

ACC

10000 | 132 / 68

226

41

Military Miss
Nov. 1943. Nov

10000 | 132 | 68

226

41

Military Missions

Nov. 1943. Nov. 1944

Message to Maj. Stewart from Col. Ingledew:

"MMIA sent signal to AFHQ agreeing that mission to Yugoslavia should not be sent. We have note in file that Political Section has been advised."

2512

6 Mar 45
HLD

SECRET

C/1589

AMHQ CITE FMGCT INFO AC

85/22

MMAIA

0.621

IMPORTANT

NOV 211930

SECRET.

Further to AC letter A/CC 091.711 of 7 November subject Italian forces in YUGOSLAVIA your P 81845 of 11 August refers.

1. Ministry of War request authority for despatch of Italian Mission to Marshal TITO's HQ composed as follows. Col MORO VITTORIO. T/Col FISICARO SALVATORE. S/T AUDIO MARCO. S/T GASCA-QUEIKAZZA FEDERICO. Caporale TICANI AUGUSTO. Geniere BRAUDANO LUIGI.
2. Authority is requested for the despatch of this mission

2511

DIST

INFO-ACTION S.O. to C.C (2)
INFO CoS
FILE

copy to Pol Sec.

SECRET

NOV 221605

SECRET

W5
KES/dfc
HHA

A/CC 091.711

7 November 1944

Subject: Proposals for Alleviating the Situation of Italian Forces in Yugoslavia

To: Allied Force Headquarters, AFHQ 512

Reference is made to memorandum, this HQ, dated 17 September 1944, reference A/CC 091.711, which was in compliance with your signal F-82845 of 11 August. It will be appreciated if an early reply can be given to this memorandum in order that details of the Italian Army mission to Yugoslavia, when approved, may be finalized as soon as possible.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

J. A. Quayle

J. A. QUAYLE
Major, R. A.
Staff Officer to A/CC

cc: Land Forces Sub-Commission (LSCIA)
Political Section

2510

SECRET

EWS/ajp

A/CC 091.711

18 September 1944

Dear Dr. Prunas:

With reference to your letter 01/71/3 of 12 September 1944, I am glad to be able to inform you that considerable advance has been made on this subject.

The Ministry for War has been asked to put forward detailed proposals for an Italian mission to Marshal Tito's Headquarters. These have been received and are now under consideration by the Allied Military Authorities. I hope and believe that they will shortly be put into effect.

I suggest, so as to avoid duplication, that the arrangement continue to be made as heretofore through the Ministry for War, who will undoubtedly supply to Your Excellency such correspondence as has already passed on this matter.

ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

His Excellency don Renato Prunas,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Italian Government,
Rome.

2509

c.c. Political Section. ✓

50 246

NO 460	5007
DISP	
Date: 19 Sept 1944	115
Via	10122

TOP SECRET

File

HC
WS

BMS/hjp

A/CC 691.711

17 September 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Allied Force Headquarters, AFQ 512

1. As directed in your signal P-82845 of the 11th August detailed proposals for alleviating the situation of the Italian forces in Yugoslavia have been obtained from the Italian High Command, and these are attached.

2. It will be seen that the principal proposal put forward is that a small Italian mission should be sent, under a colonel, to Marshal Tito's headquarters to arrange for the evacuation, when possible, of Italian forces. From the point of view of the A.C.C. we would support this proposal and Major General Browning, whom I have consulted, has pointed out in particular that large areas in the Balkans may very shortly be freed by the junction of Russian forces with those of Marshal Tito. In this event we would recommend that the whole of the Italian forces in Yugoslavia and in Greece should be evacuated immediately to Italy so as to:

a. Prevent their getting mixed up in any civil war in those localities.

b. Save those unfortunate people (though they never should have been there) from death by starvation or exposure, on the grounds of common humanity.

c. Give an Allied gesture of goodwill after a period when we have been unable to do much to help alleviate the state of affairs there.

3. As regards the terms of reference proposed for the Italian mission to Tito in paragraph 3, we consider that they are in the main unobjectionable, but that it should be made clear that the mission has no competence to deal with any matters outside those specified. 2508

4. As to other proposals contained in paragraphs 2 and 5 concerning supplies considered to be necessary for these forces while they remain in the Balkans, General Browning states that no clothing whatsoever can be supplied from the resources available to MMIA or the Italian Ministry of War.

5. As to paragraph 4, while we concur that the effort of these Italian troops should be considered as cooperation with Allied troops,

TOP SECRET

they cannot, of course, be regarded as part of the Italian Army authorised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Immediately on their return to Italy they will therefore have to be demobilised and treated as if they had no military status.

ELERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

cc: MMIA
Political Section

2563

5月25日

118 Sept 8 1895
H.H.
R.R.

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Office of the Acting Chief Commissioner
APO 394

WIS/ajp

A/CS 091.711

13 September 1944

Thil Yungin
Subject: Italian Troops in the Balkans

To : Political Section

Don attach
1. Attached are the detailed proposals asked for by AFHQ (their signal F 82845 of 11 Aug 44), which have now been obtained by MMIA from the Ministry for War.

2. Attached also are General Browning's recommendations in the event of an early liberation of the Balkans.

3. Before despatching the Italian proposals to AFHQ, please prepare a covering letter for my signature embodying your own suggestions in the light of enclosures 1 and 2 above.

W
Stone.

2566

226

I attach a draft: but suggest that it should be

2 Incls:
as in para 1 & 2 above.

Shown to Gen Browning before despatch.

Pol. Sec. are not competent to deal with

SECRET paragraphs 2, 4 & 5. *Aug 16/44*

SUBJECT: Italian troops in the BALKANS.

SECRET

Army Sub Commission, MILA.
H.Q., A.C.C.

ROME

T.E./G/31
9 Sept 44.

H.Q., A.C.C.

Ref Your A/CC 091.711 dated 28 Aug and in continuation of
my T.E./G/31 of same date: -

1. Herewith translation of the proposals of H of W on the above matter.
2. Doubtless you will show to Political Section before forwarding to A.F.H.Q.
3. It seems that shortly the whole of the BALKANS should be freed by the junction of the RUSSIAN and Marshal TITO's forces.
4. In this event, I would recommend that the whole of the Italian forces in the BALKANS and GREECE be evacuated immediately to ITALY so as to: -

- (a) Prevent their getting mixed up on any Civil war in those localities.
- (b) Give an Allied gesture of good-will after a period when we have been unable to do much to help alleviate the state of affairs there.
- (c) Save these unfortunate people (though they never should have been there) from death by starvation or exposure, on the grounds of common humanity.

The effort would not be unduly great and the moral effect on the Italians would be considerable.

tvs.LB
2.C.

/s/ L. Prowling
Major General
Army Sub Comm, A.C.C.

2505

226

226

my T.S./G/31 of same date: -

1. Herewith translation of the proposals of M of P on the above matter.
2. Doubtless you will show to Political Section before forwarding to A.T.F.C.
3. It seems that shortly the whole of the BALKANS should be freed by the junction of the RUSSIAN and Marshal TITO's forces.
4. In this event, I would recommend that the whole of the Italian forces in the BALKANS and GREECE be evacuated immediately to ITALY so as to :-
 - (a) Prevent their getting mixed up on any Civil war in those localities.
 - (b) Give an Allied gesture of good-will after a period when we have been unable to do much to help alleviate the state of affairs there.
 - (c) Save these unfortunate people (though they never should have been there) from death by starvation or exposure, on the grounds of common humanity.

The effort would not be unduly great and the moral effect on the Italians would be considerable.

tvs.LB
2.2.

/s/ L. Browning
Major General
Army Sub Com, A.C.C.

2505

(COPY)

MINISTRY OF WAR

TS/G/31

To: RADA

Subject: Italian Armed Forces in the Balkans

In reply to your letter ref TS/G/31 dated 29 Aug 44 I beg to inform you that: -

1. The Italian Armed Forces in Yugoslavia come under two categories.

(a) "Garibaldi" Division, whose original strength has been reduced, under the command of its own Italian officers and which has been fighting since 6 Sept 43 with Tito's partisans against German Units and against local populace supporting them.

(b) Scattered Units which, at the time of the Armistice did not surrender to the Germans.

In order to ease the situation of the above mentioned forces the first essential is to provide for their repatriation, giving priority to those mentioned in sub para (b) - that is to say scattered and abandoned units.

