation of private news agencies to areas outside ROME.

(b) That he direct PWB to prepare for 1 March 1945 as a tentative date for total discontinuance of PWB functions with reference to liberated ITALY.

(c) In connection with the discontinuance of activities of PWB with respect to liberated ITALY:

(i) That he endorse the assumption by CCI and MOI of PWB's present task in presenting the American and British Governments' viewpoints.

(ii) That he direct the Allied Commission, in cooperation with CCI and MOI, to assume the following responsibilities or to determine by what agencies and to what extent such responsibilities shall be assumed:

(1) The supply of materials and facilities for the Italian press and radio.

(2) The carrying out of official directives demanding [illegible] be made to present the Italian press and radio from be-

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the facts, but was of the opinion that the matter should be embodied in purely operational directives.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KELVES stated that he regarded Part VI, para 3(b) as unnecessary since as field service regulations stand at present, it is the duty of the 'S' Force as soon as it goes in to effectu te seizure of radio stations.

THE CHIEF, ING:

Directed that the Secretary prepare a paper* on behalf of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee recommending to the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference the following:

(a) That he direct PWB to discontinue its activities with reference to liberated ITALY at such time as will allow proper coordination with the extension of the operation of private news agencies to areas outside ROME.

(b) That he direct PWB to prepare for 1 March 1945 as a tentative date for total discontinuance of PWB functions with reference to liberated ITALY.

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(ii) That he direct the Allied Commission, in cooperation with CCI and MOI, to assume the following responsibilities or to determine by what agencies and to what extent such responsibilities shall be assumed:

(1) The supply of materials and facilities for the Italian press and radio.

(2) The carrying out of official directives demanding that all efforts be made to prevent the Italian press and radio from becoming Government monopolies or falling into the hands of Fascists.

(3) The distribution of motion picture films.

(4) PWB's responsibility for collection of intelligence on particular economic, political and social topics.

(iii) That he direct PWB to continue to furnish such advisory assistance as may be requested by the Italian Government or private news or radio agencies.

*Prepared as paper No. SAC(P)(45)3.

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(iv) That he direct PWB to be prepared to carry on news and radio services in newly liberated territories when AFHQ, to meet security requirements, may so direct.

(v) That he direct the Allied Commission to encourage Italian news and radio agencies to restore news and radio service in Italian areas as fast as they are liberated.

(vi) That he direct that PWB retain the privilege, in each instance with the authorisation of AFHQ, to undertake intelligence tasks in liberated ITALY which PWB may consider to be in the interest of operations against the enemy, or in support of Italian partisan groups in enemy- occupied ITALY.

(d) That he direct PWB to prepare, and coordinate with Allied Commission, OWI and MOI, a phased plan in detail for the turnover of appropriate functions by PWB to OWI, MOI, and such other agencies as may be determined, and to submit the plan to the Psychological Warfare Sub-committee.

MR. BARNES, referring to the paper on propaganda directed to the Balkans, stated that much of PWB planning in the Balkans had been based upon the following assumptions: (a) an Allied entry in strength into JUGOSLAVIA, (b) a willingness of the JUGOSLAV and ALBANIAN authorities to permit PWB operations as projected, and (c) the possibility of getting PWB officers in. He remarked that these premises no longer appeared to obtain; that already under partisan auspices a considerable propaganda and information service was operating in JUGOSLAVIA; that the present authorities in JUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA were unlikely to admit PWB officers and activities to any appreciable extent, and that in fact it had already proved impossible to introduce PWB officers into these countries for other than very specific and limited purposes. The foregoing, he stated, were the reasons for the present proposals with respect to propaganda directed to the Balkans.

COLONEL HILL-DILLON and COLONEL HEBEN agreed that the factors described by Mr. Barnes called for a change in psychological warfare plans of the nature he proposed.

MR. BARNES stated that in addition to the activities listed in para 1 of the paper under consideration, there should be added, in response to recommendations of G-5, a further item:-

Support of ML in other areas as requested by G-5.

In answer to an enquiry by Rear Admiral Stone, he stated that the reference to Greek and Jugoslav forces and refugees in ITALY and the MIDDLE EAST contained in para 8(b) of Paper No. PsWEC (45) 2, referred entirely to personnel in camps. He further pointed out that para 8(b) would in fact regularise what has been going on for some time.

THE CHIEF INC:

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COLONEL HILL-DILLON and COLONEL KENN agreed that the factors described by Mr. Barnes called for a change in psychological warfare plans of the nature he proposed.

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THE CHIEF INC:

Directed that the Secretary include in the paper to be presented to the Supreme Allied Commander in Conference on behalf of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee the following further recommendations:

(a) That he direct PWB to concentrate upon, and restrict its propaganda activities to, the following tasks:-

(i) 'Tactical' propaganda in local support of operations by Fifth and Eighth Armies.

(ii) 'Strategic' propaganda of incitement or instruction on the one hand to resistance elements in the general area of 15th Army

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Group's operations and on the other to disturbed populations in the area of AMG behind the front.

(iii) Depressive or surrender propaganda to German troops in Northern ITALY and in JUGOSLAVIA.

(iv) Propaganda of general political incitement to the population of AUSTRIA.

(v) Propaganda (carried out exclusively by a unit of the Branch's British element) in support of Land Forces and Military Liaison GREECE.

(vi) Support of Military Liaison in other areas as may be requested by G-5.

(b) That he direct PWB:

(1) to discontinue non-operational propaganda, both British and American (including the distribution of films), into liberated JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, ROUMANIA and BULGARIA, and among Greek and Jugoslav forces and refugees in ITALY and the MIDDLE EAST;

(2) to inform the appropriate United States and British governmental agencies of such discontinuance and to invite them to take necessary measures forthwith to assume the same responsibilities through their own respective organisations.

(c) That he direct PWB to cease regular broadcasts on Radio Bari in Serbo-Croat and Albanian by 1 March 1945, unless operational developments in the meantime require reconsideration of this course.

4. MEETINGS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

THE CHIEF INC:

Directed that whenever possible, the Secretary arrange for meetings of the Sub-Committee to be held upon the same days as meetings of the Supreme Allied Commander's Conferences (Political).

5. PROPAGANDA DIRECTED TO PARTISANS IN NORTHERN ITALY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MCKENNEY said he had noticed great emphasis upon leaflet and newspaper propaganda directed to enemy soldiers. He said that the morale of the pro-Allied partisans in Northern ITALY was very low and recommended that more efforts should be made to give them propaganda and information that would improve their morale.

MR. BARNES stated that he agreed this was highly desirable and that he would have the PWB Liaison Officer with 15th Army Group confer with Lieutenant-Colonel McKenney on the subject immediately.

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(vi) Support of Military Liaison in other areas as may be requested by G-5.

(b) That he direct PWB:

(1) to discontinue non-operational propaganda, both British and American (including the distribution of films), into liberated JUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, ROUMANIA and BULGARIA, and among Greek and Jugoslav forces and refugees, in ITALY and the MIDDLE EAST;

(2) to inform the appropriate United States and British governmental agencies of such discontinuance and to invite them to take necessary measures forthwith to assure the same responsibilities through their own respective organisations.

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THE CHIEF INC:

Took note of the above.

W. Bannister

W. BANNISTER
MAJOR, F.A.
SECRETARY

SECRET

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G-2	15-16
G-3 Special Operations	17
G-5	18-20
Chief Signals Officer	21
Secretary, General Staff	22
Secretary, IS & PS	23-25
Spares	26-30

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G-5	18-20
Chief Signals Officer	21
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Secretary, IS & PS	23-25
Spares	26-30

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0818

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To: Chief of Staff (for Chief Commissioner)

In obedience to Channels I send through you this precis of PWB meeting results for which the CC asked and wants quickly. I promised it by tomorrow morning.

Also attached is Barnes' paper with CC's own notes.

23. Jan. 45.

CC 454

Chief Commissioner.

Attached is submitted for your information/~~signature~~/~~approval~~.

An excellent piece of work.

DR/24/1/45.

1/4

✓ GWS GWS CL

1/4C8

RE-ORGANISATION OF P.W.B.

RESULTS OF MEETINGS HELD ON JAN. 12, 16 AND 17 TO DISCUSS MR. RUSSELL BARNES' PAPER :-

1. Italian Theatre Headquarters of PWB to be abolished w.e.f. 15 Jan 1945.

Agreed.

2. With effect from the same date separate PWB headquarters will be set up:

PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) - Head: Mr.George Edman
Deputy Head: Mr.Lanham Titchener

PWB (XV ARMY GROUP) - Head: Mr.John Rayner
Deputy Head: American, to be appointed.

Agreed and arranged that "Liberated Italy" be taken to mean all Italy South of the Army Control Line.

3. PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) will be responsible for all operations within Italian territory under Italian administration and in the Commune of Naples; and will also be charged with the liquidation or transfer of these operations, in agreement with AFHQ, AC, and the US and British Embassies.

Agreed. It appears, however, that PWB AFHQ (Mr. Radford) is now going to be in charge of liquidation and transfer.

4. PWB (XV ARMY GROUP) will be responsible for all propaganda directed against the enemy in German-occupied Italy, for all propaganda directed towards the population of the same area, and for propaganda of consolidation in the area administered by AMG.

Agreed on the understanding that AC will be consulted. PWB has since issued a directive on this (attached).

5. Directives will be prepared in draft by each Headquarters and will be forwarded to PWB AFHQ for the necessary clearance and issue. No directive will become valid unless issued by PWB AFHQ.

Attached PWB minute refers to this.

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5. Directives will be prepared in draft by each Headquarters and will be forwarded to PWB AFHQ for the necessary clearance and issue. No directive will become valid unless issued by PWB AFHQ.

Attached PWB minute refers to this.

6. News Services: Three units to be constructed from existing forces, as follows:

AFHQ — Unit to be established at Caserta for provision of communiques and essential spot news to AFHQ.

Agreed.

LIBERATED ITALY — Present services tobe maintained until the private agencies are in a position to service the whole territory. Thereafter, this unit to be modified to provide limited basic news service covering communiques, PRO releases (both Service Departments and AC), official releases by Italian Press Office and official statements by Allied Governments.

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6. LIBERATED ITALY (Contd)

Basic News and Corriere di Roma discontinued. PWB maintaining LIBERATED ITALY news service (? presumably through ANSA). Question of Rome radio undecided. Further changes dependent on Technical Sub-committee's recommendations.

XV ARMY GROUP — Unit for the servicing of this Headquarters, in accordance with its needs, to be established.

Agreed.

Note 1: A sub-committee under the chairmanship of Rear-Admiral Stone is already studying the technical problems connected with the provision of private agency news to areas outside Rome.

? March 1.

No comment.

Note 2: PWB Balkan news file in morse, issued from Rome to be discontinued.

Not discussed.

Note 3: Printed Basic News, Rome edition, to be continued as long as present commitments continue, but not to be distributed to Italian press in Rome.

Not known what is being done. To be dealt here

7. Monitoring: Following three units to be established:

AFHQ — Unit mainly for Intelligence monitoring to requirements of G-2 AFHQ.

Agreed.

LIBERATED ITALY — Unit to provide comprehensive service of Italian Fascist broadcasts and of German broadcasts as required for general purposes (communiques, etc.) and as required by the Austrian Radio Section. 1405

Chief Commissioner thinks this unnecessary. Brig. Lush, Mr. Hopkinson and others consider monitoring reports valuable. PRO agrees with C.C. that AFHQ and XV A.G. service could provide what is necessary. Ruling required as to whether PWB make these reports available to A.C. and if so through what channel.

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XX ARMY GROUP — Unit to provide full German coverage and essential coverage of Italian Fascist broadcasts.

Agreed.

8. Radio:

LIBERATED ITALY — Services to be returned to Italian Administration as soon as possible. Meanwhile Sgt. Sadun and Miss Maxwell to serve as Joint Heads of Radio Services PWB AC Italy.

Agreed. No reason for any delay. PWB say transport lacking, but it was suggested that PWB requisitioned transport be turned back to Italians for EIAR and that requests for tyres etc. be given high priority. February 1 set as date for

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8. Radio: LIBERATED ITALY (Contd).

handover. OWI agreement suggested on basis of net depreciated cost

Note 1: Italia Combatte programmes to be responsibility of PWB XV A.G. (Captain Isolani i/c), even though prepared in part in Rome and broadcast from Rome s.w. transmitter. It is recommended that time be reserved on the network for broadcasting Italia Combatte programmes throughout LIBERATED ITALY.

Note 2: Bari I transmitter to be reserved for PWB operations to any extent that PWB may indicate.

Agreed - on Note 1 and Note 2 - that time might be reserved for PWB programmes but NOT exceeding 1 hour a day.

Note 3: Time also to be reserved for PWB broadcasts to AFHQ targets and AC targets on the new Italian 100 k.w. transmitter, when in service.

Chief Commissioner considered " AC targets " would be Italian Government targets and could be dealt with by arrangement if necessary and without specific reservation.

Note 4: AC to consider the desirability, when network passes back to Italian control, of reserving time for special AC informational programmes.

Agreed no necessity of reserving time for special AC informational programmes.

Note 5: Austrian PWB Radio Services established in Rome to be responsibility of PWB AFHQ and time to be specifically reserved for the continuance of these programmes on any Italian transmitters considered suitable.

PWB to define more exactly what hours and what transmitters would be needed.

9. Radio Technical Services:

LIBERATED ITALY — Technical supervision over Rome s.w., Bari I and 100 k.w. transmitter when in service, to be maintained by PWB as long as these transmitters are used for Psychological Warfare purposes.

All other technical services now provided by PWB to be discontinued.

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throughout LIBERATED ITALY.

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1404

LIBERATED ITALY — Technical supervision over Rome s.w., Bari I and 100 k.w. transmitter when in service, to be maintained by PWB as long as these transmitters are used for Psychological Warfare purposes.

All other technical services now provided by PWB to be discontinued.

OWI to study disposal of radio technical equipment installed in Italy.

The word "supervision" in first line to be changed to "assistance". Technical Sub-committee to study problems. Any receiving equipment in South to be withdrawn, or farmed out on contract.

10. Press:

LIBERATED ITALY — (1) PWB Newspapers to be discontinued as rapidly as possible. Corriere di Roma to be closed on 15 Jan 45.

Agreed.

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10. Press: (Contd).

LIBERATED ITALY (ii) Press Liaison to be taken over by AC and the Press Attaches as soon as private agencies are admitted. (PWB at present has Press Officers at Palermo, Catania, Bari, Naples and Rome).

Agreed that this be discontinued. (Except in so far as Embassies may wish to continue in Rome).

XV ARMY GROUP (i) PWB Newspapers: PWB desires to know whether its present policy of setting up newspapers in newly-liberated cities is to be continued.

This was agreed at Mr. Macmillan's meeting on Jan. 12 but the Chief Commissioner at the meeting on Jan. 16 said he thought it was time to make a change. Mr. Linen proposed publication of one Allied News Bulletin not masquerading as an Italian paper. Brig. Lush was asked to take this up with NW Italy planning group.

(ii) Press Liaison: Present services to continue. Lieut. Col. Munro to transfer to his Headquarters as Chief Press Officer as soon as his interests in Rome can be transferred.

Agreed.

11. A.P.B.:

LIBERATED ITALY As a consequence of other measures recommended above, the A.P.B. would become redundant and should be wound up.

Not agreed. The A.P.B. to be kept alive subject to call.

XV ARMY GROUP Lieut. Col. Munro, with AMG to set up whatever machinery may be required.

Agreed.

12. Publications:

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Embassies may wish to continue in Rome).

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Not agreed. The A.P.B. to be kept alive subject to call.

XV ARMY GROUP — Lieut. Col. Munro, with AMG to set up whatever machinery may be required.

Agreed.

12. Publications:

LIBERATED ITALY — (i) British or American imported: To be passed over as a responsibility of the Embassies as soon as possible. (PWB recommends the continuation of Il Mese until the cessation of hostilities in Europe, when it could be offered to an Italian publisher).

Agreed that Embassies would take over distribution of Il Mese but help would be required on transport. Suggested that PWB give up requisitioned transport used.

(ii) Il Mondo Libero: PWB recommends that this periodical be continued

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12. Publications: LIBERATED ITALY (ii)(Contd).

until the cessation of hostilities in Europe, under the control of either PWB or AC, or the joint control of the Press Attachés.

Agreed that this be taken over by OWI and MOI

LIBERATED ITALY (iii) Other local PWB publications: a considerable booklet program has been laid out but is not yet in production. PWB recommends that this program be taken over immediately by the Embassies or by AC. Production Unit (if any).

To be taken over by OWI and MOI. No AC. Production Unit.

(iv) Posters: PWB production to be discontinued. If posters are required by AC, these to be produced by AC Production Unit (if any), or by PWB XV AG. Publications Section (see below).

Note: Embassies and/or AC to make their own arrangements for distribution of publications. PWB to continue distribution until these arrangements have been made, and meanwhile to give any assistance possible in the making of them.

It was agreed that AC could use local production if necessary and OWI would be willing to assist.

13. Bollettini di Notizie: (i.e. wall newspapers):

LIBERATED ITALY To be discontinued as PWB newspapers are given up (the Italian Press Commission can perfectly well continue this service itself insofar as it considers it useful).

Agreed.

XV ARMY GROUP To be continued under Chief Press Officer.

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a considerable booklet program has been laid out but is not yet in production. PWB recommends that this program be taken over immediately by the Embassies or by AC. Production Unit (if any).

To be taken over by OWI and MOI. No AC. Production Unit.

(iv) Posters: PWB production to be discontinued. If posters are required by AC, these to be produced by AC Production Unit (if any), or by PWB XV AG. Publications Section (see below).

Note: Embassies and/or AC to make their own arrangements for distribution of publications. PWB to continue distribution until these arrangements have been made, and meanwhile to give any assistance possible in the making of them.

It was agreed that AC could use local production if necessary and OWI would be willing to assist.

13. Bollettini di Notizie: (i.e. wall newspapers):

LIBERATED ITALY — To be discontinued as PWB newspapers are given up (the Italian Press Commission can perfectly well continue this service itself insofar as it considers it useful).

Agreed.

XV ARMY GROUP — To be continued under Chief Press Officer.

Agreed.

14. Plays: — As for Books.

1401

Not discussed.

15. Books:

LIBERATED ITALY — Responsiblity for clearance of copyrights and so forth to be passed to Embassies as soon as practicable.

Admiral Stone suggested Embassies could take over forthwith. Mr. Dowling agreed. There was much discussion of copyrights and legality of Italian authors printing or selling in America. How far the 'trading with the enemy' Act still

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15. Books: LIBERATED ITALY (Contd)

holds in these matters was not clear: the question to be investigated by Mr. Hopkinson and Mr. Dowling. Mr. Linen said OWI had bought a number of copyrights and had sold as many as 12 quite recently. Mr. Stewart suggested that AC recommend to the British and American Govts. that financial arrangements should be made in both countries for payment of book rights. Admiral Stone agreed and said that Colonel Grafftey-Smith and Commander Lawler should draw up a note to this effect for his signature.

16. Propaganda Shops:

LIBERATED ITALY	To be maintained by PWB until the Embassies, jointly, have studied and decided on the future of this medium. (Note: PWB to produce costings of this operation for the Embassies' use).

It was agreed that the time for this "hit-them-on-the-head" propaganda had passed. The Embassies, OWI and MOI were to discuss the future employment, if any, of these shops.

XV ARMY GROUP	Service to be continued as at present. Mr. Edman to make recommendations as to the division of staff between the two Headquarters.

Agreed.

17. Film Distribution:

LIBERATED ITALY	PWB to retain responsibility until arrangements can be made for the Embassies, AC or private distributors to take over.

Agreed that PWB retain responsibility until private distributors took over which would have to be adjusted by the Film Board in respect of Italian rights. Suggested that the whole matter be reviewed in 3 months' time - transport a difficulty. Question of commercial visitors or unofficial agents in uniform? (Policy of AC is to allow commercial visitors who can benefit the war effort).

XV ARMY GROUP	As at present. Mr. Edman to make recommendations as to the division of staff between the two Headquarters.

Agreed.

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a note to this effect for his signature.

16. Propaganda Shops:

LIBERATED ITALY	To be maintained by PWB until the Embassies, jointly, have studied and decided on the future of this medium. (Note: PWB to produce costings of this operation for the Embassies' use).

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Agreed that PWB retain responsibility until private distributors took over which would have to be adjusted by the Film Board in respect of Italian rights. Suggested that the whole matter be reviewed in 3 months' time - transport a difficulty. Question of commercial visitors or unofficial agents in uniform? (Policy of AC is to allow commercial visitors who can benefit the war effort).

XV ARMY GROUP	As at present. Mr. Edman to make recommendations as to the division of staff between the two Headquarters.

Agreed.

1400

18. Film Production:

LIBERATED ITALY	Production consists of: (i) the regular Italian newsreel, (ii) documentaries and shorts in support of AC propaganda. PWB recommends that it should retain responsibility for both services until AC can arrange to take over.

Agreed that this was a matter for the Film Board. PWB must retain responsibility for newsreels and shorts until Film Board could set Italian producers going.

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19. Intelligence:

LIBERATED ITALY — To continue as at present, with Major Greenlees i/c, subject to directives of CIC, PWB AFHQ. (Note: Services are in four groups: Liberated Italy, General Report; Personalities; Documents Section; and Press Reading Bureau).

Withdraw and continue as at present

Agreed, except that Press Reading should be consolidated under ACPR with additional staff (Since this was discussed Rome dailies have been increased from 12 to 25).

20. News Features Unit:

Not discussed.

21. Printing Services:

LIBERATED ITALY — Gradual liquidation of services with transfer to Embassies and AC to any extent required.

It was agreed that all except operational work should be turned back to Italian printers and their premises derequisitioned. There could, if necessary, be agreements safeguarding our right to get printing done.

22. Photographic Services:

LIBERATED ITALY — To be maintained by PWB until it is practicable for the Embassies to take over.

Agreed that this be changed to "until it is practicable to release to private agencies".

23. Leaflets.
24. Austrian Radio Section.
25. S.O.L.S.
26. Administration.

Not discussed.

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under ACPR with additional staff (Since this was discussed Rome dailies have been increased from 12 to 26).

20. News Features Unit:

Not discussed.

21. Printing Services:

LIBERATED ITALY — Gradual liquidation of services with transfer to Embassies and AC to any extent required.

It was agreed that all except operational work should be turned back to Italian printers and their premises de-requisitioned. There could, if necessary, be agreements safeguarding our right to get printing done.

22. Photographic Services:

LIBERATED ITALY — To be maintained by PWB until it is practicable for the Embassies to take over.

Agreed that this be changed to "until it is practicable to release to private agencies".

23. Leaflets.
24. Austrian Radio Section.
25. S.O.L.S.
26. Administration.

Not discussed.

24 January 1945.

1299

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0835

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A.G Rome PWB (2)

PRO

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH.

CONFIDENTIAL.

15th January, 1945.

Admin.Memo
Number 3.

1. Effective today the Italian HQ of PWB is abolished and is replaced by PWB (Liberated Italy), HQ at Rome, and PWB (XV Army Group), HQ at Florence.

