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Public Relations Branch

Dec 1944 - Jan 1945

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File No. 1744

Public Relations Branch - North West Study Planning Committee
Dec 1944 - May 1945

SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
 APO 394
 Office of the Executive Commissioner

note
gb

Ref: 5201/207/23.

11 March 1945.

My Dear Regner:

Thank you for your letter of 2nd March, which I only received on 9th March, with the news about Major Gavronsky.

The first thing that strikes me is that it is somewhat extraordinary that an officer should be sent to Switzerland to make a report on the political conditions in Northern Italy without consultation or the knowledge of the Chief Commissioner, and secondly, that he should produce a report on 11th February which is sent to the Allied Commission, not as a matter of course, but incidentally, attached to a DC letter from you.

As you know, it is vital that the Allied Commission should receive prompt information about all matters affecting the political situation in Northern Italy. If officers of PWB are being sent to that area or to neighbouring countries, I would ask that the Commission be consulted with regard to any special information which we may wish to acquire and be given information on general and particular subjects as soon as it is available to PWB.

I will comment on Major Gavronsky's report in due course.

I am sending a copy of this correspondence to AFHQ.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Maurice Lush.

Mr. John Regner,
 Head, P.W.B.,
 15th Army Group,
 APO 512, US Army.

Copy to: G-5 AFHQ
 Pol Adv
 GA Sec
 PE Branch

With copy of previous
 correspondence

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COPY.COPY.COPY.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH, PWB
Unit No. 14 - APO 512.

2nd March, 1949.

Dear Brigadier:

Your letter of the 23rd of February about Major Gavronsky:

The position is this. He is a member of the PWB Combat team which is headquartered at Nice with an outpost at Grenoble. This team is known as PWB "F" Force, the code name being FIDEL, and is under the command of Lt. Colonel MacFarlane who was our staff officer at AAI.

The "F" Force combat team is operating on the same principle as our combat teams with the 5th and 8th Armies with the difference that dissemination of leaflets by air and artillery is very much less, and the gathering of intelligence and the infiltration of material is very much more.

Gavronsky was sent on a mission for the purpose of gathering intelligence material and he returned with a report which I think it will interest you to read and of which I attach a copy. I would be glad to know if you have any comments to make on this report. The question of his going back again for the same purpose is under consideration, but no decision has been made, though I think you will agree from looking at the report that there are opportunities for useful work by an officer with a full knowledge of political background and directives.

Gavronsky is a newcomer to PWB and I do not suppose that he has seen the directive you refer to. I will see to it that he does. MacFarlane of course has it.

I can set your mind at rest that he will not go back to the Committees "and tell them things".

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) John Rayner.

Brigadier Lush,
Allied Commission,
ROME.

COPY.COPY.COPY.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 504
Office of the Executive Commissioner

Ref: 3210/188/EC.23 February 1945.

My dear Rayner:

Mr. Gavronski lunched with me today and told me that he had been travelling on the outskirts of Northern Italy making contact with CLM's, presumably from a distance, and that he was returning thither on the same mission, that is to say, putting across to the Italians in Northern Italy Allied policy and propaganda, etc.

He spoke as if he had not seen the directive which was issued for the use of PWB officers and PIC's working with the Northern groups and as if he did not know any of the policy with regard to our future treatment of partisans. He ~~ask~~ also asked me if he could "go back and tell the Committee of National Liberation that the Allies would make use of them, etc. etc."

What is his position and what direction has he been given, and does that direction tally with the policy of the Commission and AHC? It struck me that he was groping a little bit in the dark with regard to policy, although extremely earnest to find out what that policy was and to transmit it to the people in the North.

(Signed) Maurice Lush.

Mr. John Rayner,
Head, P.W.B.,
15th Army Group,
APO 512, US Army.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

G-B/new

41/PRB

7 March 1945

SUBJECT: N. W. Italy Planning

TO : Mr. George Edman, Head
PWB (LIBERATED ITALY) HQ.