Actually, the progressive repatriation of the forces mentioned at sub para (b) could be carried out chiefly with airplanes from emergency landing strips at the disposal of Tito's troops in the Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina areas and eventually in Serbia; or, for those units which are located in the vicinity of the coast, repatriation by sea in ships which will eventually make for ports along the Dalmatian Coast.

The troops of the Garibaldi Division, owing to their actual position, can be repatriated only by air. But the emergency landing strips available in Montenegro (particularly Berane and Negobugia) are not available because they have been occupied by the Germans during the last offensive in Montenegro.

As soon as the above mentioned landing strips will be once more controlled by Tito's partisans and by the "Garibaldi" Division repatriation will be carried out according to the means available giving priority to the wounded and the sick.

Should however the trend of operations, by a withdrawal or annihilation of the German Forces in the Balkans lead to the opening up of routes leading to the coast, it would be necessary to ensure an early repatriation of the bulk of the men who would be concentrated along the coast. 2504

2. While the scattered units or operating units remain in the Balkans, in order to ease their situation, it is necessary to carry on and intensify the supplies of food, clothing, medical stores, arms and ammunition by air as is actually being done by special forces of the Supreme

(b) Scattered units which, at the time of the Armistice did not surrender to the Germans.

In order to ease the situation of the above mentioned forces the first essential is to provide for their repatriation, giving priority to those mentioned in sub para (b) - that is to say scattered and abandoned units.

Actually, the progressive repatriation of the forces mentioned at sub para (b) could be carried out chiefly with airplanes from emergency landing strips at the disposal of Tito's troops in the Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina areas and eventually in Serbia; or, for those units which are located in the vicinity of the coast, repatriation by sea in ships which will eventually make for ports along the Dalmatian Coast.

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2. While the scattered units or operating units remain in the Balkans, in order to ease their situation, it is necessary to carry on and intensify the supplies of food, clothing, medical stores, arms and ammunition by air as is actually being done by special forces of the Supreme Allied Command.

Amongst these supplies, boots and uniforms are of particular importance. As is known, this Ministry has no supply of boots which can be sent to Yugo-Slavia for the Italian Armed Forces dispersed there, and for this reason it is for the Allies to decide the degree of assistance to be given to Italian troops in order to enable them to carry on operations. Regarding uniforms, we suggest, subject MHA approval, sending uniforms in worst condition which could not be issued to the Italian troops in the mainland and the islands.

MHA is also sufficiently familiar with the ration and food situation in Italy to understand that the Ministry has to rely entirely on the initiative taken by the Supreme Allied authorities for the Italian troops fighting in the Balkans.

- 2 -

In order to:-

- (a) settle the questions concerning the gradual repatriation of the scattered military personnel and those belonging to the "Garibaldi" Division
- (b) assemble and forward the scattered military to the emergency landing strips or to the coast at the right time.
- (c) acquaint MIA with the supply requirements for the Italian Forces and control the supply and issue of items which will eventually be sent.

This Ministry agrees with the Allied authorities that it is vitally important to attach a small Italian Mission to Marshal Tito's GHC.

The Head of this Mission, as requested by MIA, would be a Colonel who is fully in the picture as regards the local situation as he had been formerly attached to the "Garibaldi" Division and could therefore carry out good liaison with Marshal Tito's HQ (Strength of Mission 4 - 5 all ranks).

This Ministry will form a small mission which will be sent over to Marshal Tito's HQ when the Allied Authorities give authorization and arrange transport.

This Ministry fully understands the matter contained in para (3) of your letter under reference, that is that MIA does not consider the "Garibaldi" Division as a part of the Italian Army officially authorized by the Allies. This Ministry wishes to point out that the "Garibaldi" Division is the old Italian Regular Division "Venezia" which was a part of the old Italian Army and which, at the time of the Armistice, obeyed the orders issued by H. E. Badoglio, at that time Head of the Government, joined Tito's partisans with all its units to fight the common German enemy and was given a new name on being reinforced with units of another regular Division of the old Italian Army - the "Taurinense" Division - which had already fought the common enemy. Operations have not been carried out by single units but by a higher formation which can be compared with the other higher formations in the mainland.

Therefore the activities of the "Garibaldi" Division in the Balkans in favour of the Allied cause are to be considered as part and parcel of the operation of Italian Units on the mainland alongside Allied Units.

The above is stated in order that the Allies may give it special consideration, so that, while in the Balkans the Division may receive regular supplies, and its effort and sacrifice may be considered as co-operation of Italians with Allied troops.

5. Lastly, regarding Italian soldiers who are in Greece, be they in formed bodies and under the control of a British Mission, be they scattered in Greece and particularly in Thessaly, verbal agree-

2103

been formerly attached to the 1st Italian Division (Strength of Mission to carry out good liaison with Marshal Tito's HQ (Strength of Mission ranks)).

This Ministry will form a small mission which will be sent over to Marshal Tito's HQ when the Allied Authorities give authorization and arrange transport.

This Ministry fully understands the matter contained in para 4 of your letter under reference, that is that MIA does not consider the "Garibaldi" Division as a part of the Italian Army officially authorized by the Allies. This Ministry wishes to point out that the "Garibaldi" Division is the old Italian Regular Division "Venezia" which was a part of the old Italian Army and which, at the time of the Armistice, obeyed the orders issued by K. E. Badoglio, at that time head of the Government, joined Tito's partisans with all its units to fight the common German enemy and was given a new name on being reinforced with units of another regular Division of the old Italian Army - the "Fiumanense" Division - which had already fought the common enemy. Operations have not been carried out by single units but by a higher formation which can be compared with the other higher formations in the mainland.

Therefore the activities of the "Garibaldi" Division in the Balkans in favour of the Allied cause are to be considered as part and parcel of the operation of Italian Units on the mainland alongside Allied Units.

The above is stated in order that the Allies may give it special consideration, so that, while in the Balkans the Division may receive regular supplies, and its effort and sacrifice may be considered as co-operation of Italians with Allied troops.

2103
Lastly, regarding Italian soldiers who are in Greece, he they sent in formed bodies and under the control of a British Mission, he they agreed in other parts of Greece and particularly in Thessaly, verbal agreement has already been reached with Major Norral in the presence of Major Baumann, MIA. Briefly Major Norral has put forward a proposal for this Ministry to send monthly to the Italian troops a maximum of 2 tons of mail, newspapers and magazines, clothing and material for the welfare of the troops.

With regard to clothing sub para 2 should be borne in mind -- that is, only clothing in bad repair and not serviceable for Italian troops on the mainland would be sent.

I would be grateful to MIA if approval could be granted to the proposals as set out in this letter, and as soon as possible authority for the despatch of the Mission to Marshal Tito's HQ to establish the necessary contacts for implementing of the contents of this letter.

THE MINISTER
CABATI

(COPY)

MINISTRY OF WAR

TOP SECRET

To: MIA

Ref. No. 455/OX of 3 Sept 44

Subject: Italian Armed Forces in the Balkans

In reply to your letter ref TS/Q/31 dated 29 Aug 44, I beg to inform you that:-

1. The Italian Armed Forces in Yugoslavia come under two categories.

(a) "Garibaldi" Division, whose original strength has been reduced, under the command of its own Italian officers and which has been fighting since 8 Sept 43 with Tito's partisans against German units and against local populace supporting them.

(b) Scattered units which, at the time of the Armistice did not surrender to the Germans.

In order to ease the situation of the above mentioned forces the first essential is to provide for their repatriation, giving priority to those mentioned in sub para (b) - that is to say scattered and abandoned units.

Actually, the progressive repatriation of the forces mentioned at sub para (b) could be carried out chiefly with airplanes from emergency landing strips at the disposal of Tito's troops in the Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina areas and eventually in Serbia; or, for those units which are located in the vicinity of the coast, repatriation by sea in ships which will eventually make for ports along the Dalmatian Coast.

The troops of the Garibaldi Division, owing to their actual position, can be repatriated only by air. But the emergency landing strips available in Montenegro (particularly Herane and Megobugia) are not available because they have been occupied by the Germans during the last offensive in Montenegro.

As soon as the above mentioned landing strips will be once more controlled by Tito's partisans and by the "Garibaldi" Division repatriation will be carried out according to the means available giving priority to the wounded and the sick.

Should however the trend of operations, by a withdrawal of annihilation of the German Forces in the Balkans lead to the opening up of routes leading to the coast, it would be necessary to ensure an early repatriation of the bulk of the men who would be concentrated along the coast.