2. PWB (Liberated Italy) HQ will be responsible, subject to the directives of PWB AFHQ, for all PWB operations within Italian territory south of the Army Control line, and will also be charged with the liquidation or transfer of these operations in agreement with AFHQ, AC and the U.S.and British Embassies.

3. PWB (XV Army Group) HQ will be responsible, subject to the directives of PWB AFHQ, for all propaganda and other operations directed towards the population of the same area, and for propaganda of consolidation in the area North of the Army Control line.

4. The following appointments become effective today:

PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) HQ Head: Mr.George Edman
Deputy Head Mr.Lanham Titchener

PWB (XV ARMY GROUP) HQ Head: Mr.John Rayner
Deputy Head: American, to be appointed.

By order of Mr.Barnes.
Director.

W.G.H. Haines 1398

Brigadier.
Deputy Director.

Rome (2)

PPO

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH.

CONFIDENTIAL.

15th January, 1945.

Admin. Memo
Number 4.

1. Effective from 22nd January 1945, all policy and propaganda directives governing PWB operations in Liberated and German-occupied Italy will be issued by PWB AFHQ, after clearance with AFHQ.

2. Weekly directives drafted by PWB (XV Army Group) HQ will be co-ordinated with XV Army Group for military affairs, and with the AMG ~~Provincial Commissioner at Florence for civil affairs~~ in the liberated area north of the Army Control line. The draft, with a covering note stating the authority with which it has been co-ordinated, will be forwarded to the Head of PWB (Liberated Italy) HQ for further co-ordination with AC in respect of all operations directed to the Italian people, whether in liberated or German-occupied territory. The draft will be forwarded in time to reach Rome by 1300 hours on Fridays.

3. Drafts prepared and co-ordinated in accordance with the procedure laid down in the preceding paragraph will be submitted to the directive meeting to be held at Rome at 1500 hours on Saturdays.

4. Weekly directives drafted by PWB (Liberated Italy) HQ will, as long as such directives are deemed necessary, be co-ordinated with AC, the U.S. and British Embassies, ~~and other interested authorities~~ at the same meeting at 1500 hours on Saturdays.

5. Drafts prepared in accordance with the procedure laid down in the preceding paragraphs will be forwarded to PWB AFHQ by the quickest possible means and will be co-ordinated with the competent authorities at AFHQ.

6. When co-ordinated these directives will be issued by PWB AFHQ and will become effective immediately.

7. All standing propaganda directives at present in force will become invalid on 31st January 1945. The HQ named in the following paragraphs will review the directives indicated and forward them, with such amendments and revisions as may be thought necessary, for consideration and co-ordination by PWB AFHQ not later than 29th January 1945. Co-ordination procedure will be the same as laid down for weekly directives. If any HQ considers a particular directive redundant it will report to that effect after consulting the appropriate authority.

8. The following HQ are responsible for the directives indicated:

1287

AFHQ — Propaganda to Austria
S.O.E. S.

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ordinated with XV Army Group for military affairs, and with the AMG ~~Provincial Commissioner at Florence for civil affairs~~ in the liberated area north of the Army Control line. The draft, with a covering note stating the authority with which it has been co-ordinated, will be forwarded to the Head of PWB (Liberated Italy) HQ for further co-ordination with AC in respect of all operations directed to the Italian people, whether in liberated or German-occupied territory. The draft will be forwarded in time to reach Rome by 1800 hours on Fridays.

3. Drafts prepared and co-ordinated in accordance with the procedure laid down in the preceding paragraph will be submitted to the directive meeting to be held at Rome at 1500 hours on Saturdays.

4. Weekly directives drafted by PWB (Liberated Italy) HQ will, as long as such directives are deemed necessary, be co-ordinated with AC, the U.S. and British Embassies, ~~and other interested authorities~~ at the same meeting at 1500 hours on Saturdays.

5. Drafts prepared in accordance with the procedure laid down in the preceding paragraphs will be forwarded to PWB AFHQ by the quickest possible means and will be co-ordinated with the competent authorities at AFHQ.

6. When co-ordinated these directives will be issued by PWB AFHQ and will become effective immediately.

7. All standing propaganda directives at present in force will become invalid on 31st January 1945. The HQ named in the following paragraphs will review the directives indicated and forward them, with such amendments and revisions as may be thought necessary, for consideration and co-ordination by PWB AFHQ not later than 29th January 1945. Co-ordination procedure will be the same as laid down for weekly directives. If any HQ considers a particular directive redundant it will report to that effect after consulting the appropriate authority.

8. The following HQ are responsible for the directives indicated: 1397

AFHQ	Propaganda to Austria S.O.L.S.
PWB(Liberated Italy)	Propaganda to Liberated Italy (for transition period pending liquidation or transfer)

PWB....

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P'B (XV ARMY GROUP)	Propaganda to Italians in German-occupied Italy (including Italia Combatte). Propaganda to Italian civil population in Liberated Italy North of Army Control line. Propaganda to German troops in North Italy.

9. Standing directives will be reviewed monthly by the appropriate HQ which will advise concerning their revision or report that no revision is necessary.

By order of Mr.Barnes.
Director.

W F J Hines

Brigadier.
Deputy Director.

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0837

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Chief Commissioner
(Through C.GS)

I see that you have a meeting of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee on Saturday, 20 Jan '45. It seems that they will consider Paper No. PsWSC(45)1 of 3 Jan '45 although in fact the recommendations at the end of that paper have already been implemented by our Meetings here. I attach, in case you may need them, some notes modifying the original Paper in the light of our subsequent meetings.

18 January 1945.

NOTES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

Paper No. PsWSC(45)1 of 3 Jan 45

I)
II) No comment. AC agrees.
III)

IV. 3. If any ammunition is required, it might be asked whether these somewhat exaggerated statements are really correct in fact. In fact PWB turned over nothing to the Italian radio except music - and that with limitations; and what "agency supervisory boards, to achieve at least a measure of democratic control, and to avoid the evils of monopoly and government dictation, have been submitted and approved by AFHQ," are, we do not know.

7&8. Present requisitioning of newsprint and printing machinery by PWB will have to be drastically curtailed or stopped altogether in AC Italy.

V. No comment.

VI. 1. Agreed.
2. No objection.
3(a) The task will be assumed by OWI, MOI and the Embassies.

(b)(i) No. The AC does not assume such responsibility. The responsibility will be the Italian Government's, AC naturally assisting in so far as it can do so.

(b)(ii) No. Function of the Italian Government.

(b)(iii) No. This to remain a responsibility of PWB until such time as the Film Board can arrange to pass it to ordinary commercial control.

(b)(iv) No. PWB itself wishes to continue its intelligence reports. AC furnishes its own reports and would prefer to see such reports coordinated.

(c) Presumably AC admits this. It leaves a large loophole for things like ANSA.

(d) Agreed.

1395

(e) Agreed.

(f) This falls into the same category as intelligence reports. It gives very wide potential powers to PWB in AC Italy.

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control, and to avoid the evils of monopoly and government dictation, have been submitted and approved by AFHQ," are, we do not know.

7&8. Present requisitioning of newsprint and printing machinery by PWB will have to be drastically curtailed or stopped altogether in AC Italy.

V. No comment.

VI. 1. Agreed.
2. No objection.
3(a) The task will be assumed by OWI, MOI and the Embassies.

(b)(i) No. The AC does not assume such responsibility. The responsibility will be the Italian Government's, AC naturally assisting in so far as it can do so.

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(b)(iv) No. PWB itself wishes to continue its intelligence reports. AC furnishes its own reports and would prefer to see such reports coordinated.

(c) Presumably AC admits this. It leaves a large loophole for things like ANSA.

(d) Agreed.

1395

(e) Agreed.

(f) This falls into the same category as intelligence reports. It gives very wide potential powers to PWB in AC Italy.

(g) No comment.

(h) No comment.

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REORGANISATION OF P.W.B.-I T A L Y.

Minutes of Meeting held at Allied Commission HQ Jan. 17, 1945.

Present : Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, Chairman.
Brigadier Luso, Chief of Staff.
Lt. Henry Hopkinson, Political Section.
Mr. Dowling, American Embassy.
Captain Arneson, -"-
Mr. Michael Stewart, British Embassy.
Mr. Linen, C.W.I.
Colonel Henderson, Communications S/C.
Lieut. Colonel Goudier, -"-
Major Fletcher, Public Relations.
Major Bompir, - " -

The Meeting began at 1530. Discussion, as at previous Meetings, was based on PWB Memorandum of 11 January, 1945.

11. A.F.B:
Mr. Linen said at previous Meeting paragraph had been changed to read: "A.F.B. will be kept in existence, subject to call".

12. Publications:
AC Italy
(i) Distribution of IL MESS was discussed. Mr. Stewart said Embassies would be willing to take over but would need help on transport. Admiral Stone said they might ask the late PWB for what they have removed from Italian economy. The thing to do was to find out how PWB had been doing it and take necessary transport from them. Mr. Linen asked if he could have AC's moral support, and Admiral Stone said he could always count on that.

(ii) Further changes had been made : OWI and MOI to deal with LONDO LIAISO.

(iii) The same applied. Production units for AC were also cut.

(iv) On Posters it was decided that OWI can lend necessary services.

14. Books:
Admiral Stone suggested Embassies could take over forthwith. Mr. Dowling agreed. There was much discussion of copyrights [illegible] of Italian authors printing or selling in

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7394

Captain Anderson, -"-
Mr. Michael Stewart, British Embassy.
Mr. Liner, O.W.I.
Colonel Anderson, Communications S/C.
Lieut. Colonel Scudder, -"-
Major Fleiken, Public Relations.
Major Bewsir, -"-

The Meeting began at 1530. Discussion, as at previous Meetings, was based on PWB Memorandum of 11 January, 1945.

11. A.P.B:

Mr. Liner said at previous Meeting paragraph had been changed to read: "A.P.B. will be kept in existence, subject to call".

12. Publications:

AC Italy

(i) Distribution of IL MESE was discussed. Mr. Stewart said Embassies would be willing to take over but would need help on transport. Admiral Stone said they might ask the late PWB for what they have removed from Italian economy. The thing to do was to find out how PWB had been doing it and take necessary transport from them. Mr. Liner asked if he could have AC's moral support, and Admiral Stone said he could always count on that.

(ii) Further changes had been made : OWI and MOI to deal with MONDO LIBRO.

(iii) The same applied. Production units for AC were also cut.

(iv) On Posters it was decided that OWI can lend necessary services.

T394

14. Books:

Admiral Stone suggested Embassies could take over forthwith. Mr. Dowling agreed. There was much discussion of copyrights and legality of Italian authors printing or selling in America. How far the 'trading with the enemy' Act still holds in these matters was not clear; the question to be investigated by Mr. Hopkinson and Mr. Dowling. Mr. Liner said OWI had bought a number of copyrights and had sold as many as 12 quite recently. Mr. Stewart suggested that AC recommend to the British and American Govts. that financial arrangements should be made in both countries for payment of book rights. Admiral Stone agreed and said that Colonel Grafftey-Smith and Commander Lawlor should draw up a note to this effect for his signature.

16. Propaganda Shops:

Admiral Stone asked if propaganda shops should go to Embassies. Mr. Liner said in his opinion the time for "hit-them-on-the-head" propaganda had passed.

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17. Film Distribution:
After some discussion it was decided that film distribution would remain in PWB hands until private distributors could take over. Mr. Stewart said the matter might be reviewed in 3 months' time in the light of the transport situation. This was agreed.
Speaking on this point Admiral Stone said he did not understand how some agents of private companies can get over here and others can't? Mr. Stewart said some came in as War Correspondents etc. Admiral Stone said this was a tough problem. Mr. Hopkinson said AC had laid it down that there should be no visitors, but he would investigate possibilities of changing this.

18. Film Production:
Mr. Linen said it was decided at other Meeting that Film Board should consider this matter. Admiral Stone said: "Right, and it is understood that AC does not plan to take over". Mr. Linen said personnel should remain with PWB for the present. Agreed. Mr. Stewart said matters of censorship (except military), licensing and control should go to the Italian Govt. Admiral Stone agreed.

19. Intelligence:
Admiral Stone said recommendation here was OK for present purposes. Mr. Linen said there should be consolidation on press reading. Admiral Stone asked Majors Flinton and Bergin to report on what additional staff would be necessary to add weekly summary of provincial papers to PRO digest and get it out a little earlier - by noon if possible.

21. Printing Services:
On this point Mr. Linen said he would like to see work done by Italian printers rather than by requisitioning plants. Admiral Stone agreed. Only operational work should be done in requisitioned plants; other plants should be turned back to owners and potential buyers (PWB etc.), who could come to understanding with owners.

22. Photographic Services:
Admiral Stone suggested change: "until it is practical to release to private agencies". Agreed.

24.25 & 26:
Admiral Stone said we were not concerned with these matters.

Mr. Stewart brought up the matter of PWB personnel. Mr. Linen said that for non-Italians it is a matter of going back to their employing agencies, PWB or CWI.
Mr. Hopkinson asked if we should consult State Dept. or F.O. on any of these matters. Mr. Dowling said nothing here has to be referred to Washington. Admiral Stone said these are PWB recommendations and we purport depend much from them. He will have a meeting with

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18. Film Production:
Mr. Linen said it was decided at other meeting that Film Board should consider this matter. Admiral Stone said: "Right, and it is understood that AC does not plan to take over". Mr. Linen said newsreel should remain with PWB for the present. Agreed. Mr. Stewart said matters of censorship (except military), licensing and control should go to the Italian Govt. As Adm. Stone agreed.

19. Intelligence:
Admiral Stone said reconnaissance here was OK for present purposes. Mr. Linen said there should be consultation on press matters. Admiral Stone said Majors Fleming and Bergin to report on what additional staff would be necessary to get weekly summary of provincial papers to PBO fairly and get it out a little earlier - by noon if possible.

21. Printing Services:
On this point Mr. Linen said he would like to see work done by Italian printers rather than by requisitioning plants. Admiral Stone agreed. Only operational work should be done in requisitioned plants: other plants should be turned back to owners and potential buyers (PWB etc.). could come to understanding with owners.

22. Photographic Services:
Admiral Stone suggested change: "until it is practical to release to private agencies". Agreed.

24, 25 & 26:
Admiral Stone said he were not concerned with these matters.

Mr. Stewart brought up the matter of PWB personnel. Mr. Linen said that for non-Italians it is a matter of going back to their employing agencies, PWB or CWI.

Mr. Henderson asked if we should consult State Dept. or F.O. on any of these matters. Mr. Dowling said nothing more has to be referred to Washington. Admiral Stone said these are PWB recommendations and we haven't learned much from them. He will have a meeting with Mr. Linen and ask him to prepare original memorandum in light of these minutes.

The Meeting adjourned at 1730 hrs.

Distribution:

Acting President	Capt. Anderson
Chief Commissioner	Mr. Kinnear Stewart
Chief of Staff	Mr. Linen
Mr. Hopkinson	Colonel Henderson
Mr. Corbett	Lieut. Col. Scudder
Mr. Dowling	Major Fleming
Commission Lawyer	Colonel Pratley-Smith

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REORGANISATION OF P.W.B.-ITALY.

Minutes of Meeting held at Allied Commission HQ Jan. 16,1945.

Present : Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, Chairman.
Brigadier Lush, Chief of Staff.
Mr. Henry Hopkinson, Political Section.
Lt. Dowling, American Embassy.
Captain Anderson, -"-
Mr. Micheal Stewart, British Embassy.
Mr. Liner, C.C.I.
Colonel Henderson, Communication G/S.
Lieut. Colonel Souther, -"-
Major Fielden, Public Relations.
Major Bengin, -"-

Before the meeting formally came to order Admiral Stone stated that two fundamental principles should be borne in mind: a) AC is not an operational organization, and b) PRO AC is not a news agency.

Meeting began at 15.15. Brigadier Lush said to-day's meeting was to be a meeting of "powers" of functions of PWB. Major Fielden suggested discussion should be based on PWB Minutes, Appendix to Minutes of Meeting with Mr. Macmillan held on 12 Jan. '45.

Items 1 and 2 called for no comment.

Under Item 3 Major Fielden said it was now to be understood that Mr. Radford would be responsible.

Items 4 and 5. Brigadier Lush said preparation for AMG area should be undertaken in consultation with AC. Major Fielden asked where the weekly directives are to be made up. Admiral Stone inserted that he still didn't understand why the introduction of a few news agencies should call for such a drastic and predictable change in PWB organization. Colonel Henderson said operation directives, purely military, should be drawn up by AFHQ PRO. Mr. Dowling said in any case meetings would be held for radio directives. Admiral Stone said it could be stated that AC would be aware at all meetings; however, there would be a time lag.

1393

6. News Services:

Admiral Stone remarked that this read as if news services were continuing. Capt. Anderson thought it referred only to services within PWB but Admiral Stone did not think that was what was meant. He further pointed out that Radio Rome was essentially a basic news service; what had happened was that PWB discontinued [illegible] through Radio Rome was still giving it

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Mr. Randall Stewart, P [illegible]
Mr. Liner, O.W.I.
Colonel Henderson, Communication Bd.
Lieut. Colonel Gardner, -"-
Major Fielden, Public Relations.
Major Berwin, - " -

Before the meeting formally came to order Admiral Stone stated that two fundamental principles should be borne in mind: 1) AC is not an operational organization, and 2) PWB AC is not a news agency.

Meeting began at 2 P.M. Brigadier Dunn said to-day's meeting was to be a meeting of "powers" of functions of PWB. Major Fielden suggested discussion should be based on PWB Minutes, Appendix to Minutes of Meeting with Mr. Macmillan held on 12 Jan. '44.

Items 1 and 2 called for no comment.

Under Item 3 Major Fielden said it was now to be understood that Mr. Sattorn would be responsible.

Items 4 and 5. Brigadier Dunn said propaganda for AFHQ area should be undertaken in consultation with AC. Major Fielden asked where the weekly directives are to be made up. Admiral Stone inserted that he still didn't understand why the introduction of a few news agencies should call for such a drastic and precipitate change in PWB organization. Colonel Henderson said operation directives, purely military, should be drawn up by AFHQ PSO. Mr. Berwin said in any case meetings would be held for radio directives. Admiral Stone said it could be stated that AC would be aware at all meetings; however, there would be a time lag.

1393

5. News Services:
Admiral Stone remarked that this would be if news services were continued. Capt. Ashmead thought it referred only to services within PWB but Admiral Stone did not think that was what was meant. Mr Sattorn pointed out that Radio Rome was essentially a basic news service; what had happened was that PWB discontinued Basic News for Allied but, through Radio Rome, was still giving it to Italians. Mr. Liner pointed out that the source of Basic News was the agencies and they were not supposed to compete with them. Yet, said Admiral Stone, no agency had asked for suppression of Basic News service. He was still unable to understand why PWB was so anxious to discontinue it. Mr. Liner said it was bad policy to compete with agencies.

7. Monitoring:
Major Fielden would take over distribution within the shop". Mr. Liner recommended monitor service continue for the time being. Eventually FCC might take over. Admiral Stone heard what they would do some; were there not enough monitoring units in

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0 8 4 6

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0847

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10. Press (Cont'd):
40 Italy (ii) (Contd):

Lt.Gen. Wyman: Major Fleming said he didn't know. It was decided to amend the paragraph to read: "Recommend that Press Liaison in Italy be discontinued by PWB".

XV A.G. (i): Admiral Stone wanted to know why we did all this in Italy when it wasn't necessary in France. It should be remembered that original directive was drawn up when Italy was at war; it is time the policy was changed. There was much discussion of this point and finally Lt. Gen. Lyon suggested publication of an Allied News Bulletin to give news of early liberation period. Admiral Stone said the idea was good, and suggested Brigadier Lush take it up with NW Italy planning group.

XV A.G. (ii): No objections.

Colonel Henderson said facilities and equipment surrendered by PWB are military and of no use to private individuals nor the Italian Govt. The Italian Govt. has, however, facilities just about adequate; plans are being worked out whereby Italcable will handle main centers and Govt. will file it. They can start in mid-February. Radio service is yet to be discussed in detail but Colonel Henderson has the impression they will be adequate.

Further arrangements between:

AC
COS
Comms. Sub. Com.
Political Sec.
PWB

OWI
Embassies ..... dtd 1630 hrs 17/1/45.

Distribution:
Acting President
Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff
Mr. Hopkinson
Mr. Scrutt
Mr. Dowling
Chief Engineer
Mr. Michael Stewart
Mr. Lyon
Colonel Henderson
Lieut. Col. Spaldrum
Major Fleming
Major Bonin

1392

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

REORGANISATION OF P.W.B. ITALY

Minutes of meeting held at Allied Commission HQ Jan.12th,1945.

Present: The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, Chairman.
Brigadier Lush, Chief of Staff.
Mr. Russell Barnes, P.W.B.
Mr. George Edman, P.W.B.
Mr. Henry Hopkinson, Political Section.
Mr. Dowling, American Embassy.
Mr. Michael Stewart, British Embassy.
Mr. Linen, O.W.I.
Captain Anderson, P.W.B.
Mr. Benett, Political Section.
Mr. Radford, P.W.B. Int.
Major Fielden, Public Relations.

Mr. MACMILLAN said that two things were happening concurrently. The P.W.B. was withdrawing some of its activities from Liberated Italy, and he was putting forward proposals for the subsequent control of those activities by other bodies. He thought that the meeting might come to an agreement which could be sent forward to the authorities as a fusion of the two. He had before him a paper which had been submitted by Mr. RUSSELL BARNES. He thought that the meeting might go through Mr. BARNES' proposals quickly to get a general picture.

Mr. BARNES said that he had put forward these proposals as a prelude to the liquidation of a large part of PWB's commitments within territory under Italian jurisdiction. (1) The Italian Theatre Headquarters of PWB would be abolished as from 15 January 1945. (2) Thereafter PWB in Italy would be divided into two parts - PWB XV Army Group, headed by Mr. RAINER, and PWB AC Italy, headed by Mr. EDMAN. The latter would be only in the nature of a "liquidation operation". (3) The PWB wished to maintain the news and monitoring unit at Caserta; this service was provided for the AFHQ meeting at 8:30 every morning. It consisted, as far as he knew, of six British and American personnel and three Italians. It was not PWB's intention to embarrass anyone by cutting off services on the 15th, and they held themselves at the disposal of the AC for any services that might be required. They would like to continue their Basic News Commitments.

Mr. MACMILLAN asked what that meant?

Mr. BARNES said that PWB would continue its distribution of Basic News but it would have to be prevented from falling into the hands of the Press. (5) He would like to see news turned over to the Italian radio as soon as possible, but PWB would wish to have any time they needed on Italian stations for "Italia Combatte" and other pro-

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Mr. Linton, C.W.I.
Captain Anderson, P.W.B.
Mr. Sennett, Political Section.
Mr. Stafford, P.W.B. Int.
Major Fielden, Public Relations.

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Mr. MACMILLAN said that they could certainly bill them; payment was quite another thing.