Dear George:

At our recent planning meeting for N. W. Italy it was suggested by several of the Regional Commissioners that it would be helpful to all concerned if PWB officials dealing with radio in forward areas would consult with the Regional Commissioners on the radio programs which are going into the region concerned.

I gathered from the discussion that some of the Regional Commissioners felt that there was not sufficient consultation with them on the programs broadcast in their regions.

You might like to discuss this with your radio people to get their point of view.

Yours,

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HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH

GSB/mew

41/PRB

2 March 45

SUBJECT: Progress Report - Item 2/1 Agenda of N.W. Italy Planning
Conference - March 3

TO : Executive Commissioner
(Through Lt. Col. D. Morley Fletcher)

1. Reference Minute 11a. Meeting 12 February:

A. PRO, 5th Army MAC is not in a position to present a definitive plan until PWB and AFHQ approve papers on press, radio and films already submitted by PWB section chiefs.

B. PRO, AC herewith submits as Tab A, B and C tentative plans for press, radio and films as prepared by PWB section chiefs which proposals are, however subject to the final PWB and AFHQ approval.

2. Reference Minute 14b: overall plan cannot be presented until PWB submits its final authorized plans. As regards newsprint arrangements, PRO understands AC plans to import 1,000 monthly until July 1 and thereafter 1,500 tons, of which approximately 300 tons monthly will be needed in liberated Italy. The amount required in N.W. Italy will depend on the number of newspapers authorized to publish under the Press plan.

G. STEWART BROWN
Director,
Public Relations Branch

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
INFORMATION AND CENSORSHIP SECTION
P.W.D. ITALIAN THEATRE HEADQUARTERS.

Radio Section
P.W.D. Unit No. 12
APO 512, U.S. Army

February 27, 1945.

TO : Mr. Stewart Brown, Public Relations Branch, A.C., Rome.
FROM : Chief, Radio Division, P.W.D.

As promised, I give below in brief PWB's proposals for radio in north Italy.

1. Existing broadcast transmitters are to be taken over, if intact, or replaced, if destroyed, in Bologna, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice, and Trieste.
2. These transmitters will be programmed by screened Italian staff under the supervision of PWB personnel.
3. Broadcasts will comprise news bulletins compiled from the PWB news file, commentaries, instructions issued by the competent military authority, feature programs, and entertainment.
4. Individually separate programs will be prepared in each town, but as soon as suitable lines become available, the more important programs will originate and be fed from a central station to the others.
5. Owing to the financial position of RAI and its consequent inability to maintain a large output when we withdraw, it is proposed to limit transmission hours in the north approximately 6 1/2 hours a day. The daily schedule will probably be 0700-0815, 1300-1415 and 1900-2300 A time daily, with perhaps additional hours on Sundays.

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(3rd)

TO : Mr. Stewart Brown, Public Relations Branch, A.C., Rome.
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(3/1)

IVOR N. THOMAS

TehC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum on operation of P.W.B. Film Section in
Northern Italy

Our Section already had plans to open branches when this will be possible in the following cities:

Bologna
Padova
Milan
Genoa
Turin
Trieste

Our Northern operation will have the same pattern followed up to now in liberated Italy and we will employ chiefly Italian film officers in the above cities. However, we have the following Allied personnel: Lt. P. Levi - Mr. S. Pallos - Lt. Peter Moore. Further, we have been promised the transfer to our section of another Allied officer.

Our main problem will be the insufficient number of prints, chiefly of American feature pictures, but Mr. Reginald Armour, Head of O.W.I. Film Section for Europe is on his way to the United States to try and obtain the required additional prints for the northern operations.

Our other major problem is transportation for the Film Section and when northern Italy will be liberated it is absolutely imperative that the Film Section obtain assignment of cars to make it possible to deliver the pictures to the various offices, and from these offices to the cinemas.

Outside of the above, there is no other impediment to the operation of P.W.B. Film Section in Northern Italy.

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ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT
CITY OF FLORENCE

February 26, 1945

To: Public Relations Office

Subject: Proposed Liaison with PWB in Northwest Italy.