2502

2. While the scattered units or operating units remain in the Balkans, in order to ease their situation, it is necessary to carry on and intensify the supplies of food, clothing, medical stores, arms and ammunition by air as is actually being done by special forces of the Supreme Allied Command.

Amongst these supplies, boots and uniforms are of particular importance. As is known, this Ministry has no supply of boots which can be sent to Yugoslavia for the Italian Armed Forces dispersed there, and for this reason it is for the Allies to decide the degree of assistance to be given to Italian troops in order to enable them to carry on operations. Regarding uniforms, we suggest, subject MIA approval, sending uniforms in worst condition which

(b) Scattered units which, at the time of the Mistice did not surrender to the Germans.

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MIA is also sufficiently familiar with the ration and food situation in Italy to understand that the Ministry has to rely entirely on the initiative taken by the Supreme Allied authorities for the Italian troops fighting in the Balkans.

3. In order to:-

- (a) settle the questions concerning the gradual repatriation of the scattered military personnel and those belonging to the Garibaldi Division.
- (b) assemble and forward the scattered military to the emergency landing strips or to the coast at the right time.
- (c) acquaint MIA with the supply requirements for the Italian Forces and control the supply and issue of items which will eventually be sent

TOP SECRET

this Ministry agrees with the Allied authorities that it is vitally important to attach a small Italian Mission to Marshal Tito's HQ.

The Head of this Mission, as requested by MIA, would be a Colonel who is fully in the picture as regards the local situation as he had been formerly attached to the "Garibaldi" Division and could therefore carry out good liaison with Marshal Tito's HQ. (Strength of Mission 4 - 5 all ranks).

This Ministry will form a small mission which will be sent over to Marshal Tito's HQ when the Allied Authorities give authorization and arrange transport.

4. This Ministry fully understands the matter contained in para (5) of your letter under reference, that is that MIA does not consider the "Garibaldi" Division as a part of the Italian Army officially authorized by the Allies. This Ministry wishes to point out that the "Garibaldi" Division is the old Italian Regular Division "Venetia" which was a part of the old Italian Army and which, at the time of the Armistice, obeyed the orders issued by H.E. Badoglio, at that time Head of the Government, joined Tito's partisans with all its units to fight the common German enemy and was given a new name on being reinforced with units of another regular Division of the old Italian Army - the "Taurinense" Division - which had already fought the common enemy. Operations have not been carried out by single units but by a higher formation which can be compared with the other higher formations in the mainland.

Therefore the activities of the "Garibaldi" Division in the Balkans in favour of the Allied cause are to be considered as part and parcel of the operation of Italian Units on the mainland alongside Allied Units.

The above is stated in order that the Allies may give it special consideration, so that, while in the Balkans the Division may receive regular supplies, and its effort and sacrifice may be considered as co-operation of Italians with Allied troops.

5. Lastly, regarding Italian soldiers who are in Greece, be they in formed bodies and under the control of a British Mission, be they scattered in other parts of Greece and particularly in Thessaly, verbal agreement has already been reached with Major Werrall in the presence of Major Baumann, MIA. Briefly Major Werrall has put forward a proposal for this Ministry to send monthly to the Italian troops a maximum of 2 tons of mail, newspapers and magazines, clothing and material for the welfare of the troops.

With regard to clothing sub para 2 should be borne in mind -- that is, only clothing in bad repair and not serviceable for Italian troops on the mainland would be sent.

I would be grateful to MIA if approval could be granted to the proposals as set out in this letter, and as soon as possible authority for the despatch of the Mission to Marshal Tito's HQ to establish the necessary contacts for implementing of the contents of this letter.

THE MINISTER
CASATI

301

Ministry wishes to point out that the "Garibaldi" Division is the old Italian Regular Division "Venetia" which was a part of the old Italian Army and which, at the time of the Armistice, obeyed the orders issued by H.E. Badoglio, at that time Head of the Government, joined Tito's partisans with all its units to fight the common German enemy and was given a new name on being reinforced with units of another regular Division of the old Italian Army - the "Taurinense" Division - which had already fought the common enemy. Operations have not been carried out by single units but by a higher formation which can be compared with the other higher formations in the mainland.

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The above is stated in order that the Allies may give it special consideration, so that, while in the Balkans the Division may receive regular supplies, and its effort and sacrifice may be considered as co-operation of Italians with Allied troops.

5. Lastly, regarding Italian soldiers who are in Greece, be they in formed bodies and under the control of a British Mission, be they scattered in other parts of Greece and particularly in Thessaly, verbal agreement has already been reached with Major Werrall in the presence of Major Lammun, MIA. Briefly Major Werrall has put forward a proposal for this Ministry to send monthly ^{the} 501 Italian troops a maximum of 2 tons of mail, newspapers and magazines, clothing and material for the welfare of the troops.

With regard to clothing sub para 2 should be borne in mind -- that is, only clothing in bad repair and not serviceable for Italian troops on the mainland would be sent.

I would be grateful to MIA if approval could be granted to the proposals as set out in this letter, and as soon as possible authority for the despatch of the Mission to Marshal Tito's HQ to establish the necessary contacts for implementing of the contents of this letter.

THE MINISTER
CASATI

TOP SECRET

Political Section

Copy of inclosure to
Memorandum to AFHQ
dated 17 Sep 44, ref A/CC 091.711,
TOP SECRET, You received
copy of Memo, less inclosure 2500

1/3 Elmiston
Secy Gen Office

SUBJECT:- Italian Forces in the Balkans

Army Sub Commission (MMA)
H.Q. A.C.C.
R O M E.

TS/c/31
29 Aug 44

Minister of War

1. I have been requested by HQ A.C.C. to ask you to put forward detailed proposals for alleviating the situation of the Italian forces in YUGOSLAVIA.
2. The Allied Authorities might be prepared to sanction a small temporary Italian Mission of investigation to Marshal TITO's HQ, provided this Mission was headed by an officer of (say) not above the rank of Colonel.
3. It is to be clearly understood that this letter involves no departure in the attitude of MMA towards those Italian forces. The latter are considered as civilians as far as MMA is concerned. They do not form part of the official Italian Army authorised by the Allies and any action which may be taken in connection with them will therefore be on a civilian basis.
4. In view of my remarks in para 3 you may wish to consult other Ministries of the Italian Government and Comando Supremo before forwarding your proposals.

ABC

d. Browning

Major General
Army Sub Commission ACC
M M I A

243326

Copy to:- HQ A.C.C. (ref A/CC 091.711 dated 28 Aug)
Political Section A.C.C.

TOS

SUBJECT: Italian Troops in the Balkans.Army Sub Commission, MMIA.
H.Q., A.C.C.

ROME.

15 G/6
Aug 44.H.Q., ACC.Copy to: Political Section, ACC. ✓

Ref your SI 300 dated 12 Aug -

1. We have steadfastly refused to get drawn into affairs on the other side of the ADRIATIC and it has always been agreed that FORCE 266 deal with these, without interference by MMIA.
2. These Italian soldiers are NOT officially recognised by us. They are to all intents and purposes civilians. When they arrive in ITALY, we do not feed or hospitalise them even.
3. MMIA, M of W and S.M.R.E. have their hands more than full with military matters on hand, and something military would suffer if we imposed this task on them.
4. In fact, the whole business is a civil responsibility (somewhat analogous to the patriots).
5. I therefore consider it would be most unwise to take on this added responsibility, apart from the fact that it is NOT a function of MMIA.
6. I consider that this matter should and could best be handled by a civilian branch of A.C.C. e.g. Displaced Persons Sub Commission.

226

2458

tvs.LB.
4.c.

Major General.
Army Sub Comm., A.C.C.

ALIED CONTROL CC MISSION
INTER OFFICE MEMO

From Acting Chief Commissioner

*Take up with
Army Sub-Comm*FILE No. 51845

SUBJECT:

TO: Army Sub-Commission, Hq ACC

12 August 1944

Reference attached signal, please co-ordinate with Political Section and deal with this.

*W*ELMER E. STONE
Captain, USMC

Acting Chief Commissioner

1 Incl:
Incoming Message from AFHQ
F-81845, 12 August 1944

cc: Political Section

*Major Quigley reviewed this
matter today and stated that
Army Sub-Commission's opinion
and action on this matter
Aug 12, 1944.*

2497

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ACTION: ACC RET ACC

5/12

AFHQ SIGNED SACRED

TOP SECRET

F 82845

PRIORITY

AUG 111915B

CITE FROCT

Your message 5-297 is reference.