Mr. BARNES said (16) that the PWB wished to cut loose entirely from the newspapers which they had been running and to insist that the titles should not be used again. (17) As to films, they had an organisation of 300 people for distribution, but this cost nothing as payment for it was taken from film receipts. They could turn over to AC or anyone else a smoothly functioning organisation. (18) He

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thought that production could be taken over by the AC; the main PWB activity was to make Italian trailers for the newsreels sent from overseas.

Mr. RADFORD said (1) that many people were anxious for the Intelligence services to continue. They were found useful in Washington and London. He thought that they might be taken over by the Embassies.

Mr. MACMILLAN said that the object of the meeting was to get a dividing line between PWB and other bodies. They could decide later which bodies would take over the various activities. He did not wish to draw a line between AC and the Embassies at this point.

The meeting then considered Mr. BARNES' memorandum point by point:-

1 - 4. Brigadier LUSH said that the definition "PWB XV Army Group" might be confusing. It would not include much AAI territory.

Mr. BARNES said that it could be called "PWB AAI and German-occupied Italy" and "PWB Italian Government territory".

Brigadier LUSH said that what was intended, he thought, was Italy south of the Army Control Line.

Mr. MACMILLAN agreed and directed that the territory described in Mr. BARNES' memorandum as "AC Italy" be taken to mean all Italy south of the Army Control Line.

5. It was agreed that directives would only be necessary on rare occasions in AC Italy. There was no objection to the procedure suggested.

6. News Services: Mr. BARNES asked Captain ANDERSON to speak to the question of Agencies.

Captain ANDERSON said that no Italian agency was yet functioning well enough to deliver news. Nor did he think that outside agencies were yet in a position to do so. PWB had the facilities to work with ANSA and could relinquish employees and information to ANSA in order to get it going. This was absolutely necessary for any Italian agency. Also PWB had to make their news from Liberated Italy available to the Roman press. He did not know how that was to be done. PWB could not do this according to the Caserta directive. Could AC do it? He thought that ANSA was very much frightened about its responsibilities and it would be a hard struggle for them to take over on Monday.

Mr. BARNES said that PWB had been told that it should not work with ANSA. It seemed to be rather a difficult

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Mr. BARNES said that PWB had been told that it should not work with ANSA. It seemed to be rather a difficult situation.

Captain ANDERSON said that it would be easy for the PWB to hand over to ANSA, and it was a cooperative organisation which could not be called a monopoly. But if it was to be prohibited from working in requisitioned premises, it would be working under grave difficulties.

Mr. DOWLING said that perhaps the premises could be derequisitioned by us and rerequisitioned by the Italian Government for ANSA.

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Captain ANDERSON said that he thought we might forget about the requisitioning question altogether for the time being. He would like to know whether PWB could give its Liberated Italy news to the Rome newspapers on Monday morning?

Major FIELDEN said that this was a new point which had never been discussed, but logically, since the newspapers were going on to a paying basis, any PWB news should be sold to them on the same terms as Agency news. Otherwise, there would an overlap and complaints. He saw no reason why AC should take over distribution; distribution was only a mechanical operation. The important point was to avoid monopoly, as SACMED had ruled. PWB was giving a virtual monopoly to ANSA by handing over personnel and premises, as ANDERSON had suggested. All agencies should compete on an equal footing.

Mr. BARNES said that nobody wanted a free press more than the PWB. He thought that Captain ANDERSON had used the wrong word when he said "relinquish" employees; he had meant "release" employees, who would be available to any other agency or newspaper. PWB had absolutely no connection with ANSA.

Major FIELDEN objected that it was generally thought that PWB was sponsoring ANSA and there was much ill-feeling on the subject. The Chief Commissioner's view was that we could not prevent ANSA from being used, if the newspaper editors so decided, as a post-office and delivery organisation, but that it should not have preferential treatment above any other agency.

Mr. MACMILLAN said that he thought these considerations applied only to the short-term view. The Technical sub-Committee would have to decide on the facilities given to ANSA. Until its decisions were taken, he thought that PWB should distribute Liberated Italy news to the Rome press.

6. Note 3: Major FIELDEN said that if Basic News were continued there would be an outcry from the Agencies, since it would be quite impossible to prevent it from getting into the hands of the Press.

Brigadier LUSH agreed.

Mr. HOPKINSON said that it was very useful. Many officers could not read Italian. He himself found it essential. 1390

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1390

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Brigadier LUSH asked whether Mr. HOPKINSON did not get the PRO digest.

Mr. HOPKINSON said that it came too late. He wanted it on the breakfast table.

Brigadier LUSH asked PRO whether it could not be done earlier. Mr. DOWLING also wanted it earlier.

Major FIELDEN said it was a question of staff. With more staff, it could be done earlier.

Brigadier LUSH said he thought that ought to be done.

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Mr. BARNES said that he would rather discontinue Basic News.

Mr. RADFORD said that Basic News would have to be continued, in part at least, to supply internal needs of EWB.

Brigadier LUSH asked whether PRO could not get out a daily summary to substitute Basic News.

Major FIELDEN said that he entirely disagreed with that idea. We were endeavouring to hand over news responsibilities to the Italians and to cease propagandising. It would be wholly wrong, in his opinion, to start another propaganda sheet from AC. Foreign news would come from the Agencies and Italian news should come from Italian sources. Italian news could be translated into English for those who did not understand the language, but official news-sheets should be avoided.

Mr. MACMILLAN agreed that Basic News should be discontinued.

2. Monitoring: Mr. BARNES asked whether AC would want to continue to have a monitored record of enemy broadcasts.

Brigadier LUSH and Mr. HOPKINSON said that this was essential.

Mr. LINEN said that, owing to agreements with OWI and MOI, PWB would in any case have to monitor enemy broadcasts, if only for transmission to London and Washington. There would therefore continue to be a monitoring file, and AC could have a copy.

Mr. BARNES said that the distribution would have to be taken over by AC.

Mr. MACMILLAN agreed.

3. Radio: Mr. BARNES said that he would like Radio Rome to have the news at once for distribution. Otherwise there would be different news for the enemy in Rome and elsewhere.

Major FIELDEN said that that had been ruled out for the moment, as the Agencies felt that the news would be pirated by the Fascist Press and it would be very difficult to bring that to book later.

Mr. BARNES said that the Agencies had a perfect right to sell to Radio Rome.

Major FIELDEN said that that was not the case. SACMED's direction had been that they could sell direct to the

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Mr. MACMILLAN said that in this case again it was a question only of the interim period. News would be sold to Radio Rome as and when the Technical sub-Committee made its recommendations on news distribution outside Rome.

6. Note 1: Mr. RADFORD insisted that PWB should have the right to certain periods in the Italian programme for "Italian Combatte" etc.

Brigadier LUSH agreed.

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9. Radio Technical Services: Mr. BARNES said that facilities and equipment would have to be provided by OWI and MOI if they wished to provide them.

10. Press: AC Italy: As regards the Press, Mr. BARNES said that it was the desire of PWB to cut loose from all newspapers, and to stop any computation of the PWB titles.

Major FIELDEN said that in the case of the CORRIERE DI ROMA they were raising a storm at the present time. It was apparently falling back into the hands of the Patrons.

Mr. MACMILLAN said that that was a matter for the Italian Government.

Mr. BARNES said that that was the case. The PWB had nothing to do with the matter. They merely released their employees and the machinery. Anyone could take them up.

Major FIELDEN said that that was not strictly true. It might perhaps be a case for the Italian Government eventually, but in fact PWB was handing over a going concern lock, stock and barrel, and this was entirely out of keeping with everything that had been done to avoid monopoly. The invisible assets were of great value. He merely wanted to make that point clear.

Mr. BARNES said that the future of the paper was no concern of theirs. They merely wished to safeguard the employees.

Brigadier LUSH agreed that the employees must be safeguarded.

Major FIELDEN said that it still remained the gift of a going concern.

10. Press: XV A.G.(1) Mr. BARNES asked whether PWB should continue its work of setting up newspapers in forward areas.

Mr. MACMILLAN concurred, but referred to the allocation of paper which Major FIELDEN had mentioned in an earlier note.

Major FIELDEN explained that the AFB had made an allocation of 300 tons monthly to PWB, 300 to the Italian Press, and 400 to be stockpiled in the North. Under the changed circumstances, PWB would not need nearly so much paper and the allocation would have to be revised.

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Mr. MACMILLAN concurred.

11. A.P.B.: Mr. BARNES said that he thought that APB could now be wound up.

Major FIELDEN said that it certainly had not much to do now, but it was the only link between Censorship and the Italian Press Commission. As such he thought it might serve a useful purpose at times. It would be better to keep it in being for the moment, perhaps working in the North, but available if serious Press disputes arose.

Mr. MACMILLAN concurred.

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12 - 18:

Mr. BARNES said that PWB publications and propaganda shows would be passed over to CWI and MOI. AC would care to look after the distribution of publications and booklets. The film distributing unit could also come under AC as a self-contained unit. PWB could carry on the with the production of films until AC could take over.

Major FIELDEN said that he did not think AC need "take over"; it was simply a question, where documentary AC films were concerned, of asking an Italian company to make them. That could be done to-morrow, if materials were available. Newsreels would be more complicated.

Mr. BARNES said he would like to hand over newsreels to the Italian Government.

Mr. LINEN said that that would be difficult. The newsreels sent out now were owned by British and American companies who would not easily surrender their rights.

Mr. STEWART said that the question of transport for distribution would be difficult. Was PWB going to surrender their transport?

Mr. BARNES said they had no transport - they had to commandeer.

Mr. MACMILLAN said that he thought AC should take over the PWB film responsibilities as soon as it could be arranged.

Mr. BARNES objected that that might leave the PWB "with the baby for many months.

Brigadier LUSH assured Mr. BARNES that AC would play fair.

19. Intelligence: Mr. RADFORD said that the PWB had 60 or 80 intelligence services, about half of which were in Liberated Italy. Many people thought them very valuable.

Mr. MACMILLAN said that they were no doubt very well run, but he wondered whether the function of interviewing did not now properly belong to the Embassies. An intelligence man might be very conscientious and clever, but he could not always know when he was embarrassing the authorities by visiting certain people and perhaps praising them. It was difficult to get proper coordination. Anonymous reports, he thought, were less valuable than those sent through proper Embassy channels.

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Mr. HOPKINSON and Mr. DOWLING stressed the value of "D" section reports.

Brigadier LUSH thought that lack of coordination was the chief fault. All such reports should be coordinated at one final point before being sent on.

Mr. MACMILLAN agreed. He thought the reports very interesting and well done, but he had sometimes thought that they were tendentious.

Mr. BARNES said that they were merely newspaper reports.

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Mr. MacNEIL [illegible] thought. They created an official enemy and could create much discomfort and misunderstanding if they were incorrect.

Mr. HOPKINSON said that he thought perhaps "D" section should do the time information to the Embassies and those who really needed it but not circulating their reports to a large number of people.

Mr. MacMILLAN said that it was really a question of who conducts the reporting. Why should the unit as a whole not be transformed to AC? He thought that it might continue as it was for the time being, but a coordinating committee should be set up and it should be eventually transformed.

Mr. RADFORD said that the question was very complicated and suggested that the AC should detute someone to discuss the whole matter with him.

Mr. MACMILLAN agreed that it was a doubtful problem and might be left over for a technical committee to make recommendations; he thought however that a coordinating committee should be set up.

Brigadier LUSH referred back to an earlier part of the Memorandum and asked that all propaganda for Kesselrings Italy should be coordinated with AC. Mr. BARNES agreed.

Mr. MACMILLAN thanked Mr. BARNES for preparing the paper, and said he thought we now had an idea of the division of activities. We should now have to consider how those activities were to be divided between AC, OWI, MOI, and the Embassies. That would be the purpose of a further meeting, which should be held as soon as possible.

Meeting arranged between:

AC — CG
COS
PRO
Comms. Sub-Com.

OWI
MOI
Embassies — for 1500 hrs 15/1/45

Distribution:
Acting President
Chief Commissioner
Chief of Staff
Mr. Hopkinson
Mr. Schott
Mr. Bowling
Mr. Michael Stewart

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Mr. Schott
Mr. Dowling
Mr. Michael Stewart
Mr. Russell Barnes
Mr. George Eman
Captain Anderson
Mr. Linen
Mr. Bedford
Colonel Henderson

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
- - - - - - - - -

CONFIDENTIAL

RE-ORGANISATION OF P.W.B. ITALY

On instructions from SACMED, the private news agencies are being admitted in Rome on 15 Jan 1945, and will be admitted in the rest of Italy under Italian administration as soon as the technical problems involved in this change can be solved. SACMED's instructions further envisage the reduction at an early date to Italian control of the radio operations within territory under Italian jurisdiction.

These instructions must be considered the prelude to the liquidation of a large part of PWB's commitments within territory under Italian jurisdiction, and in certain cases to their transfer to other Allied agencies.

In order to facilitate this operation, it is desirable to separate the present PWB Italian Headquarters into two parts: PWB (AC Italy), and PWB 15 army group, the former principally concerned with the smooth handover of functions in accordance with a programme to be worked out between AFHQ, PWB, AC, and the US and British Embassies, the latter designed to carry on Psychological Warfare against the enemy in German-occupied Italy and consolidation propaganda in Italian territory under AMG administration.

The following suggestions are put forward by PWB as a basis for discussion:

1. Italian Theatre Headquarters of PWB to be abolished w.e.f. 15 Jun 1945.

2. With effect from the same date separate PWB Headquarters will be set up:

   PWB (AC Italy) - Head: Br. Brigadier
   Deputy Head: Lt. Col. Titchener.

   PWB 15 Army Group - Head: Lt. Col. Rayner
   Deputy Head: Lt. Col. Grandi.

3. PWB (AC Italy) will be responsible for all operations within Italian territory under Italian administration and in the Com-

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technical problems involved in this change can be solved. SACMED's instructions further envisage the transition at an early date to Italian control of the public organizations within territory under Italian jurisdiction.

These instructions envisage the gradual liquidation of a large part of PWB's commitments within territory under Italian jurisdiction, and in certain cases to their transfer to other Allied agencies.

In order to facilitate this operation, it is desirable to separate the present PWB Italian Headquarters into two parts: PWB (AC Italy), and PWB IV Army Group, the former principally concerned with the orderly handover of functions in accordance with a programme to be worked out between Army, Navy, AC, and the US and British Embassies, the latter designed to carry on Psychological Warfare against the enemy in German-occupied Italy and consolidation propaganda in Italian territory under AMG administration.

The following considerations are put forward by PWB as a basis for discussion:

1. Italian theatre headquarters of PWB to be abolished w.e.f. 15 Jan 1945.

2. With effect from the same date separate PWB headquarters will be set up:

PWB (AC Italy) - Brig Gen. [illegible]
Deputy Brig. Gen. Kitchener.

PWB IV Army Group - Brig. Gen. Mayner
Deputy Brig. Gen. Grundi.

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3. PWB (AC Italy) will be responsible for all operations within Italian territory under Italian administration and in the Commune of Naples, and will also be charged with the liquidation or transfer of these operations, in agreement with Army, AC, and the US and British Embassies.

4. PWB IV Army Group will be responsible for all propaganda directed against the enemy in German-occupied Italy, for all propaganda directed towards the population of the same area, and for propaganda of consolidation in the areas administered by AMG.

5. Directives will be prepared in draft by each headquarters and will be forwarded to PWB Army for the necessary clearance and issue. No directive will become valid unless issued by PWB Army.

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6. News Services: Three units to be constructed from existing forces, as follows:

AFHQ — Unit to be established at Caserta for provision of communiques and essential spot news to Army.

AC Italy — Present services to be maintained until the privincing are in a position to service the whole territory. Thereafter, this unit to be modified to provide limited basic news service covering communiques, PIC releases (both Service Departments and AC), official releases by United States Press Office and official statements by Allied Governments.

MTO A.C. — Unit for the services of this headquarters, in accordance with its needs, to be established.

Mr. Emerot, A/C News Services PWB Area, to make recommendations on the distribution of staff and equipment, including morse monitoring staff and equipment, for the establishment of the above units.

Note 1: A sub-committee under the chairmanship of Major-General Stone is already studying the technical problems connected with the provision of privincing news to areas outside Rome.

Note 2: The daily news file in Rome, described from Rome, to be discontinued.

Note 3: Printed Daily News Edition, to be continued as long as present communications continue, but not to be distributed to Italian press in Rome.

7. Monitoring: Following units to be established:

AFHQ — Unit as daily for intelligence monitoring to requirements of G-2 AFHQ.

AC Italy — Unit to provide comprehensive service of Italian broadcasts as required for general purposes (communiques, etc.) and as required by the Austrian Zone Section.

MTO A.C. — Unit to provide full French coverage and essential coverage of Italian broadcasts.

Captain Cassella, A/C Monitoring Service PWB, to study composition of units and report.

8. Misc:

AC Italy — Services to be returned to Italian administration

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Note 2 (contd.)

by extent to which I.F.B may indicate.

Note 3: Time also to be reserved for PWB broadcasts to Adr. targets and AC targets on the new Italian 100 K.W. transmitter, when in service.

Note 4: AC to consider the desirability, when network passes back to Italian control, of reserving time for special AC information programmes.

Note 5: PWB wireless Radio Services set aside in time to be responsibility of P.B.M.O. and time to be specifically reserved for the continuance of these programmes on any Italian transmitters considered suitable.

9. Radio Technical Services:

AC Italy — Technical supervision over Rome S.W., Bari I and 100 K.W. transmitter when in service, to be maintained by PWB as long as these transmitters are used for psychological warfare purposes.

All other technical services now provided by PWB to be discontinued.

PWB to supply disposal of radio technical equipment in Italy to Italy.

HQ A.G. — Services to be continued as at present. Italian to report on division of staff and to make recommendations for the appointment of Italians employed.

10. Press:

AC Italy — (i) PWB News Agency to be discontinued as rapidly as possible. Corriere di Roma to be closed on 15 June.

(ii) Press Liaison to be taken over by AC as the Press Attaché as soon as private agencies are established. (PWB to transfer one Press Officer to Rome, Catania, Bari, Naples and Rome).

HQ A.G. — (i) Newspapers. To desires to know whether the present policy of setting up newspapers in newly-liberated cities is to be continued.

(ii) Press Liaison. Present services to continue. Lieut. Col. Munro to transfer to AMG headquarters

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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for the continuance of these broadcasts on My Italian to monitors considered suit ble.

9. Radio Technical Services.

AC Italy Technical supervision over local A.M., Bari I on 1oo m.c/s. transmitter and the services, to be maintained by U.S. personnel as long as these transmitters are necessary for the purposes.

In Time as required

All other technical services now provided by PWB to be discontinued.

Owl to work directly with local technical personnel in Italy.

CV A.G. Services to be continued as at present. In due course to submit proposals for the establishment of local services through ...

10. Press:

AC Italy (i) PWB News Agency to be discontinued as early as possible. Services to Rome to be closed on 15 Jun 45.

(ii) Press Liaison to be taken over by AC as the press activities are part of private agencies re-activated. (PWB to procure two Press Officers at Palermo, Caserta, Bari, Naples and Rome).

CV A.G. (i) Two Newspapers: Desires to know whether the present policy of setting up newspapers in newly-liberated cities is to be continued.

(ii) Press Liaison: Present services to continue. Lieut. Col. Lucas to transfer to AMG Headquarters as Chief Press Officer as soon as his interests in Rome can be transferred.

11. A.F.H.B.

AC Italy As a consequence of other measures recommended above, the A.F.H.B. would become redundant and should be wound up.

CV A.G. Lieut. Col. Lucas, will be to set up whatever machinery may be required.

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12. Publications:

AC in Italy (i) Critical or wartime dispatches to be passed over all responsibility of War Cabinets as soon as possible. (I.e. recommends continuation of IL issue until the cessation of hostilities in Europe, when it could be offered to an Italian publisher).

(ii) La Scala Issue. Rec. recommends that this periodical be continued until the cessation of hostilities in Europe, under the control of either AFHQ or AC, or the joint control of the three Governments.

(iii) Cancellation of Publications: A considerable conflict exists and a new list is being drawn up, but is not yet in production. Rec. recommends that this process be left entirely by the Governments concerned, production unit (if any).

(iv) Contracts: The production to be discontinued. Is desired are required by AC, these to be produced by AC production Unit (if any), or by Brit. & U.S. Publications Section (see below).

Note: The Governments concerned to make their own arrangements for distribution of public stocks. PWB to continue distribution until these arrangements have been made, but in the meantime to give any assistance possible in the handling of them.

AC in Italy. Brigadier Charles to be i/c Publications Section this to be given effect to to submit proposals rights concerning all publications required by this Section. Headquarters ought to be at the discretion of AC or the Governments, if required.

13. Collection of Publications (i.e. old newspapers).

AC in Italy. To be discontinued as old newspapers are given up (though it is a serious consideration as to perfectly well continue this service itself therefore as it considers it useful).

14. Films: To be continued under Chief Press Officer.
15. Plays: As for books.
16. Books:

AC in Italy. Responsibility for clearance of copyrights and so forth to be passed to Publications Section as soon as practicable.

Part I
Are Publications
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work for transfer
work support by AC

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NOT TO W/

PW/ will
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CC

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

(iii) [illegible] Public Affairs: A corresponding booklet copy must be drawn [illegible] but not yet in production. It is proposed that this programme be taken over immediately by the [illegible] on by AC [illegible].

(iv) [illegible] protection to be discontinued. If [illegible] is required by AC, these to be provided by AC production unit (if any), or by [illegible] Public Affairs Section (see below).

Note: The unit [illegible] to work [illegible] arrangements for distribution of public films. This to continue until these are superseded above [illegible], and unable to give any specific [illegible] in the events of war.

XV A.G. Right to [illegible] to be the Publications Section [illegible] headquarters and to submit recommendations concerning [illegible] required by division. Grounds stated to be at the disposal of AC or the Two Corps, if required.

13. Collecting of Pictures (i.e. mail order, [illegible]).

AC It Ly To be discontinued as [illegible] are given up (but it is [illegible] continue as [illegible] if wanted).

XV A.G. To be continued under Chief Press Officer, as for Books.

15. Plays:

14. Books:

AC It Ly [illegible] responsibility for clearance of copyrights and so forth to be placed to Two Corps H'quarters.

XV A.G. Not applicable.

16. Programme Sales:

AC It Ly To be undertaken by AC until the Treasure, Jointly, have studied the problem of the future of this medium. (Note: Link to producer questions of this type which for the Two Corps' use).

XV A.G. Service to be continued as at present. No change in [illegible] recommendations to be the division of staff between the two Headquarters.

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17. Film Distribution:

AC Italy — PWB to retain responsibility until arrangements can be made for the Sub Commn, AC or private distributors to take over.

XV A.G. — As at present. I.e. Lt. Col. Bancroft to make recommendations as to the division of staff between the two Headquarters.

18. Film Production:

AC Italy — Production consists of: (i) the regular Italian newsreel, (ii) documentaries and shorts in support of AC programmes. PWB recommends that it should retain responsibility for both services until AC can arrange to take over.

XV A.G. — Not applicable.

19. Intelligence:

AC Italy — To continue as at present, with Major Greenlees i/c, subject to directives of CIC, PWB AFHQ. (Four Services now in four groups: Liberated Italy, General Report, Foreign Liaison, Documents Section; and Press Reporting Agency).