- 1) The following report is entirely tentative, informally given by PWB, and is subject to approval by AFHQ, and subject to change. PWB has not as yet formulated definite projects, and the following is the result of a conversation with Mr. George Bookman, Deputy Chief Unit 14, and News Chief of 15th Army Group, PWB.
- 2) There will be Units of PWB in the following places in 5th Army Area of Northwest Italy: Milano, Genoa, Turino, Bologna. Each of these units will publish a newspaper, and have a radio station.
- 3) The plan is to allow recognized, bona fide ^{UNDERGROUND} newspapers to continue, and they will be encouraged to apply for a license within seven days of the Liberation of the community in which they are published. If they do not apply for a license, steps will be taken to either oblige them to do so or to suppress the publication. Application for a license should be made to the Army Commander on recommendation of PWB. A temporary license will be issued, subject to confirmation by APB.
- 4) Fascist newspapers will be instantly suppressed.
- 5) There is no stockpile of newsprint available to PWB here. They are depending on Mr. White of AC to provide them with paper.

Rock Ferris
Rock Ferris
Public Relations
AMG 5th Army

T-O-P

1. The following information is being furnished to you for your information only and is not to be distributed outside your agency.

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When this information is furnished to you, it is for your information only and is not to be distributed outside your agency.

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[illegible]

2. Since the 1960s, the role of the State in the economy has been greatly reduced. The State has been largely responsible for the development of the economy, but in the 1960s, the State began to withdraw from the economy. This was done in order to reduce the size of the government and to encourage private enterprise. The State has been largely responsible for the development of the economy, but in the 1960s, the State began to withdraw from the economy. This was done in order to reduce the size of the government and to encourage private enterprise.

The following information is being furnished to you for your information and guidance. It is requested that you advise the Bureau of any changes in the information furnished herein.

[illegible][illegible]

1. The first of these is the fact that the United States has a long and distinguished record of leadership in the field of human rights. This record is reflected in the many treaties and declarations which the United States has sponsored or signed, and in the many actions which it has taken to promote and protect human rights throughout the world.

2. The second of these is the fact that the United States has a strong and growing interest in the promotion and protection of human rights. This interest is reflected in the many resources which the United States has devoted to the study and promotion of human rights, and in the many actions which it has taken to promote and protect human rights throughout the world.

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5. The fifth of these is the fact that the United States has a strong and growing interest in the promotion and protection of human rights. This interest is reflected in the many resources which the United States has devoted to the study and promotion of human rights, and in the many actions which it has taken to promote and protect human rights throughout the world.

7. It will be no on that under point 4 of the military agreement that the...
 undertake to encourage allied military operations, which is in accordance with the
 with view to that agreement, all necessary and possible of local government provisionally
 issued. They also undertake that military operations dependent upon them should
 demand and resources that will be used upon to be so by the...
 situation. In doing so, therefore, with any other which may be used in freely like
 armed countries to the local conditions of national liberation to ensure position
 of resistance or to maintain any position of military which their mission may have
 assumed, or the refusal of political power to the...
 may be used and of by allied military operations...
 be used in defense. In particular no reference should be made...
 case of emergency which are being planned to the...
 formation of national liberation...
 with control of the...
 but which will be... by the... government.

8. Finally, National Government should be aware of the implications of the
 establishment of a military for...
 areas...
 the activities of the forces of resistance in the...
 to the allied...
 be modified...
 finally approved will be sent to... in the future.

of Government for its position in any position of authority which, under the law, may have authority, or the refusal of power to exercise its authority, the above agreement may be used as a full use of by Allied Military Government authorities and it could not be used in any other. In particular no reference should be made whatsoever to the issue of money which are being placed in the disposal of the Government. For the formation of regional commissions only, this money is being provided by the Allied Military Government, with control of its use remaining in the hands of the Allied Military Government, and which will be administered by the Italian Government.