It is directed that you request the Italian High Command to put forward detailed proposals for alleviating the situation of the Italian Forces in Yugoslavia. It should be pointed out at the same time that a request to send Italian officers on a temporary mission of investigation to Marshal Tito's headquarters might receive favourable consideration by the Allied authorities and would be examined together with their detailed proposals.

ACC DIST:

ACTION - Secy Gen (3)

INFO - File (Skeleton)

2496

TOP SECRET

AUG 120730B

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AT
BART OF THE ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
AT ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

PART

22nd July, 1944.

WITH MR. BLOOD'S CONCURRENCE

Shannon Gen
Bunny
Mar 30/7

H. Caccia, Esq.,
Allied Control Commission.

To be returned to Political Section.

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AT BARI
OF THE MILITARY RESERVE AT
ALLIED FORCES HEADQUARTERS,

36, Via Salvatore Cometti,
BARI.

SECRET

22nd July, 1944.

Subject: Repatriation Sick and Wounded
of Garibaldi Division.

To: Army Sub-Commission, Main Headquarters (MELA),
Lecce (Lecce).

I have received your letter of the 29th June (marked
180/22/27).

I cannot confirm or refute the statement made by Marshal
Nesce about the six Allied aircraft which landed at Bertone on the
night of the 17th June.

It seems possible, however, that the Italian Supreme Command
are not aware of the number of Italian soldiers who have been
evacuated from Yugoslavia with Allied assistance, and, in this
connexion, I suggest that you might inform Marshal Nesce that from
Berone alone 313 Italians were evacuated during June. In the same
period 380 Partisans were brought out from Berone, all of whom were
badly wounded, whilst many of the Italian evacuees had not been
injured in engagements with the enemy but were merely exhausted by
the conditions under which they had been serving.

All concerned have been informed that the Italian Government
are prepared to accept all Italian sick and wounded whom it may be
possible to evacuate. Marshal Nesce can be reassured on this point.

The question of the despatch of an Italian Military Mission
to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation
has been discussed by the Belgian Air Force Policy Committee, and I
have referred the matter to Mr. Gaccia with the Allied Control
Commission, Naples, to whom I am also sending a copy of this letter.

On political grounds it is considered undesirable that such
a mission should be formed, as it will raise difficulties with
Allied Governments who may wish to send similar missions.

I should, therefore, be grateful if you could discourage the
proposal and point out that the machinery of the Allied Control
Commission exists for such purposes.

226

2405

To: Army Sub-Command
Lecquila (Lecco).

I have received your letter of the 29th June (marked
ASG/22/27).

I cannot confirm or refute the statement made by Marshal
Messe about the air Allied aircraft which landed at Berame on the
night of the 17th June.

It seems possible, however, that the Italian Supreme Command
are not aware of the number of Italian soldiers who have been
evacuated from Yugoslavia with Allied assistance, and, in this
connection, I suggest that you might inform Marshal Messe that from
Berame alone 313 Italians were evacuated during June. In the same
period 360 partisans were brought out from Berame; all of whom were
badly wounded, whilst many of the Italian evacuees had not been
injured in engagements with the enemy but were merely exhausted by
the conditions under which they had been serving.

All concerned have been informed that the Italian Government
are prepared to accept all Italian sick and wounded whom it may be
possible to evacuate. Marshal Messe can be reassured on this point.

The question of the despatch of an Italian Military Mission
to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation
has been discussed by the Balkan Air Force Policy Committee, and I
have referred the matter to Mr. Gaccia with the Allied Control
Commission, Naples; to whom I am also sending a copy of this letter.

On political grounds it is considered undesirable that such
a mission should be formed, as it will raise difficulties with
Allied Governments who may wish to send similar missions.

I should, therefore, be grateful if you could discourage the
proposal and point out that the machinery of the Allied Control
Commission exists for such purposes.

A copy of my previous communication to Mr. Gaccia is enclosed
for your information.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

TOP SECRET

TOPSEC

OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AT BARI
OF THE MINISTER RESIDENT AT
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

BARI.

22nd July, 1944.

I have received your letter of the 18th July (marked 14/46/0) regarding a possible Italian military mission to Tito.

The trouble is that so many matters have arisen between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, that the normal machinery of liaison has been somewhat strained. If the Italian military authorities insist on a mission, we cannot in fact stop them from establishing one, as they have already some 16,000 troops with a headquarters staff in Yugoslavia, out of which a mission could be formed at any time.

The existence of these forces would also be a strong argument in any discussion which might arise with the French Committee of National Liberation.

No concrete approval, however, has in fact been given for the sending of an Italian mission, and I am writing to the military sub-commission of the Allied Control Commission to suggest that the idea be discouraged.

(Sgd) PHILIP BROAD

R. M. Makins, Esq., C.M.G.
Office of the Minister Resident
at Allied Force Headquarters.

TOPSEC

2494

TOP SECRET

AFHE

H. ACC

S-297

22 JUL

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

ACTING CHIEF COMM.

COMAND SUPREMA HAVE INFORMED ARMY SUBCOMMISSION THAT CMA ACCORDING TO THEIR INFORMATION CMA THE FOLLOWING ITALIAN FORCES ARE AT PRESENT OPERATING WITH PARTISAN UNITS IN YUGOSLAVIA CLN PAREN TO AFHE FOR SACRED CMA BRITISH RESIDENT MINISTER AND UNCLE SUGAR POLITICAL ADVISOR FROM H. ACC FROM STONE PERSONAL PAREN GAMBALDI DIVISION UNDER SECOND CORPS SMOGLIN GAMBALDI BATTALION UNDER FIRST PROLETARIAN BRIGADE SMOGLIN BATTALION UNDER THIRD PROLETARIAN BRIGADE PD IN ADDITION THERE ARE VARIOUS DISPERSED GROUPS PD PARA TWO PD IN ORDER TO DO WHAT THEY CAN FOR THESE ITALIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL COMAND SUPREMA HAVE SUBMITTED PROPOSAL TO SEND AN ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION TO THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE YUGOSLAV PARTISAN ARMY PD TASKS SUGGESTED FOR MISSION ARE CLN PAREN ABLE PAREN TO EXAMINE THE NEEDS OF THE ITALIAN SOLDIERS SMOGLIN PAREN BARKER PAREN TO SUBMIT THESE TO THE PARTISAN COMMAND FOR SUCH ACTION AS IS POSSIBLE SMOGLIN PAREN CHARLIE PAREN TO SUBMIT MEANS WHEREBY ITALIAN SOLDIERS IN YUGOSLAVIA CAN BE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH ITALIAN AUTHORITIES AS WELL AS THEIR FAMILIES SMOGLIN PAREN BOB PAREN TO WORK OUT WITH PARTISAN COMMAND PROCEDURE FOR REPATRIATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO CMA FOR REASONS OF HEALTH ET CETERA CMA CAN NO LONGER CONTRIBUTE EFFECTIVELY TO THE BATTLE PD PARA THREE PD IT IS PROPOSED THAT THIS MISSION SHOULD BE HEADED BY A CORONEL AND COMPOSED OF A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WITH RADIO EQUIPMENT TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATION 2483 PARA FOUR PD ABOVE PROPOSAL WAS SENT BY ARMY SUBCOMMISSION TO FORCE TWO SIX SIX FOR OBSERVATIONS AND A MEETING ON TWO EIGHT JUNE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE DECIDED

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE NO. 27 COURTESY, AS NUMA 443, COMBATANT

THAT THERE WAS NO MILITARY OBJECTION TO AN ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION BEING SENT TO THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE PARTISAN ARMY CMA BUT THAT ANY COMMUNICATION WHICH THE ITALIANS MIGHT BE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE TO GENERAL TITO SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE BRITISH MILITARY MISSION FOR FORWARD TRANSMISSION PD PARA FIVE PD GENERAL BROWNING AND I AGREE THAT DESPATCH OF MISSION ON LINES PROPOSED WOULD HAVE AN EXCELLENT EFFECT HERE PD PROVIDED THAT MISSION IS KEPT ON A LOW LEVEL CMA FOR INSTANCE CMA A COLONEL AND TWO MAJORS CMA I TRUST THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATION WOULD NOT DERAIL PROPOSAL FROM RECEIVING FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION BY ALLIED AUTHORITIES PD PARA SIX PD I SHALL BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS

AUTHENTICATED:

ELMER W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - Political Section
- 1 - VP Float File
- 1 - Army Sub-Commission

2492

TOP SECRET

0 2 1 1 1

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Office of the Resident Minister
at Allied Force Headquarters.
ALGIERS.