XV A.G. — Occupied Italy Intelligence (Major Robertson i/c) and AMG Italy Intelligence (Major Howells i/c) to pass to this Headquarters, remaining subject, however, to directives of CIC PWB AFHQ.

Note: The organisation of German Intelligence to be reserved for future discussion.

20. News Features Unit

AC Italy — This Service to pass to Press Attaches as soon as practicable.

XV A.G. — Mr. Bancroft to submit recommendations as to requirements.

1385

21. Printing Services:

AC Italy — Gradual liquidation of services, with transfer to Emissaries and AC to any extent required.

XV A.G. — As at present. Mr. Antilla and Captain Tiscop to make recommendations as to division of staff

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

AC Italy — Production consists of: (1) the regular Italian Reserve, (2) documentaries and shorts in support of AC programs. Bn recommends that it should not in any way be responsible for these services until AC can arrange to take over.

XV A.G. — Not applicable.

19. Intelligence:

AC Italy — To continue as at present, with Major Grenadier i/c, subject to directives of CIC, PWB AFHQ. (Inter-Services Liaison Group liberated Italy, General Report, Interpretive Documents Section, and Press Release Unit).

XV A.G. — Occupied Italy Intelligence (Lt. Col. Robertson i/c) and Axis Italy Intelligence (Lt. Col. Howard i/c) to go as to take up headquarters, remaining subject, however, to directives of CIC PWB AFHQ.

Note: The organization of German Intelligence to be reserved for future discussion.

20. News Features Unit:

AC Italy — This Service to go as to cross Mediterranean as soon as practicable.

XV A.G. — Mr. Bancroft to submit recommendations as to requirements.

1385

21. Printing Services:

AC Italy — Gradual liquidation of services, with transfer to Allied and AC to any extent required.

XV A.G. — As at present. Mr. Butler and Capt. Bishop to make recommendations as to division of assets between the two headquarters.

22. Photographic Services:

AC Italy — To be maintained by PWB until it is practicable for the Allies to take over.

XV A.G. — Mr. Stroud to report on personnel required (if any).

23. Leaflets: — Service to pass wholly under the control of PWB XV A.G.

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24. Austrian Radio Section: Service to be under the control of [illegible], but administratively responsible to, [illegible] (AC It.Ly).

25. S.O.I.S.: Service to be under the control of [illegible], but administratively responsible to PWB (AC It.Ly) or SHAEF (MV A.G.), as the circumstances may be.

26. Administration: Both military and civilian administration of PWB (AC It.Ly) and SHAEF (MV A.G.) to be entirely separate. Military Director, Deputy Military Director and Administrative Coordinator PWB (AFHQ, to examine and report on the course to be taken to effect this separation directly decisions have been reached on the principal proposals noted above.

DCHW/SS
11th January, 1945.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH
ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS
P.W.B. UNIT No. 12 U.S.A.P.O. 512

16 January 1945

TO : Major L. Fielden, Director PRO AC

FROM : Mr. J.G. Barney, Press Officer

SUBJECT : Automobile permits and petrol and oil allocations in connection with Rome Press and publishing activities

At the original request of AMG, PWB has up till now handled the above question. Through Dr. Scivicco, secretary of the "Associazione Editori Giornali", located at Via S. Nicolo' da Tolentino 22, who certified the applications, PWB transportation officer accepted requests from the publishers of authorised newspapers and periodicals and also from distributors, for car permits and petrol and oil allowances in connection with editorial work in Rome and distribution work both in Rome and in the provinces.

PWB transportation officer made his bid each month, one month in advance, to Region IV AMG for the total quantity of petrol and oil necessary for the operation. Revision of automobile permits was made quarterly.

Now that PWB has relinquished editorial control of the PWB newspaper in Rome and has also handed over the News Agency service to Italian hands, it is requested that you make arrangements for the continuation of the control hitherto exercised by PWB on the matter of these car permits and petrol and oil allowances. PWB transportation officer, Lt. J. Mattalon, phone ext.190, will be pleased to give your representative any further information required and also to put his files at your disposal.

J.G. BARNEY
Press Officer

c/ to Lt.J. Mattalon

9

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K 55

PsYSC (45) 1st Meeting
16th January 1945

RESTRICTED

COPY NO 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

JAN 18 1945

The next meeting of the Psychological Warfare Sub-Committee has been further postponed from Friday, 19th January to Saturday, 20th January 1945. It will be held at 1430 hours in the G-1 (B) (formerly Chief Administrative Officer's) Conference Room. Agenda, and sections invited to attend or be represented, will be as previously announced.

W. A. Bannister
W.A. BANNISTER,
MAJOR, FA,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Chief, INC	1
Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U.S. Political Adviser	6-8
British Resident Minister	9-11
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	12-14
G-2	15-16
G-3 Special Operations	17
G-5	18-20
Chief Signals Officer	21
Secretary, General Staff	22
Secretary, IS & PS	23-25
Spares	26-30

COS DIST - 18 JAN 45

CHIEF COMMISSIONER (12)
C.O.S. (12)

1283

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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MAJOR, FA,
SECRETARY.

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COS DIST - 18 JAN 45

CHIEF COMMISSIONER (12)
C.O.S. (13)
P.R.B. (14)

1283

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

COPY

5 32

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

RESTRICTED

PsWSC (45) 1st Meeting
15th January 1945

Copy No. 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB COMMITTEE

The next meeting of the Psychological Warfare Sub Committee has been postponed from Tuesday 16th January 1945 to Friday 19th January 1945. It will be held at 1430 hours in the G-5 Conference Room (Archway A, entry 26 - through and beyond the Visitors Bureau and Billeting Office). Agenda, and sections invited to attend or be represented, will be as previously announced.

W.A. MANCHESTER,
Major, FA,
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Chief, PWB	1
Director, PWB	2- 3
Deputy Director, PWB	4- 5
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C O S DIST

CHIEF CSTAFF (12)
C O S (13)
P R B (14)

1382

SECRET

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS K-24

PsWSC (45) 1st Meeting
12th January 1945

SECRET

COPY NO 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE

THE NEXT MEETING OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB-COMMITTEE WILL BE HELD IN THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER'S CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1430 HOURS ON TUESDAY 16 JANUARY 1945

A G E N D A

1. MINUTES OF PREVIOUS MEETING
(PsWSC (44) 8th Meeting - already circulated)

2. LIQUIDATION OF PWB FUNCTIONS IN ITALY
(Paper No. PsWSC (45) 1 - already circulated)

3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROPAGANDA DIRECTIVE TO THE BALKANS
(Paper No. PsWSC (45) 2 - already circulated)

NOTE: G-2 and G-5 are invited to attend or be represented for Items 2 and 3.
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, G-3 Special Operations and Chief Signals Officer are invited to attend or be represented for Item 2.

W.A. BANNISTER,
MAJOR, FA,
SECRETARY.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO
Chief, ING	1
Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U.S. Political Adviser	6-8
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Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	12-14
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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

STRATEGIC OFFICERS CONFERENCE ROOM AT 1430 HOURS
ON TUESDAY 16 JANUARY 1945

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

HEADQUARTERS C.S. 1 JAN 1945 A.C.

In A.C. Rome (2)
PRO. (2)
Seen by Major Fulton

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch
APO 512

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)
:
NUMBER 2)

12 January 1945.

1. The post is hereby created of Assistant Deputy Director PWB.

2. This officer will assist the Director and Deputy Director in the control and coordination of PWB activities as a whole and will act for them in their absence.

3. He will be responsible in particular for insuring that all matters of policy requiring reference to the Political Advisors of the SAC or to other branches of AFHQ (other than administrative branches and Signals Division) or to the Allied Commission are properly coordinated before submission to the Director or Deputy Director.

4. He will represent the Director or Deputy Director as instructed and will report to them in all matters.

5. He will have from the above a particular responsibility for the coordination of the directives on which the Branch's officers carry out psychological warfare and for assuring himself on behalf of the Directorate that they are being observed.

6. Other specific responsibilities which he will assume under the Directorate are:

a. Supervision and control, through the appropriate heads of units, of all PWB intelligence work.
b. Supervision and control, through the appropriate heads of units, of all psychological and political warfare output directed towards Austria.
c. Supervision at PWB AFHQ of the work of the Special Operations Liaison Section.
d. Direction, on behalf of PWB, of measures for the liquidation or transfer to other agencies of PWB interests in the Balkans and Italy.
e. Supervision and coordination of plans for PWB units in Austria, elaborated by the Austrian Planning Section(s).

7. Mr. C.A. Raleigh Radford is appointed to this post effective today.

By order of Mr. BARNES:

H. L. HARRIS
Major, Inf., for
Deputy Military Director PWB

HEADQUARTERS
15 JAN
A. C.

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A.C. - Rome (2)

PROF 21

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Psychological Warfare Branch
APO 512

MEMORANDUM SS/1. 11th January, 1945.

1. Mr. T.G.H. Harman has been selected for an appointment in another Theatre, and is in consequence relinquishing the post of Deputy Director, PWB AFHQ w.e.f. 12th January 1945.

2. Brigadier W.F. Jeffries, D.S.O., has been appointed Deputy Director, PWB AFHQ, with the approval of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, w.e.f. the same date.

3. Brigadier Jeffries will retain his appointment of Military Director (Br.) PWB AFHQ, in addition to his new duties.

4. Before leaving this Theatre, Mr. Harman will be completing certain work, particularly with regard to AIS Greece, on behalf of the Director.

Russell Barnes,

DIRECTOR, PWB, AFHQ.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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Russell Barnes,

DIRECTOR, PWB, AFHQ.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

9 PRB

Translation

Perrone - Corso Umberto, 237

11 January 1945

To His Excellency,

We want to submit to your kind examination the enclosed letter which we sent to P.W.B., about the 'Corriere di Roma'.

Truly yours,

S. Pio Perrone

Mario Perrone

Sir C C has seen

Rear Admiral Ellery Stone

A.C. H.Q.

R o m e

c.c.

C.O.S. List 12 Jan 45

ACTION: PRB

INFO: Chief Comm

C.S.

1278

Translation

C o p y

11 January 1945

To: Psychological Warfare Board
R o m e

Through the Roman Press and officious informations, we have heard that the decisions about the 'Corriere di Roma' were being examined.

The hypothesis that the paper would no longer be issued would mean the disavowal of a tradition which is now very favourably established; at the same time, it would throw three hundred families on the pavement and endanger the fate of the property because of the unexpected burden of the relative and important liquidations, and because of the stoppage of every productive activity.

The continuation of the 'Corriere di Roma' would, on the contrary, keep up a political and journalistic initiative, which, for public opinion, is linked with the liberation of Rome, and the going back of Italy to its traditions of 1915-18.

In homage to the Allies, and trusting in the guarantees it has been given, the Societa Editrice has employed all its activity in supporting the 'Corriere di Roma'; when the 'Messagero' was suspended, it passed on to it all its technical and industrial organization, refusing to make other arrangements, fearing it might have unfavourable consequences for the affirmation and diffusion of the 'Corriere di Roma'

We think it is therefore our right that the continuation of the publications of the Corriere di Roma should go over to the Societa Editrice.

Considering the present circumstances, we repeat what we have already declared to the Bonomi Government: to be ready to adhere to whatever proposal directed to guarantee the political, democratic and popular character of the newspaper, and its character of the organ of international informations, supporting the new European policy of the Allies.

If required, we can also make definite proposals: in accordance with our spirit and with our traditions of the past which culminate in our concrete collaboration to the victory of 1915-18 with the decisive industrial production of the Ansaldo Plants.

Trusting that the decision of the Allies will avoid the above mentioned serious and unfair damages, and will be inspired by a sense of justice, We remain,

S. Pio Perrone
Mario Perrone

P.S. We deem it unnecessary to answer to the personnal attacks of the Roman Press, for we have already communicated the matter to the Council of State, as from the enclosed appeal.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

view.

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Mario Perrone

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e.c.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

PERRONE CORSO UMBERTO 337
ROMA

11 gennaio 1945

TEL 65.463

A Sua Eccellenza,

teniamo, Eccellenza, a sottoporre anche al Suo benevolo esame l'acclusa lettera da noi diretta al P.W.B. nei riguardi del "Corriere di Roma".

Con ossequio.

Prof. Perrone
Mario Pettorelli

Rear Admiral Ellery Stone
Headquaters
Allied Commission
Roma

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

COPIA

PERRONE CORSO UMBERTO 337
ROMA

11 Gennaio 1945

TEL 65 483

Al PSYCOLOGICAL WARFARE BOARD

R O M A

Dalla stampa romana e da informazioni ufficiose abbiamo appreso essere in esame decisioni circa il "Corriere di Roma".

La ipotesi della cessazione delle pubblicazioni del giornale equivarrebbe a sconfessione inspiegabile di una tradizione ormai così favorevolmente affermatasi; nel tempo stesso getterebbe sul lastrico trecento famiglie e metterebbe in grave pericolo le sorti della proprietà per l'aggravio improvviso delle relative, ingentissime liquidazioni e per la cessazione di ogni attività produttiva.

La continuazione del "Corriere di Roma" conserverebbe, invece, una iniziativa politico-giornalistica legata, di fronte alla pubblica opinione, alla data della liberazione di Roma ed al ritorno dell'Italia alle sue tradizioni del 1915-18.

La Società Editrice - per ossequio verso gli Alleati e sicura degli affidamenti avuti - ha impegnato ogni sua attività al potenziamento del "Corriere di Roma": nel quale, sopravvenuta la sospensione del "Messaggero", essa ha trasfuso tutta la sua organizzazione tecnico-industriale, non accedendo all'invito di altre combinazioni sopratutto nel timore di possibili danni all'affermazione e diffusione del "Corriere di Roma".

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Riteniamo che questo ci dia pieno diritto a che la conti-

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nuazione delle pubblicazioni del "Corriere di Roma" passi alla Società Editrice.

Di fronte alla particolare delicatezza di questa ora storica, ripetiamo quanto abbiamo già dichiarato al Governo dell'on. Bonomi: di essere pronti ad aderire a qualsiasi proposta diretta a garantire l'indirizzo politico democratico e popolare del giornale, ed il suo carattere di grande organo d'informazioni internazionali, in appoggio alla nuova politica europea degli Alleati.

Se richiesti, potremo al riguardo presentare anche noi precise proposte: perfettamente consone al nostro spirito ed alle nostre tradizioni del passato che culminano nella concreta collaborazione data alla vittoria del 1915-18 con la decisiva produzione industriale delle Officine Ansaldo.

Nella certezza che le decisioni degli Alleati eviteranno gli ingiusti e gravi danni sopra indicati e si ispireranno ad alti sensi di equità, rinnoviamo l'espressione della nostra alta considerazione.

f.to) Pio Perrone

" Mario Perrone

P.S. - Agli attacchi personali della stampa romana, riteniamo di non dover rispondere avendo già investito del merito il Consiglio di Stato, come da ricorso già trasmesso a codesto Ufficio e che qui alleghiamo.

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ECC.MO CONSIGLIO DI STATO

(IN SEDE GIURISDIZIONALE)

RICORSO

DELLA

Società Editrice «Il Messaggero»

Prof. Avv. ERNESTO ORREI
Avv. GUIDO CASSINELLI
Avv. GIULIO EGIDI

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RICORSO

DELLA

Società Editrice «Il Messaggero»

Prof. Avv. ERNESTO ORREI
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ROMA
TIPOGRAFIA AGOSTINIANA
—
1944

0880

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ECC.MO CONSIGLIO DI STATO
(IN SEDE GIURISDIZIONALE)

RICORSO

della SOCIETA' EDITRICE «IL MESSAGGERO», Anonima per azioni, in persona del Presidente e dell'Amministratore Delegato della disciolta amministrazione, rispettivamente gr. cr. Pio e gr. cr. Mario Perrone, elettivamente domiciliati in Roma, Via D'Azeglio n. 11 presso l'avv. Giulio Egidi, dal quale sono rappresentati e difesi in unione all'avv. prof. Ernesto Orrei e all'avv. Guido Cassinelli: il tutto anche in virtù della delibera 4 ottobre 1944 del Consiglio di amministrazione, e della procura 11 ottobre 1944 a rogito notar Russo Aiello.

CONTRO

Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, S. E. il Cavaliere Ivanoe Bonomi, domiciliato per la carica in Roma al Palazzo Viminale,

e nei confronti

dell'avv. comm. Mario Giacone, quale Commissario nominato per la Società Editrice «Il Messaggero», residente per ragione della carica in Roma, via del Tritone n. 152

per l'annullamento

del decreto presidenziale del 22 settembre 1944 (pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 63 del 3 ottobre 1944), con il quale

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è stato nominato un Commissario per la temporanea gestione della Società Editrice «Il Messaggero».

Nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del 3 ottobre 1944 veniva pubblicato il seguente decreto presidenziale:

«Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri

Visto il decreto legislativo Luogotenenziale 6 settembre 1944, n. 207;

Ritenuta la necessità di provvedere alla nomina di un commissario straordinario per la temporanea gestione della società editrice «Il Messaggero» che durante la guerra e specialmente dopo l'8 settembre 1943 ha svolto attività in favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi;

Su proposta del Sottosegretario per la Stampa e le Informazioni;

Decreta: Art. 1 - L'avv. Mario Giacone è nominato commissario per la temporanea gestione della società anonima editrice «Il Messaggero».

Art. 2 - L'avv. Giacone eserciterà la predetta gestione sino a sei mesi dopo la cessazione dello stato di guerra.

Art. 3 - Il presente decreto sarà pubblicato nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del Regno e depositato in copia presso la Cancelleria del Tribunale di Roma.

Roma, addì 22 settembre 1944.

«Il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri: BONOMI».

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A seguito di ciò, il Commissario avv. Mario Giacone, previa comunicazione fatta alla Società con lettera del 10 ottobre 1944, si immise in possesso, come da verbale 12 ottobre 1944 nel quale i rappresentanti della Società, attuali ricorrenti, fecero espressa riserva di impugnativa del provvedimento del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri.

Tale decreto si denuncia al Supremo Consesso per violazione e falsa applicazione dell'art. 1 del decreto legislativo luogotenenziale 6 settembre 1944 n. 207, in relazione all'art. 26 del T. U. 26 giugno 1924 n. 1054.

MOTIVI DI DIRITTO

I.
DIFETTO DI MOTIVAZIONE

Si è sempre discusso se l'Amministrazione abbia o non un obbligo generale di motivare gli atti amministrativi. Dottrina e giurisprudenza hanno ritenuto, in passato, che l'art. 3 n. 3 della legge 1865, che aboliva il contenzioso amministrativo, sancisse tale obbligo. In seguito, la giurisprudenza di questo Supremo Consesso, confortata da gran parte della dottrina, ha mitigato il suddetto principio, ma unicamente per stabilire che, pur non essendovi un obbligo generale di motivazione, l'Amministrazione debba dare indicazione dei motivi, che l'hanno determinata ad emanare il provvedimento, tutte le volte che ciò sia imposto dalla legge o sia richiesto dalla natura dell'atto. Tra questi ultimi, si son fatti rientrare gli *atti discrezionali, che limitano facoltà o diritti dei cittadini.*

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La suddetta giurisprudenza è ricordata nel pregevole scritto del dott. Roehrssen (in *Riv. di Diritto Pubblico* 1941, p. I, pag. 210 e segg.). Tra le decisioni più recenti di questo Supremo Consesso, che han fissato i suddetti principi, vanno ricordate la n. 197 del 21 luglio 1941 della IV Sezione (in materia di *sequestro di aziende*) e la n. 331 del 9 luglio 1943 della V Sezione.

Nella decisione della IV Sezione (in *Foro Amm.vo* 1941, I, col. 231 e segg.) si legge:

« *Giova, anzitutto, ricordare e precisare succintamente i criteri della giurisprudenza di questo Collegio circa la motivazione dei provvedimenti, quale vizio di legittimità dei medesimi; giurisprudenza che appare ispirarsi talvolta a concetti più rigorosi, nel senso di una maggiore necessità di motivazione (specie in pronunciati della V^a Sezione), e talvolta a concetti più larghi come più spesso avviene nei pronunciati della IV^a Sezione. Sembra tuttavia di poter affermare, in linea generale, che un obbligo di motivazione, per i provvedimenti* assolutamente *discrezionali, non sussista. Nè, per sostenere tale obbligo, può invocarsi l'art. 3 della legge* 20 *marzo* 1865, *n.* 2284, *all.g. E, riferendosi questo articolo ai provvedimenti che decidono su un ricorso: a quella parte, cioè, della attività amministrativa che può dirsi contenziosa, e che, perciò, sotto alcuni aspetti, si avvicina all'attività giurisdizionale e* richiede, *in conseguenza,* più particolari garanzie di forme (*vedi IV Sezione* 4 *aprile* 1934, *n.* 174, *in Foro Amm.*, 1934, I, 1, 163).

« *Ma appunto* questa ultima esigenza *può ritenersi estensibile ad altri provvedimenti discrezionali, oltre che* per la na-

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tura stessa *di alcune categorie di atti amministrativi*, e può variare altresì di intensità in relazione alla diversa natura degli atti e delle conseguenze che essi vengono a produrre nei confronti dei cittadini *cui gli stessi atti si indirizzano, dovendosi logicamente ammettere, in linea generale*, NEI CASI IN CUI L'EFFETTO DELL'ATTO SIA PIU' GRAVE E DANNOSO, *che sia* GIUSTO ACCORDARE AL COLPITO DA ESSO UNA PIU' LARGA CONOSCENZA DELLE RAGIONI CHE L'HANNO ISPIRATO, *anche* per consentire un più fondato e serio esercizio del sindacato di legittimità, diretto a controllare se SIA STATA REALMENTE COMPIUTA QUELLA VALUTAZIONE DEGLI ELEMENTI DI FATTO che la legge demanda alla discrezionalità dell'Amministrazione e se il FINE DELL'ATTO CORRISPONDA ALLE FINALITA' DELLA LEGGE CHE LO CONSENTE. *Ciò spiega come* per il provvedimento disciplinare, *che pure è atto indubbiamente e largamente discrezionale, sussista* un rigoroso obbligo di motivazione ».

Obbligo di *motivazione* che dinanzi a questo Consesso si traduce — è bene aggiungerlo in rapporto al successivo motivo — anche in obbligo di *documentazione* dei fatti addotti dalla pubblica Amministrazione come presupposto del suo provvedimento.

Ci sia consentito affermare che questi principi — sul dovere della motivazione *più intenso* allorchè *« l'atto sia più grave e dannoso »*, perchè *« è giusto accordare al colpito »* (tale garanzia) — debbono essere rigorosamente applicati nei riguardi di una legge *eccezionale* e tipica diretta a *colpire il*

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cittadino per avere mancato ai suoi più alti doveri, quale appunto è quella del 6 settembre 1944 n. 207.