6. Finally, regional commissions should be aware of the implications of the establishment of a Ministry for Local Italy under direct administration. Draft decrees outlining the formation of this Ministry in which forwarding power is over the activities of the former of commissions in the North are already in the process of the Allied Commission and in at present under examination. It will undoubtedly be modified substantially before approval can be given. A copy of the decree as finally approved will be sent to regional commissions in due course.

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SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS AUTHORIZED BY THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION ON THE BASIS OF THE DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE OF THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION.

1. The Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) will continue to exist as a sovereign state and will continue to be a member of the United Nations. The Republic will continue to be a member of the United Nations and will continue to be a member of the United Nations.

2. During the period of emergency, the Republic will continue to exist as a sovereign state and will continue to be a member of the United Nations. The Republic will continue to be a member of the United Nations and will continue to be a member of the United Nations.

3. The military and of the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the Republic) will continue to exist as a sovereign state and will continue to be a member of the United Nations. The Republic will continue to be a member of the United Nations and will continue to be a member of the United Nations.

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2. During the period of army occupation, the military administration will be given the right to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers and to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers. The military administration will be given the right to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers and to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers.

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ARMY	20
NAVY	20
AIR FORCE	25
COAST GUARD	20
ARMED FORCES	35

The above are and all other military and police officers will be given the right to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers.

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7. The military administration will be given the right to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers and to appoint and dismiss all military and police officers.

orders issued by the Government, 1944, under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and transmitted through the various commands will be carried out by G.I.s, the General issued of the 'Liberation of Liberty and their consequences.

REMARKS: ALLIED COMMANDERS
REMARKS: ALLIED COMMANDERS

(Signed) W. Laidlaw Wilson,
General.

FOR THE COMMANDER OF BRITISH
ARMY IN NORTH AFRICA

(Signed) Major General.

Major

Major

Major

(Signed) Dr. William Wilson,
Director

(Signed) Walter Wright

Director

John

W. Wright

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FOR THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL
LABORATORY AND RESEARCH

TOP SECRET(CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
(BY AUTHORITY OF ORINT
(COMMISSIONER, AG.TRANSLATIONMINISTRY
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Rome.

December 1944.

The Italian Government recognises the Committee of National Liberation for Northern Italy (C.L.N.A.I.) as the organ of the anti-Fascist parties in the territory occupied by the enemy.

The Italian Government designates the C.L.N.A.I. as its representative in the struggle that the patriots have undertaken against the Fascists and Germans in that part of Italy not yet liberated.

The C.L.N.A.I. agrees to act towards this end as the delegate of the Italian Government which is recognised by the Allied Governments as the successor of the government which signed the Armistice Terms and is the sole legitimate authority in that part of Italy which has already been or will later on be restored to the Italian Government by the Allied Military Government.

THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

(signed) Ivanoe Bonomi

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR NORTH ITALY

(signed) Mare

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TOP SECRET

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OFFICIALS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

The Italian Government has received the following information from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

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Statement made by Mr. Winston Churchill
at the Conference on the 8th, 1945

In his ~~speech~~ speech of January 13th, 1945, the British Prime Minister referred to the "great populous districts of the North, the cities of Turin, Milan and other centres of industry and activity" and the large population of all kinds of political views including "great numbers of vehement or violent politicians". He foresaw an unhappy state of affairs when - probably at a time when the Northern Regions would be stripped bare of food by the retreating German - these elements would be thrown upon the "fragile structure of the Italian Government in Rome with consequences which could not be accurately foreseen and certainly not measured".

2. The experience of Greece has shown that the existence of organised groups of politically conscious patriots is a factor with which to reckon seriously. I do not think that I exaggerate in suggesting that during the last year forces have been coordinated in the North of Italy which after liberation will present a problem very different from any which the Allied Commission has had to handle in the past in connection with patriots.