TO: *Dr. A. Caccia Log,*

With the compliments of

Mr. H. Martin
.....P. 2. 4. 4.....

Office of the British Resident
Minister at Allied Force Headquarters,
Algiers.

13th July 1944.

L/46/O.

I have just seen your letter to Harold Gaccia of the 10th July about the proposal that an Italian military mission might be sent to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.

2. I am rather disturbed that approval has been given to this idea, since the policy has been rather to hinder direct contact between Tito and other allied countries by means of missions in Yugoslavia. In particular we have successfully impeded the despatch of a mission from the French Committee of National Liberation. If now they learn that an Italian mission has been accepted there will be an outburst of rage.

3. I therefore suggest that any necessary liaison between the Italians and Tito should be effected in some other way, e.g. through the intermediary of the Central Commission or its military sub-Commission.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to the High Commissioner Ross, the Foreign Office and Gaccia.

2491

[Handwritten signature]

Roger Watkins.

P. Broad Req.

Mr. Carcia $\leq$
Gen. Browning
understands how
the political
aspects of such
a mission. He
agrees that a
low-level mission,
(colonel and 2
majors, say)
would be o.k. (u)

TO
POLITICAL
SECTION

FOR FILE —
See A/CC's cable
S-297

Lt J. Shumfield
SG

OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE AT BARI
OF THE MINISTER RESIDENT AT
ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS,

BARI.

see S 297

10th July, 1944.

My Dear Harold,

You will probably have seen a copy of a minute sent by the Army Sub-Commission of Allied Control Commission to Force 399 on the 19th June (marked G/6/1) about Italian troops in Yugoslavia.

This question was discussed at a meeting of the new Policy Committee on the 28th June.

It was decided that there was no military objection to an Italian Military Mission being sent to the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, but it was pointed out that this was a matter for arrangement solely between the Italian Military authorities and Marshal Tito.

The meeting emphasised the great practical difficulties in the way of any large-scale evacuation in the present military situation and pointed out that Italian doctors had already been infiltrated into Yugoslavia and an increasing number of Italian wounded had been brought out.

Any communications which the Italians may wish to make to Marshal Tito should be addressed to the British Military Mission for onward transmission.

Yours ever,

Philip Druce.

2490

H. Caccia, Esq.,
Allied Control Commission,
BARI.

P.S. I am sending copies of this letter to Sir Noel Charles, Naples; Resident Minister A.F.H.Q., and the Foreign Office.

SUBJECT:- Italian troops fighting in JUGOSLAVIA

Army Sub Commission A.C.C.
Main H.Q. (MIA)
LEQUELE (LECE)
G/6/1

19 Jun 44

Force 266

Adv HQ Army Sub Comm

1. Att is a translation of a letter received from Marshal MESSE.
2. Would you please state your reaction to his proposal, in order that a reply may be sent.

ABC

[Signature]
Maj Gen.
Army Sub Comm A.C.C.

2489

0215

BEST COPY POSSIBLE

TRANS - ION No. 677 - BONNANNI

Comando Supremo
Unit: Operations Office
Ref No: 13528/Op
7 June 44

A.C.C.

SUBJECT: - Garibaldi Division and Italian soldiers fighting in YUGOSLAVIA
with Partisan Units.

This Comando Supremo has been able to ascertain that the following Italian forces are at present operating side by side with Partisan units of the Army of Liberation:-

- The Baribaldi Division - under the II Corps
- The Garibaldi Battalion - under the I Proletarian Brigade
- The Matteotti Battalion - under the III Proletarian Brigade
- Numerous groups of military distributed among the various partisan units
- Numerous military isolated and dispersed, who have found refuge with various private individuals as workers

The A.C.C. knows very well the difficult conditions to which Italian officers and soldiers at present in the Balkans are subjected to because of the deficiency of food, clothing, equipment, medicine, etc.

The heavy losses suffered in battle and the acute sufferings endured have influenced the physical status and morale of these men who, having given their oath, follow their Commander's orders, refusing to surrender to the Germans.

I believe it is absolutely necessary to provide in some way for these brave soldiers whose efforts, though of an individual character make up the contribution of the Italian armed forces to the Allied cause against the common enemy. It is indispensable that they hear the voice and the aid of the Fatherland, so that they remain unswerving in that faith which they have chosen voluntarily from the very beginning.

I am of the opinion that a good beginning for the solution of the problem would be to send an Italian Military Mission to the Supreme Command of the YUGOSLAV Partisan Army of Liberation (Marshal Tito).

The tasks of the Mission could, in general, be the following:-

- examine the needs of our soldiers
- submit to and obtain from the Supreme Command of the J.P.A.L. (Partisan Army) all those measures of a material and moral nature which could be executed within the Partisan Army itself and in the interest of the individual soldier.
- suggest to the Italian Comando Supremo those measures which are apt to inform our soldiers that the Italian authorities follow their tidings, their life, appreciate their sacrifices and look after their material and spiritual needs.
- concretise, in accordance with the Supreme Command of the Partisan Army, the procedure for the repatriation of those military needing medical care and rest, and who can no longer contribute effectively to the fight.

The Military Mission, headed by a colonel, would be composed of 4 or 5 officers and various mixed personnel for the mission.

- Numerous military units isolated and dispersed, who have found refuge with various private individuals as workers

The A.C.C. knows very well the difficult conditions to which Italian officers and soldiers at present in the Balkans are subjected to because of the deficiency of food, clothing, equipment, medicine, etc.

The heavy losses suffered in battle and the acute sufferings endured have influenced the physical status and morale of these men who, having given their oath, follow their Commander's orders, refusing to surrender to the Germans.

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- concretise, in accordance with the Supreme Command of the Partisan Army, the procedure for the repatriation of those military needing medical care and rest, and who can no longer contribute effectively to the fight.

The Military Mission, headed by a colonel, would be composed of 4 or 5 officers and various mixed personnel for liaison services, and furnished with radio equipment to establish communications with the units deployed with the Partisans, and with the Italian Supreme Command.

I trust that the above proposal, submitted with the purpose of increasing to the maximum the Italian contribution to the fight against the Germans and of meeting the requirements, of a military, and above all, a spiritual nature of the many Italian soldiers scattered throughout YUGOSLAVIA, will find in the Commission the support necessary to surmount those difficulties which could come in the way of its practical application.

THE MARSHAL OF ITALY

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Giovanni Messe

2488

CONFIDENTIAL

FARGO 678

FARGO

2 FEBRUARY 44

CONFIDENTIAL

10050 REBER

ROUTINE

FREEDOM

WITH REFERENCE YOUR MEMORANDUM OF JAN
ONE NINE CMA YUGOSLAV MILITARY MISSION PD PLEASE PAREN FARGO FROM
REBER SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN TO AFHQ ~~FOR~~ ^{for} CIVIL AFFAIRS PD
CITE FARGO SIX SEVEN EIGHT PD MEMORANDUM DELAYED IN TRANSIT AND
REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS NECESSARY INFORMATION OBTAINED
FROM BARI PD MEANWHILE DEPARTMENT MAY BE INFORMED THAT THE YUGOSLAV
MISSION ATTACHED TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS SUBCOMMISSION IS NOW
FUNCTIONING IN SOUTHERN ITALY

226

2483

L.F. NICKEL,
Lt. Col. AGP
Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1793

ADV HQ AMT RPT CG 5TH ARMY; CG ROSE AREA; CG PEE. INFO: ALCON, ROSE
 AREA FOR DEPS AND ALCON FOR KIRK

AFMA SIGNED CG MTCUSA

EX 37302

NOV 241603A

FOR INFORMATION ONLY 107/24

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

Left WASHINGTON 23 November by special ATC planes for MTCUSA were
 17 members House Military Affairs Committee accompanied by 3 officers.
 In addition to those names previously furnished party includes PAUL
 SCHAFER, PORRETT HARRISS, BOLIVAR PAGAN and JOSEPH ROGER VARRINGTON.
 SAC Lt Col FLORENCE T. NEWCOM also with group. Party's arrival here
 expected within 10 days or 2 weeks. Will inform you as soon as definite
 known.