Parimenti, nella decisione della V Sezione si legge:

«*La affermazione che la discrezionalità dell'atto amministrativo escluda l'obbligo della motivazione, per quanto possa apparire suffragata dalla giurisprudenza*, non va tuttavia accolta senza riserve e la giurisprudenza non va citata senza riguardo alle singole fattispecie decise. *Trattasi di materia nella quale l'orientamento attuale della dottrina e della giurisprudenza tende ad escludere le tesi estreme. Fra la tesi, sino a poco tempo fa prevalente, che la motivazione sia obbligatoria anche quando la legge non la prescrive, al fine di rendere possibile il controllo circa l'eventuale eccesso di potere, e la tesi che, viceversa, ricollega alla discrezionalità la non obbligatorietà della motivazione, si è affermata, come è noto*, la tesi intermedia che la motivazione occorra quando è richiesta da apposite disposizioni o DALLA NATURA DELL'ATTO.

«*Bisogna dunque aver riguardo alla* NATURA DELL'ATTO *impugnato per decidere se esso* dovesse *o meno essere motivato. La natura dell'atto va qui intesa in relazione alla sua funzione, al suo scopo pratico, e, cioè, alla causa*».

Applicando i principi e gli insegnamenti sopra ricordati alla specie della quale ci occupiamo, si deve pervenire alla dichiarazione di illegittimità del provvedimento impugnato per assoluto difetto di motivazione.

Trattandosi di *atto discrezionale che veniva a colpire il cittadino* per motivi di particolare gravità e, fra l'altro, *a limitare il diritto*, assicurato dallo Statuto, di gestire personal-

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mente la propria impresa editoriale, *la motivazione era necessaria* per stabilire *se la legge era stata applicata per i fini per i quali era stata dettata.*

Il decreto impugnato, invece, non indica alcuno degli elementi che avrebbero potuto e potrebbero giustificare la grave sanzione dello scioglimento della ordinaria amministrazione.

Affermando che «*il Messaggero durante la guerra e specialmente dopo l'8 settembre* 1943 *ha svolto attività in favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi*» non fa altro che riportare letteralmente — come in una guisa meccanica — il testo del D. L. Luog. del 6 settembre 1944 n. 207, che dà «facoltà al Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri di nominare, «con propri decreti, Commissari per la temporanea gestione delle Imprese editoriali..., che *durante la guerra, e specialmente dopo l'8 settembre* 1943, hanno pubblicato libri, giornali, opuscoli e stampati *o svolto attività a favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi*».

Più che motivazione generica si ha ASSENZA di qualsiasi motivazione, in quanto *la formula limitata adottata nel provvedimento amministrativo è perfettamente identica a quella del testo legislativo ma senza alcun riferimento specifico in sede di applicazione al caso concreto.*

Ci troviamo perciò di fronte a specie identica a quella decisa dalla Eccma IV^a^ Sezione, proprio in materia di *sequestro di aziende*, con la pronuncia — già citata — del 1941. E', quindi, più che utile riportarne la motivazione:

«*Comunque, anche ammesso che realmente nella fattispecie vi fosse una assoluta necessità ed urgenza di giungere*

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immediatamente al sequestro, ... certo è che essa avrebbe dovuto, quanto meno, addurre le ragioni ..... e, quindi, motivare ben più specificamente il provvedimento, *il quale, così come è stato redatto, non ha che* una motivazione assolutamente generica, *che nulla spiega, sia pure nel modo più succinto, sulle* concrete *ragioni di esso. Si verifica così, nella fatt specie, una delle ipotesi più sopra prospettate a proposito della necessità della motivazione in talune categorie di atti discrezionali.*

«*Ma l'obbligo di motivazione sembrava tanto più incombente nella fattispecie in quanto non solo* dalla formula adottata nulla di concreto e di apprezzabile risulta, *ma dagli atti prodotti e dalla discussione scritta ed orale delle parti risulterebbe, invece, anche ad una semplice delibazione di alcuni degli elementi di fatto, che* questi elementi sarebbero *in realtà* in evidente, *se pur parziale,* contrasto (1) *così come sono stati prospettati e come, quindi, sembrano essere stati considerati dall'autorità amministrativa, con le condizioni ed i presupposti voluti dall'art. 1 sopra citato circa la totalitaria o prevalente sussistenza di interessi nemici,* così da poter costituire anche una forma di eccesso o di sviamento di potere».

Siamo perciò sicuri che l'Eccmo Consesso, che ha saputo essere supremo tutore dei diritti e degli interessi dei cittadini in momenti in cui la libertà non aveva pratica applicazione,

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(1) Nella specie, in pieno e netto contrasto con i documenti esibiti ai Volumi II e III; cfr. l'indice allegato al presente ricorso.

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terrà fermi ed applicherà i suoi insegnamenti nel momento attuale nel quale il Governo per la sua stessa ragion d'essere, politica e giuridica, non può prescindere dalla tutela della libertà e dei diritti dei cittadini.

Nella specie l'obbligo della motivazione nei provvedimenti dell'amministrazione è d'ordine pubblico e costituisce uno degli elementi dello stato giuridico secondo ne fanno rilievo i due più grandi scrittori sullo Stato giuridico cioè quali R. Gneist e O. Bähr.

II.
ECCESSO DI POTERE
PER DIFETTO DI PRESUPPOSTI

L'obbligo della motivazione, del quale ci siamo occupati nel primo motivo, era ed è reso più necessario dalla considerazione che *nel caso in esame gli elementi di fatto sono in assoluto contrasto con i presupposti del decreto legislativo luogotenenziale 6 settembre* 1944.

Il provvedimento impugnato è stato, in realtà, emesso senza il minimo esame preventivo della situazione di fatto: esame doveroso se è vero — come è vero — che nell'ordine giuridico non può esservi *sanzione* senza azione, nè *azione* senza *responsabilità*, nè responsabilità senza rapporto di *causalità* (cfr. art. 40 c. p.). Sanzione, azione, responsabilità, nesso di causalità sono, per il diritto, termini indissolubili.

Dalla documentazione, che esibiamo, risulta infatti che nessun elemento nella specie autorizzava il Presidente del

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Consiglio dei Ministri a ritenere che la ricorrente Soc. Editrice « Il Messaggero » avesse — « *durante la guerra e specialmente dopo l'8 settembre* 1943 » — svolto attività in favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi.

Dato il testo della legge — che in modo tassativo prescrive l'indagine sull'azione svolta dall'azienda editoriale « SPECIALMENTE *dopo l'8 settembre* 1943 » — interessa precisare, anzitutto, in quale situazione ebbero a trovarsi « Il Messaggero » e i suoi dirigenti in tale periodo cruciale della storia italiana.

a) Situazione determinatasi ne " Il Messaggero „ nel periodo successivo all'8 settembre 1943.

Al riguardo è notorio in Roma che l'azienda editoriale del giornale « Il Messaggero », con l'occupazione militare della capitale da parte delle forze armate tedesche, fu costretta a passare completamente, in tutta la sua attività giornalistica, a disposizione delle autorità di occupazione nonchè del restaurato regime fascista nella sua nuova veste repubblicana.

Tutti i componenti il Consiglio d'Amministrazone in carica — e precisamente il Presidente Pio Perrone, l'amministratore delegato Mario Perrone e gli altri due consiglieri Ferdinando ed Alessandro Perrone — intendendo rifiutare ogni collaborazione ai nazifascisti, furono costretti ad occultarsi per sfuggire all'arresto ed alle implacabili persecuzioni, conseguenza della notorietà del loro mai smentito sentimento antitedesco (1) e della loro contrarietà alla guerra.

(1) Il sentimento antitedesco è tradizione della famiglia Perrone. Nel volume di Frank Arthur Vanderlip, presidente

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Tanto la casa del sig. Pio Perrone — e del figlio Ferdinando con lui convivente — quanto quella del sig. Mario Perrone — e del figlio Alessandro con lui convivente — furono occupate e ripetutamente saccheggiate. Dei rispettivi figli entrambi consiglieri di amministrazione della Società ricorrente, l'ing. Ferdinando Perrone oltrepassò due volte le linee agli ordini del Servizio Informazioni Alleato, ed Alessandro Perrone partecipò alla difesa di Roma col Genova Cavalleria.

Anche i maggiori esponenti della redazione de «Il Messaggero» furono costretti a fuggire per sottrarsi alla cattura ed a pene maggiori. Fuggì il direttore Tomaso Smith — poi arrestato — e fuggirono i redattori Ermanno Contini, Diego Calcagno, Vincenzo Talarico, Piero Bonanni, Antonio Picone Stella, Gaetano Petrosemolo, Nino Sangiovanni, Arrigo Jac-

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della City National Bank di New York, dal titolo «CIO' CHE ACCADDE ALL'EUROPA» (Ed. Treves, 1920), pag. 67 si legge:

«Eravi un uomo nella vita industriale italiana, che re-
«sistette alla penetrazione pacifica del capitale *tedesco* (Fer-
«dinando Maria Perrone). Egli possedeva a Genova dei grandi
«stabilimenti industriali. Aveva una diffidenza profonda, ra-
«dicale, verso il teutono, e mentre il capitale germanico pe-
«netrava le altre industrie, egli non solo resistette a tutte le
«proposte che tale capitale gli fece di interessarsi nei suoi af-
«fari, ma instillò nei suoi due figli un sentimento di scievi-
«nismo, che diventò quasi una religione, per tutto quanto con-
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chia, Bruno D'Agostini, Giovanni Cagianelli, Vezio Muria'di, Carlo Cavalli ed altri.

Molti di tali redattori attraversarono le linee e collaborarono in riviste e giornali dell'Italia liberata, riconfermando così lo spirito che li animò presso *Il Messaggero*.

Anche nella vita clandestina tutti gli esponenti de « Il Messaggero », a cominciare dai signori Pio e Mario Perrone, persistettero con atti positivi nel loro atteggiamento decisamente contrario ai nazifascisti. I Perrone, a mezzo del loro legale avv. Lino Eramo e di altri loro fiduciarii, sovvenzionarono bande di partigiani; per loro istruzioni ed a loro spese furono sempre corrisposti, segretamente, gli assegni al direttore ed ai redattori che erano stati arrestati o si erano occultati, od alle loro stesse famiglie.

Fra i redattori, che avevano cercato scampo nella fuga, fu anche Arrigo Jacchia — attuale direttore del « Il Corriere di Roma » — riguardo al quale va ricordato che quando, per effetto delle inique disposizioni razziali avrebbe dovuto lasciare l'ufficio di redattore, venne trattenuto in servizio dai Perrone con gli stessi emolumenti e con altre apparenti funzioni.

Il 3 maggio 1944 le maestranze de « Il Messaggero » — ben conoscendo, per prova, i sentimenti dei dirigenti, quantunque assenti, e sicuri di essere sempre da loro sostenute — parteciparono allo sciopero generale organizzato a Roma per tale data; e la loro partecipazione rappresentò, se non l'unico, certo l'episodio di maggior rilievo dello sciopero stesso.

I nazifascisti procedettero, allora, all'arresto di diciotto operai: Allegrini Pietro, Allegrini Giovanni, Barberini Rober-

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to, Favalli Umberto, Conti Edmondo, Marta Alfredo, Donati Aldo, Germani Annibale, Antonini Giulio, Berini Renato, Costa Antonio, Belardinelli Alberto, Di Carlo Cesare, Papini Bruno, D'Antoni Natale, Fusi Corrado, Gabbionetta Ugo, Zenobi Ezio. Altri nove: Pace Mario, Ciampicacigli Silvano, Pace Gino, Crescentini Giulio, Cardinali Mario, Cardinali Remo, Aubry Renato, Rastelli Alfredo, Rinaldini Antonio furono costretti ad occultarsi per sottrarsi all'arresto.

Alle famiglie di tutti i suddetti operai, per ordine ed a spese dei Perrone, furono *sempre* corrisposti gli assegni. *E non è lecito ignorare o dimenticare il rischio costituito — in quel triste periodo — dal dare aiuto ad elementi che erano imputati di azione positiva contro il nazifascismo, quale la partecipazione allo sciopero del 3 maggio* 1944.

In tale occasione, come pure nelle altre sopraindicate, contatti e sovvenzionamenti nei riguardi di elementi del giornale perseguitati dal nazifascismo, furono tenuti dai Perrone sopratutto per il tramite del loro legale avv. Lino Eramo: il preclaro cittadino che per tale attività ed altre iniziative patriottiche, ignobilmente e tristemente denunziate, fu arrestato il 20 maggio 1944 dai tedeschi, e quindi barbaramente assassinato insieme ad altri 13 patrioti all'alba del 4 giugno 1944, poche ore prima della liberazione di Roma.

Dire che dirigenti e maestranze de «Il Messaggero» svolsero «SPECIALMENTE *dopo l'8 settembre* 1943» attività a favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi è un'ingiuria alla verità e alla giustizia, un insulto rivolto anche al coraggioso comportamento

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dei partecipanti allo sciopero del 3 maggio 1944. E ne è turbata la nobile memoria del martire avv. Eramo.

Pio e Mario Perrone «PER I LORO PRECEDENTI POLITICI SONO DA ANNOVERARSI FRA I NEMICI DELLA REPUBBLICA SOCIALE ITALIANA» — è proclamato nel Decreto del Capo della Provincia di Genova in data 14 dicembre 1943 — col quale veniva sottoposta a sequestro conservativo la Società Anonima Edizioni e Pubblicazioni - Editrice del quotidiano «Il Secolo XIX» di Genova, il cui capitale azionario è nella totalità di proprietà dei Perrone (1).

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(1) Il contegno tenuto da «Il secolo XIX» dopo l'8 settembre 1943 è descritto nella esibita relazione 22 giugno 1944 del giornalista Vincenzo Pasquero — redattore del giornale suddetto, rifugiatosi a Roma nel gennaio 1944 — dalla quale risulta che per il deciso atteggiamento dei redattori, contrario al nazi-fascismo, le pubblicazioni de «Il Secolo XIX» *furono interrotte* dal 9 settembre al 14 dicembre 1943, data in cui furono riprese forzatamente ad opera di esponenti delle autorità tedesche e fasciste. Si astennero però, dal presentarsi al giornale e rifiutarono ogni loro collaborazione, fra gli altri, il capo cronista Massaro ed i redattori Steno, Vagge, Chiossone, Canesi, Murialdi, Giazotto, alcuni dei quali vennero per tal motivo licenziati in tronco.

Si esibisce anche copia del giornale «Il Secolo XIX» del 14 dicembre 1943 dalla quale risulta che in tale data venivano riprese le pubblicazioni, che erano state sospese dall'8 settembre 1943 per ordine dei Perrone: sicchè in tale periodo il giornale «*non è esistito*». Ciò che i Perrone, costretti a darsi alla latitanza, non ebbero la possibilità di disporre per «Il Messaggero».

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Del resto, lo stesso personale de « Il Messaggero » che, per essere meno compromesso e perciò meno esposto a persecuzioni era rimasto al proprio posto, ha sempre tenuto in tale tristissimo periodo un atteggiamento decisamente anti-nazifascista.

Bruno Spampanato — il direttore nominato in effetti dallo pseudo governo repubblicano durante l'occupazione tedesca — in un rapporto inviato in data 27 marzo 1944 al Ministro della Cultura Popolare del governo del tempo, tale Fernando Mezzasoma, affermava di aver dovuto « essere insieme energico « e ragionevole per provocare un *nuovo* orientamento specialmente dei redattori »; di aver avuto « delusioni » per cui aveva « dovuto finire con l'impugnare direttamente le numerose e complesse leve del giornale fino a quelle assolutamente « tecniche »; che « l'ambiente del Messaggero è quello che è », nè poteva esso Spampanato « improvvisare una redazione in « 24 ore ».

Aggiungeva che durante la sua direzione erano già stati allontanati gli « elementi non permeabili al nostro nuovo cli« ma », mentre altri erano attentamente controllati « per even« tuali e tempestivi provvedimenti »; che in seguito al rinvenimento di un foglietto contenente frasi di carattere ostile per la repubblica e per Mussolini, il collaboratore cartografo Giulio Tirincanti era stato « immediatamente allontanato dal giornale « e denunciato alle competenti autorità »; che comunque « per « dare ancora uno scossone al resto della redazione » per es« sere poi in grado di poter eliminare i più restii a immedesi

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«nel nostro ordine politico» aveva tenuto il 4 marzo 1944 una riunione di cui allegava il testo stenografico.

In tale riunione, effettivamente tenuta con i redattori del giornale il 4 marzo 1944, pronunciò un discorso (anch'esso rinvenuto tra gli incartamenti della Direzione nel testo stenografico). Lo Spampanato vi dichiarò di aver constatato nel *complesso* redazionale «*resistenza sorda*» e «*boicottaggio*».

Il predetto Ministro Mezzasoma, in una lettera diretta allo Spampanato in data 16 marzo 1944 (anche questa rinvenuta negli incartamenti della Direzione) lo ringraziava per l'assunzione di quattro «camerati» nel giornale, aggiungendo: «*Hai fatto bene ad assumere* GENTE NUOVA. *Ma forse converrebbe anche allontanare gente vecchia.* «SPECIALMENTE IN AM-«MINISTRAZIONE CE' ANCORA ATMOSFERA... PERRO-«NIANA!».

Appunto perchè nel giornale c'era ancora «atmosfera perroniana», i redattori compilavano fogli clandestini, tra cui uno intitolato «*Noi Italiani*», e durante la notte ne curavano l'affissione per le vie della città. Sempre in tale «atmosfera», elementi di fiducia dei proprietari avevano messo in salvo alcune macchine perchè, in caso di distruzione del giornale, se ne potesse assicurare la pubblicazione al momento della liberazione di Roma. Essendo trapelato il fatto, vennero arrestati dai fascisti il sig. Vincenzo Spasiano, redattore ed il comm. Lorenzo Guerrini addetto all'Amministrazione: essi, nonostante le minaccie, mantennero il segreto.

Tutte le circostanze sopra ricordate risultano, su ogni punto, dai documenti esibiti al Vol. III. Da essi si rileva, altresì,

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che dirigenti e maestranze avevano provveduto a murare nelle soffitte del giornale mitragliatrici e bombe a mano per impugnarle contro i tedeschi ed i neofascisti al momento in cui, costoro, costretti a fuggire da Roma, avessero messo in attuazione il loro già dichiarato proposito di distruggere i macchinari ed il palazzo de «Il Messaggero» per evitare così che la sua genuina voce risuonasse con gli stessi accenti del 25-26 luglio 1943, nella Capitale liberata (1).

* * *

La situazione sopra esposta, venne, naturalmente, ad impedire in modo assoluto agli organi della società ricorrente — cioè al Presidente, all'Amministratore Delegato, ai Consiglieri d'amministrazione ed all'Assemblea degli azionisti — di esercitare i loro poteri, di mantenere il controllo sull'azienda e di imprimerle le direttive per la sua attività giornalistica. Dai documenti esibiti risulta, infatti, che nessun Consiglio d'Amministrazione fu tenuto dall'8 settembre 1943 al 4 giugno 1944 perchè, come si è detto, i suoi componenti — Pio, Mario, Ferdinando ed Alessandro Perrone — si erano occultati, e risulta altresì che le assemblee generali ordinarie degli azionisti, convocate in tale periodo di tempo, andarono deserte poichè le

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(1) Essendo stato, fra l'altro, minato anche il palazzo del *Messaggero*, i Perrone avevano avuto cura di fare stipulare un contratto con la tipografia della Soc. An. «Novissima» (Via Romanello da Forlì 9) per potere stampare il giornale al momento della liberazione di Roma.

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azioni, tutte nominative per legge, erano intestate nella loro *totalità* ai predetti signori Perrone.

Gli organi legali ed i rappresentanti legali della Società non poterono, dunque, mai esercitare — e di fatto non esercitarono mai — dall'8 settembre 1943 in poi alcuna attività: mai poterono compiere una qualsiasi manifestazione di VOLONTA'.

Rimasta nulla o assente la *normale rappresentanza* — anzi qualsiasi rappresentanza — della Società Editrice «Il Messaggero», non potè, in conseguenza, aversi alcuna forma di attività a favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi da parte degli *organi legittimi* della Società medesima: quale è considerata dall'art. 1 del D. L. L. 6 settembre 1944 n. 207, per potersi procedere in sede di potere esecutivo, come illegalmente si è proceduto, alla nomina del commissario per la temporanea gestione. L'attività del giornale era non solo controllata ma ancora *determinata* dalla potestà nazifascista, era non altrimenti che un oggetto della stessa potestà nel più ampio senso della parola, per essersi in realtà *sostituita agli organi naturali e legali* della predetta Società Editrice.

E poichè il Decreto Presidenziale è stato influenzato, anzi *determinato*, da una pretesa attività svolta a favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi «SPECIALMENTE *dopo l'8 settembre* 1943», l'esclusione di questa azione — *anzi il sussistere di una situazione di fatto del tutto opposta* — porta, senz'altro, all'accoglimento del presente ricorso:

a) perchè il provvedimento impugnato *espressamente*

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risulta e si dichiara preso in vista di un asserito comportamento tenuto « SPECIALMENTE *dopo l'8 settembre* 1943 »;

b) perchè la legge, nel suo testo *letterale*, prescrive per la nomina del Commissario *due elementi e condizioni coesistenti*: 1) l'azione svolta « durante la guerra »; 2) l'azione svolta « SPECIALMENTE *dopo l'8 settembre* 1943. Non solo; ma stabilisce che il secondo elemento va considerato in modo *prevalente* sul primo;

c) perchè, subordinatamente, cioè pur quando si dovesse ammettere essere in facoltà del Governo addivenire alla nomina del Commissario anche basandosi solamente sul comportamento tenuto nel periodo *anteriore* all'8 settembre (ciò che noi neghiamo per la *inscindibilità* dei due elementi, evidente nel testo e nello spirito del decreto legislativo), una simile dichiarazione — *non contenuta* nell'attuale decreto 22 settembre 1944 — dovrebbe essere rimessa al Presidente del Consiglio: al quale soltanto competerebbe valutare ed indicare i motivi che lo determinino a sottoporre l'azienda alla gestione commissariale, malgrado la situazione di fatto sia *diversa* e NON SIA PIU' POSSIBILE riferirsi all'azione svolta « *specialmente dopo l'8 settembre* 1943 ».

E quindi, anche a voler concedere l'esistenza di questa facoltà nel Governo, il relativo accertamento e giudizio discrezionale dovrebbero pur sempre provenire dal Presidente del Consiglio: non da altro organo amministrativo.

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b) Situazione de "Il Messaggero", nel periodo dal 10 giugno 1940 al 25 luglio 1943:

Ma anche per quanto riguarda il periodo precedente all'8 settembre 1943, la situazione de «Il Messaggero» è da considerare in modo particolare, per la rilevabile mancanza di ogni libertà di volontà e di azione, in conseguenza di eccezionali provvedimenti del governo del tempo.

La condotta del giornale fu indubbiamente coatta nel periodo successivo al 17 luglio 1941 attraverso la nomina dei direttori Buoninsegni e Pavolini che vennero effettuate, rispettivamente il 17 luglio 1941 e l'8 febbraio 1943, *direttamente* dal fascismo, e per esso dal Ministero della Cultura Popolare, *senza che fossero interpellati gli organi legali della Società od i suoi maggiori esponenti* (1).

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(1) Peraltro, era ben noto al fascismo quale fosse il sentimento dei signori Perrone nei riguardi del regime.