3. Intelligence reports from the North show that the various Committees of National Liberation and the military commands operating under the orders of the Committees have learnt a good deal about the art of government in the year-long struggle against the Fascists and the Germans. In many districts "shadow" Governments have been set up and the various portfolios have been distributed amongst the leaders of the different parties. In most cases the Committees represent the six parties which, up till last December, were represented in the Government in Rome. In some of the

Committees however the Action party is not represented and in ¹⁹⁴⁵ 1946 the Republican party forms part of the Committee. On the whole it

an unhappy state of affairs when - probably at a time when the Northern regions would be stripped bare of food by the retreating Germans - these elements would be thrown upon the "fragile structure" of the Italian Government in Rome with consequences which could not be accurately foreseen and certainly not measured".

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Committees however the Action party is not represented and in ⁴²³⁶ the Republican party forms part of the Committee. On the whole it seems that for the time-being there is a remarkable degree of unity of purpose in the Committees and party differences have been sunk in the common desire to chase the Germans from Italy and punish their Fascist collaborators. These Committees are, as you are aware, assisted in their operations by the Allied Authorities and the giving of such assistance has necessarily implied recognition of the

/value

make known to Supreme Allied Commander and the CINCPAC in December last, value of these operations. ^{As you know, arrangements were} ~~the arrangements between the~~

defining the extent to which the Allied military authorities are prepared to recognize the Committee.

4. ~~Under the arrangements, it has been agreed that~~ ^{Under the arrangements, it has been agreed that}

When the enemy withdraws from territory occupied by them the CINCPAC will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, the CINCPAC will recognize Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, ^{1st Army Group} ~~the~~, acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government issued on his behalf, including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so.

5. The attitude of the Allied military authorities is therefore made quite clear. But there are other considerations which should be borne in mind when we come to implement the policy ^{which} ~~in the arrangements~~ ^{in the arrangements} ~~in the arrangements~~ which I have just mentioned. It is in the interest of the Allies that there should be a stable Government in Italy and it is our policy to strengthen the legitimate Italian Government in every way possible and to prevent developments which would result in political disturbances throughout the country. We have every reason to believe that the Italian Govern-

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the CLMFI will exercise its best endeavours to maintain law and order and to continue the safeguarding of the economic resources of the country until such time as Allied Military Government is established. Immediately upon the establishment of Allied Military Government, the CLMFI will recognise Allied Military Government and will hand over to that Government all authority and powers of local government and administration previously assumed. As the enemy withdraws all components of the General Command of the Volunteers of Liberty in liberated territory will come under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief, ^{15th Army Group} acting under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander and will obey any order issued by him or by Allied Military Government issued on his behalf, including such orders to disarm and surrender their arms when required to do so.

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made quite clear. But there are other considerations which ^{inclusion} should be borne in mind when we come to implement the policy ^{in the arrangements} ~~set in the military agreement~~ which I have just mentioned. It is

in the interest of the Allies that there should be stable Govern-4235
ment in Italy and it is our policy to strengthen the legitimate Italian Government in every way possible and to prevent developments which would result in political disturbances throughout the country. We have every reason to believe that the Italian Government in Rome, which, as I have said, it is our policy to support, may not have the entire confidence of the Committees of Liberation in the North, or at any rate that their influence there is subject to fluctuation according to developments in liberated Italy -- as for example the present Roatta incident. The reasons for this are varied. There is, to begin with, the traditional scorn of the North

/Italian

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Italian for the Southerner. There is the feeling that the population in the North has contributed more generously to the defeat of the Germans than the South has been able to do and has suffered far more heavily at their hands. There is criticism of the slow progress made by the Bonomi Government in the reconstruction of the country, in the solution of the pressing economic problems of food supply and inflation and above all in the punishment of former Fascists. The

Italian Government are well aware of this antipathy and in an agreement signed *at the time when the emergency, I have mentioned, was made* ~~in connection with the military one already mentioned~~

they go much further than the Supreme Allied Commander in recognising the OIMAT as their representatives in the struggle in the North.