Dist

Info-Action-Ext Sec (2)
 " " -Amer Del (Ad)
 Info-Chief 6000 I'
 Chief of S
 Econ Sec
 Pol Sec
 CA Sec
 File

224

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
 NOV 24 1964

2486

NOV 241620A

18 DEC 1943

FROM COMMANDO SUPREMO

Operation Office

2840/OF

18, Dec. 1943

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Italian Military Mission in Spain

Reference to your note N. 014.33 of 14th inst. UK

I regret not having at my disposal all requested data concerning each single member of the Italian Military Mission in Spain.

I take note of what ARHQ has decided as to the repatriation of the whole Mission, including Col. Carnevale; I have informed of this the Foreign Office which will forward instructions to the Italian Ambassador in Madrid, from whom the Mission depends.

In course of time I will inform the Allied Control Commission as to the officer will succeed Col. Carnevale.

THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF

(Marshal Messe)

226/091112

Reference to your note N. 014.33 of 14th inst. OK

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In course of time I will inform the Allied Control Commission as to the officer will succeed Col. Carnevale.

THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF
(Marshal Messe)


2403

PR

18 Dec

226 091112

243 19055 1943



SEGRETO

P.N. 151, 17 dicembre 1943

COMANDO SUPREMO

AL SIGNOR GENERALE PRESIDENTE DELLA

Ufficio Operazioni

COMMISSIONE ALLEATA DI CONTROLLO

N. 3840 / OF. di prot.-

O G G E T T O : Rimpatrio della Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna.-

Riferimento foglio n° 014.33 del 14 corrente di codesta
Commissione.

Sono spiacente di non disporre dei dati richiesti, relativi a ciascun membro della Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna.

Prendo atto di quanto stabilito dal Comando in Capo delle Forze Alleate circa il rimpatrio dell'intera Missione, compreso il Colonnello Carnevale: ne ho data comunicazione al Ministero degli Affari Esteri per le conseguenti disposizioni al R. Ambasciatore a Madrid, da cui dipende la Missione.

Riserva di comunicazioni a codesta Commissione circa il successore del Colonnello Carnevale.-

IL MARESCIALLO D'ITALIA

CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE

(Giovanni Messe)

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Riserva di comunicazioni a codesta Commissione circa il
successore del Colonnello Carnevale.-

IL MARESCIALLO D'ITALIA
CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE
(Giovanni Messe)

2484

MDT/hjp

14 December 1943

In reply refer to:
014.33

MEMORANDUM FOR: His Excellency, Marshal Messe
Chief of the Supreme General Staff

With reference to the proposed evacuation of the Italian Military Mission in Spain, Allied Force Headquarters has requested a brief background sketch of each member together with a statement of rank and physical description (height, built, eyes, hair). In connection with this evacuation it is the understanding of Allied Force Headquarters that the entire Mission will be repatriated including Colonel Carnevale. The latter's successor can be sent to Spain when he has been definitely designated.

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

see 3840/OP
which answers this

2463

0 2 2 8

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE /mip

SVC/RELAY NO. SVC 3328 M/C NO: 4/10
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL REF NO:
PREC: ROUTINE FILED: DEC 092300A
FROM: FREEDOM G-2 SIGNED CINC CITE FHGBI REC'D: DEC 100126A
(CITE FHGBA (?) RPT FHGBA) (CITE FHGBAT (?) RPT FHGBAT)
TO: FATIMA FOR JOYCE

014.88

In any instructions concerning evacuation of Military Mission sent by Badoglio to Italian Ambassador in Madrid please insure that it will be made clear that whole Mission should be repatriated including Colonel Carnevale. Paraphrased by FREEDOM of 11293. Carnevale's successor can be sent to Spain later whether it is Ponzani or someone else.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - General Taylor - ACTION

*Letter dictated
17 Jan T. 14 Dec
To Marshall
File 014.33*

*014.88
1201 - Communication
1201 - Communication*

091112

2482

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING

SE/and

SECRET

PRIORITY

FATMA

FRENCH

DEC

DEC

ITALIAN AUTHORITIES STATE THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BETWEEN AMBASSADE DE COCHIN
AND MACCARRON TO DISMISSE THE ITALIAN CRUISER QUOTE POMPO MAGNO UNQUOTE TO GIBRALTAR
~~TO~~ TO REPARATE ITALIAN SUBJECTS PARAN TO PROCEED FROM FATMA SIGNED JUDGE PARAN
AND REQUEST THAT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE BE SENT IMMEDIATELY TO THE ITALIAN EMBASSY IN
MADRID TO QUOTE NUMBER ONE TWO ONE DATED DECEMBER SIX PD ONE PD IN ORDER TO REPARATE
MEMBERS AND FAMILIES OF OUR MILITARY MISSION IN SPAIN ONE NAVAL CRUISER POMPO MAGNO
WILL SAIL ONE ACCORDING TO PLANS ONE ON DECEMBER EIGHT FOR GIBRALTAR PD TWO PD CRUISER
SHALL CARRY TO GIBRALTAR OFFICERS AND NEW COMMISSIONED OFFICERS FOR SERVING OUR
RESERVE SHIP IN SPANISH WATERS PD THREE PD CRUISER HAS FOLLOWING ACCOMMODATION
ONE A PD TWO ZERO CABINS FOR OFFICERS AND ONE ZERO CABINS FOR NEW COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS THAT COULD BE ALSO USED BY WOMEN ONE CHILDREN AND OFFICERS PD B PD FURTHER
POSSIBLE BATH UNCOMFORTABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR ABOUT TWO ZERO PERSONS PD C PD
POSSIBLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR FIVE ZERO SAILORS PD FOUR PD MEN AND ALSO POSSIBILITY
STAYING PART OF REMAINING ITALIAN PERSONNEL PARAN OFFICERS ONE OFFICIALS ONE ENGINEERS
ONE TEACHERS TWO BAKEN STILL IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL WHOSE REPARATION IS PROMISED BY
YOUR PROGRAM TO REALIZE REPARATION PD FIVE PD THE NAVAL ATTACHE WILL BE INFORMED OF
DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL OF CRUISER AT GIBRALTAR PD PLEASE DIRECT NAVAL ATTACHE
PROCEED TO GIBRALTAR IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE REPARATION OPERATIONS PD SIX PD ON

2481

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

Cable to Freedom continues:

JOURNEY FROM MADRID TO GIBRALTAR THE FIRST SECRETARY OF EMERGENCY BEARS ACCOMPANY
MISSION TO STATED PHRASE UNQUOTE

AUTHENTICATED:

ROBERT E. DOR
Major, A.C.D.
Secretary of the Commission

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG Files
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - Mr. Reber

2480

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI

Telegramma in PARENZA

N. coll. 227

Oggetto: RUMORIO MISSIONE ITALIANA SPAGNA

Data: 7 dicembre 1943

Tramite: C.A.C.

Diretto a: R. AMBASCIATA ITALIANA - MADRID
Testo: (originale)

- 121 December 6 stop 1) Royal Cruiser Pompeo Magno will sail, according to plans, on December 8th for Gibraltar in order to repatriate members and families of our Military Mission in Spain. (.)
- 2) Cruiser shall carry to Gibraltar officers and crew commissioned officers for remaining our remaining ships in Spanish harbours stop
- 3) Cruiser has following accommodations: (a) 20 cabins for officers and 10 cabins for non commissioned officers that could be also used by women children and officers; (b) Further possible accommodations - rather uncomfortable - for about 20 persons; (c) Possibility accommodations for 50 sailors stop
- 4) Examine also possibility embarking/boarding of Italian personnel (officers, officials, employees, teachers, etc) still in Spain, (where repatriation is foreseen by your program to realize economies stop
- 5) The naval attaché will be informed of departure and arrival of Cruiser at Gibraltar stop Please instruct naval attaché to proceed to Gibraltar in order to supervise embarkation operations stop
- 6) The First Secretary of Embassy shall accompany mission on journey from "Gandia to Gibraltar" stop

(traduzione)