In una comparsa depositata il 28 novembre 1934 dall'avv. Pier Giulio Breschi, direttore del «Messaggero» fino al 1931, nella causa da lui promossa contro i signori Perrone innanzi al Tribunale di Roma, per fornire al Magistrato «un indice dello stato d'animo del Comm. Pio Perrone nei riguardi del regime» veniva letteralmente trascritto il seguente promemoria da questi «inviato all'avv. Breschi e non a lui soltanto»: «*Roma, 6 febbraio 1924 - L'articolo di stamani in favore del «Governo era molto bello, ma questo gettarsi avanti così mi «taglia la strada nei passi che penso di fare e nella definitiva «attitudine che siamo per prendere, che potrebbe anche es-*

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La prima di tali nomine — quella del Buoninsegni — fu preceduta ed accompagnata da circostanze che attestano la deplorazione del governo del tempo per essersi formate ne « Il Messaggero » latenti correnti di freddezza verso la guerra e la Germania, con critiche e previsioni tanto più notevoli in quanto che in quel momento *sembrava* che la vittoria dovesse essere sicura per l'asse.

La ragione per la quale dal governo del tempo si addivenne — di autorità — alla nomina del Buoninsegni e del Pavolini nella direzione del giornale, è tale da mettere in una luce politicamente corretta « Il Messaggero » anche per il periodo che intercorse dal 10 giugno 1940 al 17 luglio 1941 (data di nomina del Buoninsegni a direttore).

Ed infatti, proprio perchè l'atteggiamento del giornale e dei suoi esponenti non fu ritenuto dal governo fascista sufficentemente estremista ed entusiastico, fu imposto il licenziamento degli elementi equilibrati che esprimevano preoccupazioni per l'esito probabile della guerra e per la sua impreparazione militare e, sopratutto, industriale. Per l'intervento della Direzione del partito fascista si inscenò nel giugno 1941 una inchiesta, si arrestò e si assegnò al confino il sig. Plinio Turcato, capo dell'Ufficio di pubblicità ed inserzioni, si arrestò e si assegnò al confino il redattore Pio Ambrogetti, si giunse persino ad imputare d'intelligenza col nemico il redattore Anto-

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« sere, se non ostile visibilmente, per lo meno fredda e riservata ».

Si esibisce (Vol. II) la comparsa del Breschi.

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La prima di tali nomine — quella del Buoninsegni — fu preceduta ed accompagnata da circostanze che attestano la deplorazione del governo del tempo per essersi formate ne « Il Messaggero » latenti correnti di freddezza verso la guerra e la Germania, con critiche e previsioni tanto più notevoli in quanto che in quel momento *sembrava* che la vittoria dovesse essere sicura per l'asse.

La ragione per la quale dal governo del tempo si addivenne — di autorità — alla nomina del Buoninsegni e del Pavolini nella direzione del giornale, è tale da mettere in una luce politicamente corretta « Il Messaggero » anche per il periodo che intercorse dal 10 giugno 1940 al 17 luglio 1941 (data di nomina del Buoninsegni a direttore).

Ed infatti, proprio perchè l'atteggiamento del giornale e dei suoi esponenti non fu ritenuto dal governo fascista sufficentemente estremista ed entusiastico, fu imposto il licenziamento degli elementi equilibrati che esprimevano preoccupazioni per l'esito probabile della guerra e per la sua impreparazione militare e, sopratutto, industriale. Per l'intervento della Direzione del partito fascista si inscenò nel giugno 1941 una inchiesta, si arrestò e si assegnò al confino il sig. Plinio Turcato, capo dell'Ufficio di pubblicità ed inserzioni, si arrestò e si assegnò al confino il redattore Pio Ambrogetti, si giunse persino ad imputare d'intelligenza col nemico il redattore Anto-

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« sere, se non ostile visibilmente, per lo meno fredda e ri- « servata ».

Si esibisce (Vol. II) la comparsa del Breschi.

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nio Petrucci (poi arrestato e deportato in Germania) con minaccia di più duri provvedimenti.

Si pervenne così, sempre per imposizione del governo, al licenziamento del direttore dott. Francesco Malgeri e dei redattori dott. Vittorio Gorresio e dott. Gino De Sanctis, oltre ai predetti Ambrogetti, Petrucci, Turcato ed altri. Tali licenziamenti portarono alla Società un onere di oltre due milioni per indennità dovute corrispondere, a parte le continue sovvenzioni date in seguito dai Perrone a taluni dei licenziati come atto di solidarietà.

Nel tempo stesso, venne imposto certo Silvio Petrucci alla carica di redattore capo e di certo Mazza Luigi ad altro posto direttivo, tutti rimunerati con alti stipendi — anch'essi imposti dall'alto — in rapporto alla posizione di diretti esponenti e fiduciari del partito che venivano ad assumere nel giornale.

In tal modo è soltanto in base ad una impressione superficiale che potrebbe essere definita e considerata atteggiamento di servilismo e di conformismo al Governo, quella parvenza di autonomia che «Il Messaggero» si illuse di poter mantenere dal 10 giugno 1940 al 17 luglio 1941: se il Governo stesso poi ebbe a dolersene ed a censurarla *prendendo gravi provvedimenti* e disponendo i suddetti sintomatici *licenziamenti*.

Dopo il 17 luglio 1941, con l'insediamento di autorità alla direzione del quotidiano romano del dott. Fausto Buoninsegni (dal 17 luglio 1941 all'8 febbraio 1943) e del dott. Alessandro Pavolini (dall'8 febbraio 1943 al 25 luglio 1943), l'attività propria della Società Editrice «Il Messaggero» divenne in effetti del tutto *nominale*, senza la minima impronta di autonomia

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o di indipendenza; sicchè si sottrae per ciò stesso ad un accertamento di responsabilità.

Soltanto il 25 luglio 1943, appena ristabilita la libertà di stampa con la caduta del regime di Mussolini, «Il Messaggero» potè riprendere la sua autonomia e sostenne subito l'insorgenza popolare antifascista per il ripristino delle istituzioni costituzionali e democratiche. L'articolo «*Rinascita*» pubblicato sul giornale del 25 luglio 1943 è *l'unico articolo contro il fascismo che sia apparso in quel giorno nella stampa italiana!*

* * *

I rilievi suesposti dimostrano come la pretesa attività «svolta in favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi» non abbia, nel caso del Messaggero, rispondenza nei fatti e, dimostrano, conseguentemente, l'eccesso di potere che inficia il provvedimento.

Questo Supremo Consesso, quindi, non potrà non dichiarare che dalla delibazione della fattispecie emergono molteplici ed univoci elementi di fatto, dai quali si trae la convinzione che il provvedimento impugnato non sia stato preceduto, ad opera dell'Amministrazione, dal necessario *esame di merito*, sicchè non sarà possibile all'Aministrazione stessa darne LA DIMOSTRAZIONE DOCUMENTATA.

E' appena necessario ricordare come sia stato già autorevolmente ritenuto non interdetto al Consiglio di Stato l'esame dei fatti. Preciso, anche al riguardo, è l'insegnamento contenuto nella preclara decisione, già citata, della IV Sezione, che ne ha dato giustificazione con la seguente motivazione:

«*Potrebbesi obbiettare, a questo punto, che l'apprezza-*

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mento di tali fatti rientra nel giudizio discrezionale di merito dell'autorità amministrativa, e che questo non possa, perciò, essere toccato dal sindacato di legittimità. Ma, secondo l'insegnamento della giurisprudenza di questo Collegio e della stessa Cassazione, l'esame dei fatti è interdetto solo in quanto si traduca in una loro nuova valutazione od apprezzamento in relazione alle finalità che l'atto amministrativo si propone, in modo da convertirsi inevitabilmente in un vero e proprio giudizio di merito amministrativo. Ma tale esame non è interdetto, ai fini appunto della constatazione o meno dell'eccesso di potere, quando miri soltanto a stabilire se, in tutto o in parte, i fatti, quali sono stati presi in considerazione dall'atto amministrativo, trovino conferma o smentita negli elementi di giudizio in possesso dell'Amministrazione e se i fatti stessi, come premessa del giudizio logico contenuto nella manifestazione di volontà dell'Amministrazione, corrispondano, oppure no, alle conseguenze cui il giudizio medesimo è pervenuto.

In altri termini, il giudice di legittimità può controllare il giudizio, ma non sostituirsi al giudizio medesimo (vedi Decisione IV Sezione 11 aprile 1930, N. 145).

Riconfermando la propria giurisprudenza, questo Alto Consesso dichiarerà che, pur non potendo in questa sede rinnovare o *rivedere* il giudizio espresso in sede amministrativa, rientra nella sua potestà accertare che un giudizio *sui fatti che sono il presupposto per l'applicazione D. L. Lgt. 6 settembre 1944 n. 207*, sia stato realmente compiuto al momento in cui venne adottato il provvedimento amministrativo 22 settembre 1944, sia pur esso di natura discrezionale.

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III.

ECCESSO DI POTERE PER SVIAMENTO.

I fatti esposti nella illustrazione del secondo motivo escludono, in modo assoluto, che la Società Editrice «Il Messaggero» abbia svolto attività in favore del fascismo e dei tedeschi «specialmente dopo l'8 settembre» e, comunque, «durante la guerra» in condizioni di autonomia e libertà di azione.

L'inesistenza dei presupposti di fatto voluti dalla legge, già lascia perplessi sulle finalità perseguite dal Governo nella emanazione del provedimento impugnato. Esse, peraltro, appaiono nella loro vera luce per *elementi di fatto e situazioni* segnalati anche da quotidiani della Capitale, compresi quelli di partiti attualmente al Governo, in ordine a due deliberazioni della Commissione Nazionale per la Stampa, sulle quali il Sottosegretariato competente — su nostra istanza — ha rilasciato la seguente dichiarazione:

« **PRESIDENZA**
« **DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI**

Roma, 22 novembre 1944.

« **SOTTOSEGRETARIATO**
« **PER LA STAMPA E LE INFORMAZIONI**
« **Direz. Gen. Stampa**

Prot. N. 4201.

«La richiesta di pubblicazione del «Nuovo Messaggero»
«è stata approvata dalla Commissione Nazionale per la Stam-
«pa nella sua seduta del 26 settembre.

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«Successivamente vista la contrarietà della pubblica opi-
«nione al titolo — sia pure modificato con l'aggiunta dell'ag-
«gettivo «Nuovo» — l'On. Enrico Molè — già indicato nella
«primitiva domanda dall'avv. M. Giacone Direttore del Gior-
«nale — comunicava alla Commissione Nazionale per la Stam-
«pa di aver deciso di adottare quale titolo «L'Indipendente».

«La Commissione nella sua seduta del 26 ottobre pren-
«deva atto di ciò.

«Nel verbale della seduta del 26 ottobre, il passaggio re-
«lativo a tale argomento, è il seguente:

«L'avv. Rossini riferisce che in seguito alle note polemi-
«che il giornale d'informazioni del mattino «Il Nuovo Mes-
«saggero», la cui pubblicazione fu autorizzata dalla C. N. S.
«(salvo il visto dell'A. P. B.) nella seduta del 26 settembre,
«avrà per titolo «L'Indipendente», editrice del giornale sarà
«la Società «Vita Nova» direttore del giornale l'On. Avv. En-
«rico Molè.

«La Commissione prende atto delle dichiarazioni del-
«l'avv. Rossini e all'unanimità dà mandato all'ufficio di pro-
«muovere il visto dell'A. P. B.».

Dal documento sopra trascritto risulta che, per la pubblicazione del «Nuovo Messaggero» autorizzata nella seduta 26 settembre 1944, era stata presentata *«domanda dall'avv. M. Giaccone»*: EVIDENTEMENTE PER ISTRUZIONI A LUI IMPARTITE. E tutto ciò *prima* che la nomina dello stesso avvocato Giacone nell'ufficio di Commissario divenisse operativa con la pubblicazione nella Gazzetta Ufficiale del 3 ottobre 1944 n. 63, del decreto che assoggettava a gestione temporanea la Società ricorrente.

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Risulta — sempre dal documento sopra trascritto — che la seconda deliberazione, presa dalla Commissione Nazionale per la Stampa il 26 ottobre 1944, si collega alla prima, anzi *con essa si identifica*, salvo la sola modifica della testata del nuovo giornale in «*L'Indipendente*».

E poichè nella seconda deliberazione si specifica che editrice del nuovo quotidiano doveva essere una società (1) *estranea* alla Società ricorrente è evidente che queste progetto, per la pubblicazione di un nuovo giornale *ad opera e per conto di terzi*, è anteriore alla «*primitiva domanda dell'avv. M. Giacone*» ed alla correlativa deliberazione presa il 26 settembre 1944 dalla Commissione Nazionale per la Stampa. Donde deve dedursi che le due deliberazioni del 26 settembre e del 26 ottobre rispondono ad una preordinata unità di propositi.

A chiarire tutto ciò sarà utile avere presenti il testo della domanda dell'avv. Giacone e della deliberazione 26 settembre 1944, delle quali attendiamo, quindi, l'esibizione da parte dell'Avvocatura dello Stato o, eventualmente, il richiamo a cura di questo Supremo Consesso.

In tal modo, la nomina del Commissario — avvenuta con decreto 22 settembre 1944, pubblicato nella Gazz. Uff. del 3 ottobre 1944 — è stata *preceduta* e, poi, seguita da iniziative dirette ad attuare da parte di un nuovo gruppo e per conto

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(1) Precisamente la Società a responsabilità limitata «Vita Nova», costituita a rogito 16 ottobre 1944 del notaio Cardelli di Roma, cioè appena *quattro giorni* dopo l'inizio della gestione Commissariale.

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di una nuova società, la pubblicazione, *in luogo* de « Il Messaggero », di un quotidiano, organo di diretta ispirazione del Governo nella sua condotta e direttiva politica (1).

Dalla situazione di fatto sopra documentata risulta, così, evidente l'eccesso di potere sotto la forma di sviamento.

Il provvedimento in oggetto ha avuto, cioè, lo scopo di creare un nuovo giornale, *nella finalità di utilizzare l'organizzazione tecnico-industriale e l'avviamento potenziale de « Il Messaggero » a vantaggio di terzi.*

Ai fini giuridici, va poi rilevato che la creazione di un nuovo giornale è in contrasto con la disposizione della legge che limita la gestione commissariale a sei mesi dopo la cessazione dello stato di guerra. Nè in contrario varrebbe eccepire che al Commissario è concesso dalla legge compiere atti *eccedenti* l'ordinaria amministrazione previa autorizzazione del Sottosegretario per la Stampa e le Informazioni: in quanto tale facoltà va riferita soltanto, e non altrimenti, agli atti che abbiano carattere di *utilità* e, comunque, carattere di *urgenza* per l'azienda temporaneamente gestita. Evidentemente, la creazione di un nuovo giornale implica una situazione di molto superiore, negli effetti, alla gestione temporanea che la legge speciale consente al Commissario.

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(1) Cfr. in atti: « Il Tempo » del 26 settembre 1944; « Italia Nuova » del 27 settembre 1944; « Avanti! » del 27 settembre 1944; « L'Unità » del 28 settembre 1944; « Italia Nuova » del 4 ottobre 1944; « L'Italia Libera » del 3 ottobre e del 3 novembre 1944.

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Inoltre, la pubblicazione di un nuovo giornale, *innestata* all'azienda editrice de « Il Messaggero » mediante affitto od altro mezzo similare, sarebbe doppiamente illegittima:

a) perchè in contrasto con lo statuto della società ricorrente per il quale essa « ha per oggetto la pubblicazione del giornale di sua proprietà « Il Messaggero » e di altri giornali, periodici, libri e riviste » (art. 3);

b) poichè avrebbe l'ulteriore, quanto non ammissibile effetto, di *conferire a terzi l'organizzazione tecnico-industriale e l'avviamento* della Società ricorrente.

Non è dubbio, quindi, che nella esposta situazione di fatto si concreti il classico *detournement de pouvoir*, messo soprattutto in luce dalla giurisprudenza del Consiglio di Stato francese per rilevare la illegalità sostanziale dei provvedimenti amministrativi; giurisprudenza fatta proprio da questo Supremo Consesso che, con varie formule, ha segnalato e represso tale vizio degli atti amministrativi, riscontrandolo laddove « *l'atto « sia determinato da tutt'altro fine che quello di favorire un « pubblico interesse* » (27 sett. 1892 n. 260 in « *Giust. Amm.va* » 1892, I, 430) oppure « si sia fatto uso di una facoltà *per uno « scopo diverso da quello avuto di mira dalla legge* », (Sez. IV 30 dic. 1910 n. 463 in *Giust. Amm.va* 1910, I, 569); e, infine, « *se la disposizione eccezionale sia stata applicata al di là dei « limiti consentiti, in relazione al fine della legge* » (Sez. IV 12 ottobre 1917 in Giur. It. 1918, III, 16).

In base a tali principî è stata ritenuta illegittima, ad es., l'ordinanza podestarile « *che dichiara inabitabile una casa* non « per motivi di pubblica sanità ed igiene, ma *al fine di pro-*

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a) perché in contrasto con lo statuto della società ricorrente per il quale essa «ha per oggetto la pubblicazione del giornale di sua proprietà «Il Messaggero» e di altri giornali, periodici, libri e riviste» (art. 3);

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« *vocare in via amministrativa la risoluzione in tronco*, per « colpa del locatore, *del contratto di locazione* della casa », (Sez. V n. 419 del 21-6-940 in *Foro Amm.vo* 1940, I. 2. 253).

E la dottrina ha ravvisato il vizio dell'eccesso di potere per sviamento in tutti quei casi, nei quali « *si sia fatto uso* « *di atti amministrativi per un fine diverso dall'interesse pub-* « *blico, ossia per un fine privato* ». (Zanobini - Giust. Amm.va 3ª Ediz. pag. 229).

Nel caso in esame, il decreto luogotenenziale n. 207 del 6 settembre 1944 risulta sostanzialmente applicato per il raggiungimento di fini concernenti interessi di terzi.

Per questi motivi, si chiede che:

PIACCIA ALL'ECC.MO CONSIGLIO DI STATO

Annullare il decreto impugnato ed ogni altro provvedimento dipendente, con tutte le conseguenze di legge.

Roma, 25 novembre 1941.

PIO PERRONE nella qualifica.
MARIO PERRONE » »

Prof. Avv. ERNESTO ORBEI
Avv. GUIDO CASSINELLI
Avv. GIULIO EGIDI

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SOCIETÁ EDITRICE «IL MESSAGGERO»

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PRESIDENTE DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI

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DOCUMENTI: relativi al periodo 10 giugno 1940 - 25 luglio 1943.

1. — Lettera 25 agosto 1943 dell'Ente Italiano Audizioni Radiofoniche (E.I.A.R.) nella quale è trascritto:

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a) il testo del comunicato del Ministero della Cultura Popolare, trasmesso dal giornale radio del 17 luglio 1941, circa l'avvenuta nomina *di autorità* del dott. Fausto Buoninsegni a direttore de « Il Messaggero », in sostituzione del dott. Francesco Malgeri;

b) il testo del comunicato del Ministero stesso, trasmesso dal giornale radio dell'8 febbraio 1943, circa l'avvenuta nomina *di autorità* del dott. Alessandro Pavolini, a direttore, in sostituzione del predetto Buoninsegni.

Cfr. il seguente doc. 23.

2. — Copia autentica dell'ordinanza 26 luglio 1941 con la quale la Commissione Provinciale di Roma ha assegnato al confino di polizia per anni cinque il sig. Plinio Turcato, capo ufficio pubblicità ed inserzioni de « Il Messaggero », per aver « *criticato le operazioni belliche* e per aver pronunziato « frasi offensive per il duce ». (Cfr., altresì, il seguente doc. 6).

3. — Copia autentica del verbale 14 aprile 1942 della R. Questura di Roma - Ufficio Politico, dal quale risulta che il giornalista Pio Ambrogetti, redattore de « Il Messaggero », era stato tratto in arresto e veniva denunziato alla Commissione Provinciale per l'assegnazione al confino di polizia « per « aver raccontato barzellette di intonazione offensiva per il « duce ed alte personalità del regime e *per aver criticato* « *provvedimenti del governo* ».

4. — Lettera 6 dicembre 1944 dell'avv. Annibale Angelucci — difensore del giornalista Antonio Petrucci, redattore de « Il Messaggero », innanzi al Tribunale speciale ed al Tribunale Militare — dalla quale risulta che il Petrucci era « im- « putato di spionaggio a favore degli Alleati » e che il processo non ha potuto celebrarsi perchè nell'ottobre del 1943 « tanto il Petrucci quanto l'incarto processuale furono *prele-* « *vati dai tedeschi e portati in Germania* ».

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5. — Lettera 20 novembre 1944 del rag. Lorenzo Guerrini, capo contabile della Società Editrice «Il Messaggero» dalla quale risulta:

a) l'onere dovuto subire dalla Società per indennità corrisposte al direttore Francesco Malgeri, ai redattori Vittorio Gorresio, Gino De Sanctis, Pio Ambrogetti e Antonio Petrucci a seguito del loro licenziamento imposto dal Ministero della Cultura Popolare dopo il luglio 1941 per atteggiamenti contrari alla politica del regime (cfr. anche doc. 6);

b) «che nel luglio 1941, per imposizione del Ministero «della Cultura Popolare si sono dovute anche effettuare, con «gravi oneri per la Società, nuove assunzioni e conferire nuove «attribuzioni a redattori del giornale;

c) che quando nell'ottobre 1940 per effetto delle disposizioni razziali il giornalista dott. Arrigo Iacchia avrebbe dovuto lasciare l'ufficio di redattore del Messaggero, venne con altre apparenti mansioni «trattenuto in servizio per ordine «del sigg. Perrone, con gli stessi assegni che prima percepiva».

Sulle circostanze *a*, *b*, cfr., altresì, il seguente importante **doc. 23** dal quale risulta, tra l'altro, che nel 1941 il fascismo ha tentato d'imporre la cessione delle azioni della Società, a prezzo volutamente inadeguato: ciò che può spiegarsi *soltanto* con l'atteggiamento contrario alla guerra ed al fascismo, tenuto dai dirigenti della Società stessa *dopo il* 10 *giugno* 1940.

6. — Lettera 6 dicembre 1944 del sig. Plinio Turcato, già capo-ufficio pubblicità ed inserzioni de «Il Messaggero», nella quale si conferma che — dopo la sua assegnazione al confino di polizia per il suo contegno contrario alla guerra ed al fascismo (cfr. doc. 2) — sono stati corrisposti alla sua famiglia «*per ordine ed a spese dei signori Pio e Mario Perrone*» assegni vari in conto della liquidazione che gli venne così «*riconosciuta contro e nonostante le disposizioni perentorie date dal partito fascista*».

7. — Lettera 7 dicembre 1944 del Presidente della Commissione Interna Aziendale della Società Editrice «Il Messag-

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gero », nella quale è trascritto il testo del verbale 15 novembre 1944, redatto in sede di indagini compiute dalla Commissione stessa, « per accertare la posizione politica degli esponenti e del personale » della predetta Società.