They have succeeded by this agreement in exacting a certain measure of recognition of their own legality by the Committees in the North but the possibility cannot be overlooked that the Committees of Liberation or the component political parties will not abide by this agreement if circumstances seem favourable for a political upheaval which would either bring the Committees out as the Government of Italy or would wrest from the Government in Rome a measure of autonomy which might be in effect complete independence from Rome. The

Italian Government are therefore anxious to establish as much contact as possible with the Committees in the North in order to be able to explain to them what is being accomplished in liberated Italy and what the Government propose to do in the North when the Germans have been driven out. The Allied Governments are generally in favour of the establishment of such contacts and hope that after liberation the

Rome Government will be able to absorb representatives from the North and thereby become ^{more} representative and therefore stronger.

6. The problem facing the Allied Commission therefore is as follows:

we must endeavour on the liberation of the North to reconcile

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inflation and above all in the power of the Italian Government are well aware of this antipathy and in an agreement signed ~~at the time when the engagements [have not been made]~~ ^{at the time when the engagements [have not been made]} ~~with the military~~ ^{one already mentioned} they go much further than the Supreme Allied Commander in recommending the C.I.A.M. as their representatives in the struggle in the North. They have succeeded by this agreement in exacting a certain measure of recognition of their own legality by the Committees in the North but the possibility cannot be overlooked that the Committees of liberation or the component political parties will not abide by this agreement if circumstances seem favourable for a political upheaval which would either bring the Committee out as the Government of Italy or would wrest from the Government in Rome a measure of autonomy which might be in effect complete independence from Rome. The Italian Government are therefore anxious to establish as much contact as possible with the Committees in the North in order to be able to explain to them what is being accomplished in liberated Italy and what the Government propose to do in the North when the Germans have been driven out. The Allied Governments are generally in favour of the establishment of such contacts and hope that after liberation the Rome Government will be able to absorb representatives from the North and thereby become ^{more} representative and therefore stronger.

6. The problem facing the Allied Commission therefore is as follows.

we much endeavour on the liberation of the North to reconcile the needs of military Government with the aspirations of the political leaders of the Committees of liberation to self-government. At the same time, we must bolster up the authority of the Italian Government in Rome in order that they may be able to administer the Northern territories once Allied military Government is withdrawn. The solution of this problem may well be found to lie in the absorption at a very early date of members of the local Committees of National liberation into

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the civil administration operating under Allied Military Government. If Regional Commissioners arrive in the North and bluntly inform the Committees of National Liberation that their task is accomplished and that they may now disperse and if, after that, prefects, mayors and other administrative officers are imported from the South or even from other localities in the North, the disappointment, the antagonism, I might even say, of the Committees of Liberation will be great. I cannot emphasize too much the danger of setting up local administrations composed of Italians who are not acceptable to the patriot organizations who have been struggling against the Germans for so long. I do not wish to imply that every local Committee of National Liberation should automatically be confirmed as the local administration, but I do urge that Regional Commissioners should, wherever possible, decide to make appointments in favour of the members of the Committees rather than in favour of strangers from other parts of Italy. If the local Committees of Liberation are installed at once as the local administration, many of the problems of maintaining law and order will never arise. It will be easier to collect arms from the patriots and to disband them. It will be easier to exploit the local resources of the country in the work of reconstruction and the work of feeding the population. It will be easier to bring together the former patriot organizations and the Italian Government and it will be easier to prepare the ground against the time when the Government in Rome will take over the administration of the North.

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7. I realise that the lack of precise information about personalities in the North due to the clandestine nature of their activities in recent months will make it difficult for Regional Commissioners to assess the relative claims of members of the Committees of Liberation to participate in local Government. In order in some measure to offset

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7. I realize that the lack of precise information about personalities in the North due to the clandestine nature of their activities in recent months will make it difficult for Regional Commissioners to assess the relative claims of members of the Committees of Liberation to participate in local Government. In order in some measure to offset this disability, I hope to be able to compile in the next weeks a sort of "who's who" which might prove useful to Regional Commissioners in the task of selection. It would assist us in this work of compilation if I could learn from this meeting whether the views I have put forward are generally acceptable and if so to what extent, that is, in what grades of the civil administration the Allied Military Government authorities would be prepared to absorb members of the Committees of Liberation in the North.

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