- 1) Let prevista per 8 dicembre partenza R. Incrociatore Pompeo Magno diretto a Gibilterra per imbarcare nostra Missione Militare in Spagna e rispettive famiglie;
- 2) Con stesso incrociatore si inviano ufficiali ed sottufficiali per completare quadri piazze ufficiali e sottufficiali per spogli.
- 3) Sarebbe offrire seguenti possibilità imbarco: (a) 20 alloggi per ufficiali e 10 per sottufficiali che potrebbero venire in parte cedute per donne, bambini ed ufficiali; (b) ulteriori possibilità sistemazione per circa 20 persone stesso rango con notevoli dispendi; (c) infine possibilità imbarco personale di buona forza per un totale di 50 persone.
- 4) Esaminare possibilità imbarcare parte altro personale italiano (ufficiali, funzionari, impiegati, insegnanti, ecc); tuttora in Spagna, (il cui è previsto rimpatrio in base vostro progetto di rimpatrio et economia.
- 5) Comitato addetto navale sarà informato partenza et arrivo nave a Gibilterra ove si dovrà recare per prendere accordi di dettaglio circa sistemazione a bordo personale.
- 6) Il primo segretario delle Regie Ambasciata accompagnerà i

bers and 10 cabins for non commissioned officers that could be
 line used by women children and officers; (b) Further possible
 accommodations - rather uncomfortable - for about 20 persons; (c)
 Possibility accommodations for 50 sailors etc.
 4) examine also possibility employing/retaining Italian person-
 nel (officers, officials, employees, technicians, etc) still in
 Spain, while repatriation is foreseen by your program to realize
 operations stop

5) The naval attaché will be informed of departure and arrival
 of Cruiser at Gibraltar stop Please instruct naval attaché to
 proceed to Gibraltar in order to supervise embarkation operation
 stop

6) The first Secretary of Embassy shall accompany Mission on
 journey from Madrid to Gibraltar stop

PROVVIS

(traduzione)

1) Sei prevista per 5 dicembre partenza di Incrociatore Pompeo
 Magno diretto a Gibilterra per imbarcare nostra missione milita-
 re in Spagna e rinviare famiglie;

2) Con stesso Incrociatore si inviano ufficiali ed equipaggi
 per compiere quadri pitagorici necessari rifugiati, posti spa-
 gnoli;

3) Dove offre sufficiente possibilità imbarco (a) 20 alligati per
 ufficiali e 10 per equipaggi che potrebbero venire in parte
 cedute per donne, bambini ed ufficiali; (b) alternative possibili
 di sistemazione per circa 50 persone stesso rango con notevoli
 disagi; (c) infine possibilità imbarco personale di buona forza
 per un totale di 50 persone.

4) Confronto possibilità imbarcare parte altro personale italia-
 no (ufficiali, funzionari, impiegati, insegnanti, ecc); tuttora in
 Spagna; (d) già è previsto rimpatrio in base vostro progetto di
 sistemazione ed seconda.

5) Colloquio addetto navale sarà informato partenza ed arrivo nave
 a Gibilterra ove si dovrà recare per premiare accordi di detta-
 glio circa sistemazione a bordo personale.

6) Il primo segretario della Regia Ambasciata accompagnerà i
 membri della Missione nel viaggio da Madrid a Gibilterra.

PROVVIS

2479

Consegnato a: C.A.C.

11: 8.12.1943



U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

INCOMING

/mip

11/04

SECRET

9143

ROUTINE

DEC 031852A

FREEDOM

DEC 040336A

FATIMA

OK

Security information desired reference your 1235 is condensed story of background each member. (FATIMA FOR JOYCE FROM G-2 FREEDOM SIGNED GING CITE FICBI) together with rank and physical description namely height, build, eyes, hair.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - General Taylor - ACTION

0911112

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

2478

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

OUTGOING

MDT/hjp

SECRET

ROUTINE

FATIMA

FREEDOM

DEC

DEC

REFERENCE YOUR EIGHT ZERO FOUR THREE PLEASE SPECIFY PAREN TO FREEDOM FOR G
DASH TWO FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PAREN THE PERTINENT SECURITY INFORMATION
DESIRED

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG
1 - Diary

U. S. SECRET
Equals British SECRET

2477

U. S. SECRET

GROUP 2

SECRET

- INCOMING

/hft

33/01

8043

DEC 011404A

DEC 020635A

MOST SECRET

ROUTINE

AFW 3-2 FREEDOM

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION RPTD BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE
MADRID NUMBER 2 DISTRICT

Cite FROBI signed C in C. Necessary that lists of names and Pertinent
Security information needed concerning Italian Military Mission in Spain be
despatched here prior to repatriation so that number 2 District can screen
members arriving at Tarento. Also advisable that Italian Government instruct
their Embassy that returning members will only be permitted to proceed to
territories under the control of Royal Italian Government.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - Gen. Taylor (action)

091112-Dir (at Madrid)
+ 014.33-Repatriation

2476

U. S. SECRET

GROUP 2

SECRET

U. S. SECRET
 BRITISH SECRET

200 394

123/424

In reply refer to:
 091.112

3 December 1943

His Excellency Don Renato Prunas
 Secretary General, Royal Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The following message to Italian High Command has been received
 from Italian Military Mission in Spain:

"Number 618 dated 21 November signed Colonel Carnevale: In order
 that they might volunteer for the army, certain Italian subjects have
 asked to be repatriated. Grateful for urgent instructions whether
 request can be met and whether their repatriation should be arranged
 with that of Military Mission. Certain of these, such as Colonel
 Vagliasini, fought in the International Brigade in the Spanish War.
 These persons would be excluded who are known to have committed
 ordinary penal offenses."

For the Deputy President, Allied Control Commission:

Political Section

091.112 - Dir (Jt/Prunas)
~~091.112 - Dir (Jt/Prunas)~~
 X 201 - Col. Carnevale
 X 201 - Col. Vagliasini
 X 324 - Volontaries

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
 Allied Control Commission

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

INCOMING

MESSAGE

/mip

SVC/RELAY NO.

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL

PREC : ROUTINE

FROM : FREEDOM

TO : FATIMA

M/C NO : 10/02

REF NO: 8234

FILED : DEC 011901A

REC'D : DEC 020740A

To Italian High Command is addressed following message from Italian Military Mission in Spain, number 818 dated 21 November.

Certain Italian subjects have asked to be repatriated in order to volunteer for the Army. Grateful for urgent instructions whether request can be met and whether their repatriation should be arranged with that of Military Mission. Certain of them, such as Colonel Vagliasindi, fought in the International Brigade in the Spanish War. FATIMA FOR JOYCE FROM G-2 FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHGBI. Those who are known to have committed ordinary penal offences would be excluded. Signed Colonel Carnevale.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - General Taylor - INFO
- 1 - Mr. Caccia - ACTION

U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
 Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

24.4

U. S. GOV. DEPT. OF STATE
 Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING

/33f

31/25

CONFIDENTIAL

5416

ROUTINE

NOV 251355A

AFHQ FROM G-2 Q

NOV 260735A

FATIMA FOR JOYCE SIGNED C IN C CITE PROBI

Send please following message from Italian Military Mission in Spain number 506 dated 16th November to Italian High Command.

Reference your telegram number 2746 of November 8th. My telegram number 745 of October 3rd dealing with question of Repatriation of the Mission. With the exception of those (?) who have been (?) dismissed in (?) secret (?) the Military Attache and a few persons essential to his office and to the indispensable services of the Italian Embassy all staff of the Mission and their families should be repatriated. Transport arrangements are being made by the British authorities and departure should begin at an early date. I will notify you well in advance.
 Signed Carnevale.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - M/C
- 1 - General Taylor (ACTION)

U. S. GOV. DEPT. OF STATE
 Equals British CONFIDENTIAL

2473

OUTGOING

/ta

SECRET

PRIORITY

FATIMA

FREEDOM

THE FOLLOWING PAREN TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA SIGNED JOYCE PAREN MESSAGE FROM THE ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND TO THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR MADRID IS OCCASIONED BY YOUR RADIO NUMBER SIX ONE TWO ONE PD QUOTE FROM COMANDO SUPREMO TO COLONEL CARNEVALE MILITARY ATTACHE ROYAL ITALIAN EMBASSY MADRID PD EIGHT NOVEMBER ONE NINE FOUR THREE NUMBER TWO SEVEN FOUR SIX OF ACCORDING TO COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM ALLIED AUTHORITIES SPANISH MINISTER OF WAR REQUESTS THAT REENTRY INTO ITALY OF MILITARY ATTACHE ALONG WITH NINETY OFFICERS AND ORS BE EFFECTED PD YOU WILL PLEASE MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER SUCH REQUEST CONCERNS REPATRIATION OF MISSION OF WHICH YOURS SEVEN FOUR FIVE OF THREE OCTOBER INST OR WHETHER THE MILITARY ATTACHE WITH PART PERSONNEL DESIGNATED TO REMAIN THERE ARE ALSO TO RETURN PD FOR YOUR GUIDANCE ALLIED AUTHORITIES HAVE KINDLY OFFERED TO REPATRIATE ITALIAN PERSONNEL THROUGH GYERALTAR VIA SHIP OR PLANE PD GENERAL AMEROSTO QUOTE

DISTRIBUTION:

2 - AG Files
1 - Diary

AUTHENTICATED:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

2472

201 Corroborate
Material 270.05 Association of Transport

COMANDO SUPREMO -
Operatic. Office

nr. 2746/OP - 8, nov. 1943

TO THE GEN. CHIEF OF
THE ALLIED MILITARY MISSION

SUBJECT: Repatriation of the Italian Military Mission from
Spain

According to the request made by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, orders have already been issued for the repatriation of Italian Military Mission from Spain.