In tale verbale la Commissione ha rilevato:

a) « che *la maggioranza del personale non era iscritta « al partito fascista;*

b) « che *ai dipendenti non fu mai richiesta l'iscrizione « al partito fascista e che questo particolare si inquadra nel « modo di agire e di pensare dei fratelli Perrone, schiettamente ed apertamente antifascisti, i quali, anche per esperienza personale di alcuni membri della Commissione stessa, « tanto* ANTERIORMENTE *che posteriormente all'8 settembre « 1943 spontaneamente e generosamente sovvenzionarono gli « elementi del personale che dal fascismo erano stati danneggiati con condanne, persecuzioni e simili ».*

8. — Copia di comparsa aggiunta depositata il 28 novembre 1934 dall'avv. Pier Giulio Breschi, direttore de « Il Messaggero » fino al 1931, nella causa da lui promossa contro i signori Pio e Mario Perrone innanzi al Tribunale Civile di Roma. In tale comparsa, per fornire al Magistrato « un in« dice dello stato d'animo del comm. Pio Perrone nei riguardi « del regime », veniva trascritto un promemoria da questi « in« viato all'avv. Breschi e non a lui soltanto », dal quale emergono sentimenti e propositi di *ostilità nei confronti del fascismo.*

9. — Copia de «Il Messaggero» del 25-26 luglio 1943 nel quale è pubblicato col titolo « Rinascita » l'unico articolo nettamente contrario al fascismo apparso in quel giorno sulla stampa italiana. (Da notare che la responsabilità legale e politica dell'articolo fu assunta da Pio Perrone che prese la direzione provvisoria del giornale al posto del defenestrato Pavolini).

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VOLUME III

DOCUMENTI: relativi al periodo 8 settembre 1943 - 4 giugno 1944

10. — Copia del giornale «Il Messaggero» del 14 settembre 1943 dalla quale risulta che in tale data la carica di redattore responsabile fu assunta dal sig. Alfonso Novara in sostituzione del direttore Tomaso Smith, sottrattosi con la fuga all'arresto e poi catturato dai nazi-fascisti: cfr. seguente doc. 26.

11. — Copia del giornale «Il Messaggero» del 16 dicembre 1943 dalla quale risulta che da tale data la direzione del giornale stesso fu assunta dal dott. Bruno Spampanato.

12. — Certificato per atti 6 dicembre 1944 del notaio Russo Ajello dal quale risulta:

a) che *nessuna deliberazione* fu presa dal Consiglio di Amministrazione della Soc. Editrice «Il Messaggero» nel periodo 8 settembre 1943-4 giugno 1944. (Ciò perchè tutti i quattro componenti del Consiglio stesso ebbero ad allontanarsi per sfuggire all'arresto intendendo rifiutare ogni collaborazione al nuovo pseudo governo fascista repubblicano: cfr. seguente doc. 16);

b) che, pertanto, nessuna deliberazione fu presa dal Consiglio di Ammistrazione della predetta Società *per le nomine del redattore responsabile Alfonso Novara* (di cui al superiore doc. 10) *e del direttore Bruno Spampanato* (di cui al superiore doc. 11).

13. — Certificato, rilasciato dalla Cancelleria del Tribunale di Roma il 2 dicembre 1944, dal quale risulta che il Consiglio di Amministrazione della Soc. An. Editrice «Il Messaggero» era ed è composto dai signori Pio Perrone, Presidente - Mario Perrone, Amministratore delegato - Ferdinando Per-

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rone ed Alessandro Perrone, Consiglieri (cfr. seguenti docum. n. 16 e 17).

14. — Certificato per atti 6 dicembre 1944 del notaio Russo Ajello dal quale risulta che nel periodo 8 settembre 1943-4 giugno 1944 *non vi furono assemblee generali* ordinarie degli azionisti della Soc. Editrice «Il Messaggero» e che, in particolare, andarono deserte l'assemblea generale ordinaria indetta per il 30 marzo 1944 e l'altra, indetta in seconda convocazione, per il 29 aprile 1944 (cfr. i seguenti doc. 15, 16, 17).

15. — Certificato per atti 6 dicembre 1944 del notaio Russo Ajello dal quale risulta che «la totalità delle azioni rappresentanti l'intero capitale sociale» della Società Editrice «Il Messaggero» è intestata ai signori Pio e Mario Perrone.

16. — Atto di notorietà in data 9 dicembre 1944, dal quale risulta:

a) che i signori Pio e Mario Perrone, intendendo rifiutare ogni collaborazione allo pseudo governo nazifascista, il 10 settembre 1943 si allontanarono dalle loro abitazioni, e, per sfuggire all'arresto, si occultarono fino al 4 giugno 1944, data della liberazione di Roma da parte delle truppe alleate;

b) che durante il periodo della occupazione tedesca le suddette loro abitazioni furono ripetutamente invase e saccheggiate da elementi del fascio repubblicano di Roma e dalle S.S. germaniche;

c) che negli ambienti politici di Roma si ebbe notizia essere state poste ingenti taglie sui predetti signori Perrone.

17. — Dichiarazione 18 novembre 1944 di Padre Agostino Arcibal (Procuratore dei Preti della Misericordia in Roma). Da essa risulta che i signori Pio e Mario Perrone per sfuggire alle persecuzioni nazifasciste nel periodo dal 10 settembre 1943 al 4 giugno 1944, si occultarono, trovando asilo di volta in volta presso la Casa dei Preti della Misericordia, l'Università Gregoriana ed il Vaticano.

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18. — Copia del decreto 14 dicembre 1944 del Capo della Provincia di Genova con il quale — considerato che il capitale azionario della Soc. An. Edizioni e Pubblicazioni, Editrice del quotidiano «Il Secolo XIX» «risulta *in possesso dei fra-*«*telli Mario e Pio Perrone i quali per i loro precedenti poli-*«*tici sono da annoverarsi fra i nemici della Repubblica So-*«*ciale Italiana*» — è stata sottoposta a sequestro conservativo la società stessa e, quindi, il detto giornale.

19 e 19 bis. — Lettera e Relazione 22 giugno 1944 del giornalista Vincenzo Pasquero — redattore de «Il Secolo XIX», rifugiatosi a Roma, nel gennaio 1944 — dalla quale risulta che, per il deciso atteggiamento dei redattori, contrario al nazi-fascismo, le pubblicazioni del predetto giornale furono *interrotte* dal 9 settembre al 14 dicembre 1943, data in cui furono riprese forzatamente ad opera di esponenti delle autorità tedesche e fasciste.

Si astennero però dal presentarsi al giornale e rifiutarono ogni loro collaborazione il capo cronista Massaro ed i redattori Steno, Vagge, Chiossone, Canesi, Murialdi, Giazotto e Pasquero, alcuni dei quali vennero, per tal motivo, licenziati in tronco.

20. — Copia de «Il Secolo XIX» del 14 dicembre 1943 dalla quale risulta che il giornale riprendeva in tale data le pubblicazioni che aveva interrotto dall'8 settembre 1943 per ordine dei signori Perrone e che, quindi, per tre mesi il giornale «*non è esistito*».

21. — Volume di Frank Arthur Vanderlip, presidente della City National Bank di New York, dal titolo «*Ciò che accadde all'Europa*» (Ed. Treves, 1920).

In esso (pag. 67) è ricordato il sentimento antitedesco, tradizionale nella famiglia Perrone, come riferito in nota a pagg. 10-11 del ricorso, e vi si aggiunge: «Quando il padre «morì, i due figli, con un senso di romanticismo italiano, fe-«cero vicino alla sua bara il reciproco e fiero patto di non am-

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« mettere mai il capitale tedesco nella loro grande eredità in- « dustriale ».

22. — Copia autentica della « Comparsa di risposta » in data 8 febbraio 1944 depositata dalla convenuta Soc. Editrice « Il Messaggero » nella causa promossa dal dott. Fausto Buoninsegni ex direttore del giornale, dalla quale risulta come i difensori della Società — in detta data 8 febbraio 1944, *in pieno periodo di dominazione nazifascista* — sostenessero, per istruzioni avute dai signori Perrone, che la nomina e la revoca del detto direttore erano avvenute per fatto estraneo alla volontaà della Società, cioè per provvedimento dell'autorità politica, al di sopra delle stesse norme di legge e senza il consenso del datore di lavoro *che ebbe a subire il Buoninsegni stesso* con imposizione anche di uno stipendio di L. 16.000 mensili, contro le L. 12.500 percepite dal precedente direttore dott. Malgeri, di ben maggiore anzianità e capacità professionale (cfr. il seguente doc. 23).

23. — Copia delle « Deduzioni » presentate il 27 marzo 1944 — imperante il nazifascismo — nella causa di cui al precedente doc. 22. In esse, tra l'altro, la difesa della Società Editrice « Il Messaggero » « *a prova delle pressioni ed intimidazioni* che pre- « pararono l'imposizione a direttore del giornale del dott. Buo- « ninsegni » fece istanza al Presidente Istruttore affinchè venisse « richiamato dal Ministero della Cultura Popolare il fa- « scicolo dell'*inchiesta condotta contro i maggiori esponenti* « *del giornale per accuse politiche, che avrebbero potuto por-* « *tare, dati i tempi, anche al confino ed alla imposizione della* « *cessione delle azioni a prezzo volutamente inadeguato* ».

Inoltre la difesa stessa affermò e chiese di provare con testimoni — sempre in data 27 marzo 1944 — « *con quali im-* « *posizioni e minacce,* il dott. Buoninsegni riuscì a farsi fissare « lo stipendio di L. 16.000 contro lo stipendio di L. 12.500 rag- « giunto dal dott. Malgeri dopo un lungo servizio, esplicita- « mente dicendo che, altrimenti, avrebbe fatto imporre di au- « torità L. 30.000 mensili. In tutto questo *comportamento di*

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« *coartazione* prospettava essere egli il portavoce delle Auto-« rità politiche e la sua nomina come *l'ultima concessione*, « venendo meno la quale il *Giornale sarebbe stato oggetto di « gravi provvedimenti* » (cfr., altresì, i precedenti doc. 1 a 7).

24. — Copia del giornale « Il Messaggero » del 5 maggio 1944 con notizia dell'arresto di un gruppo di operai della tipografia del giornale stesso a seguito di manifestazione conseguente al loro tradizionale, latente ma ostinato, anti-fascismo.

25. — Atto di notorietà in data 9 dicembre 1944 dal quale risultano i nomi dei diciotto operai arrestati in conseguenza dell'episodio di cui sopra e di altri nove operai che furono costretti ad occultarsi per sottrarsi all'arresto.

Da tale documento risulta altresì che alle famiglie di tutti i suddetti operai per ordine ed a spese dei signori Perrone, *furono sempre corrisposte segretamente* — in pieno dominio nazifascista — le paghe normalmente percepite dai loro congiunti.

26. — Atto di notorietà in data 9 dicembre 1944, dal quale risulta che nel periodo dall'8 settembre 1943 al 4 giugno 1944 venne arrestato il direttore de « Il Messaggero » Tomaso Smith e furono costretti a fuggire per sottrarsi alla cattura ed a pene maggiori, i redattori Ermanno Contini, Diego Calcagno, Vincenzo Talarico, Piero Bonanni, Antonio Picone Stella, Gaetano Petrosemolo, Nino Sangiovanni, Arrigo Jacchia, Bruno D'Agostini, Giovanni Cagianelli, Vezio Murialdi, Carlo Cavallo, alcuni dei quali attraversarono le linee e collaborarono in riviste e giornali dell'Italia liberata.

Da tale documento risulta altresì che alle famiglie dei medesimi per ordine ed a spese dei signori Pio e Mario Perrone, *furono sempre corrisposti segretamente, imperante il nazifascismo, gli assegni mensili.*

27. — Copia di lettera 16 marzo 1944 diretta dal Ministro della Cultura Popolare dello pseudo governo nazi-fascista Fer-

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nando Mezzasoma al dott. Bruno Spampanato per ringraziarlo dell'assunzione di quattro «camerati» nella redazione del giornale e per esortarlo ad «allontanare gente vecchia» perchè specie nell'amministrazione c'era ancora «ATMOSFERA... PERRONIANA!».

28. — Copia di rapporto in data 27 marzo 1944 diretto dal dott. Bruno Spampanato al Ministro Mezzasoma nella quale, tra l'altro, lo Spampanato affermava di aver dovuto «essere insieme energico e ragionevole per provocare UN «NUOVO ORIENTAMENTO specialmente dei redattori»; che «L'AMBIENTE DEL "MESSAGGERO" E' QUELLO CHE E'»; che comunque «per dare ancora uno scossone al resto della «redazione e per essere poi in grado di poter eliminare i più «restii a inquadrarsi nel nostro ordine politico» aveva tenuto il 4 marzo 1944 una riunione di cui allegava il testo stenografico (cfr. seguente doc. 29).

29. — Testo di resoconto stenografico di un discorso tenuto il 4 marzo 1944 dal dott. Bruno Spampanato, direttore de «Il Messaggero» durante l'occupazione tedesca, ai redattori del giornale — resoconto trovato fra gli incartamenti della Direzione ed allegato al precedente doc. 28 — dal quale risulta, tra l'altro, che i redattori stessi facevano «resistenza sorda» e «boicottaggio» al predetto Spampanato.

30. — Lettera 2 settembre 1944, con la quale l'avv. Claudio Matteini, segretario di redazione de «Il Messaggero» ha trasmesso all'Amministratore Delegato della Società Editrice i superiori doc. 27, 28 e 29.

31. - 31 bis e 31 ter — Copia di lettera ed allegata relazione, inviata dal direttore del Messaggero Tomaso Smith all'«Allied Publication Board» in data 14 giugno 1944. In tale Relazione, tra l'altro, viene illustrata l'attività svolta nel giornale, dopo l'8 settembre 1943, dagli elementi di fiducia dei signori Pio e Mario Perrone e risulta:

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a) che erano state nascoste armi per cercare di difendere il giornale nella eventualità che fosse tentata la progettata distruzione delle macchine e degli impianti;

b) che erano state messe in salvo alcune macchine perchè, in caso di distruzione del giornale, se ne potesse assicurare la pubblicazione al momento della liberazione di Roma. Essendo trapelato il fatto vennero arrestati dai fascisti il sig. Vincenzo Spasiano, redattore, e il comm. Lorenzo Guerrini addetto all'Amministrazione, ma essi nonostante le minacce, mantennero il segreto;

c) *che i signori Perrone, sfidando anche gravi minacce, fecero sempre corrispondere segretamente lo stipendio e gli assegni al personale fuggiasco o alle famiglie di coloro che erano stati arrestati;*

d) che i redattori compilavano fogli clandestini, tra cui uno intitolato «Noi Italiani» e durante la notte ne curavano l'affissione per le vie della città.

Alla Relazione suddetta è allegata copia fotografica di lettera 12 giugno 1944 del Senatore Alberto Bergamini nella quale si afferma: «*...il memoriale dice la sostanziale verità «della nostra dolorosa storia giornalistica: e lo confermo*».

32. — Atto di notorietà in data 9 dicembre 1944 nel quale vengono confermate circostanze di cui al superiore doc. 31 (cfr. anche doc. 26).

33. — Copia del giornale «Il Messaggero» dell'8 giugno 1944 con la notizia che tra le salme dei 14 patrioti assassinati dalle SS. tedesche il 4 giugno 1944 in località Giustiniana, era stata rinvenuta anche quella dell'avv. Lino Eramo che aveva dato al Messaggero «*la sua preziosa attività di professionista e di consigliere legale*» e che era stato arrestato dalle S.S. tedesche perchè accusato «di avere contatti con i partigiani, «di favorirli con aiuti morali e finanziari... di avere fatto parte «di un complotto antitedesco, di svolgere propaganda antina-«zista».

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dere il giornale nella eventualità che fosse tentata la progettata distruzione delle macchine e degli impianti;

b) che erano state messe in salvo alcune macchine perchè, in caso di distruzione del giornale, se ne potesse assicurare la pubblicazione al momento della liberazione di Roma. Essendo trapelato il fatto vennero arrestati dai fascisti il sig. Vincenzo Spasiano, redattore, e il comm. Lorenzo Guerrini addetto all'Amministrazione, ma essi nonostante le minacce, mantennero il segreto;

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34. — Atto di notorietà in data 9 dicembre 1944, dal quale risulta:

a) che il martire avv. Lino Eramo, barbaramente assassinato dai tedeschi insieme ad altri 13 patrioti il 4 giugno 1944, era il legale della Società Editrice «Il Messaggero» e dei signori Pio e Mario Perrone in proprio;

b) che a mezzo del predetto avv. Lino Eramo e di altri loro fiduciarii, durante il periodo dell'occupazione della Capitale da parte dei nazifascisti i signori Pio e Mario Perrone, resisi latitanti per sfuggire a cattura e persecuzioni, sovvenzionarono bande di partigiani, corrisposero segretamente gli assegni al direttore ed ai redattori de «Il Messaggero» arrestati o fuggiti od alle loro stesse famiglie, nonchè alle famiglie di tutti gli operai che erano stati arrestati o si erano occultati a seguito della loro partecipazione allo sciopero generale organizzato a Roma per il 3 Maggio 1944.

VOLUME IV

DOCUMENTI: in rapporto al III Motivo di ricorso.

35. — Dichiarazione rilasciata dalla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri — Sottosegretariato per la Stampa e le Informazioni — Direz. Gen. Stampa il 22 novembre 1944 - Prot. n. 4201 dalla quale risulta:

a) che «la richiesta di pubblicazione del «Nuovo Mes«saggero» è stata approvata dalla Commissione Nazionale «per la Stampa nella sua seduta del 26 settembre»;

b) che «successivamente, vista la contrarietà della pub«blica opinione al titolo — sia pure modificato con l'aggiunta «dell'aggettivo «nuovo» — l'on. Enrico Molè — già indicato «nella primitiva domanda dell'avv. M. Giacone direttore del «giornale — comunicava alla Commissione Nazionale per la «Stampa di avere deciso di adottare quale titolo «*L'Indipen-*

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«*dente*». La Commissione nella sua seduta del 26 ottobre «prendeva atto di ciò»;

c) che «editrice del giornale sarà la Società «Vita «Nova».

36. — Copia della domanda presentata al Sottosegretariato per la Stampa e le Informazioni - Direzione Gen. Stampa il 15 novembre 1944 per il rilascio del precedente doc. 35.

37. — Lettera 10 ottobre 1944 dell'avv. Mario Giacone alla Soc. An. Editrice «Il Messaggero», con la quale il predetto ha dato comunicazione della sua nomina a Commissario per la gestione temporanea della società stessa con Decreto Presidenziale 22 settembre 1944 e fissa la data del 12 ottobre 1944 «ai «fini della presa di possesso prevista dall'art. 4 del R. D. L. «6 settembre 1944 n. 207».

38. — Certificato rilasciato dal notaio Alfredo Cardelli il 29 novembre 1944, dal quale risulta che a rogito 16 ottobre 1944 del notaio stesso (quattro giorni dopo l'insediamento del Comissario nella Società Editrice «Il Messaggero») è stata costituita la Società a responsabilità limitata «Vita Nova» avente per scopo principale la edizione e pubblicazione di un giornale denominato «L'Informazione» o con altra testata.

39. — Certificato rilasciato dalla Cancelleria del Tribunale di Roma il 2 dicembre 1944 dal quale risulta che, per statuto, la Società Editrice «Il Messaggero» «*ha per oggetto «la pubblicazione del giornale di sua proprietà «Il Messag-«gero» e di altri giornali, periodici, libri e riviste*».

40. — Copia del giornale «Il Tempo» del 26 settembre 1944. Vi si annuncia l'imminente pubblicazione del «Nuovo Messaggero» autorizzata «con lo specioso pretesto che il *Go-«verno... manca di un organo proprio*, di un pulpito dal quale «render conto delle proprie tendenze e difendersi».

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c) che «editrice del giornale sarà la Società «Vita «Nova».

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41. — Copia del giornale « Italia Nuova » del 27 settembre 1944. Nell'articolo « *Il Messaggero riprende le pubblicazioni* » si annuncia che la *competente Commissione ha all'unanimità autorizzato*, con decorrenza immediata, *la pubblicazione del « Nuovo Messaggero »*, « *organo a quanto risulta, « personale dell'attuale Presidente del Consiglio* ».

42. — Copia del giornale « Avanti! » del 27 settembre 1944. Vi si annuncia la pubblicazione dal 15 ottobre 1944 del « Nuovo Messaggero », a seguito di decisione presa dalla Commissione della Stampa.

43. — Copia del giornale « L'Unità » del 28 settembre 1944, riproducente lettera d'Italo De Feo, membro della Commissione Italiana per la Stampa, in cui si conferma l'avvenuta deliberazione, precisando che « il rappresentante del P. C. e « il rappresentante del P. S. non hanno votato a favore, ma « contro la decisione ».

44. — Copia del giornale « Italia Nuova » del 4 ottobre 1944, con notizia che, nella riunione del Comitato dei Ministri senza portafoglio tenuta il 3 ottobre 1944 sotto la presidenza dell'on. Bonomi, sono stati esaminati « i problemi relativi alla « stampa, in relazione alle *note direttive governative per la « ripresa delle pubblicazioni del « Messaggero »* e — aggiunge « l'Italia Nuova » — con criteri da estendersi alle regioni di futura liberazione, « per la più equa *ripartizione* fra i sei condomini delle *grandi aziende editoriali del nord* ».

45. — Copia del giornale « L'Italia Libera » del 3 ottobre 1944, in cui si polemizza sull'adottata deliberazione, parlando del « Nuovo Messaggero » come *organo del Governo*

46. — Copia del giornale « L'Italia Libera » del 3 novembre 1944 con un articolo che annuncia la pubblicazione del nuovo giornale « L'Indipendente » che « dietro il titolo squil-

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«lante nasconde... ma sì, proprio il vecchio, tenacissimo, te-
«tragono «Messaggero», costretto all'ultima mimetizzazione
«per tentare di rinascere».

Roma, dicembre 1944.

Prof. Avv. ERNESTO ORREI
Avv. GUIDO CASSINELLI
Avv. GIULIO EGIDI

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SECRET

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K20

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PsWSC (45) 2
9th January 1945

SECRET

COPY NO 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUB COMMITTEE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROPAGANDA DIRECTED TO THE BALKANS

Note by Director, PWB

1. The Psychological Warfare Branch of AFHQ is responsible for the following principal activities :-

(a) 'Tactical' propaganda in local support of operations by 5th and 8th Armies.

(b) 'Strategic' propaganda of incitement or instruction on the one hand to resistance elements in the general area of 15th Army Group's operations and on the other to disturbed populations in the area of AMG behind the front.

(c) Depressive or surrender propaganda to German troops in Northern ITALY and in YUGOSLAVIA.

(d) Propaganda of general political incitement to the population of AUSTRIA.

(e) Propaganda (carried out exclusively by a unit of the Branch's British element) in support of LF & ML GREECE.

2. Until recently, PWB also had an output of propaganda of the first importance to YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA. The developments in those countries, however, and the German withdrawal, greatly reduced the significance of Allied propaganda there.

3. SACMED has recently instructed that measures be taken whereby PWB is relieved of responsibility for consolidation propaganda and control of information services in liberated ITALY.