Only the R. Military Attaché with the strictly needed personnel will remain in Madrid.

From your note of the 5th inst. it might appear that the Spanish Minister of War has also requested the return to Italy of the R. Military Attaché with part of personnel at his disposal.

As such request might be a consequence of a misunderstanding in the sense that the Spanish Minister of War meant to allude to the repatriation of the Italian Military Mission rather than the Military Attaché of the R. Italian Embassy in Madrid, I think it necessary to make the matter clear with the annexed telegram which I beg you to have kindly forwarded.

Concerning the repatriation of Italian Military Mission I wish to thank you for the cooperation that can be given by Allied Authorities for the journey from Gibraltar via sea or air.

THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF - sig. Ambrosio

FROM COMANDO SUPREMO TO COLONEL CARNEVALE MILITARY ATTACHE
ROYAL ITALIAN EMBASSY MADRID

8 NOVEMBER 1943 NR 2746 OP ACCORDING TO COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM ALLIED AUTHORITIES SPANISH MINISTER OF WAR REQUESTS THAT REENTRY INTO ITALY OF

From your note of the 6th inst. it might appear that the Spanish Minister of War has also requested the return to Italy of the R. Military Attaché with part of personnel at his disposal.

As such request might be a consequence of a misunderstanding in the sense that the Spanish Minister of War meant to allude to the repatriation of the Italian Military Mission rather than the Military Attaché of the R. Italian Embassy in Madrid, I think it necessary to make the matter clear with the annexed telegram which I beg you to have kindly forwarded.

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THE CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF - sig. Ambrosio

FROM COMANDO SUPREMO TO COLONEL CARNEVALE MILITARY ATTACHE
ROYAL ITALIAN EMBASSY MADRID

8 NOVEMBER 1943 NR 2746 OP ACCORDING TO COMMUNICATION RECEIVED FROM ALLIED AUTHORITIES SPANISH MINISTER OF WAR REQUESTS THAT REENTRY INTO ITALY OF MILITARY ATTACHE ALONG WITH NINETY OFFICERS AND ORS BE EXPECTED STOP YOU WILL PLEASE MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER SUCH REQUEST CONCERNS REPATRIATION OF MISSION OF WHICH YOURS 745 OF 3 OCTOBER INST OR WHETHER THE MILITARY ATTACHE WITH PART PERSONNEL DESIGNATED TO REMAIN THERE ARE ALSO TO RETURN STOP FOR YOUR GUIDANCE ALLIED AUTHORITIES HAVE KINDLY OFFERED TO REPATRIATE ITALIAN PERSONNEL THROUGH GIBRALTAR VIA SHIP OR PLANE STOP GENERAL AMBROSIO

2471

1430

8 Nov.

p. m. 151

SEGRETO**COMANDO SUPREMO**

II SIGNOR GENERALE CAPO DELLA
MILITARE ALLEATA

Ufficio Operazioni

Rispondito al foglio del

N.

Sez.

Dir.

Prot. N. 2946/OP. Allegati

Rimpatrio Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna.-

OGGETTO:

In seguito a richiesta fatta dal Ministero degli Esteri spagnolo e dallo Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito spagnolo, è già stato disposto il rimpatrio della Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna, restando in posto soltanto il Regio Addetto Militare col personale strettamente necessario.-

Secondo la comunicazione di cui al Vostro promemoria del 6 corrente parrebbe che il Ministro della Guerra spagnolo abbia richiesto anche il ritorno in Italia del R. Addetto Militare coll'aliquota di personale destinata a sua disposizione.-

Poichè tale richiesta potrebbe essere derivata da equivoco nel senso che il Ministro della Guerra spagnolo abbia voluto alludere al rimpatrio della Missione Militare Italiana, anzichè dell'Addetto Militare presso la R. Ambasciata d'Italia a Madrid, ritengo opportuno chiarire la questione coll'unito telegramma che prego voler cortesemente far pervenire tramite Autorità Alleate.-

Circa il rimpatrio del personale della Missione Militare Italiana ringrazio per la collaborazione che potranno dare le Autorità Alleate per l'evacuazione da Gibilterra via mare o via aerea.-

2470

IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE

0 2 4 3

In seguito a richiesta fatta dal Ministero degli Esteri spagnolo e dallo Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito spagnolo, è già stato disposto il rimpatrio della Missione Militare Italiana in Spagna, restando in posto soltanto il Regio Addetto Militare col personale strettamente necessario.-

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2470
IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GENERALE



8 novembre 1943

DAL COMANDO SUPREMO

AL COLONNELLO CARNEVALE
ADDETTO MILITARE PRESSO R. AMBASCIATA ITALIA
IN MADRID

2946 /OP. SECONDO COMUNICAZIONE PERVENUTA DA AUTORITA' ALLEATE
MINISTRO SPAGNOLO GUERRA DESIDERA SIA EFFETTUATO
RIENTRO IN ITALIA ADDETTO MILITARE CON SEGUITO NOVANTA
TRA UFFICIALI E TRUPPA ALT PREGO CHIARIRE SE TALE
RICHIESTA CONCERNE RIMPATRIO MISSIONE DI CUI VOSTRO
745 DEL 3 OTTOBRE OPPURE ANCHE ADDETTO MILITARE CON
ALiquota PERSONALE DESIGNATO RIMANERE IN POSTO ALT
PER VOSTRA NORMA AUTORITA' ALLEATE HANNO CORTESAMENTE
SEGNALATO CHE POSSONO COMPIERE RIMPATRIO PERSONALE
ITALIANO DA GIBILTERRA VIA MARE O VIA AEREA ALT

GENERALE AMBROSIO

2469

ALLIED MILITARY MISSION
APO 512

FILE

DT/afe

6 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Ambrosio, Chief of the Supreme General Staff

It is reported from Madrid that the Spanish Minister of War desires to effect the return to Italy of the Italian Military Attache and entourage of ninety officers and men. The views of your Excellency on the proposed evacuation of personnel are requested. I understand that the Allied authorities can accomplish the evacuation from Gibraltar by sea or by air.

For the Chief of Mission:

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Brigadier General, USA

MADRID 370.05 - EVACUATION OF TROOPS.

2468

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET
 INCOMING

/arr

46

SECRET

NOT GIVEN

FREEDOM

PATINA

10/04

6121

032031A

040847A

MADRID 370015-0000000000

Below appears substance of message Madrid to Freedom repeated DMIS (?).

Italian Military Attache and entourage of 90 officers and men under pressure from Spanish Minister War to return to Italy. Agreed are British Military Attache and Roventhal, after securing what, in our opinion, is all available information that there is no objection. Also in agreement are British and US Embassies. That Theater Commander authorize this move is recommended in step of three to ten individuals in 30 days time via Gibraltar and air. PATINA FOR ITALIAN HIGH COMMAND AN EMBASSY
MADRID FROM 4-2 FREEDOM SIGNED RING SITE MIKEL SITE FIMES SITE MIKEL SITE FICIV.
 If authorized British will fix up from Madrid to Gibraltar.

Request views in view of our understanding air passage from Gibraltar very difficult. Further that Navy endeavouring make suitable arrangements by Italian War vessel. These not complete but should be able advise soon.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG Files
- 1 - Diary
- 1 - R/C
- 1 -
- 1 -

2467

U. S. SECRET
 Equals British SECRET

0 2 4 7