4. In the course of its work, however, the Branch has become to a certain extent the channel for the introduction of non-operational propaganda material both British and American (including the distribution of films) into liberated YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, and to a very small extent ROUMANIA and BULGARIA. This activity grew from the demands of missions and liaison officers in these countries for goodwill and informative propaganda, and was extended to distribution, for similar goodwill purposes, of material among Greek and Yugoslav forces and refugees in both ITALY and the MIDDLE EAST.

1349

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5. The responsible U.S propaganda agency, the Office of War Information, has expressed the wish that the introduction into liberated Balkan territories of such general U.S material should no longer be handled by the Branch, but by the appropriate governmental agency. The British element of the Branch (Psychological Warfare Executive) concurs in the propriety of this proposal, and endorses its application to British propaganda also.

6. At the same time, the development of radio and press facilities in ALBANIA and in liberated YUGOSLAVIA tends to reduce the value of the news broadcasts in Serbo-Croat and Albanian which are conducted by PWB from Radio Bari, and should shortly make them redundant as a source of essential information. It may be noted that broadcasts in Roumanian and Bulgarian from BARI were stopped some time ago, and that certain services from PWB radio stations in the MIDDLE EAST are being discontinued.

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7. PWB have received requests from G-5 that in the event of ML missions entering YUGOSLAVIA and ALBANIA the Branch should support them with its services. The work involved, however, is very small in relation to PWB's total output; retention of Serbo-Croat and Albanian language broadcasts is moreover not considered essential to the task of assisting ML.

8. The Psychological Warfare Branch therefore requests the Sub Committee to recommend to the Supreme Allied Commander that he should direct :-

(a) That propaganda conducted by the Branch should be restricted to and concentrated on the tasks stated in para 1 above.

(b) That the proposal of the Office of War Information at paragraph 5 above is approved, and that PWB should so inform the appropriate US and British governmental agencies and should invite them to take the necessary measures forthwith to assume responsibility, through their own organisations respectively, for the introduction of American and British propaganda material (including the distribution of films) into liberated YUGOSLAVIA, ALBANIA, ROUMANIA and BULGARIA, and among Greek and Yugoslav forces and refugees in ITALY and the MIDDLE EAST.

(c) That PWB should cease broadcasts on Radio Bari in Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Albanian by March 1st 1945, unless operational developments in the meantime require reconsideration of this course.

(Intd) R.B. by R.M.

DISTRIBUTION	COPY NO
Chief, INC	1
Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U.S. Political Adviser	6-8
British Resident Minister	9-11
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	12-14
G-2	15-16
G-3 Special Operations	17
G-5	18-20
Chief Signals Officer	21
Secretary, General Staff	22
Secretary, IS & PS	23-25
Spares	26-30

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COS List

CHIEF COMM
COS
P.R.B.

SECRET

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MINUTES OF MEETING OF TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE HELD ON

9 JANUARY, 1945.

Present : Admiral Stone
Colonel Reeves
Colonel Henderson
Mr. Edman
Colonel Hayden
Colonel Boudder
Major Fielden.

Admiral Stone said he was puzzled by the attitude of the PWB towards ANSA. Did they want to create a monopoly?

Mr. Edman said that ANSA was only a monopoly in the sense of being a cooperative monopoly : it could not in fact be called a monopoly because it was jointly owned.

Admiral Stone said that he could not see how a private agency could set up business in requisitioned offices.

Mr. Edman said that ANSA would of course have to pay for office space.

Admiral Stone objected that ANSA was already, as far as he understood, using the PWB offices without payment.

Mr. Edman said that the PWB was ready to help any agency over the first difficult steps.

Admiral Stone asked who controlled the circuits.

Colonel Reeves said they were controlled by the Italian Government if derequisitioned.

Admiral Stone asked whether in fact it was the Government or the terminal companies.

Colonel Reeves was not sure.

Admiral Stone pointed out that military circuits could not be given to a private news agency.

Colonel Henderson said that PWB used military circuits : there were no others.

Admiral Stone said that in that case circuits would have to be released for private agencies which would have to pay for them.

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Colonel Henderson said that the release of PWB time - 3 to 4 hours per day - would not release whole circuits.

Admiral Stone asked how PWB time was taken.

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Colonel Reeves said it had last priority.

Mr. Edman said that the circuits were used as a back-stop on their Morse transmissions.

Admiral Stone asked what PWB had in the way of radio facilities.

Mr. Edman said that they had shortwave, medium and long wave transmitters at Terranova. There were 6 transmitters, 3 being used for Italy, 1 for the Balkans and 1 for Moscow. The equipment was Italcable equipment much rehabilitated by PWB.

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Admiral Stone gave the Committee a summary of the discussions leading up to the Committee's appointment and read the terms of reference. He said that in spite of the warning against monopoly and the AC alteration of the PWB release as submitted, the original PWB release referring to ANSA had appeared in the Stars and Stripes.

Mr. Edman said that the PWB had had nothing to do with that release. He had never seen it until he read it in the Stars and Stripes.

Admiral Stone said he would not deal further with Rome for the moment. Our chief directives were (a) to settle distribution outside Rome, and (b) to avoid monopoly. PWB had elected to withdraw some of its activities from Liberated Italy : that was PWB's affair. But the new agency, ANSA, must not have a preferential position. The UP and other agencies would fight against that. PWB must permit all agencies, including other Italian agencies which might arise, to compete on an equal footing. The Committee would have to study time requirements as well as financial requirements in conjunction with the Italian Government or the terminal companies. He thought there were already certain facilities for provincial papers : the possibilities of long-distance telephone must be explored. As to radio facilities, if PWB was not going to carry news some facilities must be restored to the agencies but not as a free gift.

Mr. Edman said that ANSA should be treated as any other agency. He understood that Reuters and AP would have their own men sitting in ANSA.

Admiral Stone said he believed that Italcable had operated a number of high-speed circuits before the war and some of these might be restored.

Colonel Reeves said he did not understand ANSA's connection with Italcable. All Italcable property was requisitioned by him for military use and could not be given over to private enterprise.

Admiral Stone asked if ANSA personnel were not already there.

Mr. Edman said that some were there; some were on PWB's payroll.

Colonel Reeves said that all space there had been authorized by him and unauthorized persons could not be permitted. He thought Italcable themselves wanted the premises back.

Admiral Stone said that UP would make a terrific blast if there were any question of monopoly by ANSA. We should see that Italcable was open to all and there should be no preferential rates.

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Admiral Stone said that UP would make a terrific blast if there were any question of monopoly by ANSA. We should see that Italcable was open to all and there should be no preferential rates. He asked whether PWB would be taking ANSA's news to the North and if in that case Southern papers could not pick up PWB's transmissions.

Mr. Edman said he thought Southern papers would have to carry a tag-line but of course they might pirate.

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Admiral Stone said he began to wonder whether there was really any distinction between PWB and ANSA.

Mr. Edman said that he did not see how piracy could be prevented.

Admiral Stone asked if PWB would recommend the Italian Government to prosecute it.

Mr. Edman assented.

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Admiral Stone said that he thought an address system might be possible, Italcable acting as a common carrier. The Italian Government could then prosecute in Italian territory and AC in AC territory. He did not know what possibilities there were of wire services.

Colonel Henderson said that telegraph services were picking up. He thought that perhaps the best plan would be to restore Italcable's services as far as possible. He would go into the matter with Colonel Reeves.

Admiral Stone asked if newspapers in the South still had a lot of PWB equipment.

Mr. Eaman said no; but in any case it would not be given away to them; they would have to pay. He thought PWB still had receivers in Catanzaro and Cosenza.

Colonel Henderson said that a common carrier would only serve the major towns, except for radio. He wondered whether it should be Italcable or the State.

Admiral Stone said it was a question not only of politics but also of efficiency. He had an open mind on it. On the whole he thought there were more objections to State control.

Colonel Reeves said that he doubted whether there would be spare circuits for lease to Italcable.

Admiral Stone said that the important point was that Italcable should be a common carrier serving ANSA, UP or any other agency equally.

If there were only one wire it would have to be split up, as had been done at Algiers. There was always the additional possibility of telephoning news.

Colonel Reeves remarked that many partially destroyed transmitters had been rebuilt with Allied material and it would be a tough problem to unscramble that. Most Italcable employees were now paid by PWB.

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
A P O 394

10th January, 1945

Minutes of the FIRST MEETING, held in the Allied Commission on Tuesday 9th January, 1945, to discuss the arrangements to be made to provide communication facilities for news agencies.

Present:

Rear Admiral Ellery W. STONE, U.S.N.R. — Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission

Colonel J.L.HENDERSON — Communications Sub-Commission, Allied Commission

Major Lionel FIELDEN — Public Relations Officer, Allied Commission

Mr. G. EDMAN — P.W.B., Italy

Lieut.Colonel J.L.HAYDEN I.N.C., A.F.H.Q. Adv.

Lt. Colonel L.P.REEVES Signal Officer, R.A.A.C.

Lt. Colonel.H.H.SCUDDER Secretary

Rear Admiral E.W.Stone presided.

Admiral Stone read the directive given at the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference on 30th December, 1944, under which this Committee had been convened. It was:

"THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER:

(a) Directed that private news agencies be permitted to sell news direct to the newspapers of ROME on and after 15th January 1945, and that the Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission, so inform the private news agencies.

(b) Appointed a technical sub-committee consisting of,

Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission - Chairman

Director, PWB

Chief, INC

Chief Signals Section, AFHQ

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or their representatives, to investigate at what juncture and by what means the distribution of news to newspapers and radio stations by private news agencies, both foreign and Italian, should be extended throughout the remainder of liberated ITALY, and to report their recommendations to AFHQ.

(c) Directed that the technical sub-committee appointed Under (b) above, in carrying out their investigation, have particular regard to the safeguards required to prevent the establishment of a monopolistic indigenous news agency in ITALY."

He pointed out that although certain agencies had agreed to deal with a co-operative agency known as ANSA, other agencies were not prepared to do so. It was a particular duty of this Committee to ensure that no monopoly was established by this co-operative agency so far as communications facilities were concerned.

From statements by Mr.Eaman, Lt.Col.Reeves and Colonel Henderson it appeared that the present facilities utilised by P.W.B. fall into two categories:

a. line telegraph facilities - provided through the Allied military teleprinter network, by P.W.B. having positions on the military teleprinter switchboards and using the Allied junction circuits at times when military traffic permitted.

b. radio broadcast facilities - provided partly by the use by P.W.B. of requisitioned and rehabilitated Italcable equipment, and partly by C.W.I. equipment. Some radio receivers were on loan by P.W.B. to provincial newspapers for the reception of these broadcasts, many others possessed their own receiving equipment.

On line telegraph facilities.

Lt.Col.Reeves stated that the relinquishment by P.W.B. of a few hours use of some military channels would not enable any full circuits to be released from military use; the pressure of military traffic would immediately absorb any freed time.

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Col. Henderson stated that although Italian Government circuits were very scanty the situation was slowly improving. There was a possibility that circuits could be made available; possibly it would be preferable to restore the Italcable domestic service in part, with this press service as one object.

Admiral Stone said that it was obviously impossible, with the very limited facilities, to make line time available to all agencies, and that therefore the best method of preventing any monopoly would be to have a common carrier; this might be the Department of Posts and Telegraphs or Italcable. The latter would give the advantages of better and more experienced service, and would be less liable to influence.

It was agreed that

a. private news agencies should not make use of Allied military facilities; if for any reason such use were permitted the question of rates would have to be settled, as free service to private agencies could not be given.

b. a common carrier, preferably commercial (Italcable), open to all agencies, would be the best means of providing the facilities.

On radio facilities,

Mr. Edman stated that P.W.B. were using morse transmissions on short and medium waves and dictation-speed broadcasts. Most of the radio equipment was requisitioned from Italcable, rehabilitated partly by C.W.I. items, partly by items requisitioned from other Italian sources. He was prepared to release the requisitioned equipment used by P.W.B. on the news services for the territory administered by the Italian Government, and would assist in transferring the C.W.I. items that had been put in to rehabilitate this equipment, probably on a sale basis.

Lt.Col.Reeves stated that all Italcable radio equipment and accommodations in Rome Area was requisitioned by the Allied military authorities and under his control. The equipment was turned over to operation by the military, by P.W.B., R.S.A.C., etc. as required. When released from Allied use, equipment and accommodation etc. would be restored to Italcable and placed under supervision of the Allied Commission; until that time no civilian operation could be permitted. It was stated that AMSA had some personnel in the Italcable stations, apparently introduced by P.W.B., and Lt.Col.Reeves took exception to this. Mr.Edman said that he had no knowledge of this and would rectify the position.

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Admiral Stone said that instructions had been issued by the C.S.C., A.F.H.Q. for the return to Italcable of such equipment etc. as could be released by P.W.B. on the change of system of distribution of news. He asked what progress was being made.

Colonel Henderson stated that his Sub-Commission was assisting at the transfer and that the first meeting with the representatives of R.A.A.C. Signals, P.W.B., Italcables and the Italian Government was being held tomorrow (10 Jan.) Following this, it would be possible to state what facilities would become available.

Admiral Stone said that it would be necessary to ensure that the rates charged by Italcable were not excessive, particularly if they were an exclusive carrier. This would be a matter of Italian Government regulations.

Piracy of News

Mr. Edman pointed out the danger of piracy of news, and in particular of P.W.B. news broadcast for use in Regional Military Government territory. He was in favour of the Italian Government taking measures to prevent news piracy, and suggested curtailment of the paper supply of offenders.

Admiral Stone said that corresponding action would be taken in Regional Military Government territory in respect of piracy of the news distributed by private agencies in Italian Government territory.

Admiral Stone stated that Colonel Henderson would preside at the next meeting.

Colonel Henderson said that it appeared that the next move was to hold a meeting with the Signal Officer R.A.A.C. and the Italian Government authorities, which Italcable might be invited to attend, to determine what facilities could be made available and to recommend by what organization they should be operated. This was agreed.

Major Fielden said that it was necessary to move fast owing to the time limit placed on the transfer.

Admiral Stone said that the time limit only referred to the distribution of news in Rome, not to the further extension throughout Italian Government territory. However, the matter was urgent.

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The meeting then closed.

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COMMENTS ON PWB NOTE REGARDING LIQUIDATION OF PWB FUNCTIONS IN ITALY

The general sense of the document is in conformity with AC policy and with the proposals contained in Mr. Macmillan's memorandum. Detailed points which may be taken up are as follows :

Under IV 7 it must be pointed out that PWB has always claimed a very large share of the newsprint available. The most recent plan sets aside 300 tons a month for PWB papers, and 400 tons to be stockpiled in the North, out of an expected total import of 1000 tons a month, thus leaving the Italian press 300 tons of imported stock. A new allocation of paper stocks is necessary.

Under IV 8 it should be remarked that PWB still operates considerable amounts of printing machinery and supplies in Liberated Italy and furthermore will have the right to requisition all such in newly-liberated territories. Unless PWB gives up a part of its present equipment and paper it can scarcely expect "the Italians themselves or the Allied Commission" to supply it.

Under VI (Recommendations) 3(a) it seems desirable to bear in mind Mr. Macmillan's proposal for an integrated staff and also to avoid, if possible, the arrival of new and formidable bodies to replace PWB. It would seem that Mr. Macmillan considered that this work could be handled by the Press Officers of the Embassies. They would perhaps need OWI and MOI assistance but anything resembling a new set-up of distinct OWI and MOI officers geared to high-powered propaganda would obviously defeat the very objects which have led to the winding-up of PWB.

Under 3(b)(i) it must be re-stated that the Allied Commission cannot produce non-existent materials and facilities like rabbits from a hat; PWB has to give them up.

Presumably 3(b)(ii) will be dealt with by the Technical Sub-Committee and also by this Branch.

3(b)(iii) is new. I doubt if AC can do it, although it can send for experts, or take them over from PWB. There must be expert handling of distribution until such time as the Temporary Film Board has made its recommendations. But it is not understood whether this clause implies the complete shutting-down of PWB's film production activities also : it is presumed that PWB would still require to make and distribute films in AMG and newly-liberated territory.

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3(c) leaves a very large loophole. Under this clause PWB can obviously plant its staff in any news agency or radio station. However, it seems a reasonable clause and I do not see how it can be refused.

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3(f) raises a most controversial issue. It may cover almost anything, and gives PWB just that ability to act independently of AC which has been deplored and deplorable in the past and which Mr. Macmillan does not appear to favour. I would strongly suggest that Mr. Macmillan's point be fully

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taken and that PWB should work under AC in AC and Italian territory. It can be pointed out that PWB officers and operations are indistinguishable from those of AC, and any propaganda or mass-observation stunts will react on AC. "Intelligence tasks" is a wide phrase which can cover a multitude of activities which AC might find completely at variance with its policy in Liberated Italy.

Conclusions

(i) If the endorsement at (i) is effected, presumably (~~vi~~) will give the opportunity of working out the plan. It seems particularly important, in view of recent misapprehensions, to avoid the possibility of PWB presenting a fait accompli in the sense of having made agreements with OWI and MOI before the plan is co-ordinated with AC. Therefore AC should have the strongest possible representation on the Sub-Committee which will presumably be created under (ii). and on which the Press Attaches of the Embassies should also sit.

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P.R.B.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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PsWSC(45)1
3 January 1945

COPY NO 12

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SUBCOMMITTEE

LIQUIDATION OF PWB FUNCTIONS IN ITALY

Note by PWB

I. Present Operations of PWB.

1. The primary function of PWB is psychological and political warfare directed against targets selected by AFHQ.

2. The basic weapon of PWB is the distribution of news by radio, posters, leaflets, and sound trucks. Individual stories in the flow of news are expanded, contracted, or suppressed to create effects ordered, through official guidance, by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, AFHQ, OWI, and PWB.

II. Effect of the Admission of Private News Agencies.

1. With the admission of private news agencies into liberated Italy, (already authorized as to Rome newspapers for 15 January 1945) it will be impossible for PWB to carry out directives for shaping, by news and radio, the attitudes of the Italian people toward Allied forces and the Allied plans for world reconstruction.

2. It is, furthermore, the declared policy of AFHQ to remove all except military security controls from Italian media of expression.

III. Experience of PWB in Turning Over its Functions in Other Areas.

1. Already in North Africa a pattern has been set whereby PWB has turned over its functions to OWI and MOI in territory already liberated for a long period.

2. PWB experience in France furnishes a basis for recommending that Italian news and radio agencies be requested to restore news and radio facilities in further Italian territory soon after liberation. In France, when the Seventh Army landed, the French required assistance only until they were able to establish news and radio agencies. There the PWB teams moved on after a few weeks.

IV. Capabilities of the Italians with Respect to Assumption of PWB Functions.

1. It is the essence of news and radio broadcasts that they know no frontiers. Any news distributed in liberated Italy quickly becomes common property with occupied Italy. It therefore seems only logical that Italian news and radio agencies should expand their activities northward just as

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2. In Italy, the Italian news and radio agencies are already organized, and are able to assume the responsibilities, as the opportunities become available.

3. The PWB has been working for many months toward preparing the Italians to administer their agencies along democratic lines. All of Italian radio except news and a few propaganda programs have already been turned back to the Italians. The Italian government now has the power to issue and revoke publication licenses, and to allocate supplies of newsprint, in liberated Italy. The PWB has trained an Italian news desk in the technique of a free press. Plans for agency supervisory boards, to achieve at

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least a measure of democratic control, and to avoid the evils of monopoly and government dictation, have been submitted and approved by AFHQ.

4. The Italian agencies possess, or can engage, sufficient radio technical personnel, for the technicians exist in Italy.

5. When it is decided by AFHQ that it would be proper to release Italian news and radio programs over any particular radio station, the Italian news and radio agencies would be requested to furnish necessary personnel and supplies.

6. If equipment and supplies are lacking to recondition captured Italian radio stations, the Italian radio agency should apply to Signals Section, AFHQ, or the Allied Commission.

7. In all territories so far liberated, adequate printing machines and some paper for newsprint have always been found available.

8. If printing machinery and supplies should be lacking, they can be supplied either by the Italians themselves or by the Allied Commission.

V. Effects of Passing Radio and News Functions to the Italians.

The effects of passing radio and news functions to the Italian agencies in liberated territory would be these:

a. The Italians would be encouraged to solve their own problems.

b. American and British taxpayers would be saved considerable sums of money.

c. American and British personnel would be made available for American and British teams in Austria, the Balkans, and the Pacific theater.

VI. Recommendations.

1. That PWB discontinue its activities with reference to liberated ITALY at such time as will allow proper coordination with the extension of the services of private news agencies to operation in areas outside ROME.

2. That PWB prepare for 1 March 1945, as a tentative date for total discontinuance of PWB functions with reference to liberated ITALY.

3. In conjunction with the discontinuance of its activities with respect to liberated ITALY, PWB recommends the following programme:-

(a) That OWI and MOI assume PWB's present task in presenting the American and British Governments' viewpoints.

(b) That the Allied Commission assume responsibility for:

(i) The supply of materials and facilities for the Italian

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(b) That the Allied Commission assume responsibility for:

(i) The supply of materials and facilities for the Italian press and radio. 1337

(ii) The carrying out of official directives demanding that all efforts be made to prevent the Italian press and radio from becoming Government monopolies or falling into the hands of Fascists.

(iii) The distribution of motion picture films. (Although the desirability of operation of commercial film agencies in Italy is recognised, it is recommended that temporarily this be a responsibility of the Allied Commission.)

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(iv) PWB's responsibility for collection of intelligence on particular economic, political and social topics.

(c) That PWB continue to furnish such advisory assistance as may be requested by the Italian Government or private news or radio agencies.

(d) That PWB be prepared to carry on news and radio services in newly liberated territories to the extent requested, on account of security requirements, by AFHQ.

(e) That Italian news and radio agencies be requested by the Allied Commission to organise teams and prepare to restore news and radio service in Italian areas as fast as they are liberated.

(f) That PWB retain the privilege, in each instance with the authorisation of AFHQ, to undertake intelligence tasks in liberated Italy which PWB may consider to be in the interest of operations against the enemy, or in support of Italian partisan groups in enemy occupied Italy.

(g) That Italian partisans be requested by AFHQ to seize and hold radio stations at the time of liberation, to prevent, if possible, their demolition or removal.

(h) That actual seizure of radio stations in newly occupied territory, and determination of their use, should be a responsibility of Signals Section, AFHQ.

CONCLUSIONS

The Psychological Warfare Subcommittee is requested:

(i) To endorse the recommendations set forth in part VI, above, and to report accordingly to the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political).

(ii) To recommend to the Supreme Allied Commander's Conference (Political) that PWB be directed to prepare and coordinate with the Allied Commission, OWI and MOI, a phased plan in detail for the turnover of appropriate functions to OWI and MOI by PWB, and to submit the plan to the Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

(intd) R. B.

DISTRIBUTION

	COPY NO.
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Director, PWB	2-3
Deputy Director, PWB	4-5
U.S. Political Adviser	6-8
British Resident Minister	9-11
Chief Commissioner, Allied Commission	12-14
G-2	15-16

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G-5	18-20
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Secretary, General Staff	22
Secretary, IS & PS	23-25
Spares	26-30

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AC [illegible]
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
G-5
PWB

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